INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
COUMONT, Eileen Ann, 1944-.  
THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURE OF POPE'S ILIAD: A  
STUDY IN THE POETICS OF AUGUSTAN EPIC.  

Rice University, Ph.D., 1973  
Language and Literature, general

University Microfilms, A Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright  
Eileen Ann Coumont  
1973
RICE UNIVERSITY

THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURE OF POPE'S ILIAD:
A STUDY IN THE POETICS OF AUGUSTAN EPIC

by

Eileen Ann Coumont

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's signature:

Houston, Texas

May 1973
ABSTRACT

The Rhetorical Structure of Pope's Iliad:
A Study in the Poetics of Augustan Epic

Eileen Ann Coumont

Director: Monroe K. Spears

Many critics have warned against measuring Pope's "Homer" by ours. Acknowledging only stylistic and ideological differences, however, most judge Pope's local variations upon the Greek according to their own--rather than Pope's--interpretation of the larger thematic and structural patterns of the original. To understand why Pope renders the Iliad as he does, we need to know how he read it.

Renaissance critics inherited from the Middle Ages a body of epic theory based on the epideictic and Chrisitan allegorical reading of Virgil's Aeneid. This epideictic model demanded a central hero, an exemplum of sapientia et fortitudo. When the text of the Iliad was recovered late in the fifteenth century, Achilles' role was found to be neither central nor exemplary; the Iliad would not be reconciled to the epic tradition until the moral rhetoric of the genre was
displaced from exemplum to fable, from character to the structure of action. The epideictic model had been challenged by apologists for the romance form, by the Castelvetran Aristotelians and by the French formalists. In 1675 Le Bossu's popular Traité defended Homer's hero and structure, interpreting the Iliad's unity of action as a logical proof of the moral that discord ruins and concord preserves states.

Refining upon Le Bossu, and drawing upon the affective Longinian structural theories of John Dennis, Pope reconciles the moral terms of Renaissance epic to an Augustan poetic. The structure of his Iliad is rhetorical--linear and periodic. By a combination of incremental repetition, timed release, and techniques of anticipation and delay, claims Pope, Homer has created a climactic structure in which Achilles' reappearance is the most important event of the epic. The last battle climaxes a rising progression of martial prowess and horror; and finally, admiration for the hero's fortitudo is climaxed by admiration for his sapientia, the humane virtues he reveals in Books XXIII and XXIV.

Pope does not restructure the Iliad by reassembling its parts. By a combination of stylistic resources, however, he revises significantly the relationships of these parts to one another and to the whole of the epic. Because Pope's rhetor-
ical structure works by sequences of comparisons and by incremental progressions, the most important of these stylistic resources are the dialectical force of the heroic couplet and the principle of stylistic decorum, a form of Aristotelian energia. Within given passages, and over sequences of dialogue and narrative, Pope's couplets and the progressive energia of his stylistic decorum shape the reader's response to the moral significance of Homer's action.
CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................. 1

Chap. I. Critical Backgrounds of Pope's Rhetorical Structure: The Iliad and Epic Tradition. 13

i. Medieval, Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Aristotelianism: The Epideictic versus the Formalist Traditions 18

ii. Le Bossu's Logical Structure and Circumstantial Rhetoric 49

iii. Dennis and the Structural Sublime 69

Chap. II. The Rhetorical Structure of Pope's Iliad 89

i. Logical, "Existential" and Rhetorical Structures 91

ii. Pope's Rhetorical Structure 99

iii. Characterization and Structure 125

iv. The Wrath of Achilles 131

Chap. III. Style and Rhetorical Structure 174

i. Decorum of Style and Structure 176

ii. Pope's Epic Voice: Dialectic and Climax in the Similes 194

iii. Style and Structure in Pope's and Dryden's Versions of Iliad I 213

Conclusion ................................................... 237

Bibliography of Works Cited ................................ 243
INTRODUCTION

Four years before the publication of the first volume of his translation of the *Iliad*, Pope synthesized in *An Essay on Criticism* (1711) the best of the classical, Renaissance and neo-classical critical tradition, and presented this synthesis as a corrective to what he saw as his contemporaries' excessively narrow and *a priori* standards of literary judgment. Against those critics who judged according to "a Love of Parts" (288) or condemned as "Error" what might prove, once the poet's intention was understood, to be "Stratagem" (179), he argued for a more inductive approach to literature, an approach which took into account the distinctive part-to-whole and means-to-end dynamics of a given work. ¹ The separate elements of a literary work must be approved, not by the authority of rules, but as they contribute to a successful whole:

In Wit, as Nature, what affects our Hearts
Is not th' Exactness of peculiar Parts;
'Tis not the Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call,
But the joint Force and full Result of all.

Thus when we view some well-proportion'd Dome,
(The World's just Wonder, and ev'n thine 0 Rome!)
No single Parts unequally surprize;
All comes united to th' admiring Eyes;
No monstrous Height, or Breadth, or Length appear;
The Whole at once is Bold, and Regular.²
These are the standards which guide Pope's critical "Observations" on the *Iliad*; as Homer's critic, he follows his own advice—"Still with it self compar'd, his Text peruse" (128).

Only within the past twenty years, however, have we begun to read Pope's *Iliad* with the same justice. Douglas Knight, in his *Pope and the Heroic Tradition: A Study of His Iliad*, demonstrates the consistency of Pope's heroic style, the coherence of interpretation by which he characteristically modifies Homer's theology and, finally, the continuity of this interpretation with the heroic tradition which culminates in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. More recently, Knight has distinguished three aspects of Pope's "response to an overarching concept of the whole" of the *Iliad*. In addition to its "economy" (TE VII clxvi) and its combination of "extension on the one hand, coherence and consistency on the other" (TE VII clxix), Pope is struck by the *Iliad*’s "firmness of design . . . especially in the great similes and characters. Each is characterized by individuality and placement--by being something in itself and yet contributing to the larger situation" (TE VII clxv). Finally, Reuben A. Brower describes how Pope consciously "transformed Homer while trying to satisfy contemporary standards of the 'heroic' and the 'poetic'."

That Pope's translation embodies a recognition and an interpretation of Homer's "firmness of design" we are now prepared to accept. On the question of Pope's Homer versus
ours, however, even the best of recent critical studies is vitiated by confused and contradictory assumptions. Most critics warn against confounding "our" Homer and Pope's, but consider the distinctions only stylistic and ideological; none has explained what "design" Pope recognizes in the Iliad, or how his characteristically Augustan modifications constitute a structural interpretation of Homer's epic. Pope provides a clue to this "design" in the "Preface" to the Iliad, where he refers his reader to "Bossu's admirable Treatise of the Epic Poem [For] the justest notion of Homer's Design and Conduct" (TE VII 23). Douglas Knight ignores Le Bossu and attributes Pope's modification of Homeric ideology chiefly to the example of Milton. Both Knight and Brower ignore their own warnings, and proceed to argue as if Pope read Homer as we do, but conscientiously revised the Iliad according to neo-classical tastes.

In order to understand why Pope altered the Iliad as he did, we need to know how he read it—what he conceived to be the formal and thematic patterns which he must adapt from Homer's medium to his own. Medieval and Renaissance scholars have long realized that Dante read Virgil, Milton read Plato and Chapman read Homer through the best critiques and commentaries available to them. Several critics have realized that Augustan imitations of the classics must be treated as new poetic wholes; and that in explaining variations upon the original we must consult contemporary, rather
than modern, commentaries. If our Homer is the Homer of
Parry, Bowra and Whitman, Pope's is essentially the Homer
of Eustathius and Le Bossu, authors of the two most exten-
sive critical commentaries on the Iliad available to him.

The selective anachronism which limits our apprehension
of Pope's design also tends to produce curiously distorted
estimations of his local achievements. A critic may praise
some part of the translation as exemplary Augustan poetry
but at the same time judge its success as Homeric interpre-
tation in terms of his own--rather than Pope's--conception
of the part-to-whole dynamics of the original. Thus Norman
Callan, by no means insensitive to the poetry of a given
passage, finds that he must nevertheless condemn Pope's
characteristically Virgilian treatment of Homeric simile
as 'inadequate' due to its excessive "literalness in inter-
preting the implications" of the original (TE VII xcviii):

If the Homeric simile is made the test of the
translator, then it must be admitted that Pope
is unequal in his performance. That this is so
is perhaps as much due to the age in which he
wrote as to any failure of poetic vision. These
similes are unlike anything else in poetry. They
are points of rest amid the violence of the poem,
and not parallels in the sense that Virgil and his
successors made them. Some of them afford such
parallels, of course. . . . But more often than
not they introduce a different mode of experience;
they are essentially moments of tranquillity which
underline violence only by contrast and the sense
of shock with which the reader is brought back
from them to the narrative.

(TE VII xcvii)
I shall discuss Pope's similes more at length in a later chapter; the point to be made here is that for Pope, Virgil and Homer (taking into account their very different poetic methods and media) simile is one part of a complex and various style of narrative--not a digression from it. Nor, as part of narrative, is the simile incapable of "introducing a different mode of experience" or "underlining violence ... by contrast." Callan seems to consider his "sense of shock" the result of a deliberate Homeric strategy; his "shock" is more probably affective, the reaction of a modern literary sensibility--trained on imagism and a poetics of discontinuity--to the only apparently kindred parataxis of the oral-formulaic style. Because he has taken into account neither the oral-formulaic nor the Augustan heroic poetic, Callan's simile is neither Homer's nor Pope's.

Related to the fallacy of selective anachronism is what William Frost calls "the mechanical theory of translation," the setting up of the original poem as a kind of target at which the translator is assumed to be shooting, and the grading or rating of his marksmanship by some quasi-mathematical, or at any rate 'objective,' formula easy to apply to the parts of the translation; for the mechanical theory customarily neglects the new poem as a whole. . . . The most available part of the translation is of course, the words themselves. . . . The great weakness of the exact-verbal meaning approach to translation of literature is its tendency to proceed from the assumed premise that the value of the original consists in the brilliance of this
or that detached passage. . . . Or perhaps the assumption is that a congeries of such passages accounts for its value. Treatment of fragments of the translation seems to imply that the original is being also thought of as fragmentary. 9

In an otherwise acute description of Pope's method, Callan ignores the larger context of a passage to praise its ultimate local fidelity to the original:

Pope's method is that of dissipation to recreate. He takes the constituent elements of a passage, sometimes giving them a slightly different turn, and weaves them into a new pattern, which substantially retains the sense of the original. . . . Indeed, when translating Homer's verse he tends to treat it as his own, and the story that he got passages by heart is consistent with this, for he not only recasts the passage, but sometimes imports into it ideas or images that have gone before or that follow later. (TE VII xcii)

In a given passage, Pope's method is not much more conservative than what Dryden terms "imitation," a method freer than either metaphorise or paraphrase, "where the translator (if now he has not lost that name) assumes the liberty not only to vary from the words and sense, but to forego them both as he sees occasion, and taking only some general hints from the original, to run division on the ground-work, as he pleases." 10

We need to know what Pope conceived the "ground-work" of the Iliad to be. His local modifications are governed by a coherent and inclusive interpretation of its meaning. Even a cursory reading of his Observations suggests that Pope thought of the Iliad as "fragmentary" no more than we do.
If we are to understand the real achievements—and the limitations—of Pope's translation as an aesthetic whole, we must know what he thought to be the Iliad's structural dynamics, its principles of part-to-part and part-to-whole coherence, sequence and unity. Secondly, we must consider how he was able to render these larger patterns stylistically.

Taking warning by Frost's remarks, it might be well to state as clearly as possible our own twentieth-century understanding of the Iliad's structural dynamics, and then to set down some preliminary distinctions between our Homer and Pope's. I do not mean to suggest, at any point in this study, either that Pope's Iliad is a complete distortion of Homer's or that ours is the authoritative reading. We have not yet succeeded in reconciling the oral-formulaic style, as we understand it, to modern literary critical methods; and Pope considered the Iliad a "literary epic" like the Aeneid. My purpose is to isolate the distinctive structural and stylistic dynamics of Pope's version by comparing two coherent literary "wholes," our interpretation of the Iliad and Pope's.

Modern criticism, attempting to defend the artistry of the Iliad against nineteenth-century primitivist and multiple-lay theories, has distinguished three principles, or dimensions, of structural unity in Homer's narrative:
the literal, or temporal-linear, which follows the course and effects of Achilles' anger in the tenth year of the war against Troy; the temporal-symbolic, which suggests, from the mustering of troops to the ominous fall of Hector, the course of the entire war, and thereby sets Achilles' wrath against a larger context of death, defeat and victory; and the geometric, a complex chiastic disposition of episodes which Cedric Whitman and others have termed "ring structure."

The simultaneous fulfillment of these three structural patterns in Book XXIV results in a powerful existential statement on human achievement against human mortality, the recognition of which climaxes the development of Achilles' character and resolves his anger. What Erich Auerbach sees as the objectivity, the "perpetual foreground" of Homer's narrative is both universalized and in a sense evaluated by the interplay of the two non-literal dimensions upon the strictly temporal-linear.11

Pope reads and therefore translates Homer's thematic and formal design quite differently. He responds, for the most part, to what we would call the temporal-linear dimension; even allowing for some distortion, his response to this dimension is far more acute than ours.12 Following the Traité du poème épique (1675) of René Le Bossu, Pope "re-structures" the Iliad toward the argument of its "great Moral": "that Concord, among Governours, is the preservation of States, and Discord the ruin of them" (TE VIII 591).
Although Pope uses Le Bossu's insights frequently throughout his Observations and appends to the fifth volume of his *Odyssey* extracts from Mr. W. J.'s English version (1695), the structure in which he sees this "great Moral" embodied is distinctively Augustan. Refining upon Le Bossu, Pope sees the *Iliad*’s unity as rhetorical and thematic, its structural patterns as linear, dialectic and periodic. When read this way, the *Iliad*’s balance of structure, character and themes must be significantly readjusted.

George DeF. Lord argues that George Chapman's translation of the *Odyssey* marks an "Homeric Renaissance"; it is no exaggeration to say that Pope's translation of the *Iliad* marks a second "Homeric Renaissance." The textual and the critical recoveries of the *Iliad* were not simultaneous, because of the difficulty of assimilating its hero and its structure to the existing epic tradition. Chapman defended the piecemeal publication of his translation of the *Iliad* by appealing to the theory of a Pistratid recension: because the epic was no more than a collection of heroic lays, there would be little point in rendering it as a literary whole. We cannot know how sincerely Chapman believed in his own excuse; but his failure with the *Iliad* is symptomatic of the failure of his age to come to terms with heroic structures and themes less compatible with its own critical theories than the *Odyssey*’s.
Many of the issues which delayed the critical acceptance of the *Iliad* are resolved in Pope's interpretation and translation. By embodying what is essentially a Renaissance epic "moral" in a style and structure which are distinctively Augustan, he is able to recover more of the *Iliad* than had been possible according to earlier theories of epic poetry.
NOTES

1 For Pope's comments on the part-to-whole dynamic, see An Essay on Criticism, 128-29, 169-74, 263-66, 285-88; for the means-to-end dynamic, see 118-23, 146-49, 152-57, 163-64, 179-80, 254-58. See also his "Postscript to the Odyssey."


7 For Pope's Horace, see Lillian D. Bloom, "Pope as Textual Critic: A Bibliographical Study of His Horatian

8


9


10


11


12

CHAPTER I. CRITICAL BACKGROUNDS OF POPE'S RHETORICAL
STRUCTURE: THE ILIAD AND EPIC TRADITION

When Pope undertook in his Observations on the Iliad to
collect those comments of his predecessors which concerned
"the Poetry or Art" of Homer, he found that "It is no easy
task to make something out of a hundred Pedants that is not
Pedantical":

It is something strange that of all the Commenta-
tors upon Homer, there is hardly one whose principal
design is to illustrate the Poetical Beauties of
the Author. They are voluminous in explaining
those Sciences which he made but subservient to his
Poetry, and sparing only upon that Art which con-
stitutes his Character. This has been occasioned
by the Ostentation of Men who had more Reading than
Taste, and were fonder of showing their Variety of
Learning in all Kinds, than their single Under-
standing in Poetry. Hence it comes to pass that
their Remarks are rather Philosophical, Historical,
Geographical, Allegorical, or in short any thing
than Critical and Poetical. Even the Grammarians,
tho' their whole Business and Use be only to
render the Words of an Author intelligible, are
strangely touched with the Pride of doing something
more than they ought.

(TE VII 82)

Pope's complaint suggests the necessary eclecticism of his
Observations, which include material from several apparently
incompatible traditions. He draws upon the moral and rhet-
orical commentaries of the ancients, medieval allegorical
explication, the Aristotelian commentaries of the Italian
Renaissance—which tended toward comparison of Roman and Greek, ancient and modern epic, and the works of the seventeenth-century French formalists. Among those sources most frequently cited are Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *De Compositione Verborum* and *De Oratorum Figuris* (first century B.C.); Quintilian's *De Institute Oratoria* (first century); Plutarch's *Quaestiones Convivales* and *De Audiendis Poetis* (second century); Macrobius' *Saturnalia* (fifth century); the *Parekbolai* on Homer by Eustathius, Bishop of Thessalonica (twelfth century); Scaliger's *Poetices Libri Septem* (1561); and the works of two of René Le Bossu's disciples—André Dacier's *La Poetique d'Aristote avec des Remarques* (1692) and Anne Dacier's Homeric translations and commentaries (1711).

Both the variety and the necessary eclecticism of Pope's sources can be explained by an odd fact of literary history: for the most part, western European epic theory had evolved in ignorance of Homer's *Iliad*. The text of the *Iliad*, preserved by Byzantine scholars, was finally brought to Italy in the fifteenth century, when Pope Nicholas V undertook to collect manuscripts of the Greek classics and have them translated into Latin.¹ The *editio princeps*, by Demetrius Chalcondyles, was published at Florence in 1488.² Meanwhile, the epic theory which the Middle Ages had developed upon what it took to be Virgil's example and Horace's pre-
cept had developed into a conception of the nature of heroic poetry which could not easily be read into the Iliad.

Historically, the rediscovery of Aristotle's Poetics was nearly contemporary with the rediscovery of Homer's Iliad; it was first printed by Aldus Manutius, along with the Rhetoric, in the Rhetores Graeci issued at Venice in 1508-1509. Before the Italian critics of the sixteenth century published their commentaries on the Poetics, discussion of what Pope was to call the "Design and Conduct" of the Iliad is virtually nonexistent. But the newly recovered Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century, with its emphasis on unity of action, found itself in conflict with the older medieval epic theory which had been accepted as Aristotelian on the authority of Averroës' paraphrase, in Hebrew, of the Poetics. This medieval theory had been founded upon the rhetorical and allegorical reading of Virgil's Aeneid as an encomiastic Bildungsroman, an allegory of the Christian soul's journey towards wisdom and virtue.

When the Greek classics were recovered, Homer's Odyssey and Xenophon's Cyropaedia were assimilated to the epideictic tradition with relative ease. But when critics turned their attention to the Iliad, they found themselves faced with a dilemma which was not to be resolved until late in the seventeenth century. Medieval and Renaissance tradition had taught that poetry ought to be morally instructive. The epic, because it placed before the reader a hero exemplary
of the highest virtue, ought to be the most morally instruc-
tive of the genres. The Iliad, however, neither conformed
to the accepted Bildungsroman pattern nor offered in the
character of Achilles a model of virtue. Although his valor
was admirable, Achilles' morals were considered vicious; and
it was only by the most selective reading that the Iliad
could be reconciled to the accepted epic tradition.

Late in the seventeenth century, René Le Bossu published
his Traité du poème épique (1675), a work devoted to the
interpretation of the Aeneid, the Iliad and the Odyssey
according to the principles of Aristotle and Horace. Through
an imaginary interlocutor, he first presents the traditional
objections to the Iliad and then exposes the critical fallacy
upon which they are based:

"But what signifies it (may some one say) if
Homer had a mind to lay down Instructions of
Morality? This does not hinder, but he might
have made choice of a Hero whom he might have
praised, and this Elogy rightly managed might
be a Fable. He was willing then to praise Achilles
and Ulysses as Xenophon did his Cyrus. Is not
this plainly the Design of Virgil? And if Homer
was less successful, ought we not to pardon the
Imperfection of those first Ages, which did not
furnish him with those great Ideas of Vertue and
those perfect Heroes which after Ages did produce?"

The Hero of Virgil is indeed a true Hero in
Morality as well as Poetry; and represents to Kings
a compleat Model of all the Vertues which conspire
to make a great Prince. This might have given that
Idea of the Epick Fable, which we are now examining.
For the Aeneid is better read and understood than
the Iliad. And Men are easily persuaded, that the
Design of these less known Pieces is the same with
that which they are so well acquainted with. Be-
sides, this judgment is backed by that noble Idea
Men commonly conceive of the Valour of Achilles, and of the consummated Prudence of Ulysses. These are almost the two only things which the generality of the World are acquainted with in the Greek Poems: which may have induced them to believe that the Fables of Homer are the Panegyricks of Achilles and Ulysses.  

The significance of Le Bossu's rejection of the epideictic, or "Virgilian," reading of the Iliad is threefold. First, it calls for a more inductive apprehension of the design of a given literary work than tradition allowed. Second, it distinguishes between the "heroes" of literary tradition and of Christian—or christianized—ethics. Finally, and most important for the understanding of Pope's achievement, it opens the way for a conception of narrative structure which is neither epideictic nor devoid of moral instruction, a narrative structure which teaches by the moral direction of its action rather than the virtuous example of its hero.

One might have expected to find the Iliad vindicated upon the first application of Aristotle's principle of the unity of action. This was not, in fact, the case. Insistence upon the unity of action tended toward a probabilistic theory of narrative which advocated the repression of those marvels and machines common to romance and Homeric epic. Furthermore, the epideictic was so firmly associated with moral instruction that in denying the one, commentators on Aristotle often felt obliged to deny the other. Thus until Le Bossu discovered a means to reconcile Aristotelian unity
of action with the moral and rhetorical expectations of traditional epic theory, the *Iliad* was bound to remain a source of controversy.

Pope's translation of the *Iliad* is heavily indebted to Le Bossu; but because the *Traité*'s analysis of the *Iliad* is general and comparative, it could not guide a translator at every point. Pope often had recourse to other sources, ancient, medieval, Renaissance and modern. To understand how he refined upon Le Bossu, in the course of creating an answerable style and structure, it will be necessary to consider his *Iliad* in the context of the larger issues of critical controversy.

i. Medieval, Renaissance and Seventeenth-century Aristotelianism: The Epideictic versus the Formalist Traditions

It is to an extent true that Renaissance Italy "rediscovered" Aristotle, and with Aristotle the principle of a more purely aesthetic unity of action than the didactic medieval model, the encomiastic *Bildungsroman*, could have accommodated. In his survey of the classical and Renaissance backgrounds of Restoration and eighteenth-century epic theory, H. T. Swedenberg, Jr. turns directly from the classical Greek and Roman critics to the theorists of sixteenth-century Italy. He dismisses the medieval phase as unimportant except insofar as its allegorical defenses of pagan poetry against ecclesiastical strictures influence Renaissance
literary theory and practice. J. E. Spingarn argues the same point: "until some rational answer to the objections urged against poetry in the Middle Ages was forthcoming, literary criticism in any true sense was fundamentally impossible; and that answer came only with the recovery of Aristotle's Poetics."^8

There can be little doubt that the sixteenth-century Italians regarded the Poetics as an important new discovery. Bernardo Segni, in the Preface to his translation (1549), claims that the Poetics "has been abandoned and neglected for a long time"; Bernardo Tasso (1559) refers to the work as "buried for so long a time in the obscure shadows of ignorance"; and Robortello (1548) claims that "it lay neglected almost until these times of ours."^9 In his commentary on Chapter VI of the Poetics (1571), Castelvetro anticipates Le Bossu in castigating an older and apparently non-Aristotelian notion of poetic unity with all the vehemence of a reformer:

If the plot is the end of tragedy, and consequently of every sort of poem, for the plot holds the same place in every sort of poem as in tragedy,—if the plot is final, and not a thing accessory to the morals of the agents, but on the contrary the morals do not hold the final place and are accessory to the plot, it follows that many authors of high reputation for letters among the ancients and the moderns, among whom is even Julius Caesar Scaliger, have greatly erred, for they think the intention of good poets, like Homer and Virgil in their most famous works, the Iliad, the Odyssey and the Aeneid, has been to depict and to show to the world, let us say, a general portrayed in the most
excellent manner that is possible, as a valorous leader, or a wise man, and their nature, and the like absurdities. For if this is true the moral habits of characters would not have been chosen to second the action, as Aristotle says, but the action would have been chosen to second the characteristics. In addition, it would happen that if such material were principal and not accessory, it could not be poetic material, since it is naturally philosophical and taken from many philosophers, especially Aristotle and Theophrastus.10

Scaliger had offended by reaffirming the advantages of the encomiastic epic structure, in which the action exists only to illustrate and recommend the virtues of an exemplary hero. He argued that Virgil was a better poet than Homer because his Aeneas, perfect in both public and private virtues, was a more worthy example for imitation than either Achilles or Odysseus: "Virgil set out to unite in Aeneas alone the valor of Achilles and the prudence of Ulysses, and added to them piety. He eliminated the rashness of the one and removed the craft of the second, and transferred rashness to Turnus and craft to Sinon."11

Castelvetro's insistence on the preeminence of the unity of action led to a rationalist Aristotelianism which virtually drained the epic of moral content. Pleasure, he claimed, is the end of narrative poetry; unity of action pleases because it displays the poet's cleverness of construction.

For it is not to be wondered at if a number of actions by one person, or one action of one people, or a number of actions by several persons delight us and render us eager to hear them, for because of the number of actions, variety,
novel happenings, and multitude of persons and peoples, the plot carries with it pleasures and greatness and magnificence. Yet in that narration, though in itself it brings about the end of poetry, the ability of the poet does not show to much advantage. But in the narration of a single action of a single person, which at first sight does not appear to have power to cause an audience to listen with pleasure, there is revealed the judgment and the industry of the poet, since he does with one action of one person what others scarcely are able to bring about with many actions by many persons. Therefore Homer is much to be commended, for with but one action by Achilles, and that of lesser importance, namely an instance of anger, he knew how to plan the fabric of so excellent a plot. Similarly from one action by Ulysses, that is, his return from Calypso to his native land, he planned a second web not less wonderful. From this it is to be concluded that the plot of a tragedy or of a comedy should of necessity contain one action of one person, or two that are mutually dependent, and the plot of an epic should contain one action of one person, not of necessity but to show the excellence of the poet.¹²

Castelvetro's distinction between the proper epic plot (a single action by a single person), the traditional epideictic plot (many actions by one person) and the newer romance plot (many actions by many persons or one action of one people) implied several other distinctions which were to be of increasing importance to the discussion of the epic. Among them were the issues of the marvellous, of machines and of verisimilitude.

In the debate between those critics who favored the epic and those who favored the romance, the marvellous came to be scorned as a trait of extravagant, non-classical imaginations, and epic came to be restricted almost exclusively to
the narration of probable action. By misapplying Horace's caveat against the over-vivid stage representation of shocking events ("Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem, / quam quae sunt oculis fidelibus et quae / ipse sibi tradit spectator," Ars Poetica, 180-82) and by misinterpreting Aristotle's warning against attempting to stage such an action as Achilles' pursuit of Hector around the Trojan wall (Poetics, XXIV), Castelvetro deprives the epic of the marvellous and reallocates it to tragedy. The marvellous, he claims, is necessary to excite that terror which produces compassion:

There is presented here the sixth thing required of the plot, that it may be beautiful, namely that it should be marvellous, since it is said in the definition of tragedy that it should not be merely an imitation of an action that is magnificent, perfect, etc., but also an imitation of things terrible and worthy of compassion. And because those things are terrible and excite compassion chiefly by means of the marvellous, it is not well to omit speaking of the marvellous, which generates and increases terror and compassion.  

The epic, deprived of both the moral and the marvellous, becomes a probable narrative designed to delight and to recreate the minds of the crude multitude and of the common people who do not understand the reasons and the division and the arguments, subtle and far from the practice of ordinary men, which the philosophers use ... for it naturally annoys us excessively when anyone speaks to us in such a way that we are unable to understand him.
The only surprizes allowable in epic narrative are those attributable to a change of fortune—a version of Aristotle's discovery and reversal—and therefore within the credible bounds of nature. 15

The marvellous, Castelvetro argues, is proper to epideictic and romantic structures, but no part of true epic. The events of epic ought to "depend one from another," in a purely probable sequence, "like rings joined in a chain." 16 Because both Ariosto and Virgil have violated the requirements of epic probability, their works are mixed forms of the romantic and epideictic:

If Virgil had paid attention to Aristotle's advice, he would not, in order to flatter and please the Roman people, have inserted into his poem the digression of the unregulated love of Dido for Aeneas. It is rejected in manner because Dido for the preservation of her honor killed herself, since she wished to keep her faith to her husband who was already dead. It is rejected as to time because Aeneas could not have arrived in Africa when Dido was alive. Not to mention that it does not appear that he understands that the infamy with which he attempts to soil the glory of the founder of Carthage, by speaking to the liking of the Romans, is common to Aeneas their founder; for the affair is not conducted much to his honor, but shows his great ingratitude. And perhaps it can be said that the digression made by him to the same purpose, of flattering the people of Rome or Augustus, that of the journey of Aeneas to the lower world inserted into the Aeneid, is not artistic, since in neither history nor fame did anything appear earlier of his going into the underworld. . . . Thence also it can be seen how much less daring Homer was, who causes Ulysses to see the spirits of the dead by way of incantation, while Aeneas, through the unrestrained daring of Virgil, goes in person to the lower world. . . . But let him who wishes to see an example of unfitting digres-
sions brought in to please others read those in the *Orlando Furioso* of Ariosto, introduced now by way of prophecy, now by other methods, yet none of these paths is legitimately trod by him.17

The rigor of Castelvetro's rationalist Aristotelianism is a revolutionary development in the history of epic theory, and extremely important to the development of the French formalism of the seventeenth century. His restriction of the marvellous to the vicissitudes of fortune and to the bounds of popular superstition were fundamental to this later rationalist theory, although his amoral conception of the epic's function was not. In emphasizing the power of the probable and the credible to hold an audience's attention, however, Castelvetro anticipates Le Bossu's displacement of the rhetoric of epic from the force of example to the poet's use of known circumstance.

It is not surprising that Spingarn, searching the Middle Ages for evidence of a Castelvetran reading of the Poetics, finds that "the critical ideas of the period show slight indication of Aristotelian influence."18 Aristotle had been introduced to western Europe three hundred years before the Italians recovered the text of his Poetics in Hermannus Alemannus' Latin translation of Averroès' Hebrew paraphrase. Because the paraphrase merely confirmed the epideictic reading of epic which had long since been established by the fusion of classical rhetoric and Christian allegory, it was hardly considered a revolutionary document, and caused
little stir. The importance of the paraphrase, however, ought not to be underestimated: it provided the epidictic epic with the sanction of what was to become in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the major critical treatment of the subject. The Latin version of the paraphrase survives in Europe in twenty three manuscripts and became in 1481 the first published "Aristotle." In the sixteenth century, its continuing influence is confirmed by the publication of six editions—in 1515, 1525, 1550, 1560 and 1574—and frequent citation in other Aristotelian commentaries.\(^{19}\)

It is ironic that Aristotle's *Poetics*, written in part to defend Homer from such strictures as Plato's, should be revived to sanction a fundamentally Platonic theory of poetry. Plato would allow his guardians to hear only epidictic poetry. He not only disapproved Homeric imitation of godlike and heroic character—he feared the moving force of the poetic example when improperly used, and its power to disrupt the passions of the guardian class (the appetitive element of the soul) in his ideal state (*Republic*, IX and X.)

Rhetorical and allegorical defenses of pagan literature in the Middle Ages inherited their methods and arguments from the attempts to reconcile poetry and philosophy which had begun in sixth-century B.C. Greece. Arguing for a single and non-anthropomorphic deity, and anticipating Plato, Xenophanes had complained that "Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is a shame and reproach among
men, stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other." Other Presocratics, however, among them Empedocles and Heraclitus, adopted Homer's poetic and mythopoetic methods of discussing cosmology, and thus encouraged further allegorical interpretations of the Homeric gods. Later philosophers and grammarians, such as Theogenes of Rhegium, defended the unseemly behavior of Homer's gods allegorically, explaining the Theomachy of Iliad XX, for example, as a war of the elements. The claim for Homer's universal knowledge, popularized by the Neopythagoreans, soon became commonplace. The Stoics Chrysippus and Zeno drew upon allegorical readings of Homer to lend authority to their own teachings; and Seneca was to deplore the tendency of all philosophical sects to read their own doctrines into--and then out of--Homer's epics. The moving force of Homer's poetry, which Plato had feared, was praised by Quintilian, who established the notion--commonplace in Pope's time--that Homer was the first and most accomplished of rhetoricians (X.i.46). By the first century, Philo Judaeus, a Hellenized Jew, had applied Greek allegoresis to the study of the Old Testament; and the Church Fathers were soon to adapt it to Christian interpretations of Scripture and literature in general.

Medieval Europe had no text of the Iliad. Late in the thirteenth century, Hugo of Trimburg laments the lack of a Latin version of Homer, who "apud Graecos remanens nondum est translatus." Nevertheless, medieval schoolboys read of
the Homeric heroes and the tale of Troy in the *Ilias Latina*, a poem of 1070 hexameters by "Pindarus Thebanus" which dates from the first century. More important were "Dares'" *Ephemeris belli Trojani* (fourth century) and "Dictys'" *De Excidio Troiae historia* (sixth century), based on earlier Greek models of the prose romance, which, as Ernst R. Curtius points out, helped to establish the *sapientia et fortitudo* topos as a staple of epic poetry. The importance of this epideictic topos to the history of epic is suggested by Scaliger's comparison of Virgil and Homer, which depends upon the distribution of heroic characteristics among exemplary epic personae. Furthermore, the judgments of Homeric characters established by Dictys were to survive long after the recovery of the *Iliad*, and prevent a more inductive approach to its structure and meaning. In Dictys' version, rash valor alone is shown to be inferior to a combination of *sapientia et fortitudo*: Achilles is slain by daring too much while Agamemnon survives and conquers because he is preeminent in both qualities. Like Scaliger, Christian theorists preferred a character who combined these two virtues to a character possessed of one or the other. Sidney and others were to echo the definition of heroic poetry which Isidore of Seville (seventh century) adopts in his *Etymologiae*: "It is called heroic song because it tells the deeds of brave men. For hero is the name given to men who by their wisdom and courage are worthy of heaven."
Classical rhetoric was as important a part of medieval epic theory as the allegory which it borrowed from Greece. Although the texts of Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric were unknown to medieval Europe, surviving lists of school texts affirm that Horace's Ars Poetica, Cicero's De Inventione and the Ad Herennium believed to be his, and parts of Quintilian's De Institutio Oratoria were widely read along with the works of Virgil, Lucan, Statius, Juvenal and other pagan poets. Rhetorical interpretation of poetry, as well as school exercises in epideictic rhetoric were commonplace. Book IV of St. Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana argues the importance of classical rhetoric to the proper interpretation of Scripture and to the effective teaching of Christian truth. Charlemagne writes to his bishops and abbots in 787 to warn them of the dangers of neglecting the study of pagan literary models:

We have begun to fear lest, if the knowledge of how to write should be lost, the knowledge of how to interpret the scriptures should be lost also. And while errors of speech are harmful, we all know that errors of thought are more harmful still. Therefore we exhort you not merely not to neglect the study of letters, but to pursue it with diligence, that you may be able to penetrate with ease and security into the mysteries of the Holy Scriptures. For, inasmuch as there are in the sacred books figures of speech, metaphors and other ornaments of style, it is clear that every reader will the more readily grasp the spiritual sense in proportion as he is the more instructed in the art of letters.

Pagan poetry, classical rhetoric and sacred Scripture were reconciled without much difficulty in the Middle Ages.
Even before Virgil was Christianized, his Aeneid had been read as a rhetorical narrative. In his Interpretationes Virgilianae (fourth century) Tiberius Claudius Donatus illustrates the pre-Christian, late classical tendency to read poetic narrative as encomium:

First and foremost we must know what matter (i.e., type of discourse) our Maro has taken. This is nothing other than the epideictic. It has been overlooked and hidden because while he ran through the acts of Aeneas using a marvellous epideictic form, he is also shown to have included incidents from other forms (i.e., the forensic and the deliberative). However, these are not really alien to the elements of praise, for they were included to heighten the praise of Aeneas. If anyone wants to measure Virgil's genius, his morality, the nature of his speech, his knowledge, character, and skill in rhetoric, he must first learn whom he undertakes to praise in his poem.29

Long before Donatus, Isocrates had established the panegyric oration as a didactic form which followed the outlines of the hero's biography. So in his Evagoras (fourth century B.C.) he exhorts Nicocles, newly crowned King of Cyprus, to follow the example of his father:

I have undertaken to write this discourse because I believed that for you, for your children, and for all the other descendants of Evagoras, it would be by far the best incentive, if someone should assemble his achievements, give them verbal adornment, and submit them to you for your contemplation and study. For we exhort young men to the study of philosophy by praising others in order that they, emulating those who are eulogized, may desire to adopt the same pursuits.30

The epideictic and the allegorical interpretations of narrative structure are combined by the Christian mytho-
grapher Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe (467-532) in his *Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae secundum Philosophos moralis. "Virgil" himself explains the arrangement of the first line of his *Aeneid* as a signal that the work is to be an encomium on the virtue of fortitude, not a logical or historical discourse.

Although in following the rules of logical discourse one ought to mention the person first and then his attribute, . . . because I have followed the rules for praise, I have mentioned the excellence of the man before the man himself, whereby one encounters the person only after the quality of his virtue has been noted. There may be many men, but not all are praiseworthy. Therefore I placed the virtue first.31

In the course of the allegory which follows this preface, Fulgentius illustrates what Donatus meant by the use of forensic and deliberative digressions to heighten the encomium of the exemplary hero. These are the dangers, the evil, non exemplary characters, and the warnings that Aeneas encounters on his allegorical path to wisdom and virtue. The following synopsis suggests Fulgentius' method of analysis:

**Book I. Allegory of birth** (shipwreck; Juno as the goddess of birth) and entry into a life of pain (Aeolus as perdition).

**Books II and III.** Naive imagination and the perils of childhood: Cyclops as youthful vanity conquered by good sense (Ulysses); Polyphemus as the threat of lost reputation avoided by escape. Death of Anchises signals the end of parental authority.

**Book IV.** Youth enjoys independence, but gives way to lust (Dido) until freed by intellect (Mercury). Love turns to ashes (Dido's pyre).

**Book V.** Aeneas returns to his father's example, devoting himself to valorous exercise (funeral games).
Book VI. Aeneas seeks wisdom (Apollo's temple), plunges into philosophy (descent to the underworld), where he learns the secret of things. Time (Chiron) guides him over the troubled waters of youth. He encounters the quarrels which divide men (Cerberus); learns of the future, and reflects upon lust (Dido's ghost) and affection (Anchises' ghost). His education is complete.

Book VII. Aeneas attains increase of god (Ausonia) and espouses the via laborum (Lavinia).

Book VIII. Aeneas allies himself with the good man (Evander, the "Greek" equivalent of vir bonus) and learns how virtue triumphs over vice (Hercules and Cacus).

Books IX to XII. Clad in the arms of the spirit (Vulcan's armor) Aeneas combats the attacks of the vice of rage (Turnus), which is led by drunkenness (Metis) and stubbornness (Iuturna from diuturna) and assisted by blasphemy (Mezentius) and folly (Messapus). Wisdom and virtue triumph over passion.32

Although details vary, Pulgentian analysis of Virgil's allegorical and epideictic structure continues throughout the Middle Ages.33 In his commentary on the first six books of the Aeneid, Bernard of Chartres (twelfth century) claims that Virgil writes "in his capacity of philosopher, on the nature of human life. This is his method: under a veil he describes what the human spirit does or suffers, while temporarily placed in the human body."34 John of Salisbury (twelfth century), who also wrote a commentary on Aeneid I-VI, reads into the poem the same allegorical structure, adding that since the Greek root ennaios signifies "inhabitant," Aeneas is to be interpreted as the human soul.35 "The most striking result of this process," comments O. B. Hardison, "is the revision of the structure of the poem."36
For a Christian hero, the *summum bonum* was beatitude. Thus Bernard of Chartres and John of Salisbury read the progress of Aeneas from shipwreck to the underworld as the progress of the human soul from birth to death, from naiveté and original sin to wisdom and the regeneration which makes the soul, in Isidore's phrase, "worthy of heaven."
The *sapientia et fortitudo* topos becomes, in the linear, allegorical interpretive tradition, a structural determinant: the hero's moral progress (*sapientia*) is figured in his martial, geographical or biological progress (*fortitudo*)—martial in Fulgentius and geographical or biological in Bernard and John. The literal level not only figures the moral; more important, it is itself the rhetoric which moves men to imitate the moral. Whatever marvels on the literal level contribute to the hero's martial stature serve also to recommend his moral example—the more hyperbolic the episode the better. According to Curtius, the two most common eideictic topoi—both forms of hyperbole—were the "inexpressibility topos" and the "outdoing topos." The panegyric *vitae sanctorum* which appeared in the fifth century, for example, made much use of the hyperbole: "the saint must have performed as many miracles as possible." Medieval poets found models of such hyperboles in Homer, Virgil, Statius and Lucan. Curtius has stressed the importance of panegyrical techniques to the understanding of medieval poetry of all
kinds; the Laus was a common genre, and although usually applied to a given virtue, it could great almost any subject.

Like many later Renaissance commentators, Averroës interpreted Aristotle's account of the evolution of poetic genres as a prescriptive statement on the epideictic nature of all poetry. In Chapter IV of the Poetics Aristotle had traced the divergence of different modes of mimesis. The more serious poets, he says, imitated the noble actions of noble characters, while the less serious imitated the common actions of lesser men. Thus evolved hymn and panegyric, on the one hand, and invective on the other. In rhetorical terms, panegyric and invective are both forms of the epideictic; Averroës therefore claims that all poetry is by nature epideictic.

Aristotle says that all poetic discourse is blame or praise. And this is evident from examination of the poems themselves, which concern matters of will—the honorable or the base. . . . And because makers of representations and imitations intend through this poetry to impell certain actions which involve the will and to repel from others, those subjects will of necessity be either vices or virtues. For all action and all morality are concerned with one of these two, namely, virtue or vice.

Averroës' paraphrase attracted at least two major followers during the fourteenth century. The Florentine Coluccio Salutati, in his De laboribus Herculis, cited Averroës' authority for the notion that "every poem is an oration either of vituperation or of praise"; "with Aristotle," he continues, "we may conveniently define poetry as the forceful
reflections of encomiums and invectives." Benevenuto da Imola applies Averroës' Aristotelian criticism to Dante's *Commedia*, reading its three books as three stages of epideictic rhetoric in a general encomium of virtue: the *Inferno* is invective, the *Purgatorio* is an encomium of imperfect virtue, and the *Paradiso* is an encomium of absolute and perfect virtue.

By far the most important and influential of Averroës' disciples, however, was Torquato Tasso. To refute Castelvetro, he marshalls to the defense of the epideictic form of epic a host of authorities:

> without doubt Castelvetro erred when he said that praise was not appropriate to the heroic poet, for if the heroic poet celebrates heroic virtue he ought to raise it to the heavens with his praises. And Saint Basil says that Homer's *Iliad* is nothing other than the praise of Vertue; and Averroës has the same opinion in his commentary on poetry; . . . therefore, leaving aside the followers of Castelvetro in their opinion; we will follow the opinions of Polybius, of Damascus, of Saint Basil, of Averroes, of Plutarch, and of Aristotle himself.

One year after the publication of Tasso's *Discorsi*, Sidney published his *Defense of Poesie*, echoing Tasso's insistence upon the epideictic and didactic nature of epic. The English were as concerned with defending poetry from Puritan attacks upon its vicious influence as from Castelvetran attacks upon its methods and essential morality:

> for by what conceit can tongue be directed to speake evill against that which draweth with it no less Champions than Achilles, Cyrus, Aeneas, Turnus, Tideus, and Rinaldo? Who doth not onely
teach and moue to truth, but teacheth and moueuth
to the most high and excellent truth; who maketh
magnanimity and justice shine throughout all
misty fearfulness and foggy desires; who, if the
saying of Plato and Tullie, be true, that who
could see Vertue would be wonderfully ravished
with the love of her beauty: this man sets her out
to make her more lovely in her holyday apparrell,
to the eye of any that will daine not to disdaine
until they Vnderstand. But if any thing be already
say'd in defence of sweete Poetry, all concurreth
to the maintaining the Heroicall, which is not
onely a kinde, but the best, and most accomplished
kinde of Poetry. For as the image of each action
styreth and instructeth the mind, so the loftie
image of such Worthies, most inflameth and instruct-
eth the mind with desire to be worthy, and informes
with counsel how to be worthy. 41

Sidney's Defense is not only typical of the critical argument
of the period; it also includes every element of epideictic
epic theory. The philosopher and historian can offer pre-
cepts and examples, respectively; but only the poet can in-
flame us with the desire to follow these precepts and exam-

plcs. Also notable in this context is Sidney's coupling of
Xenophon's Cyropaedia with Homer's and Virgil's epics. Quot-
ing the Ciceronian commonplace that Xenophon's prose epic
provides an "effigium iusti imperii," Sidney claims that
the Cyropaedia is therefore "an absolute heroicall poem,"
as is Heliodorus' romance, the Aethiopica. 42 For Sidney, it
is the encomiastic, oratorical effect of the epic which dis-
tinguishes its excellence. Questions of romantic versus epic
structures do not concern him, nor does the problem of the
imperfect moral exemplar: we are able to tell good from evil
examples, he says, "but although our erected wit maketh vs
know what perfection is, ... yet our infected will keepeth
vs from reaching unto it."\textsuperscript{43} Philosophers and historians can teach an "erected wit" to know good from evil, if we will read them, "but to be moued to doe that which we knowe, or to be moued with desire to knowe, Hoc opus, hoc labor est."\textsuperscript{44}

The Elizabethans inherited from the Middle Ages the sapientia et fortitudo topos and the notion that beatitude—or near beatitude—is the most heroic of heroic states. Although Xenophon and Virgil still dominated the epic canon, the biographical structure, especially after the recovery of Aristotle's Poetics, was no longer so necessary to this theme. Unity of action and the quest for the soul's perfection could be combined in structures more like the Iliad's—with its quarrels, wars and reconciliations. This seems to have come about with a shift of emphasis in the history of ideas: the many-faceted correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm which dominated the Elizabethan imagination allowed the course of the soul's progress to be figured in the course of a state's or a nation's progress. A further development of Fulgentian allegory, this meant that the human soul might be figured by two characters representing, for example, its appetitive and rational elements or representing the different virtues which combine to perfect it. Thus Tasso, in his Allegoria della Gerusalemme Liberata, explained the relationship between the literal and allegorical, or the macrocosmic and the microcosmic, levels of his poem. The Christian army represents
man, Godfrey the rational soul, and Rinaldo the irascible soul. Not until—with God's help—man's appetites are subordinated to his reason, until the army's champion is reconciled to its general, can the Christian army win the city of Jerusalem. Beatitude and political victory are coextensive; but the regulation of the microcosm is the precondition of the success of the macrocosm.

The Iliad is reconciled to the epic canon in a variety of ways and by many a critical compromise. It was seldom doubted that Homer meant to praise Achilles. Saint Basil's comment—that Homer composed his Iliad in praise of Achilles and his Odyssey in praise of Ulysses—was quoted by Minturno in his L'arte poetica (1564), by Politian in his Praefatio in Homerum (1546), and by Tasso in his Discorsi del poema eroico (1594). The epic morality of the Middle Ages was further secularized, and combined with a theory of decorum derived from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' De Compositione Verborum, Cicero's De Oratore, Horace's Ars Poetica, and a theory of genres derived from Aristotle's Poetica (XXIV); heroic poetry came to be considered both a textbook and a source of fame and inspiration for princes. Plutarch had told how Alexander preferred Homer's Iliad to his tutor Aristotle's philosophical definition of martial fortitude. This story was often quoted. Sidney recounts the anecdote, as does Sir Thomas Elyot in his The Gouernor (1530),
dedicated to Henry VIII "on the education of them that hereafter may be deemed worthy to be gouernors of the public weal under your highness."  

But Scaliger, it will be remembered, found each of Homer's epics imperfect by itself, and each of his heroes debased by a mixture of vice: Virgil "set out to unite in Aeneas alone the fortitude of Achilles and the prudence of Ulysses, and added to them piety. He eliminated the rashness of the one and removed the craft of the second, and transferred rashness to Turnus and craft to Sinon." Many felt that the Iliad and Odyssey must be read as companion pieces, if one was to find in Homer the example of perfect virtue. Scaliger finds in each of Homer's heroes a public virtue and a private vice: fortitude and prudence, on the one hand, and rashness and craft on the other. In Aeneas, he claims, Virgil had combined the public virtues of Homer's heroes and replaced their private vices with the private virtue of piety. This sort of analysis, which finds in Homer's epics either the two components of public virtue (fortitude and prudence) or the image of public and private virtue (valor and wisdom) pervades criticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Some defend the relative imperfection of each of Homer's epics by claiming, as does Thomas Wilson in his Arte of Rhetorique (1560), that Homer actually intended separate treatment of the active and contemplative virtues: "In the Iliades are described strength and valiauntnesse of the body:
in the Odissea is set forth a lively paterne of the minde." Spenser, also following the active/contemplative distribution, attributes the moral example of the Iliad to Agamemnon alone:

The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline. . . . In which I have followed all the antique Poets historickall, first Homere, who in the Persons of Agamemnon and Vlysses hath ensampled a good governour and a vertuous man, the one in his Ilias, the other in his Odysseis: then Virgil, whose like intention was to doe in the person of Aeneas: after him Ariosto comprised them both in his Orlando: and lately Tasso disseuered them againe, and formed both partes in two persons, namely that part which they in philosophy call Ethice, or the vertues of a private man, coloured in his Rinaldo: The other named Politice in his Godfredo. By ensample of which excellent Poets, I labour to pourtraiot in Arthure, before he was king, the image of a brave knight, perfected in the twelue private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised. . . . I may be perhaps encouraged, to frame the other part of politick vertues in his person, after that hee came to be king. 49

Other critics read the Iliad and Odyssey as encomia of the two public virtues of valor and policy. According to Pigna (sixteenth century), Achilles "is formed as the image of perfect valor" and Odysseus "is the example of perfect prudence." In 1586 Sir William Webbe, in his A Discourse on English Poetrie, follows Elyot and Sidney, analyzing at some length the moral examples of the two active virtues to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey:

For so did that worthy Poet frame those his two workes, that in reading the first, that is his Iliads, by declaring the setting forth so lively the Grecians assembly against Troy, together with their prowesse and fortitude against their foes, a Prince shall learne not only courage and valiant-
nesse, but discretion also and pollicie to encounter with his enemies, yea a perfect forme of wyse consultations with his Captaines and exhortations to the people, with other infinite commodities. Agayne, in the other part, wherein are described the manifold and dangerous adventures of Ulisses, may a man learne many noble vertues; and learne to escape and auoyde the subtyll practices and perilous entrappinges of naughty persons; and not onely this, but in what sort also he may deale to knowe and perceiue the affections of those which be neere vnto him, and most familiar with him, the better to put them in trust with his matters of weight and importaunce. Therefore I may boldly sette downe thys to be the truest, ancientest, and best kinde of Poetry, to direct ones eneuer always to that.51

In 1598, George Chapman dedicated his Achilles Shield ... out of [Homer's] eighteenth Iliades to his noble patron, "humbly presenting your Achilleian virtues with Achilles Shield"; he remarked that "Onely kings & princes have been Homers Patrones, amongst whom Ptolomie wold say, he that had slight handes to entertayne Homer had as slight braines to rule his common wealth."52

There were, however, those who objected to Homeric examples, whether of public or private virtues. As early as 1554, Giraldi Cinthio, in his Discorsi intorno al comparre de i romanzi, delle dommedie, e delle tragedie, had objected to Homer's faulty examples of the political virtues:

But I hold it certain that in this matter the Romans were much wiser than the Greeks, because it is not probable that great and lordly persons would wish to consider matters of great importance, such as appear in tragedy, in the midst of a multitude of people, even though these were their servants, but in matters which deal with honor or shame or the life or death of great persons, they have with them merely their secretaries, counsellors, and
other prudent and wise persons in whom they confide and who have been chosen by them for such matters, and surely they often speak with them alone of important affairs; nor is it probable that in the course of their activities and in their considerations pertaining to an important action they would speak of them to others about the court in the midst of a multitude. If the Greeks did not understand this matter of decorum, the Romans did, and knew how to give to the majesty of royal actions the persons who would manage them in such a way as would be fitting to so great majesty. . . . Homer sometimes did not consider what fitted the majesty of the actions he had in mind.\textsuperscript{53}

This sort of complaint is easily answered by the development of an historicist approach to literature; the more common objections to Homeric morality are not. In his defense of Dante's \textit{Commedia} (1587) Mazzoni finds the example of Achilles irreconcilable with Christian heroism, which requires a purging of the soul from such passions as wrath and a degree of virtue not often attained while man remains imprisoned in the flesh.\textsuperscript{54} Even Tasso argues that Christian love, and the heroism it inspires, might be a passion more worthy of celebration than wrath.\textsuperscript{55} In his \textit{Comparazione di Omero, Virgile, et Torquato} (1607) Paolo Beni insists that the epic must portray a perfect heroic exemplar, and objects to Homer's division of virtues among the heroes of his \textit{Iliad}--fortitude in Achilles, prudence in Nestor and endurance in Diomedes. He claims that Tasso, like Virgil, had condemned such heroes as Homer's to minor and non-exemplary roles. In modelling the Egyptian messengers Alethes and Argantes on Ulysses and Achilles respectively--one a lying flatterer and one a fierce
champion—Tasso, he says, had shown these vices to be both ignoble and against the cause of the Christian crusaders. Beni's conclusion is that Homer intended to imitate moral excellence, but failed. 56 John Steadman, finally, in his Milton and the Renaissance Hero, argues that by combining the heroic qualities of both Homeric protagonists in the character of Satan, Milton "demonstrates they they are not properly heroic in themselves, but should necessarily be contingent on piety.... not the essence of heroic virtue, but its accidents":

In his destructive wrath, his implacability, his pride in his own strength, his sense of injured merit, his martial fortitude divorced from right reason and piety, Satan offers more than a fortuitous parallel to Achilles. In his eloquence and cunning, his tricks, frauds and lies, his professed attempt to "save his companions," he resembles Ulysses. Like the wily Greek, he penetrates an enemy citadel, in disguise and overthrows it by a simple ruse. 57

Within the epideictic tradition, the issue of Homeric heroism was a problem which concerned the objects of imitation. Was the poet to imitate ideal practical virtue? or ideal virtue in the absolute? This debate was, in practice, a continuation of the debate between Plato and the now Horatian and Averroan "Aristotle." Epideictic verisimilitude was, in either case, verisimilitude to an ideal. Jacopo Mazzoni, defending Dante's Commedia against the Castelvetran Aristotelians, had made this clear as early as 1587. Following Plato, he argued that Homer's failure was one of "dissimilitude" to
an absolute standard of virtue, as represented in godlike and heroic natures:

And because the truth of imitation, therefore, consists in representing things exactly as they are, it therefore follows that it is an essential mistake in poetry to represent them differently and with dissimilitude. . . . For this reason it appears that Plato in the Republic thought Homer erred essentially in imitation when he represented many repulsive vices of the gods and the heroes, for he should have done the very opposite when attempting to represent with correct imitation divine and heroic nature.

The decorum of epideictic epic, whether to a political or a moral ideal, was directed externally; it was meant to recommend by various types of heightening a standard to which men could only aspire. The decorum required by the Castellvetram Aristotelians, on the other hand, was directed internally, and concerned the range and nature of a reader's own experience, mundane and literary as well. The major distinction between the rhetoric of the epideictic and the rationalist tradition, therefore, is the distinction between moving an audience and merely convincing it.

Both the epideictic and the rationalist traditions agree in requiring decorum of character. The epideictic, with its background of heightened biography and the soul's progress, allowed some degree of character development. Epideictic decorum involved the hero's success, however difficult, over a series of trials. According to the rationalist tradition, however, decorum of character tended to refer to a Theophrastan "type," to the experience and expectations of one class.
of readers of the behavior of another. Thomas Rymer's attack on *Othello* best illustrates the implications of this sort of criticism. Although the type character was common to both epideictic and rationalist traditions, it must be stressed that the epideictic type was an ideal, the rationalist type a means of appealing to the reader's experience.

Castelvetran rationalism was developed most fully by the seventeenth-century French, into what H. T. Swedenberg calls a "near cult of correctness." Verisimilitude was "one of the foundation stones in the edifice of French neo-classicism," and its general tendency was "towards good sense, judgment and caution." Unlike Castelvetro, however, most of the French believed that morality was essential to the epic. With the exception of Le Bossu, most combined the class type to some degree with the ideal and moral type of character decorum; but because they restricted the use of the marvellous and improbable even more rigorously than had Castelvetro; the French hero tended to exemplify a rather bland and docile sort of virtue. Dryden's Crites, in *An Essay of Dramatic Poesy* (1668) describes the effects of this rigorous decorum:

> Homer described his heroes men of great appetites, lovers of beef broiled upon the coals, and good fellows; contrary to the practice of the French romances, whose heroes neither eat nor drink nor sleep for love. Virgil makes Aeneas a bold avower of his own virtues:

> Sum pius Aeneas, fama super aethera notus,
which in the civility of our poets is the character of a fanfaron or Hector; for with us the knight takes occasion to walk out or sleep, to avoid the vanity of telling his own story, which the trusty squire is ever to perform for him.61

As Swedenberg has noted, French classicism demanded that epic decorum be referred both to historical verisimilitude and to the tastes of a modern reader. This led to a contradiction: "It was held, for example, that Alexander should be presented as a fourth-century Greek, but in such a manner that the character would harmonize with what the French of the seventeenth century thought a fourth-century Greek should be. Thus public knowledge and taste became the critical arbiters, constantly ruling out low sentiments and barbarous manners, which were out of harmony with public feeling."62

The French preoccupation with probability and good sense produced probabilistic plots in which, in accord with the Castelvetran argument, events were combined like the links of a chain. The significance of Le Bossu's contribution will appear clearer when set beside such an account of the ideal logical structure as Chapelain's, in the preface to his La Pucelle (1655). Chapelain was an avowed disciple of the stricter Italian Aristotelians; he once referred to Castelvetro as one of "the two great savants beyond the Alps," actively supported Malherbe's reaction against the experimental poetics of the Pleiade, and was largely responsible for formulating the neo-classical rules and unities in France.63
His account of the virtues of his own epic, while using such rhetorical terms as "invention et . . . disposition," is at the farthest possible remove from Sidney's praise of the epidictic form which "most enflameth and instructeth the mind with the desire to be worthy":

La pièce que ses juges considéreront le plus sera, je m'assure, le dessein, comme celui qui tient lieu d'âme à son corps, et qui donne la qualité de poëte à celui qui a bien mis ses matériaux en œuvre. Ils esplucheront scrupuleusement son invention et sa disposition, comme les deux principaux arceaux qui en soutiennent l'édifice. Ils observeront si l'imitation y règne partout, si la vraisemblance y accompagne la merveille, et si le rapport des parties au tout y est juste et sans embarras. Ils observeront si le noeud s'en forme nécessairement et si le désenroulement s'en fait de même; si la péripétie y est régulière et si les agitations y augmentent ce qu'elle a de surprenant; . . . Ils observeront si, dans la distribution des événements, l'un y suit probablement de l'autre, et si tous y tendent sans violence, infailliblement, à leur fin, avec ce plaisir sensible qui résulte de la conversion de la fortune lorsqu'on n'a pu prévoir par quels destours ce changement devait arriver. Ils observeront, après toutes choses, si le génie du siècle, qui a été spectateur de ce visible miracle, s'y trouve bien représenté; si les moeurs et les passions, les descriptions et les harangues n'y tiennent point de la chimère et de la déclamation; car, quant aux vers et au langage, ce sont des instruments de si petite considération dans l'époque, qu'ils méritent pas que de si graves juges s'y arrestent. 64

Chapelain's insistence upon logical sequence and credibility ignores entirely the affective aspects of poetry. Related to this is his indifference to style, part of Malherbe's campaign to purify the language of French poetry from extravagant figures and Latin coinages. It is symptomatic of the quarrel between the French and the English over the relative
merits of the pure versus the figured style in tragedy, which culminated in the 1720's in the debate between Voltaire and his once friendly translator, Aaron Hill.

Paradoxically, the rather over-delicate sensibilities of the French, whatever their effects on contemporary epic, were the source of a definite advance in the criticism of ancient epic. Both the theorists who wrote in defense of Homer and those who wrote in defense of the moderns admitted the necessity of an historical approach to ancient epic. Thus Saint-Évremond--a Modern--writing in 1678 On the Imitation of the Ancients argued that the difference in ancient and modern customs, manners, science and religion requires an entirely new relationship between character, moral, and the structure of action:

Take away the gods from the ancients, and you take away from them all their poems; the constitution of the fable is in disorder and the design is turned upside down. . . . These immortal leaders of parties among men contrived all, gave life to all, inspired force and courage, engaged themselves in fight, and . . . there was no considerable warrior that had not his god upon his chariot, as well as his squire, the god to conduct his spear, the squire to direct his horses. Men were pure machines whom secret springs put in motion; and those springs were nothing else but the inspiration of their gods and goddesses. The Divinity we serve is more favorable to the liberty of men. We are in his hands, like the rest of the universe, by way of dependence; but in our own to deliberate and to act. This great change is followed by that of manners, which, by reason of their being civilized and softened at present, cannot suffer that wild and unbecoming freedom that was assumed in former times. It is this change that makes me nauseate the vile and brutal scolding between Achilles and Agamemnon and other such inhumanities in Homer. . . .
Their customs differ no less from ours than their morals. . . . Truth was not the inclinations of the first ages; a useful lie and a lucky falsehood gave reputation to impostors, and pleasure to the credulous. 'Twas the secret of the great and wise to govern the simple ignorant herd. The vulgar, who paid a profound respect to mysterious errors, would have despised naked truth, and it was thought a piece of prudence to cheat them. All their discourse were fitted to so advantageous a design, in which there was nothing to be seen but fictions, allegories, and similitudes. . . . The genius of our age is quite the opposite to this spirit of fables and false mysteries. We love plain truth; good sense has gained ground upon the illusions of fancy, and nothing satisfies us nowadays but solid reason. To this alteration of humor we may add that of knowledge; we have other notions of nature than the ancients had. The heavens, the eternal mansion of so many divinities, are nothing else with us but an immense fluid space. The same sun shines still upon us, but we assign it another course; and instead of hastening to set in the sea, it goes to enlighten another world. The earth, which was immovable in the opinion of the ancients, now turns round in ours, and is not to be equalled for the swiftness of its motion. In short, everything is changed, gods, nature, politics, manners, humors, and custom. Now is it to be supposed that so many alterations should not produce a mighty change in our writings? If Homer were now alive, he would undoubtedly write admirable poems; but then he would fit them to the present age. Our poets make bad ones, because they model them by those of the ancients, and order them according to rules which are changed with things that time hath altered.65

Historicism such as Saint-Évremond's becomes in Le Bossu the argument that Homer designed his moral instructions to fit the needs and to appeal to the prejudices of a specific people at a specific time in their history. The notion that Homer's gods are nothing but fictions exploited to impose upon the credulity of an ignorant herd becomes in Le Bossu the argument that the gods, machines, similitudes and other fictions by which Homer raises his epic are part of his political rhetoric.
Finally, disapproval of Achilles leads to the realization that there is a structure of character and action, and a form of narrative rhetoric, independent of the biographical encomium.

ii. Le Bossu: Logical Structure and Circumstantial Rhetoric.

The reaction to the *Traité du poème épique* (1675) was immediate and widespread. Le Bossu became at once the single most authoritative theorist of the epic, and remained in this position of eminence throughout most the eighteenth century. John Sheffield, Earl of Mulgrave, seems to have been the first to call the attention of the English to Le Bossu's achievement. In his *Essay on Poetry* (1682) Mulgrave rejoices, like many after him, that the *Traité* has finally unlocked the secret of Homer's skill:

Had Bossu never writ, the world had still
Like Indians view'd this wond'rous piece of Skill;
As something of Divine the work admired,
Hoped not to be Instructed, but Inspired;
Till he, disclosing sacred Mysteries,
Has shewn where all the mighty Magick lies,
Describ'd the Seeds, and in what order sown,
That have to such a vast proportion grown.
Sure from some Angel he the secret knew,
Who through this Labyrinth has given the clue! 66

Dryden cites Le Bossu frequently: in "The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy" (1679), in his "Character of Saint-Évremond (1682), in the "Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire" (1693), in his "Parallel betwixt Painting and Poetry"
(1695) and in the Preface to his translation of the *Aeneid* (1695). Both Anne and André Dacier admit their indebtedness to Le Bossu. In his Preface to Aristotle's *Poetics* (1692) André Dacier praises Le Bossu as the first true explicator of Aristotle's comments on epic:

> The Treatise of Epick Poem by Father Bossu is above all the Moderns have done in that Kind, and is the best Commentary Extant, on what Aristotle has wrote concerning that sort of Poem; none ever penetrated deeper into the bottom of that Art, and set in a better Light (according to Aristotle's Rules) Homer's, and Virgil's Beauties, or the Solidity and Beauty of Aristotle's Rules, by the marvellous Conduct of those two great Poets.

In the same year Rymer writes that "we begin to understand the Epick Poem by means of Bossu; and Tragedy by Monsieur Dacier." Sir Richard Blackmore, in his Preface to *Prince Arthur* (1696), claims to follow the *Traité*. John Dennis asserts in 1701 that "it would be an easy matter to prove that none of the Moderns understand the Art of Heroick Poetry, who writ before Bossu took Pains to unravel the Mystery" and cites Le Bossu's authority throughout his critical works. Addison refers to the *Traité* in *Spectators* 183 (1711) and 369 (1712) and applies most of Le Bossu's methods to *Paradise Lost* in *Spectators* 267 to 369.

Later in the century Le Bossu's theories had become commonplace. Because many had misinterpreted his "Design ... of explaining the *Aeneid* of Virgil" as an attempt to codify and prescribe universal epic rules, others felt obliged to react against his authority. Thus Voltaire published in 1727
his Essay . . . upon the Epic Poetry of the European Nations from Homer down to Milton as a plea for relativism and experimentation in the reading and writing of literature. By 1759 Le Bossu's authority had become so despotic that Sterne could count on his readers' recognition of an allusion to the French critic's mechanical system of "rules":

"And for the epick poem, your lordship bid me look at;—upon taking the length, breadth, height, and depth of it, and trying them at home upon an exact scale of Bossu's, 'tis out, my Lord, in every one of its dimensions.—Admirable connoisseur."

But admiration for Le Bossu continued. In 1749; Fielding had ranked him among the foremost critics of any age, "to whose labours the learned world are so greatly indebted. Such were Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus among the Ancients, Dacier and Bossu among the French, and some perhaps among us." Notwithstanding some distortion of his purpose and some disagreement with his authority, the influence of Le Bossu upon the theory of epic and narrative in general was strong and lasting.

Le Bossu's achievement was the re-evaluation and the displacement of the rhetorical element in epic poetry. Like most of the Italian, French and English critics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he considered himself an expositor of Aristotle. Like the medieval and Elizabethan proponents of the epideictic epic, he felt that heroic poetry was intended to move its readers to virtuous action; like the Italian and French formalists, he insisted upon the preeminence of a
probable sequence of episodes. Unlike either school, however, and largely under the influence of the new historicism in criticism, he was able to combine the requirements of probability and the requirements of morality, to appreciate at once the realistic and the marvellous aspects of Homer's epic.

The rhetorical locus of epideictic epic had been the exemplum of the hero. According to a theory such as Sidney's the reader is inspired by the fame and the success of a figure like Cyrus to imitate his virtue and aspire to his renown. Probability is unimportant; the poet's task is to raise to the heavens that virtue he wishes to celebrate. Although men like Cyrus are not to be found often in the common course of fallen nature, man can at least imagine his unfallen state and be moved to regain it. Nature might, by accident, produce another Cyrus; but it is the poet's task to inspire many:

neither let this be iestingly conceiued, because the works of the one [i.e., philosophy] be essentiaall, the other, in imitation or fiction; for any vnder-standing knoweth the skill of the Artificer standeth in that Idea or foreconceite of the work, and not in the work it selve. And that the poet hath that Idea is manifest, by deliueriing them forth in such excelencie as hee hath imagined them. Which deliueriing forth also is not wholie imagina-tive, as we are wont to say by them that build Castles in the ayre; but so farre substantially it worketh, not onely to make a Cyrus which had been but a particular excellencie, as Nature might haue done, but to bestow a Cyrus vpon the worlde, to make many Cyrus's, if they wil learne aright why and hou that Maker made him. 76

According to Sidney's Platonic theory, the "Idea" is more important than the poetic artifact. In the name of reason and good sense, the French formalists reversed this priority and
insisted upon a more empirical and probabilistic appeal to the reader. Because they restricted what men could imagine to their experience of this world, the locus of their epic rhetoric became the logical construction of the poetic artifact, based upon the range of the reader's own experience.

The claim that Homeric morals, manners and poetic methods are not suitable to a contemporary epic led first to the rejection and then to the recovery of the Iliad. Le Bossu argues that Homer wrote to a specific audience at a specific time in its history, when it was necessary to persuade the Greek nation to unite against a common enemy:

Besides, he was oblig'd to accommodate himself to the Manners, Customs and Genius of the Greeks his auditors, the better to make them attend to the Instruction of his Poem, and to gain their Approbation by praising them, as far as the fault he must of necessity make his personages fall into, would admit. He admirably discharges all the Duties, by making these brave Princes, and those victorious People, to be Grecians, and the Fathers of those he had a mind to commend.??

According to Le Bossu, the plot must be logical, not in terms of the purely experiential verisimilitude of the formalists, but according to the necessity of impressing fully and without inconsistency the truth of the moral. All else—heroes, machines, wondrous actions—is part of the poet's affective rhetoric.

In order to explain the design of the Iliad, Le Bossu insists upon the integrity of each poem he treats. Every element of a work must be a means to its particular end. The moral goodness of a character is not so important as its
poetic goodness. Because the perfect heroes of the epideictic tradition are indistinguishable, mere copies of one another, the perfect hero cannot be organic to the action of any one epic:

They would be alike in all these pieces, we should see them all Valiant in Battel, Prudent in Counsel, Pious in the Acts of Religion, Courteous, Civil, Magnificent, and lastly, endued with all the prodigious Vertues, the best Poet could invent. All this would be independent from the Action, and the Subject of the Poem. And upon seeing each Hero separated from the rest of the Work, we should not easily guess to what Action, and to what Poem the Hero does belong. So that we should see that none of these would have a Character, since the Character is that which makes a Person discernable, and which distinguishes it from all others. ... Homer and Virgil furnish us with quite different Examples. Achilles, Ulysses, and Aeneas have nothing in common, and differ as much among themselves as the three Poems, and the three Actions, of which they are the Hero's. 78

"Expression" as well as character must further the particular end of the poem. Le Bossu castigates those who imitate the ancients mechanically and without adapting what they borrow to their own poems and their own purposes. Like bad encomiasts, these poets impress an audience with their own learning rather than the virtues of their subject. 79 Merely gratuitous decoration, says Le Bossu, "makes no part of the Essence of the Fable. ... though all the Earth were cover'd and embellish'd with an infinite number of Trees, and pierc'd very deep with their Roots, yet it will never pass for a Tree itself." 80 The norm of each epic's expression will depend upon the passion which dominates that particular epic:
These singular Passions correspond to the Character of the Hero. Anger and Terror reign throughout the Iliad, because Achilles is Angry and the most Terrible of all Men. The Aeneid has all soft and tender Passions, because that is the Character of Aeneas. The Prudence, Wisdom and Constancy of Ulysses do not allow him in either of these Extremes, therefore the Poet does not permit one of them to be predominant in the Odysseis. He confines himself to Admiration only, which he carries to a higher pitch than in the Iliad: And 'tis upon this account that he introduces a great many more Machines of the Odysseis, into the Body of the Action, than is to be seen in the Actions of the other two Poems. 81

Although admiration is the passion most necessary to all epic, it does not preclude degrees of terror and pity, for "we admire with Terror and Grief such things as terrifie and make us sad." 82

Every element of character, narrative and action in Homer's poem must be understood in relation to his purpose. While philosophers "treat of the Virtues and Vices in general," the poet "has a nearer regard to his own Country, and the Necessities he sees his own Nation lie under. He chooses a moral best suited to meet these "Necessities," and in order to enforce it, "makes less use of Reasoning, than of the force of Insinuation; accommodating himself to the particular Customs and Inclinations of his audience and to those which in the general ought to be commended in them." 83 Homer saw the Greeks divided into independent city-states; he resolved to impress upon them the necessity of uniting in time of war against a common enemy.

As for the ... sort of Government observable in the Union or rather the Assembling of many Inde-
dependent States. Experience has always made it appear, "That there is nothing like a due Subordi-
nation, and a right Understanding between Persons
to make the Designs that are form'd and carried on
by several Generals to prosper. And on the other
hand, an universal Misdnderstanding, the Ambition of
a General, and the Under-Officers refusing to submit
have always been the infallible and inevitable
pane of these Confederacies." . . . All sorts of
States, and in particular the Grecians, have dearly
experienced this Truth. So that the most useful
and the most necessary Instructions that could be
given them, was, to lay before their Eyes the Loss
which both the People and the Princes themselves
suffered by the Ambition and the Discord of these
Last.

Upon this basic outline of an instructive moral, the poet
builds the "fable," which Aristotle had called the soul of the
poem.

To illustrate Aristotle's claim, and to reduce the Iliad
to its most essential terms, Le Bossu demonstrates that the
moral fable of an epic poem, its exemplary action, is identi-
cal with a fable of Aesop's: "Whilst the Dogs did bite and
tear one another, the Wolf broke in upon the Sheep: and when
the Dogs, seeing the ravage of the Enemy, were good Friends
again, they made him fly for it, and killed him." 85 Such a
basic fable as this may be cast into the form of comedy, trag-
edy or epic, depending upon the poet's treatment: "if a
Fable be Rational, Probable, Serious, Important, mix'd with
Divinities, Amplified and Rehears'd in Verse, it will be an
Epic Poem: If it has not these Conditions, it will be ano-
other kind of Fable." 86 To confirm the importance of the poet's
circumstantial transformation, Le Bossu demonstrates how fable
becomes epic genre:
Homer has stretch'd out his Fable by long Harangues, by Descriptions, by Similitudes, and by particular Actions: In like manner might one amplify that of AESop without spoiling it. One need only relate what provok'd these Dogs to quarrel, and to describe the rise of their Anger with all its Circumstances: To make fine Descriptions of the Plain where the Sheep were feeding, and of some neighboring Forest, which serv'd the Wolf for a shelter and Retreat: To give this Enemy some little Cubs to breed up, to make them follow their Sire in the Quest of their Prey, and to describe the Booty they take at several Times.

One should not likewise omit the Genealogy of these Heroes. The Wolf should boast of his Descent from Lycaon; and one of the Dogs should have issued in a direct line from the great Celestial Dog, and the Canicula. This should be the Hero of the Poem, for he would be very hot and Cholerick. He would do well to represent the Personage of Achilles; and the Poll of a certain Ajax his Kinsman, would be a handsome Proof of his Nobility, and of an Origin so Divine as that is. There is no need of any thing farther to engage Heaven in this Quarrel, and to divide the Gods into Parties. For the Gods have as much to do in the Republick of AESop, as in the States of Homer.

The point of Le Bossu's reduction of the Iliad to its basic structure--and his facetious reconstruction of another "epic" upon the same foundation--is to stress the distinction between the demonstrative and the affective aspects of a narrative poem.

According to Le Bossu's reading, the Iliad works upon the reader at two levels. He is to be convinced by a sequence of action built upon the fable and structured with all the symmetry and precision of a logical syllogism; he is to be moved by the circumstances by which this action is amplified. Both logic and the appeal to the passions are aspects of the epic's deliberative rhetoric: the plot in this case satisfies the
reader's reason, while historical detail, illustrious ancestors and the machines and descriptions used to "raise" them appeal to the reader's patriotic emotions.

The unity of action requires a beginning, middle and end to Achilles' anger. This is a merely formal requirement, according to Le Bossu's interpretation. More important is the unity of the fable—the "proof" of the moral. Unity of fable involves anticipating and meeting all logical objections to the moral. At the same time, the several maxims which might be derived from, or serve as the foundation of an epic must be united as parts in its proof of a single moral. Homer might have built the Iliad upon one or more of the following maxims:

1. Division between those of the same party exposes them to the Fury of their Enemies. 2. Conceal your weakness, and you will be dreaded as much, as if you had none of those Imperfections, which they know nothing of. 3. When your strength is only feigned, and founded only on the Opinion of others; never venture so far, as if your strength was real. 4. The more you agree together, the less hurt will your enemies do you.

Homer's Iliad includes all these maxims, but not by any "vicious Multiplication of Fables." Rather, he has joined them with no injury to the unity and coherence of the major fable.

1. The Division between Achilles and his Allies tended to the Ruin of their Designs. 2. Patroclus comes to their relief in the Armor of this Hero, and Hector retreats. 3. But this young man, pushing the Advantage, which his Disguise gave him, too far, ventures to engage with Hector himself; but not being Master of Achilles's Strength (whom he only represented in outward appearance) he is
killed, and by this means leaves the Grecian Affairs in the same disorder, which he in that Disguise came to free them from. 4. Achilles provok'd at the Death of his Friend, is reconciled, and revenges his loss by the Death of Hector.

Like the episodes of the epic action, each part of the fable is incomplete in itself, but necessary to the unity of the whole: they "cannot be separated without enervating the force" of the moral, "That a right understanding is the Preservation, and Discord the Destruction of a State." Actions must be related to one another causally—not merely temporally--in a successful narrative proof:

If the Dogs that were set to keep the Sheep, and and whose falling out gave the Wolf an opportunity of seizing upon some of them; if they, I say, follow the Wolf before they end their Quarrel; and if upon overtaking him, they are as fierce against one another, as against their Common Enemy: in this case, though the Wolf quit his Prey, fly for it, or though he die of the wounds they give him; yet this Fiction will no longer signify, That Concord reestabishes what Discord destroys; since the Calamity would have been ended, tho the discord still continued.

In like manner, if Achilles being provok'd at the Death of Patroclus, had set upon and kill'd Hector, without being reconcil'd to Agamemnon; the Omission of this Incident, would have spoil'd the Fable.

We add farther, that if Achilles had been less inexorable, and had submitted to the offers of Agamemnon, before the Death of Patroclus; and if this Quarrel had not cost him the Life of his Friend the Fable would have been spoil'd: For since the Quarrel would have been only prejudicial to Agamemnon, this Example would have showed us, in the Person of Achilles, that one might quarrel, and be at Variance, without losing any thing; which is quite contrary to the Moral of the Poet.

The only multiplication of fables possible within the bounds of unity and coherence, according to Le Bossu, is within
speeches or machines. Thus Vulcan's tale of his expulsion from Olympus in Iliad I enforces the main fable, reiterating the lesson that "Discord is a prejudice of the Affairs of those who quarrel: And this story of Vulcan applies it, to the Injury which the falling out of Parents do to their Children."  

The unity of the fable must not be confused with the unity of action. The action of the Iliad is neither the whole of the Trojan war, nor the dogs' quarrel, reconciliation and conquest of the wolf, but Achilles' revenge upon the Greeks for the insult he suffered and upon Hector for the death of Patroclus.

We must not confound the Action with the Fable; nor the design of the Hero in the Action he does, with the design of the Poet in the Allegory, and in the Moral he teaches. 'Tis well known that a Wolf, devouring a Lamb, has no design to give us the Instructions which AEsop has drawn from it.

The siege of Troy cannot be the action of the Iliad, because it has no beginning, middle or end: "for tho' Jupiter sends Agamemnon to assault the town, yet 'tis not with the Design it should be taken, as this Abused Prince imagin'd: But only to be punish'd by the Trojan arms for the affront he had put upon Achilles, and to satisfie the Anger, and the Revenge of this Hero." Confusion between the hero's and the poet's design, between the whole of an enterprise and that part of it which properly constitutes the action, says Le Bossu, has led many to misread Aristotle and to manage their own epics badly.
Although a beginning, middle and end are necessary to the unity of the action, they are not in themselves sufficient to satisfy Aristotle's precept. Each event must follow the preceding in a linear cause-and-effect sequence. Had Homer not fused Achilles' anger against the Greeks and his anger against Hector into a continuum, claims Le Bossu, "the Action would have been double and Episodical" notwithstanding its beginning, middle and end.

These two parts of the Iliad are joyn'd together regularly. If Achilles had never fell out with Agamemnon, he would have fought in person, and not have expos'd his Friend singly against Hector, under those Arms that were the cause of this Young man's Rashness and Death. And besides, the better to joyn these two parts with one another, the second is begun a great while before one sees what Event the first ought to have. All the Articles of the Reconciliation are propos'd, and one might say, that this Reconciliation, with respect to Agamemnon, is made before the Death of Patroclus, and even before it was ever thought of exposing him to a Battel. There was nothing more wanting but Achilles' Consent: and since that was not given till the Death of Patroclus had made him resolve upon that of Hector; it may be truly affirmed, that the Anger and the Revenge of Achilles against Hector, which is nothing else but the second part of the Poem, is the only cause of the Reconciliation, which finish'd the first Part. 96

The Greek's resistance to the Trojans, and Hector's resistance to Achilles are not digressive episodes, but part of this linear sequence of action. Each half of the poem contains its own "Intrigue" and "Solution" or "Unravelling" to that intrigue. The intrigue of the first part consists of Achilles' revenge upon Agamemnon versus the Greeks' efforts to prevail against Troy without him. Achilles' vengeance on
Hector, and Hector's attempts to protect himself, form the intrigue of the second part. Again, Agamemnon's offer and Patroclus' death are the links which combine both pairs of intrigues into one continuous action. Agamemnon's offer and Patroclus' death unravel the first intrigue and cause the second. Finally, although lesser episodes may be extended with probable circumstances, none may be complete in itself: "It is not enough for the Unity of a Body, that all its members be natural, and duly united and compacted together; 'tis farther requisite, that each Member should be no more than a Member; an imperfect Part, and not a finish'd compleat Body." Thus in such a minor episode as the single combat between Paris and Menelaus, the issue is left undecided that the action might continue unbroken. Paris and Menelaus would not have met, notes Le Bossu, if Achilles had not withdrawn; and if one of them had conquered, Achilles' wrath and withdrawal would have been rendered ineffectual.

Given the importance of the fable to the moral instruction of the epic and the necessary unity of action which supports it, it is clear that the epic hero need not be a perfect moral exemplar. Achilles' inexorability is necessary to the unity and continuity of the action and the fable; his anger is "the very Life of all the Violence that reigns there." Yet he is not the poem's hero in the sense that he commands the reader's sole attention. Although his
wrath is necessary to the design of the moral fable, "the Anger which the Poet sings is rather that which makes Achilles to absent himself from fighting, than that which puts him upon killing of Hector. To conclude, the Fable consists less in this Anger, than in the Quarrel and Reconciliation, wherein Agamemnon had as great a share as he." 101

The fable requires only that its hero have a "precise and sensible Character, which may appear in all sorts of Encounters." 102 Thus Achilles is neither wise at counsel nor dignified at religious ceremonies and funeral games:

But Homer at the Council Board gives Agamemnon occasion to provoke Achilles, who is presently transported with anger against him, and who begins to revenge himself by affronting and venting seditious Reproaches against him. And in the Funeral of Patroclus, the Ceremony that is most visible is the cruelty which Achilles shows to the brave and unhappy Hector, which he ties by the heels to his Chariot, and for twelve Days together inhumanely drags about the Tomb of his Friend. Thus Achilles is always the same, and is no less Cholerick and Revengeful at the Council Board, and the Funeral Solemnities, than in War and Battle. 103

Although he finds Achilles' character uniformly "brutish," Le Bossu is far from reading the Iliad as a negative encomium. Character is subordinate to the requirements of the fable: Achilles must be wrathful in order to maintain the action; but Homer might also have made him cowardly. Thus the valor which has so often blinded readers to Achilles' faults is as necessary to the action as the wrath, "to produce great Designs, and to put them in Execution." 104
Nevertheless, Achilles' is "a Cholerick, Cruel, Brutish and Inexorable Valour which never pardons, and had rather its Vengeance should fall upon its Friends, than spare one single Enemy." 105 So fixed is Achilles' character, and so firm the impression of his anger upon the reader, that although the fable is complete with Hector's death in Book XXII, the end of the action requires two more books:

The observation of the Truce depended upon Achilles. The Poet had good reason to presume that all his Readers were not persuaded of the Moderation of so passionate a Man. It was a business of the highest Importance for the Conclusion of this Action to convince them that his Anger was appeas'd. This Hero in the whole series of the Poem had appeared so testy, unreasonable and unjust, that though the Poet's precaution was very great and exact, yet one might distrust this extravagant humour, as long as the Body of his Enemy was in a condition of being insulted over. They were then ready to bestow such Honours upon this Corps, as one might fear would put our Hero into a Passion. So that the Poet thought himself oblig'd to carry on the Funeral and the Observation of the Truce to the very End of his Poem: That so he might absolutely convince us of his tranquillity and repose, whose Action and Anger he had undertook to sing. 106

For Le Bossu, the Achilles of Book XXIV is the Achilles of Book I. He has acquired no insight into the nature of his choice between long life and early death, and his acquiescence to Priam signifies nothing more than the end of a long fit of anger. Yet Homer had to consider his audience and its prejudices. Brutish as he is, Achilles' valour "shew'd such an Air of Greatness, which dazzles our Sight, and will not let us see his Faults so, as to wish him any greater punish-
ment than what he suffer'd by the Death of his friend. In speaking of the Fable, I hinted upon what account the Iliad should end thus, because it redounded more to the happiness of the Grecians.  "107

Every circumstance of the narrative beyond the bare fable, therefore, becomes part of the poet's affective rhetoric. We have seen that the fable of the Iliad might become an epic about dogs, wolves and sheep. Unlike the action of the Aeneid—which concerns the destruction of one empire and the founding of another—the action of the Iliad is unimportant in itself, and might be narrated of the most common sorts of people and events. It "contains nothing but what is common, and which requires no higher Qualities, than those which a Merchant, a burgomaster, or at most a plain Country-Squire is capable of." Two of these might "fall out about a Captive wench, and break the neck of their affairs" as plausibly as do Achilles and Agamemnon.  "108 Homer has made this quarrel an important matter—first by his choice of personae and secondly by giving "a higher Idea of these Personages than that which the Readers conceive of all they know to be great."  "109

Because they are part of the "Expression," machines are not necessary to epic action. They are one aspect of the poet's highly metaphorical style:

'tis the Presence of a Deity, and some supernatural, extraordinary Action, which the Poet inserts into almost all the Incidents of his Work, to make it
look more Majestical and surprizing, and to give his Readers a Lesson of Piety and Vertue. This mixture should be so made, that one might re-trench the Machines without cutting off any thing from the Action."

The intervention of a god on a hero's behalf amplifies, rather than diminishes his stature as Saint-Évremond had charged. Thus a man "so jealous of his Honour" as Achilles "charges the Grecians to keep off from Hector, whom he pursues. But when Minerva offers to assist him in this pursuit, and to help to conquer and kill him, he was so far from rejecting this Divine Aid, that he thinks it an honour to him, and brags of it ev'n to Hector himself." As metaphorical devices, Le Bossu concludes, "Machines are to be made use of all over, since Homer and Virgil do nothing without them":

He therefore that would be a Poet, must leave Historians to write, that a Fleet was shattered by a Storm, and cast upon a strange Coast: and must say with Virgil, that Juno went to Aeolus, and that this God upon her instance unknennel'd the Winds against Aeneas. Let him /leave/ an Historian to write, That a Young Prince behaved himself upon all occasions, with a great deal of Wisdom and Discretion: And let him say with Homer, that Minerva led him by the hand in all his Enterprises. Let an Historian relate, that though Agamemnon fell out with Achilles, yet he could not but acknowledge that he stood in need of his Assistance for the taking of Troy: And let a Poet say, that Thetis, disgusted at the Affront offered to her Son, goes up to Heaven, demands Satisfaction of Jupiter; and that this God, to satisfy her, sends the God of Sleep to Agamemnon, who puts the Cheat upon him by making him believe he must take Troy that very day."
In order to understand Homer's use of allegories, a modern reader "must not imagine, when he sees the Name of a God or Goddess, that he must needs meet with nothing but what is fine, good, and commendable."\textsuperscript{113} Some allegorical figures are physical, some moral, and some psychological; their manners are not a matter of decorum but the poet's concession "to the Infirmity of our minds, which makes us look upon these Qualities in God"--such as mercy and justice, in the case of a moral allegory--"as opposite to one another."\textsuperscript{114}

The poet's metaphoric style, and the historical circumstances in which he embodies his fable are the rhetoric which raise a reader's passions and involve him in the narrative. The poet must not risk losing control of those passions which he has raised by the force of his figured style. He must avoid boring his reader by tedious digressions or dull harangues. Descriptions ought to be introduced to a purpose, and ought to heighten rather than cool excitement. Thus Virgil's "Description of a Calm and quiet Night in the Fourth Book renders the cruel Disturbances of Dido a great deal more moving, since they rob her of the Rest which all Nature enjoy'd, to the very vilest and most despicable Creatures."\textsuperscript{115}

Counsels and assemblies must not consist merely of sober debates, "which are opposite to the Motions, and the Action, which ought to appear throughout the whole Epick Poem."
Our Poets have carefully avoided all manner of sage and serious Debates, where each person speaks in turn, and delivers his sober Thoughts. They generally brought in some hasty or passionate persons, such as are Achilles, and Agamemnon in the first Book of the Iliad, and almost all the other Grecians and Trojans of this Fable. ... The Council in the ninth Book of the Aeneid is altogether as Passionate, but in the Movements are of another kind. There are neither Quarrels, nor Heats. All the Personages therein are generous, and manly; And yet of above threescore verses which the Poet spends about it, there are scarce five calm ones. Nisus and young Euryalus, that are introduced therein, make the rest so passionate, that this Passage is not one of the least tender and moving Beauties which the Aeneid has of this kind.116

The reader must not be bored; neither must he be puzzled by gross improbabilities, lest his attention be distracted in trying to account for those marvels meant to raise his admiration.117 Both boredom and counterproductive shock will be avoided if the poet takes care to prepare the affective by degrees:

The Necessity of preparing the Auditors is founded upon the Nature and General necessity of taking things where they are, when we would convey them elsewhere. 'Tis easie applying this Maxim to the Subject in hand. A Man is in a quiet and profound repose, and you have a mind by a discourse made on purpose to make him angry; You must begin your discourse by a mild way; by this means, you will Close him, and then going hand in hand together, as the saying is, he will not fail following you in all the Passions: You have a mind to excite in him by degrees. But if at the first touch you manifest your Anger, you will make your self as ridiculous, and meet with as little success as Ajax in Ovid's Metamorphoses. ... These necessary Preparations arise from the discourse that goes before these Movements, or else from some Action, that already begins to excite them before one speaks. The Orators themselves sometimes make use of this last way. For tho' they generally
excite not the Passions till the end of their Harangues, yet when they find their Audience already mov'd, it would be ridiculous, if by an unseasonable Calmness they should begin by making them quit that which they would have them affected. 118

If the reader is kept interested and involved in the action of the epic by these means, he will be persuaded to accept the logical argument of its fable more readily.

iii. Dennis and the Structural Sublime.

Interpretations of the Longinian sublime throughout the eighteenth century are various and often contradictory.119 Longinus is brought to the defense of the "Moderns" as well as the "Ancients"--a presumption on the part of the Moderns which Pope ridicules in his Peri Bathous (1728). His treatise is used to authorize the cult of sensibility and the cult of untutored genius--an excess which Coleridge attempts to discourage in his Shakespeare's Judgment Equal to his Genius (1818). John Dennis, however, is able to reconcile Longinian sublimity to the rules; his is the most thorough and far-reaching synthesis of the Longinian sublime and the Aristotelianism of the neo-classical formalists. With the introduction of his ideas for the reformation of poetry, Dennis effects a further displacement of epic rhetoric, from the circumstantial to the structural.

Dennis's displacement of epic rhetoric cannot be understood without a brief account of the system of poetics which
supports it. In his *Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* (1701) Dennis attempts to prove that modern poetry, like the greatest ancient poetry, must be based upon religion. He agrees with Boileau's belief that epic machines, because they mix religion with fiction, are not suitable to a Christian poem. How, then, is a Christian poet to provide the admiration and the instruction necessary to epic? Dennis solves this dilemma by arguing that the poet can raise and move his readers' passions by involving himself empathetically with the attitudes a speaker—whether character or narrator—feels and evokes toward his subject matter. The designs and methods of poetry and Christianity are the same—to reconcile the conflict of reason, passion and sense which has plagued man since the fall. All complain of unhappiness, and philosophers agree that man is miserable because of the continual war among his faculties. Philosophers err, however, in assuming that either passion or reason must or can be suppressed entirely. They believe man's nature to have been created defective. In fact, man was created with his reason, passions and senses in harmony. At the fall, he directed his passions away from God to God's creatures; his senses became clouded through intemperance, his reason disapproved the choice of his passions, and he has suffered from the disharmony of these faculties ever since. Christianity is God's remedy for this distemper. Its proof works by revelation and miracle, and so appeals to the
senses; it appeals to the most pleasant and self-interested of the passions, joy, admiration and love; based upon a simple moral philosophy, Christianity appeals to man's reason as it was created. The best art, like the best religion, is that which makes man happy by reconciling him to himself; by appealing to his senses, passions and reason, it leads them to agree. Like the Christian religion, however, Christian poetry must work its cure by accommodating itself to the disease. Although man still enjoys the passions of joy and admiration with which he was created, he has learned since the fall to anticipate danger and misery; he is now also subject to terror and pity. The poet must learn to arouse and then to lead all these passions to harmony.120

While Longinus describes the effects of the sublime on the human mind, complains Dennis, he does not say how the poet produces these effects. Furthermore, he neglects to draw an inference implicit in his own selection of examples: that sublimity is inseparable from religious ideas. Finally, Longinus contradicts himself, claiming first that the sublime does not so much persuade as ravish and transport the reader, and then that the sublime can exist where there is no passion.121 Whether speaking through a narrator or a character it is the poet who must be ravished and transported, and through the force of his style, communicate this excitement
to his audience. Literature, asserts Dennis, especially epic and tragedy, works upon the reader by moving and directing his passions.

In a poem such as epic, which consists of both dramatic interaction and descriptive narration, the poet can make use of two sources of the affective, what Dennis calls the ordinary and the enthusiastic passions.

Vulgar Passion, or that which we commonly call Passion, is that which is moved by the Objects themselves, or by the Ideas in the ordinary Course of Life; I mean that common Society which we find in the World. As for example, Anger is moved by an Afront that is offer'd in our presence, or by the Relation of one; Pity by the Sight of a mournful Object, or the Relation of one; Admiration or Wonder, (the common Passion I mean; for there is an Enthusiastick Admiration, as we shall find anon) by the Sight of a strange Object, or the Relation of one.122

The ordinary passions, as they arise from the interaction of characters, are best managed and most moving when those characters are first kept distinct enough from one another to direct our concern properly: "For if the Manners are ill expressed in them, we can never become acquainted with them, and consequently, can never be terrified by foreseeing their Dangers, and never be melted by feeling their sufferings."123

Second, they ought to be such characters as the reader can identify with, neither monstrously perfect nor monstrously criminal, "For, no Man commiserates what another Man suffers, unless he is apprehensive of enduring the like."124 Dennis proceeds to cite the authority of Aristotle, quoting liberal-
ly from the *Rhetoric*, II.x. The faults of these charac-
ters ought to be those which the reader can admit himself
subject to: "those Defects, which either are found in most
Men, and which they believe that they have, or to which
most men at least are liable, and believe themselves liable,
are violent Passions. And of these Passions, to make the
Pity and Terror surer and stronger, such in my Mind ought
to be chosen, as are the most universal, and such as though
they are not the least guilty, are the most credible in the
Eyes of the World." 125

The poet's second, and stronger, affective resource is
the sort of enthusiastic passion raised by meditation upon
the universal, or supernatural causes or significance of
objects and actions:

Most of our Thoughts in Meditation are naturally
attended with some sort and some Degree of Pas-
sion; and this Passion, if it is strong, I call
Enthusiasm. Now the Enthusiastic Passions are
chiefly six, Admiration, Terror, Horror, Joy,
Sadness, Desire, caus'd by Ideas occurring to us
in Meditation, and producing the same Passions that
the Objects of those Ideas would raise in us, if
they were set before us in the same Light that
those Ideas give us of them. And here I desire
the Reader to observe, that Ideas in Meditation
are often very different from what Ideas of the
same Objects are, in the course of common Con-
versation. As for Example, the Sun mention'd in
ordinary Conversation, gives the Idea of a round
flat shining Body, of about two foot diameter.
But the Sun occurring to us in Meditation, gives
the Idea of a vast and glorious Body, and the top
of all the visible Creation, and the brightest
material Image of the Divinity... So Thunder
mention'd in common Conversation gives an Idea of
a black Cloud, and a great Noise, which makes no
great Impression on us. But the Idea of it
occurring in Meditation, sets before us the most forcible, most resistless, and consequently the most dreadful Phaenomenon in Nature: So that this Idea must move a great deal of Terror in us, and 'tis this sort of Terror that I call Enthusiasm. And 'tis this sort of Terror, or Admiration, or Horror, and so of the rest, which express'd in Poetry make that Spirit, that Passion; and that Fire, which so wonderfully please.126

On the authority of Aristotle (Rhetoric III.ii-iii), Hermogenes and Longinus, Dennis proves that "the strongest Enthusiastick Passions in Poetry are only justly and reasonably to be rais'd by religious Ideas."127 Because sacred subjects stir more wonder and terror than any other, they are capable of moving the strongest passions most strongly: after the idea of divinity itself, are angels and daemons, miracles and apparitions, followed by the "great Phaenomena of the Material World" which "lead the Soul to its Maker and shew ... his eternal Power and Godhead";128 next in order of power to produce astonishment are "Emanations of Divinity," such virtues as "Temperance, Justice, Fortitude, Magnanimity; or Nature, Law, Power and the like."129

It is not enough, however, that a poet raise these passions. He must also move them "justly," and toward the harmony of reason, passion and sense that man lost at the fall. As in created nature, apparent disharmony is often a means to harmony, part of a larger design imperfectly understood.130 Thus in The Person of Quality's Answer to Mr. Col-
lier's Disswasive from the Play-house (1704), one of Dennis' imaginary speakers claims that plays are more innocent diversions than gaming, music meetings, or dances: plays "Raise the Passions only to correct them, whereas the others raise them merely for the sake of inflaming them."

Elsewhere, Dennis attempts to explain why he is more pleased by Sophocles' Oedipus than by Shakespeare's Julius Caesar.

Upon Reflection I find, that the Reason is, Because I am more delighted, and more instructed by the former; and that for this very Reason, because I am more mov'd by it; For I find by Experience, that I am no farther pleas'd, nor instructed by any Tragedy, than as it excites Passion in me. . . . I have a great deal of Reason to suspect, that the Oedipus derives its Advantage, from its Regularity, and its Religion; and the Presumption grows still more strong, when, upon Enquiry, I find, that the foremention'd Regularity, is nothing but the bringing some Rules into Practice, which Observation and Philosophy have found requisite for the surer exciting of Passion. . . . If any of the Enemies to Regularity, will give themselves the Trouble, to pursue the Oedipus of Sophocles, with an impartial Eye, he will easily discern, how instrumental the Poetical Art is in leading him from Surprize to Surprize, from Compassion to Terror, and from Terror to Compassion again, without giving him so much as Time to breathe; and he will as easily discover, how the Religion, that is everywhere intermix'd with the Play, shews all the Surprises, even when he least expects this, as so many successive Effects, of a particular dreadful Providence, which makes them come, like so many Thunder-claps, from a Serene Heaven, to confound and astonish him."

Given the movement of the reader's passions from disharmony to harmony, the end of the poem becomes especially important as an emotional climax. In his Preface to the Passion of
Byblis (1692), Dennis criticises Oldham's translation for its omission of the catastrophe of the tale: "Now the Catastrophe was absolutely necessary, that the Story at ending might make a deeper impression: I have therefore contracted it in the last five lines; at the same time I have altered it. For to make it moving it was necessary to make it credible." 133

In order to reconcile reason, passion and sense, each genre raises and moves those emotions most appropriate to it and to its traditional subject matter. Thus although epic arouses pity and terror, its proper passion is admiration. Reason and passion are reconciled at the poem's close when poetic justice and the genre's proper passion work together. Because the heroes of tragedy and epic are neither perfect nor criminal, the specific verdict of poetic justice can vary with the affective requirements of the genre:

By a Character morally vicious, then, I mean such a Character as is compounded of good and bad Qualities, the good at the same time overcoming the bad, and hiding them as the Sun does Mercury, by the greatness of their Neighbouring Lustre: Now a Poet is not to make a Heroick Poem end Unfortunately, with respect to such a Character, because such an end would weaken and destroy that Admiration which is requisite for the Poet's attaining his End, and destroy or weaken it in the very place where its Influence is most requisite. For as the greatest Impression that a Poem is to make, ought to be made at the end of it, the reigning Passion of that Poem ought to predominate most there. As therefore, Terror and Compassion ought to be most violently mov'd, at the Catastrophe of a Tragedy, and Laughter at that of
a Comedy, Admiration ought to be rais'd to its utmost height, at the end of an Epick Poem. But if that Poem should end unfortunately, with relation to such a compounded Character, as we have just mention'd above, it would cause great Indignation in some, and great Compassion in others: Now as great Indignation and great Compassion are always attended with Grief, Admiration is constantly accompanied with Joy. An Epick Poet therefore, by exciting Compassion or Indignation at the latter end of his Poem, instead of Admiration, would make that Poem throw off its Nature and assume that of Tragedy, which is as directly contrary to its own, as Grief is to Joy, or as Light is to Darkness.

Nor would such a prosperous End, in relation to such a Character be in the least a violation of Poetick Justice, tho' for the most part in Tragedy, it would be a very great one; because the Hero of the Epick Poem always carries on some good and great Design, for the Advantage of that Society, of which he is the chief, or an illustrious Member. 134

Dennis' version of the epic hero is a partial return to Sidney's, but with a significant difference. The rhetorical locus of Dennis' epic model is not the hero's moral example but the affective structure of the poem, the combination of character, action and narration which disturbs in order to harmonize the reader's emotions in accord with the genre's predominant passion. Epideictic techniques are used to raise admiration and to climax the poem, but govern neither its characterization nor its structure.

Le Bossu had displaced epic rhetoric from the heroic exemplar to the fable and action, distinguishing between it logical and its affective aspects. Although Dennis is an avowed disciple of Le Bossu, he displaces the rhetoric of epic once again, arguing for an affective, rather than a
logical structure. According to Le Bossu, Homer addressed his own countrymen at a time of crisis in their history, and in an allegorical manner fitted to their religious customs; by an appeal to their patriotic prejudices, moreover, he sought to move them to accept the "proof" of his fable. Dennis considers the political motive less important than the universal appeal, and claims that Homer and Virgil wrote to all men and all ages:

They wrote not with a little narrow Design, to please a tumultuous transitory Assembly, or a Handful of Men, who were call'd their Countrymen; they wrote to their Fellow-Citizens of the Universe, to all Countries, and to all Ages; and they were perfectly convinc'd, that tho' Caprice and Extravagance may please the Multitude, who are always fluctuating and always uncertain; yet that nothing but what is great in Reason and Nature, could be able to delight and instruct Mankind. They were clearly convinc'd, that nothing could transmit their Immortal Works to Posterity, but something like that harmonious Order which maintains the Universe.135

Whereas Le Bossu had separated the logical and the affective aspects of the didactic narrative, Dennis reunites them. Poetry works by its own structural and imagistic "logic," he argues, and according to the psychology with which man was created. The dialectic of discordant passions which the poet induces leads to a concord of the passions at the poem's close, where the poet aims to affect the reader most strongly. The dialectic and periodic model which Dennis establishes early in the eighteenth century is an important source for the rhetorical structure of Pope's translation.
NOTES


2  Sandys, II, 64 and 104.

3  Sandys, II, 104 and 133.


5  Le Bossu and Voltaire on the Epic, ed. Stuart Curran (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1970), p. 32.


9  Spingarn, p. 11.

11 Gilbert, p. 317.

12 Gilbert, pp. 318-19.

13 Gilbert, p. 328.


16 Gilbert, p. 326.

17 Gilbert, p. 327.

18 P. 11.

19 Hardison, pp. 34-35 and 38.


22 Sandys, II, 647.

23 Curtius, p. 50, n. 42.
24 Curtius, p. 175.


27 See Comparetti, pp. 29-134; Curtius, esp. pp. 62-105; and Hardison, pp. 3-42.

28 Quoted by both Curtius, p. 48, and Comparetti, pp. 96-97. Comparetti mentions similar complaints by Cassiodorus, Bede, Alcuin and others.

29 "Primam igitur est ante omnia sciendum est quod materiae genus Maro noster agressus sit; hoc enim non nisi laudativum est, quod idcirco incognitus est et latans, quia miro artis genere laudationis ipse, dum gesta Aeneae percurret, incidentia quoque aliarium materiarum genere complexus ostenditur, nec tamen ipsa aliena a partibus laudis; nam idcirco adsumpta sunt, ut Aeneae laudationi proficeret. Hoc quisque Virgilis i/N/genium, moralitatem, dicendi naturam scientiam, mores, peritiamque rhetoricae metiri volet, necessario primum debet advertere quem susceperet carmine suo laudandum." Hardison, pp. 33 and 206, n. 24; from the text of Henricus Georgius (Leipzig, 1905), p. 2.


31 "Et quamvis oportueris secundum dialecticam disciplinam primum personam edicere, sicque personae congruentia enarrare, quo prima poneretur substantiae, deinde accidens substantiae, ut primam virum sic enim arma edicere, virtus enim in subiecto est corpori: sed quia laudis est adsumpta materia ante meritus viri quam pisum virum ediximus, quo sic ad personam veniretur iam recognita merita qualitate. ... multi viri sunt, non tamen omnes laudandi; ergo virtutem primum poesi." Hardison, pp. 34 and 207, n. 27; from Fabii Flanciatis Fulgentii opera, ed. Rudolphus Helm (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 67-68.
32 Hardison, pp. 77-78.

33 Comparetti, pp. 113ff.

34 Comparetti, pp. 116-17: "Scribit enim (Vergilius) in quantum est philosophus humanae vitae naturam. Modus vero agendi talis est; sub integumento descript quid patiantur humanus spiritus in humano corpore temporaliter positus."

35 Comparetti, p. 117.

36 Hardison, p. 78.

37 The rest of this paragraph summarizes Curtius, pp. 154-56.

38 "Dicit [Aristoteles] omne itaque poemata & omnis oratio poetica aut est vituperatio aut est laudatio & hoc patet per inductionem poematum ipsorum quae sunt de rebus voluntariis sive honestis aut turpibus. . . . Et ex quo representatores et assimilatores per hoc intendunt instigare ad quosdam actiones quae circa voluntaria consistunt et retrahere a quibusdam erunt necessario ea quae intendunt per suas representationes aut virtutes aut vicia. Omnis nam actio et omnis mos non versatur nisi circa alterum istorum videlicet virtutem aut vicium." Quoted from Aristotelis rhetorica ex arabico latine reddita interprete Alemanno Todesco ecc. excerpta ex Aristotelis poetica per eundem Ermannum de Averrois textu (Venice, 1481), 90r-91r; in Hardison, pp. 34-35; p. 207, nn. 32 and 33.

39 "Inquit [Averroes] in ipsius libelli fonte omne poema esse orationem vituperationis aut laudis: . . . convenienter possimus cum Aristotele deffinire poesin esse potentiam considerantem laudationes et vituperationes." Quoted from the text of B. L. Ullman (Zurich, 1951), I, 9-10 and 14; by Hardison, pp. 36 and 207-8, n. 39.

40 From the Discorsi del poema eroica (1594). Hardison, p. 40.

42 Smith, I, 160.


44 Smith, I, 172. See also Sir John Harington, A Brief Apology for Poetry (1591) in Smith, II, 198-99.

45 Gilbert, p. 279; and Hardison, p. 218, nn. 14 and 16.

46 Gilbert, pp. 215, 218 and 228.

47 Gilbert, pp. 233-34.

48 Steadman, p. 9.


50 Steadman, p. 9.


52 Smith, II, 304 and 302.

53 Gilbert, pp. 248-49.

54 Steadman, p. 7.

55 Steadman, p. 13.

56 Steadman, pp. 4-5, 10 and 17-18.
57  Steadman, pp.

58  Translated from Della difesa della "Commedia" di Dante by Gilbert, pp. 364-65.

59  P. 23.

60  Swedenberg, pp. 21-22.

61  Gilbert, pp. 617-18.

62  Swedenberg, p. 23.

63  Spingarn, pp. 147-58.

64  Quoted by Swedenberg, pp. 15-16.

65  Gilbert, pp. 663-65.


67  See Watson, I, 246-54; II, 58, 96, 188-93, 224 and 233.

68  Swedenberg, p. 17.


71  Spingarn, Critical Essays, III, 240.

Curran, p. 2.


Smith, I, 157.

Curran, pp. 19-20.

Curran, p. 201.


Curran, p. 43.

Curran, pp. 140-41.

Curran, p. 140.

Curran, p. 18.

Curran, p. 18.

Curran, p. 21.

Curran, p. 23.

Curran, p. 22.
88 Curran, p. 48; italics reversed.
89 Curran, p. 48; italics reversed.
90 Curran, p. 49; italics reversed.
91 Curran, pp. 41-42.
92 Curran, p. 49.
93 Curran, p. 84.
94 Curran, p. 83.
95 Curran, p. 83.
96 Curran, pp. 71-72.
97 Curran, pp. 92-93.
98 Curran, p. 72.
100 Curran, p. 108.
102 Curran, p. 205.
103 Curran, p. 189.
104 Curran, p. 198.
105 Curran, p. 198.
106 Curran, p. 105.
107 Curran, pp. 105-6.
108 Curran, p. 110.
109 Curran, p. 111.
110 Curran, pp. 229-30.
111 Curran, p. 232.
113 Curran, p. 218.
114 Curran, p. 216.
115 Curran, p. 240.
116 Curran, pp. 131-32.
117 Curran, pp. 136-37.
118 Curran, pp. 140-41.
120 Summarized from Hooker, I, 338-39.
121
Hooker, I, 358-59; see also I, 223.

122

123
Hooker, I, 128.

124
Hooker, I, 128.

125
Hooker, I, 129.

126

127
Hooker, I, 340.

128
Hooker, I, 347.

129
Hooker, I, 348.

130
Hooker, I, 317.

131
Hooker, I, 200-201.

132
Hooker, I, 3.

133
On the Moral and Conclusion of an Epick Poem (1716)

134
CHAPTER II. THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURE OF POPE'S ILIAD

We have considered in the preceding chapter how the poetic structure which one age feels to embody the truth and the moral terms of human life can be read into the literature of a previous age, and in such a way that it actually "restructures" this earlier literature. This phenomenon is especially important to the study of translation. Insofar as the Iliad is felt to be relevant to the concerns of a later age, and insofar as the translator aims to reproduce the original as a work of literature--rather than a "trot"--any new version will reveal the conceptual and communicative structures characteristic of this translator's own culture.

It is virtually impossible, and relatively unimportant, to distinguish absolutely between those patterns of theme and form which the translator sees in the original and those which he consciously imposes upon it. Had Pope omitted those parts of the Iliad which he could not defend, such a distinction would be possible. That he omits nothing considerable, however, suggests that he intended a relatively faithful translation, and that (barring a few instances of special pleading) the formal and thematic
patterns by which he reads and translates the *Iliad* are those which he thinks Homer actually intended. Where Pope praises or condemns the *Iliad*, he is therefore judging its local success or failure in terms of an overall view of Homer's larger structures and thematic intentions.

Any reading or translation of the *Iliad* which alters the structure of the original will alter its meaning as well. The relationships among character, action and meaning in a successful literary narrative stand in delicate balance. A change, substitution or re-emphasis of one element is certain to affect the others. A skillful translator will readjust this balance if he must jar it at all, just as a skillful critic will readjust his reading of a work as he comes to understand the relevance of more and more of its separate elements.

Prior to our own century, the most complete and coherent interpretations of the *Iliad* are Le Bossu's and Pope's. Unlike our modern poetic, however, Pope's and Le Bossu's neo-Aristotelian poetics do not allow for character development. Although they read the same moral in the *Iliad*, moreover, Pope and Le Bossu read the structural embodiment of this moral very differently.
i. Logical, "Existential" and Rhetorical Structures.

In the introduction to this study, I offered a preliminary distinction between Pope's rhetorical and Homer's existential handling (as we read it) of the *Iliad*. We have seen, in the preceding chapter, how Le Bossu's interpretation recovers more of the *Iliad* than had been possible according to the traditional reading of epic as epideictic *Bildungsroman*. Because literary structures can tell us a good deal about literary method and meaning, we need at this point to clarify further the relationships among Le Bossu's logical, Pope's rhetorical and our existential readings of the *Iliad*.

Le Bossu's logical structure reconciles the problematic "unity of action" and the morality expected of epic to the non-exemplary character of Achilles only by decentralizing the role of this hero. The logical cause and effect of the action proves a moral; thus the hero need only be rewarded or punished according to his desert, and his character can be considered "poetically" good. Because it is the movement of the action which is important to the logical structure, character must be fixed--a "given" which acts and is acted upon according to the laws of the poem's moral scheme. Should the character of any of the heroes change--or "develop," in our terms--the argument and logical proof of the fable will become confused.
The "shape" of a logically structured narrative is both linear and symmetrical: linear because it must demonstrate a sequence of cause and effect; symmetrical because possible objections to the proof of the moral must be met, and because the poet must demonstrate that he has considered all sides of the issue. He must show that the mere appearance of unity among governors is not so effectual as unity in fact. Furthermore, intrigues by one party must be balanced by counter-intrigues on the part of the opposing party. To demonstrate the ruinous consequences of discord, the poet must show the Achaeans attempting victory in spite of Achilles' withdrawal; and to show that victory is attributable to the strength which comes of union, not to the weakness of the enemy, the poet must convince the reader that Hector puts up an adequate defense against Achilles.

Like the logical structure, a rhetorical structure aims to enforce a moral or recommend a given course of action. But a rhetorical structure employs very different means to this end—it is predominantly linear and cumulative in its effects. Whereas it is important that a logical structure leave in the reader's mind the shape and process of the "proof," the rhetorical structure tends to concentrate its forces toward the single point in time at which the reader is convinced or moved to agree. Forward momentum is more important than syllogistic symmetry. The one form might be characterized as spatial, the other as temporal.
The relationship between "fixed" and "moving" elements in each of these structures is significant. The rhetorical form allows for the incremental repetition, or progressive alteration, of its fixed elements; because its actual movement is in the minds and the emotions of a reader, it admits alteration of a premised or "fixed" element, so long as this change works coherently and by degrees, and without violating the sympathy or belief of the audience.

A brief example will clarify this point. Perhaps the best known instance of literary rhetoric is Antony's funeral speech to the Roman rabble in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, III.ii. Antony avoids the syllogistic reasoning and the larger political issues with which Brutus has just challenged the crowd. The first movement of his speech restricts itself to the concepts of Caesar's alleged "ambition" and the "honor" which Brutus has claimed for himself and the conspirators. Variants of these two terms are repeated twelve times in thirty-five lines, and less frequently throughout the rest of the speech--each time in a different context and with less certain reference. In the end, the rabble are so convinced of Caesar's "honor" and the "ambition" of Brutus and the conspirators that they are determined to mutiny. Antony has not literally redefined these terms, nor explicitly contradicted Brutus' interpretation of the issues. He has merely moved from reminding the people of instances of Caesar's apparent lack of self
interest, to the reading of Caesar's will; the crowd eagerly recognizes its own self-interest and transfers "honor" from Brutus' rather abstract identification of the term with patriotism and liberty to Caesar's more material generosity. Symmetry, in this sort of structure, is undesirable; it is likely to undermine the cumulative force of the crowd's empathy with Brutus' rising emotion and the forward thrust of the argument. Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel is structured after a model more rhetorical than logical. The traditional complaints about its lack of "action" and its lack of structure--meaning symmetry of design--are certainly misplaced.

While both rhetorical and logical structures use the relationship between selected, relatively fixed, and often polarized terms to prove a statement or enforce an opinion, an "existential" or geometric structure like the Iliad's tends to present individual, limited arguments or opinions in order to reveal the relationships among them. Like the logical, the rhetorical structure has a given lesson or moral in view, and adapts its design to this end. The existential, on the other hand, will use the partial aims of characters or systems to reveal a design operative in human behavior or society. Because its end is the revelation of these more universal relationships or patterns, this type of structure is likely to be symmetrical, or spatially ordered. Thus although the structure of each of the four
epistles of Pope's *Essay on Man* and the direction of their sequential development are rhetorical, the structure of the whole might be said to be existential. Pope considers man "with respect to the UNIVERSE," "with respect to Himself as an individual," "with respect to Society," and "with respect to Happiness." Taken together, the four epistles constitute a revelation of the divine scheme of salvation which man's pride is in continual danger of forfeiting. In his well known introduction to the *Essay on Man*, Maynard Mack notes that

imaginatively, the thesis of restoration is explicit in the very structure of Pope's poem. Not simply because the breaking of union which each epistle condemns implies the desirability of reunion, but because all four epistles conclude with picturizations of a reunited world from different points of view and there is an unmistakable progress in them.

Another less subtle and less successful, because more mechanical example of this combination of structures in Augustan poetry is Thomson's *Seasons*.

The existential structure of the *Iliad* is common to many modern novels, notably Henry James's *The Ambassadors*. Both narratives have linear as well as geometric, or symmetrical, structural dimensions. The logical structure develops sequentially according to the demands of its moral cause and effect. Both the *Iliad* and James's novel develop sequentially and temporally according to the central character's process of insight, although their methods of char-
acterization are very different. In both, however, the central character's growth is measured in terms of his grasp or acceptance of the universal or social order figured in the author's geometrical structure. The Ambassadors follows the course of Lambert Strether's "vision"; at the same time, the structure of the novel itself is geometric. As E. M. Forster notes, although not with complete approval,

The Ambassadors ... is the shape of an hour-glass. Strether and Chad change places, and it is the realization of this that makes the book so satisfying at the close. ... The final effect is pre-arranged, dawns gradually on the reader, and is completely successful when it comes. Details of intrigue, of the various missions from America, may be forgotten, but the symmetry they have created is enduring.2

It is the "hour-glass," the combination of structure and meaning—as opposed to merely sequential action—that remains with the reader after minor details are forgotten. Moreover, the whole of the novel's shape "dawns gradually on the reader" once the established pattern begins to reverse itself; or, to use Jean Anouihl's metaphor, when the coiled spring begins to unwind of itself.

The existential structure, clearly, may allow for a degree of character development which the rhetorical and the logical do not. The relationship, in each type of structure, among character, action and meaning is different and significant, especially when we are speaking of the translation of a major work of literature from one "structure" into another.
In the case of Pope's *Iliad*, emphasis upon one structural dimension at the expense of another alters what we conceive to be Homer's methods of creating meaning from the several elements of his epic. When a linear structure predominates, the meanings created by the geometrical structure are ignored or re-expressed.

We have noted that character is among the "fixed" elements of a logically ordered narrative. We have seen how Le Bossu recovers the *Iliad*, arguing against a traditional epideictic structure which is unified by the hero's exemplary character, and for a logical structure in which the morality of the hero is irrelevant, so long as the poet directs the cause and effect of his action toward the proof of a "moral." In the name of a unity of action which is also moral, Le Bossu recovers the *Iliad* at the expense of its hero. He thus distorts Homer's epic insofar as Achilles' character and character development are essential to the structure and meaning of the original.

Even the most casual reading of the *Iliad* suggests that there is more to Achilles than brutality and martial valor. Few readers would agree with Le Bossu that Achilles' dragging of Hector's body around Patroclus' pyre is the most noteworthy or the most emphatic of his actions during the funeral and games of Book XXIII. Fewer still would agree that "Achilles is always the same, and is not less Cholerick at the Council Board, than in War and Battle."³
Related to the sacrifice of Achilles' central role in the epic is Le Bossu's dismissal of the last two books of the *Iliad*. The moral is fully "proved" at Hector's death. The function of Books XXIII and XXIV is therefore merely rhetorical, unrelated to the structure or meaning of the whole. Homer "thought himself obliged to carry on the Funeral and the Observation of the Truce to the very End of his Poem: That so he might absolutely convince us of his tranquillity and repose, whose Action and Anger he had undertook to sing."⁴ Besides this, the last two books serve another purely rhetorical function. The happy ending of the *Iliad* "redounded more to the happiness and the Glory of the Grecians."⁵ Praise of the Greeks, and the use of their illustrious ancestor Achilles are, according to Le Bossu's argument, the rhetorical means by which Homer recommends the end of the fable's logical proof of a moral. The last books, which settle Achilles' affairs happily, are arbitrary additions to the whole, necessary to the rhetoric but unnecessary to the structure and meaning of the epic.

Character is also among the constant, or fixed, elements in a rhetorical structure. But because the rhetorical structure allows incremental repetition, a character may be set in different lights, or revealed in all its fulness gradually, so long as this revelation does not violate unity of character. Pope's rhetorical structure "recovers" more of the *Iliad* than does Le Bossu's by this means. By further
displacing epic rhetoric from historical circumstance to the epic's structure, Pope restores the coherence of structure, action and moral to the epic. Let us first survey the formal patterns by which he reads and translates the *Iliad*. We shall then be in a position to consider and evaluate how Pope's treatment of Achilles' character, and thus of the structure and meaning of the epic as a whole, differs from Homer's.

ii. Pope's Rhetorical Structure.

Whereas Le Bossu displaces the affective dimension of epic narrative to the local and historical details meant to flatter and thereby engage its particular audience, Pope displaces the affective dimension once again to the epic's structure, the formal patterns which govern the arrangement of its materials. A major source of Pope's rhetorical structure is the criticism of John Dennis, who called for the reformation of literature based on the principles of Aristotelian rhetoric and the Longinian sublime. In affirming the emotional "logic" of literature, he praised structures such as that of the *Oedipus* which disturb the passions and senses in order to lead them to harmony. These passions must be raised by degrees, and may be heightened by violent alternation with their opposites. As in the *Oedipus*, pity and terror may intensify one another by contrast. Dennis'
theories, emphasizing the importance of an emotional progression, throw special weight upon a poem's close. A poet must leave upon his readers' minds a strong impression of the passion, the moral and the sort of poetic justice appropriate to a given genre.

Pope's structure, like Dennis' model, is climactic—linear and cumulative in its effects. In distinguishing between rhetorical, logical and existential structures, I noted that the rhetorical tends to combine "fixed" and "moving" elements in patterns of incremental repetition. This results in a literary form which moves by a linear progression of dialectical comparisons toward a periodic close.

What I have called Pope's rhetorical narrative structure is a reflection in large of the smallest characteristic expressive structure of Augustan verse, the heroic couplet. The strength of the heroic couplet is its ability to express almost every type of comparison: its component details may be set in parallel, antithetical or progressive relationships to one another. A periodic structure depends upon comparative patterns just as do the more widely acknowledged Augustan figures of parallel and antithesis; details of the progression must rise above one another according to principles both of similarity and dissimilarity. As in the heroic couplet, the formal patterns of Pope's Iliad are governed by principles of comparison, progression, and incre-
mental repetition. The elements so treated may be characters, actions, machines, or combinations of narrative and dialogue.

Pope reads the *Iliad* as an epic in which the action--including speeches, machines, narrative descriptions and authorial commentary--is patterned on linear and cumulative principles. In order to raise the "admiration" traditionally requisite to the genre without violating probability, the poet must proceed by degrees. Pope sees several types of linear patterns operative in the *Iliad*, each of them involving the sort of incremental progression discussed above. These patterns may be distinguished as strategies of anticipation, on the one hand, and strategies of delay, on the other. In either case, the poet is timing, or pacing, his effects--for maximum emphasis, or in order to prepare the reader for the seemingly incredible, or both.

The techniques of anticipation apply chiefly to instances of the "marvellous," and to those incidents which might otherwise shock the reader if not sufficiently prepared, such as amoral or vicious behavior on the part of gods or heroes. In neither case is fidelity to the reader's mundane experience or to the laws of sublunar probability so important as ensuring the reader's acquiescence to a poetic and emotional deceit. If an action has been established as sufficiently normative within the "world" of the poem, it is not likely to violate the reader's belief nor offend his
feelings: "If Homer is resolv'd to do anything extraordinary, or arbitrary, which his readers may not very well relish, he takes care however to prepare them by degrees for receiving such Innovations" (TE VIII 280). The case in point is Apollo's role in the death of Patroclus. We saw a "sketch" of this sort of machine in Book XIII, where Neptune slays Alcathoos; here, Homer "carries it a little further"; and by this gradual preparation, gives us "Specimens of what we are to expect from Minerva at the Death of Hector in Il. 22" (TE VIII 280). This gradation is not mere empty formal patterning, but prepares for an important moral climax. The interference of Minerva in Hector's death, says Pope, is necessary to "insinuate that it is a greater Glory to Achilles to be belov'd by the Gods, than to be only excellent in Valour" (TE VIII 467). By this point in the narrative, Troy's guilt has become manifest, and must be punished. Achilles is Heaven's instrument.

A few other examples will suggest the frequency of Pope's notes on this anticipatory technique in Homer. The lightening and thunder with which Jove frightens the Greek assembly at the end of Book VII, says Pope, are inserted there in order to prepare the reader for the more extravagant machine in Book VIII. There, Jove hurls three thunderbolts before Diomedes' chariot to stop his pursuit of Hector. Thus at the end of Book VII, "The Signs by which Jupiter... shews his Wrath against the Grecians" are a prelude to
those more open Declarations of his Anger which follow in
the next Book, and prepare the mind of the Reader for that
Machine, which might otherwise seem too bold and violent"
(TE VII 392). Patroclus appeals to Achilles for permission
to fight in his armour: "Proud Troy shall tremble, and
desert the War; / Without thy Person Greece shall win the
Day, / And thy mere Image chase her Foes away" (TE VIII 237).
Besides raising Achilles' "terrible Character," notes Pope,
Homer "had it in his View to prepare hereby the wonderful
Incident that is to ensue in the eighteenth Book, where the
very Sight of Achilles from his Ship turns the Fætune of the
War" (TE VIII 238). Achilles' cruelty to the body of
Hector might shock the reader beyond the point of disapproval
which Homer clearly intends, if the poet had not shown Hector
threatening in Book XVII to perform the same atrocities upon
the corpse of Patroclus:

Homer takes care, so long before-hand, to lessen
in his Reader's Mind the Horror he may conceive
from the Cruelty that Achilles will exercise upon
the Body of Hector. That Cruelty will be only
the Punishment of this which Hector here exercises
upon the Body of Patroclus; he drags him, he de-
signs to cut off his Head, and to leave his Body
upon the Ramparts, expos'd to Dogs and Birds of
Prey. Eustathius.

(TE VIII 293)

Although reprehensible by any standard, Achilles' cruelty
shocks the reader less because within the poem's world it
contains an element of poetic justice. The most potentially
shocking incident of the Iliad, however, is Hector's flight
around the walls of Troy. Again, Pope demonstrates how
Homer has prepared for this surprizing action by degrees:

First, It will not be found in the whole Iliad,
that Hector ever thought himself a Match for
Achilles. Homer (to keep this in our Minds) had
just now made Priam tell him (as a thing known, for
certainly Priam would not insult him at that time)
that there was no Comparison between his own
Strength, and that of his Antagonist. . . .

Secondly, we may observe with Dacier, the
Degrees by which Homer prepares this Incident.
In the 18th Book the mere Sight and Voice of
Achilles, unarmed, has terrify'd and put the whole
Trojan Army into Disorder. In the 19th, the
very Sound of the coelestial Arms given him by
Vulcan, has affrighted his own Myrmidons as they
stand about him. In the 20th, he has been upon
the point of killing AEneas, and Hector himself
was not sav'd from him but by Apollo's inter-
posing. In that and the following Book, he
makes an incredible Slaughter of all that oppose
him; he overtakes most of those that fly from
him, and Priam himself opens the Gates of Troy,
to receive the rest.

Thirdly, Hector stays, not that he hopes to
overcome Achilles, but because Shame and the dread
of Reproach forbid him to re enter the City; a
Shame (says Eustathius) which was a Fault, that
betray'd him out of his Life, and ruin'd his
Country. Nay, Homer adds farther, that he only
stay'd by the immediate Will of Heaven, intoxi-
cated and irresistibly bound down by Fate. . . .

Fourthly, he had just been reflecting on the
Injustice of the War he maintain'd; his Spirits
are deprest by Heaven, he expects certain Death,
he perceives himself abandon'd by the Gods; (as
he directly says in V. 300 &c. . . . This indeed
is the strongest Reason that can be offer'd for
the Flight of Hector. He flies not from Achilles
as a mortal Hero, but from one whom he sees clad in
impenetrable Armour, seconded by Minerva, and one
who had put to flight the inferior Gods them-

(TE VIII 461-62)
This preparation for marvels and improbabilities is more than a merely defensive strategy. As in the cases of Hector's flight and Minerva's interference in his death, these progressive increments raise the action to an emotional climax. Furthermore, these climaxes raise the character of Achilles, for "It is indeed a high Exaltation of Achilles (which was the Poet's chief Hero) that so brave a Hero as Hector durst not stand him" (TE VIII 461). The terror with which the poet has gradually invested Achilles' approach is raised several degrees more by Hector's flight. The grief of Hector's family at seeing him dragged from Achilles' chariot is likewise depicted periodically. Priam's and Hecuba's laments are capped by Andromache's:

I must take notice of one Particular which shews the great Art of the Poet. In order to make the Wife of Hector appear yet more afflicted than his Parents, he has taken care to encrease her Affliction by Surprise: It is finely prepar'd by the Circumstances of her being retir'd to her innermost Apartment, of her Employment in weaving a Robe for her Husband . . . and of her Maids preparing the Bath for his Return: All which (as the Criticks have observ'd) augment the Surprize, and render this Reverse of Fortune much more dreadful and afflicting.

(TE VIII 479)

Had Homer ordered these laments differently, the change would not necessarily have lessened what we feel to be the characters' grief; another sequence would, however, have weakened the reader's own empathetic response. Thus the three speeches in Book IX, by which the Achaean ambassadors
attempt to win Achilles' aid, are disposed "in such an
Order, as raises more and more the Pleasure of the Reader"
(TE VII 448):

Ulysses speaks the first, the Character of whose
Discourse is a well-address'd Eloquence; so the
Mind is agreeably engag'd by the Choice of
his Reasons and Applications: Achilles replies
with a magnanimous Freedom, whereby the Mind is
elevated with the Sentiments of the Hero:
Phoenix discourses in a manner touching and
pathetick, whereby the Heart is moved: and Ajax
concludes with a generous Disdain, that leaves
the Soul of the Reader inflamed. This Order
undoubtedly denotes a great Poet, who knows how
to command Attention as he pleases by the
Arrangement of his Matter.

(TE VII 448)

The narrator himself uses this periodic strategy in comment-
ing upon praiseworthy actions. Early in Book XIII, Pope
remarks upon Homer's habit of rising above himself in paral-
el or repeated expressions of the same idea:

When Homer retouches the same Subject, he has
always the Art to rise in his Ideas above what
he said before. We shall find an Instance of it
in this Place; if we compare this manner of
commending the exact Discipline of an Army, with
what he had made use of on the same occasion at
the end of the fourth Iliad. There it is said,
that the most experienc'd Warrior could not have
reprehended any thing, had he been led by Pallas
thro' the Battel; but here he carries it farther,
in affirming that Pallas and the God of War them-
selves must have admir'd this Disposition of the
Grecian Forces.

(TE VII 113)

So important is this progression to a climax in creating
the "admiration" due to epic, that Pope condemns as a lapse
in method, a violation of Homer's own purposes, any speech
or stretch of description which checks the forward impetus
of the narrative. As Le Bossu observed, the poet who
wishes to move and lead his readers' passions cannot afford
to undermine what he has raised, whether by moving counter-
active passions or by risking gross improbabilities. Pope
objects to the conversation between Achilles and Aeneas
during the heat of battle, in Book XXII, because it is
anticlimactic:

I shall lay before the Reader the Words of
Eustathius in defence of this Passage, which
I confess seems to me to be faulty in the Poet.
The Reader (says he) would naturally expect some
great and terribleAchievements should ensue
from Achilles on his first entrance upon Action.
The Poet seems to prepare us for it, by his mag-
nificent Introduction of him into the Field:
But instead of a Storm, we have a Calm; he follows
the same Method in this Book as he did in the
third, where when both Armies were ready to engage
in a general Conflict, he ends the Day in a single
Combate between two Heroes: Thus he always agree-
ably surprizes his Readers. Besides the Admirers
of Homer reap a farther Advantage from this Con-
versation of the Heroes: There is a Chain of ancient
History as well as a Series of poetical Beauties.
Madame Dacier's Excuse is very little better;
And to shew that this is really a Fault in the
Poet, I believe I may appeal to the Taste of every
Reader who certainly finds him self disappointed:
Our Expectation is rais'd to see Gods and Heroes
engage, when suddenly it all sinks into such a
Combate in which neither Party receives a Wound;
and (what is more extraordinary) the Gods are
made the Spectators of so small an Action! What
occasion was there for Thunder, Earthquakes, and
descending Deities, to introduce a Matter of so
little Importance? Neither is it any Excuse to
say he has given us a peice /sic/ of ancient His-
tory; we expected to read a Poet, not an Histor-
ian. In short, after the greatest preparation
for Action imaginable, he suspends the whole Nar-
ration, and from the Heat of a Poet, cools at once
into the Simplicity of an Historian.

(TE VIII 402-3)
Like Dennis, however, Pope realizes that counterpointed effects can heighten the movement of passions which the poet has initiated. Thus the shifts of scene from the plain of battle to Priam's palace in Book III create suspense for the single combat between Paris and Menelaus (TE VII 186-87). Book XXII, in which Hector faces Achilles, "assembles in it all that can be imagined of great and important on the one hand, and of tender and melancholy on the other. Terror and Pity are here wrought up in Perfection" (TE VIII 452-53) and heighten one another by contrast.

Related to these preparatory and periodic structures is Homer's technique of "timed release," a technique of delay. The poet may choose the most effective moment in the narrative to amplify an event which, among the habitual acts of warring men, is actually quite common.

The Conduct of Homer in enlarging upon the Games at the Funeral of Patroclus is very judicious; There had undoubtedly been such Honours paid to several Heroes during this War. . . . But the Poet passes all these Games over in Silence, and reserves them for this Season . . . The Death of Patroclus was the most eminent Period; and consequently the most proper Time for such Games. (TE VIII 502)

On the other hand, "Homer is very concise in describing the Funeral of Hector, which was but a judicious piece of Conduct, after he had been so full in that of Patroclus" (TE VIII 574).
The "timed release" which delays may also contribute to climactic effects. Homer does not describe at length the arming of Patroclus in Book XVI "for besides that the time permits it not, he reserves this Description for the new Armour which Thetis shall bring [Achilles]/; a Description which will be plac'd in a more quiet Moment, and which will give him all the Leisure of making it, without requiring any Force to introduce it" (TE VIII 244). Similarly, Homer defers the machine of the river gods until the twenty first book:

This Book is entirely different from all the foregoing: Tho' it be a Battel, it is entirely of a new and surprizing kind, diversify'd with a vast Variety of Imagery and Description. The Scene is totally chang'd, he paints the Combate of his Hero with the Rivers, and describes a Battel amidst an Inundation. It is observable that tho' the whole War of the Iliad was upon the Banks of these Rivers Homer has artfully left out the Machinery of River-Gods in all the other Battels, to aggrandize this of his Hero.

(TE VIII 420)

Like the incremental repetition of significant narrative elements, this opposite method of retrenching repetitive material ensures the emphasis necessary to Pope's periodic structure.

Another form of "timed release" is the poet's anticipation of objections to the probability of the story as a whole. The reader might justly question the necessity of a war which could so easily be settled by single combat between the injured parties. It is for this reason, claims
Pope, that Homer sets Paris against Menelaus in Book III. The single combat is rendered ineffectual by Venus' intervention and Pandarus' treacherous attempt to slay Menelaus while the treaty is still in force. Thus Homer has "con-triv'd such a method to render this Combate of no effect, as should naturally make way for all the ensuing Battels, without any future Prospect of a Determination but by the Sword" (TE VII 198). Similarly, the reader might well question the probability of two nations fighting a war of such magnitude and duration over a single and not altogether admirable woman. Helen must be reconciled to us by consciousness of her own guilt, and on the testimony of those who have the best reasons to hate her.

The following Part where we have the first sight of Helena is what I cannot think inferior to any in the Poem. The Reader has naturally an Aversion to this pernicious Beauty, and is apt enough to wonder at the Greeks for endeavouring to recover her at such an Expence. But her amiable Behaviour here, the secret Wishes that rise in favour of her rightful Lord, her Tenderness for her Parents and Relations, the Relentings of her Soul for the Mischief her Beauty had been the Cause of, the Confusion she appears in, the veiling her Face and dropping a Tear, are Particulars so beautifully natural, as to make every Reader no less than Menelaus himself, inclin'd to forgive her at least, if not to love her. We are afterwards confirm'd in this Partiality by the Sentiment of the old Counsellors upon the sight of her, which one would think Homer put into their Mouths with that very view: We excuse her no more than Priam does himself, and all those do who felt the Calamities she occasion'd: And this regard for her is heighten'd by all she says herself; in which there is not a word that is not big with Repentance and Good-nature.

(TE VII 199)
Le Bossu sees Homer as meeting logical objections to the proof of the Iliad's moral. Pope, however, sees Homer meeting the reader's prejudices at the outset of the work, after which he may proceed to manipulate the reader's responses freely. This distinction between logical and rhetorical methods of meeting objections is also a distinction between symmetrical and linear narrative structures.

Another form of "timed release" involves actually withholding information or evidence from the reader in order to guide the course of his emotional involvement in the epic's moral world. The best examples of Pope's notes on this practice concern Homer's treatment of Troy's guilt and Hector's share in this guilt. Early in the epic, Hector is an almost exemplary character. He is contrasted to Achilles as "an accomplish'd Character of Valour unruffled by Rage and Anger, and uniting his People by Prudence and Examples" (TE VII 191). Paris's character is a foil to Hector's: "we are perpetually opposing in our Minds the Incontinence of Paris, who exposes his Country, to the Temperance of Hector, who protects it" (TE VII 191). Hector's single fault is his support of an "unjust Cause, which Homer has yet been careful to tell us he would not do, if his Opinion were followed" (TE VII 191). At this point, Hector's reasons for submitting to this unjust cause are presented as virtues: "Since he cannot prevail, the Affection he bears to his
Parents and Kindred, and his Desire of defending them, incites him to do his utmost for their Safety: (TE VII 191). Much later in the Iliad, when Hector's death and the ruin of Troy are at hand, Hector stands debating whether to face or attempt to propitiate Achilles. His soliloquy reveals reasons why his death is justified, and thus reconciles the reader to an event which might otherwise seem to violate poetic justice.

There is a very beautiful Break in the middle of this Speech. Hector's Mind fluctuates every way, he is calling a Council in his own Breast, and consulting what Method to pursue: He doubts if he should not propose Terms of Peace to Achilles, and grants him very large Concessions; but of a sudden he checks himself, and leaves the Sentence unfinished. The Paragraph runs, "If, says Hector, I should offer him the largest Conditions, and give all that Troy contains—" There he stops, and immediately subjoins, "But why do I delude myself," &c.

'Tis evident from this Speech that the Power of making Peace was in Hector's Hands: For unless Priam had transfer'd it to him he could not have made these Propositions. So that it was Hector who broke the Treaty in the third Book; (where the very same Conditions were propos'd by Agamemnon.) 'Tis Hector therefore that is guilty, he is blamable in continuing the War, and involving the Greeks and Trojans in Blood. This Conduct in Homer was necessary; he observes a poetical Justice, and shews us that Hector is a Criminal, before he brings him to Death. Eustathius.

(TE VIII 459)

Finally, as the Gods debate whether to recover Hector's body by stealth or to attempt placating Achilles, Homer mentions for the first time the judgment of Paris as a cause of Hera's and Athena's enmity to Troy. Macrobius had objected to
the passage as interpolation because Homer does not refer to the legend earlier. Eustathius had argued that the Goddess of Wisdom ought to be less implacable than Achilles. Pope justifies the passage and its placement on both counts.

It may be answer'd, that the Silence of Homer in the foregoing part of the Poem, as to the Judgment of Paris, is no Argument that he was ignorant of that Story: Perhaps he might think it most proper to unfold the Cause of the Destruction of Troy in the Conclusion of the Ilias; that the Reader seeing the Wrong done, might acknowledge the Justice of it.

(TE VIII 537)

Homer has chosen this point in the narrative to bring up the judgment of Paris and to heighten Pallas' anger against Troy in order to arouse the reader's desire for poetic justice.

The several linear patterns of anticipation and delay which I have just surveyed cooperate toward a single climax. Again, the grand period of the epic as a whole is developed by rising comparisons, which Pope describes as

that artful Manner of taking Measure, or (as one may say) Gaging his Heroes by each other, and thereby elevating the Character of one Person by the Opposition of it to that of some other whom he is made to excell. So that he many times describes one only to image another, and raises one only to raise another. I cannot better exemplify this Remark, than by giving an instance in the Character of Diomed that lies before me. Let us observe by what a Scale of Oppositions he elevates this Hero, in the fifth Book, first to excell all human Valour, and after to rival the Gods themselves. He distinguishes him first from the Grecian Captains in general, each of whom he represents conquering a single Trojan, while Diomed
constantly encounters two at once; and while they are engag'd each in his distinct Post, he only is drawn fighting in every quarter, and slaughtering on every side. Next he opposes him to Pandarus, next to Aeneas and then to Hector. So of the Gods he shews him first against Venus, then Apollo, then Mars, and lastly in the eighth Book against Jupiter himself in the midst of his Thunders. The same Conduct is observable more or less in regard to every Personage of his Work.

This Subordination of the Heroes is one of the Causes that make each of his Battels rise above the others in Greatness, Terror and Importance, to the end of the Poem. If Diomed has perform'd all these Wonders in the first Combates, it is but to raise Hector, at whose Appearance he begins to fear. If in the next Battels Hector triumphs not only over Diomed, but over Ajax and Patroclus, sets fire to the Fleet, wins the Armor of Achilles, and singly eclipses all the Heroes; in the midst of all his Glory, Achilles appears, Hector flies, and is slain.

The Manner in which his Gods are made to act, no less advances the Gradation we are speaking of. In the first Battels they are seen only in short and separate Excursions: Venus assists Paris, Minerva Diomed, or Mars Hector. In the next a clear stage is left for Jupiter, to display his Omnipotence, and turn the Fate of Armies alone. In the last, all the Powers of Heaven are engag'd, and banded into the regular Parties, Gods encoun-
tering Gods, Jove encouraging them with his Thun-
ders, Neptune raising his Tempests, Heaven flâm-
ing, Earth trembling, and Pluto himself starting from the Throne of Hell.

(TE VII 256-57)

The comparative, or dialectical, patterns work both to char-
acterize a single hero and to raise one hero above another periodically. Because of the "Subordination of the Heroes" to one another, the battles of the Iliad become progressively more great and terrible. Consequently, the reader's emotional participation in the action is increased by degrees. Like Le Bossu, Pope acknowledges the linear coher-
ence of Homer's action. He is more concerned, however, with the affective than the logical, or cause-and-effect, progression of events. Like Dennis, he recognizes the importance of the poem's close. Refining upon both, he is able to combine character, action and narrative toward a single climax.

The moral world which this structure embodies is fitted to its rhetorical techniques. Pope reads the Iliad according to Le Bossu's moral, that discord ruins and concord preserves states. The requirements of this moral, according to Pope, account for Homer's architectonics of epic roles. Unity and discord work within and among characters as well as states.

The chief Moral of Homer was to expose the ill Effects of Discord; the Greeks were to be shewn disunited, and to render that Disunion the more probable, he has designedly given them mixt Characters. The Trojans on the other hand were to be represented making all Advantages of the others Disagreement, which they could not do without a strict Union among themselves. Hector therefore who commanded them, must be endu'd with all such Qualifications as tended to the Preservation of it; as Achilles with such as promoted the contrary. The one stands in Contrast to the other, an accomplish'd Character of Valour unruffled by Rage and Anger, and uniting his People by his Prudence and Example. Hector has also a Foil to set him off in his own Family; we are perpetually opposing in our Minds the Incontinence of Paris, who exposes his Country, to the Temperance of Hector, who protects it. And indeed it is this Love of his Country which appears his Principal Passion, and the Motive of all his Action.

(TE VII 191)
The dialectical progression of heroes and battles which governs the structure of the *Iliad* is reflected in the moral antithesis within and among characters. The moral unity among governors and within characters is thus made the precondition of political unity.

On the other hand, because the action and emotional focus of the poem is to be climaxed in Achilles, the poet must delay the perfect union of wisdom and valor until the poem's close. He must show that the moral excellence of individuals is ineffectual unless they also cooperate with one another. This is the strategy which Pope sees in Homer's characterization and exaltation of Diomedes in the early battles of the *Iliad*. To enforce the moral, Diomedes is shown to be as much like Achilles as possible, but possessed of "conduct" as well as "courage";

he seems to have more of the Character of Achilles than any besides. He has naturally an Excess of Boldness and too much Fury in his Temper, forward and intrepid like the other, and running after Gods or Men promiscuously as they offer themselves. But what differences his Character is, that he is soon reclaim'd by Advice, hears those that are more experienced, and in a word, obeys Minerva in all things. He is assisted by the Patroness of Wisdom and Arms, as he is eminent both for Prudence and Valor.

(TE VII 264)

Diomedes' "great and enterprizing Nature . . . would be perpetually venturing too far, and committing Extravagancies and Impieties, did it not suffer itself to be checked by Minerva or Prudence." By her aid, Diomedes' eyes are opened,
he is prevented from contending "against Heaven" and
allowed to "resist only Venus and Mars, Incontinence and
ungovern'd Fury" (TE VII 320). The role of Diomedes as a
surrogate for Achilles is, according to Pope, to show that
even were an "Achilles" restored to the Greeks at this
point, the continuing discord among their governors would
still prevent victory. Pope's analysis of the whole Dio-
medeia demonstrates the way in which he sees the periodic,
dialectical and moral structures of the Iliad working in
combination:

He becomes immediately the second Hero of Greece,
and dreaded equally with Achilles by the Trojans.
At the first sight of him his Enemies make a
Question, Whether he is a Man or a God? AEneas
and Panderus go against him, whose Approach ter-
rifies Sthenelus, and the Apprehension of so great
a Warrior marvellously excites the Intrepidity of
Diomed. AEneas himself is not sav'd but by the
interposing of a Deity: He pursues and wounds
that Deity, and AEneas again escapes only by the
Help of a stronger Power, Apollo. He attempts
Apollo too, retreats not till the God threatens
him in his own Voice, and even then retreats but
a few Steps. When he sees Hector and Mars him-
self in open Arms against him, he had not retir'd
tho' he was wounded, but in Obedience to Minerva,
and then retires with his Face toward them. But
as soon as she permits him to engage with that
God, he conquers, and sends him groaning to
Heaven. What Invention and what Conduct appears
in this whole Episode? What Boldness in raising
a Character to such a Pitch, and what Judgment in
raising it by such Degrees? While the most daring
Flights of Poetry are employ'd to move our Admira-
tion, and at the same time the justest and closest
 Allegory, to reconcile those Flights to moral
Truth and Probability? It may be farther remark'd,
that the high Degree to which Homer elevates this
Character, enters into the principal Design of his
whole Poem; which is to shew, that the greatest
Personal Qualities and Forces are of no Effect when Union is wanting among the chief Rulers, and that nothing can avail till they are reconciled so as to act in Concert.  

(TE VII 264-65)

We have noted that Pope appends to his translation of the Odyssey an abstract of Le Bossu's Traité. In the Poetical Index to his translation of the Iliad, he paraphrases Le Bossu's analysis of its "fable":

The great Moral of the Iliad, that Concord, among Governors, is the preservation of States, and Discord the ruin of them: pursued thro' the whole Fable. The Anger of Achilles breaks this Union in the opening of the Poem, l. 1. He withdraws from the Body of the Greeks, which first interrupts the Success of the common Cause, ibid. The Army mutiny, l. 2. The Trojans break the Truce, l. 4. A great number of the Greeks slain, 7.392. Forced to build Fortifications to guard their Fleet, ibid. In great Distress from the Enemy, whose Victory is only stopt by the Night, 8. Ready to quit their Design and return with Infamy, 9. Send to Achilles to persuade him to Re-Union, in vain, ibid. The Distress continues; the General and all the best Warriors are wounded, 11. The Fortifications overthrown, and the Fleet set on fire, 15. Achilles himself shares in the Misfortunes he brought upon the Allies, by the loss of his Friend Patroclus, 16. Here upon the Hero is reconciled to the General, the Victory over Troy is compleat, and Hector slain by Achilles, 19, 20, 21, 22 &c.

(TE VIII 591)

Pope's emphasis, as opposed to Le Bossu's, is upon the progressive seriousness of the Greeks' plight, climaxed in the loss of Patroclus and the return of Achilles. The death of Hector caps the entire series of battles. The structure of Le Bossu's logical proof required that Achilles'
wrath be shown destructive to the Greeks and advantageous
to the Trojan enemy. Pope reads a larger and more universally humane moral into the Iliad, and finds support for it
in Homer’s scenes of Trojan—as well as Greek—discord and
suffering.

It is not simply disagreement among governors which
ruins states; the root of this disagreement is the individual's inability to unite reason and passion. or, in the epic's
martial terms, wisdom and courage. This larger theme per-
vades what Pope—following Le Bossu—calls the "episodes,"
whose allegorical actions multiplied upon the epic "fable"
which confirm and reinforce its lesson. Among the episodes
he cites in his Poetical Index are "Prudence restraining
Passion, represented in the Machine of Minerva descending to
calm Achilles, I.261. Love alluring, and extinguishing
Honour, in Venus bringing Paris from the Combate to the Arms
of Helen, 3.460 &c. True Courage overcoming Passion in Dio-
med's Conquest of Mars and Venus, by the Assistance of Pallas,
5.407, &c. through that whole Book" (TE VIII 591-92). These
courage/ wisdom and reason/passion antitheses are important
both to Pope's epic characterization and to his refinements
upon Le Bossu's analysis of the Iliad's fable. They are im-
portant terms of the dialectic by which the action rises to
a climax.

According to Pope's reading, the fable of the Iliad
unfolds its moral in a linear, periodic progression, climaxed
in Books XXIII and XXIV by Achilles' return to reason. A brief synopsis of this moral and rhetorical progression will clarify the dual formal and thematic linearity of Pope's translation.

After the split between Achilles and Agamemnon in Book I, the army mutinies. It is brought to order by the address of Agamemnon, Nestor and Ulysses by the end of Book II, where the catalogue of ships celebrates the Greeks' new variety in unity. After the Trojan Pandarus treacherously breaks the truce, the partially reunited Greeks are still unable to conquer the enemy, though their attempts rise in fury and their cooperation is increasingly exemplary. Diomedes' virtues, as we have seen, cannot compensate for the discord between king and champion. Hector's efforts are more and more successful, and the martial horrors increase until, after the death of Patroclus, the Greeks face complete ruin in the burning of their ships. Achilles and Agamemnon are reconciled, however, soon after Patroclus' death. Whereas the Greeks are now restored to unity, the Trojans begin to show a dangerous division. Overconfident in his victory, Hector foolishly rejects the priest Polydamas' warning that the Greeks are now formidable in their alliance. Eager for glory, Hector insists upon spending the night camped before the Greek ships in hope of making a final conquest the next day.
Pope's translation of Polydamas' speech interpolates several wisdom/courage antitheses, and will serve to exemplify the manner in which he points these dialectical comparisons at crucial points in the narrative. Homer introduces Polydamas in terms of his relationship to Hector: "he was Hector's companion, for they were born on the same night; / but he Polydamas conquered with words, Hector better with the spear" (XVIII.251-52). Pope recasts the antithesis of "words" and "spear," expanding the details of Polydamas' and Hector's fellowship in order to heighten the double antithesis of wisdom and courage, counsel and action: "The Friend of Hector, and of equal Years: / The self same Night to both a Being gave, / One wise in Counsel, one in Action Brave" (TE VIII 336). In expressing his fear of Achilles' return, Homer's Polydamas says that "while this man was angry with godlike Agamemnon, / then the Achaeans were easier to fight against" (XVIII 257-58). Pope's Polydamas elevates the personal quarrel to civil war—which by implication is now reconciled to political union: "I deemed not Greece so dreadful, while engag'd / In mutual Feuds, her King and Hero rag'd" (TE VIII 336). Finally, Homer's Polydamas closes his speech with an appeal to the Trojans to hear him, and with some practical suggestions for their safety: "If we obey my words, though grieved, / we will hold our strength tonight in the gathering place and the city will be guarded / by the towers and high gates and by the doors,
well-polished / and high, which are set therein and bolted" (XVIII 273-76). Pope’s version curtails the circumstantial description of the original, and contrasts the different sorts of "defenses" which counsel and fortifications provide: "Whatever be our Fate, yet let us try / What Force of Thought and Reason can supply; / Let us on Counsel for our Guard depend; / The Town, her Gates and Bulwarks shall defend" (TE VIII 337). "Thought" and "Reason" are "Forces," "Counsel" a "Guard"—Pope invests the usually passive term of the sapientia et fortitudo dichotomy with martial energy, and thus renders it a metaphorically respectable equivalent for Hector’s opposite warlike advice.

Achilles now returns to action, and raises the war to a new height of terror. The combat between Hector and Achilles climaxes the terror, the reader’s progressive emotional involvement and the poetic justice necessary to the political moral at once: "It is impossible but the whole Attention of the Reader must be awaken’d. . . . The Heroes of the two Armies are now to encounter, all the foregoing Battels have been but so many Preludes and Under-actions, in order to this great Event" (TE VIII 452). Here the terror of Achilles’ approach and pity for the suffering parents of Hector are "wrought up in Perfection" (TE VIII 453). Both emotions are heightened at this climactic moment by contrast:
With how much dreadful Pomp is Achilles here introduced! How noble, and in what bold Colours hath he drawn the blazing of his Arms, the Rapidity of his Advance, the Terror of his Appearance, the Desolation around him; but above all, the certain Death attending all his Motions and his very Looks; what a Crowd of terrible Ideas in this one Simile!

But immediately after this, follows the moving Image of the two aged Parents, trembling, weeping, and imploring their Son: That is succeeded again by the dreadful gloomy Picture of Hector, all on fire, obstinately bent on Death, and expecting Achilles; ... And indeed thro' the whole Book this wonderful Contrast and Opposition of the Moving and of the Terrible, is perpetually kept up, each heightening the other.

(TE VIII 454)

This is the Iliad's climax of terror, and the period of its political moral. Having punished the Trojan incontinence which began the war, it only remains for Homer to deal with that incontinence of Achilles which began and sustained the Greeks' troubles.

It will be recalled that Le Bossu considered the last two books of the Iliad merely rhetorical, inessential to the "fable." Pope meets the objection that these books are anti-climactic; because his moral is humane as well as political, he can read Books XXIII and XXIV as the climax of Homer's intention to show that "we should avoid Anger, since it is ever pernicious in the Event" (TE VIII 417). Achilles' countrymen lament the effects of his anger in Book XXIII and his Trojan enemies lament its effects in Book XXIV:

We are now past the War and Violence of the Ilias, the Scenes of Blood are closed during the rest of the Poem; we may look back with a pleasing kind of
Horror upon the Effects it has wrought in the compass of nineteen Days: Troy and Greece are both in Mourning for it, Heaven and Earth, Gods and Men, have suffer'd in the Conflict. The Reader seems landed upon the Shore after a violent Storm; and has Leisure to survey the Consequences of the Tempest, and the Wreck occasion'd by the former Comotions. Troy weeping for Hector, and Greece for Patroclus. Our Passions have been in an Agitation since the opening of the Poem; wherefore the Poet, like some great Master in Musick, softens his Notes, and melts his Readers into Tenderness and Pity.

(TE VIII 286)

The poet's moral is reconciliation. He does not wish to leave upon the minds of his readers "admiration" for mere martial valor, but admiration for concord and the union of wisdom and courage. While the reader feels pity for the sufferings caused by wrath, this emotion supports the admiration he feels for Achilles' behavior in Books XXIII and XXIV. Homer delays the amplification of any funeral games to this point to honor not only Patroclus, but Achilles:

who exhibits games to a whole Army; great Generals are Candidates for the Prizes, and he himself sits the Judge and Arbitrator; Thus in Peace as well as War the Poet maintains the Superiority of the Character of Achilles.

(TE VIII 502)

His continual mourning for Patroclus "softens and recommends the Character of Achilles" (TE VIII 535) in our last view of him. Finally, at the interview with Priam in Book XXIV, we see that Achilles' "Reason now prevails over his Anger." With this final reconciliation of Achilles' faculties, his character is raised to the morally admirable
"and the Design of the Poem is fully executed" (TE VIII 567). Thus Pope's Iliad rises in emotional force through a series of imperfect forms of political and moral union. This series is climaxed successively by the political union which brings about Troy's punishment and then by the moral union within Achilles' character.

iii. Characterization and Structure.

Character is one of the most important of the elements of incremental, dialectical progression in Pope's rhetorically structured Iliad. Hero rises above hero in a sequence of increa singly terrible scenes of slaughter which are climaxed in Achilles' return to action. In discussing the coextensive patterns of theme and structure which allow the epic's moral and its requisite "admiration" to meet simultaneously in Achilles' last appearance before the reader, I suggested the ways in which the single character of Achilles is treated according to the techniques of anticipation and delay, or the patterns of climax and "timed release" which govern Pope's translation. It is by these means that Pope restores Achilles to his central role in the Iliad; but these formal resources are based upon a distinctive Augustan conception of spiritual and political authority, and of human psychology, which differs as much as does his Augustan poetic from Homer's.
In Homer's *Iliad*, the analogy between man's state and the endless ease of the Olympian gods is essential to the theme of how man faces life in the knowledge of his own mortality. The chief distinctions between men and Olympians—who share the same very "human" passions—are in the foresight and immortality of the gods, versus the ignorance of fate the the mortality which are the lot of man. Within their own "societies," men and gods exercise relatively the same amounts of domestic and political control. Man's wisdom and foresight, however, must come from the comparisons and analogies he is able to make among his own experiences; and his progress in insight is measured in terms of the new experiences which he is enabled, by these means, to face and absorb. Achilles, for example, begins in enmity to a friend, and concludes in friendship with an enemy. Homer's deities represent metaphorically the "what if?" dimension of human life, his linear and chiastic structures the actual process and shape of human understanding.

Pope finds Homer's analogy of gods and men uncomfortable. Homer's "supreme being" can be rendered as a Christian god only selectivity. There is nothing to be done, for example, with such "machines" as Hera's deceit of Zeus in Book XIV. More important to Pope is the analogy between political and moral harmony, a relationship of no great importance to Homer. Unlike Homer's deity, the Christian god is impassive, benevolent, and a reconciler of those discords necessary to the
dynamic unity of the human, political and natural worlds.

"Of Systems possible, if 'tis confest / That Wisdom infinite
must form the best, / Where all must full or not coherent be,
/ And all that rises, rise in due degree" is a premise
unknown to Homer.

According to Pope, the poet's role is, like the patriot's,
to restore harmony, to move "jarring int'rests" toward that
concord which is natural to them under God's benevolently
created order:

'Twas then, the studious head or gen'rous mind,
Follow'r of God or Friend of human-kind,
Poet or Patriot, rose but to restore
The Faith and Moral, Nature gave before;
Re-lum'nd her ancient light, not kindled new;
If not God's image, yet his shadow drew:
Taught Pow'r's due use to People and to Kings,
Taught not to slack, nor strain its tender strings,
The less, or greater, set so justly true
That touching one must strike the other too;
'Till jarring int'rests of themselves create
Th' according music of a well-mix'd State.
Such is the World's great Harmony, that springs
From Order, Union, full consent of things,
Where small and great, where weak and mighty, made
To serve, not suffer, strengthen, not invade,
More pow'rful each as needfull to the rest,
And in proportion as it blesses, blest,
Draw to one point, and to one centre bring
Beast, Man, or Angel, Servant, Lord or King.?

(Essay on Man, III, 283-302)

The discordia concors on the natural/moral and social/political
levels is reflected by a created analogy within man's
nature. Every man is a composite of rational and passionate,
ordering and compulsive faculties:

Two Principles in human nature reign;
Self-love to urge, and Reason to restrain;
Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call,
Each works its end, to move or govern all;
And to their proper operation still,
Ascribe all Good; to their improper, Ill.
Self-love, the spring of action, acts the soul;
Reason's comparing balance rules the whole.
Man, but for that, no action could attend,
And, but for this, were active to no end;
Fix'd like a plant on his peculiar spot,
To draw Nutrition, propagate, and rot;
Or meteor-like, flame lawless thro' the void,
Destroying others, by himself destroy'd.

(Essay on Man, II, 53-66)

Each particular man's rational and passionate faculties,
however, work upon a ruling principle which is born with
him, "grows with his growth, and strengthens with his
strength" (Essay on Man, II, 136). This is what causes
every man to be sometimes virtuous and sometimes vicious.
Heaven's benevolent order, again, uses these mixed charac-
ters to its own end:

Virtuous and vicious every man must be,
Few in th' extreme, but all in the degree;
The rogue and fool by fits is fair and wise,
And ev'n the best, by fits, what they despise.
'Tis but by Parts we follow good or ill,
For, Vice or Virtue, Self directs it still;
Each individual seeks a sev'ral goal;
But Heav'n's great view is One, and that the Whole:
That counter-works each folly and caprice;
That disappoints th' affect of ev'ry vice.

(Essay on Man, II, 231-40)

Because the poet's task is to create for the reader "Heav'n's
great view" from the several ends of mixed characters, he
need not choose a hero who is exemplary. The direction of
his appeal, however, must be to recommend an exemplary har-
mony of reason and passion. Thus although not all readers
will share the "Love of Glory" which is Achilles' "darling Passion" (TE VII 459), they must admit that Achilles is more morally admirable when he finally accepts glory within the social order for which man was created, than when he sought glory without it.

According to Pope's system, character does not really "develop," in our terms. It vacillates "by fits": "The Rogue and Fool by fits is fair and wise, / And ev'n the best, by fits, what they despise." This notion of mixed character which vacillates according to a ruling passion is of great importance to Pope's structural use of character in the Iliad. A hero's "fits" can be presented to the reader in whatever order the poet's moral purpose requires; his ruling passion provides the necessary coherence and consistency. This structural characterization is thus a form of rhetorical, incremental repetition. Pope calls what he perceives to be Homer's use of the method setting a character "in several Views and Lights" (TE VIII 34). Agamemnon is "a master of Policy and Strategem," and "personally very valiant, but not without some mixture of Fierceness" (TE VIII 34). These characteristics are constants, and may appear as virtues or vices depending on their use. Agamemnon's violence and skill at strategem can be either beneficial or ruinous to a state at war. Homer, says Pope, chooses to present this mixture of possibilities climactically, in rising order from worst to best:
It is very observable how this Hero rises in the Esteem of the Reader as the Poem advances: It opens with many Circumstances very much to the Disadvantage of his Character; he insults the Priest of Apollo, and outrages Achilles: but in the second Book, he grows sensible of the Effects of his Rashness, and takes the Fault entirely upon himself: In the fourth he shows himself a skillful Commander, by exhorting, reproving and performing all the Offices of a good General: In the eighth he is deeply touch'd by the Sufferings of his Army, and makes all the Peoples Calamities his own: In the ninth he endeavours to reconcile himself to Achilles; and condescends to be the Petitioner, because it is for the publick Good. In the tenth, finding those endeavours ineffectual, his concern keeps him the whole Night awake, in contriving all possible Methods to assist them: And now in the eleventh, as it were resolving himself to supply the want of Achilles, he grows prodigiously in his Valour, and performs Wonders in his single Person. Thus we see Agamemnon continually winning upon our Esteem as we grow acquainted with him; so that he seems to be like that Goddess the Poet describes \(i.e.,\) Eris, or Strife, who was low at the first, but rising by degrees, at last reaches the very Heavens.

(TE VIII 34)

Besides the periodic progression in characterization, we may note that Agamemnon himself climaxes the Achilles-surrogates who rise before Patroclus appears in Achilles' armor. Finally, Pope claims that Agamemnon "rises in the Esteem of the Reader as the Poem advances," not that he changes before us in fact. Those qualities which are constant in Agamemnon's character could conceivably, after the poem's action is over, have produced another catastrophe.

The recovery of the Iliad is very much the recovery of Achilles' role. The periodic structure of the action of the whole, and the series of surrogate characters which Pope
sees Homer advancing, ensure Achilles' centrality to the structure and moral of the epic. His is the action to which all else builds. Like Agamemnon's, his character is not "developed," but revealed by degrees according to the poem's needs. Let us first survey the tactics of anticipation and delay by which Pope sees Homer presenting Achilles, and then consider how Pope modifies Achilles' speeches, at four crucial points in the Wrath, in accord with his thematic and formal principles.

iv. The Wrath of Achilles.

The modern term "character development" usually refers to a protagonist's progress in insight about himself in relation to his world through a combination of experience and reflection. Lambert Strether, the hero of James's *The Ambassadors*, finds himself, at age fifty-five, in a "false position." 7 "Thrown forward . . . upon his lifelong trick of intense reflection" 8 Strether has arrived in Paris to begin his "drama of discrimination," 9 his "state of mind . . . undergoing, as a result of new and unexpected assaults and infusions, a change almost from hour to hour." 10 A new experience "puts so many new meanings into things, does its little part toward shifting so many landmarks and confounding so many small assumptions" that his "judgments, conclusions, discriminations are more or less in solution . . . waiting
to come up in what will be doubtless new combinations." 11

This tortuous series of insights constitutes the novel's linear structure. Strether must extricate himself from the "false position" into which the whole former course of his life has betrayed him:

He has . . . missed too much, though perhaps after all constitutionally qualified for a better part, and he wakes up to it in conditions that press the springs of a terrible question. Would there yet perhaps be time for a reparation?—reparation, that is, for the injury done his character; for the affront, he is quite ready to say, so stupidly put upon it and in which he has even himself had so clumsy a hand? The answer to which is that he now at all events sees; so that the business of my tale and the march of my action, not to say the precious moral of everything, is just my demonstration of this process of vision. 12

Like Strether, Homer's Achilles finds himself in Book I of the Iliad in a false position. Agamemnon badly shakes his faith in the code of honor and reward, and their relationship to personal integrity. Like Strether's, Achilles' "process of vision" moves through a series of partial solutions and apparent confusions.

"The highest heroes," claims Cedric Whitman, "are not men of delusion":

They are men of clarity and purity, who will a good impossible in the world and eventually achieve it, through suffering, in their own spiritual terms. It is the will to the impossible which resembles delusion, until the terms are found in which it is possible. 13

The paradoxes of the impossible possible, and of the apparent delusion of "men of clarity" govern the chiastic and the
linear structural dimension, respectively, of Homer's *Iliad*. The linear development of the action, as it relates to Achilles, proceeds by an alternation of diastolic and systolic movements, as he alternately rejects and returns to the human community. Furthermore, as Whitman notes, \(^{14}\) Achilles is linked successively with four characters—Agamemnon, Patroclus, Hector and Priam. As Achilles seeks the spiritual terms of the impossible within the possible, absolute integrity in this world, his involvement with each of these characters marks one step in the solution.

Partial solutions, the steps in this process, however they constitute an advance in spiritual development, are likely to appear to the world as mistakes, extremes of self delusion. This is the principle behind Achilles' alternate expansions and contractions of consciousness and action. In Book I, Agamemnon's insult moves him to withdraw from any action within the human community. In Book IX we see him confused and wavering. In the time elapsed during the battle books, Achilles has come to doubt that "honor" consists in material recompense. In the course of his long reply to Odysseus' eloquent plea, he reveals the confusion of terms which constitutes the apparent self-delusion which leads him to reject Agamemnon's offer of recompense. Merit could not buy material rewards for honor. Now material recompense cannot buy life. Paradoxically, Achilles' growing awareness keeps him from the sphere of human action. However,
recognition of the pricelessness of his own life begins to draw Achilles to the aid of his countrymen, and he finally consents to send Patroclus to battle in his own armor. At Patroclus' death, he rejoins the war. Paradoxically, again, he does not at the same time rejoin the human community. Refusing food and rest himself, he would refuse them to the entire army, did Odysseus not insist upon an interval for refreshment. Achilles' reconciliation to Agamemnon is quite perfunctory. He is interested only in vengeance upon Hector. Once in battle, his single-minded search for Hector is of nearly cosmic proportions. As Achilles becomes more and more involved in action, his human sympathies narrow. He slays all who come in his way, he will accept no ransom for suppliants, and he refuses to agree with Hector on terms of burial for the loser of their single combat. Once Hector is dead, his human sympathies are widened again by the pleas of Patroclus' shade for burial and the plea of Priam for the restoration of Hector's body. At the same time, he performs social activities distantly—his real "life" at this point is in his grief for Patroclus. His distance is, however, kingly and godlike. At the funeral games, he distributes prizes according to merit as well as victory, unlike Agamemnon in Book I. Nestor and Agamemnon are rewarded without contending, in recognition of their dignities as counsellor and monarch. At the interview with Priam, he talks of life and death with the Olympian detachment which --ironically--
alone enables a man to go on living with dignity in the face of death. When Priam takes advantage of his softened temper to suggest that the Achaeans sail home, Achilles flies into a passion. His is not that sort of relenting. "This yielding to ransom," as Whitman remarks, "is not to be considered a correction, but a completion of his quest for honor." 15

Although Achilles' action and sympathies widen and contract dialectically, their movement is progressively toward the godlike and away from the pettily or narrowly human. Metaphorically, this means that he gradually grasps and accepts the meaning of his original choice between long life, or early death and deathless fame. Even in the pursuit of Hector, for all its nightmarish cruelty, Achilles is more like a fury than a man. Although he ignores Achilles' character development, Pope responds strongly to this metaphoric progress toward the godlike; his periodic structure is its rhetorical equivalent.

According to Pope, Homer begins to raise the reader's anticipation for the terrors Achilles will perform long before the hero actually appears.

Since there was a Necessity that this Hero should be absent from the Action during a great Part of the Iliad, the Poet has shewn his Art in nothing more, than in the Methods he takes from time to time to keep up our great Idea of him, and to awaken our Expectation of what he is to perform in the Progress of the Work. His greatest Enemies cannot upbraid or complain of him, but at the same time they confess his Glory and describe his Vic-
tories. When Apollo encourages the Trojans to fight, it is by telling them Achilles fights no more. When Juno animates the Greeks, it is by putting them in mind that they have to do with Enemies who durst not appear out of their Walls while Achilles engaged. When Andromache trembles for Hector, it is with Remembrance of the resistless Force of Achilles. And when Agamemnon would bribe him to a Reconciliation, it is partly with those very Treasures and Spoils which had been won by Achilles himself.

(TE VII 352)

In Book XVI, in the speech we have already remarked, Polydamas fears to camp overnight on the plain in sight of Achilles. "This Reflection," claims Pope, "makes Achilles a God, a single Regard of whom can turn the Fate of Armies, and determine the Destiny of a whole People" (TE VIII 148).

The rising progression of these anticipatory references demonstrates Homer's firmness of design. All of these allusions are climaxed in our first sight of Achilles as a warrior:

There cannot be a greater Instance, how constantly Homer carry'd his whole Design in his Head, as well as with what admirable Art he raises one great Idea upon another, to the highest Sublime, than this Passage of Achilles's Appearance to the Army, and the Preparations by which we are led to it. In the thirteenth Book, when the Trojans have the Victory, they check their pursuit of it, in the mere Thought that Achilles sees them: In the sixteenth, they are put into the utmost Consternation at the sight of his Armour and Chariot: In the seventeenth, Menelaus and Ajax are in Despair, on the Consideration that Achilles cannot succour them for want of Armour: In the present Book, beyond all Expectation he does but shew himself unarm'd, and the very Sight of him gives the Victory to Greece: How extremely noble is this Gradation!

(TE VIII 333)
What interests Pope most in Homer's treatment of Achilles' actual return to battle is the way in which the machines that "introduce him with the utmost Pomp and Grandeur" (TE VIII 392) also link his fury to the just punishment of Troy. The counsel at which Jove "permits several Deities to join with the Trojans, and hinder Achilles from over-ruling Destiny itself" is assembled by Themis: "She is the Goddess of Justice; the Trojans by the Rape of Helen, and by repeated Perjuries haveing broken her Laws, she is the properest Messenger to summon a Synod to bring them to punishment" (TE VIII 392). Neither in the original nor in the translation proper does any circumstance suggest this connection. Pope's explanation of the relevance of this detail accords with his interpretation of the overall formal and thematic method and movement of the whole.

Having roused the gods to battle to raise expectation for Achilles' return, Homer suddenly withdraws them. They become spectators of the action. This is not anticlimax, but strategy:

I conceive the reason of this Conduct in the Poet to be, that Achilles has been inactive during the greatest part of the Poem; and as he is the Hero of it, ought to be the chief Character in it: The Poet therefore withdraws the Gods from the Field that Achilles may have the whole Honour of the Day, and not act in subordination to the Deities: Besides, the Poem now draws to a Conclusion, and it is necessary for Homer to enlarge upon the Exploits of Achilles, that he may leave a noble Idea of his Labour upon the Mind of the Reader.

(TE VIII 401)
Similarly, once we have been led to expect a violent and conclusive encounter between Hector and Achilles, we might be disappointed that Hector is rescued by Apollo:

_Eustathius_ answers, that the Poet had not yet sufficiently exalted the Valour of Achilles, he takes time to enlarge upon his Achievements, and rises by degrees in his Character, till he completes both his Courage and Resentment at one Blow in the Death of Hector. And the Poet, adds he, pays a great Compliment to his favorite Countryman, by shewing that nothing but the Intervention of a God could have sav’d Aeneas and Hector from the Hand of Achilles.

_(TE VIII 416)_

Because Pope has already condemned as anticlimactic the conversation between Achilles and Aeneas which immediately precedes this interrupted encounter with Hector, one might suspect him of special pleading here. There is, however, a significant difference in the two passages. The conversation is part of the poet's dramatic mimesis, and ought to be probable; but the machines, being part of the poet's expression, raise rather than sink the reader's excitement.

Book XX ends with a picture of Achilles slaughtering on every side, his chariot wheels stained with blood and carnage. Pope remarks upon "the dreadful Idea of Achilles, which the Poet leaves upon the Mind of the Reader . . . a Painter might form from this Passage the Picture of Mars in the Fulness of his Terrors" (TE VIII 419). Left alone by the gods at the beginning of the book, Achilles is by the end of it raised to equal the god of war himself. In
the next book, he actually fights gods. Homer has delayed the machine of the river gods until this point in order to "aggrandize" this climactic battle. The style rises, and Achilles' valour is set in a more intense light (TE VIII 420). By the end of the book, Homer has raised the idea of Achilles yet further.

The Poet still raises the Idea of the Courage and Strength of his Hero, by making Priam in a Terror that he should enter the Town after the routed Troops: For if he had not surpass'd all Mortals, what could have been more desireable for an Enemy, than to have let him in, and then destroy'd him?

(TE VIII 447)

The poet's expression has raised Achilles to godlike stature; here the testimony of another character confirms the poet. Only Apollo's intervention saves Troy from Achilles' onslaught.

Finally, Homer "completes both Achilles' Courage and Resentment at one Blow in the Death of Hector" (TE VIII 416). This is Homer's climax of the terrible, and is raised above all previous horrors: first, by the progressively intense expectation which Homer has roused in his readers; second, by the reader's desire for poetic justice which Homer has created by delaying the evidence of Troy's guilt; and third, by the mutually heightened extremes of pity and terror which Homer arouses by his arrangement of events.

At this point the anticipatory techniques have done their part, and Homer begins the "timed release" of Achilles'
more civilized virtues. By showing Achilles' prominence and generous behavior at the funeral games, the poet "leaves a noble Idea of his Hero upon the Mind of his Reader, and as he rais'd our Expectations when he brought him upon the Stage of Action, so he makes him go off with the utmost Pomp and Applause" (TE VIII 512). Although Achilles does not contend for prizes, "Homer has found out a way to give him the Victory in two of them" (TE VIII 526). Achilles himself remarks that no one might beat him in the chariot race, if he competed; and Antilochus expresses a similar sentiment after the foot race: "Thus tho' Diomed and Ulysses conquer in the Chariot and Foot-race, it is only because Achilles is not their Antagonist" (TE VIII 526).

To show Achilles calm and rational is a more difficult task, especially before the parent of his bitterest enemy. Because Pope sees nothing of the inner development of Achilles character, he finds it more difficult to account for the outward manifestations of this development. The temperate Achilles of Book XXIV can be reconciled to the terrifying and godlike avenger of Book XXII only by the greatest exertion of the poet's art:

It may be thought that so many Interpositions of the Gods, such Messages from Heaven to Earth, and down to the Seas, are needless Machines; and it may be imagin'd that it is an Offence against Probability that so many Deities should be employ'd to pacify Achilles: But I am of Opinion that the Poet conducts this whole Affair with admirable Judgment. The Poem is now almost at the Conclusion, and Achilles is to pass from a State of an
almost inexorable Resentment to a State of perfect Tranquillity; such a Change could not be brought about by human Means; Achilles is too stubborn to obey any thing less than a God: This is evident from his rejecting the Persuasion of the whole Grecian Army to return to the Battle: So that it appears that this Machinery was necessary, and consequently a Beauty to the Poem. ... Homer excellently sustains his Character by representing the inexorable Achilles as not parting with the Body of his mortal Enemy, but by the immediate Command of Jupiter.

If the Poet had conducted these Incidents merely by human Means, or suppos'd Achilles to restore the Body of Hector entirely out of Compassion, the Draught had been unnatural, because unlike Achilles: Such a Violence of Temper was not to be pacify'd by ordinary Methods.

(TE VIII 541)

Besides the machines which persuade the reader, on the emotional level, of Achilles' return to reason, Pope notes several probabilistic devices. "It being improbable that so stubborn a Man as Achilles should relent in a few Moments," Homer allows Priam the greater part of the evening in which to move him to compassion (TE VIII 554). Priam appeals to Achilles by reminding him of his own father. His success is the more probable because "Achilles has every where been describ'd as bearing a great Affection to his Father" (TE VIII 561).

The "Wisdom" of Achilles is the last of his humane qualities to be revealed. This appears in the speech in which Achilles attempts to comfort Priam and persuade him to eat and sleep:

Homer to shew that Achilles was not a mere Soldier, here draws him as a Person of excellent Sense and
reason: Plato himself ... could not speak more like a true Philosopher: And it was a piece of great Judgment thus to describe him; for the Reader would have retain'd but a very indifferent Opinion of the Hero of a Poem, that had no Qualification but mere Strength: It also shews the Art of the Poet thus to defer this part of his Character till the very Conclusion of the Poem: By these means he fixes an Idea of his Greatness upon our Minds, and makes his Hero go off the Stage with Applause.

(TE VIII 564)

It is not unlikely that Achilles should be possessed of such wisdom, "for as Eustathius observes, he had Chiron and Phoenix for his tutors, and a Goddess for his Mother" (TE VIII 564). These circumstances are the probabilistic basis for Homer's machines. Finally, Pope claims that Homer intends to confirm this newly revealed wisdom by making Achilles suppress the last outburst of his wrath by his own will and without the intervention of the gods.

The Reader may be pleas'd to observe that this is the last Sally of the Resentment of Achilles; and the Poet judiciously describes him moderating it by his own Reflection: So that his Reason now prevails over his Anger, and the Design of the Poem is fully executed.

(TE VIII 567)

The hero thus confirms, by spontaneous action, the resolution of sapientia et fortitudo which required Jove's direct intervention earlier in the book. The reader is convinced of this resolution rhetorically, probabilistically and dramatically.

Let us now consider how these larger structural dynamics are embodied in Pope's translation locally. The progression of admiration by which Achilles is characterized in Pope's
version controls Pope's rendition of his speeches. The hero's anger appears in "lights" increasingly violent, until in Book XXIV he is suddenly rendered as a wise and reasonable prince.

Achilles' oath of withdrawal will provide a good example of Pope's rendering of the early stages of the wrath. Achilles has just been insulted by Agamemnon's threat to seize Briseis, and is on the point of drawing his sword. Pope's meter and rhetoric dramatize what he interprets as a psychomachia between wrath and reason:

Distracting thoughts by turns his Bosom rul'd,
Now fir'd by Wrath, and now by Reason cool'd;
That prompts his Hand to draw the deadly Sword,
Force thro' the Greeks, and pierce their haughty Lord;
This whispers soft his Vengeance to control,
And calm the rising Tempest of his Soul.

(TE VII 98-99)

I have omitted Pope's italics, and added my own where he departs from the Greek or where his substitutions are especially significant. Homer had developed this conflict in five lines, very differently paced: one devoted to Achilles' grief at the insult, one to the division itself within his "shaggy" breast; two to the more violent alternative, "whether drawing the sharp sword from his thigh / to make the Achaeans stand up and to slay Atrides" (I.190-91); and one line to the other, "or to cease from anger, and curb his spirit" (I 192). Whereas Homer develops each of these antithetical alternatives separately, Pope tends to restate
the same basic antithesis several times, in different terms and at different lengths. In nearly every case, he restructures Homer's verse toward a dialectical progression by incremental repetition of the same issues.

Before Achilles can draw his sword, Athena intervenes. Homer's goddess commands only that Achilles "hold, and be persuaded by us" (I 214). Pope's expands the injunction metaphorically, repeating the "rule" metaphor of line 253 of his psychomachia: "Then let Revenge no longer bear the Sway, / Command thy Passions, and the Gods obey" (TE VII 100). In the course of vowing vengeance by inaction and heaping further abuse on Agamemnon, Pope's Achilles will develop this government metaphor further.

At Athena's departure, Achilles breaks out once again in reproach and invective. Let us consider the meaning and the rhetoric of the original:

Heavy with wine, having the front of a dog but the heart of a deer, never for war with the people to arm yourself nor to go into an ambush with the noblest of the Achaeans have you dared in your heart; that to you seems to be death. Much better it is, through the wide camp of the Achaeans to take back his gift, whoever speaks against you, people-devouring king, since you rule men of nought, for otherwise, Atrides, now for the last time you would commit outrage. But I shall speak out, and also swear a great oath. By this sceptre, which never again leaves and branches will bear, since indeed it first left the stump in the mountains; nor will it turn green, for the bronze has stripped it round
of leaves and bark; and now the sons of the Achaians bear it in
their hands, they who give judgment, and who guard the right
before Zeus; this will be a mighty oath for you. Indeed one day a longing for Achilles will come upon the Achaians,
all of them; then by no means will you be able, though pained,
to help them, when many under man-destroying Hector fall slain; but you will consume the heart within you, angry that you did not honor the best of the Achaians.

(I 225-44) 16

Again, Homer devotes four lines to each of Achilles' separate charges against Agamemnon—his cowardise and his avarice. In beginning his oath, Achilles contrasts himself to the other Achaians, whom he mentioned in the course of the second of the above accusations. For Homer's Achilles, the issue at hand is whether to stand one's ground and speak out or to acquiesce tamely to a "people-devouring king." Those who do speak out are deprived of their gifts; but those who don't become "men of nought."

Furthermore, this emphasis on speaking out prepares dramatically for Achilles' oath. As is common in Homer, Achilles now dwells upon the history of the sceptre—this digression is a means of emphasizing the sceptre's importance—first by amplification and then by underscoring the significance with which it has come to be invested in the process of being fashioned for human use. Also typical of Homer's paratactic style is Achilles' repetition, at the beginning and end of this digression, of his intention to swear the
oath. This allows him to continue again from the point at which he left off before the digression on the sceptre. The oath itself is more a prophecy than a declaration or an accusation. Achilles suspends until the last climactic line his complaint, which is at the same time the source of the Greeks' foreseen deaths, the cause of Agamemnon's future weakness, and the reason for his predicted self reproach: "you did not honor the best of the Achaeans." As in the beginning, the issue rests upon Agamemnon's helplessness in war and his willingness to devour or see destroyed the men under his command. As before, Agamemnon betrays his duty by dishonoring merit, denying worth its material reward. Like Pope's, Homer's style reflects in miniature his larger structures. Its formal and thematic movement is paratactic and chiastic.

Homer suggests Achilles' angry delivery of this speech through the techniques of meter and word placement. Lines 228 and 233, Achilles' scornful charge of cowardice and his deliberate and threatening preparation for the oath, begin with spondees; the ominous prophecy of Greek defeat in lines 241-43 is heavy with them. In the latter case, moreover, Homer has combined metric emphasis with semantic emphasis. Each of these lines is enjambed with the line preceding it, such that every line-beginning isolates an especially significant expression. Each of these expressions is stressed, therefore, by its heavy meter, by its
emphatic initial position, and by its syntactic isolation: "all of them" ("οὐμακαντάς"), "to help" ("κραίομεν"), and, with slight variation, "shall fall slain, but you..." ("οὐνοματες πέπτωσοι οὐ"). Finally, Achilles punctuates his accusations of cowardice in lines 225-26 with anaphora and parallel syntax, the "never" and "nor" ("οὐε...οὐε") both occurring in emphatic initial position. Although the same parallel is used elsewhere (lines 234 and 236) its emphasis is lost by the distance between the terms and their medial positions in the line. Excepting the barrage of epithets in line 225 and the ominous emphasis of lines 240-44, the rhetoric of Homer's Achilles is at this point coldly deliberate rather than passionate.

Pope's Achilles, however, is at the height of his rage, and his rhetoric reveals his passion. Homer's Achilles realizes the strength of his position, having "heard" Athena's prophecy. Pope wishes to develop the sequence of speeches in this book periodically, for reasons which will become clear in the next chapter, and so renders the speech that it caps the hero's several angry outbursts.

The most immediately obvious difference between Homer's and Pope's versions is one of grammatical "mood." Whereas Homer's sentences are all declarative, Pope makes free use of rhetorical questions, exclamations, and imperatives. Another major difference is in the speed and rhetorical
sweep, or continuity, of Pope's version.

0 Monster, mix'd of Insolence and Fear,
Thou Dog in Forehead, but in Heart a Deer!
When wert thou known in ambush'd Fights to dare,
Or nobly face the horrid Front of War?
'Tis ours the Chance of Fighting Fields to try,
Thine to look on, and bid the Valiant dye.
So much 'tis safer thro' the Camp to go,
And rob a Subject, than despoil a Poe.
Scourge of thy People, violent and base!
Sent in Joye's Anger on a slavish Race,
Who lost to Sense of gen'rous Freedom past
Are tam'd to Wrongs, or this had been thy last.
Now by this sacred Sceptre, hear me swear,
Which never more shall Leaves or Blossoms bear,
Which sever'd from the Trunk (as I from thee)
On the bare Mountain left its Parent Tree;
This Sceptre, Form'd by temper'd Steel, to prove
An Ensign of the Delegates of Joye.
From whom the Pow'r of Laws and Justice springs:
(Tremendous Oath! Inviolate to Kings!)
By this I swear, when bleeding Greece again
Shall call Achilles, she shall call in vain.
When flush'd with Slaughter, Hector comes, to spread
The purpled Shore with Mountains of the Dead,
Then shalt thou mourn th' Affront thy Madness give,
Forc'd to deplore, when impotent to save:
Than rage in Bitterness of Soul, to know
This Act has made the bravest Greek thy Poe.

(I 297-324; TE VII 101-3)

Out of twenty-eight lines, ten are translated in moods other
than the declarative: two as questions (299-300), five as
ekphriseses (297-98, 305-6, 316), and three as imperatives
(309, 321, 323). Achilles' agitation is further evident in
his meter. Unlike Homer's, Pope's speech moves with a for-
ward rush. Twelve of the twenty-eight lines begin with
spondees or trochees (297, 299, 302, 303, 305, 306, 309, 312,
321-24). Of fourteen couplets, five enjamb their first and
second lines (307-8, 313-14, 317-18, 319-20, 323-24). Sev-
eral couplets of the fourteen, although in themselves end-stopped, begin with relative clauses or other references to preceding couplets ("Who lost . . . which never . . . which sever'd . . . This Sceptre . . . From whom . . . By this . . . When . . . Then . . . Then").

Pope interpolates at the beginning of Achilles' speech the exclamation, "O Monster" and thus sets the tone of what follows. Achilles declaims against the monstrous inversion of government which makes a king the "scourge" of those he is bound to protect, and against a king who in his "Madness" makes Greece's strongest champion her "Foe." Achilles associates "gen'rous Freedom" with the "Pow'r of Laws and Justice" and the "sacred Sceptre" which symbolizes it. As the Achaeans are "slavish" and "tam'd," their king is "bass" and "violent."

Each of the three movements of the speech (297-308, 309-316 and 317-324) has its own integrity, and each rises in passion above the last. By omitting Homer's "heavy with wine," Pope can point more sharply the antithesis between Agamemnon's "Insolence" and his "Fear." The whole of this first section is built upon the opposition of courage and fear, "gen'rous Freedom" and avarice. As in the psycho-machia examined above, Pope collapses Homer's development of the two indictments and restates them several times in a series of sharp antitheses which progress to a climax in lines 307-8. In the first six lines of the speech, Pope
develops four antitheses, two in one line each and two in one couplet each. Cutting across metric and syntactic boundaries, the metaphor of "face" controls this passage. Opposed to Agamemnon's dog's "Forehead" and his "look[ing] on to bid the Valiant die" are the "horrid Front of War" (i.e., bristling with weapons) and the courage of those who "nobly face" this "Front." The fourth couplet (304-5) ignores Homer's "whoever speaks out against you," sums up the preceding three couplets and leads to the next two. Pope makes explicit what was implicit in Homer's parataxis, that Agamemnon would rather "rob a Subject than despoil a Foe"; he thereby equals Agamemnon's fear to his avarice. The "rob" metaphor leads easily to the "Scourge" metaphor.

The last four lines of this first movement constitute a single sentence, periodic in syntax and meter. After ten sharply end-stopped lines, the last couplet enjambits its first and second lines, climaxing by a sort of metrical coda the lines which precede it. Having set Agamemnon against the valiant in general, Achilles now sets himself against all, both slavish people and base king, in "gen'rous Freedom."

The second movement, Achilles' digression on the sceptre, is not, like Homer's, sharply divided from the rest of the speech. "Jove's Anger" in line 306 anticipates the "sacred Sceptre" of line 309 and the "Delegates of Jove" in line 314.
The syntactic break, in other words, is softened by a thematic continuity. Rather than trace the sceptre's history, Pope's Achilles reworks Homer's details and expounds its symbolic relevance to the occasion and the issues. After an introductory line, which alters Homer's declarative "I shall speak out, and also swear a great oath" to the imperative "hear me swear" Achilles devotes two relative clauses to the meaning of the sceptre's barrenness (310-12) and a long participial clause (313-16) to the symbolism of its fashioning. It is here that Achilles' rhetoric begins to work against his cause. By introducing these symbolic details, Achilles invites comparison of the requirements of just government with his own position. The first two couplets of this section are based upon Homer's "this sceptre, which never again leaves and branches will bear, since indeed it first left the stump in the mountains." Achilles explicitly likens the cutting of the branch to his break with Agamemnon. As the branch left its "Parent Tree" on a mountain now "bare," Achilles will leave the Achaeans helpless. The next two couplets conflate Homer's second and third details: "nor will it turn green, for the bronze has stripped it round / of leaves and bark" and "now the sons of the Achaeans / bear it in their hands, they who give judgment and guard the right / before Zeus." The steel which formed Pope's sceptre was "temper'd"—a metaphor picked up and extended by the verb "prove." Temper and proof, as
metallurgical terms, suggest formal control and restraint. However just Achilles' indictment of Agamemnon, who has betrayed that "Pow'r of Laws and Justice" which "springs" from Jove, Achilles "gen'rous Freedom" threatens another form of betrayal. The exclamatory parenthesis which closes the second movement at line 316 only serves to strengthen the implication that both Achilles and Agamemnon do violence to "Laws and Justice" in the name of "Pow'r" alone.

Unlike the sharply punctuated sentences and exclamations of the first movement, or the paratactic clauses of the second, the four couplets of the third section of Achilles' speech (lines 319-24) are syntactic; meter, rhetoric and content are carefully interwoven to create a sweeping climax without sacrificing clarity. The "when ... When ... Then ... Then" which distinguish each stage of the climax also unite it. The "When" of line 319, for example, seems at first to belong to the "I swear, when" of line 317; actually, it is coordinate to the "Then" of line 321. Similarly, the "Then" of line 323, which at first seems coordinate to the temporal "Then" of line 321, is actually independent of it, modifying "rage" with the force of "so" or "therefore."

This third movement of Achilles' speech presses Agamemnon's guilt home. Here Achilles describes his culpability in terms of its ruinous future effects on the Achaeans. But because this description is also the substance of Achilles'
oath, its metaphor, like its rhetoric, is heightened to
climax the whole of the speech. The first two couplets de-
pict for Agamemnon the horrors of facing a Trojan assault
without Achilles. In Homer, Hector is not mentioned until
Achilles has prophesied Agamemnon's helplessness. It is
worth quoting the whole of these lines once more:

Indeed one day a longing for Achilles will come
upon the Achaeans,
all of them; then by no means will you be able,
though pained,
to help them, when many under man-destroying Hector
fall slain; but you will consume the heart within
you,
angry that you did not honor the best of the
Achaeans.

(I 240-44)

In Homer's version, the Greeks and Hector are grammatically
passive. The Greeks fall, and a longing comes upon them.
Although semantically the cause of their deaths, Hector is
grammatically relegated to the object of a preposition.
Pope reverses the order of Agamemnon's mourning and Hector's
onslaught in order to juxtapose "bleeding Greece" and the
picture of Hector "flush'd with Slaughter." The Greek
nation is personified and set in action. Greece is made to
bleed and to "call in vain" upon Achilles. Hector becomes
an almost impersonal force of destruction; he creates a
landscape of death when he "comes to spread / The purpled
Shore with Mountains of the Dead." Greece, Hector, the shore
itself--all are infused with blood. It is by means of these
hyperboles of personification and depersonalization that
Achilles drives home his oath. But at the same time, he suggests with equal force the monstrous crime he commits against Greece. Having opposed Hector's force to Agamemnon's weakness in lines 319-22, he then virtually equalizes himself with Hector, as an enemy to the helpless Greeks, in the last line. Homer reiterates the theme of "honor." Pope, however, omits this term, and closes the speech with the idea that Achilles is now Greece's "Foe."

The suggestion in this early speech that honor cannot exist without "gen'rous Freedom" is developed more fully by Pope in Book IX. In remarking upon the emotional progression of the ambassadors' speeches, as we have already noted, Pope characterizes Achilles' responses explicitly, and in contrast to the others', in these terms:

_Ulysses_ speaks first, the Character of whose Discourse is a well-address'd Eloquence; so the Mind is agreeably engag'd by the Choice of his Reasons and Applications: _Achilles_ replies with a magnanimous Freedom, whereby the Mind is elevated with the Sentiments of the Hero: _Phoenix_ discourses in a manner touching and pathetick, whereby the Heart is moved: and _Ajax_ concludes with a generous Disdain, that leaves the Soul of the Reader inflam'd.

(TE VII 488)

Achilles first long speech—122 lines in the original and 149 lines in Pope's version—cannot be treated here in its entirety. Instead, I shall first summarize the original, and then discuss Pope's more significant modifications.

Achilles begins with a retort to _Odysseus'_ eloquent address. He for one will speak his mind, to avoid a pointless
exchange; and he hates like the gates of hell whomever thinks one thing and says another. Bluntly, Achilles refuses to be persuaded. There is no point in fighting the Trojans, he says, since coward and brave man are rewarded alike, and both will die at any rate. Like a mother bird for her young, he has thanklessly toiled for the Greeks, and won them much wealth. Agamemnon keeps most of it, and takes again what little he gives. Briseis was dear to Achilles, though a slave. If Agamemnon is justified in taking her, why then fight Troy? do the sons of Atreus alone love their wives? Since Achilles refuses propitiation from one he has learned not to trust, let Agamemnon's other counsellors help him. Hasn't he built a wall and a ditch without Achilles' help? But it fails to hold Hector back, and was not necessary before Achilles withdrew. Achilles will sail home at dawn, reclaim the wealth he left at Pththia, and join to it all he has acquired by lot at Troy—-all but the prize which proud Agamemnon reclaimed. Achilles would have the ambassadors declare his intention publicly, lest another be deceived by Agamemnon—-who doesn't dare to face Achilles. But let him go to ruin in peace, since Zeus has taken away his wits. His gifts are hateful. No amount of wealth would satisfy Achilles' vengeance. Achilles could never wed a daughter of Agamemnon; let him choose a more "kingly" son-in-law. No amount of wealth is worth so much as life, which once gone cannot be won back. Thetis has told Achilles
of his double fate: either to fall at Troy and win endless renown or to live long and peacefully at home. He advises the other Greeks to choose the latter and abandon Troy, which Zeus protects. In any case, they must seek help elsewhere, because Achilles' wrath will not be pacified. But let Phoenix, if he wishes, remain in the tent and sail for Phthia in the morning.

Homer's Achilles is as unrelenting here as in Book I. But he has begun to see that life itself does not reward valor; that since the good and the cowardly alike will die, a man must "reward" himself. So Achilles decides to choose a life of peace and plenty, an existence which, in opposition to the heroic, can only be described as pastoral. Related to this point is his growing awareness of the cosmic paradox. In Book I, he indicted Agamemnon's hypocrisy. Here he sees the hypocrisy of the war against Troy, and of war in general. The sons of Atreus are not alone in loving their wives. Achilles, the Trojans, all men wish to keep what is dear to them—including life, which unlike any other possession, cannot be reclaimed by ransom or by warfare. The motifs of ransom and the unransomable, of going home versus staying on to fight, pervade the Iliad, and provide the terms of its life/death symbolism. At this point, Achilles is confused. He has not completely sorted the political from the existential paradox, as evidenced in his continual, almost
compulsive reiteration of Agamemnon's affront and the
rambling but associative structure of his speech as a whole.
Pope finds Achilles' decision to sail home merely in-
consistent with his character, an example of the excess to
which wrath can drive a man:

Nothing sure could be better imagin'd, or more
strongly paint Achilles' Resentment, than
this Commendation which Homer puts into his
Mouth of a long and peaceable Life. The hero
whose very Soul was possessed with Love of
Glory, and who prefer'd it to Life itself, lets
his Anger prevail over his darling Passion: He
despises even Glory, when he cannot obtain that,
and enjoy his Revenge at the same Time; and
rather than lay this aside, becomes the very
Reverse of himself.

(TE VII 459)
Pope not only notes but admires Achilles' every mention of
Agamemnon: "These Repetitions are far from being Faults
in Achilles' Wrath, whose Anger is perpetually breaking
out upon the same Injury" (TE VII 456). Ignoring the assoc-
ciative nature of Achilles' discourse except insofar as it
reveals his anger, and ignoring Achilles' evident struggle
to reconcile the existential and the political paradoxes,
Pope reads the speech as Achilles' persistence in preferring
"gen'rous Freedom" to slavery. Refusing to accept any
amount of recompense, even the entire wealth of Thebes,
Achilles "does in Effect but shew the Greatness of his own
Soul, and of that insuperable Resentment which renders all
these Riches (tho' the greatest in the World) contemptible in
his Sight, when he compares them with the Indignity his Hon-
our has receiv'd" (TE VII 457). The structural function of the entire discourse, Pope claims, is to show Achilles still wrathful. The formal interplay between dialectical and periodic patterns operates here—as in the larger structures of the poem—to express high emotion:

Nothing is more remarkable than the Conduct of Homer in this Speech of Achilles. He begins with some degree of Coolness, as in respect to the Ambassadors whose Persons he esteem'd, yet even there his Temper just shows itself in the Insinuation that Ulysses has dealt artfully with him, which in two Periods rises into an open Detestation of all Artifice. He then falls into a sullen Declaration of his Resolves, and a more sedate Representation of his past Services; but warms as he goes on, and every Minute he but names his Wrongs, flies out into Extravagance. His Rage awaken'd by that Injury, is like a Fire blown by a Wind, that sinks and rises by Fits, but keeps continually burning, and blazes but the more for those Intermissions. (TE VII 452)

"Sullen Declarations" and "sedate Representations" heighten the progress of Achilles' growing anger by momentary contrast. In each of Achilles' more passionate outbursts, Pope makes significant additions to the original, many of them referring to the antithesis between "gen'rous Freedom" and tyranny.

The first of these outbursts (Pope, IX 414–45; Homer, IX 315–36) extends from Achilles' bitter reflection upon the equal reward of hero and coward to the statement that Agamemnon reclaimed only his prize. In Pope's version, Achilles' rhetoric rises in passion as he recalls his slavish submission to "haughty" Agamemnon and the reward for this service.
I quote a sample sufficiently long to demonstrate the waxing
and waning of this passion, and set asterisks beside those
four lines which climax Achilles' resentment:

I sacked twelve ample Cities on the Main,
And twelve lay smoaking on the Trojan Plain:
Then at Atrides haughty Feet were laid
The Wealth I gather'd, and the Spoils I made.
Your mighty Monarch these in Peace possest;
Some Few my Soldiers had, himself the rest.
Some Present too to ev'ry Prince was paid;
And ev'ry Prince enjoys the Gift he made;
* I only must refund, of all his Train;
* See what Preheminence our Merits gain!
* My Spoil alone his greedy Soul delights
* My Spouse alone must bless his lustful Nights:
The Woman, let him (as he may) enjoy
But what's the Quarrel then of Greece to Troy?
What to these Shores th' Assembled Nations draws,
What calls for Vengeance but a Woman's Cause?
Are fair Endowments and a beauteous Face
Belov'd by none but those of Atreus' Race?
The Wife whom choice and Passion doth Approve,
Sure ev'ry wise and worthy Man will love.

(IX 432-51; TE VII 453-54)

Pope has shifted the emphasis of the original significantly;
the climax of his Achilles' emotion occurs upon remembering
Agamemnon's unjust and presumptuous seizure of Briseis—who
is by implication one of the "Spoils" which Achilles himself
won for the Greeks. In the original, it is his reflection
upon the equal hypocrisy of Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis
and his war against Troy that enrages Achilles.

Twelve cities of men have I destroyed with my ships,
on the plain eleven, I say, throughout fertile Troy;
from all of these, much worthy spoil
I took, and bringing it all to Agamemnon I gave it
to this son of Atreus; but he, staying behind beside
the swift ships
accepted, and doled out part, but kept much.
But to the chiefs he gave prizes, and to the kings,
and for these [their prizes] remain; but from 
me alone of the Achaeans 
he took and he holds my dear wife. Lying beside 
her, 
* let him enjoy her. But why must they fight with 
the Trojans, 
* these Argives? Why has he gathered and led the 
people here, 
* this son of Atreus? was it not because of fair 
haired Helen? 
* Or do they alone of mortal men love their wives, 
* these sons of Atreus? As any good and sane man 
loves and cares for his own, so even I loved her 
from my heart, spear-captive though she was.

(IX 328-43)

Most notable of Homer's emphatic techniques here is the repe-
tition, in the initial position of the lines in which they 
occur, of the expressions "these Argives," "this son of 
Atreus," and "these sons of Atreus." Furthermore, Achilles' 
syntax fights his meter throughout much of the passage, especi-
ally in lines 337-41, where he fires a series of rhetorical 
questions. The Greek is worth quoting, to suggest the import-
ance of Pope's re-emphasis of its semantic and metrical effects.

— οὐ —

希腊原文

τις παραισὶν

υπερηφάνων. τι δὲ δεν πολεμεῖμαι Τρώας;

'Αργείων; τι δὲ λαὸν ἀντίζηκεν ἑνδόν, ἀγέρας

'Αρείίδης; τι σύλ 'Ελένης ἑνεκ' οὐκόμου;

ἡ μοῦνοι φίλεως ἀδημόσιος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων

'Αρείίδαι; (IX 336-41)
Eleven of the twenty-seven feet of this passage are spondaic—a relatively high proportion. Moreover, these spondees tend to be concentrated at the ends and beginnings of lines, disturbing the normal break of the verse. Combined with line enjambment, which isolates the significant last word of a sentence in the emphatic initial position of the next line, this violent agitation of normal meter and syntax suggests Achilles' own emotional agitation.

As Pope's notes to this speech suggest, its close ought to be of special importance. The original ends anything but climactically:

But you, going to the Achaean chief's, declare my message—for that is the privilege of elders—so that they may think up in their minds another, better plan, which may save their ships and the Achaean people beside the hollow ships, since this one will not work for them—this which they have thought up—because of my wrath. But let Phoenix, remaining here with us, lay down to sleep, so that he may follow me in the ships to our dear native land tomorrow, if he will. By force I will not take him.

(IX 421-29)

Homer's conclusion, composed of two loosely constructed sentences and one brief declaration, is not spoken in a passion; its sarcasm is cold. Pope's rhetoric is more pointed, and more violent:

Go then, to Greece report our fix'd Design; Bid all your Counsels, all your Armies join, Let all your Forces, all your Arts conspire, To save the ships, the Troops, the Chief's, from Fire.
One Strategem has fail'd, and others will:  
Ye find, Achilles is unconquer'd still.  
Go then—digest my message as ye may—  
But here this Night let rev'rend Phoenix stay,  
His tedious Toils, and hoary Hairs demand  
A peaceful Death in Phthia's friendly land.  
But whether he remains, or sail with me,  
His Age be sacred, and his Will be free.

(IX 544-55; TE VII 460)

Homer's Achilles uses only two imperative, "declare" and  
"let." Pope's Achilles uses eight: "Go ... Bid ...  
Let ... Go ... digest ... let ... be ... be."  
Pope has broken Homer's hierarchy of clauses. Homer's  
rambling purpose clause, "so that they may think up another,  
better, plan ... / hollow ships," becomes the imperative  
clause, "Bid ... from fire," and a second "Go then" is  
added at line 550. This anaphora, and the four repetitions  
of "all your" at lines 545-46, give drive and force to  
Achilles' vehement final refusal. In order to heighten this  
drive, Pope allows the anaphora on "all your," the parallel  
position and imperative force of "Bid" and "Let," the parallel  
construction of lines 445 and 446, and the itemizing of  
"Counsels ... Armies ... Forces ... Arts ... the  
ships, the Troops, the Chiefs" to overrun the normal break  
between the first and second couplets and rise to a climax  
in line 547.

Achilles' diction is certainly more vehement in Pope  
than in Homer. Rather than a "message" he bids the ambas-  
sadors to report a "fix'd Design"; they must "conspire" once
again, for the present "Strategem" has left Achilles "un-
conquer'd." These metaphors of treachery and war not only
underline Achilles' anger--they distinguish the dishonesty
and violence of the Achaean, on the one hand, from the
"gen'rous Freedom" and strength of Achilles, on the other.
Finally, because Homer's Achilles speaks calmly throughout
the first six lines of the original, his offer to Phoenix
ends the speech in the same tone. To avoid anticlimax,
Pope has made Achilles speak of Phoenix's case in terms of
his own: his age "demands" a "peaceful Death" in "friendly"
Phthia, and Achilles insists that his "Will be free."

Because Pope does not take Achilles' desire for long
life as a serious alternative to glory, the relation of
recompense to reward throughout the speech is significantly
altered. Homer's metaphoric use of recompense is reduced in
Pope's version to mere bribery, another attempt at that
tyranny which Achilles despises. Thus Homer's "not if he
gave me so many gifts as there is sand and dust, / not so
should Agamemnon persuade my soul" (IX 385-86) becomes Pope's

Tho' Bribes were heaped on Bribes, in Numbers more
Than Dust in Fields or Sands along the Shore;
Should all their Offers for my Friendship call;
'Tis he that offers, and I scorn them all.

(IX 506-9; TE VII 458)

The issue is no longer between "giving" and "persuading,"
but between coercive bribery and free and noble friendship.
In Pope's version, Achilles does not withdraw from martial
strife to a pastoral peace, but from political tyranny to
political freedom. His retirement is constantly affirmed
to be a noble alternative:

Let Greece then know, my Purpose I retain,
Nor with new Treaties vex my Peace in vain.

(IX 410-11; TE VII 452)

Some Greater Greek let these high Nuptials grace;
I hate alliance with a Tyrant's Race.

(IX 514-15; TE VII 458)

Thessalian Nymphs there are, of Form divine,
And Kings that sue to mix their Blood with mine.
Blest in kind Love, my years shall glide away,
Content with just hereditary Sway.

(IX 519-22; TE VII 458)

As compared to Agamemnon's arbitrary rule and usurped
power, Achilles' nobility is hereditary; his is a moral
nobility, but it is nevertheless also politically "just."

We have noted how Achilles' stature is raised to the
godlike at his last encounter with Hector. In the original,
Hector has just suggested that they agree to restore for
burial the body of whoever is slain in the combat:

Then with a louring glance Achilles addressed him.
Hector, do not speak to me, you cursed wretch, of
treaties.
As between lions and men there are no faithful oaths,
nor are the hearts of wolves and lambs in accord,
but continually they meditate evils for one another,
so is it not for me and you to be friendly, nor be-
tween us any
oaths will there be, before one of us, fallen,
has sated with blood Ares, the warrior whose shield
is of tough hide.
Be mindful of all your skill; now especially must you
be a spearman and a courageous warrior.
Nor is there any escape for you, since Pallas Athena
will straightway
subdue you to my spear; now will you pay all at
once for all
my griefs over my comrades, whom you slew, when
you were raging with your sword.

(XXII 260-72)

Homer's Achilles is vengeful and inhumane, but Pope's is
hardly human. According to his interpretation this is the
climax of the poet's terrific sublime. I have italicized
Pope's more significant additions:

Talk not of Oaths (the dreadful Chief replies,
While Anger flash'd from his disdainful Eyes)
Detested as thou art, and ought to be,
Nor Oath nor Fact Achilles plights with thee:
Such Facts, as Lambs and rabid Wolves combine
Such Leagues, as Men and furious Lions join,
To such I call the Gods! One constant State
Of lashing Rancour and eternal Hate:
No Thought but Rage, and never-ceasing Strife,
Till Death extinguish Rage, and Thought, and Life.
Rouze then thy Forces this important Hour;
Collect thy Soul, and call forth all thy Pow'r.
No farther Subterfuge, no farther Chance;
'Tis Pallas, Pallas gives thee to my Lance.
Each Grecian Ghost by thee depriv'd of Breath,
Now hovers round, and calls thee to thy Death.

(IX 333-49)

Homer's Achilles dismisses Hector's honorable proposal of a
mutual burial agreement by the simile of men and lions, lambs
and wolves; Pope's Achilles accepts such an agreement as
exists between these enemies, "One constant State / Of lash-
ing Rancour and eternal Hate." Unlike Homer's Achilles,
who refuses to be one member of an unnatural league among
enemies, Pope's Achilles eagerly embraces the part of the
more savage member of the pair. Words such as "rabid," "furi-
ous" and "lashing" raise him from man to wolf or lion and
at the same time sink Hector by implication to the weaker
role. Achilles becomes, like the "Hector" he painted in
the speech to Agamemnon, an inhuman force. By the end of
the speech, his inhuman force becomes supernatural venge-
ance. Homer's hero threatens that Hector will now pay for
the grief he has caused Achilles; Pope's Achilles pictures
a crowd of angry ghosts urging him to revenge. This touch
is both supported by Achilles' certainty of Pallas' super-
natural aid, and provides a climax to the expression of this
certainty.

By Book XXIV, Homer's Achilles has learned that the
foreknowledge and the certainty of death are part of life,
that glory and grief, the need to act and the need to suffer,
must be endured in turn. Taking part in the common duties
and comforts of life neither cures nor subdues sorrow such
as Achilles'. He advises Priam to set aside his lamentation
and eat, knowing full well that in sustaining life the old
king only sustains woe. Achilles marvels at the strength of
resolve, the iron heart (an expression which others have
used of his own) which has brought Priam before him; in the
next breath he advises the king to eat, for nothing avails
against pain. An iron heart does not subdue grief; it enables
men to bear continuing life:

But when bright Achilles was sated with lamenting
and when the longing for it had gone from his heart
and limbs,
he rose immediately from his seat, and raised the old man by the hand, pitying his white head and his white beard, and speaking, addressed him with winged words: Oh unhappy man, many evils indeed have you borne in your soul. How did you dare to come upon the Achaean ships alone, before the eyes of the man who your many worthy sons has slain? Surely your heart is of iron. But come, then, sit upon a chair; our sorrows we will wholly let lie at rest in our heart, even though pained; for no profit comes of cold lament; for so have the gods spun it for unhappy mortals, that they live in pain; yet they themselves are without cares. For two urns are set upon Zeus's threshold of the gifts which he gives, one of evils and one of blessings; To whomever Zeus who delights in thunder gives a mixed lot, that man meets sometimes with evil, another time with good; but to whomever he gives only of miseries, he makes him despised and evil famine drives him over the sacred earth, and he is honored neither by gods nor men.

(XXIV 513-33)

There follows a comparison of Peleus' and Priam's happy youths and miserable later years, and Achilles concludes by reiterating his earlier point:

Endure, nor lament ceaselessly in your heart; for you will profit nothing, grieving for your son, nor will you restore him; before that you will suffer some other evil.

(XXIV 549-51)

The emphasis of Achilles' statement is upon the nature of human life, not the best way to endure it. One grief is not to be forgotten except in suffering another.
Pope's rendering of the speech makes Achilles argue that the passion of grief can and must be overcome by reason:

Satiate at length with unavailing Woes,
From the high throne divine Achilles rose;
The rev'rend Monarch by the Hand he rais'd;
On his white Beard and Form majestick gaz'd,
Not unrelenting: Then serene began
With Words to sooth the Miserable Man.
Alas! what Weight of Anguish hast thou known?
Unhappy Prince! Thus guardless and alone
To pass thro' Foes, and thus undaunted face
The Man whose Fury has destroy'd thy Race?
Heav'n sure has arm'd thee with a Heart of Steel,
A Strength proportion'd to the Woes you feel.
Rise then: Let Reason mitigate our Care:
To mourn avails not: Man is born to bear.
Such is alas! The Gods severe Decree;
They, only they are blest, and only free.
Two Urns by Jove's high Throne have ever stood,
The Source of Evil one, and one of Good;
From thence the Cup of mortal Man he fills,
Blessings to these, to those distributes Iills;
To most, he mingles both: The Wretch decreed
To taste the bad, unmix'd, is curst indeed;
Pursu'd by Wrongs, by meagre Famine driv'n,
He wanders, Outcast both of Earth and Heav'n.
The Happiest taste not Happiness sincere,
But find the cordial Draught is dash'd with Care.

(XXIV 647-72; TE VIII 563-65)

Pope's is an hortatory speech, rather than an existential statement. As characterization, Pope recasts the speech to demonstrate "the end of the Anger of Achilles" (TE VIII 563). The implication of lines 657-70 is that the "Heart of Steel" which allows Priam to face Achilles ought to be the "Strength" by which "Reason" will "mitigate our Care." Physical metaphors such as "Weight," "guardless," "Strength" and "bear" reinforce this dichotomy between a moral burden or siege, on
the one hand, and the means of sustaining them, on the other. Elaborating upon Homer's two urns, Pope adds metaphors for the dispersion of good and evil which suggest the pouring and the mixing of liquids: "Source," "Cup," "fills," "taste," "unmix'd," "taste," "cordial Draught," "dash'd."

The implication of these metaphors in combination alters Homer's emphasis upon the alternation of good and ill; they are now to be borne simultaneously, reconciled by reason. It is not insignificant that Pope praises Achilles' wisdom here as worthy of Plato. For Pope, the gods who created man passionate have also "arm'd" him with the means to moderate his passions.

Achilles' anger, it will be recalled, justified itself as "gen'rous Freedom." Here, Achilles points out to Priam that only the gods are "free." This is Pope's addition to the original. Admirable as it was, Achilles' noble independence proved disastrous to the Greeks. Here Pope combines emphasis on man's nature, and its need of control, with emphasis upon Achilles' serene royalty. His former independence was only illusory freedom. This present state of resolution is true human freedom, a state of moral and political harmony.

Whereas both Achilles' choice between long life and endless fame, and his interview with Priam are crucial to the themes of Homer's Iliad, Pope sees only their local
rhetorical force. Achilles' choice and Priam's visit heighten crucial points in Pope's narrative progression. The wish to return home is so unlike Achilles that it intensifies and raises his anger. In the last book, the theme of long life versus early death is objectified by Homer at the meeting of the doomed youth and the aged king whose ruin is imminent. Pope's treatment of the scene virtually obscures the intended contrast between youth and age. Priam's likeness to Achilles' father is necessary to move Achilles' compassion; but in the speech we have just considered, Pope's emphasis upon Achilles' royalty and the simultaneity of good and evil blurs Homer's antithesis. Pope's interpretation of the episode is rhetorical: Homer, he claims, has brought Priam to the Achaean camp to aggrandize Achilles by the supplication of a king and confirm our admiration of him by that of his enemy. These effects are necessary to what Pope sees the the climax of "admiration" to which Homer leads the reader. If his own cultural and poetic models have precluded his understanding of the character development, geometric structure, and existential meaning of the Iliad, Pope has nevertheless succeeded, by these very "limitation," in recovering more of the Iliad than any interpreter before him. From the Middle Ages and the Renaissance he inherited many of his assumptions about human psychology and the qualities which constitute
heroism. This was a basically Christian system of morality; and although Pope never really mistakes Homer's gods for his own, these Christian patterns of thought and expression guide his reading of the Iliad. The resolution of sapientia et fortitudo required in Renaissance epic and epic theory is made to work for, not against, the Iliad by means of a charactistically Augustan structure of character and action.
NOTES


3  Curran, p. 189.

4  Curran, p. 105.

5  Curran, p. 106.


8  The Art of the Novel, p. 316.

9  The Art of the Novel, p. 316.

10 The Art of the Novel, p. 314.

12 The Art of the Novel, p. 308.


14 Whitman, pp. 207-8.

15 Whitman, p. 220.

16 I have translated closely, if awkwardly, in order to preserve Homer's word order and line division wherever possible. Here and elsewhere, I translate and cite from the text of D. B. Monro's Iliad, 5th edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). Pope used the texts of Spondanus (Geneva, 1606) and Barnes (London, 1711), which differ only typographically from Monro's text in the passages I have cited.
CHAPTER III. STYLE AND RHETORICAL STRUCTURE

Pope does not actually "restructure" the Iliad in the sense that one might "restructure" a work by rearranging its parts. We have seen, nevertheless, that Pope's interpretation of the whole leads him to change significantly the movement and meaning of a series of Achilles' speeches. Style is an important aspect of structure; it is, in fact, the means by which poetry must create structure, barring purely mechanical indications of division and sequence. Especially in translation, structure must be shown to be the product of the poetry itself.

In advocating an approach to translation which admits the impossibility of perfect equivalence, William Frost makes a very useful distinction between what he calls "pillar" and "local" symbolism:

Under the term pillar symbol—that is, a symbol of basic structural importance to an imaginative work—I include not only the ideologies, . . . but also any logical sequence of ideas, or any sequence of images. . . . The arbitrary physical shape of poetry makes for the constant potentiality of local symbolism. . . . Local symbolism can be important in the creation of attitude.¹

Although the pillar and local symbols of the original are separable in memory to the extent that "an account of them
could be communicated to someone who had never read the poem," they are in the process of reading "never experienced separately from the words that embody them." The ideal translator must, in order to render the original as a work of literary art, be fully conscious of the interdependence of its pillar and local symbolism—or of some version of this interdependence—and of the necessity of reproducing, in his own work, an analogous interdependence:

What the translator of a poem can do, ideally, is construct fairly convincing analogies for pillar symbols; local symbolism he must create for himself . . . If he translates into verse with his eye firmly fixed on the mechanical, rather than the organic, aspects of the local symbolism in the original, he produces a structure in which the local symbols, instead of reflecting the pillars, are always tending to undermine them or distract attention from them.2

Frost's suggestions, expressed in terms of a modern poetic, are generally and ideally valid; but their application to the special problem of Pope's translation requires some preliminary refinement.

The heroic couplet, the characteristic medium of Augustan poetry, determines to a great extent the nature of its "local" symbolism. By playing meter and rhetoric against syntax, the heroic couplet can subsume variety under many different types of unity, and express almost every possible type of comparison.3 We have already noted its relationship to Pope's larger patterns of form and meaning. Secondly, Frost's notion of interdependent "pillar" and
"local" symbolism must be adjusted to the neo-Aristotelian terms in which the Augustans conceived of style and structure. They recognized a special relationship between language and subject matter known as "decorum of style" which was, I shall argue, in effect both rhetorical and structural. Like the heroic couplet, the principle of stylistic decorum shapes its material by a sequence of comparisons.

1. Decorum of Style and Structure.

Decorum of style, a principle which Swift, in his Letter to a Young Gentleman, described as "Proper Words in Proper Places," has always been somewhat of an obstacle to the poetic respectability of Augustan literature. The Romantic complaint, in the tradition of Matthew Arnold and A. E. Housman, is that this "decorum" produces a style both arbitrary and inorganic to meaning, unemotive logical argument merely decorated with tropes and figures or, by the abuse of Horace's "ut pictura poesis" simile, idealized and merely ornamented representations of nature. What we value most in modern poetry--such as Crane's The Bridge or Pound's Cantos--is its ability to strike new meanings from the para-tactic recombination of old, its creation of synthetic systems or myths lately received but no longer viable as wholes.⁴
The Augustan poetic differs in several important respects from both the Romantic and the modern. For the Augustan poet, an ordered reality was pre-existent in the moral design of the universe. Discontinuity was, in the end, only apparent, because the result of a necessarily limited human perspective. This moral order, or some aspect of it, must be recreated by the poet in terms fitted to, and judgeable by, human understandings. So, according to Dryden, "Poetry must resemble natural truth, but it must be ethical." In practice, this becomes a persuasive, or rhetorical, poetic.

Dryden's clearest statement of the so-called "decorative" Augustan poetic, and the locus classicus for its critics, occurs in his "Parallel Betwixt Poetry and Painting," published in 1695 when his translation of Virgil's Aeneid was well in progress:

For the moral, (as Bossu observes) is the first business of the poet, as being the groundwork of his instruction. This being formed, he contrives such a design, or fable, as may be most suitable to the moral. After this he begins to think of the persons whom he is to employ in carrying on his design; and gives them the manners which are most proper to their several characters. The thoughts and words are the last parts, which give beauty and colouring to the piece. According to Dryden's, Le Bossu's and Pope's neo-Aristotelian hierarchy of moral, fable, persons, manners, thoughts and words, structure and style seem opposite poles of poetic priority. In the "Preface" to his Iliad Pope, like Dryden,
discusses Homer's supremacy as the poet of "Invention" under these several Aristotelian heads. But this "design" which takes priority over all other compositional considerations is not merely abstractly structural; being grounded upon a moral, it is also a design upon the reader. The "decorum" of style, therefore, is double in its reference: poetic language must be appropriate to a given character or speaker in given circumstances, and it must be appropriate to the poet's strategic manipulation of a reader's attitude toward either character or event. The poet must both gain the reader's credence and control his moral response. Like Dennis, most Augustan critics derive the principle of stylistic decorum from the rhetorics of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and their Renaissance imitators. The relationship between style and the poet's dual "design" is analogous to the relationships among the *inventio*, *dispositio* and *elocutio* of classical rhetoric; in both, *inventio* and *dispositio* take compositional precedence over *elocutio*.

Although words, according to Dryden, are the last of a poet's compositional concerns, they are recognized, as in classical rhetoric, to be the first aspect of a work perceived by the reader. Thus Dryden distinguishes between the diction appropriate to stage drama and to epic according to their different persuasive means and ends:

The style of the heroic poem is, and ought to be more lofty than that of the drama. . . . the work of tragedy is on the passions, and in dialogue;
both of them abhor strong metaphors, in which the epopee (which works on the "manners," Dryden says, by raising "admiration"/ delights. A poet cannot speak too plainly on the stage: for volat irrevocabile verbum; the sense is lost, if it be not taken flying; but what we read alone, we have leisure to digest."

And thus Le Bossu, in a chapter devoted to the relationship between thought and its expression in epic poetry, grounds "The Foundation of this Doctrine" upon rhetorical principles.

The doctrine of the Thoughts and that of the Expression stand upon the same Foundation. Both This and That is nothing else but the Art of Imprinting on our Auditors such Ideas as we would have them receive. It seems as if this Notion belonged rather to the Expressions than the Thoughts; since the Thoughts being nothing else but Ideas, one would imagine that if they were well Expressed, that would be sufficient to imprint them on the minds of the Hearers. But you will see that this is not enough, if you reflect, that there is a great deal of difference between making any one comprehend what we think and have a mind to, and the inspiring into him the same Inclinations, and the same Thoughts. A good Expression is enough for the first. But it often happens, that if I would give another the same Inclinations, which I have my self, I shall succeed better if I express quite contrary Thoughts, than if I clearly discovered the Ideas of my mind, and my real Thoughts. . . . We express not our precise Thoughts in an Hyperbole, we say a great deal more of a thing, than we conceive of it, and more than we would have others conceive of it; and the Irony does the contrary.

Because the reader apprehends structure through style, the highest praise of the poet depends upon his ability to make style and structure intercreative:

Mr. Hobbes, I say, begins the praise of Homer where he should have ended it. He tells us that the first beauty of an epic poem consists in diction; that is, in the choice of words, and
harmony of numbers. Now the words are the colouring of the work, which in the order of nature, is last to be considered. The design, the disposition, the manners, and the thoughts, are all before it. Where any of those are wanting or imperfect, so much wants or is imperfect in the imitation of human life, which is the very definition of a poem. Words, indeed, are the first beauties that strike the sight. But if the draught be false or lame, the figures ill disposed, the manners obscure or inconsistent, or the thoughts unnatural, then the finest colours are but daubing, and the piece is a beautiful monster at best.9

If any of what Dryden cites above as structural elements is weak, the cause-effect dynamics of the whole will be ajar, and the reader’s interest will be strained or lost altogether. The finest language, in this case, is mere "daubing"; that is, as in painting, the combination of "colours" will bear no apprehendable relationship to one another when the elements of structural design bear no apprehendable relationship to one another. If, on the other hand, structure is strong but expression faulty, the poet will either fail to convey any sense of design at all, or he will fail in his rhetorical direction of plot to a moral end; though the cause-effect dynamics of his action may demonstrate a moral, in other words, "there is a great difference between making any one comprehend what we think and have a mind to, and the inspiring into him the same Inclinations." The poet will, in the latter case, have ignored his readers’ human limitations and human needs:

those things which delight all ages must have been an imitation of nature. . . . Therefore is rhetoric
made an art; therefore the names of so many tropes and figures were invented: because it was observed that they had such and such an effect upon the audience. Therefore catachreses and hyperboles have found their place amongst them; not that they were to be avoided, but to be used judiciously, and placed in poetry as heightenings and shadows are in painting, to make the figure bolder, and cause it to stand off to sight. 10

But since the reader does experience language and structure together, it is not always so easy, in practical criticism, to distinguish their respective contributions—especially to a poetic failure—as it is in compositional theory. To the reader, it seems a combination of the two that renders a work ineffective. So, because Addison virtually ignores his audience, Johnson finds Cato imperfect both in design and expression:

of Cato it has been not unjustly determined that it is rather a poem in dialogue than a drama, rather a succession of just sentiments in elegant language than a representation of natural affections, or of any state probable or possible in human life. Nothing here 'excites or assuages emotion'; here is no 'magical power of raising phantastick terror or wild anxiety.' The events are expected without solicitude, and are remembered without joy or sorrow. Of the agents we have no care; we consider not what they are doing, or what they are suffering: we wish only to know what they have to say. Cato is a being above our solicitude; a man of whom the gods take care, and whom we leave to their care with heedless confidence. To the rest, neither gods nor men can have much attention; for there is not one amongst them that strongly attracts either affection or esteem. But they are made the vehicles of such sentiments and such expression that there is scarcely a scene in the play which the reader does not wish to impress upon his memory. 11

In accord with the Augustan rhetorical poetic, the effect of the intercreative language-structure combination upon the
reader—especially in epic, where the conduct of the moral fable is essentially the process of persuasion—must be to reinforce his sense of progressive conviction. In practice, it is difficult to know whether faulty expression obscures structure, or whether "false and lame" structure renders expression mere "daubing"; that is, whether the poet has produced a "structure in which local symbols, instead of reflecting the pillar[s], are always tending to undermine them or distract attention from them" or whether the pillars themselves are too imperfectly conceived and constructed to support the local symbolism.

Nevertheless, the Augustans were very much aware of the rhetorical necessity of some connection between sequential structure and style, and of the effects—expressive or not—of their disproportion. Among the worst of these disproportions was the result of a style consistently grand, and ever grand in the same way. It is apparently this abuse of stylistic decorum that Housman describes with such disdain:

The way to write real poetry, they thought, was to write something as little like prose as possible; they devised to the purpose what was called a 'correct and splended diction,' which consisted in always using the wrong word instead of the right, and plastered it as ornament, with no thought of propriety, on whatever they desired to dignify.

Thus Dryden, comparing Lucan's and Statius' epic styles and structures with Virgil's, complains that while Virgil raises his expression as his action rises in importance, Lucan and
Statius overlay everything with the same heavily figured
diction, or apply it otherwise indiscriminately:

I have not leisure to run through the whole compari-
son of lights and shadows with tropes and figures;
yet I cannot but take notice of metaphors, which like
them have power to lessen or greaten anything.
Strong and glowing colours are the just resemblances
of bold metaphors, but both must be judiciously
applied; for there is a difference betwixt daring
and foolhardiness. Lucan and Statius often ventured
them too far; our Virgil never. But the greatest
defect of the Pharsalia and the Thebais was in the
design: if that had been more perfect we might
have forgiven many of their bold strokes in the col-
ouring. Statius was always in a foam at his setting
our, even before the motion of the race had warmed
him. . . . But Virgil knew how to rise by degrees in
his expressions. Statius was in his towering heights
at the first stretch of his pinions.13

If every action is expressed in an equally exalted style,
the "admiration" due to epic is soon jaded; for lack of the
sense of movement which comparison affords, the argument of
its moral fails in emphasis. We read Cato, but think only
of Addison—the reader's "Inclinations" remain unaffected.

Ridicule of the anti-rhetorical effects of disproportion
between style and subject matter pervades Pope's and the
Scriblerans' Peri Bathous. Should the poet's attitude as
expressed in style be over-consistent, he risks a form of
bathos which combines "the Cumbrous, which moves heavily
under a Load of Metaphors, and draws after it a long Train
of Words. And the Buskin, or Stately, . . . For as the first
is the proper Engine to depress what is High, so is the second
to raise what is Base and Low to a ridiculous Visibility:
When both these can be done at once, then is the Bathos in Perfection; as when a Man is set with his Head downward, and his Breech upright, his Degradation is compleat."  

So the "Modern" will express such homely domestic injunctions as

Who knocks at the Door?

For whom thus rudely pleads my loud-tongu'd Gate,
That he may enter?—

See who is there?

Advance the fringed Curtains of thy Eyes,
And tell me who comes wonder.—

Light the Fire.

Bring forth some Remnant of Promethean Theft,
Quick, to expand th' inclement Air congeal'd
By Boreas's rude Breath.—

In the course of a long work, disproportions such as these can be disastrous. In his essay on "Pope's Odyssey" (TE VII cxcv-cxxi) Robert Fagles points out that Pope's collaborator Fenton raises the 'lower' circumstances of the Odyssey so far that he "removes the 'high' to an impossible pitch" and consequently "deforms the scale of its decorum." This is not merely a stylistic, but a structural flaw.

An inconsistently proportioned style produces either confusion or unwitting satire. Unless the reader's perception of a sequence of images is concomitant with a coherent sequence of attitudes, the work is in effect antirhetorical. Pope classifies one source of this inconsistently proportioned style among the "Diminishing Figures" as
Anticlimax, where the second line drops quite short of the first, than which nothing creates greater surprize. . . .

On a Warrior

And thou Dalhousy the great God of War, Lieutenant Colonel to the Earl of Mar.

When anticlimax operates upon a larger scale, when the action rises in importance though the style sinks from high to low, the bathos becomes structural:

At other times this figure operates in a larger extent; and when the gentle Reader is in expectation of some great image, he either finds it surprisingly imperfect, or is presented with something very low, or quite ridiculous. A surprize resembling that of a curious person in a cabinet of antique statues, who beholds on the pedestal the names of Homer, or Cato; but looking up, finds Homer without a head, and nothing to be seen of Cato but his privy member. 16

An apparent disproportion of style and subject matter can, of course, be expressive, as in the "pissing contest" in Book II of Pope's Dunciad (157-90). The devastating irony of The First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace Imitated: To Augustus works by such disproportion. George II was not only contemptuous of the arts but notoriously oblivious to domestic and international politics. Pope's combination of allusions to Homer, Augustus Caesar and Horace points the dire straits of the poet who aspires to heroic verse in a Saturnian Age of Lead:

Oh! could I mount on the Maeonian wing,  
Your Arms, your Action, your Repose to sing!  
What seas you travers'd! and what fields you fought!  
Your Country's Peace, how oft, how dearly bought!
How barb'rous rage subsided at your word,
And Nations wonder'd while they dropp'd the sword!
How, when you nodded, o'er the land and deep,
Peace stole her wing, and wrapped the world in sleep.
Till earth's extremes your mediation own,
And Asia's Tyrants tremble at your throne--

(394-403)

Here the double implications of such words as "dearly,"
"wonder'd," "nodded" and "mediation," and the local anticli-
mactic effects obtained by concluding the apparently lauda-
tory couplets at lines 394-95 and 400-1 with "Repose" and
"Sleep" undercut a style otherwise aggrandized by rhetorical
exclamation, anaphora and syntactic unity. Excepting syntac-
tic progression and unity, however, the sequence of this
passage contributes nothing to its rhetoric--the effects
remain local and aggregate.

In the opening lines of Canto III of The Rape of the
Lock, however, Pope has united every possible expressive
element, including several structural patterns, into a rhet-
orical whole:

Close by those Meads for ever crown'd with Flow'rs,
Where Thames with Pride surveys his rising Tow'rs,
There stands a structure of Majestick Frame,
Which from the neigh'ring Hampton takes its Name.
Here Britain's Statesmen oft the Fall foredoom
Of Foreign Tyrants, and of Nymphs at home;
Here Thou, Great Anna! whom three Realms obey,
Dost sometimes Counsel take--and sometimes Tea.

In this passage there are several movements at work simul-
taneously. First, it is united and dignified by the semantic
anaphora of terms of location: "Close by . . . Where . . ."
There . . . Here . . . Here." Secondly, the subject matter rises in importance—from court grounds, to court, to statesmen, to the queen—as the style decreases in generality. The elaborate *periphrasis* of lines 1–4 means no more than "at Hampton Court." But Pope has raised his description by personification of the Thames; by the use of such terms as "for ever crown'd," "Pride," "rising" and "Majestick"; and by alliteration and assonance, as in "close/those," "crown'd /Flow'rs," and "Thames . . . Pride / rising Tow'rs." The rhetoric of the last four lines is different, but no less elaborate. It includes an apostrophe to Anne; its couplets are symmetrical; and it alternates lines of general description with lines which define both by syntactic and metric parallelism, and by semantic antithesis. In accord with the increasing particularity of subject matter, and in contrast to the circumlocution of lines 1–4, the style and rhetoric here are analytic.

But where the reader has expected climax, he finds anticlimax. It seemed at first that Pope's simultaneously rising subject matter and decreasing generality of description would focus upon the queen all the importance of state and rhetorical grandeur. It becomes apparent, however, that rhetoric and subject matter have been structured to another end: "the closer--and the higher--one looks, the pettier the English court appears." Finally, although the driving semantic anaphora of "Close by . . . Where . . . There . . .
Here" and the progression of subject matter seemed to promise some unity of court interest, culminating in the queen, the syntactically and rhetorically enforced suggestion of unity is counterpointed to the vacillation of court interest from the serious to the trivial. Thus the divisive rhetoric of lines 6 and 8: "Of Foreign Tyrants, and of Nymphs at home" and "Dost sometimes Counsel take—and sometimes Tea."

What unites style and structure in this passage from The Rape of the Lock is the poet's rhetorical strategy. The rhetoric of Pope's Iliad works upon similar principles. In the course of a long narrative poem, however, a sequence of subject matter, if it is to embody in its structure a process of rhetorical persuasion, must also be a sequence of attitudes toward that subject matter.

John Dennis, it will be recalled, advocated a reformed poetic which used the reader's natural emotions, such as wonder and fear, to move him toward moral resolution. The raising, structuring, and movement of these passions was to be accomplished by the poet's style. In order to inspire both ordinary and enthusiastic passions, the poet makes use of the figure which Aristotle calls energia, a variation of metaphor by which things are set before the eyes of the reader vividly, and in such a way that the poet's or speaker's attitude toward these things is clearly conveyed. ¹⁷ Dennis terms this the "energy of Images," distinguishing between images of sound and images of things. ¹⁸
Thoughts and attitudes cannot move the reader's passions unless they are presented to the senses.

But those Passions that attend upon our Thoughts, are seldom so strong, as they are in those kind of Thought, which we call Images. For they being the very lively Pictures of the Things which they represent, set them, as it were, before our very Eyes. But Images are never so admirably drawn, as when they are drawn in Motion; especially if the Motion is violent. For the Mind can never imagine violent Motion, without being in a violent Agitation itself; and the Imagination being fir'd with that Agitation, sets the very Things before our Eyes; and consequently, makes us have the very same Passions that we should have from the things themselves. For the warmer the Imagination is, the more present the Things are to us of which we draw the Images; and therefore, when once the Imagination is so inflam'd, as to get the better of the Understanding, there is no difference between the Images, and the Things themselves.¹⁹

Because of the "strict Affinity" which the eye and ear share with the imagination, and because of man's natural instinct for self-preservation, the reader apprehends imaginary, "poetic" danger as real danger.

But terror is moved more strongly as its object moves nearer; if the object is merely set before the eye, the reader, after his first surprize, will have "leisure to reflect upon the Deceit."²⁰ When the ancient epic poets drew "an Image or Picture of a terrible Object, so as to surprize and astonish the Soul by the Eye, they never fail'd to draw it in violent Action or Motion; and in order to that, they made choice of Words and Numbers, which might best express the Violence of that Action or Motion."²¹ Therefore if the motions of these objects "occasion'd any
extraordinary Sounds that were terrifying, they so contriv'd their Numbers and Expressions, as that they might be sure to ring those Sounds in the very Ears of their Readers."22

To illustrate how style, by the expression of progressive attitudes, structures its matter to a climax, Dennis cites the Laocoon passage from Virgil's Aeneid II. Aeneas is describing the fall of Troy. Laocoon, suspecting a ruse, has struck the belly of the wooden horse with his spear. The Trojans are considering whether or not to credit Sinon's story and accept the horse, when two monstrous serpents rise from the sea, advance to the land, and horribly kill Laocoon and his two sons. The terrified Trojans take this as punishment for Laocoon's suspicions, and quickly draw the wooden horse within their walls. In describing his rising terror as the serpents approach nearer, says Dennis, Aeneas makes the reader a participant in the scene:

Ecce autem gemini a Tenedo tranquilla per alta, Horresco referens, immensis orbibus angues
Incumbunt pelago, pariterque ad litora tendunt:
Pectora quorum inter fluctus arrecta jubaeque
Sanguineae exsuperant undas: pars caetera pontum
Pone legit, sinuātque immensa volumine terga,
Fit sonitus, spumante salo: jamque arva tenebant,
Ardentesque oculos suffecti sanguine et igni,
Sibila lambebat linguis vibrantibus ora.

Aeneas' terror, and thus the reader's, is greater because this omen is believed to be an expression of Minerva's anger and because the serpents are described in motion. Dennis' translation, however, improves considerably upon
the movement and *energia* for which he praises Virgil. I have italicized his more striking interpolations:

```
Two huge Twin Serpents of prodigious size
(A shiv'ring Horror chills all my Life Blood,
At the bare Thought, and freezes ev'ry Nerve!)
Their monstrous folds incumbent on the Main,
With equal haste come rowling toward the Shore.
Their spotty Breasts erect above the Waves,
And bloody Crests, look fearful to the Eye.
Their other parts come winding through the flood,
In many a waving Spire; the Sea resounds,
While with the scaly Horrors of their Tails
They swinge the foaming Brine.
And now they land! now dart their flaming Eyes
Disdain'd with Blood, and streaming all with Fire!²³
```

Dennis twice adds references to Aeneas' own emotion: the "chills" and "freezes" clauses and the predicate "look fearful to the Eye." He adds the adjectives "huge," and "prodigious" to impress the reader visually with the serpents' "size." The movement of images which Dennis admires is also intensified by his own interpolations: "With . . . haste . . . rowling" is his, as is "came . . . through the flood."

Finally, Dennis synthesizes all the details of Virgil's passage in terms of the monsters' *approach*. He attributes the "sonitus" caused by the "spumante salo" to the serpents' movement, making the foaming brine an object of the gratuitous clause, "While . . . the scaly Horrors of their Tails / They swinge." To close the passage with greater force, he renders Virgil's imperfect verbs in the present tense, omits mention of the serpents' flickering tongues, and concentrates all his imagistic energy on the more horrific
detail of their fiery, bloody eyes. Virgil's serpents' eyes are themselves relatively passive, "ardentesque oculos suffecti . . . sanguine et igni." Dennis sets them in threatening motion by transferring the force of "lambabant" and "vibrantibus" from the serpents' mouths and tongues--they now "dart their Eyes."

Another sort of decorum to subject matter, speaker, and desired effect is necessary when the poet wishes to structure larger sections, combinations of speech and narrative, climactically. If the reader's emotions are to be raised by degrees, the poet must raise his subject matter, his style--or both--by degrees. It would not do, for example, to follow an excited speech with a dispassionate one. Because different characters will show different attitudes to a given subject matter, speeches must be arranged carefully with regard to a progressive energia. Milton's Paradise Lost is thus anticlimactic, because in preserving the decorum of characters' attitudes, he has neglected the decorum necessary to guide the reader's.

For whereas in the first eight Books, he had by the Mouth of God or Angels, or of Man the Companion of Angels, divinely entertain'd us with the wond'rous Works of God; in the latter end of the Poem, and more particularly, in the last Book, he makes an Angel entertain us with the Works of corrupted Man. From which it is very plain, by what has been deliver'd above, concerning the nature of Enthusiasticick Passion, that that Angel could draw no sort of Enthusiasm, and least of all that Admiration and Terror, which give the principal Greatness and Elevation to Poetry. For how flat, how low, and unmusical is the Relation of the
Michael speaks as an angel ought of the works of man. It is hardly possible that they should inspire him with wonder or terror. To the reader, however, this progression of attitudes is antithetical. Presumably, Dennis would approve the narration of this prophecy of corruption by a horrified Adam to a horrified Eve. As it stands, however, Adam's and the narrator's energia have raised emotions in the earlier books of the epic which are only to be cooled in the later books. We might at this point recall Dennis' argument against ending an epic unfortunately: "such an end would weaken and destroy that Admiration which is requisite for the Poet's attaining his End, and destroy or weaken it in the very place where its Influence is most requisite. For ... the greatest Impression that a Poem is to make, ought to be made at the end of it."\textsuperscript{25}

The neo-classical translator of narrative poetry must vary his style to suit his changing subject matter in accord with his understanding of the relation of subject to subject and hence of the morally persuasive direction of the action. As we shall see in examining Pope's and Dryden's versions of Iliad I, a single unit of subject matter is capable of very different interpretations. Within a single translation, it is the coherence of these interpretations in sequence that constitutes the success or failure of rhetorical structure.
Before turning to these larger structures, however, we might examine the various decorums preserved by Pope's treatment of the Homeric simile. Especially in the case of those extended similes which "introduce another mode of experience" (to use Callan's expression), their paratactic relationship to the action and their contrasting subject matter offer the neo-classical translator an unusually difficult problem in style and structure. Like Pope's Achilles, his "narrator" is a speaker whose attitudes help to shape the reader's responses. Extended similes which introduce subject matter foreign to the action are potential distractions and anti-climaxes.


Like his translation of the speeches, Pope's translation of Homer's epic voice attempts to minimize the strictly paratactic effects of the original in the interests of forward momentum and local climax. The most obviously paratactic component of Homer's epic voice is the extended simile. As Callan observes, "these similes are unlike anything else in literature" (TE VII xcvi). Once a single detail of the principal object has been compared to a single detail of another, Homer develops from this second detail a complex and independent image. The result is that two very different and very "literal" (TE VII cxxiv) pictures of
Homer's world are set side by side. This literalism is a function of Homer's Greek—which had no set of abstract terms, as distinguished from the concrete—-and the formulæic nature of oral epic composition. The simile is Homer's way of making a general statement.

Critics of Pope's day were well aware of this paratactic quality of the Homeric simile. The Moderns attacked the superfluous detail of Homer's style, especially in the similes, which they called "comparaisons à longues queues." Anne Dacier, the most extreme of the Ancients, earned for her attempts to defend Homeric excesses the title of "Homero- maniac." In his Battel of the Books, Swift parodied the Homeric simile with more accuracy than sympathy:

Rage sparkled in his Eyes, and leaving his Pursuit after W-lett-n, he furiously rush'd on against this new Approacher. Pain would he be revenged on both; but both now fled different Ways: *And as a Woman in a little House, that gets a painful Livelihood by Spinning; if chance her Geese be scattered o'er the Common, she courses round the Plain from side to side, compelling here and there, the Stragglers to the Flock; They cackle loud, and flutter o'er the Champain. So Boyle pursued, so fled this Pair of Friends.

*This is also, after the manner of Homer; the Woman's getting a painful Livelihood by Spinning, has nothing to do with the Similitude, nor would be excusable without such an Authority.

Because it was commonly believed that Homer's epics were written, composed for readers rather than hearers, and because of his traditional connection with Virgil in the epic tradition, the English and French found it difficult to
reconcile Homer's digressive and repetitive style to his obvious genius.  

Callan offers a very accurate description of the effect of the Homeric simile, rendered literally, upon an English reader: "they are essentially moments of tranquillity which underline violence only by contrast and the sense of shock with which the reader is brought back from them to the action" (TE VII xcvii). This is precisely the effect which Pope's translation seeks to minimize. Centuries of epic theory had reiterated the idea that surpizes and digressions only bore and distract a reader. Pope's special interpretation of the Iliad's structural dynamics required above all a forward momentum.

Douglas Knight has observed that "the heroic world is pre-eminently a world without waste motion ... The chief function of a heroic style is to convey the feeling of urgency, of constant pressure and constant significance." Notwithstanding his paratactic style, this is as applicable to Homer as to Pope. In those similes which are not strict parallels, the detail of the image describes not the immediate action, but its importance within the established context; Homer is essentially drawing for his audience a picture, a summary in miniature of the significance of this action in another perspective. This second perspective, and Pope's response to it, is what Callan fails to take into account when he judges Pope's "literalism in interpreting
the implications" (TE VII xciii) a fault in poetic "vision."
Knight observes that Pope "often provides information which
is implicit at another point from the one where he includes
it," a technique "directed toward the creation in the English
of a consistent version of the Greek text." It is by his
constant evaluation of the action in terms of its context
that Pope achieves this consistency, combining forward
momentum with meaning. As applied to the similes, and
especially to the non-parallel similes, this technique most
often takes the form of a verbal and metaphoric fusion of
action, image and context. These effects are most striking,
and most successful, in those similes which seem to "under-
line violency by contrast." Pope is especially skillful in
using antitheses, exploiting them for simultaneous effects
of depth and momentum. In terms of the larger structural
patterns of his Iliad, I have characterized this technique
as dialectical progression, a rising series of comparisons.

Among Homer's non-parallel similes are those which
describe the occupations of war in terms of the occupations
of peace. In one such simile, he compares sudden success in
battle to a woodman's respite from toil. The explicit point
of comparison is temporal:

As long as it was dawn, and the holy day increased,
so long the missiles of both sides hit home, and
the people fell.
But at that time when the woodman prepares his
midday meal
in the groves of a mountain, when his arms have
become weary
from cutting large trees, fatigue enters his heart
and the desire of sweet food siezes his heart;
then by their valor the Danaans broke through
the phalanx,
calling out to their companions along the lines
of battle.

(XI 84-91)

Zeus has forbidden the gods to aid Greece in order that
Achilles' absence might bring them to the brink of ruin.
The similarity between the physical motions of warfare and
the action of felling trees is obvious; and the sustained
tension of battle is equivalent to the monotonous repetition
of the woodman's toil. But while the woodman is relieved
by refreshment, and in accord with the routine and predict-
able custom of the noontime meal, the Greeks are relieved
unexpectedly, and by a breakthrough which only means more
effort; for Zeus has decreed that their painful resistance
must continue until Achilles returns to battle. That the
course of battle changes at noon, when the sun has reached
the point from which it will begin to decline, introduces a
note of foreboding. Before this day's battle is ended, as
the reader has been told, Hector will pursue the Greeks to
their ships.

Pope's translation makes these implications a part of
the comparison, and at the same time avoids digressive
effects by subordinating the image itself to its context in
the action.

Thus while the Morning Beams increasing bright
O'er Heav'n's pure Azure spread the growing Light,
Commutual Death the Fate of War confounds,
Each adverse Battel goar'd with equal Wounds.
But now (what time in some sequester'd Vale
The weary Woodman spreads his sparing Meal,
When his tir'd Arms refuse the Axe to rear,
And claims a Respite from the Sylvan War;
But not till half the prostrate Forest lay
Stretch'd in long Ruin, and expos'd to Day)
Then, nor till then, the Greeks impulsive Might
Pierc'd the black Phalanx, and let in the Light

(XI 115-26; TE VIII 39-41)

The Homeric image is transformed into metaphor by what
Knight calls the "mutual animation of the war and its
image." The woodman has become a warrior ("Axe to rear
... Sylvan War") and the trees fallen heroes ("prostrate
... stretch'd"). Pope not only makes the image itself
parenthetical—he minimizes the time element as a determin-
ant of the action by making it relative to the progress of
the woodman's labor and achievement ("Thus while ... But
now ... Then, nor till then ... not till half").

Pope's simile ennobles its context. He interprets the
comparison as Homer's way of raising the Greeks along with
techniques of "gaging": "To vary his Battels, Homer supposes
the Gods to be absent this Day; and they are no sooner gone,
but the Courage of the Greeks prevails, even against the
Determination of Jupiter" (TE VIII 41). Pope incorporates
the notion that the Greeks prevail even against the determin-
ation of Jupiter by contrasting the weariness of the wood-
man ("weary Woodman ... tir'd Arms refuse ... claims a
Respite") to the extent of his achievement. His translation
implies that the woodman has earned this respite, for he
does not rest "till half the prostrate Forest lay / Strech'd in long Ruin, and expos'd to Day." The suggestion of deserved relief is further emphasized by the parallelism between the "black Phalanx" of Trojans and the woodman's forest: the thinning of the forest leaves the felled trees "expos'd to Day"; and by the thinning of the Trojan line, the Greeks "let in the Light."

Pope is not unaware of the darker implications of the simile. He renders them in part by his contrast of balanced tension and release: the "weary" woodman rests when "half" his work is done, and the balance of "commutual Death" and "equal Wounds" is broken by a burst of "impulsive Might."

But although the woodman reaches the "half" way point in his labor at midday, the Greeks accomplish nothing until then. This contrast is the pattern for his more general statement in dark and light images: he establishes a counterpoint between the regular progression of the natural order and the irregular progress of men controlled by the "Fate of War." As the Greeks struggle against the Trojans' "black Phalanx," the "increasing . . . spread" of the sun's light is contrasted to the equilibrium of battle. Not until the hour when the sun is at its height does the Greeks' delayed thrust "pierce" the darkness. The natural and the human worlds, however, dovetail in this final line, and this ultimate union ennobles the Greek effort. Pope has thus
used the simile's more sinister implications to raise the Greeks, to suggest the great odds which they have overcome unaided by the gods. Antithesis of odds and heroic effort heighten's the simile's climax.

Another of Homer's extended similes likens the contrast of blood and white skin to the contrast of ivory and red dye. Menelaus and Paris have called a truce in order to determine the issue of the war by single combat. Athena tempts Pandarus to shoot Menelaus, and gain honor and rewards from Paris.

Then the tip of the arrow grazed the man's skin; and straightway the dark blood flowed from the wound. As when some woman dyes ivory with red, some woman of Maeonia or Caria, to be a cheek-piece for horses; it lies in a treasure-room, and many horsemen desire to have it; but it lies there, a treasure for a king, Both an ornament for the horse, and a glory to the driver.
So, Menelaus, your thighs were stained with blood, and your well-shaped calves, and the ankles beneath them.

(IV 139-47)

Homer gradually elevates the cheek-piece, tracing its history of manufacture from an object of skilled craftsmanship to an object of envy, and finally to a king's treasure.

Pope mitigates the "shock" effect of Homer's extended history by reversing its order of development, shifting Homer's emphasis on progress to an emphasis on purpose:

The Folds it pierc'd, the plaited Linen tore, And raz'd the Skin and drew the Purple Gore. As when some stately Trappings are decreed, To grace a Monarch on his bounding Steed,
A Nymph in Caria or Moeonia bred,
Stains the pure Ivory with a lively Red.
With equal Lustre various colours vie,
The shining Whiteness, and the Tyrian Dye.
So, great Atrides! show'd thy sacred Blood
As down thy snowie Thigh distill'd the streaming Flood.

(IV 169-77; TE VII 228-29)

The reader is informed immediately of the relevance of the comparison by the similar connotations of "purple" (of the blood) and "stately" (of the ornament):

the Simile does not consist barely in the Colours; It was but little to tell us that the Blood of Menelaus appearing on the Whiteness of his Skin, vyed with the purpled Ivory; But this implies that the honourable Wounds of a Heroe become him as much as the most gallant Ornaments in which he takes the Field.

(TE VII 229)

The entire comparison is made heroic by its emphasis on action: Pope's king rides a "bounding Steed," the "Trappings are decreed," the "shining Whiteness" and the "lively Red . . . vie" and the "streaming Flood" actually runs down Menelaus' leg in a slow Alexandrine.

The secondary result of his reversal of Homer's order of development is that Pope can now describe the staining of ivory and the flowing of the blood simultaneously. As the emphasis is thrown upon the abstract contrast of colors, the ornament becomes a metaphor for the wound and the wound itself becomes an aesthetic object. Pope causes the potentially incompatible ideas of wound and ornament to "vie" rhetorically as the red and white "vie" literally, through a system of cross reference between literal and figurative,
and between active and evaluative adjectives. Pope frames the chiasmus by consistently naming the bright objects ("pure Iv'ry . . . equal Lustre . . . shining Whiteness . . . snowie Thigh") within the first half of the line, and the color ("lively Red . . . Colours . . . Tyrian Dye . . . sacred Blood") within the second half. The ivory is "pure" and therefore linked to Menelaus' "sacred" blood; its "shining" whiteness links it to his "snowie" Thigh. The stain in turn suggests his blood by its "lively" red. Finally, the elevation of the "wound" combines with the aggrandizement of Menelaus ("great . . . sacred"); and the incident which was meant to destroy him exalts the hero. Again, dialectic leads to a climactic fusion of act, image and context.

Homer occasionally imposes upon the heroic world an image which is "mean in comparison," according to Pope. Pope fears that the likeness will seem "low and trivial" to the uneducated reader (TE VIII 235): "It is true we should not use it now-a-days, by reason of the low Ideas we have of the Animals from which it is derived; but those not being the Ideas of Homer's time, they could not hinder him from making a proper use of such a Comparison" (TE VIII 287). Although Pope's commentary shows him well aware of the difference between Homer's and his own cultures, Pope's translation of these low comparisons is not, as some have argued,
merely defensive. As elsewhere, he translates these similes into his own heroic medium without sacrificing fidelity to what he believes to be Homer's design.

Among the most striking uses of these low comparisons in Homer are his descriptions of the familial affection which Patroclus inspires, usually imaged in comparisons to animals. For Pope, the fitness of these sentiments is their cooperation in the "great Moral of the Iliad: that Concord, among Governors, is the preservation of States, and Discord the Ruin of them" (TE VIII 591). Patroclus' kind and conciliatory character is the antithesis of Achilles' violent and divisive character. Homer "had a good Poetical Reason" for this antithesis: "it affords many Incidents to illustrate the Manners of them both more strongly; and is what they call a Contrast in Painting" (TE VIII 287). According to Pope, Homer's use of domestic and animal similes is far from capricious:

It seems to me remarkable, that the several Comparisons to illustrate the Concern for Patroclus, are taken from the most tender Sentiments of Nature. Achilles in the Beginning of the 16th Book, considers him as a Child, and himself as his Mother. The Sorrow Menelaus is here described as that of a Heifer for her young one. Perhaps these are design'd to intimate the excellent Temper and Goodness of Patroclus, which is express'd in that fine Elogy of him in this Book, V. 671 . . . He knew how to be good-natur'd to all Men. This gave all Mankind these Sentiments for him, and no doubt the same is strongly pointed at by the uncommon Concern of the whole Army to rescue his Body.

(TE VIII 287)
The familial sentiments are at once metaphors and natural analogues for the political union which Homer wishes to recommend.

A good example of the manner in which Pope uses the apparent contrast of familial and heroic sentiment to elevate the ideas of loyalty and union is his treatment of the heifer simile mentioned above. Homer compares Menelaus' defense of Patroclus' body to the care of a heifer for her first-born:

He did not fail to notice, Atreus' son Menelaus, dear to Ares, that Patroclus had been slain in battle by the Trojans. He strode through the front ranks, armored in fiery bronze, and then took a stand over Patroclus as some mother over her calf, her first-born, lows plaintively, never before having known birth pangs.

So over Patroclus went yellow-haired Menelaus. He held before him his spear and his evenly-balanced shield, eager to kill whatever man wished to confront him.

(XVII 1-6)

The comparison is certainly martial enough. Even its image of the cow's solicitous care of her calf is more than merely sentimental: the responsibility of friendship among the Greeks did not stop at death. Unless Patroclus' body is rescued, the Trojans will dishonor it, and unless the body is properly buried, Patroclus' shade cannot enter the underworld. The verbs which designate Menelaus' movement ("strode . . . took a stand . . . went") are all forms of the same
verb in Greek, indicating progressive action. The comparison illustrates the intensity of Menelaus' loyalty in its dual social and emotional dimensions.

Pope is aware of all these qualities in the original. Menelaus "is represented as the Foremost who appears in his Defence, not only as one of a like Disposition of Mind with Patroclus, a kind and generous Friend; but as being more immediately concern'd in Honor to protect from Injuries the Body of a Hero that fell in his Cause" (TE VII 287). However, Pope's emphasis is upon the universal rather than the historical ethic that motivates Menelaus' defense:

On the cold Earth divine Patroclus spread
Lies pierc'd with Wounds among the vulgar Dead.
Great Menelaus, touch'd with gen'rous Woe,
Springs to the Front, and guards him from the Poe:
Thus round her new-fal'n Young, the Heifer moves,
Fruit of her Throes, and First-born of her Loves,
And anxious, (helpless as he lies, and bare)
Turns, and re-turns her, with a Mother's Care.
Oppos'd to each, that near the Carcase came,
His broad Shield glimmers, and his Lances flame.

(XVII 1-10; TE VIII 286-88)

Pope has again mitigated the shock and preserved the animation of Homer's simile by generalizing the image and mingling the terms of comparison. The heifer image does not justify the heroic diction which Pope has applied to the woodman; instead, Pope has first ennobled the emotion and then personified the heifer and her calf. The picture of the body of Patroclus is remarkably sentient. The body comes above first through the sympathy Pope arouses by the expression,
"cold Earth" and then by the implication that his corpse is somehow different from the others ("divine . . . vulgar Dead"); he is dead only by the implications of "among" and the "spread/Dead" rhyme. The emotion aroused by this verbal ambivalence justifies Menelaus' "gen'rous Woe" and anticipates the "anxious" heifer and her "helpless" calf. By the aggrandizement of "divine" Patroclus and "Great " Menelaus, the emphasis on action ("springs . . . guards") and the mention at this point of the "Foe," Pope establishes this sympathy as a heroic sentiment before it can be demeaned by the comparison. Like Patroclus, the calf is "helpless" and "bare" (Hector has stripped the corpse). Just as Patroclus is singular among the "vulgar Dead" the calf is "First-born." The heifer's motherhood is in every respect human ("Loves . . . anxious . . . Mother's care"); she does not even low here, as she does in Homer. Just as Patroclus is to Menelaus an object of "gen'rous Woe," the calf is the product of the heifer's combined "Throes" and "Loves." The repetition of open vowel sounds sustains a mournful tone throughout the comparison. The heifer's "anxious" motion of "turn and re-turn" is similar to that of Menelaus, who is surrounded by hostile troops and "Oppos'd to each." Finally, Pope combines the simile's opening description of Menelaus' fiery armor and its closing description of his weapons in one line at the emphatic close of his version; it is by this device that he has both sustained the
tone of his image and provided a combination of climax and transition to the violence which follows.

There is another class of similes in Homer which compares momentous action in the human sphere to the grandeur of natural processes. These comparisons are usually elevating, reflecting the high courage or noble spirit of the action in the image of an order which is beyond human control. Homer's comments on the pettiness of human strife never occur in the similes; they are expressed in the dramatic context of speeches or by the ironic ordering of episodes. In one such instance, an especially ironic sequence is followed by an apparently innocent natural simile. The day's battle has ended in a major reversal for the Greeks, their first since Achilles withdrew from the battle. Although Zeus has forbidden the gods to aid Greece, he reveals that Troy will fall. Meanwhile, the Trojans are exultant. Confident that the gods have decided the outcome of the war in Troy's favor and eager for the next day's battle, Hector addresses his army in a tone that rises from confidence to *hubris*. I quote Pope's version, which heightens the local irony of the original considerably:

Certain as this, oh might my Days endure,  
From Age inglorious, and black Death secure  
So might my Life and Glory know no Bound,  
Like Pallas worship'd, like the Sun renown'd;  
As the next Dawn, the last they shall enjoy,  
Shall crush the Greeks, and end the Woes of Troy.

(VIII 667-72; TE VII 427)
He orders his people to build fires "high blazing to the Sky" which will replace the "absent Sun" and prevent the Greeks from escaping unperceived during the night. At Hector's command, the Trojans offer a sacrifice to the gods; but unknown to "Proud Troy" and "her Guilty Race" the sacrifice is rejected, for the gods' "Wrath hung heavy o'er the Trojan Tow'rs" (VIII 681; TE VII 427). Hector's pride is thus dramatically framed by a prophecy of Troy's doom and the rejection of his prayer. Pope has underlined this structural irony with a multitude of light and dark images.

Homer now compares the number of the Trojan watchfires to the multitude of stars which are visible on a clear still night:

And they, high-hearted, on the ground between the battlefields sat all night, and their fires burned in great numbers.
So in the sky the stars around the bright moon shine prominently, when the sky is without wind; and then shine out all the promontories and high mountain peaks and wooded glens; and then is the air opened from beneath, all the stars are visible, and the shepherd rejoices in his heart;
In such numbers, between the ships and the streams of Xanthus did the fires kindled by the Trojans shine before Troy.
A thousand fires burned on the plain, and by each sat fifty men in the glow of the burning fires.

(VIII 553-63)
The Trojans are confident of what they believe to be the changed purpose of the gods. A change in the aspect of the heavens is implied by Homer's description of the conditions under which the stars are visible and by the gradual illumination of the earth—the calm clarity of the scene is the source of the shepherd's joy. But while he is cheered by seeing things as they are, by the return of light, we are aware that Troy is cheered and deluded by false appearances.

Pope extends both terms of the comparison in order to contrast them:

The Troops exulting sate in order round,  
And beaming Fires illumin'd all the Ground.  
As when the Moon, refulgent Lamp of Night!  
O'er Heav'n's clear Azure spreads her sacred Light,  
When not a Breath disturbs the deep Serene;  
And not a Cloud o'ercasts the solemn Scene;  
Around her Throne the vivid Planets roll,  
And Stars unnumber'd gild the glowing Pole,  
O'er the dark Trees a yellower Verdure shed,  
And tip with Silver ev'ry Mountain's Head;  
Then shine the Vales, the Rocks in Prospect rise,  
A Flood of Glory bursts from all the Skies:  
The conscious Swains, rejoicing in the Sight,  
Eye the blue Vault, and bless the useful Light.  
So many Flames before proud Ilión blaze,  
And lighten glimm'ring Xanthus with their Rays.  
The long Reflections of the distant Fires  
Gleam on the Walls, and tremble on the Spires.  
A thousand Piles the dusky Horrors gild,  
And shoot a shady Lustre o'er the Field.  
Full fifty Guards each flaming Pile attend,  
Whose umbr'ed Arms, by fits, thick Flashes send.

(VIII 685-706; TE VII 428-29)

Pope has done something quite different here. Rather than integrate the comparison with the action, he has set it apart by contrast and elaboration. The result is a slowing
down of the narrative, a poetic "coda" which climaxes both the action which preceded it and the significance of this action.

The natural heavens are abstracted and formalized into a figurative representation of universal order. What Pope's "conscious Swains" see is the "Glory" of the divine order reflected on the earth. This combination of the ideal and the real, or of the near-miraculous and the natural and orderly is due in part to what Knight calls the "twined excitement and tranquillity"\textsuperscript{34} of the simile. The moon, planets, stars and Pole constitute a moving and ruling order. The "Flood of Glory" which "bursts" upon the earth virtually animates all of nature. The shepherds "bless" the "useful" and "sacred" light, which is a sign to them of the presence of beneficent divinity. The joy and the order of the natural/divine world are anticipated, but ironically, in Pope's first line, where the "Troops exultant sate in order round."

But the neutral light of the Trojans' "beaming Fires" becomes more sinister as Pope describes the actual effect of the firelight upon the scene. In contrast to the images of the moon's steady light ("Lamp . . . spreads . . . glowing . . . shine . . . Flood") the firelight is unsteady ("glimm'ring . . . tremble . . . by fits . . . Flashes"). This firelight creates an ambivalence of illumination and shadow ("shady Lustre . . . umber'd Arms . . . thick
Flashes"); and the irony of the contrast is, as in Homer, that it is unperceived by the Trojans.\textsuperscript{35} The line upon which the simile turns connects "Flames" and "blazing" with "proud Ilion," such that the play of firelight on the "Walls" and "Spire" of Troy becomes a vision of her destruction. As elsewhere, contrast rises to climax and fusion. The watchfires which are the concrete symbol of Hector's excited confidence are at the same time the means by which Pope shows us that the wrath of the gods hangs over guilty Troy. The same simile combines the divine perspective and the limited human perception of it.

Pope's treatment of Homeric simile is more than simply metaphoric. Like the larger structures of his Iliad, they are rendered as parts of a periodic pattern. Pope's fusion of action, image and context minimizes the paratactic effects of the original, and ensures the continuity and forward momentum necessary to his periodic structures. First, Pope's similes are metaphoric repetitions of the action they describe. Second, the narrator "raises" his style in these poetic figures, and thereby caps a series by progressive increment. Because the actual placement of Homer's similes is "given," however, this cannot always be the case. The heifer simile, for example, opens Book XVII—Pope cannot treat it climactically. His woodman and moonlight similes, on the other hand, are certainly climactic; and his stained-ivory simile resolves the Pandarus incident in Menelaus' favor.
iii. Pope's and Dryden's Versions of *Iliad* I.

The first book of the *Iliad* provides an especially useful test case for the principles of rhetorical style and structure. Its action is structured upon two distinct but interdependent principles, one linear and one symmetric. First, the book proceeds in an almost unbroken chronological and cause-effect sequence: because Agamemnon has insulted Chryses, Apollo inflicts a plague upon the Achaeans; Achilles calls the council at which Agamemnon's guilt is exposed, and they quarrel; because Agamemnon fulfills his threat, Achilles calls on Thetis to win Zeus' support for the Trojans and make the Achaeans suffer for their affront; after Zeus has granted Thetis' petition, Hero (partial to the Achaeans) provokes a quarrel with him. In addition to its cause/effect structure, *Iliad* I is governed by a second formal pattern, the parallel between the Achaean and Olympian quarrels. These quarrels are thus thematically as well as causally allied; if a translator is to do more than simply "tell what happened," he must somehow interpret the relationship between these two interdependent structural dimensions.

Every critic who has attempted a comparison of Dryden's and Pope's versions of *Iliad* has based his preference on a very partial reading. Douglas Bush judges upon primitivist expectations, and finds Dryden's version the more Homeric, "the diction more simple and natural, the thought more
unsophisticated, the movement more free and flowing."  

Most, however, ground their comparisons on Dryden's and Pope's strikingly different translations of a single scene; the quarrel on Olympus—which Pope 'Christianizes' and Dryden turns to comedy—is made the crux of the translator's problem, without reference to its function as part of a larger whole. Thus Mark Van Doren finds Dryden's comic treatment the more Homeric because the more realistic: "The closing scene with Vulcan is grandiosely convivial. . . . Pope's rendering of the same scene is not half so lively; the laughter of his gods is imitation laughter, this is real. It is thinkable that this would be, even now, the most Homeric thing in English."  

Frost, characterizing the whole by the part—against his own stated standards—finds Dryden's version "anti-ceremonial, tending toward homely realism or even burlesque, slapstick and the anti-heroic—a method Pope repudiates" (TE VII cxxl). The contrast between the two translations "also illustrates the two possible attitudes . . . which the enlightenment often took toward the heroic," the heroic proper and the mock heroic.  

"Dryden's mock heroic vein," he concludes, is "closer to that of Hudibras than to that of the Rape of the Lock."  

This "mock-heroic vein," however, is by no means the norm of Dryden's version. One need only compare Dryden's "mock-heroic" style with the avowedly burlesque version of James Scudamore (1665) to admit
the distinction. Scudamore would seem to infer from Homer's epithet, "white-armed," for example, that Hera has dirty hands.

The difficulty of Dryden's version is, in fact, the range and variety of its style. Samuel Johnson complained that Dryden is "sometimes unexpectedly mean," that "ten lines are rarely found together without something of which the reader is ashamed." At times, his translation slips into what Pope was to call "the Alamode Stile," the use of contemporary slang in passages of otherwise elevated diction:

The god nine days the Greeks at rovers kill'd.

(I 74)

For yesterday the court of heav'n with Jove Remov'd; 'tis dead vacation now above.

(I 582-83)

The first libations to the gods they pour,
And then with songs indulge the genial hour.
Holy Debauch! til day to night they bring,
With hymns and paeans to the bowyer king.
At sunset to their ships they make return,
And snore secure on decks till rosy morn.

(I 645-50)

Jove at the head ascending from the sea,
A shoal of puny pow'rs attend his way.
Then Thetis, not unmindful of her son,
Emerging from the deep, to beg her boon,
Pursued their track and, waken'd from his rest,
Before the sovereign stood a morning guest.

(I 669-74)

The quarrel on Olympus, and its conclusion, are rendered in a style more consistently comic:
Drunken at last, and drowsy they depart
Each to his house, adorn'd with labor'd art
Of the lame architect; the thund'ring god--
Ev'n he withdrew to rest, and had his load;
His swimming head to needful sleep applied,
And Juno lay unheeded by his side.

(I 810-15)

The Achaean quarrel, however, is rendered in a third and
predominantly heroic style, notwithstanding its frequently
abusive dialogue. Clearly, if we intend to evaluate Dryden's
achievement upon surer grounds than an impressionistic notion
of the "Homeric," we must consider the whole of his transla-
tion.

The difficulty of Dryden's version is actually struc-
tural, in terms of the intercreative relationship of style
and structure which I have discussed above. Dryden treats
the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles with the utmost
seriousness, and in a suitably exalted style; the quarrel on
Olympus, however, develops from a domestic spat to a drunken
revel, and is rendered in a style suitably low. The effect
of this combination is disjunctive to the extent that the
actual causal connection, and the thematic analogies, between
the two quarrels suffer almost complete obliteration. One
might argue for a tragicomic plot structure; but the sub-plot
is never made to cooperate with the main plot. Dryden has
made the gods and religion in general an issue of such im-
portance to the first quarrel that their behavior--and his
attitude toward it--in the Olympian quarrel simply contra-
dicts the terms of the Achaean quarrel. The possibility of an organic relationship between the linear and symmetric structural dimensions has, in other words, been ignored; and it is because of the incoherence of Dryden's stylistic treatment of sequential actions that the structure of his Iliad I becomes anti-rhetorical.

Like Pope, Dryden accepts both Le Bossu's statement of the moral of the Iliad and his general description of its design. This accounts for both poets' rendition of the Achaean quarrel as a serious political and moral debate. Dryden's appreciation of the structural importance of Achilles' flawed character, on the one hand, and his disapproval of Homer's flawed deities, on the other, suggest the formal confusion of his translation:

All [Homer's gods had somewhat of human imperfection, for which he has been taxed by Plato as an imitator of what was bad. But Virgil observed his fault, and mended. Yet Achilles was perfect in the strength of his body, and the vigour of his mind. Had he been less passionate, or less vengeful, the poet well foresaw that Hector had been killed, and Troy taken, at the first assault; which had destroyed the beautiful contrivance of his Iliads, and the moral of preventing discord among confederate princes, which was his principle intention. For the moral (as LeBossu observes is the first business of the poet."

Again by comparison to Virgil, Homer's style is as licentious as his treatment of the gods: "The chief talent of Virgil was propriety of thoughts, and ornament of words: Homer was rapid in his rthoughts, and took all the liberties, both of numbers and of expressions which his language, and the age
in which he lived, allowed.\textsuperscript{45} Dryden alludes to the traditional camps of Homeric criticism, which continued divided throughout the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth.\textsuperscript{46} His statements seem to acknowledge, as his translation seems to embody, what he considered the juster claims of each school: appreciation for the "beautiful contrivance" of Homer's moral fable and disapproval of the licentious treatment of deity which undermines the success of this "contrivance." The curiously bathetic structural defects of Dryden's \textit{Iliad} I, then, may be intentional. Literary criticism by strategic imitation, or parody, is a genre by no means uncommon in the Restoration period: Dryden had used it against Shadwell in \textit{Mac Flecknoe}; and his own works are the targets of Prior and Montague in \textit{The Hind and the Panther Transvers'd to the Story of the Country Mouse and the City Mouse}, and of Buckingham's \textit{The Rehearsal}. In all three instances, significantly, structural bathos and inconsequence are among the literary abuses parodied.

Let us now consider how Dryden does render, in the Achaean quarrel, "the beautiful contrivance" and the "moral" of Homer's fable. We will then be in a better position to understand the distinctive structural qualities of Pope's version—based, like Dryden's, on Le Bossu's general interpretation—of the same sequence of actions.

I have argued that Dryden's comic treatment of the Olympian quarrel destroys both its thematic and its causal connec-
tion to the Achaean quarrel because Dryden makes religion such an important issue in the latter. He moralizes the conflict, presents Achilles as the champion of religion and the common good, and characterizes Agamemnon as an insecure tyrant to whose unmerited supremacy both religion and his subjects' interests seem a threat. Agamemnon's affronts to Chryses and Apollo, to Calchas and to Achilles, Dryden suggests, are aspects of the same vice. Achilles' wrath is at all times morally righteous: it is directed first against Agamemnon alone, and on the behalf of his fellow subjects; once he finds himself the sole object of Agamemnon's anger, and unsupported by the craven and corrupt chiefs whose cause he has undertaken, Achilles' wrath turns against all the Achaevans, and he vows to withdraw from battle altogether. Achilles is first the champion of the gods and then the instrument of their vengeance. Dryden effects these moral polarizations by interpolated religious allusions and by a combination of controlling images and metaphors, the most important of which refer to fire, hands, and gain. The religious and political themes, finally, are one: according to Dryden's essentially Renaissance embodiment of Le Bossu's moral interpretation of the Iliad, concord among princes must be based on mutual self control.

To observe the beginning of Dryden's moral polarization, one must go back to the first appearance of the suppliant
priest Chryses. Homer introduces him simply:

for he came upon the swift ships of the Achaeans
to free his daughter, and bearing boundless ransom;
holding in his hands the fillets of far-shooting
Apollo
on a golden staff. (I 12-15)

Dryden exalts the character of Chryses, suggesting by a
combination of religious and political images the power of
the godhead which Agamemnon is to affront:

For venerable Chryses came to buy,
With gold and gifts of price his daughter's liberty.
Suppliant before the Grecian chiefs he stood,
Awful, and arm'd with ensigns of his god;
Bare was his hoary head; one holy hand
Held forth his laurel crown, and one his scepter
of command. (I 17-22)

While in the Greek, Chryses prays that Apollo will "let the
Danaans pay for my tears by your arrows!" (I 42), Dryden's
Chryses asks that Apollo "Hear, and my just revenge propitious aid! / Pierce the proud Greeks, and with thy shafts
attest / How much thy pow'r is injured in thy priest" (I
64-66).

Agamemnon's frequent and contemptuous references to
religion and priestly fraud further this incompatibility
between tyranny and the cause of the gods. He dismisses
Chryses as ineffectual, an "holy dotard," calling his scepter
"idle" (I 39, 42; cf. Homer, I 26, 28); and in his retort
to Calchas, ironically charges the priesthood with that venal
ambition which Dryden will show to be his own crime.

Augur of ill, whose tongue was never found
Without a priestly curse, or boding sound! . . .
And now thou dost with lies the throne invade,
By practice harden'd in thy slandering trade;
Obtending heav'n for whate'er ills befall,
And sputt'ring under specious names thy gall. . . .
Since I detain a slave, my sov'reign prize,
And sacred gold, your idol god, despise.

(I 155-66; cf. Homer, I 106-20)

Achilles has deprived him of Chryseis, Agamemnon complains,
"by priestly glossing on the god's commands" (I 205; cf. Homer, I 133-34). Ordering Chryseis sent home "with all the pomp of pray'r" (I 216; cf. Homer 141-44), he suggests that "pious" Achilles might best command the ship: "Most fit thyself to see performed th' intent / For which my pris'ner from my sight is sent, / (Thanks to thy pious care,) that Phoebus may relent" (I 220-22; cf. Homer, I 146-47). Several lines later, Agamemnon describes the same ship as "Full fraught with holy bribes to the far-shooting god!" Dryden's narrator confirms the King's impiety; his seizure of Briseis reveals the hypocrisy of his apparent submission to Apollo's will:

Atrides then, his outward zeal to boast,
Bade purify the sin-polluted host.

(I 435-36; cf. Homer, I 313-14)

These pomp's the royal hypocrite design'd
For shew, but harbor'd vengeance in his mind;
Till holy malice, longing for a vent,
At last discover'd his conceal'd intent.

(I 442-45; cf. Homer, I 318-19)

The direction of Dryden's design is clear enough: Agamemnon's vicious and hypocritical opposition to religion ought
to justify the gods' support of Achilles' withdrawal; but the character of Homer's gods hardly justifies Achilles' efforts on their behalf.

Although dissociated in their religious attitudes, Dryden's Achilles and Agamemnon are alike in at least three important respects: both are angry, both are powerful, and both are concerned with the matter of rewards. Having disposed his characters on opposite sides of the religious issue, Dryden argues his moral through a sequence of interrelated metaphors for these qualities which they share—fire for anger, hands for the uses of power, and various sorts of material "gain" for reward. I shall survey the most important occurrences of these metaphors.

Homer's Calchas, fearful of arousing the king's anger, refers only to the dangers inherent in a difference of degree:

for stronger is a king, when he is angry at a lesser man.
For even if he should swallow his anger that day,
yet even later he retains his anger, until he accomplishes what is in his heart. (I 80-83)

Dryden knew Chapman's version of Homer's digestive metaphor:

When a king hath once markt for his hate
A man inferior, though that day his wrath seems to digest
Th' offence he takes, yet evermore he rakes up in his brest
Brands of quicke anger, till revenge hath quencht to his desire
The fire reserved. 47
Elaborating Chapman's metaphor, Dryden drops the implications of "quench" and combines in the term "devour" Homer's digestive and Chapman's fire images:

    And sov'reigns, ever jealous of their state,
    Forget not those whom once they mark for hate;
    Ev'n tho' th' offense they seemingly digest,
    Revenge, like embers, rak'd within their breast,
    Bursts forth in flames; whose unresisted pow'r
    Will seize th' unwary wretch, and soon devour.

    (I 114-21)

Here are included the rapaciousness, the insecurity, and the hypocrisy of tyranny. Achilles extends these implications in another metaphor. "Hands" can either support or sap the strength of the state:

    for still above the rest,
    Thy hook'd rapacious hands usurp the best;
    Tho' mine are first in fight, to force the prey,
    And last sustain the labors of the day.

    (I 246-49; cf. Homer, I 163-68)

Adding to the image of hands the image of gain, Achilles then indicts Agamemnon's impiety:

    O first in pow'r, but passing all in pride,
    Griping and still tenacious of thy hold,
    Wouldst thou the Grecian Chiefs, tho' largely soul'd,
    Should give the prizes they had gain'd before,
    And with their loss thy sacrilege restore?

    (I 183-87; cf. Homer, I 122-26)

At the height of his anger, the fire metaphor is transferred to Achilles: "the thirst of vengeance fired his blood" (I 294; cf. Homer, I 188-92). His indecision whether to draw or put up his sword is represented in Dryden as a psychomachia between reason and passion (I 284-91; cf. Homer, I 188-92)
At Athena's command to let "Reason ... resume her sov'reign sway" (I 312; cf. Homer, 207)—which combines, as in Pope, the analoguous notions of political and self control—Achilles draws a moral not of piety, as in Homer (I 218), but of the rewards due to one who masters his own passions: "The gods are just, and when, subduing sense, / We serve their pow'rs, provide the recompense" (I 326-27). Homer's Athena stresses the material rewards of obedience to the gods, with only slight reference to Agamemnon's agency: "and then will there be for you thrice and four times the amount of shining gifts, / because of this arrogance; but you restrain yourself, and obey us" (I 213-14). But Dryden subdues the material reward to contrast Agamemnon's enforced humility to Achilles' self control. "Pay" and "quit thy loss" suggest moral as well as material recompense: "An hour unhop'd already wings her way / When he his dire affront shall dearly pay; / When the proud king shall sue, with treble gain, / To quit thy loss, and conquer thy disdain" (I 318-21). The verbal "fire" which rekindles after Athena's departure has her sanction: "The fire she fann'd, with greater fury burn'd; / Rumbling within, till thus it found a vent" (I 333-34; cf. Homer, I 223-24). Achilles' nearly destructive passion has been transformed to the service of the gods.

Once Achilles has vowed to withdraw, Nestor rises to reconcile him to Agamemnon. Nestor's speech carries on the
fire metaphor, expanding its implications in two antitheses:
fire'd heat opposed to fire's light, and youth's hot passions
opposed to the cool wisdom of age:

What worse, he said, can Argos undergo;
What can more gratify the Phrygian foe,
Than these distempered heats? If both the lights
of Greece their private interest disunites?

(I 368-71; cf. Homer, I 254-58)

If such as these my counsel could reclaim,
Think not, young warriors, your diminished name
Shall lose of luster, by subjecting rage
To the cool dictates of experienc'd age.

(I 384-87; cf. Homer, I 273-74)

Nestor has enforced by his own example the theme of cooperation among warriors, claiming that he once fought with braver men than Agamemnon and Achilles, "Their dangers to divide, their fame to share" (I 380; cf. Homer, I 269-71). Some lines later, the theme of self control is more openly related to the theme of concord between king and subjects, or king and confederate princes:

Thou first, O king, release the rights of sway;
Pow'r, self-restrain'd, the people best obey.
Sanctions of law from thee derive their source;
Command thyself, whom no commands can force.

(I 395-400; cf. Homer, I 282)

But Nestor's rebuke merely provokes Agamemnon and Achilles to further hostilities, and they break council unreconciled. To point his moral, Dryden expresses the failure of Nestor's advice in one last modulation of the fire metaphor: "their council broke, / And all their grave consults desolv'd in
smoke" (I 425-26; cf. Homer, I 304-5). The design and moral of Homer's fable, as Dryden translates it, requires that Achilles remain wrathful.

Dryden's Iliad I is more akin to Chapman's than to Pope's. Like Chapman's Elizabethan poetic, Dryden's still allowed the structural metaphor—it was not yet become so strictly rhetorical that figurative effects must be for the most part local and cumulative. Furthermore, like Chapman Iliad, and to some extent like Spenser's Faerie Queene, Dryden's Iliad I argues that he rules the macrocosm best who rules the microcosm of his own soul. Here is the opening of Chapman's dedicatory epistle "To the High Borne Prince of Men, Henrie Thrice":

Since perfect happinesse, by Princes sought,
Is not with birth borne, nor Exchequers bought,
Nor follows in great Traines, nor is possesst
With any outward State, but makes him blest
That governs inward, and beholdeth theare.
All his affections stand about him bare, headed,
That by his power can send to Towre, and death,
All trait'rous passions, marshalling beneath
His justice his meere will, and in his minde
Holds such a scepter as can keep confinde
His whole life's actions in the royal bounds
Of Virtue and Religion, and their grounds
Takes in to sow his honours, his delights
And complete empire—You should learn these rights,
Great Prince of men, by Princely presidents.
Which here, in all kinds, my true zeale presents
To furnish your youth's groundworke and first State.

Dryden's Achaean quarrel is Renaissance epic; his Olympian quarrel Restoration farce. Perhaps the most that can be said in behalf of a parallel structure is that Dryden has dissolved one quarrel in "smoke" and the other in wine.
Perhaps Dryden means to compare Jove's rule and Agamemnon's, representing virtuous resistance in Achilles and vicious resistance in Juno. But the evidence for these parallels is very slight, and unsupported by evidence of other kinds. It remains that Dryden's Olympians bear no coherent relationship to his own Chryses' and Calchas' gods, and no more than a purely arbitrary relationship to the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon.

Pope, on the other hand, both acknowledges and renders a close formal and thematic relationship between the two quarrels:

As Homer makes the first Council of his Men to be one continued Scene of Anger, whereby the Graecian Chief's become divided, so he makes the first Meeting of the Gods to be spent in the same Passion; whereby Jupiter is more fix'd to assist the Trojans and Juno more incens'd against them. Thus the Design of the Poem goes on: the Anger which began the Book overspreads all existent Beings by the latter end of it: Heaven and Earth become engag'd in the Subject, by which it rises to a great Importance in the Reader's Eyes, and is hasten'd forward into the briskest Scenes of Action that can be fram'd upon that violent Passion.

(TE VII 120)

Pope's version of the progress of the action is at once coherently rhetorical and dramatic: in order to impress the moral, the poet makes the action more important in the reader's eyes by extending its implications to Olympus; and it is the Achaean quarrel which motivates the debate among the gods. The Olympian scene both climaxises and extends the action, by incremental repetition of scenes of anger.
Pope's disposition of character is more impartially dialectical than Dryden's. Agamemnon and Achilles are both wrong. They represent mutually incompatible viewpoints on the same issue rather than the right and wrong of a single issue. This allows Pope to see the ironies involved in the Achaean quarrel:

The Reasoning in point of Right between Achilles and Agamemnon seems to be this. Achilles pleads that Agamemnon could not seize upon any other Man's Captive without a new Distribution, it being an Invasion of private Property. On the other hand, as Agamemnon's Power was limited, how came it that all the Grecian Captains would submit to an illegal and arbitrary Action? I think the legal Pretence for his seizing Briseis must have been founded upon that Law, whereby the Commander in Chief had the Power of taking what part of the Prey he pleas'd for his own Use: And he being obliged to restore what he had taken, it seem'd but just that he should have a second Choice.

(TE VII 95)

This explains why Pope's Achilles is more self-centered than Dryden's and why his Agamemnon is haughtier and less passionate. Achilles' anger, in Pope, does not develop from a just cause, but reveals itself, as a character trait, under provocation. Pope's Agamemnon stresses his own kingly prerogative, rather than his particular suspicions of and animosity toward Achilles. Pope's dialectic of character is based, as we have noted, upon a principle to be found in his later Essay on Man:

We should know that the Poet rather study'd Nature than Perfection in the laying down his Characters. He resolv'd to sing the Consequences of Anger; he consider'd what Virtues and Vices would conduct most to bring his Moral out of the Fable; and artfully dispos'd them in his chief Persons after the Manner in which we generally find them; making the
not only, 'where did Pope derive his concept of deity?' but
also, 'to what artistic end did Pope render Homer's gods as
he did?' Pope's disposition of character, more equalized
than Dryden's, and the concomitantly greater structural
relevance of Nestor's speech, point to an answer.

Here is Pope's Jove, rebuking Juno's curiosity:

Seek not thou to find
The sacred Counsels of Almighty Mind:
Involv'd in Darkness lies the great Decree,
Nor can the Depths of Fate be pierc'd by thee.
What fits thy Knowledge, thou the first shall know;
The first of Gods above and Men below:
But thou, nor they, shall search the Thoughts that roll
Deep in the close Recesses of my Soul.

(TE VII 121)

Then thus the God: Oh restless Fate of Pride,
That strives to learn what Heav'n resolves to hide;
Vain is the Search, presumptuous and abhorrid,
Anxious to thee, and odious to thy Lord.
Let this suffice; th' immutable Decree
No Force can shake: What is, that ought to be.

(TE VII 122)

Pope has all but submerged the domestic aspect of the Olympian
quarrel. The theme of the earthly quarrel was faction, the
discord which ruins states. The theme of the Olympian quarrel
is the divine or fatal power which subsumes all faction in the
working out of its ultimate plan. Juno becomes the heavenly
representative of faction's limited perspective:

Thy Juno knows not the Decrees of Fate,
In vain the Partner of Imperial State.

(TE VII 121)

From whence this Wrath, or who controuls thy Sway?
Thy boundless Will, for me, remains in Force,
Fault which most peculiarly attends any good Quality, to reside with it. Thus he has plac'd Pride with Magnanimity in Agamemnon, ... And thus we must take his Achilles, not as a meer heroick dispassion'd Character, but as compounded of Courage and Anger; one who finds himself almost invincible, and assumes an uncontro'll'd Carriage upon the Self-consciousness of his Worth.

(TE VII 94)

Thus when Nestor rises to calm the princes, the propriety of his advice is, in Pope's version, dramatic as well as thematic. Because we are in sympathy with Dryden's Achilles and disapprove of his Agamemnon, his Nestor's speech is only thematically appropriate, and hence not far removed in effect from authorial intrusion.

As we have seen, William Frost characterizes the difference between Pope's and Dryden's scenes on Olympus as "a contrast which also illustrates the two possible attitudes ... which the enlightenment often took toward the heroic":

Pope, for example, manipulates the language of Homer's recurrent prayers to the gods, and that of other religious symbolism in Homer; but this manipulation affects the pillar symbols of the new poem, the gods themselves; and the concept of deity in Pope's Iliad is closer, in consequence, to that of Milton or Virgil than it is to that of the original Greek. The concept of deity affects the concept of destiny, and hence the meaning of what the human actors in the Iliad do, and hence the central theme of the poem.

This is true, so far as it goes. But Frost's treatment of "pillar" and "local" symbolism fails, as in the case of Dryden's Iliad I, to account for the work as a narrative, or sequentially structured whole. The question to be asked is
And all thy Counsels take the destin'd Course. 
But 'tis for Greece I fear; For late was seen 
In close Consult, the Silver-footed Queen. 
Jove to his Thetis nothing could deny, 
Nor was the Signal vain that Shook the Sky. 
What fatal Favour has the Goddess won, 
To grace her fierce, inexorable Son? 
Perhaps in Grecian Blood to drench the Plain, 
And glut his Vengeance with my People slain. 

(TE VII 122)

Juno's diction is that of politics and court intrigue, Jove's 
that of destiny—the measured periods of an angry god.

Pope's decorum of style is neither mere decoration nor 
slavish adherence to the rules of epic propriety. It is 
organic to the structure of his Iliad I, the action of which 
rises from the personal quarrel between Achilles and Agamem-
non over the spoils of war, to the issue of faction itself:

Nothing is finer than the Moral shewn in this 
Quarrel, of the Blindness and Partiality of Man-
kind to their own Faults: The Graecians make a 
War to recover a Woman that was ravish'd, and are 
in danger to fail in the Attempt by a Dispute 
about another. Agamemnon while he is revenging 
a Rape, commits one; and Achilles while he is in 
the utmost Fury himself, reproaches Agamemnon for 
his passionate Temper. 

(TE VII 97)

and culminates in Jove's indictment of the "restless Fate 
of Pride," wherein Pope has generalized Homer's circumstanc-
es to a purpose.

As in the case of the similes, Pope's translation 
interprets the potentially antithetical subject matter of 
the two quarrels as a periodic progression of scenes of 
wrath. Jove's anger both rises above and comprehends the
anger of the Achaean chiefs; and stylistic decorum requires that he speak more generally and less passionately. This revision of Homer's structure is a function of ideology as well as style. Because Pope, unlike Homer, recognizes the gods as the source of spiritual authority, they movement from human to divine perspectives—here as in the moonlight simile—becomes climactic.
NOTES

1  

2  
Frost, p. 29.

3  

4  

5  

6  
Watson, II, 186.

7  

8  
Curran, pp. 235-36.

9  

10  
"The Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry," in Watson, I, 201.

11  


Steeves, pp. 69-70.

Steeves, pp. 53-54.

Rhetoric, XI.1-iv.

Hooker, I, 47.

Hooker, I, 218.

Hooker, I, 362.

Hooker, I, 362.

Hooker, I, 363.

Hooker, II, 222.

Hooker, I, 351.


28 Warren, p. 83.


30 See, for example, Pope's remark that Homer "must have transcribed as fast the the Muses dictated" (TE VII 11).

31 *Pope and the Heroic Tradition*, p. 66.

32 Knight, p. 73.

33 Knight, p. 98.

34 Knight, p. 40.

35 Knight, p. 41.


38 *Dryden and the Art of Translation*, p. 30.

39 *Dryden and the Art of Translation*, p. 65.

40 *Lives*, I, 463-64.
41 Steeves, p. 65.


49 Nicoll, I, 3; lines 1-17.

50 Dryden and the Art of Translation, p. 30.
CONCLUSION

Within the last few decades critics have sensed, if not explained, the "firmness of design," the combined "extension, . . . coherence and consistency" of Pope's interpretation and translation of Homer's Iliad. The distinctively Augustan quality of Pope's version has never been denied--"Homer in Silver Gilt," as one critic describes it. Many have assumed, however, that Pope's revisions are merely stylistic, the poet's local responses to an alien medium; that the "Homer" which Pope aims to reproduce is nevertheless our Homer. Others have noted that Pope tends to interpolate issues and ideologies foreign, if not alien, to the original, reducing the complex humanity of Homer's moral world to "what we think a more limited and social dimension" (TE VII c). I have undertaken to fill both gaps in our understanding of Pope's Iliad--the unrecognized gulf between our Homer and Pope's, and the critical inattention to those formal and conceptual structures which govern Pope's local revisions of the original.

Throughout this study, I have measured the "success" of Pope's Iliad against two very different standards, the epic theory which he inherited from the Middle Ages and the Renais-
sance, and our own modern interpretation of Homer's structure and meaning. The virtue of this double reference is that it enables us to place Pope's achievement historically and at the same time measure what we conceive to be one aesthetic whole against another. Both the historical and aesthetic perspectives lead to one end--the isolation of those conceptual and expressive structures characteristic of Augustan poetry and of Pope's translation.

Pope inherited an epic tradition formulated upon Virgil's Aeneid and an extensive sample of classical rhetoric, a tradition inadequate to a coherent interpretation of Homer's Iliad. From the time of its textual recovery in the fifteenth century to the publication of Le Bossu's Traité in 1675, the Iliad remained anomalous to the epic tradition of which it was the fountainhead. According to medieval and Renaissance theory, the hero's role was central; his was the successful example which moved a reader to accept the epic's moral. But Achilles' role in the Iliad was neither central nor exemplary.

Le Bossu argues that these apparent flaws in the Iliad are intentional, that criticism has been mistaken in its expectations. Action, not character, he asserts, is the locus of the epic's moral. Those epideictic techniques which earlier critics had considered basic to the genre's structure were, according to Le Bossu, merely superimposed upon its logically ordered "fable." Heroic characters and heroic exploits were inessential to the poem's moral argument;
the poet chose those circumstances which might appeal to his readers' patriotic prejudices and thus move him to accept the moral argument "proved" by the fable. Because character must be subordinate to action, Achilles' brutality and his absence throughout much of the narrative is Homeric strategy, not error. In order to show that discord ruins and concord preserves states, Homer needed an irascible hero, but one whose valor was necessary to martial victory. His cooperation must be necessary to the Greeks' success; therefore they must be shown unsuccessful in his absence. He must be a loser by the discord he causes; but because the epic's rhetoric requires praise for the Greeks' illustrious ancestor, he must not be punished so severely that the Iliad ends unhappily. Although Le Bossu accounts for the moral, structural and epideictic dimensions of an epic without an exemplary hero, he does so by a dangerous split between character and structure.

Pope was to resynthesize these narrative elements; while accepting Le Bossu's formulation of the Iliad's moral, he would argue that its rhetoric is both circumstantial and structural. Pope draws upon the moral terms of Renaissance epic and the structural theories of John Dennis, the most prominent English literary critic between Dryden and Addison.

Dennis extrapolated Longinus' stylistic sublime to a structural sublime. Unlike Le Bossu, he saw the epic's rhetoric as a creation of its structure. The admiration traditionally associated with the hero's moral excellence
becomes a product of the poet's own architectonics of emotional effects. Poetic enthusiasm creates an emotional reaction in the reader which may be manipulated and directed toward a moral end. One character's passionate response to a phenomenon may be followed by another character's more passionate response; the reader, however, responds to the progression. Through his empathy with each of the speakers, he is led to an increasingly interested participation in the moral world of the poem. When poetic justice dovetails at the poem's end with the climax of the reader's emotional assent to the terms of this moral world, the poet has gained his point.

Pope's *Iliad* takes the structural sublime several steps beyond Dennis's formulation, by what I have called rhetorical structure, and at the same time reconciles the Renaissance moral model to the Augustan poetic. Like Dennis and Le Bossu, he emphasizes the poet's, over the hero's, role in assuring the reader's response. Achilles may not be a pattern of virtue, and he is admittedly offstage during much of the action of the *Iliad*; but by combining techniques of anticipation and delay, Homer has, according to Pope, created a climactic structure in which Achilles' reappearance is the most important event of the epic. The final books of the *Iliad* are both a moral and a rhetorical climax. For Pope, Homer's moral design is not complete until the discord which
has been shown ruinous at the political level is shown resolved at the moral level.

Pope’s poetic, unlike Homer’s and ours, does not allow for character development. Unlike Le Bossu, however, he sees character as a "moving" element of narrative. Although Achilles' ruling passion must remain constant, Pope’s rhetorical structure permits incremental repetition of this passion in such a way that Achilles' subordinate character traits may be revealed by degrees. By this timed release of character traits, the poet may shape his moral and emotional climax as he pleases. Homer’s strategy, according to Pope, is to raise the horror of each succeeding battle above the last in preparation for the reappearance of Achilles, his slaughter of the Trojans, and his conquest of Hector. Achilles' martial prowess climaxes this horror, but at the same time shows the grievous effects of anger and discord. The poem closes with Achilles restored to humanity, just as the terror of the last battle has moved the reader to desire some alternative to wrath. The admiration which the reader felt for the hero's martial virtues is climaxed, therefore, by admiration for his humane virtues.

Pope does not "restructure" the Iliad by reassembling its parts; but by a series of local variations upon the original, he revises significantly the relationships of these parts to one another and to the whole of the epic. The stylistic resources by which he is able to effect this
"Restructuring" are the heroic couplet's analytic and comparative potential, and the principle of stylistic decorum. Both are admirably suited to the creation of incremental repetition and dialectical progression. Within given passages and in combinations of dialogue and narrative, Pope's couplets and the progressive energia of his stylistic decorum shape Homer's poetry toward both local and larger climactic structures.

Pope reads and translates Homer according to those conceptual and expressive patterns in which his age saw its own values best discovered and communicated. The linear dimension of the Iliad to which he responds almost exclusively is most certainly "there" for him to see. For a modern reader, this climactic progression of interest, or suspense, is not the locus of the Iliad's meaning, but a narrative technique by which Homer draws the reader from one event to the next. For Pope, however, this linear, climactic dimension is primary; it is the means to meaning and conviction at once. The question to be asked is not whether Pope has reproduced our Homer, but how he has reconciled those dimensions of the original which he did see into a meaningful and effective whole.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED


Stanford, W. B. The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero. 2nd edn. Ann Arbor:


