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Experience of the Numinous in Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer

by

Emil Theodore Lechner

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

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Houston, Texas

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INTRODUCTION

The work of W. B. Yeats parallels in certain respects the psychology of C. G. Jung. Most interested parties would endorse this statement, and yet the pattern of approach and divergence which relates the poetry and accompanying prose of one to the psychological writings of the other has not been fully explored. To bring such a pattern into view is to distinguish—within the context of one set of widely acknowledged parameters, namely the Neoplatonic, alchemical, Goethean, Freudian formulations of Jung—not better Yeats from worse, but nearer Yeats from farther, psychologically rooted Yeats from free floating Yeats. The goal of this dissertation is not indeed full exploration, but rather the possible opening of a new trail. Positions held by Yeats and Jung may be further delineated by contrast with the theological stance of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It is the purpose of this paper to poise and counterpoise—in the interest of clearer definition—these agents for three extraordinary visions of reality: Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer.

The approach of Yeats to Jung and Jung to Yeats may be treated through their common adherence to a sense of divinity within, that is, to the felt outward movement, rather than simple presence, of a numinous power arising from self, rather than descending from above.
Helen Vendler, in *Yeats's Vision and the Later Plays*,\(^1\) contributes to an understanding of Yeats's rejection of the descending dove as symbol for the Spirit of the divine, but she has no occasion to mark contingent boundaries of Yeatsian conviction and Jungian theory. Continuing tension and reciprocity between self and anti-self are dynamic elements of some importance in Yeats's art and Jung's thought, and examination of such movements may serve further to demonstrate the mutuality of the two systems in question. Finally--and here it is possible to discern the point of nearest approach between poet and psychologist--Yeats's poetry and prose lean toward the goal of unity of being, a condition wherein opposites are transcended, and Jung's psychology prescribes as goal the integrated self or wholeness, a condition wherein opposites are endured or held in relative equilibrium. It is one of the natural tasks of this dissertation to examine the extent of such apparent relationship between Yeats and Jung.

Important distinctions must not be blurred, however, and nearer Yeats should remain in balance with farther. Certain differences exist between Yeats's understanding of anima mundi and Jung's of the collective unconscious. Moreover, Jung's self-emanant divinity shows signs of greater otherness than Yeats's; it has its beginnings in areas farther beyond what we usually think of as self. Jung's experience of the numinous is associated with an environment in which good and

evil may be relative, but in which neither is in any sense diminished, and this further separates his psychology from Yeats's artistic vision.

In its conclusion the following dissertation sets Yeats and Jung—and their patterns of approach and divergence—against a background of selections from the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer’s tov and ra duality invites comparison with Jung's attachment, and Yeats's, to self and anti-self, and yet Bonhoeffer's apprehension of the numinous and his related understanding of reality stand in sharp contrast to the visions of Yeats and Jung. Bonhoeffer's overall effect in a study of Yeats and Jung is to seem to cause these two, in spite of all declared divergences, to drift rapidly back together.

Many scholars mention apparent similarities between Yeats and Jung: Edmund Wilson in *Axel's Castle,* 2 Richard Ellmann in *The Identity of Yeats,* 3 John Press in *The Fire and the Fountain,* 4 and F. A. C. Wilson in *W. B. Yeats and the Tradition.* 5 This dissertation is intended to be a kind of diving at points marked by their buoys. It is not the purpose of this study to reveal evidence that Jung influenced Yeats, or Yeats Jung, 6 nor to demonstrate how Yeats and Jung were jointly

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6 Such ideas receive support in the following works:
swamped by some outside wave of influence. Virginia Moore in *The Unicorn*\(^7\) and F. A. C. Wilson in *Yeats's Iconography*\(^8\) hint that Yeats may have found his expressions sanctioned and corroborated in particular works by Jung. Such proposals are peripheral to the body of research which forms the foundation for this dissertation. Lillian Feder's *Ancient Myth in Modern Poetry*\(^9\) takes as its theme classical myth in its various psychological and poetic forms, as glimpsed in Freud and Jung, Yeats, Pound, Eliot, and Auden and so, in part, parallels by intention if not in content this study of Yeats and Jung. A recent article by James R. Hollis\(^{10}\) advances ideas which are clearly in keeping with certain basic tenets of this paper, specifically the following: Yeats's anti-self and his unity of being have counterparts in the world of Jung.

The general objection might be raised that studies which compare Yeats and Jung are from the outset of little potential value, because comparable ideas and themes from Yeats and Jung are survivals or seeming reincarnations of alchemical or astrological ideas and themes; in other words, the overlapping portions of Yeats and Jung are mere extensions and rehearsals of pre-established modes of thought,


\(^{10}\)James R. Hollis, "Convergent Patterns in Yeats and Jung," *Psychological Perspectives* (a publication of the C. G. Jung Institute of Los Angeles), IV, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), 60-68.
and are therefore not fit fields for original research. If we were to allow such a precept full and extended development, however, we might have to agree that—since rituals of animal sacrifice and ceremony are known to have flourished in full form in certain ancient civilizations, say, Egyptian or Minoan—there are now no likenesses worth revealing and no distinctions worth making between the rites performed by a torero in a bullring or a rabbi in a slaughterhouse. But of course there are. And there are equally important distinctions and comparisons to be made between Yeats's poetry and Jung's psychology.

No alchemical or astrological heritage casts even the faintest shadow across Bonhoeffer's theology of course. What he has to say owes little to occult presupposition. Therein lies his value in the study that follows. He serves as a free point of observation. Bonhoeffer's theology is a position from which two distinct and yet definitely related developments can be seen in their entireties. He is the third point which makes navigation by triangulation possible. He is included not for his own sake, unfortunately, but for the detachment which his presence contributes.

If we tilt the analogy of bullring and abattoir at an entirely new angle, we might observe that if a would-be scholar were to study the corresponding rites of each, he would engage possibilities not too far removed from Yeats's poetry and Jung's psychology, for the ceremony of the bullring is performed not for the sake of beauty as it resides in the dying of the one or the living of the other, but rather for the
sake of beauty as it stands specifically outside and above the living and dying of man and animal—and, moreover, bullfighting presumably proceeds from man's indecipherable and instinctual impulses—and therefore bullfighting has on two counts something of a Yeatsian quality; the ritual of the rabbi, on the other hand, is a technique and regimen practiced for the sake of the continued health of soul and body according to the dictates of seemingly removed and ancient authority, and it is therefore, through play of imagination, somewhat similar to Jungian psychotherapeutics. In any case, whether or not one sees Yeats in the ring and Jung in the packing house, one who had studied at close range and amassd data concerning the rites of matador and rabbi might do well to retire to some removed third place before reaching final conclusions, a place associated with neither barrera nor stockyard, some set-apart haven of reflection where the student might brush away the sawdust, wash off sprinklings of blood, and turn over in his mind, undisturbed, all he had witnessed. For our purposes in the following study of Yeats and Jung, Bonhoeffer's writings constitute such an advantageously removed position.

The Table of Contents of this paper is intended as a key to the organization of each chapter. Biblical passages referred to throughout this study are from the Authorized Version unless otherwise specified. The intended evolution of the emphases of the five chapters of this dissertation is illustrated diagrammatically on the next page.
The Evolution of Emphases in Five Chapters:

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Chapter One: The Jungian Symbol

A poet is likely to concern himself deeply with worlds and creatures of his own making. As if to do honor to the poet as one who creates by speaking the word only, we anticipate his fatherly concern for the creatures with which he populates new worlds newly brought forth. We yield to his willingness to make special endowments. When offspring of the poet's creative spawning, his hatchlings and seedlings, wrigglers and silver fingerlings, assume for him the aspect of reality, or what many of us agree to call reality, we are not necessarily taken aback and we are not necessarily involved. We rest in the knowledge that a creator owes homage to his own creative word and that the poet who finds reality in outpourings of his own imagination performs a rite of self-semination which insures his continued fecundity. Is he not after all like Faulkner's bear, "his own ungendered progenitor"? Yet, when a poet hints that what most call reality is but one aspect of what he and others have imagined, when in other words he suggests that "Demiurge" is not metaphor fit for poet, but rather each poet's serious and proper title, we may well experience and ought to usher into consciousness an element of rising surprise; that is, we do well to consider his claim. In a certain sense, our lives depend on it.
W. B. Yeats tells us in the poem, "Meru," "man's life is thought,"¹ and in "Blood and the Moon," that this world must "vanish on the instant if the mind but change its theme."² As if to underscore poetic allusion, Yeats voices the same theme in the plainness of prose:

Men who are imaginative writers to-day may well have preferred to influence the imagination of others more directly in past times. Instead of learning their craft with paper and a pen they may have sat for hours imagining themselves to be stocks and stones and beasts of the wood, till the images were so vivid that the passers-by became but a part of the imagination of the dreamer, and wept or laughed or ran away as he would have them.³

And again: "Solitary men in moments of contemplation . . . make and unmake mankind, and even the world itself, for does not 'the eye altering alter all'⁴" Yeats's fascination with the

willful altering of reality began at least as early as his membership in Macgregor Mather's society of the occult. "I had soon mastered Mather's symbolic system, and discovered that for a considerable minority of the members of the society--whom I could select by certain unanalysable characteristics--the visible world would completely vanish, and that world, summoned by the symbol, take its place." Yeats's invocative experiments convinced him that images which he called into being could, in the fashion of true creatures, act out private dramas independent of their creator. (Autobiographies, pp. 417-8.) Indeed, in "A General Introduction for My Work," Yeats quotes with approval the Chandogya Upanishad: "The world knows nothing because it has made nothing, we know everything because we have made everything." Yeats's attribution of evocative powers ultimately extends not only to poets and adepts but to mankind in general. Man in the role of father and creator appears in the poem, "Death" ("Man has created Death") and in "The Tower," where Yeats speaks of "All those things whereof/ Man makes a superhuman/ Mirror-resembling dream," and where, in a later stanza, he concludes confidently, "Now shall I make my soul . . .".

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The psychology of C. G. Jung reveals a similar concept. Jung reaches the image of man as creator by passage along the byways of phenomenology and through the strictures of empiricism, but certain of his conclusions are not unlike the musings and allusions of Yeats. Both Jung and Yeats breathe deeply of the steam and aroma of alchemy (having descended, we might say, steep cellar stairs backward) and both become in the course of time transformed after the images of their intent alchemical predecessors. Who were the alchemists but those who sought in the mysteries of materiality what they felt pulsating within their own beings and took (or mistook) for the insistent emanating of a man-emanant god the creator? In The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche Jung says,

I find I must emphasize over and over again that neither the moral order, nor the idea of God, nor any religion has dropped into man's lap from outside, straight down from heaven, as it were, but that he contains all this in nuce within himself, and for this reason can produce it all out of himself.⁹

Jung's alchemical sentiments are couched in that language of psychology which he helped to create and which he uses as a hedge against overstepping too boldly the spare, conscientiously limited presuppositions of science. In Civilization in Transition we find: "For primitive man any object, for instance an old tin can that has been thrown away, can suddenly assume the importance of a fetish. This effect is obviously not inherent in the tin, but is a psychic product."\(^{10}\) The implication in this case is clear: primitive man fashions a portion of his own reality, even as the alchemists by dint of arcane symbolism and blackened retorts prepare for themselves a highly attenuated—or so it appears to us—version of reality. Jung draws us ever nearer to the image we found well sung in Yeats, nearer to man the father and creator:

The world powers that rule over all mankind, for good or ill, are unconscious psychic factors \(\sqrt{\text{such as archetypes, about which we will speak later}}\), and it is they that bring consciousness into being and hence create the \textit{sine qua non} for the existence of any world at all. We are steeped in a world that was created by our own psyche.

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche.\textsuperscript{11}

From the psyche of man there emanates, according to Jung, powers which found and elaborate reality. These powers discover their foremost expression in symbols. To understand Jung's characterization of the alchemical man-emanant god the creator, it is essential that we understand the Jungian symbol, for it is by intervention and intercession of the symbol that man-emanant creative power is allowed free expression. By way of introduction it may be said that the symbol as Jung sees it is a descriptive image which arises spontaneously in the course of the movements of the human psyche. By approaching and acknowledging Jungian duality, acausality, and archetype we may apprehend the Jungian symbol.

According to Jung, each human self is engaged with incessant movement; each self possesses, wraps into its very center, a continuing reciprocity, a lasting tension. It may be said with no consequent loss of meaning that reciprocity in the Jungian system circumscribes and contains each human self. In any case, motion and psyche are ever found together. The rhythm of this

movement as sensed by Jung is contrapuntal and antiphonal, a blend of rally and retreat, escalade and descent.

In short, the psyche arises from, and signifies, movement. The human self may experience--either as the container or the contained--a gaining, a losing, a balancing, an unbalancing, a relapsing, a reappearing, but never a holding still. In *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease*, Jung says,

The psyche at any given moment is on the one hand the result and culmination of all that has been and on the other a symbolic expression of all that is to be. Since the future is only apparently like the past, but in its essence always new and unique, the present expression is bound to be incomplete, germ-like, as it were, in relation to the future. In so far as we regard the actual content of the psyche as a symbolic expression of what is to be, we have to apply a constructive interest to it--I almost felt tempted to say a "scientific" interest. But modern science is identical with the causal principle. As soon as we regard the psyche causally, that is, scientifically, the psyche as a creative function eludes us.¹²

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This passage is of special interest for two reasons. It introduces a duality which serves to reinforce the sensation of psychic motion: past and future wrapped together in some dynamic of the psyche. Duality in its various forms is a theme most durable in Jungian thinking. Secondly, this passage demonstrates Jung's concern with acausality, a term with which he seeks to ensnare certain renegade and especially provoking movements of the psyche.

Jung's world might be viewed as an elaborated series of dualities. His association of the psyche with both past and future is related to his division of human perception into two categories: the objective view, which yields retrospective understanding, and the subjective view, which makes possible prospective understanding. Prospective understanding is linked with intuition, which is, in part, the psyche's projecting into a field conventionally thought of as the undiscovered and undisclosable future.

In more general terms, intuition is an unaccountable projection forward from the depths of the psyche. It will be of particular importance later when we examine Jung's conception of art. Intuition is worthy of our attention at this point, because in company with its opposite function, sensation, it constitutes yet another Jungian duality. Thinking and feeling form

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13 Jung, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, p. 182.

a second diametrical pair of psychological functions. Time and again, Jung, following the Creator's example, deals with unruly phenomena by calling down upon them seemingly irrevocable dichotomy. Jung delineates two opposing and equally useful levels of dream interpretation, but his primary contribution to splittings in two may simply be his upholding and diligent inquiring into that division of the human psyche into the conscious and unconscious about which others, including Kant (as interpreted by Jung), had spoken before. Relationships within the context of this major split Jung distinguishes with such further divisions as ego and persona, shadow and anima or animus. States of the shadow figure or of the anima/animus figure may be designated as positive or negative, that is, harmonious or disruptive. Either of these alternate descriptions may also pertain to the power wielded by archetypes, or to the exertions of what Jung calls "spirit" (the living mentality of man, or the psychic factor, as opposed to either the living or the inert matter of the body): "Just as the archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden meaning immanent in the instincts, so the spirit, as I have shown, is two-faced and paradoxical: a great help and an equally great danger." As if these warring states of the


17Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 222.
psyche were not, in their ominous shifting, cause enough of vertigo and uneasiness, we learn that the archetype itself may at times be identified with spirit\(^{18}\) (and so partakes of the dual fullness of spirit's unpredictable nature). Furthermore, an archetype exists always in a tension between image and emotion,\(^{19}\) whether it moves toward integration of the psyche as a whole, or toward dissociation. As we might expect, Jung's psychotherapeutic approach is also two-fold, consisting of planned movements toward differentiation (a dividing up) and individuation (a putting together). It must be emphasized that division followed by reunification is an especially characteristic Jungian technique, apparent at many levels in Jungian thought and practice.

Such indulgence of duality is bound to have philosophical consequences. Jung is led to observe that psyche and matter may constitute two aspects of the same thing,\(^{20}\) which is to affirm what Descartes would not, which is to establish duality by bold pairing rather than bold splitting, which is to seek (wherever such a 'putting together' seems too unlikely) analogies in Bohr and de Broglie. It is not without significance that Jung grew especially interested in measuring somatic reactions to psychic

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\(^{18}\) Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 215-16.


changes and became the first to monitor during word-association tests bodily functions such as electrical conductivity of the skin.\textsuperscript{21} It is not surprising, therefore, that we should find in his writings something of a dual philosophical focus, an advocating of a "provisional" view of the world,\textsuperscript{22} an awareness that life may be something of a thaumatrope in motion.

Other dualities and balancings ensue. Not only must cause-and-effect in the Jungian system be matched by a concept of finality\textsuperscript{23} (for what could be more goal-oriented than a disharmonious psyche?), but causality taken as a universal governing principle must have as its counter and contrary--here our minds are given pause--acausality. Acausality allows for synchronicity,\textsuperscript{24} a broad rubric beneath which we discover specific instances of what we called earlier "especially provoking movements of the psyche."

Duality has led us, through philosophical byways, to acausality; in other words, that which serves to reinforce the sensation of psyche-associated movement brings us to that which seeks to contain remarkable variants of that movement (such as a scarab beetle's flying to the window of Jung's consulting room and tapping, raven-like, for admission during Jung's patient's narration

\textsuperscript{21}E. A. Bennet, Foreword to Jung's \textit{Analytical Psychology}, pp. xiv-xv.

\textsuperscript{22}Jung, \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{23}Jung, \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche}, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{24}Jung, \textit{Civilization in Transition}, p. 450.
of her most recent dream concerning--yes--a scarab beetle; in keeping with the teleological view, presentation to the patient of the newly arrived beetle led to dissolution of her entrenched Cartesian rationalism. Jung defines synchronicity as "a coincidence in time of two or more causally unrelated events which have the same or a similar meaning . . .", and he defends the importance of including synchronicity in one's understanding of reality. Indeed it is synchronicity which supports and conditions Jung's speculations about psyche and matter and creativity.

Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one another and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing. The synchronicity phenomena point, it seems to me, in this direction, for they show that the nonpsychic can behave like the psychic, and

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26 Jung, _The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche_, p. 441.
vice versa, without there being any causal connection between them.

(The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 215.)

Synchronicity is intimately related to the strangely appropriate and spontaneous man-emanant powers of creation which, according to Yeats and the alchemists—and in a certain sense, according to Jung—make and unmake worldly reality.

Synchronicity is no more baffling or mysterious than the discontinuities of physics. It is only the ingrained belief in the sovereign power of causality that creates intellectual difficulties and makes it appear unthinkable that causeless events exist or could ever occur. But if they do, then we must regard them as creative acts, as the continuous creation of a pattern that exists from all eternity, repeats itself sporadically, and is not derivable from any known antecedents.

(The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 518.)

Intuition, which, as we have stated, plays a role in Jung's view of art, is a psychological function related not only to acausality in general, but to specific manifestations within an acausal context, that is, to strange happenings under the heading of synchronicity, and therefore the term "creative acts" in the foregoing passage may be understood as extending not only to the
making of the world, in a special Jungian sense, but, within that world, to the making of paintings and poems. We should qualify this observation by noting that works of art contribute to the form and quality of perceived reality and so, properly speaking, the making of art within the Jungian system cannot be held distinct from the making of the world. Since art, once it has sprung into being, not only interprets but affects and stimulates the human psyche—and this across some measure of the full range of perception and intention—the production of art might be called, in its relation to the total psyche and to the psyche's building of reality, servomechanistic, an iterative process of creativity. If a specific work of art answers a particular situation of worldly reality and a definite desideratum of the psyche and so alters in some degree the general milieu, then it also, having answered, poses a new question and thus invites a repetition of the process. Assuming that a work of art is—as true art should be according to Jung—uncannily appropriate and especially timely in appearance and effect, then the intuition behind the art and its making is a part of a synchronistic whole, an answering—and alternately a questioning—portion of a grand antiphonal movement.

Synchronistic events develop out of the activation and rising of archetypes. Archetypes, Jung observes, "are to be understood as inborn modes of functioning that constitute, in their totality,
man's nature.²⁷ The unconscious portion of the psyche is the proper field and ground, the capacitor, of these innate potentialities.

... the phenomena of the unconscious can be regarded as more or less spontaneous manifestations of autonomous archetypes, and though this hypothesis may seem very strange to the layman, it is amply supported by the fact that the archetype has numinous character; it exerts a fascination, it enters into active opposition with the conscious mind, and it may be said in the long run to mould the destinies of individuals by unconsciously influencing their thinking, feeling, and behaviour, even if this influence is not recognized until long afterwards. The primordial image is itself a "pattern of behaviour" which will assert itself with or without the co-operation of the conscious personality.

(Symbols of Transformation, pp. 308-9.)

Of the specific relationship between synchronistic events and archetypes Jung observes:

... the psychoid archetype, that is, its irrepresentable and unconscious essence, is not just a postulate only, but possesses qualities of a parapsychological nature which I have grouped under the term "synchronicity." I use this term to indicate the fact that, in cases of telepathy, precognition, and similar inexplicable phenomena, one can very frequently observe an archetypal situation. This may be connected with the collective nature of the archetype, for the collective unconscious, unlike the personal unconscious, is one and the same everywhere ... 

(Civilization in Transition, p. 450.)

A certain level of psychic energy is necessary before synchronistic phenomena "materialize." Archetypes possess such energy. Archetypes may be said to serve as catalysts for synchronistic phenomena:

... as Rhine's ESP experiments show, any intense emotional interest or fascination is accompanied by phenomena which can only be explained by a psychic relativity of time, space, and causality. Since the archetypes usually have a certain numinosity,
they can arouse just that fascination which is accompanied by synchronistic phenomena. These consist in the meaningful coincidence of two or more causally unrelated facts.  

Moreover, because archetypes possess critical quanta of psychic energy, they are able to visit a fascination upon the household of the psyche, to direct, to guide, to overwhelm—in short, "to mould the destinies of individuals." There would be no alarm in this Jungian discovery if there were no potential for destruction in the archetype, but the nature of the archetype is no less equivocal than that of light itself. Indeed, the archetype of the unconscious is a luminous angel that radiates white light—or the darkest of black light. In its untold strength the archetype is capable of shattering as well as supporting the structure of the psyche. If all of life is a movement between opposing poles, it is because of the unpredictable contributions to that movement by the archetype (unexpected inputs of kinetic energy) that the frequency of oscillation may rise dangerously, may coincide eventually with some fracture threshold, may split and leave in hapless duality the crystal of the self.


This is the central distress in the Jungian system. The danger is heightened because archetypes are "imperishable elements," extra-personal elements, impersonal elements, and disconcertingly elusive elements, for "they change their shape continually. What can deliver the self from this autonomous potential for destruction, from this unseemly propensity for self-abrogation? Are the dynamics of the psyche--whatever its potential for creating reality--subject to stabalization?

The answer is yes; the answer is symbol. For Jung, a symbol is an expression at the conscious level of a profound meaning which arises from the unconscious, where, presumably, this meaning, this pre-existent, pre-emptive pattern of behavior, this archetype, maintains a kind of resplendent and ageless residence--where, in far reaches of what is essentially unknown about mind, this pattern, this archetype, prevails, it is assumed, in form too bold and full to be admitted to the courts of consciousness, holds forth in emanations too blinding, in style too imposing, in rhythms of expansion and contraction too potent and undamped to be tolerated in consciousness as we know it, in consciousness that has, especially before it has progressed along the Jungian path of wholeness, its own peculiar weaknesses.

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A symbol, therefore, is a representation of that which cannot be directly apprehended. It is spokesman for the archetype. The symbol is a reflection seen all imperfectly and darkly, as in a polished bronze mirror of antiquity. Symbols are bright eruptions on the face of dark waters, bright breakings-on-the-surface of partly transparent bubbles rising steadily from some unknown source at great depth. Archetypes (residents in the unknown), be it noted again, are very like angels. Dangerous archetypes, like bad angels, are frustrated versions of something more benign. Pre-emptive archetypes practice pre-emption because more responsible attempts to balance the psychic system have somehow been thwarted. All movements within the psyche, no matter how destructive or suicidal, are somehow related, at bottom, to the goal of wholeness. Threatening psychic movements, as seen by Jung, might be said to be analogous to sins of the flesh: unlawful attempts to achieve some heaven-sanctioned good. There is, therefore, an implied possibility of redemption in the Jungian system; there is in Jung's vision of the individual psyche no thoroughly original evil; all evil (although it may be unmistakably real and terrible) is subsequent and secondary. And yet this makes overempowered archetypes no less menacing. Perhaps it makes them more so, for they may be seen now as emanations from a deep desperation of the psyche. Moreover, only the symbol can deliver from this desperation.

Whether working toward weal or woe of the individual psyche, archetypes, like angels good or bad, are not to be trifled with
or ignored, and yet, are not to be gazed upon directly. One raises one's eyes to an angel only after it has assumed some attenuated form. In like manner, archetypes are apprehended only through symbols. They must be expressed to consciousness sotto voce, as it were. The symbol speaks for the archetype. It instructs the conscious mind in the power and intentional direction of the archetype. A symbol is an adumbration, a shadow. It translates into perceivable form the otherwise incomprehensible movements—sometimes the turbulences—of the unconscious.

So there is salvation inherent in the symbol. It interprets the unconscious to the conscious. It warns. It signals. It informs, which is to say that it advises and imparts form to. It is a conductor and channel for psychic energy. It is the mediator that makes possible psychic balance. The postulated destructive potential of the archetype in the Jungian system is modulated by the concept of the symbol. Only by confrontation with and grasp of symbolic significances can the human self maintain psychic balance, stabilize the dynamics of its own being, avert the disaster of imbalance, progress on the road to Jungian wholeness—a wholeness which is, in effect, a kind of de Broglian union of oppositions, that is, a seemingly improbable and yet somehow sustained union of Jungian dualities.

Jung's idea of the symbol is based on a principle which we shall call multiple adumbration. We mean by this: meaning that
hides behind hidden meaning. In a letter to Dr. R. Loy, dated February 18, 1913, Jung explains the flexibility of the symbol, the symbol's capability for what appears to be perennial renewal. He speaks in the following passage of symbols as they appear in the dreams of his patients:

Interpretations of earlier symbols will themselves be used again as fresh symbols in later dreams. It often happens, for instance, that sexual situations which appeared in earlier dreams in symbolic form will appear "undisguised" in later ones—once more, be it noted, in symbolic form—as analysable expressions for ideas of a different nature hidden behind them.31

When the veil has seemingly been lifted from a symbol, when one layer of meaning has been uncovered, that uncovered meaning itself often appears to assume a new function, appears now to be masking some hitherto unsuspected meaning which lies still further back, a shadow behind a shadow. Jungian symbols, in other words, exist in depth, in multiple adumbration. It is this quality of the symbol that enables Jung to see some outline of deeper meaning behind the ubiquitous mother fixation symbolism carefully unearthed

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by Freud. Jung maintains that if Freud's Oedipal persistence is allowed to have its way, "the whole edifice of civilization becomes a mere substitute for the impossibility of incest." 32 Mother fixation itself is for Jung a symbol. It prefigures man's inner concern with the necessity for psychic rebirth. Hence, Jung interprets Freud by means of Jesus's conversation with Nicodemus. 33 In other words, one must reckon with the depth of a symbol, its capacity for housing layers of meaning, its schist-like nature. There is about the symbol, as about the unconscious itself, something inexhaustible, bottomless, opened; one cannot say where either the symbol or the unconscious ends. 34 This similarity between the two makes sense if we remember that the Jungian symbol is, in essence, an expression of some archetypal content of the unconscious.

Perhaps a descent into the unconscious in search of a better understanding of symbol is in order at this point; it will be our version of what Jung calls Katabasis or Nekyia, the dark journey (desire of every being) into depths unknown to seek some perfect

32 Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 23.

33 Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p. 226.

merging of conscious with unconscious. "Everything psychic has a lower and a higher meaning," says Jung, and so we seek the "lower" meaning of symbol (and thereby hope to find its higher).

The uniqueness of the psyche can never enter wholly into reality, it can only be realized approximately, though it still remains the absolute basis of all consciousness. The deeper "layers" of the psyche lose their individual uniqueness as they retreat farther and farther into darkness. "Lower down," that is to say as they approach the autonomous functional systems, they become increasingly collective until they are universalized and extinguished in the body's materiality, i.e., in chemical substances. The body's carbon is simply carbon. Hence "at bottom" the psyche is simply "world." In this sense I hold Kerenyi to be absolutely right when he says that in the symbol the world itself is speaking.35

At one extreme, the symbol exists in consciousness, in a world of differentiated and specific contents, a world of intentional abstractions, a world individual and unique; at the other extreme

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it exists in a wold that is nearly physiological, a world deep, archaic, collective, and universal. When the symbol speaks in its full power, it speaks with the strength of the deepness of all being. Hence in this peculiar lowness, lies the secret of the symbol's highness: its numinous and universal quality.

Let the Jungian symbol be therefore a partly bounded paraboloid, a paraboloid that exists within a cylinder. The cylinder, open at both ends, begins at the same uncertain and indefinite level as the large and open (unconscious) end of the paraboloid and extends thence straight forward surrounding, bounding, and exceeding all upper, ever narrower, definitely outlined (conscious) portions of the paraboloid. The cylinder is the extension forward of the full cross-sectional area of the indefinite base of the paraboloid (extension forward of the unconscious through intuition) in spite of and as adjunct to the necessary narrowing which forms the closed (and conscious) end of the paraboloid, for where the paraboloid peaks and closes, the cylinder remains fully open, a broad and undiminished accommodation, an open channel back to bottomlessness and forward indefinitely.

The symbol partakes, then, of the body and the soul, for just at that point where it is considered in its close and privileged relationship to the materiality of the body, it may also be considered in terms of its highest office, as carrier of significances from the spirit of the collective unconscious at its most
collective (which spirit presumably quickens not only the individual man, but men as a race). By means of symbols the all-pervading and sometimes eristic spirit from a far region confronts and engages consciousness: directs, drives, and channels available psychic energy. In Jung we find no preoccupation with the power of intellect, but rather, submersion in the idea of the power of unconscious contents.

Consideration of things high and low might suggest, as subsequent field of inquiry, things forward and back. For our purposes, one aspect of "forwardness" is human progress. Jung allows for the possibility of the spreading of consciousness in unforeseeable expansiveness:

Theoretically, no limits can be set to the field of consciousness, since it is capable of indefinite extension. 36

Jung proposes expansion of the conscious domain through the raising of unconscious contents to consciousness, together with a balancing of the conscious with what remains unconscious, all of which is to result, when all goes well, in a tending toward spherical rounding of man's being. Consistent with that view, Jung prescribes no limit for human progress; neither does he demonstrate, despite

his recognition of the psyche's destructive potential, a
strongly developed eschatological sense. Although Jung in-
sists upon the final view--insists that is, that all movements
are movements toward--he makes, aside from his stressing of
the psyche's urge to achieve wholeness, no attempt to divine
the ultimate goal, or to envision the end of particular pro-
cesses. Instead, he makes use of acausality to stress limitless
possibility within the dynamics of the flow of psychic energy:

The idea of development is possible only if
the concept of an immutable substance \( \sqrt{Freud's} \)
concept of the "immutable" sexual component of
the psyche is not hypostatized by appeals to a
so-called "objective reality"--that is to say,
if causality is not assumed to be identical
with the behaviour of things. The idea of
development requires the possibility of change
in substances \( \sqrt{that is, psychic components} \),
which, from the energetic standpoint \( \sqrt{the Jungian} \)
standpoint, appear as systems of energy capable
of theoretically unlimited interchangeability
and modulation.

(The Structure and Dynamics
of the Psyche, p. 22.)
Even the alchemist's dream of the transmutation of the elements has been fulfilled, and magical action at a distance has been realized by the discovery of electricity. So we have every reason to value symbol-formation and to render homage to the symbol as an inestimable means of utilizing the mere instinctual flow of energy for effective work.

(The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 47.)

It may be said, therefore, that Jung demonstrates an openness to the possibility of limitless development based upon the capacity for infinite variety within the symbol.

Another movement forward might be the advance of the symbol toward overt, fully revealed meaning. The very word "symbol" denotes for a thinker such as Ernst Cassirer something "charged with meaning." The Jungian symbol also, it is fair to say, bears its burden of meaning, but that meaning must necessarily be in some degree beyond the reach of conscious understanding. As the Jungian symbol penetrates deeper into consciousness, as it draws closer to plain-spoken analogy or allegory, closer to 'sign' and open significance, closer to an immediate and specifiable idea, it grows also closer to the periphery of its

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existence as symbol. The numinous and luminous quality of the Jungian symbol depends upon a meaning present but not fully discerned. The symbol's identity fades in the light of full appreciation—and yet, paradoxically, it is through the appearance and mediation of the symbol, through disclosure, that is, of a portion of its meaning, that man is enabled to enlarge reality by bringing to consciousness what has been unconscious.

A movement back—back in terms of cultural development—may serve further to delineate the nature of the symbol as Jung understands it. Although symbols represent the very power of psychic creation, they are not in themselves of an evolutionary nature. They do not develop in concert with mankind, his civilizations and cultures. True, Jungian symbols are clothed in some power accumulated over eons of human experience, but man is effectively severed from the critical primordial events which have empowered archetypes and symbols; he cannot know these beginnings. From the standpoint of man as he appears now and as he appears throughout those preceding centuries about which something is known, archetypal symbols are not developmental; they are, rather, representatives of something which is, from the human standpoint, fully developed. If Psalm 139:16 were read to Jung as he pondered symbols, he might be absorbed in the phrase "and in thy book all my members were written," and remain relatively unaffected by ". . . which in continuance were fashioned." Jung's symbols do not
evolve and mark points of progress along man’s path of cultural development. Rather, man in the Jungian system, although theoretically capable of unlimited development, is embroiled always in trying to catch up with what, from man’s point of view, has always been, that is, with the archetypal patterns which symbols seek to communicate. Man strains to read the signs in the heavens which have themselves declared their presence, if not their essential meaning or full nature, to one generation of mankind after another. The process continues because man’s nature and the symbol’s nature are such that man’s scanning of the heavens is a reaching for that which cannot be grasped in its entirety, for "man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing.\ The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be . . .".\footnote{Ecclesiastes 1:8.}

The foregoing observations may be restated in this fashion: although movement through time seems to effect a continual recasting of civilized man, Jungian symbols—and more especially that from which they arise—are not similarly subject to what might be interpreted as developmental tendencies. This imputation of timelessness to symbols and the sources of symbols may explain why we find in Jungian thought an almost Velikovskyian respect for what has gone before. Ancient astrologers, for instance,
receive rather favored treatment at the hands of Jung—as do alchemists, sun worshipers, and Masai hunters: examples, all, we are told, of finely tuned sensitivity to messages and images from the unconscious; they stand, as Yeats would have it, "naked to the winds of heaven," each a creator in his own right.

It is of paramount importance in the Jungian system that symbols be regarded as infinitely various representations of unconscious patterns which do not change from century to century, or from one level of culture to another. This ageless aspect of the archetypal symbol is what, for Jung, binds humanity into oneness and brings human history into wholeness; this is that which connects Montagnard with Parisian, Assyrian with Rotarian, in the Jungian world. In Jung's kingdom,

... consciousness does not create itself—it wells up from unknown depths. ... It is like a child that is born daily out of the primordial womb of the unconscious.  

It is, as we have said, by intervention and intercession of the symbol that man-emmanent creative power is allowed free expression. It is through symbols that the unconscious becomes conscious.

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It is through symbols that man creatively constitutes and expands reality. Since Jung asserts that "every act of dawning consciousness is a creative act,"\textsuperscript{41} the symbol is the seed of all creation, and art—called forth through the good offices of intuition—its coming and its effects synchronistic events— is a special case of the timely flowering of the symbol. In due season the symbol flowers. It is by virtue of its symbolic nature that art is a participant and a precipitant in the building of reality.

Since the making conscious of what has been unconscious may exert a profound influence and have a healing effect upon the individual psyche, there is not only creation but also salvation inherent in the symbol. Jung charts the movements of the energy of the human spirit within the dynamics of the human psyche with a view toward understanding and learning to cooperate fully and gracefully with the continual sproutings forth of symbols, carriers of psychic energy which signal revelation or attempts of the self to balance its processes. Symbols are capable of restoring fitness to the psyche.

In spite of the healing potential of the Jungian symbol, it is hardly proper to say that all things work together for good through the movements of the symbol; yet in truncated form such

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a statement is possible, for in concert with the movements of the symbol all things work together. The symbol is associated with another kind of "fitness," namely, the appropriateness of one thing with another, or one event beside another. The symbolic, the numinous, and the synchronistic assemble reality and in so doing weave the pattern that comprehends all, for which Jung borrows the term Tao. In its coming the symbol depends upon a condition of numinosity, and in its coming as it is called for, upon a condition of synchronicity. Speaking before an English audience Jung said,

The Eastern mind, when it looks at an ensemble of facts, accepts that ensemble as it is, but the Western mind divides it into entities, small quantities . . . .

It is like this: you are standing on the sea-shore and the waves wash up an old hat, an old box, a shoe, a dead fish, and there they lie on the shore. You say: 'Chance, nonsense!' The Chinese mind asks: 'What does it mean that these things are together?' The Chinese mind experiments with that being together and coming together at the right moment, and it has an experimental method not known in the West . . . namely, the use of the I Ching.

(Analytical Psychology, pp 76-77.)
It becomes clearer now why Jung insists, as we have seen, that one must regard synchronistic events "as creative acts, as the continuous creation of a pattern that exists from all eternity,\(^2\) and why he also maintains that when "we regard the psyche causally, that is, scientifically, the psyche as a creative function eludes us."\(^3\)

Like the Chinese mind of the foregoing quotation, the alchemical mind of old seeks meaning through exercise of "an experimental method." And yet use of the I Ching must be held distinct from attempts to distill aqua permanens or materialize the lapis. The Chinese mind and the alchemical mind apprehend in like manner the "ensemble" of life, but ultimately relate to that pattern of unbroken connectedness in different ways: both contrive to enter the sacristy of nature and to receive there from her very hand certain secrets—to see where others, seeing, see not—but the mind of the alchemist includes a more highly developed intention to foist upon nature certain willful formulations of its own. The difference between the two methods of these two minds is the difference between requesting and extorting. In its essentially passive approach to the symbols of the I Ching, the Chinese mind demonstrates its affinity with that earliest of pseudo sciences, astrology. An astrologer

\(^2\)Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, p. 518.

\(^3\)Jung, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, p. 185.
waits upon the movements of the ensemble of the heavens, even as a psychologist who follows Jung's clinical directions bides time, observes and endures quietly, until from the movements of that ensemble of figures and charged complexes which constitutes the psyche of his patient there is cast forth into consciousness a peculiarly apt symbol. And therefore, although much in the nature of the Jungian symbol itself suggests its association with what we have called, under the guiding spirit of intimations from Yeats, the alchemical man-emanant god the creator, much in the nature of Jungian analytic procedure—at least in its initial cycles and spirals—suggests the astrological mode, the passive style of the East and its Book of Changes. To be more specific, the earlier, more plainly receptive phases of applied analytic psychology are in effect observations of passing symbols and therefore are, we might say, analogous to astrology, while later stages in the analytic process and the path toward Jungian wholeness take on an actively exploratory character more in keeping with the spirit of alchemy and the evocation of symbols. Jung comments:

Astrology led the conscious mind back again and again to the knowledge of Heimarmene, that is, the dependence of character and destiny on certain moments in time; and alchemy afforded
numerous "hooks" for the projection of
those archetypes which could not be fitted
smoothly into the Christian process.

(Psychology and Alchemy, p. 34.)

Notice that Jung associates "dependence" with astrology and
"projection" with alchemy. Astrology observes the "being
together" and awaits the "coming together at the right moment;"
it is in receipt of creative symbols through projections from
regions far above. Whether this projected light is considered
in its verifiable physical or its postulated spiritual aspect,
astrology attends the light that falls from stars, and having
thus received symbols, interprets grandly and engenders in plain-
spoken reality an eloquence and newness—or so it seems. Alchemy,
as Jung understands it, projects up and outward from its own
depths—no mere receiver of signals the soul of the alchemist!—
and from the illumined array of these self-emanant and disengaged
expenditures of psychic energy selects symbols for reality and
the making of reality. The alchemist plays the creator actively,
summoning by formula and gesture his own reality, "calling into
outer life," as Yeats says of certain artists, "some portion of
the divine life, or of the buried reality . . ."44

44Yeats, Ideas of Good and Evil, p. 240.
If the astrologers, as we have noted, are observers transfixed by a phenomenon which may be considered either as physical, external ambiguity of wave and particle or as illumination spiritual and symbolic, that is, at first blush, more exclusively psychic—and Jung would see neither aspect, neither effect, as ultimately less mysterious than the other—then alchemists are those who seek in their dusty tomes, as they sought in bygone laboratories, a perfect fitting and an appropriate assembling—a new creativity whether molecular or spiritual.

For many alchemists the allegorical aspect undoubtedly occupied the foreground to such an extent that they were firmly convinced that their sole concern was with chemical substances. But there were always a few for whom laboratory work was primarily a matter of symbols and their psychic effect.

(Psychology and Alchemy, p. 34.)

It seems natural then that Jung should emphasize "the signal connection between our modern psychology of the unconscious and alchemical symbolism." Moreover, our association of alchemy— as

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45 Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, p. 37.
well as art and the healing of the mind—with man-emmanent
creativity as Jung understands it would seem to follow effort-
lessly and receive sanction if we place the foregoing quotation
beside another from a different work by Jung: "For me the uncon-
scious is a collective psychic disposition, creative in character." 46

We have seen that Yeats felt that upon the proper exercise of
symbol within the proper mind, "the visible world would completely
vanish, and that world, summoned by the symbol, take its place." 47
This active application of symbol for the breaching and re-creation
of nature is alchemical and therefore also, in a restricted sense,
Jungian. Whatever Yeats's symbols are, they share by reason of
their potential for ushering in new reality a portion of the life
and appearance we now associate with Jungian symbols; they surface
and come to view within a partly shared area of what might be seen
as an expanse of liquid surface, while Jung's symbols remain, both
across this shared and their own broad range of appearance, the
variable surfacings of some steady stream of partly transparent
bubble-like forms destined to burst upon the surface, rising in
short-lived and captivating shapes from some dark, unknown, and
constant source far below: ever new and changing images (seen
through some dark glass) of hidden images which, themselves too
radiant to behold, are timeless and immutable.

46 Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 537.
47 Yeats, Autobiographies, p. 231.
Dorothy Wellesley is much intrigued with Yeats's lack of interest in familiar nature. She writes,

I have come to the conclusion that this lack of 'visualness', this lack of interest in natural beauty for its own sake, may originate in the fact that most of the Celtic poets are not concerned with nature at all. Yeats did not himself draw much inspiration from Nature, certainly from no details; only sometimes massed effects, such as a painter sees, influenced his verse. Referring to a poem of mine Yeats once said to me in an outburst of irritability: 'Why can't you English poets keep flowers out of your poetry?'

Commonplace flowers fail to move Yeats. Moreover, Yeats is drawn not to ordinary asses, but "milk-white asses"; he fixes upon "horrible green parrots," not simple parrots. Milk-white asses are laden with the high attributes of the Yeatsian symbol and

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leave in their wake a charged field of symbolic power: power which is not only from Yeats but also over Yeats and over his readers as a brocaded coverlet over dreamers in sleep.

Wheels by milk-white asses drawn
Where Babylon or Ninevah
Rose; some conqueror drew rein
And cried to battle-weary men,
'Let all things pass away.'


All familiar things might indeed be said momentarily to pass away for any who falls beneath some word of a worker in words who creates by speaking the word only, and yet this explanation is insufficient. Yeats's conqueror drawing rein does not cry, "Let all things momentarily pass away," for Yeats does not see nature as harboring and from time to time realizing a potential for occasional symbols: mere hints from nature concerning what, in and of herself nature herself may be. Rather, Yeats sees symbols as founding and comprehending nature, and therefore when the mounted conqueror utters his unconditional "Let all things pass away," he speaks out of the full power of this half-secret understanding of things, namely, that nature in her entirety stands as a mere hint of what comes to pass through the elaborate workings of symbols in and of themselves. Yeats is not interested in symbols for the sake of green parrots, but in horrible green parrots for the sake of symbols.
Your hooves have stamped at the black margin of the wood,
Even where horrible green parrots call and swing.

("On a Picture of a Black Centaur...,"
The Collected Poems ..., p. 212.)

The narrow talents much relied upon for establishing value in poetry--
a sense of worldly good taste, an appreciation for the appropriate
and natural--are brought almost to naught in the world of Yeats,
where poetic images--ugly or supernal, fitting or incredible--are
designed to receive sanction through their power to summon the non-
apparent world. It is difficult to criticize Yeats's poetry on any
ground except its own. A symbol, be it formed from fine beast or
terrible bird--if it performs as Yeats would have it--brings image
and emotion. The poetic word dignifies its existence in Yeats's
eyes insofar as it evokes image and emotion, insofar as its inti-
macy with symbol is assured and established.

In his early poem, "The Song of the Happy Shepherd," Yeats
speculates that the planet we inhabit may be a bona fide poetic
word, that is, sound inseparably mated with symbol:

The wandering earth herself may be
Only a sudden flaming word,
In clanging space a moment heard,
Troubling the endless reverie.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 7.)

It appears that Yeats's lack of interest is directed not against
nature herself and the world itself--for the poetic word, at least
his own, is much in favor with Yeats—but against what others commonly mistake for nature and what others flatly accept as the world. For Yeats, mere appearance does not establish reality; visual images do not constitute vision. Neither the world nor nature is to be taken simply for what it seems, and therefore Yeats in his poetry brooks no banal and commonplace asses and parrots.

The symbol as Yeats sees it may be defined, in brief, as an image charged with the power to summon vision. This definition may be elaborated by exploration of the origin of the Yeatsian symbol, its association with duality and acausality, its archetypal nature.

If commonplace nature is not the matrix from which the Yeatsian symbol arises, where should we look for its beginnings? How does Yeats's poetry come to possess "tortoiseshell butterflies" and "peacock butterflies,"4 "heron-billed pale cattle-birds,"5 and "cloud-pale unicorns" with aquamarine eyes and ladies on their backs? Yeatsian symbols—and the foregoing are modest examples from a distinguished array—may be said, if we accept the evidence Yeats gives, to sprout both from esoteric tradition and from


the poet's inmost imagination. In other words, Yeats's symbols come from far and near: from distant fields and from that center point most hidden and close, that is, both from areas farther from the individual than familiar nature and from areas nearer. We learn of farflung and symbol-rich esoteric tradition in Yeats's article, "Invoking the Irish Fairies":

The Occultist and student of Alchemy whom I shall call D. D. and myself sat at opposite sides of the fire one morning, wearied with symbolism and magic. D. D. had put down a kettle to boil. We were accustomed to meet every now and then, that we might summon the invisible powers and gaze into the astral light; for we had learned to see with the internal eyes. But this morning we knew not what to summon, for we had already on other mornings invoked that personal vision of impersonal good which men name Heaven, and that personal vision of impersonal evil, which men name Hell. We had called up likewise, the trees of knowledge and of life, and we had studied the hidden meaning of the Zodiac, and enquired under what groups of stars, the various events of the bible story were classified by those dead Occultists who held all things, from the firmament above to
the waters under the Earth, to be but symbol and again symbol. We had gone to ancient Egypt, seen the burial of her dead and heard mysterious talk of Isis and Osiris. . . . we had asked of the future and heard words of dread and hope. We had called up the Klippoth Frayne's footnote: "'Klippoth' is the Hebrew word for demons." and in terror seen them rush by like great black rams, and now we were a little weary of shining colours and sweeping forms. "We have seen the great and they have tired us," I said; "let us call the little for a change. The Irish fairies may be worth the seeing; there is time for them to come and go before the water is boiled."?

On the one hand this passage acquaints us with Yeats's experience of the search for symbols in fantastic and distant regions, and on the other hand with at least a hint of his recognition that symbols may arise also in association with nearer and more parochial realms: " . . . let us call the little for a change." Yeats's opting for Irish fairies instead of phantasmagoric creatures from afar is a suggestion of the in-working process which finds its natural conclusion in his diligent search for

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apt symbols for poetry in the Irish tradition, in the Irish, in the Irish soul, in his own soul: "Beloved, gaze in thine own heart,/ The holy tree is growing there . . ."  

Although it would doubtless be of little concern to him, Yeats stands both condemned and acquitted in the light of Jung's description of those who constantly search with their eyes the far side of the temple of the world.

People will do anything, no matter how absurd, in order to avoid facing their own souls. They will practise Indian yoga and all its exercises, observe a strict regimen of diet, learn theosophy by heart, or mechanically repeat mystic texts from the literature of the whole world—all because they cannot get on with themselves and have not the slightest faith that anything useful could ever come out of their own souls. Thus the soul has gradually been turned into a Nazareth from which nothing good can come. Therefore let us fetch it from the four corners of the earth—the more far-fetched and bizarre it is the better!  

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Coming from the mouth of one so multifarious and ambitiously eclectic as Jung, such declarations seem more in keeping with the character of psychological projection than objective statement, but for our present purposes let only this point be established: whether Jung is here or there, in place or out of place, Yeats is, in Jung's own terms, both here and there: both ranging afar in search of symbols and holding still; both in some ocean of the bizarre and held by the gleam of some droplet that is his own soul.

The Yeatsian symbol has no fixed origin. It sprouts from the dreams of the heart or from arcane tradition. For the sake of symbol Yeats at times casts his lot with the deeply personal, with for instance the lone blind hound that supplicates deep within and before itself:

One blind hound only lies apart
On the sun-smitten grass;
He holds deep commune with his heart;
The moments pass and pass;

("The Ballad of the Foxhunter," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 26.)

The hound, blind to the world at large, but open to the world within, mourns the master who is soon to be lowered to a simple, narrow grave—an abjectly local grave as every personal grave must be.
But also for the sake of symbol Yeats at times abandons himself and his readers to the forcefully impersonal. The host of the Sidhe ride from the far reaches of dimmest Irish history. They are heedless of individual demise and thunder across all private graves:

The host is riding from Knocknarea
And over the grave of Clooth-na-Bare;
Caolte tossing his burning hair,
And Niamh calling Away, come away!

Empty your heart of its mortal dream.

("The Hosting of the Sidhe," The Collected Poems . . . , p. 53.)

Fully unlike the blind hound are the host of the Sidhe for they are frighteningly open to the world at large: Niamh cries, "... our eyes are agleam." The Yeats who exalts the highly personal with "gaze in thine own heart" sings this last song also: "empty your heart;" he finds symbols near and far; he not only bends his head to his own breast, but scans the odd creatures and decorative columns of the far side of the temple. He gazes after symbols quite beyond himself in part II of "The Tower." We might well think of his eyes as agleam.

I pace upon the battlements and stare
On the foundations of a house, or where
Tree, like a sooty finger, starts from earth;
And send imagination forth
Under the day's declining beam, and call
Images and memories
From ruin or from ancient trees,
For I would ask a question of them all.

(The Collected Poems . . . ,
pp. 192-3.)

Likewise, in part II of the poem "Fragments" we glimpse Yeats's diverse and outlying sources:

    Where got I that truth?
    Out of a medium's mouth,
    Out of nothing it came,
    Out of the forest loam,
    Out of the dark night where lay
    The crowns of Ninevah.

(The Collected Poems . . . ,
p. 211.)

In other words, Yeats wanders in search of symbols through far fields of strange traditions and conditions: spiritualism, emptiness, naturalism, darkness, antiquity. And yet, he is engrossed also by the highly personal testimony of his inner soul, so much so that at times he seems to have no other source for symbols, seems in fact to close his eyes to the outer, as dreamers do in sleep.
But I, being poor, have only my dreams;
I have spread my dreams under your feet;
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.

("He Wishes for the Cloths of Heaven," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 70.)

Ambivalency characterizes Yeats's search for symbols. He chooses from beyond self and from within self. He courts the impersonal and the personal. Perhaps it is for the sake of the ambiguity of its origin that the Yeatsian symbol brings vision which is at once both imposing and delicate. Yeats says in Per Amica Silentia Lunae,

... a vision, whether we wake or sleep, prolongs its power by rhythm and pattern, the wheel where the world is butterfly. We need no protection but it does, for if we become interested in ourselves, in our own lives, we pass out of the vision. Whether it is we or the vision that create the pattern, who set the wheel turning, it is hard to say, but certainly we have a hundred ways of keeping it near us: we select our images from past times, we turn from our own age and try to feel Chaucer nearer than the daily paper. It compels us to cover all it cannot incorporate, and would
carry us when it comes in sleep to that moment
when even sleep closes her eyes and dreams begin
to dream; and we are taken up into a clear light
and are forgetful even of our own names and actions
and yet in perfect possession of ourselves murmur
like Faust, "Stay, moment," and murmur in vain.10

Notice Yeats's awareness of the double aspect of the vision which
arises from the charged images we have called Yeatsian symbols.
The far regions of antiquity are suggested by Yeats's "we select
our images from past times," and, in contrast, the self-intimacy
of convoluted dreaming is implied in "that moment when even sleep
closes her eyes and dreams begin to dream." The impersonal and
highly personal nature of vision is hinted at when Yeats observes,
"we ... are forgetful even of our own names and actions and yet
in perfect possession of ourselves murmur like Faust, 'Stay moment,'
..." The Yeatsian symbol is therefore an image whose birth and
origin are somewhat in question; its beginnings may be associated
with distance, or perhaps with nearness; and whether it arises
from far or near it is charged with the telling and yet tenuous
power to call vision into being.

This ambiguity in the symbol's origin is paralleled by a
duality in its nature and potential. Manifestations of the symbol

10W. B. Yeats, "Anima Hominis," Per Amice Silentia Lunae
may exhibit qualities of radiance and darkness. It is as if a mysterious child whose nativity might be either of greater Asia or the Isle of Man were discovered to be not half Chinese and half Manx, but—whether Chinese or Manx—half melanic, half albinic. We glimpse the possibility for diametric opposition—for light and dark—in the showings forth of the symbol Yeats calls the secret rose:

... I, too, await

The hour of thy great wind of love and hate.
When shall the stars be blown about the sky,
Like the sparks blown out of a smithy, and die?
Surely thine hour has come, thy great wind blows,
Far-off, most secret, and inviolate Rose?

("The Secret Rose," The Collected Poems ..., p. 67.)

Yeats implies that a similar potential for continuing duality rests in the heart of the whole of nature when he writes, "There are some who understand that the simple unmysterious things living as in a clear noon light are of the nature of the sun, and that vague, many-imaged things have in them the strength of the moon. Did not the Egyptian carve it on emerald that all living things have the sun for father and the moon for mother...?" In keeping with that theme, the chorus of Yeats's poem "Those Dancing Days Are Gone" reads, "I carry the sun in a golden cup,/ The moon in a silver bag." (The Collected Poems ..., p. 261.) This innate opposition in the world at large is mimicked in the make-up

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of each human soul, or does the division in man presuppose and establish the world's duality?

From man's blood-sodden heart are sprung
Those branches of the night and day
Where the gaudy moon is hung.
What's the meaning of all song?
'Let all things pass away.' 12

Man as well as nature has a double aspect, and, as the lines above intimate, the duality of one is closely twined with that of the other. So interrelated are the two dualities that as the pulsations of nature and the gyrations of the planet enfold man in a progression of seasons and years, in an envelope of that time once thought standard and gloriously pervasive, but recently revealed as wretchedly local, the condition of man's duality changes somewhat, or so Yeats says: "Young, we discover an opposite through our love; old, we discover our love through some opposite neither hate nor despair can destroy, because it is another self, a self that we have fled in vain." 13

As we have seen, Jung also has an interest in two-sidedness. He not only asserts, "The forces of nature are always two-faced . . .,"14 but he notes that one side of man's nature may assume the role of

tempter over against the other. The temptations which the
tempted side of man suffers are sometimes imaged by the psyche
as pointed projectiles. Jung comments, "The wounding and
painful shafts do not come from outside . . . but from the
ambush of our own unconscious. It is our own repressed desires
that stick like arrows in our flesh." 15 Yeats's poem "The
Valley of the Black Pig" pictures a continuing clash of opposed
armies and begins, "The dews drop slowly and dreams gather:
unknown spears/ Suddenly hurtle before my dream-awakened eyes . . ."
(The Collected Poems . . ., p. 63.)

Whether or not the duality of self as Yeats realizes it
substantiates Jungian theory, Yeats's full awareness of the
dichotomy within remains and persists. For the Yeatsian symbol
there is therefore no real possibility of escape from duality.
If the origin of the Yeatsian symbol lies either in far reaches
outside self, or in the very vestibule of the soul, it lies, in
accordance with Yeats's view, in the midst of a sure potential
for grand opposition. It seems fitting therefore that the wind
associated with Yeats's secret rose should be so thoroughly
ambivalent--a "great wind of love and hate." It seems equally
appropriate that the piece of lapis lazuli which Yeats envisions
as a symbol should give rise to a poem that forms such exquisitely
poised contradictions, that the Chinese sages of "Lapis Lazuli"

15 Symbols of Transformation, p. 287.
achieve renown among critics of poetry for staring on "all the tragic scene" with measured gaiety, with "ancient, glittering eyes."

We noted that on one occasion Yeats's experience with conjurations of fantastic scenes and large-looming creatures that sprang from esoteric tradition brought on a subsequent yearning for the simplicity of a vision of Irish fairies. The story, as Yeats tells it, does not end here, and the vision of the called-up fairies turns out to be not so simple after all. Yeats explains that he uttered the incantatory formula and a vision of "a barren mountain crest with one ragged tree" appeared.

The leaves and branches of the tree were all upon one side, as though it had been blighted by the sea winds. The Moon shone through the branches and a white woman stood beneath them. We commanded this woman to show us the fairies of Ireland marshalled in order. Immediately a great multitude of little creatures appeared, with green hair like sea-weed and after them another multitude dragging a car containing an enormous bubble. . . . They passed on and a troop who were like living flames followed and after them a singular multitude whose bodies were like

the stems of flowers and their dresses like the petals. These latter fairies after a while, stood still under a green bush from which dropped honey like dew and thrust out their tongues, which were so long, that they were able to lick the honey-covered ground without stooping. 17

The initiatory symbols, the mountain crest and the wind-blasted tree, together with what might be called the controlling symbol, the white woman, have up to this point expended their respective charges of evocative energy in a proliferation of visual figures of a more or less benign and reassuring nature. But observe what Yeats further relates:

The white woman told us that these were the good fairies and that she would now bring D. D. to the fairies of evil. Soon a great abyss appeared and in the midst was a fat serpent, with forms, half animal, half human, polishing his heavy scales. The name of this serpent was Crew-grew and he was the chief of the wicked goblins. About him moved quantities of things like pigs, only with shorter legs, and above him in the air flew vast flocks of cherubs and bats. The bats, however flew

with their heads down and the cherubs with their foreheads lower than their winged chins.--I was at the time studying a mystic system that makes this inversion of the form a mark of certain types of evil spirits, giving it much the same significance as is usually given to the inverted pentagram \[\text{sic}\]. . . .

Presently the bats and cherubs and the forms that a moment before had been polishing the scales of Grew-grew, rushed high up into the air and from an opposite direction appeared the troops of the good fairies, and the two kingdoms began a most terrible warfare. The evil fairies hurled burning darts but were unable to approach very near to the good fairies, for they seemed unable to bear the neighbourhood of pure spirits. The contest seemed to fill the whole heavens, for as far as the sight could go the clouds of embattled goblins went also.

(pp. 246-7.)

The controlling symbol of the white woman abruptly presents a vision which constitutes a sharp departure from the homogeneous contentment and harmless frolic of the immediately foregoing
images. In other words, there has existed from the beginning in this symbol of the white woman a potential for duality, a likelihood for the production of visions either bathed in light, benighted, or both. So it is with the Yeatsian symbol. Its power is divided, and therefore the vision which the symbol precipitates is—in its full form—divided against itself, or at least of double aspect. The Yeatsian symbol is a charged image which summons vision of potential duality. This symbol arises from the multiform and teeming birthplaces of the mysterious and less mysterious traditions which about in the would-be hidden places of nature and of the world at large and abroad—and all of nature as Yeats sees it, together with the world in all its sphericity, is a mighty incorporation of opposites—or the symbol is born from the inner soul of the individual man, who is likewise subjected, even in his most hidden, womb-like center, to the clash of opposing forces. The evil fairies of Yeats's vision hurl "burning darts" and so associate themselves with the arrow-shooting tempter of the inner man as Jung describes him and with the throwers of the "unknown spears" before the dreamer's eyes in Yeats's poem "The Valley of the Black Pig," a poem whose very title—if we take sober cognizance of the "quantities of things like pigs" in Yeats's vision of the evil fairies—implies a revelation of the more threatening possibilities of the symbol. 18

It may further clarify the nature of the Yeatsian symbol if we consider it in relation to what in our discussion of Jung we called acausality, that is, the ground of wholly unexpected relationship, a range of connected possibilities outside the wide purview of cause and effect. Specific instances of meaningfully related events within an acausal context we have described, following Jung's usage, as synchronistic. Neither Yeats nor Jung manifests any fear of the Preacher's warning that the making of many books is an interminable process and that extensive study may bring woe to the body; instead both give themselves wholeheartedly to these doubtful occupations, and therefore it is not surprising that those instances of synchronicity which seem especially striking to both Yeats and Jung should occur in association with books. In 1906 a very modestly educated and untraveled schizophrenic patient presented Jung with a detailed vision of the sun's display of a waving phallus that caused a mighty wind, and some years later Jung discovered a description of the same image in a passage from Mithraic liturgy published in 1910.\textsuperscript{19} Speaking before the Institute of Medical Psychology in London in 1935, Jung made mention of this uncanny correspondence:

\begin{quote}
I thought of the schizophrenic patient,  
'This man is crazy and I am normal and his .
\end{quote}

vision should not bother me.' But it did.
I asked myself: What does it mean? I was not satisfied that it was just crazy, and later I came on a book by a German scholar, Dieterich /Footnote: Albrecht Dieterich, Eine Mithras-
liturgie/, who had published part of a magic papyrus. I studied it with great interest and on page 7 I found the vision of my lunatic 'word for word.' That gave me a shock. I said: 'How on earth is it possible that this fellow came into possession of that vision?' 20

That this fellow did come into possession of a symbol that moved men in ancient times is evidence in favor of Jung's collective unconscious; that Jung himself came into possession of these two corresponding visions is an event that warrants classification as synchronicity. Yeats's anima mundi is very like Jung's collective unconscious, and evidences for anima mundi Yeats also finds in the reading of books:

Before the mind's eye whether in sleep or waking, came images that one was to discover presently in some book one had never read,

and after looking in vain for explanation to
the current theory of forgotten personal
memory, I came to believe in a great memory
passing on from generation to generation. \[21\]
The inquiring mind of Yeats, like that of Jung, served at
certain times as location for the seemingly fortuitous meeting
of closely related visions, that is, as juncture for synchro-
nicity. Yeats says:

... I find in my diary that on December 27, 1897,
a seer, to whom I had given a certain old Irish
symbol, saw Brigid, the goddess, holding out 'a
glittering and wriggling serpent,' and yet I feel
certain that neither I nor he knew anything of her
association with the serpent until Carmina
Caedelica was published a few months ago... .
Almost every one who has ever busied himself with
such matters has come, in trance or dream, upon
some new and strange symbol or event, which he
has afterwards found in some work he had never
read or heard of. \[22\]

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\[21\] Yeats, "Anima Mundi," Per Amica Silentia Lunae, p. 50.

\[22\] Yeats, 'Magic,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and
Introductions, pp. 45-6 (the same numerals, be it noted, serve
as the numbers for the pages which contain Jung's tale of
Psychology . . .). Yeat's confirmation from alchemy of strange symbolism in a work of
art is another instance of scholarly synchronicity: Yeats, 'My Friend's
Book,' "Later Essays and Introductions," Essays and Introductions, p. 413.
This is "that being together and coming together at the right moment" of which Jung speaks.\textsuperscript{23} We have said that in its coming the Jungian symbol depends upon a condition of numinosity—as the coming of the symbol of sun and phallus to the schizophrenic patient is a coming in the full power of an unaccountable fascination—and we have said that in its coming as it is called for the Jungian symbol depends upon a condition of synchronicity—as the arrival of the sun and phallus symbol as an apparent vagary of a disturbed mentality is an arrival within a time frame appropriate to this symbol's conjunction in Jung's consciousness with the same symbol from a different, ancient, seemingly unrelated source. This particular instance of synchronicity, taken together with Yeats's like experience with the symbol of Brigid and the serpent, introduces us to a new variation on the theme we saw established in our discussion of the origin of the Yeatsian symbol. The established theme is that symbols as they are beheld by Yeats stem from the individual soul or from farflung realms of arcane tradition. The Jungian symbol, we now see, has at least this much in common with the Yeatsian: the possibility of birth in either of two widely disparate regions, although Jung would ultimately interpret both regions in terms of the collective unconscious and so place them beneath a single overarching authority. The synchronistic examples from Jung and Yeats represent a new

\textsuperscript{23}Analytical Psychology . . ., pp. 76-7.
corollary for this general law of symbol beginnings in that they reveal that a single symbol may have its origin not only in either the hidden places of the heart or of the world at large, but in the hidden places of both at one time, which corollary blends well with Jung's positioning of all such events somewhere in the sea of the greater unconscious.

In the example from Yeats, that is, the vision of Brigid and the serpent, the Jungian condition of numinosity might be deemed satisfied by the "glittering and wriggling" of the symbol that transfixedes the seer. We saw earlier that the Yeatsian symbol partakes both of image and emotion, and the nearness of these qualities to what Jung calls numinosity becomes through the agency of seized patient and spellbound seer ever more apparent. Likewise, the Jungian condition of synchronicity is amply fulfilled for Yeats's symbol in the serpent's arrival from two far removed quarters into the receptive chambers of the single mind of Yeats the observer. The ensemble of reality, the orchestration of events, which we explored in Jung under the comprehensive name Tao seems to hold sway also in Yeats's mind and helps to explain his dissatisfaction with commonplace understandings of nature. There is in Yeats's thought the concept of reality as a weaving of intricate relations—and an understanding of this weaving as the meaningful involvement by way of symbols of one age with another, of one mind with another,
of soul with race, of time with timelessness. Yeats therefore sings effortlessly at two extremes; he sings of the musings of a blind hound and of the thunderings of the Sidhe, and he sings of both with insight and conviction. It is this awareness of the interwoven quality of reality that leads Yeats to paraphrase his own early reasoning as follows: "Our daily thought was certainly but the line of foam at the shallow edge of a vast luminous sea ..."\textsuperscript{24} We recall that Jung regards synchronistic events "as creative acts, as the continuous creation of a pattern that exists from all eternity."\textsuperscript{25} This is to say that Tao is a pattern of connectedness, and that it perhaps stretches so far as to connect even Jung and Yeats.

Within the warp and weft of Tao every small event has its place, and so we find in Yeats and in Jung unusual respect for the significance of little events, for the generally neglected aspects of life, for the overlooked, the discounted, the nugatory. Their faith in the little is bound up with their respective understandings of symbol and is only superficially related to that humility and reliance on things small one finds in the Apostle Paul.\textsuperscript{26} Because the creative symbol of either Yeats or

\textsuperscript{24}"Anima Mundi," \textit{Per Amica Silentia Lunae}, p. 51.


\textsuperscript{26}I Cor. 1:27-28, Authorized Version: "But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring nought things that are . . . ."
Jung may clothe itself in impotence but eventually manifest itself in glory, we find in Yeats's thought and in Jung's a mixed flavor of humility and hauteur. Yeats observes in "The Symbolism of Poetry":

It is indeed only those things which seem useless or very feeble that have any power, and all those things that seem useful or strong, armies, moving wheels, modes of architecture, modes of government, speculations of the reason, would have been a little different if some mind long ago had not given itself to some emotion, as a woman gives herself to her lover, and shaped sounds or colours or forms, or all of these, into a musical relation, that their emotion might live in other minds. ²⁷

It is the synchronistic movements of symbols, bringers of image and emotion, that weave for Yeats the pattern of Tao. These symbols may appear insignificant and so a poet does well to exercise humility, and yet—here arises once more the alchemical man-emanant god the creator—the motions of these symbols found and establish reality.

All sounds, all colours, all forms, either because of their preordained energies or because of long association, evoke indefinable and yet precise emotions, or, as I prefer to think, call down among us certain disembodied powers, whose footsteps over our hearts we call emotions; and when sound, and colour, and form are in a musical relation, a beautiful relation to one another, they become, as it were, one sound, one colour, one form, and evoke an emotion that is made out of their distinct evocations and yet is one emotion. . . .

Because an emotion does not exist, or does not become perceptible and active among us, till it has found its expression, in colour or in sound or in form, or in all of these, and because no two modulations or arrangements of these evoke the same emotion, poets and painters and musicians, and in a less degree because their effects are momentary, day and night and cloud and shadow, are continually making and unmaking mankind. 28

Stemming from such convictions, Yeats's poetry and prose are bound to glow with the pride of the creator, the pride of the one who knows the use \(^*\), and power of symbols: "I cannot now think symbols less than the greatest of all powers whether they are used consciously by the masters of magic, or half unconsciously by their successors, the poet, the musician and the artist."\(^{29}\) Here, as elsewhere, there is revealed in Yeats an attitude of willfulness, or half willfulness, over against the symbol and its purported power to make the world. Yeats does not merely await the coming of the symbol; he seeks to call the symbol, and in calling the symbol to call a new reality.

In Jung there is a greater appreciation for the apparent aimlessness and relative inaccessibility of the symbol, but the same preoccupation with the symbol's dissembling under the lowliest and most humble circumstances, the same obstinate pride in the coming of creative possibilities as the symbol unfolds and emerges from the hidden places of seeming insignificance. Petrarch exclaims in one of his sonnets, "Ah, we are shadows crying for a sign!"\(^{30}\) and Jung exclaims as if in reply, "Glad

\(^{29}\) "Magic," "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 49.

tidings: when the eternal signs have vanished from the heavens, the pig that hunts truffles finds them again in the earth."\(^{31}\) It appears that the psychologist as well as the poet dare not lose the humility necessary to the sorting through and embracing of the little and the low, although in awaiting the symbol's unpredictable arrival through some series of subdued poses the psychologist--and all who see with his eyes--may have to trust to what seems a disorder and purposelessness worthy of a wandering pig. In Jung the comings together that form the pattern of Tao are, in one sense, totally out of hand, and consciousness has almost as little control over the synchronistic movements of symbols as an astronomer over the conjunction of two planets. Jungian method waxes alchemical only under the aegis of the unconscious, so that when Jung speaks of the psyche's creation of reality--here enters the pride of the creator--he speaks of this creation as beyond all control where consciousness is concerned, but as positively man-emanant and willful from the point of view of the unconscious. The meanderings of the pig are aimless and uncontrolled only for consciousness. Thomas Mann in his essay, "Freud and the Future," calls attention to the "extravagant statement"\(^{32}\) in Jung's introduction to The Tibetan Book of the

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Dead. Mann is moved to rich and lengthy expression by Jung's implication that each of us draws to himself the events of external reality. Jung puts it this way:

We are so hemmed in by things which jostle and oppress that we never get a chance, in the midst of all these "given" things, to wonder by whom they are "given." ... we learn from the very first paragraphs of The Book of the Dead that the "giver" of all "given" things dwells within us. This is a truth which in the face of all evidence, in the greatest things as in the smallest, is never known, although it is often so very necessary, indeed vital, for us to know it.33

Notice that the seeds of this alleged truth—namely that man is responsible for the ensemble of events that constitutes his reality—are located "in the greatest things as in the smallest," a reminder of the importance of keeping curiosity

in a state of humility. In the same breath, Jung offers that "the 'giver' of all 'given' dwells with us," and, later in this introduction, refers to man as "the maker of his circum-
stances" (p. 514). By positing a reality which seems almost to emanate continually from man's psyche, Jung places himself in a position of extravagance as far as Thomas Mann is concerned—
'albeit absorbing and usefully provocative extravagance—and,
where W. B. Yeats is concerned, in a position of approximate parallelism. Many distinctions could be made between Jung's creation of reality and Yeats's, foremost of which might be that for Jung the forming of external reality is a kind of resolving and compensatory response of nature to the condition of the psyche—just as the symbol as Jung sees it comes into being within inner reality in accordance with the prevailing situation of the psyche—while for Yeats the making of the world is more a simple consequence of the movements from man outward of symbols that summon vision. In Jung's system man projects and is projected back upon; in Yeats's system man simply projects. In Jung's view external reality is a cor-
respondent and counterpart of the symbol, for the symbol is the best expression of the inner condition (although, if the truth be told, Jung as psychologist would prefer to do the impossible and remain largely indifferent to distinctions between outer and inner reality). In Yeats's view external reality is more simply
and directly a function of the symbol. In general, however, it may be said that the external reality of Yeats has something very much in common with that of Jung: it is symbolic expression. What does this mean? No one can be sure. This much, however, we know: both Yeats and Jung are convinced of the numinous nature and the synchronistic—that is, the uncannily appropriate—comings and goings of the symbol, and both see external reality as closely bound up with the nature and movement of symbols. Moreover, both Jung and Yeats view their respective understandings of reality as knowledge which can be accepted only by the elect. We have seen that Jung declares that man resolutely refuses to see that he himself has prepared what befalls him, and Yeats in his autobiography declares, "The knowledge of reality is always in some measure a secret knowledge. It is a kind of death."

Even the hidden ways of nest-building birds and other creatures of mystery stand open to the speculations of the two who hint with one voice in hushed tone that all without is spun forth from all within. Yeats confides that "it is the dream martens that, all unknowing, are master-masons to the living martens building about church windows their elaborate nests . . ." Jung observes that in man "the instinctive process can be visualized by phantasy images and this inner perception can be expressed to an outer observer by

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35 "Anima Mundi," Per Amica Silentia Lunae, pp. 74-5.
means of speech," and he further comments, casting about in the fashion of Yeats for likely winged creatures to carry his suppositions forward:

If the animal psyche were capable of such an accomplishment, we should, for example, be aware of the mythology which the weaver bird is expressing when it builds its nest and the yucca moth when it spins its cocoon round the yucca blossom. That is, we should know the phantasy images which move them from within in preparation for their instinctive actions. 36

Notice that what Jung implies about the reality of the weaver bird and Yeats about the reality of the marten matches in a reasonable degree what each has formerly concluded about the reality of man, namely, whether internal or external, reality is something of a symbolic expression. Moreover, the symbols which shape reality—"dream martens" or "phantasy images" in the cases at hand—arise from the unconscious. This is why each has talked of birds in the first place: Jung for the sake of illustrating the possible extent and the sometimes highly practical nature of the collective unconscious; Yeats

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for the sake of embellishing further his anima mundi with declarations so alarmingly strange as to insure that all within earshot will take offense except those most surely elect and anointed. Of possible interest for our purposes is the barely discernible but not necessarily insignificant difference between "dream martens" and "phantasy images."

In his essay, "My Friend's Book," Yeats cites the good works performed for living birds by birds of a more spiritual dimension and makes favorable mention of Henry More's opinion that these last are none other than what remains of dead birds. 37 Dead bees are likewise accorded status as spiritual mentors. There is reason to believe, therefore, that Yeats attributes a living quality, a ghostly animation, to his dream martens. Dream martens have wings; they are not static symbols. For Yeats "the great Memory is . . . a dwelling-house of symbols, of images that are living souls." 38 Many of the Yeatsian symbols we have hitherto encountered have indeed presented themselves as "living souls:" the white woman, the wind-blasted tree, the world as butterfly, the secret rose, the sun as father, the moon mother, asses, parrots, unicorns, the vast ghostly host of the Sidhe. Although Jung is dependably imprecise in his use of the


38 Yeats, 'The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 79.
terms symbol and archetype, it is true, by and large, that he attributes a living and spiritual quality to the archetype and views the symbol as the image pushed forward by this living and powerful unknown. It seems, however, that Jung grants to poets a propensity for accomplishing the improbable: the drawing of form-giving images of living quality out of the shadows of the unconscious and into the open.

It is as if the poet could still sense, beneath the words of contemporary speech and in the images that crowd in upon his imagination, the ghostly presence of bygone spiritual worlds, and possessed the capacity to make them come alive again.

(Symbols of Transformation, p. 303.)

Yeats's symbol is something like Jung's archetype lured into the open. It does not seem, like the Jungian symbol, primarily a mediator. The Yeatsian symbol is less that which stands between and more that which stands in its own right. It is not the interpreter of a hidden presence so much as a presence no longer hidden, awesome but not inaccessible to the elect and the enlightened.

Both nuns and mothers worship images,
But those the candles light are not as those
That animate a mother's reveries,
But keep a marble and a bronze repose.
And yet they too break hearts—O Presences
That passion, piety or affection knows,
And that all heavenly glory symbolise—
O self-born mockers of man's enterprise;


Whereas Jung says in explaining archetypes, "... the nature of the symbol-creating forces does not change from age to age," 39 Yeats seems to say that symbols themselves are immune to change. The Yeatsian symbol seems immutable, and yet may be looked upon in a more or less direct fashion by mortal man. Jung stands with the multitude at the foot of the mountain and awaits a glimpse of the radiant face, while Yeats, scorning mediation, climbs to the cloud-shrouded top, his eyes agleam: "We are, it may be, at a crowning crisis of the world, at the moment when man is about to ascend. . . ."40

Many of the attributes of the Jungian archetype apply to the Yeatsian symbol. Yeats often speaks of the symbol as if it were not only living, but fixed, immortal, godlike. We have heard him speak of the "preordained energies" of certain sounds, colors, and forms, and in the same essay he maintains that the emotion evoked by a work of art—a work woven of sounds, colors, and forms, which is to say, a work replete with symbolic power—may be looked upon as a "god"

39 Symbols of Transformation, p. 228.

called "among us." As if to hint of the openness of what some think effectively removed, the fairies of Yeats's poetry behave and speak at times as if they were animated Jungian archetypes:

We who are old, old and gay,

0 so old!

Thousands of years, thousands of years,

If all were told:

("A Faery Song," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 38.)

"... they are surely there, the divine people," Yeats says in The Celtic Twilight, "for only we who have neither simplicity nor wisdom have denied them, and the simple of all times and the wise men of ancient times have seen them and even spoken to them." The Chinese sages of "Iapis Lazuli," aloof, impartial, untouched, in full possession of vision and serenity, are distinctly archetypal, but also, through Yeats's poetic power, fully visible. In his essay, "Magic," Yeats speaks of "an inherent power in symbols" and explains that this power is associated with the summoning of visions according to foreordained patterns: "I discovered that the symbol hardly ever failed to call up its typical scene, its typical event, its typical person . . ." As we have seen, Jung maintains

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that archetypes are the powers behind the "more or less typical patterns that repeat themselves over and over again." (Symbols of Transformation, p. 294.) The Yeatsian symbol would seem to be the Jungian archetype brought to light. All that we have discovered so far about the Yeatsian symbol might be interpreted as hallmarks of the archetype: the ambiguity of its origin, its ambivalent potential, its close association with numinosity and synchronicity. The Jungian archetype stands hidden behind the Jungian symbol; it sends forth the symbol into the light of consciousness. The Yeatsian symbol stands openly in the arena of consciousness; furthermore, it stands before, that is, prior to and in front of, the Yeatsian vision; it beckons and vision appears. If the Yeatsian symbol is, as it seems, something of an incorporation of Jungian archetype and Jungian symbol, what is there in the Jungian system to correspond to Yeatsian vision?

Strictly speaking, nothing. When Jung speaks of vision he does not mean something summoned by a charged image of archetypal character; rather, vision to Jung means simply symbol, or symbolic expression, something pushed forward by the unknowable archetype. True art is for Jung, true symbol; it flowers in freedom and in its own individuality, but its form bespeaks the hidden authority of the archetype and its roots find nourishment in the deep unconscious. According to Jung, true art is true symbol, and the symbol is both fixed and free. It is easier to know Jung's view of art than Yeats's, for Yeats is an artist and Jung a psychologist, but it may
be that the summoned vision of Yeats which has no perfect counterpart in the Jungian scheme of things is comprehended in Yeats's special understanding, his poet's understanding, of art and the meaning of art. Art as vision in the Yeatsian sense may be a step removed from all Jung says. Poetry may be for Yeats the poet in some degree qualitatively different from poetry for Jung the psychologist, and if so, we need not marvel that the Yeatsian symbol—seemingly a blend of Jungian archetype and symbol—summons vision unmentioned in Jung's writings. In general it may be said that in the Jungian system one does not summon but rather awaits symbol, vision, art, as an astrologist awaits the movements of an ensemble of stars into a particular sector of the celestial sphere. The Yeatsian system contains possibilities for direct contact and willful summonings more in keeping with alchemy. It is after all true that if a poet holds an archetype in hand, he holds a genie of unreckonable power. It may be well to recall that in our discussion of the making of reality, we observed that in Jung's world man projects and is projected back upon, while in Yeats's world man simply projects. We have seen, of course, that Jungian psychology is itself not totally innocent of the alchemical method, and Yeats's musings, as if to defy our analysis, seem often in concert with the patient spirit of astrology. In "Pages from a Diary Written in 1930," for instance, Yeats speaks of the symbol as an entity that descends
to men—as if men must wait for its descent—and he thereby confounds all efforts to bring the Yeatsian method or the Yeatsian symbol into rigid conformity.

The problem with the Yeatsian symbol does not end here, however. At times it abandons its archetypal identity and becomes virtually indistinguishable from what we have called the Jungian symbol. It becomes less fixed, less determined and determinative, less given to the typical and more multiplied in meaning. It is at this point in the course of the natural history of the symbol that we hear Yeats's "our dreams begin to dream" and recall his visionary figures of a man and a woman "rising like a dream within a dream." We remember that the multiple adumbration of the Jungian symbol we defined as meaning which hides behind hidden meaning. As if to endorse that view of the character of symbol and to detract from the concept of symbols as "living souls," Yeats speaks in "The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry," of "symbols that have numberless meanings . . ." Moreover, in the poem, "The Statues," we hear that "Mirror on mirror mirrored is all the show." (The Collected Poems . . ., p. 323.)

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45 "Anima Hominis," Per Amica Silentia Lunae, p. 41.


47 "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 87.
Yeats himself is aware of possible contradictions in the nature of the symbol considered as a single species. He writes, "At first I tried to distinguish between symbols and symbols, between what I called inherent symbols and arbitrary symbols, but the distinction has come to mean little or nothing." 48 Any inflexible distinctions we ourselves might be tempted to impose on Yeats's symbols are therefore sure to come to an undistinguished end. Some of his symbols are of magic, some of his magic symbols are of poetry, and some of his poetic symbols are not at all magical. Our investigation of the ambivalency of the origin of the Yeatsian symbol would lead us to expect exactly this situation.

O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?


One thing we can know: much of what we have said of the Yeatsian symbol, this summoner of vision, finds expression in the Jungian modifier, "archetypal": its beginnings in the sea of anima mundi, its association with darkness and light, disguise and glory, height and depth, numinosity and synchronicity, weavings of Tao and the making of reality. Nevertheless, the Yeatsian symbol has its own

48'Magic,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 49.
fully peculiar powers, not the least of which may be its unfailing elusion of final analysis. In the manner of some desired substance of alchemy the Yeatsian symbol behaves, alive in each turn of the alchemist's imagination and grandly absent from every vial and retort in his array.
Chapter Three: Trinitarian Patterns

Slippery though Yeats's symbols seem, their high creative power may not be called into question. It may not, that is, if we are to understand Yeats's symbols as he understands them. Likewise, if we would bring our voices into unison with Jung's, we must confess that the archetypes' least doubtful attribute—an attribute which we glimpse in the protean symbols which archetypes endow and send forward—is their power to create. If we say that the throne of the Yeatsian symbol or the Jungian archetype is the mind of man, our assertion—assuming that we look to the greater glory of humankind—approaches a resplendence which is yet a full order of magnitude short of Saint Paul's declaration that man is the temple of the living God (II Cor. 6:16). But if we understand that the obverse is true, namely that the mind of man finds its throne divine in Yeatsian symbol and Jungian archetype, greater glory seems to loom. Man then broods over his own chaos, the creative word forming in his own mouth. To testify to the true nature of Yeats's symbol or Jung's archetype is to acclaim a power of primary creativity which in the first if not the last analysis is in, from, and of man. It is for that reason that we speak here, as we have spoken in earlier chapters, of a man-emmanant god the creator in the poetry of Yeats and the psychology of Jung, a creator who dwells in duality and reaches out through synchronicity and establishes himself in numinosity. It is our present purpose to demonstrate that the man-emmanant god of Yeats or Jung satisfies
not only the image of father-creator, but projects in behalf of its own further definition a developed pattern of trinitarian form.

A brief recapitulation of the father-creator is a reasonable opening for a campaign which bids to unveil a trinity in its entirety. Does man continually discover a given reality? We know now that Yeats would say, no, man continually calls forth and posits reality—if he wields the full power that is his. If he does not wield such power, he stands to be wrapped in reality called forth by others. Jung also maintains, as we have seen, that man is not so much called into the world as he is himself caller of the world. Inasmuch as man-emanant god the creator speaks with man's voice, man may be said to call to himself the world. But where Jung is concerned, man is caller whether man cares to be or not. This last condition helps to distinguish Jung's man-emanant god the creator from Yeats's, for in Jung's view there is little question of choice. All men continually create reality, although most go through for their own benefit an elaborate enactment of merely stumbling upon it. For Jung, man's making of reality is a calling of the world in the same sense in which the flow of heat to a heat sink might be a calling of heat energy. We have seen that for Yeats, on the other hand, man's creation of reality is closely associated with man's willfulness. The man from whom this creativity emanates calls the world as the moon calls for the rising of tides, or as the wise man of a clan calls ceremonial figures from the rising of smoke, or as a general calls through the smoke
of the field for a battalion in reserve to rise up and move forward. So near at hand, from Yeats's viewpoint, is the possibility for the relationship between man and man-emanant god the creator to narrow and close into single identity that he declares as imminent a time when "we will trust our own being and all it desires to invent; and when the external world is no more the standard of reality . . .".  

In Yeats's poetry the self-generating nature of god the creator belongs fully to man; each man may become that Faulknerian "ungendered progenitor" about which we earlier spoke. In the 'Ribh in Ecstasy' portion of "Supernatural Songs," we learn that "Godhead on Godhead in sexual spasm begot/Godhead," and of the soul it is said in the subsequent 'Ribh Considers Christian Love Insufficient,' "How can she live till in her blood He live!" The God of Moses makes Himself known from the flames of an inconsumable bush with the assertion, "I AM THAT I AM," whereas Moses's introduction of himself at the opening of this conversation is simply "Here am I" (Ex. 3:4, 14). How in contrast to Moses's manner is that of the feminine presence, a Yeatsian anima of man, who appears in the 'He and She' verses which immediately continue.

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the sequence, "Supernatural Songs":

She sings as the moon sings:
'I am I, am I;
The greater grows my light
The further that I fly.'
All creation shivers
With that sweet cry.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 285.)

The moon receives light from the sun and yet shines with a radiance quite her own. Any distinguishing between giver and receiver, between caller and called, becomes a thorny and complicated activity: "O may the moon and sunlight seem/ One inextricable beam,/
For if I triumph I must make men mad." ("The Tower," pp. 193-4.)
The self-generative powers that Yeats discovers in the mind and soul of man bespeak a resident man-emanant god the creator. Notice that the light of creation and creativity—perhaps the primordial light which some astronomers associate with the inconceivable beginning of that play and dance of matter and that oceanic heaving of materiality which have, presumably from mankind's earliest opportunity forward, captivated him so—enters straightforwardly into the being and body of the Yeatsian man, engendering in him the capacity for becoming, even as the bear in Faulkner's tale, "his own ungendered progenitor":
What motion of the sun or stream
Or eyelid shot the gleam
That pierced my body through?
What made me live like these that seem
Self-born, born anew?

("Stream and Sun at Glendalough," p. 250.)

In a similar tone Yeats comments in prose, "We are mirrors of the stellar light and we cast this light outward as incidents, magnetic attractions, characterisations, desires." In the intimacy of his relationship with man-emanant god the creator, man either casts a spell from which he draws reality, as the gamester in "The Tower" draws a pack of hounds and a hare from a pack of cards (The Collected Poems ..., p. 194), or--failing thus to unite with the man-emanant creator--man falls beneath the chants of others and drawn on by their spell, as Cuchulain by the conjurings of the wise men of the Druid clan, wades out to become one with the tide--and thereafter no doubt rises and wanes in accordance with the beckonings of the moon ("Cuchulain's Fight with the Sea," pp. 35-6). When Yeats sings, "I declare this tower is my symbol" ("Blood and the Moon," part II, p. 233), he poses as one who knows the power of his own creative word, as one who rests assured, having satisfied himself early in life that with proper enunciation of such a word "the visible world would completely vanish, and that

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world, summoned by the symbol, take its place," as one who is under authority and so, after the confident style of the military commander of the poem "Vacillation," draws rein and cries out to "battle-weary men"--to troops as weary perhaps as Cuchulain in his ceaseless struggle with wave after wave of imposed reality--that anathema which is at the same time, being immediately followed by its maranatha, the first syllable of the creative word: "Let all things pass away."  

As Elohim fashions man's body in Genesis, so man--assuming that he is representative of the light of the proper phase of the moon--forms his own body in Yeats's "The Phases of the Moon": "His body moulded from within his body/ Grows comelier ..." (The Collected Poems ... , p. 161). It is the intended self-generation of both soul and body that lurks within Yeats's unequivocal, "I declare this tower is my symbol" (p. 233). And yet, this proclamation from the poet carries still further. It glows not only with creative power contained but with that same power projected, for Yeats bids to mould his own body and to quicken his own soul and to deliver into the world in living form

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5Yeats, "Vacillation," part VI, The Collected Poems ..., p. 247. This line appears in the context of its entire stanza in chapter two, p. 39, this paper.
the symbols embodied in songs and verses. Of the artist and the making of art, Yeats speaks in an especially peculiar and engaging fashion: "... you cannot give a body to something that moves beyond the senses, unless your words are as subtle, as complex, as full of mysterious life, as the body of a flower or of a woman." Such subtlety and complexity—the elusive breath and tremor of life itself—proceed from the mind and finger tip of the man from whom the creator god emanates. Living art, living reality, and the living body of man are, by virtue of the man-emanant character of Yeats's creator, the work of man himself. So plainly is man creator-father in "Young Man's Song" that repentance here is properly made by man the wayward son and sinner to man himself, the offended father: "And all shall bend the knee/ To my offended heart/ Until it pardon me" (The Collected Poems . . ., p. 257). The upsurge of wounded spirit and the bending of the knees in "Young Man's Song" are indications of more than simple regret, or contrition turned inward. Rather, the poem pictures an act of repentance, for pardon is in the offering.

Repentance presupposes a redeemer, and indeed "Young Man's Song" makes a glancing approach to such an idea when the male figure of the poem speaks of having seen the feminine object of his affection "Before the world was made." We can scarcely avoid

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seeing that the first-person narrator of the poem—whether or not in this case he has the poet's express permission—draws an image of himself not far removed in likeness from a saving figure of prodigious dimensions who is reputed to have said, "Before Abraham was, I am." (John 8:58) and of whom the Council at Nicaea confessed, "begotten of His Father before all worlds . . ." Yeats makes other sidelong gestures toward images which might be construed as Christ-like. The speaker in the poem, "The Pilgrim," says, "I fasted for some forty days on bread and buttermilk" (p. 310), and in another poem the boughs of trees wither "because I have told them my dreams," even as a fig tree in another land in another time is said to have withered in response to the Messiah's instructions to that effect.7 If such lines from Yeats's poems contain dim intimations of a redeemer's authority, others speak plainly of a redeemer's suffering. In "Travail of Passion," for instance, one need not look forward in time or backward to a saviour, but simply within: man is his own redeemer, who enters


The likeness between the two cases of tree-withering is mildly reinforced by Jeffares's observation that Yeats comments in Mythologies (New York: 1959), p. 116, that the rising of sap in trees is said by the Irish to cause dreams to lose their wisdom. A. Norman Jeffares, A Commentary on the Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (Stanford: 1968), p. 91. In other words, trees might contradict the dreamer's intention to dream and to dream wisely. Likewise, contradiction of intention may be said to have been the nemesis of the fig tree in the New Testament.
in sexual splendor his own exceptional holy city:

When the flaming lute-thronged angelic door is wide;
When an immortal passion breathes in mortal day;
Our hearts endure the scourge, the plaited thorns, the way
Crowded with bitter faces, the wounds in palm and side,
The vinegar-heavy sponge, the flowers by Kedron stream;

(p. 68.)

The sufferings of man-emmanant god the redeemer, potentially the
allotted portion of mankind in general, are most poignantly
realized in the beings of poets and other artists. In the essay
"Blake's Illustrations to Dante," Yeats affirms that "he who half
lives in eternity by which Yeats means, one who is an artist of
visionary power endures a rending of the structures of the mind,
a crucifixion of the intellectual body." 8

Because of Yeats's understanding that reality in its entirety
and in its full ambiguity may be spun forth from the creator
within, he sings recklessly in praise of gaiety--as we glimpsed
in his poem, "Lapis Lazuli" 9 --in the face of tragedy. In the essay
"Anima Hominis" Yeats speaks of a painter who wished to paint a
woman who had led a tragic life and who said of himself in this
connection, "if I denied myself any of the pain I could not believe

8 Yeats, 'Blake's Illustrations to Dante,' "Ideas of Good and
Evil," Essays and ..., p. 128.

9 The Collected Poems ..., pp. 291-3; this paper, chapter
two, p. ...
in my own ecstasy." Yeats himself proclaims in this essay, "... for the awakening, for the vision, for the revelation of reality, tradition offers us a... word--ecstasy."10 It is therefore understandable that Yeats's man-emmanent redeemer does not perfectly recapitulate--infact, in some respects fully contradicts--that image of the hero-savior with which Western civilization is most familiar. In the narrative poem "The Wanderings of Oisin," the dripping sea-god calls forth "The mightier masters of a mightier race":

And at his cry there came no milk-pale face Under a crown of thorns and dark with blood, But only exultant faces.


In "The Phases of the Moon," it is the self-scarring by scourging, "as with the cat-o'-nine-tails of the mind," which brings man's body to a more comely form (p. 161); in other words, man-emmanent god the redeemer submits to a sacrifice which brings him into mutually exultant coincidence with man-emmanent god the creator. Self-sacrifice leads to self-realization. These terms belong to Yeats. They acquire their significance in a conversation with and acquaintance:

We discussed self-realisation and self-sacrifice.

He said the classic self-realisation had failed

and yet the victory of Christian self-sacrifice had plunged the world into the Dark Ages. I reminded him of some Norse God, who was hung over an abyss for three days, "a sacrifice to himself," to show that the two were not incompatible...

(The Autobiography . . . , p. 314.)

In the passion of Yeats’s man-emanant redeemer suffering and death are swallowed up by victory and glorification not subsequently but simultaneously. This departure from the traditionally prescribed pathway of the hero-redeemer carries the advantage of avoidance of any point of climactic defeat. A redeemer who emanates exclusively from man would seem to make this attractive variation possible. The portions of the deliverer and of the delivered become one. The compulsion to be wounded for the sake of the lost and the desire to be made whole solely for one’s own sake are happily resolved into a single intention.

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Yeats no doubt refers to Odin:

I ween that I hung/ on the windy tree
Hung there for nights full nine;
With the spear I was wounded,/ and offered I was
To Odin, myself to myself.

If we postulate man the father and man the redeemer, who or what proceeds from these two? "Caoilte tossing his burning hair"12 combined with Aengus's proclaiming, "a fire was in my head"13 may put us in mind of other flames upon (but observe; not in the hair of, or inside) eleven other heads, and thus suggest an answer. Yeats tells us that for Boehme and the alchemist writers "imagination was the first emanation of the divinity"14 and that Blake "deified imaginative freedom."15 This last quotation is taken from an essay in which Yeats himself later bends to the task of a similar apotheosis and insists that man's imagination should "strive to bring fire from heaven . . . "16 That it may sometimes do so is a truth nearly established by Yeats's personal pentecostal experience:

A couple of years ago, while in meditation, my head seemed surrounded by a conventional sun's rays, and when I went to bed I had a long dream of a woman with hair on fire. I awoke and lit a candle, and discovered presently from the odour that in doing so I had set my own hair on fire.

("Anima Mundi," Per Amica Silentia Lunae, p. 73.)

16 "William Blake and his Illustrations," Ideas . . ., p. 196.
We know from Yeats's poem "The Mother of God" that the awareness of a living and presumably active and gesticulating deity within, or against one's own breast, may well raise the hair on one's head.¹⁷ Perhaps hair so excited is especially likely to go up in flames. In any case, Yeats's holy spirit expresses its nature in the fire of imagination and the wind of imaginative inspiration. Both fire and wind possess the force of graceful spontaneity. Yeats's poem "Sweet Dancer" may be viewed as his hymn, his utterly beautiful hymn, to imagination, to the fire-bringing holy spirit that emanates in arabesque sinuosity from the mind of man.

The girl goes dancing there
On the leaf-sown, new-mown, smooth
Grass plot of the garden;
Escaped out of her crowd,
Or out of her black cloud.
Ah, dancer, ah, sweet dancer!

(The Collected Poems . . ., pp.293-4.)

Yeats's essay, "The Body of the Father Christian Rosencrux," is an invoking of the same holy spirit of imagination, which proceeds from the mind of man who is man the creator and man the redeemer:

I cannot get it out of my mind that this age of criticism is about to pass, and an age of imagination,

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¹⁷ What is this flesh I purchased with my pains,
    This fallen star my milk sustains,
    This love that makes my heart's blood stop
    Or strikes a sudden chill into my bones
    And bids my hair stand up?

of emotion, of moods, of revelation, about to come in its place; . . . we will trust our own being and all it desires to invent . . . . . 
. . . the life of the artist is in the old saying, 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the spirit.' [John 3:8]

(Ideas . . ., pp. 310-1.)

To be born of the spirit in the Yeatsian sense is to have dispensed with the wrappings of commonplace reality and so to be able to stand for the coming anointing shoulder to shoulder with stalwart primitives, "naked to the winds of heaven."18 We are assured by Yeats that, from the artist's standpoint, "there's more enterprise/ In walking naked,"19 and that the artist's eyes are blinking, in the words of his poetic character Dathi,

'With the secrets of God half blind,
But I can see where the wind goes
And follow the way of the wind;

'And blessedness goes where the wind goes,
And when it is gone we are dead;
I see the blessedest soul in the world
And he nods a drunken head.

("The Blessed," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 66.)

18Yeats, Ideas . . ., p. 51; this paper, chapter one, p. 26.
The gift of the holy spirit that emanates from man is the grace to cast off the common apparel of the world, to walk openly naked, and to be so swamped by waves of new vision summoned by symbol as to seem, with grace and gaiety, thoroughly intoxicated.

Dathi's association of spirit breathed in with spirits imbibed has of course its precedents. Many examples might be cited. Bystanders are reported to have said of those to whom fire and wind came in old Jerusalem, "These men are full of new wine." (Acts 2:13.) The grieving feminine presence of Yeats's "The Grey Rock," too taken with the tragedy of the moment to embrace the ecstasy Yeats everywhere prescribes, is doused with wine from goblets of the gods and thus soaked to her skin regains Yeatsian vision:

And she with Goban's wine adrip,

No more remembering what had been,

Stared at the gods with laughing lip.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 104.)

We have said that for Yeats mere appearance does not establish reality and visual images do not constitute vision. The shiftings of the wind of the spirit bring forth proliferations of symbols, and symbols summon vision. The dancing tongues of flame of the spirit who emanates from man transform what seems to be into what is not and what seemed not to be into what suddenly and most powerfully is, namely the summoned vision in full illumination. Men claimed by such fascinations have drunk indeed the new wine of the spirit.
In "Per Amica Silentia Lunae," Yeats sums up the godhead in trinity which emanates from man, this man-emanent god: "I must assume . . . that, as Blake said, 'God only acts or is in existing beings or men.'" In the same essay he reveals a dream and so tempts us to see in manifestations of his unconscious a like summary of divinity in man, a like conclusion concerning who the Yeatsian god is and whence he comes:

I dreamed very lately that I was writing a story, and at the same time I dreamed that I was one of the characters in that story and seeking to touch the heart of some girl in defiance of the author's intention; and concurrently with all that, I was as another self trying to strike with the button of a foil a great china jar.

(Mythologies, p. 358.)

At the end of that essay we receive the most telling revelation:

Once, twenty years ago, I seemed to awake from sleep to find my body rigid, and to hear a strange voice speaking these words through my lips as through lips of stone: 'We make an image of him who sleeps, and it is not he who sleeps, and we call it Emmanuel.'

(p. 366.)


21 Yeats records the same experience in slightly different words in The Autobiography . . ., p. 252.
At first blush, "God with us" may seem an unexpectedly regal designation for any poet, or for any poet's image, but when we perceive the doctrine of man-emanant god and receive understanding of the symbol as a living image, this strange title—omen of incarnation spoken in a bedchamber—becomes more understandable. The glass begins to clear; the poet plays many roles—all suitably sacred: the father, the son, the spirit, the mother of the son. It is of himself Yeats speaks when he declaims, "The terror of all terrors that I bore/ The Heavens in my womb." We know now that one who stands—immaculately self-shrouded and venerated, conveniently androgynous—behind the conceiving, the giving, the taking, the wielding of the title (paeans of new praise to self-semination), "The Mother of God." *(The Collected Poems . . . , p. 244.)*

Before Yeats set his own hair afire with the candle, he had been, as we saw before, so deeply lost in dream or meditation that his head had seemed to him "surrounded by a conventional sun's rays."22 The sun is also associated with the numinous experience—that is, the uncannily gripping, the awesomely fascinating experience—which makes up the poem which we used as evidence for the self-generating powers imparted by man-emanant god the creator.

What motion of the sun or stream

Or eyelid shot the gleam

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22"Anima Mundi," *Per Amica Silentia Lunae*, p. 73.
That pierced my body through?
What made me live like these that seem
Self-born, born anew?

("Stream and Sun at Glendalough,"
The Collected Poems . . . , p. 250.)

The sun may be construed in both instances at hand as limitless source and grandly excessive donor. Both the prose description of the burning hair (although this troublesome and obstinately ordinary candle admittedly plays something of a controlling role in the drama at hand) and the poetic picture of the enlivened soul and body are associated with the power of the rays of the sun. The large flame shows itself in the flickerings of smaller flames. It may have occurred to no one present on that now memorialized day of Pentecost to draw analogies between the assumed Source of the cloven tongues of flame and the Mediterranean sun which doubtlessly blazed overhead that morning.23 And yet analogies something like this had appeared in the minds of men before—whether or not it occurred to Moses as he stared at the burning bush under the blazing sun of Midian—and would appear again later: "For the Lord God is a sun and shield . . . ." (Psalms 84:11) and "For our God is a consuming fire." (Heb. 12:29). Naturally, such flights of the reasoning and comparing spirit in man do not escape the scrutiny

23 It occurred to Jung, however, to associate the wind of Pentecost with the vision of the schizophrenic patient mentioned in chapter two of this paper—a vision which proved fateful for Jung and which featured the sun's waving phallus as the source of earthly winds. In the same connection Jung offers: "'Animo descensus per orbem solis tribuitur' (They say that the spirit descends through the disc of the sun)." Carl Gustav Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche (New York: 1960), p. 151.
of Jung:

The sun, as Renan has observed, is the only truly "rational" image of God, whether we adopt the standpoint of the primitive savage or of modern science. In either case the sun is the father-god from whom all living things draw life; he is the fuctifier and creator, the source of the energy for our world. 24

So much for the sun as god. How is this concept related to man as god? If we hold to more judiciously chosen and to more specific terms: how is this concept of the deified sun related to the man-emanant god we found in the writings of Yeats? Jung's further comments concerning the sun and images of the sun come close to giving us an answer:

... the sun is perfectly suited to represent the visible God of this world, i.e., the creative power of our own soul, which we call libido, and whose nature it is to bring forth the useful and the harmful, the good and the bad. That this comparison is not just a matter of words can be seen from the teachings of the mystics: when they descend into the depths of their own being they find "in their heart" the image of the sun ...

(pp. 121-1.)

So much for the sun as a legitimate image of a god who emanates from within visionaries and poets. How is this concept related to Jung's psychology? When Jung says that the sun represents "the creative power of our own soul," he presents us not only with a problem of agreement in number between modifier and noun modified—a problem which we could hardly resolve here, short of blaming the translators or surrendering to the collective unconscious, and which we will therefore ignore—but he also touches the border of his own psychological teachings, and this at a point not far removed from the keystone of what we have previously presented as his world-view, namely an understanding of reality as affected in content and form from within rather than as given in its entirety from without—of reality as secretly custom-made rather than openly ready-made. The foundation of Jung's psychology, as our previous explorations have revealed, gives rise to this most far-reaching of flying buttresses: man-emanant god the creator continually calls to himself the events and circum-
stances of everyday existence. This god is farther removed from the will of man than his Yeatsian counterpart, and yet in a number of respects he seems much the same.

We have seen that it is by intervention and intercession of the Jungian symbol that man-emanant creative power is allowed free expression. It is through the movements of the symbol that the intricate and synchronistic weavings of Tao are accomplished and the entire ensemble of reality drawn forth in full array, a process
which we might envision as the harmonious movement and
rearrangement of heavenly bodies of the night sky into some
newly appropriate and well fitted constellation replete with
hidden astrological meanings. It may be well to remember at
this point that a patient’s vision of the sun with a penis—a sun
with the power to impregnate—and Jung’s subsequent discovery
of the same impressive image in Dieterich’s translation of an
ancient manuscript were, by Jung’s own account, the two events
which sparked his interest in acausal correlations and thus,
ultimately, gave to his psychology its distinctive form and
character.\footnote{Jung, \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche} (New York: 1960), pp. 150ff.} In just such artistic fashion does Jung’s man-
emanant god the creator work to shape man’s life and to astound
the man who lives it. Man projects upon the heavens and is
projected back upon.\footnote{As the trauma theory shows, we are too much
inclined . . . to attribute the emotional develop-
ment of a person wholly, or at least very largely,
to accidents. The old trauma theory went too far
in this respect. We must never forget that the
world is, in the first place, a subjective pheno-
menon. \textit{The impressions we receive from these
accidental happenings are also our own doing.}
It is not true that the impressions are forced on
us unconditionally; our own predisposition condi-
tions the impression.

Dieterich reads, "I am a star wandering together with you and shining up from the depths." (Symbols of Transformation, p. 87.) Here is at least a suggestion of a correlative for Yeats's "The Mother of God," in which a truly, and we might say literally, overawed feminine presence speaks of the god to which she gives birth as "This fallen star my milk sustains."\textsuperscript{27} We are in better position to understand now the deep significance of Jung's bluff assertion, "Glad tidings: when the eternal signs have vanished from the heavens, the pig that hunts truffles finds them again in the earth."\textsuperscript{28} The heavens reflect so deeply into creation that they may be said to be present, not simply in one degree but in their entirety, in the depth of man's only seemingly simple soul. Of the psychic structure of man Jung states flatly, "It is the mother."\textsuperscript{29} The god who has his nativity within is the god who creates and emanates from within. It is on his behalf that Jung speaks of "the divine creative power inherent" in the human psyche,\textsuperscript{30} and it is in response to his movements that "being together" and "coming together at the right moment"\textsuperscript{31} are effected.

\textsuperscript{27} Yeats, The Collected Poems ..., p. 244.


These formative gestures of man-emanant god bring about such varied results as Jung's recognizing a psychiatrist's vision as a repetition of images to be found in a four hundred year old woodcut, one of his own dreams as a correct anticipation of illustrations in a sixteenth century document ordered but not yet received, a young American's dream as matching a precognitive dream recorded by Artemidorus of Daldis, a friend's dream as warning against the possibility of the fatal fall from a mountain which later claimed that friend.\(^{32}\) Jung maintains that by way of such memorable—or in the last instance, emphatic—demonstrations, man-emanant god the creator testifies to his own presence.\(^{33}\)

In *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, Jung quotes Angelus Silesius's "What good does Gabriel's 'Ave Mary' do? Unless he give me that same greeting too?"\(^{34}\) and so seems to move us back to the bedroom where Yeats receives his personal annunciation message. Jung takes pains to explain to us the alchemical version of God


\(^{33}\)It is so much more straightforward, more dramatic, impressive, and therefore more convincing, to see all the things that happen to me than to observe how I make them happen. Indeed, the animal nature of man makes him resist seeing himself as the maker of his circumstances.


incarnate, the Messiah, Emmanuel:

... the Christian opus is an operari in
honour of God the Redeemer undertaken by man who
stands in need of redemption, while the alchemical
opus is the labour of Man the Redeemer in the
cause of the divine world-soul slumbering and
awaiting redemption in matter. The Christian
earns the fruits of grace ex opere operato, but
the alchemist creates for himself—ex opere
operantis in the most literal sense—a "panacea
of life"... 35

In a similar passage we glimpse Jung's own attitude toward man the
redeemer:

Whereas the Christian belief is that man is freed
from sin by the redemptory act of Christ, the
alchemist was evidently of the opinion that the
'restitution to the likeness of original and
incorrupt nature' had still to be accomplished
by the art, and this can only mean that Christ's
work of redemption was regarded as incomplete.
In view of the wickedness which the 'Prince of
this world' [Footnote: John 12:31], undeterred,
going on perpetuating as liberally as before, one
cannot withhold all sympathy from such an opinion.

(Mysterium ..., pp. 34-35.)

The self-sacrifice and self-realization which Yeats declared united in the image of Odin might be seen as closely related to Jung's psychotherapeutic approach, which we have characterized as consisting of planned movements toward differentiation (a dividing up) and individuation (a putting together). Differentiation might be characterized as the wrestling of a name from each devil within and the effort to give each his conversational due; it is a process of discovery which may involve pain for the individual tantamount to his being fixed by his right hand to one end of a beam and by his left to the other. Such are the extremes to which inner colloquy leads. Individuation is acceptance, endurance, and transcendence of such a condition. One's own completed person becomes the spanning of the unendurable gap and thus unites left with right, earth with heaven. Defeat and glorification become a single word. Jung is as fond of Odin as Yeats and reminds us that "through hanging on the tree of life Odin obtained knowledge of the runes and of the inspiriting drink that gave him immortality." (Symbols of Transformation, p. 433, note 79.) It would have been even better for the purposes of Jung and Yeats had Odin sipped the drink of immortality while suspended over the abyss. Such cooperation would have affirmed more plainly their shared preference for simultaneity over sequentiality. Although Odin's timing may leave something to be desired, the general principle remains: by offering himself to himself man exceeds his natural presumption and spills over into that person of the man-emamant trinity whose task is redemption. Jung puts it this way: "Whenever the archetype of the
self predominates, the inevitable psychological consequence is a state of conflict vividly exemplified by the Christian symbol of crucifixion—that acute state of unredeemedness which comes to an end only with the words 'consummatum est.' 36 The "Self," as Jung understands it, is that beckoning totality toward which the human personality traces an asymptotic course in the process of individuation.

It is necessary to understand the reality-making nature of Jung's man-emanant god the creator to appreciate fully the continuing deliverance which is the offering and duty, the prerogative, of god the redeemer. He frees man from the world which poses as that set of conditions to which man is merely called. Man is—as participant in an on-going and ceaseless reciprocity with nature—the secret caller of the world:

A great reversal of standpoint, calling for much sacrifice, is needed before we can see the world as "given" by the very nature of the psyche . . . . Redemption is a separation and deliverance from an earlier condition of darkness and unconsciousness, and leads to a condition of illumination and releasedness, to victory and transcendence over everything "given."

(J. Adler, Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 514.)

Jung warns that Western man is especially susceptible to psychological inflation when identification of the ego with the numinous saving figure within suggests itself as a possibility. The Self may comprehend the ego, but the ego is not capable of claiming the Self. Jung's patient who was able to see with the eyes of schizophrenia the private parts of the sun also thought of himself as the Saviour. When the ego considers itself the Self, when man the redeemer becomes I the redeemer, the personality has, in Jung's eyes, reached a state of fallen grace a full story or two beneath that condition of unconscious innocence which preceded its first inklings of the movements of man-emamant god. If there is so high a qualification placed on the permitted movements and mergings of Yeats's man-emamant god the redeemer, it is well hidden. And yet it is difficult, from time to time, to discern in Jung's own writing the restrictions he would have man observe where man-emamant

37 What do we mean by the ego? For all its appearance of unity, it is obviously a highly composite factor.. . . . Consciousness . . . . seems to be the necessary pre-condition for the ego . . . .

The ego is a complex that does not comprise the total human being; it has forgotten infinitely more than it knows. It has heard and seen an infinite amount of which it has never become conscious. There are thoughts that spring up beyond the range of consciousness, fully formed and complete, and it knows nothing of them . . . .

I . . . think of ego-consciousness as a synthesis of various "sense-consciousnesses," in which the independence of each separate consciousness is submerged in the unity of the overruling ego.

Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, pp. 323-4.
god the redeemer is concerned. In *Psychology and Religion* Jung advances exegesis which would seem to promote a simpler understanding of the issue of who is delivered by whom: "Though we have the logion: 'I myself and the Father are one. Who seeth me seeth the Father,' it would be considered as blasphemy or as madness to stress Christ's dogmatic humanity to such a degree that man could identify with Christ and homoousia. But this is precisely the inference which one is entitled to make."\(^{38}\) If we suspend for the moment the question of the specific relationship between ego and Self in the issuing forth of the messiah from within, we may state with confidence that the redeemer of Jung's psychology is forthrightly in, from, and of man, and consequently indispensable as the second person of a man-emenant trinity.

A special power of imagination constitutes the third person in Jung's trinity as in Yeats's. Jung does not reserve the word "spirit" for denotation of the power of human imagination, and therefore when we find "spirit" in Jung's writings we may not automatically assume that he refers to something which is in any sense closely related to what we have called Yeats's man-emenant god the spirit. We earlier discussed Jung's use of "spirit" in connection with the living quality of the mind as opposed to either the living or inert matter of the body. Jung explains this meaning

of the word at some length in the chapter "Spirit and Life" in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche. In Psychology and Religion, Jung chides a Jesuit author of the sixteenth century who would restrict the interpretation of dreams to (in Jung's words) "such persons as are ex officio endowed with the donum spiritus sancti." Jung pictures instead, as we might expect, "a descensus spiritus sancti extra ecclesiam." Elsewhere Jung uses "spirit" in reference to a kind of Zeitgeist who is free to operate either from within an individual or across some spectrum or sprinkling of persons, who may be situated in a particular locality or nation, or distributed at random throughout the world. Spirit in this sense begins to draw closer to spirit in the Yeatsian sense: In Civilization in Transition Jung speaks both of a spirit at large and, albeit obliquely, of a spirit from within:

But even in such an age of enforced conformism (1934) the spirit is at work in science, in art, philosophy, and religious experience, heedless of whether the contemporary situation is favourable or unfavorable. We might recall Yeats's reference to "the wind bloweth where it listeth . . .", for there is something in man that is of divine nature and is not condemned to its own treadmill and

imprisoned in its own structure. This spirit wants to live—which is why old Galileo, when they had done torturing him, recanted, and afterwards, so the story goes, said, "But it does move"—only very softly, I'll wager. 40

Whereas the third person of a trinity is conventionally thought of as a power which proceeds from father and son, as a veritably living and moving relationship between father and son, between Godhead and creation, what we might term the third person of Jung's trinitarian pattern is a formative power which underlies father and son. Observe in the following passage Jung's stipulation, "dependent on human imagination"—and in the observing recall if you will the movingly elegant spontaneity of Yeats's "Sweet Dancer":

If . . . we say 'God,' we give expression to an image or verbal concept which has undergone many changes in the course of time. We are, however, unable to say with any degree of certainty—unless it be by faith—whether these changes affect only the images and concepts, or the Unspeakable itself. After all, we can imagine God as an eternally flowing current of vital energy that endlessly changes shape just as easily as we can imagine him as an eternally

unmoved, unchangeable essence. Our reason is
sure only of one thing: that it manipulates
images and ideas which are dependent on human
imagination and local conditions, and which
therefore have changed innumerable times in
the course of their long history.41

Furthermore, imagination does not remain in Jung's writing for-
ever mere pretender to the third throne. Jolande Jacobi attempts
description of Jung's investiture of man's gracefully fruitful
and canny, holy imagination:

The opus which the alchemist brings forth and the
imaginatio, which is the psychic instrument whereby
the Eastern mystic 'produces' Buddha, are based on
the active imagination that leads Jung's patients to
the same experience of symbols and through them to the
knowledge of their own 'centre,' the self. This ima-
gination has nothing to do with 'imagining' in the
common sense of the word. 'The imaginatio,' says Jung,
'is to be understood here as the real and literal power
to create images (Einbildungskraft=imagination)--the
classical usage of the word in contrast to phantasia,
which means a mere "conceit," "idea," or "hunch" (Ein-
fall) in the sense of insubstantial thought . . .

Imaginatio is the active evocation of (inner) images . . .

41C. G. Jung, "Lectori Benevolo," Answer to Job (London: 1954),
pp. xiii-xiv.
an authentic feat of thought of ideation, which
does not spin aimless and groundless fantasies
"into the blue"—does not, that is to say, just
play with its objects—but tries to grasp the
inner facts and portray them in images true to
their nature." It is an activation of the pro-
foundest depths of the soul, intended to promote
the emergence of salutary symbols.  

Jung's active imagination is that distinctly alchemical technique
which, as we discovered earlier, bears a certain resemblance to
Yeats's practice of summoning more or less autonomous visions by
way of symbols. Yeats comments in "Symbolism in Painting":

Every visionary knows that the mind's eye soon
comes to see a capricious and variable world,
which the will cannot shape or change, though
it can call it up and banish it again. I closed
my eyes a moment ago, and a company of people in
blue robes swept by me in a blinding light, and
had gone before I had done more than see little
roses, and confused, blossoming apple-boughs
somewhere beyond them, and recognised one of the

42 Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (New Haven
and London: 1962), pp. 139-140. Jacobi quotes from Jung's
Psychology and Alchemy, p. 160.
company by his square, black, curling
beard.\footnote{Symbolism in Painting,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 151. "Symbolism in Painting" is dated 1898 and related footnote referred to above, 1924.}

In a footnote to the foregoing glimpsed cavalcade of imperial noteworthies, Yeats offers a strikingly Jungian explanation of the play of his imagination: "I did not mean that this particular vision had the intensity either of a dream or of those pictures that pass before us between sleep and waking. I had learned, and my fellow-students had learned, as described in The Trembling of the Veil, to set free imagination when we would, that it might follow its own law and impulse." Jung describes his active imagination as "a method (devised by myself) of introspection for observing the stream of interior images." He continues in terms which resemble those of Yeats's interpolation to his vision:

One concentrates one's attention on some impressive but unintelligible dream-image, or on a spontaneous visual impression, and observes the changes taking place in it.

Meanwhile, of course, all criticism must be suspended and the happenings observed and noted with absolute objectivity. Obviously, too, the objection that the whole thing is "arbitrary" or "thought up" must be set aside, since it
The objection springs from the anxiety of an ego-consciousness which brooks no master besides itself in its own house.\footnote{C. G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (New York: 1969), p. 190.}

The summoning both in Jung's method and Yeats's is willful in a restricted sense. Intention is definitely involved. They summon by imagination not as one who falls into jungle waters summons crocodiles, but more as a naturalist who imitates the cry of a mortally wounded rabbit summons predators. The naturalist brings predators by an act of will, but this is not to say that every wolf, bear, wolverine, or weasel who arrives is therefore subservient to him. After all, if such creatures come, they do so more to satisfy themselves than to satisfy the caller. If Jung were our hypothetical woodsman he would scrutinize all called mammals with a view toward identification, denomination, classification, perhaps domestication. Yeats in the same role would eye closely and entreat called creatures in the secret hope of being allowed to mount up and ride away on them. In either case, elements both of predetermination and freedom would be present. So it is with the enlivening movements of man-emanant spirit in Yeats and Jung. This spirit is human imagination both called and freed.

Our foregoing analogy has a facetious overtone and therefore does not do justice to the seriousness with which Yeats and Jung regard and seek to apprehend man-emanant god the spirit. At the end of the essay in which he relates his vision of the company in
blue robes, Yeats asserts that the issue of the true nature of such images is "the only controversy in which it is greatly worth taking sides" (p. 152). Jung is equally adamant in his insistence that images paraded before the mind's eye through the exercise of active imagination are of high importance to the health and destiny of the psyche, to man's possession of a sense of the divine. Yeats and Jung are dogmatic in this respect. Each views the experience of the power of imagination as arresting, transforming, likely to impart conviction concerning hidden truth. In the light of such findings we may declare Jung's man-emanant trinity complete in three persons, father/mother, son, and spirit of holy imagination.

Imbedded in *Answer to Job* we find a summary of Jung's trinity: "It was only lately that we realized (or rather, are beginning to realize) that God is Reality itself and therefore--last but not least--man." (*Answer to Job*, p. 64.) And in *Psychology and Religion* Jung brings forth in array and full form man-emanant god:

> What one could almost call a systematic blindness is simply the effect of the prejudice that the deity is outside man. Although this prejudice is not solely Christian, there are certain religions which do not share it at all. On the contrary they insist, as do certain Christian mystics, upon the essential identity of God and man . . . .

We might . . . conclude that the symbol of quaternity or wholeness, the number four in some form, a square in a circle for instance, spontaneously
produced in the dreams of modern people, means the God within. Although the majority of cases (that is, patients) do not recognize this analogy, the interpretation might nevertheless be true. If we take into consideration the fact that the idea of God is an "unscientific" hypothesis, we can easily explain why people have forgotten to think along such lines. And even if they cherish a certain belief in God they would be deterred from the idea of God within by their religious education, which always depreciated this idea as "mystical." Yet it is precisely this "mystical" idea which is enforced by the natural tendencies of the unconscious mind. I myself, as well as my colleagues, have seen so many cases developing the same kind of symbolism that we cannot doubt its existence any longer.

(Psychology and Religion, pp. 72-73.)

When Jung speaks in such terms it seems appropriate to envision the Jungian man as projecting rather than as projected upon. Although the dynamics of the Jungian psyche are to be understood in terms of exchange and reciprocity, Jung stresses man's emanation rather than man's reception of the powers of divinity to the extent that such emanation achieves a kind of unquestioned primacy in his teaching. He comments, "The medieval mind finds it natural to derive the psyche from the Trinity, whereas the modern mind reverses
the procedure." (Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 137.) So it may be. It is most certainly true where Jung himself is concerned. Our approach to Jung and his man-emanant god must by the same standard be termed thoroughly modern. We have found in the Jungian model of the psyche and in the psychology which is derived from that model, a certain pattern, and this pattern is of trinitarian form. From Yeats's poetry we have extracted another and a parallel trinitarian pattern. In one of Yeats's poems we glimpse a highly conditioned reciprocity which may put us in mind of Jung's psychology: man reflects and is reflected back upon; man emanates and man receives emanations; and yet, in the verse

45 H. L. Philp reminds us of Jung's early absorption in the mystery of the Trinity. He quotes Jung as follows:

I well remember my confirmation lesson at the hands of my own father. The catechism bored me unspeakably. Once I turned the leaves of the little book in order to find something of interest, and my glance fell on the paragraphs about the Trinity. That interested me, and I waited impatiently till the instruction had advanced to that section. But when the longed-for lesson had arrived, my father said, "We will skip this section; I cannot make anything out of it myself." With that my last hope was laid in the grave. /C. G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality (London: 1940), p. 64./H. L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil (New York: 1958), p. 70.

46 Jung attributes "the greatness of the Bardo Todol," the Book of the Dead, to the fact that it "vouchsafes to the dead man the ultimate and highest truth, that even the gods are the radiance and reflection of our own souls." Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, p. 513.
that follows, the primacy of man's emanation holds sway: all original movement is from man, and only after this fact, to man—not the reverse: ". . . Can poet's thought/ That springs from body and in body falls/ Like this pure jet, now lost amid blue sky, / Now bathing lily leaf and fish's scale, / Be mimicry?" 47 The implication is clear. Man is origin and source; especially is man the artist origin and source, and therefore if we would seek significant patterns at their place of birth we must look to man. If instead we catch the rebounded and returning reflection, we will find ourselves in possession of second generation signals and transmissions. Because of the redoubtable power of symbols such a practice or such a mistake might, in Yeats's view, swamp the mistaken one with reality not his own, or in Jung's view, bring him such confusion as to negate the possibility of even relative harmony in the household of the psyche. The one danger is markedly alchemical and magical, namely a long and unwitting fall beneath some alien influence; the other danger is more in keeping with matters fateful and astrological, namely a reading of the signs, which—being in error—fails to prevent a debacle. The influences cast outward by symbols extend, as we have seen, to indefinite extremes in the life of man as defined by Yeats and Jung. The man-emanant trinity of Yeats is a kind of ether within which Yeatsian symbols move. The divine persons of Yeats's godhead provide, choose, channel, and employ charged images which summon vision. In this

fashion is the world created and synchronized, the body glorified, the soul transformed, and fine poetry written. The man-emanant trinity of Jung is on the one hand itself a symbol, a three-part representation of near-wholeness which speaks on behalf of that unsatisfied potential of the unconscious which strains toward the rounding and completion of each human psyche. It is this aspect of man-emanant god to which Jung refers when he states that "libido creates the God-image by making use of archetypal patterns" (Symbols of Transformation, p. 86). On the other hand, Jung's trinity is the force of the psyche itself. It is what happens and what tries to happen within man's total personality. In accordance with such happenings and attempted happenings is man's reality acquired and most carefully fashioned, his body set free, his mind introduced to meaning, and his imagination--under urgent orders to do specifically as it sees fit--fed and sent forward.
Chapter Four: The Field and Range of Man-emanant God

In earlier paragraphs we have examined evidence in favor of the existence of a kind of deity in the poetry of Yeats and the psychology of Jung. We conclude that a man-emanant god presides, at least from time to time—now issuing forth in brilliance, now waning to faint outline—in the writings of Yeats and Jung, and that this god appears fully formed in three persons. The man-emanant god of Yeats is not the man-emanant god of Jung and yet in certain respects these deities are so alike as to be nearly indistinguishable. May we pry further into man-emanant divinity and so seek out new likenesses and new differences in the Yeatsian and Jungian versions? Perhaps we may if we tack toward the milieu and ultimate purpose of this interior and sometimes ulterior god. To that end we formulate the following doctrine: man-emanant god resides in duality and culminates in unity. Here we may find a new field of likenesses. We should, in the search for similarity, touch upon the duality of the symbol, of man-emanant god, of man's psyche in its living totality—as well as the relativity of any good or evil associated with these beings (for if Yeats refers to symbols as living beings, perhaps for the moment we may also)—and we should, moreover, treat the unity toward which these living elements jointly strain. Subsequently, we will venture forth to explore the seas of Yeats's anima mundi and Jung's collective unconscious, as well as Yeats's deeper understanding of good and evil.
over against Jung's. Here we may discover differences.

Our discussion of the Yeatsian symbol revealed Yeats's highly developed awareness of duality. Night and day, sun and moon radiance and darkness, vision and blindness, wakefulness and sleep, choice and chance, highness and lowness, alternate throughout his poetry. Were there space enough and time, it might be possible to build a case for the point that Yeats's primary symbols are simply earth's own, namely day and night and their concomitants. In Yeats's eyes man as well as nature has a double aspect. The duality of nature is the duality of the symbol. The duality of the symbol is reflected in the duality of man himself. The duality of man is what we have called the milieu of man-emanant god. The doubleness that enwraps man-emanant god in Yeats's work might be seen at several levels, but because this god is in, from, and of man, that duality which is deeply ensconced within the mind and body of each human is of special and critical importance: each man's inner schism, each man's inner divisiveness, each man's line of struggle between self and other-self. The very engagement of such a struggle is, in Yeats's eyes, sign sufficient that a man has begun to claim his own reality, that he has begun to emanate the creator within. "The other self, the anti-self or the antithetical self, as one may choose to name it, comes but to those who are no longer deceived, whose passion is reality."¹ Such men are closely

knit with reality, for they understand that it proceeds from them. In the closeness of this relationship with what is, in the full awareness that from themselves flows daily all that of which they themselves are daily aware, such men know the joy of self-possession which Yeats calls ecstasy.

Ered to a harder thing
Than Triumph, turn away
And like a laughing string
Whereon mad fingers play
Amid a place of stone,
Be secret and exult,
Because of all things known
That is most difficult.²

The self-possession of those who have cast aside the veil of commonplace reality is based on a kind of braiding or intertwining, for men embattled with the daemon have, in a most explicit fashion, come to themselves: each has met his opposite and in so doing has stumbled upon the lost field of champions and has at last last met in single combat the proper opponent. In a peculiarly Yeatsian sense, such a man has exchanged the commonplace for the numinous. Yeats comments in "Anima Hominis":

When I think of life as a struggle with the

Daemon who would ever set us to the hardest

work among those not impossible, I understand why there is a deep enmity between a man and his destiny, and why a man loves nothing but his destiny. In an Anglo-Saxon poem a certain man is called, as though to call him something that summed up all heroism, 'Doom eager.' I am persuaded that the Daimon delivers and deceives us, and that he wove that netting from the stars and threw the net from his shoulder . . . . We meet always in the deep of the mind, whatever our work, wherever our reverie carries us, that other Will.

(Per Amica Silentia Lunae, pp. 30-3.)

We saw in our earlier discussion of the duality of the symbol that Yeats knows of "a self" which one flees "in vain." The daemon is a kind of living invitation to dread, and therefore, until one sees in this opposite the terms and qualifications and on-going process of personal destiny, one is inclined to flee: "the Daemon comes not as like to like but seeking its own opposite, for man and Daemon feed the hunger in one another's hearts." (Per Amica Silentia Lunae, p. 29.) It is from the depth of such duality that man-emancipant god emanates. It is his Yeatsian ambience. Duality both grounds and extends the natural themes of man-emancipant god.

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We might have guessed this from our knowledge of the life and
times of the symbol, for the Yeatsian symbol is a charged image
which summons vision of potential duality.

In "Ego Dominus Tuus" Ille replies to Hic, "By the help of
an image/ I call to my own opposite, summon all/ That I have
handled least, least looked upon." (The Collected Poems . . . .,
p. 157.) The conversation between Hic and Ille—which is itself
a shifting portrait, a moving reflection, of duality—concludes
in this fashion:

**Hic.** Why should you leave the lamp

Burning alone beside an open book,

And trace these characters upon the sands?

A style is found by sedentary toil

And by the imitation of great masters.

**Ille.** Because I seek an image, not a book.

Those men that in their writings are most wise

Own nothing but their blind, stupified hearts.

I call to the mysterious one who yet

Shall walk the wet sands by the edge of the stream

And look most like me, being indeed my double,

And prove of all imaginable things

The most unlike, being my anti-self,

And, standing by these characters, disclose

All that I seek; and whisper it as though
He were afraid the birds, who cry aloud
Their momentary cries before it is dawn,
Would carry it away to blasphemous men.

(p. 159.)

We discern that the inner struggle of man as depicted by Yeats is not capriciously constituted; it is proper and meaningful tension. This is not at all to say, however, that through such movements of self intertwined with self all things work together for good in the formation of personal destiny. If the daemon chose at this moment to speak aloud in our ears we would hear, "Destiny is destiny, but what is good?" The dynamic reciprocity which exists between self and daemon mirrors the Yeatsian view of the inherent and necessary duality of nature and the consequent relativity of all good and evil. In "Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop," we find: "'Fair and foul are near of kin,/ And fair needs foul,' I cried" (The Collected Poems ..., p. 254.), while of the Chinese sages in "Lapis Lazuli" we learn again, as we learned before:

There, on the mountain and the sky,
On all the tragic scene they stare.
One asks for mournful melodies;
Accomplished fingers begin to play.
Their eyes mid many wrinkles, their eyes,
Their ancient glittering eyes, are gay.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 293.)

In the poem "To a Friend Whose Work Has Come to Nothing," melody is to arise from "a laughing string/ Whereon mad fingers play . . ." (p. 107), and this in agreement with, not in contradiction to, the
musical arrangement of "Iapis Lazuli." Transcendence of the values and measurements of commonplace reality knows no unresolved contradiction; the seemingly ceaseless wrestling with the one who is one's own contradiction pre-empt all inner and outer channels which might otherwise broadcast the ordinary antagonisms of more conventional and widespread contradictions. As little as he requires for his poetry commonplace asses and parrots, just so little does Yeats require commonplace judgments of good and evil. As the courageously engaged struggle with the opposite works its destined work and carries a man, or a woman (as in "To a Friend Whose Work Has Come to Nothing"), quite beyond the definition and judgment of those who are strapped to an ordinary standard, just so that locked struggle with the opposite continued and sustained spirals the man who is thus self-possessed to heights (as in "Iapis Lazuli") quite above the earthly tragedy which overpowers the sensibilities of the unengaged and the unascended. From such a height the worldly agony that poses as good in contact with evil may be seen for the swirling eddy it has always been, a product of the naturally opposed cross-currents of life. "Beyond and above. Distance, distance ..." the daemon whispers into the ear of the opposite with whom he labors. And therefore whether we have "mournful medodies: played by "accomplished fingers," or "a laughing string" plucked by "mad fingers," we have no ordinary mourning and laughing, and no commonplace skill or madness, and furthermore no contradiction—but only ecstasy.

James R. Hollis points out in his essay "Convergent Patterns in Yeats and Jung"⁴ that Yeats's poem "The Indian to His Love" contains

⁴James R. Hollis, "Convergent Patterns in Yeats and Jung," Psychological Perspectives, IV, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), 61.
an apt picture of the conflict with the opposite in the following lines: "A parrot sways upon a tree/ Raging at his own image in the enamelled sea." (*The Collected Poems* . . ., p. 14.) This is no doubt one of Yeats's "horrible green parrots," not a simple parrot. Jung, on the other hand, holds with red parrots. He comments, "There are some Indians in South America who will assure you that they are Red Araña parrots, though they are well aware that they lack feathers, wings, and beaks." In other words these particular natives discern

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5 Yeats, "On a Picture of a Black Centaur by Edmund Dulac," *The Collected Poems* . . ., p. 212. Lillian Feder, I have lately discovered, is also especially struck by Yeats's "horrible green parrots," which she associates with the "bizarre quality of his [Yeats's] imagination." She also points out that T. R. Henn sees "On a Picture of a Black Centaur by Edmund Dulac" as itself a duality, a coalescence of Yeats's thought about two different paintings /T. R. Henn, *The Lonely Tower* (New York: 1952), p. 243, / Lillian Feder, *Ancient Myth in Modern Poetry* (Princeton: 1971), p. 80. Because Yeats himself had much to say about the roles which mask and daemon play in life and poetry, a cataloguing of the scholars who have offered insightful comments about the doubleness in Yeats and in his work would, I suppose, constitute in itself a volume of some size and weight. The following deserve special mention: Richard Ellmann, *The Identity of Yeats* 
F. A. C. Wilson, *W. B. Yeats and the Tradition and Yeats's Iconography* 
Helen Vendler, *Yeats's Vision and the Later Plays*

Yeats makes an observation germane to Indians and red parrots:

We cannot doubt that barbaric people receive such influences /naye, "invisible beings, far-wandering influences, shapes that may have floated from a hermit of the wilderness/ more visibly and obviously, and in all likelihood more easily and fully than we do, for our life in cities, which deafens or kills the passive meditative life, and our education that enlarges the separated, self-moving mind, have made our souls less sensitive. Our souls that were once naked to the winds of heaven are now thickly clad, and have learned to build a house and light a fire upon its hearth,
and acknowledge in the most ornate fashion a certain duality in their own characters. Jung sees such taking on of the parrot as evidence for the natural partnership of conscious and unconscious. We might add a single refinement to Jung's example and see the Red Arara as symbolic of that other will which Yeats maintains man may persistently sense within. In any case, an Indian and a red parrot in a single being may be said to express, at least in general terms, an undoubted duality. It may be a sense of duality within that prompts speakers of English to unite subject and object in such idioms as, "he leads his life (in such-and-such a fashion)," or, as Jung points out, "he has come to himself." Our earlier discussion of the Jungian

and shut-to the doors and windows. The winds can, indeed, make us draw near to the fire, or can even lift the carpet and whistle under the door, but they could do worse out on the plains long ago.


As there are among men, if we would believe Yeats, those who are "naked to the winds of heaven," so also among elemental particles, if we adopt the imagery of Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington. In the following passage James R. Newman explains his view:

The atom consists of a heavy nucleus with a "girdle or crinoline" of electrons. Stellar atoms, stripped of their crinolines by collisions are "nude savages innocent of the class distinctions of our fully arrayed terrestrial atoms."


7 Jung uses the plural: "They came to themselves . . . ."

symbol is an attempt to establish that duality is a central theme in Jung's psychology. The Jungian psyche exists in grand opposition with itself.

The essence of the conscious mind is discrimination; it must, if it is to be aware of things, separate the opposites, and it does this contra naturam. In nature the opposites seek one another—les extremes se touchent—and so it is in the unconscious, and particularly in the archetype of unity, the self. Here, as in the deity, the opposites cancel out. But as soon as the unconscious begins to manifest itself they split asunder, as at the Creation, for every act of dawning consciousness is a creative act, and it is from this psychological experience that all our cosmogonic symbols are derived.\(^8\)

It is perhaps fitting therefore that Jung's man-emanant god should be described as resident in duality. Jung's understanding of the psychological meaning of the god-image is founded in duality:

"Psychologically the God-concept includes every idea of the ultimate, 

of the first or last, of the highest or lowest. The name makes 
no difference." Jung is convinced that a chief cause of man's 
besetting psychological ills is failure to confront the dual 
nature of the god-image each man carries within.

The ominous happenings that occur right at 
the beginning of a seemingly satisfactory Creation--
the Fall and the fratricide--catch our attention, 
and one is forced to admit that the initial situ-
ation, when the spirit of God brooded over the 
deep, hardly permits us to expect an absolutely 
perfect result. Furthermore the Creator, who 
found every other day of his work 'good,' failed 
to give good marks to what happened on Monday. 
He simply said nothing--a circumstance that favours 
an argument from silence! What happened on that 
day was the final separation of the upper from the 
lower waters by the interposed 'plate' of the

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In another volume but in the same vein, Jung offers:

Oddly enough the paradox is one of our most 
valuable spiritual possessions, while uniformity 
of meaning is a sign of weakness. Hence a religion 
becomes inwardly impoverished when it loses or waters 
down its paradoxes; but their multiplication enriches 
because only the paradox comes anywhere near to com-
prehending the fulness of life. Non-ambiguity and 
non-contradiction are one-sided and thus unsuited to 
express the incomprehensible.

(Psychology and Alchemy, pp. 15-16.)
firmament. It is clear that this unavoidable
dualism refused, then as later, to fit smoothly
into the monotheistic conception, because it
points to a metaphysical disunity. This split,
as we know from history, had to be patched up
again and again through the centuries, concealed
and denied.

(Answer to Job, pp. 47-48.)

Of the author of the Apocalypse, favored by Jung because of his
adumbration of duality on many levels, Jung says,

He also knew that the fire in which the devil is
tormented burns in the divine pleroma for ever.
God has a terrible double aspect: a sea of grace
is met by a seething lake of fire, and the light
of love glows with a fierce dark heat of which
it is said 'ardet non lucet'--it burns but gives
no light. That is the eternal, as distinct from
the temporal, gospel: one can love God but must
fear him.

(Answer to Job, p. 146.)

One marvels that Jung, who ranges throughout the Old and New Testa-
ments in an effort to fortify Answer to Job misses the chance to
construe--or misconstrue--Jeremiah's "Out of the mouth of the most
High proceedeth not evil and good?" (Lamentations 3:38.)

Such preaching of the fundamental duality of the god-image is
bound to introduce in Jung an appearance of the relativity of good
and evil. A passage from *Civilization in Transition* may serve as an example. Jung's statement stops short of Yeats's "Crazy Jane and the Bishop" but draws nigh to the idea that evil's being evil has something to do with perspective.

... Yahweh is both just and unjust, kindly and cruel, truthful and deceitful. This is eminently true of the God archetype as well. That is why the primitive form of conscience is paradoxical: to burn a heretic is on the one hand a pious and meritorious act--as John Hus himself ironically recognized when, bound to the stake, he espied an old woman hobbling towards him with a bundle of faggots, and exclaimed, 'O sancta simplicitas!'--and on the other hand a brutal manifestation of ruthless and savage lust for revenge.¹⁰

In a letter to H. L. Philp, dated June 11th, 1957, Jung moves the subject of the relativity of good and evil from the experience of Yahweh to the experience of daily behavioral options:

I am tempted and even possessed by evil forces (like St. Paul) time and again and sin is *nolens-volens* mingled with my daily bread. You find such statements moreover everywhere in all imaginable forms. It is f.i. bad and even evil to step on

the chief's shadow or over a sleeping man.
It is sinful to scrape a skin with an iron
knife instead of a flint.

(Jung and the Problem of Evil, p. 211.)

Jung's duality in divinity and the apparent ambiguity which it
casts over good and evil leads us to the point where Yeatsian
duality resolves itself into daemon and tempted one, into self
and other-self. Jung explains that the duality in the character
of Yahweh "corresponds to a unitary image of the psyche dynamically
based on opposites, like Plato's charioteer driving the white and
black horses. Alternatively, we must admit with Faust: 'Two souls,
alas, are housed within my breast,' which no human charioteer
can master, as the fate of Faust clearly indicates." (Civilization
in Transition, p. 448.) Jung's unconscious possesses some very
Yeatsian daemonic qualities. We might recall that Yeats asserts,
"When I think of life as a struggle with the Daemon . . . I under-
stand why there is a deep enmity between a man and his destiny,
and why a man loves nothing but his destiny." (Per Amica Silentia
Lunae, pp. 30-1.) Consider the similarity of this statement to
the following passage from Jung's Psychology and Alchemy:

A religious terminology comes naturally, as the only
adequate one in the circumstances, when we are faced
with the tragic fate that is the inevitable concomi-
tant of wholeness, "My inevitable fate" means a
daemonic will to precisely that fate—a will not
necessarily coincident with my own (the ego will). When it is opposed to the ego, it is difficult not to feel a certain "power" in it, whether divine or infernal. The man who submits to his fate calls it the will of God; the man who puts up a hopeless and exhausting fight is more apt to see the devil in it.

(p. 30.)

The provocative and eristic other of Jung's unconscious, like Yeats's daemon, may be utterly enigmatic, endlessly frustrating, but not simply capricious. One is reminded of Einstein's "Gott ist raffiniert, aber boshaf ist er nicht." The man-emmanent god of both Jung and Yeats resides in a purposive environment. In fact, the daemon may be considered as a most forceful manifestation of man-emmanent god the redeemer:

The sin of the confrontation between a patient and the inner figures of his unconscious is to abolish the dissociation between various components of the psyche. In order to reach this goal, either nature herself or medical intervention precipitates the conflict of opposites without which no union is possible. This means not only bringing the conflict to consciousness; it also involves an experience of a special kind, namely, the recognition of an alien "other" in oneself, or
the objective presence of another will. The alchemists, with astonishing accuracy, called this barely understandable thing Mercurius, in which concept they included all the statements which mythology and natural philosophy had ever made about him: he is God, daemon, person, thing, and the innermost secret in man; psychic as well as somatic. He is himself the source of all opposites, since he is duplex and utriusque capax ("capable of both"). This elusive entity symbolizes the unconscious in every particular, and a correct assessment of symbols leads to direct confrontation with it.11

Jung sees the duality of the god-image which is imbedded in man's psyche as one aspect of the duality of man himself. Once more we are bound to observe that the line of radiance and reflection originates in man and passes thence outward toward the heavens. Man's psychic totality is by nature dual, and therefore man's emanation of god or his image of god is of double aspect. God is man-emanant and therefore two-sided. Where Jung is concerned this statement applies equally to symbols and symbolic patterns which Jung designates as god-images, to the archetypes which stand behind such manifestations, and--following the Jungian model of the psyche--to the force of the human psyche itself, which we have analyzed as

trinitarian and which we have named man-emanant god. Moreover, this two-sidedness prepares the way for redemption. Man's failure to confront his image of god in its true nature—whether we speak of a particular symbol or of the force and functioning of the psyche itself—is always his failure to confront himself. This confronting is requisite for psychic health and suggests the second part of the doctrinal formulation which we inscribed on the pedestal of man-emanant god: this god culminates in unity.

Yeats embraces in his poetry the radiant and the high, the dark and the low. He is fully capable, as we have seen, of memorializing in verse a creature as low to the ground and woebegone as a solitary blind hound filled with the sentiments of death—a hound who "Lifts slow his wintry head"—\(^{12}\) while singing, this Yeats, with his next breath of a gathering of beings as towering and imperious, as fulgurating, heedless, ageless, relentless, "rushing," as the high host of the Sidhe who thunder across "the grave of Clooth-na-Bare," their eyes "agleam."\(^{13}\) It is the merging of such contradictory themes, the coalescence of opposing extremes, which Yeats seeks in his poetry. Yeatsian duality strains toward a hypothetical merging of posed opposites, toward a condition of transcendent unity. We have a hint of such ultimate intention in that


\(^{13}\) Yeats, "The Hosting of the Sidhe," The Collected Poems . . . , p. 53.
transmundane middle course followed by the host of the Sidhe:
"The host is rushing 'twixt night and day". Here also is an
adumbration of Yeats's peculiar preference for twilight, which in
other poems becomes perfectly explicit:

Out-worn heart, in a time out-worn,
Come clear of the nets of wrong and right;
Laugh, heart, again in the grey twilight, . . . .

("Into the Twilight," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 56.)

If this importunate heart trouble your peace
With words lighter than air,
Or hopes that in mere hoping flicker and cease;
Crumple the rose in your hair;
And cover your lips with odorous twilight and say,
'O Hearts of wind-blown flame!
O Winds, older than changing of night and day,
That murmuring and longing came
From marble cities loud with tabors of old
In dove-grey faery lands;

("The Lover Asks Forgiveness of His Many Moods," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 63.)

As we might expect, Yeats's twilight is not ordinary twilight; it
is a passing away of the rhythm of night and day; it is a damping
of the seemingly ceaseless and harsh oscillation between opposites;
it is that increase to the point of overflow of Yeatsian entropy
which has, to take words from the mouth of Henri Poincare, "flattened the salients and filled up the reentrants"\textsuperscript{14} of the entire curve of existence. That curve rounds smoothly into a circle, and the circle enters into a quiet revolving and so permutes itself by degrees into a perfect sphere. A feminine presence in Yeats's "Chosen" declares of herself and her masculine opposite:

\[
\ldots \text{I take}
\]
\[
\text{That stillness for a theme}
\]
\[
\text{Where his heart my heart did seem}
\]
\[
\text{And both adrift on the miraculous stream}
\]
\[
\text{Where--wrote a learned astrologer--}
\]
\[
\text{The zodiac is changed into a sphere.}
\]

\textit{(The Collected Poems . . ., p. 268.)}

Zodiacal light, which astronomers say sometimes glows faintly at twilight or near daybreak, and then always in association with the

\textsuperscript{14} . . . since the beginning of the ages, there have always been complex causes ceaselessly acting in the same way and making the world tend toward uniformity without ever being able to turn back. These are the causes which little by little have flattened the salients and filled up the reentrants of probability curves, and this is why our probability curves now show only gentle undulations.

apparently reclusive sphere of the sun, might be called Yeatsian light, for Yeats sings, as we have seen before, "O may the moon and the sunlight seem/ One inextricable beam" ("The Tower," The Collected Poems . . ., pp. 193-4). In the person of Homer, who is mentioned in the same poem, such unlikely merging is effected, for day and night are obliterated in his blindness, while at the same time he emanates the glow of poetic enlightenment. "The ultimate reality," Yeats says in "Pages from a Diary in 1930," "must be all movement, all thought, all perception extinguished, two freedoms [namely man's and God's] unthinkably, unimaginably absorbed in one another."15 A young girl in one of Yeats's bedside visions—a vision recorded in The Celtic Twilight—seems to epitomize the evenness and perfect blending of this ultimate intention and quietude, this ultimately to be desired condition, unity of being.

... what filled me with wonder was the miraculous mildness of her face. There are no such faces now. It was beautiful, but it had neither, one would think, the light that is in desire or in hope or in fear or in

speculation. It was peaceful like the
faces of animals, or like mountain pools
at evening, so peaceful that it was a
little sad.\textsuperscript{16}

It is perhaps significant that so remarkable a feminine presence
appears to Yeats in company with her natural opposite, namely a
young man, with whom she is, it would appear, most perfectly
reconciled. They are, as if to maintain the fine equilibrium of
their compatibility, dressed in matching "olive-green raiment"
(p. 115). In other words, this vision prepares us for Yeats's
general contention that it is through experience of an opposite
that man approaches that point of overlapped silence and stillness
which is unity of being.

\textsuperscript{16} W. B. Yeats, "A Voice," \textit{The Celtic Twilight} (London: 1902),
p. 116.

W. H. Auden offers interesting observations concerning the disposition of opposites in different visionary experiences:

Many people have given accounts of what they experienced while having a tooth extracted under nitrous oxide, and these show close similarities. Thus William James says:

The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictions and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity.

My experience, like his, was of two opposites, love in the sense of agape, and hate, but in my case they did not melt into a unity.

We might recall in this connection Ille's yearning in "Ego Dominus Tuus" for the double who, being Ille's proper lord, will—as Ille expresses it—"disclose/ All that I seek" (The Collected Poems ..., p. 159). It is no hidden mystery that Ille seeks completion by way of perfect combination. Man-emmanent god arises in duality and, ideally, moves toward an apex which is the dissolution of duality. Ille desires the open conflict with opposite which ultimately resolves conflict, the unity of being which is the fusing of the opposed halves of being, the consummated wholeness which is a rescinding of the inherently dichotomous nature of being. In Per Amica Silentia Lunae, Yeats tells us of the daemon's concern with properly tendentious struggle:

The Daemon ... brings man again and again to the place of choice, heightening temptation that the choice may be as final as possible, imposing his own lucidity upon events, leading his victim to whatever among works not impossible is the most difficult. He suffers with man as some firm-souled man suffers with the woman he but loves the better because she is extravagant and fickle.

(pp. 79-80.)

Yeats's "place of choice" is a fit correlative for Jung's "confrontation" with the inner figures. The Yeatsian man beset by daemon

17Jung, Alchemical Studies, p. 348.
reaches, occupies, and transcends "the place of choice" by dint of suffering—a suggestion here of man-emanant god the redeemer—which puts us in mind of Jung's "tragic fate that is the inevitable concomitant of wholeness" (Psychology and Alchemy, p. 30). Yeatsian duality, the consequent ambiguity of good and evil, the suffering that accompanies the tension engendered by duality, the supreme reconciliation made possible by the suffering and the tension and the duality, are seen in four lines from "Crazy Jane and the Bishop":

'. . . But love has pitched his mansion in
The place of excrement;
For nothing can be sole or whole
That has not been rent.'

(The Collected Poems . . ., p. 255.)

Yeats explains the nature of that rending, that is, the passion of man the redeemer, in the now familiar passage from "William Blake and His Illustrations": "... he who half lives in eternity [that is, he who advances boldly, as William Blake did, toward unity of being] endures a rending of the structures of the mind, a crucifixion of the intellectual body."18 The wholeness that such a pilgrim approaches, following the truths of duality and horizontal unity incorporated in a god who emanates from within, is an ultimately satisfying circularity in depth, that is, an encompassing sphericity which holds all places in one, all "there's" being simply "There."

There all the barrel-hoops are knit,
There all the serpent-tails are bit,
There all the gyres converge in one,
There all the planets drop in the Sun.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 284.)

In "Later Essays and Introductions" Yeats elucidates that sought-after unity:

... my Christ, a legitimate deduction from the Creed of St. Patrick as I think, is that Unity of Being Dante compared to a perfectly proportioned human body, Blake's 'Imagination,' what the Upanishads have named 'Self': nor is this unity distant and therefore intellectually understandable, but imminent, differing from man to man and age to age, taking upon itself pain and ugliness, 'eye of newt, and toe of frog.'

Thus Yeats nurtures us in knowledge of the unity toward which man-emamant god points, affords us understanding of the "perfectly proportioned" "Him" of "The Dancer at Gruachan and Cro-Patrick";

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Yeats makes similar references to perfect embodiment of the principle of unity of being in 'Discoveries,' "The Cutting of an Agate," and 'An Indian Monk,' "Later Essays and Introductions," Essays and Introductions, pp. 291 and 431.
I, proclaiming that there is
Among birds or beasts or men
One that is perfect or at peace,
Danced on Cruachan's windy plain,
Upon Cro-Patrick sang aloud;
All that could run or leap or swim
Whether in wood, water or cloud,
Acclaiming, proclaiming, declaring Him.

(The Collected Poems ..., p. 263.)

This poem begins with an "I" who issues proclamations and performs uninhibited dances. We may, with some exercise of imagination, see in such images the utterances of a man-emamant godhead and, in particular, the inspirations of man-emamant god the spirit. The poem reaches its apex in the fused and reconciled "I" rounded into unity, that is, in "Him" who is "One." In the beginning stands "I"; at the end looms "Him"; all between is transformative movement. Earnest yearning for final transformation is the half-hidden meaning of Yeats's poetry, and such transformation would see the deliquescence of those primary and preeminent Yeatsian symbols, night and day. This is the deeper significance—we should say, rather, the ultimate significance—of the verse in which we formerly found merely the impulse to discount the commonplace in favor of summoned vision entirely one's own:

From man's blood-sodden heart are sprung
Those branches of the night and day
Where the gaudy moon is hung.
What's the meaning of all song?

'Let all things pass away.'


Homer is for Yeats the chosen agent of such transformation, for from the depths of the darkness of his blind being—a darkness which is neither day nor night—there arises a new strength clothed in the surpassingly strange, faint radiance of perfected poetry.

Homer is my example and his unchristened heart.

The lion and the honeycomb, what has Scripture said?

So get you gone, Von Hügel, though with blessings on your head.

("Vacillation," part VIII, p. 247.)

In a passage concerning various sacramental foods of reputed transformative power Jung also pauses at the example of Samson and his slaughtered lion: "Another parallel is Samson's strangling of the lion, and the subsequent inhabitation of the dead lion by a swarm of bees, which gave rise to the riddle: 'Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness.'"²⁰ From the finished and forever settled conflict of night and day in the body of Homer comes the twilight glow of poetry-perfected unity of being. From the conflict of outraged Samson and ill-fated lion comes the honey which is, in a number of respects, the nectar of reconciliation. Is it not true that Jonathan, acting in accordance

with the military precept that he who feeds well fares better, --and this after the commencing of a clash between Hebrew and Philistine in which "every man's sword was against his fellow, and /here the most wonderful of understan/ements/ there was a very great discomfiture"--consumed as he advanced through the woods a happily chanced-upon and promptly speared hunk of honeycomb and honey "and his eyes were enlightened."? Jonathan sensed an inner transformation worthy of Yeats or Jung, and apparently worthy of public comment: ". . . see, I pray you, how mine eyes have been enlightened, because I tasted a little of this honey." (I Samuel 14:20, 27, 29.) "Great art chills us at first," says Yeats, "by its coldness or its strangeness, by what seems capricious, and yet it is from these qualities it has authority, as though it had fed on locusts and wild honey."21 If we hold in mind simultaneously Samson, Jonathan, and Yeats's imagery concerning great art, honey would seem both propagator and product of transformation, even as the Christ known to Paul is both worker of redemption and himself "the firstfruits" of the redeemed and resurrected (I Cor. 15:20, 23), even as Yeats's man-emanant god the redeemer both poses as energetic daemon and culminates as that transfigured "One" whose perfection of form represents the condition known as unity of being, even as Jung's mysterious other arises to chide and guide, by way of a multitude.

of protean symbols, the man he occupies, only—in the fullness of time—to transmute and intensify all such symbolic utterances of his own into the encompassing mandalaic symbol of sustained reconciliation.

Jung's mandala is a symbol of wholeness. It suggests itself to the human mind in a variety of engaging forms: wheel, flower, sunburst, circle, ornamented tetrad. It usually appears as an incorporation of four;\textsuperscript{22} it is a unification and comprehension of four-part division. The bringing together of four parts in the mandala is a composition of completion and totality. There is a signal connection then between the mandala and the goal of the individuation process in Jung's psychology. The mandala is the reconciling symbol of Jungian wholeness, and Jungian wholeness has its counterpart in Yeatsian unity of being.\textsuperscript{23} Because the mandala is associated with a union of four, or—as Jung would have it—quaternity,\textsuperscript{24} and moreover because it may appear in curvifoliate

\textsuperscript{22}Jung comments in a letter to Dr. Philp dated May 21st, 1957:
Curiously enough among our collection of mandalas I have a small number of trinities and triades. They stem all and sundry from Germans! (Unconscious of their shadows, therefore unaware of collective guilt!)


\textsuperscript{23}James R. Hollis comments: "The search for identity, for what Yeats called Unity of Being, is described by Jung as the process of individuation." Hollis, "Convergent Patterns in Yeats and Jung," \textit{Psychological Perspectives}, IV, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), 67.

or flower-like form. Yeats's title "To the Rose upon the Rood of Time" would seem to be a perfect invoking of mandalaic imagery. If we follow the mainstream of Yeats's poetry, however, it is clear that he envisions unity of being by stressing circularity or sphericity rather than the four points of the cross. To be more specific we should say that the four-part imagery of the cross comes to light more often in Yeats's poetry in connection with the suffering of man in confrontation with daemon—the precondition of unity of being—and less often in connection with that suffering transcended, namely unity of being in realized form. If we were to adopt terms both simplified and sufficiently general to apply both to Yeats and Jung, we might describe their common representation of unity or wholeness as symmetry sustained within a closed pattern of perfectly conjoined curves, or—in three dimensions—symmetry sustained within a closed solid formed of curved surfaces perfectly seamed. Jung's emphasis in such a description would be upon the sustaining of the symmetry, Yeats's upon the closed condition of the curves. The settled quietude and tranquillity in the face of the girl who appears at Yeats's bedside bespeaks the completely rounded and finished quality of unity of being. Her face is itself that symmetry of the image of wholeness perfectly consummated and forever fixed. "Doubtless she was from among the children of the Moon,"25 muses Yeats, who thereby witnesses to the impression of sphericity which lingers after the feminine

presence herself departs. Jung also relates a bedside vision, and his vision is cast also in a shade of green and speaks also of wholeness.

In 1939 I gave a seminar on the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. At the same time I was occupied on the studies for Psychology and Alchemy. One night I awoke and saw, bathed in bright light at the foot of my bed, the figure of Christ on the Cross. It was not quite life-size, but extremely distinct; and I saw that his body was made of greenish gold. The vision was marvelously beautiful, and yet I was profoundly shaken by it. A vision as such is nothing unusual for me, for I frequently see extremely vivid hypnagogic images. 26

The intense holding power and the considerable residual effect of Jung's visitation puts us in mind of Yeats's own. So it is, apparently, with the experience of the numinous. Moreover, in each of the two cases at hand, the power to fascinate and the power to coincide join hands. The mandala comes in the full power of numinosity, but it comes also in a timely and appropriate fashion, which is to say, in the full power of synchronicity. The viridescence of both visions is a numinous and synchronistic glow. Not only are Yeats and Jung seized, so to speak, but both

are seized at appropriate moments, for each claims to have given thought, immediately prior to his experience, to some aspect of mysticism, in particular "Christian mysticism." And yet, Jung’s vision concerns a holding together in one figure of four distressingly disparate points, while Yeats’s depicts a visage of satisfied inclusion and completion. The strain of the cross is the mark of Jung’s wholeness: the fixed enduring of the union of four, the sustaining of symmetry. The sphere, on the other hand, is the eminently suitable representation for Yeats’s silent, plenary, encompassing, and fully closed unity of being.

Jung’s interest in mandalas, in wholeness—really, in all that we have called man-emmanent god, his milieu and ultimate purpose—is rooted in therapy. It is important to realize, however, that in Jung’s eyes all men stand in need of that therapy which leads to wholeness, to the experience of the Self.

A spiritual goal that points beyond the purely natural man and his worldly existence is an absolute necessity for the health of the soul; it is therefore the Archimedean point from which alone it is possible to lift the world off its hinges and to transform the natural state into a cultural one.28


The religious need longs for wholeness
which may remind us of Ille's yearning for
his double and therefore lays hold of the
images of wholeness offered by the unconscious,
which, independently of the conscious mind, rise
up from the depths of our psychic nature.

(Answer to Job, p. 178.)

In a manner not unlike Yeats's daemon, a guiding figure of the
unconscious emerges from man's state of duality to assume,
according to Jung, a critical role in leading man to "The place
of choice," to "confrontation," to forthright facing of the dark
earth-split chasm of inner contradiction.

Once the exploration of the unconscious has
led the conscious mind to discovery of the archetype
that is, the archetype which manifests itself in
symbols which emphasize wholeness or dramatize inner
oppositions, the individual is confronted with the
abysmal contradictions of human nature, and this
confrontation in turn leads to the possibility of
a direct experience of light and darkness, of Christ
and the devil . . . .

Without the experience of the opposites there is
no experience of wholeness and hence no inner approach
to the sacred figures. Christ, Buddha.

(Psychology and Alchemy, p. 19-20.)
Symbols from the unconscious lead man to the edge of great and awful sundering, that is, to the place of suffering, and thereby enable man the redeemer to assume his burden and mission, which is to say that the guiding and contrary other from within insures that man may approach—but more than approach—yes, become, one of the sacred figures:

To round itself out /as Yeats's "I" is rounded into "One/, life calls not for perfection but for completeness; and for this the "thorn in the flesh" is needed, the suffering of defects without which there is no progress and no ascent.

(Psychology and Alchemy, p. 152.)

Thorns in the flesh may put us in mind of our earlier discussion of Yeats's lines, "The dews drop slowly and dreams gather; unknown spears/ Suddenly hurtle before my dream-awakened eyes . . . ."
( "The Valley of the Black Pig," The Collected Poems . . . ., p. 63). We attributed to Jung in that previous discussion a statement concerning the likely inner origin of such barbs and projectiles, and the same assertion may now be seen as testifying to the presence of that contentious and symbol-wielding other within, who would fashion man through the impact and heat of conflict: "'The wounding and painful shafts do not come from outside . . . but from the
ambush of our own unconscious."\textsuperscript{29} It is through the conscientious ministrations and services of the hidden one within—services not unlike those performed by a zealous sheep dog on behalf of a wandering wether—that man glimpses and applies to himself the reconciling symbol of wholeness, the emblem of the Self. Man's destiny might

\textsuperscript{29}Jung, \textit{Symbols of Transformation}, p. 287. Jung's comment is prompted by his review of the case of a visionary nun, Anna Catherine Emmerich (1774–1824), who carried the stigmata and of whom it is said in the passage, also on p. 287, which Jung quotes from her biography:

She felt . . . heart-trouble physically, as if her heart were continually pierced by arrows. These arrows—and for her this was a far worse spiritual torment—she recognized as the thoughts, schemings, secret gossipings, misunderstandings, and uncharitable slanders with which her fellow sisters, wholly without reason and conscience, plotted against her and her God-fearing way of life.

\textsuperscript{7}Thomas a Villanova Wegener, \textit{Das wunderbare innere und äussere Leben der Dienerin Gottes Anna Catherine Emmerich} (Dülmen: 1891), p. 63.

Luther has of course his own opinions concerning arrows and wounds. He comments upon Paul's "... for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." (Gal. 6:17.):

... these marks are the troubles or sufferings of the body, as well as the arrows of the devil and the mental fears that Paul mentions throughout his epistles . . .

... we, too, by the grace of God, bear them on our body today on account of Christ. For the world persecutes and slays us; false brethren hate us bitterly; and Satan terrifies us inwardly in our hearts with his flaming darts (Eph. 6:16)—all this for no other reason than that we teach that Christ is our righteousness and life.


(footnote continues, next page)
therefore be said to issue from a kind of grand affair of honor, a settling of an issue of moment after the fashion of Jacob and the angel.

Jung often requested his patients to draw pictures to express their inner experiences. Of the goddess figure in a drawing made by a woman patient Jung said,

She is fastened to the tree by a snake, and thus forms an analogy to the crucified Christ, who, as the self, was sacrificed for earthly humanity, just as Prometheus was chained to the rock. Man's efforts to achieve wholeness correspond, as the divine myth shows, to a voluntary sacrifice of the self to the bondage of earthly existence.

(Alchemical Studies, p. 263.)

Within the Jungian mandala the shadow of the four points of the cross persists. The way of directed suffering and crucifixion, the way of redeemer-in-self, leads man ultimately to an experience of wholeness, to an attempted sustaining of totality. In passages that follow it becomes increasingly clear that Jung's wholeness approaches as limit Yeats's unity of being.

One of the psalms of David suggests yet another possible origin for wounding projectiles: "O Lord, rebuke me not in thy wrath; neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure. For thine arrows stick fast in me, and thy hand presseth me sore." (Psalm 38:1-2.)
"Ars totum requirit hominem!" exclaims an old alchemist. It is just this _homo totus_ whom we seek. The labours of the doctor as well as the quest of the patient are directed towards that hidden and as yet unmanifest "whole" man who has his prototype perhaps in Yeats's "perfectly proportioned" "Self", who is at once the greater and future man. But the right way to wholeness is made up, unfortunately, of fateful detours and wrong turnings. It is a _longissima via_ which suggests Yeats's "the hardest work among those not impossible", not straight but snakelike, a path that unites the opposites, reminding us of the guiding caduceus, a path whose labyrinthine twists and turns are not lacking in terrors which would seem to be in keeping with Yeats's "pain and ugliness, 'eye of newt and toe of frog'". It is on this _longissima via_ that we meet with those experiences which are said to be "inaccessible." Their inaccessibility really consists in the fact that they cost us an enormous amount of effort: they demand the very thing we most fear, namely the "wholeness" we talk about so glibly and which lends itself to endless theorizing, though in actual life we give it the widest possible berth. It is infinitely more
popular to go in for "compartment psychology,"
where the left-hand pigeon-hole does not know
what is in the right.

(Psychology and Alchemy, p. 6.)

If you sum up what people tell you about their
experience of healing, or wholeness, you can
formulate it in this way. They came to themselves,
they could accept themselves, they were reconciled
to themselves and by this they were also reconciled
to adverse circumstances and events. This is much
like what was formerly expressed by saying: He has
made his peace with God, he has sacrificed his own
will, he has submitted himself to the will of God.

A modern mandala is an involuntary confession
of a peculiar mental condition. There is no deity
in the mandala, and there is also no submission or
reconciliation to a deity. The place of the deity
seems to be taken by the wholeness of man.

(Psychology and Religion, p. 99.)

The last sentence of the above passage returns us to the major
theme. Through the sundered, dichotomous world runs and twines
the thread into the wilderness hinterland of the unconscious to
temptation and ministration of the daemon who is evidence of
besetting duality and emerges from it and through the destined
suffering runs the fine and tenuous thread to the final confrontation
and beyond, all the tortuous long way "There" insinuates the elusive thread of meaning that binds Yeats to Jung: man-father/mother, -son, and -holy spirit; man from whom issues man-emanant god, three in one, who resides in duality and culminates in unity.

To restate our observations: the teleological twinings of Yeats's poetry and Jung's psychology come to light in their visions of unity of being and psychological wholeness. The coming of either such condition of completion rests upon the postulate of pre-existent duality. Combination presupposes division. For Yeats the thoroughgoing duality of the symbol and of the vision summoned by symbol is recapitulated—or perhaps prefigured—in the nature of man-emanant god, who is the mobile medium and moving ether of symbols which are living souls. One of the many evidences and final effects of his duality is the relativity which his presence lends to the concepts we know as good and evil, a relativity which blends into a pronounced ambiguity and whose status as an issue of consequence approaches nullity at an exponential rate as man-emanant god culminates in that removed and effectively aloof fixity which Yeats understands as unity of being. Jung's symbols are not living souls, and it is perhaps for that reason that they can scarcely be construed as instrumental in the coming of a kingdom of unimpeachable and eonian sphericity. And yet Jung's symbols are emissaries from ultimately unknowable archetypal presences which, hidden though they may be, may nevertheless—if we attend closely to the
hints, innuendoes, and glimmerings which inevitably accompany
the comings and goings of symbols, their court messengers—
resemble in certain shadowy respects Yeats's symbols, although
these latter may be said to walk among us as residents of Olympus,
fully undiminished in strength and at long last returned.\(^{30}\) Jung's
symbols are related to Jung's archetypes as native-born sons of
immigrants to the lakes and mountains, the principalities and
princes, of their fathers' homelands. Jung's symbols are distinctly
second-generational. They none the less bear in their bodies the
resolute distinguishing marks of original country and race, namely
the signs and symptoms of indubitable duality. Jung's man-emmanent
god is the force of the psyche itself. In the power of this god's
own two-sidedness and in the interest of eventual wholeness he reigns
by dint of symbols, not the least of which may be the numinous god-
image, the symbol of the Self. This deity, who is in, from, and of

\(^{30}\) In contrast it might be noted that no Greek god—no, not
so much as a poltergeist—inhabits the world of Sigmund Freud.
In a fatherly and eminently reasonable communication to Jung he
patiently explains that the loud noises in his house and its
appurtenances which seemed to punctuate his recent conversation
with Jung were of no synchronistic of numinous significance:

In my front room there are continual creaking
noises, from where the two heavy Egyptian steles
rest on the oak boards of the bookcase, so that's
obvious. He discusses certain crashing noises
and concludes; My credulity, or at least my
readiness to believe, vanished along with the spell
of your personal presence; once again, for various
inner reasons, it seems to me wholly implausible
that anything of the sort should occur. The furniture
stands before me spiritless and dead, like nature silent
and godless before the poet after the passing of the
gods of Greece.

Freud to Jung, April 16th, 1909, "Appendix I," Memories, Dreams,
Reflections, p. 361.
man, builds and contrives toward that paradoxical resolution of
oppositions and dualities which is at one and the same time, man-
emanant god's abrogation of his own divided nature and his climactic
transfiguration in sustained unity. Through the movements of man-
emanant god, symbols rise through dark waters and break upon the
surface of life. Jung explains the process whereby through the
power of man-emmanent god and through the symbols to which he gives
rise the self learns to know Self, to enter into an equilibrium
prepared and mysteriously intended from the beginning, to fulfill
individual destiny, to commune with the ageless and immutable, to
achieve wholeness.

This encompassing completeness toward which all psychic move-
ment tends in the Jungian system is not primarily—as in the
Yeatsian system—a banishment of commonplace reality, but rather
an accomplished stress and strain which brings balance into being
and so changes subtly but essentially the quality of the whole of
life. Jung's goal is an amplified self-realization, which even in
its finest form can be expected to fall a degree or two short of
final consummation. Jung's wholeness is a tenuous business. The
Self is not a target for interception, but rather an on-going
beckoning which may be approached asymptotically. Yeats's unity
of being is more a fait accompli, even though it may show itself
only instantaneously—in single pulse or sun-glint on insect wing,
to use Yeats's own imagery—for the thing itself, namely unity of
being, is timeless and our hour- and second-conditioned impressions
are therefore of little moment as measurements of its depth and
duration. Jung's wholeness touches also upon eternity and prevails—if it prevails—in and because of its intimacy with this sea that surrounds our island of time.

The virescent quality of the clothing of Yeats's mild-countenanced visionary female being, as well as the greenish-gold aura of Jung's vivid crucifix at bedside, might be compared with the shifting green shades of the unfathomed depths of the seven seas. Jung's own comparison is not far removed from such an imagining: "The green gold is the living quality which the alchemists saw not only in man but also in inorganic nature. It is an expression of the life-spirit, the anima mundi or filius macrocosmi..." (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 211). It is this expanse of liquid surface across which we must yet sail if we would know Yeats and Jung and determine to what extent they know one another. Surrounded by such seas man's being must inevitably appear as a single, slender, twisting vimen of some centrally hidden and spreading subaqueous instance of cold-water flora—the only parental giant of its kind—and all man's movements must then seem merely epicentral in relation to the seismic contortions beneath. It will be cold sailing indeed. It must be as cold perhaps as the serpent that glides again and again into the thoughts and musings of Yeats and Jung, the serpent that stings or heals with cool detachment (for even healing serpents—which Jung so often erects before the afflicted masses—are made of cold brass or climb a cold Mercurial staff), the serpent that seems to know nothing of mammalian warmth and peers from
behind cold and changeless eyes that seeing, seem to see not, and yet the selfsame serpent that may, if it wishes, completely encircle the heated body of the mammal from which it is separated by so unspeakable a distance. Can there be any such two creatures of the same universe between which there is fixed a gulf so great and measureless? He who thinks to gaze thoughtfully into the eyes of a snake knows with what intentional thoughtlessness his gaze is returned. He understands how chilling even splashes from the sea of anima mundi may seem. Yeats understands also and he announces the coming of poetry that will appear "as cold/ And passionate as the dawn" 31 and proclaims, as if he were Blake reincarnated and inverted, "Suddenly I saw the cold and rook-delighting heaven/ That seemed as though ice burned and was but the more ice," 32 and cries also that "imagination must dance, must be carried beyond feeling into aboriginal ice." 33 Jung, in his turn, pronounces the archetypal identities of such inner figures as anima and animus characteristically remote and sometimes without trace of warm relation to mortals. In their archetypal capacity such figures live "in a world where the pulse of time beats infinitely slowly, where the birth and death of individuals count for little." 34 Jung apparently understands also the chilliness of the

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waters we have yet to traverse, waters as cold perhaps as a tomb of Egypt (and by Western standards any Egyptian tomb must, in terms of good and evil, be a veritable entrenchment of the chill of ambiguity) and in particular as cold as that Egyptian tomb which, according to Jung's eye-witness account of opening and exhumation, contained—just inside the entrance of this impersonal emptiness—the small withered form of a once human infant now long dead, miserably encased in a little basket of reeds: splinter of flotsam on far-removed and frigid waters. It is as if Yeats holds Jung and infant, this speechless tomb and such waters, in mind when he sings of the remote and un-touchable beings who "will ride the North when the ger-eagle flies,/ With heavy whitening wings and a heart fallen cold:"

I kiss my wailing child and press it to my breast,
And hear the narrow graves calling my child and me.
Desolate winds that cry over the wandering sea;

("The Unappeasable Host," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 56.)

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Jung comments further:

Evidently the wife of one of the workman had hastily laid the body of her dead child in the nobleman's tomb at the last moment, hoping that, when he entered the sun-barque in order to rise anew, it might share in his salvation, because it had been buried in the holy precinct within reach of divine grace.

The image of splinter afloat in watery arctic latitudes persists. A sea of such possibilities stretches before us. In waters so cold and greenish-gold one might lose sight of good and evil altogether, or, on the other hand, is it possible that good and evil might sink so far in such depths as to become indistinguishable? And what has the holiness of man-emmanent god--together with his wholly personal and wholesome intention--to do with such coolly impersonal waters? Such are the perplexities toward which we must lay course, and such the uncertainties which lie in the offing, fully awash in uneasy waters.
Chapter Five: Distinctions Between Three

Our representation of man-emanant trinity is formed but perhaps not clearly focused. Who or what man-emanant god actually is cannot be perceived in sharp outline without more prolonged consideration of Yeats's belief in an anima mundi and Jung's in a collective unconscious.

Lovely Abigail, having slipped from the back of the donkey, gathered herself in seemly grace at the feet of the leader of a band of four hundred irate guerrilla fighters, and said, among other things,

... the soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God; and the souls of thy enemies, them shall he sling out, as out of the middle of a sling.

(I Samuel 25:29)

The "bundle of life" of which Abigail spoke, an apparent pooling of souls, a capacious envelopement, sounds something like the phenomenon that fascinates Yeats and Jung. Yeats asks,

Was modern civilization a conspiracy of the subconscious? Did we turn away from certain
thoughts and things because the Middle ages
lived in terror of the dark . . . ?¹

And Jung marvels,

It is . . . a remarkable fact that many of
the processes which lead to the mandala, and the
latter itself, seem to be direct confirmations of
medieval speculations. It looks as if people had
read the old tracts about the Philosopher's Stone,
the aqua permanens, the divine water, the roundness,
the squareness, the four colors and so on. And yet
they have never been anywhere near alchemistic
philosophy and its abstruse symbolism.²

Yeats answers his own question: "Whatever the passions of man
have gathered about, becomes a symbol in the great memory, and
in the hands of him who has the secret, it is a worker of wonders,
a caller-up of angels or devils."³ Jung, who seems to possess
the secret, explains that confrontation with the personal uncon-
scious "leads to archetypal symbols which represent the collective
unconscious."⁴ In the 'Anima Mundi' portion of "Per Amica Silentia

²Carl Gustav Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: 1938),
p. 106.
p. 65.
Lunae" Yeats waxes explicit:

... I came to believe in a Great Memory
passing on from generation to generation.⁵

If all our mental images no less than apparitions
(and I see no reason to distinguish) are forms
existing in the general vehicle of Anima Mundi,
and mirrored in our particular vehicle, many
crooked things are made straight. I am persuaded
that a logical process, or a series of related
images, has body and period, and I think of
Anima Mundi as a great pool or garden where it
moves through its allotted growth like a great
water-plant or fragrantly branches in the air.

(Mythologies, p. 352.)

Jung bestows on the same thought our eccentric century's primary
distinction: association with scientific research:

The fact is that certain ideas exist almost every-
where and at all times and they can even spontaneously
create themselves quite apart from migration and
tradition. They are not made by the individual,
but they rather happen—they even force themselves
upon the individual's consciousness. This is not
platonic philosophy but empirical psychology.

(Psychology and Religion, p. 4.)

Such ideas from beyond "force themselves upon" the individual in somewhat the same fashion as "the dried brains of a dead enemy... hurled out of a sling" forced themselves upon the cranium of Conchobar and became thereafter, by virtue of overweavings of golden thread, an integral portion of Conchobar's golden head. 6 Although this fragment from Yeats's store of Irish fancy may in present context seem to border on the extraneous, the fact remains that Yeats in "The Secret Rose" grants to Conchobar a vision of the crucifix not unlike Jung's own7--and how more resoundingly might a golden warrior receive sanction in relation to the world of Jung and the collective unconscious? We have said that the symbols of Yeats's grand inventory stem both from areas farther from the individual than familiar nature and from areas nearer. Such an inventory comprises then both elements truly extraneous to what seems the simple and natural extent of an individual and elements intimately related. So it was with Conchobar's head. So it is with the souls of all mankind if we are to admit without prejudice Yeats's understanding of the greater unconscious. Solely from the nature of Yeats's symbols we have intimations of anima hominis and anima mundi.

Yeats's legendary Fergus learns also of the double aspect and double origin of mind-affecting influences. The Druid who speaks

with Fergus carries "a little bag of dreams"—no doubt held
innocently close to his body—but notice from what expanse
such dreams must have come, in what boundlessness they must have
spawned, and with what surprising powers of expansion they seem
able to possess any fool or any weary one who might loosen the
threads of their little bundle:

Druid. Take, if you must, this little bag of dreams;
Unloose the cord, and they will wrap you round.

("Fergus and the Druid," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 32.)

And so they do. What flights of speculation concerning the cool
nature of the greater unconscious such a tale invites! Tracing the
progression of his own far musings concerning anima mundi, Yeats
notes, "Our daily thought was certainly but the line of foam at
the shallow edge of a vast luminous sea . . .", while in another
essay he declares, "our thoughts are not, as we suppose, the deep,
but a little foam upon the deep." He continues:

Shelley understood this, as is proved by what he
says of the eternity of beautiful things and of the
influence of the dead, but whether he understood that
the great Memory is also a dwelling-house of symbols,
of images that are living souls, I cannot tell.9

8 W. B. Yeats, "Anima Mundi," Per Amica Silentia Lunae

9 W. B. Yeats, 'The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry,' "Ideas of
Jung builds upon a most similar groundwork:

Ideas spring from a source that is not contained within one man's personal life. We do not create them; they create us.\(^{10}\)

It is not Goethe who makes Faust, but Faust that makes Goethe. And what is Faust? Faust is a symbol, not a mere semiotic reference to something known long ago, but the expression of something primitively alive in the soul of the German, which Goethe has helped to be born.

*(Psychological Reflections, p. 177.)*

The unconditioned and unconditional mind that prevails in the deep psyche of all men at all times Jung calls the collective unconscious. We have seen its shadow before, because we noted that Jung, in search of a definition for symbols, courts both the personal and the impersonal. In our discussion of Jung's man-emanant god the redeemer we held in abeyance the question of the relationship between ego and Self. It may now be seen that ego is well ensconced in the narrowly personal, while the Self--as indeed all symbols underwritten by the authority of an archetype--is contingent on the impersonal and the collective. In earlier paragraphs we have merely skirted the cold sea. Its otherness in relation to the

individual must now be taken fully into account. Although that otherness may be interpreted as an encroachment upon what we have hitherto termed Jung's man-emanant god, it is also a vindication of that god's numinosity and synchronicity. Numinous and synchronistic events impart to life a meaning and a moving form which are not only fascinating, but inexplicably coordinated and fitting. Although such events remain beyond explanation, Jung's collective unconscious constitutes a postulated center of orchestration, a galactic hub about which constellations of events may be said to circle and blend. The Jungian collective unconscious is the clearinghouse wherein are gathered the loose threads of all possibilities and from which issue man-emanant god the creator's generous authorizations. For the sake of the collective unconscious it may be said that all reality is--while at one and the same time the reality of each one is--self-chosen, custom-made, utterly coordinated. Upon the premise of a greater unconscious is formulated the paradox that each man is omnific. We might repeat here our former finding: when Jung speaks of the psyche's creation of reality, he speaks as if such a process were beyond conscious control but also and at the same time man-emanant and willful. This willfulness may be seen only from the point of view of the unconscious. We have discovered once more the heavy shuttle and great loom which vibrate forth constantly the weavings of Tao. The universe fairly dandles with that sound and movement.

If Yeats is less intensely interested in the synchronization of events on a cosmic scale it is because of his absorption in the
private use of charged images to summon vision. In Yeats's eyes, each man draws upon anima mundi and forms his own reality or becomes ever more wrapped in someone else's. Therefore Yeatsian reality may be looked upon as an admixture of competing systems. Jung is more keenly conscious of a removed but pulsating centrality, and therefore his reality is more nearly a single system—or so it seems. Yeats is actively interested in the workings and heavings of anima mundi, but for the most part from a passionately personal standpoint. The impersonality of the greater unconscious is of concern to Yeats mainly insofar as it contrasts with and provides a limitless space for the expansion of personality. Perhaps it can be put this way: Yeats's sea of anima mundi is an absolutely measureless and endlessly altering expanse of wave-tossed surface (in which a perfect sphere might float and bob in perpetuity), while Jung's is an unimaginably great oceanic vortex, all waves swept into a single titanic disturbance (where the would-be sustained flotation of any object might be called into question). Windfalls of synchronicity are chiefly of interest to Yeats as convenient opportunities for pointing out to those who exercise an annoying avoidance of the mysterious that mystery abounds in every corner of life. Beyond that, he is himself too wrapped in mystery either to proselytize further or to seek overarching meaning in unmasked-for coincidences; too involved in active evocation of happenings which are specifically and personally meaningful, too fully given to active discovery of the possibilities for spherical and individual expansion into the far reaches of the unexplored space of the impersonal. Yeats
is a great and solitary explorer. His sea of the greater unconscious
is a vast sea indeed, and it is moreover his sea indeed.

Jung’s collective unconscious casts up continually clues
concerning the meaning of life at large and abroad. Its gratuitous
suggestions are allegedly applicable to men in general, although
few men are able to receive them. Jung is not so much an explorer
as a Moses on the brink of exodus, or in the act of striking the
great rock of the wilderness with his rod. Where Yeats in relation
to the greater unconscious is attracted to the idiosyncratic and the
specific, Jung seizes upon the typical and the general. The one
is, after all, very much a poet, and the other at least chiefly a
physician. It could hardly be more fitting that Yeats should investi-
gate séance and Jung hypnosis. Yeats, it seems, may be depended upon
to ignore camels in favor of swallowing gnats, Jung to ingest the
momentous and the small, the insignificant and the colossal: behemoth
and infusoria. Nevertheless, Yeats’s sea of anima mundi is by his
own description an incredibly broad expanse. His poetry partakes of

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11 An exception would seem to be the comprehensive scheme outlined
in Yeats’s *A Vision* (1925), a work which might be looked upon as
Yeats’s concerted effort to demonstrate that many systems may be one
system. Even here, however, in the midst of what seems the highest
generality, one can scarcely escape the feeling that every line has
been inscribed with the tip of a most finely honed and marvelously
sharpened instrument of idiosyncrasy; it is a galactic map scratched
on a closet wall with a stiletto; it is a Rosetta stone that includes
no portion in Greek.
this extramundane expansiveness, and is thereby endowed and enriched and shaped to a form out of all proportion to commonplace reality. Both the extent and effect of Jung's collective unconscious are likewise hardly susceptible of overestimation. We have seen that Jung postulates a collective as well as a personal unconscious, and that taken together they become enantiomorphous—and in the creation of symbols, omnipresent. But what are the full implications of the Sahara-like range of the Jungian collective unconscious? What of its expanse and its potential for imparting expansion? When we realize that the collective unconscious as Jung knows it contains some record of the entire psychic history of the race, that it envelops ultimately all individual selves and affects powerfully, from the bottom up, so to speak, all social interchange: the building of cultures, the shaping of civilizations, the waging of wars, that it moreover projects forward through intuition upon what is to be, we must admit that Jung's world of the greater unconscious has an expansiveness of its own—strange and incomparable—and that in man's awareness of such indefinite extension and volume he must perforce feel ushered into the presence of inescapable otherness.

We have said that Tao is a pattern of connectedness and that within its warp and weft every small event has its place. In the tête-bêche circumstance of consciousness and the unconscious every man is, as Conchobar literally was, of two minds—and all over-woven with golden thread and free-flowing golden hair. We have witnessed before the devotion offered by Yeats and Jung to various winged
creatures and especially to those with the skill to weave. A spirit of Arachne seems to have possessed both poet and physician. True, they share a certain regard for parrots which must owe nothing to weaving, for which other birds construct nests with so unabashed an incoherence? About parrots there is something admirably dégagé, but nothing very instructive. No, parrots are the grand exception in each case; well-knit construction is the principle that binds Yeats to Jung, and both to birds. Yeats is thoroughly impressed with the nest-building habits of an entire body of avifauna, but especially of his own canaries (Autobiographies, pp. 335-6). He sees such instinctual action as ready illustration of anima mundi. Jung repeatedly mentions similar phenomena in explaining the collective unconscious, although he displays no special interest in canaries. There is in fact neither time enough nor space: Jung's favorite is the weaver-bird. So taken is Yeats with the effortless talent of birds that he puts "unnumbered nests" constructed by birds of dexterity and noticeable savoir-faire into his poem, "Anashuya and Vijaya":

Anashuya. Swear by the parents of the gods,
Dread oath, who dwell on sacred Himalay,
On the far Golden Peak; enormous shapes,
Who still were old when the great sea was young:

On their vast faces mystery and dreams;  
Their hair along the mountains rolled and filled  
From year to year by unnumbered nests  
Of aweless birds, and round their stirless feet  
The joyous flocks of deer and antelope,  
Who never hear the unforgiving hound.  
Swear!  

(The Collected Poems . . ., p. 12.)

These "parents of the gods," these "enormous shapes," are those  
Yeatsian symbols which pose as Jungian archetypes come to visibility.  
Yeats would appear to know no fear of Semele's fate. The hypersomatic  
presences of his poem stem from the depths of anima mundi, which is,  
as we have seen, a sea that floats each human soul, a sea which each  
individual soul may glimpse or touch if he attends the rhythm, the  
gentle or perhaps heavy heaving, of the fluid support beneath; but  
whether he attends or not, he is related and subject to that rhythm.  
Of the attending Yeats says in "Anima Mundi," "We perceive in a  
pulsation of the artery . . ." (Mythologies, p. 361), and he enshrines  
that "pulsation" in "A Meditation in Time of War," a song of the  
anima mundi, a song of the greater unconscious.

For one throb of the artery,  
While on that old grey stone I sat  
Under the old wind-broken tree,  
I knew that One is animate,  
Mankind inanimate phantasy.  

(The Collected Poems . . ., pp. 187-8.)
After opening the "little bag of dreams," Fergus suffers a similar enlightenment, for he reveals, "I have been many things--/
A green drop in the surge, a gleam of light/ Upon a sword . . . ." ("Fergus and the Druid," p. 33), 13 even as Yeats the student and postulant declares in "Gratitude to the Unknown Instructors," "All things hang like a drop of dew/ Upon a blade of grass." (p. 249.) In an interview in 1957, Jung offered the following thought, which we might take as summary of Jung's collective unconscious, Yeats's anima mundi, and perhaps Abigail's "bundle of life": "Nobody can say where man ends. That is the beauty of it, you know. It is very interesting. The unconscious can reach--God knows where." 14

The question remains: in what way must the sea of anima mundi alter our perception of man-emanant god? The answer is that the man-emanating quality, the emanating strictly from man, of god-in-self is seriously mitigated by this newly emphasized limitlessness of the unconscious. We must stretch our understanding if we would have the whole truth. What we have called man-emanant god is not so eminently and undeniably man-made as previous evidence has

13 Joseph Hone quotes, in his biography of Yeats, Cecil Salkeld's narration of a conversation which includes: "'Eternity,' Yeats said, 'Eternity is in the glitter on the beetle's wing . . . it is something infinitely short . . . ." Joseph Hone, W. B. Yeats, 1865-1939 (London: 1962), p. 326.

indicated, not at least where man is understood as a discrete being. Yeats says,

Our most elaborate thoughts, elaborate purposes, precise emotions, are often, as I think, not really ours, but have on a sudden come up, as it were, out of hell or down out of heaven.

And Jung echoes,

We know that an archetype from the collective unconscious can break with shattering force into an individual human life and into the life of a nation. It is therefore not surprising that it is called "God."15

Have we erred in saying that the god of Yeats and Jung is man-emmanent? Not necessarily. The governing characteristics of the deity which we have so far encountered in the writings of Yeats and Jung are, as we have said, manifestly man-emmanent. It behooves us, however, not to mistake the stem and twiglets, leaves and flowers, for the whole plant. We formulate a new doctrine of man-emmanent god: he grows in and through the individual and flowers there, but buries his roots in regions indefinitely removed. How then in its final features does this god differ from other more familiar gods, the God

of orthodox Christianity for instance? That question is of prime importance, but must be deferred pending closer examination of the distinctive features of the Jungian man-emanant god over against the Yeatsian.

Jung's man-emanant god may be distinguished from Yeats's in at least two ways: Jung's deity is of greater otherness, and Jung's deity resides in an environment in which there is no diminution of the concept of evil.

Jung inscribed in Latin and in stone across the door of the tower-front of his house at Küsnacht the oracle's answer to the Lacedaemonians, "Summoned and not summoned God will be there," \(^{16}\) or as it has been otherwise rendered, "Called and not called, God is present." The statement can hardly refer to a god who is responsive simply to self. More than this, the statement imputes to this god a kind of resolute and unimpeachable autonomy, similar to that of the aforementioned Jungian archetype which breaks by way of some numinous symbol into any man's psyche whenever it desires. This god who awaited the Lacedaemonians may be man-emanant but he emanates according to his own will, not man's. This deity rises and moves not as extracted steams and essences before the eyes of alchemists but as the starry heavens before the eyes of astrologers.

A god of such attributes has no large part in Yeats's world. What Yeats engraves in stone is not in Latin but in his mother tongue,

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his own tongue, and speaks not of a formal deity, but of man: man's capacity for remote vision, man's life and death, man's elevated posture, man's movement. But more than this, for man on mount is more than man:

On limestone quarried near the spot
By his command these words are cut:

Cast a cold eye
On life, on death.
Horseman, pass by!

("Under Ben Bulben," The Collected Poems . . . , p. 344.)

The man who has learned to ride high and to ride well works his own will. Such a one may choose if he wishes to be that "conqueror" who "drew rein/ And cried to battle-weary men,/ 'Let all things pass away.'" ("Vacillation," part VI, The Collected Poems . . . , p. 247.) To be sure, the daemon--who is a manifestation or highly functional counterpart of man-emanant god the redeemer--has a contrary will of his own and a way of his own; he is the "other will" and he presumably has some obscure anima hominis to anima mundi link with the otherness that goes beyond self, but essentially he is encompassed by self, for he is the other-self; he is the other half of the sundered whole. A god who emanates according to his own will has no large part in Yeats's world.
Our master Caesar is in the tent
Where the maps are spread,
His eyes fixed upon nothing,
A hand under his head.

("Long-legged Fly," The
Collected Poems, p. 327.)

Yeats's obsession with "topless towers" (p. 328) is not accidental. Our master Caesar, yours and mine, is an inoperative nothing in nothing: we have no master. Yeats's understanding of the man-emmanent god who draws upon anima mundi and who culminates in unity of being has in fact considerably more to do with nothingness than otherness. The dreams that swirl—we might say in a pattern of spherical convections--about the enchanted Fergus and so present him an encompassing view of existence also lead him to say, "But now I have grown nothing, knowing all" ("Fergus and the Druid," p. 33), and Martin in Yeats's drama "The Unicorn from the Stars" cries, "Where there is nothing, where there is nothing--there is God!" Observe how these exclamations contrast with the following passages from Jung:

... even the enlightened person remains what he is, and is never more than his own limited ego before the One who dwells in him, whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysses of the earth and vast as the sky.

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Should any of my readers feel tempted to add an apologetic 'only' to the God-images as we perceive them, he would immediately fall foul of experience, which demonstrates the extraordinary numinosity of these images beyond the shadow of a doubt.

("Lectori Benevolo," Answer to Job, pp. xvi-xvii.)

I have been accused of "deifying the soul." Not I but God himself has deified it: ¹⁹

So man's soul as pictured by Jung is, as we have said, deified, the emanator of its own godhead; man-emanant god is surely present and emanating; but we perceive now that Jung's philosophy accommodates not only man-emanant god, that is, deified soul, but also, at the same time and in some quite hidden sense, deifier of the soul. Jung's system encompasses, by admitting the possibility of his being, some other who is quite other, a deifier of the soul who in his otherness from man's self partakes of the boundlessness of the collective unconscious—even as the archetype partakes, when from the selfsame realm of invisibility it fathers the symbol—and in this boundlessness of the unconscious—curved in breadth an untold stretch of sea beyond horizons and beneath, falling in depth some sea-shelf drop to unknown darknesses—in this boundlessness and distinct otherness, if in no other way, Jung's deifier resembles

more closely "the Lord thy God" of Abigail's "bundle of life" than anything or any being to be found in Yeats's poems. Yeats asks in the essay, "Discoveries," "Is it that . . . the poet has made his home in the serpent's mouth?" and earlier in the same essay declares,

If it be true that God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, the saint goes to the centre, the poet and artist to the ring where everything comes round again. 20

Jung, however, reminds us that there is a "definition of God as a 'circle whose centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere.'" 21 Jung's definition, catching Yeats unawares, seems to evanesce Yeats himself out of existence. Jung unwittingly makes clear to us that he who insists that God is where there is nothing has placed himself, with that God, beyond the extrados of the highest arc of the curve of all existence, beyond consideration, out of the picture— at least when the consideration is the quality of otherness in deity. Otherness, strictly speaking, may not be applied to those most distinct and manifold aspects of deity which show themselves in Yeats's writing, those aspects of deity which were the foundation of our images of man-father/mother, -son, and -holy spirit. What we said of Yeats and Jung in our discussions of their trinities and of the greater unconscious is still fully representative of Yeats: all aspects of


man-emanant god which we have so far encountered are manifestly
man-emanant. The man-emanant quality of Yeats's god is mitigated
only (and that only in an undefined sense) by the invisible roots
which that god buries in anima mundi. Jung's god however is now
more highly qualified; a distinct and godly otherness must be taken
into account.

To what extent is Jung's deifier himself the god who emanates
from the Jungian deified soul? To what extent is this other and
boundless god himself what we have called man-emanant god? We do
not know. Further, let it be here proposed that Jung does not know.
One thing we know, that, whereas we formerly thought of Jung's man-
emanant god as equivalent to Yeats's, we now discern that Jung's
man-emanant god is associated with distinct otherness in a way in
which Yeats's is not, or to simplify, Jung's man-emanant god is of
greater otherness.²²

²²Although Jung's deifier of the soul may be characterized by
a lordly otherness, he possesses little that is akin to the glorified
and intensely personal presence, the highly discriminating and intelli-
gent presence, to which a Christian testifies concerning his Lord. Jung
puts it all with admirable succinctness:

Is the self a symbol of Christ, or is Christ a
symbol of the self?

In the present study I have affirmed the
latter alternative. I have tried to show how
the traditional Christ-image concentrates upon
itself the characteristics of an archetype—the
archetype of the self.

C. G. Jung, Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self

(footnote continues, next page)
Furthermore, Jung's deity resides in an environment in which there is no diminution of the concept of evil. It is true that Jung's Weltanschauung implies a relativity of good and evil. In fact the quality of otherness which one feels in Jung's man-emanant

In another volume he comments in a similar vein:

The decision of the early Church in favour of homousia was of great psychological importance, for it asserted that Christ is of the same nature as God. But Christ, from the point of view of psychology and comparative religion, is a typical manifestation of the self. For psychology the self is an imago Dei and cannot be distinguished from it empirically.


Jung is not, however, without a certain detached recognition of the distinction in quality we seek to formulate here between various possible experiences of the numinous. (Such a recognition is yet another hint concerning Jung's truly apotetic character; as he approaches a cathedral he is quite likely to begin speaking effortless Latin.) Of "consciousness born of religious practice" he says:

... an empty consciousness stands open to another influence. This "other" influence is no longer felt as one's own activity, but as that of a non-ego which has the conscious mind as its object. It is as if the subject-character of the ego had been overrun, or taken over, by another subject which appears in place of the ego. This is a well-known religious experience already formulated by St. Paul. Undoubtedly a new state of consciousness is described here, separated from the earlier state by an incisive process of religious transformation.


We might note however that Jung neglects to explain that St. Paul's new "consciousness" is "born of religious practice" only in the sense in which, say, an Arapahoe-ambushed, -captured, and -adopted son of a white scalphunter who made with this offspring in tow one foray too many might be said to be "born (into the tribe) as a result of frontier practice."

(footnote continues, next page)
god, in his collective unconscious, in his archetypes, and specifically in his archetype of the Self, allows for such a relativity: "The self, in its efforts at self-realization, reaches out beyond the ego-personality on all sides; because of its all-encompassing nature it is brighter and darker than the ego . . ."23 If the elevated god-image is itself mottled with light and dark, good and evil, how can these opposites be--within the scope of man's finite being--anything but relative? Man can be no more confidently positive in distinguishing between good and evil than Heisenberg in sorting out which movement belongs to inquiring man and which to spied-upon atom. Jolande Jacobi explains Jung in terms of what might be called cosmic relativity, a relativity that fairly glints in the knowing eyes of Yeats's Chinese sages ("Lapis Lazuli," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 293). Jacobi says:

Yeats explains Blake's Christ as follows:

The historical Christ was indeed no more than the supreme symbol of the artistic imagination, in which, with every passion wrought to perfect beauty by art and poetry, we shall live, when the body has passed away for the last time; but before that hour man must labour through many lives and many deaths. Yeats, 'Blake's Illustrations to Dante,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 137.

23 Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, p. 545.
It was Heraclitus who discovered the most marvellous of all psychological laws, namely the regulative function of opposites. He called if enantiodromia, by which he meant that everything must ultimately flow into its opposite.\(^\text{24}\)

It is a principle "marvellous" for colligation and comprehension perhaps, but devastating for man's obligatory function of discrimination. In any case, there is more to Jung's philosophy than endless passade. There is also a belief in the unadulterated potency of both good and evil. Jung himself puts it this way: "The quaternity symbol relativizes Good and Evil, but it does not minimize them in the least."\(^\text{25}\) Far from seeking the attenuation of evil, Jung declares repeatedly that it is the ever-present concomitant of wholeness.\(^\text{26}\) Evil is associated with that earthy


\(^{26}\)Monroe Spears observes: "The Shadow self is both divine and demonic, in Jungian terms; it contains both original sin and the possibility of redemption."

fourth in the Jungian system which permutes trinity into quatern-
nity and thus renders the whole of life truly cruciform. This
explains in part how Jung is able to shift so naturally in his
writing from the tramontane to the transpadane and back again,
almost as if there were no real barriers between. He is Hannibal,
for he manages to take elephants over the Alps. He thinks of
Catholicism's Assumption of Mary as a kind of noble but insuffi-
ciently audacious attempt to incorporate a fourth. One has the
feeling that Jung's own version of such an ascent would have in-
cluded hawser and prolonge to drag up out of Pandemonium and
heavenward the great chariot of Belial. Jung's belief in the
thoroughgoing duality inherent in man's god-image and man's nature
introduces an appearance of the relativity of good and evil, but
Jung maintains that good is not therefore less than it might
otherwise be, nor is evil any the less evil. On the contrary,
only the enantiodromian model of existence gives both good and evil
their due--allows each to be more in its own right. Yeats speaks
of the "great wind of love and hate,"27 a wind that reaches point
of lull only in unity of being, but unlike Jung he never envisions
the world as "a place of horror"28 in consequence of mankind's


28 Jung, Psychological Reflections, p. 316.
proclivity for lapsing toward the side of evil. In an essay titled "After the Catastrophe," 1945, Jung comments on the evil perpetrated by National Socialism: "A piece of the abysmal darkness of the world has broken in, poisoning the very air we breathe and imparting a stale, nauseating taste of blood to the clear water." Lest we misunderstand and consider this period-fragment an isolated emotional response unrelated to the larger body of his philosophy, Jung tells us in *Symbols of Transformation*, "... never before has our civilization been so swamped with evil," and in *The Undiscovered Self*:

> The evil that comes to light in man and that undoubtedly dwells within him is of gigantic proportions, so that for the Church to talk of original sin and to trace it back to Adam's relatively innocent slip-up with Eve is almost a euphemism. The case is far graver and is grossly underestimated.

Once more we might issue the cry: "Hannibal! Hannibal ad portas!" Jung charges that the Church recognizes evil and yet refuses to

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30Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, p. 231. This edition of 1952 is an extensively revised version of repeated revisions of *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, 1912, and therefore it seems likely that Jung's "swamped with evil" is meant to apply to more than one decade and to more than one nation of the present century.

recognize its firm hold upon a fourth position in the overall scheme of things, which is to say that the Church knows of evil but refuses to apprehend directly evil's full extent and deep entrenchment in the very nature of reality. Rather, the Church falls into the trap of defining evil not as the opposite of good but as the absence of good, and hopes thereby to assign evil to some lower and inferior station in reality, to relegate it to an underworld existence. Of course this is manifest self-delusion on the Church's part, Jung would say, for evil is the linchpin that holds the wheel of the world in place. Any such Churchly disposition and dispossessing of evil can take place only by way of pins on a wall map, not in the darkness and lightness, the sinking and rising, of the actual terrain of reality. The Church's chosen stance is factitious and succeeds only in giving evil a kind of renegade status, that is, in allowing evil to escape into the Black Hills whence later massacres arise, while acceptance of the quaternity is, so to speak, a putting of evil in its place in an open and forthright fashion. Only after evil has received diplomatic status are negotiation and litigation free to ensue.

The one or two elephants Hannibal has left after crossing the Po would seem to be hammering at the city gates. And yet, Jung's insistence on man's continual susceptibility and possible subjection to evil aligns rather well with traditional doctrines and teachings of the Church and stands in sharp contrast to Yeats's intended out-distancing of both good and evil. Jung continues in The Undiscovered Self:
The evil, the guilt, the profound unease of conscience, the obscure misgiving are there before our eyes, if only we would see. Man has done these things \( \bigcap \) the "barbarities and \( \bigcap \) blood baths perpetrated by the Christian nations . . . throughout European history;" the horror and terror created by modern dictator states\( \bigcap \); I am a man, who has his share of human nature; therefore I am guilty with the rest and bear unaltered and indelibly within me the capacity and the inclination to do them again at any time. Even if, juristically speaking, we were not accessories to the crime, we are always, thanks to our human nature, potential criminals. In reality we merely lacked a suitable opportunity to be drawn into the infernal melee. None of us stands outside humanity's black collective shadow.

(The Undiscovered Self, pp. 105-106.)

Surely any mirage of the diminution of evil in the world of Jung has by the foregoing been forever dispelled. In fact, after listening to such a spreading imputation of blameworthiness one might shrink back somewhat--churched or unchurched--and declare of Jung and his followers as David--after denying his own blood-guiltiness in connection with the malicious slaying of Abner--of
the sons of Zeruiah: ". . . These men . . . be too hard for me" (II Samuel 3:39). Of course the parallel is imperfect, for Zeruiah's sons had more than philosophical familiarity with the hardness life has to offer; they had, rather, a working knowledge of the guerrilla technique of inserting a blade beneath a fellow-man's fifth rib (3:27), and yet the analogy bears further working, for the seemingly innocent victim in the case at hand, Abner over whom David pours both soliloquy and eulogy of innocence, was himself so practiced in the same fifth-rib method as to be able to accomplish all behind his own back, so to speak—and with the butt-end of a spear (2:23). It is like that with all humanity, Jung says. If we look closely—so closely as to look inwardly—we discover that the skills of seeming wickedness are more prevalent and far-reaching than we might have thought. Jung's familiarity with the unreckonable power of evil places him close to the earth. Hannibal is said to have slept on the ground with his own troops. He who exercises such a Uriah-like virtue\(^{32}\) knows the chill that creeps into one's bones from the body of the earth. Nightly, Hannibal and

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\(^{32}\) Uriah the Hittite to David the King:

. . . my lord Joab \(\sqrt{\text{the very Joab who, together with his brothers, seemed "too hard" for David}}\), and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open fields; shall I then go into mine house, to drink, and to lie with my wife? as thou livest, and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing. (II Samuel 11:11.)
his men lay supine as close to the cold earth as Gideon's narrowly chosen warriors prone to the shoreline--by force of habit gathered as low to the ground as canines, these few Gideonites--to lap water (Judges 7:5-6). Jung has tasted of the earth and of the earth's mixed and muddy waters--and of the experience of Katabasis, or Nekyia, which terminates in the deep places of the earth--and therefore a certain fully experienced chill accompanies his concept of good and evil. That chill is implicit in man-emanant god and is carried in the currents of the sea of the collective unconscious.

If the relativity of good and evil is assured, and yet the idea of any consequent depreciation of evil an unreal vapor, then Jung's god--and the psyche of the man from whom that god emanates--are profoundly duplex indeed. This is the terror of Jung's design and conception. There really is a good and an evil, actual and consequential, unimaginably disparate. And from this conception the incredible upshot, as of a steel bolt hurtled from a crossbow: man's psyche incorporates both good and evil, gives rise to a god who is of terrible double aspect--coal to the touch, blistering to the touch, life-giving, fire-breathing--and the psyche embraces that god, wraps it into the center of its being. The duality of self and god which Jung believes man must confront in himself if he would approach wholeness is a frightening chasm. The Jungian confrontation is no initiation ceremony; it is trial by fire and ice.

We search in vain for a similar perception of enormity in Yeats--although iciness for the sake of the beauty of sheer iciness is
easy enough to find, for on more than one occasion does the poet pose as towering sørac shaped by the bite of the winds of his own inclement poetry. No, when the proportions and implications of wickedness are to be measured, Yeats is not in evidence, he is non-apparent. He is well sheltered in ambiguity. The glittering of the eyes and the gaiety of Yeats's hermit-oracles in "Lapis Lazuli"\textsuperscript{33} stem from no preoccupations with the heinous effects of evil and from no long ponderings of the possible integrity of the nature of evil. At the same time the withdrawal into ecstasy of these ascended hermits, their surpassing self-possession, derives from something more than recognition that tragedy has a peculiar beauty of its own. Rather, their joy derives from knowledge that evil is no more than one side of a quite necessary and perpetual tug of war in nature, the world's continuing approach-approach conflict. Which side of the struggle is evil's side depends on perspective, on person, moment, age. Evil has no final consequence, unless re-enactment is consequence, for good is the other side of evil, and evil is merely aberrant form of good, as necessary to life's being life, as reflection to a mirror's being a mirror. In "Anima Mundi" Yeats disposes of evil handily:

> All power is from the terrestrial condition, for there all opposites meet and there only is the

\textsuperscript{33}Yeats, "Lapis Lazuli," \textit{The Collected Poems} \ldots, p. 293.
extreme of choice possible, full freedom. 
And there the heterogenous is, and evil, 
for evil is the strain one upon another 
of opposites . . . .

(Per Amica Silentia Lunae, pp. 70-1.)

Those who believe in the real power of real evil might be tempted to the uncharity of declaring that such definitions issue only from those who have been thoroughly overpowered by evil. Of course such speculation is steeped in possible calumny, and therefore anyone tempted to such unfairness, but struggling against it, can only be disheartened to learn that Jung advises Freud: "Try the spirits whether they are of God" (1 John 4:1). It is greatly to be doubted that Jung's intended meaning when he pre-empts a fragment of the Epistle of John carries with it the probable supposition of the original, namely the existence in discrete form of depraved and ravenous spirits, and yet where possible indictment of Yeats as volunteer victim is concerned, Jung unwittingly pushes the issue even further when he says, "Man is neither so reasonable nor so good that he can cope co ipso with evil. The darkness can quite well engulf him, especially when he finds himself with those of like mind." (Mysterium Coniunctionis, p. 256.) One tempted to slander might by force of such theory feel positively goaded. Nevertheless, Yeats's being overwhelmed by sinister forces is an

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incredible fancy, and it would be unworthy of mention if Yeats had not broached the subject himself. He tells us in "The Sorcerers" of his being nearly overcome by the black cloud conjured by two evil-looking conjurers and his question, "What would happen if one of your spirits overpowered me?" and the sorcerer's answer, "You would go out of this room with his character added to your own." (Mythologies, p. 39-40.) On that occasion Yeats left unscathed and unaugmented, but how is anyone to be certain of the outcomes of subsequent seances? Facilis descensus Averno. Surely being overcome would include the crafty determination to conceal that fact. All we can say is that early in Yeats's career the devils of "The Countess Cathleen," who are very unambivalent and real devils, say of themselves,

Yet all agree a power is in their look
That makes men bow, and flings a casting net
About their souls . . . .

(The Collected Plays . . . , p. 20.)

How odd that in later years Yeats uses the image of the casting net not to describe soul-thirsty, insatiable demons, but, as we saw earlier in this paper, the relatively helpful, long-suffering daemon.

I am persuaded that the Daimon . . . wove that netting from the stars and threw the net from his shoulder.

(Mythologies, p. 336.)
Of course any slanted musing about what happened at subsequent séances is an indecorous and unworthy fancy. We might almost wish that Yeats and Jung had not forced it on us so. Absit omen.

We have uncovered one idea which is not fancy: Jung believes in the potential extremity if not the simple absoluteness of evil and Yeats does not. The man-emanant god of both resides in a duality that is precondition for a culminating in unity. This man-emanant god in duality buries his roots beyond the sole man in and from whom he emanates by way of numinosity and synchronicity. Jung’s man-emanant god, however, is of greater otherness than Yeats’s and, unlike Yeats’s god, resides in an environment which allows no diminution of the concept of evil, an environment which serves to emphasize the schismatic nature of man-emanant god himself.

The question voiced before returns: how then in its final features does man-emanant god differ from other more familiar gods, the God of traditional Christianity for instance? Such a question naturally suggests itself if man-emanant god does indeed, as we have affirmed, issue forth in trinitarian patterns from the poetry and psychology which are here our prime concerns. Moreover, Yeats and Jung make repeated references to Christianity, its meaning, its symbols, its pertinence, its supposed strengths and weaknesses. As we have seen, they draw threads of analogy from the fabric of Christian thought—as perhaps all Western men as a matter of course—and often in the most insightful and artful fashions they invoke the cross, or—given to a change of spirit—hammer with blows of the fist on the door of the cathedral, as if to loosen the great hinges and splinter
the planks and cross-braces and break wide open the whole of the arched entranceway. They seem never to tire of illuminating poetry or psychology against a backdrop of the spires and bell towers of Christendom. Christianity is their shared and primary field of comparison and contrast. For purposes of placing and understanding Yeats's poetry and Jung's psychology it is necessary that we assemble on our own behalf a skeletal, if none the less largely proportioned, scaffold of comparison. Christianity will be our third point of reference. If we are able to stabilize such a point, we may hope to triangulate and so fix relative positions.

We turn to Bonhoeffer, who is not the only Paul within reach, but who, brought to the attention of the organized church through squalls of religious controversy and storms of political peril which he, like Stephen, willingly entered, and being likewise shortly thereafter led away, is for us the only Stephen within reach. For consideration of the Christian question in our day, his writing, even if judged incomplete, seems to serve as dependable touchstone, as a reliably fertile and legume-laden field, a field in which seed sown is multiplied many times over. We turn to Bonhoeffer not that we may see him as he is--for that would mean an arduous effort indeed, a long climb into rarefied atmospheres--but that we may see, in relation to Christendom, Yeats and Jung as they are.

Bonhoeffer shares with Yeats and Jung a concern for the uncovering of the true nature of reality. "To understand reality," Bonhoeffer says, "is not the same as to know about outward events. It is to perceive the essential nature of things."\(^\text{35}\) We have seen Yeats's

absorption in the non-apparent world and his impatience with commonplace reality. We have attributed to him the conviction that nature in her entirety stands as a mere hint of what comes to pass through the elaborate workings of symbols. There are similar currents in the expressions of Jung. Speaking in English and in London before an assemblage of physicians, Jung declared, "Only childish people imagine that the world is what we think it is,"36 and in the more formal style of one of his written works: "There are people, as there always have been, who cannot avoid the insight that the world and experience of the world are essentially in the nature of a parable and really illustrate something which lies hidden deep down in the subject itself, in its own trans-subjective reality." (Psychological Reflections, p. 296.) These are three formulations--Bonhoeffer's, Yeats's, Jung's--of an issue which is now no less pressing than it was when St. Paul preached (if we follow the free rendering of J. B. Phillips), "Our battle is to bring down every deceptive fantasy and every imposing defense which men erect against the true knowledge of God."37 To push Bonhoeffer--as representative of Judeo-Christian conviction--as close as possible to Yeats's understanding of reality and Jung's, we might seize upon "... as ... [a man] thinketh in his heart, so is he" (Prov. 23:7). Immediately, however, distinctions stemming from our previous findings

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about Yeats and Jung would begin to present themselves. Jung would elaborate such a thought as follows: as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he and so are the events that enfold him; moreover, all such enfoldings coalesce to form the world. And Yeats, quite simply: as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he, so are the events that enfold him, and so is the world. It would seem that three would agree that man constructs reality; it is the extent of that construction which is in question. Between reality and humanity, between divinity and humanity, who is the container and who the contained? Isaiah speaks of the graven image and comments that, typically, such an image is made "after the figure of a man, according to the beauty of a man; that it may remain in the house." (Isaiah 44:13.) He gives us a figure for the perplexities of Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer. Who is within the house? Who is outside the house? What is the house?

Beyond general questions of creation and reality there lie problems of duality and unity. In other words, how is Zechariah's tripartite vision to be interpreted, for it features Joshua the high priest to one side, Satan to the opposite side, and the Lord at some unspecified center of elevation? (Zech. 3:1ff.) Is divinity subject to good and evil, or is the situation reversed? Is the Lord sundered by the pull of opposites and does He therefore find His almighty wholeness in the resolution of these contraries, or does He preside, judge, and rule over such tension and would-be unity? Does God create Heraclitus, or Heraclitus God?
The god of Bonhoeffer, who is a personal god and therefore bears in his name the mark of capitalization—God—presides over a world of duality in many respects startlingly similar to the divided worlds of Yeats and Jung and their man-emanant god:

Tob and ra are the categories for the deepest division of human life in every aspect. The essential thing about them is that they appear as a pair and that, in their state of division, they belong inseparably together. Tob, the pleasureful, the good, the beautiful does not exist without being constantly submerged in ra, the painful, evil, mean, impure. And—in this wide sense—the painful, the evil, does not exist without a glimmer of pleasure, which makes pain wholly pain.38

Here we have a suggestion of the relativity that throbs in the poetry of Yeats and the psychology of Jung. And yet, Bonhoeffer sees thus tob and ra sundering of the world, with its overtones of Yeatsian and Jungian sundering, as the consequence of a deeper, primal, more terrible pulling apart than any Yeats would recognize under any circumstance, or Jung accept without extenuating provisos. If Bonhoeffer's thought were envisioned as a moving object, its

orbit would begin at this point to deflect noticeably from that
superficially similar object—similar by virtue of a like appre-
hension of the extremity of evil—which would be Jung's Weltansicht,
while the moving object of Yeatsian poetic thought, obeying its
own high eccentricity, would now be orbiting far away and veering
farther. Bonhoeffer's sundering is a pulling apart quite his
Christian own and finds its beginnings in a twilight drama of the
rending of the whole:

"You will not die." "You shall die." In these
two statements the world gapes asunder for Adam . . .
Truth against truth—God's truth against serpent's
truth, God's truth connected with the prohibition,
the serpent's truth connected with the promise,
God's truth pointing to my limit, the serpent's
truth pointing to my limitlessness—both are truth,
both come from God, God against God. And this second
God is at the same time the God of the promise to
man to be like God.

(Creation and Fall, pp. 70-1.)

A vision of man-emanant god's culminating in a sphericity of
expansively indefinite inner dimensions floats across Bonhoeffer's
description. Although we cannot tell whether it was such a serpent
speaking, we have heard words of such promise before. We have heard
them in poetry and psychology. In any case, the cool serpent who
represents for Yeats and Jung certain aspects of the impersonal
greater unconscious is clearly associated with limitlessness, for he is potentially the uroboros, the perfect circularity, the serpent who bites his own tail. The phenomenon of conflict which Bonhoeffer pictures is not nature devouring and so replenishing nature, but a struggle in which the whole of earthly nature is but one of several participants. Bonhoeffer postulates lordly othernesses of a type we have not encountered in either Yeats or Jung. How far from Joshua the high priest does Satan stand in Zechariah's vision? Is he an alien influence or an integral, if antagonistic, part of the whole? How large is the house of which Isaiah speaks, and who is within and who without? Bonhoeffer heightens the contrast between himself and Yeats and Jung:

God against man-like-God. God and \textit{imago dei} man against God and \textit{sicut deus} man. \textit{Imago dei}—Godlike man in his existence for God and neighbour, in his primitive creatureliness and limitation; \textit{sicut deus}—Godlike man in his out-of-himself knowledge of good and evil, in his limitlessness and his acting out-of-himself, in his underived existence, in his loneliness. \textit{Imago dei}—that is, man bound to the Word of the Creator and living from him; \textit{sicut deus}—that is, man bound to the depths of his own knowledge about God, in good and evil; \textit{imago dei}—the creature living in the unity of obedience; \textit{sicut deus}—the creator-man living out of the division of good and evil.

\textit{(Creation and Fall, p. 71.)}
Man-emanant god the creator who resides in duality would seem to be no stranger to Bonhoeffer, and yet Bonhoeffer nowhere appends to his description of this creature, "who culminates in unity," for he sees serpents and man-emanant divinities from a new--no, we should say a different--perspective. He sees them differently because he looks at them askance. He looks at them askance because his direct gaze is elsewhere; he maintains quite another point of focus.

Bonhoeffer's orbit deflects now further and far from Jung's; Jung's orbit, formerly holding close to Bonhoeffer's by the attractive force of otherness and good-evil disparity, bends so radically as to seem almost to be rejoining the trace of Yeats's trajectory. Bonhoeffer's duality is now seen for what it is; Bonhoeffer has split the world and, from the standpoint of Yeats and Jung, he has re-split the world, for the cleavage he makes, far from coinciding with the cleavages made by Yeats and Jung, leaves the cleaver himself, Bonhoeffer, on one side of his chasm--and Yeats and Jung, with their cleavages, on the other: a new duality. This is not to say that Yeats and Jung in their undoubted knowledge of this re-splitting are somehow profoundly affected--not from their own standpoints in any case. Jung continues to see long lines of patients and speak convincingly of wholeness, with reference to his own world-splitting; Yeats leads in song those who wish and sometimes seem to "dance on deathless feet" ("Mohini Chatterjee," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 243) or wanders alone to the edge of his own chasm led by vision of unity, "painting," in his primordial joy, "the dust and the sunlight."
("Gitanjali," *Essays and Introductions*, p. 393.) But even the
twilight, which we formerly considered solely a Yeatsian property,
that is, the glow of ecstasy from unity of being ultimately achieved,
seems to be known to Bonhoeffer and receives at his hands, as we
might expect, a somewhat different interpretation. Man, he main-
tains, "is no longer able to distinguish clearly the light of Lucifer,
the light-bearer, from the light of God." Man therefore "remains in
the twilight . . ." (*Creation and Fall*, p. 89). Twilight for Bon-
hoeffer is not a sign of perfect merging, but rather a symptom of
pitiful confusion.

Jung's wholeness and Yeats's unity of being do, however, have
a counterpart on Bonhoeffer's side of the dramatically re-divided
world of Bonhoeffer. Each of the three prophets in question preaches
a gospel of disunity ultimately resolved in unity. Yeats and Jung
follow inner voices to the place of choice, or to confrontation,
that is, to the Gethsemane and Golgotha of man the redeemer, and
through his suffering reunite the widely divided, achieve the
sought-after sphericity, become the whole man. Because Bonhoeffer's
duality is an altogether different duality, it requires for its
reconciliation an altogether different plan of unity. The key to
this scheme for wholeness for man, for the filling of the gap be-
 tween *imago dei* and *sicut deus* man, is the man who is more than man
and already whole:

*Imago dei, sicut deus, agnus dei*--the One who was
sacrificed for man *sicut deus*, killing man's false
divinity in true divinity, the God-man who restores the image of God.

(Creation and Fall, p. 71.)

... there is a place at which God and the cosmic reality are reconciled, a place at which God and man have become one. That and that alone is what enables man to set his eyes upon God and the world at the same time. This place does not lie somewhere beyond reality in the realm of ideas. It lies in the midst of history as a divine miracle. It lies in Jesus Christ, the Reconciler of the world. As an ideal the unity of simplicity and wisdom is doomed to failure, just as is any other attempt to hold one's own against reality. It is an impossible ideal, and an extremely contradictory one. But if it is founded upon the reality of a world which is at one with God in Jesus Christ, the commandment of Jesus acquires reality and meaning. Whoever sees Jesus Christ does indeed see God and the world in one. He can henceforward no longer see God without the world or the world without God.

(Ethics, pp. 69-70.)

Here we glimpse how utterly variant are Bonhoeffer's definitions of the numinosity and synchronicity first named in our discussions of
Yeats and Jung. The beholding of Christ is the truly numinous experience, or perhaps all numinosity amplified and redirected. It is an experience of unaccountable fascination, for it is, if we are to believe Bonhoeffer, an experience of Him to whom man is drawn as child to father, as brother to older brother. Likewise, the single great stroke of synchronicity, below which and into which all lesser coincidences must be gathered, is for Bonhoeffer the incarnation. Christ enters history at an uncannily appropriate time and in an altogether fitting fashion, as presumably the Holy Spirit the heart of each believer. The unity which Bonhoeffer's "Reconciler of the world" brings into being is not such as we have seen before in examination of Yeats and Jung. Christ's sacrifice is not merely a fulfilling of personal destiny, nor the fashioning for the sake of human destiny a model of universal applicability and high symbolic value. No, in Bonhoeffer's terms, Christ did not live and simply die, nor merely show men how to live or how to die, but by coming to die and to live changed the nature of death—and therefore also the nature of life.

Holding as he does this most peculiar, if in Western lands most familiar, view of final unity, what does Bonhoeffer say of the inner voices that purportedly lead Yeats and Jung in the dance of man the holy spirit and bring them to the possibility of the ultimate unity which Yeats and Jung foresee and proclaim? Here too, pronounced duality holds sway in Bonhoeffer's understanding. Initially, there exists for Bonhoeffer the duality that is man's ruinous middle-range
uncertainty, his hopeless twilight confusion: "Man no longer lives in the beginning—he has lost the beginning. Now he finds he is in the middle, knowing neither the end nor the beginning, and yet knowing that he is in the middle, coming from the beginning and going towards the end." (Creation and Fall, p. 14.) Because of the perplexity and derangement inherent in his isolation from beginning and end, man is susceptible to a second—and we might say auditory—duality, a kind of mixed-channel reception of two voices:

And because he [the evil one] lies he will say:
"I am the beginning and you, man, are the beginning. You were with me from the beginning. I have made you what you are and with me is your end. I am the beginning and the end, the Alpha and the Omega; worship me. I am the truth from which the lie comes: for I am the lie that only then gives birth to the truth. You are the beginning and you are the end, for you are in me. Believe in me. I have lied from the beginning; lie, and thus you will be in the beginning and a lord of the truth. Discover your beginning yourself." Thus speaks the evil one, because he has lied from the beginning. Either he is speaking, or the other One who, from the beginning, was the way, the truth and the life, who was in the beginning: God himself, Christ, the Holy Spirit.
No one can speak of the beginning but the one
who was in the beginning.

(Creation and Fall, p. 15.)

For Bonhoeffer the choice is clear; man listens to one voice, or
man listens to the other. 39 Man listens to one voice and is held
fast by a strength not his own in Abigail's bundle of life, or man
listens to the other voice and is propelled irresistibly out and
away from the bundle of life, for "Satan's truth is the death of
all reality." (Ethics, p. 366.) Indeed, we might imagine Bonhoeffer's
fallen Adam as crying out in Fergus's own words, "But now I have
grown nothing, knowing all." ("Fergus and the Druid," The Collected
Poems . . . , p. 33.) Bonhoeffer's orbit, now so clearly his own and
solitary trajectory as to be incommensurable with the Yeatsian and
Jungian, curves forth into the far courses of his own far removed
half of all orbital space. With man-emanant god who resides in
duality and culminates in unity, Bonhoeffer deals ruthlessly:

It is man's right and duty that he should be man.
The quest for the superman, the endeavor to outgrow
the man within the man, the pursuit of the heroic,

39 St. Paul speaks also of certain apparently irreconcilable
opposites:

What common interest can there be between good-
ness and evil? How can light and darkness share
life together? How can there be harmony between
Christ and the devil? What can a believer have in
common with an unbeliever? What common ground can
idols hold with the temple of God?

The New Testament in Modern English, tr. J. B. Phillips,
II Cor. 6:14-16.
the cult of the demigod, all this is not the
proper concern of man, for it is untrue. The
real man is not an object either for contempt
or for deification, but an object of the love of
God . . . . The real man is at liberty to be his
Creator's creature . . . .

(Ethics, p. 81.)

Man becomes man because God became man. But man
does not become God. It is not he, therefore, who
was or is able to accomplish his own transformation,
but it is God who changes his form into the form of
man, so that man may become, not indeed God, but, in
the eyes of God, man.

(Ethics, p. 82.)

Taken at its most valueless, taken at the far margin, taken so
lifelessly as to raise a shudder perhaps in even the hardest son
of Zeruiah—that is, taken with no serious consideration of its
possible coincidence with what is true—Bonhoeffer's refusal to
equivocate yet leaves us in possession of an instrument for drawing
clear distinctions. There need be no doubt in our minds. In Bon-
hoefler's eyes, he who does not embrace Christ acts ever and only,
to appropriate Yeats's words, "in defiance of the author's intention"
(Mythologies, p. 358). He who places his faith in a god who can be
found not in the Word, but solely in his emanating and flowering in
man, no matter where this god's roots, no matter if he possess some
claim to an obscure autonomy, has no place in the great kingdom; he who places his trust in man-emmanent god, who for Bonhoeffer is fallen man in disguise, that is, he who places his trust in himself, he who is "the creator-man living out of the division of good and evil," has no part in the bundle of life held together in a rounded One by "the Lord thy God."

In terms of stars and constellations Bonhoeffer is most surely Polaris: he holds a lonely vigil; he marks most steadfastly a given direction; his tireless occupancy of a removed point gives meaning to the term polarity; and all light that passes through his field of influence must become uniformly polarized in accordance with that powerful and unidirectional force that rules his own inmost parts. If Bonhoeffer is Polaris, then Yeats and Jung must be the Dioscuri, the two first-magnitude stars of Gemini. Although the distances between these two particular bright points of the night sky, Pollux and Castor by name, must be incalculable, yet their joint removal from Polaris is such that they do indeed appear as fraternal twins, would-be everlasting sons of Zeus. As they follow their respective universal orbits--these two brother-stars--they no doubt whisper to one another their dreams, while Polaris holds to his position so many light-years away (and one such light-year is said to equal five-point-eight trillion miles) that he may be thought of as existing in a dimension of space and time entirely his own. The positions of Yeats and Jung in relation to Bonhoeffer are revealed and summarized in the following comparative analysis from Jeremiah:
The prophet that hath a dream,
let him tell a dream;
and he that hath my word,
let him speak my word
faithfully. What is the chaff
to the wheat? saith the Lord.

(Jeremiah 23:28.)

In exactly this fashion, Jeremiah's fashion, Bonhoeffer places his God behind and before, prior to and after—over, around, and under—beneath and above, all symbols and archetypes, all creation and conception, all calling and being called, all worlds and galaxies. Martin E. Marty notes that in Bonhoeffer's work, *Sanctorum Communio*, "God is unverdinglichte—not at man's disposal in his majesty."\(^40\)

We have explicit data from Bonhoeffer concerning his view of the relative placements of protagonist and antagonists in Zechariah's vision and concerning who indeed is within and who without the house of which Isaiah speaks.

There is a kind of proffered wisdom that runs through the writings of each of the three in question. At times there appear what seem to be actual concourses of their respective currents of thought. Between Yeats and Jung such confluences are more than illusory, but between these two and Bonhoeffer only seeming at best.

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Their understanding of the Word is separated from Bonhoeffer’s own as surely and by as great a distance as Jeremiah’s Word of the Lord from the dreams of the ancient oneirocritics who were his adversaries and contemporaries. Yeats’s understanding of the cross and Jung’s are distinctly pagan, for each points—by way of occasional mention but also, in reality, continually and throughout his writing—to Odin’s sacrifice of self to self, not to Christ’s sacrifice of self for man. Odin prevails both in letter and in spirit in the writings of Yeats and Jung. Odin’s fabled sacrifice concerns the inner and the non-apparent world; Christ’s reputed sacrifice concerns the fusing of the world of the spiritually unapproachable with the world of the commonplace. These two are not miscible.

Of a visionary figure glimpsed in the poem, "Byzantium," Yeats says, "I hail the superhuman; / I call it death-in-life and life-in-death." (The Collected Poems . . . , p. 243.) It is a fit description for the resolution that Yeats, through the entire body of his poetry, would approach. Jung might make use of similar terms. He would say that what appears to be death-in-life, namely the demonic reflections projected from the imagination of man’s own soul, may in the approach to transformative wholeness be seen as life-in-death; the undertaker may be revealed as midwife in disguise. Bonhoeffer’s formula might be stated more simply: the death-in-life which is man’s fate and bane becomes by reason of the person of Christ overturned, engulfed, and eclipsed by its opposite, life-in-death. Death-in-life maulders on only in a kind of sub-reality. The great and final opposites are destined for effective separation. When Bonhoeffer’s serpent
has come full circle he does indeed bite his own tail—and the
wound proves fatal. Each of these three—Bonhoeffer, Jung, Yeats—
has a kind of wisdom to put forward. Bonhoeffer would have us be
wiser than serpents (that is, he would have us beyond the serpent
world of unredeemed reality) and as harmless as, but wiser than,
doves (for ordinary doves fail to understand the rigor of true
Christianity). Jung seems to tell us to be wiser than doves (for
the merely religious are trapped in forms both long and dead and
in dire need of psychological revivification) and harmless as serpents
(for, unless meanly crossed, the greater unconscious is a persistent
insinuation toward wholeness). Yeats, for his part, would have us
be as wise and as dangerous as a serpent, preferably with eyes fixed
and glittering (for to bite one's tail is no mean feat) and forget
doves.

Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer momentarily aside, we might observe
that the world moves constantly and simultaneously, from its center
outward, in two or more contrary directions, and therefore one must
say either that one day the world will pull itself apart, or that it
must perforce grow continually larger. Yeats holds with the latter
alternative. Jung would be found somewhere inbetween, attempting to
span both choices. Superficially, Bonhoeffer, as well as all of
Christendom, affirms the former alternative. And yet, there is
another side to Bonhoeffer and to Christianity. Bonhoeffer embodies
in his word and thought a simultaneity worthy of the highly developed
forms of that principle which we discovered in the doctrine of syn-
chronicity and in our original discussion of Yeats, Jung, and their
understandings of Odin on the tree. It is with such simultaneity in mind that Yeats speaks of the rhythmic prolongation of "the moment of contemplation, the moment when we are both asleep and awake, which is the one moment of creation ..." ('The Symbolism of Poetry,' "Ideas of Good and Evil," Essays and Introductions, p. 159.)

For Bonhoeffer, Christ's declaration, "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (Matt. 22:32), means that God is Lord not of the once living past, nor merely of the yet to be living future, but of the living present. Although the world is indeed bound to fly apart, it is at this moment also bound together in the person of Christ.

For Bonhoeffer, Christ's historical coming was, as we noted earlier, a unique correspondence in time, circumstance, and person. But the very present redeeming of the time (Eph. 5:16; Col. 4:5) through the movements of the body of Christ is also a simultaneity of a high order, an envelopment of extreme alternatives. Bonhoeffer's peculiar synchronicity resides in his understanding that God is not only "unverdinglichte," but also and at the same time, through Christ, "pro nobis, for man,"41 which is to say, we might add, in a special sense pro mundi beneficio, for the benefit of all earthly creation. The pieces of the world may fly apart even as stars and galaxies are said to flee from one another at great velocities, and yet be held together, for no galaxy escapes the universe, no matter what its

direction or ambition. The simultaneity from which the world benefits, according to Bonhoeffer, benefits also the enlightened man, for he becomes at one and the same time in need of redemption and fully justified, or, in the words of Luther, who gives impetus to Bonhoeffer, "simul justus et peccator." 42

Although the characteristic reigning of simultaneity over sequentiality in Bonhoeffer must be held distinct from those like preferential orderings of the combinative moment over serial moments which we have identified in Yeats and Jung, Bonhoeffer's supremacy of the moment of coincidence points none the less to a final field of possible comparison. The principle of simultaneity implies the untold importance of the present instant, and direct experience of the numinous is the present instant in highest intensification.

Each man in the beginning wings forth alone; this much is clear from the thoughts of Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer. The quality—in flight—of his experience of the present moment is critical to his development and to the development of the world and reality. Yeats's belief in the necessity for direct experience of symbols which are living souls needs no further emphasis. A single moment of such numinous experience may constitute and compose, according to the canon of Yeats, the quality of an entire existence. Jung's psychology

is likewise built around present-moment encounterings of the numinous. "Experience of the archetype is not only impressive, it seizes and possesses the whole personality, and is naturally productive of faith," says Jung. "'Legitimate' faith must always rest on experience." (Symbols of Transformation, p. 232.) That Luther who experienced present moments so claiming as to call forth from his soul defensive exclamations ("It isn't me!" or "I am not!") (43) or to demand of his body the hurling of inkwells toward Satan's malevolent presence, speaks as a fit antecedent for Bonhoeffer—and in a certain sense for Jung also—when he says of those who do not possess the faith of "living and unshakeable confidence": ". . . in their hearts, and out of their own resources, they conjure up an idea which they call 'belief,' which they treat as genuine faith. All the same, it is but a human fabrication, an idea without a corresponding experience in the depths of the heart." (44) For Bonhoeffer, the experience of the numinous is indeed preeminently and primarily the experience of Christ within: "He who is called must go out of his

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situation in which he cannot believe, into the situation in which, first and foremost, faith is possible."45 The experience of the living Christ is an encounter with "the absolute, direct, and unaccountable authority of Jesus."46 This is numinosity in highly personal form. This is the awesome experience which pre-occupies Bonhoeffer, while, in contrast, Yeats and Jung are taken with--claimed by--experiences of living symbols and symbols that speak from the power of living archetypes. As if to emphasize the strict limits of the similitude between his all-claiming experience and the counter-experiences of Yeats and Jung, Bonhoeffer says, "The call of Jesus teaches us that our relation to the world has been built on an illusion" (The Cost of Discipleship, p. 108), and it is for this reason, namely the unquestionable and pre-emptive nature of the experience of the Redeemer, that Bonhoeffer refers to Christian life as "the dawning of the ultimate in me; it is the life of Jesus Christ in me." (Ethics, p. 141.) It is this sole and continuing experience--this singular experience of the life of Christ--which stands behind, composes, and embraces Bonhoeffer's sense of the numinous and the simultaneous.

Confidence in the present-moment validity of experiences of the numinous is the high distinction of these three taken together: Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer. On the other hand, and at the same


time, their respective and divergent interpretations of experiences of the numinous distinguish them, in most pronounced fashion, each from the other.\footnote{47} The patterns of thought that proceed from these

\footnote{47}{Parting comments from outside, albeit somewhat tendentious, authorities on--perhaps we should say cautious apologists for--numinosity may now be in order:

With the Uncanny \[ which may put us in mind of synchronicity and inexplicable simultaneity \] one has reached the fringes of the Numinous . . ..

. . . no factual description of any human environment could include the uncanny and the Numinous or even hint at them. There seem, in fact, to be only two views we can hold about awe. Either it is a mere twist in the human mind, corresponding to nothing objective and serving no biological function, yet showing no tendency to disappear from that mind at its fullest development in poet, philosopher, or saint \[ three examples spring almost immediately to mind \]; or else it is a direct experience of the really supernatural, to which the name Revelation might properly be given.

The Numinous is not the same as the morally good, and a man overwhelmed with awe is likely, if left to himself, to think the numinous object "beyond good and evil."


To those who have never been Christians or, for one reason or another, have lost their faith, the very innocence of the experience \[ an experience of a visionary and numinous nature, specifically one which fits beneath Auden's heading, "The Vision of Dame Kind" \] can be an occasion for error. Since it involves neither the intellect nor the will, it is always possible for the intellect to misunderstand and the will to abuse it. The intellect can take the encounter with a numinous creature for an encounter with deity itself.

three are ingeniously woven of gracile strands and filaments of of blended colors: threads drawn from great tapestries of the numinous. And yet, each of the three unmistakably fashions his own nest. The interweavings between Yeats, Jung, and Bonhoeffer--and, for that matter, the absence of interweavings--are a curious business. In a sense, these three launch themselves from a common point--an exceptional regard for the numinous--and yet each sails forth into directions of his own and develops in the course of his flight a highly specialized body of faith: ultimately incomparable and productive of unique markings and auras of radiance. In that each of these three denies that life yields to the straightforward power of intellect, and in that each puts forward in his own person and in his own words certain stylized tenets of half-hidden wisdom, each may be said to hold a position beneath a single highly general rubric, which might be termed 'the burden of revelatory dogma.'

Moreover, as visions of dogma may suggest, each of the three in question bears a distinct relation--although it may be where Yeats or Jung is concerned a somewhat thinned and overextended relation, or a relation chiefly by way of contrast--to organized Christendom and to the Church. Alfred North Whitehead has said:

A system of dogmas may be the ark within which the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of history.

But the Church will perish unless it opens its window
and lets out the dove to search for an olive branch. 48

Wise thoughts well spoken. And who of the three we have chosen flew excursions from the window of the ark? All three. Bonhoeffer in the updrafts of controversy both theological and political is the dove who twice flew reconnaissance and twice returned to the ark, the last return presumably motivated by little more than a sense of obligation to Noah, other perches being available. He is unlike the more complacent doves who flew no such missions, for he has an uncompromising streak, and he flies headlong into waiting turbulencies. Genesis also provides an image to account for Yeats. He is the raven who preceded the dove, the raven who preferred freedom over some designated place to perch. He is the raven who behaves like the hawk:

'I will not be clapped in a hood,
Nor a cage, nor alight upon a wrist,
Now I have learnt to be proud
Hovering over the wood
In the broken mist
Or tumbling cloud.'

(Yeats, "The Hawk," The Collected Poems . . ., p. 147.)

We can imagine such a Noah-escaped raven's winging far distances—perhaps to southern polar regions (where temperatures, it is said,
subside below zero more than a hundred Fahrenheit degrees, a
depth which after all may be considered not far above that
glorious nadir of chill where all movement ceases), 49 yes, very
likely to antarctic climes, singing to himself, this raven, in
more beautiful rhymes than any story-teller might mouth or
presumptuously mime, thoughts such as these: "Freedom and flight!
So much to be preferred over some contrived and designated spot
to perch! And more besides, for--perch or no perch--there is in
the desolation below a certain beauty . . . ." Yeats might approve
the raven-image (if not the raven-thoughts we have given that
image), for he has written:

... in the evening flight of the rooks

he [the poet] may discover rhythm and

49 Besides absolute zero, another point on the scale
of coldness might win favor with Yeats: a fresh blossom
cooled and held perfectly, that is, without variation, at
a point of temperature which corresponds to a specified
fraction of a degree short of freezing will maintain indefi-
nitely and undiminished its freshness, and yet will never
know brittleness--will in fact be ever as pliable in petal
as the day it was plucked. (And in the course of such a
process of cooling would a blossom enter a phase of reca-
lescence? And would it therefore give off a twilight glow?
No, it is too much to hope.) If Yeats had known of the pos-
sibility of such effective this-worldly suspension, would
he ever have sung, "Once out of nature I shall never take/
My bodily form from any natural thing/ But such a form as
Grecian goldsmiths make/ Of hammered gold and gold ename-
ling" ("Sailing to Byzantium," The Collected Poems . . . ., p. 192)?
pattern like those in sleep and so never
awake out of vision.

(Mythologies, p. 342.)

And Jung? Jung is the small gyrfalcon about which Holy Writ says
nothing. (It says nothing of the gyrfalcon, that is, in connec-
tion with Noah, and in connection with Moses makes only oblique
insinuations concerning the unsuitable nature of such a bird as
food for the sons of Abraham.) Jung is the small gyrfalcon (al-
though some of his colleagues in psychology would no doubt prefer
to think of him as a wivern) who flew from the window of the ark
and, fully intending to return but drawn on by the lure of favored
polar climes, chose a great circle route and approached the ark--
after, lo, so long a time--from the direction least expected; he is
the small gyrfalcon who, when he had returned, neglected the window
and perched instead on the peak of the ark where--especially after
so long an absence--it was difficult for Noah to recognize him.

50 Concerning the raven as appropriate representative for
Yeats, we may consult also with naturalists:

The common raven is becoming rarer in
Europe and North America, but it adapts well
to the Arctic. Its naked legs and toes, like
those of seabirds, are capable of tolerating
low temperatures without affecting metabolism.

Fascinating World of Animals, ed. L. Harrison Matthews and Richard
Even the other small gyrfalcons had difficulty recognizing him and disputed loudly among themselves who this one perched so far and high might be. Yeats may have had him in mind when he wrote:

The ger-eagle has chosen his part
In blue deep of the upper air
Where one-eyed day can meet his stare;
He is content with his savage heart.

("Calvary," The Collected Plays, p. 293.)

The dove, the raven, and the small gyrfalcon. Each flew from the same sill and presumably from the same hand, and so, to a certain extent, each moved in a destiny which began with the ark, which was of and from the ark, and yet, at the same time, each chose freely his own course of far flight.

It is in openness and fullness of airy freedom that a poet sings and grows ever more wrapped in the harmonies of his own vision; that a physician heals and becomes the focal and reflective point for visions restored; that a preacher preaches and denounces all visions for the sake of one vision. We can understand in part therefore how it is that a poet sings and is shaped, that a physician heals and is himself anointed, and that a preacher preaches and in this process loses his life.

Centuries preceding ours had of course their own categories for visionaries, each such category no doubt with its supposedly corresponding fate. Sadly enough, records left by even immediately
preceding centuries must seem to us remote, if not altogether impermeable. And yet, even with the earlier of foregoing centuries intelligent exchanges are not utterly precluded. We might still partly understand, for instance, if we were told that a wizard orders the movements of the heavens, that a seer observes patiently and interprets the movements of the heavens, or that a saint responds to a single sign and is taken forthwith into the bosom of the moving heavens.
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