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BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA IN CISLEITHANIAN POLITICS, 1878-1879

by

Philip Stephen Snyder

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's Signature:

[Signature]

Houston, Texas

May 1974
To my wife.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ......................................................... iv

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CISLEITHANIAN POLITICS .... 29

III. BEFORE THE TREATY OF BERLIN ......................... 67

IV. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN AND THE OCCUPATION
    OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA .......................... 98

V. THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS IN CISLEITHANIA ............. 117

VI. THE ADDRESS TO THE THRONE AND THE
    CISLEITHANIAN DELEGATION ............................ 139

VII. THE DEBATE OVER THE TREATY OF BERLIN ............ 161

VIII. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1879 IN
     CISLEITHANIA ........................................... 180

IX. CONCLUSION ............................................... 211

APPENDIX ....................................................... 217

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 219
PREFACE

Historical studies of the Habsburg monarchy between 1867 and 1918 have tended either to concentrate on purely national problems or on the period after 1900. Of the periods of time into which the era between the Ausgleich of 1867 and the fall of the monarchy in 1918 naturally divides itself the least studied has been the period of liberal rule in Cisleithania between 1867 and 1879. Indeed, the only part of those twelve years that has received a significant amount of recent scholarly attention has been the single period when the liberals were out of power, when the emperor, Count Karl Hohenwart, and Dr. Alfred E. F. Schäffle attempted to impose a federal solution on the Czech problem in 1870-1871. The Constitution Party (Verfassungspartei) has been neglected by comparison. This dissertation aims to fill one of the important lacunae in the history of the Constitution Party--its fall from power in 1879 and the reasons behind that fall.

No one can write a work such as this without the assistance of others, and the gratitude expressed in a preface is so inappropriate to the assistance given that I hesitate to offer it. My deepest thanks must go to Professor R. John Rath, without whose patience, understanding,
and knowledge this dissertation could never have been written. Every page has been improved by his suggestions. I must also thank him for assisting me in securing funds to enable me to spend time in Vienna to do research on this difficult subject. In addition, I wish to thank the members of the history department of Rice University and the staff of the Fondren Library for their assistance and support. Finally, my thanks go out to my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Walter S. Snyder, and to my wife, Susan, without whose love and encouragement this dissertation never would have been finished.

Philip S. Snyder

Houston, Texas
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On July 28, 1878, units of the Austro-Hungarian army crossed the border into the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina to occupy them in accord with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin concluded fifteen days before. After a war lasting two months Habsburg troops succeeded in occupying the two provinces, thus solving for the time being the question of whether local dissatisfaction with Turkish rule in Bosnia and Hercegovina would start a European war. The occupation also caused an internal crisis in the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian halves of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.\(^1\) In Hungary, indignation over the occupation, while highly vocal, never went to the length of opposing the legislation necessary to legalize it, and the rule of Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza continued undisturbed. In Cisleithania, however, the liberals, incensed over what appeared to them to be unconstitutional actions of the imperial government,

\(^1\)In this dissertation the term "Cisleithania" will be used to denote the "Austrian" half of the Dual Monarchy, since the only official name for this area was very cumbersome: "the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat." Since the Kingdom of Hungary had a short name, it was rarely referred to as "Transleithania."
actually attempted to block passage of credits for the occupation army and to prevent the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, which gave international legal sanction to the occupation. As a result, Emperor Francis Joseph removed the liberal ministers from office and thereafter never again seriously considered attempting to rule in Cisleithania through ministers selected solely from parties having a parliamentary majority. Instead, he chose men he could trust, without regard to their party affiliation.

The fall of the Constitution Party (*Verfassungs-partei*) from power in 1878-1879 would in itself be a subject worthy of study. What makes it even more interesting to the historian is that the crisis leading to the end of liberal government in Cisleithania was not merely a political but also a constitutional crisis as well. The leaders of the Constitution Party attempted to use the fiscal powers of parliament to bend the Dual Monarchy's foreign policy to their will. To Francis Joseph their actions were clearly unconstitutional. As events proved, the leaders of the Constitution Party were on very shaky political ground when they challenged the emperor's foreign policy, whatever the merits of their legal arguments may have been. Had the liberals been proved correct, had they forced the emperor to remove his troops from Bosnia and Hercegovina, the consequences for Austro-Hungarian, and European, history would have been enormous.
As it was, the emperor was stronger than his parliament. The crisis prompted by the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina proved once and for all that parliament did not have the power to repudiate the emperor's authority in foreign affairs. After the conflict ended in victory for the emperor, the parliament in Vienna swiftly degenerated into an unruly battlefield where members expressed their views by throwing inkpots at each other. By 1900 parliament had little to do and even less to say about the important affairs of the monarchy, whereas in 1878 its leading party had felt strong enough to challenge the very power of emperor Francis Joseph himself and nearly won. After 1879 parliament was powerless, as was clearly shown by the demonstrations over the Badeni language bills, when it could not even serve as a forum for debate, much less resolve any question at issue.

The loss of power by the Cisleithanian parliament after 1879 had momentous consequences for the Dual Monarchy. Had Austria-Hungary possessed two effective parliaments, each qualified to speak for its part of the monarchy, Habsburg history would have taken a very different course in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Francis Joseph's efforts to limit Magyar chauvinism, which he saw as the greatest threat to his empire, might have been more successful had he had the support of a united Cisleithania. Such a united Cisleithania could have been
born only if there had been some meaningful forum where the nationalities could have met to share power between themselves. The nationalities in Cisleithania were deprived of that forum when the Reichsrat ceased to be an independent political force after 1879.

The roots of the great constitutional crisis in Cisleithania in the late 1870's go back to the decay of the Ottoman empire and the growth of nationalism among the Balkan peoples, on the one hand, and to the beginnings of parliamentarism and liberalism in the Dual Monarchy, on the other. To understand why the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Count Julius Andrásy, felt that Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be administered by the Dual Monarchy, it is necessary to examine the foundations of Habsburg foreign policy in general and the basis of Andrásy's Balkan policy in particular.

On account of Austria-Hungary's location in Europe after 1871, expansion could take place only to the south and the east—that is, into the Balkan peninsula. Before 1871 Habsburg policy had been to uphold or restore its sphere of influence over Italy and Germany. To preserve Austria-Hungary as a great power, these areas had to be kept free from the dominion of another Great Power and, in addition, prevented from becoming power centers in their own right.\(^2\) After 1871, however, Italy and Germany were

\(^2\)See the analysis by Enno E. Krache in his "Foreign
themselves Great Powers, and Habsburg influence over these areas could never be restored.

Because Italy and Germany had slipped away from Habsburg control, it became more necessary than ever before for the Dual Monarchy to bolster its position in Europe by making an alliance with another Great Power. For reasons of geography that become obvious to anyone who looks at a map of Europe, that other Great Power could only be either Germany or Russia, for only these two countries had powerful armies on the Habsburg borders. Since Prince Otto von Bismarck, the chancellor of the German empire, also had reasons for wanting an alliance between Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, as did Tsar Alexander II of Russia, a League of the Three Emperors was signed between the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian governments in 1873. An informal arrangement was made for the three powers to consult each other on foreign policy problems.

This vague entente quickly collapsed as soon as the Dual Monarchy and the Russian empire threatened to come to blows in the Balkans in 1875.3

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Geographic considerations were important in another way, for if Austria-Hungary could expand into the Balkans she could be threatened from that area as well. Andrassy believed that the existence of the Dual Monarchy was threatened by the rising tide of nationalism among the South Slavs in the 1870's and that German and Magyar hegemony in the empire would not endure unless South Slav nationalism could be checked. Indeed, he feared that the monarchy itself might not survive if it lost its South Slav areas. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister shared with most of his fellow Magyars a conviction that their rule could not be maintained in the lands of the crown of St. Stephen unless the monarchy was ruled only by the Germans and the Magyars. The Magyars insisted that it would be dangerous to grant even the slightest measure of self-rule or power to the Hungarian Slavs and that no outsiders could be permitted to agitate among them or to create a large South Slav state outside the monarchy as an example for them to follow. Moscow and St. Petersburg were thought to be


the centers of a vast Panslav conspiracy that agitated for the formation of a great Slavic kingdom under Russian control. The Russian government was believed (with some justification) to be the driving force behind this conspiracy.\(^6\) Obviously, the realization of the Panslav dream would mean the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Both the Germans and the Magyars shared this fear of Panslavism, and the Germans in particular had no desire to add to the number of Slavs within the monarchy.\(^7\) It was also necessary, however, the Magyars especially felt, to prevent the formation of a great Slavic state in the Balkans which would serve as a focus of attraction for the Austro-Slavs. For Serbia to annex Bosnia and Montenegro to obtain Hercegovina would thus place the Dual Monarchy in

\(^{6}\) For Panslavism, see Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953); Alfred Fischel, Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1919); Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); Frederick J. Cox, "Khedive Ismail and Panslavism," The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 78 (December, 1953), pp. 151-167; and Hermann Wendel, Der Kampf der Südslawen um Freiheit und Einheit (Frankfurt a/M.: Societäts-Druckerei, 1925).

deadly danger. Andrásy fully accepted these views.⁸

Andrássy's freedom of action was limited by both the emperor and the various national groups who attempted to shape Austro-Hungarian foreign policy to suit their own interests. Both the Germans and the Magyars were opposed to the inclusion of any new Slavic areas in the monarchy because increased Slavic majorities in Hungary and Cisleithania would threaten an already shaky dominance and would in addition place further burdens on an imperial budget which they considered already too great.⁹ By contrast, Slavic groups often favored adding new Slavic areas to the Dual Monarchy precisely because it would increase their majority in the state.¹⁰ Since Andrásy shared the views of most Magyars, he therefore resisted any Habsburg move

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into Bosnia until that move became the lesser of two evils, and even then he invented the fiction of occupation and administration so the political and legal problems of annexation could be avoided.\footnote{A. F. Meyendorff, "Conversations of Gorchakov with Andrassy and Bismarck in 1872," The Slavonic Review, Vol. VIII, No. 23 (December, 1929), pp. 404-405.}

Francis Joseph, personally uninfluenced by nationalism, wanted to preserve and extend his empire. He was surrounded at court by officers who saw Habsburg control over Bosnia and Hercegovina as an answer to these desires, and Andrassy battled them as best he could in an attempt to change the emperor's mind. This was the situation in the Hofburg when a revolt against the Turks broke out in Hercegovina in July, 1875, spread to Bosnia, and quickly embroiled all of Europe in a great diplomatic crisis. For three years Europe was on the brink of war. Andrassy's policy during these three years was essentially defensive; he did not try to shape events any more than was absolutely necessary.

The Austrian monarchy's interest in Balkan affairs, already considerable during the Middle Ages, grew in direct proportion to the victorious advance of the Ottoman Turks during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At the time of the first Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529 the very

\footnote{Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 29-30.}
existence of the Habsburg dominions seemed threatened. Beginning with the death of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, however, the internal cohesion of the Turkish state slowly began to disintegrate under his incompetent successors. While the Kuprili family of grand viziers managed to revive Turkish strength during the seventeenth century, Kara Mustafa's defeat before Vienna in 1683 and the ensuing war fatally weakened the empire.  

In the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 the Ottomans were compelled to give up Hungary, and, in the Treaty of Passarowitz, nineteen years later, they had to surrender northern Serbia, part of Walachia, and border areas in Bosnia to the Habsburg monarchy.  


eighteenth century. In the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739
the gains of Passarowitz were lost, and Turkey easily
defended itself against Joseph II.\textsuperscript{15} Unfortunately for the
Ottoman empire, though, by 1799 a new enemy—Russia—had
appeared in the Black Sea area. Early in the eighteenth
century Czar Peter the Great had unsuccessfully attempted
to drive the Turks from the Ukraine and to gain control of
the Black Sea,\textsuperscript{16} as had Czarina Anne slightly later in what
Vasili Klyuchevsky referred to as an "absurd" war.\textsuperscript{17} Anne's
war marked a new and ominous development from the Ottoman
viewpoint, for it was made in alliance with the Habsburg
monarchy. For the first time the Turks had to face both
their great enemies acting in concert. Fortunately for the
Porte, Austria and Russia were rarely allies.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}For short summaries of Austro-Turkish relations in
the eighteenth century, see Erich Zöllner, Geschichte
Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (3rd ed.,
252-267, 274, and 320-321; and Lavender Cassels, The
Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740. (London: John
Murray, 1966). The latter is a colorful if somewhat
informal account. For the Ottoman empire during this period,
see, in addition to the works listed in n. 13, Henry Gren-
ville, Observations sur l'état actuel de l'Empire Ottoman,
edited by Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University

\textsuperscript{16}Vasili Klyuchevsky, Peter the Great, trans. by

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18}Zöllner, Geschichte Österreichs, p. 274; Cassels,
Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, pp. 27-28. For a general
history of Habsburg policy in the Balkans after 1774, see
Adolf Beer, Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1774
Under Catherine the Great, Russia finally cleared the northern shores of the Black Sea of the Turks, and in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774 also won the right to represent Turkey's Orthodox Slavs at the court of the Sultan and to take action against the Porte if they were, in Russia's opinion, mistreated—a provision that made a new war almost inevitable. In 1788 the Habsburg-Romanov alliance against the Turks was revived, but it was dissolved on the death of Joseph II in 1790.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century national feeling began growing among the Balkan peoples. First the Serbs and then the Rumanians won a measure of autonomy from Constantinople as Ottoman power became weaker and weaker. By 1860 the Turkish empire seemed to be on the point of collapse, and Austria and Russia began eyeing each other in

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rivalry over the spoils. By 1871 Russia was moving
towards a position of genuine strength in the Balkan area
as its contacts with the South Slavs became closer than
ever before. By contrast, Austro-Hungarian policy,
especially under Andrassy, was essentially defensive and
limited to staving off political changes in the Balkans
insofar as it was possible to do so.\textsuperscript{22}

For a time the League of the Three Emperors appeared
to be a mechanism to play down Austro-Russian differences
in the Balkans. As Bismarck wrote, the conflict between
the "social republic" and "the system of order on monarchical
foundations" was more important to him and his allies than
a "rivalry over the national fragments that inhabit the
Balkan peninsula."\textsuperscript{23} As long as everything was was quiet,
the League fulfilled its purpose. The "war scare" of 1875,
however, revealed deep and lasting policy differences
between the three empires,\textsuperscript{24} and this crisis was hardly
over when Bosnia and Hercegovina rebelled against the
Sultan.

In 1875 Bosnia and Hercegovina were little known to
Europe, even though one writer had prophesied as early as

\textsuperscript{22} Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{23} Otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen
(2 vols., Stuttgart: Verlag der I. G. Cotta'schen

\textsuperscript{24} Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp.
31-55.
1867 that they would eventually play a "not unmeaningful" role in history. With a total area of approximately 18,000 square miles and a population of about one million (excluding the Sanjak of Novibazar), desperately poor, with wretched roads, scarcely any railroad lines, and an administration as corrupt as it was inefficient, Bosnia and Hercegovina scarcely seemed desirable enough to cause a great European crisis. That the two provinces were a storm center was due primarily to the European tensions caused by rising South Slav nationalism and by Panslavism.

It is generally agreed that both Russian and Austro-Hungarian agents were present in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1875 and that the revolt of that year can to some extent be blamed on them. The Habsburg servants were not controlled from Vienna but rather from Dalmatia and took their orders not from Andrássy but from a military clique headed by Baron

25 Johann Roškiewicz, Studien über Bosnien und die Herzegowina (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1868), p. v. Roškiewicz was an Austro-Hungarian army officer sent to the two provinces to study them from a military point of view.


27 Roškiewicz, Studien über Bosnien und die Herzegowina, p. 5.


Gabriel Rodich, the governor of Dalmatia, who wanted to annex the two provinces to Austria-Hungary to provide a "hinterland," and thereby military security, for Dalmatia. The Russian agents were inspired, though not controlled, by Count Nicholas P. Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. Like Redich, Ignatiev opposed his government's policy in Bosnia and Hercegovina, for Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister, had already come to the conclusion that the two provinces belonged to the area in Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence.

The Turks proved unable to crush the rebellion in Bosnia and Hercegovina, but the rebels were unable to drive the Turks from the two provinces. Andrássy's major preoccupation was to end the rebellion quickly before it triggered a major European crisis. As the revolt dragged

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33 Rupp, A Waivering Friendship, p. 8. At the same time, oddly enough, Francis Joseph was dubious about annexing the two provinces and regarded such a move as strictly an emergency measure. See Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreichisch-ungarischen Heere, Vol. II, p. 288.

34 Harris, Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 66-72.
on, therefore, he offered a reform program in a note to all the Great Powers in December, 1875: internal reforms in Bosnia and Hercegovina, coupled with continued full Turkish sovereignty over the affected area.\textsuperscript{35} Gorchakov had been pressing for autonomy for the two provinces;\textsuperscript{36} this was unacceptable to Andrásy because he feared that if Bosnia and Hercegovina gained control over their own internal affairs they would become a center for South Slav nationalist agitation both inside and outside the Dual Monarchy.\textsuperscript{37} Andrásy's note was a failure, for the rebels rejected it. They feared Turkish reprisals.\textsuperscript{38}

In May, 1876, Andrásy and Gorchakov reached agreement on a joint policy for their two countries to follow in regard to the rebellion in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and submitted it, under the name of the Berlin memorandum, to the other Great Powers for their approval. The basic features of the Berlin memorandum were a two-month armistice between the belligerents and reforms introduced by Turkey but


\textsuperscript{36} Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship}, pp. 85-86.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 79. Harris, \textit{Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878}, pp. 239-240, gives graphic descriptions of the difficulty of enforcing customs regulations on weapons and supplies going from sympathetic Slavs within the monarchy to the rebels in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

\textsuperscript{38} Harris, \textit{Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878}, pp. 245-246.
supervised by the consuls of the Great Powers. The Berlin memorandum failed when Great Britain objected to the second of these provisions, arguing that Russia could not be granted a formal role in governing any part of the Ottoman empire because to do so would upset the balance of power. 39

Since the Berlin memorandum had failed to settle the Balkan problem, Andrásy and Gorchakov decided that their two countries should reach an agreement covering the future of the Balkan area before they went to war over it. Accordingly, they arranged the famous meeting between Francis Joseph and Andrásy, on the one hand, and Alexander II and Gorchakov, on the other, at the castle of Reichstadt in Bohemia on July 8, 1876. What resulted was a verbal agreement, informal in nature, that Austria-Hungary was to receive certain portions of Bosnia and, according to Andrásy, Hercegovina, in return for remaining neutral in a Russo-Turkish war. The two powers also agreed that if Serbia and Montenegro won their war against the Porte which they had begun eight days before, they would receive considerable additions of new territory; if they lost, the situation was to revert to the status quo ante bellum. In any event,

there was to be no large Slavic state in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{40}
The agreement was to be kept secret from the other powers. At the outset even Bismarck knew only that a meeting had taken place.\textsuperscript{41} Andrássy had won a victory at Reichstadt, for he had both safeguarded Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests and dictated the essential outlines of any future Russo-Turkish peace treaty. Although the Russians later\textsuperscript{42} disputed the amount of Bosnian territory that Austria-Hungary might take, they had to give way.

The Reichstadt meeting was held because during the previous months the situation in the Balkans had taken a sudden turn for the worse. The Turks, with their regular forces engaged in Bosnia and Hercegovina, crushed an attempted rebellion in Bulgaria in May, 1876, by arming the local Moslems and turning them loose on the Christian population. The result was what became known as the "Bulgarian Massacres"--a not inapt term considering the fact that some ten to fifteen thousand persons were killed.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41}Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{42}In 1877.
\textsuperscript{43}David Harris, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1939), passim; Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 128-129.
In June, 1876, the situation became even more serious. Serbia and Montenegro had from the beginning actively supported the rebels in Bosnia and Hercegovina by sending arms and supplies to them. Prince Nicholas of Montenegro wanted to help the rebels even more by declaring war on the Turks himself, but Prince Milan of Serbia did not want to fight the Porte without the active military support of the Great Powers. He thought, and rightly so, that the Serbs would lose in short order without such support. Unfortunately, Jovan Ristić's Liberal Party had won control of the country during the Serbian elections of 1875, and Ristić was a firm supporter of Serbian intervention on the side of the rebels. By the summer of 1876 war fever against the Turks was so great in Serbia that, even though Milan succeeded in having Ristić ousted from office, preparations for war went on apace. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia warned Milan against becoming involved in a war, but he was helpless in the face of the military fervor that gripped the Serbian masses. A growing conviction that Russian protests against the Serbian moves


45Trivanovitch, "Serbia Russia and Austria during the Rule of Milan Obrenovich," p. 430.
toward war were not sincere finally induced Milan to join the war party, and on June 30, 1876, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman empire.\(^{46}\) On July 1, Montenegro followed suit.\(^{47}\) The crisis had not merely expanded to include other areas of the Turkish empire: it now included non-Turkish states in the Balkans.

Serbia and Montenegro were generally expected to win over a decadent Turkey which could not even defeat the Bosnian guerrillas. When the Serbian army, under a Russian general, Michael G. Chernyaev, invaded Bulgaria, however, it was quickly crushed by a Turkish army which showed few signs of decadence.\(^{48}\) Although Russian and Romanian volunteers flocked to the Serb standards, the Turks' superior forces were victorious, and by September the Serbian army was in full retreat.\(^{49}\)

The Serbian defeat was all the more surprising in that the Turkish government seemed to be falling apart in the summer of 1876. In May the Sultan, Abdul Asiz, was deposed and probably murdered by a group advocating constitutional government for the empire. The conspirators

\(^{46}\)Ibid., p. 432.

\(^{47}\)Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, p. 124.


\(^{49}\)Summer, Russia and the Balkans, p. 191 n.
placed Murad V on the throne, but he swiftly went mad under the pressures of his office. Accordingly, he was deposed in a second coup on August 31, 1876, and replaced by Abdul Hamid II, who soon proved to be a strong ruler. The political battles in Constantinople during the summer made it impossible for the Turkish government to have any coherent policy towards the domestic reforms in Bosnia and Hercegovina so ardently desired by the Great Powers. The delay in Turkish policy-making was welcomed by Andrassy, however, for he favored maintaining the status quo in the Ottoman realm, whatever it happened to be.

Soon after the accession of Abdul Hamid II to the Ottoman throne the magnitude of the Serbian military defeat became clear. Turkey offered Serbia very harsh peace terms, and Serbia turned to Russia for help. Andrassy and Gorchakov as they had agreed at Reichstadt, answered the Serbian pleas by supporting an armistice, which was implemented, despite


51 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 228-229; Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, p. 368.


53 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, pp. 157-159.
Turkish protests, on September 17, 1876, after its terms had been decided by the Great Powers. Although the armistice later broke down, it was quickly restored by united action of the Great Powers.  

In addition to supervising the armistice between the Serbian and Turkish armies, the Powers agreed to hold an ambassadorial conference at Constantinople to see if the crisis in the Balkans could be settled. The matter was urgent, for, acting upon the counsel of his advisors, the Czar had decided to declare war on the Turks if Russia's aims, including a general retreat of Ottoman power in Europe, could not be achieved at the conference. The prospects for peace were dim, however, for Andrassy and Disraeli supported the Turks against the Russians while the other Powers stood aside. The conference was a failure. The only ray of light came from the Turks, who proclaimed a new constitution the day the conference opened and thus seemed ready at last to begin meaningful reforms in their Balkan territories.

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54 Ibid., p. 170.
55 Ibid., pp. 237-242; Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, p. 218.
Gorchakov had never been sanguine about the possibility that the conference at Constantinople would produce peace in the Balkans. For this reason, he had kept open his lines to Vienna, and before the conference met he had proposed, in a letter from the Czar to Francis Joseph on October 10, 1876, a new agreement between the two empires to replace the one concluded at Reichstadt. Gorchakov suggested that Austria-Hungary and Russia invade Turkey and divide the spoils. Although Francis Joseph insisted that the Dual Monarchy would not go to war with Turkey, he assured the Czar that Austria-Hungary would not object to a unilateral Russian declaration of war against the Turks provided that Russian influence did not expand into the western Balkans as a result. The upshot was the signing of a diplomatic convention between the two powers which was concluded in Budapest on January 15, 1877, followed by a military convention on March 17, 1877. In return for observing a benevolent neutrality towards Russia, the Dual Monarchy would receive Bosnia and Hercegovina after the expected Russian victory. In addition, no "great compact Slavic or other state" could be erected in the Balkans after the Turks were driven out.58 Assured of Austro-Hungarian support, Russia declared war on the Ottoman empire on April 24, 1877.59

58 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, p. 300.
At first, it was believed that the Russians would easily defeat the Turks. Disraeli was so optimistic that he predicted that the Russians would be in Constantinople in sixty-four days! Nevertheless, the Turkish army held up the invading Russians at Plevna until December 12, 1877. After Plevna fell, however, the Turks quickly collapsed and an armistice was signed in Adrianople on January 31, 1878. The armistice included preliminary peace terms which would have made Russia the master of the Balkans had they remained in effect.

Among the provisions of the preliminary peace was one creating a large new Bulgarian state, which was to be occupied by Russian troops for two years. This, to Andrassy, was a clear violation of the Budapest conventions. He was further enraged when, in January, to bring pressure on the Ottoman government, the Russians began a direct advance on Constantinople. Britain was also angered by the Russian advance, and offered Andrassy an alliance between Britain and Austria-Hungary to restrain Russia in the Balkans.

60 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, p. 368 n.
Andrássy, however, although personally ready for war as a reply to Russian "cheating," as he called it, was restrained by Francis Joseph. In the end, as a substitute for force, he sent out invitations to all the Great Powers for a European Congress to discuss the Balkan crisis.

Bismarck now found himself confronted by a dilemma. Should he support Austria-Hungary or Russia at the upcoming conference? For him to support either would be to incur the enmity of the other for years to come. To avoid this choice, he determined to support neither and instead offered Berlin as a neutral site for the congress.

Balked in his effort to induce the emperor to attack Russia, Andrássy sought domestic support in the delegations, the Dual Monarchy's nearest approach to a legislature for the entire Habsburg realm, by asking for sixty million gulden in emergency funds, to meet, he said for public consumption, unforeseen situations. Here, too, he met with little success;

62"Russland hat also falsch gespielt." As quoted in Rupp, A Wavering Friendship, p. 444.


even that was not granted until just before the congress met in June. Austria-Hungary did not, therefore, respond to the Russian advance on Constantinople as strongly as Andrassy would have liked. Although the Russians did not occupy Constantinople, partly because of Austria-Hungary’s attitude toward their Balkan triumphs, they were not deterred from attempting to carry through their original peace terms with Turkey.

On March 3, 1878, Russia and Turkey signed the Pan-Slavist Treaty of San Stefano, which confirmed the preliminary terms of January. In particular, a large Bulgaria was created, and Turkey was nearly driven entirely out of Europe. Russia had gone ahead despite the protests of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain and fastened her grip on virtually the entire Balkan peninsula.

Andrassy and Disraeli, as soon as they heard its terms, were determined to destroy the Treaty of San Stefano, for neither could tolerate so great an extension of Russian power. In London, Lord Salisbury, a confirmed Russophobe,

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65See post, Chapter III, for more detail on this episode.


67Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 138-140; Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 398-408.

68He replaced Lord Derby after the latter split with Disraeli over Britain's Russian policy.
began at once to negotiate bilaterally with the Russians to change the terms of the treaty.\(^69\) Andrássy, after offering his resignation and seeing it rejected,\(^70\) consulted with Bismarck and, on March 6, 1878, issued a call for a European congress to meet in Berlin in June to consider the crisis created by the Treaty of San Stefano\(^71\)—an invitation which was accepted by all the Great Powers by June 3. The British forced the Russians to agree that the entire Treaty of San Stefano would be laid before the congress for its consideration.\(^72\)

One of the more curious features of the congress of Berlin was that much of the negotiating was done on a bilateral basis between the powers before the congress ever met. Of the agreements reached before the congress met, the three most important were those between Great Britain on one side and Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey on the other. The net effect of these three agreements was that Great Britain obtained Cyprus and Habsburg support for opposing the greater Bulgaria which had been provided for in the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia gained British backing


\(^71\) Ibid., Vol. III, p. 87.

for her new borders in Asia Minor, and Austria-Hungary got British support for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Thus most of the major issues confronting the powers were settled before the congress opened.

Austria-Hungary's interest in Balkan affairs made it inevitable that she would play a major role in any crisis connected with that area. Andrassy, however, like any other foreign minister, could not make decisions without taking public opinion in his country into account. Neither could he play at foreign affairs as a chess master does at chess, for the chess master is not plagued, as foreign ministers are, by kings with minds of their own. Andrassy's case was even more complicated, for he had not one king, but rather three, to guard: Cisleithania, Hungary, and the emperor. He had the emperor's support; whether he had that of Cisleithania and Hungary was another matter. To understand his problems with them, it is necessary to look more closely at the internal institutions of the Dual Monarchy, and especially at those of Cisleithania, where his troubles were greatest.

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CHAPTER II

AN INTRODUCTION TO CISLIEBHIANIAN POLITICS

After the defeat of the Habsburg army at Königgrätz (Sadowa) in 1866 and the resulting peace treaty with Prussia, Francis Joseph had to accept Prussian domination in Germany, at least for the moment. Königgrätz was as much a domestic defeat for Francis Joseph as a foreign one, however, for in addition to costing him Germany, it also, in a sense, cost him Hungary as well. For eighteen years—since 1848—Francis Joseph had denied the validity of the Hungarian constitution of that revolutionary year. After Königgrätz, he was so weakened by defeat that he had to agree with the Magyar demand that it be reinstated. Therefore, Francis Joseph allowed himself to be crowned in Budapest, swearing allegiance to the liberal constitution of 1848, which restricted his powers to such an extent that he was merely a constitutional monarch.¹ Hungary and the "kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat" were to be coequal partners in a dualistic system. Each was to have a government which existed independently of the other, and each theoretically could not interfere in the

¹May, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, pp. 42-43.
affairs of the other. The only common institutions for both halves of the empire were to be the delegations, the monarch, and three ministries--war, foreign affairs, and finance.

When matters of great importance were in progress, the monarch discussed them with his ministers and with the government leaders in both halves of the monarchy. If the two parliaments had to approve them, the more important party leaders were included as well. The ministries had very little scope for independent action but handled all routine decisions. Francis Joseph depended heavily on his confidential advisors--including the war and foreign ministers--when considering a decision; the government and party leaders in both halves of the monarchy had lesser roles to play. Overall, it was a system that depended heavily on the monarch himself. In internal matters he was always consulted, while in foreign and military affairs Francis Joseph would brook no interference. His war and foreign ministers could offer advice, and it was often taken, but the final decision was the emperor's alone. The common minister of finance had even less to say in important matters than his two colleagues, for the Cisleithanian and Hungarian finance ministers guarded their powers jealously, and had done so ever since 1867. Legislatively, Hungary and Cisleithania were linked by the delegations, two bodies of 60 men--40 from the lower house and 20 from the upper
house of each half of the monarchy—who represented the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest in affairs affecting the entire monarchy. To be effective, any law for the entire monarchy had to be passed in identical language by both delegations. Since it always voted unanimously, the Hungarian delegation dominated its Cisleithanian counterpart. As a body, the delegations had little power, for they could always be overruled by their parent bodies.  

The Hungarian constitution which Francis Joseph accepted in 1867, created a constitutional monarchy with many restrictions on royal power. All real power in the Hungarian state was vested in parliament, especially the lower house. Francis Joseph could convene parliament at his pleasure, but he had to convene it at least once a year. The power to originate laws lay with either the king or the lower house, the upper house having only the right to pass on all measures coming before it. Ministers were responsible to the lower house, not to the king, and

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held office at that body's pleasure. The king did have the right to veto laws passed by parliament, but he did not often exercise that power. In short, then, in Hungary as in Great Britain, power was in the hands of the lower house of parliament and of the Hungarian ministry, which was headed by Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza in 1878. The prime minister and his cabinet were appointed by the king from the ranks of the dominant party in the lower house.  

Between 1867 and 1875 the Andrásy party had dominated parliament. It, like its leader, was devoted to the Ausgleich. Two other minority parties opposed it. One, known as the "Tigers" and headed by Kálmán Tisza, wanted further autonomy for Hungary within the monarchy. The other, the Kossuth faction, still advocated total independence for Hungary. In the elections of 1869, 1872, and 1875, these two minority parties were defeated as more and more of the voters came to accept the Ausgleich of 1867 as a solution to the problem of Hungary's relation to the remainder of the monarchy. By 1875, however, most of the leaders of Andrásy's party were dead or had retired to private life, and no fresh leadership was coming up from the ranks. Tisza saw his chance, accepted the Ausgleich of 1867, merged his party with Andrásy's, thus creating the Liberal Party.

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3May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, pp. 41-43.
and quickly became prime minister. His rule lasted until 1890.⁴

Croatia occupied a special place in Hungarian affairs. All of the Kingdom of Hungary, except Croatia, was divided into counties, each ruled by a Magyar lord lieutenant, who sat in the upper house of parliament. In spite of the nationality law of 1868,⁵ each county was ruled for the benefit of the Magyars, whether or not they constituted a majority there. Croatia, however, had possessed at least a degree of autonomy ever since it had formed part of the lands of the crown of St. Stephen in the middle ages and had, indeed, made war on the Hungarian rebels in 1848-49. Francis Joseph had rewarded the Croats for their loyalty in 1848 by placing them under the government in Vienna. However, in 1867, he abandoned them to the mercies of the Magyars, after they promised to resolve their differences with the Croats through the Magyar-Croat compromise, or Nagodba, of 1868. Croatia obtained forty seats in the Hungarian lower house and four in the upper house, as well as five seats in the Hungarian delegation. However, the Croatian representatives in Budapest could take part in parliamentary debates only when

⁴Tbid., pp. 70-89.

⁵For this law, see Carlile A. Macartney, "Das ungarische Nationalitätengesetz von Jahre 1868," in Berger, Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867, pp. 219-230.
affairs concerning the entire kingdom, including Croatia, were under consideration. Croatia was allowed to regulate her own educational system, and all criminal, civil, and religious affairs in Croatia were controlled by the Croatian diet meeting in Agram (modern Zagreb), but Hungary nevertheless dominated Croatian affairs by stipulating that all taxes and other monies for the Croatian government had to be voted by the parliament in Budapest and not by the Croatian diet, which had no independent taxing authority whatever.  

The kingdom of Hungary was thus a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, with a centralized government directly administering internal affairs everywhere except in Croatia. Since the Hungarian prime minister depended for his power on his party in parliament, not on the kings, he was able to take an independent line in dealing with all affairs confronting either Hungary or the monarchy as a whole. The Magyars ruled Hungary, and when extra-Hungarian affairs were under discussion they acted as a united group in the delegation. Hungary thus possessed both the ability

and the will to have and pursue an independent policy without too much regard for what the king desired. Only in foreign and military affairs did Francis Joseph insist on having his own way.

The government in Cisleithania was neither as centralized nor as free of the monarch's influence as the one in Hungary. After the Ausgleich of 1867 the non-Hungarian Habsburg lands did not even have an official name. Old institutions of the Austrian empire were maintained in Cisleithania as far as possible after 1867, though they were often discarded or changed into something else while retaining the old name. Before 1867, for example, the parliament for the whole empire had been known as the Reichsrat. This name was retained after 1867 to denote the legislative body for the non-Hungarian lands even though it had considerably greater powers and duties than its predecessor.

With war, foreign affairs, and matters affecting the entire monarchy left largely to the emperor's decision or to that of the delegations, the Cisleithanian government was left to deal with purely internal matters in the western half of the monarchy, though even here the Hungarian government sometimes intervened, as it did, for example, in 1871, when it forbade Bohemian autonomy within Cisleithania. Francis Joseph usually gave way to the party in power (when there was one) even when its position was strongly opposed

Other examples may be found of Francis Joseph's willingness to be a constitutional monarch when it was a matter of purely internal affairs.

The government in Cisleithania was parliamentary in form. A bicameral parliament, the Reichsrat, met in Vienna each year to deliberate and vote on measures affecting the Cisleithanian half of the monarchy.\footnote{For the text of the December constitutional law in Cisleithania, see Bernatzik, Die österreichische Verfassungs gesetze, pp. 390-453. See also Josef Lukas, Die rechtliche stellung des Parlaments in der Gesetzgebung Österreichs und der constitutionellen Monarchien des Deutschen Reiches (Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky's Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1901).} Neither of the two houses were chosen by anything resembling a popular vote. The Herrenhaus, or House of Lords, operated much like its British counterpart in that it could vote any law passed
by the lower house. Moreover, its members were either hereditary or life peers, and Francis Joseph, like the British monarch, could add an unlimited number of life peers to the upper house at any time. After the electoral reform of 1873 the Abgeordnetenhaus, or House of Representatives, was composed of 353 members chosen by four electoral classes. The landed nobles chose 85 representatives. The cities elected 99; and the chambers of commerce, 21. These two groups also shared another 19 representatives. Finally, the voters outside the other three classes were classified as agriculturalists. They elected 129 members of the lower house.9 Money bills had to originate in the lower house, but the Herrenhaus could exercise its veto power over them, as could the emperor.10

After 1867 the Cisleithanian cabinet ministers were responsible to parliament and not to the emperor, although he appointed them.11 The ministers, whose administrative

9 See Appendix I for a province-by-province breakdown of the members of the lower house of the Reichsrat. May, in his The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, gives slightly different figures. I have followed the figures given by Geoffery Drage in his Austria-Hungary (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1909), pp. 728-731, because they are more detailed.

10 Drage, Austria-Hungary, pp. 725-750.

duties were similar to those of cabinet ministers in other constitutional states, had to countersign all imperial decrees issued when parliament was not in session. There were nine ministerial posts in the 1870's, including the one held by the prime minister and the minister for Galicia, who only attended cabinet meetings when laws applying to Galicia were being discussed.\textsuperscript{12}

With the exception of Galicia, the Cisleithanian provinces had little autonomy. General policy in virtually all matters was established by the \textit{Reichsrat}; the local diets usually enacted only implementing legislation, but even this had to be approved by the emperor, who also appointed the provincial governors and the presidents of the diets.\textsuperscript{13}

Galicia was a special case. To gain the support in the \textit{Reichsrat} of the Polish faction, which held 49 of the 353 seats between 1873 and 1879,\textsuperscript{14} the government in 1871 granted the provincial government special financial and administrative privileges as well as a voice in the ministerial council whenever Galician affairs were being

\textsuperscript{12}See Aleis von Czedik, \textit{Zur Geschichte der k. k. österreichischen Ministerien 1861-1916} (4 vols., Teschen: Karl Prochaska, 1917-20), Vol. I, pp. 3-13, for a complete list of all Cisleithanian cabinets between 1861 and 1916.

\textsuperscript{13}May, \textit{The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914}, pp. 44-45.

discussed.\textsuperscript{15}

Cisleithania was thus unquestionably a parliamentary state in the legal sense. Ministers were responsible to the legislature, not to the emperor, and parliament possessed broad powers to regulate internal affairs. What was true in law, however, was not always true in fact. The emperor still had the right to convene and dismiss both parliament and the cabinet, and he possessed all the moral authority of a formerly absolute monarch. Thus, the cabinet ministers were the emperor's men, even though he usually consulted the party leaders before naming them. He also had broad powers in military and foreign affairs. In fact, Cisleithania was a constitutional state only because Francis Joseph had finally, in 1868, relented to pressures he had resisted since his accession in 1848.\textsuperscript{16}

Of far greater importance to maintaining the emperor's power was his dual role as chief of state in both Hungary and Cisleithania and his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Hungary and Cisleithania were each restricted by the existence of the other. As for the army, it was an instrument that was responsible to and would obey only the emperor. While he was willing


to limit many of his powers, at least to some extent, Francis Joseph would never permit any parliament to deny him the fundamental power and instruments necessary to preserve and to extend the Habsburg state. As Joseph Redlich wrote, "dualism was bound to be what Francis Joseph chose to make of it."\textsuperscript{17} It was this purely personal element in the state system that made the government of Cisleithania non-parliamentary in actual practice, for the parliamentary system works in theory without regard for purely personal factors. When subjected to the reasoning implied by this theory, Cisleithania was patently not a mature parliamentary state. In fact, after 1867 one of the major questions in Cisleithania was whether it could actually become a true parliamentary state. Could strong political parties, strong enough to be independent of the emperor, be built up and maintained? That was one of the most important political issues of the day.

The political parties which existed in Cisleithania in 1878 tended to be based on nationality. There were Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, and Croatian blocs in the \textit{Reichsrat}, and often a nationality would be represented by more than one party. In 1901, for example, there were two Czech and two Polish clubs,\textsuperscript{18} and one each for the Italians, Slovenes, 


\textsuperscript{18}A "club" was a faction within the \textit{Reichsrat}. It was not a party (the Constitution Party in 1878, for example,
Croatians, Ruthenians, Serbs, and Romanians. Since the Germans had more than half of the seats in the lower half of the Reichsrat in 1878, they did not emphasize their nationality for the excellent reason that its dominance was not being seriously challenged in parliament. Although the Czechs were boycotting parliament, the Poles were satisfied, and there were no other assertive national groups represented in large enough numbers to threaten German control of the legislature. Consequently, the Germans did not assert themselves as Germans, and it can be said—at least the Germans did—that the Constitution Party (Verfassungspartei), which was composed almost exclusively of German liberals, was not a national party at all. On occasion, some of the Constitution party leaders tried to put this belief into practice; they were almost always rebuffed by their colleagues. It was rare for a non-German

had four clubs), but it often functioned as an electoral organization.

19 Knauer, Das österreichische Parlament, pp. 19-20.

20 In the years before 1876 a faction of the Constitution Party led by Dr. Eduard Herbst tried to partition the Tyrol to provide local autonomy for the Italian districts of the Adige area. The Italians threatened to walk out of the Reichsrat if their demands were not met, but they offered to join the Constitution Party if they were. The question was theoretically whether parliament had the power to order a province's internal affairs without the consent of the provincial diet, but in fact it was a national question: should Germans continue to dominate Italians in the Tyrol? While the conservatives and clericals were concerned more with the question of the Reichsrat's competence to reorder a province's internal affairs without its consent, many German liberals saw the question in national terms. The conservatives, clericals, and what might be termed "national
to join the Constitution Party, but it did happen; on at least one occasion two Poles were welcomed into the party with loud cheers. 21

As the nineteenth century progressed, nationalism came to have an ever stronger hold over all the peoples of the Habsburg monarchy, including the Germans. While it is hardly the purpose of this dissertation to examine in detail the growth of German nationalism in the Dual Monarchy, the reader's attention should be called to the fact that the German population of the state was influenced by nationalism during the nineteenth century and that by the 1860's and '70's the problem of being both a German and a loyal subject of the Habsburgs had become a difficult one for many people. 22

21 As an instructive example of "national" politics in Cisleithania, in 1878 two "Poles," Otto Hausner and Ludwig Wolski, left the Polish Club and joined the Constitution Party in order to support the address of the liberals to the throne, which strongly condemned the emperor's Balkan policy. Hausner was a property owner in Lemberg and therefore a "Polen." See Otto Hausner and Ludwig Wolski, Oesterreichisch oder Kosakisch? Reden der Abgeordneten Hausner und Dr. Wolski in der Adressdebatte des österreichischen Abgeordnetenhauses (Vienna: Verlag von L. Rosner, 1878), pp. 3-5. See also August Weeber's memorandum on his audience with Francis Joseph on December 13, 1879, as printed in Paul-Molisch (ed.), Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich von 1848 bis 1918 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1934), p. 238; Albert Fuchs, Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867-1918 (Vienna: Globus-Verlag, 1949), pp. 11-12; and Charles A. McCartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 605-606.

22 On this problem, see Paul Molisch, Geschichte der
While the Germans constituted the largest single nationality in the Habsburg state, they composed only 24 percent of the total population. But they were more important than their numbers would indicate. German had been the original language of the Habsburg family, and until the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 and the acquisition of Galicia and Bucovina in the late eighteenth century the Germans had constituted more than half of the population of the monarchy. Most of industry, banking, and commerce were in their hands, and, since more Germans than other national groups tended to receive higher education, the state administration had a German flavor; indeed, German was the administrative language of the entire monarchy before 1867.  


24 The Jews in the Habsburg monarchy were usually considered to be Germans.

In 1784 Joseph II attempted to establish German as the official language of the monarchy, not out of any feeling of German nationalism but rather because more of his subjects spoke German than any other language. In fact, a Slavic tongue was rejected only because the Slavic languages were not alike enough to be understood throughout the empire.26 While Joseph's plan foundered on Magyar opposition, the idea that German was the true state language of the Habsburg dominion did not die among the monarchy's Germans.

In 1809 Francis I attempted to use German nationalism as a weapon against Napoleon, counting on it to produce recruits to fight the French army. There were few recruits, and the Austrian armies went down to defeat once more. In the long Biedermeier era between 1815 and 1848 a form of cultural nationalism gradually developed among the Germans of the Habsburg monarchy, but as yet it did not take on a political form. Only in 1848 did the conflict between being German and being Austrian become apparent. A purely German national state could not exist unless either the Austrian Germans stayed outside it or the Austrian empire was broken up. For some, the answer lay in including the non-German areas of the monarchy, in semi-colonial roles, in the new united Germany, but to others this solution was

repellant because it violated the principle of national self-determination, so dear to liberal hearts. Bohemia was to all Germans a German territory, despite its Slav majority.

After the revolution of 1848 was crushed in the Habsburg dominions, the problem of Austrian citizenship versus German nationality remained to plague the Austrian Germans. They took their status as the superior nationality in the monarchy for granted, not least because they could, or so they thought, call on their national brothers in Germany for assistance if their supremacy in the monarchy was ever threatened. In 1866, however, Germany rejected the Austrian Germans, who suddenly found themselves a distinct minority in a state they had always regarded as theirs. The Slavs were suddenly seen as a genuine danger to be guarded against. German supremacy in the monarchy as a whole had been destroyed in the Ausgleich of 1867; now the Slavs, led by the Czechs and Poles, threatened to destroy German supremacy in Cisleithania as well. In the 1870's the Austrian Germans saw themselves as an island of culture in the midst of a sea of Slav barbarism—a sea which seemed to be rising.27

27 For the growth of German nationalism in the Habsburg dominions, see Molisch, Geschichte der deutschnationale Bewegung in Österreich, pp. 57-106; Theodor von Sosnosky, Die Politik im Habsburgerreich: Randglossen zur Zeitgeschichte (2nd ed., 2 vols., Berlin: Allgemeine Verein für deutsche Literatur, 1912), Vol. I, pp. 164-167; and
Nationalism and liberalism were the twin ideologies of the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. Liberalism and nationalism were contradictory forces in the Habsburg monarchy, however, because liberalism was a supranational idea which was proclaimed mostly by Germans in cases where they would benefit most. The great liberal goals--free trade, political liberties, constitutional government, and parliamentary rule--were sincerely pursued by German liberals; yet it quickly became clear that when Germans were in the minority a liberal state could not at the same time be a German state. Some liberal leaders who were faced with this dilemma, such as Dr. Eduard Herbst, sincerely believed that the administration should be centralized and germanized to make it more efficient and less costly. Beginning in the 1870's other liberal leaders held that the state should be administered by the Germans even if it was less efficient as a result. By and large, the German liberals tended to become more and more German and less and less liberal as the nineteenth century progressed. By 1879, and to an even

greater extent by 1882, nationalism had won out over liberalism among Cisleithanian Germans, and those who had as late as 1879 welcomed non-German elements into the Constitution Party were in a hopeless minority. 28

Liberalism had a long history in the Habsburg monarchy dating back to the reign of Joseph II (1780-1790), from whom, though he was not himself a liberal, the party took many of its ideas and especially its obsession with a rationally ordered state. 29 The Austrian liberals thus desired a state organized on what they conceived to be rational grounds--free trade, laissez-faire capitalism, political freedom, and a constitutional monarchy 30--ideas that found expression in the revolutions of 1848, particularly in Vienna. 31 The ensuing eleven years of absolutist rule under Francis Joseph came to an end with the Austrian defeats at Magenta and Solferino in 1859, when

28 See the manifestos issued by Georg von Schönerer in 1879, the program proposed by Heinrich Friedjung at the Constitution Party convention in 1880, and the Linz Program of the National German Party in 1882, in Berchtold, Österreichische Parteiprogramme, pp. 189-194 and 198-203.


30 Curiously, Joseph II would have turned with horror over these views of his self-styled "disciples." See ibid.

the emperor was compelled to yield to pressures from the middle class and give his realm a constitution.

Francis Joseph's first attempt to promulgate a constitution for his empire was the October Diploma of 1860, which created a central parliament for the entire monarchy but gave many powers to the provincial assemblies. The German liberals were opposed to the Diploma; they favored a highly centralized state because it was more efficient. Anton von Schmerling, who was also dominated by centralist views, was selected by the emperor to write a new constitution that would satisfy the liberals. He drafted the February Patent of 1861, which created a centralized government with a powerful central parliament and stripped the provincial diets of many of their newly-acquired powers. Although the Hungarians and Czechs were so unhappy with this new constitution that they boycotted the Reichsrat, the liberals were overjoyed and swore to uphold it. As a result, they swiftly gained the name of the Constitution Party and


were often referred to as Verfassungstreue (those loyal to the constitution).\textsuperscript{35} The political arm of liberalism among the Cisleithanian Germans was the Constitution Party, which was split into a number of shifting factions.

Personal allegiances played a considerable role in maintaining the party organization, and each club in parliament usually had its leaders. Dr. Eduard Herbst, born in Vienna in 1820 but representing Prague, had a magnetic personality which enabled him to command respect from all factions within the party and usually to be the leader of its largest faction.\textsuperscript{36} Though he never became Prime Minister of Cisleithania (his highest post was that of minister of justice in the "citizen's ministry" from 1867 to 1870), he was without question the most powerful individual in the Constitution Party. At no time was his dominance more marked than in 1878 and 1879.\textsuperscript{37} Other notable party leaders included Princes Carlos and Adolf Auersperg, from Bohemia; Dr. Josef Kopp and Dr. Karl Giskra, from Moravia; Dr. Eduard Sueß, from Vienna; Ignaz von Plener and his son,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35}Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld, pp. 174-177.
\item \textsuperscript{36}Friedrich Schütz, Werden und Wirken des Bürgerministeriums (Leipzig: Verlag von Georg Wigand, 1909), pp. 80-96, contains a short biography of Herbst, who was called the "King of German Bohemia" by a Czech leader. See Eder, Der Liberalismus in Altösterreich, p. 155.
\item \textsuperscript{37}In its lead editorial, the Neue Freie Presse praised Herbst's leadership on the eve of electoral disaster! See issue of June 24, 1879, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
Ernst, from Bohemia; Dr. Eduard Sturm, from Moravia; and Moritz von Kaiserfeld, from Styria.\textsuperscript{38} Most of the leaders of the party were Germans from the Bohemian lands, where the Slav-German battle was at its peak—hence their strong German nationalist feelings.

Ideological and personal differences, as well as revelations of corruption, led to splits within the Constitution Party almost from the date of its founding.\textsuperscript{39} The deepest cleavages were caused by the revelations of corruption during the economic depression of 1873, which, in turn, was the result of an over-inflated stock market. Many liberal politicians had accepted bribes to influence parliamentary bills which gave legal validity to certain forms of business transactions. Of the 167 deputies actually sitting in the pre-electoral reform Reichsrat of 1873, some forty-six, most of them liberals, held a total of 146 company and bank directorships.\textsuperscript{40} Dr. Karl Giskra was proven to have accepted 100,000 gulden as a bribe; he

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\textsuperscript{38} Knauer lists all members of the Kremsier parliament of 1848 and of the Reichsrat from 1861 to 1918 in his Das österreichische Parlament, pp. 21-194.

\textsuperscript{39} There is a concise account of the constantly shifting internal alignments within the Constitution Party in Charmatz, Deutschösterreichische Politik, pp. 157-165.

defended himself by declaring that tips (!) were not to be scorned.\footnote{Tschuppik, The Reign of Emperor Francis Joseph, p. 232.} Although Dr. Herbst was himself free of the brush, few other leading liberal politicians were. Oddly enough, however, most of the men involved in the scandal were returned in the election of 1873, held months after the charges were published and some of the verdicts had been published.

A new parliamentary association, the Progress Club, was formed in the new Reichsrat out of many of the liberal deputies who had remained untouched by the scandal (or against whom nothing had been proved); it claimed to be the moral standard-bearer of the Constitution Party.\footnote{Charmatz, Deustschösterreichische Politik, p. 163; Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld, pp. 35+–363.} Further dissension racked the Constitution Party when the Cisleithanian ministers, headed by Prince Adolf Auersperg, failed to obtain the terms desired by many of the rank and file in the renegotiation, in 1876 and 1877, of the economic provisions of the Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary as required by the compromise of 1867. The Progress Club was especially embittered. Although Auersperg obtained some concessions from the Magyars, they were not enough to satisfy his critics, who saw success in extracting concessions from Hungary as a means of repairing much of the
damage caused to the party by the depression of 1873. Auersperg's personal authority within the party suffered grave damage as a result of his failure in the renegotiation of the economic provisions of the Ausgleich.  

In the elections of 1873 the Constitution Party and its allies gained 204 seats in the Reichsrat, of which the large landowners loyal to the constitution (Verfassungstreue Großgrundbesitz), known as the Left Center Club, the club to which Auersperg belonged, acquired 54 seats. The Left Club, led by Herbst, held 88 seats after the 1873 elections and was the largest in the party. The other Constitution Party factions after 1873 were the Progress Club, with 57 seats, and the Vienna Democrats, with five. After 1873 further conflicts within the Constitution Party led to the formation of the New Progress Club, which, because it was led by Herbst, drew adherents from both the Left and Progress Clubs. In addition, the fourteen Ruthenian deputies in the Reichsrat voted with the liberals because they were the government party.  


44 Charmatz, Deutschösterreichische Politik, pp. 153-165. On the Ruthenian, see Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution
When the Balkan crisis became more than locally significant in 1876, the Constitution Party was thus in a state of internal dissension, though by no means of total disruption, for the party still existed as a political entity. Outwardly the party still maintained a united front, if only because it was clear to the Austro-Germans that if the party were seriously crippled German dominance in Cisleithania would be endangered, if not destroyed. Moreover, the cleavages in the party were not deep enough to threaten its very existence. Some authors have held that the occupation crisis of 1878 merely applied the coup de grâce to a party already fatally injured by internal squabbles and a loss of public confidence caused by the depression of 1873. Yet the election results of 1873 simply do not support the idea that the voting public had lost confidence in the party. In 1867 the liberals held 118 (63.4 percent) of the 186 seats in the Reichsrat. In the 1873 elections, which were held months after the crash, the liberals and their Ruthenian allies gained 218 (61.8 percent) of the existing 353 seats; since the Czechs were boycotting the Reichsrat at this time, the liberal percentage of the seats actually occupied rose to 68.1 per cent.

Moreover, few new leaders emerged from the ranks to replace those whose reputations had been tainted in the corruption scandal; indeed, Karl Giskra was as influential after 1873 as before. That the Constitution Party, which was led by many of the same men as before, should have received so strong a vote of confidence argues convincingly that damage caused by the revelations of corruption was not as strong as has been imagined. So strong a showing was not the mark of a decadent, decaying, and dying party. 46

Most of the Germans in the Reichsrat who were not members of the Constitution Party were either clericalists or federalists. The clericalists tended to be Germans from the hereditary provinces—Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, Salzburg, Styria, and Upper Austria. They represented the interests of the Catholic church and supported the emperor when he did not oppose those interests. 47 Usually voting with them were the conservative nobility. Both the clericalists and the conservative nobles (also known as "feudalists") were loyal to the concept of the monarchy. Both hated liberalism and both were opposed to dualism as a solution for the national problems of the empire. The clericalists believed that no citizen of the Habsburg realm should think of himself as a German, or Czech, or Pole, etc., but rather as an Austrian, 

47 Ibid., pp. 532-539.
loyal to the state and to the emperor, as well as to the church.

Most of the Slavic deputies, excluding the Poles, were federalists who believed in provincial autonomy as the solution for the ethnic problems of the empire. In 1871, when the federalist government led by Count Karl Hohenwart and Dr. Albert E. F. Schäffle attempted to ease national tensions by granting provincial autonomy to Bohemia and further autonomy to Galicia, both the clericalists and the feudalists supported them, and Hohenwart remained the overall leader of the clerical, federalist, and feudalist forces during the 1870's. He and his followers supported the emperor in the struggle over the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The ruling German party was anticlerical, if only because the Catholic Church tended to favor increasing the power of the Slavs in the monarchy and did all it could to foster an "Austrian patriotism" which would embrace all nationalities on an equal basis. Paradoxically, Church


50 Ibid., pp. 446-447.

officials of all ranks were often also leaders of Slav national movements, the best known being Bishop Joseph Stroßmeyer. Catholic priests were especially active in promoting Slovene nationalism. The Church only supported movements aimed at autonomy, however. It did not support any movement for national independence.

Catholic officials did not play an important role in the development of Czech nationalism. The Czechs were the most numerous Slav nationality in Cisleithania, and their demands for autonomy and self-rule were one of Cisleithania's most important problems after 1860.

After Francis Joseph revoked the federalist October Diploma in favor of the centralist February Patent of 1861, the Czech leaders felt betrayed. Before the Diploma was revoked their hopes for Bohemian autonomy had seemed fulfilled; these hopes were now destroyed. The emperor's action was especially ill-received by the Czechs, Poles, and Croats, who were unique among Habsburg Slavs in having developed a mass nationalism by the 1860's. The Czech

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52 Ibid., pp. 157-158; May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, p. 73.


55 Robert W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and
national leaders, František Rieger and František Palacky, who led the bourgeois elements, and Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic, who led the Czech nobility, decided to boycott all sessions of the Reichsrat until their demands, which included provincial autonomy and administrative unity for all the lands of the Bohemian crown, were met. Beginning in 1863, the boycott lasted until after the election of 1879.56

Because the Czechs voluntarily excluded themselves from the Cisleithanian government, they had only a negative influence on Cisleithanian politics. A substantial number of seats in the Reichsrat (33 in 1873-79) which would ordinarily have been held by opponents of the liberal government were left vacant, thus considerably easing the labors of the Constitution Party. The Moravian Czechs returned to the Reichsrat in the early 1870's, but they were simply not numerous enough effectively to represent Czech interests. They usually voted with Hohenwart. In 1879 the Bohemian Czechs played a crucial role in the government of Count Eduard Taaffe—a government based on a majority which specifically excluded the Constitution


56 Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 32.
Party from power.\textsuperscript{57}

Of all the clubs in the lower house of the Reichsrat, the most loyal to the emperor was the Polish Club. In 1868 and again in 1871 the Poles had gained certain rights which enabled them to rule Galicia without interference from Vienna. A special minister for Galician affairs was appointed to the Austrian cabinet and Galicia was allowed virtually complete internal autonomy.\textsuperscript{58} In return, the Polish representatives in the Reichsrat—49 of them between 1873 and 1879—agreed to support the emperor's policies. This coalition between the emperor and the Poles lasted until 1916, when the Poles began to sense independence.\textsuperscript{59} Between 1871 and 1916 Polish support for the emperor's policies was one of the most stable elements in Cisleithanian politics, especially since the Polish representation remained numerically much the same from 1873.

\textsuperscript{57}On the Moravian Czechs, see McCartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918, p. 606 n. On the role of the Czechs in the Taaffe government, see William A. Jenks, Austria under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893 (Charlottesville, Va.; University of Virginia Press, 1965), pp. 36-37.

\textsuperscript{58}For the terms, see Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, Vol. II, pp. 135-137.

to 1918. In 1873 the Poles held 49 seats in the lower house of the Reichsrat; in 1891 their representation had increased to 58 seats. Possessing 13.9 percent of the seats in 1873, the Poles had 13.8 percent in 1911. A more stable political element could scarcely be imagined.

The compromise of 1868 and 1871 between the Poles and the emperor were based on the desire of the Poles to rule Galicia as a Polish province. The major obstacle to Polish rule was the presence in eastern Galicia of the Ruthenians, who were slightly less numerous than the Poles and who were making nationalist demands of their own which would, if realized, have placed serious limits on Polish power in Galicia. The Poles were adamant in their contention that they alone had a right to rule there. The Ruthenians by themselves, however, were not strong enough to defeat the Poles, and they hampered their own cause when splits developed almost at once in the Ruthenian national movement over where to look for allies. The "Old Ruthenians," who had started the Ruthenian national movement in Galicia, were loyal to the monarchy, favored looking for allies in Vienna, and supported whichever party was in power there. The "Young Ruthenians" were more militant and preferred not to support any party, believing that their votes would be more valuable if they remained neutral. The "Russo-philes," who favored annexing eastern Galicia to the Russian empire, did not become involved in the politics of the
Habsburg monarchy. What counted during the 1870's, however, was that the "Old Ruthenians" were in complete control of the Ruthenian parliamentary delegation (14 in number) at that time. 60

The Ruthenian deputies in the Reichsrat supported the German liberals between 1871 and 1878 because the government came from the ranks of the Constitution Party and could help them against the Poles in Galicia. The Germans did not support them against the Poles in Galicia, however. 61 There were two reasons for the failure of the "Old Ruthenian" policy. First, with a majority in the Reichsrat, the Constitution Party did not need the Ruthenian votes and so saw no reason to undercut part of the foundation of the Cisleithanian political system. Second, and of much greater importance, was the Polish decision to cut the number of Ruthenian deputies in both the Galician diet and the Reichsrat by gerrymandering the electoral districts and hampering the campaigning activity of Ruthenian candidates. In 1876 the Poles succeeded in reducing the Ruthenian representation in the diet from 21


61 In Bucovina, unlike Vienna, the Germans and Ruthenians were allies for nationalist reasons against the Romanians. Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, Vol. II, p. 530.
to 4. It was obvious that the Ruthenians were doomed in the Reichsrat election scheduled for 1879. Clearly, their powerlessness in Galicia had a serious detrimental effect on their bargaining power in the Reichsrat between 1876 and 1879.\(^{62}\) Nonetheless, they continued to vote with the liberals on most occasions.

Of all the provinces in Cisleithania, Dalmatia was undoubtedly unique in that it had no land border with any other Cisleithanian province. Together with the Slovene lands in Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, and Istria, the Dalmatians contributed to the South Slav representation in the Reichsrat. Nationalism among the Croats and Slovenes had by 1878 reached a nature stage, but the South Slavs in the Reichsrat still voted with the clerical-feudal bloc.\(^{63}\)

As the Near Eastern crisis became acute, the Habsburg Slavs, except for the Poles, enthusiastically supported the Russians in their attempt to free the Balkans from Turkish rule. The Serbs and Croats smuggled guns across the border into Bosnia, and Russian generals were heros in Prague. The Poles, unlike the other Habsburg Slavs, feared and hated the Russians. Any solution of the

\(^{62}\)Ibid., p. 528.

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 281. See also Lujo de Voïnovitch, La Dalmatie, l'Italie et l'unité yougoslave (1797-1917): une contribution à la future paix européenne (Geneva: George & Co., 1917), pp. 119-124.
Balkan crisis that extended Serbian and Montenegrin rule while at the same time limiting Russian influence in that area would find favor with all of the Habsburg Slav groups. For that reason, in the coming conflict between the emperor and the German liberals over the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Slavs would stand behind Francis Joseph. 64

The other ethnic groups in Cisleithania during the 1870's were for all practical purposes not represented in the Reichsrat at all. What few representatives they had tended to blend in with the clerical-feudal bloc.

The main outline of party politics in Cisleithania may thus be summarized as follows. On one side were the German liberals, who held a commanding majority in parliament but were internally divided; on the other side stood (or rather sat) a heterogenous collection of aristocrats and clericalists who tended to vote as a bloc. In addition, there were the Poles and Ruthenes, each of whom, in trying to win support against the other, always voted for the emperor; and the Czechs and Italians, most of whom were not in the Reichsrat at all. It was a confused situation, but as long as the Constitution Party could vote as a bloc it would always be in command.

No discussion of Cisleithanian politics is complete

without some mention of the enormous role played by the press in both party and government affairs. Since there were some 163 party newspapers in the monarchy in 1872, it would be a waste of the reader's time to discuss in detail more than the two most important Cisleithanian party organs: the Neue Freie Presse, which was the most important liberal organ; and Das Vaterland, which championed the interests of the clericalists and conservatives.

The Neue Freie Presse was without question the most important and influential non-government newspaper in the Habsburg empire, standing head and shoulders in prestige above all other papers printed anywhere in the monarchy. Its editorial position was solidly pro-German liberal. For example, it criticized the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina on the grounds that it would be too costly, as the liberals contended, and that it would increase the Slav majority in the monarchy, which was what the German nationalists clamored. As might have been

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66 Henry Wickham Steed maintained that the editor of the Neue Freie Presse wielded such great influence that "next to him the emperor is the most important man in the country." See his The Hapsburg Monarchy (4th ed., London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1919), p. 187.

67 Neue Freie Presse, May 15, 1878, p. 1; September 21, 1878, pp. 1-2.
expected, the *Neue Freie Presse* had very close connections with the leading circles in the Constitution Party. For this reason it served for a time as a semi-official "house organ" of the Auersperg government. Nonetheless, its editor, Michael Étienne, was willing to oppose Auersperg's policies when he thought it necessary. Any illusion that the *Neue Freie Presse* was a government newspaper vanished forever in 1878.

*Das Vaterland* could also display its independence on occasion, especially when the government was threatening the rights of the Catholic church, but by and large on all questions not involving religion *Das Vaterland* was a fervent supporter of the emperor and of what it called "Austrian" patriotism. Any form of nationalism which involved either disloyalty to the emperor or a desire to reduce the emperor's powers substantially was sharply denounced. On October 8, 1878, for example, *Das Vaterland* called for a state in which "there are no Croats and Magyars, no Germans and Poles, but Austrians." Dualism as a state system was roundly condemned, but *Das Vaterland* reserved its real venom for the German liberals, who had wrecked the institutionalized power of the church. They were denounced as evil, dishonorable, and tricky.  

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68 May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914*, p. 94.
69 The italics are in the original.
70 *Das Vaterland*, October 27, 1878, p. 2; November 5, 1878, p. 1.
Vaterland, the Habsburg state was an "old Catholic and federal empire;"\textsuperscript{71} of the two, the "Catholic" was the more important.

In the 1870's political life in the Habsburg monarchy was dominated by the person of the emperor, who provided the link between the imperial ministries in Cisleithania and the kingdom of Hungary. Because they presented a united front toward outsiders, and especially other nationalities, the Magyars were considerably more free to run their own affairs than any other nationality in the empire except the Poles, who also were united toward the rest of the monarchy. The Germans were split into liberal, clerical, and conservative factions and dominated affairs only in the Bohemian lands and the hereditary provinces, despite their almost two to one majority in the Reichsrat. The political arm of the German liberals, the Constitution Party, was itself divided, though it usually united on important issues. In general, nationalism had not yet gained the virulent character in Cisleithania that it had after 1879; men of differing nationalities still spoke to one another in a friendly manner. It was still possible for representatives of different nationalities to work together in a common cause, and though national hatred was on the increase, the

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., October 1, 1878, p. 1.
German deputies found Representative Georg von Schönerer humorous rather than dangerous. This, then, was the scene as the curtain opened on the drama of 1878.
CHAPTER III
BEFORE THE TREATY OF BERLIN

Plans for the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburg monarchy had been made in Habsburg military circles before 1878. Field Marshal Johann Joseph Wenzel Radetzky in 1856 and Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff ten years later both called for the addition of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the monarchy in order to protect Dalmatia, which they felt would otherwise be lost to Serbia,¹ and the emperor, Archduke Albrecht (who had become a hero after defeating the Italians in 1866), and Andrassy nurtured schemes of a similar nature after 1867.² The leaders of the Constitution Party knew of the existence of these proposals, and the prospect of adding more Slavs to the monarchy filled them with a dismay which was only heightened by the costs such an operation would surely entail. The liberals had always been suspicious of Andrassy's intentions in the Balkans; their fears were reinforced by the patent and open glee of all the Habsburg Slavs except the Poles over

¹Adolf Beer, Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774 (Prague: F. Tempsky, 1883), pp. 747-748.

every insurgent victory in Bosnia and by the moral and physical support given to the Bosnian rebels by the citizens of the Slavic cities of the empire—support which Andrassy could use to justify adding Bosnia and Hercegovina to the monarchy.³ Both liberals and Slavs closely followed events in the Balkans, and the hopes and fears of both were expressed in the lower house of the Reichsrat in October, 1876.

The first move in the Reichsrat came from the Slavs. On the very first day of the fall session (October 19, 1876) Dr. Josef Fanderlik and fourteen other Slav deputies—nine from Moravia, two from Carniola, and one each from Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste, and Styria—interpellated the government about the Near Eastern question. Expressing the conviction that it was in the monarchy's interest for the Turks to be driven from the Balkans so that the Slavs in that area might enjoy the right to govern themselves, they declared their sympathy with the Serbian army and with the Bosnian insurgents. Chiding the government for its secrecy, they asserted:

³See ante, p. 8.

⁴An "interpellation" was an official question which any member of parliament might ask a minister or the entire cabinet. Although usually concerned with local matters, an interpellation could, as was the case in 1876, be concerned with matters of great importance. Ministers had to answer all interpellations.
Up to now the population of the monarchy lacks official information concerning the events which have taken place during the last few months in the Balkan peninsula, as well as about the position which the imperial government has taken in regard to them. The undersigned, therefore, feel obliged to ask: Is the government ready to ask the imperial and royal ministry of foreign affairs for the necessary explanations and then to inform the house about what provision has been and will be made for the creation, in the future, of a political state of affairs in the Balkans which will correspond to the interests of the monarchy and to the ardent wishes of its Slavic population as well as satisfy the aspirations of the Christian population in the Balkan peninsula?

The Slavic population of Austria...expects the imperial and royal government to demonstrate that it recognizes these legitimate feelings of the Slavs by taking the appropriate measures towards the events developing there in the Balkans.\(^5\)

At the onset, and especially in the tone adopted in the third paragraph of their interpellation,\(^6\) the Cisleithanian Slavs obviously made clear their desire to use the power of the Habsburg state to advance the liberation of their cultural "brethren" to the south.

The deputies from the Constitution Party also wanted information about the Auersperg government's policy in dealing with the Bosnian rebellion. According, they asked the ministry:

1. Has the imperial government, as is its duty, 


\(^6\)A peremptory demand, such as this one, was rare at this time.
used its influence on the direction of foreign affairs in the Near Eastern question? What has been the end in view? Is the government ready to take responsibility for the policy being followed by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in regard to this question?

2. Has the imperial government exercised this influence in such a way that, if a war arises in the Orient, peace will be secured for Austria-Hungary and...every effort to acquire foreign territory checked?

3. Furthermore, does the imperial government think that it can make its influence felt in this matter?

Both the Slavs and the Constitution Party were thus anxious to find out whether Auersperg was counseling the emperor not to take an active part in Balkan affairs and advising him not to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburg monarchy. Since the interpellation was signed by the constitutional landowners, the Left Club, and the two Progress Clubs, it was evident that a majority of the party feared that Auersperg was not championing their views before the emperor.

On October 27 Auersperg rose to answer both interpellations. Although he acknowledged the right of parliament to exercise an influence in foreign affairs, he insisted that this right was merely a general one and that the Reichsrat could never dictate what foreign policy the emperor and his foreign minister were to pursue. As for himself, Auersperg declared, he and his colleagues in the

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7Ibid., p. 6814.
cabinet were in full agreement with the monarch's policy in dealing with the Balkans. Since the emperor favored the maintainence of peace, obviously he did not intend to annex new territories to the monarchy, although he naturally had to pursue measures that furthered the security and vital interests of the state.  

The liberal deputies became very upset when Auersperg, speaking in his customary austere and lofty fashion, declared that Andrásy would brook no interference from any outside force in his conduct of the monarchy's foreign relations. From that time on, despite Auersperg's surprise at the violence of the reaction to his words, a majority of his own party no longer trusted him where foreign affairs were concerned.

At the next sitting, on October 30, 1876, Dr. Herbst moved that the Reichsrat debate the monarchy's foreign policy in the Balkans. Although the prime minister apologized for his words and declared that parliament had misunderstood them, the motion passed easily.

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The debate began on November 4, 1876. In several respects, it foreshadowed the tumultuous parliamentary conflicts in 1878. By the time the debate ended, speakers from the liberal and conservative parties were so angry that they were snarling at each other over trivial details, and statements perilously close to personal insults were being bandied about. Many of the Slavs were particularly outraged at the very thought that Habsburg troops might help the Turks against their co-nationals. Dr. Joseph Vožnjak went so far as to declare that for the monarchy to fight Russia for Turkey's sake would be "an outrage to the Christian population of Austria; it would be a slap in the faces of the sixteen million Austrian Slavs; it would be the beginning of the end of Austria!"

In general, during the debate the liberals emphasized the strain that a war would place on the financial structure of the monarchy and Turkey's role as an obvious ally if the monarchy ever fought Russia, but they also maintained that no large Slavic state could be allowed to exist in the Balkans. While it was true, they said, that a large Slavic state to the south of the Dual Monarchy could lead

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14Ibid., p. 6964.
15Ibid., pp. 6972-6973.
16Ibid., p. 6935.
17Ibid., p. 6910.
18Ibid., p. 6942.
to Russian domination of Austria-Hungary, the establishment of such a state could and must be avoided without resorting to war. Moreover, the liberals asserted that the Reischsrat had a right to exert an influence on the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy.

Unlike the liberals, the conservatives and Slavs were not concerned with the rights of the Reischsrat but rather with forcing Austria-Hungary to intervene in the conflict against the Turks and in favor of the Balkan Slavs, by force of arms if necessary. Count Hohenwart, after speaking of the "cultural mission which we have to fulfill in the east," characterized liberal policy as "peace at any price and in any eventuality." As he put it,

"We all want peace. It is a precious possession, and woe to him who sacrifices it light-heartedly. But the people have possessions more precious still: their honor; the knowledge that they have not lagged behind in their historic task; the faith that fosters the victory of the greatness and power of the state, that powerfully advances not only the material interests of the people but also those higher spiritual interests for which mankind lives and works. The defense of these is the unbreakable line which we will not cross for the sake of peace."

To Hohenwart, the monarchy's mission to advance in

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19 Ibid., pp. 6910-6911.
20 Ibid., p. 6924.
21 Ibid., p. 6925.
22 Ibid.
the Balkans justified a war, and he was pleased because Auersperg had indicated that the government agreed with his views. 23

Hohenwart also argued that according to the constitution the Cisleithanian parliament had no influence whatever on foreign policy. In words that might almost have been written by Andrassy, he declared:

According to our constitution the minister of foreign affairs is not allowed to recognize any representative body except the delegations, and he would only be conforming to his constitutional duty if he decisively rejected any attempt by the parliament of half the monarchy to influence him. 24

The liberal reply to Hohenwart was delivered by Herbst on November 7, 1876, after preliminary speeches by Dr. Johann Demel 25 and August Göllerich. 26

Herbst began by pointing out that the eighth paragraph of the twelfth article of the Ausgleich of 1867 supported the liberal view, for, after affirming that foreign affairs were common matters concerning the entire monarchy, it continued:

Therefore the diplomatic and commercial representation of the kingdom in foreign countries,

23 Ibid.


26 Ibid., p. 6917.
as well as the enforcement of international agreements, are the sphere of the common Minister of Foreign Affairs acting in common with the Ministers of both halves and with their consent.\footnote{A translation may also be found in Drage, \textit{Austria-Hungary}, p. 755.}

It was hardly necessary to cite anything else, Herbst asserted, to prove that the ministers, and through them parliament, had a legal right to exert an influence over the foreign affairs of the monarchy. His case did not rest solely on that one portion of the \textit{Ausgleich}, however; the budgetary and taxing powers of parliament, as well as its ability to fix the number of recruits for the army, gave the \textit{Reichsrat} a powerful voice in the determination of the Habsburg empire's foreign policy. "Our financial affairs are sadly ..., in such a state that ..., the right not to agree to a credit bill makes any war or action leading to war impossible without the consent of this house."\footnote{\textit{Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses}, 8th session, \textit{Vol. VII}, p. 6965.}

Herbst was confident that the Constitution Party had the strength and unity to deny the consent of the lower house to a bond issue or other credit operation to finance the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburg empire. Replying to Hohenwart's speech, Herbst spoke of possible Habsburg annexations in the Balkans and asked, "Does he [Hohenwart] doubt that the vote of the two houses
of representatives ... would cry out for the rejection of such a policy?" Herbst no doubt believed that his question was merely rhetorical, for all of his actions in regard to the Near Eastern question in 1878 were based on his conviction that any attempt to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina would be decisively rejected by the ruling liberal parties in both Hungary and Cisleithania. Since Andrássy had already verbally agreed at Reichstadt to take the two provinces, the liberals and the emperor were on a collision course. As long as the Constitution Party was united, it could emerge victorious from the collision if the emperor obeyed the constitution.

Herbst erred in his belief that his party was united on the Near Eastern question, as Ernst von Plener demonstrated on November 4, 1876. Plener, 35 years old in 1876, belonged to an impeccably liberal Bohemian family (his father, Ignaz, had served as minister of commerce when Herbst was minister of justice). Though young, he was intelligent, able and already noted by his colleagues as a coming man. His speech of November 4, in which he denounced Andrássy for not having publicly expressed any desire to add Bosnia and Hercegovina to the monarchy and Herbst because he would leave Dalmatia exposed to the threat of south Slav nationalism, must stand with Herbst's in

29 Ibid., p. 6966.
importance, for he became a leader of a small but influential group of liberals who shared his view that Bosnia and Hercegovina had to be added to the Habsburg monarchy\textsuperscript{30} and that the monarchy had to go forward to meet its fate,\textsuperscript{31} i.e., to take the two provinces from Turkey. Although Plener was practically alone in his party, at least at this time, a steadily greater number of his liberal colleagues came to agree with his Near Eastern policy in 1877 and 1878.

The major reason for the growing popularity of Plener's views among the liberals was their increasing worry about the threat that Russian Pan-Slavism and South Slav nationalism posed to the Habsburg empire. More and more, some liberals came to believe that Habsburg interests would be better served by economic penetration and domination of the Balkans than by making a military move into the area. Moreover, they strongly felt that the mouth of the Danube was far more important for Austria-Hungary than Bosnia and Hercegovina could ever be and urged the government to concentrate its efforts on removing Russian troops from Romania and the Danube delta rather than on gaining compensation in the western Balkans for Russian gains in eastern Balkans.\textsuperscript{32} Economic control of the area would,

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 6919.
\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 6921.
\textsuperscript{32}See the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, February 23, 1878, p. 1.
these liberals thought, negate the threat of Pan-Slavism.

Pan-Slavism was basically a movement originating in Russia to unite all the Slavs in a single state. Russian and non-Russian Pan-Slavists differed, however, over whether or not all Slavs would become Russians and over whether or not the Russians, because they were less contaminated by the West, should rule the other Slavs. Russian Pan-Slavists often expressed extreme views of this sort in print, as when Rostislav A. Fadayev, a general in the czarist army, proposed the annexation of Habsburg Galicia to Russia,\(^33\) or when Nikolai Y. Danilevsky declared that the future Slav empire would embrace most of the Habsburg monarchy.\(^34\) Habsburg patriots, especially the Germans and Magyars, worried that these views influenced official Russian policy. When Rieger and Palacký visited the Pan-Slav Congress of 1867 in Moscow, the Germans, especially those in Bohemia, became even more anxious, even though the two Czech leaders rejected the extreme pro-Russian views they heard there.\(^35\)

Although the Austro-Slavist program, which had been formulated by Palacký in 1848 and which saw the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as necessary to ensure the continued national existence of the small Slavic nations,

\(^{33}\)Kohn, Pan-Slavism, p. 148.

\(^{34}\)Ibid., pp. 159-160.

\(^{35}\)Ibid., pp. 139-144.
was still advocated by many Habsburg Slavs in 1876, many Slavic leaders in the monarchy had abandoned it for what seemed to the Germans to be Pan-Slavism. The Ausgleich of 1867, which many Slavs saw as a bargain between the emperor and the "master nations," i.e., the Germans and Magyars, to the detriment of the Slavs, induced many Slavs to lose their faith in Austro-Slavism. Palacký himself became disenchanted with his program in 1867, when he said, "We [the Slavs] were here before Austria and we shall be here after her."36 Ten years later Rieger sent an address to Ivan Aksakov, a follower of Michael P. Pogodin, in which he declared that "the Czech people wish the best success to Russian arms; [Russian] fame is also their fame. The Czech people are happy when the mighty Slavic empire protects a weak Slavic group."37 Dr. Vošnjak seemed to be advocating Pan-Slavism when he implied in the Reichsrat in 1876 that the Slavs in the Habsburg army might refuse to obey orders to aid Turkish troops in Bosnia and Hercegovina.38

Rieger and Dr. Vošnjak were not out of touch with their followers. The Czechs supported the Russian troops in the Balkans by demonstrating in the streets of Prague,

38 See ante, p. 70.
often with great fervor. In Dalmatia, too, the population was overjoyed at Russia's declaration of war on Turkey, and the Serbs in the Voivodina gave supplies and volunteers to help the Bosnian insurgents.

Because Russia was thought by the German liberals to be fomenting Pan-Slavism in the Habsburg monarchy as well as rebellion in the Balkans in order to build a great Slav empire, they feared for the existence of the monarchy and for their special place within it. Their fears about Pan-Slavism surfaced in the debate on the Near Eastern question in November, 1876. Baron Ludwig von Zschock quoted Pogodin's statement that Austria-Hungary had more reason to tremble for its existence than Turkey did, and added that since Pogodin had wielded great influence in Russia for many years, his words had to be taken seriously. Johann Fux, however, delivered the best summation of the liberal view of Pan-Slavism as a danger to the Habsburg monarchy when he said:

There are, as seen from the socialist-Russian viewpoint, two programs. The first includes the federation of all Slavic states. Our monarchy would be dismembered into three parts. The Poles as such

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40 See Hausner's speech in November, 1878, as reprinted in Oesterreichisch oder Kosakisch?, p. 27.

would have to cease to exist because they have given themselves over to the West, to the Catholic faith; they would certainly have to be chemically fused with Russia. The other, which is almost official, is a Romanov succession to the Byzantine empire, or at least a system of Russian vassal states in the Balkans. Everything is, I think, absolutely clear. It goes back to the saying of Fadayev [sic] that the Russian idea, in the last analysis, can gain a solid footing in Istanbul only over Austria's corpse. 42

Fux expressed the opinion that Pan-Slavism could only succeed in reaching its goals through the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy. If this happened, millions of Germans, especially in Bohemia, would be placed under Slav rule. Pan-Slavism could be defeated, though, he thought, without war or annexations in the Balkans, for if the Balkans were under Austro-Hungarian economic domination, military measures would be unnecessary.

Twice in 1877 German fears of Pan-Slav influence over the Balkan policy of the Habsburg monarchy appeared in interpellations in the Reichsrat. On April 23, 1877, 43 the German liberals asked the government again to explain the ideas behind its foreign policy. Lasser answered in generalities: Austria-Hungary would remain neutral in the Russo-Turkish war and contemplated no military measures to deal with the present crisis, he said. 44 Although the left

42 Ibid., p. 6949.
44 Ibid., pp. 8582-8583.
and center applauded Lasser, the vagueness of his answer left them uneasy.\textsuperscript{45}

Again on September 19, 1877, the Progress Club deemed it necessary to ask the government to explain its Balkan policy. Mindful of the continuing stalemate between the Russian and Turkish armies at Plevna, the Progress Club deputies asked the government whether the monarchy would remain neutral in the Balkan war, whether Serbia could be kept out of the war, and how both of these aims were to be achieved.\textsuperscript{46}

Replying to the Progress Club, Auersperg defended Andrássy's policies against charges of inconsistency and insisted that the "policy of the imperial and royal government was clearly delineated from the beginning and has been steadily carried out."\textsuperscript{47} Austrian policy was unchanged from what it had been in the spring, he declared.

There were only two interpellations on foreign policy in the Reichsrat in 1877 because, for most of the year, the military situation did not change. The Russian army was stalled besieging the Turkish fortress of Plevna, north of the Balkan Mountains. On December 10, 1877, however, Plevna


\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 9455.
fell, and the Russian armies were once again free to advance on Constantinople. When the Cisleithanian delegation met on December 12, therefore, the liberals and Poles were seriously worried that within a short time Russia would dominate the Balkans. They thus opened a debate on the monarchy's foreign policy, with Andrássy looking on. 48

Kasimir von Grocholski, the Polish leader, led off the attack. He condemned Austria-Hungary's inactivity in the Balkans during the previous two years and raised the possibility that the monarchy might have to go to war to prevent Russia from establishing a number of vassal states in the Balkan peninsula. Pointing to the Congress Kingdom of Poland, whose constitution had been abolished in 1830, as an example of autonomous rule under the Russians, he asserted that Russian assurances that any new states established under Russian protection in the Balkans would rule themselves simply could not be believed. 49 Baron Bruno von Vlück, from Dalmatia, arguing that Austro-Hungarian interests would in no way be damaged through annexing a Slavic province that belonged to Turkey, supported Andrássy's policy. 50 Johann Demel, however, pointed out that any new province in the monarchy would reopen the

49 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
50 Ibid., p. 12.
entire question of the relative balance between Cisleithania and Hungary which had been settled in 1867, and this would definitely damage the monarchy. Dr. Eduard Sturm agreed with him.

After Sturm completed his speech, Andrásy rose to defend his policies. He reproached the delegation for beginning a debate on foreign policy at a time when he was unprepared to defend himself. He defended his policies as patriotic and farsighted, but he took care not to spell out precisely what they were. Turning to the offensive, he asked his critics to state precisely what Austro-Hungarian interests had been damaged by his policies, since for the first time in years the empire stood to gain a province instead of losing one.

Such a speech was not likely to silence Andrásy's critics. Even Plener was unhappy with it. As he wrote in his memoirs, Andrásy was "bitter" and so poor a speaker that he gave "the impression that he did not have a good enough command of German for public speaking." He repeated himself and constantly became sidetracked on trivial points. Andrásy probably was genuinely unprepared to

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52 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
53 Ibid., pp. 20-23.
defend his policies because the pressures on him after the fall of Plevna were so heavy that he did not have time to prepare a speech. Even the Russians did not know what they would do next, and Andrássy had to be ready for all eventualities. He dared not reveal the Budapest conventions because the Germans and Magyars, the ruling nationalities in the two halves of the Dual Monarchy, had long ago made it clear that they would oppose the incorporation of Bosnia and Hercegovina into the monarchy. To defend his policies at length without defining them, and to do so extemporaneously, was beyond his powers. He himself knew how poor an impression he had made, and ordered all newspapers that criticized his speech confiscated.

As was the case with the preceding debates and interpellations on foreign policy, nothing concrete came of this one. The respective parties had once again made their position clear to everyone, but, as before, there was no tangible treaty or bill which they could use to test their strength. There was nothing to vote on except a bill authorizing government expenditures for the next three months, and at this juncture the liberals could hardly refuse such an appropriation because of their opposition to

55 See ante, p. 24, for Andrássy's problems with the Russo-Turkish armistice at Adrianople at this time.

Andrássy's Balkan policies.

At the common ministerial council meeting of January 20, 1878, Andrássy tried to obtain a credit of 100,000,000 gulden for the occupation of Bosnia and to prepare for a possible war with Russia, but had to settle for 60,000,000 due to the emperor's belief that the situation was not as serious as the foreign minister believed.\textsuperscript{57}

Rumors of an impending occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina soon began to circulate, all of which were printed in the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} published the armistice terms, which included a preliminary political settlement that foreshadowed a series of Russian vassal states in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{59} As for Bosnia and Hercegovina, they were to be turned into a single autonomous self-governing province within the Ottoman empire.\textsuperscript{60} The rumors in the press, coupled with the clear-cut Russian victory in her war with Turkey, led directly to a new interpellation in the lower house of the \textit{Reichsrat}. Written by Giskra, it was signed by all of the prominent deputies from the Constitution Party, including Plener. The signatories asked if the accounts of the Russo-Turkish

\textsuperscript{57} See \textit{ante}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, January 23, 1878, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{59} See \textit{ante}, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, February 9, 1878, p. 7.
armistice negotiations which had been published in the Viennese press were accurate and if the government regarded the armistice as compatible with the interests of the monarchy. If they were not, the liberals demanded to know how the government proposed to protect those interests. 61

In his reply, Auersperg carefully refrained from going into specific details about the monarchy's policies. To pacify the Slavs, he said that a prime aim of the government was to improve the lot of the Balkan Christians so far as this could be done without sacrificing vital Austro-Hungarian interests. 62

Although the liberals appeared to be satisfied with the minister's declaration and the Neue Freie Presse actually characterized his reply as peaceful, 63 they were, nonetheless, still worried about Andrassy's Balkan policies. An attempt by the foreign minister himself to calm their fears through a face-to-face meeting with fifteen liberal leaders failed when he refused to answer specific questions about his Balkan policy and especially about the reasons behind his request for 60,000,000 gulden. 64 The liberal

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63 Neue Freie Presse, February 20, 1878, p. 1.

leaders were prodded by the *Neue Freie Presse*, which had immediately voiced loud opposition to Andrásy's request. Sixty million gulden, the paper argued, were enough "to have as many troops ready to march as are necessary for the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina." To the *Neue Freie Presse*, and to the liberal leaders in parliament, the trade routes along the Danube were more important than the two provinces.

When the Cisleithanian delegation again met on March 9, 1878, Andrásy's 60,000,000 gulden credit bill was sent to the budget committee immediately after it was introduced. This committee was usually dominated by Herbst even though the liberals were in a distinct minority in the delegation as a whole. The bill was first discussed in the budget committee on March 10, at which Andrásy was present for questioning. He was specifically asked if the money would be used to finance an occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In reply, the foreign minister assured the committee that "we are certainly not thinking of an occupation as a goal of our policy. Occupation and annexation have never been and never will be the goal and intention of the government." Andrásy's bland assurances were

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66 Ibid., February 27, 1878, p. 1.

far from the truth. The occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina had never been his personal goal, to be sure, for like most Magyars he had no desire to add more Slavs to the monarchy, but as the foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy he could see no other way to escape the Pan-Slavist danger than by controlling the South Slav areas to the south of the monarchy. This clearly involved the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Andrássy could, of course, not admit in public that plans to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina after the approaching congress had already been made. His public reason for requesting 60,000,000 gulden was that he needed the money to protect the monarchy against sudden emergencies at the congress. To do this, he had to be able to speak in Berlin with the funds needed for full mobilization already in hand. He contended that to wait while the legislative bodies considered his bill would take too long and could endanger the security of the state. He specifically promised not to use the money to route supplies to the army unless there was a genuine crisis at the congress.68 In fact, however, the decision to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina had already been taken, and, unless an emergency did arise, the money from the credit would be used for that purpose.

68 Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation des Reichsrathes, 10th session, p. 38.
On March 16, 1878, the budget committee approved the credit bill and sent it to the full delegation for its consideration, although nine liberals voted against it and issued a minority report. Andrásy received virtually everything he asked for, though, in an effort to placate the liberals, the committee's version of the bill specified that the delegation be called and informed when the two parliaments were asked to cover the credit and requested that the credit be used only in cases of "urgent and pressing necessity."\(^{69}\)

In their minority report, the liberals, led by Sturm, Giskra, and Kuranda, proposed that the credit not be authorized at once. Instead, the delegations should pledge themselves to meet when the need for it was evident and pass the credit bill at once, without debate. In this way the state could avoid needless expense if the congress went smoothly.\(^{70}\) In fact, however, the liberals distrusted Andrásy because he would not say precisely what he planned to do with the money.

The liberal fears became public knowledge on March 20, when the bill came up for debate in the full delegation. Count Franz von Coronini-Cronberg, speaking in favor of the majority report, argued that the money was essential for the

\(^{69}\) Ibid., pp. 175-177.
\(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 178.
army; in addition, he declared that the government could be trusted to use the money only in a genuine emergency. He chided the liberals for having criticized Andrásy first for doing nothing in 1877 and then for pursuing an active policy in 1878.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 86-90.} Sturm, by contrast, declared that according to Andrásy, the credit was not for a demonstration of the strength of the monarchy, not for an occupation, not for equipment for the army, and not for mobilization. Moreover, the sum was not great enough to serve as a reserve in the event of war. "What then was it for?" asked Sturm. Until he found out, he would vote against granting the credit.\footnote{Ibid., p. 79.} Plener also voiced his opposition to the credit, and for the same reason: he did not know its purpose. If, he declared, it was to finance the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, he would gladly vote for it, but since Andrásy's previous statements before the budget committee indicated that this was apparently not the case, he felt compelled to oppose it.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 104-114.}

On the next day, March 21, Dr. Ernst Baureuther argued that no money should be authorized until the foreign minister explained precisely why it was needed.\footnote{Ibid., p. 119.} After
Sturm spoke, Herbst summed up the liberal argument against the credit bill. Until a clear need for the money had been demonstrated, he declared, he and the liberals would vote against it.

Those favoring the majority report continued to argue that Andrassy could be trusted with the money and that he needed it to make Austria-Hungary's voice heard at the congress. Except for Andrassy himself, Sueß, who, like Plener, had long wanted to add Bosnia and Hercegovina to the monarchy, was the bill's most effective advocate. Andrassy declared that the credit bill was necessary to assure Austria-Hungary's position as a great power at the congress. No great power could afford to be without ready cash at such a time, he said, for no one could know when the money would be needed or just how urgent that need would be.

When the vote was taken, the result was thirty-nine to twenty in favor of the majority report. All of the members of the Constitution Party voted against it.

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Ibid., pp. 159-161.

Ibid., pp. 146-153.

Ibid., pp. 121-122.


Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation des Reichsrathes, 10th session, pp. 161-165.

Except Sueß. Ibid., p. 172.
liberals were defeated because the conservatives and clericalists from the lower house united with the nobility from the upper house against them, and it became clear that the liberals could not defeat in the delegations any bill connected with the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{81}

In April and May the lower house of the Reichsrat was primarily concerned not with the Near Eastern question but rather with the revision of the financial clauses of the Ausgleich law of 1867.\textsuperscript{82} On May 9, 1878, a bill was introduced permitting the imperial and royal government to raise some 41,160,000 gulden in Cisleithania in accordance with the credit authorization passed by the delegations in March.\textsuperscript{83} The need for this authorization was not explained. By coincidence, on the same day the Polish Club, led by Grocholski, interpellated the Auersperg ministry on various matters relating to the Near Eastern question. Referring to the report by the Neue Freie Presse on May 6 that a day had already been fixed for the occupation of Bosnia and

\textsuperscript{81}See the Neue Freie Presse, April 28, 1878, p. 1; and May 6, 1878, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{82}These clauses of the Ausgleich law had to be renegotiated every ten years.

Hercegovina, the Polish Club pointed out that the whole populace feared a parallel occupation, with Russia moving into Bulgaria at the same time. For this reason they asked the ministry the following questions:

1. Is the movement of Austro-Hungarian troops into Bosnia and Hercegovina contemplated?
2. In the event that this is actually the case, why and to what end does the imperial government intend to order this march?
3. Will the march take place because of an understanding with the signatory powers of the Treaty of Paris or because of an agreement with Russia?85

On May 14, 1878, Auersperg rose to answer the questions of the Poles. In his reply he said:

The views of the government have not changed concerning either the goals striven for or the choice of means. The imperial and royal government has never considered the question of Bosnia and Hercegovina from any other standpoint than that of the necessity to work steadfastly for a solution which offers guarantees against the periodic return of conditions similar to those of today and which would protect the monarchy from the disadvantages and disturbances bound up with such conditions.

It was never the intention of the imperial and royal government to deprive the European congress which has been called...to definitively regulate affairs in the Orient of the right to evaluate this matter, or to aspire to a settlement of this question through cooperation with a single power.

The questioners have, therefore, a full right to regard the information to which they have

84 Neue Freie Presse, May 6, 1878, p. 1.
referred in their interpallation as unworthy of belief. The imperial and royal government is in a position to declare all these reports unfounded, and those combinations of Great Powers involved in these reports...are also lacking in any factual basis.\textsuperscript{86}

Auersperg was applauded, though not lustily, for his answer. Andrásy's denials of any intent to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina were generally believed in the house, and an attempt on May 16 to open a debate on Near Eastern affairs failed.\textsuperscript{87}

Though Auersperg was believed in the house, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} was not pleased with his answer. In a major editorial, it pointed out that in his reply Auersperg had merely denied that the imperial government intended to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina in conjunction with another power; unilateral action was still possible. The two provinces, the editorial continued, were still the axis around which Habsburg foreign policy revolved.\textsuperscript{88}

While the debate over Habsburg policy in the Near East went on in the press, parliament continued its work on the economic \textit{Ausgleich} between Austria and Hungary. According to the credit authorization bill which had been passed by the delegations, they had to be called into session and informed officially as soon as a bill was

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12349.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 12349 and 12407.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, May 15, 1878, p. 1.
presented in Vienna or Budapest authorizing the government to raise the money. Herbst used this provision to delay any consideration in parliament of the bill authorizing the floating of bonds in Cisleithania to the amount of 41,160,000 gulden until May 28. When the delegations finally met on that day, they were duly informed of the government's action regarding the credit bill and dismissed.\(^{89}\) Because the continuing debate over the financial clauses of the *Ausgleich* took up most of the time of the lower house of the *Reichsrat*, the credit authorization bill did not come up for consideration by the full house before June 7—only six days before the Congress of Berlin was scheduled to hold its first meeting. Consequently, little debate was scheduled over the credit bill, for most members felt that since the delegations had passed the bill the *Reichsrat* had little choice but to do likewise.\(^{90}\) The bill passed quickly. Andrássy finally had his emergency fund.

There was no further comment on the Near Eastern question in the lower house of the *Reichsrat* before it closed its session on June 17, 1878. Even the opening of the Congress of Berlin passed seemingly unnoticed there. The members were tired. They had been meeting continuously

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\(^{89}\) *Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation des Reichsrathes, 10th session*, pp. 220-221.

\(^{90}\) *Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XI*, pp. 12798-12799.
for ten months, and they wanted to go home. For twenty
months, from October, 1876, to June, 1878, the Near Eastern
question had been debated in press and parliament. To say
more seemed useless. The attitudes toward the Near Eastern
question of the various parties and protagonists had been
clearly defined during this time. The liberals were re-
assured by Andrásy's promises; the conservatives were dis-
mayed by them. When the great European Congress opened
in Berlin on June 13, 1878, Andrásy was bound by his
pledged word to the Cisleithanian delegation that he would
not occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina.
CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN AND THE OCCUPATION OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA

The European Congress that assembled in Berlin on June 13, 1878, boasted not only the most brilliant collection of diplomats since Vienna in 1814-1815 but had to consider the most important problems since that illustrious meeting as well. It was universally recognized that only a European Congress or a European war could settle the Balkan problem, and the Powers opted for a congress. To compel Russia to back down without pushing her into war against most of the Great Powers of Europe was a delicate task, but this was the problem faced by the peace negotiators at Berlin, for, even though most of the agreements reached there had been decided before the congress met, things could still go wrong.

Bismarck's palace served as the meeting place for the conference, and the German chancellor was elected president of the congress. The German chancellor dominated the congress, for his role as president enabled him to take sides to ensure that no Great Power was placed in a position where war was its only recourse from humiliation without incurring
the rancor of the other Powers.¹ The Russians were repre-
represented by Gorchakov, who, because of his egotism and
petulance, made a bad impression on his foreign colleagues.
His second in command, Count Peter A. Shuvalov, ambassador
to the Court of St. James, looked all the better by compari-
son and quickly came to dominate the Russian delegation.²
Austria-Hungary's seat at the Congress was occupied by its
foreign minister, Andrássy, by Baron Heinrich von Haymerle,
ambassador to Italy,³ and by Count Alois Károlyi, ambassador
to Germany. The British delegation was chaired by the
prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), and
included the third Marquess of Salisbury, who had recently
replaced Lord Derby as foreign secretary. The French were
represented by William Henry Waddington, and Italy by
Count Luigi Corti. Since France and Italy were both too
weak to exert any significant influence on Balkan affairs,
their delegates did little at the Congress but sit and
listen. Finally, the Turkish delegation was headed by
Karathodory Pasha. It included Mehemet Ali Pasha, a former
German for whom Bismarck never failed to display his
contempt.

¹Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p. 36.
²Summer, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 501-503.
³For Haymerle, see Marvin L. Brown, Jr., Heinrich von
Haymerle: Austro-Hungarian Career Diplomat 1828-1881 (Colum-
The British and Austro-Hungarian delegates worked closely together to implement the agreements both powers had made with the Russians before the Congress opened, and, while there were some amusing incidents, the work went smoothly enough. Russia and Great Britain had already agreed on the broad outlines of the Balkan settlement; all that remained to be decided were the details. Since Austria-Hungary supported Great Britain on every point, the details were always decided in favor of the British, for Russia, her army weakened in the war with the Turks, could not fight them both.

The most important conflict at the Congress between Great Britain and Russia came when Gorchakov demanded that Turkish troops be excluded from the new province of Eastern Rumelia. Disraeli could not agree. To deny a ruler the right to keep troops in part of his country would, he thought, set a dangerous precedent. In addition, Russia had to be taught her place. This issue was resolved by permitting Turkish troops inside the province but only in

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a zone near the provincial borders, not in its center.\textsuperscript{7} The importance of Austria-Hungary's support for the British position was clearly seen in the critical meeting at the British embassy on June 18, when Andrásy supported Disraeli against Gorchakov without hesitation on every single issue.\textsuperscript{8} Nine days later, on Bismarck's advice,\textsuperscript{9} the Russians surrendered and accepted virtually every British demand.\textsuperscript{10} When Andrásy and Shuvalov haggled over the length of time Russian troops could remain in the Balkans, however, the British did not return the former's strong support. Although Andrásy had demanded a time limit of six months on the Russian occupation of Bulgaria and Romania, he finally had to accept limits of nine months for Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia and one year for Romania.\textsuperscript{11} When a final misunderstanding over the status of Novibazar was smoothed over,\textsuperscript{12} the most dangerous portion of the Congress was concluded. So far, the negotiations had gone as smoothly as could have been expected.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., p. 59; Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, pp. 448-449.
\textsuperscript{10}Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 517 and 523.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 525-526.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 531-532. It was finally agreed that although Habsburg troops would occupy Novibazar it would continue to be administered by the Turks.
The most unexpected conflict that marred the Congress was the one over Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was unexpected because the Turks refused to comply with an agreement between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Great Britain—the four greatest Powers in Europe.\(^{13}\) Andrásy had thought that the Turks would back down before this combination of Powers. He did not learn of his mistake until the June 28 session of the Congress, when the Turkish delegates revealed their new instructions from Constantinople. Whereas the Porte had previously recognized that part of the two provinces would have to be surrendered,\(^{14}\) he now ordered Karatheodory Pasha to resist the occupation of any part of Bosnia and Hercegovina.\(^{15}\) The Turkish delegates therefore refused, in the face of all the Great Powers of Europe, to accept an occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Habsburg monarchy. Although Bismarck and Disraeli both berated Karatheodory Pasha and his colleagues as incompetent fools, there was no option but to postpone consideration of the fate of the two provinces until Constantinople could reconsider its position.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{13}\)Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After*, p. 72.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 75.


July 2, the Turks capitulated, and Karatheodory Pasha announced to the Congress on July 4 that the Turkish government accepted its decision.\textsuperscript{17} The details of the occupation were to be worked out later in negotiations between the two powers.\textsuperscript{18} As Karatheodory Pasha phrased it, Constantinople "places entire confidence in" the Congress' decision regarding Bosnia and Hercegovina, but it also reserves for itself the right "to come to a direct and preliminary understanding with the Cabinet at Vienna on the subject."\textsuperscript{19}

The Turks believed that until such an understanding was reached, Austria-Hungary could not, according to principles well established in international law, occupy the two provinces, and the Porte intended to delay reaching any agreement with the Dual Monarchy on the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina for as long as possible.

At Berlin, Austria-Hungary received the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Hercegovina. The symbols of Turkish rule were allowed to exist, however: Ottoman currency remained legal tender and Turkish flags could be flown over mosques during prayer. According to international law, the Turks believed, no occupation could actually take place until the two empires had reached agreement on the

\textsuperscript{17}Medlicott, \textit{The Congress of Berlin and After}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
details of that operation, but whether Andrassy and his sovereign would feel bound by this view was another matter. Viennese press reaction to the news that Austria-Hungary would shortly occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina was mixed. The *Neue Freie Presse* greeted the official news of the occupation with resignation, for the paper's inability to influence the monarchy's foreign policy had long since become apparent. Its writers continued to be sarcastic, but the editorials lacked heat and passion.\(^{20}\) *Das Vaterland*, by contrast, took longer to react to the news of the occupation than the *Neue Freie Presse*. It favored the occupation of the two provinces as much as the *Neue Freie Presse* opposed it because it would extend the power of both the central government and the Catholic Church. The emperor alone would rule in Bosnia and Hercegovina, since the two regimes in Vienna and Budapest could never agree on anything, and in *Das Vaterland*’s eyes Habsburg power was Catholic power. The Greek Orthodox "schismatics"\(^{21}\) in the two provinces could be converted in good time. All in all, *Das Vaterland* saw the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as marking the beginning of a new and better era for Austria-Hungary.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{19}\)Ibid.  

\(^{20}\)See the *Neue Freie Presse* for June 2, 1878, p. 1; June 27, 1878, p. 7; June 29, 1878, p. 1; and July 1, 1878, p. 1.  

\(^{21}\)*Das Vaterland*, July 17, 1878, p. 1.  

\(^{22}\)Ibid.
The Neue Freie Presse and Das Vaterland thus continued to expound the views on Near Eastern affairs that they had before the Congress of Berlin met. Although Das Vaterland agreed with the Neue Freie Presse that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina would be expensive, it nonetheless called on the monarchy to bear the burden gladly.\textsuperscript{23} When the Neue Freie Presse pointed out that Bosnia and Hercegovina were inhabited by Slavs and asked whether it was really in the interests of the Germans and Magyars to bring more Slavs into the monarchy,\textsuperscript{24} Das Vaterland retorted that all nationalities should rejoice that civilization had advanced in the Balkans through the forthcoming occupation.\textsuperscript{25}

Since the Neue Freie Presse was the most influential German liberal organ in the monarchy, its articles made it clear that many members of the monarchy's largest and most influential nationality disagreed with the foreign policy of the monarchy. Whether or not this gap between the Germans and the government would become too wide and deep to be bridged was, however, a question which appeared to worry neither the government nor the German liberal political leadership, for both continued on their respective courses.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., July 4, 1878, p. 2; Neue Freie Presse, July 4, 1878, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{24}Neue Freie Presse, July 26, 1878, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{25}Das Vaterland, July 28, 1878, p. 1; August 23, 1878, p. 1.
without regard for the other.

While the press campaigns over the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina went on, the Habsburg government organized the occupation army. Its task was not made easier when the *Neue Freie Presse* and *Das Vaterland* both published secret military information. Both papers, as a result, had issues confiscated more than once.26

Andrássy's major role in the preparation for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to discover whether or not the inhabitants of the two provinces would forcibly resist the Habsburg troops as they moved into the area. He preferred a peaceful occupation if it were at all possible. A war against the tough inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be expensive and difficult and could lead to requests for more money from the delegations--money which might well not be granted. Furthermore, his position as foreign minister might well be shaken by a difficult and costly occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its attendant problems both internally and externally. For all of these reasons, it was of capital importance for Andrássy to learn whether or not the impending occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be resisted.

According to all private and government reports, a military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was likely

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26 The *Neue Freie Presse* had three issues confiscated; *Das Vaterland*, two.
to result in armed combat on a large scale. As early as February, 1878, Conrad Wassitsch, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Sarajevo, admonished Andrássy that if the Dual Monarchy occupied the two provinces a large army would be necessary to overawe the population. The same warning was echoed from Mostar, where Anton Strauß, the Habsburg consul stationed there, polled the fifty-one most influential men in Hercegovina on the question of a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Of the fifty-one notables, he reported to Andrássy, thirteen were friendly to the idea, nine were not opposed to it, two were indifferent, twenty strongly opposed, and seven had not yet made up their minds. Strauß also reported that the Orthodox population in Hercegovina were prepared to resist an occupation.

In addition to the reports by the Austro-Hungarian consuls in Sarajevo and Mostar warning that resistance was likely, private sources also declared that an occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina would have to be carried out with force. On July 18, 1878, for example, the Neue Freie Presse printed a memorandum supposedly sent to the paper


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., p. 24.
by a certain Wesselitzky-Bozidarovich, an agent of the Bosnian insurgents in Rome, who pointed out that the nationalism of the Bosnians would lead them to resist an occupation by Habsburg forces.\textsuperscript{30} Reports from private sources like this one made it clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the least, viewed the approaching Habsburg occupation with distaste. As July progressed, this became clearer and clearer.

On June 5, 1878, Mazhar Pasha, the Ottoman governor in Sarajevo, in response to popular unrest, appointed a "popular committee" to assist him in formulating policy. At its first meeting on July 4, the committee considered the problem of defending the two provinces from outside intervention, i.e., against the forthcoming occupation by Austria-Hungary, but could reach no decision. On July 7, when control of the committee was assumed by Hadji Loja, a new genuinely popular leader among the Moslem masses, it quickly took steps both to escape Mazhar Pasha's control and to resist the forthcoming occupation. The governor, whose troops sympathized with Hadji Loja and his followers, quickly capitulated to the committee, and, after naming a man publicly committed to armed resistance to the occupation as the army commander in the two provinces, he recognized the committee as the governing body of Bosnia and

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, July 18, 1878, pp. 1-2.
Hercegovina. The committee moved at once to distribute arms to the local Moslems, including the lower class.\textsuperscript{31} Outside Sarajevo, too, the local Turkish officials did all in their power to aid the committee; they would have been overthrown if they had not. The Orthodox population of the two provinces quickly joined the Moslems, for they shared with them a distaste for Habsburg rule. By the fourth week of July, 1878, the Bosnians were under arms to resist the Austro-Hungarian army when it came.\textsuperscript{32}

Wassitsch kept Andrásy well informed of the preparations to resist the occupation that were being made in all parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina. So did his colleagues in other Bosnian towns. Nonetheless, the foreign minister still appeared to expect a bloodless occupation. On July 19 he asserted that a company of hussars and a regimental band would suffice for the occupation,\textsuperscript{33} and he argued seriously for an occupation force of only two divisions.\textsuperscript{34}

There were several reasons behind Andrásy's belief


\textsuperscript{32}Muelder, The Austro-Hungarian Administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 60-62.

\textsuperscript{33}Fournier, Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{34}Deusch, "Andrássy und die Okkupation," p. 18.
that resistance to the Habsburg troops would be scattered and easily defeated. A peaceful occupation was best from his own point of view: it would save money and lives and reduce considerably the opposition within the monarchy to the occupation of the two provinces. There is reason to believe that Andrásy let his desires color his reading of the reports from his consuls in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Too, the Turks had consented at the Congress to the occupation; surely, he reasoned, they would recognize their obligations and keep order in the area to be occupied. Thirdly, the situation within Hungary was delicate. Elections for parliament were scheduled for August 5-14, 1878. None knew better than Andrásy—once condemned to death for his nationalism—how little the Magyars relished the prospect of adding Slavs to the monarchy; to add the expenses of a war—even a small war—to that prospect would be feeding the flames.  

Fourth, resistance to the Habsburg troops would almost certainly be expensive enough to make it necessary to request the delegations to provide more money—a request Andrásy wished to avoid.  

Although the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister kept up a brave front in public concerning the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, he was privately worried, for armed


36 Ibid.
resistance to the occupation seemed more and more likely with each passing day. In the end his worst fears were realized. The first battles between Habsburg troops and the guerilla forces in Bosnia were fought just as the elections were getting underway in Hungary, and the Turks did nothing to make things easier for the occupation forces. Indeed, they could not do anything, for of the twenty-three battalions of the Ottoman army in Bosnia no fewer than nineteen deserted to the resistance forces in July. Had the Ottoman authorities desired to smooth Andrássy's path into Bosnia—and there is no reason to think they did—they did not have the power to do so.37

The Austro-Hungarian army itself had a keen appreciation of the difficulties it faced in occupying Bosnia and Hercegovina. Habsburg staff officers had considered the problem for years,38 and it was clear that in such mountainous terrain a hostile population would be difficult to subdue with only four divisions, even though no resistance was expected from the Christians and the Moslems were thought to be divided on the question of whether or not to resist the occupation.39 The army did not, however,

37Deusch, "Andrássy und die Okkupation," p. 25. There was an ancient law in the Ottoman empire that no territory could be surrendered unless it had first been conquered by the enemy, and such old laws were often taken very seriously.

38See ante, Chapter I.

anticipate that the population would resist the occupation forces so strongly, and this misreading of the situation was to have tragic consequences for Habsburg arms.

The Treaty of Berlin had specified that Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire were to negotiate a special agreement covering the occupation before the Habsburg troops moved in. But the Turks dawdled and procrastinated in the hopes of thereby postponing their loss of control over Bosnia and Hercegovina. As the dimensions of the resistance movement in the two provinces became clearer during July, Francis Joseph and Andrásy realized that on military grounds alone the occupation could not be postponed, for further delay would give Hadji Loja and his followers time to create a force which would require a full-scale war to crush; therefore they ordered the occupation to begin on July 28, 1878, with the four divisions then available, in the hope that full-scale war might be averted. Their effort failed, however; hostilities began as soon as the Austro-Hungarian forces crossed the frontier.

The Austro-Hungarian plan was to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina from northwest to southeast, from the Hungarian to the Serbian border. Two major columns were involved. The first, composed of three divisions, was to enter Bosnia at Brod and occupy that province, moving directly towards

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Sarajevo; the other, with one division, was to move from Cattaro (Kotor) to Mostar and occupy Hercegovina. Mostar fell on August 6 and Sarajevo on August 19, but before they did both columns had encountered stiff resistance and had to be strongly reinforced. 41 Eventually, Artillery General 42 Joseph Philippovich von Philippsberg commanded eleven full divisions of the Habsburg army, and even these were barely enough. The guerillas numbered 100,000 to 200,000 men, fully armed and operating in rugged terrain with which they were intimately familiar. Although the towns fell quickly to the Austro-Hungarian forces, the guerillas resisted in the countryside for months and were not finally crushed until early October. The imperial forces lost 5,000 men killed. 43

As it became clear that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina would be accompanied by bloodshed on a large scale, the Cisleithanian press began to lambast the government even more than it had in the past. At first, the 

Neue Freie Presse expected a relatively bloodless campaign, 44

41 This account of the occupation itself is largely drawn from "Die Okkupation Bosniens und die Hercegovina durch k. k. Truppen im Jahre 1878," Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs, Vol. IV (1879), pp. 1-666.

42 Feldzeugmarchall.

43 Even so, it all had to be done over again three years later. See Charles Jelavich, "The Revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1881-1882," Slavonic Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (June, 1953), pp. 420-436.

44 Neue Freie Presse, July 23, 1878, p. 1; July 30, 1878, p. 1.
but as early as August 2 a more somber note crept into its articles on the occupation,\textsuperscript{45} and by August 6 the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} used the first battles as proof that the Habsburg forces should never have entered Bosnia and Herzegowina.\textsuperscript{46} While the troops were supported and praised for their gallantry and bravery in battle,\textsuperscript{47} the government was condemned for sending them into the two provinces. Oddly enough, however, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} also argued that, once begun, the occupation should, for the sake of the empire's prestige, be successfully concluded.\textsuperscript{48}

As the war dragged on and the fighting grew in intensity after the fall of Sarajevo, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} turned from criticizing the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina \textit{per se} to a general and unfavorable consideration of Andrassy's role in sending the Austro-Hungarian army into the two provinces. Why, the paper asked, had no convention with Turkey been signed before the occupation began, as the Treaty of Berlin had required?\textsuperscript{49} Why had Andrassy not known that the Bosnians would resist?\textsuperscript{50} Above all, why were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, August 2, 1878, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, August 6, 1878, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, August 1, 1878, pp. 1-2; August 6, 1878, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, August 21, 1878, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, August 29, 1878, p. 1; August 30, 1878, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}, September 4, 1878, p. 1; September 27, 1878, pp. 1-2; October 3, 1878, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
military measures used to assure Austria-Hungary a commanding position in the Balkans when economic measures, including control of the Danube trade, would have served as well. 51 To all of these questions the Neue Freie Presse could offer no real answers; it could only point to Andrássy's mistakes and recommend his removal from office. 52 In the paper's eyes the war in Bosnia was his war; since the war was a failure, he should be ousted as foreign minister.

Das Vaterland, in contrast to the Neue Freie Presse, fully supported Andrássy's policies in general and the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular. While surprised at first because so many troops had been mobilized for a peaceful operation, 53 Das Vaterland quickly called for even greater forces as soon as the first resistance was encountered in Bosnia. 54 Those who opposed the occupation were accused by Das Vaterland of raising the morale of the Bosnian guerillas by showing them that the monarchy was divided and thus increasing casualties among the Habsburg forces by inspiring the Bosnians to resist. 55 The other

51 Ibid., September 7, 1878, p. 1; September 12, 1878, p. 1.

52 Ibid., October 10, 1878, p. 1.

53 Das Vaterland, July 4, 1878, p. 2. Das Vaterland believed Andrássy's assurances that the occupation would be peaceful.

54 Ibid., July 25, 1878, p. 1.

55 Ibid., August 11, 1878, p. 1; September 7, 1878, p. 1.
papers took no notice of this charge.

When the Reichsrat, with its German liberal majority, reassembled in Vienna on October 22, 1878, it was confronted with a fait accompli—Bosnia and Hercegovina had been occupied. Francis Joseph and Andrassy had occupied the two provinces in defiance of the views of a majority of the two largest nationalities in the Dual Monarchy. Whether those two nationalities could—or would—reverse the actions of the emperor and his foreign minister now became the pressing question of the moment.
CHAPTER V

THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS IN CISLEITHANIA

Because the German liberals were so deeply moved politically by the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, other political problems of much longer standing were inextricably involved in their response to it. Not the least of these other problems was the fact that Adolf Auersperg had long been regarded by many in his party as an unsatisfactory prime minister.

Auersperg had become prime minister of Cisleithania only because Herbst had rejected Baron Ernst Kellersperg, the first choice of Francis Joseph for the post.\(^1\) Auersperg, as a provincial governor, had won liberal favor by resisting Hohenwart's program to federalize Cisleithania in 1871\(^2\) and was therefore named prime minister on November 26, 1871, because he had offended no one in the Constitution Party. In addition, as a member of the Constitutional Landowners' Club, he could influence that club to vote with the remainder of the party on occasions when it might otherwise break

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 251.
away.\(^3\) Auersperg's colleagues in the cabinet included Baron Joseph Lasser, the minister of interior, Baron Sisinio de Pretis-Cagnodo, minister of finance, and Dr. Karl von Stremayr, minister of worship and education.

When the Adolf Auersperg ministry took office, no one expected it to last eight years,\(^4\) for its only task was the passage of a new electoral law which would make it possible for the voters themselves to elect all the deputies. In 1873 the Auersperg ministry completed its work when the franchise was extended to voters previously disqualified by poverty and the number of deputies raised to 353.\(^5\) New elections were then held in the fall of 1873, as a result of which the Constitution Party once again had an absolute majority in parliament. Due to infighting between the various factions of the Constitution Party, however, the leaders of the party were unable to select a new prime minister, and thus the Auersperg ministry remained in office. Because the infighting between the liberal factions continued in the years that followed, it became easier to leave the Auersperg ministry in office and a tendency appeared to put


\(^4\) Neue Freie Presse, February 12, 1879, p. 1.

off the problem of choosing a new ministry until a better
time which never arrived. 6

Auersperg remained in office despite conflicts of
temperament between the prime minister (and some of his
colleagues) and the leaders of the Constitution Party in
parliament. Baron Johann Chlumecky, at first minister of
agriculture and then minister of commerce, described the
cabinet's problem very well: "Fault-finding by the party
about its own cabinet began with the day it took office." 7
And he also wrote to Czedik:

The Constitution Party took up the battle
against all sides—a battle against its own
ministry, a battle against the opponents of the
constitution, a battle against Hungary, a battle
against the military faction and against the
court party, a battle against party comrades. It
pursued the war of 'all against all' in order
eventually to disintegrate, to destroy itself. 8

Auersperg himself did not help matters any by his attitude
towards the parliamentary representatives of his party. In
a letter to Andrásy in January, 1876, he wrote:

Above all I believe I should point out...
that the position of the government ministers
[Baron Lasser and myself] who have attended
club meetings not only was not deferential to
the members of the representative bodies but
was precisely and decisively the opposite.
Deference to parliament is...at no time a
characteristic of the present ministry on this

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6See ante, Chapter II.
7Chlumecky to Czedik, n. p., September 10, 1879, as quoted in Czedik, Zur Geschichte der k. k. Österreichischen
8Ibid.
side [of the Leitha]....Baron Lasser went so far as to say that the question was not whether the ministry possessed the trust of the party but whether the situation inside the party was such that the ministry could still have faith in it.9

Further evidence of Auersperg's attitude toward the party in parliament exists in references to Auersperg's "habitual severity"10 as well as to his treating the Constitution Party as his personal cavalry squadron to be ordered about at will.11

Auersperg plainly was not suited to lead, even if only in name, a party made up of touchy individualists like Herbst, Giskra and Kopp. With neither the party leaders in the cabinet nor those outside it having a high regard for each other, friction between them was inevitable, but care was taken by all involved that it never reached the point of having to choose a new ministry until 1877, when the personal conflicts between Auersperg and the leaders of the party in parliament could no longer be papered over. The issue that forced the break between them was the negotiation of a new economic Ausgleich with Hungary.

Although the political stipulations of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867 remained permanently in force,

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9 Auersperg to Andrassy, Vienna, January 14, 1876, as quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich, pp. 185-186.


11 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 3.
the economic clauses regulating the financial relations of
the two halves of the monarchy had to be renegotiated every
ten years. Under the 1867 agreement Hungary bore only
thirty per cent of the remainder of the common budget
after all customs duty income had been applied to it.
Cisleithania was therefore responsible for more than two-
thirds of the budget but had only fifty per cent of the
votes in the delegations.\textsuperscript{12} To many members of the Cis-
leithanian parliament, especially the left-wing German
liberals, this was an intolerable state of affairs. Dr.
Heinrich Friedjung, an eminent historian and well-known
German nationalist, wrote in 1878 that the Germans, who
had ruled in Austria for three hundred years, had been
humiliated by the Magyars in 1867,\textsuperscript{13} and other liberal
politicians were unalterably opposed to any Ausgleich
agreement that did not provide for a more equal Hungarian
share of the financial burdens of the monarchy.\textsuperscript{14}

Auersperg represented Cisleithania in the negotiations
with Hungary as well as he could, but the Hungarians were

\textsuperscript{12}Alois Brusatti, "Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen des
Ausgleichs von 1867," in Berger, Der österreichisch-
ungarische Ausgleich von 1867, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{13}Heinrich Friedjung, Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn.
Politische Studie über das Verhältnis Oesterreichs zu
Ungarn und Deutschland (3rd ed., Leipzig: Verlag von
Otto Wigand, 1878), pp. 3-6.

\textsuperscript{14}Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich,
unyielding in their demands for an even lighter burden than they had previously borne, and they were backed by the emperor. In the end, Francis Joseph compelled the Cisleithanian cabinet to accede to many of the Magyar terms.\textsuperscript{15} Although Auersperg did not want to support the agreement, he did so at the emperor's request,\textsuperscript{16} and as a consequence the entire cabinet was savagely criticized by the party on which it depended for support. Dr. Sturm held Pretis responsible for much of the Hungarian success,\textsuperscript{17} but Auersperg received most of the blame.\textsuperscript{18}

Early in 1878 the prime minister's position became impossible when the liberals rejected the Ausgleich bills that Auersperg had negotiated with the Hungarians. On January 24, 1878, Auersperg told a conference of liberal club leaders that, at the emperor's request, the cabinet had submitted its resignation because the Ausgleich bills had been rejected,\textsuperscript{19} and on January 26, he informed parliament that he and his ministry would remain in office only until a new ministry could be formed.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 381.
\item \textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 384.
\item \textsuperscript{17}Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XI, pp. 12654-12655.
\item \textsuperscript{18}Planer was especially vocal on this issue. See ibid., Vol. IX, p. 10146.
\item \textsuperscript{19}Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, Vol. II, p. 389.
\item \textsuperscript{20}Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. X, p. 10790.
\end{itemize}
attempted during the next few days to form a new liberal government, but, due to conflicts within the Constitution Party, this task was as impossible in 1878 as it had been in 1873. The party leaders would not support any prime minister who would agree to the economic Ausgleich that Auersperg had negotiated with the Magyars, while the emperor would appoint only those who did agree with Auersperg's terms.  

Auersperg thus returned to office as prime minister, with his former cabinet, but he had some words of reproof for his party colleagues:

His majesty herewith expects that, through mutual fairness and conciliatory feeling, there will finally be success in arriving at an understanding expressing the interests of both sides and the welfare of the whole.  

In short, since the liberals had failed to offer an alternative to Auersperg and his Ausgleich bills, they should remain silent and cooperate with Auersperg and the emperor in passing the new Ausgleich bills through the Reichsrat. The bills did eventually win the approval of parliament, but not without further grumbling from the parliamentary liberals and further splits within the Constitution Party. At one point, in fact, the Poles, constitutional landowners, and the Left Club voted against the Right Club, the Progress Club, the New Progress Club, and the Viennese

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21 Ibid., pp. 10832-10833.

22 Ibid., p. 10833.
Democrats. In other words, party lines vanished in the struggle over the Ausgleich bills. Although the bills were passed, Auersperg's position in the Constitution Party was undermined. He was unacceptable to the liberals as prime minister; however, they were unable to agree on anyone else to take his place. The emperor would have been happy to appoint a new liberal ministry if one could have formed, but, as events had shown, that was impossible. Auersperg remained in power, but he was no longer a parliamentary prime minister: he had lost the confidence of his party.

The Constitution Party leaders thus did nothing to help solve the ministerial crisis in 1878. Chlumecky was correct when he wrote Czedik that "the ministry of [their] own party was hounded to death [and] the impossibility of putting another [liberal] cabinet in its place [was] proven." Moritz von Kaiserfeld complained that he no longer understood the Constitution Party. "Led by babbler who live...only for the applause of the crowd," he chided, "it has forgotten everything which gave it its existence and its leading role [in Cisleithania]." Pretis

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25 Kaiserfeld to Stremayer, Birkfeld, July 7, 1876, as quoted in Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld, p. 372.
was praised by Kaiserfeld for not having given in to pressure from the liberals in parliament—praise which he extended to the entire cabinet.  

This praise from cabinet ministers and retired elder statesmen did not restore Auersperg's authority within the Constitution Party, and accordingly, as soon as he had shepherded the Ausgleich bills through parliament, he offered his resignation to Francis Joseph once more on July 4, 1878. The emperor would not allow Auersperg to leave, however, for still no new ministry could be formed. Only Lasser was allowed to resign, because he was very ill. Otherwise, the cabinet remained in office.

Despite Auersperg's difficulties with his party, Francis Joseph was still determined to rule through the Germans in Cisleithania, and in September he granted audiences to a number of Constitution Party leaders to discover just who would be acceptable to them as the chief of a new government.

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26 Kaiserfeld to Stremayr, Graz, June 4, 1878, as quoted in ibid., pp. 390-391.


28 Czedik, Zur Geschichte der k. k. österreichischen Ministerien, Vol. I, p. 276; Rogge, Oesterreich seit der Katastrophe Hohenwart-Beust, Vol. II, p. 442. Evidence of liberal helplessness in finding a new prime minister may be found in the Neue Freie Presse, September 1, 1878, p. 1, and September 18, 1878, p. 1. Although the liberal daily stressed the urgency of forming a new government, it was unable to suggest anyone to be the head of that new government.
cabinet. Among those consulted were Carlos Auersperg, Herbst, and Sues--a true cross-section of the party. 29 Meanwhile, Adolf Auersperg kept pressing the emperor to accept his resignation. 30

The final blow to the Auersperg government was the publication in the Grazer Tagespost on October 9, 1878, of an interview on August 18 of the prime minister with Dr. Adalbert Svoboda, the editor of the paper, and Jakob Syz, the president of the Graz chamber of commerce. According to the Tagespost, Auersperg had stated during the course of the interview that while the official press had supported his policies gratis, to obtain favorable editorials on his Ausgleich bills from the independent press had cost a great deal of "hush-money." 31 It "had cost a lot," 32 he added, to push the Ausgleich bills through parliament, and the implication that members of parliament had taken bribes was lost on no one. 33

As soon as the Grazer Tagespost published the

31 Auersperg's phrase.
32 Also Auersperg's words.
interview with Auersperg, the liberals erupted with indignation. The liberal press, of course, denied that it had taken money from the government\textsuperscript{34} and condemned Auersperg for saying that it had. Auersperg denied that he had granted the interview, but it did him no good.

On October 7, Francis Joseph accepted Auersperg's resignation as prime minister. When the interview was published two days later, the emperor asked Herbst to an audience to advise him on the selection of a new prime minister.\textsuperscript{35}

At the beginning of the audience Francis Joseph asked Herbst to become prime minister of Cisleithania himself, but Herbst refused because he believed that his personal rivalries with other liberal leaders would hamper him in exercising that office.\textsuperscript{36} When the emperor then asked who would be acceptable to the party, Herbst replied that Pretis would be a good choice. Herbst did not mention, apparently, that if Pretis supported the emperor's Balkan policy he would be unacceptable not just to Herbst but to most other liberals as well, and it certainly would never have occurred to the emperor to name to the premiership someone who did disagree with him on so vital an issue.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Neue Freie Presse, October 17, 1878, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{35} Plener, Erinnerungen, Vol. II, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} In addition to Plener, sources for the interview include Leopold von Hasner, Denkwürdigkeiten (Stuttgart:
Since in early October the most important issue facing the empire was the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a policy from which the emperor could not retreat, any prime minister of Cisleithania whom he appointed would have to support the emperor on that issue. Although Herbst understood this, he named Pretis to the emperor without specifying that a prime minister acceptable to the Constitution Party could only gain support by opposing the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Francis Joseph assumed the opposite: that by naming Pretis Herbst had committed his party to supporting the occupation, if only because it was a fait accompli. Pretis gave proof of the emperor's belief that the liberals had decided to accept the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina when he wrote to Herbst on October 15. In his letter, he thanked Herbst for his support and then set an extraordinary condition for his assumption of the

Verlag der I. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1892) and two letters exchanged between Pretis and Herbst that are quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich. From these sources, it is difficult to determine precisely what was said between Herbst and Francis Joseph. Hasner wrote (see p. 114) that Herbst recommended Pretis as a person without committing himself to any specific policies, but Plener says (see p. 128) that Herbst did not specify any one individual by name as an acceptable prime minister. However, Pretis certainly believed that he had Herbst behind him: Pretis to Herbst, Vienna, October 15, 1878, as quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich, p. 207. In retrospect, a misunderstanding between Herbst and the emperor seems to be the most likely explanation of what happened.

Who, at this early date, could have assured Pretis of Herbst's support except Francis Joseph himself?
premiership: he would not accept unless he had the full support of the Constitution Party, granted formally at a party meeting. Furthermore, he mentioned that Herbst was familiar with his views on current affairs. In return for Herbst's support of his candidacy, Pretis promised that his cabinet would be composed entirely of members of the Constitution Party and that he would remain in office until the elections the next summer.

Only Herbst was influential enough in the party to give Pretis' candidacy any possibility of success. If Pretis were to become prime minister, the Constitution Party would have to forget its internecine conflicts over the Ausgleich, in which Pretis himself had played a leading role (indeed, many party leaders blamed him for the Cisleithanian "defeat"), and formally agree to support the cabinet. Pretis was not coming hat in hand to the party; rather, he expected the party to come to him. He expected Herbst to work in favor of his candidacy, which had after

39 Auersperg had not received such support before he assumed office. See Chlumecky to Czedik, September 10, 1879, as quoted in Czedik, Geschichte der k. k. österreichischen Ministerien 1861-1916, Vol. I, p. 275.

40 If this is true, this makes what follows even more difficult to explain.

41 The word he used was "verfassungstreue."

42 Pretis to Herbst, Vienna, October 15, 1878, as quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Oesterreich, pp. 207-208.
all been Herbst's idea to begin with, and with Herbst's support as well as that of the emperor, he felt he could demand what he would never have dared to ask otherwise.

In his reply of October 17, Herbst assured Pretis of his support, even though he had serious doubts about whether he could expect a formal resolution of support from the Constitution Party as a whole. He even doubted whether it would be worthwhile to make an effort to obtain such a resolution. Instead, he suggested that Pretis should express his views on the problems facing the monarchy to the leaders of the party meeting in private, and cautioned Pretis that "the goals and directions of our foreign policy" were, in his opinion, of greater importance than domestic matters at the moment. 43

There was no suggestion in Herbst's letter to Pretis that he was alarmed over the latter's views on foreign policy or on the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and while no formal resolution of support could be expected from the party, 44 an endorsement of Pretis' candidacy by the liberal leaders in parliament would serve the same purpose. Pretis could view his prospects for the office of prime minister with satisfaction.

43 Herbst to Pretis, Prague, October 17, 1878, as quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutschen Politik in Österreich, p. 208.

The Reichsrat opened its fall session on October 22. Pretis spent the first day rounding up party leaders for a meeting that night at the finance ministry. Present at that gathering were nearly forty members and leaders of the Constitution Party, among them Adolf Auersperg, Herbst, Giskra, Kopp, Demel, Sturm, Plener, and, of course, Pretis. Pretis opened the meeting by informing the group that Francis Joseph had invited him to form a new liberal ministry. Then he outlined his policies. He maintained that although he favored a balanced budget, extraordinary expenses connected with the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina would make such a budget impossible during the coming year. He would urge the emperor eventually to reduce the strength of the army from 800,000 to 600,000 men, although he admitted that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina would make it necessary to maintain an army of 800,000 men in 1879. After 1879 all expenses of the occupation were to be met by revenues obtained in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Moreover, the emperor had assured him that the occupation would last only until the cost of the operation had been paid by revenues from the two provinces, peace and order had been reestablished and Austro-Hungarian

45 Neue Freie Presse, October 23, 1878, p. 2.
46 Ibid. All but four were from the lower house of parliament.
47 Ibid.
interests in the area protected.\textsuperscript{48}

To most of those at the meeting, Pretis' policies seemed satisfactory, although some of them were worried that the emperor might interfere if Pretis actually attempted to implement some of them.\textsuperscript{49} Herbst, however, condemned Pretis' program in scathing terms. He demanded that Pretis ask Francis Joseph for the immediate evacuation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and insisted that both the Cisleithanian and Austro-Hungarian governments issue formal statements disavowing any intent to annex the two provinces. In addition, he declared that if Pretis supported Andràssy, he (Herbst) could not support Pretis.\textsuperscript{50} In short, Herbst cut the ground from under Pretis' feet and in essence declared war on the same emperor to whom he had recommended Pretis as prime minister. Francis Joseph could fulfill Herbst's demands only by renouncing the whole basis of the monarchy's foreign policy.

Herbst's condemnation of the emperor's policies doomed Pretis' chances to become prime minister for he influenced


\textsuperscript{49} Neue Freie Presse, October 23, 1879, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.; Plener, Erinnerungen, Vol. II, pp. 129-130. Both Sueß and the German ambassador believed that Herbst actually demanded Andràssy's resignation as foreign minister as the price for supporting Pretis, but if this was actually the case Plener or the Neue Freie Presse would certainly have mentioned it.
most of the party leaders present at the meeting to turn away from Pretis. 51 Amazed over their change in attitude after Herbst spoke, Pretis asked the party leaders whether they were totally disinterested in having a Constitution Party cabinet in Cisleithania, only to be told that if the monarchy "was going to be driven into the ground," someone else would have to lead it while it did so. 52 Confronted with a choice between remaining in office and supporting a policy in which it did not believe or losing the leadership it had held since 1871, the Constitution Party, confident that its majority in the Reichsrat would eventually compel the emperor to come to terms with it, did not hesitate to choose the latter alternative.

Pretis was rejected as prime minister by his own party because he tried to live with the occupation rather than agreeing to lead a foredoomed attempt to reverse it. True, some of the liberal leaders harbored some lingering resentment about his role in the Ausgleich negotiations, but it was Pretis' attitude toward the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was mainly responsible for the refusal of the party leaders to support him as prime minister. His views on the occupation were especially abhorrent to Herbst, whose influence on the Constitution Party was much greater than that of anyone else. Had he

52 Ibid.
supported Pretis, the other liberal leaders would probably also have agreed to back his candidacy for the position of prime minister.

Pretis' rejection by his liberal colleagues influenced Francis Joseph to give up all further attempts to build a cabinet in a parliamentary fashion. He had consulted the leaders of the majority party in parliament, had appointed the man whom they recommended, and had then seen him rejected by them. What further point was there in trying to rule through that party? After October 22, 1878, Francis Joseph no longer appointed leaders of the largest party in parliament to the ministry but persons who were loyal to his own policies. As he said to a Hungarian opponent of his Balkan policy in 1878, "You always speak of Andrássy's policy. Do not forget, my dear baron; it is my policy." 53

The immediate problem confronting the emperor on October 23, 1878, was that of deciding what should be done about the ministerial crisis. Since the Constitution Party had rejected both Pretis and the emperor's Bosnian policy, it was clear that the emperor would reject any cabinet acceptable to Herbst, and no other leader with the backing of both the sovereign and the majority party was available. Consequently, the simplest solution was to ask Auersperg temporarily to remain in office. It was not until after the Treaty of Berlin was ratified by parliament on January 28, 1879 that Francis

53 Ibid., pp. 443-444. The italics are mine.
Joseph made another effort to solve the ministerial crisis by asking Count Eduard Taaffe to form a cabinet.

Taaffe, though formally a member of the Constitution Party, was known primarily as a childhood friend and loyal supporter of the emperor. He had served in the citizen's ministry as minister of defense and deputy prime minister and had been de facto prime minister after the resignation of Prince Carlos Auersperg and served from April, 1870, to February, 1871, as minister of interior in the cabinet of Count Alfred Potocki. From 1871 to 1879 he was the provincial governor of the Tyrol. His liberal credentials were impeccable; more important, he was also a trusted servant of the emperor. These qualifications made him the obvious choice as prime minister after the final break between the Constitution Party and Francis Joseph in November, 1878, when the liberals, led by Herbst, forced the delegations to shelve all money bills for Bosnia and Hercegovina and for the occupation troops until the Reichsrat had an opportunity to deliberate on the Treaty of Berlin. While their action was perfectly legal, Francis Joseph was so furious over this action by the liberals that he resolved they would never again exercise power.

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54 For Taaffe's career, see Arthur Skedl (ed.), Der politische Nachlaß des Grafen Eduard Taaffe (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922), pp. 9-11.

55 See Ch. VI below.

Immediately after the emperor asked him to form a cabinet Taaffe was praised by the liberal press: indeed, the *Neue Freie Presse* referred to him as "the man of the future"\(^{57}\) who had "grown up in the Austrian tradition of officialdom."\(^{58}\) Taaffe, however, restricted his search for ministers to liberals who had voted in favor of simple ratification of the Treaty of Berlin instead of the motion favored by Herbst and the *Neue Freie Presse*. In response, the Herbst liberals in parliament went on strike, refusing to allow any bill to come up for consideration, and the lower house had to be dismissed until the ministerial crisis was resolved.\(^{59}\)

In his search for cabinet ministers, Taaffe offered Plener the ministry of commerce; Coronini, the ministry of agriculture; Stremayr, the ministry of justice; and Horst, the ministry of defense. His goal was a government that could make policy, not merely a caretaker government that would conduct the business of the government until the elections in the summer of 1879. In order to achieve this end, he needed liberal support in parliament, and he calculated that with the above-mentioned men in the cabinet he would have the support he needed.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{57}\) *Neue Freie Presse*, Abendblatt, February 3, 1879, p. 1.

\(^{58}\) *Neue Freie Presse*, February 6, 1879, p. 1.

\(^{59}\) *Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session*, Vol. XII, pp. 13523-13526.

Taaffe was unable to construct a ministry before the logjam in parliament caused by the liberal sit-down strike there threatened to paralyze the government. Francis Joseph therefore turned to Stremayr, who agreed to head a "caretaker ministry" until the elections. Except for Auersperg's resignation and Stremayr's assumption of the premiership, the cabinet remained much the same as it had been, the major change being the appointment of Taaffe as minister of interior. When Stremayr spoke to the lower house of the Reichsrat on February 18, he declared that he had "neither a program for the future...nor a political action to announce."

Taaffe failed to form a cabinet because he did not have enough time and because of quarrels between the liberal candidates for cabinet posts. Plener refused the ministry of commerce and declared that five million gulden would have to be cut from the army budget before he would agree to become minister of finance. Coronini refused the ministry of agriculture, and Sueß also turned down a ministry.

Once again, a lack of unity among the liberals had

61 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordentenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13531.
63 Ibid. Sueß claimed in his memoirs (p. 295) that Plener played an active role in Taaffe's attempt to build a cabinet, and is supported by a letter from Plener to Taaffe (Vienna, February 5, 1879, as quoted in Skedl, Politische Nachlaß des Grafen Taaffe, pp. 247-248) which Plener did not mention in his memoirs.
rendered impossible a lasting solution to the ministerial crisis in Cisleithania. Only an appeal to the electorate could cut the Gordian knot.
CHAPTER VI

THE ADDRESS TO THE THRONE AND
THE CISELEITHANIN DELEGATION

In reply to Francis Joseph's rescript calling the Croatian parliament into session on September 28, 1878, that body decided to send an address to the throne to express its official viewpoint on the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the other problems that concerned Croatia. Characterizing the royal rescript as vague, the Croats specifically demanded a railroad connecting their territory to the two conquered provinces, the inclusion of Slavonia and Dalmatia in Croatia, and the immediate annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Dual Monarchy. The Croats were ignored by the emperor, but they gained considerable publicity for their views, and the Neue Freie Presse recommended that the Reichsrat adopt the same tactic by sending an address to the throne expressing its views on the occupation. While the address was not expected to influence the emperor, it would, so the Neue Freie Presse

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2 Neue Freie Presse, October 20, 1878, p. 1. According to Plener, the idea of an address from the Reichsrat to the throne originally came from Kopp. Plener, Erinnerungen, Vol. II, p. 129.
believed, gain public support for the liberal cause.\footnote{Neue Freie Presse, October 20, 1878, p. 1}

Prompted by the article in the Neue Freie Presse, Kopp, the leader of the New Progress Club, moved at the opening of the fall session of the Reichsrat on October 22 that the lower house send an address to the throne expressing its official views towards the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.\footnote{Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 12943.} Kopp had a draft of the address already prepared, and it was a remarkable document.\footnote{Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 876.} It began with a history of parliament's attempts to understand the monarchy's foreign policy and expressed the frustration of the house at its inability to do so because the government had hindered it. Kopp, in his draft, accused the emperor of violating both the constitutional law of 1867 and the army law of 1868 by using troops outside the borders of the monarchy without the permission of the Cisleithanian and Hungarian parliaments.\footnote{Actually, this was not quite true. The army law of 1868, paragraph 7, states: "The standing army and the navy are intended for the defense of the entire monarchy against foreign enemies and for upholding domestic order and security." Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich. Jahrgang 1868 (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1868), p. 439. This paragraph does not exclude such actions as the occupation; neither does it include them. And the constitutional law said only that "the emperor exercises supreme command over the armed forces, declares war, and concludes peace." Bernatzik, Die österreichischen,
The Reichsrat had scarcely closed its session in June, 1878, Kopp declared, when the Habsburg army had entered Bosnia and Hercegovina, "and all this happened before the representative bodies could consider the Treaty of Berlin as required by the constitution." Finally, Kopp demanded that the emperor take note of the unrest caused by the monarchy's foreign policy, and especially by the arrogance displayed toward parliament in its application, that he explain what unexpected circumstances caused him to spend the sixty million gulden, originally appropriated for emergency use only, to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina, and that the Treaty of Berlin be laid before the Reichsrat and the Hungarian parliament for ratification.

Kopp's address first had to be printed and distributed to the members of parliament before it could be formally considered by them. Since this still had not been done by October 25, and since the delegations were to meet in Budapest on November 7, barely two weeks away, Dr. Karl Hoffer moved that a committee be appointed to consider the address when parliament met on October 29. His motion was carried.

Verfassungsgesetze, p. 436. While the spirit of these laws was obviously violated, the letter was not.

7Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 876.

8Ibid.

9Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 12957.

10Ibid., pp. 12959-12960.
Between October 22 and October 29, the Neue Freie Presse threw its weight behind Kopp's draft of the address, recommending that it be adopted without any amendments. The Neue Freie Presse feared, with some reason, that some of the demands in Kopp's draft might have to be deleted to placate the more conservative factions of the Constitution Party, such as the Constitutional Landowner's Club, and that would, the paper feared, deprive the address of its intended impact on the public mind.

The attacks on the address from the right were beaten off easily by the liberals on October 29. Kopp contended that the lower house of the Reichsrat was the only institution in Cisleithania that represented the people and maintained that it had a duty to make its views known to the emperor. Grocholski, counterattacking, declared that, since the address was self-contradictory, the Polish Club could not vote for it. Hohenwart stated that the conservatives would vote against the address no matter how it might

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11 Neue Freie Presse, October 24, 1878, pp. 1-2; October 30, 1878, pp. 2-3.
12 The liberals always contended that "the people" were behind them. See ibid., October 24, 1878, pp. 1-2.
13 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 12967-12968.
14 Ibid., p. 12970. The Poles blasted Kopp for condemning the government's foreign policy at the same time he confessed that he was not certain precisely what it was.
be revised to make it more palatable to the right.\textsuperscript{15} The liberals then united against the right and Kopp's motion was sent to committee\textsuperscript{16} by a vote of 142-78.\textsuperscript{17} When the committee itself was selected, it included ten liberals, four constitutional landowners, and four conservatives, among them Herbst, Kopp, Sturm, Sueß, Plener, and Grocholski. The new body began its deliberations at once.\textsuperscript{18}

Although the Constitution Party had a majority of fourteen to four in the committee, the majority in favor of Kopp's draft of the address was not so great, for Suess, Plener, and the constitutional landowners liked neither its tone nor the requests it made of the emperor. Since their votes were crucial to the liberals both in the house and on the committee, considerable changes were made in Kopp's draft. When the committee reported to the house on November 1, of the three demands made by Kopp—that Francis Joseph take notice of the unrest caused among his subjects by his policies, that he explain why it had been necessary to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina, and that the Treaty of Berlin be laid before the \textit{Reichsrat} for ratification—only the first was

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 12970-12971.

\textsuperscript{16} All bills had to go to a committee.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses,} 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 12971.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 12973 and 12977.
left, thereby reducing the address to little more than a list of grievances. After the committee had finished with Kopp's draft, the address no longer reflected the anger of a majority of the Constitution Party.

While the committee was considering the address to the throne the lower house of the Reichsrat occupied itself with electing forty of its members to membership in the Cisleithanian delegation, even though Georg Ritter von Schönerer, who was beginning to become known as a German nationalist and radical but who was at the time regarded with disfavor by most of his colleagues in the house, unsuccessfully tried to block the election until the house received assurances that it would have an opportunity to ratify the Treaty of Berlin. Schönerer was not alone in voicing his fears that the government intended to dismiss parliament when the delegates were elected. Johann Fux, a liberal, also expressed concern that the government might have such a scheme in mind and moved that the election of delegates be the last business conducted by the house—a move which would have thwarted any possible plan to dissolve the house immediately.

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19 Ibid., p. 13001; Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 880.

20 See Molisch, Deutschnationale Bewegung, pp. 91-92. For an example of Schönerer's rhetoric at this time, as well as the way in which it was received, see Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13111-13112.

21 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 12974-12975.
after the delegation was elected.\textsuperscript{22} After both Rechbauer and Stremayr—the latter speaking for Auersperg, who was not present—denied that any plan existed to dismiss parliament before the address to the throne could be considered, Fux withdrew his motion,\textsuperscript{23} but bad feeling between the government and parliament still existed.

After Stremayr convinced the representatives that the government had no intention of thwarting the will of parliament, the house proceeded to elect its delegates. Herbst and the other liberal leaders were determined to secure as large a number of delegates opposed to the occupation as possible. In their efforts to do so they violated a long-standing custom that a representative who had been elected to the delegation continued to be re-elected as long as he was in parliament. While the liberals lost some votes from resentment in their use of this tactic,\textsuperscript{24} they picked up others because of national conflicts in the provinces.\textsuperscript{25} By using such tactics in defiance of the customs of the house, the liberals secured

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., pp. 12988-12989.
\item\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 12989.
\item\textsuperscript{24}In his memoirs Plener expressed his bitterness over being excluded from the Bohemian delegation even though his election was normally assured. Plener, Erinnerungen, Vol. II, p. 131.
\item\textsuperscript{25}Slavic delegates from Styria and Moravia did not vote as a protest against the treatment their nationalities were receiving at home, and this guaranteed a liberal majority in the delegations from those two provinces.
\end{itemize}
the election of a large majority of lower house delegates who opposed the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In the upper house, however, only supporters of the emperor's policies were elected. Only 26 of the 60 delegates as a whole could be counted upon to oppose the emperor's Balkan policies.

The debate over the address to the throne began on November 4 after the delegation of the lower house had been selected. Hohenwart delivered the most effective speech for the conservatives, while Otto Hausner was the best orator for the liberal cause. Hohenwart characterized those who refused to support the monarchy's Balkan policy as unpatriotic and demanded an address which would make positive suggestions for future policies and not just give negative criticism.\textsuperscript{26} Hausner, in contrast, compared the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina with the three partitions of his native Poland in the previous century. He also pointed out that an occupation of the area would violate the constitutional law of 1867.\textsuperscript{27}

Since the address had been edited to conform to the wishes of the Constitutional Landowners' Club, it passed easily, with 160 representatives in favor and 70 opposed.\textsuperscript{28} Jubilantly, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} asserted that the outcome of the vote demonstrated that the Constitution Party had

\textsuperscript{26}Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13002-13005.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., pp. 13051-13057.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., pp. 13064-13065.
reunited itself\textsuperscript{29} and had, at the same time, performed a heroic service in favor of constitutional government in Cisleithania.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} declared, the sheer size of the majority for the address assured continued liberal rule in Cisleithania for years to come.\textsuperscript{31}

Although the Constitution Party liberals who opposed the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina had seemingly won a victory when the address to the throne passed, it was an ephemeral one. After the deletions made by the committee, the address contained little of substantive value. Nothing had been at stake but prestige, and there was little even of that. Of far greater importance than the address itself was the fact that the debates over the address made it clear that the Constitutional Landowners' Club would not go very far in opposing the emperor, but the liberals and other observers on the scene failed to notice this ominous sign.

The feeling of victory among liberals was enhanced by the results of another vote taken immediately after the address was voted on. Since the sixty million gulden appropriated in June had long since been swallowed up by the costs of the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the ministry asked the house on October 25 for authority to issue bonds worth

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\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Neue Freie Presse}, November 5, 1878, p. 1.
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\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}, November 7, 1878, pp. 1-2.
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\textsuperscript{31}As a prediction, this must rank with the same paper's statement that the Congress of Berlin could not change one word of the Treaty of San Stefano. \textit{Ibid.}, March 14, 1878, p. 1.
\end{flushright}
twenty-five million gulden to cover immediate costs.\textsuperscript{32} The bill proposing such authorization was sent to the budget committee, which was chaired by Herbst. It not only rendered an unfavorable report but also added to it a motion requesting that the government immediately submit the Treaty of Berlin to the lower house for ratification.\textsuperscript{33} Even though Stremayr, acting for Auersperg, had already submitted the text of the treaty to the house on November 4, Herbst's motion passed less than fifteen minutes after the vote on the address was completed.\textsuperscript{34} In this instance, the landowners again voted along with those who followed Herbst. The liberals who followed Herbst were jubilant. If the anti-occupation bloc would stick together, they felt sure that they could prevent the permanent occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

There were signs, however, that the majority would not hold together. In speaking of the address to the throne, Baron Peter Pirquet, from Lower Austria, voiced the real feelings of most of his comrades in the Constitutional Landowner's Club when he admitted that "we only voted for it halfheartedly."\textsuperscript{35} Because the liberal nobles were reluctant to vote

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 875.
\item[33] Ibid., No. 879.
\item[34] Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13065.
\end{footnotes}
against the emperor, there was a serious danger that Herbst's
determination to turn the issues of the occupation and the
Treaty of Berlin into a test of party loyalty might produce a
dangerous split in the ranks of the Constitution Party.

As soon as the debate over the address to the throne
ended, the members of the Cisleithanian delegation went to
Budapest for the session of the delegations which began on
November 7. The liberals were in a minority in the delega-
tion as a whole, but they dominated both the budget committee,
of which Herbst was chairman, and a committee which screened
bills before presenting them to the full body.\footnote{Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle der Delegation
des Reichsrathes, 11th session (Vienna: Kaiserlich-Königliche
Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1879), pp. 4-5.}

The Balkan question did not come before the Cislei-
thanian delegation as a whole until November 21, 1878, when
Andrássy personally introduced a request that a credit of
41,270,000 gulden be added to the 60,000,000 gulden appropri-
ated the previous March as well as another bill providing suf-
cient money to maintain the Habsburg army in Bosnia and
Hercegovina until December 31, 1879.\footnote{Ibid., p. 23.} The budget committee
under Herbst, however, had included a critique of the occupa-
tion in its report on the ministry of war which was published
on November 21, and recommended 432,928 gulden less than the
war ministry had requested. The budget committee justified

\footnote{Stenographische Sitzungs-Protokolle der Delegation
des Reichsrathes, 11th session (Vienna: Kaiserlich-Königliche
Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1879), pp. 4-5.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 23.}
the lesser amount by pointing to the strain which the occupation had placed on the financial resources of the monarchy.  

Andrássy and the liberals having fired their opening guns on November 21, the debate between them continued on November 22, in a dispute over whether or not the army should purchase a new rifle (the Werndl) for its troops. Nikolaus Dumba, a liberal from Lower Austria, declared that the financial position of the monarchy had been hurt so badly by the extraordinary costs of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that he and his liberal colleagues would, out of sheer patriotism, vote to cut the army budget. To use all of the monarchy's credit sources now, he argued, would mean that nothing would be left if a real emergency came along. Andrássy tried to argue that the occupation and the new rifle were separate questions, but Dumba's rejoinder that the financial position of the monarchy was indeed relevant to any question involving money won him the argument as far as most of the delegates were concerned.  

Neither Andrássy nor the liberals ordinarily descended to such petty measures as they did in the debate over the Werndl rifle. They were angry with one another, and the result was an atmosphere of distrust in which wild rumors

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38 Ibid., p. 41.
39 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
40 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
41 Ibid., p. 73.
flourished and tempers flared. The foreign minister of the monarchy and the political leaders of the liberals could no longer speak to one another in a calm and reasonable manner.

On November 24, only three days after the bill itself was introduced, the delegation budget committee report on the extraordinary credit bill to cover the costs of the civil administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina appeared, and it widened the gap between Andrásy and Herbst, for the committee stated that the crédit could not be constitutionally acted upon by the delegations before the Treaty of Berlin was ratified by the Cisleithanian and Hungarian parliaments. Until then, the committee contended, Austria-Hungary had no legal right to administer the two provinces. Andrásy was helpless against the budget committee in this instance, not only because the committee was legally right but also because he was unable to convince members of the delegation in private conversations to pass the credit bill anyway in spite of the constitutional objections to it. Even some Poles and other

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42 The Neue Freie Presse on November 10, 1878, p. 2, printed a rumor that a bargain to depose Andrásy had been struck between the liberals and the delegates from the upper house. While this rumor was false, the fact that it was printed at all illustrates the atmosphere of distrust pervading the Cisleithanian delegation at this time.

43 Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation, 11th session, pp. 145–146.

44 See the Neue Freie Presse, November 26, 1878, p. 1, for an interesting account of the budget committee session of November 24, 1878. See also Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, Vol. II, p. 453.
normally solid supporters of the government were willing to vote against the government on this issue because they believed that the liberal position was correct. 45

Finding himself without the necessary support to pass the credit bill, Andrássy recommended to the delegation that it delay its consideration of the special credit for Bosnia and Hercegovina for another day. 46 On November 28, after attending a crown council meeting the previous day, he finally withdrew the credit bill from consideration until after the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest had ratified the Treaty of Berlin. 47

The liberals won a great victory in forcing Andrássy to withdraw the credit bill for the civil administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina, but it was a Pyrrhic victory, for after they had defeated Andrássy both he and the emperor determined to destroy them. With the emperor's blessings, Andrássy maneuvered to defeat the liberal opposition in their stronghold: the budget committee. On November 30, 1878, he defended his policies before that committee with consummate skill. Declaring that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina was necessary to protect the monarchy against Pan-Slavism and South Slav nationalism, as well as to save Dalmatia as a

46 Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation, 11th session, pl 110.
47 Ibid.
Habsburg province, he promised the committee that the troops would be withdrawn when all danger to the monarchy vanished in the area. These dangers, he explained, included the possibility of losing Dalmatia, enemies along Austria-Hungary's communications with the Orient, the threat of revolution in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the continuing growth of South Slav nationalism, and, finally, the peril that the two provinces might be occupied by another Great Power. He assured the liberals that if annexation of the two provinces to the monarchy were ever contemplated, the legislative bodies of the empire would be consulted. Even though Herbst and his allies greeted Andrássy's remarks with "ironic laughs," the foreign minister made such a good impression on the delegation as a whole that he won the support of the large majority for the government's position.

The occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina proved to be an expensive financial burden for the Dual Monarchy. So also were other costs connected with the administration of the two provinces. Since 1875 refugees had fled into Habsburg territory from Bosnia and Hercegovina to escape the Turkish repression of the rebellion. They had fled primarily to Dalmatia, where a permanent refugee community was created which overtaxed the resources of that small, poor, province. By November, 1878,

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48 Neue Freie Presse, December 1, 1878, p. 1.
50 Neue Freie Presse, December 1, 1878, p. 1.
the number of refugees had increased to more than twenty thousand, and since the resources of Dalmatia were too limited to provide for them, the delegations voted more than seven and a half million gulden to provide for their maintenance.\footnote{51}

Even though various delegates, particularly the liberals, grumbled about the "vagabonds" who had the temerity to burden the Habsburg state by having babies while living in Dalmatia, on December 4, 1878, the delegations voted another 1,360,000 gulden to care for them, but this time a rider was attached to the bill demanding an investigation of the entire refugee problem.\footnote{53}

The liberals continued to needle the government in early December on matters associated with the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. On December 4, an interpellation signed by Sturm and five other liberals asked the government to set a date for the release of the reservists drafted into the army for the Bosnian campaign.\footnote{54} Although this was not an attempt to vote the government down, it was another liberal incursion into an area that Francis Joseph regarded as exclusively his—military affairs—and could only have the effect of irritating him still further.

The liberal campaign in the Cisleithanian delegation

\footnote{51}{\underline{Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation}, 11th session, p. 172.}

\footnote{52}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 167-168.}

\footnote{53}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 168.}

\footnote{54}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 170.}
against the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy reached its climax on December 5, when the report of the budget committee on the foreign ministry appropriation was taken up for consideration. Herbst and Dr. Wilhelm Schauf, a liberal from Upper Austria, combined to induce the committee to draft a report condemning Andrásy in the strongest terms and cutting 225,000 gulden from the foreign ministry budget. In the report, Herbst repeated all the liberal charges against the foreign minister: he had lied to secure passage of the 60,000,000 gulden credit; he had occupied Bosnia and Hercegovina without securing the consent of parliament; and he had attempted to secure funds for the continued occupation and administration of the two provinces even before the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest had ratified the Treaty of Berlin. Moreover, Herbst asserted, the expenses connected with the occupation had severely damaged the financial structure of the imperial government, and the fault was Andrásy's.\textsuperscript{55}

Andrássy did not lack defenders in the debate that followed, and some came from the ranks of the Constitution Party. Baron Ludwig von Oppenheimer, a member of the Constitutional Landowners' Club, declared that, although he had not desired the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, he had no choice but to support it now that it was an accomplished fact. Andrásy, he maintained, proved his good faith by waiting as long as he could before ordering the Habsburg army to occupy

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., pp. 237-243.
the two provinces. He could have done so in 1875.56

The speakers in the debate alternated according to their views on the occupation. The first to present the case against Andrásy's policies was Giskra, who blasted Andrásy for having allowed Russia to take Bessarabia and thereby gain control of the mouth of the Danube, through which a great deal of Austro-Hungarian commerce passed. The monarchy's compensation for this Russian stranglehold on its trade, he pointed out scornfully, was nothing but a "poor province" which, in any event, could not be held against the South Slav nationalists in Serbia and Montenegro who coveted it. Since his policy was obviously a failure, Giskra demanded that Andrásy should either resign or become a real parliamentary minister.57

Dr. Julian Dunajewski, speaking for the Poles, replied to Giskra's charges by arguing that Austria-Hungary was bringing civilization to the Balkans. Unlike the Turks, the Austrians were respecting individual and national rights in the area. Even though he agreed with Giskra that the Habsburg state would sooner or later have to fight a war with the South Slavs, he maintained that the very threat of such a conflict made it imperative for Austria-Hungary to control as many South Slavs as possible.58

56 Ibid., pp. 177-181.
57 Ibid., pp. 181-190.
58 Ibid., pp. 190-195.
Kuranda, for the liberals, characterized Andrásy's conditions for a Habsburg withdrawal from Bosnia and Hercegovina as ridiculous, for they could be fulfilled only "when the wolf lies down with the lamb, and the tiger with the child," and Dr. Michael Kláic supported the occupation as the first step in the creation of a triple monarchy--Cisleithania, Hungaria, and "Yugoslavia"--with all South Slavs united under the Habsburg scepter.  

On December 6, the debate continued. Herbst presented another essential portion of the liberal attack on Andrásy's policies by questioning the monarchy's legal right to administer Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Habsburg empire, he maintained, had signed no convention with the Ottoman empire, as Britain had in regard to Cyprus. Even the right of a European congress to turn over land belonging to one state to the administration of another state was problematic at best.  

All three common ministers defended the government's policies. Baron Leopold von Hoffmann, the common minister of finance, declared that the fiscal condition of the monarchy had never been better, so the empire could easily bear the burden of the occupation, especially since Russia, the major potential enemy of the dual state, was financially weak.  

59 Ibid., p. 195.  
60 Ibid., pp. 198-203.  
61 Ibid., pp. 255-264.  
62 Ibid., pp. 270-272.
Count Arthur von Bylandt-Rheidt, the common minister of war, defended the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina on military grounds, citing the extreme vulnerability of Dalmatia to attack by land if Bosnia and Hercegovina were not firmly under Habsburg control.63

Andrássy was the last to speak. He began by declaring that he would consider a favorable vote on the report of the budget committee as a vote of confidence. The government had never intended to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina, he declared. It only intended to occupy them. Moreover, the occupation had not been carried out in agreement with Russia. The occupation was necessary to protect the Habsburg monarchy against Pan-Slavism and South Slav nationalism. Austria-Hungary had a perfect legal right, he stated, to have troops in Bosnia and Hercegovina, for international treaties were binding on those who signed them, and the Turks had signed the Treaty of Berlin, which gave the Dual Monarchy its mandate to occupy and administer the two provinces.64

Both sides backed away from a final confrontation, and thus no vote was actually ever taken on the report of the budget committee. Only the foreign ministry budget was voted on, and no attempt was made to restore the funds which Herbst had cut from the foreign office budget.65 Nonetheless, the

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63Ibid., pp. 272-274.
64Ibid., pp. 274-286.
65Ibid., p. 290.
budget committee report on the foreign ministry and the debate over it represented an important milestone in the conflict between the emperor and the Constitution Party, for only in the delegations could Herbst and Andrásy meet and debate face to face.66 As a consequence of that debate the constitutional landowners reaffirmed their determination to vote with Andrásy and the emperor on the occupation issue by voting on December 4 against the recommendations of a majority of the budget committee, in favor of an appropriation of twenty million gulden instead of fifteen million to support the Hapsburg troops in Bosnia and Hercegovina until the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest could consider the Treaty of Berlin.67 Thus the liberals were soundly defeated in their efforts to limit the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The liberal defeat in the Cisleithanian delegation on December 4, 1878, came only after a long string of victories over the supporters of Andrásy's policies which stretched back to October 22, when Pretis was rejected as prime minister in an expression of anger at the way the government had treated parliament. Even the Constitutional Landowners' Club shared this anger. The rejection of Pretis as prime minister was one way to express this frustration; another was to attempt to

66 By law, Andrásy could not appear before either the Cisleithanian or Hungarian parliaments.

67 Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation, 11th session, pp. 294-315.
thwart the government's plan to remain in Bosnia and Hercegovina. A majority of the Constitution Party, though not the Constitutional Landowners' Club, dedicated itself to this goal. The address to the throne, the Reichsrat's rejection of the special 25,000,000 gulden credit for the civil administration of the two provinces, and the postponement of the bills in the delegation providing for a permanent civil administration and military occupation force in Bosnia and Hercegovina were all part of a concerted plan to deny the emperor the means to implement his foreign policy. The climax was to come in January, 1879, when the Treaty of Berlin was to come before the Reichsrat for ratification. Unfortunately, the leaders of the anti-occupation forces forgot that Andrassy's policy was also that of the emperor and that a majority of the Constitution Party was not necessarily a majority of the Reichsrat.
CHAPTER VII

THE DEBATE OVER THE TREATY OF BERLIN

The Reichsrat met again on December 10, 1878, shortly after the session of the delegations ended. Its major tasks were to pass a one-year extension of the army bill of 1868 and to ratify the Treaty of Berlin.

According to the army law of 1868, the strength of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces was fixed for a period of ten years at 800,000 men. One year before this period was to elapse, the Hungarian and Cisleithanian parliaments were to establish a new figure for the total number of soldiers in the army, which then could not be changed for another ten years.\footnote{Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaisertum Oesterreich, 1868, pp. 439-440.}

The situation in the Balkans was such in 1877 and 1878, however, that the Reichsrat not only could not reduce the size of the army, for the military forces had to remain at full strength to meet all possible crises, but had to increase it to provide men for the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Due to these "unfavorable circumstances," as the committee considering the army law referred to them,\footnote{Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 893, p. 1.} as well as to the

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precarious position of the Auersperg government, nearly all of 1878 passed without any consideration of a new army bill. Instead, the army law of 1868 was merely extended for one year, thus leaving it to the new government which would come into power after the elections of 1879 to deal with the problem.

As with all other bills before the house, that favoring an extension of the army law for a single year was sent to a committee which, like all the other committees in the lower house, was dominated by the liberals. The Constitution Party had long advocated saving money by reducing the army to 600,000 men and severely restricting recruitment. Both the army and the emperor opposed the liberal proposals, for they believed it imperative to maintain a large army in order to keep step with the other Great Powers of Europe, and the emperor simply could not understand how the liberals could deny him a large army at a time of crisis just after that army had proven its worth in a bloody guerrilla war. Many liberals also disagreed with the committee's action, but for a different reason: they felt that either the government should be compelled to recommend a new law or that the committee

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3Ibid.


5Ibid.

6Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 893.
should write one itself. These liberals came, for the most part, from the Progress Club, and they forced a debate on the army bill to express their discontent with the government. 7

All four speakers who signed up 8 at the beginning of the debate on December 19, 1878, were against the committee's motion to extend the army bill for one year. They argued that there had never been any real danger of war in 1877 or early 1878, that there was no need to put off serious consideration of a new army bill for another year, and that a reduction in manpower would mean that the remaining troops could be better trained and equipped. 9 In addition, they complained about the failure of either the emperor or the Constitution Party to resolve the ministerial crisis. 10

Those favoring the committee's bill, including liberals who sympathized with the four above speakers but who could see no point in delaying the inevitable, retorted that no time was left to write a new army law and that with Russian troops still in Bulgaria it was not appropriate to engage in sweeping army reforms. 11 Although the final result was never

7Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13127-13128.

8Speakers who signed up got precedence in the speaking order.

9Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13139.

10Ibid., p. 13133.

11For the majority view, see Horst's speech in Ibid., pp. 13152-13159.
in doubt, the stormy and tumultuous debate was one more symptom of liberal discontent with the government, and the passage of the committee's motion\textsuperscript{12} did nothing to ease the tension.\textsuperscript{13} While the debate over the army bill was merely a gesture of liberal discontent with the imperial government, the debate over the Treaty of Berlin was not. In fact, the army bill had been put off for a year for the purpose of giving parliament time to deal adequately with the treaty.

The debate between the government and a majority of the Constitution Party over the Treaty of Berlin began on December 10, 1878, when the supporters of the emperor introduced a bill to incorporate a tiny area known as Spizza into Dalmatia. They contended that this was the only portion of the Treaty of Berlin that the Reichsrat could legally ratify.\textsuperscript{14} The liberals, in rebuttal, asserted parliament's right to ratify the entire treaty when they moved that the entire treaty be considered by a special committee of eighteen representatives.\textsuperscript{15}

Georg Lienbacher, a clerical from Salzburg, repeated

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 13200–13201.

\textsuperscript{13}In February, 1879, Plener still demanded army cut-backs before he would join the ministry. The famous battle between Taaffe and the Constitution Party over the army bill, which took place in December, 1879, was an outgrowth of this debate.

\textsuperscript{14}Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13071. For the bill, see Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, No. 885.

\textsuperscript{15}Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13075.
the conservative assertion that the only portion of the Treaty of Berlin which the Reichsrat could ratify was that incorporating Spizza into the monarchy. The remainder of the treaty was before the house for that body's information only, for the Reichsrat could not ratify the acts of a congress of the Great Powers. If it possessed this right, no treaty would be valid for months after it was signed and thus would be a worthless document. Lienbacher therefore moved that the Treaty of Berlin be passed over and the house move on to the next item on its agenda—the equivalent of tabling in American parliamentary practice.16

Sturm pointed out to Lienbacher that all government bills had to go to committee, and since the Treaty of Berlin had been introduced by Streimayr on November 4 like any other bill, it too would have to be considered by a committee before it could be considered by the lower house as a whole.17 Rechbauer, the president of the house, backed Sturm's position,18 as did Russ with quotes from the 1867 debates over the new constitutional law.19 Lienbacher called on Streimayr to support his position,20 but the minister remarked only that since the government had introduced the bill incorporating

16 For Lienbacher, see Ibid., p. 13075.
17 Ibid., pp. 13075-13076.
18 Ibid., p. 13076.
19 Ibid., pp. 13078-13079.
20 Ibid., p. 13078.
Spiazza into the monarchy there was no doubt as to its position in the matter.\textsuperscript{21}

Encouraged by Stremayr's lack of support for Lienbacher, the liberals pressed their attack. Demel scornfully pointed out that the minister had clarified nothing and reaffirmed the lower house's right to ratify the Treaty of Berlin,\textsuperscript{22} and Herbst maintained that since the delegation only a few days before had refused to consider the government's requests for money to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina until after the treaty was ratified by the Reichsrat, the latter body had to act on the ratification of the treaty.\textsuperscript{23}

The liberals won a victory when Lienbacher's motion was defeated\textsuperscript{24} and the liberal motion to establish a special committee to consider the treaty was adopted.\textsuperscript{25} The right of parliament to ratify the Treaty of Berlin was successfully asserted because the entire Constitution Party was united on the question; where it split was over the question of how the treaty should be ratified.\textsuperscript{26}

On December 11, the committee on the Treaty of Berlin

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., pp. 13078-13079.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 13079.

\textsuperscript{24}At the same time, a nuisance motion by Schönerer was also voted down. Ibid., pp. 13081-13082.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}Sueß, Erinnerungen, p. 291.
was elected by the house. Even though sixteen of the eighteen members of the committee belonged to the Constitution Party, five of the committee who belonged to that party were landowners who favored the treaty, and one was a Ruthene. In addition, both Plener and Sueß, who favored the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, were members of the committee, as were Herbst, Sturm, and Kopp, who opposed the occupation. 27

The committee then met from December 12 to December 18, 1878, to consider the annexation of Spizza to the monarchy and the Treaty of Berlin. 28

Although the liberals won when the committee voted that the Reichsrat did have to ratify the Treaty of Berlin for it to be valid, 29 they were otherwise beaten. The temper of the committee was clearly seen when, of all the various motions and resolutions presented, 30 only that offered by Baron Max Scharschmid, a constitutional landowner, passed. He proposed simply to ratify the treaty without any resolutions or expressions of opinion on the part of the lower house of the Reichsrat that might offend the emperor. 31 Herbst and his followers on the committee then issued a minority report

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27 *Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13088.*

28 *Ibid., p. 13093.*

29 *Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, 896, p. 3."

30 *Ibid., p. 2.*

which recommended that the treaty be ratified but which also
would have the house condemn the Balkan policy of the mon-
archy.  

Although the committee's majority and minority reports
were ready by December 18, the treaty did not appear on the
schedule of the house until it reconvened on January 15
because of the Christmas vacation. As soon as the house met,
it immediately resumed its deliberations over the Treaty of
Berlin. Sueß, speaking for the committee majority, affirmed
the right of the house to ratify the treaty, read the com-
mittee motion, and sat down.  

Next, Herbst, in his capacity
as spokesman for the minority on the committee, expressed his
belief that although the house had no recourse but to ratify
the treaty, it was, nevertheless, duty-bound to express its
views on that treaty and to declare once more its distaste for
military adventures in the Balkans. The house had to make it
clear to the imperial government that it was ratifying a fait
accompli with which it violently disagreed but which it had no
choice but to accept.  

The debate over the Treaty of Berlin lasted until
January 27, 1879. Of the liberals who followed Herbst, most
declared that they would vote to ratify the treaty but only

32 Verhandlungen des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, 896, p. 3.

33 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13216-13217.

34 Ibid., pp. 13217-13220.
because they felt they had no other choice. A small minority, however, mostly from the Progress Club, declared their intention to vote against any motion, including Herbst's in favor of ratification. This latter group included a few Poles, who were ready to vote against any treaty signed by Russia.

Otto Hausner, one of these renegade Poles, asserted that the Treaty of Berlin was a disaster for the Dual Monarchy. It was not concerned with justice and the protection of peace, with humanity and national independence, he insisted.\textsuperscript{35} No treaty had ever been further from the ideal set forth by Grotius,\textsuperscript{36} for in it "everything [was] permitted to the strong, while everything [was] demanded from the weak."\textsuperscript{37} It had been hastily thrown together, he said, and was unworthy of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{38}

Hausner pointed out that the Berlin covenant required Austria-Hungary to come to an agreement with Turkey before the two provinces were to be occupied, and this had not been done. In addition, he declared, every peace treaty contained detailed provisions for its enforcement, yet Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin had none. The final result of so poorly written a treaty, he said, was to bring ruin on the Dual Monarchy. He

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13433.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13434.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13436. Here Hausner was referring to the clause which required Romania to give equal treatment to all its citizens, including Jews. Nothing was said about the treatment Jews received in Russia.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13433.
ended by moving that parliament pass over the treaty until a responsible ministry existed in Cisleithania. 39

Julian Dunajewski, representing the ultraconservatives, argued that parliament had no right either to approve or to reject the treaty. To send to a European Congress representatives not fully empowered to act in their country's name would, in his eyes, be politically irresponsible. Moreover, to make the acts of a European Congress dependent on parliamentary approval for their validity would reduce such congresses to absurdity and lead to war. The Cisleithanian constitution had to be interpreted according to its spirit, not its letter, he declared, and that spirit was that military and foreign affairs were the spheres of the emperor and the delegations and not of the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest. Furthermore, he felt that the Treaty of Berlin did not impose a "burden" on the monarchy in the sense that the constitution meant, for the costs of the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina were military in nature and thus outside parliament's competence.

The core of Dunajewski's argument, however, was that while the constitution stated that parliament had the right to ratify "treaties of commerce and state," the Treaty of Berlin, in his opinion, was neither. Obviously, it was not a trade agreement, and the "state treaties" which the Austrian parliament could ratify were those involving only Cisleithania. The Berlin agreement had a far wider scope; hence, parliament

39 Ibid., pp. 13425-13439.
had no right to ratify it. According to Dunajewski, "that had to have been the intent of the lawmakers, if they did not want to make a foreign policy for the monarchy completely impossible" by subjecting it to the whims of parliament. Although Dunajewski was not opposed to the right of a people to decide its own fate, he did not believe that it was in the interest of the monarchy to give the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest a right that no other European parliament except the British (where parliament was a true sovereign) possessed. Dunajewski declared as well that parliament would be ridiculed for exceeding its powers if it ratified the treaty\textsuperscript{41} and condemned Herbst's argument that parliament had a duty to speak out on the great issues of the day by pointing out that that right belonged to the citizenry, not to parliament.\textsuperscript{42} He ended by moving that the Treaty of Berlin should be acknowledged ("zur Kenntnis genommen") but not ratified. To do otherwise would, in his eyes, be unconstitutional and dangerous.\textsuperscript{43}

Johann Fux, a liberal opposed to the Treaty of Berlin, attempted to circumvent the majority committee motion by offering a restatement of the original address to the throne proposed by Kopp in October, to be voted on only if the minority

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 13231.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., p. 13232.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}The entire speech may be found in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 13227-13233.
motion did not pass.\textsuperscript{44}

Scharschmid, undaunted by his failure in the committee in December to find a middle ground on which the entire Constitution Party could stand, presented a resolution carefully designed to be acceptable to all wings of the party. It was divided into two paragraphs. The first was vague, merely affirming the views in the address to the throne and asking the government once again to take note of the address. The second was much more specific. It asked that administrative costs in Bosnia and Hercegovina be covered by taxes raised in the two provinces themselves and that any permanent public works built in the two provinces which were not necessary for the support of the occupation forces and which were not paid for by local taxes be kept to an absolute minimum.\textsuperscript{45} Schar-

schmid defended his resolution by declaring that while he rejected the minority motion as too negative, he felt that parliament did have a duty to express its opinion of the oc-

cupation.\textsuperscript{46}

Scharschmid's hopes for unity were blasted by Pirquet, who declared that since the situation had changed after the Progress Club's address was agreed upon he and most of the other Constitutional Landowners had changed their minds about the emperor's policy. Turkey had demonstrated its utter

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 13233-13244.

\textsuperscript{45}The full text of Scharschmid's resolution can be found in \textit{ibid.}, p. 13377.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 13477.
weakness by permitting a rebellion to continue in Albania; some other power therefore had to take Bosnia and Hercegovina in charge, and that other power could only be Austria-Hungary.

Pirquet poured scorn on Herbst and those who followed him:

When you pass judgement on policies, gentlemen, [he asked] why do you advance no political program yourselves: . . . . The minority [Herbst and his faction] . . . . throws it up to us that we only want to pass a bare resolution without adding anything to it. I believe there must certainly be something to find in this bareness; otherwise, no one would strive so hard to prevent its passage. . . .

At the time of the address, the minority took over the leadership of the governing party and carried us along with it; now this leadership is faltering. He who wants to lead the crowd must show it the way; if he cannot do so, the crowd will seek its own path. 47

To the argument that the house had to remain faithful to its views as expressed in the address to the throne, Pirquet replied that the representatives of the people should keep an open mind and be ready to change their views without referring to the stenographic protocols ["if they have a bad memory"] 48 to find out what they thought on the matter months before. Pirquet still thought of himself as a constitutionalist and was very angry at the opponents of the occupation because they were splitting the party to no good end over a useless issue. 49 Pirquet's speech was important because he gave voice to the views of most of the landowners, who considered themselves ill-used by the Herbst wing of the party.

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47 Ibid., p. 13388.
48 Ibid., p. 13389.
49 Ibid., pp. 13387-13393.
On January 18 Dr. Josef Unger, minister without portfolio, placed the cabinet firmly behind Dunajewski's contention that the Reichsrat did not have the right either to ratify or to reject the Treaty of Berlin and thus completed the breach between the Auersperg cabinet and the Constitution Party as a whole, for even the Constitutional Landowners' Club believed that the Reichsrat possessed the power to ratify all treaties.\(^50\) Unger's speech was not merely a declaration, however; it was a challenge to the Constitution Party to vote as the emperor wished or take the consequences.

Herbst, speaking in his role as spokesman for the committee minority, accepted Unger's challenge when he stated at the close of the debate that:

> I am in a position publicly to declare, in the name of the other adherents of the minority, that we will never vote for the majority motion and that if the minority motion is not carried, we will vote in the only way which, under those conditions, would be consistent with our convictions, namely, to vote for the defeat of the Treaty of Berlin.\(^51\)

The gauntlet had been thrown down by those who supported the emperor, and Herbst had picked it up. If the minority motion did not pass, Herbst and his followers would vote not to ratify the treaty. What was more, Herbst pointed out to the assembled deputies that an election lay ahead in the near future, and that while ministers might be responsible to parliament, parliament was responsible to the people it

\(^{50}\) Ibid., pp. 13303-13313.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 13475.
represented. This was a direct threat to any liberal deputies who might vote against him that they need not look for party support at the polls if they did so.

Sueß replied to Herbst's threats by praising Herbst's long years of service on behalf of the "constitution, freedom, and security" of the state, and by wondering aloud whether the majority and minority reports of the committee were so important that they were worth the party splits and angry words that had resulted from the battles over them. Pointing out that the entire Constitution Party agreed that the Reichsrat had the right to accept or reject the Treaty of Berlin, he attempted to prove that the treaty should be ratified. After repeating the major arguments in favor of the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina—the military security of Dalmatia, better control of the monarchy's trade routes in the Balkans, and protection against the threat of South Slav nationalism—he ended by stating that parliament should adhere closely to its areas of competence and not add resolutions merely repeating what it had already declared once at considerable length, especially not if doing so meant the break-up of the Constitution Party.53

The Neue Freie Presse supported Herbst against Sueß in the internecine liberal battle over the Treaty of Berlin. On January 15, 1879, it warned all deputies that a vote for the

52 Ibid., pp. 13474-13486.

53 Ibid., pp. 13486-13497.
majority motion would condemn the man who cast it, no matter why he had done so,\textsuperscript{54} and on January 20 it declared that all of the motions and resolutions offered up to then would fail because of a lack of unity among the liberals. This lack of unity was blamed especially on the Constitutional Landowner's Club,\textsuperscript{55} which the \textit{Neue Freie Presse} expected to vote for the majority motion.\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Das Vaterland}, by contrast, though it agreed with Dunajewski's statements concerning the right of parliament to ratify the treaty, concluded pragmatically that if that right was going to be established, the treaty should at least be ratified.\textsuperscript{57}

On January 27, 1879, the house voted on the Treaty of Berlin immediately after the concluding speeches by Herbst and Sueß. First to come up for a vote were those motions which, if successful, would automatically have tabled both the minority and majority motions of the committee. The house also decided to have roll-call votes on Dunajewski's motion and the majority motion instead of voting en masse as it usually did.\textsuperscript{58}

Two motions to table, including Hausner's,\textsuperscript{59} went down to quick defeat by votes of 203 to 58 and 229 to 32. They

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, January 15, 1879, pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, January 20, 1879, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, January 17, 1879, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Das Vaterland}, January 16, 1879, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses,} 8th session, \textit{Vol. XII}, pp. 13498-13499.
\textsuperscript{59} See \textit{ante}, p. 163.
failed for a number of reasons, chief among them the desire of the liberals to establish parliament's right to ratify important treaties and the contrasting desire of the conservatives to prove that parliament did not have that right. Only if Dunajewski's motion was successful could they do so, and thus they had to vote against any motion to table the treaty. In the event, Dunajewski was beaten by a vote of 181 to 90. The liberals had successfully defended the right of parliament to ratify treaties; even the Constitutional Landowners' Club voted against Dunajewski's motion.  

Herbst and the committee minority fared no better than Dunajewski, however, as their motion was crushed by a vote of 172 to 78. The landowners and the Left Club joined the conservatives and clericals against it. Herbst may also have lost some votes from the extreme anti-occupation liberals in the Progress Club, who oddly enough, voted against the minority motion in order to gain votes from Herbst and his followers against the majority motion, which came up next and passed 154 to 112. Only Scharschmid of all the deputies who had offered resolutions to accompany ratification had any success; all the others were voted down. His first vague paragraph passed 149 to 111, but the second, a more specific condemnation of the Balkan policy of the monarchy, failed.  

The majority wing of the Constitution Party thus met

60 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13500-13501.
61 Ibid., pp. 13501-13505.
defeat at the hands of a coalition of conservatives, clericals, Poles, constitutional landowners, and the "Bosnian Left," the latter made up of liberals who, like Sueß and Plener, believed that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a forward step for the monarchy. The latter two groups had been the true cause of Herbst's defeat, for of the 154 votes in favor of the majority motion, thirty-six came from the Constitutional Landowners' Club and twenty-nine from the Bosnian Left. These 65 men represented more than a third of the vote to ratify the treaty; had they gone the other way, the Treaty of Berlin would have been rejected, or the minority motion passed, by the old two-to-one Constitution Party majority. Indeed, had the Bosnian Left alone voted with Herbst, the treaty would have failed by sixteen votes, though they could not have saved the minority motion. In the end, however, the Bosnian Left and the Constitutional Landowners' Club could not or would not oppose the emperor's foreign policy—some, like Sueß and Plener, because they agreed with it; others, like many of the landowners, because they felt that foreign policy belonged exclusively in the emperor's domain. Of the parliamentary members of the Constitution Party, these men alone were willing to abide with the bargain made in 1867 between Francis Joseph and that party to allow foreign and military affairs to remain within the purview of the emperor in return for control over domestic policy. Herbst and his followers had not kept that bargain, for they had, when it counted, voted against the Treaty of Berlin and the occupation
credits. In this sense, the Constitution Party was the architect of its own destruction. Herbst and his followers themselves cut the string that upheld the sword of Damocles.

As a postscript, the upper house of the Reichsrat, unanimously and with no debate, ratified the Treaty of Berlin on February 6, 1879. The Hungarian parliament followed suit on March 27, 1879.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1879 IN Cisleithania

In spite of the defeats the Constitution Party had suffered in the debate over the Treaty of Berlin, the Neue Freie Presse looked optimistically toward the elections scheduled for the summer of 1879. The liberals, it felt, were still in a very strong electoral position, for although a majority of the party had gained the enmity of Francis Joseph by voting not to ratify the treaty, the election laws, unchanged since 1873, were so advantageous to the German liberal bourgeoisie that it seemed possible that the Constitution Party could win a majority in parliament even against the wishes of the emperor.

On February 14, 1879, the 112 representatives who had voted not to ratify the Treaty of Berlin on January 27 met, ostensibly to discuss ways and means of reducing costs in Bosnia and Hercegovina but in fact to organize themselves to dominate the Constitution Party during the impending electoral campaign. Herbst was especially determined to make each

\(^1\)Neue Freie Presse, January 26, 1879, pp. 1-4; January 28, 1879, pp. 1-2; and January 29, 1879, pp. 1-2.

\(^2\)Neue Freie Presse, February 15, 1879, p. 2.
deputy's vote on the majority motion ratifying the Treaty of Berlin into a test of his membership in the Constitution Party and thus invited only those who had voted against the majority motion to the meeting despite efforts by Dr. Anton Tomaszczuk, a Ruthenian liberal, to persuade him to open the meeting to representatives of all of the liberal factions, including the Constitutional Landowners' Club. Herbst refused.  

At the meeting, a committee of fourteen representatives was established to write an election platform and to make plans for the anticipated effort by all factions of the Constitution Party to lower the costs of the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as soon as parliament met again. On February 19 the Left Club endorsed the plans of the 112, declared that, despite its support of the majority motion, it too was concerned about reducing the costs of the occupation and would therefore, if permitted, send representatives to the committee of fourteen. The Progress Club simultaneously approved the aims of the 112.  

Herbst and Giskra added point to the formation of the 112 as a Constitution Party organization by resigning their seats in the Cisleithanian delegation on February 22 because,

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4 Neue Freie Presse, February 15, 1879, p. 2.
5 Ibid., February 20, 1879, p. 2.
they declared, they could not, after leading the liberals to vote against the treaty, then vote funds to administer Bosnia and Hercegovina. The two liberals were careful not to lose support for their views in the delegation, however; they were replaced by two constitutional landowners who had also voted against the treaty. Herbst and Giskra, in addition to publicizing their views by their sensational resignations, were also trying to conciliate the Constitutional Landowners' Club and thus selected members of that club as their replacements.

The committee of fourteen followed up Herbst's and Giskra's resignations from the Cisleithanian delegation by drafting a resolution calling for a two-pronged policy towards the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina: first, a definite time limit should be fixed for the occupation; second, the two parliaments in Vienna and Budapest should have some institutionalized role in governing the two provinces. Some of the committee members, led by Dr. Sturm, felt even more strongly than Herbst that the two provinces should be removed from the control of the common government; one of them, Josef Neuwirth from Moravia, proposed that the two parliaments should write the annual budget for the occupied provinces without

6 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, p. 13598.
7 Ibid., pp. 13630-13631.
8 Neue Freie Presse, February 22, 1879, p. 2.
9 Ibid., February 23, 1879, p. 3.
consulting their own delegations and thus take all power in Bosnia and Hercegovina to themselves.\textsuperscript{10} While the resolution produced by the committee was not so extreme, it did demand some say in Bosnian finances for the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest.\textsuperscript{11}

On February 26, the committee of fourteen sent its resolution on Bosnian affairs to Stremayr, the new prime minister, with a request that it be placed before the common ministerial council. Although Stremayr promised the committee members that he would do so, he also assured them that it would not meet with a favorable reception.\textsuperscript{12} for both he and, more significantly, the emperor believed that since the Reichsrat could not contribute funds to the administration of the two provinces, it could have no influence there.\textsuperscript{13}

Francis Joseph was not influenced in the least by the resolution of the committee of fourteen, for he was determined to control affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina himself. Even before all resistance had been broken in the Bosnian hills, he had ordered the Habsburg army to erect a rudimentary administrative structure for the conquered provinces. Military administration was extremely expensive, however, and for that

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Neue Freie Presse, Abendblatt, February 26, 1879, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
reason was only a temporary measure. In September, 1878, then, the emperor created the Bosnian Commission to rule the two provinces. Its five members were appointed by the three common ministers and the Cisleithanian and Hungarian governments; they were supervised by the common minister of foreign affairs. Since men appointed by his own ministers had a three to two majority on the commission, the emperor had complete control of the administrative structure of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Indeed, his control of the commission was even tighter than it appeared to be, for although the Cisleithanian and Hungarian governments did appoint their commission members, no funds were available to provide a staff for them. An informal system quickly arose under which employees of the ministry of foreign affairs carried on the routine work of the Bosnian Commission. Andrássy—and the emperor—thus tightened their control of the two provinces.

As liberal pressure to place Bosnia and Hercegovina under parliamentary control built up in February, 1879, the


15 Schmid, Bosnien und die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, p. 50.

16 Ibid. Peter Sugar states that the two governments alone appointed the commissioners (see his Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, p. 27) and that it would seem more likely for Andrássy to have had control of the two provinces from the outset since Hungarian officials were favored in the area. Ibid.
jerry-built structure of the Bosnian Commission seemed about to collapse from its own complexity. Something had to be done, and done quickly, or the Cisleithanian and Hungarian liberals would have valid grounds for claiming a role in the administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina. On February 28, therefore, the day after the delegations began their session, Francis Joseph cut the ground from under the feet of the liberals by ordering a whole new administrative structure for the two provinces. The common minister of finance was ordered to assume responsibility for Bosnia and Hercegovina, and a new advisory body, the Bosnian Bureau, was created to assist him in administering the two provinces. Incredibly, the Bosnian Commission was not abolished but rather was moved intact to the finance ministry, where it functioned as an advisory body to the Bosnian Bureau. 17

Two of the bills placed before the delegations when they met in Budapest on February 27, 1879, provided the funds the government had requested the previous November to cover all civil and military costs in Bosnia and Hercegovina during the year 1879. By 1880 Bosnia and Hercegovina should, in the opinion of the Bosnian Commission, which had drafted the bills, be able to pay enough taxes to support the civil administration, if not for the troops occupying them. 18

17 Schmid, Bosnien und die Herzegovina unter der Verwaltung Österreich-Ungarns, p. 50.

18 During the spring the government promised to introduce after the elections bills dealing specifically with
The bills dealing with the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina reached the floor of the Cisleithanian delegation together on March 11, 1879. The first of them asked forty million gulden to cover the costs of the occupation troops, while the second, a revival of the supplementary credit bill delayed by Herbst the previous November, asked 46,270,000 gulden to cover the costs of the civil administration, including an increase of five million gulden to reflect expenses already incurred. The military bill was rejected by the budget committee, which was still dominated by the liberals in spite of the absence of Herbst and Giskra. Instead of forty million gulden, the committee approved only thirty million, including the twenty million gulden passed by the delegation the previous December to cover military expenses in the two provinces until the Reichsrat could consider the Treaty of Berlin. In addition, the committee made two formal requests of the imperial government: first, that troop strength in the occupied lands be cut back as far as possible, and, second, that none of the money appropriated for the occupation forces in the two provinces be used under any conditions for civil administration or for public projects designed primarily to benefit the civilian population. 19

Even for the conservatives in the delegation, forty million gulden to support 50,000 men in the occupied area was

19 *Stenographische Protokolle der Delegation, 11th session, pp. 396-401.*
excessive when the budget for the entire Habsburg army (800,000 men) was only 75,000,000 gulden. No amount of railway construction could justify so huge a sum. The government thus met opposition from all of the delegates except the Poles, who voted against the committee motion not because they opposed the lower sum but rather because they could not agree with the words "under no conditions" limiting the appropriation to purely military uses. They argued that if a genuine emergency arose the government might have to use the money to meet it; it should not have its hands tied in advance. Rather than accept such a restriction on the government's freedom of action, the Poles would support the government request even though they did not agree with it. Grocholski then moved that the offending words be struck from the committee motion. 20

Russ, speaking for the liberals, pointed out that no one expected the regime to stand idly by if a genuine emergency arose in the occupied provinces and pointed out that if the words "under no conditions" were struck out without any change in the remainder of the motion, it would mean the opposite of what the committee had intended. 21 Andrássy gave evidence that the government was anxious to conciliate the liberals by stating that the government was not hostile to the

20 Ibid., p. 387.
21 Ibid.
motion as it stood, and his declaration enabled the committee motion to pass, 29 to 25. The government thus received only thirty million gulden instead of the forty million it had requested.

The credit bill for the civil administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina also received rough handling from the liberals on the budget committee, who accepted the entire bill as it stood except for the extra five million gulden, which they felt were unnecessary. The conservative members of the committee were strong enough, however, to separate the motion rejecting the extra five million gulden from that advocating the passage of the other forty-odd million—a parliamentary maneuver which virtually guaranteed a liberal defeat.

There was no debate on the credit bill itself, which passed easily, but the liberal attempt to reject the extra five million gulden occasioned a bitter debate. Pirquet, speaking for the conservatives on this question, agreed with the liberals that the five million gulden did not belong in the credit bill for the civil administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina. In his opinion, since the extra funds were to finance large-scale public works to be built by the army, five million gulden should be added to the army budget. He then

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pp. 385-387; 390.
24 Ibid., pp. 396-401
25 Ibid., p. 360.
moved that that be done.\textsuperscript{26} Russ retorted that the army had four million unspent gulden in its coffers already; if the public works mentioned by Pirquet were necessary to assure military control of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the army already possessed the means to build them. There was thus no excuse to strain the monarchy's financial structure any further for the sake of the occupation.\textsuperscript{27} After Pirquet pointed out that the unspent four million gulden were committed to other projects,\textsuperscript{28} his motion passed, 35 to 22, and the committee motion was defeated.\textsuperscript{29}

The March, 1879, session of the delegations was a success for the Cisleithanian liberals in their continuing battle with the imperial government over the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, for of the fifteen million gulden which they attempted to cut from the two bills for the occupied provinces, they had succeeded in removing ten million. While they thus concluded the long parliamentary battle over the financial side of the occupation with a partial victory, they had failed, however, to obtain any control over the administration of the two provinces, and the Bosnian budget remained in the sphere of the delegations, not, as they had insisted, in those of the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest.

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 360-364.
\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 367.
\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 369.
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 377-378.
Immediately after the delegations closed their session, the Reichsrat met on March 18, 1879 to consider the Cisleithanian budget for 1879. The Near Eastern question arose, however, when 103 liberals, most of whom had voted against the majority motion ratifying the Treaty of Berlin, united to ask Chlumecky, the minister of commerce, about the status of Austro-Hungarian trade relations with Serbia. On July 8, 1878, they pointed out, Serbia and the Dual Monarchy had signed a treaty at Berlin which pledged the two states to negotiate either a commercial treaty or a customs union shortly after they had ratified the Treaty of Berlin.30 What had prompted their interpellation, they declared, were reports that Serbia and Great Britain had recently signed a most-favored-nation commercial agreement and that similar treaties with France and Russia were pending. In view of the sacrifices made to protect the monarchy's position in the Balkans, including especially the expense and loss of life connected with the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the liberals asked the commerce minister if the reports of Serbian trade treaties with Great Powers other than Austria-Hungary were true; what was blocking implementation of the Austro-Serbian treaty of July 8, 1878; and what were the government's plans if the reports mentioned above were true?31

31 Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses, 8th session, Vol. XII, pp. 13778-13781.
Chlumecky declared a few moments later that the imperial government had always done its best to protect Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans. However, during 1878 and the first months of 1879 commercial treaties had been negotiated with Germany, France, and Italy, and these activities had left no time for negotiations with Serbia. Nothing had thus been done by the Auersperg government to negotiate a commercial treaty with Serbia before it left office. Since the new government had come to power, however, negotiations had begun with the Serbs, but because they were still going on, Chlumecky declared that he could say nothing definite about them. While the government had of course heard about the reports from Belgrade referred to in the interpellation, Chlumecky stated, it had received no official information from any source that made it possible either to confirm or to deny them.\textsuperscript{32}

For some liberals, Chlumecky's vague answer was an excuse to conduct one last debate over the foreign policy of the Habsburg monarchy.\textsuperscript{33} The purpose of the debate, however, was not so much to convince those who disagreed with them but rather to go on record concerning the empire's Balkan policy once more before the upcoming election. As one of them declared, recriminations were useless;\textsuperscript{34} the only real purpose

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 13791-13792.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 13810.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 13861.
of the debate was to clarify once again the position of the Constitution Party towards Austria-Hungary's role in the Balkans.

Fux presented the liberal case against the monarchy's Balkan policy. He contended that while the Dual Monarchy had "to seek to pluck and secure the fruits of [its] expensive and troublesome Balkan policy," what was important now was how these fruits, among them especially a strong position in Serbia, were to be secured. Although the Austro-Serbian treaty had been signed on July 8, 1878, the monarchy had apparently received no guarantees from the Serbs that it would receive favored treatment from them, and when Serbia reached advantageous agreements with other countries there was apparently nothing the monarchy could do about it. Fux suspected collusion in this matter between the Cisleithanian and Hungarian governments (no sin could have been worse in the eyes of the German liberals after the outcome of the Ausgleich negotiations the previous year), for the Hungarians feared Serbian agricultural exports and were thus always ready to block trade between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy.

Fux reserved his real anger for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why, he inquired, had it been undertaken? The government's answer, he said, was that the two provinces had been occupied to protect Austro-Hungarian military and commercial interests in the Balkans. "I cannot discern

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what dangers exist for us in a military sense from the Serbian militia or the Montenegrin clans. Commercial interests are thus the center of gravity of the entire operation." 36 Even these, however, were now lost, for other countries had reaped commercial advantages in Serbia without paying for them in blood and treasure: as the monarchy had. 37 Fux concluded by pointing out that the government surely could have found time to negotiate with Serbia if it had time to do so with Germany, France, and Italy. 38

Chlumecky could not defend the government, he said, because the negotiations with Serbia were in progress and consequently could say nothing about them, 39 and no one else cared to do so. Thus the last debate in the lower house of the Reichsrat over the Near Eastern question came to an end. The remainder of the session, which lasted until May 17, was taken up primarily with the budget for 1879.

Normally, the budget debate was the verdict rendered by parliament on the government, but in 1879, as the Neue Freie Presse pointed out, that verdict had already been rendered. Occupation costs made up a substantial portion of the budget but the occupation had already been debated and

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36 Ibid., p. 13863.
37 Ibid., p. 13864.
38 Ibid., pp. 13861-13865.
39 Ibid., p. 1387.
discussed at great length. In addition, the deputies were
tired due to the long Reichsrat and delegation meetings
which had followed one another in an almost unbroken succes-
sion since October 22 (only the Christmas break had inter-
vened). The budget debate, then, was desultory. The
deputies spoke before half-empty benches; those few present
did not listen.\(^{40}\) The party leaders realized that only the
upcoming elections counted. If, on the one hand, the Con-
stitution Party could retain its majority and restore its
internal cohesion, then Francis Joseph might be compelled to
accept a ministry that disagreed with him over foreign policy;
on the other hand, a Constitution Party defeat would place
Cisleithania; for all practical purposes, under the personal
rule of the emperor.

It was in this context that Taaffe and the German
liberals competed for the favor of the Czechs in Bohemia and
Moravia. Various Czech leaders had decided in the 1860's to
passively resist conditions which they found intolerable for
their nationality by refusing to participate in the deliberations of the Reichsrat
and of the Bohemian diet. By 1878,
however, even Rieger, whose idea it had been, recognized
under pressure from the Young Czechs that his policy had
clearly failed.\(^{41}\) The pressure on Rieger to return the

\(^{40}\) *Neue Freie Presse*, April 1, 1879, pp. 1-2.

\(^{41}\) The Young Czechs were more strident in their
demands than Rieger and saw no sense in depriving themselves
of their best forum--parliament. See Stanley Z. Pech, "F. L.
Czechs to Cisleithanian politics increased when it became known that some German liberals, notably Adolf Fischhof and Michael Étienne, the editor of the Neue Freie Presse, were ready to make concessions to the Czechs, and this pressure eventually resulted in a conference between Rieber, Fischhof and Étienne at Fischhof's home near Emmersdorf in Carinthia which resulted in the "Emmersdorf Memorandum" of October 31, 1878. According to the Memorandum, a new nationality law for Cisleithania, guaranteeing equal treatment for all nationalities, was to be passed through the Reichsrat; provincial autonomy as guaranteed in the October Diploma of 1860 was to replace the centralized Cisleithanian government of 1878; the state rights of Bohemia were to be recognized; and finally, all of the above points were to be guaranteed by the Constitution Party before the Czechs returned to parliament.\footnote{42}

The Emmersdorf Memorandum represented a stunning triumph for the Czechs. Rieber seemed to have gained everything the Czechs had demanded in 1863, when they had left parliament, and had failed to obtain during the Hohenwart ministry in 1871. Unfortunately for the Czechs, however, Fischhof and Étienne did not speak for the Bohemian Germans in the Constitution Party. Étienne's personal prestige as the editor of the Neue Freie Presse had provided much of the


force behind the Emmersdorf Memorandum, and when he died in April, 1879, Herbst and Giskra both came out against it at once. They declared that if the Memorandum were enacted into law Cisleithania would cease to have a strong central government and that, more significantly, the Bohemian Germans would be abandoned to the mercies of a Czech diet in Prague. That prospect was simply intolerable. With the collapse of the Emmersdorf Memorandum the Young Czechs also withdrew from the negotiating table in May, 1879, and another attempt at compromise between the Germans and Czechs in Bohemia had failed.

Taaffe, instead of dealing with the Czech nationalists, concentrated from the outset on the Czech and German nobility in an effort to win their votes in the upcoming election, believing that since the negotiations between the German liberals and the Czech leaders were breaking down, the Czechs would support him because they had nowhere else to go. This conviction was strengthened by the Czech return to the Bohemian diet in September, 1878—obviously, they would also return to the Reichsrat. He thus ignored the commoners and worked instead with the nobility in Bohemia

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43 Ibid.
and Moravia to gain their support.\textsuperscript{46}

Using Carlos Auersperg as an intermediary, Taaffe pressured the German nobility in Bohemia and Moravia to agree on a compromise list of candidates with the Czech nobility in each electoral district. When the compromise was finally worked out on June 24, 1879—\textemdash one day before the elections were to begin\textsuperscript{47}—\textemdash the Constitution Party received thirteen seats in the landowners' curia in Bohemia and the Czechs ten. Although the German Bohemian nobility, virtually all of whom supported the Constitutional Landowners' Club in the Reichsrat, were uneasy about this compromise (even Carlos Auersperg later repudiated it) they agreed to it because it was the express wish of the emperor.\textsuperscript{48}

In negotiating the electoral compromise between the German and Czech nobility in Bohemia and Moravia, Taaffe struck at the Achilles' Heel of the Constitution Party: the Constitutional Landowners' Club. He knew that, as their votes in the parliamentary conflicts over the occupation had demonstrated, the loyalty of the landowners to their sovereign outweighed their loyalty to their party. Taaffe's

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47}Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, Vol. III, p. 4.

triumph in Bohemia and Moravia eventually led to the destruction of all liberal hopes for power in Cisleithania.

While Taaffe and the Bohemian liberals were still attempting to reach their compromises with the Czechs, one of the major liberal complaints against Andrassy vanished on April 21, 1879, when the Dual Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire finally concluded a convention to formalize the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as required by the Congress of Berlin. The liberal press had demanded such a convention before the occupation could begin, and Andrassy's failure to reach agreement with the Turks had been one of the major liberal complaints against his handling of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. In fact, he was not really to blame for the delay, for the Turks had delayed the negotiations. When the convention was finally signed, however, it was a serious Turkish defeat,\textsuperscript{49} for although the Sultan remained the formal sovereign, although the Turkish flag could be flown over mosques during services, and although Turkish coins were still legal tender, they had to renounce all their other rights in Bosnia and Hercegovina. No time limit was placed on the occupation. Andrassy's only concession to the Porte came when he agreed to consult with the Turks before

Austria-Hungary exercised her right under the Treaty of Berlin to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar.\textsuperscript{50} Since Andrássy's failure to conclude the convention before the occupation had been one of the strongest points against him among liberals, his victory removed from the campaign an issue from which the liberals had hoped to garner many votes.

Shortly after the Austro-Turkish convention of April 21, 1879, was signed, the electoral campaign got under way in earnest when the first election manifestoes from the various Cisleithanian parties appeared. First in the field were the German liberals from Bohemia. Since the negotiations with the Czechs were still under way their platform attempted to conciliate the Czechs by agreeing to virtually all of their demands except recognition of the historic rights of Bohemia. On the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina the Bohemian German liberals did not give an inch. As their manifesto put it:

\begin{quote}
It will be the task of our future deputies to devote their full attention to the question of the occupation of Bosnia and to deal with it . . . in such a way that any broadening of the occupation, as well as any appropriation which does not serve the single goal of supplying the occupation forces, will be implemented only with the consent of the Cisleithanian legislature and only after a clear and indisputable prior solution of the question of the legal status of the occupied provinces.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50} In the event Austria-Hungary occupied Novibazar on September 1, 1879.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, April 10, 1879, p. 2. Eleven days later the Austro-Turkish convention settled the problem of the legal status of Bosnia and Hercegovina.
The other planks in their manifesto included a call for a new method of choosing the delegates from the Reichsrat, but were otherwise unexceptional.\textsuperscript{52}

Next to appear was the manifesto of the Czechs. It was praised in the Neue Freie Presse because it stressed financial prudence in state affairs, but it was vague about the possibility of future German-Czech cooperation.\textsuperscript{53}

On May 9, the electoral manifesto of the 112 appeared. Its relatively late appearance was due to the press of business in parliament and local party meetings.\textsuperscript{54} It stressed financial prudence in all governmental affairs and devoted a great deal of space to both the newly proposed means of selecting delegates from the lower house of the Reichsrat and the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, on which it declared:

A policy which would strive for further expansion and annexations would put Austria in [further] unforseeable financial and political danger. Therefore, it appears especially necessary not to extend the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, begun without the prior consent of the imperial parliament, any farther; to

\textsuperscript{52}Under the old method, each province chose its own delegates from its own deputies in each house of the Reichsrat. Herbst wanted each house to vote as a whole, thus selecting its delegates by party rather than by province. This method would have assured a majority against the occupation in the Cisleithanian delegation, since the liberals against the occupation would, in Herbst's eyes, have held all forty seats from the lower house.

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Neue Freie Presse, Abendblatt}, April 10, 1879, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid., Morgenblatt}, May 1, 1879, p. 3.
reduce the cost of the occupation to the smallest possible amount; and to cease all non-military outlays for the occupied lands until both parliaments have decided [on the bill concerning the civil administration of the two provinces which had been postponed until after the election] and until an agreement on a tax ratio guaranteeing economy [in Bosnia and Hercegovina] has been reached.55

The other planks of the electoral platform of the 112 followed those of the Bohemian Germans, except that they were more critical of the Czech leaders because the negotiations between the two nationalities had broken down.

Advance copies of the electoral program of the 112 were distributed to the other clubs in the Constitution Party, but the result was a setback for Herbst, for while the Progress Club approved it on May 7,56 the Left Club, the Left Center Club,57 and the Constitutional Landowners' Club all refused to endorse the program of the 112 because of its clauses on the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Although the Left Center Club gave no reasons for refusing its endorsement, the Left Club not only aggressively supported the emperor's Balkan policy but also demanded that the army not be reduced.58 These were costly policies for these clubs, for two representatives from the Left Club, and six more from the

55 Ibid., May 9, 1879, pp. 2-3.
56 Ibid., Abendblatt, May 8, 1879, p. 3.
57 Ibid., Morgenblatt, May 8, 1879, p. 2.
58 Ibid., Abendblatt, May 12, 1879, p. 3; Ibid., Morgenblatt, May 11, 1879, p. 3.
Left Center Club, went over to join the 112, but, nonetheless, the gaps created in the Constitution Party on January 27, 1879, were still there.

While the Left and Left Center Clubs rejected the electoral program of the 112, the two Progress Clubs embraced it enthusiastically, as the Progress Club demonstrated in its electoral manifesto, which was written by Kopp. He recounted once more the liberal version of the strife surrounding the Treaty of Berlin in the Reichsrat and lamented that "for the last time hope flickered up that so earnest and unanimous a proclamation [the address to the throne] would have its effect." To have rejected Pretis as prime minister had been an error, Kopp admitted, but the party had, in his eyes, redeemed itself by voting not to ratify the Treaty of Berlin.

The press almost universally condemned the electoral platform of the 112. The Neue Freie Presse maintained that it was too doctrinaire, too general, and incomplete, and could give it only reluctant support. Das Vaterland, by contrast, found nothing whatever to support in the program of

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59 Ibid., May 9, 1879, p. 3.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Neue Freie Presse, May 9, 1878, p. 1. The major omission in the program of the 112, according to the Neue Freie Presse, was the failure to advocate a program to re-establish the strength of the monarchy's currency.
of the 112, finding it to be only a collection of party goals designed to attract votes, not a serious position paper designed to aid the monarchy in its difficulties. Specifically, Das Vaterland condemned the planks favoring reductions in the army and increases in the power of the Reichsrat over against its delegation. The latter plank was opposed because it would strengthen dualism, which Das Vaterland condemned.\textsuperscript{63}

On May 17, in the midst of the developing electoral campaign, Francis Joseph closed parliament with a speech noted chiefly for its dryness and lack of warmth.\textsuperscript{64} Later the same day, eight liberal deputies lunched together on the Kahlenberg (a hill overlooking Vienna) and attempted to paper over the rifts in the Constitution Party before the election, but they failed. The rifts were too wide and too deep.\textsuperscript{65} Other, similar, meetings similarly failed, and the liberals thus entered the election under a cloud of their own making.

Unlike the liberals, the conservative and clerical groups published no elaborate electoral programs; their views, however, were generally known. The clericals, in addition

\textsuperscript{63}Das Vaterland, May 11, 1879, p. 1. Curiously, Das Vaterland and the Magyars, usually bitter opponents, were united in their opposition to Herbst's proposal that the lower house of the Reichsrat vote en bloc to choose its delegates, instead of by provinces as in the past. The Magyars condemned it because it would decrease their power in the monarchy, for since the Magyars always cast their 60 votes as a bloc, they always won any conflict between the delegations. Herbst's proposal threatened this Hungarian domination of the delegations. See Neue Freie Presse, May 15, 1879, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., May 19, 1878, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{65}Sueß, Erinnerungen, p. 296.
to supporting a stronger position in the state for the Catholic Church, also opposed dualism and thus both Andrásy and Herbst and the Hungarian and German centralism they represented. The conservative platform concentrated, first, on supporting the emperor under any circumstances, and, second, on a federal solution for the nationality problem in Cisleithania. The tie that bound the conservatives and clericals together was their common desire to defeat the liberals.  

In Galicia, the Poles had prepared a crushing defeat for the Ruthenes, who were allied with the Constitution Party in the Reichsrat and had carried 15 Reichsrat seats out of 59 in the 1873 elections. Alarmed by this evidence of Ruthene strength, the Poles had immediately and successfully set out to destroy Ruthene political power in Galicia. In 1876 the Ruthenes had lost 17 of their 21 seats in the Galician diet, and a similar fate awaited them in the Reichsrat election in 1879. While the destruction of Ruthene political power was not carried out primarily to maim the Constitution Party but rather to preserve Polish predominance in Galicia, the effect was a severe blow to the liberal forces in the Reichsrat.  

Meanwhile, on May 24 and 25, 1879, the splits in the Constitution Party continued to widen as the Styrian branch  

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of the Progress Club, demanding a broader franchise and a loosening of the ties between Cisleithania and Hungary, repudiated the electoral platform of the 112 which their parent body in parliament had endorsed. Other liberals were horrified at this further split in party ranks just before the election. Kaiserfeld came out of retirement to blast the Styrian Progress Club in the pages of the Neue Freie Presse, and the Grazer Tagespost also denounced the Styrian Progressives. In particular, the Salzburg Progress Club, which had unanimously endorsed the program of the 112, was held up as an example to the Styrians. Despite all the criticism heaped upon them, however, the members of the Styrian Progress Club remained unmoved, and after the election they formed a "club within a club," led by Walterskirchen, in the Reichsrat.

Elsewhere, the Constitution Party was able to pull itself together for the election, although some districts had difficulty in choosing candidates. The Neue Freie Presse and Das Vaterland agreed that the splits in the liberal ranks would not deprive the party of another victory at the polls

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68 Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld, p. 410.
69 Neue Freie Presse, June 1, 1879, pp. 1-2.
70 Ibid., June 11, 1879, p. 1; and June 13, 1879, p. 1. See also Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld, p. 411.
71 Neue Freie Presse, Abendblatt, June 6, 1879, p. 2.
72 Charmatz, Deutsch-Österreichische Politik, pp. 171-172.
73 Some candidates were still unchosen as late as June 17.
even though they expected that the liberal majority in parliament would be somewhat reduced. One reason for this optimism was that the Bosnian Left returned to the party as the election grew nearer. Wolfrum, for example, who had voted for the majority ratifying the Treaty of Berlin, declared on June 11, 1879, that the monarchy had to avoid further costly adventures in the Balkans, thereby placing himself on the side of the program of the 112.

The issues over which this election was fought arose almost entirely from the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. The method of choosing delegates in the Reichsrat was an issue because, in the eyes of the liberals, the Cisleithanian delegation had thwarted the will of the Reichsrat by supporting government bills concerning the occupation. Another major point of contention was whether the emperor or the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest should have the last word in Bosnian affairs. To the liberals, it was clear that in all financial affairs, the representatives of the people (i.e., they themselves) should have the final say. Overriding all of these lesser issues, however, was that of whether the emperor or the Reichsrat should have formal control over all policy matters. Until 1878 this question had been handled informally: by agreement, the emperor controlled

74 Neue Freie Presse, June 24, 1879, p. 1; Das Vaterland, July 9, 1879, p. 1.
foreign and military policy while the liberals determined domestic policy. Now, by challenging the emperor's authority in the fields reserved to him, the liberals had broken this informal agreement and thus opened the way to a new ordering of Cisleithanian political life.

To the emperor, the conservatives, and the clericals, the liberal position was anathema. To begin with, Bosnia and Hercegovina were the only provinces under Habsburg control where Cisleithanians and Hungarians could meet as equals, and thus the last remnant of the Austrian empire of the past. In addition, their occupation was the only real foreign triumph that Francis Joseph had achieved in thirty years on the throne; yet the liberals wanted to deprive him even of that. Finally, in the opinion of the conservatives and clericals, the liberals demanded too much power for parliament. Only if foreign and military policy remained in the hands of the emperor, they insisted, could the empire prosper. Too many cooks spoil the broth, they declared, and parliament had too many cooks.

Voting in Cisleithania was a lengthy process, for the curia in each province voted on different days. In 1879 the election began on June 24 and continued until July 12. As the returns began to pour in, the Neue Freie Presse grew ever more despondent; Das Vaterland, ever more jubilant, for the results spelled disaster for the Constitution Party. The clericals swept the Upper Austrian and Carniolan countryside;
Slovenian nationalists captured two liberal seats in the Carniolan cities; two more liberal seats fell in Styria. By July 5 the liberals had, according to the Neue Freie Presse, lost 33 seats. Of these, 11 were in the landowners' curia in Bohemia and 13 in Galicia, where the Ruthenians were crushed. In Moravia, nine seats in the landowners' curia fell to the Czechs. Even if liberals won, their majorities were often sharply reduced from what they had been six years before. When all of the results were in, the liberals had lost 49 seats in the lower house of the Reichsrat, giving them 177 seats in the new parliament—a figure which placed them in the minority by one vote. Fifty-four Czech and 57 Polish candidates were elected, while the conservative-clerical group in the new parliament numbered 57. The balance of power between the Constitution Party and the Polish-Czech-conservative/clerical bloc was held by forty independent deputies who, according to the Neue Freie Presse,

76 Neue Freie Presse, June 25, 1879, p. 2; ibid., Abendblatt, July 1, 1879, p. 1, and July 3, 1879, p. 2; Das Vaterland, July 1, 1879, p. 2.
77 Neue Freie Presse, July 5, 1879, p. 3.
78 Neue Freie Presse, July 13, 1879, p. 2.
79 Das Vaterland, July 2, 1879, p. 1.
80 Ibid.
held no particular party views and could thus support either side. 82

The Constitution Party lost the election of 1879 because the Constitutional Landowners' Club, at the emperor's request, ceded twenty seats to the Czech nobility in Bohemia and Moravia. A subsidiary cause for the liberal defeat was that the Poles took 13 seats from the Ruthenes in Galicia. The Constitution Party lost only 16 seats elsewhere, and that would not have been enough to deprive it of its majority in parliament. Francis Joseph had succeeded in his plan to drive the Constitution Party from power in Cisleithania.

Following the narrow liberal defeat in the election, Taaffe was appointed prime minister on August 12, 1879. He at once, in a gesture of reconciliation, invited the Constitution Party to join his cabinet. Herbst, Kopp, and Giskra still clung to their independence, however, for they expected a coalition which did not include the Constitution Party to be so divided by class and national hatred that conflicts within the coalition would bring Taaffe down and compel the emperor to call on them--on their terms--to form a government. If this program was to be successful, however, the liberals dared not break ranks. For this reason Herbst threatened that "whoever goes into this [Taaffe's] ministry is lost,"

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82 Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, Vol. III, p. 12. A number of deputies were affiliated with none of the established factions and voted with either side, thus making it impossible to determine the exact number of seats held by either the Constitution Party or its opponents.
and Kopp openly declared that he was against any liberal joining Taaffe's government. For the last time, the bitterness engendered by the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined the course of Cisleithanian politics, for the liberals who favored joining Taaffe's cabinet followed Herbst and Kopp instead in the name of party unity, and thus passed the last chance for the Cisleithanian liberals to hold power. After the election of 1879, liberalism as a political force steadily lost influence in Cislethiania.

83 Alois von Czedik to Stremayr, Linz, August 30, 1879, as quoted in Molisch, Briefe zur deutsche Politik in Oesterreich, p. 227.

84 Czedik to Stremayr, Linz, August 31, 1879, ibid., pp. 227-228.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In the second half of the nineteenth century the Habsburg monarchy lacked a framework for the orderly solution of political problems, for Francis Joseph never allowed one to be created. Instead, all affairs of great moment had to be settled by him and by him alone, and only when confronted by superior force, as he was in Hungary in 1867, did he admit others into the decision-making process. Although the Cisleithanian constitutional law of 1867 provided for a parliamentary form of government, in fact the emperor conducted affairs through personal favorites and faceless bureaucrats; for most of his reign, what political life there was in Cisleithania outside his personal circle was basically irrelevant to the decision-making process. Only once did Francis Joseph experiment with a true constitutional and parliamentary form of government in Cisleithania--during the years of liberal hegemony from 1867 to 1879--and even then he kept the reins of foreign and military policy, which he saw as the twin foundations of his power, firmly in his hands. In this period, except for his attempt to find a federal solution to the Czech problem through Hohenwart and Schäffle in 1871, he
appointed ministers only from the leading party in parliament and occasionally even accepted as members of his official family men whom he distrusted and with whom he did not feel he could work—solely because they were prominent within that party.

Francis Joseph's experiment in parliamentary government ended when he realized that the Constitution Party was challenging his jealously guarded right to conduct the foreign and military affairs of the monarchy. By demanding a definite role in the making of foreign policy, and specifically demanding that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina be ended, the left wing of the Constitution Party had struck at the very heart of his power. Francis Joseph regarded his prerogatives as a sacred trust, handed down to him by his ancestors and to be handed down by him to his descendants. It followed that he would be failing in his duty if he allowed a political party to gain absolute authority over the crown. Fully convinced of the divine sanctity of the privileges of the House of Habsburg, therefore, he moved to destroy the budding system of parliamentary government.

The leaders of the Constitution Party knew that they were treading on forbidden ground when they challenged the prerogatives of the emperor in foreign affairs by questioning his right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina without parliamentary approval, but they believed that they had a legitimate grievance against the emperor because he had
fought a bloody war at a cost of millions without requesting permission from parliament. They were especially resentful because Andrassy had, in their eyes, lied when requesting the special emergency credit of sixty million gulden. Since Andrassy had not been removed from office, his lies must have been approved by the emperor. That, the liberal leaders could not tolerate. Francis Joseph's view that he could conduct foreign affairs without asking the Reichsrat for the money that made his policies capable of being carried out was intolerable to proud men like Herbst, Giskra, Kopp, and their followers. The taxpayers should, in their view, have the final say in how their money was to be spent.

The liberal leaders erred in imagining that they were strong enough to challenge Francis Joseph for control of the foreign policy apparatus of the Dual Monarchy, for the German middle class in Cisleithania simply did not possess the strength or the stamina to do battle with the emperor over such an issue. The liberals needed support from the only other politically active class--the nobility--and they did not get it. In fact, the nobility by and large sided with Francis Joseph and thereby sealed the doom of the middle-class German liberals. When the Constitutional Landowners' Club deserted them, they were helpless. The Bosnian Left was aware of this, and its leaders attempted to restrain Herbst and Kopp from leading the party into the wilderness--to no avail, for on the night of October 22, 1878,
the fate of parliamentary government in Cisleithania was decided in a room in the ministry of finance building in Vienna when the Constitution Party leaders, pushed by Herbst, rejected Pretis as prime minister after Herbst had told the emperor that Pretis was acceptable. Obviously, there was a serious misunderstanding between Francis Joseph and Herbst; of its nature, we know nothing. Herbst was far too intelligent to believe that Francis Joseph would order his troops to leave Bosnia and Hercegovina, yet his subsequent behavior clearly demonstrated that he thought exactly that: the emperor had, by accepting Pretis, repudiated his own foreign policy. Francis Joseph would never have appointed a prime minister who was not committed to follow his policies, or at least said he was in public; yet Herbst apparently believed that the emperor had done precisely that by agreeing to Herbst's candidature for the premiership. The contrast between Herbst's letter to Pretis on October 17 and his repudiation of Pretis on October 22 cannot be explained in any other way.

When Herbst spoke against Pretis' candidacy, the remainder of the Constitution Party fell into line behind him, with the exception of the Bosnian Left and the Constitutional Landowners' Club. Even the latter voted with him as long as the issue in question was merely one of words, i.e., the address to the throne. When Herbst attempted to deny to the emperor the funds necessary to cover the costs of
the occupation, however, both the Bosnian Left and the Constitutional Landowners' Club repudiated him at once, and Herbst lost a series of votes in the Cisleithanian delegation and the Reichsrat which culminated in the ratification of the Treaty of Berlin by the majority motion on January 27, 1879.

In the ministerial council meeting of November 27, 1878, the emperor decided to remove the Constitution Party from power in Cisleithania and replace it with a coalition of the Poles, clericals, Czechs, and conservatives after the election scheduled for the summer of 1879. He succeeded, but only by a narrow margin, for in spite of the bargain struck between the Czech and German nobility--at the express request of the emperor--and the destruction of Ruthene political power in Galicia, Taaffe's majority for his "Iron Ring" was often as little as one vote. Only by this tiny margin was Francis Joseph able to implement his new policy of ruling only through men personally loyal to him, not to a political party or even the state. The electoral system, weighted to favor the German middle class, had almost given them the victory.

The constitutional crisis of 1878-1879 in Cisleithania was not a great watershed of Habsburg history, fraught with hidden meanings for future generations. To be sure, all chance for genuine parliamentary government in Cisleithania was lost for the immediate future--as it turned out, forever--but that chance had never been very great in any event. Only
a united Reichsrat, supported by a unified population, could have forced parliamentary government on the British model on Francis Joseph, and neither a united parliament nor a unified population existed, then or later. A strong parliament might have provided a forum in which nationalities competing with one another could have compromised on the issues dividing them, but national hatreds have a great deal of staying power, as we of the twentieth century have learned to our cost, and such a possibility was minimal at best.

The crisis of 1878-1879 in Cisleithania thus did not destroy, or even doom, the Habsburg monarchy; at best, it closed a door to its salvation that was standing only slightly ajar. Its importance lies rather in the destruction of unchallenged German rule in Cisleithania. Never again would one nationality dominate affairs west of the Leitha.
APPENDIX I

Provincial representation in the Abgeordnetenhaus, 1873-1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Landowners</th>
<th>Cities²</th>
<th>Chambers of Commerce²</th>
<th>Country side</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalmatia</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Moravia</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

¹The information for this table was taken from Drage, Austria-Hungary, pp. 728-731.

²The figures located midway between the headings "cities" and "chambers of commerce" represent the number of deputies elected to the Reichsrat from these two curia in the provinces of Görz and Gradisca, Istra, Dalmatia, Salzburg, Carniola, Silesia, Tirol and Vorarlberg, where they were combined into one.
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