INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeib Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
POTTER, Elizabeth Faye, 1947-
KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THREEFOLD SYNTHESIS.

Rice University, Ph.D., 1974
Philosophy

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
Kant's Doctrine of Threefold Synthesis

by

Elizabeth Paye Potter

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's signature:

Houston, Texas

May, 1974
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the members of my committee, especially to Professor Zeno Vendler for his firm guidance and good advice, and to Professor J. S. Fulton for his patience and help. I wish also to express special thanks to my friends in the Rice University Department of Germanics.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: The Role of Empirical Concepts in the First Critique 6
  Section One: We know by means of concepts 7
  Section Two: Concepts as classificatory 15
  Section Three: Introduction to concepts as rules of synthesis 24

CHAPTER TWO: Synthesis As an Account of the Application of Empirical Concepts 32
  Section One: The threefold synthesis 35
  Section Two: Synthesis and the formation, use, and application of empirical concepts 49

CHAPTER THREE: The Process-View of Synthesis 55
  Section One: Three typical interpretations 56
  Section Two: Objection 69

CHAPTER FOUR: The Recognition-View of Synthesis 80
  Section One: The immanence of threefold synthesis 82
  Section Two: Concepts and rules of synthesis 93
  Section Three: "Rule of synthesis" 98
  Section Four: Limitations 109

CHAPTER FIVE: Implications of and Apparent Contradictions to the Recognition-View of Synthesis 118
  Section One: Three problematic passages 119
  Section Two: The deduction and the Analogies 123
  Section Three: Implications for the Schematism 141
INTRODUCTION

Kant says very little in his works about empirical concepts or about his doctrine of "empirical synthesis," threefold synthesis according to empirical concepts. Nevertheless, he holds an interesting view of empirical concepts as having a dual role: he considers them first in their traditional role as class-concepts and second as rules for threefold synthesis. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he argues that empirical concepts and synthesis according to empirical concepts are necessary for the possibility of experience, and as such, they provide an indispensable link in the chain of argument for the categories.

The argument in the first half of the Critique can be roughly outlined as follows: Kant wishes to determine the necessary elements of human knowledge; all knowledge, he says, depends upon experience, or empirical knowledge, and we can distinguish two elements in experience, its givenness and its spontaneity; that is, in any experience, something must be given in intuition and acted upon in thought. According to Kant, the spontaneity of experience, or empirical knowledge, depends upon empirical concepts, for he considers empirical knowledge to be comprised of (possible) empirical judgments and in an empirical judgment a general empirical concept is applied to some object. The application of any empirical concept depends upon a threefold synthesis, which, in turn, depends upon the concept of an 'object' (the transcendental object=x). The possibility of there being objects rests upon the transcendental unity of
apperception, and this unity of apperception, finally, upon categories. This, of course, is an outline of the deduction as it is given in the first edition of the *Critique*; however, the second edition version follows the same basic outline, although Kant sometimes refers to synthesis (*Synthesis*) as "combination" (*Verbindung*) and does not specifically set out the doctrine of threefold synthesis. Too, in the second edition much greater emphasis is laid upon the transcendental unity of apperception and the interdependence of the synthetic unity of consciousness and the possibility of self-consciousness. However, as Kemp-Smith points out, although threefold synthesis is not discussed in the second edition argument, it is presupposed by it.¹ Kant only briefly discusses combination (or synthesis) in the opening paragraphs of the B deduction and argues primarily that analysis is impossible without a (logically) prior synthesis. But unless one is familiar with the first edition discussion of threefold synthesis, one finds it difficult (though not impossible) to understand 'combination' or to know what is supposed to be combined, and one is in difficulties throughout the deduction because synthesis is referred to again and again.

As we can see, then, on Kant's own version of the deduction, synthesis (or combination) plays an indispensable role. Recently, however, questions have been raised about the intelligibility of the notion of synthesis, most notably by Strawson, who considers synthesis

to be part of the "myth" of "transcendental idealism" and complains that it is objectionable on the grounds that it is unverifiable.¹ Strawson attempts to revise Kant's deduction, and to argue for categories along Kantian lines, leaving out the notion of synthesis, as well as certain other Kantian notions which he considers to be problematic, and part of the "myth" of "transcendental idealism."

The difficulties that Strawson and others have with the notion of synthesis arise, I believe, from their interpretation of it, an interpretation which I refer to as the "process-view" of synthesis. On this interpretation, synthesis is a 'pre-conscious' or 'pre-cognitive' mental process which takes place each time we recognize or know an object, that is, each time we experience an object. According to this view, the three aspects of threefold synthesis—the "synthesis of apprehension," the "synthesis of reproduction," and the "synthesis of recognition"—are stages which succeed one another; for example, before one recognizes an apple, one apprehends its shape, which one reproduces, or holds in memory, while one goes on to apprehend its extension, then its impenetrability, then its color, then its hardness, and so on. Finally, one "grasps together" or recognizes the successively apprehended and reproduced representations of shape, color, texture, etc. as an apple. Intuitively, however, one balks at this

¹P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1968), p. 32. It is clear from his remarks in this passage that Strawson accepts Kemp-Smith's interpretation of synthesis as a pre-cognitive (transcendent) activity which, as pre-cognitive, cannot itself be experienced or known.
account of an activity which always takes place before one can know any object because one is seldom aware of such a process occurring, and indeed, in cases such as the one presented here, it seems impossible ever to be aware of such a process.

I wish to show in this work that one's intuitive suspicion of synthesis as it is presented on this view, the "process-view" of synthesis, is well-founded, and to argue for an alternative interpretation of synthesis, which I call the "recognition-view" of synthesis. I will argue that the paradigm cases of synthesis are those in which synthesis must be an instantaneous act, a simultaneous apprehension, reproduction, and recognition of a manifold presented in intuition, and I will further argue that on this interpretation, synthesis escapes the charge of unverifiability and can, as Kant himself realizes, itself be an object of experience.

Both these interpretations of synthesis arise from a consideration of empirical concepts in their role as rules of synthesis. Therefore, we will first examine the connection between empirical concepts as class-concepts and as rules of (threelfold) synthesis, and will set out Kant's doctrine of threelfold synthesis in detail. We will then examine three versions of the "process-view" of synthesis, those of Norman Kemp-Smith, H. J. Paton, and R. P. Wolff, and show that they are all open to the common objection that in some cases synthesis must be instantaneous, and hence that it cannot, except in certain obvious and uninteresting cases, be referred to as a "process."

In Chapter Four, we will state the "recognition-view" of synthesis
and argue, as we noted above, that although synthesis is transcenden-
tal or necessary for the possibility of experience, it is immanent
and so itself a possible object of experience. We will also attempt
to discover the limitations of the recognition-view, that is, to dis-
cover whether threefold synthesis is necessary for the application of
all empirical concepts, or only the empirical concepts of 'objects'
in a restricted sense of the term. Finally, inasmuch as there are
certain passages in which Kant appears to contradict the recognition-
view and to hold the process-view of synthesis, in Chapter Five we
will deal with these passages, found in the deduction and the Analo-
gies, and show that the recognition-view of synthesis is compatible
with their doctrines and, in certain ways, necessary to those doctrines.
CHAPTER ONE

The Role of Empirical Concepts in the First Critique

In this chapter, we will explore three related questions concerning Kant's account of empirical concepts. First, we must determine what place empirical concepts have in Kant's overall theory of knowledge; second, inasmuch as empirical concepts are used in making the judgments which constitute empirical knowledge, we will examine his understanding of concepts as class concepts, for he views empirical judgments primarily as distinguishing the world into objects which are members of classes; and third, we will begin to examine Kant's account of empirical concepts as rules for the synthesis of the manifold, since such a synthesis according to rules is necessary for the use of concepts as class concepts.
Section One

We know by means of concepts

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s primary concern is to give an account of human knowledge by giving an analysis of the elements into which it can be divided and without which it is not possible. What does Kant understand by "knowledge" (Erkenntnis), and where do concepts find their place in it?

There are at least three uses of Erkenntnis in the Critique. In the first, Kant uses the term in the singular with the definite article or adjective and appears to mean what we mean when we speak generally of knowledge; for example, when we say that knowledge is awareness or understanding of facts, places, people, etc., or that "his knowledge is extensive," meaning that he knows many things. Thus Kant says, for instance, "all our knowledge begins with experience" ("alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfanze"\(^1\)). Here he seems to be speaking of knowledge generally.

There is a second use of Erkenntnis in Kant's work, in which he uses the plural Erkenntnisse, or the singular with the indefinite

---

\(^1\)Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin, 1911). All future references to the original German will be to this edition and will be cited in the text according to the convention of referring to the pages of the first edition as A--, and those of the second edition as B--. All references to the English version will be to the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp-Smith (New York, 1968), and will also be cited in the text according to the convention of referring to the pages of the first edition as A--, and those of the second edition as B--.
article. For example, "one calls such cognitions \[\text{Erkenntnisse}\] a priori..." (B 2); and "What is at issue is a characteristic by which we can distinguish a pure cognition \[\text{ein reines Erkenntnis}\] with certainty from an empirical one" (B 3). I believe that when Kant uses the singular "a cognition" and plural "cognitions," he has in mind what we would call a "judgment" or "proposition." For example, in the Analytic of Concepts, when discussing the question "What is truth?" he remarks that "truth consists in the agreement of a cognition \[\text{eine Erkenntnis}\] with its object" (B 83), and he goes on to say that a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related. And again, where Kant says that a cognition conforms to the laws of logic ("although a cognition \[\text{eine Erkenntnis}\] might be fully in accord with logical form, that is, does not contradict itself...") (B 84), we would say that a judgment or proposition accords with the laws of logic, and so does not contradict itself.

There is a third use of \text{Erkenntnis} in Kant's work. At B 94 and again at B 141 he uses \text{Erkenntnis} to refer to concepts. Thus at B 141 he says:

But if I investigate more precisely the relation of the given cognitions \[\text{Erkenntnisse}\] in any judgment and distinguish it as belonging to the under-

---

I have inserted "cognition" into these translations reluctantly and only because it is awkward in English to say, for example, that "one calls such knowledges a priori." I do not find Kemp-Smith's translation of \text{Erkenntnis} as "mode of knowledge" helpful. However, it is interesting to note that Kant sometimes uses the same term for judgments and concepts that he uses for knowledge, for the usage points to the fact that, for Kant, judgments and concepts are elements logically necessary in order for there to be knowledge, that is, they are elements of knowledge.
standing, from the relation according to laws of the reproductive imagination, which has only subjective validity, I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given cognitions are brought to the objective unity of apperception.

In the light of his remarks a few lines earlier, we can be certain that when he says "cognitions" here, Kant has in mind what we would call concepts, for he remarks that a judgment in general, according to logicians, is "the representation of a relation between two concepts." (He amends this definition to include hypothetical and disjunctive judgments as well as categorical ones, for inasmuch as hypothetical and disjunctive judgments "contain a relation not of concepts but of judgments," any discussion of judgments in general must include them, as well as categorical judgments which "contain a relation between two concepts." )

I believe that in the Critique Kant is concerned with knowledge in the first sense distinguished above; that is to say, he is concerned with knowledge in a general sense, with what anyone can know or how far human knowledge extends. And this knowledge, he says, has two fundamental sources: sensibility, through which objects are given to us, and understanding, through which objects are thought by means of concepts (cf. A19=B33; A50=B74). In saying that knowledge "has two fundamental sources," Kant is indicating that for the purposes of analysing knowledge into the elements logically necessary to it, that is, logically necessary for knowledge to be possible, he will distinguish two basic kinds of elements. These are the elements which have to do with objects being given to us, and the elements which have to
do with the objects being known. In the first part of the *Critique*, Kant deals with these two elements of knowledge: the Transcendental Aesthetic is a discussion of how objects must be given and the Transcendental Logic is a discussion of how they must be known.

In his discussion of how objects are given, Kant introduces the technical term "intuition." And in the opening line of the Transcendental Aesthetic he says, "In whatever manner and by whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them..." (A 19). In claiming that "intuition" is a technical term, I mean to claim that, in its primary use, the term refers only to a logical element in knowledge. That is, if we examine the experiences which we have, we will not come across intuitions; nor, if we, so to say, watch ourselves perceiving the world, will we catch ourselves intuiting. The term as Kant employs it is useful only in epistemology and logic, not in psychology or taxonomy. By "intuition", I believe Kant means primarily to indicate the way in which objects are given to intelligent beings. It so happens that they are given to human beings through the senses ("...intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us. This...is only possible, to man at least,¹ insofar as the mind is affected in a certain way...entitled sensibility" A19=B33). (Later in the *Critique*, it is clear that Kant wishes to allow that there may be other intelligent beings--such as God--whose intuition, i.e. the way in which objects of knowledge are given to them, is not sensible, but is intellectual.

¹Underlining is my own.
Cf. B 138-139; B 150.) Thus, if "intuition" refers to the way in which objects are given to intelligent beings, then if someone sees a redbird flying by, he may be said to have intuited, or to have had an intuition of, that object, inasmuch as it was "given to him in sensibility," i.e. through his senses.

Kant's use of "intuition" is not limited, however, to "ways in which objects are given to intelligent beings." That is, it does not always refer to the "faculty" or ability to intuit or to receive objects. Sometimes he uses the term to refer to the object of knowledge itself and not to the way the object is given. That is, sometimes "intuition" refers to that which is intuited. For instance, in the B Deduction, he refers to time and space as "intuitions": "But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold..." (B 16).

The second fundamental element of knowledge Kant calls the "Understanding." In the Transcendental Logic, the "understanding" is variously defined and discussed as spontaneity of knowledge (as opposed to the receptivity of sensibility), as a power (or faculty) of thought, a faculty of concepts, and as a faculty of judgments. "All these definitions," says Kant, "when they are adequately understood, are identical" (A 126). The understanding is described from the outset as a faculty of thought (A 19), as the faculty "which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition" (A51=B75). Let us explore the faculty of thought as an element or sub-species of knowledge. "Thought," Kant says at B 94, "is knowledge by means of concepts." Whereas sensibility is understood as knowledge by means of intuitions (meaning that intuitions
are an element in knowledge), thought is knowledge by means of concepts (meaning that concepts are also an element in knowledge). Holding in abeyance a judgment upon what Kant means by "concepts," we go on to find that thought, as knowledge by means of concepts, has two sub-species: thought which has an object, and thought which does not. This distinction is brought out at B 146 where Kant says:

To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it.

There are, apparently, two ways that we may fail to come up with knowledge: either we have an intuition which we are not able to apply a concept to (i.e., somehow we can pick out something in space and time, as being a this-here-now, but we do not know what it is), or we have a concept to which no intuition corresponds (i.e., there is no object to which it applies; we do not know that it is); in the latter case, Kant says, the concept still has the form of a thought, but it is not knowledge. Such a concept, he says, is "empty." A mere thought is a concept which purports to apply to an object, but when we check, we find that there is no intuition corresponding to it, i.e. we are unable to pick out the object to which it purports to apply. But a successful thought, in which we have a concept and are able to pick out the object to which it applies, is a case of knowledge.

However, a cognition may or may not agree with the object to
which it is related. It if agrees with the object, it is a true cognition; if not, it is a false cognition. Thus Kant says:

If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, that object must thereby be distinguished from other objects; for a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even although it contains something which may be valid of other objects (B 83).

In fact, when Kant says that a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, he does not make explicitly clear whether he is accounting for false statements or mistaken cognitions or judgments. For, strictly speaking, statements are false, while cognitions or judgments (which might be expressed in first person psychological statements) cannot be false, but can be mistaken. But perhaps Kant's ambiguity on this point is unimportant, for the distinction he makes between false or mistaken judgments, on the one hand, and judgments employing "empty" concepts, on the other, still remains. According to Kant, if I mistakenly apply some concept to an actually existing object, my judgment (or perception) is mistaken, and the statement expressing the judgment is false. But this is different, Kant claims, from making a judgment involving an empty concept, i.e. a concept which cannot in fact be applied to an actually existing object. For example, according to Kant, the statements, "I dreamt about a golden mountain" and "The animal in the picture is a unicorn" are not false. Rather, they are "empty." (This is not to say, either, that they are meaningless, for golden mountains and unicorns are possible objects or possible intuitions. They are not self-contradictory
concepts.)

Concepts find their place in knowledge then, for Kant, inasmuch as they are used in thoughts, both empty thoughts and thoughts which have an object, and in both true and false judgments (where "judgment" is understood as "knowledge" or "thought with an object"). But I submit that the most important use of concepts for Kant is their use in making (true) judgments (for empty thoughts do not yield knowledge, and false knowledge is not a problem for Kant in the Critique). He says, "Now the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them" (A68=B93).
Section Two

Concepts as classificatory

Except in section one of the *Logik*,\(^1\) Kant nowhere gives us a definition of "concept," or any statement of what a concept is. Instead, the closest he comes to a statement about the nature of concepts is his remark that "concepts rest on functions," and that by "function," he means "the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation" \((A68=E93)\). How are we to understand these remarks?

In the first place, how are we to understand "rest on" (beruhen auf)? Since the account of human knowledge found in the *Critique* is a transcendental one, then it is especially to be distinguished from an empirical account. Kant himself is at great pains, in his introduction to the paralogisms and in the first paralogism, to point out that his is not an endeavor of empirical psychology, but of rational psychology

\(^1\)Yet even there, Kant says only that "all cognitions (Erkenntnisse), that is: all representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts. An intuition is a single representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept, a universal representation (repraesentatio per notas communes), or reflected-on representation (repraesentatio discursiva)." [Immanuel Kant, *Logik*, ed. G.B. Jäsche, in *Immanuel Kant's sammtliche Werke*, ed. K. Rosenkranze and F.W. Schubert (Leipzig, 1838), Vol. III-IV, p. 269. All future references will be to this edition, will be cited in the text, and will be my own translations.\(^2\) This pushes us back to the problem of what a representation is, for Kant. Presumably a representation is, at least, our consciousness of something, either as it is given (in intuition) or as it is thought (through concepts). However, this brings us no closer to a genuine understanding of what a concept is for Kant. It gives us, rather, a restatement of the doctrine of the *Critique* that all knowledge can be divided into two (logical) elements: intuitions and concepts.
(perhaps we might say, of philosophical psychology). He is not concerned to give a "physiology of the mind" and of human knowledge; rather, he is concerned to make certain logical, or epistemological, points, which hold true necessarily and universally, about human knowledge. If that is so, then when he says that "concepts rest on functions," he cannot mean that they depend upon certain psychological events or occurrences. If this were his intention, then we should expect him to describe those events, or at least to argue that they must occur. Instead, Kant makes transcendental points about human knowledge; he gives arguments for the elements without which that knowledge would be impossible. Therefore, we can read "rest on" at B93 to mean "logically depend upon": concepts (logically) depend upon functions.

Second, how are we to understand "functions" (Fonctionen) at B93? In the light of the previous arguments, we should be wary of any empirical psychological interpretation of "function." If it is the case that Kant's is a logical/empistemological endeavor, as opposed to a psychological one, we should look for an interpretation of function as something logically necessary for the existence of concepts.

There are several possible uses of "function," but it seems to me that the most productive interpretation of the term is as a rule.¹ This interpretation is suggested by Kant's own definition of "function" as "the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation" (A69=B93). We saw in Section One that Kant is

¹See Appendix for arguments concerning alternative interpretations of the term "function."
concerned in the *Critique* to find the necessary elements in human knowledge. One of these is experience; knowledge, as we argued above, depends upon experience, according to Kant. But experience, as a whole, depends upon particular experiences of objects. To experience or recognize an object, as we shall argue below, is to make an empirical judgment, which means (*inter alia*) applying an empirical concept to some object. When he says, at B 93, that concepts rest on functions, I believe Kant has in mind the application of concepts, and is arguing that the application of concepts rests on functions. A function, he says, is the unity of an act. If we may understand by "the unity" (*Einheit*), the "uniformity" or "sameness" or "regularity," then we read that concepts depend upon the uniformity or regularity of certain acts or activities. What activities? The activities of bringing various representations under one representation, common to them all. Thus a function is the regularity in acts of classifying.

A function as a regularity is exemplified by mathematical functions. In mathematics, a function indicates a regularity in the production of a quantity, or the production of a quantity according to a rule. In a function, \( F(x) \), the quantity produced, \( y \), varies with the value of \( x \) according to the rule, \( F(x) \). Functions for the classification of objects are similar. A particular empirical concept serving as a function, or rule, determines a kind of object, or class of objects. It does so by specifying the features which that kind of object, or class of objects, have in common. If the function specifies one group of features, a certain kind of object is thereby determined, but if the
rule specifies another group of features, a different kind of object is
determined. In Kant's own example, "the concept 'dog' signifies a rule
according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-
footed animal in a general manner..." (A141=B180). The concept 'dog,'
as a function or rule specifies the features, animal and four-footed,
which, in addition to certain others, determine a particular kind of
object, a dog.

Applying a concept depends upon being able to classify objects;
but being able to classify objects depends upon having functions or
rules for the determination of the objects. The particular kind of ob-
ject is determined by a rule specifying the features which mark off that
kind of object. We will discuss the point that the application of con-
cepts depends upon rules in great detail in the following chapters of
this work, beginning with the next section of the present chapter.
But here we will concentrate on Kant's view of concepts as classifica-
tory.

Kant is indicating, by his remark that concepts rest on func-
tions and by his definition of function, that concepts depend upon our
ability to bring various representations under one common representa-
tion, which is to say that they are classificatory. They depend upon
our ability to recognize various things as similar in some respect, or
as having something in common and so as being members of the same
class. For example, an oak tree and a pine tree are both members of
the class of trees. Kant goes on to say that

Since no representation, save when it is an intui-
tion is in immediate relation to an object, no con-
cept is ever related to an object immediately, but
to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is the representation of a representation of it (A68=B93).

What Kant has in mind, I believe, is the notion of concepts as genera and species, under which, ultimately, fall particulars, or objects in the world.¹ That understanding of concepts is set out more clearly in the Logic. There he says:

Concepts are called superior (conceptus superiores), if they have other concepts under them, which in relation to them are called inferior. ... As superior and inferior, concepts are so called only relatively (respective); thus one and the same concept, in different relations can be a superior and an inferior. Thus for example, the concept man in relation to the concept centaur is a superior concept; but in relation to the concept animal, an inferior one (p. 276).

And furthermore:

The superior concept, in relation to its inferior ones, is called genus (genus); the inferior concept, with regard to its superior ones, species (species).

As superior and inferior, genus and species-concepts are distinguished in logical subordination not according to their nature, but only in respect of their relations to one another (termini a quo or ad quod) (p. 276).

A concept, then, is a "superior" (higher) concept in relation to another, if the "superior" concept can apply to any object to which the

¹Although Kant uses the term "concept" (Begriff) to mean class concept or genera and species here, this is not the only way in which he understands concepts. For instance, at A24=B39, he refers to space as a concept, but he specifically denies that it is a general concept or class concept.
"inferior" concept applies (as well as to others to which the inferior concept does not apply). Thus, 'man' is superior to 'centaur' since anything which is a centaur is a man. But although 'man' is superior to 'centaur,' it is inferior to 'animal.' The point is understood more clearly when the terms "genus" and "species" are introduced. One concept is generic and another specific if the generic concept applies to every object to which the specific concept applies, but the specific concept does not apply to any object to which the generic concept applies. Thus, the concept 'metal' is generic and the concept 'gold' specific since all gold is a metal, but not all metal is gold. However, 'metal' is specific in relation to 'body'—which is now the generic concept, since all metals are bodies, but not all bodies are metals.

Furthermore, we learn that higher concepts arise by abstraction from more and more determinations, while lower concepts arise by more thorough determination, i.e. by qualifying a "higher" concept, applying more adjectives to it. For example, to the concept 'animal' we add 'upright' and 'thinking,' and we arrive at the concept 'man.' It is pointed out that only particulars are thoroughly determined—only cognitions as intuitions. Concepts can never be completely determined (p. 279).

The act of recognizing a particular chair as a member of the genus 'chair' (that is, of recognizing this as a chair) is making a judgment. The judgment as expressed in English would be: "This is a chair." Similarly, the act of recognizing a particular chair as brown is also making a judgment, expressed in English by "This chair is brown."
The example which Kant cites is the judgment, ¹ "All bodies are divisible."

He says:

In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Thus in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible,' the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility (A68=B93-94).

What Kant means is that the concept of 'the divisible' or of 'a divisible thing' is a "superior" concept; it qualifies as the genus, under which 'bodies' is a specific or inferior concept. And furthermore, "certain appearances which present themselves to us" (in intuition), that is, certain particulars, objects in the world, are members of the class of bodies; the predicate "body" applies to them. And they are mediately represented through the concept of 'divisibility,' i.e. inasmuch as they belong to the species 'body,' they belong to the genus 'divisible thing'; the predicate "divisible" applies to them because the predicate "body" applies to them.

"Accordingly," says Kant, "all judgments are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation,

¹The term "judgment" is ambiguous and I, with Kant, am playing upon the ambiguity. On the one hand, it refers to the act of recognizing or knowing something as a member of the class, say of chairs, or as a chair, and on the other hand, it refers to the signs written or spoken which express the act of knowledge, e.g. "This is a chair." Except when he uses "judgment" (Urteil) as a species of knowledge (A68=B93 - A69=B94), Kant usually uses "judgment", not as identical with knowledge, but as expressing that knowledge.
a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one" (A69=B93-94). When we make a judgment in which we recognize a particular object or a concept as a member of a superior genus (when we "bring some representation under" another), we unify our knowledge. We simplify it. Instead of seeing in the world (per impossibile) various unconnected (and "as yet undetermined") things (intuitions), we see chairs, and furthermore, we see brown chairs, and so on. Superior concepts, which can be applied to various particulars and various inferior concepts, are used in knowing objects. Instead of remaining undetermined sense-data for us, objects are known as 'chairs' or 'people' or 'rainbows,' etc. We cannot know an object by means of an intuition alone; rather, we know it "by means of" concepts. The concept can be applied to many objects; but in a particular judgment, it is applied to one object, and marks off that object as a member of the class represented by the concept. By classifying the objects of knowledge, a concept simplifies or unifies our knowledge.

Inasmuch as we know by means of concepts used in judgments, and inasmuch as the understanding is our faculty of knowledge, we can, with Kant, "reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a capacity to judge" (B 94). Knowing an object, or making a judgment about it involves the capacities (or faculties) of distinguishing an object in space and time, and having concepts and knowing how to use them.
We have found that for Kant, concepts find their place in the making of true judgments, which constitute knowledge. And furthermore, using a concept in a judgment primarily involves recognizing that the object of the judgment, the object of knowledge, is a certain type of object; it belongs to a particular class of objects. Concepts, then, are used in judgments to distinguish the world into recognized objects; the world is known "by means of" concepts.
Section Three

Introduction to concepts as rules of synthesis

Although Kant primarily views concepts as classificatory, as genera and species, we find in the Critique that he also views them as rules. There are two questions to be answered regarding concepts as rules: first, what are we to understand by a concept as a rule? and second, what is the relationship between a concept as a rule, and as a class concept?

First, how are we to understand concepts as rules of synthesis? Kant introduces the notion in his discussion of the concept of an object, and remarks that:

All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances (A 106).

In the example given by Kant here, we find that the concept 'body' serves as a rule inasmuch as it is the unity of the manifold which is thought through it. Here we have introduced a technical term, "unity of the manifold." Let us begin with an interpretation of the term "manifold." The term basically refers, I believe, to the various impressions which are given in intuition.¹ But what are we to understand

¹We shall see below, in Chapters Three and Five, that there are three sorts of thing which can comprise a manifold: impressions, which we shall discuss here, and representations, and perceptions, which we shall discuss in Chapters Three and Five.
by an "impression" (Eindrücke)? This is a term which Kant appears to have borrowed from Hume.

Hume divides what he calls the "perceptions of the human mind" into "two distinct kinds," viz. "ideas" and "impressions." Impressions include "sensations, passions and emotions," while ideas are "faint images of these in thinking and reasoning."¹ Hume makes it quite clear that impressions and ideas are the same kind of thing, both being perceptions of the human mind, and remarks that the only difference between them is in their "force and liveliness":

The first circumstance that strikes my eye is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every particular, except their degree of force and vivacity (p. 2).

What are impressions? The things which Hume calls "impressions," viz. sensations, passions, and emotions, and the examples which he gives of them, e.g. seeing Paris, seeing red in the sunshine (p. 3), "perceiving any color" or "feeling any sensation" (p. 5), and "all bodily pains and pleasures" (p. 275), are all examples of experiences, of experiencing something: the experience of seeing Paris, the experience of feeling pain, the experience of being angry. In claiming that impressions and ideas are the same kind of thing, I suppose Hume means that my seeing a tall building is the same kind of thing as my idea of the tall building, or that my feeling angry at John is the same kind of thing as my idea of being angry at John. One can see, in a sense,

¹ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1968), p. 1. All future references will be to this edition and will be cited in the text.
Hume's point; feeling angry and thinking about that feeling are both cogitationes, acts of mind, so to say, and are to be distinguished on the one hand from kicking a ball (which we might call a physical act) and on the other from physical events such as getting struck by lightning.

Impressions and ideas are further divided into simple and complex. Hume says:

Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts (p. 2).

If our reading of "impression" is correct (if an impression is experiencing something), then Hume is making a distinction between simple experiences and complex experiences, and the simple ideas and complex ideas corresponding to them. The question arises, then, what is a simple impression (simple experience)? Our experiences are of apples, people, events, etc. We see people, hear symphonies, witness accidents, etc. We do not usually think of simply seeing red, seeing round, or hearing ping. We do, of course, see that the apple is red; that is, we see its red color; we see its round shape, etc. And perhaps this is what Hume has in mind; inasmuch as things (complex objects, of which we have complex impressions) have many different aspects, if we can be said to perceive, say an apple, we should perceive its red color, round shape, sweet taste, etc. According to Hume, the impression of the apple must be complex because a distinction can be made between its color, shape and taste; whereas the red color, round shape and sweet taste are simple impressions, because they cannot be distinguished
into parts or aspects.

To return, now, to our question regarding Kant's use of the term "manifold," if "intuition" is understood as the way in which an object is given to human beings (i.e., through the senses) so that it can be spatially and temporally distinguished from other objects, then the manifold (Mannigfaltiges) given in intuition, is the various, the diverse, "given" when the object is intuited (sensed, in the case of human beings). The various what? The manifold, I believe, is what Hume would have called "simple impressions" of an object. What Kant means is this: in any experience, for example, the experience of seeing the wall, I have an intuition, and in the intuition there is a manifold, i.e. the various simple impressions which I have of the wall, e.g. of extension, impenetrability, grayness, roughness, etc. These are all aspects of the wall; it is extended; it is impenetrable; it is gray; it is rough. These can also be called "representations" and if they were all separate and never connected together, I would never know the wall or anything about it; thus Kant says, "If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is...a whole in which representations stand compared and connected" (A97).

How, then, are the impressions compared and connected? Kant's title for the connection is "synthesis." Although the notion of "synthesis" will be discussed in detail in Chapter II, here we may introduce it briefly as follows. Kant, having divided our experiences of objects into impressions for his own epistemological purposes, must
give some account, as he remarks in A 97 quoted above, of how it is that the impressions are not separated and unconnected. In his own introduction of this new technical term, "synthesis," he says:

...if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name synthesis.

By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge (A77=B102-103).

In some way (which we will explore in Chapter II) the manifold impressions are "synthesized" to yield experiences of objects. The impressions are "put together" (zu einander hinzusethun); and that which is one in them, the object to which the impressions belong, which remains the same throughout the various impressions, is "grasped" (begreifen). Here is where Kant's new view of concepts as rules enters the picture. A concept is the concept of that which remains the same throughout the impressions; thus, it unites the impressions. According to Kant:

The word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness /eine Bewusstsein/ is what combines /vereinigt/ the manifold, successively intuited /nach und nach Angeschaute/, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation (A 103).

The concept, as a "unitary consciousness" or "consciousness of the unity of synthesis" (A 103), combines or synthesize the manifold. In this section, Kant points out that our impressions cannot be haphazard or arbitrary; they must "possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object" (A 105). In its role as combining the manifold so that it is not haphazard or arbitrary, the concept functions as a rule.
Kant says:

It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary and renders possible a concept in which it is intuited (A 105).

The phrase "synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition" is a complicated one in which every word is important for understanding Kant's account of concepts. The "manifold of intuition" (Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung) refers, as we have seen, to the various impressions "given" in intuition, or through the senses. The "unity" or "synthetic unity" (synthetische Einheit) of that manifold refers to the fact that the various impressions must be "synthesized" or "put together" into one recognizable object of knowledge; they must be put together into a "unity". We must know some object of which these are the manifold impressions. It is only possible to apply the concept of that object when the manifold has been put together or synthesized; it would be impossible (for reasons which we will examine in Chapter Two) to apply a concept to the object of which we have impressions if the impressions were kaleidoscopic, always and aimlessly changing, having no order. But if the manifold impressions are put together in the same way more than once, if there is an orderly synthesis of the manifold, then it is possible to apply a concept of the object to the manifold impressions. The concept of the object functions, then, as a rule of the synthesis of impressions.
Perhaps an example may be helpful here. If I am told that
the various lines and squiggles which constitute the drawing of Witt-
genstein's duck-rabbit is a drawing of a duck, then I recognize the
drawing as a duck. But if I am told to look for a rabbit, I may, in-
stead, see a rabbit. The example has limitations, of course, but it
serves to point up the fact that in each case, I take the squiggles and
lines in a certain way, according to a concept. The concept functions
as a rule for how to take the lines and squiggles. (There might be
many ways to take the lines and squiggles; they might be a rough map
of a northern peninsula of Russia.)

In Kant's own example, the concept 'body', as the unity of
a manifold, serves as a rule. Whenever we see a body, there are many
impressions which may be given to us, of extension, impenetrability,
hardness or softness, shape, color, texture, and so forth. When I have
the concept 'body', I, so to say, know how to take this collection of
impressions. I do not have a kaleidoscope of impressions; rather, I
see a body which has a certain shape and color, which is extended and
impenetrable, and which I may touch and find to be hard or soft and of
some particular texture. The concept 'body' is a rule for putting these
impressions together in this way, as opposed to putting them together
in some other way, or putting some of them together with other impres-
sions, so that I apprehend, not a body, but something else. If what I
see is to be a body, it must have these impressions. There is, thus,
an element of necessity about the concept. As a rule, it indicates that
the impressions must be apprehended in this way—at least twice. (This
qualification will be discussed in Chapter Two.)

In answer to the second question of this section, What is
the relationship between the concept as classificatory and the concept
as a rule? we find that the concept as a rule of synthesis is necessary
to the concept as a class concept applying to objects in the world.
Concepts as rules are necessary for the possibility of general concepts.
There are three claims to be argued to show this relationship. First,
as we saw in Section Two, a class concept or general concept applies to
more than one object; it applies to all the objects which make up a
certain class. Second, we must show that if we are to apply the gener-
al concept to an object, then we must be able to pick out or distin-
guish the object to which it applies. Third, if we grant that Kant's
technical distinctions between impressions, objects of impressions,
and concepts of objects, etc. are plausible, then we must show that
being able to distinguish an object and apply a concept to it entails
putting together the impressions given to our senses, synthesizing them
to yield an object. If we cannot synthesize our many impressions, if
we are left with merely a kaleidoscope of impressions, then we are
never able to distinguish objects in the world; thus, we are never
able to apply general concepts (and as we shall see, we are not able
to form general concepts, either).

Let us turn now to a more detailed examination of these
claims regarding synthesis as a necessary condition of forming and
applying general concepts.
CHAPTER TWO

Synthesis As an Account of the Application of Empirical Concepts

To account fully for human knowledge, according to Kant, something must be added to an account of how it is possible for us to have impressions, i.e. to an account of the receptivity of the senses; what is needed is an account of how it is possible for us to use general concepts, i.e. an account of the "spontaneity of the understanding."

He says:

As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a synopsis. But to such synopsis a synthesis must always correspond; receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge... (A 97).

There is, as we have seen, a manifold given in an intuition which must be "synthesized" or "combined" before knowledge is possible. In this chapter, I will attempt to show two things: first, that "synthesis" refers to a group of related mental\(^1\) activities; and second, that these activities are logically necessary for the application of general concepts. (One refers to synthesis as activities because Kant describes the synthesis at A 97 as "threefold," as having three aspects, and these aspects he entitles the "synthesis of apprehension in intuition,"

\(^1\)I refer to these as "mental" activities to distinguish them roughly from what might be called "physical" activities such as walking or kicking a ball. These mental activities, inasmuch as they are necessary for the use of all general concepts, may be necessary conditions of any physical activities (i.e., any conscious physical activities since to engage in and hence to be conscious of an activity, one must have a concept of that activity).
"the synthesis of reproduction in imagination," and the "synthesis of
recognition in a concept." These are the titles for a group of related
activities which we must be able to perform if we are to apply concepts.

My first argument for Kant's understanding of "synthesis" as
an activity is a negative one: We must remember that Kant is not
offering us a "physiology of the mind," or a psychological account of
the origin of concepts; rather, he offers us a transcendental account
of human knowledge. Therefore, we should understand "synthesis" as a
technical term for a logical element of knowledge, i.e. as denoting an
element which is logically necessary in order for experience (and
hence knowledge) to be possible. When Kant introduces "synthesis,"
then, as "the act of putting different representations together and
of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge" (A77=
B103), he should not be taken to be giving us a description of the
operation of mental machinery which "constructs" objects of experience.
Such operations could not be conscious, but would have to be "pre-con-
scient" since they would be operations which are involved in working
up raw material into conscious experience of objects. When we examine
Kant's account of the threefold synthesis, we find, I believe, that he
is talking about a group of related activities involved in seeing and
hearing objects, etc., as well as recognizing and judging them, etc.
I refer to these as "activities" because they are "conscious acts"--as
opposed, on the one hand, to what might be called "unconscious acts"
such as stepping on a cockroach unbeknownst to oneself, or habitually
readjusting one's glasses; and on the other hand, to that element in
experience which Kant thinks of as passive, viz. being given an object
which can become an object of awareness or consciousness, being presented with something which might become an object of awareness. If synthesis is not "pre-conscious," if it refers to something which we do and which we can be conscious of,\(^1\) then it can be called an "activity."

Let us turn now to an examination of the three aspects of synthesis and see what it is that we do when we synthesize the manifold of intuition.

---

\(^1\)We can be conscious of associating two impressions, of thinking of many impressions as all belonging to one object, and of recognizing this as an "X". But usually when we see objects, we are not aware of these things. If they occur simultaneously, when one is conscious of the unity of the manifold (i.e., the object to which a manifold of impressions belongs), the consciousness, as Kant says, "may often be only faint, so that we do not connect it with the act of synthesis itself, that is, not in any direct manner with the generation of the representation, but only with the outcome..." (A 103). The cases in which we are aware of associating or reproducing impressions, of thinking of them as belonging to one object, and of recognizing the object as a particular kind of object, are cases in which we do not immediately recognize the object, but have to think hard about it, have to figure out what it is; perhaps we saw one of these as a child and have only vague memories of it; or perhaps we have been told about these strange objects and must think hard to figure out whether this is one of those objects.
Section One

The threefold synthesis

A. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

In the first place, when we see a wall, we do not see a thing that is extended, something else which is impenetrable, something gray, and something rough; we see a wall, of which these are the aspects. How is this possible? How is it possible that we see one thing, of which the many are attributes? How is it possible that we have the many impressions as impressions of one object and not as separate and unconnected? Kant gives a transcendental answer to these questions. Since the manifold impressions are distinct from one another, and are given to different senses (some to sight, some to touch, etc.), it seems to Kant that it must be the case that we "put them together," so to say; that is, because we do not apprehend them as separate entities, but rather as the manifold impressions of one object, it must be the case that we apprehend the many as many aspects of one thing. This "putting together," which constitutes the first aspect of the threefold synthesis, Kant calls the "synthesis of apprehension"; he says:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition arise out of this manifold ...it must first be run through and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold
which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis (A 99).

It must be the case, since any object has various aspects, that when we apprehend an object, we apprehend the various aspects as various aspects of one object. One might say here that when we apprehend an object, in the sense of knowing that object or recognizing it, we (inter alia) recognize the various aspects as aspects of one object—we see the aspects as aspects of one object.¹ This is not to say that we know what the object is, or recognize it as a particular kind of object (for example, as a chair); rather, I wish to point out that seeing aspects as aspects of one object is only part of the threefold synthesis. However, it is an "act of understanding"; it is not (logically) a part of intuiting the object, but of understanding or knowing it.

B. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination

Apprehending aspects as aspects of one object would be impossible without "reproduction in imagination." "Reproduction" here refers to two elements without which, Kant argues, empirical experience would be impossible; these are remembering and association.

Although Kant devotes most of this discussion to reproduction as association, he does raise the point at A 102 that it is necessary in order for me to have certain experiences that I be able to remember

¹Further discussion of "seeing as" will occur in Paragraph C as we examine the synthesis of recognition and discuss the concept of an 'object'.
the parts of them. This point is brought out in the three examples
presented in A 102 where Kant says:

When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained; none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise (A 102).

If in drawing a line in thought,\(^1\) I am unable to remember the preceding

\(^1\)I have interpreted Kant here as concerned with three activities: drawing a line, marking time, and counting. I do so first because he says "wenn ich eine Linie in Gedanken ziehe" (A 102) and uses the verb "to draw"; he does not say "When I contemplate a line in thought" or "When I think about a line," etc. Second, I do so because of his remark that "if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations...a complete representation would never be obtained." This remark indicates that Kant is thinking of a succession of representations, and as I will argue in Chapters Three and Four, although there are many cases in which we successively apprehend and reproduce representations in recognizing an object, there are also cases in which we simultaneously apprehend and reproduce representations. For example, I may instantly recognize a line; I can do so with lines drawn on paper, or with an imaginary line. It is difficult to understand what it would be like to "drop out of thought" or forget the first parts of a line, the antecedent parts of a time period, or the first units counted, when I am simply thinking of the concepts of a line, or a twenty-four hour period, or of a certain number. When I think of the number two million, I do not bear in mind each unity; nor when I think of a twenty-four hour period, do I think of each hour. However, in certain actual cases of applying these concepts, it is possible to make sense of the notion of dropping preceding representations out of thought. For instance, suppose the line I am looking at or imagining is a sine curve; I am noting to myself certain features of it, first the upper arc, then the lower. I am trying to figure out whether it is a sine curve. I attend the parts of the line one after the other. And as Kant says, if I forget the first part when I go on to the second, I will not be able to recognize the line as a sine curve.
segments when I arrive at later ones, by the time I finish drawing
the line, so to say, I will have no thought of a line at all. In the
same way, if I am to apply the concept of a "twenty-four hour period"
in thinking of the time from one noon to the next, I must remember
from one hour to the next the fact that hours have elapsed and how many
have elapsed. If I forget, then when I "come to the end of the time
period," I will not be aware that twenty-four hours have elapsed. I
will be conscious only that one hour (the last one to elapse) has pass-
ed. I will have no concept of a twenty-four hour period having elapsed.
The point should also be clear in connection with counting up to a
particular number (cf. A 103).

When Kant refers to a "law of reproduction" (Gesetz der Repro-
duction) or a "synthesis of reproduction" (Synthesis der Reproduction),
he means, primarily, what he calls the "association of impressions";
that is, first, our ability to associate certain impressions with
others, for example, to associate red with heavy cinnabar. He is re-
ferring to our ability to recognize various impressions (a manifold)
as all belonging to the same object, or as all being impressions of
the same object, the empirical result of which is that if we think of
one of the impressions, we are reminded of the object. Secondly, he
is referring to our ability to recognize something as being the same
throughout a series of impressions, as for example, when in counting
to 100, I am able to use the same unity, say 10's, and say to myself
"10, 20 (two 10's), 30 (three 10's)...100 (ten 10's)," thereby repro-
ducing the unity or remembering the same unity in each case while
counting to 100. These two abilities are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, when we think of the various impressions of an object, for example, the color of the chair, the shape of the chair, the texture of the chair, etc., we are thinking primarily of the different impressions—which all belong to the same object. On the other hand, we may be interested in the fact that, in the series of impressions: the color of the chair, the shape of the chair, the texture of the chair, etc., the various impressions are impressions of one and the same object; they all belong to the same object. In the first case, we are concerned to emphasize the impressions; in the second case, the object to which they belong. The point is that if we are to be able to associate impressions, we must realize that although the impressions are different, they all belong to the same object. We may emphasize the fact that the impressions are all different, or the fact that they all belong to one object.

Reproduction, whether considered as association or as remembering, depends upon activities which involve the concept of 'the same'. This is one of the points made in the three cases which Kant gives at A 102. Being able to draw a line in thought, to think of the time from one noon to the next, and to represent a number to oneself (i.e., counting to a certain number) are all different activities and involve being able to do different things. However, we can say of all of them that they involve being able to reproduce something, in the sense of remembering something as the same from moment to moment—in the first case, being able to reproduce segments of the line, in the
second, units of time, and in the third, units used in counting. Yet, what "the same" amounts to in one case is not exactly what it amounts to in another; the same is not always the same. This is an odd way of saying that different concepts are involved in each case, all of which involve somewhat different abilities to do somewhat different things. Drawing a line in thought and reproducing its segments is a quite different activity than thinking of the time from one noon to the next, say in terms of hours, and these are different than counting to 100 by 10's. Each is an activity and involves doing something in an orderly or rule-governed way—i.e., doing something in the same way. But it is important to notice that what counts as going on in the same way varies from case to case. Drawing a line is doing something in one way, following one kind of rule; but counting is a very different activity, and what counts as following a rule (=doing the same thing) in drawing a line, does not count as following a rule (=doing the same thing) in counting.

At A 102, after giving the three cases, Kant remarks that "the synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction." What he means is that he is interested in these three cases, primarily in what he calls a "complete representation" of, for example, thinking of the time from one noon to the next, and only secondarily in the activity of the thinking or 'keeping the time' or 'marking the time'. Marking the time by hours and not forgetting that hours have passed and how many have passed, are necessary conditions of applying the "complete representation," 'a twenty-four hour period,'
This activity of marking time with its necessary reproduction of hours constitutes the synthesis of reproduction; but it is pointless without the concept of what one is about, in this case, thinking of the time from one noon to the next. There must be an apprehension of this activity, when it is completed, as thinking of 'the time from one noon to the next.' This is the synthesis of apprehension. Just as, in the case of seeing a wall, all the impressions of shape, color, texture, etc. of the wall are seen as aspects of one object, so in the case of thinking of a twenty-four hour period, that is, of applying the concept of 'a twenty-four hour period,' each hour counted is understood as part of 'a twenty-four hour period.'

C. The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

In this section concerning the third aspect of synthesis, Kant argues for the concept of an object in terms of two things: as the consciousness of the unity of synthesis, and as a concept of that which prevents our impressions from being haphazard or arbitrary.

As we have seen, one must, in order to recognize an object, apprehend the many impressions of that object and reproduce or associate them. As Kant says:

...it is clear that...apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection [Zusammenhang] of the impressions, were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. This is the reproductive faculty of imagination, which is merely empirical.

If, however, representations reproduced one
another, just as they happened to some together (wie sie zusammen gerathen), this would not lead to any determinate connection of them (wiederum kein bestimmter Zusammenhang derselben), but only to accidental collocations (sondern bloss regellose Haufen derselben); and so would not give rise to any knowledge. Their reproduction must, therefore, conform to a rule (eine Regel haben), in accordance with which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of representations (A 121).

But further, the manifold representations or impressions which I apprehend and reproduce or associate, must "form a whole"; I must be conscious of the unity of the synthesis. That is, I must be conscious that the many impressions apprehended and associated belong to one object. Having given an example of apprehending and reproducing numbers in adding units together to reach a certain number of units, Kant remarks that "the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis," and he remarks further that "the word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation" (A 103). As we remarked earlier, Kant is concerned to show that adding units or marking time is pointless unless one bears in mind or, simply, knows what one is doing. In other words, one must have a concept of adding units to reach twenty, or of a 'twenty-four hour period,' etc. Apprehension and reproduction are incomplete without recognition in a concept; one

1It is successively intuited in the example of adding units together to reach a certain number of units.
may apprehend impressions and associate them together, but one must also recognize the unity in the impressions, i.e. the object of the impressions.

This brings us to the second point of Kant's discussion in this section, that objects prevent our impressions from being haphazard or arbitrary. An object is understood by Kant to be something experienced which has many aspects of which we have impressions; a concept of an object is the concept of something to which these impressions all belong. At A121, Kant says that if "...representations reproduced one another in any order, just as they happened to come together, this would not lead to any determinate connection of them, but only to accidental collocations; and so would not give rise to any knowledge. Their reproduction must, therefore, conform to a rule in accordance with which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another."

Kant's point holds both for representations which occur one after another and for representations which occur simultaneously. In fact, when we perceive an object, a wealth of impressions are given to our senses, some of which belong to the object and some of which do not. It is the concept of the object which tells me which belong to the object and which do not. In the same manner, I may have a representation of a leaf, then of the sky, then of a branch, and then of a squirrel, then of another leaf, etc. It is the concept 'tree' which tells me that the representations of leaves, branches and trunk, etc. must be taken together as belonging to one object, despite the fact that the representations occurred helter-skelter and in irregular order,
interspersed with representations which do not belong to the object 'tree.' If representations are taken ("reproduced") together in any irregular order, just as they occur, then I would never have the chance to associate leaf with branch, etc., and so to form the concept 'tree.'

Now it might be argued against this that we could "associate" successive impressions and form a concept of them, i.e., think of them as all belonging to the same object. But it must be pointed out that such a series of impressions may never occur again; there is nothing to guarantee that the impressions would recur in that order. Thus it would be impossible to use a concept formed in this manner. It could never be used again,¹ for there would be nothing to which it could apply.

¹It might be argued that such an activity could still constitute "experience." However, if experience is understood as experience of things which are distinct from the experience of them, then it could not, for it would not be something upon which knowledge could be based. One reason for this is that knowledge requires the concepts 'mistaken' and 'correct'; i.e., one must be able to distinguish things which one knows from things which one may think one knows, but about which one is mistaken. In the "experience" consisting of a succession of subjectively or arbitrarily associated impressions, one can never check to see whether one's knowledge is in fact knowledge. For example, I have certain impressions; I associate them and apply a concept to them; I say, "This is a chair." My subjective association may be different from everyone else's (on this account, it may be that no two people associate the same impressions, thus it is pointless for me to ask whether anyone else agrees that "this is a chair.") Second, on this account, there is no guarantee that the particular succession of impressions will recur; I can never "look again" and be certain that "this is a chair." On the other hand, I may never be mistaken; a group of impressions is whatever I "conceive" them to be. No subsequent experience can prove me mistaken. But if there are no cases of being mistaken, there are no cases of being correct. If there are no false judgments, i.e., if "this is a chair" is always true, then there are no true judgments; but then, surely, there is nothing which can be called "knowledge."
Impressions, then, must be reproduced or associated together in a certain order which may often differ from the order in which they occur. As Kant puts it, "it is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object" (A 105). The associating of certain representations together is the synthesis of those representations; and synthesizing them into one object is "producing a synthetic unity" from them. Kant next turns to a discussion of the transcendental object=\(X\), in which he indicates that we must, in order to have experience, have the concept 'object.' (The concept is called "transcendental" because experience is impossible without it.) Having this concept of 'object,' we know that the unity provided for our impressions by empirical concepts of objects is a necessary unity. Thus Kant says, "this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule \([\text{Regel}]/\) by means of such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary," and "The concept of this unity is the representation of the object=\(X\)\(^1\)..." (A 105).

\(^1\)Given that all our knowledge is based upon representations, and given that we have only representations (or impressions) of an object, and do not "have" an object of these representations in any way other than through representations given in sensible intuition, then an object corresponding to these representations and yet distinct from them, can never be known by us. Thus, all objects of knowledge, whether spatial or non-spatial (such as a headache), as distinct from our representations of them, must be understood as "something in general=\(X\)," as Kant points out in the following remarks:

At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations.' We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of
The concept of 'object,' then, is the concept of that which makes necessary a certain unity in our impressions. Without this unity there can be no concepts, and hence no experience; thus, objects are necessary for concepts and for experience. We cannot form or use an empirical concept unless impressions exhibit an orderliness—orderliness which, according to Kant, constitutes the concept of 'object.' Impressions cannot go together now in one order, now in another, but must go together in the same order; they must be orderly or rule-governed. They must constitute a unity, but it is the particular unity which makes up the concept of a particular object. The concept 'object' necessitates that there by some order among impressions. The particular order (which representations are to go together) is provided by representation. What then is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and consequent-ly distinct from, our knowledge? It is easily seen that this object must be thought only as something in general=x, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it (A 104).

This does not mean that we can know nothing about the objects of representations, but Kant means simply that an object is understood as something of which we have knowledge, but which is distinct from our knowledge of it. Insofar as all our knowledge of objects arises from our representations or impressions of these objects, and objects are distinct from them, then the objects are unknowable apart from the representations. Kant does not discuss here whether there is any more to be known about an object than we can know through our representations, but presumably, apart from a priori knowledge about objects in general (such as, for example, that they must conform to the categories), there is nothing more about them to be known by us, for all our knowledge is based upon sensible intuition. And for us, all that there is to be known about an object is given in sensible intuition (though perhaps it is different for God, or other beings whose intellect, as Kant puts it, is intuitive, or whose intuition is intellectual).
the empirical concept.

Although impressions cannot go together now in one order, now in another without concepts being impossible, there is a sense in which our impressions could go together in a different order. A concept of an object (not the concept 'object,' but the concept of any particular object, such as 'chair,' or 'rainbow') is the "consciousness of unity" or awareness that something is the same throughout a series of impressions. (Perhaps it is not misleading to picture the manifold in the following way: "X is a"; "X is b"; "X is c"; etc. In this picture, the concept of X remains the same throughout the series of judgments formed from impressions of the object.) It is possible, on Kant's account of empirical concepts, that we might have a different set of empirical concepts than the one we have in fact. That is, it is possible for human beings to associate impressions together in ways different than the way they are now associated. But whatever way the impressions are ordered, the empirical object is what gives the particular order to the collection of impressions. The one thing that cannot vary in this way is that the impressions be ordered according to the pure concepts of understanding or categories. Kant argues that without categories, no experience—whether of objects as we know them or of a different set of objects—would be possible. But with regard to empirical concepts which make up our experience of the world, there is no such absolute necessity that the manifold always be constituted in the same (twelve) ways. The manifold is given, then, without any necessary order, and can be ordered into any number of different sets
of objects.¹

Thus it makes sense to say that the manifold can be taken in more than one way. A particular manifold can be seen as one object, or, under another set of empirical concepts, as another. It only makes sense to speak of seeing a manifold as some object when it is possible for it to be seen as some other object; the manifold itself must be "object neutral." Since that is the case, in speaking of the categories, on Kant’s account, we cannot say that we can "see the manifold as" a substance or a cause or a reciprocal cause or as something else entirely. According to Kant, there can be nothing else than substances and causes; anything else would be unrecognizable as experience. The necessity accruing to empirical concepts is not the necessity accruing to the pure concepts of understanding. The latter are concepts which must always be operative. The necessity accruing to empirical concepts is the necessity that the manifold be synthesized according to them more than once, though not necessarily always. We cannot have impressions helter-skelter and still have concepts; therefore, the order which empirical concepts impose upon impressions is necessary in the sense that experience is impossible without it. (That is, experience is impossible without ordered manifolds of impressions; whether they are ordered according to one set of concepts, or another, is unimportant.)

¹Two qualifications must be added here: first, in order to have a concept, once the manifold has been ordered in a certain way, into a certain object, it must be ordered in that way at least once more, otherwise the concept has no application. And second, one cannot "mix worlds," so to say; one cannot apprehend the world half on one system of objects and half on another. This is because many objects and concepts are inter-dependent, for example, shoes are senseless in a world without feet; eye-glasses in a world without eyes, etc.
Section Two

Synthesis and the formation, use and application of empirical concepts

As we see, then, we must, in order to apply concepts and hence have experience, be able 1) to apprehend the many impressions given in an intuition as aspects of one object. To do this, we must 2) be able to associate the impressions together, and 3) to recognize something as the same throughout them all; that is, we must have concepts of objects, and know that impressions are orderly and belong to an object. We then apprehend them as (aspects of) one object. These are three elements of the one act of apprehending or recognizing an object.

The question arises whether Kant's account of threefold synthesis is an account only of applying empirical concepts, or of forming and of using them as well. The answer, I believe, is that we need not synthesize a manifold either in forming or in using an empirical concept, but that in forming one, we learn a rule for synthesis or for how a particular empirical manifold should be synthesized.

One might be tempted to say that the threefold synthesis is necessary in order to form a concept on the grounds that when one forms a concept of something, one synthesizes the manifold for the first time. However, to say this is to confuse the application of the concept with learning the concept. A synthesis occurs only when a manifold of intuition is given to the senses. But one is not always given an intuition when one forms a concept; for example, one might know what a tree is,
and furthermore, what a fruit tree is, in particular, orange trees and lemon trees. One is then told that a grapefruit tree is like these in certain ways; one may be given a more or less detailed botanical description of a grapefruit tree, and although one has never seen a grapefruit tree, one may form a concept of it and be able to pick out the tree on the first try. In this case, when one learned the concept 'grapefruit tree,' there was no intuition given to one at the time. This case is similar to the formation of concepts which, although they are not senseless, nevertheless have no intuition corresponding to them in fact. One may know what a horse is, and one may know what it is for an animal to have a single horn in the center of its head (one knows that rhinoceroses have them). Therefore, when one has a unicorn described to one, one may form a concept of this mythical animal, and the concept is legitimate, for although one has no actual intuition corresponding to it, it is logically possible that one might. Thus one need not synthesize a manifold when forming an empirical concept. (This case also points up the fact that we can also use concepts, such as the concept of 'unicorn' without performing a threefold synthesis. If no intuition corresponding to the concept is given us, if there are no impressions to apprehend, associate or recognize in a concept, then we do not

1There is a very interesting group of concepts, similar to concepts such as 'unicorn' in that we may form the concepts even though no intuition of them is ever given in experience. These are concepts involving very large numbers, such as the concept of a chiliagon. The rule we learn for the application of the concept 'chiliagon' is a rule for counting the sides of a figure to find whether it is 'thousand-sided.' In learning the concept 'chiliagon' it is not necessary that a chiliagon be present to us, and in fact it is not possible to apply the concept with certainty, for we cannot ever be certain that we have not made a mistake in counting the sides.
perform a synthesis.)

It seems that if synthesis is an activity, then it is something we learn to do. If when applying a concept, we perform an act of synthesis, then when we learn a concept, we are learning, among other things, how to synthesize the manifold according to that concept. But in what sense is this true? An objection arises immediately. One may be ostensively taught certain empirical concepts; for example, mother may point to the dog and say, "This is a dog." And if I understand pointing and the locution "this is a...," I may learn the concept 'dog.' But mother does not point and say, "Apprehend this manifold of impressions as a dog" (how does one point to the manifold?), or "now associate furry with brown, and with four-legged, long-eared, etc." If one learns to synthesize, one does not learn by being taught ostensively. Indeed, it may be that while we can be taught empirical concepts, we are not taught to synthesize.

We may learn synthesis by trial and error; it may be something like learning how to take certain optical illusions or ambiguous figures, etc. (It is, then, like learning certain kinds of rules.) One keeps trying, thinking of the figure now in one way, now in another. But, in fact, different people might learn in different ways; the learning may be slow and laborious, by trial and error, or it may be instantaneous (one "just sees" the figure as X, then as Y). How in fact one learns to see an optical illusion or ambiguous figure in one way or another is a matter for empirical research and is not of interest in a transcendental endeavor. Nor is it a transcendental matter how one in
fact learns to synthesize the manifold. Kant, therefore, never addresses himself to this point; rather, he is concerned solely to argue that the threefold synthesis is a necessary condition of applying empirical concepts and hence of having experience.

We have said that in forming or learning an empirical concept we learn a rule for the synthesis of the manifold. We must, however, qualify this statement, for although most cases of learning an empirical concept include learning to apply the concept, there may be cases (such as that of 'unicorn') in which one might be said to have learned a particular concept without having learned to apply it. These cases fall into two kinds: those in which one is able to apply the concept, but has not done so (as with the concept of 'unicorn' in which case, one has learned a rule of synthesis and could apply the concept if the occasion arose) and those cases in which one can actually be said to have an empirical concept, even though one cannot apply it. These latter again fall into two kinds: cases in which one cannot apply the concept because one has not learned to recognize the object, and cases in which one is inhibited (for example by blindness or other defect) from doing so. The interesting cases are those in which one may be said to have a particular concept, but has not learned to recognize the objects to which it applies, for these cases show that being able to apply a concept and hence the threefold synthesis, is not a necessary condition of having the concept. An example might be someone who knows a great deal about computers, what they can be used for, what they do, facts about their storing and retrieving data and what sorts of operations they can perform with that data, etc., etc. However, though he
knows a very great deal about them, he has never seen a computer (only a computer terminal), has never heard or read a description of one and has no idea of what one would look like.

But although one may have some empirical concepts which one cannot apply, it certainly seems strange that there might be someone who could still be said to have empirical concepts, and to have experience. Of course there are exceptional cases; perhaps a deaf and blind person whose experience of the world is limited; for example, he may know what a symphony is, but since he cannot hear, he cannot distinguish a symphony by listening, and hence cannot be said to experience a symphony (though perhaps he is a musicologist and has learned to read music in braille and so distinguishes symphonies and knows much about them). These exceptional cases can be explained, but can there be experience in which no empirical concepts are applied? Surely we would hesitate to attribute experience to someone who had none of the five senses and could in no way distinguish objects in the world.

Thus, while we cannot say that being able to apply a concept is a necessary condition of having a concept, we can say that the paradigm cases of having empirical concepts and of having experience, are cases in which one applies one's concepts. The exceptional cases must be exactly that—exceptions—for if they were the rule, if one were seldom or never able to apply one's empirical concepts, then it would be questionable whether one were experiencing the world, since that just means distinguishing or recognizing objects in the world.

Since there is a distinction to be made between forming a concept, having a concept, and applying a concept, it is important to
stress that Kant is concerned to account for only one of these—applying a concept, for as we have seen, it is possible both to form and to use empirical concepts without a synthesis taking place.
CHAPTER THREE

The Process-View of Synthesis

In this chapter, we shall examine three interpretations of Kant's synthesis. Although they differ widely in other ways, Norman Kemp-Smith, H. J. Paton, and R. P. Wolff all, as we shall see, hold what may be called a "process-view" of synthesis; that is, they argue that synthesis is a process, that Kant's doctrine of threefold synthesis is an account of cases of knowledge in which a manifold (given in intuition) is successively apprehended and reproduced. But, as we shall see, this view falls prey to the objection that it is logically impossible for at least one sort of synthesis to be a process.

I have chosen these three commentators for three reasons. First, they are among the few recent Kant commentators who deal in any depth with the notion of synthesis, particularly empirical synthesis, or threefold synthesis according to empirical concepts; second, they are fairly representative in that they hold the common view of synthesis as a process, but, third, these three commentators are unique, I believe, in offering plausible arguments for this interpretation of Kant.
Section One

Three typical interpretations

A. R. P. Wolff.

To explicate the argument of the Analytic, one of Wolff's primary concerns in his commentary is to untangle the notion of "synthesis." And this he attempts in his section on the subjective deduction, which he refers to as "the real heart of his book."¹ For the purpose of understanding the notion of a 'rule of synthesis,' Wolff begins with Kant's assertion at A 106 that "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule." The paradigm cases of rule-governed activities under which Wolff operates throughout his book are those of a potter shaping clay and a purposeful pedestrian. The potter and the pedestrian, Wolff says, each follow a set of prescriptions, or rules. In the case of the potter, the rule is like a recipe: "(1) Place a large handful of clay on the wheel; (2) smooth it while slowly turning the wheel..." (p. 122). Examining these paradigm cases, Wolff points out three characteristics of rule-governed activities: first, the activity can proceed correctly or incorrectly, second, there is a particular temporal order in the stages of the activity; and third, the activity is "coherent," by which he means that the rule determines what features are relevant

¹R. P. Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 120. All future references will be to this edition and will be cited in the text.
to the activity, i.e. which are parts or stages of the activity and which are accidentally associated with it (pp. 122-123). Furthermore, Wolff draws a distinction between two types of rule-directed activity which may be referred to as first and second-order processes. He says:

The first sort are activities concerned with the working up of a product, as in the case of the potter and the bowl, or with the carrying out of a planned sequence of actions, as in the case of the pedestrian on his walk. These we may call first-order rule-directed activities. The second sort of rule-directed activity consists in the formulation of a rule in accordance with which a working-up or carrying-out is done (p. 124).

Cases of synthesis, according to Wolff, are like the cases of the potter and the pedestrian. One of the basic similarities is that in both kinds of case, the stages are successive in time ("the manifold which is run through stretches out in time" p. 126). Thus, for Wolff, "The key to an understanding of synthesis lies in the mental activity which Kant calls reproduction in imagination" (p. 127). Memory, the ability to recall past perceptions and experiences, enables us to think of a manifold of representations, given successively, as a unity, in one consciousness.

Wolff also thinks of the synthesizing process in terms of the example of looking at a forest: we cannot be said to have seen the forest if we forget the individual trees which we look at one after the other. He says:

What I must do, therefore, as I proceed from one moment to the next, is to reproduce the representation which has just been apprehended, carrying it along in memory while I apprehend the next. In looking at a forest, I must say to myself, "There is a birch; and there is an elm, plus the
birch which I remember, etc." The result of this repeated recollecting—or synthesis of reproduction in imagination, as Kant calls it—is the apprehension in one consciousness of a variety of representations which were originally disjoint. By carrying them forward, the mind has made it possible to think them as a unity (pp. 128-129).

Later he points out that even if a diversity of representations are given as simultaneous, "the mind must run over them one after another. If I am presented with a variegated visual field, for example, I keep recalling it in memory as I say to myself; 'There is a green patch and a red circle and a blue patch and a black dot.' Such a process takes time, even though it is the analysis of a perception which was presented at one instant" (p. 153). This passage is important, for it shows us that although he recognizes that representations seem sometimes to be given simultaneously ("even if they are given as simultaneous"¹ p. 153), Wolff is quite certain that synthesis is a successive process. In those cases in which a perception is given (or seems to be given) at one instant, the mind successively analyses and apprehends the representations given in the perception. Thus, on Wolff's interpretation, synthesis is a successive process, a process which takes time. This is true, on his interpretation, not only in the obvious cases such as synthesizing a forest by successively apprehending and remembering individual trees, but also in cases in which, according to Wolff, representations seem to be given simultaneously and the synthesis seems to be instantaneous.

¹Underlining is my own.
B. Norman Kemp-Smith.

Kemp-Smith's interpretation of threefold synthesis rests upon his belief that the subjective deduction of which it is a part is concerned with consciousness of time, as opposed to the objective deduction which is concerned with awareness of objects. Thus he says:

In the subjective deduction experience is chiefly viewed as a temporal process in which the given falls apart into successive events, which, in and by themselves, are incapable of constituting a unified consciousness. The fundamental characteristic of human experience, from this point of view, is that it is serial in character. Though it is an apprehension of time, it is itself also a process in time. In the objective deduction, on the other hand, the time element is much less prominent. Awareness of objects is the subject matter to which analysis is chiefly devoted.¹

He believes that consciousness of time is the starting point of the subjective deduction of the categories because, he argues, "consciousness of time is an experience whose actuality cannot be questioned" (p. 243). And if the experience of time cannot be doubted, then anything which forms a necessary condition of the experience of time is also real. Kemp-Smith recognizes that the purpose of the deduction is to establish the necessary conditions of experience, but he argues that there are basically three forms of experience, and that only one of them is indubitable and therefore able to form the starting point of a deduction. Experience of self and experience of objects, are, Kemp-Smith says, "open to question." He says of them that

¹Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York, 1950), pp. 239-240. All future references will be to this edition and will be cited in the text.
They may be illusory, as Hume has argued. And as their validity, or rather actuality, calls for establishment, they cannot fulfill the demands which the transcendental method exacts from the experience whose possibility is to yield proof of its discoverable conditions (p. 241).

Experience of time, however, in the form of consciousness of change, he says, "is beyond doubt" (p. 241). Thus Kemp-Smith's argument is that we cannot doubt that we are conscious of or experience change, therefore anything necessary for the consciousness of change is also real.

Now Kemp-Smith is aware that Kant nowhere actually states such an argument, for he says:

...such in effect is the ultimate character of Kant's proof of the objective validity of the categories. They are proved in that it is shown that only in and through them is consciousness of time possible.¹

He also attributes this line of argument to Kant on the basis of Kant's preliminary remark to the subjective deduction at A 99 where Kant says that all our representations belong to inner sense and hence are subject to time. Kemp-Smith quotes Kant as saying that "this is a general remark which the reader must bear in mind as being a fundamental presupposition of my entire argument" (Kemp-Smith, p. 245). On the basis of Kant's remark, Kemp-Smith asserts that "consciousness of time is thus the starting point of the deduction" (p. 245).

Because that which we are supposedly never in doubt of is

¹Ibid., p. 242. Underlining is my own.
the consciousness of change, Kemp-Smith considers that the time consciousness with which Kant is concerned is "serial consciousness." And based upon his interpretation of the subjective deduction as concerned only with what he terms "serial consciousness," Kemp-Smith naturally views threefold synthesis as an account only of cases of serial consciousness, i.e. cases in which the manifold is apprehended and reproduced successively. He says:

> Among the conditions indispensably necessary to all consciousness of time are synthetic processes whereby the contents of consciousness, occurring in successive moments, are combined and unified. These processes are processes of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition (p. 243).

Furthermore, when he offers an example of threefold synthesis, it is "the empirical concept...of the number six," in which we experience a series of contents, a, b, c, d, e, f, in succession to one another. And he points out that in order to make up an experience of the total of six, the contents which have been successively apprehended must be "reproduced in image" (or remembered) and recognized as forming a unity or whole, viz. the number six (pp. 245-246).

I do not wish to engage in an extended or detailed criticism of Kemp-Smith's interpretation of the subjective deduction for that would take us far afield from the concerns of this work. However, I must point out that it is not at all clear that Kemp-Smith has correctly understood the argument of the subjective deduction. In the first place, in the deduction of the categories, Kant does not argue from "experience of time" to the necessity of categories; rather, as he
himself says, he argues from thought (or experience) of objects:

If we can prove that by means of the categories alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity (A 96-97).

Second, when Kemp-Smith refers to Kant's introductory comments at A 99, he assumes that "consciousness of time" is the fundamental premise in the sense of the starting point of the deduction. Kemp-Smith translates Kant's remarks as follows:

...all the contents of our knowledge are ultimately subject to the formal condition of inner sense, that is, to time, as that wherein they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation to one another. This is a general remark which the reader must bear in mind as being a fundamental presupposition of my entire argument (p. 245).

However, even on Kemp-Smith's own translation, the assertion that all representations are subject to time is only a fundamental premise of the following argument; there might be others as well. But, more importantly, to say that the assertion is a fundamental premise /sine allgemeine Anmerkung, die man bei dem Folgenden durchaus zum Grunde liegen muss/ is not to say that it is the starting point of the deduction.

However, even if Kant had chosen consciousness of time as the "experience" whose possibility he wished to deduce instead of consciousness of objects, his decision could not be based upon the indubitability of the consciousness of time. That is, Kemp-Smith argues that consciousness of time in the form of consciousness of change is the indubitable experience whose possibility is to be proven, or whose necessary conditions must be found. But the consciousness of change
is no more a certainty than the consciousness of objects or of self, for the concepts of 'change' and of 'sameness' are mutually dependent. Consciousness of change requires consciousness of the same; that is, consciousness of change requires consciousness that something is the same, either the object that undergoes the change, or the self within which the changed representations occur, or for whom something changes or in whose consciousness representations change.

In fact, I suppose, Kant could have begun as well from experience of time as from experience of objects, inasmuch as the same arguments arise regarding each. Consciousness of each requires a distinction between the subjective and the objective, and one comes in any case to the necessity for consciousness of objects and the distinction between their objective existence and the subjective order of our perceptions of them. For there is no way to distinguish subjective from objective time consciousness, on Kant's grounds, without consciousness of time in the existence of objects, whether they exist simultaneously or successively. Therefore, consciousness of time depends upon consciousness of objects.

In fact, Kant begins his deduction with the knowledge of objects (=experience) and seeks to find its necessary conditions. One of these is that we be able to distinguish between the subjective order of our representations and the objective order of changes in objects or events in the world, etc. This requires awareness of change; however, in Kant's deduction, this awareness of change is not the starting point.
It follows that if consciousness of time is not the experience whose necessary conditions are deduced, then consciousness of change, although it plays a part in the deduction, is not that which is being accounted for (whose necessary conditions are deduced). And since Kemp-Smith has identified consciousness of change with "serial consciousness," it follows that it is not the case that in the subjective deduction consciousness is viewed solely as a "temporal process" in the sense of being a serial process.

But because Kemp-Smith thinks that in the subjective deduction consciousness is viewed solely as a temporal process, he interprets threefold synthesis as an account solely of cases of serial consciousness, i.e., of cases in which the manifold is apprehended and reproduced successively.

For Paton, too, threefold synthesis is comprised of a successive apprehension and reproduction of a manifold, as well as a recognition of the manifold in one concept. This is apparent in his first discussion of the notion of synthesis, when he remarks that

Synthesis, in its most general sense, is "the act of adding different ideas to one another, and of grasping (or comprehending) their multiplicity in one cognition." An example of the kind of act which Kant has in view would be the act of combining a series of given appearances into the complex intuition of one individual house.\(^1\)

The phrase "adding different ideas to one another" is shown to refer to a successive addition of ideas by Paton's example, "combining a series of given appearances." In fact, Paton believes that threefold synthesis is comprised of two processes, one which is the adding of (serially given) ideas, and one which is their recognition in a concept. He says:

This synthesis is divided into two processes—not I think to be regarded as succeeding one another—firstly an adding of different ideas (or appearances) together, and secondly a 'grasping' of them in one cognition by means of a concept (p. 263).

And again:

I believe—in spite of his use of temporal phrases like 'at first'—that he is analyzing our knowledge into contemporaneous and not successive processes (p. 273n).

---

\(^1\)H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London, 1936), p. 264. All future references will be to this edition and will be cited in the text.
Paton means to indicate that the two processes occur together, contemporaneously, but although the two processes are not successive, one of them at least, the "adding together of different ideas," is a successive activity.

Throughout his work, the examples which Paton gives us of threefold synthesis are cases which involve an enduring successive awareness of the object of knowledge. In dealing with the synthesis of reproduction he says:

Since our awareness of a color, and still more our awareness of a concrete object, is a process which occupies time, we must, if we are to have experience of objects, be able to keep before our minds what has been given, when it is no longer given. This is the work of memory... (p. 363).

It is not clear whether Paton means to say that our awareness of a color or of an object occupies an instant of time, or that it endures through a period of time; however, one suspects the latter, since he is arguing that memory is necessary in order to be aware of an object. Although I will deal with the point in greater detail below, I wish to note here that there are two senses of awareness, and that Paton does not make clear which he has in mind. On the one hand, there is a moment of awareness, an instant of time in which one becomes aware of something; and on the other hand, there is an enduring awareness which lasts through a period of time. However, memory is necessary to both, as we shall see in Chapter IV, so it can in fact offer us no clue to whether Paton is arguing that an instantaneous awareness of an object is a process either occurring at an instant of time or enduring through a period of time, or the obvious case that an enduring awareness
of an object endures through time. Kant's account of synthesis is intended to explain both; Paton's explains only the latter, cases of enduring awareness of objects.

Later, when he turns to the transcendental synthesis of reproduction, Paton is still dealing with cases in which the apprehension of the object takes time. He thinks that Kant is arguing "on the ground that it takes time for us to apprehend a pure manifold as a whole, or as combined in one idea—that a pure reproductive synthesis of imagination is necessary, if we are to know a line, or the time from one noon to another, or a definite number, and even if we are to know time and space themselves" (p. 372). And when he comes at last to summarize Kant's account, he says:

In order to recognize any object as an object, we must unite in one idea the manifold which we have (1) intuited in successive moments, and (2) reproduced in imagination... (p. 375).

Even cases which he should (as we shall see in Section Two) analyze as simultaneous, Paton analyses as successive apprehensions of the manifold:

...in knowing a triangle, the concept of 'triangle' will compel me to reproduce side AB when apprehension has gone on to side BC; and again in knowing a body, the concept of 'body' will compel me to reproduce extension when apprehension has gone on to impenetrability (p. 393).

In the end, Paton's account is that "the manifold is given to us successively in sense" (p. 464), that reproduction reinstates "earlier sense-perceptions beside later ones" (p. 479) so that they can
be grasped in one cognition by means of a concept. He concentrates solely on cases in which impressions are given successively, and fails to discuss cases of the simultaneous apprehension of the manifold. Thus he, like Kemp-Smith and Wolff, is open to an objection which will be explained in the following section.
Section Two

Objection

The objection which I will bring against the "process-view" of synthesis requires that several distinctions be made. The first is a distinction regarding the nature of the manifolds which are synthesized to yield objects.

Usually when Kant mentions the manifold given in intuition, he refers to it simply as "the manifold" (das Mannigfaltige), for example when he says:

Synthesis of a manifold \(\text{des Mannigfaltigen}\) (be it given empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to knowledge (A77=B103).

And again:

This act I name the synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold \(\text{ein Mannigfaltigen}\) which can never be presented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis (A 99).

But "manifold" (Mannigfaltiges) is originally an adjective which has been nominalized; therefore, the question arises, the manifold what? What comprises the manifold which is synthesized to yield an object of experience? Kant, so to say, fills out the phrase in two ways. At certain points he speaks of the manifold as comprised of impressions, and at other points, as comprised of representations, thus:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one
impression \[\text{Eindrücke}\] upon another; for each representation \[\text{Vorstellung}\], insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity (A 99).

Here "representations" is obviously interchangeable with "impressions."

But at another place, Kant says that

...this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances \[\text{Erscheinungen}\] are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of their representations \[\text{Mannigfaltigen ihrer Vorstellungen}\] a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules (A 100).

In this instance, we learn that appearances (given in intuition) have a manifold of representations.

In fact, I do not believe that Kant's use of the terms "manifold of impressions," "manifold of representations," and "manifold of appearances" is completely rigorous.\(^1\) However, I think that it is possible to distinguish two kinds of manifold which are in need of synthesis in order to yield objects. The first is a manifold of impressions, and the second, I refer to as a manifold of "representations" because "representation" is a generic term and can be used to refer to something more than an impression, viz., a perception of an object. By "impression" I mean the aspects or attributes of an object which are given to us through our senses, such as extension, impenetrability, hardness or softness, shape and perhaps color (or at least the

\(^1\)Cf. B 1 where "impression" (Eindrücke) and "representation" (Vorstellung) are interchangeable; also A20=B34, where Kant speaks of "the manifold of appearance" (das \[\text{Mannigfaltige der Erscheinung}\]) and the "manifold of appearances" (\[\text{Mannigfaltige der Erscheinungen}\]).
chroma, hue and intensity which make up the color of an object).
These I believe, constitute the manifold given to us in sensible intu-uition, which must be synthesized to yield certain objects. But, I believe that there are also certain objects, which might be called "complex" objects, whose manifold is a manifold of other objects. For example, in certain cases of the application of the concept "forest", i.e. in certain cases of recognizing a forest, the manifold synthesized is a manifold of trees: I apprehend first one tree and then another and another (all the while reproducing past ones as my attention shifts to the next) and then I recognize that this is a forest.

Second, it is possible to distinguish three kinds of case of synthesis according to empirical concepts, based upon the "synthesis of apprehension" and the "synthesis of reproduction." Basically, these distinctions rest upon the fact that the apprehension of a manifold can be instantaneous or successive and that the reproduction\(^1\) of a manifold can be simultaneous or successive.

First, there are cases in which the synthesis of reproduction is usually successive, but it is not logically necessary that it be so. For instance, one may usually apprehend a forest by a successive apprehension of individual trees, or one may usually recognize a

\(^1\)Kant's use of "reproduction" is ambiguous. It can refer both to remembering, or to a process of holding in memory, and to the act of association. The term "reproduction" suggests the first sense of reproducing in memory successively, while "association" best conveys an act of putting two or more things together at once (although it is possible to associate things successively). However, as it is used in the phrase "synthesis of reproduction," "reproduction" is a generic term referring to both kinds of reproduction: reproduction proper, and association.
decagonal figure as ten-sided by counting the sides; but perhaps with practice one can come to recognize decagonal figures at a glance; in the same way, one may become a pilot, accustomed to seeing forests from the air, and one may recognize a forest instantly, and only upon looking a second time distinguish the individual trees in that forest.

Second, there are cases of synthesis in which the instant apprehension and reproduction (i.e., association) of the manifold is logically necessary. That there are such cases requires detailed argument which will be given below, but these cases will, I believe, turn out to be the ones whose manifolds are manifolds of impressions as opposed to being manifolds of representations other than impressions, i.e. representations of objects.

Finally, there are cases in which the apprehension and reproduction (association) is usually instantaneous, but not necessarily so. These are the most common cases of the recognition and knowledge of everyday objects, cups, brooms, trees, people, etc., etc. One is not usually aware of a successive apprehension of the manifold contained in these objects; one does not ordinarily apprehend the handle and then the bowl of the cup, or the handle and then the straws, or individual straws, of a broom; one simply sees a cup or a broom. Yet it is possible on occasion for various reasons to apprehend the manifold successively before applying concepts to these objects. Is this object a glass or is it a cup? It is transparent, but it has a handle; is it a glass with a handle, or is it a Danish modern cup? The glass is very thick; it must be a cup.
For the purposes of this thesis, the first and third kinds of case of synthesis, although interesting, are not important, for it is a merely empirical, psychological fact that sometimes we recognize a forest instantly and sometimes only after successively looking at the trees in the forest, or that sometimes we examine the separate parts of an object to see whether it is a broom although usually we recognize brooms immediately. The interesting question is whether all cases of synthesis could be cases of the successive apprehension and reproduction of a manifold, or whether there are some cases of synthesis which must be instantaneous. Kemp-Smith, Paton, and Wolff, each for different reasons, argue that all cases of threefold synthesis are cases in which the manifold is apprehended and reproduced successively. Kemp-Smith assumes that this is so because he assumes that threefold synthesis, like the subjective deduction of which it is a part, is concerned only with serial consciousness. Paton assumes the "process-view" of synthesis on the basis of his argument that it is comprised of two distinct processes: one, the (successive) adding together of representations (or "ideas" as he refers to them), and two, the grasping of the representations in one concept. Finally, Wolff adopts the "process-view" because, he argues, synthesis is a rule-governed activity, and the paradigm cases of rule-governed activities are cases in which the stages are successive in time; thus, in his view, representations are apprehended and reproduced one after another.

Are all cases of synthesis cases in which the manifold is apprehended and reproduced successively? I submit that the paradigms
of synthesis which these commentators have in mind are cases of the second and last sort distinguished above, and in all of these cases the manifold is a manifold, not of impressions, but of some other representations, viz. objects. This is particularly clear in Wolff's example of the forest and its trees. He argues that, in recognizing a forest, we must apprehend and reproduce (or remember) the individual trees first. In this case the manifold to be apprehended and reproduced is a manifold of objects, namely trees. Paton offers us two examples of successive synthesis, the cases of knowing a triangle and of knowing a body, and he asserts that when knowing a triangle, we must reproduce one side when apprehension has gone on to another; and in the case of the body, that we must reproduce extension when apprehension has gone on to impenetrability. These cases, however, are very different, as we shall see. In fact, Paton trades upon the ambiguity of the phrase "know a triangle." He may mean some physically existing triangle, perhaps a drawing of a triangle on a blackboard, or a wire sculpture of one, or he may be referring to the triangular shape of some object. Let us assume for the moment that he is referring to some triangle in space and time. In this case we must realize that the side of a triangle is itself an object, just as much as the triangle is. In the same way that the triangle, either the drawing or the sculpture, is three dimensional, so is each side of the triangle.\footnote{I am assuming that lines drawn on a blackboard have thickness or depth as well as length and breadth.}
three dimensional triangle, the manifold is comprised of objects, which as such must themselves be synthesized in order to be recognized. For example, the apprehension of any individual tree in Wolff's forest itself requires the synthesis of a manifold; it may require the successive apprehension of trunk, limbs, leaves, etc. This successive synthesis of the manifolds and sub-manifolds of an object might go on for some time. In some cases of the successive synthesis of an object, the objects involved in the synthesis of the object have themselves manifolds of objects, which in turn are successively synthesized, etc. But successive syntheses endure through time; they take time. Therefore, one might be tempted to think that the successive syntheses of manifolds and sub-manifolds could go on without end, and thus it would appear that experience of a complex object might never occur, for, strictly speaking, one cannot be said to experience an object or recognize it or know it, until the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are complete and there is a recognition of the manifold in a concept. If the manifolds and sub-manifolds, etc., of an object were all successively synthesized, the synthesis would indeed be an unending process. It would go on and on in time, and one would never finally recognize or know the object. However, a proponent of the process-view might argue against this that ultimately or originally the process begins with the apprehension of impressions, for these are not synthesized in order to be apprehended, but, on Kant's account, are simply given to us in sensibility and "apprehended as modifications of the mind in intuition." Thus the process of synthesizing a complex object will not go on without end, because the first sub-manifold to be
synthesized is a manifold of impressions. But, as we shall see below, although the process-view is invulnerable to the attack that it can go on indefinitely, it is not because ultimately impressions are apprehended and synthesized—successively apprehended and reproduced.

According to our three commentators, a manifold of impressions, like a manifold of objects, is also synthesized successively on Kant's account. Thus, Paton analyzes the case of the synthesis of a body:

...in knowing a body, the concept of 'body' will compel me to reproduce extension when apprehension has gone on to impenetrability (p. 393).

This analysis of the synthesis of impressions presupposes that one can first apprehend or be conscious of extension, then be conscious of impenetrability, then of shape, etc. But can we have an act of consciousness solely of one impression; that is, can we be conscious of the extension or the impenetrability, etc. of an object before we recognize that there is an object there before us? I do not believe that we can, for the concepts of 'object' and of 'attribute' or 'aspect' are mutually dependent. Aspects or attributes do not exist except as aspects or attributes of some object. They have no independent existence in the way that a pillowcase exists independently of the pillow it covers. What could it be like simply to see shape without seeing an object of which it is the shape? How could one be conscious merely of extension, without being conscious of something which is extended? There is no awareness of the attributes of an object without awareness of the
object.\footnote{I am not arguing that one necessarily recognizes what kind of object one is apprehending, but that one must, when one is aware of an attribute, apply the concept 'object', i.e. be aware that one is apprehending an object.} And, for the same reason, one cannot be aware of an object without being aware of certain of its attributes, particularly its extension, impenetrability, and shape. One may be blind or blindfolded and have a baseball thrust into one's hands. In this case, one could not be aware that this was an object without being aware of its extension, impenetrability, shape, and hardness or softness (one need not be aware of its color in this case).

Paton, then, is mistaken in thinking that one can successively apprehend and reproduce the extension, then the impenetrability, etc. of a body. And, furthermore, he and Kemp-Smith and Wolff are mistaken in their assumption that all cases of synthesis are cases in which a manifold of representations is successively apprehended and reproduced. Their "process-view" of synthesis applies only to those cases in which the manifold is a manifold of objects. Thus, the process-view is adequate to account for some cases of synthesis, but it cannot account for all.

Even the cases in which the synthesis can legitimately be called a "process", cases in which the apprehension and reproduction of the manifold is successive and so takes time or endures through time, depend ultimately upon cases of instantaneous synthesis. Synthesis, when it is a process, cannot go on indefinitely, or else experience of an object would never take place. At some point, a manifold or sub-manifold must be synthesized instantaneously. As we have seen, there
are two kinds of case of instantaneous synthesis: cases in which the manifold logically must be synthesized instantly (when the manifold is one of impressions); and cases in which the manifold just is synthesized instantly, though it is not logically necessary that it be. The latter sort of case is, as we have noted, the most common; every day of our lives we recognize ordinary objects instantly. We recognize cups and saucers, or the faces of our friends, etc. And it may be that even in most of the cases in which synthesis actually is a process, the syntheses of the sub-manifolds are contingently instantaneous.

For example, in recognizing Wolff's forest, I may instantly recognize each individual tree, which I then reproduce (or remember) as my attention turns to the next. It is not necessary that I go through the process of synthesizing the limbs, trunks, and branches before recognizing each tree.

Lest the process of the synthesis of a "complex" object go on without end, the syntheses of certain of its manifolds or sub-manifolds must be instantaneous; and the instantaneous synthesis can be either the necessarily instantaneous synthesis of a manifold of impressions, or the contingently instantaneous synthesis of a manifold of objects.

I have been concerned in this chapter to point out that certain commentators, including those I have dealt with here, have emphasized only two of the three kinds of case of synthesis, those involving possible successive apprehension of the manifold, and have ignored the importance of the other, involving instantaneous apprehension, or worse,
have failed to recognize it altogether. Kant himself simply argues that there must be a reproduction of the manifold, whether successive or simultaneous, and does not directly address himself to the question of which is the paradigm case.\(^1\) However, based upon the arguments above, we find that the paradigm cases of synthesis are those in which the manifold is apprehended and reproduced simultaneously. Wolff's case in which trees are successively apprehended before the forest can be recognized, depends ultimately upon instantaneous synthesis (whether the instantaneous recognition of each tree or of some parts of each tree). And in other cases, it is impossible that the manifold be reproduced successively; thus, Paton is mistaken when he argues that in knowing a body, there is a successive apprehension and reproduction of the impressions of extension, impenetrability, etc. Impressions must be apprehended and associated simultaneously. This view that the paradigm cases of synthesis must be those of the simultaneous apprehension and association of the manifold, I have dubbed the "recognition-view" of synthesis, and it is the subject of the following chapter.

\(^1\)Kant does not argue that all cases of synthesis involve successive apprehension of the manifold. Wolff and the others have overemphasized successive reproduction of the manifold which involves remembering a manifold successively presented. However, as we saw in Chapter Two, Kant also discusses the association of the manifold, a notion which is neutral as to how the manifold is presented in time. Notice that he makes room for the co-existence as well as for the succession of representations in the first paragraph concerning the synthesis of reproduction:

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated.../The law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules. (Underlining is my own, A 100)
CHAPTER FOUR

The Recognition-View of Synthesis

The paradigm cases of the synthesis of a manifold are those cases in which the manifold is apprehended, associated and recognized in a concept simultaneously. I refer to this as the "recognition-view of synthesis" because the term "recognition" suggests an instantaneous apprehension of the manifold synthesized, as opposed to the "process-view" (or versions of that view) according to which the manifold is apprehended, etc. successively. As we saw in the previous chapter, based upon the three different sorts of empirical syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, we can distinguish three sorts of case of empirical synthesis. These are cases in which the manifold is usually, but not necessarily, apprehended and reproduced successively, cases in which the manifold is necessarily apprehended and reproduced simultaneously, and cases in which it is usually, but not necessarily, so. In the cases in which the synthesis is successive, the manifold is a manifold of objects—objects whose manifolds must themselves be apprehended and synthesized before they can be involved in the synthesis of a more complex object. It is possible that there should be cases of successive synthesis in which the objects synthesized in the successive synthesis are themselves successively synthesized, but in such cases, there is ultimately an instantaneous synthesis of the manifold of the objects synthesized. The ultimate instantaneous synthesis may necessarily be instantaneous or only happen to be instantaneous. It is necessarily

80
instantaneous if the manifold synthesized is a manifold of impressions; thus, if in the act of knowing a large house, I successively synthesize the walls, the windows, the doors, etc., the walls cannot be successively synthesized (or if they are too large to be apprehended in one glance, then whatever smaller portions which I apprehend in one glance in apprehending a wall cannot be successively synthesized), for the manifold of the wall is a manifold of impressions: extension, impenetrability, shape, color, texture, etc. In other cases of successive synthesis, however, it may happen that the objects constituting the manifold synthesized are themselves instantly apprehended. For instance, in knowing a forest, I successively apprehend individual trees, but these trees I recognize instantly; there is no successive apprehension of trunk, limbs, leaves, etc., just the instant recognition of a tree.

The recognition-view of synthesis does not ignore cases in which the synthesis is successive; it merely argues that all of these cases depend logically upon cases of instantaneous synthesis.
Section One

The immanence of threefold synthesis

When he introduces the threefold synthesis, Kant makes the following remarks:

If we can prove that by means of the categories alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of knowledge that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, we must first of all consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience (A 97).

And again:

...receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself—and consequently all experience as its empirical product (A 97).

Kant tells us in these remarks that the deduction of the categories will require a consideration of certain "subjective sources" which are necessary for the possibility of experience. There are three of these subjective sources, which, as he puts it, "make possible the understanding itself—and consequently all experience." The threefold
synthesis has three aspects, apprehension, reproduction and recognition, which, he says, "point to" the three subjective sources of knowledge. Thus, the three "subjective sources" are found in the aspects of the threefold synthesis, a synthesis "necessarily found in all knowledge," including empirical knowledge or experience, and as a necessary condition of any possible experience, the threefold synthesis may be called "transcendental."

To justify this last remark, it is necessary to make two distinctions. The first is the distinction, in Kant's critical philosophy, between the "transcendent" (transcendent) and the "transcendental" (transcendental). We find that, for Kant, a judgment or principle is "transcendent" if it is (or purports to be) about objects which lie beyond any possible experience;¹ for example, if the pure concepts of reason (a simple soul, God, or the world) are used in judgments in which they are thought to be about possible objects, those judgments are transcendent:

The objective employment of the pure concepts of reason is, therefore, always transcendent (transcendent) while that of the pure concepts of understanding must, in accordance with their nature, and inasmuch as their application is solely to possible experience, be always immanent (immanent) (A 327).

A transcendent object, then, would be one lying outside the possibility of experience, beyond space and time, and so also beyond the possible application of the categories.

At A11=B25f, Kant tells us that a "transcendental" judgment

¹Cf. B352=A296f; A327=B383.
is one having to do with a \textit{a priori} knowledge of objects:

I entitle \textit{transcendental} all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible \textit{a priori}.

A \textit{a priori} knowledge, as we learn at B3-B6, is knowledge which is absolutely necessary and universal; therefore, a \textit{a priori} knowledge of objects is knowledge of objects which is true (necessarily and universally) of all objects. Thus, the pure concepts of understanding are transcendental concepts inasmuch as they hold \textit{a priori} of the objects of experience. And the pure principles of understanding are transcendental for the same reason. These principles are transcendental in that they are necessary for the possibility of experience. But, both the pure concepts of understanding and the pure principles of understanding are immanent, as opposed to transcendent, i.e. they apply only to objects of possible experience and not to objects lying beyond any possible experience.

The second distinction to be made is that between "pure" \textit{[Rein]} and "empirical" \textit{[empirische]}. A judgment is pure, Kant says, "if it be not mixed with anything extraneous. But knowledge is more particularly to be called absolutely pure, if no experience or sensation whatsoever be mingled with it, and if it be therefore possible completely \textit{a priori}" (A 11). Thus, pure knowledge and a \textit{a priori} knowledge overlap, but the terms stress different aspects of the knowledge: pure \textit{a priori} knowledge is called "\textit{a priori}" inasmuch as it is absolutely necessary and universal; but it is "pure" inasmuch as it is known without reference to experience. When a judgment is made by reference
to experience (when experience is "mingled with it"), it is made and found to be true by experiencing something in the world. A pure judgment is not based upon experience when it is made, and we do not check our experience to see whether it is true.

The pure concept of understanding, "cause," is transcendental, not because it cannot refer to something in the world of experience, but because it is a concept of something without which experience itself would be impossible. Thus a transcendental concept may refer to something which can be experienced, but the fact that it is transcendental rests upon the fact that it is necessary for any knowledge of objects. And a judgment is transcendental, for example, "Everything which happens has a cause," not because we do not have experiences of "things which happen" and of "causes," but because the judgment is true necessarily and universally and if it were not, experience would be impossible. The concept "cause" is immanent (or empirical) inasmuch as causes can be experienced, even though it is transcendental in that it is the concept of something which is necessary for experience. In the same way, I believe, any concept which is necessary for the possibility of experience can be called "transcendental," even though the concept refers to something which lies within experience, or can be experienced.¹ Thus, inasmuch as Kant argues that threefold synthesis is necessary for the possibility of experience, threefold synthesis can called "transcendental," even though the term "threefold synthesis"

¹Although he uses slightly different terminology to make this distinction, Kemp-Smith makes the same point. Cf. p. 75f; also p. 283.
refers to an empirical act, one which takes place in time, and which it is possible to experience.

A final distinction must be made to avoid possible confusion. Kant often speaks of two syntheses, an empirical and a pure one. But it appears that the distinction rests on the nature of the manifold to be synthesized, not upon the nature of the synthesis. If the manifold is a pure one, the synthesis is pure; but if the manifold is empirical, then the synthesis is empirical. When I say that on Kantian grounds "threelfold synthesis" can be called "transcendental" even though it refers to something which is immanent or can be experienced, I do not mean to refer only to what is called "empirical synthesis" or the synthesis of an empirical manifold. No act of synthesis, whether of a pure or of an empirical manifold is transcendent; rather, all acts of synthesis are immanent; they are all objects of possible experience. In this sense, all syntheses can be called "empirical."

Furthermore, when Kant introduces his discussion of threelfold synthesis with the remark that "we must consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience" (A 97), he means to say that he will consider threelfold synthesis inasmuch as it is transcendental, necessary for the possibility of experience. His remark indicates, however, that the threelfold synthesis is empirical (occurring in time and subject to possible experience), and it could, as such, be considered "in its empirical constitution," i.e.

---

1 Cf. A77=B103f; A 99.
as an interesting psychological phenomenon. One could do a psychological study of it, as well as a philosophical one, but the purposes of each are different, and the conclusions drawn about it in psychology would be based upon inductive arguments.

If synthesis were transcendent, instead of immanent, several problems would arise. First, synthesis is an act and, therefore, something which happens or occurs; and acts, since they happen or occur, take place in time. However, that which is transcendent stands outside of the condition of time; therefore, a transcendent synthesis would be an act, yet an act which did not occur in time. Second, as an act, synthesis is something done by a conscious agent. It is possible for an agent to be aware of his acts (although there are cases in which he is not in fact, as when the act is habitual). There are, of course, many things which, so to say, occur in human beings which it is logically impossible to be conscious of. For instance, in the act of recognizing a tree, I cannot be conscious of the occurrences in my brain, the stimulation of nerves, etc., which are necessary conditions of my recognizing the tree. But these occurrences are not referred to as "acts." That term is reserved for things which we do and which we can be conscious of. But if synthesis is transcendent, it is logically impossible that we should be aware of it, for we can, on Kant's account, be conscious only of things having existence in space and/or time. Finally, if it is transcendent, we cannot know anything about synthesis, for as we have noted, we can be conscious of, and so know, only things in space and/or in time; therefore, it would be pointless to make
statements about synthesis. It might be threefold or a hundredfold, one would have no way of knowing which. Indeed, one could not be certain that the act or occurrence was a synthesis at all; it might be something else entirely.

The notion of a 'threefold act of synthesis,' if it is taken to be transcedent, seems to me to be self-contradictory. If it is transcedent, we cannot know that it is threefold. And surely, what distinguishes an act from a mere occurrence, is that it is at least possible to be conscious of an act. Yet a transcedent act is one which it is impossible to be conscious of. And finally, an act is at least something which occurs or happens, and 'occurs' and 'happens' are temporal notions: something which happens, happens at some time or occurs at some time. But as transcedent, synthesis cannot happen or occur in time (or at any time). If we are to grant Kant's theory the least plausibility, we must not force upon him so untenable a notion as that of a "transcedent act of synthesis."

Inasmuch as we have argued that the threefold act of synthesis is not transcedent but immanent, we have argued that it is possible to be conscious of synthesis. Indeed, Kant himself holds that we can be conscious of it (whether we ever are in fact) as we see from his remark that

The word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark.¹ For this unitary consciousness is what combines

¹Kant's remarks here happen to be made with regard to a case in which the synthesis is successive, viz. the successive addition of unit to unit to reach a total.
the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we do not connect it with the act itself, that is, not in any direct manner with the generation of the representation, but only with the outcome /that which is thereby represented/. But notwithstanding these variations, such consciousness, however indistinct, must always be present; without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible (A 103-104).

If indeed synthesis is immanent, then a remark such as Wolff's (p. 131) that synthesis is "pre-conscious" cannot mean that we cannot be conscious of synthesis. To say that synthesis is pre-conscious may mean that a particular act of synthesis must take place before one can be conscious of an object. In cases in which synthesis may legitimately be called a "process," the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction occur chronologically before one is conscious of the object synthesized. Thus the synthesis is pre-conscious. But in a case in which synthesis is instantaneous, there is no process prior to consciousness of the object, and so synthesis is not "pre-conscious" in the sense of chronologically prior. But synthesis might, in a stretched sense of the term, be called "pre-conscious" because it is logically prior to consciousness of the object. Furthermore, synthesis might be called "unconscious" inasmuch as we are rarely ever aware of it, even in cases in which it is a process.¹ Too, a particular act of synthesis might be called

¹But it cannot, as we have seen, be called "unconscious" in the sense in which Kemp-Smith asserts that it is, when, for instance, he remarks that synthesis is not immanent (p. 238), or that one can never be conscious of the activities of synthesis (cf. p. 243; also pp. 263-264).
"unconscious" to indicate that it is not self-reflexive; that is, an act of consciousness cannot be its own object. But this does not prevent an act of synthesis from being the object of another, subsequent act of consciousness. Thus, for example, if I am in the process of recognizing individual trees, I may pause and realize that I am in the process of recognizing trees. I may reflect upon my just having recognized a tree. If my recognition of that tree was a successive synthesis, I may reflect upon how I recognized the trunk, then the leaves and branches of the tree. After the pause, I may go on looking at individual trees and then recognize them as a forest. I might then reflect upon my recognition of the forest.

Thus it is possible to be aware of a successive act of synthesis. But can one be aware of an instantaneous synthesis? It is not, of course, an objection to the notion of "instantly recognizing X" that I cannot be aware of the process of instantly recognizing X, for instantly recognizing something is not a process; a process is (usually understood as) something which takes place during a period of time, over an extended length of time. But instantly recognizing something occurs at a point in time, not over a period of time. When "process" is understood as a successive series of happenings, instantly recognizing a thing is not a process. If Kemp-Smith or Paton or Wolff wish to argue that in fact instant recognition is a process, either they must argue for "process" as something other than that which occurs over a period of time, or they must argue that in fact there is no such thing as "immediately recognizing X," that in fact cases of instant recognition
must be analysed into cases of a series of occurrences which culminate in recognizing or knowing X. But as we have seen, there are certain cases which it is logically impossible to analyse in this way. The recognition of an object whose manifold is one of impressions cannot be the culmination of a series of acts of consciousness of separate impressions. Therefore, there must be at least some cases of instant recognition of objects.

What, in the case of instantaneous synthesis, are we asking to be aware of? Surely not of the apprehension of each impression, and surely not of the associating of the impressions together, if the "associating" is understood as "adding them together." However, one can reflect upon an instantaneous act of synthesis and be aware of associating certain impressions together,\(^1\) for in this case the act of associating certain impressions is indistinguishable in fact from the act of recognizing them as an object, although we can, as Kant does, make a logical distinction between association and recognition. In cases in which recognition chronologically follows upon apprehending and remembering certain representations, the distinction between reproduction and recognition is more than logical. We can reflect upon a successive act of synthesis and remember successively apprehending representations and we may remember how we remembered (or reproduced) them at the time; we may also remember recognizing them as an object. But in a case of instantaneous synthesis, the distinction between

---

\(^1\)Here associating means taking certain impressions together and ignoring others; therefore, being aware of associating means being aware of having taken certain impressions together.
association and recognition is merely logical and we cannot reflect upon the act of associating the impressions without reflecting upon their recognition in a concept.
Section Two

Concepts and rules of synthesis

As we learned in Chapters One and Two, empirical concepts can be understood not only as the names of classes of objects, but also as rules for the synthesis of empirical manifolds. We found that the concept as a rule of synthesis may be understood in the following way. We apprehend the various aspects of an object, its shape, color, texture, etc., through our senses. Insofar as these aspects are apprehended by our senses, Kant refers to them as impressions (or sensible impressions), and says that the impressions are "given" or "given in sensibility."

(As we shall see in Section Four, we may also "have impressions" in the sense that we have sensations, whether or not they are impressions of a spatio-temporal object. In these cases, the impressions are subjective.) When he says that impressions are "given in sensibility," Kant is indicating the passive element in experience—we simply "have" impressions, as opposed to the active element—their being thought by the understanding through concepts. Impressions of objects in the world are given to us in fact arbitrarily; that is, in no order (except the bare temporal order of occurring one after another). When we perceive an object, many impressions are given to us, some of which are impressions of the object and some of which are not. Those which belong to the object must be picked out and put together, or taken together; they must be ordered, and this putting together or ordering Kant calls "synthesis." When the impressions are synthesized, we recognize a
particular object. The recognition of a particular object is "recognition in a concept," or the application of a concept. It would be impossible to recognize particular objects, or what is the same, to apply concepts of particular objects, if the manifold were kaleidoscopic and were not put together in certain ways, or synthesized. Knowing which impressions to put together and how to put them together can be thought of as having a rule of synthesis. When one has a rule of synthesis for an object, one knows which impressions belong to the object and which do not. Thus, when one has a particular concept and is able to apply it to objects, one has a rule for the synthesis of the manifold of that kind of object.

Kant refers to the concept as the "consciousness of the unity of synthesis" \(\text{BewuâŸƒtsein dieser Einheit der Synthesis}\), thereby indicating the fact that when we know (or are aware of) an object, we are aware of an object, the impressions of which have been synthesized. If one has a concept of an object and is able to apply that concept, one is able to be aware of or to recognize an object which, so to say, unites its impressions—one apprehends the impressions as belonging to that object. Since being able to recognize an object or being able to apply an empirical concept entails being able to synthesize the manifold impressions of that object according to a rule, then applying a concept involves having a rule of synthesis.

Rules of synthesis determine not only which impressions belong to an object, but in cases of complex objects, the rule determines which objects are part of the manifold of the complex object (and so determines which are not). For example, if I have the concept 'house'
and am able to apply it, I know what sorts of objects should be taken as belonging to the house and what sorts should not. I know that walls and windows and doors may be part of the house, and I know that the trees standing next to the house are not.\footnote{Wolff seems to think that an empirical concept serves as a rule in the sense that it prescribes not only which representations are to be synthesized, but also the order of their synthesis (his paradigm case was that of the potter throwing a pot; first the potter takes a lump of clay, next he puts it on the wheel, then he turns the wheel slowly, etc., etc.). We may well ask which impressions must be synthesized first and which second when we, for example, recognize a ball. Do we apprehend shape first, or color first? Or perhaps we must first apprehend extension, then impenetrability. And in recognizing a forest, does our concept, 'forest', dictate that we must first apprehend the oaks, then the birches, etc.? Obviously not. As we shall argue below in Chapter Five, the temporal features of an empirical synthesis (as opposed to a pure synthesis) according to empirical concepts (as opposed to pure a priori concepts) are not determined by the empirical concepts but by the nature of the manifold (i.e., whether it is a manifold of impressions or other representations) and the circumstances under which the manifold is given.}

Part of having a rule of synthesis for the application of a concept is knowing how to take the manifold together, in one moment, whether the synthesis itself is simultaneous or successive. As we have seen, impressions are aspects or attributes of an object, and as such cannot each be separate objects of consciousness. The apprehension of impressions, then, must be simultaneous. The shape of an object cannot be seen apart from its extension, or from its color, etc. These attributes of an object must be apprehended simultaneously. Too, they must be reproduced or associated at the moment of their apprehension; that is, many impressions are given to my senses at once; some of them belong to a particular object and others do not (they belong to other objects). If I have a concept of a particular kind of object and if I
can apply that concept, then I am in possession of a rule telling me which impressions belong to that object. Thus I associate certain of the impressions when recognizing that object and ignore the rest. Furthermore, I recognize the impressions as belonging to that object; in other words, I recognize the object. And I do so instantly; at the same instant at which I apprehend and associate the impressions, I recognize them as a certain object.

We also learn how to take a manifold together, or recognize it in one moment, in those cases in which it is possible to synthesize the manifold both successively and simultaneously, for example, the manifold of a forest. When we learn to recognize a forest instantly, perhaps we are learning to recognize certain colors and overall shapes as a forest. That is, instead of noticing particular details, leaves, branches, etc., one simply notices shades of green and brown and a myriad of trunks and branches. In the case of apprehending a forest instantly, there may be more than one rule; different people may recognize a forest by noticing different features. Since the rule is an empirical one for synthesizing an empirical manifold, it is not necessary that there be only one; what is necessary, as we saw in Chapter Two, is that there be some rule, some orderly, repeatable way to synthesize a manifold; otherwise, there can be no empirical concepts and no application of them. But even when we synthesize a forest successively, we must still learn how to take the manifold together, how to recognize it in one moment, for if we are merely apprehending and remembering individual trees, we have not yet learned to apply the concept 'forest.'
This point is perhaps clearer in a related example, grasping an argument. One may follow the steps of an argument, but until one reaches the conclusion, grasps in a final instant the point of those steps, one has not yet "grasped the argument," in Kant's words, "as a whole."¹ That is, in following an argument, one must "apprehend" each step, in the sense of understanding it; if one is to understand certain subsequent steps, and certainly if one is to understand the conclusion, one must not forget the premises, or steps, of the argument. And finally, one must grasp the point of the argument, or the conclusion. One realizes that the argument, or that the steps in the argument, form an argument for this conclusion. In both the case of synthesis and the case of grasping an argument, there is a final instant of awareness, a moment in which we recognize that all these trees are a forest, or that all these steps form an argument for this conclusion.

¹Memory is obviously necessary for the possibility of the final instant of awareness; we must remember each stage of the argument (or at least that each stage followed logically from the last) in order to grasp the conclusion, just as we must remember each hour in order to know that a twenty-four hour period has elapsed.
Section Three

"Rule of synthesis"

How exactly are we to understand Kant's use of the term "rule" in the phrase "rule of synthesis"? Wolff argues that the rules of synthesis are sets of prescriptions like the set of prescriptions which a potter follows when shaping clay (p. 122ff). Is a rule of synthesis a set of prescriptions to be followed?

In the first place, rules of synthesis are not followed in the way that a recipe is followed; first I recall step one; I perform it; then I recall steps two and three and perform them, etc. Obviously, when I recognize a cup, no such procedure of recalling and following a set of prescriptions takes place. Second, the potter is able to give the general set of prescriptions (to cite or recite the rules) which distinguish his activity from a child's haphazardly slapping clay. Only the philosopher or someone engaged in a technical endeavor similar to Kant's is able to give a rule for the synthesis of the manifold of a particular object. When one has an empirical concept which functions as a rule of synthesis, one is not and need not be aware that the concept is a rule of synthesis, etc. The notions, 'rule of synthesis' and 'synthesis,' etc., are philosophical, technical ones; we need not be familiar with them in order to apply an empirical concept. Rules of synthesis, then, are not rules to be followed or obeyed when this means that one must know the rules (in the sense of being able to give them) and be mindful of them when carrying on a certain activity.
When Kant uses the term "rule (Regel), for example at A 106
where he says that "a concept is always, as regards its form, something
universal which serves as a rule," I believe that he uses it to indi-
cate regularity and order. A concept (such as 'body') serves as a rule
insofar as it prescribes regularity and order in the manifold of repre-
sentations which constitute certain of the objects of our experience.
Or as Kant says, a concept serves as a rule "in so far as it represents
in any given appearances the necessary reproduction of their manifold,
and thereby the synthetic unity in our consciousness of them" (A 106).
Kant's remarks here regarding 'body' hold for all empirical concepts
in their role as rules of synthesis. The concept, as a rule, "repres-
sents"\(^1\) a particular reproduction\(^2\) of the manifold of certain appear-
ances (or objects of consciousness). The concept, as a rule, necessi-
tates a particular reproduction of the manifold of objects (those ob-
jects which can be subsumed under the concept, or to which the concept
applies). The manifold must be reproduced in a certain way. Further-
more, when the concept necessitates such a reproduction, it thereby
necessitates a synthetic unity in our consciousness of those representa-
tions which make up the manifold of the object subsumed under the

\(^1\)By "represents" (vorrstellt) Kant means that the concept, as
a rule (Regel), prescribes or requires a certain reproduction in the
manifold, for rules are not class concepts which "stand for" or "re-
present" a class of objects. At this point it is not necessary to be
precise about the term used to interpret vorstellt, beyond indicating
that for Kant, concepts as rules require something, as opposed to
naming something.

\(^2\)"Reproduction" is used in its generic sense here.
concept. That is, a particular manifold will be reproduced—certain representations will be reproduced and others will drop out, i.e. the concept as a rule determines the relevant representations and enables one to select them; they will be put together in a certain way, or unified and will be recognized as belonging to one particular kind of object. Bearing in mind that the necessity accruing to the concept as a rule is the necessity that the manifold be synthesized in a certain way more than once (not the necessity that it always be synthesized in a certain way), we can see that as a rule, the concept necessitates a certain order or regularity in the manifold of appearances (or in the manifold of an object of awareness); certain representations must be reproduced and they must be unified in a certain way (more than once).

Inasmuch as they prescribe a certain order and unity in our experience, it might be thought that concepts as rules of synthesis are similar to or are a species of the regulative ideas. The regulative ideas and concepts—both empirical concepts and the pure concepts of understanding—can be called rules of unity. First, the regulative ideas because they serve as ultimate principles from which our judgments can be inferred; the judgments are united in being derived from one principle. Second, empirical concepts and categories are rules of unity in that they prescribe how representations are to be synthesized into objects.

Before proceeding, it will be well to explain how, according to Kant, the categories serve as rules for the synthesis of a manifold. That is, when he is not being absolutely consistent, Kant refers to
them as "rules" (Regeln); for instance, at A 109f, he says:

Since the unity of consciousness must be regarded as necessary a priori—otherwise knowledge would be without an object—the relation to a transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge, rests on the transcendental law (Gesetz), that all appearances, insofar as through them objects are to be given to us, must stand under those a priori rules (Regeln) of synthetical unity whereby the interrelating of these appearances in empirical intuition is alone possible.

Although, as we can see, he is not always consistent, Kant really means to refer to the categories as laws (Gesetz) for the synthesis of a manifold, rather than as rules (Regeln); thus:

The representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion is called a rule (Regel), and, when it must be so posited, a law (Gesetz) (A 113).

But the term "law" (Gesetz) does not signify a radical difference between categories as laws and empirical concepts as rules; rather, as Kant says at A 113, it signifies a shift in the kind of necessity demanded by the categories and the kind demanded by empirical concepts.

Although, of course, there are many other major differences between empirical concepts and categories, they are alike in that they both provide for regularity in the synthesis of a manifold given in intuition.

As we learned in Chapters One and Two, empirical concepts are called "rules of synthesis" because they prescribe what sorts of impressions are to be put together to make up an object and how they are to be put together. As we learned, many impressions are given to us through our senses, but with no order among them; certain of them
must be reproduced (associated or remembered) while the others simply "drop out" or are ignored. And a particular group of impressions which have those relations and are reproduced together are understood as belonging to the same object, an object of a certain kind marked off by the concept in question. As we also learned earlier, unless the same impressions are synthesized, or put together in the same way, more than one, experience is impossible. Thus the concept is a "rule" in the sense that it provides for a certain necessity—the necessity that these impressions be reproduced in this way more than once. But it is not necessary that impressions always be synthesized according to the set of empirical concepts which we now have. Experience, according to Kant, would be possible with another set of empirical concepts than the one we now have. And here is the major difference between empirical concepts as rules and categories as laws. The categories also provide for certain relations between the impressions which make up the objects of our experience; specifically, they provide for certain temporal relations which those impressions must have. But unlike empirical concepts, the categories are "necessary" in the sense that no experience would be possible without them. They must always be employed in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition; thus, Kant refers to them as "laws." Furthermore, according to Kant, the only possible set of categories is the one we now have; there can be no other set.

Empirical concepts are much more specific in their ordering of the manifold of representations than categories. The empirical concept as a rule determines which specific representations will belong
Filmed as received
without page(s) 103.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.
to the object of the concept, and how those representations are related. Thus in the application of the concept 'dog,' representations such as 'furry,' 'two-eared,' 'long-nosed,' 'four-legged,' etc. are reproduced (they can be reproduced either successively or simultaneously), and are ordered in certain spatial relations. The categories on the other hand, do not prescribe anything regarding what sorts of representations are to be synthesized, much less which particular ones are to be synthesized. Rather, if something is to be an object of experience, its manifold must exhibit four of twelve possible temporal relations. (These relations are set out in the Schematism.) Here let a simple example suffice. If the object of experience is a physical object, it will have some number (there will be one or more objects of experience—in this case, one); it will actually exist in time; it will exist in a certain determinate time, perhaps the present; and it will endure through time (as opposed to its aspects or attributes, such as its color, which may change over a period of time).

Thus empirical concepts and categories can be called rules and laws of unity, respectively, inasmuch as they both provide for the putting together or unification of the manifold in certain ways, in certain relations.

But as Kant says, although concepts (both empirical and pure) and regulative ideas are alike in providing rules for unity, they are different in major ways:

Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.
Filmed as received
without page(s) 105.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.
Accordingly, reason never applies itself directly to experience or to any object, but to understanding, in order to give to the manifold knowledge of the latter an a priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason, and which is quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding (B 359).

Thus, concepts as rules provide unity for appearances, that is, unity in the manifolds of the objects of our experience, whereas ideas as rules do not concern manifolds of objects, but provide unity for our concepts, or for the empirical judgments employing concepts of objects, and prevent our judgments from being "a mere contingent aggregate." The judgments form "a system connected according to necessary laws" (A645=B673).

Empirical concepts and regulative ideas are also similar in that, unlike the categories, neither can be objectively or transcendentally deduced. As we argued in Chapter Two, empirical concepts as rules, although they provide for the necessary synthesis of the manifold (providing order among our impressions without which experience is impossible), are not such that they must always be employed; as we saw in Chapter Two, experience would still be possible if we employed another set of empirical concepts than the one we in fact have. Thus, while it is necessary that there by some set of empirical concepts, no particular set is absolutely necessary, as, according to Kant, the particular set of twelve categories given in the Table of Categories is absolutely necessary for the possibility of any experience.

In the same way, according to Kant, it is necessary that there be some regulative ideas of unity in our experience, but an
objective deduction of the three particular regulative ideas is impossible. Kant gives what may be called a "subjective deduction" of the transcendental principle of the unity of the objects in nature at A650=B3678. But it argues that without a systematic, necessary unity in nature (among objects), there would be no reason, and without reason no coherence among our judgments and hence no sufficient criterion for truth. Obviously, if there is no criterion by which to distinguish true from false judgments, experience is impossible. But this "subjective deduction" is not an argument for the particular concepts of unity provided by the regulative ideas. Regarding these, Kant remarks again and again that "No objective deduction, such as we have been able to give of the categories, is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of the transcendental ideas" (A336=B393).

Thus we see that empirical concepts and regulative ideas are similar in two ways. They are both rules of unity, but empirical concepts are rules for the unity of sense impressions yielding objects, while the regulative ideas have nothing to do with knowing objects of experience, but instead, serve as rules for the unification of our judgments. Second, we can give a subjective deduction for the necessity of each--empirical concepts as necessary for experience and regulative ideas as necessary for the criterion of truth and hence for experience, but we cannot give a transcendental deduction of any particular set of empirical concepts or any particular set of regulative ideas.

Finally, it might be noted that a regulative idea as a rule is like an empirical concept as a rule in that it is not necessary that
one be able to cite or recite the rule in order to be able to apply it. One may be able to infer, to employ a categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive syllogism without knowing anything at all about the science of logic. One need not know the science of logic in order to think logically, any more than one need know critical philosophy in order to apply empirical concepts.
Section Four

Limitations

In Chapter Two, we discussed the threefold synthesis of the understanding solely as it provides the necessary conditions of the application of concepts of objects, specifically "physical objects" or what Kant calls "outer objects," objects having existence in space as well as in time, such as people, trees, cups, etc., etc. The question now arises whether the threefold synthesis accounts for the application of any other sorts of empirical concepts, or whether it is limited solely to the application of concepts to "outer objects." Particularly, does it account for (A) the application of concepts to "inner objects" such as hallucinatory objects, having existence only in time, and does it account for (B) the application of concepts of what Kant would call "attributes," for example, particular colors, shapes, textures, etc.

(A) At A 98, Kant says:

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things /äußerer Dinge/, or are produced through inner causes /innere Ursachen/, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense.

Here we can see that Kant makes a distinction between representations of outer things, and representations of inner things. Our question is whether threefold synthesis accounts for the application of concepts to inner things. Do we synthesize impressions and representations which, in Kant's words, are "produced through inner causes," to yield the
objects given in our "private experiences," experiences which cannot be "had" by more than one person, such as hallucinations, certain delusions, dreams, etc.?

In fact, we can distinguish several sorts of cases in which impressions are given through "inner causes." In an hallucination, I may, for example, see an elephant which is pink, or which flies. I "see" the elephant; I may also "hear" it and "smell" it or "touch" it. We put "see," "hear," etc. in quotation marks to indicate that although I see the pink elephant, there is in fact no pink elephant there, at that time in that place. But we use the terms 'see,' and 'hear' because I actually have sensations of colors, sounds, etc. On Kant's account of "impression," I may in these cases be said actually to have impressions--impressions of color, sound, and odor, etc.--for, on Kant's account, "impression" refers to a color, etc. insofar as one is immediately aware or conscious of it, not insofar as the color exists in the world at some particular time and place. Furthermore, in certain cases of delusion, and perhaps in certain vivid fantasies, the impressions which we have are also very real. In this group, also, fall cases such as the one in which someone is the subject of a scientific test in which parts of his brain are stimulated: by electrical impulses, and he "sees," "hears," "smells," etc. objects. When one's brain is stimulated, one has sensory impressions, which perhaps one synthesizes into objects. Finally, there are certain states of mind, for instance under the influence of certain drugs, or having been cossed on the head, in which one simply has a "blooming, buzzing confusion," a kaleidoscope of impressions. In such cases, there is no question whether the impressions
are impressions of some object; nor is there any question of the synthesis of such impressions.

Thus we can distinguish three sorts of impressions: those given in perception, which turn out to be veridical, i.e. there is some object in space and time of which they are impressions; those given in hallucinations and delusions which are not impressions of any actually existing object; and those which arise, for example, from being coshed on the head, in which the question of their being impressions of an object never arises.

I believe that the answer to our question of whether we synthesize delusory and hallucinatory impressions and representations to yield the objects which we "experience" in delusions and hallucinations, etc., is that we cannot be certain that a threefold synthesis of "subjective" representations and impressions takes place. A threefold synthesis, as we found above in Section One, must itself be a possible object of awareness, either of an immediate awareness or of a reflective awareness). We must be able, after the synthesis has taken place, to reflect upon it; we must, in particular, be able to reflect upon the synthesis of reproduction. This means, in the case of a successive synthesis of hallucinatory representations, that we can remember our successive representations of apink rat as it crossed the floor. We must be able to remember the series of representations of the rat. Remembering a series of representations entails correctly remembering the series; but we cannot be sure that we have correctly remembered a series of "subjective" representations. We can only have correct memories of veridical perceptions, not of hallucinatory representations, etc.,
for in order to have a correct memory, it must be possible to verify
the memory. A memory of a perception involves either the memory of the
circumstances of perceiving, or remembering the object of the percep-
tion or both. We verify the memory by going back for another look at
the object, looking at a photograph of it, asking our friends about the
object, etc. But all of the means of verifying a memory are possible
only if the object (and so the perception of it) is "objective"—in
Kantian terms, it must endure through time, follow the laws of causality,
and, if it is an "outer object," be locatable in space as well as
in time.

We cannot be certain that in a memory of a subjective repre-
sentation, we are remembering the same object apprehended in the subjec-
tive representation; there is no possibility of checking our memory of
the representation of the object against the object itself, or against
the circumstances in which we had the subjective representation of it,
etc. Remembering a series of representations of an object entails re-
membering each member of the series, i.e., each object "perceived." And
we cannot check the memory of a subjective object (we cannot go back
for a second look because the object cannot be located in space and
time; we cannot ask friends about the object; we cannot have photo-
graphs of it, etc., etc.)

If we cannot correctly remember a series of representations,
then we cannot be sure that it is a series at all. And, therefore,
we cannot be sure that a synthesis of reproduction (remembering succes-
sively given representations and associating only the relevant ones)
took place.
In the same way, we cannot be certain that an association of "subjective" impressions takes place, for we can only be certain that we have correctly associated impressions if we correctly recognize the object. But there is no question of correctly or incorrectly recognizing a "subjective" (hallucinatory or delusory, etc.) object because subjective objects, etc. just are what we apprehend them or recognize them as being. Furthermore, we cannot reflect upon or correctly remember an experience of an hallucinatory object because there is no way to verify our memory of the experience of the object by checking the object. Objects can be checked and our representations of them verified only, as we noted above, if they are "objective." Thus, while it is not impossible that we perform a threefold synthesis of subjective representations and impressions, we cannot know for certain that we do.

(B) The question now arises, just how broad was Kant's use of "Gegenstand"? Can qualities, usually considered as qualities of objects, themselves be "objects" of knowledge, and are they subject to the threefold synthesis? In fact, although Kant never denies that qualities are objects of knowledge or consciousness, he never affirms that they are either. However, perhaps we can find a clue to our question as

---

1In the Logik Kant says that "all cognition, i.e. all representations related with consciousness to an object [Objekt] are either intuitions or concepts...the concept is a universal...or reflective representation..." (p. 91). Presumably, then, on Kant's account, we can have a concept of anything which can be an object of consciousness. But this does not yet tell us whether he considers qualities as objects of consciousness and so as concepts. However, in the discussion of the origin of concepts, in one of the examples of abstraction, we find that the quality 'scarlet' appears as a concept. We read:

One does not always use the term 'abstraction' (con'd)
follows: We know that any object which is synthesized, is synthesized according to its concept (that is, when we have the concept of a particular kind of object, we know how to synthesize the representations of the manifold of that kind of object and so how to pick out that sort of object). Do we, on Kant's account, have concepts of qualities which serve as rules of synthesis enabling us to pick out those qualities?

Suppose we allow that on Kant's account, anything of which we can be aware or conscious, can constitute the matter of a concept. Then, of course, we may be said to have concepts of qualities, for we are aware of them; we pay more or less attention to them whenever we are conscious of anything in the world of experience. But do concepts of qualities in this sense serve as rules for the synthesis of a manifold? At A 103 Kant remarks that the word "concept" suggests consciousness correctly in logic. We must not say: "to abstract something," but "to abstract from something." For example, if I think only the red color in scarlet cloth, as I abstract from the cloth, as I abstract also from this and I think to myself the scarlet as a material stuff in general, so I abstract from more determinations, and my concept of scarlet was thereby become more abstract (p. 95).

Despite this example, however, I am inclined not to put too much weight upon the Logik and particularly upon the examples of points made in the Logik, for we learn from its Preface* that the Logik was put together by G.B. Jänsche from scattered notes, papers, and notes in the margins of G.F. Meier's logic text which Kant used in his logic lectures. I am inclined to suspect that many of the sections in the Logik are Jänsche's reconstructions from some comments of Kant, but not direct quotes from him. Many of the remarks in the Logik (for example, §6, Anmerkung 1) are contrary to Kant's philosophy as it is set out more fully elsewhere. Furthermore, Kant rarely gave examples of his points, and it is probable that the examples provided in §6, Scholion 2 are provided by Jänsche, not Kant.

of the unity of synthesis. "This unitary consciousness," he says, referring to the concept, "is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon reproduced, into one representation."1 Here Kant is talking about the concept in its role as rule of synthesis. The concept as a rule provides a certain unity or order of synthesis. To put it another way, we are conscious of a certain order and unity among our representations, that is, we are conscious, or aware, of certain representations, we reproduce them (we associate certain of them together, as opposed to others which may be given at the same time, or we remember certain of them after our attention has turned to yet others) and we recognize that they all belong to one object, viz. the object to which the concept applies. It is clear that in order for the concept of an object to serve as a rule of synthesis, the object must have a manifold of representations. It must have parts or aspects which are in need of synthesis in order to be recognized as an object. Do qualities have manifolds?

It appears that some qualities do and that some do not. On the one hand, colors have traditionally been considered to be qualities of objects. Yet colors themselves have aspects which might be considered to comprise a manifold in need of synthesis in order to recognize any particular color. Any instance of a color has two aspects, chroma and hue. ("Hue" refers to the shade of whatever color it may be, for instance, to the particular shade of red which this color instances;

---

1 As we have noted before, in the case of counting to a number, which is the case Kant happens to be dealing with when he makes these remarks about concepts, the manifold is successively intuited. In other cases, it need not be, as we have seen.
and "chroma" refers to the intensity of the color, i.e. to its dullness or opacity or its brilliance. Black and white are referred to as "achromatic"; however, there are different shades of both which fall short of the "ideal" colors, white—which would be completely "brilliant," being composed of all colors—and black—the complete absence of color.) It is impossible to recognize a particular instance of a color without apprehending both its hue and its chroma.

On the other hand, impressions such as impenetrability, which is also considered to be a quality of objects, has no manifold. In the same way, inasmuch as particular sounds have manifolds and are considered to be objects, the pitch, timbre and intensity—which comprise the manifold of a sound—they themselves do not have manifolds. (Though it is possible to measure the frequency of the pitch of a particular sound, one need not measure frequency of the pitch in order to apprehend the pitch of a sound, any more than one need measure the frequency of light waves in order to apprehend the hue of a color. In the same manner, one need not be aware of the particular measurement of the extension of an object in order to apprehend the extension.)

In fact, however, having a manifold is not the only criterion, on Kant's account, for something's being an object. An object, for Kant, must at least be a substance, something which endures through time and whose attributes can change without the substance thereby becoming a different substance. With the addition of this criterion, we see that it is impossible for a color to be an object, for the aspects of a color, its hue and chroma, are essential to it. If either of them
changes, the color is no longer the same one, but is a different color.¹ A particular color should not be confused with a particular color patch, say a painted patch on a wall. For a patch of paint may fade, and its color change, yet still be the same patch of paint. The object here is the patch and the color is its attribute. But once the color fades, its hue changes and it is in fact no longer the same color. Therefore, if, in addition to the criterion that an 'object' must have a manifold of aspects which must be synthesized in order for it to be recognized, we posit the criterion that an object must be a substance and able to undergo changes of state without thereby becoming a different object, then we find that colors do not qualify as objects.

If we take these as our criteria for an 'object': being a substance and having a manifold, then we find that the threefold synthesis is not necessary for the application of all empirical concepts, but is limited to the application of concepts of 'objects' which are substances and have manifolds.

¹The color is not something additional to hue and chroma, in the way that a chair can be considered something different than its attributes, its color, shape, texture, etc. There is nothing more to a color than its hue and chroma. But not only can the color of a chair be changed, we might also change its shape, break it down and build it up in a different shape, and it is still the "same chair," in a sense in which a color is not the "same color" if its hue changes.
CHAPTER FIVE

Implications of and Apparent Contradictions to the Recognition-View of Synthesis

There are, of course, passages in which Kant himself appears to hold the "process-view" of synthesis, for he says things which appear to contradict the "recognition-view." In this chapter, we will deal first with a few brief passages in the Critique which are somewhat problematic and in need of interpretation in order to defend the thesis that Kant himself held the recognition view. Second, we will turn to a passage in the first edition of the deduction and to the Analogies, both of which exhibit the same apparent contradiction to the recognition-view. Here I hope to show that the contradictions are only apparent, and that the doctrines of the deduction and of the Analogies are not in conflict with that view. Finally, we will turn briefly to the Schematism to show that the recognition-view of synthesis is compatible with it and holds certain implications for it.
Section One

Three problematic passages

The first passage which presents difficulties for the recognition-view of synthesis is found at A 99 in the discussion of the first aspect of threefold synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension. Kant says:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity.

I believe Kant is arguing here that every intuition (of an object of experience) contains a manifold, i.e. that the intuition (of the object) can be divided up and represented as many only insofar as the mind "distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another," (die Zeit in der Folge der Eindrücke auf einander unterscheiden), that is, only by distinguishing the impressions successively. This is an epistemological remark. We can only do critical philosophy, only talk about the manifold of an object, by successively distinguishing the impressions we have. Otherwise, we do not have a manifold or many impressions; rather, we have a unity, an object, given in intuition. Note that Kant does not say here that we represent something as a manifold (of one object) when we put together impressions one after another. He is talking, instead, about an analysis, about distinguishing (unterschiede) impressions, not about putting them together. The analysis is a philosophical one; we distinguish the manifold as many impressions for
purposes of critical philosophy. It is not until the next sentence that Kant points out that these impressions, which are in fact given to various senses, must be put together as a manifold of some object, i.e. in a single representation: "In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold...it must first be run through, and held together" (A 99).  

The next problematic passage occurs at A 102 in Kant's discussion of the synthesis of reproduction in which he says that

When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other [nach der andern in Gedanken fassen müsse]. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained; none of the above mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise.

One must read this passage in the light of the discussion in which it occurs. Kant's argument in the section on reproduction is that an empirical synthesis of reproduction, i.e. one's associating certain attributes with an object, such as red with heavy cinnabar, or a certain name with an object, would be impossible without a priori principles (viz., the categories) which make reproduction possible. In his

---

1st "...so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit denn die Zusammennehmung derselben notwendig."
discussion, he gives two different sorts of example of reproduction; on the one hand, he talks about association, as in one's associating red with heavy cinnabar, and on the other hand, he gives the examples quoted above of drawing a line in thought, etc., which are cases involving the successive apprehension and remembering of representations. Kant's point is that in order to have the experience of drawing a line or thinking of the time from one noon to another, one must remember past representations when one's attention turns to new ones. "Reproduction," as I understand it, is a generic term for both association and for remembering separate representations which make up an object of knowledge. Kant has both in mind throughout this section, as we see from his opening remark that

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another /die sich oft gefolgt oder begleitet haben/ finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. But this law /Gesetz/ of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule /Regel/, and that in the manifold of these representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules.¹

The passage at A 102 is the discussion of reproduction as remembering sequential representations. It does not contradict Kant's earlier discussion (at A 100-101) of reproduction as the association of simultaneously apprehended representations.

¹"...in dem Mannigfalten ihrer Vorstellungen eine gewissen Regeln gemäße Begleitung oder Folge stattfinden. A 100. Underlining is my own.
At A 103 Kant remarks that "the word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark [that the concept of a number is nothing but the consciousness of a unity of synthesis]. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited \(\text{nach und nach Angeschaute}\), and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation." This passage was discussed in Chapter Three in which we pointed out that Kant's remarks are made in terms of the example he is dealing with, viz. counting units to reach a certain total. Counting units is a successive activity, not an instantaneous act. But the point of the remark, that a concept can be understood as the consciousness of a unity in a manifold of representations, holds true for representations instantaneously synthesized as well as for representations successively synthesized.
Section Two

The deduction and the Analogies

From A 119 through A 128, Kant gives his (first) argument for the objective validity of the categories. The argument follows the line that without categories, experience is impossible. It is in the early sections of the argument, specifically at A 121, that Kant appears to contradict the recognition view of synthesis, according to which at least some representations must be synthesized simultaneously. At A 121 he says:

...it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions [Eindrücke], were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions.¹

If one wished to argue that Kant held the process-view of synthesis, and that this passage represents the view that the apprehension of a manifold is always successive, one might also cite an earlier remark in the same argument:

...since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them... is demanded (A 120).

¹...Wahrnehmung von welcher das Gemüth zu einer andern übergesangen, zu den nachfolgenden herüber zu rufen, und so ganze Reihen derselben darzustellen.
Strictly speaking, however, to say that representations occur in the mind "separately and singly" is not necessarily to say that they are successive to one another. Kant's remark might be interpreted to mean only that one may distinguish the manifold of an appearance into various perceptions, which are separate and distinct from one another, and which, since they are distinct, must be combined in order to yield an object of experience, or an appearance.

To defend him against the process-view, it is necessary first to distinguish three, so to say, "levels" at which Kant's argument concerning threefold synthesis may operate. That is, the threefold synthesis can be interpreted to account for three different phenomena, all of which are necessary for the possibility of experience of an object.

Since, as we have noted above, Kant's use of terms is not rigid, I will make the distinctions using his terminology, but forcing each term to bear a univocal meaning, which it does not always have in Kant's own use. I have argued above (cf. Chapter One, Section Three) that "impression" (Eindrücke) can refer to an aspect of an object which is given to the senses; "impression" refers to an aspect (or attribute) insofar as one is aware of the aspect (one "has an impression"), but it does not refer to the aspect insofar as it exists in the empirical (spatio-temporal) object. I have argued that the manifold of an object may be comprised of "representations" (Vorstellungen), and that whereas the term "representation" can refer to an impression, it can also be used to refer to an object which comprises part of the manifold of another object. But now I wish to distinguish yet another sense in which a representation (of an object) may comprise part of a manifold, and I
will make the distinction using the term "perception." Kant uses the term "perception" (Wahrnehmung) to refer to (inter alia) my seeing (or otherwise perceiving) an object at a particular moment in time. Thus at time $T_1$, I may be said to have a perception of a chair, and a moment later, at time $T_2$, another perception of it, and another and another. I may, in each perception, view the chair from a slightly different angle, or under slightly different circumstances (say the light is slowly changing, etc.), or I may look at it more than once from exactly the same angle, in exactly the same light. Perhaps each look at the chair between blinks of my eyes could be referred to as a perception of the chair. In fact, of course, one's perceptions are constantly changing; during one's conscious life, one notices now one object, now another; one's attention shifts from one part of an object to another, etc. In this sense, perceptions are successive; one's consciousness or awareness may be referred to as a "stream" to indicate that it is on-going, that one is continuously conscious or aware, and that the objects of one's consciousness or attention constantly change.

If one is to be aware of a particular object over a period of time, the threefold synthesis must occur. For example, if one is to be aware of a particular chair, as a chair, over a period of time, one must apprehend the chair many times or have perceptions of it. 1 Upon each different occasion of recognizing the chair, one has a perception

1It is interesting to note that in each apprehension of the chair, a threefold synthesis must take place, which could be a successive synthesis of parts of the chair, or an instantaneous synthesis of them. This point will be discussed in detail below.
of it, or apprehends it. Second, one must, in order to recognize the chair as the same chair, reproduce one's past perceptions of it. That is, one must recognize that this particular perception of the chair belongs to a series of perceptions (of the same object). In order to do this, one must associate the perceptions of the chair together; that is, one must be able to distinguish perceptions of the chair from other perceptions which one may have of other objects which occur in between one's perceptions of the chair. Finally, of course, one must be able to recognize all the perceptions as being perceptions of the same object, viz. the chair.

I submit that in the passage A 119ff in his deduction of the categories, Kant has in mind threefold synthesis of this last sort, a synthesis of "perceptions," which is necessary in order to know any object as being the same object over a period of time. After arguing that there must be an apprehension and reproduction (remembering) and association of perceptions, Kant also argues that a "transcendental affinity of perceptions (or representations or impressions)" is necessary in order for an object to be known and so for experience to be possible. This affinity of perceptions or representations means that the representations must be apprehended in a certain orderly or rule-governed way—and the order is provided, Kant argues, by categories.

In the passage A 119ff, Kant's terminology is far from orderly; he shifts constantly between "appearances" (Erscheinungen), "impressions" (Eindrücke), "representations" (Vorstellungen), and "perceptions" (Wahrnehmenungen); apparently it makes no difference to him which term he uses, and indeed, when the passage is properly understood, it
is clear that the terminology is unimportant. For an understanding of the passage, it is only necessary to distinguish between my awareness of an object, my series of awarenesses of it, and the (spatio-temporal) object as it exists apart from my awareness. My awareness of the object at a particular moment in time can be referred to indiscriminately as an appearance, a perception, an impression, or a representation, but it cannot be referred to as "the object as it exists in itself" (where "exists in itself" means exists in space and/or time apart from my awareness of it); the spatio-temporal object existing independently of my awareness of it should not be confused here with the noumenal object or thing in itself (Ding an sich).

When it is interpreted in this way, the passage at A 119ff need not conflict with the recognition-view of synthesis. For indeed, as we pointed out above, in order to have even one perception of an object, one must perform a threefold synthesis, for even it one does not recognize what specific kind of object something is (say, a chair), in order to be conscious of it at all, one must distinguish it, pick it out, from among other objects, and making any distinction involves the application of some concept, whether it be a generic concept, say, 'household object' or 'object on which to sit,' or the very general concept 'body' or, even more general, the concept 'object.' Thus, in any perception of an object, one applies some concept to it, and the application of the concept requires a threefold synthesis. Furthermore, as we argued in Chapter Four, if an experience of an object (having a perception of it) is to be possible at all, the synthesis cannot go on without end; at some point there must be an instantaneous synthesis,
and if the original (or first) manifold apprehended is a manifold of impressions, the synthesis must be instantaneous.

Although Kant chooses to make his deduction of the categories in the first edition of the *Critique* in terms of the threefold synthesis of a manifold of perceptions (*Wahrnehmungen*),\(^1\) it can also be made in terms of a manifold of impressions (*Eindrücke*) and in terms of a manifold of representations (*Vorstellungen*) in the senses distinguished above. For the argument of the deduction is that in order for experience to be possible, representations\(^2\) must be brought under a transcendental unity of apperception, i.e. they must all belong to one single consciousness. But for this to be possible, the representations must have a transcendental affinity or unity of synthesis according to certain laws (categories). For representations to be subject to transcendental affinity, as opposed to rules of empirical association, means that certain representations must go together in certain relations and

---

\(^1\)Here the term "manifold of perceptions" refers to the various perceptions of an object. (Kant never uses the locution; I use it on the basis of the distinctions made above.) An object may be said to have a manifold, or as Kant would put it, as "appearance" may be said to "contain a manifold," of perceptions, inasmuch as the perceptions "belong" to the object; that is, I am aware that they are all different perceptions of the same object; the object is the same throughout all the different perceptions. And the apprehension of this manifold, which involves having perceptions of the same object over a period of time, is, as we have argued, necessary for the possibility of the formation and application of an empirical concept. For if we cannot recognize the same object twice, if we cannot associate the manifold representations of the object more than once, we cannot form a concept of it, or apply a concept to it.

\(^2\)I use "representation" in the generic sense here to include "impressions," "representations of objects," and "perceptions."
so be "associable in themselves," or able to be associated together. An empirical law of association, on the other hand, merely determines that representations which have often accompanied or succeeded one another become associated (A 100). The empirical law would be impossible without transcendental affinity, for representations would not "often accompany or succeed" one another if they were apprehended (or "had") haphazardly, that is, merely occurring to us one after another. There would be nothing to prevent representations from occurring in a different order every time they were apprehended, or from occurring in different groups, i.e., different ones occurring together each time. A given group of representations would never accompany each other more than once. Laws of transcendental affinity do not, like empirical rules of synthesis, determine which representations shall go together to make up an object, those representations must have certain (temporal) features and relations. The laws of transcendental affinity (the categories) make it possible for us to have concepts of objects because they make it possible for us to recognize an object as being the same, even though certain things about the object may change. These laws of affinity make it possible for a group of representations which make up an object, or comprise its manifold, to occur together more than once; they make it possible for us to be conscious of the same manifold of representations more than once. And they do so because they demand that whatever particular representations make up objects shall be apprehended together in certain ways (i.e., according to the ways specified by the twelve categories).

When he makes the deduction of the categories at A 119ff,
Kant argues, as we explained above, that our various perceptions of an object (a manifold of perceptions belonging to or "contained in" an object) must be apprehended (or "had"), reproduced (or remembered) and associated (i.e., certain perceptions are distinguished from others, which we may also have, as belonging to the series of perceptions of one and the same object). These perceptions are associated together. But this would be impossible, Kant argues, if not for a transcendental affinity among those perceptions which makes them associable. For example, according to the law of affinity provided by the category of Substance and Accident, the perceptions must be apprehended as perceptions of the same object which endures through time, even though the accidental properties of the object change from perception to perception.

For example, the object looks now green, now blue, now smooth, now rough, according to the light shining on it and where I stand in the room when I look at it.

However, the same need for transcendental affinity according to categories arises in the cases of the experience of an object whose manifold is one of representations, or objects; for example, the experience of a forest would be impossible without categories. In the experience of the complex object, a forest, as we have seen, the apprehension and reproduction of the manifold may be successive. The apprehension and remembering of the trees in the forest requires an association

---

1In the case of the successive apprehension of objects which make up the manifold of a complex object, each apprehension could be referred to as a perception. But cases of the synthesis of a variety of objects to yield one complex object are still different from the cases of synthesis of perceptions in which the perceptions synthesized are all perceptions of the same object.
according to a rule; that is, I must apprehend and reproduce only
trees and whatever objects are relevant to the recognition of a forest.
I do not, when coming to recognize a forest, synthesize whatever repre-
sentations occur in my mind, for I may notice, in addition to the indi-
vidual trees, a fence, a bulldozer, and men chopping down trees. These
representations are not part of the forest, and if I have the concept
"forest," I know that they are not. If I have the concept, I am in
possession of a rule telling me which representations, or what sorts of
representations, comprise a forest. However, this empirical association
and reproduction of representations depends upon an "objective ground,"
or "affinity" of representations; otherwise, Kant argues:

...even though we should have the power of associat-
ing perceptions [here we are arguing for representa-
tions], it would remain entirely undetermined and
accidental whether they would themselves be associ-
able... (A 122).

The representations must be "subject to the conditions of transcenden-
tal unity of apperception," and the conditions of belonging to a unity
of apperception (or to one single consciousness) are the categories, as
laws for the synthetic unity of the representations. Unless the indi-
vidual trees can be known to belong to one and the same object, I will
never recognize a forest. I must have the category of Substance and
Accident in order to recognize that something remains the same through-
out my various representations of individual trees. If I did not have
the (pure a priori) concept of something which remains the same through
different representations, I would never be able to "add together" indi-
vidual trees, successively apprehended and reproduced, to arrive at
the recognition of a forest. The manifold of representations must be more than accidentally associated simply in virtue of their occurring together, or succeeding one another. The manifold of representations must occur together because they belong to the same object (which endures through time), otherwise they might never occur together more than once, and when in fact representations of the trees in the forest are interspersed among other representations which I have, I would never associate the relevant representations together, ignoring the irrelevant ones.

In the same way, I could never have an empirical rule (or empirical concept) for the synthesis of a manifold of impressions unless I had the (pure a priori) concept of a substance which remains the same though having different attributes. If round shape went together only once with impenetrable, extended, hard and fuzzy, I could never form or apply the empirical concept 'tennis-ball.' The impressions 'round,' 'impenetrable,' 'extended,' 'hard,' and 'fuzzy,' must occur together (at the same time) more than once, in order for me to apply the concept 'tennis-ball' or to experience that particular object. The impressions, then, must be subject to a transcendental law of affinity, in this example, to the category of Substance and Accident.

In the process of explaining how and why representations (in the generic sense) must be subject to transcendental affinity or to categories, in order for experience of objects to be possible, I have already referred to specific categories, especially to the category of Substance and Accident. Kant himself does not explain how specific laws of transcendental affinity, or categories, operate until the Analytic of Principles. In the deduction, he is merely concerned to show
that some categories are necessary for the possible experience of objects, not how specific categories operate.

In the Analogies, Kant appears flatly to contradict the recognition-view of synthesis according to which some representations must be apprehended simultaneously. For instance, in the proof of the first analogy he says:

Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing (B 225).

And again in the proof of the second analogy:

The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts follow upon one another. Whether they also follow one another in the object is a point which calls for further reflection... (B 234).

And finally, in the proof of the third analogy:

Things are coexistent when in empirical intuition the perceptions of them can follow upon one another reciprocally, which, as has been shown in the proof of the second principle, cannot occur in the succession of appearances (B 256-257).

It would appear from these remarks that Kant thinks the manifolds of all objects to be synthesized, i.e. apprehended and reproduced, etc., successively. If we interpret Kant's remark that "The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" (Die Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinung ist jederzeit successiv) B 234, as referring to the "synthesis of apprehension" of the manifold of any object of experience, then not only are the manifold representations in a complex object such as a forest apprehended successively, but also
manifolds of impressions. However, here, as earlier in the deduction of the categories (A 119ff), "manifold of appearance" refers to the series of perceptions of an object (or event); and as we explained above, perceptions are successive, for a perception may be understood as the momentary apprehension of an object, and our conscious life may be understood as a continuous stream of such perceptions. When, for instance, Kant says in the First Analogy that "Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" (B 225), he is referring to the fact that we apprehend or "have" the perceptions which are perceptions of an object (or "appearance") successively. The perceptions form a series (successive to one another), for they all belong to one object, i.e. they are all perceptions of one and the same object.

In the Analogies, Kant argues that there must be a distinction between the "accidental order" in which perceptions occur in our minds and the "connected existence" which appearances or objects have in space and time. This distinction can also be expressed by saying that there is a distinction between the subjective order of our perceptions and the objective order of the objects in space and time of which they are perceptions. Kant argues that the possibility of experience demands necessary connections among the objects of experience, therefore, there must be certain concepts which determine necessary connections among perceptions, for experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions (B 219).

There are, Kant argues, three possible ways for objects to exist and to be related in time, therefore there will be three rules determining the existence and relations of objects in time. The three
"modes of time" are duration, succession, and coexistence, and the three rules will be based on them. Kant's fundamental argument is that despite the fact that perceptions occur in accidental order, merely successive to one another, we can still know that certain perceptions are necessarily connected to others, for we have rules for their necessary connection.

The first of these is a rule for the duration of an object or appearance through time, despite the fact that our perceptions of the object are constantly changing and that in our perceptions of it, the object is different, i.e. "determined" now in one way, now in another. Kant's argument for the permanence of substance is based upon the argument that simultaneity and succession are relations in time and that relations of time are only possible if there is one time in which they occur. But since we do not perceive time itself, in order to perceive succession and coexistence, we must find something in experience which gives us the idea of time as something on-going. The idea is given to us by the perception of permanent objects, or substances, enduring through time. We must have the concept of permanence in relation to which things can occur simultaneously or successively (A183=B226). Kant says:

All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists. In all appearances the permanent is the object itself, that is, substance as phenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to their determination (A184=B227).
In the Second Analogy, as in the First, Kant is concerned to show that experience is impossible without a distinction between the subjective order of perceptions and the objective order of objects in space and time (B 234ff). The distinction can be made, he argues, only if objective perceptions (perceptions of objects, as opposed to subjective perceptions such as fantasies or dreams) are subject to rules (A191=B236). But in the Second Analogy, Kant is concerned with how we can distinguish the perceptions of an event from the perceptions of an object. (The problem arises because perceptions themselves occur haphazardly; they simply follow one another in our minds.) Once we grant that experience is impossible without rules determining necessary connections among the objects of our perceptions, we must make a distinction between the rules governing perceptions of an object and rules governing perceptions of an event. The difference, says Kant, is that in an event, the preceding state of the object must be perceived first, and the succeeding state second. It is impossible to reverse the order in which the perceptions can occur, if something is an event. Kant makes his point (at A192=B237f) in terms of perceptions of a house and perceptions of a ship floating downstream. Perceptions of a house (i.e. of an object) can begin with the basement and end with the roof or vice-versa. We can apprehend the manifold from right to left or from left to right; it makes no difference. But in the apprehension of a ship floating downstream (i.e., of an event), we must first perceive the ship upstream and second perceive it downstream. It is impossible to perceive the ship first downstream, and then to perceive it upstream.
(That is, it is impossible if the event we perceive is objective or real. In dreams, on the other hand, we may imagine anything. But it is precisely the necessary order of perceptions that distinguishes objective perceptions from subjective dreams and imaginings.)

Finally, in the Third Analogy, Kant argues that although our perceptions occur successively, it is still possible to know that certain objects in space and time exist simultaneously, or coexist. The rule which allows us to know that objects coexist, despite the fact that our perceptions of them are successive, is that the perceptions of the objects can occur reciprocally. It makes no difference which perception occurs first and which second (B 257f).

Does Kant's contention that perceptions occur successively contradict the recognition-view of synthesis? If not, what is the relationship between the recognition-view and the doctrines of the Analogies? As we stated at the outset, if we interpret Kant's remarks that "The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" to refer to the perceptions of objects (and events, etc.), then the remarks need not contradict the recognition-view, according to which certain representations comprising the manifolds of objects must be apprehended simultaneously. For, as we noted in regard to the deduction at A 119ff: a perception—whether of a substance, or of an object which figures in an event, or is part of a community of coexisting objects—is itself impossible without threefold synthesis of the sort we described in earlier chapters. Let us examine this point with regard to perceptions of a substance. We will find, I believe, an inter-dependence
of the possible perception of a substance, the threefold synthesis, and the transcendental concept 'object.'

The argument of the First Analogy is that in order for our successive perceptions of an object to be perceptions of the same object, we must have the (pure a priori) concept of a substance (or object) which endures through time, and which has accidents which may change over a period of time. Thus our successive perceptions of the substance may all be different, but the differences are accidental ones; that is, we perceive changes in the attributes of the object, but the object itself is still the same one.

However, as we noted above, each perception of the substance involves a threefold synthesis. For instance, if the perceptions are of a house, each perception, for example, the perception of the roof, requires 1) the synthesis of apprehension of the parts of the roof, 2) the remembering of the parts (if the synthesis is successive), and 3) the recognition of the parts as a roof. In fact, of course, certain of my perceptions of the house require an instantaneous threefold synthesis. For instance, I may have a perception of one wall of the house. I instantly apprehend and associate the extension, impenetrability, shape, color, and texture of the wall when I recognize it as a wall. Here, having a perception of the wall just is recognizing it, which involves an instantaneous threefold synthesis. Furthermore, the possibility of one's performing a threefold synthesis rests upon one's having the concept of 'object' for that is the concept of something which unites representations. In a threefold synthesis, we associate certain representations together and think of them as belonging to the
same object. This means that we have the concept 'object,' that which remains the same throughout successive representations, or that to which representations (or impressions) belong. Thus, any possible perception of a substance depends upon threefold synthesis and upon the concept 'object.'

However, the concept 'object' itself is impossible without the (pure a priori) concept of 'substance,' i.e. that which endures through time and to which accidents belong. For an 'object' just is something which has attributes, and there must be a rule, in the recognition of any particular object, which determines that these attributes belong to this object. There being a "rule" indicates that the attributes (and our representations of them) must go together more than once; "rule" indicates that they go together regularly. And as we argued above, if representations did not come together more than once, it would be impossible to form or to apply any concepts. But there being a rule for attributes inhereing in an object, or for representations being taken together more than once to yield the same object, depends upon the concept of a 'Substance,' because a substance is that which endures through time, and so can be perceived more than once. Thus, it would be impossible to perform a threefold synthesis (to apply an empirical concept) without the transcendental concept 'object'; but the concept 'object' cannot be applied without the concept of 'substance,' without the category of Substance and Accident.¹

¹The concept, 'object,' though it is transcendental, is like other empirical concepts in that it does not serve to determine the order of time in the apprehension of attributes. See pp. 145-147 below for a discussion of this point.
Thus, the doctrines of the Analogies do not contradict the recognition-view of synthesis. Rather, as we see, there is a mutual dependence between the possible perception of a substance and the possibility of performing a threefold synthesis; furthermore, the necessity that some cases of threefold synthesis be instantaneous still holds, for certain perceptions of substances are perceptions of objects whose manifolds are manifolds of impressions, which, as we argued in Chapters Three and Four, must be synthesized instantly.¹

¹Any possible perception of any object involved in an event, whether it is the cause or the effect, depends upon a threefold synthesis, as does any perception of any object which coexists in a community of objects. The arguments here are the same as those above for the possible perception of a substance. And the arguments that certain objects must be synthesized simultaneously also hold good for objects which are involved in events and for objects which exist in a community of objects.
Section Three

Implications for the Schematism

In the Schematism, we do not find apparent contradictions to the recognition-view such as those found in the Analogies and elsewhere. However, we do find, I believe, that the Schematism is concerned with synthesis, both according to categories and according to empirical concepts. It is, therefore, concerned with threefold synthesis, and so we will find that the recognition-view of synthesis has implications for it.

In this section, I wish to suggest that by "schema," Kant means a rule, such as we described in earlier chapters, for the synthesis of a manifold given in intuition, or through sensibility. He makes a fundamental distinction, in his discussion, between a "schema" and an "image," and I believe that, whereas a schema is a rule for synthesis, which, as we have argued, is necessary for the application of a concept to an object, an "image" is anything--spatial object, picture of an object, mental image of an object, etc.--which can be "subsumed under" a concept; that is, anything to which the concept can be applied. This distinction Kant makes at A140=B179f, where he says:

The schema is in itself always a product of imagination. Since, however, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the image. If five points be set alongside one another, thus, I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance
a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself. For with such a number as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept.

Thus we see that an image of the number five just is anything to which the concept five can be applied, whether five dots, five apples, or five of anything else. But according to Kant, the number five in general is "the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity...may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept [here, the concept 'five']..." (A140=B179). And a "method" or "universal procedure" may also be called a "rule." Indeed, in his discussion of the difference between an image of a triangle, and the schema of the concept 'triangle,' Kant makes it clear that a schema is a rule for the synthesis of a manifold, for he says:

The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination... (A 141).

Kant goes on to say that the schema is "a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept," and it is as such that the specific concept is related to the schema (A141). As an example of a schema of an empirical concept, he discusses the concept 'dog.' The concept 'dog,' he says, "signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents" (A 141).
We have, then, two reasons for identifying a schema with a concept in its role as a rule of synthesis. First, as we argued in Chapter Two, one must be in possession of a rule of synthesis in order to apply an empirical concept; and Kant's argument in the Schematism just is that the schema "mediates between" a concept and an object, and so allows a concept to be applied to an object of experience. He says:

This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept (A140=B179).

Furthermore, as we noted above, he specifically refers to the schema as a rule at A 141. Second, the imagination provides an image for a concept according to a "universal procedure," or rule, to which Kant gives the title "schema." The schema, Kant says, is "a rule of synthesis of the imagination" (A 141). We found that in the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, synthesis is also referred to as a "result of the power of imagination" (Herkunft der Einbildungskraft) (A78=B103), and that an empirical concept serves as a rule for the synthesis (the concept, Kant says, represents the synthetic unity of a manifold) (A 106).

Throughout, I have referred to the concept itself as the rule for the synthesis of a manifold, and have made a distinction between a concept in its role as a class-name and in its role as a rule for synthesis. Kant, however, is unwilling to identify the concept with its schema; he refers to the schema, or rule, as a "third thing" standing between the concept and the image, or object to which it applies. I suggest that he does so because he holds the view that concepts are
primarily universal class names,¹ and that when he discovered that the application of a concept involves a schema, or rule, for the synthesis of a manifold, he could not reconcile the new discovery with his traditional view of concepts. It is interesting, however, to note places at which he does tend to identify the concept with the rule or schema. For instance, in the deduction he says that "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule" (A 106). And in the Schematism, when discussing the schema of the empirical concept 'dog,' he says that the empirical concept "stands in immediate relation" to the schema inasmuch as the schema is a rule for the determination of our intuition. But then he says that "The concept 'dog' signifies a rule...".²

In fact, however, whether a concept is considered solely as a class-name and the schema as a third thing distinct from it, or whether a concept can be considered to have two roles, as a class-name and as a rule of synthesis, is not important. The important point is that a schema can be understood as a rule of synthesis, necessary in order for a concept to be applicable to objects.

If the schema of a concept is understood to be identical with the rule of synthesis necessary for the application of that concept, then we find that the recognition-view has certain implications for the

¹For instance, in the Logic, he defines a "concept" as "a universal representation (representatio per notas communes), or reflected-on representation (representatio discursiva)" (p. 269). Cf. also A68–B93.

²A 141. Underlining is my own.
Schematism. For according to the recognition-view, certain cases of threefold synthesis must be instantaneous, that is, the manifold must be apprehended, reproduced, and recognized simultaneously. This means that some cases of synthesis according to empirical concepts as rules of synthesis must be instantaneous, and if the schema of a concept is identical with the rule of synthesis, then it follows that some cases of synthesis according to schemata must be instantaneous.

The schema, or rule of synthesis, allows a manifold to be taken together, but it does not determine whether the manifold is taken together in a "synthesis of recognition" after being successively apprehended and reproduced, or whether it is apprehended, etc. simultaneously. We say that the schema allows a manifold to be taken together for the following reason. The schema of a particular empirical concept determines which representations are to be synthesized to yield an object which can be subsumed under that concept. For instance, the empirical concept 'ball' determines that the impressions of extension, impenetrability, roundness, hardness, etc. must be synthesized if an object is to be known as a ball. But, as we shall see below, the concept 'ball' does not determine whether the manifold is synthesized simultaneously or successively. In fact, two empirical concepts as rules, or two empirical schema, are necessary for the recognition of an object.¹

¹Here I am not concerned with synthesis according to categories and so am not counting the schemata of categories which are also necessary for the recognition of an object.
These are the schema of the concept 'object' and the schema of the particular empirical concept involved. As we have noted, the schema of the particular empirical concept tells us which particular representations are to be synthesized. But the concept 'object' is necessary in order for us to associate any representations together to form a particular object, for the concept of 'object' is the concept of the unity of representations (A 105). It is in virtue of the concept 'object' that we are able to associate representations together, to think of them as belonging to one and the same thing, which we call an "object."

But the concept 'object' does not determine whether a particular object is synthesized simultaneously or successively, for some objects, such as forests may be synthesized either successively or simultaneously. Nor does the empirical concept 'forest' determine whether the manifold is apprehended successively or simultaneously. This is determined by the conditions under which the manifold is given, or how it is given, in intuition. It is also determined by what sort of manifold is given in intuition, rather than by the concepts applied to the manifold. For instance, as we have seen, if the manifold is one of impressions, it must be synthesized instantaneously, while, if it is a manifold of objects, it can be synthesized either successively or simultaneously. Furthermore, the conditions under which I apprehend a manifold may also determine whether it is synthesized simultaneously or successively. If

---

1 The concept 'object' is empirical inasmuch as objects can be experienced; but it is transcendental inasmuch as it is necessary for the possibility of experience. What the object may be in itself, however, apart from our representations of it, we can never know.
I intuit an object from very close on, I may apprehend the manifold successively. For example, I may find myself standing very close to a large object; first I apprehend a broad, smooth surface; then as I move around the object, I distinguish its shape; I find certain parts and I discover their relationship to one another. I then recognize the object as a large piece of sculpture. But, on the other hand, I might, from far off, apprehend the object in one glance. I might simultaneously apprehend its overall shape and color, etc., or I might even apprehend its parts simultaneously; I instantly recognize it as Michaelangelo's "David."

Thus, while the schema of an empirical concept is a necessary condition for the synthesis of a manifold, it is not sufficient to determine how the manifold is synthesized. The nature of the manifold, and the conditions under which it is given in intuition determine how the manifold is synthesized, that is, whether it is synthesized simultaneously or successively. The schema or rule provided by an empirical concept has no temporal features; it does not tell us how the manifold is synthesized in time, nor how the object of the concept exists in time.
CONCLUSION

According to Kant, we can distinguish two elements in experience, the given and the spontaneous. These he often refers to respectively as the passive and active elements of experience. On the passive side, Kant says that objects are given through intuition (which for human beings is sensible; objects are given through the senses), and on the active side, these objects are thought through concepts (he sometimes says that objects are thought "by means of" concepts).

Kant identifies experience with empirical judgments (and an experience with an empirical judgment), and in an empirical judgment (or in an experience) an empirical concept is applied to some object (the object is brought under, or subsumed under, the concept). We have argued that the application of an empirical concept depends upon a synthesis of that which is given in intuition. Kant often refers to that which is given as "the manifold" or "the manifold of appearance," by which he means the manifold aspects of an object which are given to us through our senses. We have seen that when an empirical concept is applied, that is, when an object is subsumed under a class concept, the concept serves as a rule for the synthesis inasmuch as what is given in experience is not intelligible simply as it is given (our intuition is not intellectual). We do not, merely in having sensations, know objects. Kant argues that in order for experience to arise in these sensible impressions and perceptions, we must synthesize them, or put certain ones of them together with
certain others, according to rules; these rules are provided by our concepts; therefore, Kant argues, we must synthesize the manifold impressions or perceptions according to concepts.

Kant does not believe that impressions and perceptions of an object constitute knowledge of objects merely in being given in sensation or empirical intuition. He is pointing to a fact which, I believe, we can see in cases such as the following: When I see a book lying on a table (and I have in mind here a case in which I make the judgment 'That is a book'), in fact I have many impressions in addition to the impressions of the book. If I am standing back from the book, I will have, in addition to impressions of the book, impressions of the table, perhaps a bit of the wall behind the table, and impressions of any other objects lying on the table near the book. Kant's point is that in order to recognize the book, I must pick out the relevant impressions from among all the impressions given to me in the moment of perception in which I see the book, and put them together or take them together as impressions of a book. This putting together of the relevant impressions, Kant calls "synthesis," and the relevant impressions he calls "the manifold" of the "appearance" (which in this case is a book).

Another sort of case in which we see that the given element needs synthesis is the case of recognizing the same object more than once over a period of time, or having several perceptions of the same object over a period of time. In the last chapter, we mentioned the "stream of consciousness," referring to the constantly changing and
shifting series of perceptions which constitutes our conscious life. In most cases of perceiving an object, we do not have an unshifting series of perceptions of it; rather, our attention shifts now to the object, now to another, and back again. We attend or perceive the book, but then the table, then other objects in the room, then the book again. If we are to be said to recognize the book again and again over a period of time, we must be able to pick out from among our constantly changing perceptions the relevant ones, i.e. the perceptions of the book. These must be synthesized or put together to constitute a series of perceptions of the one object, the book.

This synthesis Kant refers to as "threefold synthesis," thereby indicating that it has three aspects, which he entitles the "synthesis of apprehension in intuition," the "synthesis of reproduction in imagination," and the "synthesis of recognition in a concept." Generally speaking, these aspects of synthesis may be understood as follows: (A) the "synthesis of apprehension" is an account of that aspect in the experience of an object of apprehending the manifold given in intuition. Before we can recognize an object, it must be the case that we become aware of the various impressions of that object given to us, its color, extension, impenetrability, hardness or softness, shape, etc. We must "have the impressions." Or, if the manifold to be synthesized is one of objects, we must apprehend, or be aware of the parts of the object to be recognized; we must have the perceptions of the parts of the object. Or, again, if the manifold is one of perceptions of the same object, we must "have the perceptions."
Obviously, unless we become conscious of the manifold which constitutes an object, we cannot recognize that object. (B) The "synthesis of reproduction" may be, we have argued, understood in two ways. First, in those cases in which the manifold is apprehended successively, we must remember the parts of the manifold apprehended previously, while our attention shifts to those parts apprehended later. As Kant says, if we forget the first parts when our attention turns to later parts, we will never come to recognize the object being synthesized. Second, in those cases in which the manifold is apprehended simultaneously, the relevant representations (whether impressions or perceptions of the parts of the object being synthesized) must be associated or taken together, while the irrelevant ones drop out or are ignored. (C) Finally, the "synthesis of recognition" is Kant's title for that aspect of the experience of an object whereby we recognize the manifold, apprehended and reproduced, as a particular (kind of) object; we apply a concept to the manifold.

We have argued that there are three sorts of representation which can constitute the manifold to be synthesized. First, the manifold may be one of impressions, that is, impressions of the sensible aspects of an object, its shape, color, texture, extension, hardness or softness, etc., etc. Second, the manifold may be one of perceptions of the parts of an object. The example which we used throughout this work was that of the recognition of a forest, whose manifold consisted of individual trees. Finally, the manifold, as we saw in the last chapter, may be one of various perceptions of the same object.
These perceptions may include both changes in the perspective of the perceiver and changes in the state of the object perceived. But in cases of synthesis of all three sorts of manifold, there must be a threefold synthesis—an apprehension of the representations, a reproduction or association of them, and a recognition of them in a concept, i.e. a recognition of the object to which they belong.

The sort of manifold (as well as the circumstances under which it is given) determine whether the synthesis is instantaneous or whether it takes time, that is, whether the manifold is synthesized simultaneously or successively. We have argued that, although in most cases the synthesis can be either simultaneous or successive, there are some cases in which it must be simultaneous. These are cases in which the manifold is one of impressions. In Chapter Three we argued that a manifold constituted of the impressions (of the sensory attributes) of an object cannot be successively apprehended (and reproduced) because it is logically impossible to perceive the attributes of an object before one perceives the object, or to perceive the attributes of an object apart from one another. That is, we cannot perceive the shape of an object without perceiving its color or its extension, etc. Nor can we have a perception of its impenetrability without a simultaneous perception of its extension, etc. Thus, the synthesis of a manifold of impressions is instantaneous. The manifold is simultaneously apprehended; there is no need, therefore, for any of its parts to be remembered; rather, the manifold must be associated (the relevant impressions taken together, and the irrelevant
ones ignored). Furthermore, knowing which impressions to apprehend and associate can be thought of as having a rule for the synthesis, a rule supplied by the concept of the object being synthesized. Thus, when one apprehends and associates certain impressions, one, at the same time, recognizes them as being a particular object, or takes them to be a particular object.

We further argued that such cases of instantaneous synthesis are the paradigm cases of synthesis; that is, even cases of successive synthesis depend upon them. In Chapter Three, we showed that the synthesis of a complex object, such as a forest, would go on indefinitely unless there occurred an original instantaneous synthesis of the sub-manifolds of the complex object. We pointed out that such an instantaneous synthesis need not be the synthesis of a manifold of impressions, but could be the instantaneous synthesis of the representations of objects constituting the manifold of the complex object. For instance, in recognizing a forest one might instantly recognize an oak tree without a successive synthesis of its trunk and branches, etc., and so with the other individual trees which constitute the manifold of the complex object, a forest. But in any case, as we argued in Chapter Three, even though there may be no instantaneous synthesis of the cub-manifolds of the objects which constitute the manifold of the complex object, the synthesis cannot go on indefinitely, for there must be an original synthesis of the impressions of the objects constituting the sub-manifolds of the complex object in question. Thus, even if we did not happen to recognize the individual
trees in a forest instantly, and synthesized each tree from its trunk and branches, and even if we synthesized each branch and trunk from constitutive parts, ultimately, the original synthesis will be a synthesis of a manifold of impressions (perhaps impressions of a part of a branch, etc.) which, as we have seen, must be instantaneous.

Moreover, as we argued in Chapter Five, the possibility of any perception of an object, and hence the possibility of a series of perceptions of the same object, also depends ultimately upon cases of the instantaneous synthesis of a manifold. For as we saw above, any one perception of an object involves a synthesis of that object and either the synthesis, or a "sub-synthesis" of a "sub-manifold," of that object must be instantaneous. Furthermore, in order for the category of Substance to find application in experience, that is, in order for anything to be a substance, as we have seen, it must be possible to have a series of perceptions of it; and inasmuch as a series of perceptions of an object depends upon the possibility of an instantaneous synthesis, the application of the (pure a priori) concept of "substance" depends ultimately upon the possibility of an instantaneous synthesis. We also set out, in Chapter Five, Kant's account of the dependence of all syntheses of objects, and hence the application of any empirical concept, upon the category of Substance. Thus we see the mutual dependence of the application of empirical concepts and the possibility of instantaneous synthesis, on the one hand, and the application of the category of Substance, on the other. We also pointed out that, on the same grounds (viz., that any one perception of an
object entails the possibility of instantaneous synthesis and hence that any series of perceptions of the same object also entails it), the application of the categories of Causality and of Reciprocity also depend upon the possibility of instantaneous synthesis.

It seems to me impossible to argue for categories without making use of the concept of synthesis. For, as we saw in Chapter Five, the application of the concept of Substance depends upon it in two ways: The concept of 'substance' is the concept of an object which endures through time and which remains the same even though its 'determinations' (or states) may change and successive perceptions of it may be different. As we have pointed out, in our actual stream of perceptions, the perceptions are always changing: the objects of the perceptions are constantly changing, the view-point of the perceiver is constantly shifting, and the object of successive perceptions itself undergoes changes of state. Because the perceptions of one object do not always follow immediately upon one another, but are interspersed by perceptions of other objects, the relevant perceptions must be picked out of the stream and taken together as perceptions of one and the same object. This picking out of the relevant perceptions is the synthesis of those perceptions. Furthermore, the concept of 'substance' and empirical concepts are mutually dependent, for we are able to pick out the relevant perceptions of an object only because we have a concept of that object and thus are able to recognize it again and again. And we have argued that we are able to form and to apply empirical concepts only because we have a concept of 'substance'
or of objects enduring through time, which can be recognized again and again. If we were able to synthesize a manifold only once, that is, only once take a group of representations together, we could not form a concept of that group of representations; it would not constitute the manifold of an object because an object must be something which can be recognized twice. Unless we can recognize an object twice, we have no way to distinguish between subjective and objective experiences of objects. We could never know whether we were mistaken in our experiences of an object; there would be no way to check on our experiences to find whether they were mistaken. And if we cannot be certain of our mistaken experiences (or empirical judgments) we cannot be certain of our correct ones. Under such conditions, experience itself is impossible.

In the same way, we argued in Chapter Five, the concept of 'substance' depends upon synthesis inasmuch as it is impossible to pick out the relevant perceptions of one object unless one is able to recognize the object, and the recognition of an object, we have argued, is impossible unless one is able to pick out the relevant perceptions of the parts of the object (if one comes to recognize the object only after the successive apprehension of its parts), or unless one is able to pick out the relevant impressions of the aspects of the object (if one recognizes the object immediately by simultaneously apprehending its aspects or attributes). Just as, in the stream of our perceptions, there are perceptions relevant and irrelevant to the knowledge of one object, so in one perception or cognition of an object, relevant and
irrelevant impressions are given to us simultaneously. In both cases, if one object is to be recognized (and recognized again), the relevant perceptions or impressions must be picked out and the irrelevant ones ignored. Thus synthesis is necessary in both kinds of case, and is necessary for the concept of 'substance.'

The recognition-view of synthesis is of interest for Kant interpretation only if the notion of synthesis itself is a viable one. Attempts have been made to argue for the possibility of experience and for categories without the notion of synthesis, most recently by Strawson, who attempts to do so in his commentary on Kant, The Bounds of Sense. Instead of 'synthesis,' he employs the notion of a 'necessary connectedness of experiences (=perceptions).'' Such connectedness is necessary for experience, he argues, and is provided by certain concepts, that of an enduring or persisting object (substance), that of causality, and that of a person. Strawson never deals with the question of exactly how these special concepts provide the connectedness of experiences necessary for the possibility of experience, but clearly there are only two ways that the connectedness can arise. Either the experiences (=perceptions) somehow occur or are given in a connected fashion, i.e. are already connected when they are intuited, or else, as we have argued, they must be connected by the perceiver.

Kant argues that objects are given to us in sensible intuition; strictly speaking, all that is given to us are sensations; they are not given as connected, but in fact occur in different senses both at the same time, and at different times. (The only order which
sensations have merely in being given is temporal order; they occur one after another, or simultaneously.) If this is so, they are in need of connection by the perceiver in order for them to be perceived as sensations of objects. This is not to deny that spatio-temporal objects of which we have sensations and perceptions are in orderly relations, but only to deny that the mind is simply a mirror reflecting the order of objects in the world. It is difficult to understand what it might mean for representations (impressions and perceptions) to be "given as connected," except perhaps that they are not completely random, do not occur at random, but are, rather, connectable or able to be connected and associated into patterns or groups or series which constitute a group or series of representations of an object. Impressions and perceptions cannot be connected in themselves (cf. B219).

The strong argument for synthesis is that all the perceptions of a single object do not occur in immediate succession to one another and so are not connected in that way, and that in one perception, many impressions are given, some of which belong to one object and some of which do not, therefore a synthesis is necessary which involves picking out and taking together the relevant perceptions and impressions in order to recognize an object. But even if we leave aside the strong argument and grant that in some way perceptions and impressions occur together, or occur (are given) in orderly fashion (that is, they have more connection than simply their occurring one after another), still Kant's argument stands that this alone is insufficient for the possibility of experience. For experience entails,
as we have seen, the application of empirical concepts, and the application of an empirical concept is only possible if the concept can be applied more than once. For this to be possible, the subject of experience must be able to do three things. First, he must have the perceptions of the object (or of the parts of the object); second, he must be able to remember the perceptions after they have been had and while he is having new perceptions of the object; significantly, he must associate these perceptions, that is, he must be able to recognize them later as belonging together; if he cannot, then he will not be able to recognize the object again; and third, he must be able to recognize them as one object.

One cannot, if one is talking about experience, speak of perceptions or experiences as if they connected themselves. They must be connected by the perceiver. It seems to me that in his deduction of categories, when Strawson employs the notion of 'necessary connectedness of experiences,' he implicitly makes use of the notion of synthesis or connection of experiences by the perceiver. The doctrine of threefold synthesis is an attempt to account for the necessary connectedness of experiences. That is, granted that a certain connectedness of experiences is necessary for the possibility of experience, what is necessary for the possibility of such connectedness? What is necessary is that the experiences be connected, for we have seen that even if (contra factum) perceptions of one object (or its parts) occurred successively, that is, in immediate succession, still experience would be impossible if the subject forgot previous perceptions of the object,
or was not able to associate the perceptions of the object (i.e., not able to understand them as being perceptions of one object). The subject's being able to remember and to associate perceptions is part of Kant's threefold synthesis (viz., the synthesis of reproduction). And once it is admitted that the subject of experience must be able to do these things in order to apply a concept twice and so in order for him to have experience at all, then the notion of synthesis as Kant presents it, is reintroduced into the argument for the necessary conditions of experience. And with it the importance of the recognition-view of synthesis.
APPENDIX

We shall examine two alternative uses of the term "function" (function), first that of H. J. Paton, set out in his commentary on the Critique, and second, the traditional use of the term as found in Plato and Aristotle.

H. J. Paton argues that at B 93, when Kant says that "concepts rest on functions," "function" should be understood to mean "form." The premiss underlying Paton's interpretation of the Metaphysical Deduction is that "function" and "form" are identical and, therefore, that the "functions of understanding" and the "forms of judgment" are identical. After noting that the primary meaning of "function," as the term is used in such expressions as "the function of a thing," is "that which a thing alone can do best," Paton gives a second definition of "function":

The word 'function' is, however, used also, not for the work which a thing performs, but for its way of working, or, in the language of the dictionary, for the 'mode of action by which it fulfills its purpose.' The function is then a common nature or a common form, present in separate acts.

However, this may be, Kant, when he speaks of understanding and judgment, uses the word 'function' as synonymous with the word 'form.' The functions of understanding are the same—at any rate in their denotation—as the forms of understanding; and the functions of judgment, or the functions in judgment, are the same as the forms of judgment. The general function of the understanding, namely judgment, is supposed to differentiate itself into the necessary forms of judgment, and these are identified with the functions of the understanding (pp. 246-247).

It is important to make clear how Paton identifies "function" with "form," for if the identification holds, we shall see that Kant's argument in the Metaphysical Deduction rests on a petitio. In the first paragraph
quoted above, we see that Paton effects the identification by using "form" in the scholastic sense to mean "nature": if the function of a thing is the "mode of action by which it fulfills its purpose," then every action of the thing has a common feature or something in common (viz., the way in which the action is accomplished); another term for the common feature is the "common form."

In the second paragraph quoted above, we see that Paton simply asserts that Kant uses "function" as synonymous with the word "form," and, in an attempt to support his assertion, he claims that since the purpose or function of the understanding is to judge, then this activity of judgment differentiates itself into the forms of judgment which are identified with the functions of the understanding (pp. 246-247).

Since he has distinguished three senses of "function" (as that which a thing does best, the mode of action of a thing, and a power or faculty), Paton finds it necessary to determine which sense Kant has in mind in his definition of "function" at A68-B93:

"By "function,"" he \[\text{Kant}\] says, 'I mean the unity of the act of ordering different ideas under one common idea.' He is referring to the word 'function' only as it is used in connection with understanding, and the 'act' spoken of must, I think, be the act of judgment itself. In that case the 'unity of the act' would seem to mean 'the form of the judgment,' and this is how it is understood my Mellin. The form of the judgment is the way in which the judgment unites ideas, and thus the form or function of the judgment is identified with its special kind of unity (p. 247).

We can see that Paton picks the second sense of 'function'--the "way of working" or "mode of action" of a thing by which it fulfills its purpose--as the sense Kant has in mind in his remark that concepts rest on
functions and in his definition of "function" at A68=B93. Thus, since the "mode of action" is the common form, "function" here is identical with "form."

Paton's interpretation of "function of understanding" as "the act of judgment" also arises from his certainty that, for Kant, conceiving is judging. First, in Kant's definition of "function" as "the unity of the act of ordering different ideas under one common idea," Paton says that "Kant appears to be saying at least this, that the act of abstraction or analysis whereby we make a concept is a judgment" (p. 250). And second, Paton claims to find the same doctrine that conceiving is judging in Kant's statement that the acts of understanding can be reduced to judgment (A69=B94). Paton argues this against the possible objection that the act of conceiving is a different act from that of judging by pointing to Kant's remark that concepts are predicates of possible judgments:

To say that concepts are essentially predicates of possible judgments is to say that conceiving is really judging. Concepts do not precede judgment, but rather are abstractions from judgment. If so, they must rest upon the form of judgment; and this may turn out to be of importance later (p. 251).

Paton, then, is saying that conceiving, both in the sense of making concepts and of using concepts, is judging, and that concepts are abstractions from judgments. Therefore, since "function" means "form," when Kant says that "concepts rest on functions," he must mean that concepts depend upon forms of judgment and so upon judgment.

Paton finds himself very perplexed over the term "function" and, as we have seen, claims to find at least three senses of the word;
these are "forms of judgment," "function or purpose of understanding," (which is to judge), and "function" as equivalent to a power or faculty (p. 248). I believe that Paton is perplexed because, although he comes close to a good interpretation of "function," he follows an unproductive track with it. He begins well enough with his definition of the "function" of a thing as "the mode of action by which it fulfills its purpose," but from this he concludes that the function is the "common form" or "common nature", present in the separate acts." This conclusion, it seems to me, gives us no real insight into Kant's assertion that concepts rest on functions. In fact, if Paton is right and functions just are forms of judgment (pp. 246-247), and furthermore, if he is right in saying that "Kant's discussion of concepts has as its immediate purpose the establishment of the conclusion that the functions of understanding are identical with the forms of judgment" (p. 251), then Kant is guilty of a petitio, for then the functions (=forms of judgment) of the understanding are certainly identical with the forms of judgment and to attempt to argue for this assertion, when "function" already means "form of judgment" is to commit a logical blunder.

Second, in philosophy, "function" has traditionally been understood to mean the work or purpose of a thing. For example, in the Republic, Plato defines the "work" or "function" (πρώτον) of a thing as "that which one can do only with it or best with it."¹ He gives several examples, such as the function or purpose of a pruning knife, which is

to trim vine branches, or the function of the eyes, which is to see. And Aristotle has occasion in the Nichomachaean Ethics to discuss the "work" (ἔργον) of man qua man, in comparison to the work of a cobbler, etc. (viz., making shoes, etc.), in virtue of which the cobbler, etc. is considered good or bad. He also cites as examples of the "work" of something, the eyes' work of seeing, and so on with other parts of the body (1097b). As we have seen, according to Kant, concepts (logically) depend upon functions. If a function is the purpose or work of something, then a concept depends upon the purpose or work or function of something. If Kant's argument is that the application of concepts depends on functions, if a function is the purpose or the work of something, then the application of a concept would depend upon knowing the function or purpose of something. Similarly, having a concept would depend upon knowing the function or purpose of something. But knowing the function of a thing depends upon having a concept of the function or purpose of the thing. Therefore, if a concept depends upon the purpose or function of something, it depends on the concept of the purpose or function. But if the concept of the function is the same as the concept in question, Kant's argument becomes circular, for he would be arguing that a concept depends upon itself. On the other hand, if the concept of the purpose or function is different from the concept in question, then having a concept always logically depends upon having some other concept which is the concept of a purpose or function. And either there is an unlimited number of these purpose concepts, or else there is a limited number, upon which all concepts depend. If there is an unlimited number, then Kant's argument is that any concepts depend upon
other concepts, and is not very enlightening. On the other hand, the argument might be that all concepts depend upon a limited number of concepts. It may be, of course, that Kant wants to argue something very like this, viz. that all concepts depend upon a few special concepts, which he calls "categories." However, the categories are not understood to be purposes or functions of things.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


The First Critique, ed. by Terrence Penelhum (Belmont, 1966).

Moltke S. Gram, Kant, Ontology, and the A Priori (Evanston, 1968).


____________, Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1911), Vol III.

____________, Logik, in Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1923), Vol IX.

Norman Kemp-Smith, Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York, 1950).


Gottfried Martin, Sachindex zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Berlin, 1967).


Heinrich Ratke, Systematisches Handlexikon zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Leipzig, 1929).

John Richardson, Kant's Metaphysical Works (London, 1836).


