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THE EMERGENCE OF AUSTRIAN PATRIOTISM, 1918-1934:
THE POLITICAL ASPECTS

by

Jerry Wayne Pyle

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's signature:

R. John Rath

Houston, Texas
May, 1973
PREFACE

For many years little was written about Austrian patriots in the First Austrian Republic. The history and prehistory of the Anschluss, however, have been recorded in great detail. The time has come when we can more profitably study those individuals who fought to preserve Austrian independence. This thesis is an attempt to examine the political aspects of Austrian patriotism from 1918 until 1934. I hope that it will prove useful to others who wish to do research in this field.

I wish to express my special thanks to Dr. R. John Rath, my thesis director, for his many helpful comments. I have also received many useful suggestions from Fritz Fellner, J. Thomas Forgey, David H. Sixbey, Reinhart Kondert, and my wife, Rosalie B. Pyle. Valuable research assistance has been provided by the staffs of the Fondren Library, the Peace Library, the Nationalbibliothek, and the Vienna Arbeiter Kammer. Clerical assistance has been provided by Mrs. Linda Davidson, Miss Christine Vanscoder, Miss Terrai Ann Jones, and Miss Brenda Morris. It should be noted that I alone am responsible for the final interpretation and any errors found in this manuscript.

Rice University
May, 1973

Jerry Wayne Pyle
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The development of Austrian patriotism from 1918 until 1934 has been ignored by too many students of twentieth-century European history. In fact, until fairly recently the vast majority of historians were convinced that patriotism was all but non-existent during this period of Austrian history. This viewpoint, moreover, seemed confirmed by circumstantial evidence. For example, in 1918 the provisional national assembly voted almost unanimously in favor of Anschluss with Germany. Furthermore, in widely publicized plebiscites conducted in 1921 and 1938 fewer than one percent of the Austrian electorate opposed union with Germany. The evidence now available, however, suggests that during the period from 1918 until 1934 a surprisingly large percentage of the country's citizens gave their supreme allegiance to the new Austrian Republic. The purpose of this study is to identify these Austrian patriots and to trace their efforts to maintain the independence of Austria, especially from Germany.

Although patriotism is one of the most used catchwords of the twentieth century, it is a concept the meaning of which is still not clearly understood. In its simplest form patriotism means the love of one's fatherland or native land. Unfortunately, such a clear, concise definition has been inadequate for the needs of modern scholarship.
The historical evolution of the state has added new dimensions to the meaning of patriotism. The intimacy that man once shared with the city-states of ancient Greece, for instance, has vanished completely with the creation of superstates in the industrial age. The nature of man's affections for his homeland, moreover, has changed considerably as cultural factors have become an increasing necessity in identifying one's fatherland.¹ The nebulous quality of patriotism is also accentuated by the fact that it may assume different corporeal forms at both the national and local levels.²

The vagueness of the concept of patriotism makes it virtually impossible to draw any sharp distinction between patriotism and nationalism. In fact, nationalism is usually defined as a fusion of patriotism and nationality.³ Despite the obvious overlapping of the


²For an excellent discussion of "national patriotism," "local patriotism," and "imperial patriotism," see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928), pp. 23-26. "National patriotism" is the variant most scholars have in mind when they use the word "patriotism" without any form of a modifier. In general, national patriotism can be described as the affection that an individual has for his country in contrast to the esteem in which he holds the immediate vicinity in which he was born. Thus, national patriotism involves nothing less than the acceptance of an entire country as one's fatherland.

two concepts, Karl W. Deutsch has noted the following differences between them:

Strictly speaking, patriotism is an effort or readiness to promote the interests of all those persons born or living with the same patria, i.e., country, whereas nationalism aims at promoting the interests of all those of the same natio, i.e., literally a group of common descent and upbringing, or rather of common culture, that is to say of complementary habits of communication. 4

Despite their almost universal acceptance by the historical profession, these subtle distinctions are not always valid. Overwhelming difficulties beset the scholar, for instance, when the patria and the natio coincide as they do in a number of modern nation-states. The designation of patriotism as political and nationalism as cultural, moreover, becomes totally meaningless where the former is a product of the educational process. 5 Furthermore, according to Carlton J. H. Hayes, one of the most distinguished authorities on nationalism, in the formative stage of a nation-state, nationalism is primarily political. 6

As a consequence of the ambiguous nature of both nationalism and patriotism, it is sometimes impossible to decide which of the two terms is more appropriate. For instance, the prolonged struggle

---


5 See Doob, Patriotism and Nationalism, p. 142.

6 Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, pp. 5-6. Of the four distinct types of nationalism recognized by Hayes only one is political.
of Austria's leaders to preserve the political independence of their fatherland from 1918 until 1934 obviously belongs in the category of patriotism. However, since these same events contributed substantially to the eventual creation of a full-scale Austrian nationality from what had historically been considered a German subnationality, a scholar would not make an egregious error if he classified these Austrian patriots as nationalists.\(^7\)

Although some scholars may disapprove of my terminology, I have personally elected to use the terms patriotism and patriot throughout the remaining pages of this narrative because I have confined my research exclusively to the political arena, while totally ignoring the cultural aspects of Austrian history unless they were politically inspired.\(^3\) My choice of nomenclature was ultimately determined by the

\(^7\)As noted above, Hayes believed that in the formative stage of a nation-state nationalism is primarily political.

\(^3\)As most students of nationalism are already aware, no one has yet attempted an exhaustive investigation of the cultural aspects of Austrian nationalism. The best introduction in the English language, however, is Stanley Suval's "The Search for a Fatherland," Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. IV-V (1968-1969), pp. 275-299. An excellent article in German is Ernst Hoor, "Die Österreichische Nation—eine Realität," Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur, Vol. I, No. 4 (1957), pp. 193-200. Individuals interested in original source material would do well to consult the works of Hugo Hantsch, Ernst Karl Winter, Hermann Bahr, Richard von Kralik, Richard Schaukal, Hugo von Hoffmannsthai, Erwin Hanskik, Hans Kelsen, Raimund Frederick Kaindl, Rudolf Hans Bartsch, Joseph Everle, Anton Wildgans, Wilhelm Bauer, and Oscar A. H. Schmitz. Many of these authors, however, could be described as monarchists instead of nationalists. Frequently, there is no clear distinction between the two. The two most valuable books for an evaluation of the nationalists are Bahr's Österreich in Ewigkeit (Hildesheim: F. Borgmeyer, 1929), which should be read in connection with Karl Nirschl, In seinem Menschen ist Österreich: Hermann Bahrs immerer Weg (Linz: Oberösterreichische Landesverlag, 1964); and Oscar A. H. Schmitz, Der Österreichische Mensch: zum Anschauungsspeccchrift für Europäer, insbesondere für Reichsdeutsche
fact that in the context in which I have used the word a majority of historians probably prefer the word "patriotism" to "nationalism." 9

The study of Austrian patriotism is also complicated by the identity crisis that had haunted the Austrians ever since the creation of the duchy of Austria in 1282. Although they never ceased to consider themselves as members of the German nation, they did, nonetheless, eventually acquire a new political identity under the Habsburg dynasty. Despite their separate political existence, however, no insurmountable problems emerged until after the French Revolution, when the German intelligentsia began insisting on a single state that was to embrace all members of the German nation. The majority of the German people in Austria, however, supported their emperor when he refused to merge only the German-speaking areas of the Habsburg empire into such a state. His people remained loyal, moreover, when his ministers refused to sanction the creation of a state that included all Germans except the Austrians. The position of the Habsburgs was not seriously challenged until 1848, when a large percentage of the German-Austrians pledged their allegiance to the short-lived political entity fashioned by the Frankfurt Assembly.

(Vienna: Wiener Literarische Anstalt, 1924), which should be read in conjunction with Friedrich F. G. Kleinwaechter's Der deutschösterreichische Mensch und der Anschluß (Vienna: Eckart-Verlag, 1926). The books by Bahr and Schmitz also illustrate the relationship between cultural and political factors within nationalism.

9Aside from Hayes, most scholars adhere to the political and cultural distinctions set forth by Deutsch. Hayes did little more than acknowledge the existence of such a form of nationalism.
The identity crisis of the German-Austrians assumed a new dimension in 1866, when Bismarck forcefully extruded them from the German Confederation. Those individuals who refused to accept their exclusion from the new German federation as permanent banded together under the name Pan-Germans and worked ceaselessly for Anschluß, or political union, with their fellow Germans in the north. In their zeal to become part of a single German state, many Pan-Germans repudiated Austria as their fatherland. In fact, whenever they used the word "fatherland" it was always in reference to Germany—never to Austria. By 1914 the Pan-German movement, however, no longer played any meaningful role in the affairs of the Austrian state.\(^{10}\)

In 1918, with the dissolution of the Habsburg empire, every German-Austrian was subjected to the uncertainty that had previously been confined to the Pan-Germans. The masses simply could not believe that the impoverished Austrian Republic was a reincarnation of the Austrian empire and its glorious past. A great deal of the doubt stemmed from the fact that Austria and the Habsburg dynasty seemed virtually synonymous to the average citizen. Without the Habsburgs Austria was simply unthinkable to the vast majority of the people. They suddenly found themselves in an inexplicable twilight zone in which only one thing appeared unchanged: they were still Germans.

For lack of a better alternative, many individuals consequently advocated a political union with the Weimar Republic—a course that the vast majority of the Austrians pursued with great reluctance. It certainly was not easy for them to surrender their previous identity after over six hundred years of independence, to obliterate centuries of animosity directed against the Prussians and Lutherans, and to accept all the north Germans as their equals instead of their inferiors. A complete restoration of the old empire would have been preferable to a sizeable percentage of the Austrian people, but that alternative hardly seemed feasible.

The most devoted subjects of Francis Joseph balked at the suggestion that they would be relegated to a role of minor significance in the Weimar Republic. On the other hand, the thought of becoming a second Switzerland was repulsive to every Austrian simply because of his illustrious patrimony. It was impossible for the Austrians to forget the grandeur that went with the phrase "A. E. I. O. U." (Austriae est imperare orbis universo or Austria erit in orbe ultima)\(^1\) or the fact that they had been responsible for saving Europe from the Turks. With the slow realization that henceforth, regardless of their place of residence, they were destined to be mere mortals, the Austrian people lapsed into a dangerous trauma.

The atmosphere of despair that engulfed the Austrian people from 1918 until 1922 was unquestionably the major deterrent to the development of Austrian patriotism. Consequently, I have placed considerable emphasis on those factors which contributed to the growth and the subsequent decline of this sense of hopelessness: disillusionment with the war, the Treaty of St. Germain, inflation, partisan politics, and the Geneva Protocols.

In order to demonstrate that the Austrian people were never quite so enthusiastic about the Anschluß with Germany as we have sometimes been led to believe, I have touched upon the Tyrolean plebiscite of 1921, the Hindenburg election, the Austro-German Customs Union Project, the 1933 detente between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, and finally Hitler's plebiscite of 1938. I have also devoted considerable time to the Austrian provincial election of 1932 and 1933 because the statistics from these elections constitute the factual basis for virtually every estimate of Anschluß sentiment in Austria during the Hitler era.

Unable to arrive at a satisfactory estimate of the number of Austrian patriots by any other means, I found it most enlightening to examine press releases about the funerals of Francis Joseph, Ignaz Seipel, Johann Schober, Engelbert Dollfuß, and Karl Renner. The estimated number of mourners on each occasion provides a useful barometer to measure not only the popularity of each individual at the time of his death but the relative strength of Austrian patriotism as well. Seipel and Schober were both laid to rest during the course of a lengthy parliamentary debate which left the Austrian public with
the impression that Schober had been unable to establish closer
economic ties with Germany, due to the restrictive provisions of the
Geneva Protocols which were universally acknowledged as the greatest
achievement of Seipel's political career. The murder of Dollfuß,
moreover, provided the Austrian people with an opportunity to express
their opposition to Hitler and the Anschluß by attending his funeral.
Furthermore, when Renner died in December, 1950, one thought was
uppermost in the minds of the Austrian people: the liberation of
their country—a fact which was dramatized on New Year's day, 1951,
by the radio broadcast of a previously prepared speech in which the
dead president pleaded for an end to the four-power occupation of his
country. Four days later Renner was buried. I have included a
description of the funeral of Francis Joseph because it constitutes
the standard by which those of Seipel, Dollfuß, and Renner were all
measured by their contemporaries.

Although some individuals, no doubt, converged on the cemetery
in order to witness a spectacle, the vast majority of the people
seemed to have come with the sole intent of paying their last respects
to the dead. The socio-economic status of the mourners on each
occasion was sufficiently varied to indicate the presence of a
different group of participants each time. Finally, a person only
needs to juxtapose the funerals of Seipel and Schober to realize
that very few Viennese attended every public funeral.

In my brief analysis of Austrian patriotism, I have relied
extensively on the Austrian press, particularly the Reichspost and
the Arbeiter-Zeitung—a decision which I feel is fully warranted by
the nature of Austrian politics. The content of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* was determined to a large extent by the two most important socialist politicians in the First Austrian Republic, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. From the moment of its inception, the socialist newspaper served as the journalistic arm of the Social Democratic Party.

The *Reichspost*, moreover, for all practical purposes was the unofficial organ of the Christian Social Party until 1938. Friedrich Funder, who edited the Catholic journal, was granted the privilege of speaking and voting at every session of the Christian Social Club. Seipel, moreover, explained:

> We regard Dr. Funder as our fellow combatant, our companion in arms in the true sense. His relationship to the party is different from that of the editor of the Social Democrat *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. As is well known we have no party press in this sense. As editor of the *Reichspost*, Dr. Funder is not an employee of the party; he runs his newspaper concern independently. If in this work he stands one hundred percent on our side [italics added], this is not because he is a party employee but because he is our ally.\(^{12}\)

Funder, himself, stated:

> The cordial relations between the Christian-Social Club and the *Reichspost* had never been marred by the slightest disharmony, even when on certain important issues the newspaper was not afraid to make use of its own freedom of judgment and even of criticism. Both sides were aware that this very freedom of opinion gave the public the confidence which was essential before they could help to further the aims of the party. It was not the function of this paper to act as a narrow party organ, a sort of extension of the party organization, but rather, as Seipel so aptly described it,

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\(^{12}\) Funder, Fredrick, *From Empire to Republic: An Austrian Editor Reviews Momentous Years*, Trans. by Barbara Walstein (New York: Albert Unger Publishing Co., 1963), p. 244. In order to ensure that the *Reichspost* would remain in "good hands," Seipel used his influence with the Pope to block the appointment of Funder as the Austrian ambassador to the Vatican. See *ibid.*, pp. 225-226.
as an ally. The Christian political party need never fear a truly Christian journalist who is really aware of the responsibilities involved in his profession and views his work not as a mere trade but a true vocation, a vital duty.\textsuperscript{13}

By studying the pages of the Reichspost and the Arbeiter-Zeitung in conjunction with each other, it is possible to determine at any given time the strategy and the counter-strategy of Austria's two most important political parties. Furthermore, at times the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats even used the Reichspost and the Arbeiter-Zeitung as a forum in which they could thresh out their political differences outside legislative chambers.

In general, I have approached my subject with only one basic objective in mind—to explore the political aspects of Austrian patriotism from 1918 through 1934. Although I have identified the Christian Socials as "patriots" and the Social Democrats as "Anschluss advocates," I do not wish to imply that the former were heroes while the latter were villains. However, it is my personal belief that both parties were more concerned about their own welfare than with the best interests of their Austrian fatherland.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 244.
Chapter II

WHERE IS THE FATHERLAND?

At the insistence of the French government, the Paris Peace Conference inserted a provision in the Treaty of St. Germain which precluded any form of political association between Austria and Germany without prior approval of the Council of the League of Nations. Although the majority of the Austrian people presumably favored Anschluß with Germany, the French negotiators were, nonetheless, confident that they could safely ignore the wishes of the people of German-Austria. They reasoned that at some indefinite time in the future the German people of Austria would develop an Austrian national consciousness. They also believed that, as the Bavarians would become more and more Prussianized, many of the existing similarities between them and the Austrians would be obscured. Meanwhile, the French were hopeful that the continued use of the word "Austria" would bestow an instant identity to the German-Austrians.

The immediate reaction of the Austrian people to the Treaty of St. Germain did little to justify the expectations of the French. Infuriated by the terms of the peace settlement, the Austrian-Germans not only claimed that they had been wrongly blamed for the outbreak of the war but also insisted that they had also been unjustly punished by being denied the right of self-determination which President Wilson had promised them. Moreover, they asserted that the special privileges accorded the Successor States of Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland at the expense of German-Austria would subject the people of Austria to unbearable hardships. Unable to reverse the pronouncements of the peace conference, many Austrians sought relief from their psychological burdens by regarding themselves as Germans, socialists, or almost anything other than Austrian. Within a few days the angry resentment evoked by the Treaty of St. Germain crystallized into hatred of the Austrian state. In fact, a sizable percent of the Austrian-Germans developed a death wish for their state.

As a consequence of the hostile climate of opinion that existed after World War I, it was virtually impossible for any substantial degree of Austrian patriotism to exist prior to 1923. In fact, the period from 1918 to 1922 was characterized by a tendency of the Austrian people to view themselves as German nationals who would someday be reunited with their brothers to the north.

The Austrian commitment to German nationalism during these fateful years, however, was due more to deep-seated animosity towards the French, the war-guilt issue, and the aloofness of the other Successor States than to any deep commitment to German nationalism. The few concerned Austrians in the country who wished to promote Austrian patriotism found every move in this direction countered by the socialists, who adopted the subterfuge of denouncing "Austrianism" and championing "Germanism" to win converts to Marxism. Socialism, which they publicly equated with German nationalism. The temporary success enjoyed by the socialists in discrediting everything Austrian eventually contributed to their downfall, since it encouraged various
Austrian patriots such as Ignaz Seipel and Kurt von Schuschnigg to confuse "Austrianism" with anti-socialism. In the immediate postwar era Seipel and his followers, however, were unable to dispel the hopelessness which had engulfed their country.

The disillusionment of the Austrian people in 1919 was in marked contrast to their attitude on the eve of hostilities. On July 26, 1914, Sigmund Freud, for instance, wrote to a friend: "For perhaps the first time in thirty years, I feel like an Austrian, and would like to try it once more with this not very promising empire. The mood everywhere is excellent." ¹ Freud's son, who shared his father's views, enlisted in the Austrian navy despite the fact that he was already exempt from military service as a result of an injured leg. ² Engelbert Dollfuß demonstrated the same patriotic enthusiasm by visiting innumerable recruiting stations until he finally discovered a sympathetic official who was willing to dispense with rules and regulations about minimum height.

There were few "soldier Svejks" among the German people of Austria. Even the socialists were enthusiastic about the prospect of war. Karl Renner, for example, rejoiced in the fact that "the day of the Germans" ³ had arrived. Viktor Adler, the titular head of the


² Ibid., p. 138.

³ Arbeiter-Zeitung, August 5, 1914, p. 3; and September 14, 1914, p. 1. See also Karl Renner, Der Tag der Deutschen (Berlin: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 1923).
party, likewise advocated war. Even Friedrich Austerlitz, who was
busily editorializing against any form of violent reaction against
Serbia in the columns of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, admitted in private
that Austria must act against Serbia. Untroubled by ideological
misgivings against war, the clerical-controlled Reichspost favored
immediate punitive action against Belgrade. The influential Neue
Freie Presse, in a more moderate editorial, demanded only that the
individuals responsible for the assassination at Sarajevo be punished.
Arthur Polzer-Hoditz, a special advisor of the emperor, correctly
described the martial spirit of the Austro-Germans when he reported
that the aroused masses could be appeased only with a declaration of
war or possibly by Serbia's public submission to the Austrian
authorities.5

The official declaration of war on July 25, 1914, was over-
whelmingly endorsed by the Austrian people. Large and enthusiastic
crowds surged through the inner streets of Vienna voicing their
approval of the government's action with thundering cheers of "Long
live the Emperor!" "Long live Austria!" and "Death to the Serbians!"

4 Arthur Polzer-Hoditz, The Emperor Karl (Boston, Mass.: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1930), p. 178; Joseph Redlich, Schichsaljahre
Österreichs 1908–1919. Das politische Tagebuch Joseph Redlichs,
edited by Fritz Fellner. Vols. XXXIX–XL of Veröffentlichungen der
Kommission für Neuer Geschichte Österreichs (2 vols., Graz: Verlag
Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1953–54), Vol. 1, p. 238; Arthur J. May,
The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1914–1918 (2 vols., Philadelphia,

5 Polzer-Hoditz, The Emperor Karl, p. 178.
The next day the Reichspost reported:

Every word and gesture, every posture and song, expressed the universal satisfaction felt at our government's action. Any officers or soldiers who chanced to pass received an ovation. Enthusiastic speeches were made at Schwarzenberg Monument, in front of the war office, and before the Rathaus. Orchestras in the cafes played military music to the accompaniment of cheers by the guests. The people in every possible way manifested their consciousness of their glorious past and determination to defend their country's honor as nobly and firmly as their grandfathers before them.6

On Sunday, July 26, 1914, the editorial staff of the Reichspost confirmed its previous observations:

It has been a Sunday of patriotic demonstrations—a Sunday when we reconsecrated Austria's sentiment of solidarity and saw a rebirth of the ideals and aspirations of the days of Prince Eugene, Archduke Charles, and Radetzky. Only proof was needed that our rulers have at length decided to act, to take the resolute and manly step that the dignity of the monarchy demands, to arouse the old Austrian spirit from the fatal spell that has lain upon it.7

Throughout the first months of the war the patriotic enthusiasm of the Austrian people continued unabated. On numerous occasions mobs surged through the streets of the Habsburg capital patriotically waving black and yellow flags along with pictures of Emperor Francis Joseph and deliriously sang "God save the emperor!" The almost irrepressible enthusiasm of the people prompted Leopold von Chlumecky, a well-known Austrian author, to write that "a new Austrianism, a new


7Ibid., July 27, 1914, p. 1. If the articles in the Reichspost are accepted at face value, then the Austrian people were undoubtedly much more eager for the war than the government was. See Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 57-72.
Hungarianism has been born."\(^8\) Another observer noted that the declaration of war "evoked a popular enthusiasm unexampled since the struggle for liberation against Napoleon I."\(^9\) The declaration of war even prompted the normally apathetic Viennese to attack the Serbian embassy. Cardinal Piffl of Vienna aroused the passions of the people even more by admonishing them that it "is the voice of God, which speaks through the roar of guns."\(^10\)

The ardent of the Austrian people was not visibly dampened until Russia entered the war. Although an ominous sense of dread simultaneously swept over the various peoples in the monarchy, the St. Petersburg declaration of war assured the Habsburg government of the overwhelming support of its subjects. Even the socialists pledged their support to the Austrian government, since the only alternative seemed to be the extension of a despotic, agrarian Russian empire into eastern, or possibly even central, Europe, either through annexation or through the creation of a series of vassal states.\(^11\) The majority of Catholics likewise supported the war


\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 38 and 287.

because they were convinced that they must defend Orthodox Europe against the heretical Cossacks.  

By the end of 1914 the Austrian people had lost their initial enthusiasm for war. Disillusionment had set in when the first three major Austrian offensives against the small Serbian state ended in total failure. They had become even more demoralized as they gradually learned of the immense casualties suffered by the Austrian army on the Eastern front. With one eye on public opinion and the other on the military situation, the Austrian government threatened to negotiate a separate peace unless Berlin provided additional military assistance.

Although Germany did dispatch more troops to the Eastern theater, the Austrian people found little else to rejoice about in 1915. In May, for instance, they were shocked by the news that Italy had suddenly renounced its position of neutrality and declared war on their fatherland. A few days later they were horrified to learn that the sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine might embroil them in a war with the United States. Six months later they were disturbed by the news that the United States was once again in a }

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13 Throughout the remainder of the war the Austrian government refused to divulge the number of casualties suffered by the army. See Gerald E. Silberstein, The Troubled Alliance: German-Austrian Relations, 1914-1917 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 315. Due to the propensity of the Austrian people always to imagine the worse, the secrecy employed by the state officials probably accomplished the exact opposite results from what was intended.
belligerent attitude because a Habsburg submarine had sunk the
Ancona.

Although the mood of the people had improved somewhat after
subsequent victories on the battlefield, Emperor Francis Joseph had
already concluded that the "struggle is beyond our strength." 14
The casualty lists which he received in January, 1916, revealed
that the Habsburg armies had already suffered the following losses:
approximately 350,000 dead; over a million wounded; another million
sick; and still another million listed as either captured or missing
or otherwise unaccounted for. It was not surprising, therefore, that
Francis Joseph again voiced his despair in July:

Things are going badly with us—perhaps worse than we
suspect. The starving people can't stand much more. It
remains to be seen whether and how we shall get through
next winter. I intend to end the war next spring. Whatever
happens, I can't let my realm go to hopeless ruin. 15

The troubles that Francis Joseph had foreseen for winter started
several months earlier than he had anticipated. On October 21, 1916,
Friedrich Adler, the popular socialist leader, assassinated Prime
Minister Karl Sturghk. Hoping that his action would transform the
deep discontent of the Austrian people into revolution, Adler
encouragingly shouted as he fired the fatal shots: "Down with
absolutism! We want peace." 16 In order to prevent anyone from
dismissing the murder as the work of a psychotic assassin, Adler

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15. Ibid.
16. Friedrich Adler, *Vor dem Ausnahmege richt* (Jena: Thuringer
Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei, 1923), p. 66.
voluntarily explained during his trial that he had "wished to call attention to conditions that were worse than in Russia" as a means of creating a "psychological foundation for future action of the Austrian masses." The implications of Adler's treason were only too clear to the Austrian authorities: the ever-increasing number of people who identified themselves as socialists could no longer be counted upon to support the Austrian war effort even against tsarist Russia.

The psychological foundation of the Dual Monarchy was undermined still further by the death of Emperor Francis Joseph on November 21, 1916. Since his reign dated back to the time of Metternich, he obviously was the only ruler most Austrians had ever known. His person was one of the few unifying bonds that had held the diverse peoples of the Dual Monarchy together. Now that he was dead, no one could safely predict whether or not the Austrian people would continue to endure the hardships of war or whether the non-German peoples would maintain their loyalty to the monarchy. The sense of uncertainty caused by the emperor's death was accentuated by his unprecedented wartime funeral. An estimated 200,000 Viennese gathered outside Schönbrunn palace on the frigid, damp night of November 27 to watch as the body was transferred to the Habsburg Chapel. On November 30 an estimated 500,000 Viennese lined the streets of the inner city to watch as the body was moved to St. Stephen's for the final rites.

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Many observers were of the opinion that unless the war immediately ended this perhaps would be the last imperial funeral witnessed by the Viennese.  

Charles Francis Joseph, Francis Joseph's grandnephew, ascended the Austrian throne on November 21, 1916, amid considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the Austrian people. Although anyone succeeding an immensely popular ruler would have encountered some distrust and discontent, Charles was particularly handicapped by his marriage to Princess Zita of Parma, whose patriotism during the war was already somewhat questionable as a consequence of her Italian ancestry. Furthermore, the fact that the casket of the late emperor had not been opened while the body was lying in state suggested to many Viennese that perhaps their beloved emperor had met with foul play. At best, Charles received only half-hearted support from many of his predecessor's most loyal subjects.


19. The rumors concerning the empress became progressively more pernicious as the war progressed. In 1918 she was accused of having sold the Austrian defense plans to the Italians. See Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Last Habsburg* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), p. 203. Her status in Austria was somewhat comparable to that of Marie Antoinette in France during the French Revolution.

20. Schreiner, "Life and Death of Franz Josef," p. 214. The casket was not opened because the body had been discolored while being embalmed.
The people did not resent Charles so much as the sacrifice they were asked to make in behalf of the monarchy. As early as April, 1915, ration cards had been required to obtain a meager portion of bread, while in 1916 it was necessary to procure such cards for such items as milk, sugar, and coffee. Meat was so scarce that the government decreed two meatless days a week in 1915 and added still another in 1916. The official restrictions, however, were totally meaningless since not even horsemeat was available in many areas.²¹ As early as 1916 the German ambassador reported the demoralizing effects of the bad food situation to Berlin: "The people in the suburbs of Vienna are starving; they are driven to despair by long queueing, which often brings no results."²² The Viennese were also frustrated by the lack of such necessary luxuries as coffee and tobacco, although a few imaginative citizens discovered ersatz substitutes such as beechnut coffee.²³ Transportation was a constant


problem since the majority of the horses had been requisitioned for stews. The inability of the Viennese to escape from their pent-up emotions by indulging in diversions in the Prater Amusement Park, which had been converted into a large vegetable garden and a compound to house goats, did little to alleviate the conditions that seemed to portend disaster for the new inexperienced ruler.

As a result of the almost rebellious mood of the people, Charles promised shortly after he had ascended the throne that he would "do all in my power to banish as soon as possible the horrors and sacrifices of war and to re-obtain peace as soon as the honor of our arms, the life of my countries and their allies and the defiance of our enemies will allow."\(^{24}\) The emperor's public commitment to peace, however, produced no significant change in the morale of the people. The military defeat of Romania and Russia likewise failed to bolster the spirit of the people as almost everyone had expected, primarily because of the entry of the United States in the war. The Austrians for the most part refused to believe the boastful promises of Berlin that unrestricted submarine warfare would produce an Austro-German victory before the United States could become a factor of any significance.\(^{25}\) The defeatists in the Habsburg monarchy who believed that the war was already lost were joined by a strange mixture of


\(^{25}\) When the Germans embarked on their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, the emperor himself insisted; "Now it's the end. If America comes in we are finished for good. The Empire will be cut off from the outside world." Quoted in Brook-Shepherd, *The Last Habsburg*, p. 77.
socialists and Catholics who believed that there was no longer any need to continue fighting since Russia had been defeated. 26

The hopes of the Austrian peoples for an immediate peace following the defeat of Russia posed immense problems for Emperor Charles. Unable to persuade the German officials at Brest-Litovsk to modify their extreme demands, Charles watched helplessly as his country approached the brink of revolution. On January 14, 1918, ten thousand Viennese workers took to the streets to demand an immediate cessation of all hostilities. Demonstrations quickly mushroomed throughout the empire. Within two days, 95,000 workers were on strike in Lower Austria, while additional strikes appeared imminent in Styria, Upper Austria, and the Tyrol. On January 15 the Arbeiter-Zeitung defiantly voiced the mood of the country by declaring Czernin's only obligation at Brest-Litovsk was "to produce peace and nothing but peace." 27 The next day it published a proclamation prepared by the leaders of the Social Democratic Party which declared that the people did not wish to continue the war on Russia in order that the Emperor of Austria may be elected King of Poland and the King of Prussia acquire economic and military domination over Courland and Lithuania . . . . Therefore, we ask you workers to raise your voices again and again and demand


with us the earliest possible end of the war. Peace, without open or veiled annexations. Peace on the basis of genuine self-determination of peoples.28

On January 16, the Arbeiter-Zeitung once again spoke on behalf of the militant workers. In a defiant editorial which the government did not dare censor, the Marxist journal asserted: "Russia today menaces nobody. What the German Empire does is its own affair. Austria-Hungary can neither prevent nor resist it. But ninety percent of the Austrians say, "Germany's new war against Russia is not and shall not be our war."29

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29 Arbeiter-Zeitung, January 16, 1917, p. 1. Czernin had already admitted to a German diplomat that there was no public support for the war anywhere in Austria-Hungary—only demands for peace. See Zeman, The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, p. 112. Otto Bauer later wrote: "In the autumn of 1917 it was clear to us that if peace did not soon come, the war would end with revolution." As quoted in Mamayev, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 112. In July, 1917, the German ambassador in Vienna had informed his government that, in his opinion, if a plebiscite were to be taken in the western half of the empire, a majority of the people would probably vote in favor of launching an attack against Germany. See Zeman, The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, p. 150. See also Gratz and Schiller, The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary during the War in its External Relations. Trans. by W. Alision Phillips (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 238-240; and Stephen Bonsai, Unfinished Business (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1944), pp. 88 and 137. On November 3, 1918, the report of an incident of special interest appeared in the Reichspost: "Yesterday at Fehring, the frontier station, Reich German troops arrived who were completely naked. During their passage through Hungary their clothing, including their underwear, had been taken from them." See Ibid., p. 7. The Viennese, moreover, allegedly tried to storm the German embassy in June, 1918. See The New York Times, June 22, 1918, p. 1.
Deeply disturbed by the peace demonstrations, Charles telegraphed Czernin:

I must once more earnestly impress upon you that the whole fate of the Monarchy and of the dynasty depends on peace being concluded at Brest-Litovsk as soon as possible. We cannot overthrow the situation here for the sake of Courland, Livonia and Polish dreams. If peace be not made at Brest, there will be revolution here, be there ever so much to eat. This is a serious instruction at a serious time.30

The emperor's misgivings were fully shared by Czernin, who wrote in his diary: "We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe; I fancy, in bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage that, if the Entente persists in refusing to come to terms."31

The immediate likelihood of an Austrian insurrection ended on February 9, 1918, when the Habsburg government and Germany bypassed the Russian authorities at Brest-Litovsk and signed a treaty with the Ukraine. When the Austrian ministry of war explained that the unorthodox treaty with the Ukraine was the first step toward an honorable peace, the Viennese public reacted as if the war itself


31 Czernin, In the World War, p. 221. See also Ibid., pp. 37, 148, and 238; Burian, Austria in Dissolution: Being the Personal Recollections of Stephan, Count Burian. Trans. by Brian Lunn (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1925), p. 374; and Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, pp. 56-57.
were over. Hundreds of thousands of joyful citizens surged through
the streets, cheering and shouting their approval of Emperor Charles
and Count Czernin.\textsuperscript{32}

The enthusiasm of the Austrian people vanished almost overnight
when fighting resumed on the eastern front. The masses suddenly
seemed convinced that the Ukrainian treaty was a hoax perpetrated
on them by their own government. Nothing had really changed. Food
seemed as scarce as ever. And it seemed as if the war was to last
forever. The situation once again appeared to be hopeless.

The Austrian people lost what little respect they still had for
the fatherland when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on
March 3, 1918. The Viennese were firmly convinced that the harsh
terms imposed upon the Bolshevik government would needlessly prolong
the war. The \textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung} clearly reflected the disillusionment
of the masses when it stated that the "Baltic barons and the Polish
schlachta, the Prussian Junkers, the Magyars magnates, and the
Rumanian boyars all can enjoy the fruits of this peace."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32}See the \textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung}, February 11, 1918, p. 1; \textit{Reichspost},
February 11, 1918, p. 1; \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, February 11, 1918, p. 1;
and \textit{The New York Times}, February 13, 1919, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung}, March 5, 1918, p. 1. The bitterness
engendered by the whole episode persisted long after the war was over.
When Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles and praised the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk as the supreme example of a generous peace, the
clerical \textit{Reichspost} and socialist \textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung} still engaged
in a continuing contest to outdo the other in thinking up new
invectives to describe the treaty.
The Habsburg government soon discovered that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had not only alienated a large portion of the people but had also laid the groundwork for a Bolshevik revolution throughout the empire. Many of the soldiers who had served on the eastern front had become converts to the Bolshevik cause. Many others had picked up communist literature as war mementoes which were passed on to friends and relatives as the troops were transferred to the Italian front. Unfortunately there was little that anyone could do to suppress the circulation of these leaflets among the civilian population.

Any possibility that Charles might reclaim the confidence of his many disillusioned subjects was destroyed by the disclosure of the Sixtus Affair in April, 1918. When Caemmin tried to boost the morale of the people by charging that France was fast approaching the point when she would be forced to sue for peace, Clemenceau replied to the allegation by asserting that it was Austria, not France, that was in desperate straits. In order to substantiate his statement, the French prime minister revealed that as early as 1916 Austria had been compelled to seek a separate peace with France. He explained, moreover, that the Austrian emissary involved had been none other than Empress Zita's brother, Prince Sixtus of Parma. Although the disclosure confirmed the widespread belief that the monarchy was on the verge of collapse, the ensuing scandal hastened the disintegration of the empire. The more nationalistic Germans in the empire denounced Emperor Charles as a traitor to the German cause and ceased paying even lip service to him. The non-Germanic nationalities seized upon
the incident as a means to advance their demands for new nation-states. Heretofore pro-Habsburg groups, not knowing what they should do, became thoroughly demoralized. 34

The Sixtus affair was especially important for the German people of Austria. Already disillusioned by the Austrian war effort, a sizeable percentage of the German-Austrians looked upon their fatherland with increasing hostility. The word "Austrian" came to symbolize everything that they detested about the war. Alienated by their homeland, the large majority of the people resolved that henceforth they were to be Germans instead of Austrians. Moreover, they despised those individuals who continued to support the discredited Habsburgs. After the war these same unrepentant German-Austrians withheld their allegiance from the Austrian Republic not only because they preferred political reunion with their German kinsmen but also because the chief defenders of the new state had been closely associated with the Habsburg monarchy. 35


35 The vast majority of the Austrian-Germans were still loyal to the Habsburg state but only because they "believed that their own interests were inseparably connected with the continued existence of the monarchy in its hitherto existing form." Friedrich F. G. Kleinwaechter, Von Schonbrunn bis St. Germain, Die Entstehung der Republik Österreich (Graz: Styria, 1964), pp. 37-38. See also Fritz Fellner, "The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and its Significance for the New Order in Central Europe: A Reappraisal," Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. IV-V (1968-69), pp. 12-13.
Internal developments in Austria at the time of the Sextus Affair brought increasing psychological despair to those individuals who still believed in the Austrian state. By February, 1918, desertion and mutiny had become rampant in every branch of the armed services. The next month the specter of a Marxist revolution appeared throughout Austria as prisoners of war, obsessed with Bolshevist ideas, began returning from Russia. Aided by the war and the disenchanted with the emperor, communism enjoyed fleeting success at various places throughout the country as "the intensity of social unrest in Austria-Hungary during the last months of the war reached the same revolutionary pitch as it had done in Russia by March 1917."  

The social revolution that swept across Austria was immediately followed by political disintegration. When President Wilson announced that the United States would insist upon an independent Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, the Southern Slavs seized the initiative in the national crisis by proclaiming the creation of a "Jugoslav" state on October 5, 1918.  

This pronouncement was followed in rapid succession by similar decrees by Czech and Polish leaders. On October 7th the German National Party of Austria issued a demand for the independence of German-Austria and a national assembly composed of all German

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delegates in the old Reichsrat. The last possibility of avoiding complete political chaos came on October 16, 1918, when Charles made one final attempt to preserve a semblance of order by issuing an imperial manifesto which proclaimed the establishment of a federal empire with autonomous status for each of the nationalities. The Czechs, Slavs, and Magyars, however, ignored the proclamation since they preferred complete independence.

When they realized that every other nationality had taken irreversible steps to create their own nation-states, the German-speaking legislators of Austria finally met on October 21 to discuss their own future. They readily agreed that the principle of self-determination should apply to all nationalities in the empire—both Germanic and non-Germanic. They, however, insisted that the right of self-determination must apply to individuals and not to territories. They then pledged themselves to do everything in their power to protect every strip of ground which rightfully belonged to the German people of Austria.

Having agreed upon the formation of an Austro-German nation-state, the delegates then debated the organic status of their state. The Pan-Germans, who constituted the largest single party, favored eventual union with Germany as well as the retention of a monarchist form of government. The Christian Socials, on the other hand, desired the creation of a Danubian Confederation and continuation of the monarchy.

38 *Neue Freie Presse*, October 8, 1918, p. 6.

The Social Democrats, however, wanted the establishment of a republic, but they were as yet uncommitted either to the Anschluss or to a federated multinational state. Hoping to woo one of the other parties into the republican camp, Viktor Adler, the socialist spokesman, declared:

The German people of Austria is now to establish its own democratic state . . . which will decide in full freedom the nature of its relationship with its neighbors and with the German Reich. It may unite with the neighboring peoples to form a league of free nations—if this is the people's will. Should, however, the other nations reject such a union, or only be prepared to agree to it on conditions which do not meet the economic and political requirements of the Austrian people, then German Austria will be compelled to attach herself to the German Reich as a federal unit, as, left on her own, she would not be an economically viable state.  

The first few days of debate produced no perceptible progress toward a compromise solution as each party tried to create public support for its position. On October 22, the Christian Socials, however, made overtures to the socialists through the columns of the pro-clerical newspaper, the Reichspost. Appealing to the supranational tendencies inherent in socialism as well as the vested interest of the Social Democratic party, which was already well-organized throughout the former Habsburg empire, the Reichspost explained the many advantages of the Danubian confederation. Economically, politically, socially, and territorially Austria-Hungary constituted a natural unit. In order to preserve a nucleus around which a Danubian confederation could be constructed, an Anschluss

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between Germany and Austria must be prevented. The monarchical form of government, moreover, must be maintained, since a common dynasty was the only possible way to reform the natural association of the community of nations. Furthermore, most of the problems of the past were attributable not to the Habsburgs but to national animosities. The paper concluded that what was needed was "not a new form but a new spirit for the state." The promising prospects for a compromise solution between the clericals and the socialists were unfortunately destroyed when the Reichspost unwiseely denounced a working-class demonstration for a republic and agitation for Anschluss as power politics and politics of the street.

The negotiations between the two parties were never renewed as a consequence of the German Revolution on November 9, which resulted in the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm and created a German republic. Immediately sensing the possibility of an advantageous compromise with the Pan-Germans, Remner and Bauer visited Viktor Adler to discuss their best course of action. The two youthful socialists insisted that, since the creation of a Danubian confederation seemed all but impossible in view of the prevailing circumstances, their best alternative would be to reverse their position and vote for an Anschluss. After a few moments of thought, Adler consented to their proposal. He justified his decision by explaining that Germany and Austria "will have to come together again one day; it will be best

41 Reichspost, October 22, 1918, Morgenblatt, p. 1.
42 Ibid., October 31, 1918, p. 1.
for them.\textsuperscript{13} Two days later, armed with Adler's dying commitment, Remner and Bauer persuaded their party to join forces with the Pan-Germans to pass a resolution proclaiming that the Republic of German-Austria was an integral part of the German empire. The political commitment of the Social Democratic Party to the Anschluss marked the beginning of a new era in Austrian history. Having assumed the leadership of the Anschluss movement, the socialists incurred the enmity of Austrian patriots for the next fifteen years.

Surprisingly, when the Anschluss resolution was finally presented to the entire legislative body, the Christian Socials also voted in favor of its adoption, even though only one day before the crucial vote was taken a large delegation of clerical legislators had assured Emperor Charles of their undying opposition to the Anschluss.\textsuperscript{44}

Although the last minute decision of the Christian Socials to support union with Germany can be partially explained by their fear of rather violent street demonstrations, they were influenced more by the following unexpected announcement of Emperor Charles that appeared in the evening edition of the Neue Freie Presse on November 11:

> Since my accession to the throne I have been untiring in my efforts to lead my peoples out of the horrors of the war, for whose outbreak I bear no responsibility. I have not delayed the restoration of constitutional government and have opened to the peoples the way to their independent state development.


Now as ever filled with unalterable love for all my peoples, I will not present my person as a hindrance to their free development.

I recognize in advance the decision German-Austria takes with reference to its form of state in the future. The people have taken over the government through their representatives. I renounce every participation in the business of the state.45

Stunned by the impact of Charles’ announcement, the majority of the Christian Socials believed that there was no longer any need for them to oppose the Anschluß resolution. On the final roll call they cast a total of only three dissenting votes.

The vote in favor of union with Germany was not a true reflection of the mood of the Austrian people. First of all, the reader’s attention should be called to the fact that the majority of the Christian Socials had been opposed to the measure the day before it was enacted into law. Three weeks earlier a majority of all the legislators had been prepared to vote in favor of a Danubian Confederation. Even if the legislators had dared vote their true convictions, the final results would still not have mirrored public opinion on the issue of the Anschluß. Thousands of individuals who had been enfranchised since 1911 had no voice whatsoever in parliament. Moreover, many of the individuals who had voted in the last election had died on the battlefields during the four years of fighting. Furthermore, the delegates who had originally won office in 1911 had been chosen at a time of intense rivalry between the various nationalities on the Cisleithanian half of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. To a considerable extent the outcome of the Anschluß issue was determined

45 Neue Freie Presse, November 11, 1918, Abendblatt, p. 1.
by the representatives from the Sudetenland and the South Tyrol, even though these states never legally constituted a part of the German-Austria that came into being in the fall of 1918. These Sudeten and Tyrolese legislators strongly advocated union with Germany since the only other alternative for them was domination by non-German national groups.

The elections of 1919 underscored the distorted representation that existed in the Provisional National Assembly. The Pan-Germans held 44 percent of the seats in parliament in October, 1918, compared to only 15.3 percent in 1919. The socialists, on the other hand, who had traditionally supported a Danubian Confederation, increased their representation from 18.1 to 40.8 percent. Despite the 1919 election, those groups who wanted an independent Austria were probably still not adequately represented in the constituent assembly since large numbers of patriotic soldiers were still in captivity on election day and since a large percentage of the monarchists did not vote.

There were indications that a sizeable percentage of the Austrian people opposed union with Germany. In 1918 and 1919 the Social Democrats, for instance, rejected every proposal for a national referendum on the Anschluß issue. On several occasions, moreover, socialist leaders even acknowledged that union with Germany lacked the support of the majority of the people. In his book, *The Austrian Revolution*, Otto Bauer, for example, stated that the "republic" was

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46 By the term "republic" Bauer meant the "German-Austrian republic," which was "an integral part of the German empire." See ante, p. 28.
imposed on the overwhelming majority of the German-Austrian bourgeoisie by force in 1918. The tradition of the vast majority of the German-Austrian bourgeoisie is old Austrian, Habsburgian.\(^{47}\)

Moreover, on at least two occasions Karl Renner expressed similar views to Stephen Bonsal, a prominent American official at the Paris Peace Conference. On April 4, 1919, he told him:

> Botho Wedel, the German Minister, had just left me and what I told him he is even now wiring to his Government. It was that we would join with the Reich. I was quite frank with him and told him that we were doing it without any enthusiasm; I made it quite plain that the lessons derived from our relations during the war were too fresh in our memories for that. What else was I to do?\(^{48}\)

Later, on April 6, he declared:

> Whatever the decision as to our future may be, whether it is one of free choice or as a result of coercion, it bristles with difficulties, and this I hope you will endeavor to make plain. Few of our people are enthusiastic about union with North Germany. We have learned to know these people both in war and peace.\(^{49}\)

Despite the fact that the Anschluß lacked the wholehearted support of the Austrian people, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, nevertheless, were determined to bring about a union between Austria and Germany. In order to make the Anschluß with Marxist Germany more palatable to the conservative Austrian, they launched a systematic propaganda campaign to degrade the Austrian state and thereby prevent the revival of Austrian patriotism. They tried to convey the impression that the Habsburg monarchy and everything


\(^{48}\) As quoted in Bonsal, *Unfinished Business*, p. 86.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 137.
associated with it was evil and repulsive. They also tried to create the illusion that the Austrian Republic was an unviable state whose inhabitants lacked the will to exist as an independent country. They explained that the only alternative to Anschluss was an indefinite continuation of the hardships that the Austrian people had experienced during the war.

The socialist propaganda campaign began on November 12, 1918, with the following editorial in the Arbeiter-Zeitung:

The national assembly will decree that the German-Austrian Republic is an integral part of the German republic. This action has become feasible and necessary as a result of urgent necessity. Our Slavic neighbors have dissolved all ties with us; they have stopped shipments to us of flour, cattle, sugar, and coal. They have denied the Germans of the Sudetenland their right of self-determination. They want to subject three and one-half million Germans to their domination. It had become clear that any community of interest with the peoples with whom we formerly comprised a state is no longer possible. We must, therefore, seek union where we belong on the basis of our history, language and culture. . . . . It is the red, the proletarian, the socialist Germany with which we wish to unite and will unite. German-Austria is a poor mountainous land, with inadequate agriculture, backward industry, and with masses of conservative peasants, who, if left to themselves, would not be ready for a socialist society. Among all the counties of Europe, Germany has the largest and the best organized industry, the best system of popular education, the most numerous and best-trained proletariat. Today the proletariat has already come to power there. Tomorrow the expropriators there will become the expropriated, and the tools of work will become the property of the workers. Anschluss with Germany is Anschluss with socialism. As an integral part of Germany, German-Austria can and will become what, if left to herself, she would not become for a long time—a socialist community. Of all the accomplishments in recent days the proclamation of the Anschluss with Germany, therefore, is the most significant and the most important. It insures not only our right of self-determination and our economic future; it

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50 See p. 1.
also guarantees that we will become an integral part of that great society in which the factories, the mines, the land, and the soil will no longer belong to the capitalists but collectively to the people.

The above editorial clearly reflected the strategy and the objectives of the Social Democratic Party. Its major goal was to strengthen the political base of Marxism in Europe by integrating Austria, which was a backward, agrarian state, into the more industrially-advanced Germany. To overcome the objections of the Catholic peasants of Austria to the Anschluss the socialist leaders relied more heavily on German nationalism than they did on Marxist philosophy. Subsequent articles in the leftist press were likewise oriented towards nationalistic motifs, sometimes to the point of virtually omitting all Marxist trappings. During the period from 1926 until 1932 many leftists unequivocally equated German nationalism with Marxism. Although the socialists' strategem was temporarily successful, it created the impression among Austria's future patriots that most, if not all, Social Democrats were traitors to their Austrian fatherland.

The decision of certain socialist leaders to utilize German nationalism in their Anschluss campaign can perhaps be attributed to their early childhood. For example, Karl Renner was born in Untertarnowitz and Wilhelm Ellenborgen, in Lundenburg; while as a youth Otto Bauer resided in the Sudetenland. Since the Sudeten Germans51 were always more inclined to stress their Germanism than

51 Although Renner was technically a Moravian, historians no longer draw a distinction between Moravian Germans and Sudeten Germans.
their Austrianism, it is not inconceivable that the socialists leaders were more nationalistically motivated than they publicly admitted.

As early as November 12, 1918, Karl Renner, for instance, advised his fellow legislators:

This moment when it would be so easy and comfortable and perhaps not a little tempting to present our account separately, and perhaps through such a maneuver to derive advantage from the enemy, at this hour our German people in every nation shall know that we are of one stock and that we have a common destiny.52

Renner also wrote several articles for Der Kampf in 1919 in which he used the phrase "Anschluss with Germany" rather than "Anschluss with the proletariat in Germany." This "Freudian slip" prompted Franz Rothe, a member of the extreme left wing of the party, to submit an article to Der Kampf in which he openly accused Renner and Bauer of leading the Social Democrats into a nationalistic "hell." He also accused Bauer of dictating his own personal desires with respect to the Anschluss while "robbing" the people of their right of self-determination.53

As a consequence of his criticism, which aided the cause of Austrian patriotism, Rothe was not surprisingly denied access to the pages of

52 Stenographische Protokolle Über die Sitzungen der provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich 1918 und 1919, p. 66, November 12, 1918.

53 Franz Rothe, "Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft revolutionären Sozialdemokraten Deutschösterreichs: Eine Erwiderung an Otto Bauer," Der Kampf, Vol. XIII (September, 1910), pp. 326-335. In order to fully appreciate Rothe's position, the entire article should be read in conjunction with Otto Bauer's "Die alte und die neue Linke," Der Kampf, Vol. XIII (July, 1920), pp. 249-260. It is interesting to note that Rothe feared a Horthy-type reaction in Germany if the Anschluss were carried out, while Bauer feared such a reaction on the part of the monarchist elements in Austria if the Anschluss were not consummated.
the periodical. For a brief time after this embarrassing incident both Bauer and Renner were considerably more diligent in basing their Anschluss arguments solely on economic and socialist principles. By 1922 the party leaders, however, once again resorted to nationalistic arguments.

In conjunction with their other arguments in favor of Anschluss, the socialists launched a campaign to villify the Habsburgs. They were motivated by more than a simple desire to create a republic. They were convinced that union with Marxist Germany was impossible unless the monarchical heritage of the old state was first destroyed. In order to achieve this objective, they attacked not only the royal family but everyone whom they even remotely suspected of having monarchist sentiments. Ignaz Seipel, for instance, was branded as an incorrigible monarchist simply because he had been a minister in Emperor Charles' last cabinet for a total of fifteen days and because he had helped draft Charles' controversial abdication statement.

The basic strategy of the socialists in their anti-Habsburg crusade was revealed in Der Kampf in a review of the Czech book K. u. k. Kriminal. The basic premise of the book was that the relations of the Habsburg rulers to the Czech people could best be described as "criminal." Siegmund Popper, the socialist reviewer,

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54 Bauer, Die Österreichische Revolution, p. 102.

asserted that, since the "criminal activities of the Habsburgs were
directed against the German workers as well as against the Slavic
people, Austria's former rulers should be treated as common criminals
who were undeserving of any respect from the citizens of the republic."\(^{56}\) Popper's conversion of an obscure idea into a basic motif for other
Marxist writers provided a valuable means for constantly reviving
the widespread dislike of the Habsburg that had originated during
the war.

Julius Deutsch effectively combined the idea of an imperial
criminal complex with the appeal of German nationalism in an article
entitled, "Die Manner der Katastrophe." The passages relating to the
emperor portrayed Charles as a well-intentioned but incompetent
individual who ruled only as a consequence of Francis Ferdinand's
unfortunate death. Because of his inadequate training, Charles
resembled an ill-trained musician of only meager ability who was
suddenly called upon to conduct the great masterpieces. Under normal
circumstances, Charles would have been no worse than any other
monarch; however, he was destined to rule at a time when the "empire
was cracking at every seam." Naturally, he was unable to propose
any realistic solutions to Austria's problems, since he could not
comprehend any of the great questions of his age. Charles was also
a liability because he was completely under the influence of his
Italian wife, who placed the interests of her Italian-French family
above everything else. Empress Zita, for example, had been primarily

\(^{56}\) Siegmund Popper, "K. u. k. Kriminal," Der Kampf, Vol. XII
(August, 1919), pp. 531-532.
responsible for the Sixtus affair. Her influence even extended to military affairs, according to the chief of the general staff, who reported that when Germany was in the hour of her greatest danger Charles had delayed a crucial military decision until he could secure the approval of his wife. A critical examination of Charles' reign clearly indicated that he "was neither German nor Slav nor Magyar... He was in the truest sense of the word enational." Thus it was obvious that the royal family was interested in using the German people only as "a footstool to power." 57

In their attempt to root out all vestiges of the former monarchy, the Social Democrats also destroyed many traditions and concepts that were essential to the development of patriotism in the first Austrian Republic. As Kurt Schuschnigg put it:

Every reminder of other days was sternly proscribed. An absurd iconoclasm, a state of mind which did not stop short even of inscriptions as harmless as street-names, if they recalled historical characters or events, best characterized the confusion of minds which then prevailed. Any impulse of patriotism was alien to the spirit of the hour and was rejected offhand as the embodiment of reactionary opinions.

Many among us were too poor to get civilian clothes, and so we had to go on wearing our uniforms. But woe betide him who dared wear his officer's distinctions or even war decorations....

The 'Medal for Bravery' was so long jeered at as a piece of tin that men returning from the front were

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57 Julius Deutsch, "Die Manner der Katastrophe," Der Kampf, Vol. XIII (July, 1920), pp. 265-275. Many similar efforts at debunking the Habsburgs and the Austrian heritage can be found in the first few postwar issues of Der Kampf. Although the Arbeiter-Zeitung also printed several such articles, most of the latter were not as vitriolic as the ones in Der Kampf.
really persuaded, although for a short time only, to think wearing it a degradation.\(^{58}\)

Or, as he put it elsewhere, "Everything that recalled Austria, her history or her symbols was persecuted with demonic hatred."\(^{59}\)

Although many individuals shared Schuschnigg's convictions, there was virtually no public opposition to the socialist pro-\textit{Anschluß} campaign. The Christian Socials, Catholics, peasants, former soldiers, monarchists, right-wing intelligentsia, and other nostalgic individuals did nothing at the time because they were demoralized and disunited by political and economic factors. The Christian Socials, for instance, were disheartened by Charles' abdication, while the soldiers were still stunned by their wartime experiences. The intellectuals, on the other hand, were shocked by the utter destruction of their dreams and plans for the Habsburg monarchy.

The personal despair of Ignaz Seipel, who was destined to become one of Austria's foremost patriots, was typical of that felt by many of the reform-minded public officials under the old monarchy. When Charles appointed him to his cabinet in October, 1918, Seipel was an idealist who was committed to the reorganization of Austria-Hungary along federal lines. When his plans were dashed to the ground by the decision of the various Slavic nationalities to establish their own independent nation-states, he became despondent about this cruel trick of fate. Late in November he gloomily suggested that perhaps


\(^{59}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 48.
Anschluss with Germany would be the best course of action for Austria. He insisted, however, that the two states be joined by means of an equal union rather than through the humiliating declaration of a parliament which had declared that German–Austria was "an integral part of Germany." Reflecting upon his frustrated dreams, Seipel then whimsically suggested that perhaps the obvious economic solution for Austria was not the final solution, since the Austro-Germans still attached considerable importance to the questions of where "they could best serve the German people." Despite his reluctance to endorse the Anschluss fully, Seipel said nothing to indicate that he was willing to work for a realistic alternative.

Although Seipel's political associates disliked the prospect of Anschluss, none of them took any effective action to preserve the Austrian state. The Christian Socials were certainly not apathetic, but they lacked effective leadership. The Christian Social Party temporarily acquired new vitality in November, 1918, when the seventy-two-year-old Alois Liechtenstein finally resigned as chairman of the party. Unfortunately, under his successors the organizational structure of the party continued to deteriorate. In fact, the frustrated Christian Socials became so demoralized that they endorsed the Anschluss in a moment of despair. The major weaknesses of the

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60. Reichspost, November 23, 1918, p. 1. See also Seipel's article entitled "Das Recht des Volkes," in the Reichspost, November 19, 1918, pp. 102.

party surfaced immediately after the socialist victory in the election of February, 1919. Leopold Kunischak, editor of the weekly Christlichsoziale Arbeiter-Zeitung, angrily blamed the defeat on "too many organizations and too little organization." He also charged that the margin of defeat had been determined by the failure of responsible leaders to disprove the socialist accusations that the Christian Socials had been responsible for the war and that they favored the return of the monarchy and the old military power structure. Traumatized by its own difficulties, the Christian Social Party was scarcely in a position to rally despairing patriots in support of the Austrian fatherland.

Handicapped by a lack of leaders and disciples, Austrian patriots also encountered a hostile political climate throughout 1919. The year began on an ominous note with the Czech occupation of the Sudetenland, while the Austrian government helplessly appealed to the principle of self-determination. This defiant action on the part of the Prague government produced a new upsurge of German nationalism and a renewed clamor for Anschluß. The Austrian people were firmly convinced that if they had been a part of the German empire, the Czech troops would not have dared to dismember their country.

The extreme bitterness evoked by the Bohemian crisis was further intensified by the negotiations at St. Germain. The Austrian people were enraged by the decision of the Allied Powers to classify the Austrian Republic as the legal heir to the Habsburg monarchy instead

of as a Successor State. They were equally incensed by the Anschluß ban and the clause of the treaty which stipulated that the word "German" must be removed from the official title of the Austrian state. Angered by the dictatorial nature of the treaty, the Social Democrats, the Pan-Germans, and the Christian Socials all joined together to denounce the peace settlement.

In a major parliamentary address Otto Bauer vehemently denounced the hypocrisy of the Paris Peace Conference. While championing the principle of self-determination, he claimed that the Allies had taken convenient recourse to historical and economic arguments to subject two-fifths of the German-Austrians to foreign domination. Self-determination was valid only when it worked against the best interest of Austria. Deprived of her rightful control of the Sudetenland, certain areas of Bohemia, Carinthia, Lower Styria, German West Hungary, and the South Tyrol, the Austrian Republic was not economically viable. Decisions that had been dismissed at Paris as "trivial" had become matters of "life and death" for the Vienna government. Bauer asserted that the only solution for Austria's problems was Anschluß, and he asserted that union with Germany would come "in spite of everything." 63

The Treaty of St. Germain intensified the despair that had haunted the Austrian people since the end of the war. The Neue Freie Presse admonished the people: "Mourning colors must be hung out." 64

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63 Unser Friede (Vienna: Alfred Helder, 1919). The pamphlet contains Bauer's address in the national assembly on June 7, 1919: brief excerpts from other speeches, and a forward entitled "Anschluß—In Spite of Everything."

64 Neue Freie Presse, June 4, 1919, Morgenblatt, p. 1.
The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reported that the Allied Powers "have fallen upon weak German–Austria and torn the living flesh from her body, without shame, without pity, without compassion." 65 Magra Lammash, the daughter of Heinrich Lammash, described her initial reaction for the *Reichszeitung:* "I must confess that seldom have I been so deeply shocked as by the experience of this day." 66 Franz Klein, a member of Austria’s peace delegation, summed up the mood of the Austrian people when he wrote: "One would like for it to be a wild, improbable dream if it were not so terribly true." 67

The public outcry that surrounded the Treaty of St. Germain aided the Social Democrats in their campaign to popularize the Anschluss. Those individuals who had formerly opposed union with Germany now questioned the wisdom of their previous advice. For instance, Leopold Kunschak, who was later praised for his "eternal Austrianism," angrily responded to the terms of the treaty by asking his fellow legislators "And what gives the men in Paris the right so categorically to put the blame for the outbreak of the World War on us, just the inhabitants of German–Austria? . . . The day will come when the world will clearly see that one can force the body into servitude, but one can never clap the spirit and soul in chains." 68

The eternal defiance that Kunschak and the other legislators had vowed came to an end in September, 1919. As the food crisis in Austria became critical, the national assembly finally decided to ratify the detestable treaty. As an eternal symbol of their "unbroken spirit," Austria's parliamentary leaders, however, changed the forbidden phrase "German-Austria" to read "the German people of Austria," thereby preserving the intent of the original wording. 69

Strangely enough, the first important indication that Austrian patriots might have wielded considerable power as early as 1918 appeared in the immediate aftermath of the "St. Germain crisis." In October, 1919, a heated debate developed in the national assembly when Dr. Alfred Gurtler, a Christian Social, interrupted a speaker who was busily denouncing the Habsburgs to ask if "the former government [the Habsburg government] had dictated the Peace of St. Germain?" 70 At this point Dr. Straffner, a Pan-German, accusingly replied: "I have the firm impression that the peace treaty on this point [the Anschluß ban] was dictated not so much in St. Germain as in Vienna." 71

The insinuation that patriotic Austrian citizens had persuaded the Allied Powers to prohibit an Anschluß between Germany and Austria was perhaps not without foundation. Recent evidence indicates that in February Otto Bauer, the foreign minister, had come into possession


70 *Ibid.*, October 25, 1919, Morgenblatt, p. 3.

of a remarkable letter written by Seipel on December 17, 1918.\textsuperscript{72} Although there is no indication that Seipel communicated his thoughts to the Allied Powers, similar ideas were most likely expressed to the Allied peace negotiators. According to Seipel, the Anschluß could produce only unhappiness in Austria at that time. Not only would German Bohemia be incorporated into Czechoslovakia but the German South Tyrol would be permanently lost, since the Allied Powers would never sanction German control of the Brenner Pass. Instead of being partitioned as a consequence of the Anschluß, Seipel believed that the Tyrol and Voralberg would much prefer to become small neutral states. He emphasized that Tyrol had, in fact, already threatened to secede if the Anschluß were consummated with Germany.\textsuperscript{73} Seipel also explained that the Anschluß would be detrimental not only to Austria but to Germany as well, since the latter would undoubtedly be deprived of the left bank of the Rhine. Seipel was firmly convinced that the ideal solution for the entire German nation and German-Austria in particular was the revival of "old Austria" or the creation of a Danubian confederation. He suggested that if Austria should be hopelessly destroyed, then German-Austria would be morally free to seek union elsewhere. In any event, he believed that union with Germany was impractical until the Berlin government had triumphed over its own political instability. Moreover, Seipel insisted that

\textsuperscript{72}Viktor Reiman, Zu Gross für Österreich; Seipel und Bauer im Kampf um die Erste Republik (Vienna; Fritz Molden, 1968), pp. 176-177; Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, pp. 115-116.

\textsuperscript{73}Seipel was referring to the Anschluß resolution passed by the provincial national assembly on November 12, 1918.
he would never support the Anschluß as long as a socialist government was in power in Germany.74

Seipel's opposition to the Anschluß was clearly based on his hopes for the establishment of a Danubian confederation. Indirectly he contributed to the growth of Austrian patriotism by rejecting the objectives of the German nationalists. Furthermore, the failure of the Successor States to revive a spiritualized version of the old empire eventually forced the isolated country to develop the rudiments of a new Austrianism.

To a limited extent the Treaty of St. Germain confirmed Seipel's expectations. The Anschluß ban, the removal of the word "German" from the country's official title, and the provision that Austria could enter into a customs union with Hungary or Czechoslovakia seemingly provided major inducements for the formation of some form of economic union between the Successor States. On the other hand, the Vienna government was dispossessed of the South Tyrol. The prospects of creating a Danubian confederation, however, were considerably diminished by the fact that Austria was compelled to grant the most favored nation clause without reciprocity to all the Allied and Associated states, including Czechoslovakia, for a period of five years.75

To Seipel's dismay the Danubian confederation never advanced beyond exploratory talks. After centuries of German domination, the

74 Reimann, Zu Gross für Österreich, pp. 177-180.

75 See articles 27, 120, 179, 206, 220, 222, and 232 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.
Prague government approached every proposal for closer economic cooperation with the Austrian Republic as a possible attempt to re-enslave the Czech people. After four years of intermittent discussions, Édouard Beneš finally destroyed all Austrian hopes for a Danubian confederation by announcing at Genoa: "I do not believe in any sort of international agreement for unifying customs or currency reconstruction among the successor states. Each state must work out its own problems, both internal and external... Each country must protect its industries and its agriculture." 76

The possibility of economic and political isolation was a nightmare that had haunted almost everyone in Austria since the end of the war. The coal mines of Bohemia and the oil fields of Galicia were gone. In fact, the Republic retained only 0.5 percent of the coal mines of the monarchy. The Austrian provinces, moreover, were capable of producing only one-third of the country's food supply. 77 The optimists, who were almost invariably foreigners, pointed to the state's important iron deposits and the numerous rivers and streams which could contribute unlimited hydroelectric power. Other commentators stressed the economic importance of the state's numerous tourist attractions, while still other observers believed that if Vienna recaptured her position as the financial city of the Danubian

76 The New York Times, April 11, 1922, p. 11.

basin the entire country would enjoy at least a degree of prosperity. The Austrian people found little comfort in these words of encouragement because the bitter experience of World War I had already proven that the entire Habsburg empire was not self-sufficient. Although peace had returned, they realized full well that there was no escape from the economic straitjacket imposed on them by the Treaty of St. Germain.

Within a few brief months the fears of the Austrian people became a reality. As the economic unity of the Danubian basin was destroyed, the Austrian Republic found itself at the mercy of its neighbors. One by one the Successor States had imposed embargoes on all imports in attempts to preserve their national autonomy.\(^7^8\) Moreover, as the former members of the Habsburg empire established their own currencies, the millions of Austro-Hungarian banknotes circulating within the Austrian Republic became worthless.\(^7^9\) A victim of the economic nationalism practiced by the other Successor States, Austria discovered that she could not export or import or buy foodstuffs with her inflated currency. By December, 1921, the Austrian economy was completely paralyzed, with over fifty percent

\(^7^8\) Francis Hodac, "The Tariff Arrangements of the Succession States," The Manchester Guardian Commercial: Reconstruction in Europe, 1922, p. 312.

of the federal budget allocated for food subsidies. Welfare expenditures would have been even greater if the state had not taken corrective action by placing 10 percent of the Austrian people on the federal payroll. 80

Austria quickly earned the titles "land of continuous famine" and "the beggar of Europe." As a consequence of her paralyzed economy, Austria subsisted only on the charity of the world. From the Armistice until the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain on September 10, 1919, Austria received a total of $103,075,200 worth of food and clothing from both public and private agencies. Within a year after the peace treaty was signed, when there was no longer any apparent danger of an Anschluss between Austria and Germany, all foreign assistance from the European Powers ceased. 81

Confronted by a situation in which they obviously could no longer obtain the bare necessities of life, the Austrian people concluded that Anschluss with Germany or perhaps the creation of a communist state were the only solutions for their economic problems. 82

Facing starvation, the Austrian people had simply lost faith in


81 In October, 1920, the British government explained that it could no longer use British taxes to support former enemies of the British people. George Franckenstein, Facts and Features of My Life (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1939), pp. 223-225.

the viability of their country. One way or another they were determined to find a better way of life.

The Austrian crisis had an immediate impact on the Allied Powers. They all agreed that, if Austria were not provided with immediate financial assistance, chaos would result in Central Europe and that chaos might lead to a new war. Unable to agree on how much financial aid was needed, or who should furnish it, or how it should be administered to prevent its misuse, Great Britain and France referred the Austrian question to the League of Nations.

The League's abortive attempt to solve Austria's financial problems was interrupted in April, 1921, when the Tyrol announced that it intended to conduct a plebiscite on the question of Anschluß with Germany. France immediately announced that she would not extend any assistance to Austria unless the Austrian government put an immediate end to the agitation for Anschluß.83 The British and Italian ministers bolstered the French threat by declaring that their governments would not support any plan to aid Austria that did not include France.84 Since Michael Mayr, the Austrian chancellor, did not wish to jeopardize Austria's chances of receiving financial assistance from the League, he tried to prevent the plebiscite from taking place. His efforts, however, were to no avail. On April 25, 98 percent of the electors of the Tyrol voted for union with Germany.85

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., April 26, 1921, p. 25; and April 27, 1921, p. 2.
Contrary to popular belief, the plebiscite does not prove that the Tyrolese were predominantly German nationalists in 1921. According to the Neue Freie Presse, the people of the Tyrol did not necessarily desire an Anschluss between Austria and Germany, although they voted overwhelmingly in favor of such a proposal. The paper reported that the Christian Socials, who normally controlled the majority of the votes in the province, were actively campaigning against the Anschluss until France issued her ultimatum to Mayr. At that point they reversed their position and urged the people to vote in favor of the proposed union between Austria and Germany. 86 The odd behavior of the Christian Social Party was simply a manifestation of provincial patriotism. The local politicians did not want to be identified with the arch-enemies of the Tyrol—France and Vienna. Careful investigation, furthermore, indicates that there was considerable opposition to the Anschluss, which most likely would entail the permanent loss of the South Tyrol since the Italian government would never permit the Brenner Pass to fall into German hands. 87

Despite Mayr's inability to comply with the French ultimatum, the League of Nations proceeded with its plans for financial assistance. On May 1, J. A. Salter, chairman of the financial committee, informed the Austrian government that the League was prepared to sponsor an Austrian loan if certain conditions were met.

86 Neue Freie Presse, April 24, 1921, Morgenblatt, p. 6.
87 See ante p. 43; and Reichspost, November 18, 1918, p. 1.
First of all, the Austrian government was to institute financial reforms which the League deemed necessary, and, secondly, it was to pledge the country's immovable property as security for any assistance. Finally, it was to be understood that any loan was contingent upon the Allied Powers' releasing their liens on Austrian assets. 88

The collapse of the League plan in August destroyed all faith in the Austrian currency. The exchange value of the crown, which had a prewar parity of five to the dollar, fell from 600 in July, 1921, to 10,000 to the dollar in May, 1922. 89 A soap peddler promoted his product by wrapping it in crown notes, 90 while a Swiss cinema presented each of its patrons with either a hundred, thousand, or ten thousand krone bill. 91 Dr. Eduard Beneš finally suggested that under the circumstances "probably the best thing that could happen to Austria would be for her to go bankrupt and repudiate her currency . . . . It is a drastic solution, but probably the only way out of the pit into which Austria has sunk." 92

The economic collapse of Austria destroyed the faint hope of Austria's more patriotic citizens that their fatherland might yet be saved through the financial assistance of the League of Nations.

89 Ibid., June 27, 1921, p. 19; and June 5, 1922, p. 23.
90 The Times (London), March 31, 1922, p. 11.
91 Ibid., May 15, 1922, p. 9.
92 Ibid., April 12, 1922, p. 12.
Prior to the formal presentation of the Treaty of St. Germain, they had been able to agree that pessimism about their country's economic future was unjustified because no one knew what resources Austria would have. After September, 1919, the advocates of a Danubian confederation could still point to the benefits that would develop from closer economic cooperation with the Successor States. In May, 1922, there seemed to be only one solution for Austria's economic nightmare—Anschluss with Germany. Austrian patriotism appeared only as the "ghost of things past."
Chapter III

THE SAVIOR

In May, 1922, while European and Austrian statesmen were busily drafting obituaries for the Austrian state, Ignaz Seipel quietly pondered the fate of his fatherland. After several days of prayer and meditation, he finally found the answer for which he had been so fervently searching. Assured that he was acting as the spokesman of God, he quickly engineered the overthrow of Schober as chancellor. On May 29 he announced the formation of a new Austrian cabinet. Two days later he spelled out the motives for his recent actions: "the German people in Austria ... must live, and we who are flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood must do everything which stands in our power that it may live."¹

The prospects of success for Seipel's undertaking were anything but promising. Since the end of the war, Austria, "the beggar of Europe,"² had been totally dependent upon foreign charity. However, as Austria's foreign benefactors gradually became imured to "poor little Austria's" impasioned pleas for more financial assistance,


they became more stringent with their purse strings but more generous with their sympathy and advice. Seipel's assumption of power now threatened the last remaining source of assistance since Great Britain had stipulated that any future aid on her part was contingent upon Schober's continuing as head of state. In any event, a workable solution to Austria's fiscal problems was deemed impossible until the country's six and one-half million inhabitants developed a will to exist.

Seipel's decision to tackle Austria's supposedly irremediable problems was apparently prompted by a revelation from God which led him to reexamine his previous role in the government. He recalled that the turning point in his life had come in 1916, when he had published his theory of politics and concepts of nationalism in a volume entitled Nation und Staat. Two years later Heinrich Lammasch, one of Austria's most renowned scholars of international law and a close personal friend of Seipel, asked him to become minister of public works and social welfare in the imperial cabinet. Seipel dutifully accepted the appointment when he learned that Lammasch had been instructed by Charles to convert the old empire into a federal state. When the empire collapsed fifteen days later Seipel subjected himself to a period of intense soul searching. Had he misinterpreted God's plan for his life? Had God led him to accept his new position without any intention of providing him with

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4 Ibid.
an opportunity to implement his ideas? Seipel harbored his recurring doubts until 1922. At that time he apparently came to the conclusion that he had misinterpreted God's plans in 1918. Instead of fighting for the preservation of the multinational heritage of Austria, he had been more concerned with the defense of the Habsburg family.

Now, through a revelation which he attributed to God, he understood for the first time the true meaning of the Austrian mission. The imperial idea was the only viable alternative to the curse of integral nationalism.

His new insight led him to the following conclusions: Austria had originally been established for one purpose—to defend the German people from barbarian invaders. In 1866, with her exclusion from the German Reich, she was entrusted with the role of interpreting German culture to the non-Germanic peoples of Southeastern Europe. At the end of World War I Austria was assigned the "spiritual mission" of trying to lead the states of Europe away from integral nationalism. Although she had been deprived of her status as a great power by the Treaty of St. Germain, Austria could still exercise supremacy in the world of ideas. As long as Austria existed, whether large or small, the Austrian idea would be alive.

Seipel was eminently qualified to be the prophet of a new order. His personal integrity was beyond reproach. As chancellor he preferred his simple room in the convent to the official residence. His elevation to the highest office in the state, moreover, produced little change in his life style. He continued to appear in public in his priestly garments and to travel about Vienna by street car. The full magnitude of his humility, however, did not become apparent until 1924, when he personally intervened to save the life of his would-be assassin and then secretly contributed his modest salary to support the young prisoner's family. He almost never took recourse to inflammatory speech. He preferred instead to appeal to his audience only through logic. His sharp, crisp sentences, moreover, were noted for their double entendre and impeccable grammar. Peering through gold-plated spectacles perched on his oversized nose, he spoke with a hesitating delivery, accentuated with a nasal tone that frequently made him appear almost ludicrous. No one, however, laughed at his uncanny ability to convince an audience that he had a situation well under control and that he was personally capable of handling any problem.

Seipel realized that in the final analysis the success or failure of his divine mission depended entirely upon his ability to win the overwhelming support of the people. Not only would he have to refute

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7 Schuschnigg, My Austria, p. 80; Reichspost, October 9, 1923, pp. 1-2.
the attempts of the Social Democrats to root out the last vestiges of the Habsburg heritage, which was, after all, intimately connected with the Austrian mission; he would also be compelled to find a solution to Austria's financial problems.

In his inaugural address he tried to revive faith in the Austrian fatherland. Describing himself as an eternal optimist, he sternly denounced the insinuation of the socialists that he would be the last minister of the Republic just as he had been the last minister of the empire, and boldly proclaimed that as chancellor he had "no intention of presiding over a second dismemberment of Austria." To the Catholic masses the priest—chancellor proudly asserted that "God has led me to this place." As for the financial problems of the state, Seipel explained that the problems could more likely be solved by a person who believed in its viability. Appealing to the less rabid of the Anschluss advocates, Seipel reminded them that union with Germany could be viewed only in the light of "Realpolitik" and must wait until a more favorable opportunity.8

Within a few days of his inauguration it became obvious that Seipel intended to devote himself and his administration almost exclusively to the task of solving Austria's financial problems. Such action was absolutely essential if he were to create a solid foundation on which Austrian patriots could build. He knew only too

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8Seipel, "Die erste Regierungserklärung," pp. 17–21. It is interesting to note that Seipel used the term "Realpolitik" in his first inaugural address. As indicated below, he used this term whenever he found it expedient to take a non-committal position on the Anschluss.
well that in the postwar era Austrian patriotism had declined in almost direct proportion to the depreciation of the Austrian currency. Moreover, he realized fullwell that the recent upsurge in Anschluß sentiment among the Austrian people was a direct consequence of Austria's economic collapse. Furthermore, he understood that the Social Democrats would most likely oppose every step that he took to restore the Austrian economy, since they believed that such action would pose an unnecessary obstacle to an Anschluß with Germany. What Seipel failed to perceive was that the socialists were not unpatriotic at heart but were simply convinced, and with considerable justification at the time, that while Austria's financial problems might be arrested for a brief time they could never be permanently solved until the Austrian Republic became an integral part of a larger economic entity.

Working on the assumption that the majority of the Austrian people did not really support the Anschluß policy of the socialists, Seipel introduced an ambitious plan in the national assembly for the financial salvation of his country. His suggestions included foreign aid, currency control, and a balanced budget. In order to end deficit spending, he intended to increase federal revenues, institute an austerity program, operate all state-owned business at a profit, and eliminate all unnecessary civil servants. To halt the depreciation of the crown, he planned to transfer the responsibility for printing and circulating new currency from the federal
treasury to an independent bank of issue.\footnote{Kleinfeld, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Austria, 1918–1922," pp. 134–135. Other factors besides his religious convictions may have contributed to Seipel's unshakable faith in Austria after July, 1922. If Austria collapsed after Seipel had publicly assured the masses that God had led him to assume the position of chancellor, Seipel knew that he would personally bear the responsibility for the irreparable harm that would be done the Catholic Church in Austria. Furthermore, Seipel's personal reputation was at stake, if he were once again associated with the destruction of Austria, as he had been in 1918. The fact that Seipel remained true to his principles was quite possibly a consequence of the fact that he had nothing to lose and everything to gain if he could somehow engineer a miracle that would save Austria.}

None of Seipel's legislation could in itself change the attitude of the Austrian people towards their state. The vast majority of the people were already firmly convinced that their country was not viable. The purpose of Seipel's financial reforms was to convince the Allied Powers and the international money market that Austrian securities were once again a sound investment. If international capitalists could be persuaded to invest their money in the Austrian Republic, then the Austrian people might possibly believe in themselves once again. It was possible that they would agree with Seipel that they could play a "spiritual" role in European politics. Everything, however, depended on whether or not the foreign capitalists considered Seipel's latest legislation adequate to halt the deterioration of the Austrian economy.

Despite Seipel's financial reforms, the international banking community was still convinced that the Austrian state had no future. Consequently, the bankers, following the leadership of J. P. Morgan,
refused to become a party to Seipel’s latest scheme to save Austria.  

Although the odds were stacked overwhelmingly against him, Seipel still refused to admit defeat. In desperation, he finally advised the Allied Powers that if they did not immediately allocate sufficient funds to endow his proposed bank of issue, his country would collapse. There were no other alternatives. If they refused to act, then they must assume full responsibility for the terrible consequences that would develop in Central Europe. 

Unimpressed with his scare tactics, the Allied representatives rejected Seipel’s request for financial assistance. They did promise, however, that if the League of Nations somehow could devise a plan for helping Austria that would not involve additional loans, then they would do what they could to assist Austria. 

Seipel was angered by the decision to refer Austria’s problems to the League of Nations. He realized that the Allied Powers were fully cognizant that the League of Nations had tried without success to aid Austria for over a year. Under the circumstances, he concluded that the Allied Powers simply wished to wash their hands completely of Austria. Seipel, however, believed that they had acted prematurely.

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Since his fatherland could be saved only by outside assistance, he decided to frighten the Allied Powers into furnishing the foreign aid that they would not provide voluntarily.

Seipel commenced his diplomatic blackmail on August 19 by informing the representatives of the London Conference that his government might press for a "practical solution" of its problems. Everyone realized that the phrase "practical solution" was only a euphemism for Anschluß with Germany. In order to make it absolutely certain, however, that everyone realized the full implications of his insinuations, a few days later he provocatively stated that if Austria should find it necessary to associate with a single neighboring state Germany was quite naturally an obvious choice.

The fact that Seipel actually avoided using the phrase "Anschluß with Germany" emphatically suggests that his news conferences were prompted by ulterior motives. As an avowed practitioner of "Realpolitik," he certainly realized that, due to French intransigence, a union between Austria and Germany was still impossible. Thus in all probability his "Anschluß rhetoric" was simply a subterfuge cleverly conceived to publicize his subsequent trip to Prague, Berlin, and Verona. His thoughtful choice of language on the eve of his departure assured him that foreign service officials throughout Europe would subject his every move to the closest scrutiny. Somehow, somewhere on his itinerary Seipel hoped to be able to create the

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14 Neue Freie Presse, August 22, 1922, p. 1.
illusion for all his interested observers that he was secretly negotiating some form of political association between Austria and another state. The fear that Austria was to be enveloped by some other power would create such hostility that a major European war could not be averted unless the Allied Powers took immediate action to guarantee Austria adequate financial resources to ensure her continued independence.  

Seipel's "survival diplomacy" worked to perfection. By means of skillful diplomacy, suggestive press conferences, and the inevitable speculation of the press, the Austrian chancellor brought Europe to the brink of war—all within the span of two weeks.  

When Italy and Yugoslavia actually began mobilizing their troops on the pretext that the other had designs on Austria, Seipel decided the moment had finally arrived when he might opportunely explore the possibility previously suggested by the Allied Powers that the League of Nations might somehow be able to solve Austria's financial problems.  

15 Although there is no available evidence that Seipel had a preconceived plan when he decided to undertake his diplomatic pilgrimage, there is considerable circumstantial evidence to suggest that he did. His conversations with Joseph Wirth, the German chancellor, indicate that he was pursuing an unsettled but nonetheless vigorous foreign policy to force the Allies to grant important economic assistance. In the event that his tactics led to war Seipel was informed that he could expect no help from Germany. See Ladner, Seipel als Überwinder der Staatskrise vom Sommer 1922, pp. 91-94; and Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, pp. 186-197.  

16 Although the details of Seipel's diplomacy are not germane to this thesis, interested readers should consult Ladner, Seipel als Überwinder der Staatskrise vom Sommer 1922, especially pp. 91-98.
While the League of Nations summoned her already jittery members to Geneva to consider the possibility of financial assistance to Austria, Seipel added one final touch to his diplomatic blackmail. He issued an ominous note stating that if assistance were not immediately forthcoming there would be no way to prevent complete chaos in Central Europe.\(^{17}\)

On September 2, 1922, the Austrian government presented its case to the League of Nations. Alfred Grünberger, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, assured the League Assembly that a group of American financiers were ready to extend new loans to Austria if their investment could be safeguarded against a political upheaval and the possibility of financial default. He insisted that the Allies should provide whatever additional security was necessary since they had promised to help Austria rebuild her economy when the Treaty of Saint-Germain was signed in 1919. Unless the League devised some acceptable plan, Grünberger explained that Austria's only alternative was to establish a commercial union with one or more of her neighbors. Austria, in that case, might play the "role of Mrs. O'Leary's cow and set all of Central Europe aflame."\(^{18}\)

Four days later Seipel tried to pressure the League Assembly into immediate action. After vividly describing the plight of his countrymen, he warned the League that, rather than perish in isolation, the Austrian people will do everything within their power to "break

\(^{17}\)The New York Times, August 31, 1922, p. 15.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., September 2, 1922, p. 4.
the chain which was oppressing and strangling them." It was the
League's responsibility to see that this took place in such a manner
that the peace of the world was not endangered. He explained,
however, that his country preferred to merge itself into a larger
economic entity rather than accept any financial assistance from
the League that compromised Austria's sovereignty.

In an interview immediately following his speech, Seipel
provided one additional incentive for the League of Nations to aid
Austria. In an obvious attempt to exploit the volatile situation
in Central Europe, he explained that, if the League were unable to
help Austria, he would not enter a union with Italy. His statement
once again raised the specter of war, since the Italian government
had already decreed that any form of union between Austria and the
Little Entente or between Austria and Germany was a casus belli.
Prompted by Seipel's inflammatory remarks to the press, the League
of Nations hurriedly perfected a plan to solve Austria's financial
difficulties. The League of Nations agreed to guarantee an inter-
national loan of $130,000,000 if Austria in return promised, first
of all, not to take any action which might alienate her independence

19. Speech by Seipel at Geneva on September 6, 1922, in Gesal,
Seipels Reden, pp. 27-28. The speech was widely quoted by the world
press.

20. Ibid., p. 32.


22. Ibid., August 29, 1922, p. 17. If the Italian government had
not been so ready to take up arms, Seipel's diplomacy might well have
and, secondly, to use the proceeds of the loan to achieve economic
stability. In order to ensure full compliance with the above
provisions, the League was to appoint a commissioner general who was
to withhold monthly installments of League funds if the Austrian
government failed to take adequate measures to end all deficit
spending within a period of two years. 23

Despite the restrictions imposed on his government, Seipel was,
nonetheless, pleased with the League's final product. On October 4,
1922, with tears in his eyes, 24 Seipel expressed his eternal gratitude
to the League. He explained that Austria had wanted to live from the
very beginning and now the League of Nations had made it possible for
her to do so. He proclaimed it would be a great day for the
Austrian people when an Austrian chancellor could finally say that
"Austria is rehabilitated. Her people are living, if not in
affluence, at least not in crushing poverty. Austria has proved
that she can manage her own affairs. You may now set her free from
financial control." 25

Seipel's exuberance about the Geneva Protocol was not shared by
the Social Democrats. In early August they had been confident that
Seipel would fail in his attempt to solve Austria's financial problems
the same as everyone else had failed. They had reasoned that, once

23 See Protocols containing the Scheme for the Financial Recon-
struction of Austria, Geneva, October 4, 1922, in International
Conciliation, No. 132 (January, 1923), pp. 52-69.


25 Speech by Seipel, Geneva, October 4, 1922, in Gessl, Seipel's
Reden, pp. 34-36.
he admitted defeat, the last major obstacle to an **Anschluss** between Germany and Austria would be removed. Under the circumstances they decided to give Seipel enough rope to hang himself.

In anticipation of Seipel's failure, the **Arbeiter-Zeitung** attempted to mobilize public opinion on behalf of the **Anschluss**. During the course of his trip, the newspaper had intimated that not even Seipel knew what he wanted to accomplish in either Prague or Berlin. The editor also charged that Seipel had humiliated the Austrian people by placing them on the auction block. "Who wants to buy German-Austria? . . . We are for sale!" "For a few million francs," the **Arbeiter-Zeitung** asserted, "Seipel has offered a 'union' in Prague and in Rome. He has traveled to Berlin only to pacify the conscience of the Pan-Germans."  

When Seipel concluded his diplomatic mission to Prague, Berlin, and Vienna, the **Arbeiter-Zeitung** made the pointed observation that Seipel's policy of "national prostitution" had failed to produce any tangible results. Although Seipel had entertained great hopes in Prague, he was "promised nothing other than that Herr Benesch [Benes]"

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26 The Social Democrats believed that the reluctance of the Allied Powers to continue subsidizing the Austrian Republic indicated that they would no longer oppose an **Anschluss** between Germany and Austria. See the **Arbeiter-Zeitung**, August 29, 1922, p. 1, and August 20, 1922, p. 1.


will support our petition in the Assembly of the League of Nations. And in Verona Herr Seipel could at best obtain an advance of 60 million lire which the Italian government had already promised us in February."  

The Arbeiter-Zeitung had already questioned the propriety of accepting any assistance from either Italy or Czechoslovakia. On August 24 it had warned its readers that if the methods of Herr Seipel could really bring us foreign credit, it could bring it only at intolerable conditions, only at the price of the complete submission of German-Austria to the control of foreign powers—the complete loss of the last remnants of our independence. We must resist the danger of bartering away our independence. A final solution of the German-Austrian problem is possible only through Anschluß to Germany. As long as Anschluß cannot be consummated, we must defend our independence by every possible means. We must not permit ourselves to be converted into a colony of some foreign power. Surrender of our independence is not inevitable.

On numerous occasions the Arbeiter-Zeitung reminded its readers that the Anschluß was unlikely to take place as long as Seipel was chancellor. Seipel was portrayed as an advocate of Austrian independence who was filled with "inner disgust" at the mere thought of Anschluß with Germany. Instead of trying to escape from the prison of "independence" in which the Austrian people had been placed

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31 Ibid., August 24, 1922, p. 1.
in 1918, Seipel could envision "no other remedy than submission to foreign control." 34

The socialist press also stressed the fact that Seipel was not only disloyal to the German people of Austria but incompetent as well. "On the day when the Seipel government was elected the dollar stood at 11,100 crowns; today one must pay 75,650 crowns for a dollar." 35 Despite Seipel's promises to change things, the only new thing about his administration was that he "believed that he could change things." 36 Moreover, when the Allied Powers rejected his requests for financial assistance, he had gone, hat in hand, to the League of Nations, which not only had no money of its own but could help "only if the Entente governments wanted to help." 37

When the League of Nations agreed to place the question of financial assistance to Austria on its agenda, the Arbeiter-Zeitung expressed the belief that Seipel's moment of truth had finally arrived. Once it became obvious that the League of Nations could provide no meaningful assistance, Seipel would be permanently discredited, thereby removing the last major obstacle to the Anschluß. Confident of victory, the editor concluded: "We will know within a

33 Ibid., August 19, 1922, p. 1.
34 Ibid., August 27, 1922, p. 1.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., August 20, 1922, p. 1.
few days how well founded the hopes of Herr Seipel are. . . . With 15 million pounds sterling in hand any jackass could save our economy."  38

The scenario that was finally acted out on October 4, 1922, was entirely different from what the Arbeiter-Zeitung and the Social Democrats had expected. 39 Seipel had somehow accomplished the impossible. The League of Nations had perfected a plan that would guarantee Austria $130,000,000—a sum far in excess of what the Social Democrats considered adequate to solve all of Austria's financial problems.

The unexpected benevolence of the League of Nations left the Arbeiter-Zeitung, as well as the Social Democratic Party, in an almost impossible political predicament. If they renounced their political commitment to German nationalism in favor of Austrian patriotism, the Austrian citizenry might well consider the political counsel of Seipel superior to their own. On the other hand, it seemed the height of political folly to continue to denounce an individual who seemingly had assured the Austrian people of economic prosperity after years of deprivation. Unable to choose between the two alternatives, the Arbeiter-Zeitung became more subdued in its

38 Ibid., August 30, 1922, p. 1.

39 The Social Democrats were, unknowingly at least, partially responsible for Seipel's successful diplomacy. Their speeches and articles about Seipel tended to confirm the impression that Seipel had tried to create on his diplomatic mission to Prague and Verona, i. e., that he was a desperate man who might resort to anything in his determination to preserve Austrian independence.
criticism of Seipel's recent diplomacy, while it secretly explored the possibility of joining a coalition government with the Christian Socials.

By October 7, 1922, the Social Democrats concluded that Seipel was unwilling to form a coalition government of Christian Socials and Social Democrats to attempt to revitalize the Austrian state. Rejected by Seipel, they decided they had little alternative except to resume their all-out attack on the Austrian chancellor. The Arbeiter-Zeitung, for instance, in an especially vicious editorial, accused Seipel of "high treason." It explained:

Never until now had one dared to demand of a European nation what the League of Nations demands of our people. European imperialism has always established on the barbarous peoples of North Africa and the nomadic peoples of Asia the type of control prepared for us by Balfour, Benes and Imperiali; never before, however, has a civilized European state been treated in such fashion. . . . If we are still a people, parliament should try the prelate before the High Court of Justice before pronouncing judgment on Geneva.

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40 Compare with the editorials that appeared in the Arbeiter-Zeitung on October 1, 1922, p. 1; and on October 5, 1922, pp. 1-2.

41 See the Arbeiter-Zeitung October 7, 1922, p. 1; and the Reichspost, October 8, 1922, p. 2. Seipel was apparently convinced he could use charges of lack of patriotism to destroy the Social Democratic Party. His hatred of the Marxists was based partly on patriotic grounds. He failed to realize that political stability could never be achieved in Austria as long as he regarded the Social Democrats as traitors. Later, when Seipel tried to enlist the support of the socialists, he discovered that they were no longer interested in a coalition government. See also Bauer, Die österreichische Revolution, pp. 260-262.

The righteous indignation voiced by the Arbeiter-Zeitung was shared by the Österreichische Volkswirt. The chancellor, it maintained, had sold his country to the Entente Powers who controlled the League. And for what? Promises! Seipel had returned from Geneva without a single cent. Moreover, it was doubtful whether Austria would ever receive a League loan, because actual credits depended on parliamentary approval in four separate countries. Even if the state actually received financial assistance from the League, two years of plenary power by Seipel's administration, as envisioned by the Geneva Protocols, would prove detrimental to Austria's republican form of government. The oppressive terms of the Geneva compact left Austria with no honorable alternative except to resort once more to a policy of self-help.\textsuperscript{43}

While the Arbeiter-Zeitung and the Österreichische Volkswirt were attempting to arouse public opinion against the Geneva Protocols, Seipel discovered an invaluable ally in the Neue Freie Presse. That powerful Viennese newspaper explained that it had a number of reservations about the Geneva agreement. It especially criticized the clause which stated that the Austrian state must not alienate its independence. It explained that the existence of such a provision was a direct threat to the nation's sovereignty, because if Austria were not free to do what she wanted to when she wished, she was little more than a European Madagascar. Moreover, there was

no need for a new declaration of the inviolability of the state's borders, since Article 83 of the Treaty of Saint Germain already contained a passage to that effect. Despite its reservations, the *Neue Freie Presse* insisted that, in view of Austria's desperate financial situation, it was imperative for the government to accept the terms of the Geneva loan and hope that the League would live up to its reputation of fairness. National honor, however, demanded that the Austrian people work hard and make whatever sacrifices were necessary to free their country from financial control at the earliest possible moment.

The *Reichspost*, which had consistently supported Seipel's foreign policy, urged the immediate ratification of the Geneva Protocols. Although it admitted that the terms of the League loan were far from perfect, it insisted, nevertheless, that, in spite of the numerous objections that could be raised against League control, the crux of the matter was solvency or collapse. There were simply no other alternatives.

The *Reichspost* also advised its readers to disregard all the critical comments of the Socialist Party. It insisted that when they had had the opportunity, they had refused to rub "the magic lamp of

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Aladin to discover the treasure which Austria needed" to revive her economy. Any person not blinded by party prejudice, the Reichspost asserted, could clearly see that in this time of great crisis Seipel was the right man—"the man who had freed Austria from her isolation as a scarcely noticed beggar state and has placed her in the main-stream of European politics." Furthermore, it concluded, Seipel "has again given this people confidence and unanimous faith in this state."

While the press heatedly debated whether he was a hero or a traitor, Seipel waited for the judgement of the people. When he set foot on Austrian soil on October 7 for the first time since affixing his name to the Geneva Protocols, he encountered hundreds of grateful spectators and politicians when he stepped out of his train at the Westbahnhof. Vice-chancellor Frank, a Pan-German, praised him on behalf of the Volk for his sacrificial courage in finding a way out of the desperate situation. Jodok Fink, the chairman of the Christian Social Party, spoke of the great success which Seipel had achieved for the fatherland. Not only was the Geneva convention of universal historical importance; it would always be associated with the name of the Austrian chancellor, he declaimed. Fink asserted that if everyone "will fulfill his duty, we may hope that, with God's help, we will face better times for our fatherland and Volk."

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48 Ibid., October 8, 1922, p. 1.
When Seipel surveyed his audience of well-wishers, he was convinced that they wanted to join his efforts to save Austria. He quickly reminded everyone that his fatherland was only at the beginning of the road to salvation—not at the end. However, with the active support of the populace, he was able to visualize a time when "we can hope to lead a normal political and economic life." After cautioning the people not to underestimate the difficulties that still lay ahead, Seipel shouted to the appreciative crowd, "Our fatherland, may it live again!" 49

Seipel's moment of glory in the Westbahnhof marked the beginning of a patriotic revival throughout Austria. Kurt Schuschnigg, a quiet, withdrawn individual, was one of the many thousands of individuals who was affected by Seipel's contagious patriotism. As he later explained in his memoirs,

I was a young assistant lawyer when I heard Chancellor Seipel speak for the first time. It was a meeting at Innsbruck, just after his first journey abroad, when he became an international figure. The lucid, quiet, convincing words in which he formulated his confession of faith in Austria moved us deeply. At last a man had come forward, courageously seized the helm, and without ifs and buts, but without stipulations, recognized the Fatherland. At the same time this man took his stand upon practical and realistic grounds, the maintenance of which was necessary if Austria's desperate economic problems were to be mastered. Thus he summoned us to share in his determination to re-create Austria. 50

Like Schuschnigg, Heinrich Mataya, a member of Seipel's cabinet, traced his renewed sense of patriotism to the Geneva Protocols. When

49 Ibid.
50 Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 65-66.
Seipel had assumed control of the government, Mataya revealed, he had viewed the new chancellor's promises with extreme skepticism since he had already concluded that the situation was totally hopeless. His entire outlook on life, he explained, had changed after Seipel announced that the League of Nations had agreed to guarantee an international loan to help Austria. Mataya emphasized that he had been especially impressed by the amount of credit that Seipel had arranged. Seipel had surprised everyone by negotiating a loan more than twice the size of what anyone had expected. Since 1914, Mataya asserted, the Austrian people had grown accustomed to "astronomical" sums but always as expenditures, never as credit. With promises of more than a half billion gold francs, Seipel had more than satisfied the "indispensable prerequisite for the salvation of Austria."\(^{51}\)

Nevertheless, even though Schuschnigg and Mataya were elated over Seipel's statesmanship, many individuals were repulsed by Seipel's patriotic appeals during a time of dire financial crisis. The Social Democrats, in particular, were repelled by the fact that Seipel seemed to think that socialism was the antithesis of patriotism. Unwilling to renounce their Marxist convictions for the privilege of marching under the banner of Austrian patriotism, the Social Democrats redoubled their efforts in behalf of German nationalism.

In contrast to the praise that most public officials had heaped on Seipel after his return from Geneva, most socialist leaders thought

Seipel should be damned for betraying the German people. The Arbeiterezitung, for instance, wrote:

Today the chancellor-prelate has returned from Geneva. He brings back to our homeland the most despicable treaty which has ever been exacted from any European power. How has this gift been received? Herr Fink, the chairman of the largest party in parliament, welcomed the prelate and praised the 'great success' which he had won in Geneva. Herr Frank, the Pan-German vice chancellor, welcomed his lord and master with words of thanks and congratulations. No one will be able to forget it. Thanks for the treaty which sacrificed the Anschluss with Germany. Congratulations for the treaty which permitted the Italians and the Czechs to establish a dictatorship on German soil. And the whole bourgeois press, Jew and Christian without distinction, agrees with him. Do the majority of people think as their spokesmen think? . . . Where are the freedom-loving middle class and the peasants? Are there only Finks and Franks in this land? The working class is prepared to attempt the great struggle for the salvation of our freedom! Are they alone?52

By October 11, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party seemed to have agreed on a basic strategy for overthrowing Seipel's coalition government and thereby putting an end to his partisan patriotism. Instead of continuing their all-out attack on the Austrian chancellor, they decided, at least temporarily, to intensify their criticism of Seipel's political allies, the Pan-Germans. By publicizing the fact that Seipel's stated objectives were totally inconsistent with the basic principles of German nationalism, the Marxists were confident that sooner or later the rank-and-file membership of the Pan-German Party would force their representatives to repudiate their political alliance with the Christian Socials, which, in turn, would bring about Seipel's downfall.

52Arbeiter-Zeitung, October 8, 1922, p. 1.
On October 12 the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* attempted to publicly expose the hypocrisy of the Pan-German leaders. It reminded its readers that a year earlier the Pan-Germans had withdrawn from the government when Schober had asked parliament to ratify the Treaty of Prague, which contained an anti-Anschluss clause. It insisted that the passage of time had obviously produced a major change in the objectives of the Pan-German Party. Their political leaders had apparently abandoned their most sacred campaign slogan, the Anschluss, without receiving a single concession from the Christian Socials. Their decision to liquidate their Anschluss politics reflected their true colors. "There were no longer any Pan-German politics," the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* observed, "but only a bourgeois front."\(^{53}\)

While the socialists waited for the first visible signs of discord within the Pan-German Party, they were concerned that some of their own supporters might defect to the opposition. As a result of their own experience, socialist leaders were fully aware that many workers would find the $120,000,000 Geneva loan an irresistible temptation. In an attempt to ensure party loyalty, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* warned its subscribers what would befall the Austrian people if the Geneva Protocols were ratified. It explained that the very existence of the republic was at stake, since the Christian Socials would be able to exercise plenary power for two years. In two years of shameful rule the bourgeois parties had already brought the state to the very brink of the abyss. The newspaper concluded that in the

final analysis the Geneva Protocols, which it placed in the same category as the much-detested treaty of Saint Germain, would "destroy our freedom; violate our independence, and degrade our self-assurance as a state and a nation." 54

Although they had been accused of disloyalty to the German nation many times in the past, the Christian Socials were no longer hesitant to admit publicly that Austrian patriotism must take precedence over any commitment to German nationalism. On October 12, Leopold Kunschak, editor of the Christlichsoziale Arbeiter-Zeitung, admonished the members of the Nationalrat that the ratification of the Geneva Protocols provided everyone as opportunity to vote either for "the collapse or the salvation of this land." After arguing that parliament was under a moral obligation to honor what the chancellor had achieved in Geneva, he urged his fellow legislators to make his concluding words a reality: "Long live our fatherland! Long live Austria!" 55 Hauser, who spoke next, also appealed to the patriotic instincts of the lawmakers. He highlighted his emotional address with the words:

In days gone by, people said: It is sweet and glorious to die for one's country. It is fine and it is necessary for us to make some sacrifices for the salvation of our fatherland. We want to live. We want to create a future for our people. And today is our fateful hour. Here is the place and now is the time when we can begin again. 56

54. Ibid., October 5, 1922, p. 1. See also the edition for October 1, 1922, p. 1.
55. Reichspost, October 13, 1922, p. 3.
56. Ibid.
Despite their philosophical differences with the Christian Socials, the Pan-Germans refused to repudiate their political alliance with Seipel. Their spokesman, Franz Dinghofer, defended his party's position by explaining that Austria had three choices: Anschluss with Germany, which was temporarily impossible; a policy of self-help, which was not feasible; and private credit guaranteed by the League of Nations, which was available.\textsuperscript{57} Since Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain still permitted Austria to consummate an Anschluss with Germany with the permission of the League of Nations, the Pan-Germans did not believe that their commitment to eventual union with Germany was altered in any way by the Geneva Protocols.\textsuperscript{58}

Outraged because the Pan-Germans refused to sever their political ties with Seipel, the Social Democrats increasingly emphasized the ideological hypocrisy of the Pan-Germans. Otto Bauer accused them not only of having lost faith in the Anschluss but also of throwing themselves into the arms of the Entente because of their exaggerated fear of inflation.\textsuperscript{59} Other socialists publicized their displeasure with the Pan-Germans on October 13 by repeatedly disrupting the Nationalrat with cries of "Long live the independence of the Republic!" and "Long live Anschluss with Germany!"\textsuperscript{60} To further dramatize the

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}, October 7, 1922, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung}, October 13, 1922, p. 2.
issue the socialists organized a demonstration of twelve thousand
Viennese who stormed through the city's streets shouting "Down with
the treason of Seipel!" "Long live the Republic!" "Long live the
free and independent Republic!" "Down with the Pan-German traitors!"61

Although the Pan-Germans gave no indication of capitulating
to the demands of the Social Democrats, Seipel was obviously concerned
that his political allies might desert him. Without their legis-
lative support, his fatherland could never hope to benefit from the
Geneva Protocols. Under the circumstances, he convinced himself
that any means would be justified to ensure the salvation of Austria.
Assured only of the momentary support of the Pan-Germans, he announced
that he would speed the Geneva Protocols through parliament by enacting
the enabling legislation as a simple law instead of as a constitutional
amendment. 62

Seipel's attempt to circumvent the democratic process seemed to
confirm the worst fears of the Social Democrats. In attacking the
Geneva Protocols, Karl Seitz, for instance, charged that the "truth
is this program is only a cover up for absolutism. . . . What has
been submitted is no finance plan, but a monster."63 In referring to
the League officials, Robert Danneberg contemptuously asked Seipel,
"Who are these experts—these constitutional experts who would make

61Ibid., October 30, 1922, Mittagsblatt, p. 1.
63Neue Freie Presse, November 7, 1922, Morgenblatt, p. 6.
See also Robert Danneberg, Der Finanzplan der Regierung Seipel,
pp. 51-52.
you emperor of Austria? You should at least name them for us." 64

Otto Bauer summed up his party's official viewpoint fairly accurately when he angrily asserted that it was impossible to pay for foreign aid "with the liberty of our country and the honor of our people." 65 Bauer was firmly convinced that Seipel's "irresponsible conduct" at Geneva threatened the very existence of the republic. 66

Hoping to reach a much wider audience, the socialists reprinted their most persuasive arguments in a series of pamphlets. One of the most successful of these was Robert Danneberg's Der Finanzplan der Regierung Seipel. Drawing upon his parliamentary addresses, Danneberg argued that it was inconceivable that the Republic would be attacked from within by individuals professing to be Austrians. The Republic, moreover, was being assailed primarily because democracy had been identified with the working class and because it had become fashionable throughout Europe to attack the working class. In order to make his party's position more palatable to the conservative peasants, Danneberg expressed his personal dismay that Seipel had not revealed what "our newest friend, Mussolini" really wanted with Austria. He also intimated that perhaps the existing government intended to subject the Austrian people to the "methods of Horthy." Finally, he insisted that whatever sinister plans the Czechs, the

64 Neue Freie Presse, November 7, 1922, Morgenblatt, p. 6.


Italians, the French, and Seipel had made for the state were totally impractical since the schemers had confused the old Austria with the new.  

The efforts of the Social Democrats to stigmatize Seipel as the political stooge of Austria's wartime enemies were negated by the counteraccusations hurled at them by the Christian Socials. The Reichspost insisted, for instance, that the Marxists were guilty of not wanting to save the state. The patriotic loyalty of the socialists was further called into question by labeling them as "half Bolsheviks"—a venomous label deliberately contrived to conjure up memories of Austria's ancient enemy, Russia. The clerical press also exploited the concept of guilt by association by reminding everyone of the socialist ties with the Marxist parties and their common goal of a "world revolution." The Reichspost, moreover, tried to disgrace the entire Social Democratic Party by describing Fritz Adler, the assassin of Stürgh and the son of Victor Adler, as a friend of the Anschluß. In a slightly different vein, an overzealous Reichspost journalist tried to obscure the socialist charge of treason leveled at Seipel by unjustly pinning the entire responsibility for the Treaty of St. Germain on Karl Renner.

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67 Damberg, Der Finanzplan der Regierung Seipel, pp. 3-6 and 10.
68 Reichspost, October 12, 1922, p. 1.
69 Ibid., October 7, 1922, p. 1.
70 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
71 Ibid., August 28, 1922, p. 3.
72 Ibid., October 7, 1922, pp. 1-2.
In order to solidify public support in support of the Geneva Protocols, the Christian Socials warned the Austrian people that if they heeded the advice of the Social Democrats the republic would collapse. Jodok Fink insisted that no matter what the socialists said there were only two alternatives—credit or collapse. The party press also stressed the fact that for the first time since the collapse of the old empire the Austrian people need no longer endure the hardships that had become a way of life since the end of the war if parliament approved the Geneva Protocols.

Otto Bauer insisted that, contrary to what the Christian Socials would have the populace believe, the issue of the Geneva Protocols was not simply a question of credit or collapse. He argued that it was still possible to raise the equivalent of $40,000,000 within Austria herself. This money would provide a breathing space of at least eight months. During this period the budget could be balanced by means of new taxation and reduced spending. It was not necessary to subject the country to foreign control. There was no need to renounce union with Germany.

The controversy over the Geneva Protocols ended rather abruptly in mid-November when the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials worked out a political compromise. Seipel agreed to introduce the essential legislation as a constitutional amendment instead of as a

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73 Neue Freie Presse, November 8, 1922, Morgenblatt, p. 6.
74 Reichspost, October 7, 1922, pp. 1-2.
75 Bauer, Die österreichische Revolution, pp. 281-282.
simple law, as he had announced that he would do earlier. In return for this procedural change the socialists promised that enough of their members would absent themselves from the Nationalrat to give the Pan-Germans and the Christian Socials the two-thirds majority they needed to approve a constitutional amendment. As a consequence of these mutual concessions, parliament finally ratified the Geneva Protocols on November 26, 1922.76

Ratification of the Geneva Protocols marked the beginning of a new era in Austrian history. For the first time in the history of the Republic a government which openly championed the need for Austrian patriotism at the expense of loyalty to the German people was firmly entrenched in power. The political climate in Austria in November, 1922, was quite different from what it had been in 1918, when the Nationalrat had passed an Anschluss resolution without a single voice being raised in dissent.

The decisive shift in public opinion since 1918 was the logical consequence of the financial provisions of the Geneva Protocols. Since World War I throughout Austria pro-Anschluss sentiment had

76. *Neue Freie Presse*, November 22, 1922, Morgenblatt, p. 1; *The New York Times*, November 27, 1922, p. 17. Otto Bauer explained that it would have been pointless to continue to oppose ratification. Despite his party's massive publicity campaign, the proletariat had been unable to find a parliamentary ally in either the middle or the peasant class. Only through such an alliance could any significant alterations have been achieved in the Geneva agreement. Finally, he justified his party's action on the ground that any other decision most likely would have resulted in a prolonged food shortage for the Austrian people. *Neue Freie Presse*, November 23, 1922, Morgenblatt, pp. 1, 3. What Bauer did not admit was that the Social Democrats had never really wished to oppose the Geneva Protocols. See ante pp. 83-84.
increased at least temporarily with every substantial decline in the value of the currency. German nationalism finally reached its peak in Austria during the precipitous decline of the Austrian crown which occurred immediately after Seipel assumed office. Seipel's almost miraculous financial triumph at Geneva suddenly convinced hundreds of thousands of Austrians that union with Germany was no longer necessary or even desirable. As a consequence of the Geneva Protocols the Austrian people no longer believed that patriotism was a luxury that they could not afford.

Within a matter of days after the Geneva Protocols were officially signed, there were signs of Austrian patriotism almost everywhere. The Social Democrats, for instance, indicated that they were prepared to renounce German nationalism and to reaffirm their loyalty to their Austrian fatherland. Moreover, although the Pan-Germans continued to pay lip service to German nationalism, they, nonetheless, consistently voted with the "patriotic" group in the Nationalrat.\footnote{The Pan-Germans were reluctant to work for the Anschluss as long as Germany was controlled by the Social Democrats.}

The available evidence clearly suggests that the overwhelming majority of Austrian people looked with favor upon appeals to Austrian patriotism. After conducting a massive publicity campaign in behalf of Anschluss with Germany, the Social Democrats discovered that the middle class and the peasants remained steadfast in their loyalty to the Austrian state. The strength of Austrian patriotism is also reflected in the fact that, aside from the socialists, the Austrian
populace consistently praised the Geneva Protocols, although they reaffirmed the basic principles of the Treaty of Saint Germain which everyone in Austria held in contempt. Although this strange paradox can be partially explained by the promise of millions of dollars in foreign aid, it would appear that the Austrian people no longer despised their fatherland.

Although Austrian patriotism seemed to command the allegiance of the majority of the people in 1922, there were, nonetheless, signs that it might yet succumb to German nationalism. If the Pan-Germans and the Social Democrats could ever resolve their political differences, they could easily overthrow Seipel and establish a government firmly committed to union with Germany. Many Austrians, moreover, were attracted by patriotic appeals only because of the financial provisions of the Geneva Protocols. If Austria failed to achieve the economic prosperity these individuals expected, they might well defect to the ranks of the Pan-Germans and the Social Democrats.

The first serious defections from the ranks of Austria's newest patriots occurred in the first two months after the Geneva Protocols were ratified. Many of the defectors were disillusioned when Seipel promised the League of Nations that he would dismiss 100,000 state employees before July 1, 1924, and to reduce the national budget to a level of $70,000,000 by 1925.78 These disenchanted patriots had assumed that acceptance of the Geneva Protocols would mean more jobs

for the Austrians. Seipel also lost some public support because he and Alfred Zimmerman, the newly appointed commissioner general for Austria, were unable to agree on a president for the Austrian National Bank, which was created for the purpose of stabilizing Austria's currency. Zimmerman insisted that a foreign expert should be named to head the institution so that potential investors would not have to fear for the safety of their money. Seipel, on the other hand, opposed such an appointment because he feared a new wave of anti-foreign sentiment which eventually might force him to resign as chancellor. Although the controversy was finally resolved by naming a foreign expert as special adviser to the bank, the extensive coverage of the issue alienated many individuals who were not aware of the strings attached to the League loan. The primary cause of Seipel's growing disfavor with the public, however, was no doubt due to the fact that, although League control was established on December 9, 1922, no funds were received from the international loans until mid-March.

Encouraged by the restive mood of the people, the Social Democrats resumed their all-out attack on Seibel. They gained numerous converts throughout the winter months as Bauer repeatedly scoffed, "Austria has exchanged her national independence for a credit of $125,000,000. Up to the present we have not received a single cent. The control is here, but where is the credit?"

79 Neue Freie Presse, February 27, 1923, Morgenblatt, pp. 1-2; Monthly Summary of the League of Nations (June, 1923), p. 95.
80 Neue Freie Presse, February 9, 1923, Morgenblatt, p. 5, passim.
Alarmed by the mounting political pressure that came as a result of the socialist charges, Seipel asked Zimmerman if it were not possible for the League to arrange a small short-term loan to meet Austria's immediate financial needs. On February 1, 1923, Seipel explained to the League Council that it was all but impossible for his government to meet its financial obligation. Impressed by Seipel's arguments, the League of Nations authorized the Austrian government to borrow $16,000,000 until the details of the larger loan could be worked out.

In his anxiety to disarm the critics of his fatherland, Seipel committed a tactical mistake that almost cost him the support of the Pan-Germans. His visit to Paris coincided with the French invasion of the Ruhr. His enemies in Germany and Austria quickly exploited the issue. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, for instance, found it inconceivable that the chancellor could remain in Paris, no matter how pressing Austria's financial needs, at the very moment when the French were waging a war of extermination against the German people. Millions of Germans were already under the control of French tanks and bayonets. The situation finally reached the crisis stage when

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82 Neue Freie Presse, February 3, 1923, Abendblatt, p. 3. The Neue Freie Presse had already voiced the sentiments of the Austrian people when it declared that conditions in Germany defied every description. It insisted that no one had dared commit such acts of aggression in peacetime since the days of Napoleonic despotism. Ibid., January 22, 1923, Nachmittagblatt, p. 1.
public opinion to declare that "every German heart was moved by
sorrow and brotherly sympathy." 83

As a consequence of the French invasion, the continued partici-
pation of the Pan-Germans in the coalition government remained
doubtful until February 8. Damning the renewed hopes of the Marxists,
Franz Dinghofer stated: "We are still of the opinion that the fulfill-
ment of the Geneva Agreement is an absolute necessity. We see no
other alternative for the salvation of our state." 84 Austrian
patriotism had survived its most serious challenge.

Although they had failed in their efforts to destroy Seipel's
coalition government and thereby pave the way for eventual union
with Germany, the Social Democrats were nonetheless able to fulfill
at least part of their objectives. They had clearly demonstrated
that they constituted the only political party in Austria that was
unalterably opposed to independence. The French invasion of the
Ruhr, moreover, had forced many individuals to wonder about the
consequences of financial assistance from the League. The people
as a whole were certainly no longer as enthusiastic about the League
loan as they had been only a few weeks before. They were now assured
that continued opposition to Seipel would not produce the political
disaster that they had envisioned for themselves when the Geneva
Protocols were first signed.

83 Ibid., February 3, 1923, Abendblatt, p. 3.
84 Ibid., February 9, 1923, Morgenblatt, p. 6.
Somewhat encouraged by the shift in public opinion that had accomplished the Ruhr crisis, the Marxists eagerly waited for a new opportunity to attack Seipel. The issue for which they had been waiting surfaced rather unexpectedly at the end of February. In his first monthly report to the League, Zimmerman, who was totally unmindful of the political difficulties that had befallen the Austrian chancellor, accused the Austrians of dragging their feet in certain areas of reconstruction. Confident that the Austrian people would not tolerate such criticism, the Social Democrats angrily retorted:

A few such documents as this and the Austrian people will set up a government of a composition and mentality which no controller will dare alternately to order about like a zealous servant and again admonish like a neglectful steward. 85

A few days later, when the commissioner recommended a further reduction in the size of the Austrian army, Otto Bauer introduced a measure in the National Assembly to make it a treasonable offense for anyone to give Zimmerman or any other League official any information under penalty of twenty years of imprisonment. 86

To ensure that he would not alienate the Austrian people from the pro-Austrian cause, Seipel was forced into the awkward position of demonstrating that he was not a servant of Zimmerman or the League and that no one could dictate to him or to the Austrian state. Thus in late February Seipel refused to appoint a foreign adviser to the

85 The Times (London), March 3, 1923, p. 9.
86 The New York Times, April 9, 1923, p. 3.
Austrian National Bank when Richard Resch assured him that the bank was perfectly capable of conducting affairs without outside interference. Although the chancellor finally relented on May 15, he had, nonetheless, secured an invaluable reprieve of several months' duration when the very existence of his government hung in the balance. Likewise, in late March, when Zimmerman requested the reduction of the number of ministries from eleven to eight as an economy measure, Seipel publicly embarrassed the commissioner by agreeing to a compromise proposal when the Social Democrats voiced their strenuous opposition to the original measure.

By June, 1923, Seipel had managed to overcome a large portion of the ill-will caused by the Ruhr crisis and Zimmerman's report. He had been aided immeasurably by the promotional literature which the underwriters of the League loan had circulated to prove that the Austrian economy was fundamentally sound. Moreover, any lingering doubts that the Austrian people harbored about the viability of their fatherland were dispelled on June 11, 1923, when the Austrian loan was offered to the public. By over-subscribing their quota of the loan, the Austrians expressed their confidence in the ability of Austria to survive. The morale of the Austrian people was also bolstered tremendously by the international response to the loan. The American quota was oversubscribed fifteen minutes after the books were open; the British disposed of their allotment in an hour and fifteen minutes; and the Swedish share was sold within an hour.

88 Ibid., March 24, 1923, Morgenblatt, p. 2.
89 Ibid., June 12, 1923, pp. 1-2; September 2, 1923, Sec. II, p. 6.
Under the circumstances, it was difficult for the Austrian people not to believe that their country was viable.

Convinced that the tide of public opinion was now running strongly in his favor, Seipel scheduled new parliamentary elections for October 21. He had a remarkable list of achievements on which he could campaign. The vast sums of money now at his country's disposal disarmed those critics who had only recently predicted that grass would soon be growing in the streets of Vienna. Moreover, between February and October unemployment had dropped from 167,000 to 73,000; the stock market was booming; and international financiers had nothing but praise for Seipel. There was only one note of uncertainty: Did the majority of the Austrian people really want to preserve their country's independence?

In order to give the people a clear choice, the Christian Socials insisted that the only significant issue in the campaign was whether the Austrian people preferred political independence to Anschluss with Germany. Although other minor issues did crop up from time to time to obscure the issue, in the words of the Reichspost, "Next to the question of the existence of Austria all other questions and party differences" lost "their actual importance." In order to make their position perfectly clear, the Christian Socials used the expression, "the Austrian people," instead of the term "German-Austrian."

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90 Neue Freie Presse, August 30, 1923, Abendblatt, p. 3.
91 Layton and Rist, The Economic Situation of Austria, p. 16.
92 Reichspost, October 1, 1923, p. 1.
Whenever they did use the word "German" it was only as an adjective. For instance, the Christian Social Union of Austria headed their appeal to the people: "Christians! Austrians!" while Seipel made extensive use of the word "Austrian" in almost all of his campaign addresses. The frequent usage of this term is especially significant in view of the fact that a Pan-German writer devoted two books to attempting to prove there was no such thing as an "Austrian type" or "Austrian person." Throughout the 1923 campaign the Christian Socials used this terminology specifically to indicate that the German-speaking populace of the small Alpine Republic of Austria was entitled to a political identity separate from that of the German-speaking people who lived in Germany.

Throughout the campaign the Christian Socials constantly derided the Anschluss. Seipel taunted the Social Democrats with the slogan "Anschluss to the Mark?" and cited Germany as an example of how far Austria could have fallen if she had been unable to bring the printing presses to a standstill. In similar fashion, the Reichspost wrote


94 See *Ibid.*, December 22, 1923, p. 1; and *Reichspost*, October 15, 1923, p. 5; October 1, 1923, p. 2; October 4, 1923, p. 8; and October 7, 1923, p. 10. In actual fact, the above slogan was used in almost all of the Christian Social publications that appeared during the course of the election.

95 Realizing the political implications involved in the usage of the term "Austrian people," Kleinwächter insisted on the phraseology "German-Austrian people." Kleinwächter, *Der deutschösterreichischen Mensch*, p. 61.

96 *Reichspost*, October 10, 1923, p. 8.
that no one "wants to entrust the leadership of the state to a party
which advocates 'Anschlus' to the mark." 97 Kunschak likewise boldly
stated that "the old black-yellow hostility towards the Anschlus
which timidly concealed itself in 1919 can now venture into the
light."98 He also voiced the opinion that his viewpoints were
shared not only by the "blackest of the blacks" but also by four-
fifths of the middle class.99 In fact, Kunschak was so confident
of the approval of public opinion that he taunted Bauer with the
questions, "Herr Dr. Bauer, what say you now? Now do you still have
the courage to speak of the 'high treason' of Prelate Seipel?"100

The commitment of the Christian Socials to Austrian independence
is perhaps best revealed in the campaign addresses of Chancellor
Seipel and other leading figures of the Christian Social Party. At
Amstetten, to the vigorous applause of a crowd of 10,000, Seipel
declared: "If we all remain faithful to our land and are resolved
to work for this land, then Austria can not go under."101 That same
day at St. Pölten, before another crowd of 10,000, Carl Vaugoin
reinforced Seipel's previous remarks by declaring: "The people want
to remain faithful to our fatherland and to our Federal Chancellor

97 Ibid., October 1, 1923, p. 1.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., June 2, 1923, p. 1.
101 Reichspost, October 1, 1923, p. 2.
and therefore will vote Christian Social on October 21.\textsuperscript{102} At Jennersdorf, in the Burgenland, Dr. H. K. Zessner-Spitzenberg, a candidate for the national assembly, introduced Seipel to the thousands of people who had been waiting for hours to see "the deliverer of Austria." Explaining why Seipel commanded the trust of the masses, Zessner-Spitzenberg asserted: "Because he caused us to regain our faith in the homeland, to regain our will for Austrianism and for the land of our fathers."\textsuperscript{103} At Feldbach, in Styria, the chancellor affirmed his conviction that the "Austrian people want to see the salvation of the fatherland."\textsuperscript{104} At Gattendorf, in the Burgenland, he mentioned Burgenland's special interest in seeing to it that Austria was not again partitioned or placed under foreign control.\textsuperscript{105}

The extent of Seipel's commitment to Austrian patriotism is readily apparent in an important speech that he delivered at Zell am Ziller, Tyrol, at the Gasthaus, "Zum Bräu" on October 1, 1923. In June, 1921, Seipel maintained that almost everyone was filled with despair. At that time he was among the very small handful of Austrians who believed that the "piece of the homeland left by the so-called peace treaty" could survive. At a time when almost all the provincial leaders wished to dissolve their ties with Vienna,

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., October 15, 1923, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., October 7, 1923, p. 5.
he exerted all his influence to convince the party chieftains to give Austria one more chance. They not only yielded to his request but also elected him chairman of the Christian Social Party. Since that day the future of Austria had been assured.

The reason for this dramatic reversal, Seipel asserted, was not due to foreign aid but to the efforts of the Austrians themselves. The exchange value of the crown had been stabilised by September, 1922, before a single cent had been received from the League loan. The truth was that the foreign bankers had waited before investing their money to see if the Austrians had faith in themselves. The economic problems of the past had been due solely to the "fact that the Austrian did not believe in himself, the land, God or the future." If the people would only maintain the will to preserve Austria, Seipel promised, then the state could not perish. He explained that at the present moment "the fate of our land is once more at stake." In order to assure a happy future for our homeland, "you must draw a distinction between those who in difficult times were filled with hope and those who were grumblers and critics."

The chancellor concluded that the Christian Socials were different from the Social Democrats because his party was not a class party. "We struggle to preserve our Austrian fatherland, not only for us but also for those who are now young, the children who will come after us. . . . I am no stranger in the Tyrol because I am an Austrian, just as the Tyrolese are no strangers in Vienna. This
fact will never change because you are Austrians and will remain so for eternity." 106

Spokesmen for the Christian Social Party also assured the electorate that the Social Democrats were not sincere in their opposition to the League loan. As early as January, 1923, Seipel, for instance, had suggested that socialists misgivings about the Geneva Protocols were prompted solely by the fact that there was "not a Marxist government at the rudder." 107 In the fall electoral campaign Seipel once again accused the socialists of being opportunists, unlike the Pan-Germans, who placed their party before their fatherland. 108

To the consternation of the Social Democrats, Kunschak attempted to document Seipel's charge by reprinting a newspaper article written by a Russian Marxist which spoke in glowing terms about the Austrian experiment and even suggested that both Germany and Russia, who were both plagued by economic difficulties, could learn many worthwhile lessons from the League's experiment in Austria. 109

In response to the various accusations leveled at them by their political opponents, the Social Democrats claimed that if the Christian Socials were permitted to remain in office much longer, the German people of Austria would soon become vassals of the French. Wilhelm

106 Ibid., October 4, 1923, pp. 8-9. It was a similar speech that restored Kurt Schuschnigg's faith in his homeland. See Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 65-66.


108 Ibid., October 15, 1923, p. 1; and October 17, 1923, pp. 7-8.

Ellenbogen, for instance, argued that if the railroads were placed in private hands, as Zimmerman had suggested, the continued existence of the Austrian Republic would be endangered, for there would be nothing to prevent the French imperialists from gaining a controlling interest in the railroads. The French already dominated the rail system in Poland and to a great extent the one in Czechoslovakia as well. Eventually Austria would be reduced to the status of a French colony. The Austrian people must not permit that to happen. 110

Another writer insisted that Seipel had unleashed a vampire in the League that was depriving Austria of her life blood. 111

As the campaign progressed, the Social Democrats decided to abandon the Geneva Protocols as their number one issue. As a consequence of the dramatic improvement in Austria's economy under Seipel's administration, the public was in no mood to believe that their leader was a "traitor" to the people of Austria. Since the Social Democrats had no intention of conceding the election, they initiated a search for a new issue that would capture the imagination of the public. They finally decided to challenge Seipel's statement that the removal of all wartime restrictions on rent was essential if Austria were ever to achieve normalcy again. The emotional issue of "cheap rent" proved to be so effective that the socialists


concentrated on it almost exclusively during the final days of the election campaign.\footnote{112} The election on October 21, 1923, produced a narrow victory for Seipel and the Austrian patriotic cause. On a percentage basis, the Christian Socials received 45.0% of the total vote; the Social Democrats, 39.6%; and the Pan-Germans, 12.8%. Although the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats both won slightly larger percentages of the popular vote than they had in the previous elections, the important factor was the division of the seats in the reapportioned Nationalrat. Seipel and the Christian Socials had 82 seats—one shy of an absolute majority.

As was to be expected, both parties claimed victory. Seipel stated that the vote indicated that a majority of the Austrian people approved his reconstruction policy—a fact that he said he had never doubted.\footnote{113} At Christmas time he reexamined the results and concluded that no fewer than three-fifths of the Austrian people wanted to see the salvation of their fatherland brought to a happy ending.\footnote{114} Renner stated that his party was also happy with the election results, since the final totals indicated that the workers approved of their policies. He also volunteered the information that the socialists had never wanted to pursue a policy of opposition

\footnote{112} Gulick, \textit{Austria from Habsburg to Hitler}, Vol. I, pp. 462-466.

\footnote{113} \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, November 2, 1923, \textit{Morgenblatt}, p. 5. See also Klamperer, \textit{Ignaz Seipel}, p. 218.

at any price, but Seipel and the Christian Socials had not left them with any alternatives.\footnote{Bauer, \textit{Die österreichische Revolution}, p. 283; \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, November 16, 1923, \textit{Morgenblatt}, p. 5.}

In the final analysis, the election seemed to confirm the fact that Austrian patriotism had finally come of age. In 1918 no one had dared speak up to oppose the Anschluss and people had even wondered if their fatherland still existed. By October, 1923, almost two-thirds of the Austrian people were willing to cast their ballots for political independence from Germany. The Christian Socials had based their political campaign almost exclusively on the Austrian patriotic issue and had come within one seat of winning an absolute majority in the Austrian National Assembly—a feat that no other political party in the first Austrian Republic was ever able to duplicate. Moreover, the refusal of the Social Democrats to confine the election to the single issue of whether or not the Austrian fatherland was viable, after more than nine months of denouncing Seipel as a traitor to the German-Austrian people, clearly indicates that the attitude of the Austrian people towards their homeland had changed markedly since 1918.

The reemergence of Austrian patriotism at this time was no accident. At a time when almost everyone had concluded that the death of Austria was inevitable, Seipel had courageously seized the reins of government and set out on a new course. In desperation, he tried first one thing and then another until he stumbled on the solution that would restore life to his fatherland. By bringing Central Europe
to the brink of war, he forced the Allied Powers, through the medium of the League of Nations, to loan Austria enough money so that "even a jackass" could have saved the state. The Austrian people, meanwhile, had watched almost incredulously as he performed this miracle almost single-handedly. Awed both by the man and the miracle that he had achieved, the people rallied behind him and the Austrian idea that he espoused. Seipel was held in such high esteem that his followers and "his young men" bestowed on him the title of "Savior of Austria."
Chapter IV

THE RISE OF FASCISM

Although it had seemingly emerged triumphant from the elections of 1923, Austrian patriotism nonetheless rested on a foundation which was structurally unsound. Seipel had made the serious mistake of identifying patriotism with anti-socialism because at the time the Austrian Marxists were the principal advocates of the Anschluss. By alienating almost forty percent of the populace, Seipel created a situation in which his country's independence would remain in jeopardy for many years to come.

Seipel's decision to castigate the socialists as anti-patriotic was most unfortunate because the loyalty of many of his own supporters was questionable, for they had shown a marked propensity to place their own economic welfare before love of country. If Austria should once again experience economic conditions similar to those that had existed from 1918 until 1922, the Austrian people might once again be inclined to repudiate their fatherland. The loyalty of Austria's newest defenders was also questionable because there was no way to determine if they were really "patriots" or "fascists." If a conflict

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1 According to Ernst Nolte, "Fascism is anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically different and yet related ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy." Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 20-21. For the correct usage of the term "fascism" in Austria, see ibid., p. 15.
should develop between their fatherland and their anti-socialist beliefs, no one could predict how they might react.²

Although Seipel was obviously aware that the fate of Austria had not been resolved once and for all by the elections of 1923, he took no action to remedy the inherent weakness of his partisan patriotism. Instead, he surprised almost everyone by launching a drive to terminate the League control over Austria. The events of the past year had apparently convinced him that the League had ceased to be an asset and had become a major liability. He realized that Zimmerman's abrasive personality and the League's austerity program which was yet to be implemented would hardly endear him with the Austrian electorate, which was already disenchanted with the League of Nations because it had arranged to guarantee an international loan for Hungary without imposing the same type of restrictions that it had placed on Austria.³ Since the Austrian currency had been stabilized and inflation had been brought under control, Seipel saw no reason for his country to continue to subject itself to League control.

Seipel, however, was unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade the League that its presence was no longer needed in Austria. In fact, much to his regret, the League Council censured his government for

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²The ranks of the Christian Socials later proved to be a fertile recruiting ground for fascism. See post, pp. 143-144 and 147.

failure to balance the budget as required by the Geneva Protocols and adopted a resolution which declared that the Austrian government had "entered into a solemn undertaking and that League control" could "be withdrawn only when the permanent equilibrium of the budget" was established and the "financial stability of Austria assured."  

Having been severely reprimanded by the League, Seipel was no longer certain that he commanded the loyalty and the respect of those individuals who thought of themselves as Austrian patriots. They needed only to study the precise wording of the League's official reprimand to wonder if the Social Democrats had not been right when they accused him of bartering away the freedom of their country.

Fortunately for Seipel, his political stock dipped much less than one might have expected under the circumstances. The Austrian people were preoccupied about the best means of spending a surplus of more than $45,000,000 that had accumulated from the Geneva loan. Seipel suggested that the money be spent for the electrification of the railroads and the construction of hydroelectric plants. Austrian businessmen, on the other hand, believed that the money should be used to fill the country's need for more capital at cheaper interest.  

Only a relatively small percentage of the Austrian people advocated using the money to buy up the League loan on the international finance

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5 The New York Times, April 7, 1924, p. 35 and May 29, 1924, p. 25.
market in order to shorten the period of foreign control. In late May, his countrymen, however, became less tolerant of the League's presence when it was disclosed the Zimmerman had invested the idle money in foreign securities at 2% interest while the Austrian state was forced to pay 3% interest for the privilege of using it.

The controversy that was raging over the Geneva loan ended rather abruptly when a tragedy occurred that was to have a profound impact on the future of Austrian patriotism. On June 2, 1924, the Austrian chancellor was critically wounded in an assassination attempt by Karl Jaworek, a young socialist.

While Seipel was still recuperating from his wounds, the League once again became the center of controversy for the Austrian people. In late August Zimmerman reported to the League that the Austrian National Bank had permitted the gold cover behind the Austrian currency to fall below the minimum required level. Infuriated by the commissioner's accusation, Richard Resch, president of the Austrian National Bank, promptly denied that the bank had ever followed such an unsound banking practice. After accusing Zimmerman of either being misinformed or of deliberately distorting the facts, Resch cited figures to prove that the bank was fulfilling all of its

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6 Ibid., May 29, 1924, p. 25.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., June 2, 1924, p. 1.
9 Ibid., August 22, 1924, p. 4.
legal requirements. 10 A few days later he added, "I am convinced that ... Austria will henceforth be in a position to keep her own house in order. Austria has experienced the dangers and horrors of inflation in such a way that there is no desire for further experience of this sort." 11

Deeply disturbed by the incident, Seipel decided to disregard his physician's advice and to make a personal trip to Geneva to refute Zimmerman's charges and to ask the League of Nations once more to relinquish its control over Austrian finances. He was obviously gambling that as a convalescent, his presence in Geneva would create sympathy for his country and thereby ensure favorable action on his request.

Seipel's pilgrimage to Geneva, however, proved to be a major disappointment. The League Council refused to abolish the office of commissioner-general. Zimmerman was to remain in Austria. 12

Firmly convinced that the Austrian people shared his determination to end League control, the chancellor formulated a new plan of action. In order to provide the League Council with conclusive proof that the financial stability of Austria was assured, he proposed to curb the spending of the provincial legislators and to force them to share their revenue with the federal government.

10 Resch to Zimmerman, Vienna, August 22, 1924, as quoted in the Neue Freie Presse, August 23, 1924, Morgenblatt, pp. 3-4.


12 Neue Freie Presse, September 11, 1924, Morgenblatt, p. 4; September 11, 1924, Abendblatt, p. 1.
Although he expected vigorous opposition from the Social Democrats, who controlled Vienna, Seipel did not anticipate any serious opposition from within his own party. He was therefore taken by complete surprise when members of the rural wing of the Christian Social Party indicated that they might vote against this measure. Determined to crush this intra-party rebellion, Seipel staked his prestige on the passage of the proposed bill. However, to his surprise, when the vote was finally taken the rural wing, led by Rudolf Ramek, rebelled against party and voted with the Social Democrats to defeat the measure. Since Seipel considered the bill's defeat tantamount to a vote of no confidence, he submitted his resignation as chancellor. Although President Michael Hainisch immediately asked him to form a new government, he refused to do so.\(^\text{13}\)

In an open letter to Wilhelm Miklas, president of the Nationalrat, Seipel explained his reasons for resigning. Since the National Assembly was no longer interested in terminating reconstruction at the earliest possible date, the office of chancellor should be entrusted to someone who could work in harmony with the commissioner-general. His recent ordeal, moreover, made it impossible for him to carry out a normal work load without impairing his health.\(^\text{14}\)


\(^{14}\) Seipel to Miklas, Vienna, November 17, 1924, Neue Freie Presse (November 18, 1924), Morgenblatt, p. 1.
Seipel's refusal to form a new government had an adverse effect on the development of an Austrian national consciousness. He was the only person who seemed capable of convincing the people that the love of their Austrian fatherland must transcend all other loyalties. Without his continued guidance and inspiration, the Austrian idea seemed destined to wither on the vine. The despair that most Austrian patriots experienced as a consequence of Seipel's resignation was accentuated by the fact that the symbolic office of chancellor was entrusted to an outspoken advocate of the Anschluß, Rudolf Ramek.

Unlike many of his countrymen, Seipel did not believe that the survival of Austrian patriotism was contingent upon his retention of the office of chancellor. He reminded everyone that since he had personally retained the position of chairman of the Christian Social Party, no one could institute any major changes in Austria's foreign policy without first securing his approval. He, however, gave assurances that he did not anticipate any need to exercise his veto power.\footnote{The New York Times, November 19, 1924, p. 3.}

By mid-December it was obvious, however, that Seipel had underestimated the likelihood of an Anschluß between Austria and Germany. In December, 1924, shortly after Ramek had assumed office, the German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, had taken the first steps towards fulfilling the major prerequisite for a peaceful union of the two Teutonic nations by officially inquiring about German
membership in the League of Nations. His decision to pursue the possibility of League membership finally inspired the Pan-Germans to burn the boundary posts between Austria and Germany on February 22, 1925.16

The main impetus for an Anschluss between Austria and Germany, however, came from the Austrian vice-chancellor, Leopold Waber. In a speech at Graz on April 4, he asserted that there was only one solution for Austria's economic problems—a union with the German fatherland. He declared, moreover, that he was emphatically opposed to any attempt to form closer economic ties with any of the Danubian states. He concluded his inflammatory remarks by asserting that the "Austrian Empire was not destroyed simply in order to restore it . . . under Czech rule. That's what the Danubian confederation would amount to. The confederate idea is [nothing but] a disguised Czech plan to eliminate Vienna from world commerce."17

A few days after Waber's speech The New York Times warned its readers that unless the League of Nations took the initiative in breaking down the tariff walls which separated the Successor States of the Habsburg monarchy, the Austrian government was probably going to demand a union with Germany.18 Actions which Ramek took the next day tended to substantiate the report of the New York paper. The

16 Ibid., February 23, 1922, p. 1.
18 Issue of April 15, 1925, p. 8.
Austrian chancellor sent a note to the League Council asking that a committee of experts be appointed to find a solution for Austria's industrial and commercial difficulties." He insisted, moreover, that if a workable solution were not found in the immediate future, the Austrian people would be forced to take steps to prevent a severe economic crisis.  

Realizing that Ramek's statement was of immense propaganda value to the Pan-Germans, especially when it was coupled with vice-chancellor Waber's recent remarks, Seipel thought it advisable for some eminent person who was associated with the government to disavow the Anschluß publicly. Thus on April 16, one day after the publication of Ramek's note to the League, Seipel stated, "I am not against a union [with Germany], but I do not see a solution of Austria's problems in such a union. . . . My ideal is a United States of the whole of Europe[;] . . . if not in a political sense at least in an economic sense."  

Despite Seipel's disparaging remarks about Anschluß, the Austrian people seemed unwilling to forswear it unless Hindenburg won the German presidential election scheduled for late August. One week before election day, the Arbeiter-Zeitung insisted that the German presidential campaign would ultimately determine the future of Austria. The socialist paper then explained for the benefit of all interested persons in both Germany and Austria: "Whoever wants the Anschluß must reject Hindenburg; whoever votes  

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20 As quoted in ibid., April 17, 1925, p. 4.
for Hindenburg works against the union of the entire German nation in a united Empire." 21 The Reichspost and Seipel's faction of the Christian Social Party likewise seemed convinced that Hindenburg's election would virtually destroy the Anschluss movement in the Austrian Republic. 22

Austrian opponents of the Anschluss consequently were in a jubilant mood when Hindenburg defeated Wilhelm Marx, the socialist candidate, by a margin of over a million votes. In its analysis of the German presidential election, the Reichspost somewhat gloatingly observed that "the prospects for the Anschluss have unquestionably been considerably diminished." The Catholic paper was confident that the Social Democrats of Austria would finally repudiate their goal of union with Germany. 23 The Reichspost, however, could derive little additional satisfaction from Hindenburg's victory. In fact, it voiced its fear that he might possibly try to revive Bismarck's anti-Catholic policies throughout Germany. 24

Much to the consternation of Seipel and other Austrian patriots, the Social Democrats refused to disavow Anschluss with Germany. The Arbeiter-Zeitung reported: "Already the Black Yellows sneer 'Now that Hindenburg rules in Germany, surely the yearning of the Austrian

22 Reichspost, April 9, 1925, pp. 1-2.
23 Ibid., April 28, 1925, p. 1.
24 Ibid., April 27, 1925, pp. 1-2; April 28, 1925, p. 2. The paper believed that the possibility of a new Kulturkampf was somewhat diminished by the fact that Catholic Bavaria had voted for Hindenburg.
Social Democrats for the Anschluß will cease. The gentlemen err! We have confidence in the power of German Democracy." It then insisted that "if Austria had been a part of Germany, Hindenburg would never have been elected. More than four-fifths of the Austrian people opposed Hindenburg—less than one-fifth supported him." The socialist paper also explained that the election did not really reflect the choice of the German people. Had it not been for "the treason of the communists," the Arbeiter-Zeitung asserted, "the republican list would have received a majority of a million votes." The Arbeiter-Zeitung explained to its readers that Hindenburg's victory would inevitably inspire a right-wing reaction in Austria and elsewhere throughout Europe. Under the circumstances, the Social Democrats of Austria had no choice except to "enlarge our Republican Schutz bund."
The refusal of the Social Democrats to repudiate the Anschluss was most disheartening to those who wanted Austria to continue an independent existence. For the first time in the history of the Republic Seipel had seemed willing to reformulate his version of Austrian patriotism to make it acceptable to the socialists. The Reichspost, for instance, had published an article with banner headlines which read "Seipel and Marx." The accompanying text, which covered two-thirds of the front page and one-third of page two, pointed out how Seipel and Wilhelm Marx, the presidential candidate of the German Social Democrats, had both done so much for their respective countries. It concluded that Austria would obviously benefit if the Socialists and Catholics would cooperate as they had done in Germany. A few days later the Reichspost again spoke highly of another socialist, Ferdinand Lasalle, one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, by describing him as "a type of patriot." The text concluded with the observation that most likely Austrian Marxists would soon become patriots themselves.

Even at the end of May, 1925, Seipel still seemed willing to compromise with the Social Democrats if they would pledge their allegiance to the Austrian fatherland. In addressing a group of Catholic women, the former chancellor explained that the new Austria was completely different from the old Habsburg empire. However, in

29 Reichspost, April 24, 1925, pp. 1-2.
30 Ibid., April 30, 1925, p. 2.
order to create a viable state, it was necessary to use the only
readily available building material: the tradition of the great
Austrian past and the foundation of the old state. It would be
impossible to build a new fatherland totally from scratch. It was
simply a question of using the available material or not building
at all. There were no other alternatives.\textsuperscript{31}

Seipel intended for his remarks to allay the fears of the
Social Democrats that the Christian Socials planned to reestablish
the Habsburg monarchy either through the formation of an independent
state or through the creation of a Danubian confederation. It
probably never even occurred to Seipel that the Austrian Marxists
might question his sincerity. However, they did just that. Convinced
that Seipel was an incorrigible monarchist, they reaffirmed their
commitment to the German nation.\textsuperscript{32}

Although it failed to produce the patriotic groundswell that the
Christian Socials had anticipated, the German presidential election,
nonetheless, proved to be a boon to the cause of Austrian patriotism.
Convinced that Hindenburg's victory had destroyed any immediate

\textsuperscript{31} Ignaz Seipel, "Unser Bekenntnis zum Vaterland," Reichspost,
May 29, 1925, pp. 2-3. See also Sweet, "Seipel's Views on Anschluss

\textsuperscript{32} The Social Democrats were disturbed by the actions of the
Christian Social Party on such occasions as the third anniversary
of the death of Emperor Charles. See both the Reichspost, April 1,
1925, p. 1; and the Arbeiter-Zeitung, April 1, 1925, pp. 1 and 6.
See also Julius Deutsch, Schwarzgelbe Verschwörung (Vienna: Verlag der
Organisation Wien der Sozialdemokratischen Partei, 1925), pp. 12-13,
28, and 31. For the underlying causes of the fears of the Social
Democrats, see Wilhelm Ellenhagen, Staat und Rasse (Vienna: Wiener
Volksbuchhandlung, 1923), especially p. 44.
prospect of union between the two Germanic states, the Allied Powers began reexamining the necessity of maintaining League control over Austria. Then, on May 23, approximately one month after Hindenburg's election, Eric Drummond, the secretary general of the League of Nations, informed Ramek that, in compliance with his recent request, the League's Austrian Committee had decided to conduct a special inquiry to determine the exact status of the Austrian economy.  

It was tacitly understood by everyone involved that such a survey constituted the first step toward the withdrawal of League control.

When the secretary general announced on June 4 that Walter T. Layton, editor of The Economist (London), and Charles Rist, professor of political economy at the University of Paris, had been chosen to conduct the investigation, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, an outspoken Social Democrat, immediately challenged the selection. He asserted that the two men had been picked because the League knew that they were convinced that a Danubian confederation was the only solution to Austria's economic problems. He insisted, moreover, that the inquiry had been devised solely as a means of discrediting the Anschluss. Layton replied that the opinions expressed in his previous articles should be disregarded because he was determined to consider all the available evidence before making any recommendation to the League.

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34 Ibid., June 21, 1925, Sec. II, p. 2.
On September 6, 1925, after two months of intensive work, Layton and Rist submitted to the League a report which warmed the heart of every Austrian patriot. Although industrial production was only 80% of what it had been prior to World War I, they maintained that there was absolutely no doubt that Austria was a viable country. Most of the state's economic difficulties were only temporary side effects brought about by the country's postwar economic readjustment. After a period of time most of Austria's problems would simply disappear. The languishing trade between the Successor States, for instance, was almost certain to increase sometime in the immediate future. Austria's only real problem was a lack of capital which could always be secured through international loans.

After hearing the Layton-Rist report, the League Council agreed in principle to end League control as soon as adequate safeguards could be devised to protect the investment of those individuals who had subscribed to the Austrian loan. By the end of December the Austrian government had fulfilled all of the economic requirements which the League had deemed necessary, and May, 1926, was tentatively

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36 The non-partisan Neue Freie Presse commented that perhaps the two men had been overly optimistic about Austria's future. See the evening edition of September 6, 1925, p. 1. The economic problems that beset Austria during the early thirties, of course, proved that the optimism expressed by Layton and Rist was unwarranted.

set as the date on which Zimmerman was to leave Austria.\textsuperscript{38}

To the dismay of Seipel and his countrymen who expected the Anschluss movement to become a negligible factor in Austria once Zimmerman was gone, League control did not terminate on May 1, as originally scheduled. Mussolini used his influence to void those plans immediately after Germany submitted a formal application for League membership on February 10, 1926. Fearing that the German application was only a prelude to the Anschluss, Il duce was determined to prevent the establishment of a powerful Teutonic power on the Italian border, especially since the Tyrol was a German irredentist area. When he was unable to persuade the British and French governments to prolong League control over Austria for an indefinite period of time, he tried to obtain the cooperation of the Yugoslav government. On March 1 The New York Times reported that Mussolini and the Yugoslav foreign minister, Momčilo Ninčić, had apparently concluded a treaty to prevent Germany from annexing Austria.\textsuperscript{39} A Czech paper stated that the two powers had also reached an agreement on how Austria was to be partitioned among the various European powers if she made any attempt to unite with Germany.\textsuperscript{40}

Alarmed by the rumors growing out of the Mussolini-Ninčić talks, Ramek stated, "Our relations with the Reich are those of close and

\textsuperscript{38} The Times (London), December 21, 1925, p. 21; The New York Times, December 3, 1925, p. 8; and January 1, 1926, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{39} The New York Times, March 1, 1926, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., February 28, 1926, Sec. I, p. 27.
affectionate members of the same family. To preserve and strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries is our most earnest endeavor. How could it be possible that so simple and self-evident a policy could be misinterpreted anywhere?\footnote{Ibid., March 28, 1926, Sec. I, p. 25.}

Although none of the European powers were fully satisfied with Ramek's rather simplistic assessment of Austria's relationship with Germany, they, nonetheless, decided to release the Austrian Republic from League control on June 30. Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister, had finally persuaded Ninčić and Mussolini that their policy of obstruction was self-defeating. Instead of deterring the Anschluß, their actions were only creating a great deal of hard feelings. The best way to prevent a union between the two Germanic countries was to open their markets to Austrian products. As long as she was prosperous, Austria would do nothing to jeopardize that prosperity.

Austrian patriots were overjoyed by the official communique announcing Zimmerman's departure. On numerous occasions he had angered many individuals to such an extent that they had rashly disavowed their Austrian patrimony in order to express the utter contempt they felt for him. Seipel and the Christian Socials, moreover, were severely handicapped in their efforts to convert more people to the Austrian idea, because financial necessity compelled them to maintain a modicum of friendship with the commissioner-general, who was so unpopular that the \textit{Neue Freie Presse}
even declared that the Austrian locomotives would undoubtedly whistle for glee when they finally carried him across the border never to return.\textsuperscript{42} The vast majority of the Christian Socials seemed firmly convinced that Zimmerman's departure would provide a tremendous stimulant to the growth of Austrian patriotism.

Shortly after the office of commissioner general was abolished, the attitude of Seipel and most other Christian Socials, however, underwent a profound change. After months of fruitless negotiations they had concluded that the socialists were incorrigible Marxists who would never acknowledge the Austrian state as their fatherland.\textsuperscript{43} Rather than continue their efforts to reach some form of political understanding with the socialists, they decided to declare all-out war on the Social Democrat Party. After months of elaborate preparation, the Christian Socials finally announced the formation of a broad-based political coalition which had been created for the sole purpose of destroying the political power of the Social Democrats in the Austrian Republic. Seipel revealed that the bourgeois parties of Austria had decided to enter a single slate of candidates in the 1927 elections, because they were confident that by maximizing their efforts under the Austrian system of proportional representation they would gain a minimum of two additional seats at the expense of the

\textsuperscript{42} Neue Freie Presse, June 1, 1926, Morgenblatt, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{43} The Christian Socials were influenced in their decision to a considerable extent by the party platform approved by the Social Democrats in November, 1926. See Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, pp. 252-259; and Klaus Berchtold (ed.), Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1960 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1987), pp. 374-376.
Presumably, if the right-wing parties could gain a two-thirds majority in the Nationalrat, they would then enact into law constitutional amendments which would cripple the power of the Social Democratic Party of Austria.

In their campaign literature, the Christian Socials utilized a peculiar blend of patriotic and fascist arguments. Party spokesmen repeatedly tried to convey the impression that the Social Democrats were not Austro-Marxists or disciples of the German Karl Marx, but they, nevertheless, referred to them as either "90 percent Muscovites, who recognized no Austria," or else as "Bolsheviks," and thus disciples of Lenin, who were trying to introduce Russian concepts into a German state. The men and women of Austria, moreover, were asked to make a careful distinction between the advocates of "class conflict" and "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and those "guardians of Austrian and German self-consciousness" who championed "personal property," "a constitutional state," and realistic programs that would "produce bread and work."
Although he continued to stress the importance of the "Austrian mission,"\textsuperscript{47} as he had done in 1923, Seipel failed to draw a sharp distinction between patriotic and fascist ideas. He insisted, for instance, that "our Vienna must not remain a red island in Austria and Austria must not become a red island in a world committed to totally different principles."\textsuperscript{48} He tried to justify his party's "questionable association" with the monarchists and the fascists by explaining that when one's "house is burning, one does not ask the fireman his position on the race question; one lets him extinguish it."\textsuperscript{49}

On the eve of the election the Reichspost insisted that it was time for every good Austrian to come to the rescue of his country. The clerical paper explained that in 1683, when the Turks besieged Vienna, and again in 1809, when the French and Bavarians marched into the Tyrol, all who were able to bear arms, "great and small, young and old, rich and poor," had hastened "to save their oppressed fatherland." Although the time and circumstances were different, the Reichspost suggested that its readers would be honored alongside their illustrious forefathers if they went to the polls and cast their ballots for the "unity list."\textsuperscript{50}

Like the Christian Socials, the Social Democrats also conducted an unorthodox campaign. Their message was essentially the same as it

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., April 8, 1927, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., April 22, 1927, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., April 12, 1927, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., April 20, 1927, p. 1.
had always been. They continued to concentrate on "bread and butter issues" while insisting that the real objective of the Christian Socials was "the political reunion of Austria and Hungary under the Habsburg scepter."

However, in a revolutionary departure from convention, the Social Democrats made extensive use of the Austrian cinemas to carry their message to the Austrian people.

On April 24, 1927, the Social Democrats scored an impressive victory at the polls. In comparison to the previous election they gained an additional 2.4% of the popular vote and won three additional seats in the Nationalrat. The Christian Socials, on the other hand, lost nine legislative seats, primarily because they had been too generous in their distribution of the anticipated spoils among the other bourgeoisie parties.

The unexpected outcome of the election can be attributed to the fact that the Social Democrats were better organized than their opponents and did a much more effective job of carrying their message to the people through the visual media of the cinema. They also undoubtedly benefited from the fact that the League of Nations had alienated more people than anyone had imagined. The patriotic vote had obviously peaked in 1923 and could not rationally expect to expand to any appreciable extent unless Austrian patriotism was made acceptable to the country's blue-collar workers.

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51 See ibid., April 7, 1927, p. 1.

52 Ibid., April 9, 1927, p. 6. Rather than copy our example of their political enemies, the leaders of the Christian Socials joked about the "desperate measure" the Social Democrats had been forced to use.
The election results do not fully indicate the extent of the defeat incurred by Austrian patriots. No one realized at the time that in his determination to crush the Social Democrats for their disloyalty to the Austrian fatherland, Seipel had unwittingly opened a Pandora's box. Fascism had somehow eluded its would-be masters, and within three months it would grow to such an extent that it would threaten to destroy everything that Seipel and his friends had tried to create.

The sudden eclipse of Austrian patriotism by fascism can be dated precisely—July 15, 1927. On that day a large number of workers gathered in front of the Justice Palace to protest the acquittal of three men accused of murdering two socialists. In order to dramatize his personal contempt for the Austrian judicial system, an extremist from the crowd set fire to the building. When a number of sympathetic protesters refused to clear a path for the firemen, the police fired on the crowd. Within a matter of minutes 85 demonstrators or spectators were dead and at least a thousand others were wounded. 53

With the exception of the socialists, the Austrian public, in a rare display of unanimity, suddenly became convinced that at last the Social Democrats and the communists had taken overt action to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Three months after

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53 For the Socialist interpretation of the day's events, see Otto Bauer, Der blutige 15. Juli (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1927). For a more recent and less partisan analysis, see Reiman, Zu Gross für Österreich, pp. 66-70.
the election was over Seipel's contention that the Social Democrats were "90% Muscovites" had finally struck a responsive chord. No one seemed to remember the patriotic rationale behind Seipel's original accusations. The people were aware of only one thing—the socialists seemed bent on the destruction of the state. Fascism was no longer subordinate to patriotism; it was a monster in its own right.54

Seipel was one of the first individuals to fall victim to his own campaign propaganda. In his eyes, the Social Democratic Party, which he had courted as a political ally the previous year, had now become an organization of revolutionaries which must be destroyed at any price. In October he attempted to explain his conversion to fascism. "When we see the enemies of Jesus Christ marching in better organized and armed groups," he asserted, "we must do everything to eliminate the deficiencies of our own armaments and organization. True love for the people must manifest itself in our not shirking the decisive battle within the people and for the people."55

Seipel believed that in an hour of crisis such as he then faced he must turn to whatever help was available. Since he considered the

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54. The mood of the people can readily be discerned by reading any of the contemporary newspapers or journals. The election rhetoric of 1927 undoubtedly played a role in shaping the attitude of the people. For instance, when a group of communists tried unsuccessfully to storm parliament on April 17, 1919, there was no substantial public reaction. In the subsequent elections no attempt was made to form an anti-Marxist coalition. Moreover, numerous Austrian officials acknowledged that the Communist coup d'état of 1919 was unsuccessful to a large extent because of the Social Democrats.

Austrian army, which contained only 30,000 men at full strength, to be woefully inadequate in case of a full-scale national emergency, he turned to the Heimwehr, a loose-knit collection of assorted right-wing paramilitary units that dated back to 1918.

Seipel’s decision to seek the support of the Heimwehr was the worst possible decision he could have made under the circumstances. He needlessly obligated himself to a fascist organization which would have supported his anti-Marxist policies in any event. By publicly asking for their support, he placed himself in the awkward position of making numerous political concessions that jeopardized the whole future of Austrian patriotism. In his attempt to assimilate the Heimwehr into the political structure of the Christian Social Party, for instance, he “pacified” many individuals who were prepared to betray his Austrian fatherland if they were given an opportunity to do so.

56 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1961), p. 87; Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 78 and 133.


58 Although some Heimwehr members supported the Austrian state, a large number had Nazi ties and supported the Anschluss. See Clifton Earl Edmonson, “The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918–1934” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1966), pp. 204–205, 259, 310, and 319; Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 135–136; and Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, p. 67. The newspapers were filled with reported links between the Heimwehr and the Nazis. See, for instance, The New York Times, September 16, 1930, p. 3; October 10, 1930, p. 24; September 15, 1931, p. 24; May 1, 1932, Sec. III, p. 3; June 9, 1932, p. 7; May 16, 1933, p. 2; and January 13, 1924, p. 7. Many of these alleged ties were never reported in the Austrian press, due to government censorship or government confiscation of various newspapers. See also Edmonson, “The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics,” pp. 204–205, 259, 310, and 319.
Seipel's tragic decision to invite the fox into the hen house did irreparable harm to the cause of Austrian patriotism. Within a short time after unscrupulous members of the Heimwehr began to disseminate their fascist propaganda from within the Christian Social Party, hatred of Marxism gradually supplanted love of fatherland in many Austrian citizens. Once the rank and file of the Christian Social Party were indoctrinated with fascist principles, it became virtually impossible for Seipel to reach any compromise with the Social Democrats 59 without alienating a large segment of his own party.

For three years the Christian Social Party suffered under the handicap of its alliance with the Heimwehr. With Seipel's full approval, his "military associates" persuaded thousands of young men to don the khaki overalls and a forage cap topped with a cock's tail feather which identified a person as a member of the Heimwehr. Instead of confining the training of these young recruits to the art of armed conflict, many unscrupulous but ambitious leaders of the paramilitary organization provided extensive political indoctrination as well. They convinced many individuals that anti-Marxism and Austrianism were not synonymous, as Seipel had previously implied. In fact, they persuaded many of their trainees that German nationalism rather than Austrian patriotism constituted a better medium for the

59. Many Christian Socials later defected to the Nazis when the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats came to a political understanding.
realization of their basic objective—the destruction of the Social Democrats and all forms of Marxism.

For two years Seipel tolerated the insidious machinations of his Heimwehr friends. Then he suddenly did what no one had expected. He resigned as Austrian chancellor. He cited three major reasons for his unorthodox behavior. First of all, he insisted that his health had been a major factor in his decision. Secondly, he was convinced that there was no longer any prospect that "partisan radicalism" could succeed in Austria, and finally he believed that because the Austrian Republic was on the road toward normal development his energies could best be expended in behalf of his Church.

Seipel's unexpected retirement created a political void which the Heimwehr exploited for their own advantage. First, they conspired with Schober to bring about the downfall of Ernst Streeruwitz, a wealthy industrialist who had replaced Seipel as chancellor because he refused to give them a free hand to deal with their Marxist opponents. They then aided in the formation of a government which they thought would be more sympathetic to their cause. Their "puppet government" was headed by two men whom they idolized: Johann Schober, the police commissioner for Vienna, who had ordered his men to fire

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60 Reichspost, April 4, 1929, p. 1; Neue Freie Presse, April 4, 1929, p. 3.
61 Reiman, Zu Groß für Österreich, p. 136.
62 See also Ernst von Streeruwitz, Springflut Über Österreich (Vienna: Bernina Verlag, 1937), pp. 227-229; and Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, pp. 355-357.
on the socialists in July, 1927; and Carl Vaugoin, the Christian Social minister of the army who had worked diligently to purge the Austrian army of the Marxist tint that it had acquired in 1918.

Much to the consternation of the Heimwehr, neither Schober nor Vaugoin was willing to do their bidding. Schober elected to pursue an independent course of action which earned him their undying enmity because he frequently cooperated with the Social Democrats. Carl Vaugoin, on the other hand, refused to take any action without first seeking the sanction of his political mentor, Ignaz Seipel. Eventually, in September, 1930, after a conference with Seipel, Vaugoin precipitated a new crisis by submitting his resignation as vice-chancellor in order to force Schober to step down as head of the Austrian state.

After new elections were scheduled for November, Prince Starhemberg announced that the Heimwehr would field its own slate of candidates in the forthcoming election, thereby creating the impression that the fascist element in Austria lacked faith in the ability of the Christian Social Party to deal effectively with the country's Marxist problem. Moreover, rumors were rampant that the Austrian Heimwehr and the Austrian National Socialists would join forces in the November elections. These reports seemed perfectly plausible, since Starhemberg had been a participant in Hitler's infamous beer hall putsch.

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The Christian Social Party was alarmed by the reported links between Austria's two ultra-conservative parties, because they feared that a sizeable portion of any fascist vote would come from the rank and file of the Christian Social Party. At this critical juncture, the leaders of the Christian Socials swallowed their pride and actively sought the support of the Heimwehr. Eventually they reached an ill-fated understanding which permitted the Heimwehr to field separate tickets in the provinces.

As one might expect under the circumstances, the campaign rhetoric of the Christian Socialists stressed a peculiar blend of fascist and patriotic concepts. As in the previous election, the Christian Socialists depicted the Social Democrats as "Muscovites" and "Austro-Bolsheviks" intent on the destruction of the Austrian state. In order to validate their accusations against the Social Democrats, they referred to the July Revolt of 1927. Richard Schmitz, who later served as mayor of Vienna under the Dollfuß regime, insisted that political unrest in Austria could be traced back to the time when Otto Bauer, the most vocal member of the Social Democrats, returned to his homeland after a period of imprisonment and indoctrination in Bolshevik Russia. Under the circumstances, Schmitz suggested that the primary "goal of the election should be to free Vienna and Austria from the Red Power."

64 Reichspost, October 18, 1930, p. 1.
65 Ibid., October 17, 1930, p. 4; and November 9, 1930, p. 1.
67 Ibid., October 17, 1930, p. 4.
Throughout the campaign, the Christian Socials and the Heimwehr candidates insisted that they were the only candidates who would pursue a vigorous anti-Socialist policy if they were elected. The Reichspost reminded everyone who was still incensed by the July Revolt that a vote for any of the other bourgeois parties would be a wasted vote.\textsuperscript{68} The clerical journal, moreover, deprecated Schober's successful efforts to create a new political grouping that would occupy the ground midway between that held by the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats as nothing more than "a cheap campaign slogan" that was distracting the people from the real issues in the campaign.\textsuperscript{69}

Although the Austrian public showed a marked tendency throughout the election to identify the Christian Socials as a "single-issue" party,\textsuperscript{70} their political speeches repeatedly stressed patriotic themes. For instance, while Carl Vaugoin was campaigning in Vienna, he reminded his audience that the existence of Austria had been assured by the Christian Social Party. He then shouted "Long live Vienna! Long live Austria!" and asked everyone who still had faith in his homeland to cast his ballot for the Christian Socials and the

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., November 9, 1930, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., October 28, 1930, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{70}The fascist policies of Seipel and Vaugoin was the only issue mentioned in the post-election analyses. See, for instance, The New York Times, November 10, 1930, p. 1; November 30, 1930, p. 17; and December 4, 1930, p. 13. See also Neue Freie Presse, November 11, 1930, Morgenblatt, p. 1.
Heimatwehr. In Innsbruck, Chancellor Vaugoin, moreover, thundered, "I have unfurled the flag and now carry it into battle. Under the banner which I bear, there is only one word, which was always holy to the Tyrolese—Austria!" The vigorous applause that accompanied his words continued for more than a full minute. At the conclusion of his address, a small band thrilled the people once again by playing patriotic tunes.

During the final week of the election the Reichspost asked everyone who was considering the possibility of voting for the Schober bloc, the Pan-Germans, the Landbund, or the Democrats, to remember that it was the Christian Social Party which had ensured the existence of the Austrian state. Moreover, at that very moment the fatherland was once again under attack from all sides. To the clerical newspaper it seemed obvious that the fate of Austria once again rested on the shoulders of the Christian Social Party; consequently, the duty of every patriotic Austrian citizen on election day seemed equally obvious.

On November 10, 1930, the Austrian electorate repudiated the Vaugoin government, if not the entire Christian Social Party. The Christian Socials lost seven seats in the Nationalrat, although the Heimwehr, their political "ally," won eight. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, polled two percent fewer votes than they had in

71 Reichspost, November 9, 1930, p. 2.
72 Ibid., October 19, 1930, p. 2.
1927, but they gained one additional seat in the legislature. The Schober bloc, a temporary coalition of the Pan-Germans and the Landbund, lost 2 of their 21 seats.

The statistics, however, do not reveal the true extent of the Christian Social defeat. The party emerged from the election badly divided. The rural wing of the party, which actually exceeded its performance in the previous election, had refused to campaign on a fascist platform, insisting instead that first priority must be assigned to Austria's agrarian problems. The Seipel-Vaugoin faction, on the other hand, which had been responsible for the Heimwehr alliance, lost three seats—two of which were claimed by the Schober bloc, which opposed Seipel's socialist policies. In addition to the problem of internal dissension, the Christian Socials were far from certain that they could count on the full support of their Heimwehr allies. Two of the Styrian Heimwehr delegates quickly repudiated any form of cooperation with the Christian Social Party. Furthermore, no one could predict what course the other six fascist representatives would follow.

The problems confronting the Christian Social Party, however, could have been much worse than they actually were. Seven of the eight Heimwehr delegates were elected as a consequence of the Austrian system of proportional representation. Under the election laws of Austria, a shift of four or five hundred votes in Styria from the Heimwehr Party to the Schober bloc would have deprived the Heimwehr
of all eight of their seats in the National Assembly.\footnote{The poor performance of the Heimwehr throughout the country prompted Karl Seitz, the socialist mayor of Vienna, to observe that "one of the important results of the election was its demonstration that the Heimwehr are only a small if noisy minority." The New York Times, November 11, 1930, p. 11.}

The defeat of the Christian Social Party spelled disaster for Austrian patriots. Seipel, who had always served as their spokesman, was thoroughly discredited because of his flirtation with the fascists. They discovered, moreover, that because of their close association with Seipel, they were no longer able to exert any real influence within the party. As a consequence, they had virtually no voice at all in a new coalition cabinet composed for the most part of left-wing Christian Socials and members of the Schober bloc.

The immense difficulties that confronted Austrian patriots in November, 1930, were accentuated by the fact that the new foreign minister was none other than Johann Schober, the spokesman for the Pan-Germans. He had held the office of Austrian chancellor twice, and both times he had been forced to resign because of political intrigues perpetrated by Seipel. Since Seipel no longer shared the limelight, Austrian patriots had every reason to fear that, if the new chancellor still harbored a grudge, he might possibly attempt to avenge himself against Seipel's disciples.

The worst fears of Austrian patriots seemed to materialize in March, 1931, when Julius Curtius, the German foreign minister, announced that an Austro-German customs union was under discussion.
Schober, the Pan-Germans, and the *Neue Freie Presse* all denied that the proposed economic union was a disguised version of the Anschluß. In a futile attempt to disarm his critics, Schober explained that "Austrian independence was no more endangered by this treaty than by any other treaty which Austria had signed since 1922." In fact, he asserted, the project was designed to ensure his country's independence by guaranteeing the state's economic prosperity. He reminded everyone who had impugned his motives that in December, 1921, he had, in defiance of the Pan-Germans, also signed the Treaty of Prague, which contained a provision prohibiting the Anschluß between Austria and Germany.\(^{75}\)

The *Neue Freie Presse* used somewhat different arguments in its defense of the Austro-German customs union project. It insisted that Germany and Austria simply wanted to create the nucleus of the European economic federation which the French government had proposed in the League of Nations in 1930. The editor maintained that a beginning had to be made somewhere, and Germany was a logical starting point in central Europe.\(^{76}\) The journal continued to defend the project because no one else had made any serious attempt to implement the idea of Pan-Europe. Furthermore, it was a mistake to assume that economic cooperation would ultimately lead to political union because the Zollverein, a nineteenth century economic union between Prussia and the

\(^{75}\) *Neue Freie Presse*, March 29, 1931, p. 1.

other Germanic states, proved that economic cooperation and political
union were not synonymous.77

Temporarily stunned by Schober's decision to establish closer
ties with Germany, Austrian patriots quickly regrouped around Seipel
and immediately launched a low-profile counter-offensive against the
Austro-German customs union. The Reichspost, which had initially
hailed the project as "the practical beginning of regional customs
agreements,"78 reversed itself and insinuated that economic cooperation
might be indistinguishable from political cooperation—79 an innuendo
which was obviously conceived in order to arouse French public opinion
against any form of Austro-German cooperation.80 On April 10, the
Niederösterreichische Zeitung, a clerical newspaper with close ties
to Seipel,81 printed a scathing attack on Schober and the proposed

77 Ibid., March 22, 1931, p. 1.
78 Reichspost, March 23, 1931, p. 11.
79 Ibid., March 24, 1931, p. 1.
80 The French were already disturbed by Hitler's gains the
previous year.
81 Although there is no proof that Seipel was responsible for the
activities of the Austrian press, circumstantial evidence certainly
points in that direction. The Pan-Germans and the Social Democrats
were convinced that Seipel was ultimately responsible. Moreover,
when the Schober-Endr government collapsed, Seipel was the first
person who was asked to form a government. Furthermore, he had
already been implicated in a similar situation. See Ante, p. 54–56.
Finally, everyone suspected Seipel, because he was perhaps the only
person in Austria capable of masterminding such an ingenious plot.
See also Adam Wandruszka, "Aus Seipels letzten Lebensjahren:
Unöffentlichte Briefe aus den Jahren 1931 und 1932," Mitteilungen
customs union. It asserted that any form of economic agreement between Germany and Austria that did not include other countries would have the effect of bringing Austria "under the influence of a certain industrial group in Germany, thereby strengthening the power of Soviet Russia. The paper, moreover, insisted that all Austrian industry would suffer from such an arrangement for a few large ones were already controlled by German capitalists.\footnote{The New York Times, April 11, 1931, p. 8.}

Schober, who was understandably outraged by this journalistic "stab in the back," accused the clerical publication of "high treason." His charge elicited a rapid response from the Viennese chapter of the Christian Social Party, which condemned Schober for his ill-advised choice of words. A spokesman for the group explained that the Austrian foreign minister had undoubtedly confirmed the suspicions of the French and the Czechs that the entire project was primarily political, since he himself had accused his internal opponents of "treason."\footnote{Ibid., April 13, 1931, p. 11.}

The construction which the Viennese Christian Socials placed on Schober's words naturally made the French government more determined than ever to prevent the consummation of the Austro-German customs union. In order to ensure that Germany and Austria would abandon the proposed economic union, the French government began systematically to withdraw short-term credits from German and Austrian banks. The financial crisis that ensued brought both of the offending states to
their knees, and in June they announced they were terminating their plans for the customs union. Disgraced by the failure of their foreign policy, Otto Ender and Johann Schober submitted their resignations. Those who championed the maintenance of Austrian independence had scored an impressive victory.84

Although the Reichspost and the Viennese Christian Socials were quite relieved to see the French quash the Austro-German customs union, they denied any responsibility for the failure of Schober's foreign policy. They insisted that Schober should have realized from the very beginning that the French would never tolerate the creation of a customs union between the two Germanic nations. If Schober had simply practiced "Realpolitik," Austria would never have been brought to her knees at "Canossa."85 The Reichspost, moreover, argued that Schober's proposal was illogical, since the chancellor had suggested an unnatural association. If Austria must form closer economic ties with another state, then Hungary was the most logical choice because the industrial and agrarian interests of the two states complimented each other. Finally, if Schober had wished to create a nucleus around which a united Europe could develop, a union between Hungary and Austria would have been more sensible.

84 The French might possibly have acted without any additional encouragement. Seipel and his accomplices, however, apparently did not wish to leave anything to chance. During the interwar era France had repeatedly shown a reluctance to take any action against Germany without first receiving at least moral support from some other source.
because the French government would have been more likely to give its consent to the formation of an Austro-Hungarian customs union than one between Germany and Austria.\textsuperscript{86}

As expected, the Social Democrats insisted that the Reichspost and the Christian Socials had misinterpreted the facts. The Arbeiter-Zeitung asserted that from the very beginning the Seipel-Schmitz wing of the Christian Social Party had tried to destroy the dream of German economic unity by encouraging the French government to oppose the proposed union. The socialist leaders, moreover, concluded that the ultimate realization of "the goal which history had set for itself with the destruction of the Central European monarchy" could never be achieved through a bourgeois government which was only half-heartedly committed to an Anschluß between Austria and Germany.\textsuperscript{87}

The belligerent attitude of the Arbeiter-Zeitung was especially disconcerting for those in the "patriotic camp," because for the first time since 1924 Seipel and his political associates no longer insisted that Marxism and Austrianism were incompatible with one another. On June 19, 1931, following the collapse of Austria's most important bank, the Creditanstalt, Seipel asked Otto Bauer to accept the office of vice-chancellor in a non-partisan cabinet which was to be composed of four Social Democrats, three Christian Socials, one

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, September 1, 1931, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{87}\textit{Arbeiter-Zeitung}, September 2, 1931, p. 1; September 4, 1931, p. 1.
Pan-German, and one member of the Landbund. Although the Socialists gave serious consideration to Seipel’s proposal, they politely rejected his offer because they believed that they would best serve the interests of the Austrian worker by remaining aloof from any political alliance.

Everything considered, the prospects for an eventual reconciliation between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats seemed most promising. At long last the Austrian patriots in the conservative camp seemed to have finally realized that “a nation divided against itself cannot stand.” Although the Socialists had rejected Seipel’s first overture to peace, their politely-worded reply augered well for the future. Obviously, they still needed time for the wounds of 1927 to heal. Furthermore, the recent upsurge of Nazi strength in Germany certainly made Seipel’s offer fairly attractive. Any dramatic increase in Nazi strength in Germany might be the final inducement they needed to renounce Anschluss with Germany, especially since Austrian voters had repudiated fascism in the 1930 elections.

Thoroughly alarmed by the possibility of a rapprochement between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats, the Styrian Heimwehr decided that the time had come for them to duplicate Mussolini’s march on Rome and to establish a fascist state in Austria. They hoped to be able to capitalize on the obvious mistrust that still

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89 Arbeiter-Zeitung, June 20, 1931, p. 1.
existed between Austria's two major political parties and the popular dissatisfaction which had erupted as a consequence of France's veto of the Austro-German customs union project. Walter Pfrimer, the leader of the Styrian Heimwehr, designated September 12, 1931, as his country's day of reckoning.

Although the Pfrimer putsch began as scheduled on September 12, it collapsed completely within the next forty-eight hours. The popular support which the parliamentary organization had envisioned simply failed to materialize. The Austrian people were no more enchanted with fascism than they had been in November, 1930. In fact, the other provincial Heimwehr units did not even bother to come to Pfrimer's assistance. If Starhemberg, the leader of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr, can be believed, he was so repulsed by this act of disloyalty that he disavowed his allegiance to Hitler and became a confirmed Austrian patriot.\(^\text{90}\)

The ill-conceived Pfrimer putsch provided the catalyst necessary for the growth of National Socialism in Austria. Nazi leaders insisted that the basic objectives of the Heimwehr could never be achieved through force of arms, but only through the political program of the National Socialists.\(^\text{91}\) Apparently the Nazis had struck a responsive chord. In December, Heimwehr organizations in Lower Austria began defecting to the Nazis, and in March, 1932, the

\(^{90}\) Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, p. 56.

\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 67; Edmonson, "The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics," pp. 248-250.
Styrian Heimwehr units also switched their allegiance. Moreover, many Pan-Germans who had become disillusioned with Schober suddenly jumped on the Nazi bandwagon.

In April, 1932, the Nazis scored impressive gains in provincial elections throughout Austria. The National Socialist Party polled 16% of the votes in Vienna, 18% in Lower Austria, and 22% in Salzburg. The vast majority of these Nazi votes were cast by former members of the Pan-Germans, the Heimwehr, the Landbund, and, to a lesser extent, the Christian Socials. The only Pan-Germans who survived the provincial elections were those whose terms had not yet expired.

Most of Austria's non-Marxist politicians erroneously interpreted the provincial elections as the beginning of a Nazi ground swell. Everyone, however, based his conclusions on German political precedents instead of Austrian historical tradition. Every time the French government attempted to stifle any display of Anschluss sentiment in Austria, the Austrian public always voiced its contempt of France by voting for pro-Anschluss candidates in Austria at the first opportunity. Significantly, the provincial elections provided the Austrian people with their first chance to protest the French veto of the Austro-German customs union project. The Austrian electorate undoubtedly cast their ballots for the Nazis because the Pan-Germans and the Heimwehr had only recently been discredited and because a pro-Nazi vote was a much stronger protest vote than one cast.

for either the Heimwehr or the Pan-Germans. In comparison to previous elections, it is surprising that the anti-French vote was not considerably larger than it was. There was, to be certain, a permanent shift of allegiance from many Heimwehr members and Pan-Germans to the Nazi Party, although there are no comparative statistics to arrive at a reasonable estimate.93

Unfortunately, the Nazi victories came at a most critical period in Austrian history. The collapse of the Creditanstalt in May, 1931, had created a financial crisis which once again threatened the very existence of the Austrian state. For a time it seemed as if no one would be able to form a cabinet to deal with the state’s serious financial problems. Engelbert Dollfuß, a young Christian Social who was as yet untainted with fascism, asked the Social Democrats to form a coalition government with the Christian Socials. Remner and Bauer refused. They insisted on new elections, which Dollfuß did not want because he feared a Nazi triumph. The Pan-Germans, meanwhile, vowed to oppose any government which was not committed to the consummation of an Anschluß between Germany and Austria.

93See Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, p. 76. The last free elections held in Austria prior to 1934 were the municipal elections in the spring of 1933, but because these elections were influenced by the Lausanne loan, it is impossible to determine the extent of Nazi strength in Austria. However, on May 10, 1933, the National Socialists, who were never known to underestimate their strength, contended that one-third of the Austrian electorate were Hitlerites. See The New York Times, May 10, 1933, p. 10. The number of mourners who attended the funeral of Dollfuß in 1934 clearly suggests a precipitous drop in Nazi strength within a period of approximately one year. On the basis of the fragmentary evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that probably no more than 15-20% of the Austrian people were hard-core Nazis.
Having exhausted all other options, Dollfuß turned to the Heimwehr. On May 21 he announced the formation of a government composed of 66 Christian Socials, 8 Heimwehr men, and 9 members of the Landbund. Although he controlled only 83 votes in the National Assembly compared to 82 for the Socialists and the Pan-Germans, he, nonetheless, succeeded in creating a government committed to the preservation of Austrian independence.

Dollfuß immediately opened negotiations with the Allied Powers for a new international loan. Three weeks later at Lausanne, he triumphantly announced that the Allied Powers had agreed to lend Austria an additional 300 million schillings in return for the extension of the Anschluss ban until 1952. He then hastened back to Vienna for his first confrontation with the National Assembly.

The Pan-Germans were especially incensed by the provisions of the Lausanne loan. They recalled that in 1923 they had voted for the ratification of the Geneva loan under the impression that the Geneva agreement in no way endangered the consummation of an Anschluss between Austria and Germany. In September, 1931, much to their dismay, the World Court at The Hague officially ruled that the Austro-German customs union project was illegal according to the provisions of the Geneva Protocols, but it would have been permissible according to the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain. As a consequence, the Pan-Germans were determined to atone for this previous mistake
by doing everything within their power to prevent the ratification of the Lausanne agreement.94

Despite the support of the Social Democrats and two members of the Heimwehr, the Pan-Germans were unable to prevent the ratification of the Lausanne loan. Fate seemed to be on the side of the patriotic coalition. Seipel, who was too ill to take his seat in the National Assembly, died on August 2nd, and his replacement was sworn in in time to cast an affirmative vote. Schober, moreover, died on August 19th, and according to the provisions of an agreement signed in November, 1930, his successor was not a Pan-German but a member of the Landbund, who voted for ratification. The treaty was first approved on August 17, by a vote of 82-80, and then by a similar margin on August 23, 1932, in a successful attempt to override a veto by the Socialist-controlled Bundesrat.95

The ratification of the Lausanne Protocols, which at least temporarily ensured the continued independence of Austria, was due in large part to the patriotic revival which swept Vienna and much of Austria following Seipel's death on August 2, 1932.96 Suddenly,


95 John Gunther, "Dollfuss and the Future of Austria," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XII (January, 1934), pp. 306-308; Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 176-177; and Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, pp. 88-95.

96 See the Reichspost, August 18, 1932, p. 1. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note that the Austrian people turned out in far fewer numbers to pay their "last respects" to Schober. See ibid., August 20, 1930, p. 1.
the Austrian people seemed to forget the unsavory aspects of the
monsignor's political career and instead recalled only his tireless
efforts to save his Austrian fatherland. In death, he ceased to be
a cause for dissension and became the first great martyr for Austrian
patriots.

His funeral was the most impressive since that of Francis Joseph
in 1916. Thousands of individuals lined the Ringstrasse to watch
the funeral procession. A 100,000 mourners gathered at the Central
Cemetery to pay their last respects to the "father of Austrian
patriotism." 97

Everyone praised the fallen Caesar. Vaugoin hailed him as a
"man of whom one can say that for him one thing mattered above all
else: 'His love for our Austria. '" The former Austrian chancellor
concluded that Seipel "was the father of Austria because, had he
not lived, there would no longer be an Austria." 98 In a letter of
condolence to the Austrian people, President Wilhelm Miklas urged
the people never to "forget what it owes to Dr. Seipel, who was the
savior of our fatherland." 99 The praise of Friedrich Funder, the
editor of the Reichspost and one of Seipel's closest friends,
surpassed that of everyone else. "No Austrian statesman since
Metternich," the bereaved journalist maintained, "has attained

97 Ibid., August 6, 1932, p. 3.
98 Ibid., August 3, 1932, p. 12.
99 Ibid., p. 2.
the importance of Dr. Seipel in European politics."\textsuperscript{100}

The most noteworthy obituary was written by Otto Bauer for the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. Although Bauer was understandably critical of Seipel's anti-Marxist policies, he, nonetheless, spoke very kindly of Seipel. He specifically praised him for his efforts to form a Christian Social-Social Democrat coalition in April, 1932. He characterized Seipel, moreover, as a man of principles "who fought for his cause with the same determination that we fight for our own." Despite the enmity that existed between the two men, Bauer asserted that even as "an enemy soldier" Seipel "deserved full military honors" and consequently he saluted his "great opponent with three volleys fired over his bier."\textsuperscript{101}

The significance of Bauer's obituary lay in the fact that three days earlier the Nazis had increased their representation in the German Reichstag from 120 to 230. Bauer seemed to be extending a hand of friendship if the Christian Socialists would but accept it. If an immediate reconciliation were not possible, then at least the long-range prospects of Austrian patriotism seemed extremely promising.

Unfortunately for Austria, the National Socialists had already conceived a plot to stifle the growth of Austrian patriotism. On August 3, Franz von Papen, the former German chancellor who was instrumental in Hitler's rise to power, published an insidious article

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 3. For Starhemberg's eulogy see ibid., August 5, 1932, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{101} *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 3, 1932, p. 3.
in his newspaper *Germania* in which he attempted to prove that Seipel was not an advocate of Austrian independence, as everyone in Germany had always assumed, but a champion of Anschluß between Germany and Austria. In order to set the record straight, Von Papen's journal explained that the former Austrian chancellor, who was a practitioner of "Realpolitik," had simply wanted to preserve his country's integrity until it became feasible to consummate a union between the two Germanic countries. Von Papen also explained that all of Seipel's efforts to prevent the financial collapse of his state were designed to ensure that when the day of reunion finally came Austria would not be compelled to come to Germany as a "helpless bankrupt."  

Von Papen's *Germania* article was only the rough draft for one of Hitler's "Big Lies." Franz Riedl, a correspondent for Von Papen's newspaper, who was arrested in 1933 for his anti-Austrian activities, published a much more sophisticated version of Von Papen's thesis three years later under the title, *Chancellor Seipel: A Champion of German National Thought.* Despite the

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102 The article was reprinted in the *Reichspost*, August 4, 1932, p. 3. Von Papen left the United States during World War I amidst suspicion that he was linked to the subversive activities of the German government. In 1934 he was appointed ambassador to Austria so that he could attempt to undermine Austria's independence. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-45 (11 vols., Washington: U. S. Department of State, 1937-45), ser. D, Vol. I, p. 263.


author's obvious bias, the book had every appearance of being a scholarly work. It was replete with footnotes and long quotes taken from Seipel's speeches. It was an ingenious embodiment of falsehood.

Almost without exception, Riedl had faithfully reproduced Seipel's words. However, he frequently wrenched a passage completely out of context and at other times emphasized a few key words to create an impression totally different from that which Seipel had intended. He constantly capitalized on Seipel's fondness for double entendre. But perhaps most importantly, he cited Seipel's fascist tendencies to prove that at heart the Austrian chancellor was really a Nazi. 105

Throughout his book Riedl belabored the point that Seipel was not an Austrian patriot. He explained that in 1928 the Austrian chancellor had finally realized that union with Germany was inevitable and had consequently dropped his previous objections to an Anschluß between Germany and Austria. 106 In fact, he insisted that Seipel had become such a staunch supporter of German nationalism that at the time of his death he was in the process of revising his book Nation

105 The book is written in such a manner that only an expert on Seipel would be aware of the vast number of internal contradictions and even some of the most obvious lies. As a starting point, interested readers may profitably study pp. 27, 31, 47, 49, 58, 81, 125, 133, 137, 154, and 187, especially pp. 139-141.

106 Ibid., pp. 58, 86, 179-181. The year 1928 was apparently chosen as the date for Seipel's alleged conversion, because it could be documented by citing one of his published letters which inadvertently lent itself to such an interpretation.
und Staat to emphasize the ever-increasing importance of the new nationalism," i. e., National Socialism. 107

Without question, Riedl's book and the less-sophisticated versions of the "truth about Seipel" permitted the National Socialists to make inroads among Seipel's former supporters. Nazi propagandists, moreover, made it extremely difficult for Austrian patriots to divorce themselves completely from fascism and to extend the hand of friendship to the Social Democrats in order to create the broad base of support needed to sustain the independence of Austria. Austria was still paying the price for Seipel's commitment to fascism.

107 Ibid., p. 19.
Chapter V

"ÖSTERREICH ÜBER ALLES!"

May 10, 1932, marked the beginning of a new era in Austrian history. Engelbert Dollfuß was named as Austrian chancellor. Thoroughly alarmed by the impressive number of votes the Nazis had polled in provincial elections throughout Austria the previous month, his Christian Social colleagues miraculously expected him to arrest the development of National Socialism throughout their Austrian fatherland. Furthermore, they demanded that he accomplish this patriotic objective by severing all ties with the Heimwehr and by forming a political coalition with the Pan-Germans and the agrarian Landbund.

Dollfuß soon discovered that he had been assigned an impossible task. The Pan-Germans were entirely uncooperative. They refused to become a part of any government committed to Austrian independence. Frustrated by the uncompromising attitude of his party's erstwhile allies, Dollfuß solicited the support of the Social Democrats, who readily accepted his offer on the condition that he dissolve the National Assembly and ask for new elections. Fearing that only the Nazis would benefit from new elections, the would-be Austrian chancellor summarily rejected the terms offered by the socialists.¹

¹Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, p. 88; Schuschnigg, My Austria, pp. 94 and 168.
Much to his consternation, he was forced to choose between two unpleasant alternatives. He could accept a political alliance with the Heimwehr, who wished to establish a fascist state, or he could dissolve the national assembly. If he did the latter, he knew that the Nazi Party quite likely would emerge as the power broker in the new parliament. Rather than jeopardize the very existence of the Austrian state, he opted for a coalition with the Heimwehr and the agrarian Landbund.

Dollfuß seemingly believed that his arrangement with the Heimwehr was only temporary. If the Nazis continued to gain strength in Germany, he was convinced that it was only a matter of time before the Social Democrats of Austria would repudiate the Anschluß and propose an immediate, unconditional political alliance with the Christian Socials to ensure the independence of Austria. He seemed confident that the socialists would soon realize that they had erred in rejecting his offer of a coalition government.

Dollfuß' naïveté was rudely disclosed during the prolonged debate over the ratification of the Lausanne Protocols. The Marxists stubbornly rejected the life-giving loan because they were determined to force new elections. Dollfuß simply could not comprehend the rationale for their action. It seemed to him as if they almost wanted the Nazis to overrun the country. Suddenly, he was convinced that the Social Democrats must never be placed in the position where they could determine the fate of his beloved fatherland. To him a
Christian Social-Social Democratic coalition was no longer thinkable. 2

During the Lausanne loan crisis, Austrian patriots began to discern the true nature of their new chancellor. Unlike Seipel, he was no great intellectual but a pragmatist who arrived at instant decisions on the basis of instinctive judgements alone. Moreover, he could be a vicious, vindictive individual whenever anyone, especially the socialists, dared question his judgement. Furthermore, he was too prone to identify his own welfare with that of his country. The characteristics, however, which endeared him to the Austrian people were his fiery eloquence, his relentless perseverance, and his small stature. 3 The Austrian citizenry could readily identify with this four foot, eleven-inch tall peasant who dared defy the Nazi giant of the North.

The first confrontation between Dollfuß and the Nazis occurred in early August, 1932. A major furor had developed when Leopold Kunschak compared the Nazi "emissaries" in Vienna who were lobbying against the passage of the Lausanne Protocols to "the assassins of Archduke Francis Ferdinand." Outraged by Kunschak’s remarks, Von Papen's newspaper Germania insisted that the analogy was an affront to the German government, which demanded that Dollfuß repudiate his colleague’s contemptuous statement. Dollfuß, however,

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2 Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, p. 94; Schuschnigg, My Austria, p. 177.

3 Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, pp. 187-189 and 105-106.
simply replied that the individuals in question had not been sent by the German government. 4

Although the "Kunschak affair" passed without further incident, the National Socialists thereafter belittled and berated Dollfuß and his administration upon the slightest provocation. Much to the discomfort of Dollfuß, many Christian Socials and Pan-Germans sided not with him but with the Nazis. But to make matters even worse, the Social Democrats, who had their own lengthy list of grievances against the Austrian chancellor, decided the time had come to force his resignation. Insisting that at best he was supported by only one-third of the Austrian electorate, they demanded that he dissolve the national assembly and call for new elections. 5

Hard pressed to defend himself against attacks from both the Right and the Left, Dollfuß decided he had no recourse except to create an authoritarian government. Unfortunately for the future of Austria, his political opponents played right into his hands. On March 4, 1933, during a heated legislative debate, the three presidents of the national assembly made the mistake of all resigning at the same time. Constitutionally the Austrian parliament was seemingly incapable of reconvening. Dollfuß took advantage of the fiasco to declare that the Austrian National Assembly had committed suicide.

From the standpoint of Austrian patriotism, the collapse of parliamentary government had come at a most unfortunate time. The editorials appearing in the Reichspost and the Arbeiter-Zeitung during the last week of February and the first three days of March indicate that the Viennese wing of the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats were on the verge of forming a genuinely patriotic coalition with or without the support of Dollfuß. These political feelers, however, never progressed beyond the exploratory stages. Once it became obvious that Dollfuß would not hesitate to use force to quash his political opponents, Seipel’s disciples did an about face and urged everyone to support Dollfuß.

From the viewpoint of Dollfuß, the parliamentary crisis could not have come at a more opportune time. On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg had appointed Hitler chancellor of Germany. On March 5, one day after the parliamentary crisis in Austria, the Nazis received a “mandate” from the German people to outlaw the Communist Party. Then, on March 21, the German Reichstag passed an Enabling Act conferring dictatorial powers on Hitler and his government for the next four years. Under the circumstances, Dollfuß was convinced that if his homeland was to elude the greedy grasp of Hitler, he could ill afford to spend his time and energy defending himself in the National Assembly. He believed that any extralegal action on

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6 See especially the Reichspost for March 3, 1933, p. 1; and the Arbeiter-Zeitung, March 3, 1933, p. 1. As usual, the two papers should be read in conjunction with one another.

7 See the Reichspost, March 12, 1933, p. 1.
his part was fully warranted by the national emergency created by Hitler's triumph in Germany.

As Dollfuß had feared following his consolidation of power in Germany, Hitler initiated a new phase of verbal warfare against Austria. At his request, Hans Frank, Nazi Germany's top legal adviser, spent the first half of March in Austria denouncing both Dollfuß and the Austrian state. Later in that same month in a radio broadcast from Munich, he declared that, if it should become necessary, the Nazis would defend their comrades in Austria. Horrified by Frank's licentious conduct, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin demanded an immediate apology from German authorities. Hitler, however, placed his personal stamp of approval on Frank by naming him minister of justice in Bavaria.8

Hitler supported his verbal assault against Austria by implementing economic measures designed to destroy the Austrian economy and thereby make the thought of Anschluß more urgent to the Austrian people.9 In February he imposed high tariffs on Austrian wood products, cattle, and dairy products. Then he precipitated a financial crisis in Vienna by


9 Schuschnigg wrote: Economic "stability is the real guarantee of a permanently and firmly established new Austria." My Austria, p. 248.
selling all of Germany's schilling holdings in Zürich. But the most
important element in his financial strategy was the 1000 mark tax
which he imposed on all German tourists who visited Austria. By his
calculation, this measure would cost the Austrian state a minimum of
$35,000,000 a year—a sum almost equal to the proceeds of the Lausanne
loan.\footnote{The New York Times, March 4, 1933, p. 8.}

Dollfuß struck back at the Nazis by placing numerous restrictions
on their activities. Some were arrested and interred in concentration
camps, while others were expelled from the country. They were denied
access to the Austrian news media as well as freedom of assembly.
They were not permitted to wear Nazi uniforms or to wear any emblem
that would identify them as National Socialists. In June the Nazi
party was officially outlawed in Austria.

The results of municipal elections in March and April indicate
that for the most part the retaliatory measures taken by the Austrian
chancellor were ineffective in preventing the spread of National
Socialism. On March 27 the Nazis increased their representation on
the city council from four to nine in the city of Gmünd on the Czech
border, while that of the Christian Social Party dropped from eight
to five.\footnote{The New York Times, March 27, 1933, p. 7.}

\footnote{Wheaton, The Nazi Revolution, p. 341.} Then on April 24 the Nazis captured 42% of the vote in
the municipal elections held at Innsbruck. In contrast to the election
at Gmünd, the Christian Socialists suffered negligible losses, while the
Nazis gained at the expense of the Social Democrats and the Pan-
Germans.\textsuperscript{13}

The Innsbruck election was perhaps not an accurate barometer of
Nazi strength in Austria. Since Hitler had already expressed his
willingness to sacrifice the South Tyrol in exchange for Mussolini's
goodwill,\textsuperscript{14} it seems highly unlikely that 42% of the Tyrolese really
supported Hitler and the National Socialists. Under the circumstances,
it is somewhat more plausible to assume that a large portion of the
Nazi ballots were cast as protest votes on the part of disgruntled
Christian Socials and Social Democrats. The workers undoubtedly were
still confused by the fact that on April 13 their leaders had
repudiated the \textit{Anschluss} after extolling the benefits of union with
Germany for more than fifteen years. It seems likely, moreover, that
the Nazis picked up a large number of votes from individuals who were
dissatisfied with the provisions of the Lausanne loan, as well as
from Tyrolese who wished to protest Dollfuß' recent visit to Italy.
Furthermore, a large number of people voted the Nazi ticket not out
of conviction but because they feared for their lives.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, April 24, 1933, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, December 13, 1932, Sec. III, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{15}By February, 1934, the Tyrolese farmers were reportedly in a
"revolutionary mood," as a consequence of Nazi terrorism. See \textit{The
New York Times}, February 7, 1934, p. 5. It was not unusual for a
person who was active in the anti-Nazi cause to be attacked by the
more militant members of the National Socialist Party. See \textit{Ibid.},
Regardless of the true size of the Nazi element in Austria, Dollfuß realized even before the elections were over that his fatherland could no longer survive without outside help. Consequently, on April 11 he rushed to Rome to seek Mussolini’s support. He apparently found the Italian government sympathetic to his needs, because when he returned to Vienna on April 17 he declared: “It is now certain that Austria has a friend in the south who will always stand helpfully by her side.” On two subsequent visits to Italy the Austrian chancellor won some vital economic concessions from Mussolini and received a guarantee that Italy would stand by Austria in her fight against Nazi Germany. In return for Mussolini’s generosity, Dollfuß promised to turn Austria into a corporate state.

Ironically, there was no need for Dollfuß to turn to Mussolini to find an ally against Hitler. On April 12, 1933, the Social Democrats had withdrawn from the Anschluss movement. On May 13, Friedrich Adler explained: “We have worked for an Anschluss to the German Republic—but we refuse an Anschluss to a fascist prison.” On September 19, the Socialists repeated their offer to cooperate with Dollfuß. They argued that without the help of the Socialist Schutzbund, Dollfuß could not possibly defend Austria’s borders. “The only real possibility for defense of the country,” Fritz Schaeffer, a member of the Austrian Bundesrat, asserted “lies in

16. Ibid., April 18, 1933, p. 11.
17. Ibid., April 13, 1933, p. 2.
the Socialist workers. They are ready to do their part, but only if
the persecutions of the socialist party ceases."  

Carl Vaugoin, former Austrian chancellor and spokesman for most
of Seipel’s followers, voiced his approval of Schaeffer’s pledge of
loyalty to the Austrian state. When Vaugoin, however, urged Dollfuß
to end his feud with the socialists, the Austrian chancellor angrily
asserted that he was perfectly capable of defending Austria without
any assistance from the Social Democrats. He then reprimanded the
chairman of the Christian Social Party for his impertinence and
advised him that he was being dropped from the cabinet.  

Incredibly, Dollfuß was seemingly determined to pursue his fight with Nazi Germany
without the support of the Social Democrats and with only the half-
hearted support of many of Seipel’s followers. Collectively they
constituted almost sixty percent of the Austrian people.

In May, 1933, after one of his visits to Mussolini, Dollfuß
announced his own plan to defend his country’s independence. He
suggested the formation of a non-partisan organization to be known
as the Fatherland Front, which would attempt to “unite the Austrian
people and ignite in them the fire of patriotism.”  

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20 Ibid., September 22, 1933, p. 11. In an interview shortly
after the Civil War in Austria, Julius Deutsch stated that Vaugoin
was dropped by Dollfuß because he failed to give 16,000 rifles to
the Heimwehr. See ibid., February 18, 1934, p. 1.

21 Guido Zernatto, Die Wahrheit über Österreich (New York:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1933), p. 79. See also Schuschnigg,
My Austria, p. 205.
for the patriotic organization "to serve the peaceful, cultural and
economic development of a free, independent Austrian state."

The Fatherland Front was finally christened on September 11,
1933, the 250th anniversary of one of Austria's greatest military
achievements—the defeat of the Turks at the gates of Vienna. Dollfuß
explained that in order to preserve their independence the Austrian
people must do what their forerathers had done in 1683—cast aside all
political differences until the enemy had been driven from their city
and their fatherland. Now was the time for all good Austrians to
rally under the banner of the Fatherland Front.

Because he intended to integrate the Heimwehr into the Fatherland
Front, Dollfuß wisely used the occasion to suggest a new image for
the leader of Austrian fascism, Prince Starhemberg. As the Austrian
chancellor asserted,

Two hundred and fifty years ago the Viennese held out,
loyal and brave, under Starhemberg, the commander of the
defense. We rejoice that the name Starhemberg has been
preserved in our homeland and that one of the descendants
of that Rüdiger Starhemberg of old is among those who are
rebuilding Austria today.23

In his patriotic address Dollfuß also tried to lessen the appeal
of National Socialism for the Austrian people by emphasizing the
importance of an independent Austria not only to Europe but to the
German nation as well. In an obvious paraphrase of Saipel's ideas,
he stated his belief that "it is our duty to preserve the true

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22 Dollfuß to Mussolini, July 22, 1933, in Julius Brautenthal, The
23 Neue Freie Presse, September 12, 1933, Margenblatt, p. 1.
German culture in these Christian lands of Central Europe" and "to
fashion this culture into an Austrian mould. We leave it to future
generations to determine who is best serving the German cause."
He reminded his attentive audience that in 1683 John Sobieski, the king
of Poland, had unselfishly rushed to the defense of their ancestors
because "Vienna was not only the capital of Austria, not only a part
of Germany, but at the same time a bastion, an outpost of the
Abendland as a whole, a palladium of its existence and its cultural
freedom." \(^{24}\)

The efforts of Dollfuß to cultivate patriotism outside the
constitutional framework were successful at least to a limited
extent. To arouse the people, he had coined two catchy phrases:
"Austria awake!" and "Austria above everything!" Moreover, because
he was endowed with certain charismatic qualities, he established
an unusual rapport with his audiences, which he exploited to good
advantage. His popularity, especially soared in October, 1933, when
an attempt was made on his life by a Nazi. \(^{25}\)

The Heimwehr, however, were far from pleased with Dollfuß' increasing popularity. On January 6 the Heimwehr delivered an
ultimatum to Dollfuß in which they demanded a greater role in the
affairs of the state. \(^{26}\) When the Austrian chancellor refused to meet

\(^{24}\) *Ibid.*


their demands, Starhemberg reportedly offered to negotiate a solution to the Austro-German quarrel with Hitler.\textsuperscript{27} A few days later, he warned the uncooperative chancellor that the time was right for a patriotic "putsch." He explained that if the government did not take forceful steps to end the "brown sickness" which had infected the country, there might be a "popular rising against the [Nazi] sabotage of Austria." The Austrian people, he asserted, would never willingly become "a province of Prussia and Berlin."\textsuperscript{28}

For once Dollfuß seemed determined to resist the demands of the Heimwehr. He arrested Johann Alberti, the commander of the Lower Austrian Heimwehr and one of Starhemberg's major advisers, in the home of Alfred Frauenfeld, one of the major leaders of the Austrian National Socialist movement.\textsuperscript{29} He then sent Friedrich Funder, the editor of the Reichszeitung, to sound out the socialist mayor of Vienna about a possible political alliance with the Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{30}

The Marxists seemed quite willing to forget their previous differences with Dollfuß. On January 10 they appealed to the government to form a united front against the Nazis before it was

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, January 29, 1934, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, January 29, 1934, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, January 13, 1934, p. 7.
\end{footnotes}
too late. Then on January 28, the same day when Starhemberg was presumably negotiating with Hitler, the Social Democrats passed a resolution expressing their willingness to support Dollfuß in his struggle against the National Socialists, but only along constitutional lines. Three days later, a Marxist spokesman "hinted" that the socialists workers were eager to replace the "Heimwehr mercenaries in an anti-Nazi army." Furthermore, he stated that he had "issued orders to his organization to drop all political quarrels with the government" in the event of a Nazi putsch.

At the very moment Dollfuß and the Social Democrats appeared to be on the verge of exchanging their political vows with one another, the villain reappeared on the scene to disrupt the ceremony. On January 31, in a major foreign policy address to the German Reichstag, Hitler left little room for doubt about his intentions with respect to his Austrian homeland. He asserted:

If the present Austrian Government considers it necessary to suppress this movement [National Socialism] with all the means in its power, that is of course its own affair. But in that case it must take over the responsibility for the consequences of its own policy. Not until German citizens living in or visiting Austria were affected by it did the German Government take action against the measures of the Austrian Government against National Socialism.

I must emphatically reject the further assertion of the Austrian Government that an attack on the part of the Reich against the Austrian State will be undertaken or even

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32 Ibid., January 29, 1934, p. 5.

33 Ibid., February 1, 1934, p. 6. See also the Arbeiter-Zeitung, December 9, 1933, p. 1; December 27, 1933, p. 1; and January 17, 1934, p. 1.
planned. If the tens of thousands of political refugees from Austria now in Germany take a warm interest in what happens in their native land, that may be regrettable in some of its effects; but it is all the more difficult for the Reich to prevent this in that the rest of the world has not yet succeeded in suppressing the activities of German emigrants abroad against the developments in Germany.

How difficult it is to suppress the action of emigrants against their mother country is seen most clearly from the fact that even where the League of Nations itself takes charge of a country the activities of these emigrants cannot be stopped. Only a few days ago the German police arrested sixteen Communists on the Saar frontier, who were attempting to smuggle large quantities of treasonable propaganda material from this domain of the League into Germany. But if this is possible under the eyes of the League then it is difficult to reproach the German Reich for alleged happenings of a similar nature.

And further, as a proud son of the Austrian brotherland, my home and the home of my fathers, I must protest against the idea that the German temperament of the Austrian people is in need of any stimulus from the Reich. I believe I still know my native land and its people well enough to realize that the same enthusiasm which fills 66 million Germans in the Reich moves their hearts too.

The ominous tone of Hitler's speech forced Dollfuß to reassess the value of his alliance with the Heimwehr. If he abandoned the Austrian fascists and turned to the Social Democrats, he realized that he would lose the friendship of Mussolini and the Italian army in the event of a military showdown with Nazi Germany. No other European state had been willing to make any military commitment to


Austria to aid her in the defense of her independence. The French would protest any form of Anschluß between Germany and Austria, but in all probability they would not fight unless they were assured of Italian support. 

While Dollfuß wrestled with his conscience, he received some unsolicited advice from his spiritual adviser. Mussolini suggested that he jerk the rug from under Hitler and the Nazis by making "a frontal attack on the Social Democrats." 36 He would thereby destroy the basic appeal of National Socialism and ensure the independence of Austria. 

Dollfuß was obviously distressed by the drastic remedy which Mussolini had prescribed for Austria. At a time when his country needed every available recruit to man her defenses against Hitler's saboteurs, Dollfuß knew he could ill afford to alienate the socialists, who constituted more than forty percent of the Austrian populace. 37 A year earlier he might not have displayed any qualms about attacking the Marxists, but now things were different. They had repudiated their allegiance to Germany and were now committed to the preservation of Austrian independence. As late as February 9, 1933, they had provided visible proof of their Austrian patriotism by voting unanimously along with the Christian Socials in favor of a

major finance bill in the Viennese provincial diet. 38

Although he desperately needed the support of the Social Democrats in his unequal struggle with Hitler, Dollfuß decided that he needed Mussolini more than he needed Renner and Bauer. On February 12, 1934, Dollfuß launched an all-out attack on the socialists. For four days the socialists were bombarded with heavy artillery until they finally sued for peace. When the shooting finally ended hundreds of workers were dead and thousands of others were wounded.

The Austrian Civil War did irreparable harm to the cause of Austrian patriotism. In April, 1932, the socialists had refused to become a part of a coalition government headed by Seipel because they had not been able to forget the fact that he was responsible for the massacre of innocent workers in July, 1927. Under the circumstances, there was no reason to believe that they would forgive Dollfuß for the carnage that he had caused in February, 1934. Moreover, it was unlikely that any of the logical successors to Dollfuß could ever command the respect of the Social Democrats. Starhemberg and Emile Fey, who was mentioned as a likely candidate to replace the Austrian chancellor, were both members of the Heimwehr and therefore unacceptable, whereas Kurt Schuschnigg, who was closely identified with Seipel, had committed the unpardonable sin of referring to the Marxists in a radio broadcast as "hyenas who must

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be hunted out of the country.\textsuperscript{39}

In the immediate aftermath of the war everyone thought the workers might join the Nazi ranks en masse. Julius Deutsch, who had coordinated the military activities of the socialists since 1918, expressed the view that Dollfuss' actions would greatly strengthen Hitler and the National Socialists.\textsuperscript{40} Hitler personally predicted that "the workmen of Austria, especially, will rally to the National Socialist cause, as a natural reaction against the methods of violence that the Austrian Government had exercised on them."\textsuperscript{41}

Karl Renner, who certainly spoke for a large portion of the Social Democrats, was so repulsed by the civil war that he urged the Austrian people to vote for the Anschluss with Germany in 1938. He later wrote:

The workers turned away in resignation from their own state and came to the conclusion that if fascism was unavoidable, the anti-clerical variety of the Germans was preferable to that oriented towards Italy and the Catholic Church. That meant, in terms of foreign policy, that four years later the mass of the workers allowed annexation to take place without objection and also were soon taken in by the dazzling successes of Hitler. Without Dollfuss in 1934,


\textsuperscript{40}\textit{The New York Times}, February 17, 1934, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{41}Baynes, \textit{Speeches of Hitler}, p. 1173.
Hitler would never have been able to achieve such a stupifyingly easy success in Austria in 1938.42

Through his attack on the socialists, Dollfuß, however, lost far more than the potential support of the workers in his struggle against Hitler. The leaders of the Christian Social Party also expressed their lack of faith in the Austrian chancellor by asking that the Austrian parliament be reconvened to deal with the national emergency. More important, Dollfuß lost the moral support of the democratic nations of Europe. In their eyes, he had suddenly become a full scale fascist who differed from Mussolini and Hitler only in degree.

Although it was one of the apparent fatalities of the four-day civil war, Austrian patriotism was miraculously resuscitated on July 25, 1934. On that day a small group of Nazis forced their way into the Austrian chancellory and savagely murdered Dollfuß. A group of their comrades, meanwhile, seized control of the Austrian radio station long enough to announce the resignation of Dollfuß and the formation of a new government headed by Anton Rintelen, the former governor of Styria. But by early evening it was obvious that the coup had failed, although complete order was not restored throughout Austria for another two days.

Soon after Kurt Schuschnigg was sworn in as the new chancellor, he delivered a passionate address to the Austrian people. After

detailing the sordid details of the assassination, Schuschnigg concluded: "Our brave Chancellor died at the hands of a pack of cowardly murderers, making the final sacrifice for his Fatherland. His work will live after him." In a similar vein, the Reichspost wrote:

It is only a few hours, since Dr. Dollfuß has closed his eyes forever. He has fallen for his Austrian fatherland and for the freedom of the Austrian people whom he loved with all his heart. . . .

In death the mouth of our beloved chancellor is silenced, but his words still ring forth: Österreich über alles, wenn es nur will! And we will!\(^4^4\)

The Reichspost assured its readers that the Nazis had intended not only to kill Dollfuß but the Austrian idea as well. But the murderers had misjudged the Austrian people, the Reichspost continued, for now they "will stand as one and be the standard bearer of the idea, which they [the Nazis] wanted to destroy."\(^4^5\)

The spirit of national unity which the Reichspost described was more real than imagined. Although Dollfuß' body lay in state for only nine hours, more than a quarter of a million people waited in line outside the Rathaus for as long as three hours, hoping to catch one final glimpse of him. A large percentage of the mourners either wore the red-white-red badge of the Fatherland Front or simply wore those colors to affirm their faith in Austria. More than a million people, including a sizeable percentage of workers, attended his

\(^4^3\) Sheridan, Schuschnigg, p. 97.
\(^4^4\) Reichspost, July 26, 1934, p. 1.
\(^4^5\) Ibid., July 27, 1934, p. 6.
funeral—a scene which Vienna had not witnessed since the death of Francis Joseph. The funeral of Austria's other great postwar patriot, Ignaz Seipel, paled by comparison. 46

Throughout Austria, Dollfuß was memorialized as a great Austrian who had died for his fatherland. Josef Reither, a member of the Lower Austrian parliament, hailed him as a "truly great Austrian" and as a man whose memory would "endure throughout eternity." He vowed that the Austrian people would live by the password of their dead leader: "Austria!" 47 While Dollfuß himself was only a "flaming meteor" which appeared over Austria for a brief period of time, the work which he had started and brought close to completion, the revival of Austria, will survive forever as a "polar star" to guide the Austrian people. 48

President Miklas lauded Dollfuß as the "valiant protector of our Austrian fatherland." 49 Doctor Mittelberger, a spokesman for the Vorarlberg legislature, eulogized Dollfuß as a living example of Austrian patriotism and as a man who had instilled in the people a passionate desire to "work for their homeland, to fight for it, and to even die for it." 50

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46 Ibid., July 27, 1934, p. 6; and July 28, 1934, p. 3; Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, p. 1283.
48 Ibid., July 28, 1934, p. 4.
49 Ibid., July 29, 1934, p. 2.
50 Ibid., July 28, 1934, p. 5.
Although Starhemberg was perhaps motivated by his own self-interests,\(^{51}\) he, too, extolled the virtues of the dead chancellor and Austrian patriotism. In a passionate address to his countrymen, he insisted that his government had done nothing to deserve the hostility of the German Reich, unless defending one's honor could be construed as provocation. The Austrian people, he explained, believed that they had every right "to take whatever precautions were necessary to preserve the freedom and independence of Austria." For the benefit of Hitler and the National Socialists, he added, "We will not deviate one iota from the path to which Dr. Dollfuß has led us. We recognize his program. We know what he wanted and we want exactly what he wanted! The freedom and independence of Austria will never be an item for compromise." Passionately, he urged the Austrian people to keep the faith. "Austria, believe in your future. Be proud of your work," he implored, "and fight on for Austria's freedom! Austria above everything! Austria, for that our Dollfuß had died!"\(^{52}\) Later, at the graveside of the martyred chancellor, he added: "What you were and what you are, that does not die. Your immortal and imperishable work will live on eternally, as long as there is an Austrian history."\(^{53}\) That same day he proclaimed that the death of Dollfuß "has ensured the independence and freedom of the homeland."\(^{54}\)

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\(^{51}\) The dead Caesar had named Schuschnigg, not Starhemberg, as his heir in his "will."

\(^{52}\) Ibid., July 28, 1934, p. 7.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., July 29, 1934, p. 3.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 2.
A few days after Dollfuß was interred, Friedrich Funder published a lengthy editorial in the Reichspost in which he reminded the Austrian people that Dollfuß was the second Austrian to die for his country. He had built upon the patriotic foundation which Seipel had constructed. Seipel was the teacher and the intellectual while Dollfuß was the practitioner of Austrian patriotism. Funder thought it only appropriate that the two men who had resurrected Austria should lie side by side in death.\(^{55}\)

Funder’s editorial was more than a journalistic tribute to two great Austrians. It was an attempt to ensure that Seipel, not Dollfuß, would be enthroned as the patron saint of Austrian patriotism. He had the foresight to recognize that the socialists as a group could never identify with any ideology which was equated with Dollfuß. Seipel, however, was not anathema to the Marxists. He had at least earned their respect if not their full forgiveness in April, 1932, when he offered Otto Bauer the office of vice-chancellor in a Christian Social—Social Democrat government. Besides, Seipel was the original source for most of the patriotic concepts advanced by Dollfuß.

Kurt von Schuschnigg, who succeeded Dollfuß as chancellor, concurred completely with Funder’s assessment of Seipel and Dollfuß. For the next four years Schuschnigg repeated Seipel’s patriotic ideas almost incessantly. The patriotic slogan which he substituted for Dollfuß’ “Österreich über alles!” was “Dreimal Österreich”—a capsule

\(^{55}\)Ibid., August 2, 1934, pp. 1-2.
version of Seipel's Austrian mission. Seipel's influence moreover can be detected on virtually every page of the patriotic catechism which Schuschnigg published in 1938, appropriately enough under the title, Dreimal Österreich.

There were no free elections in Austria between 1934 and 1938 because Schuschnigg did not dare take any action which might alienate Mussolini. The latter was already deeply suspicious of the Austrian chancellor. He had previously informed Starhemberg: "I know that you and the Heimatschutz are in sympathy with Fascism; but how about Schuschnigg? Schuschnigg is Tyrolese, and strong propaganda is being made there about South Tyrol. Schuschnigg's friends at Innsbruck talk a lot about South Tyrol." During his four year tenure as Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg did indeed prove that he was no fascist. Although Schuschnigg preserved some fascist trappings in order to appease Mussolini, Austria, Nonetheless, could scarcely be classified as a fascist state during his administration.

When the Anschluss between Germany and Austria was finally consummated in 1938 it was not because there were no Austrian patriots; it was because Mussolini had sold out Austria and Schuschnigg to Hitler. Although there is no way to determine exactly how the

56Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, p. 189. Mussolini apparently did not have any reason to fear that Dollfuß might demand the return of the South Tyrol to Austria. As early as 1918 Dollfuß had stated: "As far as I'm concerned, let's give Italy the South Tyrol up to the Salzburger Klauss. But the rest of the Austria-Hungary must stay as it is in its historic frontiers." See Brook-Shepherd, Prelude to Infamy, p. 24.
Austrian people would have voted in a free plebiscite in 1938 if they had been given an opportunity, most of the disinterested observers in Austria at the time felt. Schuschnigg would have won a free election rather easily. Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick, a reporter for The New York Times, for instance, stated that the Nazi leaders with whom she spoke "admitted that they could not get more than 20 percent of the votes in the city of Vienna."

57 If the Nazi spokesmen were well informed, then Hitler could scarcely have expected to receive more than 30 percent of the vote nationwide. Most estimates above that figure assume that a large number of socialists defected to the ranks of the Nazis, although the general consensus of most informed scholars has been that the socialists constituted some of Austria's most determined defenders.

The evidence, which to a large extent is purely circumstantial, indicates that Austrian patriotism peaked sometime after the death of Engelbert Dollfuß, when the Socialists began to reaffirm their faith in their Austrian fatherland. Although Schuschnigg lacked the

passionate style of speaking necessary to arouse the masses, there is no reason to believe that there was any substantial decline in the strength of Austrian patriotism after 1934. With the death of Dollfuß and the elimination of everything except the outward forms of fascism under Schuschnigg, the Austrian people stood to lose a lot more than they could possibly have gained through union with Germany.
Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

In 1918 the German people of Austria faced a difficult decision. The disintegration of the Habsburg empire had left them totally bewildered. They did not know if they should cling to their Austrian heritage or claim their German birthright. German citizenship would ensure relative prosperity, but it also would entail a certain amount of ego deflation. On the other hand, if they swore allegiance to the new Austrian Republic, they would be assured their dignity and self-respect and most likely a dismal economic future. The vast majority of the people were quite naturally not overly enthusiastic about either prospect.

The Austrian people quite possibly would never have seriously contemplated an Anschluss with Germany if the war had not already destroyed most of their patriotic fervor. In 1916, when Francis Joseph died, there was an almost universal clamor for peace. Although Emperor Charles immediately promised to do everything in his power to end the war as soon as possible, he was unable to fulfill his promise for another two years. The people in the meantime lost faith not only in the monarchy but in their homeland as well, because they had always considered the two to be virtually synonymous.

When World War I finally ended, no one stepped forth to espouse the cause of Austrian patriotism. The Christian Socials, who had always defended the Austrian state in the past, seemed oblivious to everything around them following the unexpected abdication of Emperor
Charles on November 11, 1918. They did not completely recover from their political stupor for another four years.

The Social Democrats, who likewise had favored the preservation of the multinational Austrian state, or in its absence, some form of Danubian confederation, underwent a political metamorphosis late in 1918 only to emerge as the most vocal advocates of an Anschluss between Germany and Austria. On the pretext that their Austrian fatherland was an underindustrialized state which was simply not viable, they insisted that their country should be merged into a greater Germany. Aware of the deep-seated hostility that most German-Austrians had harbored for Prussian-dominated Germany, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party realized that they must take immediate advantage of the Austrian identity crisis to ensure the consummation of a political union between Austria and a Marxist Germany. Philosophically, they justified their action on the premise that Marxism was synonymous with true Germanism.

Because they believed that they were involved in a race against time, the socialists used almost every political strategem imaginable to attain public support for an Anschluss with Germany. They revived most of the arguments previously advanced by the Pan-Germans. They asserted, for instance, that the Austrian Republic was one of the final obstacles to the complete unification of the German nation. They explained, moreover, that there would never be a more favorable time to rejoin their blood brothers to the north in a political union. In a different vein, they stigmatized the opponents of the Anschluss as either monarchists or friends of the French.
Although the Marxists failed to bring about an Anschluß between Germany and Austria, they did, nonetheless, create the impression that Austrian patriotism was almost nonexistent. The Social Democratic Party used the communications media so effectively that the opponents of the Anschluß hesitated to speak out for fear that no one else shared their sentiments. Although the image that the socialists had so carefully cultivated was almost exposed during the much-cited Tyrolean plebiscite, the Christian Socials at the last instance reversed themselves and voted in favor of the Anschluß in order to show their defiance of the French government.

Until 1922 Austrian patriots took little heed of the Anschluß campaign. They, too, labored under the conviction that Austria was not a viable state. As the economic situation steadily deteriorated they lost what little faith they still had in their country. By May, 1922, the few remaining individuals who still identified themselves as Austrian patriots seemed to sense that the moment had come when they must administer the last rites to their beloved state.

Ignaz Seipel was perhaps the only person who still had faith in his fatherland. He had recovered from his depressed state of mind much sooner than his fellow countrymen because he had found consolation in the Scriptures. During a period of intensive soul-searching he had concluded that God would never have permitted the dismemberment of the Habsburg empire unless He had had a good reason for so doing. Through some form of revelation Seipel convinced himself that Providence had not only assigned a new corporeal form to his fatherland that would make it possible for it to perform a vital new mission for
the world but had also singled him out as the architect of God's new order. Consequently Seipel became the foremost champion of the new Austrian state.

The keystone of Seipel's prophecy was a resurrected version of the "Austrian mission" or the "Austrian idea." At times he used these terms to describe Austria's spiritual obligation to carry Germanic culture to the backward Balkans and to the Slavic peoples. He also believed that Austria's mission was to champion the concept of a multinational state and to uphold international organizations, such as the League of Nations. At still other times he used the Austrian idea to refer to a United Europe, a Danubian confederation, or any international political entity that was not a nation-state. But no matter how the terms were defined, Seipel explained that the Austrian Republic was destined for greatness, not on the battlefield but in the realm of ideas, if it would only accept the task which God had assigned it.

Seipel's concept of the Austrian mission provided the missing ingredient that was essential for Austrian patriotism. For the first time since the collapse of the old empire, the people of Austria were offered the opportunity to achieve self-respect as Austrians instead of as Germans. By acknowledging the validity of the Austrian idea, the Austrian people could claim credit for any future movement in the field of internationalization. On the other hand, if they gave their assent to the Anschluß, they would permanently forfeit their right to lead. Inspired by the potential greatness that Seipel had envisioned for them, many Austrians began advocating the maintenance
of the independence of their fatherland.

Seipel also aided the cause of Austrian patriotism immeasurably by convincing the Austrian people that the repudiation of the Anschluß was not a repudiation of the German nation. He constantly explained that nation, state, and church were co-equals and that each provided an essential service in a different dimension. He asserted, moreover, that nationalism, or the union of the nation and the state, was a passing phenomenon which contradicted God's master plan for the universe. He also pointed out that the state and the nation had each achieved some of their greatest accomplishments during the middle ages, when they had been independent of one another. Finally, Seipel reminded the German people of Austria that if they successfully executed the Austrian mission with which they had been entrusted they would bring glory not only to the Austrian Republic but to the German nation as well. By implication, he suggested that if they shunned their appointed task, they would disgrace not only themselves but the entire German nation.

Ignaz Seipel created a favorable environment in which Austrian patriotism could flourish. By successfully and dramatically negotiating an unprecedented international loan guaranteed by the League of Nations, he swept away the lingering despair that had almost driven the Austrian people into the arms of Germany. The magnitude of his financial success, moreover, finally convinced the Austrian people that their fatherland could live.

At the very moment it appeared that he had miraculously resuscitated Austrian patriotism, Seipel unwittingly jeopardized the
future of his fatherland. In 1922 he made the serious mistake of identifying patriotism with anti-socialism because at the time the Austrian Marxists were the principal advocates of the Anschluß. His unfortunate assumption made it virtually impossible for the Social Democrats to switch their allegiance from Germany to Austria. Furthermore, at the time of the July revolt of 1927 Seipel again harmed the cause of Austrian patriotism in his haste to save his country from the "Bolsheviks." His blind commitment to the anti-socialist crusade only popularized fascism at the expense of patriotism.

Seipel's subsequent actions did little to revitalize Austrian patriotism. His speech, "The True Countenance," for instance, soon convinced numerous individuals, including the Nazis that he was no longer opposed to union with Germany. His personal interest in patriotism, moreover, steadily declined as he concentrated more and more on constitutional reform.

When Schober advocated the Austro-German customs union project, Seipel finally realized that a country devided against itself cannot stand. Although he wisely extended the olive branch to the Social Democrats, they politely declined it. They had not yet recovered from the wounds that they had suffered at his hands.

In May, 1932, Dollfuß pleaded with the Social Democrats to form a patriotic alliance against the Nazis, who were publicly committed to Anschluß with Germany. The Marxists, however, rejected his appeal because he would not consent to new elections. Infuriated because the socialists had not rushed to the defense of their country, Dollfuß turned to the fascists for help. Although the Social Democrats made
a conciliatory gesture to Dollfuß in August, 1932, on the occasion of Seipel's death, the Austrian chancellor expressed no interest whatsoever in a rapprochement with the Austrian Marxists. He obviously believed that the independence of Austria could be ensured without the support of the Social Democrats, who claimed the allegiance of almost fifty percent of the Austrian people.

Over the next few months Dollfuß convinced himself that the Social Democrats constituted as great a threat to the Austrian state as did the Nazis. He therefore decided to create an authoritarian state to guarantee the political independence of his fatherland. When parliamentary government collapsed in Austria in March, 1933, he proceeded to rule by emergency decree. Freed of all legislative checks and balances, Dollfuß turned to Mussolini for protection against Nazi Germany. At the insistence of his new political mentor, he pursued a vigorous anti-Marxist policy, which culminated in a brief but disastrous civil war in February, 1934.

The decision of Dollfuß to resort to violence had tragic consequences for the cause of Austrian patriotism. Since March, 1933, the Social Democrats had repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to defend their Austrian fatherland. On April 12 they withdrew from the Anschluss movement. In May Friedrich Adler once again denounced union with Germany. Then in September the Marxists offered Dollfuß the support of their paramilitary organizations in the defense of the Austrian state if he would only call a halt to the persecution of the Socialist Party. In January, 1934, they once again pleaded with the Austrian chancellor to form a united front against the Nazis before
it was too late. After the bloody civil war the socialists, however, began to wonder if they might not be better off in Nazi Germany.

The brutal assassination of Dollfuß by a group of Nazis in July, 1934, prompted the socialists to reaffirm their loyalty to Austria. Although Schuschnigg did not openly acknowledge their support, he revealed his true colors by refusing to enforce most of the harsh anti-socialist measures initiated by his predecessor. At long last Austrian patriotism had lost its partisan coloration.

The death of Dollfuß marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Austrian patriotism. World opinion was so outraged by this act of infamy that Hitler disbanded the Austrian Legion and temporarily abandoned his effort to consummate a union between Germany and Austria. For the next two years Schuschnigg inundated the Austrian people with patriotic literature. His efforts to instill in the Austrian people a love for their fatherland seemed to have at least some success. Most disinterested observers, for instance, have generally agreed that in a free plebiscite the Austrian people would have opted not for Anschluss with Germany but for independence.

Following the German invasion of Austria on March 11, 1938, Austrian patriots were forced to go underground. When they resurfaced at the end of World War II, they were led by the socialist Karl Renner. The Christian Socials and Social Democrats had finally learned that a nation divided against itself cannot stand.
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