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AN ANALYSIS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LOCUTION 'MEANING AS USE'

by

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CHAPTER I

THE NOTION OF 'MEANING' IN THE TRACTATUS

The primary concern of this thesis is to explicate the notion of meaning given in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (hereafter 'PI'). Such a task presupposes a knowledge of some concepts which are basic to an understanding of the PI as a whole. But this requires, according to Wittgenstein himself, a look at the Tractatus. (PI, x)1

Wittgenstein is his own precursor, for much of what is contained in the PI is a direct attack upon the theses of his own earlier work. Hence, the significance of much of what is said in the PI is grasped only when it is understood as either a criticism or a modification of the theses of the

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1 References to Wittgenstein are included in the body of the text according to the following key:


Tractatus. The purpose of this chapter is to present a sketch of the system of the Tractatus in order to facilitate an understanding of the PI in general, as well as to present the background out of which Wittgenstein's locution on meaning arises.

Black has pointed out that one of the greatest difficulties a student of the Tractatus has is "the extreme compression of Wittgenstein's often oracular remarks." It would be an ambitious task indeed to attempt to clarify the whole of the Tractatus with fewer words than the book itself, much less in one part of an introductory chapter such as this one. My only purpose, therefore, is to present a sketch of the essential content of the Tractatus. In a sense I shall be looking backward at the Tractatus from the point of view of the PI and shall be especially concerned with the problem of meaning as dealt with by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.

A sketch of Wittgenstein's logical atomism is necessary in order to be able to talk with reasonable precision about the specific theories within the system of the Tractatus. The constituent theses of the system are so interdependent that any detailed analysis of one presupposes at least a cursory understanding of others and how they relate. The sketch given here is not intended in any sense to represent the form of Wittgenstein's own analysis, either chronologically or in terms of justification. Rather, the order

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of presentation is chosen for brevity and clarity.

Wittgenstein says, "The great problem round which everything I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?" (NB, 1.6.15) The presupposition that there is such an order permeates the whole of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein appears totally convinced that there is in the world a logical order (or form), which is the connection between thought and reality. And if the logical form of the world can be analyzed and expressed, not only will the problem of the connection between thought and reality be solved, but the essence of thought and reality will be revealed. Black\(^1\) and Anscombe\(^2\) both agree that the principle theme of the Tractatus is the connection between thought and reality. But because Wittgenstein maintains that thoughts are significant propositions (T, 3.1), the theme becomes the question of the relation between language and reality. If language is essentially related to reality, then the determination of the essence of language will also be the determination of the essence of reality, i.e., the logical form of language will reveal the logical form of the world. Just how Wittgenstein conceives the connection between language and reality constitutes one of the essential topics of the following sketch.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 7.

1. **Objects, Atomic Facts, Elementary Propositions, and Picture**

The substance of the world, claims Wittgenstein, is formed by objects. (T, 2·021) These objects are not empirically discovered, but rather are logical simples, unchanging and eternal, which must necessarily exist. The main reason for their necessary existence is as a prerequisite for propositions to have sense.\(^1\) An atomic fact (Sachverhalt, a fact unanalysable into other facts) is comprised of objects combined in a definite way - as links in a chain. (T, 2.01, 2.03, 2.031) It is an essential characteristic of an object that it is able to be a constituent of an atomic fact. (T, 2.011) The logical form (internal quality) of an object is its possibility of combining with other objects to form an atomic fact. The form is "logical" because, for Wittgenstein, there cannot be any "accidental" atomic facts. Any one particular object has only a certain number of possible combinations in virtue of its logical form. (T, 2.012, 2.0122)

A complete set of logically possible atomic facts, then, consists of all logically possible combinations of all objects. Thus, all molecular facts (Tatsachen) about the world are reducible to a set of actual (positive) atomic facts. In addition, it is possible to conceive of a set of non-actual (non-existing) atomic facts. Wittgenstein refers to these as negative facts. (T, 2.06) The structure of

\(^1\)Black, p. 8.
atomic facts (both positive and negative) is the particular way in which the objects can combine. (T, 2.032) Thus, the structure is a logical one, determined by the logical form of the objects, and all possible logical structures of atomic facts include both positive and negative atomic facts. But positive facts are contingent, because it is conceivable there might not have been any actual atomic facts. The set of all possible logical structures of atomic facts may be thought of as a kind of logical space, represented as a graph composed of squares. All possible points on the graph represent all logically possible atomic facts. The set of all positive atomic facts is represented by real points on the graph, and pictures the world. (T, 1.13) The empty places on the graph represent negative atomic facts. However, there is nothing logically compelling that there be points on the graph - it could be empty, and in this sense positive facts are contingent.¹

Wittgenstein uses 'elementary proposition' to refer to the simple propositional signs which depict, or picture, logically possible atomic facts. An elementary proposition is not in itself simple for it is composed of simple signs, but is "elementary" in that it is not analyzable into other propositions. Its constituent simple signs Wittgenstein refers to as names, and the meaning of each name is the object which it denotes. There is a one-to-one correspondence be-

¹Ibid., pp. 27-38.
tween the names comprising an elementary proposition and the objects comprising the atomic fact which the proposition depicts. Furthermore, the configuration of the objects in the atomic fact (i.e., the structure of the atomic fact) is projected by the configuration of the simple names in the elementary proposition. (T, 3.2-3.21)

The elementary proposition pictures an atomic fact by this correspondence between names and objects and by a correspondence between the structures of the atomic fact and elementary proposition. If the proposition is true, there is an actual atomic fact which is comprised of objects named by the simple names, and the structure of the names in the proposition is a projection of the structure of the atomic fact, i.e., the elementary proposition is verified by an actual atomic fact. (Wittgenstein argues a priori for the existence of elementary propositions in that he considers their existence as logically necessary for language to be understandable. He never produces an example of an elementary proposition and considers doing so to be a task for the empirical scientist rather than the philosopher. The analytic method of the *Tractatus* is logical rather than empirical.)

Wittgenstein explicitly says that the elementary proposition cannot be a complex name of the existing atomic fact; that is, the existing atomic fact cannot be the meaning of the elementary proposition. Otherwise, false propositions would have no meaning. When we set out to verify
or falsify a given proposition we must already understand it. The sense of a proposition must be independent of its truth value. (T, 2.22) Wittgenstein says that a propositional sign is itself a fact (Tatsache) in virtue of being a mark of some kind (T, 2.141) and has a form of its own.¹ What is important to note is that the form of a propositional sign is already determined by the arrangement of its own constituents, before there is any correlation between the simple signs of the proposition and the objects within an atomic fact. The simple names must be combined so as to depict a logically possible atomic fact for the proposition to be genuine (i.e., to have sense), but the fact depicted may be either positive or negative. Even as the form of an object is its possibility to unite in a certain way with other objects in an atomic fact, so the form of a proposition is its possibility to represent or depict certain atomic facts. Since the possibility is always a logical one, the form of a propositional sign is able to represent not only actual atomic facts, but all logically possible facts, negative and positive. (T, 3-3.001)

2. Distinctions Between "Meaning" and "Sense" and Between "Showing" and "Saying."

Wittgenstein distinguishes "meaning" from "sense" and "showing" from "saying." The former distinction is considered first. Simple names have meaning; elementary propositions have sense. The meaning of a name is the object

¹Ibid., p. 81.
it denotes; the sense of an elementary proposition is the logically possible atomic fact it pictures. The reason for this distinction is that simple names have meaning only when they are combined in an elementary proposition. (T, 3.3) 3.14a) Since simple names in elementary propositions are correlates of simple objects in atomic facts, and since it is an essential characteristic of objects to be constituents of an atomic fact, it is an essential characteristic of names to be a part of an elementary proposition.\(^1\) The reason for this can be seen in connection with Wittgenstein's claim that the world divides into facts, not things. (T, 1.1, 1.2). Presumably Wittgenstein means by this that an adequate account of the world consists of propositions rather than names. Pitcher exemplifies Wittgenstein's claim by considering a request to describe a room. Clearly a cataloguing of the objects within the room only partially fulfills the request, if it fulfills it at all. An adequate description includes "an account of what they are like and how they are arranged in the room."\(^2\) Black more accurately points out that a mere cataloguing of all the things in the world is logically impossible. The list is taken as a single true statement which asserts that just these things exist, and its truth is verified by the fact that just these things

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 114.

exist. Thus, an account of the world consists of propositions, not of a list of names. Just as the notion of a simple object loses its significance outside of its place in an atomic fact, so does a name lose its meaning outside of an elementary proposition.

Wittgenstein's notion of the sense of a proposition is intrinsically related to the capacity of a proposition to have truth value. That is, a genuine proposition has sense, and it is in virtue of its sense that a proposition can be true or false. The proposition which depicts a non-existing atomic fact is not nonsensical, but false. (T, 3.24) A proposition has sense independently of its truth value (T, 2.22), but not independently of its capacity to have truth value. Wittgenstein further establishes the point when he says that "the assertion of a proposition cannot give it sense, for what is asserted is the sense itself. And the same holds for denial." (T, 4.064) What has sense must already be true or false, and the decision as to which specific truth value is to be assigned awaits verification or falsification of the sense.

The distinction between "showing" and "saying" presupposes Wittgenstein's thesis that it is impossible to represent logical form. (T, 2.172) As previously stated, a simple proposition is a picture of an atomic fact in that each name is correlated with an object and the logical form

\footnote{Black, pp. 29-30.}
of the atomic fact is projected by the logical form of the propositional sign. If the logical form itself is to be represented, some other form of representation would be required. However, a necessary condition of representation for Wittgenstein is a one-to-one correspondence between simple signs and objects, and there are no objects for simple signs to name in logical form, i.e., logical form is not a possible atomic fact. (T, 2.174,4.12) For example, we can see that certain marks on a photograph represent certain things in the scene pictured, that there is a correlation between marks on the picture and objects in the scene pictured, but we cannot, so to speak, take a picture of the correlation. Since a propositional sign functions as a picture of an atomic fact, there cannot be any propositional signs about the form of representation of propositions. Rather, the form is "shown" in the proposition itself. (T, 4.121d) Likewise, "the proposition shows its sense" (T, 4.022), because the projection in the elementary proposition of the logical form of a possible atomic fact is an essential constituent of the sense of a proposition.

But the distinction between "showing" and "saying" is complicated by 4.022b: "The proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand." The distinction can be clarified by considering some of the features of how a mark (or sign) becomes a piece of significant language (symbol) (T, 3.32-3.321), e.g., a name. A name, as a consequence of having meaning only in the context
of a proposition (T, 3.3), is subject to rules of logical syntax, i.e., rules of combination. These rules express the logical form of the name, the possibilities of its connection with other names in a proposition. A name also has content, which is its connection with the object it denotes. These two aspects of a name, form and content, distinguish a meaningless sign (mark) from a significant symbol. A sign becomes a symbol in virtue of its having form and content. Furthermore, when a sign has form and content it has a role within a language, i.e., the sign can be applied within a language and becomes part of it. A name is able to be a part of a proposition only because it has form and content.¹ (T, 3.262-3.31)

An analogous analysis is applicable to a proposition. A propositional sign has only form in that it has the possibility of picturing an atomic fact. It contains the form of its sense but not its content. Only when the propositional sign is used as a projection of a possible state of affairs does it obtain content. This projection, says Wittgenstein, is accomplished by "thinking" (meaning) the sense of the proposition.² (T, 3.11) When the content is obtained by the variables of the propositional sign being assigned material value (i.e., being meant to correspond to certain objects) then the propositional sign obtains its sense. Furthermore,

¹Ibid., pp. 114-115.
²Ibid., p. 100.
the propositional sign, in virtue of its form and content, becomes a significant sign in a language. It now pictures a state of affairs and has the capacity of truth value which enables it to be a component of a molecular proposition where it is connected with other elementary propositions by truth-functional connectives.

The distinction between "showing" and "saying" can now be made. A proposition "shows" its content and form, and because these aspects guarantee the proposition a significant place in a language it can "say," if it is true, that the atomic fact pictured holds. Thus, "saying" is an aspect of the sense of a proposition in virtue of the significant proposition's place in language (i.e., it can be used to make a claim about the world), whereas "showing" is an aspect of the sense of a proposition in virtue of being the only means by which the two necessary conditions for propositional sense (form and content) can be expressed. Only when the form and content are shown is the sense shown, and only when the sense is shown can a proposition say anything.


This sketch has previously indicated how the world divides into facts rather than things and that the basic linguistic expression is an elementary proposition which pictures those atomic facts. It follows that "The proposition expresses what it expresses in a definite and clearly specifiable way: the proposition is articulated." (T, 3.251) Wittgenstein in the Tractatus does not recognize an expres-
sion with a vague sense as having any sense at all; it is either determinate in its sense or it is senseless. "Everything that can be said can be said clearly," (T, 4.116b) This is one reason it is important to the system of the Tractatus that all molecular propositions be reducible to elementary propositions logically joined by truth-functional connectives. In such a case the determinate senses of the composite elementary propositions govern the determinate sense of the molecular proposition. Elementary propositions clearly and distinctly picture atomic facts of the world, and thereby constitute the essential connection between language and the world. As a consequence of being composed of elementary propositions, molecular propositions have both their connection with the world and signification via elementary propositions.

Another reason for the importance of the reducibility of molecular propositions to truth-functions of elementary propositions concerns the close relation between the sense of a proposition and its capacity for truth value. The sense of a proposition can be understood independently of its truth value, i.e., irrespective of whether it is true or false, but for a proposition to have sense it must be either true or false. This thesis is also applicable to molecular propositions. Since elementary propositions are subject to verification and falsification, each has a definite truth value. If a molecular proposition can be analyzed into a set of elementary propositions joined by truth-
functional connectives, then its truth value can be calculated according to truth-table procedures. Wittgenstein says, "A proposition is the expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities of the elementary propositions." (T, 4.4) That is, a truth-table can be construed as a propositional sign, e.g., "(TTFT)(p,q)" is a propositional sign. (T, 4.4) It says: "Where p and q are joined in an expression so that p is true and q is true then the expression is true, or so that p is false and q is true then the expression is true, or so that p is true and q is false then the expression is false, or so that p is false and q is false then the expression is true." This is recognizable as the truth-functional definition for implication, i.e., \( p \Rightarrow q \).

The question arises concerning the role signs of logical connection have in a language. Wittgenstein explicitly denies that they are names denoting logical objects. (T, 4.0312, 4.441) Rather, logical constants are interdefinable. (T, 5.42b) As will be shown, the reducibility of all connectives to one is an important aspect in Wittgenstein's notion of the general form of a proposition. This one function can define all others. Wittgenstein also uses an argument concerning the negation sign (\( \sim \)) to justify his denial that logical constants denote logical objects. If \( \sim \) denoted an object, \( \sim \sim p \) would express a proposition distinct from \( p \); however, the fact that they have the same truth conditions indicates they express the same proposi-
tion.¹ (T, 5.42-5.43)

By the method of truth-table analysis three distinct possible forms of propositional signs are shown, tautologies, descriptions, and contradictions. The truth value of a descriptive proposition depends upon the truth value of its constituent elementary propositions, whereas the truth value of the other two is determined in virtue of their logical form alone, i.e., logical constants occur in them essentially. The descriptive proposition "shows what it says, the tautology and contradiction show that they say nothing." (T, 4.461) The tautology and contradiction are both extreme cases among the possible truth conditions, for the former is unconditionally true, and the latter is on no condition true. (T, 4.46a, 4.461c)

Despite their inability to say anything, tautologies and contradictions are not useless. Wittgenstein identifies logical truths with tautologies (T, 6.1), and both show something about the logical form of the world. (T, 6.12a, 6.1202) Wittgenstein says logic is autonomous in that there is nothing we can do to make a logical proposition true or false. Since descriptive propositions are influenced by human beings in that the simple signs are intended to denote certain objects, logical propositions are tautologies. (In 6.1202 Wittgenstein implicitly says that the contradictory propositions "could achieve the same purpose.") Logical proposi-

¹Black, p. 263.
tions show "the formal-logical-properties of language and the world.\" (T, 6.12) They have a connection with the world by presupposing that names have meaning and propositions have sense because the existence of language implies its connection with the world. Otherwise, all the propositions of language would be senseless. One aspect of this connection with the world is the proposition's projection of the logical form of atomic facts. Tautologies are connected with the world by exhibiting another aspect of the formal features of the world. \"That just these expressions are the tautologies of a given language 'shows something about the world' - namely that it has the form that it has.\"¹

Descriptions, contradictions, and tautologies all show aspects of the logical form of the world, and descriptions also say something about the world. Wittgenstein maintains that if the general form of all these propositions can be exhibited in a single expression, it will express the essence of language and, hence, the essence of the world.

4. The General Form of a Proposition.

To facilitate an explication of the expression of the general form of a proposition which Wittgenstein gives we must consider (a) what is required of such an expression and (b) the notions which are prerequisite to an understanding of the final expression given in Tractatus 6. Both (a) and (b) can be accomplished by an analysis of the three main

¹Black, p. 329.
sections of the *Tractatus* where the general form of a proposition is considered, *viz.*, (i) 4.5-5.01, (ii) 5.47-5.472, and (iii) 6-6.01.

(a) In (i) Wittgenstein says, "It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form" as if to indicate certain grounds must be laid before the notion can be discussed. This section immediately follows an account of molecular propositions as truth-functions of constituent elementary propositions, including reference to tautologies and contradictions. This, taken together with 4.51 (which refers to the construction of all propositions whatsoever from the set of all elementary propositions), implies Wittgenstein's expression of the general form of a proposition refers to molecular propositions, rather than elementary propositions. That is, the general propositional form is the basis for the construction of every molecular proposition from the set of all elementary propositions. This implies: (1) Every symbol which satisfies the expression of the general form of a proposition can express a sense, providing that names are suitably chosen; (2) every form of every possible significant proposition can be expressed by the propositional signs generated from the general form of a proposition; and (3) the expression of the general form of a proposition would be such for any sign-language whatsoever; i.e., if the expression is translated into the notation of any sign-language whatsoever, it would be the expression of the general form of a proposition for that sign-language.
Such a prerequisite for the general form of a proposition is necessary for Wittgenstein because he is searching for the essence of language in general, rather than the essence of any particular language. In (ii) Wittgenstein adds (4) the a priori condition of the general form of a proposition. The expression cannot be formulated inductively by observing what all propositions whatsoever have in common, for such a set is impossible to come by. What is needed is an expression from which all propositions can be generated before the fact.

(b) Wittgenstein suggests, in (i), the general form of a proposition to be "This is how things stand." This is tantamount to saying, "This is true." (PI, 136) While the expression does suggest that all propositions are truth-functions, it in no way suggests how one might generate all possible propositional forms from the set of elementary propositions. Of this formulation Black says, ". . . the form of words offered is cryptic to the point of unintelligibility."¹

Prerequisite to an understanding of the formulation of the general form of a proposition given in (iii) are the notions of "operation" and "formal series." An operation is defined as "what has to be done to the one proposition in order to make the other out of it." (T, 5.23) A formal series is that series which is ordered by an internal relation. (T, 1252a) Wittgenstein says that the general term of a

¹ Black, p. 237.
formal series can be expressed by the first term of the series and a symbol for the generating operation, e.g., "a, x, O'x", where 'a' is the first term of a series, and any subsequent term is generated from the previous by the operation 'O'. (T, 5.2522) Wittgenstein then says that every truth-function is the result of successive application to elementary propositions of the operation '(---T)(ξ,...)'. (T, 5.5a) This operation symbol is to be read according to the conventions of 4.44 mentioned above. ¹ The left hand bracket represents a column of a truth-table with blanks replacing the Fs; the sign 'ξ' in the right hand brackets represents a particular set of elementary propositions. By utilizing the expression for a particular case involving two elementary propositions, 'p' and 'q', it can be shown that the operation is one of joint negation. Fully represented the expression becomes '(FFFF)(p,q)', which means p and q are so combined in an expression that the expression is true only if both p and q are false, i.e., '¬p & ¬q', or 'neither p nor q'. The operation of joint negation corresponds to what is known as the "stroke-function," discovered by Nicod and Sheffer; all truth-functional connectives can be defined by this one function.² Therefore, any molecular proposition composed of elementary propositions connected by truth-functional connectives can be expressed by the one stroke-function.

¹ Above, pp. 13-14.
² Black, p. 276.
By the introduction of two more notational devices, 'N' for the operation of negation, and '\(\overline{\xi}\)' to mean that all the values of the specific variable in \(\xi\) are to be considered together, Wittgenstein replaces '(\(\overline{\ldots}T\)(\(\overline{\xi}\),...)' by 'N(\(\overline{\xi}\))'. This means the negation of all the variables denoted by \(\xi\).

For example, if \(\xi\) has one value, then N(\(\overline{\xi}\)) means \(~p\), and if \(\xi\) has two values, then N(\(\overline{\xi}\)) means \(~p \& ~q\).

In (iii) Wittgenstein incorporates this expression of joint negation into his expression of the general term of a formal series to get his final expression of the general form of a proposition, viz., "\(\overline{p,\overline{\xi},N(\overline{\xi})}\)." (T, 6) The sign\(\overline{p}\) is to be taken as the set of all elementary propositions, \(\overline{\xi}\) as an arbitrary selection from \(\overline{p}\), and 'N(\(\overline{\xi}\))' as the joint negation of all elementary propositions selected by \(\overline{\xi}\). Thus, given the set of elementary propositions, after an undetermined number of different arbitrary selections from this set have been made and each jointly negated, every form of all possible molecular propositions would be constructed. (For a discussion as to how this might proceed see Anscombe, pp. 133-134.)

5. **Ordinary Language: Vague, but Perfect.**

From what has been previously said in this sketch it would appear that Wittgenstein is concerned only with the construction of an ideal language which supercedes the ambiguities of ordinary language and that ordinary language must be given up as hopelessly vague. Such a view would seem to be supported by Wittgenstein's attack upon ordinary language.
He notes that the same word often has different significations (e.g., 'is' can be used as a copula, sign of identity, or to signify existence) and that words with different significations "are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way (e.g., 'exist' appears as an intransitive verb like 'go')." (T, 3.323) Philosophy, he says, is full of fundamental confusions created by these sources of ambiguity. (T, 3.324) Wittgenstein argues that the use of a sign language governed by logical syntax would avoid such errors. (T, 3.325) But the view that Wittgenstein advocates giving up ordinary language in favor of an ideal language is untenable for two reasons: (a) It is not compatible with his aim to get at the essence of language in general. Ordinary language is a language, and if the general form of a proposition is the expression of the essence of all language, it must include ordinary language. (b) In 5.5563 Wittgenstein says, ". . . all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order."

An explication of the quote in (b) will show it is not contradictory to Wittgenstein's criticisms of ordinary language. The quote is contextually placed by his preceding comment that "Since we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalyzed form must know it." (T, 5.5562) That is, a necessary condition for understanding general propositions is the understanding of elementary propositions, and if a general proposition can be understood,
it is analyzable into a set of elementary propositions truth-functionally connected. That is, if one understands a proposition, he has a thought which clearly pictures the situation which the proposition asserts to be true or false about the world; he has a pictorial image before his mind which corresponds to the situation shown by the sense of the proposition. The clarity of the thought depends upon the reducibility of a proposition to elementary propositions truth-functionally connected, So, if a molecular proposition can be understood, it has a sense and must, therefore, be logically in order. There are two obvious facts about man's use of ordinary language: on the one hand, "man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is. . .", (T, 4.002) and, on the other hand, fundamental philosophical confusions arise because of the ambiguities of ordinary language. The former fact is evidence for Wittgenstein that the necessary logical order for understanding is contained in the language. The latter fact illustrates how the logical order of ordinary language is disguised by the outward trappings of tacit conventions. (T, 4.002) Failure to understand the logic of language is what gives rise to most philosophical problems. (T, 4.003) In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is doing a critique of language to show how language (thought) is connected with reality, and, as a consequence, attempts to explicate what is involved in the notions of 'sense', 'meaning', and 'logic' as they apply
to propositions. He is showing the nature of the logical form which ordinary language hides so well and to which it must conform if it is to be genuine.

However, it is not at all obvious how some expressions in ordinary language are reducible to the requisite logical form of being truth-functions of elementary propositions and yet appear in a very obvious way to be understandable. Of these Wittgenstein comments on general propositions, propositions containing terms which refer to complexes, and propositions expressing judgment, belief, etc. Wittgenstein's comments on each will be considered in the order mentioned above.

Wittgenstein must show how general propositions are compatible with his principle of extensionality (i.e., the principle that all significant propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions). He must be able to represent general statements "(x)Fx' and ' (Ex)Fx') and molecular statements by the same notation. He attempts to do this by construing universal general statements as an indefinite series of conjuncts of elementary propositions and universal existential statements as an indefinite series of disjuncts of elementary propositions, e.g., (x)Fx =df. Fa & Fb & Fc...; and (Ex)Fx =df. Fa v Fb v Fc... Wittgenstein later admitted this to be wrong.1

Propositions containing complex terms must be reduc-

ible to elementary propositions containing only simple terms in order to make their sense determinate. (T, 3.23) The reduction is accomplished by replacing every complex sign in a proposition by a descriptive definition until it contains nothing but simple, unanalyzable names. (T, 3.26-3.261)

Actually, a proposition about a complex is internally related to a proposition which is about a constituent of the complex. (T, 3.24a) That is, complexes are really descriptions, not names, so that descriptive propositions can be analyzed out of complexes. Thus, when a proposition is about a complex, it is then related to those descriptive propositions which constitute an analysis of the complex. These propositions are, in turn, analyzable into truth-functions of elementary propositions containing only simple names. Theoretically, the pictures pictured by each of the elementary propositions determine the sense.

Propositions expressing belief, judgment, and thought are very difficult to account for in the system of the Tractatus, and Wittgenstein himself only offers a hint as to how they might be analyzed. He says,

It is clear, however, that "A believes that p", "A has the thought p", and "A says p" are of the form "p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects. (T, 5.542)

However clear this account was to the author of the Tractatus, evidence of its obscurity to readers is found in the different accounts of the passage given by commentators on
the Tractatus.

Ramsey utilizes the two notions used by Peirce of 'token' and 'type' in his account. 'Token' refers to the particular occurrence of a word (e.g., there may be a dozen tokens of 'the' on a page), and 'type' refers to what a set of tokens may have in common (e.g., the dozen tokens of 'the' are instances of one type). Ramsey's claim is that Wittgenstein's use of 'proposition' has token-type ambiguity. "A proposition is a type whose instances consist of all propositional sign tokens which have in common...a certain sense."\(^1\) When Wittgenstein reduces statements expressing judgment, belief, and thought to "'p' says \(p\)'\(^2\), Ramsey claims the question of the analysis of judgment is reduced to the question "What is it for a proposition token to have a certain sense?" While the expression "'p' says \(p\)" does concern such a question, the account given by Ramsey fails to confront the essential problems of the passage. That is, how statements like 'A says \(p\)' are reducible to "'p' says \(p\)" and how such an expression can be construed as a truth-function of its constituents.

Copi seeks to justify Wittgenstein's reduction by the following line of argument. All facts are composite in that they consist of objects, and by 2.021 all objects are


\(^2\)Ibid.
simple and not composite. Further, "according to the Tractatus (especially 4.0311 and 4.04) whatever says a composite must itself be composite."\(^1\) Since the \( p \) which \( A \) says, believes, or thinks is a fact, hence composite, \( A \) cannot be an object and must therefore be a fact, i.e., a configuration of objects. Copi says this is what Wittgenstein is referring to when he says the reduction "does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object. . ." (T, 5.542) Copi then offers an explication of what Wittgenstein does claim is involved, viz., "the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects." Copi says there are two facts correlated in 'A thinks \( p \)': the fact that \( A \), and the fact that \( p \), and these two facts are correlated by means of the correlation of their objects. Let '\( j \)' represent the set of objects which constitute fact \( A \); '\( k \)' represent the set of objects which constitute fact \( p \). Also, if a propositional sign ('\( p \)') is to say or depict fact \( p \), "\( p \)" must contain a set of names, say '\( b \)', which are isomorphically correlated with \( k \). Copi's claim is that there must be a set of objects, say '\( l \)', which is a subset of \( j \) and isomorphically correlated with \( k \). Thus, facts \( A \) and \( p \) are correlated by the correlation of \( k \) and \( l \).

"Since," claims Copi, "it is this sort of coordination of the names. . .(b). . . in "\( p \)" with the objects. . .(k). . .in \( p \) that permits "\( p \)" to say \( p \), Wittgenstein was justified in saying that '\( A \) believes \( p \)', '\( A \) thinks \( p \)', '\( A \) says \( p \)' are of the form

\(^1\)Irving C. Copi, "'Tractatus' 5.542," Ibid., p. 164.
""p" says "p"." It is not at all clear how Copi's conclusion follows. It seems clear that he relies on some sense of 'similarity' with regard to "sort of coordination" between A and p, k and l, and b and k, but he fails to clarify this sense and state how it relates to his conclusion. While it is clear, according to the Tractatus, to talk about the correlation of the names of b in "p" with the objects k in p which enables "p" to depict p, it is not clear how the second-order correlation between k and l justifies the reduction of 'A says p' to ""p" says p!'. The argument is either a non sequitur or incomplete. Finally, even if the argument is correct, the account fails to show how the reduction is related to Wittgenstein's principle of extensionality.

Anscombe agrees with Copi that what represents the composite fact p must itself be composite. But Anscombe associates the representation of p altogether with a propositional sign and never with A as Copi does. This leads her to say,

It is perhaps not quite right to say that 'A judges p' is of the form "p" says that p'; what he should have said was that the business part of 'A judges that p', the part that relates to something's having as its content a potential representation of the fact that p, was of the form "p" says that p': 'A believes p' or 'conceives p' or 'says p' must mean 'There occurs in A or is produced by A something which is (capable of being) a picture of p'.

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1Ibid., p. 165. Copi's signification of sets of objects and names are replaced by mine for sake of clarity.

2Anscombe, p. 88.
Thus, that A believes, thinks, or says p means that A "has at hand" a propositional sign "p" which depicts p, where "has at hand" indicates "p" can be expressed in some conventional linguistic manner. This follows from a thought's being a significant proposition. (T, 4) Anscombe's explanation is similar to Black's, who says "a rough analysis of 'A believes p' can be taken to be: 'A utters S. S says that p' (where 'S' is to be imagined replaced by the quotation of some sentence)."¹ The difference between the views is that whereas Anscombe maintains "'p" says p' is a genuine proposition, Black does not see how it can be so construed. Wittgenstein has said that the sense of a proposition can only be shown. (T, 4.022a) Therefore, rather than saying that he believes p, A can only show that he does so by uttering a certain sentence. That is, A utters the sentence "p", and the propositional sign pictures an atomic fact. Another person, say B, shows A that he (B) takes A to be believing p by treating A as having asserted p by using "p". As a result there are two facts which cannot be construed as truth-functionally connected: It is a fact (F) that B sees the fact (G) of A asserting p. While it remains to be shown how G is a truth-function of F, both facts are necessary for B to utter 'A believes p'.²

The result of the analysis of Wittgenstein's reduc-

¹Black, p. 299.

²Ibid., pp. 300-302. Black's criticism is so brief it is only a hint. The formulation of the argument is mine.
tion of expressions of believing, thinking, and judging to
the form "p" says p' remains obscure. Either he is wrong
in the reduction or the explanation Wittgenstein gives is so
incomplete it is unlikely we shall ever know what he actually
meant.

6. The Limits of Language, Solipsism, and the Mystical.

In the preface Wittgenstein says the aim of the Trac-
tatus is to set a limit to language, i.e., a limit beyond
which is nonsense. While there is a relation between lan-
guage and thought, Wittgenstein declares that it is not prof-
itable to talk about the limits of thought, for that would
involve talking about what is unthinkable. (T, p. 3) Witt-
genstein has used the metaphor of logical space to show that
what is physically real is a subset of what is logically
possible; that which is logically possible is the set \( x \) of
all elementary propositions, and the physically real consists
in the set of all empirically true elementary propositions
which is a subset of \( x \). The remainder of the set \( x \) consists
of false, but significant, propositions. The set of all sig-
ificant elementary propositions (true or false) and all the
possible logical combinations of these elementary proposi-
tions constitute the whole of logical space; this sets the
limit of language. The conceptual puzzle of such a boundary
of language is that 'boundary' is normally used to indicate
not only what is contained within it, but also what is ex-
ternal to it. But with regard to logical space, that which
is external to it is nonsense, illogical and, hence, un-
thinkable. "The boundaries are the boundaries of the possible: only the logically impossible (i.e., nothing at all) could be found 'beyond' the boundaries."\(^1\) Wittgenstein adds, ". . . what we cannot think we cannot say either." (T, 5.61)

There is, however, an aspect of the notion of the 'limit of language' in which that which cannot be said is not ineffable either, e.g., though language cannot represent its own form it does show itself. The sense of a proposition is the situation it pictures, and only by having the form and content essential to its being a picture can a proposition say anything. But, though a situation can be pictured, the picturing itself cannot be pictured; yet, because a picture does picture, the picturing appears self-evident. Analogously, the form of representation of language cannot be the subject matter of a significant proposition, but it does show itself in the form of language.\(^2\) The logical form of propositions corresponds to the logical form of the situations they picture, but propositions make no attempt to say their logical form.\(^3\) Rather, it shows itself in the process of the proposition saying something. Contingent propositions, tautologies, and contradictions all show the logical form of the world, but none have logical form as their subject matter.

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\(^1\) Black, p. 308.

\(^2\) Cf. T, 4.12-4.1213 and Above, pp. 9-12.

\(^3\) Anscombe, pp. 163-164.
The most interesting aspect of the limit of language concerns Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism (T, 5.62-5.641) just preceded by the statement, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." (T, 5.6) The notion of the limit of language is to be expected because of what Wittgenstein says in the preface as well as the previous general account in the Tractatus, but, as Black says, "the sudden intrusion of the personal pronoun in expressions such as 'my language' and 'my world' is startling."\(^1\) But Wittgenstein is sympathetic with solipsism as he understands it, and among those theses which seem correct but cannot be said, yet show themselves, is his interpretation of the thesis of solipsism. (T, 5.62)

Statement 5.62c is obviously an elucidation and expansion of 5.6 as well as an interpretation of solipsism. A distinction is made between "the world" and "my world." Wittgenstein explicitly says that "the world" is "everything that is the case," (T, 1) "the totality of existent atomic facts." (T, 2.04) David Keyt argues that "my world" consists of the facts with which I am personally acquainted; Wittgenstein says, "I am my world" (T, 5.63) (or "I and my world are one") and "The world and life are one." (T, 5.621) Hence, it follows that "My world and my life are one." And, since Wittgenstein says, "Our life is endless in the way our visual field is without limit" (T, 6.4311), it follows that

\(^1\) Black, p. 307.
"My world is endless in the way our visual field is without limit." Thus, we have a comparison of the world and visual field, an interpretation which Keyt supports in five other ways besides the argument given above. First, there is a quote from the Notebooks: "I know that this world exists. That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field." (NB, 11.6.16) Second, Wittgenstein's comments on death lend support. "Death is not an event in life. It is not a fact in the world." (NB, 2.9.16) That is, since death is not an event in life it is not an event in the world. Third, another quote from the Notebooks: "What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world!" (NB, 2.9.16) Fourth, a quote from the Blue Book supports the interpretation: "Only what I see (or; see now) is really seen." (BBB, p. 64) Last, Keyt claims Wittgenstein's reference to a book title which he could write lends support, viz., "The World As I Found It." (T, 5.631)

The upshot of this is that "the world" and "my world" have the same content. And since facts consist of objects, "the only objects there are are those that are contained in the facts I am personally acquainted with."¹ Keyt then claims that what solipsism wants to say but cannot is "I am the world." This thesis cannot be said because 'I' is neither an object nor a complex and, therefore, has no referent. (T, 5.5421) But the thesis shows itself through the identi-

¹ David Keyt, "Wittgenstein's Notion of an Object," Copi and Beard, loc. cit., p. 300.
fication of the limit of one's language with the limit of one's self.¹ That Wittgenstein says "The limits of my language means the limits of my world" (T, 5.6) and "The limits of language means the limits of my world" (T, 5.62) implies "The limits of language mean the limits of my language."

This conclusion, taken together with the explicit assertion in the Tractatus that language is the totality of propositions (T, 4.001), that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions (T, 5), that elementary propositions are concatenations of names (T, 4.22), and that names refer to objects (T, 3.203) implies there are no objects except those referred to in my language. This amounts to saying that (1) there are no objects beyond those of my acquaintance, but Keyt notes that solipsism says (2) there are no facts beyond those I am personally acquainted with. Keyt sees a problem in that while (1) may be inferred from (2), it is not obvious that (2) may be inferred from (1).² However, the problem is an illusion, for (2) is deducible from the same premise as (1). Language divides into propositions, and propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. These elementary propositions picture those facts (negative and positive) with which I am acquainted.

Wittgenstein also considers another class of "unsayables" which nevertheless show themselves, viz., the mysti-

¹Jaakko Hintikka, "On Wittgenstein's 'Solipsism','" Ibid., p. 158.
²Keyt, p. 302.
cal. (T, 6.522) The mystical is feeling the world as a limited whole (T, 6.45), a notion which dissolves the problems of the will, of value judgements (e.g., ethical and aesthetic statements), and of the meaning of life as philosophical problems. Wittgenstein does not hold that these are no problems at all, but that they are problems which have no philosophical significance, in his technical sense of 'philosophical'. The point is that the subject matter of each of these problems is entirely independent of the facts which comprise the world; hence, they are problems which cannot be significantly stated, and Wittgenstein says, "doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where something can be said." (T, 6.51b)

In the Notebooks Wittgenstein says that the world is given to me as it is, irrespective of my will; in this respect my will "enters from the outside" and has no effect upon what is the case. (NB, 8.7.16) Likewise, in the Tractatus he says, "There is no logical connection between my will and the world," (T, 6.374) i.e., it is purely accidental if the world coincides with my will. Statements about what is the case consist only of the propositions of natural science (T, 6.53), and what I want does not in any way alter these statements. Value judgments do not alter what is the case any more than the will. "All propositions are of equal value." (T, 6.4) To place worth upon any proposition is not to give the proposition any more sense than it already has. Hence, if value statements have sense in their own right, it
must be obtained externally to what is the case; i.e., the sense of value statements must be transcendental, and therefore "cannot be put into words." (T, 6.41, 6.421) The same argument holds for the problem of the meaning of life ("sense of the world," T, 6.41; "sense of life," T, 6.521). "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time." (T, 6.4312) The consequence is that the problems of the will, of value, and of the meaning of life cannot be significantly stated, and neither can their answers. But Wittgenstein evidently does not regard these problems as utter nonsense, for, e.g., he speaks of some people having found the sense of life, even though they have been unable to say "what constitutes the sense." (T, 6.521) These are the sorts of things that only show themselves and cannot be said, because the limit of the world is the limit of my language - a thesis which, in turn, only shows itself.

7. **Conclusion: The Tractatus is Not Self-Defeating.**

As Black puts it, "The book ends with celebrated and much quoted statements that seem to accept utter defeat."¹ Wittgenstein says that the correct method of philosophy actually has nothing to do with philosophy, viz., "to say nothing except what can be said." (T, 6.53) Since the Tractatus is largely an attempt to explain what cannot be said, Wittgenstein adds that anyone who does understand the Tractatus will know that what it attempts to say is nonsense. But the non-

¹ Black, p. 376.
sense is not useless, for each point of the system can serve as a step to an understanding as to why the statements comprising the book are nonsensical. Once one has attained this philosophical perspective, "then he will see the world aright." (T, 6.54) That is, he will know how to distinguish between what can be said and what cannot, and thereby remain silent about that which he cannot speak. A cursory consideration of these concluding statements of the *Tractatus* tempts one to judge that Wittgenstein sees himself as the victim of his own philosophical efforts just concluded. Such a judgment is the result of a failure to see a crucial distinction which Wittgenstein makes concerning the counterpart of 'sense'; i.e., it has two counterparts, 'senseless' (*sinnlos*) and 'nonsense' (*unsinn*). Not all senseless statements are useless (e.g., tautologies and contradictions), and though they do not have a sense which can be *said*, they have a logical from which *shows itself*. "What they show can be shown to anybody who understands their use."¹ Black argues that many of Wittgenstein's statements are about the logic of language and can be treated as formal statements akin to the statements of mathematics; i.e., though they cannot be said to have empirical content, they do *show* certain logical features of language. Furthermore, with regard to statements which are nonsensical (e.g., those which contain 'the world', 'a fact', 'a name', etc.), it can be held that they "can have

¹Black, p. 380.
a rational use, even if the ultimate verdict has to be that there is nothing better to do with that terminology than to discard it."\(^1\) It is characteristic of mathematics that ambiguous symbols be experimentally introduced to clarify a notion and then be discarded, e.g., \(\infty\) as the greatest number.\(^2\) In a comparable manner, Wittgenstein introduces terms which he cannot account for later in his system. The real mistake which Wittgenstein could have made, but did not, is fail to recognize the illegitimate terms for what they are after they fulfilled their use.

Wittgenstein became interested in philosophy through mathematics; his acquaintance with such men as Russell, Frege, and Ramsey, as well as exposure to *Principia Mathematica*, associated the two fields for him. As a consequence, Wittgenstein became interested in the problem of pure mathematics. If mathematics is not pure (i.e., if it is based on experience as are the empirical sciences), then the statements of mathematics ought to be contingent and tentative. On the other hand, if mathematics is pure (i.e., a priori), the question arises as to its applicability to the world and, thus, how it avoids triviality.\(^3\) Wittgenstein offers a solution to this problem in the *Tractatus* by conceiving of reality as being composed of both material objects

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\(^1\) Black, p. 382.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 382-384.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 15.
and logical form. Objects alone do not make up the world, but rather objects in concatenation (logical form), and taken together, they constitute an atomic fact. Thus, the world divides into facts, rather than things. A contingent proposition pictures because it consists of both objects and logical form, and, thus, it says something about the world. Logical statements do not say anything because they are true in virtue of their form alone, but they do show something about reality, viz., logical form. Empirical statements together with logical statements reveal the whole of reality, its form and content. This account of how the whole of language connects with reality presupposes a priori that there is a logical order in the world, and the account itself shows in what that order consists. (NB, 1.6.15)

Wittgenstein further contends that if language can reveal the nature of reality, then it does so clearly and precisely. If reality consists of substances logically ordered, then its nature is precise; hence, any adequate expression of reality must be precise and nonambiguous. Every proposition that pictures reality does so in a clear way. This leads Wittgenstein to the notion that there is only one final analysis of any proposition, for if it were otherwise, the proposition would be ambiguous and inadequate. There cannot be an indeterminate sense; either a proposition has determinate sense or no sense at all. Such a notion implies that every term in a proposition must either be determinate or reducible to constituent terms that are determinate. As
a consequence, Wittgenstein construes elementary propositions as truth-functions of elementary propositions. Such a construal is necessary for language to be determinate. Since it is obvious that sentences in ordinary language do appear to be vague and ambiguous, they must be analyzable into that which is determinate, if their sense is to be understood. As the above sketch shows, Wittgenstein contends all significant propositions are analyzable into elementary propositions. And for elementary propositions to be determinate, they must be composed of simple names and project the logical form of the atomic fact pictured. The simple names stand for the objects, and that is their meaning. Names have meaning, and propositions have sense.

It becomes obvious that Wittgenstein's notion of determinate sense is crucial to the system of the Tractatus. Yet this is the notion that Wittgenstein criticizes in the PI. The criticism results mainly from a reconsideration of the notion of meaning. It leads Wittgenstein to reject the picture theory of language, which includes the notion of a logically perfect language reducible to simple names corresponding to simple objects and the notion that molecular propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. It also leads him to radically alter his notion of the limit of language. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein considers what is logically necessary for a language to be connected with reality; in the PI the notion of meaning arises from the consideration of how one comes to learn and understand a lan-
guage and what is involved in doing so. The *Tractatus* and the PI represent radically different points of view with regard to the philosophy of language. But since Wittgenstein is concerned with the clarification of the logic of language in both works, "shadows" of theses prominent in the *Tractatus* appear again in the PI. These theses are radically modified in the PI because 'analysis' means something quite different when the logic of language is considered from so different a point of view. The next chapter shows that Wittgenstein's locution on meaning in the PI plays a crucial role in his criticisms of his own earlier work. And, the purpose of the thesis is to explicate that notion of meaning.
CHAPTER II

WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITICISM OF THE TRACTATUS

Basic to other differences between the Tractatus and PI is that 'analysis' means something different in the two books. Wittgenstein is concerned with the logic of language in both books. Whereas in the Tractatus he tries to construct a logic that will give us the a priori necessary conditions for language, in the PI he turns the perspective around and makes no recommendations whatsoever as to what language must be if it is to work. Rather, he takes an empirical approach and seeks only to describe language as it is in the process of working. In the Tractatus he presupposes, a priori, a knowledge of a logical order in the world, which leads him to look for an essence of language hidden beneath the outer trappings of ordinary language. In the PI nothing is assumed but the empirical observation that language does, in fact, work; i.e., men do use language to communicate and are for the most part able to understand one another by means of it. In the PI Wittgenstein is still concerned with the fact that men are often misled by language, and, in the PI as in the Tractatus, he maintains that the basic reason for such misunderstanding is that men have failed to understand the logic of language. A consideration
of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the Tractatus will show that the attempt of the Tractatus to clear away the basis of the misunderstandings by giving an account of the logic of language is inadequate precisely because the account given is itself inadequate and only contributes more misunderstandings. (PI, 110)

Wittgenstein introduces the notion of 'language-game' and uses it in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it is used in a technical sense to refer to primitive languages stripped of the complexity of ordinary language so that they might be examined to more clearly show how language functions in particular situations; on the other hand, the concept of 'language' is compared with the concept of 'game' to facilitate an understanding of the import of the claims Wittgenstein makes about language. The claims he makes about language are based on an analysis of the simple, primitive languages which he calls 'language-games'. This distinction is important in order to avoid the mistake of taking Wittgenstein to be saying language is a game. Wittgenstein compares 'language' and 'game' to emphasize his claim that the use of language is an activity (PI, 23), but his claims about language are based on his analysis of primitive languages. In considering the criticisms of the Tractatus we will be primarily concerned with the first sense; the latter is to be considered later.

Wittgenstein begins the PI by referring to a passage from Augustine's Confessions which describes how he learned
language as a child. There is no distinction in kind between words; each word is a name whose meaning "is the object for which the word stands." (PI, 1) In order to examine this picture of the essence of language Wittgenstein constructs a very primitive language "for which the description given by Augustine is right" (PI, 2) and whose vocabulary consists only of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', and 'beam'. The process of teaching such a language has three facets: (i) the student learns the symbols as the instructor says them; (ii) the student associates the symbols with their referents as the instructor points to them and calls out the correct word; and (iii) the student is trained to act in certain ways when the instructor calls out the words. Since, in this case, the language is to provide communication between a builder and an assistant, when the instructor calls out a certain word the student is to fetch the appropriate piece of stone "which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call." (PI, 2) The language-game is broadened in section eight to include a set of numerals, 'this' and 'there' (accompanied by a pointing gesture), and a number of color samples. This language-game which Wittgenstein constructs can be construed as a language in itself, and because its structure is quite simple one can make an empirical examination of the language to determine what significance there is, if any, to the claim that the essence of language is a one-to-one correspondence between the words of the language and their referents. Wittgenstein claims that
empirical observation of how the language works shows that if all the words do signify, that which each signifies is the manner of its use; i.e., 'The word x signifies y', where y is the description of the use of the word x. (PI, 10) Though there may be times when y is simply 'This word signifies this object', it is only when knowledge of the kind of referring accompanying this type of word is presupposed. For example, when an instructor corrects the mistake that 'slab' refers to the building stone which is actually referred to by 'block', he may say, "'Slab' refers to this," "but if the student is to understand, he must already be aware that words such as 'slab', 'block', etc., refer in a different manner than 'this', 'there', and the numeral words.

Wittgenstein further points out that the claim that the meaning of a statement in the language-game of section eight (LG8) is the conjunct of what each constituent word signifies may omit other roles the expression can have. Consider, for example, the utterance 'Eight slabs': it may be a report translatable into our ordinary language as 'There are eight slabs', or an order translatable as 'Bring eight slabs', or a question, 'Are there eight slabs?'. Hence, to say the essence of language is that each word signifies an object is an inadequate account of LG8. Since Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, conceives of the essence of language as that which is essential to any language and since the notion of meaning as the object to which a simple name refers is the basis of his construal of the essence of language: in the *Tractatus*,


the discussion above constitutes an implied criticism of the system developed in the *Tractatus*. 

Since the above criticism is self-evident, the question arises as to how one might be tempted to give an account such as that given in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein explains the basis of such a temptation and then proceeds to criticize several important theses of the *Tractatus*. Some of the criticisms are explicit and others implicit, but they are found throughout the entire PI. The implicit criticisms are extractable from several of the discussions concerning the positive alternatives to the *Tractatus*. The purpose of this chapter is to explicate most of those criticisms in order to show that the locution on meaning is closely related to them. In the process of explicating these criticisms several positive notions in the PI are indicated so as to facilitate a direct analysis of the locution in Chapters III and IV, *viz.*, 'language-game' (which has already been introduced), 'family resemblance', 'analysis' and 'understanding'. Furthermore, the importance of certain other notions to be treated in subsequent chapters are indicated, *viz.*, 'linguistic rules', 'grammar', 'criterion', 'linguistic institution', and 'form of life'. 

One is tempted, claims Wittgenstein, to object to what is ordinarily called a name and claim instead "a name ought really to signify simples" because of the following line of reasoning. 'Excalibur' is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword is as it is only because its constit-
uent parts are combined in a certain way, and if they were combined in any other way, the sword known as Excalibur would not exist. If the sword did not exist, then the name 'Excalibur', which names the sword, would not have a referent and, as a consequence, would be meaningless. Thus, sentences such as 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' would contain a meaningless term and would itself be a meaningless sentence. However, the sentence obviously does make sense, whether the sword exists or not, so there must be something which corresponds to the constituent words of the symbol, even when the sword does not exist. That is, "beneath the surface" (PI, 39), hidden from view in ordinary language, there is something that reveals the essence of language. 'Excalibur', then, must be analyzable into simple signs which name simple objects, and only these are real names. (PI, 39) These objects cannot be defined or described - their names only refer to them. Otherwise, they would not be the simple elements they are claimed to be, for that which is definable or describable can be further analyzed into more simple components. Everything else is a complex of these elements, and the names of the constituent elements of the complex describe the complex; hence, the essence of language is the propositional form which takes propositions to be composed of names whose meanings are the elements they name. Wittgenstein admits these elements to be his "objects" and Russell's "individuals." (PI, 47) He then criticizes the following theses:

1. **Objects are the simple constituents of reality.**
To say that something is "simple" is to say that it is "not composite," so it makes sense to say of something that it is not simple only if the sense of 'composite' has already been established. (PI, 47) Consider LG48 which consists of color words that refer to nine colored squares arranged to form a complex like a chessboard, three rows consisting of three squares each. The vocabulary of the language-game consists of 'R', 'G', 'W', and 'B', which are names referring to red, green, white, and black squares respectively. A sentence in the language-game is a series of these names which describes a specific arrangement of colored squares. Such a primitive language-game is analogous to a more complex language which describes the world in the same way, e.g., the language described in the Tractatus. In such a situation, claims Wittgenstein, to call each primary colored square a simple element is natural. But it is also possible to say that the total area of one square is a composite of smaller areas. Or, again, if the sentence in LG48 'RRBGGG RWW' describes a particular arrangement of squares, one can say the situation consists of either nine or four elements, i.e., there is a "token-type" ambiguity. The point is that in the most elementary situations it is not obvious what constitutes a simple without first establishing the sense of 'complex' with regard to which a constituent element can be called 'simple'. What is regarded as a simple element of a complex depends upon the perspective from which one regards the object as complex. For example, a chessboard is complex,
but it can be viewed as complex in several senses. It may be a complex of thirty-two white and thirty-two black squares; it may be a complex of the colors black and white and the schema of squares; or it may be considered complex with regard to the physical materials with which it is constructed. Which sense of 'complex' might be meant can be determined by the situation which gives rise to talk about complexity, and only when the sense of 'complex' has been established can one unambiguously speak of the simple elements of the complex.

When one asks whether or not an element x of a certain complex is simple, it is therefore legitimate to inquire about the sense of 'complex'. The inquiry in such a case is about the language rather than the object, i.e., is about the rules which govern the use of 'complex' in this language-game. Since the role of the word 'complex' may vary in different situations, the role of 'simple' also varies. The mistake Wittgenstein makes in the Tractatus is to regard 'simple' in an absolute sense, as if there is only one way to view the world as complex. As a result, he incorrectly assumes there is but one way to determine simple elements of reality. Since the essence of language in the Tractatus leans heavily upon the relation between names and objects, it is obvious that if there is more than one way to construe simple objects, there is more than one way to construe the essence of language, which, in effect, is no essence at all.
2. *Neither being nor non-being can be attributed to objects.*

Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* does not explicitly speak of objects this way, but it can be shown that he implicitly holds that neither being nor non-being can be attributed to objects. Objects exist necessarily in the *Tractatus* in that the existence of objects is necessary for any proposition to have sense, for without objects the constituent names of the proposition would be without referents and hence without meaning. As ultimate simples they do not change, only their concatenations in atomic facts change. For a certain complex to exist, particular objects must be in specific combination with one another, for that state of affairs constitutes the complex. The existence or non-existence of any complex depends upon the changeable connections between objects. Objects themselves, however, do not change; so, objects cannot be said to exist in the same sense as complexes. Objects necessarily exist, while complexes exist contingently. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein speaks, in the PI, of not being able to attribute being or non-being to objects in a system like that of the *Tractatus*. (PI, 50)

Wittgenstein's criticism does not refute the thesis, but shows that it is not an assertion about reality as much as an observation about a particular language-game. Suppose that certain color samples are preserved in Paris in the same manner as the standard metre-bar. We would then define, e.g., 'sepia' as the color of the standard sepia color sample. Wittgenstein claims that it does not make sense to judge of
this sample that it is either sepia colored or not. In the same way, it makes no sense to ascribe being or non-being to simple objects. That is, it makes no sense to judge the sample by using the sample itself as the standard by which it is judged. The sepia sample is not something that is represented but, rather, is the measure of representation — we use the sample to measure the adequacy of other color patches which are said to represent sepia. In LG48, when an element is named, say 'R', it functions in a way similar to the color sample, i.e., it becomes a measure of representation. Wittgenstein says that this amounts to no more than giving the element called 'R' a role in the language-game, and to say "If it did not exist it could have no name" amounts to saying, "If it did not exist it could have no role in the language-game." The point is that what appears to necessarily exist belongs to the language-game. It is an observation about the language-game. (PI, 50)

Another way of putting the problem is to say one may be tempted to construe the term 'name' as that which cannot occur in 'X exists', because if X does not exist, it cannot be spoken of at all. But Wittgenstein says it is more correct to say that if 'X exists' means 'X has a meaning', then it is not a proposition about X, but about the use of X in language. (PI, 58)

3. The sense of a proposition must be exact if it is to have sense at all.

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is led to believe that
when one "utters a proposition and means or understands it, he is operating a calculus according to definite rules." (PI, 81) That is, the language is bound on every side by rules. As a consequence, every proposition has only one final analysis, which reveals its exact sense. This analysis is what is necessary to clear away misunderstanding.

Wittgenstein in the PI, on the one hand, criticizes this notion of analysis by showing (i) that it is confronted with the same problem associated with the notion of 'simple object' when one tries to determine the final, simple analysis of a proposition, and (ii) that it seduces one into believing there must be an essence in language to which every proposition must conform, if it is to have sense. On the other hand, Wittgenstein criticizes the notion of 'exact sense' by showing (iii) not only that some imprecise notions have a role in language, but that they are needed in some linguistic situations as much as precise notions are needed in other situations, and (iv) that the notion of 'exact sense' is fundamentally ambiguous because of the role of 'exact' in language. These criticisms are treated in that order.

(i) Consider: 'My broom is in the corner'. According to the analysis suggested in the Tractatus, this sentence is in part reducible to a statement indicating the position of a stick and brush in certain connection with one another, and this, in turn, is reducible to another statement giving the constituent parts of the stick, brush, corner, etc., in con-
nection with one another. It is obvious that what is taken to be the final, simple analysis of the sentence depends upon the role of 'complex' in the same way as the notion 'simple object', as indicated above.

Wittgenstein also broadens the criticism as follows: There are two ways of construing a situation, (a) composite objects may be construed as having names, or (b) only parts have names, and the composite objects are described by the names of the parts. Now the question may be asked as to what sense is (b) more fundamental than (a)? An order to fetch the broom given in (a) may be translatable into (b), and both would accomplish the same thing. Yet, it is tempting to think of the order in (b) as giving something which is missing when given in (a). Wittgenstein asks, "What?" One can just as easily say something is missing in (b) that is not missing in (a). His point is that there are a great many propositions that can be uttered in (a) without having to be translated (reduced) into (b), yet these statements can also be rendered in (b) so that they accomplish the same thing. Hence, (a) and (b) are different language-games, which are in many respects similar. (PI, 60-64)

(ii) If one does construe (b) above as more fundamental than (a), in the sense that a sentence in (b) "alone shows what is meant by the other," (PI, 63) then presumably there is a most fundamental analysis, whose form is that to which all significant propositions must conform. This is the
position Wittgenstein takes in the *Tractatus* when the general form of a proposition is given as an expression of the essence of language; it is a form to which all propositions must conform in order to have sense, irrespective of experience. (PI, 92,97)

Such a position arises, says Wittgenstein, when logic is viewed as something sublime, i.e., when we consider logic as an invesitgation, not of what actually happens, but of what lies "at the bottom of all the sciences, . . .of the essence of everything empirical." (PI, 89) Its purpose is to clear away misunderstandings which arise through misunderstandings about the use of words. But when one attempts to clear up misunderstandings about the use of words by reducing all significant propositions to a form which must satisfy a general form, he is apt to look upon a proposition as doing something very queer. That is, if one wants to really see what a proposition is doing, he must *penetrate* the phenomena of the proposition to get behind the outer trappings and see the essence which is hidden. Logic becomes, as it were, "a super-order between super-concepts," e.g., 'proposition', 'word', 'proof', 'truth', 'experience', etc. Logic is assumed to be a "pure intermediary between the propositional signs and facts." (PI, 94) It is pure in the sense that it represents the a priori order of the world, "prior to all experience and must run through all experience." (PI, 97) This logical order is then taken to be the essence of thought and language and enhances the illusion that they picture the
world. (PI, 96)

The position exemplified in the *Tractatus* is a consequence of Wittgenstein's confidence in the assumption of an a priori order in the world. He says, "When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called 'propositions', 'words', 'signs'." (PI, 105) Then one begins to look for the essence of such notions, and by so doing raises them to super-concepts. It then appears as if it is necessary to describe them by extreme subtleties, and one finds that it is impossible to do so with the means at hand, e.g., recall the distinction between 'showing' and 'saying'. The difficulty is due to extracting the words from their normal language-games and giving them, so to speak, a super-role in the language-game based upon a priori recommendations. But, as a matter of fact, says Wittgenstein, if these words have a use in language, "it must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 'door'." (PI, 97)

It is important to point out that the investigations in both the *Tractatus* and PI concern rules for the correct application of linguistic signs. The criticism Wittgenstein in the PI levies at the *Tractatus* is that the linguistic rules clarified in the *Tractatus* themselves violate the rules of ordinary language, yet they purport to apply to ordinary language. The main source of the violations is the a priori attempt to connect the rules with reality. That is, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein conceives of certain types of lin-
guistic rules as expressions of reality; it is by these rules that language is solidly connected with reality so that what they show about language they also show about reality. Since reality must necessarily be constant and unchanging (logical), the rules must, on the one hand, be constant and unchanging and, on the other, pervade the whole of language. Thus, that which expresses the rules, the general form of a proposition, is the essence of language. The essential import of Wittgenstein's criticisms in the PI is that the rules given in the Tractatus do not pervade the whole of language, and in that they do not, they are themselves in violation of the rules of ordinary language. For example, the concepts referred to above as 'super-concepts' are such in virtue of the attempt to clarify the rules of language, yet as super-concepts they differ from the rules of their ordinary use. They are used in a technical sense, but are meant to cover the ordinary uses. Hence, in the PI Wittgenstein points out that these super-concepts actually say something about the language-game in which they are being used, rather than about the essence of language. Another exemplification of this concerns Wittgenstein's comments on one expression of the general form of a proposition given in the Tractatus, viz., "This is how things are." (T, 4.5) This is equivalent, says Wittgenstein, to "giving the definition; a proposition is whatever can be true or false." (PI, 136) This makes it appear as if we have a concept of true and false which functions as a standard by which one can "determine what is and what is not a proposi-
tion." (PI, 136) But such a view would be comparable to saying that the concept of 'checkmate' in chess serves as the standard by which one can determine whether or not a piece in the game is a king. Such a standard is obviously inadequate, for one could only determine which piece is the king after a move which suffices to check the piece. Rather, says Wittgenstein, "'Only a proposition can be true or false' can say no more than that we only predicate 'true' and 'false' of what we call a proposition." This is an observation about the linguistic rules which govern the use of 'true', 'false', and 'proposition'. (PI, 136)

Wittgenstein's purpose in both books is the same; he is trying to clear away misunderstandings about the use of words by clarifying linguistic rules, but the rules in the Tractatus are set forth from an a priori perspective. As a consequence they are themselves the result of misunderstandings about linguistic rules of ordinary language. In the PI Wittgenstein recognizes the mistake of a priori recommendations with regard to linguistic rules and turns the investigation around to an empirical perspective. One must look and see how language operates. In the Tractatus he begins from the perspective, "This is how it has to be," which leads him to lay down rules before the fact, and as a consequence he becomes entangled in his own rules. (PI, 112, 125) In the PI he denies the philosophical significance of a priori explanations and turns to description alone. (PI, 109) He is still concerned with the clarification of rules of language, but
from an entirely different perspective.

By looking at primitive languages, i.e., language-games, Wittgenstein claims it is empirically obvious "that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways." (PI, 65) These relations between language-games enable us to call them all 'language'. (PI, 65) Wittgenstein explains this notion by the term "family resemblance," for the resemblance between members of a family is analogous to the resemblance between language-games. (PI, 67) While several members of a family may have characteristic resemblances, it is not necessary for each member to have one or more characteristics in common with every other member for it to be said a family resemblance obtains between them, i.e., no essential characteristics are required. For example, consider a family composed of members W, X, Y, and Z, and let lower case letters represent specific characteristics which members of the family may possess. The following characteristics may be arbitrarily assigned to each member: Wabc, Xbed, Yhde, and Zefg. A 'direct relation' is, by definition, the relation between two members that have at least one characteristic in common; an 'indirect relation', between two members having no characteristic in common, but sharing a common characteristic with a third. Then X and W are directly related by sharing characteristic b; W and Y are indirectly related because both are directly related to X. Furthermore, W may be said to be related to Z
through Y in that W is indirectly related to Y through X, and Z is directly related to Y. Here we have "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing," (PI, 66) but there is no essential characteristic which serves as a necessary condition for saying the members have a family resemblance.

An examination of primitive language-games not only shows there is no essence of language, but also shows that language-games serve "as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also dissimilarities." (PI, 130) Presumably the similarities and dissimilarities are of family resemblance, and at least one aspect of these is the linguistic rules of language-games.

(iii) When the claim is made that a proposition must have an exact sense if it is to have sense at all, every concept which appears imprecise is either dismissed as nonsense, or a theory is offered which seeks to construe a precise sense in them. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* takes the latter disjunct. But the inadequacies of such an analysis have already been shown.¹ He cannot consider the former disjunct because he takes it to be empirically obvious that certain propositions containing words signifying imprecise concepts are significant, i.e., are understandable. Hence, Wittgenstein must reject the claim that propositions must have an

¹Above, pp. 20-28.
exact sense.

He refers to Frege's claim that an area with a vague boundary cannot be an area at all, and he presumes Frege to mean that nothing can be done with it. But it can be used. For example, the command "Stand roughly there" works very well, say, when two companions are out taking snapshots. One does not need to mark off an area with delicate instruments to heed the command. Imprecise pictures can be used, and furthermore, claims Wittgenstein, they are sometimes necessary for a particular purpose, just as precise pictures are necessary for other purposes. (PI, 71) The same is true of language. For example, in the sentence "N is dead," the meaning of 'N' may be explained by a number of descriptive facts about N which are claimed to be true. But if one of the descriptive facts is shown to be false, it is not then necessary to say the proposition "N is dead" is false. It is possible to "use the name 'N' without a fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little from its usefulness, as it detracts from that of a table that it stands on four legs instead of three and so sometimes wobbles.)" (PI, 79)

The point is, a word does not need to be everywhere bound by rules to be usable. This is explained by Wittgenstein by referring to a game in which a doubt is never allowed because it is so rule laden. In such a case it is conceivable that rules are needed to determine the application of rules, and so on. But such a concept is unreasonable because rules are not necessary where doubts can be imagined,
but only where doubts are likely to arise. It is conceivable that one might always doubt "before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it," (PI, 84) but it could hardly be called a reasonable doubt. An incomplete explanation is necessary only to prevent misunderstandings which would otherwise arise (and not to still every doubt that can be imagined). "The sign-post is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose." (PI, 87)

(iv) The notion of 'exact sense' itself is fundamentally ambiguous (and therefore inexact) because of the ambiguous role of 'exact' and 'inexact' in ordinary language. Actually, claims Wittgenstein, 'exact' and 'inexact' are praise and reproach words with regard to the attainment of some goal. In the illustration above of the command: "Stand roughly there" different means of indicating the area could be used, each marking off the area with more precision than the preceding. There is a point at which the exactness of measurement would lose its function; i.e., the exactness which accompanies the application of precision tools would appear to be quite beside the point when a piece of chalk or gesture would do the job. (PI, 88) Hence, when one speaks of exact sense, it is not inappropriate to ask "Exact with respect to what?" Wittgenstein in the Tractatus uses 'exact sense' in an absolute way which he fails to specify, although we see in retrospect that he used it as a kind of "super-concept". That is, he removed it from its natural language-
game and thereby violated the ordinary rules of its use without specifying others.

4. **Understanding a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.**

   The *Tractatus* claims that if a proposition can be understood it must be composed of elementary propositions truth-functionally connected. What the proposition pictures to be the case is determined by a truth-table computation of the logically connected elementary propositions, and the proposition is understood when the picture depicted is grasped. "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true." (T, 4.024) Knowing what the constituent elementary propositions picture is basic to understanding a proposition. (T, 4.111) Hence, the notion of 'understanding a proposition' in the *Tractatus* is knowing that a specific proposition is depicting a certain state of affairs (T, 4.021), i.e., there is a thought whose constituents correspond to the elements of the propositional sign. Since the propositional sign pictures a situation, the thought, so to speak, grasps the picture in its own medium through the relation between the corresponding constituents. But the nature of such a relation is a "matter of psychology to find out." (NB, p. 129) A passage in the *Blue Book* implies that Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, construed the relation between language and thought as a kind of psychological-mechanistic association:

   Thus, if you are asked what is the relation between a name and the thing named, you will
be inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and perhaps when you say this you think in particular of the mechanism of association. . . Thus, e.g., a thought (which is such a mental process) can agree or disagree with reality. . . (BBB, pp. 3-4)

The results of such a view for Wittgenstein are two-fold: (a) Understanding a proposition is having a picture (or image) of a possible state of affairs before the mind, and (b) the nature of understanding is taken to be totally irrelevant to the theory of meaning. 1 In the Tractatus Wittgenstein only speaks of a proposition being understood, and does not directly treat the nature of understanding. Yet, the construal of 'understanding' as in (a) is implicit; but Wittgenstein is presumably of the opinion it would not have any effect on the notions of 'meaning' and 'sense'. That one understands is taken for granted, but the nature of what is understood, viz., a proposition, is considered in detail.

Wittgenstein, in 1919, in a letter to Russell, admitted that he did not know what the constituents of a thought are, nor the nature of the relation between the constituents of a thought and the propositional sign and maintained the nature of the relation to be irrelevant to the system of the Tractatus. (NB, pp. 129,130)

In the PI Wittgenstein criticizes both claims by showing (a) though having an image before the mind may sometimes be a part of the act of understanding, it never serves by itself as a criterion for understanding and (b) the nature

1 Anscombe, p. 28.
of understanding is an essential consideration for the notion of 'meaning', because how one construes 'understanding' makes a great deal of difference in how one justifies saying of another that he understands something-or-other. In treating (a) Wittgenstein first shows that an image (picture) may have more than one application so that it is not correct to say the picture is the meaning of the sign in all situations, and, secondly, he shows that if understanding is construed as a special kind of mental experience it leads to misunderstandings concerning a justified use of the verb. In both cases Wittgenstein is clarifying the use of the term 'understand' in order to avoid conceptual confusion.

Criticism (b) is made obvious in the process of accomplishing (a). Wittgenstein's contention in (b) is that it is a mistake to look for the "nature of understanding" as if there were some essence in common with all experiences called 'understanding'. 'Understanding' has a family of uses connected with one another, but not in any essential way. To presume there is a nature of understanding tempts one to construe 'understanding' as a special kind of mental process.

The picture which may come to mind at the mention of a word may not in all its occurrences be its meaning. Wittgenstein says,

[T]he same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word [but] the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (PI, 140)

He claims, for example, that the picture which may accompany
the word 'cube' may be the same as the picture which accompanies 'triangular prism'. Consider:

(a) \[\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}\]
(b) \[\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}\]
(c) \[\begin{array}{c}
\end{array}\]

By placing one's visual perspective on the same plane as the base of the cube (a) and triangular prism (b) and in the same directions as the arrows, the visual image of both would be (c). Hence, though picture (a) suggests a certain use of 'cube', it need not always be used that way. Clearly the difference of application of 'cube' between (a) and (c) constitutes a difference in meaning. (PI, 139-140) It may be correctly contended that the application of 'cube' to (c) is abnormal. But the point is, there can be a conflict between the picture and the application. There are abnormal cases as well as normal cases, and only in the abnormal cases is there doubt about what to say; but the meaning in the abnormal cases cannot be explained by appealing to a picture which only accompanies normal cases. (PI, 141-142) Neither can it be said that one understands 'cube' when he is bent on only applying the term according to figure (a).

Wittgenstein criticizes the construal of 'understanding' as a special mental event by considering the following language-game and some variations of it: A orders B to write down a series of signs according to some formation rule
(LG143). The problem with which the analysis is concerned is the justification of saying of B "He understands the series." The most obvious answer is that when B has demonstrated he can continue the series. But certain questions seem to cloud the issue, e.g., "How far need one continue the series?"; "Though random mistakes do not indicate a misunderstanding of the series, what constitutes a sharp distinction between random and systematic mistakes?" Hence, it is tempting to say continuing the series "is only applying one's understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use." (PI, 146)

Wittgenstein contends this is like remembering a formula and deriving the series from it. But since a formula may have more than one application, the decision as to whether it has been applied in the way intended is made by considering the application, i.e., how accurately one continues the series. The point is that even when thinking of the formula is taken to be a state of the mind - a disposition, the application of the formula needs to be considered in order to decide whether or not B understands the series. When the notion of 'state of mind' is added to the continuation of the series, the result is that there ought now to be two criteria quite distinct from one another, viz., a knowledge of the construction of the mental apparatus which makes up the mental state and the application (what it can do). (PI, 149) Wittgenstein shows that these two criteria are incompatible.

Consider an analysis of the following language-game
(LG151) which is a modification of LG143: A writes down a series of numbers; B watches and suddenly says, "Now I can go on," which may be taken to be equivalent to "Now I know," "Now I can do it," or "Now I understand." This class of sentences will be represented by 'U'. The problem is, when is B justified in asserting U?

The following occurrences are possible: (i) B watches, thinks of the algebraic formula, and asserts U; (ii) B watches, figures out the difference between the numbers, then asserts U; (iii) B watches, says to himself, "I know that series," and asserts U; (iv) B simply continues the series with a feeling, "that's easy," and says nothing. If one takes all four of these occurrences as evidence that B understands, it is tempting to ask about the process which lies behind all the characteristic accompaniments of understanding, i.e., to assume there is a special experience which lies behind all the occurrences.

Wittgenstein agrees that, e.g., 'The formula X occurs to me' does not mean the same as U, for B may not understand even though the formula occurs to him. B has no right to assert U just because he thought of the formula; there must be a connection between thinking the formula and actually continuing the series. (PI, 179) But neither does Wittgenstein think 'The formula X occurs to me' in conjunction with U implies the description of a mental process. That is, when B is asked to explain the meaning of U, he does not say, "I have an experience which I know empirically to lead to the
continuation of the series." (PI, 179) Rather, if anything has to be behind the utterance of the formula, it is the particular circumstances which justify the assertion of U. That is, it is necessary to inquire as to what sort of circumstances justify B in asserting U when the formula occurs to him (PI, 154), e.g., B had algebra, used such formulas before, etc. (PI, 179) It may be the case that B did have a special kind of experience when he suddenly knew how to go on with the series, but what justifies A in saying B understands is the circumstances under which B has such an experience. (PI, 155) Thus, B's assertion of U means that B can continue the series under certain circumstances, but these circumstances may vary with different kinds of situations. The circumstances are not the same each time U is correctly used. (PI, 183) That the circumstances do vary may be further indicated by considering the cases in which B assert U, tries to continue, but cannot. Rather than saying in all situations that he was wrong in asserting U, "we shall say different things in different cases." (PI, 181)

Wittgenstein considers the consequence of construing 'understanding' as a special mental process which yields a special kind of experience. He takes as an example a student learning to read. 'To read' here is taken in the special sense of rendering out loud what is written and excludes understanding what is read. (PI, 156) The question is 'How does one determine when the student first begins to read?', or 'How is one justified in saying, "Now the student under-
stands how to read"? On the one hand, the student may pretend to read by quoting a memorized passage while his eyes move over the printed page, and, on the other hand, a practiced reader, functioning as a reading machine, may actually be reading the same passage the student is quoting. It is theoretically possible that both persons may be having the same mental experience. But one is tempted to say they can't be the same, i.e., there must be something different going on in the process of the brain which distinguishes reading from not reading. Wittgenstein contends such a temptation arises from the a priori assumption that a connection must exist between a mental process and genuine understanding - an assumption very much like that on which Wittgenstein bases the Tractatus, viz., that the constituents of reality correspond to the constituents of language, which in turn correspond to the constituents of thought. A thought is a propositional sign applied or thought out. (T, 3.5) Since "A thought is a proposition with a sense," (T, 4.0) and since "Language disguises thought," (T, 4.002) the purpose in reducing ordinary language to elementary propositions truth-functionally connected is to reveal the form of thought. The aim of philosophy in the Tractatus is the logical clarification of thought to get a clear picture of the world. (T, 4.112) "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world." (T, 3.001) It is Wittgenstein's contention in the Tractatus that the a priori assumption of a connection between thought and reality is manifest in language. The point Wittgenstein makes in the PI
is that such a priori assumptions (Things don't appear this way, but they must be this way. PI, 112) lead to conceptual confusion because they mistakenly raise certain concepts to a super-status which confines one's perspective to one way of considering things. If understanding is construed to be necessarily connected with a certain mental process, then that way of looking at the matter is forced onto every apparent occurrence of someone's having understood something-or-other. Such a fixed perspective tempts one to say, "Reading is a quite particular process" (PI, 165) and, as a result, neglect the circumstances which actually justify asserting that the student is reading (or not reading).

Several obviously misleading consequences would result if the claim 'Now the student understands how to read' could be justified by appeal to an experience of a mental process. (a) It would make sense to speak of the first word the student read. The student could report the occurrence of the experience, and the first word in the new state could be determined. But a teacher obviously does not depend upon such a report. Rather, there is a change in the behavior of the student, and since the change is neither radical nor abrupt, it makes no sense to speak of the first word the student reads. (PI, 157) (b) It is theoretically possible for one to be under the influence of a drug and feel as he does when he pretends to read, but this time actually be reading. Or, one could feel as he does when he is reading but be looking at marks which are not linguistic signs at all. (PI, 160)
And (c) it would not make any difference whether or not one read by a recognized alphabetical rule. Words would simply come in a special way, and as long as the special experience was felt it could be said of one that he is reading.

5. The picture theory of language determines the limits of language.

The picture theory of language in the *Tractatus* results in the limitation of language; language is fixed by the set of all elementary propositions and all their possible logical combinations. The general propositional form serves as a formula which can be used to generate every possible propositional form from the set of all elementary propositions; hence, every proposition must conform to the general propositional form. Moreover, reality is pictured by the totality of propositions (true and false). Negative and positive facts taken together comprise reality. (T, 2.06) So the general propositional form is also an expression of the form of reality and, therefore, anticipates reality. Every proposition shows something about reality, and every proposition is anticipated by the general form of a proposition, in that every propositional form can be generated from the general form.

Wittgenstein criticizes this thesis in the PI when he discusses the notion of grasping the whole use of a word in a flash. Consider again LG143 where B is to write a number series at the order of A, e.g., "Add two." Since a decision as to whether or not B understands the order depends on
B's correctly carrying out the order, it is tempting to say "A meant by 'Add two' that B was to write 1002 after 1000." That is, A knew when he gave the order that B was to write 1002 after 1000, or 1868 after 1866. Wittgenstein points out that though such sentences make sense in certain contexts, they sometimes mislead one to infer that all the steps of the series, in some real sense, have already been taken when the order was given. It is "as if they were in some unique way predetermined, anticipated - as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality." (PI, 183) That is, the way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken. Since the criterion for determining how the formula is meant is "the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it," (PI, 190) it appears the whole use of the linguistic expression of the formula could be grasped in a flash - as if all the uses were in a queer way already present. Hence, a peculiar status is given to each use - a superlative fact, claims Wittgenstein, for which there is no model. Rather, it is a misunderstanding which "emerges from crossing different pictures." (PI, 191)

Wittgenstein illustrates the two pictures which have been crossed by considering (a) how movements can be calculated from a model of a machine (machine-as-symbol) and (b) how movements are predicted in an actual machine. The machine-as-symbol may be a drawing as well as a working model, and its sole purpose is to symbolize the movements of a real machine, i.e., all possible movements can be calculated from
it. (PI, 193) When one calculates the possible movements from the machine-as-symbol, he considers the geometrical dimensions of the parts and then figures out the movements in a logical way. By considering the machine-as-symbol it may be said, "The machine's action seems to be in it from the start," which means a comparison can be made between the future movements of a real machine and the machine-as-symbol. But that cannot be said of an actual machine, for when one predicts the movements of an actual machine, the possibility of distortion of parts, etc., are considered. That is, the physical conditions for movement are essential data for predicting the movement of an actual machine, whereas they are not for calculating possible movements from the machine-as-symbol. The relation between possible movements and a machine-as-symbol is logical, whereas the relation between movements and an actual machine is causal. Wittgenstein maintains that when one is doing philosophy, he is tempted to cross pictures such as (a) and (b) and say, "The possible movements of a machine are already there in it in some mysterious sense" because of the way we talk about machines. For example, "we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can only move in such-and-such way," it has such-and-such possibilities of movement. This leads us into all sorts of queer speculations. For example, this possibility of movement does not appear to be either the movement itself nor the physical conditions for movement, but rather "like a shadow of the movement itself." (PI, 194) Yet the shadow
cannot be taken as a picture, otherwise it must be a picture of this particular instance of movement. The model is taken to represent a movement which, though it is not yet actually in motion, has the possibility of moving; hence, "possibility is something very near reality." (PI, 194) The machine-as-symbol, as it were, is taken as the essence of the actual machine, and every possible movement of the actual machine is taken to be in that essence in some queer way.

The point is that the machine-as-symbol is a logical model, and as such it accounts only for the possible movements calculatable from it and cannot account for any actual movement of any actual machine. The possible movements logically calculated from the machine-as-symbol can be compared to the future movements of an actual machine, and some may be very comparable. But the machine-as-symbol cannot account for any movements of an actual machine, for they are explained by physical conditions, rather than logical relations. Logical relations explain logical conclusions; physical conditions, plus a law, explain a particular effect. Possible movements derived from the machine-as-symbol are logical conclusions, whereas the actual movements of a real machine are the causal effects of certain physical conditions.

Wittgenstein relates these points to the notion of 'grasping the whole use of the word' in the following way. The notion of 'understanding a word' implies that one understands all the uses of the word, so that when one comes to understand a word, it might be said, "It is as if we could
grasp the whole use of the word in a flash." (PI, 191) Wittgenstein says that this is sometimes an accurate description of what we do, but it is a mistake to think of it as a queer process, i.e., to think the future development must in some sense already be present when the use of the word is grasped. (PI, 197) Such a notion is the result of construing all particular uses of a linguistic expression as logical products of an underlying essence. In the attempt to account for each specific use of a linguistic expression in terms of the essence, one is led to believe that each specific use is uniquely present when the meaning of the expression is initially understood. That is, when the essence of the expression is grasped, each use is uniquely present. Such a construal is analogous to an attempt to account for the movements of a real machine solely on the basis of a logical model (machine-as-symbol).

The theory of language described above is similar to that of the Tractatus. The expression of the general form of a proposition is taken to be an expression of the essence of language, and the expression itself is a logical formula from which can be generated all propositional forms whatsoever. Each propositional form must conform to the general form, and although "a proposition can determine only one place in logical space, nevertheless the whole of logical space must be given by it." (T, 3.42) Since logical space represents the form of all propositions, it also represents the limit of language. (Cf. Above, p. 29)
Wittgenstein's criticism of this theory of language is that even if the general form of a proposition can be used to generate every propositional form whatsoever, it cannot account for any specific occurrence of a proposition. Even if it could identify what linguistic expressions are usable, it cannot explain their specific uses. Since specific uses of linguistic expressions are obviously an integral part of language, the essence of language described in the Tractatus turns out not to be an essence at all.

Actual occurrences of language arise within specific empirical situations in order to satisfy human needs, desires, or interests. They are justified by linguistic rules which are associated with customs (institutions) (PI, 199), and one learns to follow the rules just as he learns to live within a social institution.

The system of the Tractatus is inadequate because one aspect of semiosis is overemphasized to the neglect of the other two. Though language is partially regulated by logical rules (logical syntax, the relation of signs to one another), it is also regulated by rules pertaining to the relation between the signs and the users of language (pragmatics) and by rules pertaining to the relation of signs to the conditions appropriate to their occurrence (semantics).¹ When all the dimensions of semiosis are included in the de-

scription of language the explanation of a particular occurrence of language involves consideration of empirical data, i.e., the physical conditions accompanying the occurrence.

Thus, the notion of the limit of language as pictured in the Tractatus is rejected by Wittgenstein in the PI for two reasons. First, since the limit of language is based on the logical notion of the essence of language and it is shown that it cannot account for specific occurrences of language, the limit of language is subsequently rejected. Secondly, since the occurrences of specific uses of linguistic expressions are based on certain empirical circumstances surrounding human need, custom, institution, etc., and since no logical limit can be placed on empirical circumstances, the extension of language must remain open-ended.

It was noted in Chapter I that an aspect of the limit of language concerns Wittgenstein's sympathy toward the thesis of solipsism. Wittgenstein says, "The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world," (T, 5.62) Hence, it may be objected that the treatment above is inadequate because it does not take into account Wittgenstein's solipsism. Such an objection is unwarranted, because Wittgenstein's solipsism, in effect, merely contends that one can only talk about the possible facts which are constructible from only those objects with which he is acquainted, rather than those possible facts constructible from either the totality of objects with which
everyone is acquainted or the totality of objects in the world. That is, Wittgenstein is acquainted with only those objects contained in the facts he knows, and presumably others are acquainted with some objects with which Wittgenstein is not, because they are constituents of facts known by others, but not known by Wittgenstein. As a result, Wittgenstein is able to consider only those propositional forms constructible from the objects with which he is acquainted. It makes no sense for him to claim more, because he is acquainted with only these objects, and this sets the limit of his language and his world; this is the world he knows. But whether the limit of language is set by \( n \) number of objects and the general form of a proposition or by \( k \) number of objects and the general form of a proposition, the principle by which language is limited is the same. It is this principle which is the object of Wittgenstein's criticism in the PI. Hence, the account of the criticism above need not include solipsism to be adequate. Wittgenstein criticizes the tendency toward solipsism in his celebrated private language argument, and the relation between that argument and the \textit{Tractatus} is considered below.

6. \textit{A thought is a significant proposition.}

This thesis is criticized by Wittgenstein in the private language argument. Because an analysis of the private language argument can better serve our purposes in explicating the notion of 'grammar', the account given in this section presupposes the validity of the argument without such an
analysis. Thus, the purpose of this section is only to show in what way the private language argument, if valid, serves as a criticism of the above thesis.

The private language argument criticizes the thesis in three ways: (a) while the thesis implies that a mental image is essential in order to understand a proposition, Wittgenstein in the PI shows that it is irrelevant; (b) the thesis leads to a solipsistic view which is untenable for reasons similar to (a); and (c) the thesis does not preclude a private language, and Wittgenstein in the private language argument shows such a language to be, in principle, impossible.

(a) If, as in the Tractatus, 'understanding a proposition' means a propositional sign is grasped by a thought in its own medium, then what criterion is there for determining if the proposition has been understood correctly? A and B may both claim to understand proposition p, but there is no way to determine if A and B have the same image, and neither is there any way to determine if either or both of the images before their minds is the "correct" image, i.e., it cannot be determined whether A or B actually "understand" p or only think they do, for it cannot be determined whether or not the constituents of a thought actually correspond to the constituents of a proposition. This is a picture which says there is only one correct "understanding" of any significant proposition; either one understands or he does not, though he may think he does. The image before the mind either corresponds
to p or it does not, but since one cannot show that image to another, there is no way to determine whether the image corresponds to p or not.

Wittgenstein's point in the private language argument is that the image drops out. It is not needed. It is like a free-wheeling knob on a machine. If A and B could use p as it is ordinarily used (i.e., their use of p agrees with one another and the majority of others), then it is beside the point whether A's image and B's image correspond or not, or whether either correspond to any image of any person who claims to understand p. If the "picture" in the medium of thought is inessential, then the isomorphic relation between thought and language is inessential. What becomes essential in the PI is the relation between language and custom, use, institution. This turn of perspective precludes the picture theory of language.

(b) In the Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein says a solipsist is one who is "irresistibly tempted" to use expressions of the form "Only I feel real pain," "Only I really see," etc., because he is sympathetic to the expression "We can never know what the other man really sees when he looks at a thing." This perspective is the result of the idea that "'knowing what he sees' means 'seeing that which he also sees'" in the sense that A cannot know whether or not the image before his mind corresponds to B's, when they both are looking at the same object. (BBB, pp 60-61) It is easy to see how this view corresponds to the solipsistic account in
the *Tractatus* treated above. A's understanding of \( p \) consists in a mental image 'Iap' (A's mental image of \( p \)), where A's understanding of \( p \) is correct only if the constituents of Iap isomorphically correspond to the constituents of \( p \). The solipsism of the *Tractatus* is the claim that there is no way A can "know" whether Iap is the same as Ib, when B claims to understand \( p \), where 'know' is taken in the sense of 'be acquainted with' (kennen).

However, if the private language argument is valid, and the image drops out as irrelevant (as indicated in (a) above), then the tendency toward solipsism is unnecessary. If "the meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it," then "the meaning is not a mental accompaniment of the expression." (BBB, p. 65) Thus, the use of a particular occurrence of a linguistic expression can be empirically examined to determine how it corresponds to its use in another occurrence, so as to provide public evidence as to whether or not A and B have a similar understanding of \( p \).

(c) The *Tractatus* allows a private language: since "A thought is a significant proposition," (T, 4.0) and since "What cannot be thought cannot be said either," (T, 5.61) there are no thoughts which cannot be expressed in a proposition which satisfies the general form of a proposition. Since the general form of a proposition is an expression of the essence of language in general, and all propositions in

\[ \text{Above, pp. 30-33, 76-77.} \]
any language whatsoever must satisfy it, it serves as the fundamental rule by which the form of "private language" is made public. In other words, the form of a private thought can be expressed by a propositional sign. But since "The meanings of simple signs (names) must be explained for us," (T, 4.026) the translation of "private" language into public language rests on semantical rules, i.e., rules concerning the relation between a name and the object it signifies. But if the object is private (cannot be shown to anyone), then the meaning of the name cannot be learned by another. The meaning of a name is the object it stands for, and one "knows" an object only by acquaintance (kennen). (T, 2.0123) So, if I am the only one who can be acquainted with my sensations, then I alone know the meaning of the names of my sensations. Hence, I have a language whose propositions syntactically satisfy the general form of a proposition, but is private in the sense that no one else can know the meaning of the names of the language. (Presumably others could know the syntactical form of the language.)

There are other criticisms of the Tractatus implicit in the PI (e.g., the theory of aspects, PI, pp. 193-229, shows that a picture can be construed in various ways so that an image which results from a propositional sign does not necessarily mean the proposition has an exact sense). However, the criticisms treated above are sufficient for the purpose of this chapter. That is, the criticisms, on the one
hand, depend upon the locution on meaning given in the PI, and, on the other hand, exhibit not only some descriptive features of the locution but also the cogency of those features. The features can be indicated by returning to Wittgenstein's notion of 'language-game' and considering the second sense in which it is used, viz., to facilitate an understanding of the import of the claims Wittgenstein makes about language.\(^1\) It should be obvious that these features are intricately related to the criticisms treated above.

The import of calling primitive languages 'games' can be seen by considering the following analogies between games and language: (a) Just as some games have pieces which are manipulated according to certain rules, so is language also composed of pieces, e.g., words. (PI, 31,108) (b) Individual games and languages are both governed by a set of rules. (PI, 56,567) However, 'rules' is to be taken in a very general sense, for one may consider a boy bouncing a ball against a wall to be playing a game, but the rules here are not written down, nor is it necessary for the boy to be aware of precisely what they are. But certain regularities are implicit in the playing of the game, and the vagueness of the rules does not preclude its being a game. (PI, 100) On the other hand, certain other games are tediously defined by rules carefully worded in a manual, e.g., the professionally played games. Language is similarly characterized. Whereas idle chatter and joking lays little stress on precision of lin-

\(^1\) Above, p. 42.
guistic rules, the language of legal briefs and scientific explanation requires more stringent rules. (c) Some games are of the sort that rules can be formulated during the process of playing the game. The rules for the use of words within linguistic structures are also subject to change. (PI, 83-84) (d) Consider the general notion of 'game'. Wittgenstein says that if we look at the proceedings that we call 'games', we shall not be able to find anything that is common to them all. Certain sets of games have common characteristics (e.g., board games, card games, ball games, etc.), but there is no definitive feature which relates the different sets to one another in any essential way. (PI, 66) The general term 'game' cannot be precisely defined; only a specific game can be precisely defined. One is taught the use of the word 'game' by his instructor pointing to a series of games and saying, "This is a game; this, too, is a game, and that is also a game. Other activities similar to these are games." (PI, 69) The word is extensionally defined, but in that the extension of 'game' is never closed the definition is incomplete. There is never a time when it is even theoretically possible to accumulate all games whatsoever, for new ones are invented while others are forgotten. (PI, 67) Actually, one does not define 'game', but only indicates its use. This analogy is used by Wittgenstein to claim that there are as many language-games as there are different kinds of sentences, and there are no characteristics common to all language-games. (PI, 23-24)
An indirect analogy (e) between 'language' and 'game' involves a comparison of the possible procedures for learning to play a game and learning a language. One may learn to play a game (or use a language) by any of the following procedures or a combination of all. First, one may observe others playing the game (using the language) and learn the rules by the consistent actions of the participants. Second, one may be given a set of rules from which he can learn to play (use a language). Third, one may be placed in a playing (speaking) position and guided by other participants or by a counselor. He is admonished when a wrong move is made and praised for the correct ones. In all these procedures the student is not merely learning the rules as one memorizes a grocery list, but rather is learning how the rules apply in a specific game (speaking) situation. Furthermore, he is learning how the rules apply, not only in one specific event of the game (language), but whenever that kind of game (language) situation occurs again.

These analogies indicate seven claims Wittgenstein makes about language: (i) The meaning of the linguistic symbol in a sentence is its use. (ii) Words of a language-game are bound by rules of use. When the use of a word is changed within a language-game without explication, the result is confusion of meaning. For example, the confusion ensuing from participants playing different games with a deck of cards while each imagines the other to be playing the same game is obvious; likewise, confusion and misunderstanding is
inevitable when two or more persons are participating in different language-games, yet each imagines the other is participating in one and the same language-game. This is primarily a comment about 'use' mentioned in (i) and says a description of the significant use of a word will reveal rules which limit the use of the word by degrees varying with the language-games in which it occurs. (iii) Understanding the use of a linguistic expression is intricately connected with the actions into which a language-game is woven. (PI, 6) Hence, the physical circumstances surrounding the occurrence of a linguistic expression may be as essential to the description of the use of the expression as the rules mentioned in (ii); i.e., both may be necessary to a description of the language-game in which the expression occurs. (iv) There are many different kinds of language-games comprising an ordinary language, and they cannot all be defined by any one criterion. That is, there cannot be any one set of rules which govern the employment of all words or linguistic expressions. Each word or expression is regulated by rules of use peculiar to the particular language-game in which it is employed. Neither language as a whole, nor its related concepts (e.g., 'meaning', 'understanding', etc.) is explainable in terms of an "essence". (v) Different language-games can be compared for similarities and dissimilarities in order to show certain facets of language. (PI, 130) The comparison of language-games makes possible a more adequate description of the use of an expression; it makes certain linguistic rules ob-
vious. Hence, the comparison of language-games is a useful tool of analysis. (vi) No language can be declared complete. A language is comparable to a town or village whose size fluctuates with the addition of houses, while others are torn down or remodeled. (Pl, 29) The extension of 'language-game', like 'game', is not closed. (Pl, 67) (vii) Learning a language is not so closely akin to learning rules as it is to learning how the rules apply in reiterated language situations similar in kind. That is, it is more the acquisition of a technique through training (knowing how) than knowing a list of rules (knowing that). (Pl, 199) This, together with (vi), is the result of language being a social institution. While social rules are at least implicit in every social institution, they are not always explicitly formulated. Language also functions according to rules, and neither are they all explicit. But it is not necessary for a user of the language to be able to list the rules. One acquires the facility to use language, and often only after rigorous analysis is he aware of the rules which govern his use of language. Wittgenstein points out that philosophical confusions often arise precisely because we are not aware of the rules which govern our use of language, and he recommends an analysis similar to that which he applies to the concepts of the Tractatus.

Feature (i) is a restatement of the locution, and the remainder are comments on (i), either negatively or positively. Hence, the locution on meaning plays a significant
role in every criticism. Every criticism treated above attacks the *Tractatus* either for actually violating a rule of language, for establishing special rules for technical uses of terms which purport to apply to the whole of language, or for seeking to reduce certain linguistic rules to mental processes.

The meaning locution recommends itself through the above criticisms by the following implicit claim: The mistakes of the *Tractatus* are subtle ones which arise mainly through the bewitchment of language. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by the means of language." (PL, 190) But when one applies the locution to a philosophical problem, that which one was formerly tempted to say appears nonsensical. That is, when one analyzes the use of a term to describe and compare it with other occurrences of the same term or similar terms, it is possible to show the confusions which develop from philosophical prejudices.

The task of this thesis is to analyze the locution in order to determine the limits of its application. This involves an analysis of notions closely related to the locution. Those notions have been mentioned in the criticisms treated above, and their importance has been shown. In this chapter 'language-game', 'family resemblance', 'analysis', and 'understanding' have been considered. 'Grammar', which involves an analysis of 'linguistic rules', 'institution', 'criterion', 'form of life', 'sense', and 'speech-acts', is the subject matter of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF GRAMMAR

Wittgenstein does not regard the *Tractatus* as totally wrong, rather it is misleading - like a clock that gives the wrong time. The PI, so to speak, modifies the clock-work in order to be more accurate, and as a consequence remnants of theses central to the *Tractatus* are to be found in the PI. One is the limitation of language, but radically reformed. The primary function of the limit of language in the *Tractatus* is to distinguish sense from nonsense.\(^1\) Wittgenstein is also concerned with what can be significantly said in the PI, but what is linguistically significant is what has a linguistic use, rather than what can be pictured by a propositional sign.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze those notions which Wittgenstein employs to express the rules that govern the use of linguistic symbols. It is shown that the notion of 'use' which gives a linguistic symbol its meaning is associated with the notion of 'grammar'. The grammar of a particular language-game is given by "grammatical statements" which express certain linguistic rules for that lan-

\(^1\)Above, pp. 29-30, 35-36.
guage-game. Three types of grammatical statements are analyzed in this chapter - grammatical statements resulting from a comparison of similar and dissimilar language-games, grammatical statements which are taken to be necessary statements, and grammatical statements which give criteria for the applicability of a particular predicate. An analysis of these basic types of grammatical statements involves an explication of other concepts related to 'grammar', e.g., 'rules', 'practice' ('institution'), 'speech-act', 'sense' and 'nonsense', and 'form of life'.

An explication of the notion of 'grammar' is necessarily a tedious task, for, in effect, it is an attempt to describe the grammar of Wittgenstein's use of 'grammar' and involves the concept which is being described. Therefore, an understanding of the notion might be better facilitated by observing how Wittgenstein uses it to dispel certain philosophical confusions. Wittgenstein claims a grammatical investigation of philosophical problems clears away misunderstandings which arise by drawing too close an analogy between different forms of expressions. (Pl, 90) So, an analysis of how he undertakes a grammatical investigation will help clarify the notion. Actually, several examples have already been given in considering his criticisms of the Tractatus. But Wittgenstein's investigation of the notion of 'sensation' will better serve our purposes here, because more aspects of the notion of 'grammar' are found in his comments on sensation. An explication of some of these comments are given in
section I to facilitate the subsequent analysis in section II.

I

The most famous of Wittgenstein's remarks on sensation are those which concern the refutation of private language. The argument for private language is based on the claim that no one can feel another person's sensation; as a consequence one can only know from his own case what sensation words mean. In this sense, the language of sensations is private. Cook gives an analysis of Wittgenstein's remarks on sensations which counter the private language argument. To facilitate the analysis Cook gives the following formulation of the argument for private language which Wittgenstein attacks:

\[ P_1 \] No one can feel (experience, be acquainted with) another person's sensations.

\[ P_2 \] The proper and necessary means of coming to know what sensation another person is having is to feel that person's sensation.

\[ P_3 \] Anyone who has a sensation knows that he has it because he feels it, and whatever can be known to exist by being felt cannot be known (in the same sense of 'known') to exist in any other way.

\[ C \] No one can know what sensations another person is having.\(^1\)

Cook then elaborates on two counter-arguments pre-

sented by Wittgenstein in the PI. ¹

(a) Wittgenstein says,

In what sense are my sensations private? - Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. - In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. - Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself! - It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain? (PI, 246)

Cook interprets Wittgenstein to say the whole argument for private language presupposes an illusory use of 'to know' as an expression of certainty with first-person, present-tense sensation statements. The certainty expressed in this sense of 'to know' is that which accompanies privileged access. That is, "one is in as good a position as one could want for answering the question (e.g.) 'Is it raining?'" However, this use of 'to know' implies it is conceivable for the speaker, in a particular instance, not to be in that privileged position. Wittgenstein argues that this is not the case for 'I am in pain'. The difference is this: Even though it is rather pointless for me to say, "I know it is raining," when I am obviously in optimum position for such knowledge, it still might be said of me, "He knows it is raining." Further, the question. "Do you know that it is raining?" is sen-

¹Cook elaborates on several arguments which are either explicit or implicit in the PI. The following two serve our purpose here.
sible and answerable. But there is no situation whereby the addition of 'I know' can add the notion of "certainty" to 'I am in pain'. The confusion arises from comparing pain-language with perception-language. For example, one might argue that a man in pain cannot be like the man who has a stone in his shoe, does not feel it, and therefore does not know it. So, a man in pain must know it because he must feel it.

Pain-language, however, does not take a perceptual use of 'to feel'. Compare (i) 'I feel a pain in my knee' and (ii) 'I feel a stone in my shoe'. Though the form of the sentences is the same, the sense of 'feel' is different. 'I feel' in (i) can be replaced by 'I have' or 'There is' without altering its sense, whereas (ii) can imply but does not mean 'There is a stone in my shoe'. Consider also (iii) 'There was a stone in my shoe, but I did not feel it' and (iv) 'There was a pain in my knee, but I did not feel it'. Although (iii) is intelligible, (iv) is not, for to have a pain is to feel it and vice versa. The expression of certainty in the argument for private language is modeled after perception language, i.e., the observer is in an ideal perspective for perception. But perception language is not sensibly applicable to first-person pain-language. Yet, it is perception language that the argument presupposes in $P_2$ and $P_3$.

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1Cook, "Wittgenstein on Privacy," p. 293.

2Ibid., pp. 291-296.
(b) \(P_2\) presupposes an illusory use of possessives in first-person pain statements. The premise says that if I am to know A is in pain, I must both feel pain and identify the pain I feel as his pain. Such requirements are modeled after statements like 'In order to know my neighbor's flowers are blooming, rather than taking his word for it, I must see his flowers'. I identify his flowers by identifying his garden, i.e., the possessive is of ownership. But to model the possessive in pain language after the possessive of ownership is a mistake resulting from mixing two different language-games.

Consider the use of possessives with 'pain' in the following way: A wireless connection is established between persons A and B so that when one is in pain the other is also. If A ceases to have a headache the moment the connection is broken while B's head continues to hurt, A might say, "I did not have my own headache." But A's assertion cannot mean "I was not in pain," and it can be said of A, "He was in pain," which means we can speak of "his pain," for 'to be in pain' is 'to have pain'. Thus, the statement, "Any pain I feel will be mine," is a comment on the use of possessives in first-person pain statements - a use quite different from the use of possessives in statements about physical ownership.\(^1\)

Donagan also comments on Wittgenstein's remarks on sensations and says Wittgenstein makes certain concessions to Cartesianism, while at the same time rejecting the Cartesian

\(^1\)Cook, pp. 296, 304-305.
conclusion that each man knows from his own case what a particular sensation is. But, the points are conceded only when they are taken as "grammatical facts," rather than "facts about the world."

It has already been stated that in situations where doubt is impossible Wittgenstein considers the use of 'to know' to be senseless (useless), and it is therefore senseless for one to claim he knows what sensation he is having. The reason is that the knowledge claim itself is modeled after that of physical objects, and the certainty of the knowledge claim is modeled after a situation where one is in optimum position to have the knowledge. This analogy is a mistake because it confuses the language of perception with pain-language, and it is a grammatical fact that one need not perceive pain to "know" that he has pain.

But Wittgenstein recognizes that such a statement as 'Only I can know whether I am feeling pain' can have a significant use. He says,

What does it mean when we say "I can't imagine the opposite of this" or "What would it be like, if it were otherwise?" - For example, when someone has said that my images are private, or that only I myself can know whether I am feeling pain, and similar things.

Of course, here "I can't imagine the opposite" doesn't mean my powers of imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a defense against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one. (PI, 251)

Such statements as 'Only I can know whether I am feeling pain' are senseless when taken as empirical statements, but
significant when taken as grammatical statements. Donagan interprets Wittgenstein in the same way and says that when the proposition 'Sensations are private' is taken as an empirical statement it is absurd. That is, it is absurd to say, "Sensations happen to be private; it is not the case that they are public." But when 'Sensations are private' is taken as a grammatical reminder, like 'One plays patience by oneself', it is significant. (PI, 248) Donagan claims it serves as a grammatical remark summing up three reminders:

(i) that it is nonsense to suppose that more than one sentient being can have the same instance of a sensation, (ii) that if a man has a sensation, it may be that only he can tell whether he is having it, and (iii) that when a man reports that he has a sensation it is nonsense to suppose him mistaken.

A parallel can be drawn with what Wittgenstein says in the following:

"This body has extension". To this we might reply: "Nonsense!" - but are inclined to reply "Of course!" - Why is this? (PI, 252)

If we take 'This body has extension' as an empirical statement, it is nonsensical. That is, it is nonsensical to say, "This body happens to have extension; it is not the case that

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To take 'Sensations are private' as an empirical statement is not "absurd" as Donagan claims. Rather, the statement is senseless in Wittgenstein's sense of the term, i.e., it does not have a use in the language. It will be shown that it is senseless when taken as empirical, because it presupposes a grammatical picture which leads to a dilemma that precludes the statement having a use in the language. Cf. Below, pp. 112-113.

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it does not have extension." But the statement is not nonsensical if it is taken as a grammatical reminder that all bodies are extended and that it is nonsense to suppose otherwise. Hence, the Cartesian claim that sensations are private is affirmed by Wittgenstein, insofar as it is taken as a grammatical fact, rather than an empirical one.¹

Donagan interprets Wittgenstein as also conceding to the Cartesian doctrine that sensations are occurrences. Donagan's interpretation amounts to a denial that Wittgenstein is a behaviorist in the sense that the occurrence of a sensation is totally reducible to a disposition to behave in a certain way. Donagan's interpretation depends upon an analysis of several key passages from the PI. They are:

(1) Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the pictured pot? (PI, 297)

(2) It is - we should like to say - not merely the picture (Bild) of the behaviour that plays a part in the language-game with the words "he is in pain", but also the picture (Bild) of the pain. Or, not merely the paradigm of the behaviour, but also that of the pain. - It is a misunderstanding to say "The picture (Bild) of pain enters into the language-game with the word 'pain'." The image (Vorstellung) of pain is not a picture (Bild) and this image (Vorstellung) is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture (Bild) - The image (Vorstellung) of pain certainly enters into the language-game in a sense; only not as a picture (Bild). (PI, 300)

¹Donagan, pp. 332-335.
(3) A Vorstellung is not a Bild, but a Bild can correspond to it. (PI, 301)

(4) "Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what is important - and frightful." - Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion? (PI, 297)

(5) "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? - "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing." - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. (PI, 304)

Passages (1) through (3) are used by Donagan to establish a claim that Wittgenstein has a quasi-technical use of 'imaginative representation' (Vorstellung) and 'picture' (Bild). The picture mentioned in (1) is that of steam coming out of a pot, but the boiling water in the pot is imaginatively represented. That is, though the boiling water is not a part of the direct content of the picture, Donagan claims "it is not true that you can describe what the whole picture is a picture of without referring to the contents of the pot."¹ Thus, a Bild contains nothing it does not directly represent, whereas a Vorstellung can represent indirectly.

Boiling water is not directly represented in the picture mentioned above, but what is directly represented forms a

¹Donagan, p. 330.
Vorstellung of boiling water. Is in this sense that passage (3) is to be taken.

In passage (2) Donagan takes Wittgenstein to be holding "that a picture can correspond to the imaginative representation of a man in pain."¹ That picture might be either a man exhibiting pain behaviour or others acting toward the man in ways appropriate to somebody in pain. In either case Donagan says Wittgenstein is maintaining that when it is said someone is in pain, reference is made to more than behavior and external circumstances.

The statement in passage (4) which is in quotation marks is not to be taken as Wittgenstein's. But Donagan maintains the responding question, which is to be construed as asserted by Wittgenstein, shows that he considered it a worthy reminder for the behaviorist. That is, pain is not to be treated by suppressing the pain behavior, but by removing what accompanies the behavior, viz., the pain. Thus, a doctor provides an analgesic for the patient, rather than a gag.²

Passage (5) also denies that pain is mere behavior and disposition, yet it appears to deny that "pain is something which accompanies pain behavior."³ The key to the passage, Donagan maintains, is the interpretation of Wittgenstein's statement that sensations are neither "something" nor

¹ Donagan, p. 331.
² Ibid., p. 336.
³ Ibid., p. 345.
"nothing." (PI, 304) A sensation is "nothing," claims Donagan, in that "what accompanies behavior, inasmuch as it is private, plays no part in determining the meanings of the words or phrases that refer to sensations... Yet the accompaniment itself is not a nothing."¹ Donagan explains why the sensation is not a nothing by referring to a passage in which he thinks Wittgenstein is inconsistent.

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what a pain is only from his own case! - Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says that he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be used as the name of a thing, the thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI, 293)

Donagan takes this to say erroneously that what a sensation term, say 'toothache', names, "or whether it names anything, is irrelevant to the meaning of 'toothache'."² Wittgenstein

¹ Donagan, pp. 345-346.
² Ibid., p. 347.
slips into this inconsistency, Donagan says, because he failed to note an important disanalogy between the beetle-in-the-box game and sensation language-games. In pain-language there is a place for "I am not in pain", but in the beetle-in-the-box game there is no place for "My box has no beetle". Presumably Wittgenstein would be consistent if he would say, as Donagan does, that the existence of the "object" (pain) as an accompaniment of pain behavior is "cardinal." But what the "object" happens to be is irrelevant.¹ Donagan takes Wittgenstein to say a sensation is a "nothing" in that whatever is named by a sensation word is irrelevant, and a sensation is a "something" because is names something which accompanies pain behavior.

Donagan's interpretation is misleading because he fails to see that Wittgenstein is denying that the grammar of sensation words can successfully be construed on the model of 'object and name'. This leads him to mistakenly interpret Wittgenstein as inconsistent. The following account shows Wittgenstein is not inconsistent as Donagan claims and for reasons which also show that Wittgenstein's recognition of the occurrences of sensations is not as much like the Cartesian doctrine as Donagan seems to suppose.

In the discussion surrounding the beetle-in-the-box game, Wittgenstein is concerned primarily with the claim that one learns the meaning of a sensation word only from his own

¹Donagan, p. 347.
case, exclusive of the accompanying sensation behavior. (PI, 287, 295) This is the claim that one learns the meaning of 'pain' by attending to his own private sensation of pain. As a result, the word 'pain' is claimed to function as a name on the model of 'object and name'; i.e., there is something which serves as a referent to the name, and that referent is the meaning of the name.

Wittgenstein's purpose in the passage which contains the beetle-in-the-box game is threefold: (i) He shows the doctrine that one learns what a sensation word means only from his own case cannot be generalized; (ii) he shows that if a term purported to be learned only from one's own case and modeled after 'object and name' has a use in the people's language, then the term cannot function as the name of a thing after all; and (iii) as a consequence, the thing purported to be named drops out of the language-game as irrelevant. Wittgenstein constructs the language-game with the supposition that 'beetle' is to function according to the model of 'object and name' and then establishes his three points. A person in the language-game, say A, learns what 'beetle' means by looking into his own private box; whatever the contents may (or may not) be is what 'beetle' means. But, is A justified in generalizing "It is only from my own case that I know what 'beetle' means" to "It is only from each of their respective cases that everyone knows what 'beetle' means"? Since A has no notion whatsoever as to what kind of thing is contained in another's box, there is
no reason for A not to suppose either that everyone has something different in his box, or that the contents of the boxes are constantly changing, or even that some have no more than an empty box. Even if A hears everyone else who knows the language say, "It is only from my own case that I know what 'beetle' means," he still does not know whether the term is actually being used to refer to different things or to one thing, or whether it refers to a set of constantly changing things or to nothing at all. That is, irrespective of the claims of others, the only use of 'beetle' about which A can know anything at all is his own, and the same is true of any other participant of the game. But if a term has as many uses as there are participants of the language, and if no one can know any other use than his own, the term does not have a use in the people's language. If the word 'beetle' has a use in the language, the rules which govern its use must be public for the users of the language to use the term in a consistent way. So, since the rules for the use of 'beetle' are private, it does not have a use in the language. Thus, by the location that the meaning of a word is its use in the language, the term 'beetle' is meaningless. The attempt to generalize the claim, then, only shows that the term is meaningless if everyone attempts to learn it from his own case.

If the term 'beetle' does have a use in the language, the source of the rules must be other than each person's attending to his own case, because the rules which govern the use of the term must be public. But this precludes the term
being a name according to the model of 'object and name', for the only way such a name can be established is by each person attending to his own case. Therefore, to say the term 'beetle' has a use in the language is to say that it is not used as the name of a thing. Finally, if 'beetle' is not used as the name of a thing, then the thing in the box, which was initially purported to be the object named by the term, "has no place in the language-game at all."

As a consequence of the beetle-in-the-box argument, anyone who claims that the meanings of sensations words are learned from each person's own case respectively finds himself in the following dilemma: If sensation words are names whose meanings are learned from each person's own case, then the rules for their use must be private, and they do not have a use in the language; and, if sensation words do have a use in the language, then the rules for their use are not private, and sensation words are not names of private objects.

The claim that sensation words function as a name after the model of 'object and name' is denied by Wittgenstein in passage (2) above precisely as Donagan indicates: "the word 'pain' cannot mean what it does by way of a picture qua picture: there cannot be a picture of pain as there can be of pain-behavior."¹ But Donagan fails to see that Wittgenstein is rejecting the view that sensation words function as names of objects. In the same sense that pain behav-

¹Donagan, p. 331.
ior represents (expresses) pain, the word 'pain' represents (expresses) pain and is not related to it as name to object. Wittgenstein suggests, "words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place." (PI, 244) When a parent teaches a child exclama-
mations and sentences containing sensation words, "they teach the child new pain behaviour." (PI, 244) But this is not to claim that, say, 'pain' means crying, for "the verbal expres-
sions of pain replaces crying and does not describe it." (PI, 244)

Passage (2) above is consistent with this suggestion. Anything that can be pictured can be directly pointed to, and vice versa. But what is imaginatively represented cannot be directly pointed to and is only indirectly referred to through what is pictured. What can be named on the model of 'object and name' is only that which can be the elements of a picture, and that which is imaginatively represented by a picture cannot. As Donagan indicates, pain behavior can be pictured, but pain itself is only imaginatively represented by the pain behavior. Furthermore, Wittgenstein maintains that it is not merely incidental circumstances which happen not to picture pain in this instance, but that pain cannot, in principle, be pictured. "The image (Vorstellung) of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we would call a picture." (PI, 300) Wittgenstein's remarks imply that some things that can be pictured can also be imaginatively represented, and some
"things" (e.g., pain) that can be imaginatively represented cannot be pictured.

In passage (5) Wittgenstein claims to have rejected a grammar of sensation words which leads him to say that a sensation, say pain, is either "something" or "nothing." It is obvious that the grammar rejected is that which construes "the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name'." (PI, 239) That grammar implies sensations can be pictured. So, the denial of the grammar amounts to a denial that the correct idea of the use of sensation words is given through a picture of sensations. (PI, 305) It is in this sense that Wittgenstein says a sensation is not a something, viz., it cannot be pictured because it cannot be referred to as the object of a name; i.e., a sensation word does not fit into the grammar of a physical object word, for the basic function of expressions containing sensation words is not to inform, but to express. With regard to the paradox that sensations are both something and nothing Wittgenstein says,

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please. (PI, 304)

The sense in which a sensation is not a nothing either is that sensation behavior expresses what one feels, i.e., A's pain behavior expresses the fact that A feels something, viz., pain. What sensation language expresses is quite different from what names modeled on 'object and
name' name; sensation language expresses sensations, whereas names name objects. 'Sensation' and 'object' are conceptually quite different notions. ¹ Since this appears to be obvious, it seems appropriate to ask why Wittgenstein takes so much care to point out the distinction.

That 'sensation' and 'object' are conceptually different notions is obvious, but in what respects they are different is not so obvious. It would appear that the distinction could be indicated by pointing out what empirical facts can be said of each. However, this method of distinguishing concepts may be misleading. For example, it seems to be an obvious empirical fact that physical objects are those kinds of things which any normal person can look at, whereas sensations are those sorts of things that only the possessor can perceive; i.e., objects are public, but sensations are private. If one takes both of these as statements of empirical facts, then one has the following philosophical choice; either sensations are known and named only by the one who has the sensation, in which case there are no public ostensive definitions of sensations (i.e., mental states and processes are in a private, non-physical medium), or statements about

¹Wittgenstein is not denying that sensation words are sometimes used as names, but he is claiming that when they are used as names, it is in a secondary sense. The primary sense of naming is analogous to tying a label to something (PI, 15,26), and one first learns this by attaching the labels to physical objects, events or states of affairs. That is, one can see the object, etc., named. Naming sensations is a secondary sense, for there is a conceptual difference between physical objects and sensations, and this is the essential point of Wittgenstein's analysis.
sensations are about nothing more than the observed behavior and circumstances (i.e., sensations are not private objects in a non-physical medium, but are dispositions to behave in certain ways, under certain circumstances). Both disjuncts construe "Sensations are private" as empirical, but the former claims it is true, while the latter says it is false. The radical nature of this philosophical choice comes from accepting the grammatical picture which naturally follows when one construes "Sensations are private" as an empirical statement. Sensations are taken to be the sorts of things that can be placed in a box which cuts them off from public view (i.e., a non-physical medium). The assumption is that one has a "definite concept of what is means to learn to know a process better." (PI, 308) That is, if we ever have the means of making the box publicly accessible, then these private states and processes can be publicly and ostensively defined and/or described, etc., but until then, we learn the meaning of sensation words only from our own case. Hence, the grammatical picture is that of construing the expression of sensations on the model of 'object and name', and the difficulties with this picture has been shown. \(^1\) Therefore, it is important to see that the conceptual distinction between 'sensation' and 'object' is grammatical, rather than empirical.

As Donagan has noted, if the statement 'Sensations

\(^1\) Above, pp. 101-103.
are private' is to be a significant statement, it must be construed as a grammatical statement which functions as a reminder about what moves can and cannot be made in pain-language. That is, if it can function as a reminder about what moves can and cannot be made in language-games with 'pain', it will suffice to prevent confusions which result from mixing language-games involving sensations and those involving physical objects. Therefore, Wittgenstein is not denying sensations or mental processes. Rather, he is denying the grammar which forces one to look at sensations in one way. He is denying that sensations must either be uncomprehended states in an unexplored medium or merely dispositions to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances. The 'must' is a consequence of accepting the grammar which Wittgenstein is rejecting. Specific behavior may express a sensation, but Wittgenstein does not say the behavior is the sensation. Rather, since the behavior expresses the sensation, part of the meaning of a sensation word is learned by reference to the sensation behavior and the circumstances that give rise to it. A part of the circumstances is the fact that the subject feels pain; otherwise, there is no reason to consider the most frequent abnormal occurrence of pain behavior when teaching someone pain-language, viz., the simulation of pain. But the precise nature of what is being expressed, other than being some sensation, is not included within the grammar Wittgenstein suggests for sensation words. The implication is that any adequate investigation of sensa-
tions must be made on the basis of what sensations are according to their own grammar and not according to any other. (PI, 370-371,373) That is, an investigation to determine the nature of a phenomenon concerns the use of the linguistic expression which refers to the phenomenon as much as the phenomenon itself. The grammatical investigation, as illustrated above, prevents an investigation which produces conceptual confusion. Showing the place a word is assigned in language (in grammar) facilitates an understanding of the definition (or explanation of the meaning) of the word. (PI, 29)

II

The purpose of the above explication is to illustrate Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation of sensation words. He dissolves the controversy between Cartesians and behaviorists by showing both to be grammatically mistaken about the use of sensation language. From this illustration two basic senses of 'grammar' can be shown, both of which are intricately connected with the expression of linguistic rules about what can or cannot be said in a language. On the one hand, 'grammar' is related to statements expressing rules which distinguish one language-game from another. That is, these grammatical statements express rules which either permit or prohibit moves in one language-game which are similar to moves in another language-game. On the other hand, 'grammar' is related to necessary statements when they are used
to express a rule about the linguistic use of their consti-
tutive terms. A third aspect of 'grammar' concerns those
statements which give criteria for the application of a par-
ticular predicate. Furthermore, the rules which are expres-
sed by grammatical statements, in all senses of the term,
govern the use of a term in the sense Wittgenstein employs
in the locution on meaning. The purpose of this section is
to explicate all three expressions of 'grammar'. Other re-
lated notions will also be explicated, e.g., 'sense', 'rules',
'institution', 'form of life', and 'speech-acts'.

As previously indicated, contrary to the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein in the PI is concerned with describing the logic
of language, rather than recommending conditions necessary
to language. An important tool in the description is the
notion of 'language-game'. He says,

Our clear and simple language-games are not
preparatory studies for a future regulari-
zation of language. . . . The language-games
are rather set up as objects of comparison
which are meant to throw light on the facts
of our language by ways not only of similar-
ities, but also of dissimilarities. (PI, 130)

By way of such comparisons, some linguistic terms can be
shown to have uses similar to one another while others are
quite distinct. Wittgenstein contends that a confusion of
these similarities and dissimilarities leads to philosophical
confusion, and a "grammatical investigation" will disentangle
these confusions. (PI, 90) The remarks made during the in-
vestigation which indicates how a term is being used he calls
a grammatical "statement" or "note." (PI, 232, 251, 295) A
grammatical note, for Wittgenstein, is about what can or cannot be said in a language (or language-game), irrespective of the adequacy of the grammar which the note reflects. For example, Wittgenstein regards the statement "I know... only from my own case" as a grammatical remark about sensation language, though he regards such grammar as misleading. (PI, 259) The grammar reflected by the statement allows a host of propositions into the language-game of sensations which the grammar Wittgenstein suggests prohibits. When Wittgenstein corrects an inadequate grammar, he is concerned with how sentences and constituents of sentences are used to influence concepts. As Garver puts it, Wittgenstein's notion of grammar has to do "with the meaning of linguistic forms and with the incompatibilities and inference possibilities holding among them."¹ For example, the illustration of grammatical investigation above shows the incompatibility in construing 'to know' in first-person, present-tense sensation language after the model of 'knowledge as certainty'; and the beetle-in-the-box game shows the inadequate inference possibilities resulting from construing the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name', i.e., it leads to a dilemma.

Since grammatical remarks indicate what can and cannot be significantly said in a language, it is necessary to

explicate Wittgenstein's notion of 'sense' and 'nonsense'.
The explication will also show the relation between the no-
tion of 'grammar' and the locution on meaning. Wittgenstein
says,

To say "This combination of words makes no
sense" excludes it from the sphere of language
and thereby bounds the domain of language. But
when one draws a boundary it may be for various
kinds of reasons...if I draw a boundary line
that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for.

When a sentence is called senseless, it is
not as it were its sense that is senseless. But
a combination of words is being excluded from
the language, withdrawn from circulation.
(PI, 499-500)

A linguistic expression is senseless if it has no use. But
this is not to say that if an expression is useless on one
occasion, it is useless on every occasion. Rather, it is to
say certain expressions which are significant (have a use,
have sense) in one language-game are not in others. There
are two notions of 'sense' in Wittgenstein's remark, "When a
sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense
that is senseless." First, even if a sentence does not have
a use in the language-game presently being played, we may be
able to think of a language-game in which it does have a use.
Second, the unusable sentence might be such that we cannot
think of a language-game in which it is usable; in such a
case, we might be inclined to question, as it were, "the
sense of its sense".

Wittgenstein considers individual language-games to
be languages in themselves; i.e., it is at least theoreti-
cally possible to separate one language-game from another so
that each stands on its own as an individual language. That they resemble one another in various respects matters little, just as individual members of a family carry their own traits, though there is a family resemblance between them. Thus, to show that a particular sentence is senseless in one language-game does not show that it is senseless in every language-game whatsoever. To claim otherwise would be contrary to Wittgenstein's point that the extension of 'language' is open-ended just as the extension of 'game' is. We may say of a player that he has attempted a move which is not allowed in this particular game, but we would not want to insist that such a move is not a part of any game.

By the same analogy, just as the rules of a particular game draw the boundaries for playing that game, so do the grammatical rules of a particular language-game draw the boundaries for playing that language-game. The reasons for drawing the boundaries of a language-game may be generally described as reasons which facilitate the point of the language-game. But, because there are countless different language-games with different goals, the reasons vary considerably. Some require rigid boundaries; others are loose and flexible. However, since Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with clearing up conceptual confusion in philosophy, he is obviously concerned with determining those boundaries which yield clear and consistent concepts, i.e., rules which govern the use of constituent terms and sentences so as to yield compatible inference possibilities.
Not all language-games are such that it is important to keep concepts distinct. For example, the point of a joke may be understood only when one sees that the joke has intentionally crossed a boundary which separates concepts. The breach of a boundary here does not result in a sentence's becoming sheer nonsense, e.g., like the gibberish of an infant. Rather, it is the fact that we do understand that makes the "nonsense" humorous.

The point to be made is that whether or not an utterance is sensible greatly depends upon the sorts of circumstances typical of the occurrence of the utterance. That is, an expression has a use only within a language-game, and a description of the language-game includes the circumstances surrounding its occurrence. For explicatory purposes assume G to be a language-game which is precisely distinguished from other language-games by a complete listing of circumstances a, b, ..., e, which are necessary for the occurrence of G, and an optimum knowledge of the grammatical rules governing the significant utterances in G. Then the relation between circumstances and grammatical rules of a language-game can be expressed as follows: If circumstances a, b, ..., e obtain as sufficient evidence that G is being played, then utterance x can significantly occur in G according to grammatical rules r₁ ..., rₙ. That is, the grammatical rules of a particular language-game are applicable only so long as the circumstances necessary to that language-game occur. But precisely how the grammatical rules function in the language-game is yet to be
stated.

There are only four references to 'grammatical rules' in Wittgenstein's translated writings. He refers to 'grammatical rule' twice in the Blue and Brown Books (pp, 55, 56), and in both cases the rule excludes certain propositions from the language-game being played. In the PI there is one reference stating the condition under which grammatical rules are arbitrary (PI, 497), and one reference in the RFM where he says, "To accept a proposition as unshakably certain... means to use it as a grammatical rule." (RFM, II, 39) Otherwise, the majority of the references are to grammatical statements, analogies between language-games, grammar about the use of a term, grammatical notes, grammatical investigations, and grammatical propositions. Wittgenstein implies that though these latter references do not stand for grammatical rules, they do express rules. The point is that only twice does Wittgenstein give a statement and then say, "This is a grammatical rule," and in both cases the rules comment directly about what statements can and cannot be used in a language-game. The other references to 'grammar' imply rules about the legitimate and illegitimate use of statements in a language-game. Thus, grammatical rules state what expressions can and cannot occur in a language-game. For example, consider again the precisely defined language-game G mentioned above. In such a theoretical situation it would be possible to know exactly what sentences would significantly occur in G, and as a consequence the complement set of sen-
tences would not. Let \( x_1 \ldots x_n \) represent the class of significant sentences occurring in \( G \), and \(-\{x_1 \ldots x_n\}\) represent all others. The grammatical rules \( r_1 \ldots r_n \) would respectively state that the sentences \( x_1 \ldots x_n \) have a use in \( G \), and any other grammatical rule would state that some member of \(-\{x_1 \ldots x_n\}\) does not have a use in \( G \). Sentence \( x_1 \) can occur in \( G \) according to rule \( r_1 \), provided certain circumstances obtain as sufficient evidence that it is \( G \) that is being played.

But it would seem that \( r_1 \) only says that \( x_1 \) has a use in \( G \) and does not say anything about the use. How, then, does \( r_1 \) reflect anything about the meaning of \( x_1 \), if the meaning is the use? First, it should be noted that \( r_1 \) is a comment about the grammar of \( G \) and does not give the whole grammar. Secondly, if the whole grammar of \( G \) is given, and if the grammar is consistent (i.e., the grammatical rules do not allow inconsistent statements in \( G \)), then the concepts which constitute the subject matter of \( G \) will be clear and consistent. That is, when the grammar is given, a description of the use of the constituent terms of \( G \) is given, and a participant in \( G \) is able to use the terms without confusion. The participant would know precisely what statements have a use in \( G \) and would not be in danger of mixing the grammars of \( G \) and some other dissimilar language-game. A set of rules define a game rather than describe it; but statements which say of a specific rule that it is a rule of a certain game do describe. It is in this sense that a gram-
mathematical statement which expresses a single rule contributes to the description of a use.

If some participant mixes the grammars of two dissimilar language-games, conceptual confusion results. There are three possibilities: (i) a sentence is allowed which is totally irrelevant to the language-game being played; (ii) a sentence is allowed which appears to be relevant but neither adds nor takes away from the language-game, i.e., it has no purpose in the language-game; and (iii) a statement is allowed which is inconsistent with some other sentence in the language-game. Possibility (i) is radical and would occur only in a case of gross misunderstanding. In case (ii) the sentence might appear to be structurally in order, but one simply does not know what to do with it. The sentence might look as if it gives information, but whether it actually does is difficult to determine. Wittgenstein illustrates such a case by "These deaf-mutes have learned only a gesture language, but each of them talks to himself inwardly in a vocal language," and then he says,

I do not know whether I am to say I understand it or I don't understand it. I must answer "It's an English sentence, apparently quite in order - that is, until one wants to do something with it; it has a connexion with other sentences which makes it difficult for us to say that nobody really knows what it tells us; but everyone who has not become calloused by doing philosophy notices that there is something wrong here." (PI, 348)

Case (iii) is the source of most philosophical confusion, for it is not always obvious that a grammar has allowed
inconsistent sentences. The beetle-in-the-box game illustrates such a case when it shows how a grammar of sensation statements can result in a dilemma.

Language-game G is a theoretical model of an ideal case, and it is highly unlikely that such a model could be instanced from ordinary language. But it does help explicate a method of investigation for the clarification of concepts. That is, if certain statements can be ascertained to be grammatical, then an analysis of the utterances permitted and not permitted would reveal the adequacies and inadequacies of our concepts. However, that a statement is grammatical is not always obvious. They are not identifiable by their form and can easily be taken as empirical statements. But, grammatical statements are not factual statements; rather, they are representations of "as it were illustrated turns of speech." (P.I, 295) That is, a grammatical investigation does not investigate facts about the world, but "reminds us of the kinds of statements we make about phenomena." (P.I, 90) A statement can also be used in various other ways besides grammatically. Garver illustrates this as follows: Consider the sentence, "There are two basswoods in my front yard." It can be used informatively in answer to a question, e.g., "Do you have any trees in your yard?" It can be part of an explanation of an intention, e.g., in answer to, "Why are you going to sell your house?," accompanied by the additional remark, "And I don't like basswoods." And it can be used grammatically in answer to the
question, "What does 'basswood' mean?" By indicating what 'basswood' refers to, one is contributing to another knowledge about the grammar of a certain language-game. ¹

Since the recognition of certain statements as grammatical helps avoid philosophical confusion, a method for determining when a statement is grammatical would be an aid to philosophical investigation. Wittgenstein does not explicitly give such a method, but certain salient features of grammatical statements can be extracted from his comments. These features will not suffice as criteria for definite identification of grammatical statements, but they do help. Moore notes that Wittgenstein said that 'grammar' is a vague term like 'game'. ² Thus, one is not able to give defining characteristics of 'grammar' but simply point to instances of such statements and add, "These, and statements like these, are grammatical." (PI, 66) These salient features are given and discussed below and include necessary statements and statements giving the criteria for the applicability of certain predicates. ³

(1) Most grammatical statements occur in certain kinds of circumstances. (1) They occur on occasions of correction. When a student is being taught a language a great

¹Garver, "Grammar And Criterion," pp. 119-120.
²Moore, Philosophical Papers, p. 274.
³I am indebted to Newton Garver, loc. cit., for some of these features. Because they are taken from Wittgenstein's writings, the discussions of the features may overlap with his. If so, I acknowledge his work, otherwise I trust my discussion is a helpful addition.
part of the instruction consists of grammatical statements which indicate the correct use of terms in appropriate circumstances. For example, when a child hurts himself and cries, adults talk to him and teach him sentences appropriate to the expression of pain. Another occasion of correction arises when misunderstanding is evident, e.g., "By saying, 'Pain is private,' I do not mean to state an empirical fact, but that it does not make sense to doubt that oneself is in pain." (ii) Grammatical statements occur when one is giving a definition, introducing a technical term or abbreviation. In such cases it is obvious that limits are being set on the use of the symbol in the language-game. (iii) Grammatical statements usually occur when one is expressing discontent with some standard notation. Wittgenstein gives an example of such discontent in the Blue Book when talking about solipsism. He says,

Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our minds rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does. . . . Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the notations which fulfill these needs. (BBB, p. 59)

The solipsist has such a mental cramp and wants to radically restrict the use of 'real' to his own experiences. Yet he does not disagree with others about facts, for he does not say of another person who complains of pain that he is simulating. Rather, he uses 'real' in such a way that it is
"inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real."
So, when the solipsist says, "Only my experiences are real,"
he is making a grammatical statement, not in accordance with
ordinary language, which excludes as meaningless such state-
ments as "A has a real toothache." (BBB, pp. 58-59)

(2) A grammatical statement is a comment on another
sentence, rather than a response to it. Such a feature is
to be expected, since grammatical statements express rules
which state what sentences are and are not allowable in the
language-game. It is not always obvious when a statement is
a comment on another, unless it occurs in the circumstances
listed in (1). That is, sometimes the context is overtly a
grammatical one, and then the reply is both a comment on
another statement and a response to it. If the context is
covertly grammatical, then it is incumbent upon some par-
ticipant to show that it is.¹

(3) Grammatical statements express a rule of grammar.
Though this point has been previously mentioned, it has not
been explicated. To do so entails a discussion of (i) Witt-
genstein's notion of language as an activity, (ii) his claim
that to obey a rule is to fulfill a practice (institution),
(iii) the justification of an action and the justification of
a practice, and (iv) rule formulation. They are discussed
below in that order.

(i) Wittgenstein says,

¹Garver, p. 128.
There are...countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten...

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life. (PI, 23)

Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. (PI, 25)

Language is used as a tool to perform certain activities that are as common to our way of life as walking, eating, etc. That is, linguistic symbols are used to perform linguistic jobs. The troublesome aspect is that different activities can be performed by the same sentence, as well as sentences of the same form. Declarative sentences can be used informatively, directly, interrogatively, performatively, and expressively. Thus, one must be clear about the speech-act performed with a sentence, if he is to understand it. (The importance of this point will be shown in the discussion of rule formulation.)

Though the use of language is an activity common to our way of life, it is important to note that the extension of human linguistic and non-linguistic activity is not the same. Some non-linguistic activity is rule governed, and some is not, e.g., unconscious physiological responses and some habits. That is, some human actions are neither taught nor subject to correction, and some are. For example, there
are no rules governing one's habit of twitching his nose, nor is he taught to twitch his nose (except as a gesture, e.g., of disgust), but there are rules for table manners. That one eats may be a natural response, but how he does is usually governed by social rules. That a human being makes vocal noises may be a natural product of his physiological structure, but how he uses vocal noises to perform speech-acts is rule governed.

A third point to be made here concerns the open texture of speech-activities. Because human activities arise from human needs, desires, and interests, along with contingent physical circumstances, there is no logical limit to the possible activities which may become a part of the way of life. The same is true of speech-acts.

(ii) Wittgenstein says,

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on - To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs (uses, institutions). (PI, 199)

A speech-act is a form of human activity which one is taught or trained to do - an activity which consists of a pattern of regularity. Thus, either explicitly or implicitly, there are rules which govern the act, and when one breaks a rule, he is subject to correction by an appeal to the rules. The rules define the activity as a practice - an act regularly done by a group of people on certain occasions under certain cir-
cumstances. When one is taught a practice he is, either
explicitly or implicitly, instructed in the rules which
define it.

Rawls characterizes this notion of rules and calls
it the "practice conception." Since his notion parallels
that of Wittgenstein's, it is worthwhile to consider the
main points of his characterization.

(a) Since the rules define the practice, it is es-
ential the rules be publically knowable. Otherwise the
practice could not be taught, and there would be no way to
determine whether a particular act falls under the rule of
practice. In this connection Wittgenstein says,

..."obeying a rule" is a practice. And to
think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a
rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule
'privately': otherwise thinking one was obey-
ing a rule would be the same as obeying it.
(PI, 202)

(b) The practice is logically prior to the particular
case, because a particular act cannot be said to fall under
the rule of a practice unless there is such a practice. The
practice provides a setting which is a necessary condition
for certain actions to be described. For example, one can
throw a ball, run, swing a bat whether there is a game of
baseball or not; but one cannot steal a base, strike out, or
draw a walk unless he can also be described as playing base-

1 John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," Philosophical

2 Ibid., p. 25.
person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, customs." (PI, 198)

(c) One can perform an action specified by a practice only if he follows the rules which define the practice. If one were to deviate from the rules of the practice, yet claim the act which he is performing is an instance of the practice, it would simply show that he does not understand the practice. Likewise, Wittgenstein maintains that if one deviates from the rules of a language-game which he claims to be playing, it shows he does not understand the language-game. For example, "if anyone said 'I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something else', we should think something like, he does not know what the English word 'pain' means." (PI, 288)

(iii) Rawls' most significant point for our purposes here is (d) the distinction between the justification of a practice and the justification of a particular act which falls under the rules of the practice. When asked to justify his action, one refers to the practice and the rules which define it. That is, he shows or explains that it is in accordance with the practice. When the complaint is directed to the practice, it will not do to refer to the rules which define the practice. Thus, when one is requested to justify his action, the request may signify any of three possibilities. First, the questioner does not know that the one performing the act is participating in a particular practice; second, he does not know what the practice is; or, third,
his request implicitly asks for a justification of the practice. In the first two cases the performer refers the questioner to the rules of the practice in order to either indicate the practice or define it. In either case, he is justifying his act by appealing to the rules of the practice under which his act falls. The third case asks a different question altogether, and to appeal to the rules of the practice will not answer it.

Wittgenstein uses 'justification' in several ways, but when he speaks of justifying the use of an expression he appeals to a practice. This is precisely why he objects to the notion of a private language. When one seeks to learn what a word means from his own case, say 'red', he is referring to an image which he alone 'sees' and logically precludes anyone else "seeing" that image. Since the image is private in that sense, there can be no transition from what is "seen" to words, because the institution of the use of the rules is lacking. (PI, 380) Rather, one learns what the word 'red' means by being shown that this color, which everyone can see, is what people who speak English call 'red'.

How do I know that this color is red? - It would be an answer to say: "I have learnt English". (PI, 381)

It is in this sense that Wittgenstein claims to be simply describing language, rather than explaining it. ² (PI,

1 Rawls, p. 27.

² By 'explain' Wittgenstein is here referring to an "essence" of language which accounts for it being exactly
109) That is, he is claiming to be describing certain linguistic acts as falling under the rules of certain practices. Grammatical statements express the rules which define the linguistic practice, and a language-game is partially described by asserting that such-and-such grammatical rule is a rule of this language-game. The question, 'Why follow just this rule in a certain language-game?,' is answered by "This is simply what I do." (PI, 217)

There is, however, a sense in which one can justify doing one linguistic act in preference to another, say act A in preference to B, namely, when B is the result of mixing the rules of different language-games which do not have comparable moves. That Wittgenstein is seeking to alleviate such confusion is illustrated by his grammatical investigation of the language of the Tractatus and the language of sensation.

(iv) Garver suggests that many grammatical statements take the form of Black's "rule-formulation."¹ Black claims a rule formulation identifies a class of human actions and indicates whether they are required, forbidden, or permitted.² In grammatical situations the activities identified are

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¹ Garver, p. 131.
speech-acts, and the grammatical rule of a particular language-game indicates whether a particular speech-act is required, forbidden, or permitted. If a grammatical rule indicates a speech-act is required, then the act serves as a necessary condition for the playing of that specific language-game. If the grammatical rule forbids a speech-act, then the attempt to perform that act within a language-game precludes the playing of the game. That a speech-act is permitted means the act can be significantly performed, but it is not essential to the language-game. Statements which function as acts required and permitted have a use in the language-game, while statements which function as acts forbidden do not.

The place of grammatical statements in language may be summarily shown by a brief description of language. A full-blown language consists of a complex network of individual primitive languages,\(^1\) which Wittgenstein calls 'language-games'. Each language-game consists of a vocabulary containing verbs, prepositions, nouns, proper names, etc., which are instruments for performing linguistic acts. The manner in which the constituent symbols of the vocabulary are used determines the meaning of those symbols in a specific language-game. Their use consists in their syntactical re-

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\(^1\)A 'primitive language' is one which is (a) irreducible to any other two languages, though the language may have a "family resemblance" with other primitive languages, (b) able to function as a language complete in itself although it is a constituent of a more complex language, and (c) conceivably a basic language which can be expanded into a complex language like that of which it is a constituent.
lation to one another (surface grammar) in the formation of phrases and sentences and the linguistic act which the phrases and sentences are used to perform. That is, syntactically appropriate combinations of symbols can be used to make reports, announce, predict, persuade, deceive, encourage, etc. But for every specific language-game, there are some linguistic acts which cannot be performed without yielding conceptual confusion, or otherwise interfering with the attainment of the purpose of the language-game. But no symbol, or combination of symbols, has a use without a practice or institution.

(4) The analysis thus far has only been concerned with grammatical statements which arise from the comparison of language-games. But notions about grammar as a whole have been explicated. Thus, they are attributable to grammatical statements as a whole, as well as to that class examined above. Another class of grammatical statements are those referred to as 'necessary'. These are statements which often take the form of empirical propositions, but in fact are quite different, for they are valid rather than true. The validity of a necessary statement can be shown in two ways: (a) it is deducible from other necessary statements already accepted as valid, and (b) it can be shown to express a rule of language (e.g., by showing (i) that it expresses a linguistic rule and (ii) that the rule expressed is certified by verifying another statement, which says that the rule expressed obtains.) On the other hand, if it is
taken to be valid, it can be construed as expressing a lin-
guistic rule.

If the necessary statement is accepted as valid, then when anyone using the language breaks the rule expressed, he is subject to correction. But the same is true of an empirical statement. That is, if A says London is the capitol of the United States, he would be subject to correction. What, then, is the functional distinction between necessary and empirical statements? Just this: If A were shown his mistake, yet he insisted on repeating the statement in a sincere manner, we would think something like, "For some reason he is trying to confuse his hearers"; but if one insisted on breaking the rule expressed by the necessary statement, we could only conclude he is using the terms in a sense quite different from ordinary language.¹

These kinds of statements are mentioned by Wittgenstein in 251 and 252 of the PI. They are statements whose opposites cannot be imagined and are grammatical, rather than empirical. For example, if "This body is extended" is taken as empirical, we say, "Nonsense!," but if it is taken to be expressing a linguistic rule, we say, "Of course!" (PI, 252) The rule excludes the inference that bodies are extensionless from the language-game.

The important question concerns what makes the denial of necessary statements unimaginable or unintelligible.

¹Black, Models and Metaphors, pp. 66-67.
Since necessary statements reflect grammatical rules, which prohibit certain inferences in specific language-games, the question has to do with what is called 'inferring' and 'calculating'. That is, necessary statements indicate what inferences are legitimate and illegitimate in any specific language-game. The explication of Wittgenstein's position on necessary statements below also includes an explication of that aspect of 'form of life' which is related to grammar.

Consider again the case where one is to produce a series of numbers according to the order, "Add two." The results of the tests and exercises constitute sufficient evidence that he can produce such a series up to 1000. But when asked to continue beyond 1000, he consistently writes 1000, 1004, 1008, etc., and no matter how the teacher tries to convince him that he is not following the rule 'Add two' when going beyond 1000, the student insists he is doing the right thing. Wittgenstein says,

\[ \ldots \text{In such a case we might say, perhaps:} \]
\[ \text{It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on".} \]
\[ \text{Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip. (PI, 185)} \]

The student naturally responds to the order in a way quite different from the usual. Wittgenstein maintains that a "correct" response to such an order does not depend upon a new insight or intuition at every step of the series, but
upon "what, at any stage, we are to call 'being in accord' with that proposition" (i.e., the proposition "Add two"). (Pi, 186) The question becomes "Are there any circumstances under which it is conceivable to say that the student's response is in accord with the proposition, even though his response is to write 1000, 1004, 1008, etc.?"

One answer is to say, "Yes, the student has simply adopted a different convention." That is, the student has decided that his response to the proposition is necessary, irrespective of his having adopted other conventions consonant with ordinary language. Only in this decision is he any different from whose who would write 1002, 1004, etc. Wittgenstein has been interpreted as such a "full-blown conventionalist" by Dummett, who says, ". . . for Wittgenstein the logical necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of a linguistic convention."\(^1\)

Stroud shows such an interpretation of Wittgenstein is wrong. To adopt one convention over several implies there are alternative responses to an order which are imaginable, but "it seems impossible to understand how we could 'adopt the convention' that writing '998, 1000, 1004,...' is going on in the same way, or taking steps of the same size."\(^2\)

Wittgenstein says necessary statements state that which we

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cannot grammatically imagine to be otherwise. (PI, 251-252) On the other hand, part of Wittgenstein's purpose in this analysis is to show there is some explanation other than the two alternatives that he either must understand, or he is an idiot, stupid, etc. Wittgenstein's point is that the reason we are unable to imagine the student's response to be in accord with the rule is not because it leads to a logical contradiction. But the difficulty in establishing this point, by giving a third alternative, is that Wittgenstein must explain a case which is unimaginable, i.e., make intelligible that which cannot be imagined to be intelligible.

Stroud contends that "the...intelligibility and strength of Wittgenstein's examples derive from their being severely isolated or restricted." When one considers the consequences of the student's response to the order in contexts wider than those Wittgenstein gives, the problems mul-

1 Wittgenstein gives a number of examples in his writings to illustrate this point. Cf. RPh I, 5, 115, 136, 139, 142-151, 168; II, 76, 78, 81, 84; III, 15, 17; IV, 5; V, 6, 8, 12, 14, 27, 29, 36, 42, 43, 44; PI, 185.

2 Two senses of 'logical' need to be distinguished here. First, one can speak of a logical a priori order in the world (as Wittgenstein does in the Tractatus) which is the necessary condition for any language. The necessity expressed by this sense is a "must" which holds irrespective of any empirical fact. Secondly, one can speak of a logical order which obtains because of the empirical facts. The necessity expressed here is a "must" which holds only because the facts are what they are. The former sense refers to logical rules which are independent of any empirical fact, while the latter refers to logical rules which are dependent upon empirical facts. The "logical contradiction" Wittgenstein speaks of here uses 'logical' in the first sense.

3 Stroud, p. 488.
tiply so as to make the response ridiculous. The reason the response appears more ridiculous in proportion to the context is that, in order to accommodate the response in wider contexts, one has to abandon more and more of his ordinary ways of thinking about the world. In order to live in a world where such a response is ordinary, much of what one now thinks intelligible would have to be given up as unintelligible. But if certain facts were different from what they are (e.g., facts about our physiological and psychological make-up), the student's response might be taken as ordinary. The point is, calculating and inferring might have been done differently, and just because contingent facts are such that they are done in such-and-such way does not mean they must be done that way regardless of those facts. Wittgenstein's third alternative concerns a being who differs so from us that he naturally considers intelligible some things we do not.¹

Consider now the following quote from Wittgenstein:

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as it may sound) in judgments. (PI, 241-242)

The reason why human beings can talk about what is true and false is the fact that "they agree in the language they use."

¹ Stroud, pp. 493-495.
This fact is about their form of life, which is contingent, rather than logical. But that it obtains results in a logic of language which makes language what it in fact is. Human beings construe certain statements as "necessary," because the form of life is such that a judgment about the truth or falsity of the statement does not make sense. Necessary statements, then, express grammatical rules which preclude certain inferences in specific language-games, because to include them would produce logical nonsense.¹

Grammatical rules, then, are "arbitrary" in the highly restricted sense that if the facts which constitute the form of life were any different from what they are, the grammatical rules would be different. But they are not arbitrary, because the facts which constitute the form of life do obtain. Wittgenstein also says grammatical rules are arbitrary if they are construed as rules which define language-games as empirical facts, but they are not arbitrary if construed as logically necessary conditions for there to be a language, e.g., as the logic of language in the Tractatus. (PI, 497)

(5) Statements giving criteria which enable one to justify an utterance are also "grammatical statements," because they contribute to the grammatical explanation of sign-

¹The sense in which Wittgenstein says he is only describing and not explaining language is that he is considering the logic of language only as a result of the form of life. To explain language would be to sort out the causal relations between the facts constituting the form of life and our concepts. That, he says, is a task for the natural sciences. (PI, p. 230)
significant terms in the utterance. For example, Wittgenstein says,

It is part of the grammar of the word "chair" that this is what we call "to sit on a chair," and it is a part of the grammar of the word "meaning" that this is what we call "explanation of a meaning"; in the same way to explain my criteria for another person's having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the word "toothache" and, in this sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word "toothache." (BBB, p. 24)

Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition. (PI, 353)

It is important to note that the criteria justifying an assertion give only a part of the grammar of the significant term(s) in the assertion, and the method of verifying a proposition only contributes to the grammar of the proposition. The criteria to which one appeals to justify the assertion 'B has toothache' only give a partial grammatical explanation of 'toothache', for it in no way explains the grammar of the term in first-person, present-tense statements. Failure to seriously note this may lead to the mistaken view that Wittgenstein, in the Blue Book, is saying that what a man does or says is called his having a toothache. The concept 'toothache' is incomplete as long as one is aware of only one part of the grammar of the term. Although there are significant grammatical distinctions between third-person and first-

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person pain-language, the concept of 'pain' (or of a specific kind of pain, e.g., 'toothache') is determined by the grammar as a whole. A consideration of only part of the grammar of a term may sometime be as misleading as permitting similar moves in dissimilar language-games. The explication of Wittgenstein's notion of 'criterion' in this section shows Albritton makes this mistake in his interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion of 'criterion' in the Blue Book and blurs the distinction between a criterion which justifies asserting of a phenomenon that it obtains and a criterion which justifies ascribing a state to someone. To blur this distinction is to fail to see that Wittgenstein denies that the grammar of sensations is modeled after the grammar of 'object and name', as shown in the PI, and there is no evidence that Wittgenstein's view on the grammar of sensation is any different in the Blue Book.

Albritton says,

Wittgenstein repeatedly says or implies, in the Blue and Brown Books, that criteria of X are phenomena that we call "X", or refer to by the expression "X" (if not refer to as "X"), or describe by the expression "X" (if not describe as "X") under various circumstances. He means, as far as I can make out, that a man's preparing tea for two, say, may be part of what is properly called his "expecting someone to tea, . . ."1

These various ways of speaking about criteria imply that to be a criterion of X is just to be (what is called) X, in case there is only one criterion of X, or to be (what is called)

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1 Albritton, p. 240.
X under certain circumstances, in case there is more than one criterion of X.\footnote{Albritton, p. 241.}

This leads Albritt\textlilento further say,

But can what a man does or says be called his having a toothache, or referred to as described as that, or even referred to or described by saying that he has a toothache, under any circumstances, in a proper and literal sense of the words said? No.\footnote{Ibid., p. 242.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 243.}

The "picture" of the hidden something or other that is uniquely called "expecting" doesn't vanish; or it seems to vanish, but only because the Blue Book has evoked a competing picture, of the plain man calling what that other man is doing over there, with his diary and teapot, "expecting".\footnote{Ibid., p. 243.}

Albritton interprets Wittgenstein to say that a man's toothache behavior is his toothache, and expectation behavior is his expecting. It is maintained here that Wittgenstein does not say that.

Wittgenstein does list a series of actions typical of one expecting another to come to tea and says, "And all this is called 'expecting B from 4 to 4.30'." (BBB, p. 20) But the context shows Wittgenstein does not mean the pattern of behavior is the expecting; rather, the action justifies the assertion, "A is expecting B from 4 to 4.30." Just prior to this passage Wittgenstein gives the source of man's "craving for generality" and says that his craving results in philosophical confusion by leading men to think each general
term in our language has an essence, so that every application has the same definitive boundary. In rejecting this "craving for generality" Wittgenstein appeals for a consideration of each specific case. He says,

If someone said, "surely this is not all that one calls 'wishing'," we should answer, "certainly not, but you can build up more complicated cases if you like." And after all, there is not one definite class of features which characterizes all cases of wishing. . . (BBB, p. 19, Italics mine.)

The next paragraph relates cases of knowledge followed by the passage which describes a case of someone expecting B from 4 to 4.30. Immediately after, Wittgenstein speaks of a "totally different use of the word 'expectation' which we use . . . to mean a particular sensation." (BBB, p. 20) But this use has a "connection" with the other use because "the activities described are accompanied by a peculiar feeling, a tension; and it is natural to use the word 'expectation' to mean this experience of tension." (BBB, p. 20) The point is that A's behavior can be recognized as expectation behavior which justifies one saying, "A is expecting B from 4 to 4.30," and it is reasonable to infer that A is experiencing the sensation of expecting. That is, claims Wittgenstein, I can say, "He is expecting X," when he acts thus-and-so, because I act thus-and-so when expecting X. The same is true of the correspondence between toothache sensation and toothache behavior. I suppose, claims Wittgenstein, that x-sensation corresponds to another's x-behavior just because my x-sensation corresponds to my x-behavior. (BBB, p. 24) But there
is quite a difference between supposing A's x-sensation to correspond to his x-behavior and saying A's x-behavior is his x-sensation. Albritton claims Wittgenstein to hold the latter view in the Blue Book, but he holds the former.

To interpret the Blue Book as Albritton does is to construe Wittgenstein as a pure behaviorist. It has been shown that Wittgenstein rejects behaviorism in the PI, and there is no reason to interpret him differently in the Blue Book. His comments on solipsism indicate he thinks it grammatically misleading to claim to learn what a sensation word means from one's own case. (Cf. BBB, pp. 20, 25, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 53, 68, 71, 73)

In the Blue Book Wittgenstein introduces two "antithetical term" in order to avoid certain confusions concerning the question, "How do you know that so-and-so is the case?" "We sometimes answer," he says, "by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'." (BBB, p. 24) That is, both criteria and symptoms may be used to justify the assertion, "So-and-so is the case." 'Criterion', as an antithesis to 'symptom', for Wittgenstein, defines a phenomenon, and a 'symptom' is "a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion." (BBB, p. 24-25) Thus, to justify a statement by appealing to criterion is to appeal to a tautology of definition, and to justify the statement by appealing to symptoms is to make a hypothesis. But immediately after making this point, Wittgenstein belabors the
claim that many concepts have no real definition. We do not use language as a calculus governed by exact rules. Does this mean we cannot justify assertions which contain such concept-words? Wittgenstein obviously thinks we can. Cases of wishing, thinking, and understanding cannot be strictly bound, yet statements which assert such cases are justifiable. (BBB, pp. 19-20) Wittgenstein's claim then is that third-person sensation statements are justified by (i) appealing to criteria which justify saying that a case of particular sensation behavior obtains and (ii) appealing to an established convention that there is a correspondence between one performing particular sensation behavior and one having (feeling) that sensation.

Consider the following statements:

(a) Behavioral patterns \( B_1 \ldots B_n \) illustrate the kind of behavior called 'toothache behavior'.

(b) Jones' behavior is toothache behavior because it matches behavioral patterns \( B_1 \ldots B_n \). (Or, the assertion, "Jones' behavior is toothache behavior," is justified because Jones' behavior matches the kind of behavior called 'toothache behavior'.)

(c) It is an established convention that toothache behavior corresponds to one having (feeling) a toothache.

(d) If (a) and (b) are true, then on the basis of (c) one is justified in asserting, "Jones has (feels) a toothache."

The following remarks about these statement constitute further explication of Wittgenstein's notion of 'criteria'.

(A) Statement (a) asserts that a particular linguistic practice obtains, viz., that a particular kind of
behavior is called 'toothache behavior'. Thus, there are certain linguistic rules which correspond to the regularity of the practice. But, because there is no set of behavioral patterns which place a definite limit on the extension of toothache behavior, $B_1\ldots B_n$ cannot serve as a defining criteria in that sense. Wittgenstein, however, does speak of such kinds of behavior as "criteria." (BBB, p. 24) 'Toothache behavior' cannot be precisely defined because there is no logical limitation on the ways by which a sensation can be expressed. The sensation toothache cannot be defined by criteria because its grammar cannot be construed after the model of 'object and name', i.e., we do not learn toothache language independently of the circumstances that produce them and the behavior by which they are expressed. Thus, criteria which justify the assertion, "Jones has a toothache," consist of behavioral phenomena which are taken to be natural, or conventional, expressions of sensation, as noted in (c). These behavioral phenomena are taken to coincide with the sensation itself.

Wittgenstein is consistent in speaking of the criteria for another person's having a toothache, rather than for the toothache itself. The criteria constitute the behavior called 'toothache behavior'. The point to emphasize is that if Wittgenstein is to be consistent with his definition of 'symptom', the following alternative interpretations of Wittgenstein's notion of criteria for sensations obtain: (i) The criteria are of toothache itself, and the
toothache is the behavior. (ii) The criteria are of toothache behavior, and the inference that one has (feels) the sensation of toothache is based on something other than criteria. Since Wittgenstein's explanation of the grammar of sensations in the PI shows he is not the pure behaviorist (i) suggests, and since there is no reason to think his position is any different in the Blue Book, (i) cannot be an adequate interpretation. Alternative (ii) avoids attributing such an inconsistency to Wittgenstein and readily fits the Blue Book passage, as indicated in statements (a) through (d) above. Wittgenstein says, "we learnt the use of the phrase 'so-and-so has a toothache' by associating certain kinds of behavior to those who were said to have toothache." (BBB, p. 24)

Sometime we are able to infer so-and-so has a toothache from the fact he has a red spot on his cheek, because the common toothache behavior of holding one's cheek leaves such a spot. The spot is a symptom which experience has taught us corresponds to holding one's cheek, which is a criterion for the application of the predicate 'toothache behavior'; i.e., it justifies the statement 'This is toothache behavior'. The ground of 'Jones has a toothache', in such a circumstance, is a matter of convention, at which point "we strike rock bottom." (BBB, p. 24; cf. PI, 217)

It is important to see that this claim does not mean, "If I suppose that someone has pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had." (PI, 350) This supposition is an empirical statement made
by a skeptic in defense of his position. The occasion is the following argument. The skeptic maintains there is no justification for ascribing a mental state to someone else, because there are no conceptual relations between propositions about mental states and propositions about behavior.\(^1\) By this the skeptic means there is a barrier which prohibits one from perceiving another's sensation, so there is no way to establish a correlation between one's behavior and his experiencing a sensation. Wittgenstein counters the skeptic's claim by showing the picture he produces cannot be applied, i.e., no sense can be given the hypothesis that other people feel pain as the skeptic uses the term, for the hypothesis transcends all experience.\(^2\) If the skeptic tries to give sense to the hypothesis by saying he supposes another to have what he has often had, Wittgenstein shows that this is an appeal to identity which will not work. (Cf. PI, 350) Rather, Wittgenstein's reference to "convention" concerns the recognition of natural expressions of sensation which is a part of that "common behavior of mankind" by which we are able to translate an unknown language. (PI, 206, 283, 441) If a man were writhing on the ground, holding his leg, grinning, etc., and there were no reason to think he was simulating, then one recognizes the behavior as pain behavior and naturally con-


iders the man to be experiencing the pain he is expressing. To deny he has the sensation of pain without reason is unnatural. We would say of the one who denies the man is experiencing pain that either he has some reason he does not want to tell, or he does not know the meaning of 'pain'.

(B) Statements (a) and (c) speak of contingent practices which imply that there are linguistic rules regulating the practice, and these rules are also contingent. Thus, the connection between a criterion and that which it is a criterion of is a contingent relation. It is not a necessary fact that man behaves the way he does when he expresses a sensation, and the artificial behavior which replaces natural behavior is certainly not necessary. Thus, the fulfillment of a criterion does not necessarily entail that which it is a criterion of, for the facts could be different from what they are. However, Wittgenstein says,

A doctor asks: "How is he feeling?" The nurse says: "He is groaning." A report on his behaviour. But need there be any question for them whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion "If he groans, we must give him more analgesic" - without suppressing a middle term? (PI, p. 179)

I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as any fact. But this does not make the propositions "He is much depressed", "25 x 25 = 625" and "I am sixty years old" into similar instruments. The explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind. - This seems to point to a psychological difference. But the difference is logical. (PI, p. 224)
The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game. (PI, p. 224)

That one can be certain of someone else's sensation means there is a place at which doubt loses its point, e.g., imagining an abyss yawning before the front door each time one starts to open it. Doubt is, so to speak, out of the question in such cases, because it is an unreasonable doubt. But the connection between the criterion and what it is a criterion of is not necessary in that doubt can be imagined, irrespective how unreasonable it might be. Necessary statements are those whose opposites cannot be imagined. Criteriaal statements are not necessary statements.¹

(c) Statement (a) also implies that different criteria can coincide. That is, certain kinds of behavior are called 'pain behavior', but clearly the behavior which justifies the assertion, "Jones is in pain," in one case does not have to be identical to the behavior which accompanies another case of Jones' being in pain. That different sets of criteria are used does not mean a different concept is involved, so long as the two (or more) sets coincide. Wittgenstein illustrates this by considering different criteria for fulfilling the order, "Point to your eye." One may use kinaesthetic sensation, tactile sensation, the visual experience of one's finger appearing before the eye, or the vis-

¹Albritton originally maintained that the connection between a criterion and that of which it is a criterion is a necessary connection. But in a Postscript (1966) he rejects that claim and says it is contingent in the same sense as above. Albrittion, pp. 247-250.
ual experience of looking into a mirror, etc. We use these different criteria alternately in different circumstances, but they coincide to justify the same thing. (BBB, pp. 63-64) But if the criteria were to conflict, then they would be criteria of different concepts.¹

Wittgenstein also makes the related claim that symptoms and criteria can fluctuate. He says,

In practice, if you were asked which phenomenon is the defining criterion and which is the symptom, you would in most cases be unable to answer this question except by making an arbitrary decision ad hoc. It may be practical to define a word by taking one phenomenon as the defining criterion, but we shall be easily persuaded to define the word by means of what, according to our first use, was a symptom. (BBB, p. 25)

The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to-morrow be used to define it. (PI, 79)

The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. (PI, 354)

For example, thermometers are correlated with the temperature at which water freezes under a specific atmospheric pressure. Thus, the criterion for 32°F is the change of state of pure water, and the symptom is the mercury column in the thermometer. But when the thermometer has been accurately graduated, it can be said that water freezes at 32°F, and here the criterion and symptom are reversed. Such fluctuation is

¹Garver, p. 219.
possible, of course, only if there is a reliable correlation between phenomenon. But if such a correlation has been established, the statement, e.g., "Water freezes at 32°F," can be construed as a grammatical statement which gives criteria or as an empirical statement.  

1(1) Wittgenstein's claims about coinciding criteria and fluctuation of criteria and symptoms may be used to show that Malcolm is not using Wittgenstein's notion of criterion in his comments on dreaming. (Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), pp. 74-82, and Shihara and Fodor, loc. cit., pp. 405-408.) Malcolm's claim is that whenever a criterion other than dream report is used, the concept of dreaming is significantly altered. And since the psychologist must rely on some other criteria in an attempt to measure the duration of dreams, it must be a concept of 'dream' significantly different from the ordinary concept. Such a radical method of counting concepts is not compatible with Wittgenstein's view of criterion. It is clearly conceivable that criteria other than dream reports (e.g., rapid eye movement, tossing, tumbling, etc.) may be sufficiently correlated with dream reports to become coinciding criteria of dreaming, i.e., they are concomitants of a phenomenon which may come to be used to define it. (Pl, 79; Garver, pp. 234-238.)

(2) Chihara and Fodor claim Wittgenstein overlooks a type of justification which does not involve an appeal to either criteria or observed correlations, viz., statements involving theoretical inferences, explanation, entities, etc. Theoretical systems utilize logical constructs whose criteria often are as much at issue as the indices to be correlated with them. Therefore, "such justifications depend...on appeals to the simplicity, plausibility and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole..." (loc. cit., p. 411.)

That Wittgenstein does not consider this type of justification in his writings is true. But that such a method of justification is incompatible with his theory of language is not so obvious. Though Wittgenstein claims to only be describing language, he is often given to recommending a particular grammar for a language-game. He is seeking to establish an order for the use of language, out of many orders, which will most adequately accomplish the end in view. (Pl, 132) He is looking for that order which will most adequately clarify concepts and fulfill the linguistic needs of man. Since criteria can coincide and criteria and symptoms fluctuate, presumably one, in certain situations, has reasons for using this criterion or for choosing as a
Wittgenstein's notion of 'criterion' can be summarized as follows: If $X$ is a criterion (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$ are criteria) of $Y$, then $X$ (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$) express(es) rules for the application of 'Y' under normal situations of type $C$. If $X'$ (or $X'_1 \ldots X'_n$) may be used as a criterion (or criteria) of $Y$ under normal situations of type $C$, then $X$ and $X'$ (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$ and $X'_1 \ldots X'_n$) are coinciding criterion (or criteria) of $Y$. If $X$ is a criterion (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$ are criteria) of $Y$ and $S$ an observed correlation of $X$ (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$), then $S$ is a symptom of $Y$ and may justify the application of 'Y' under $C$. It is possible that $X$ (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$) and $S$ may fluctuate so that under $C$ one is a criterion (are criteria) and the other a symptom, and under $C'$ the reverse may obtain. But, both cannot be a criterion (criteria) on the same occasion. If someone recognizes $X$ (or $X_1 \ldots X_n$) as a criterion (criteria) of $Y$, and the criterion (criteria) is (are) satisfied, yet he refuses to recognize the applicability of 'Y' under $C$, then it is incumbent upon him to show that $C$ is abnormal.

The rules expressed by the statements giving criteria for $Y$ concern the propriety and impropriety of the use criterion what was formerly a symptom. Thus, one can, in certain situations, construct a grammar which facilitates the clarification of concepts. One of these situations concerns theories of explanation, and the criteria for scientific expressions can be justified in terms of facility. Theoretical terms have a grammar which may include criteria for their use; and the criterion itself is subject to justification. The justification concerns an evaluation of the adequacy of the institution or practice constituted by the theory as a whole, i.e., the explanatory and predictive capabilities of the theory.
of 'Y' under certain circumstances; therefore, these statements may be taken as grammatical. They give at least part of the grammar of certain kinds of statements, viz., those statements which can be justified and those declarative statements which can be true or false. (exclusive of first-person, present-tense mental state statements).

It has been shown that Wittgenstein's notion of 'grammar' is intricately related to the notion of 'use' in his locution on meaning. Therefore, the analysis of grammatical statements in this chapter facilitates a determination of that use of 'use', and since a grammatical explanation is an explanation of the meaning of a term, the analysis also facilitates a determination of the use of 'meaning' in the locution. This is the task of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

MEANING AS USE

Wittgenstein's notion of 'grammar' has been shown to be intricately related to the notion of 'use' in his locu-
tion on meaning. Grammatical statements have been shown to express grammatical rules which govern the use of terms and sentences in a language-game. The preceding chapters have also given the background out of which the locution arose, and the essential notions associated with the locution have been explicated. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, the uses of 'use' and 'meaning' are considered in order to determine which are applicable to the locution. Second, the locution is discussed in the light of the previ-
ous chapters and the uses of 'use' and 'meaning' explicated in the first section of this chapter. The discussion con-
cerns a precising of the locution and comments on the limits of its application. Parts I and II deal with these problems respectively.

I

Consider the following two sentences: (1) 'A screw-
driver is used by placing the tip opposite the handle into the head of a screw and rotating the handle either to the
left or right.' (2) 'A screwdriver is used to tighten or loosen screws.' Sentence (1) states how a screwdriver is used, and (2) states the purpose for which it is to be used. Although there are variations to be distinguished between the uses of 'use' as "method" and "purpose," an analysis of these variations show these two are basic to all other ordinary uses of 'use'.

1. 'Use' As Purpose.

Examples of variations of '"use' as purpose" are considered first. (a) Ryle notes that 'use' as purpose is often referred to as 'utility' and may be confused with 'use' as method. 'Utility', he says, refers to what something is used for. 'Use' as method, on the other hand, refers to knowing how to do something - the method or way of using it. 'Use' implies technique, and presupposes rules or a standard. Furthermore, one can know the utility of something without necessarily knowing how it is used. For example, one can know an amp meter is used to determine the amps involved in an electrical system without knowing how the meter is used. A confusion of 'utility' and 'use' as method may result in a confusion of questions about the usefulness of something with questions about ways to operate with it.¹ The distinction between 'use' as purpose and 'use' as method indicated above is made to avoid confusing such questions.

O. P. Wood offers some examples of 'use' which coincide with 'use' as purpose: (i) 'The church uses the revised version', (ii) 'I use Pope's translation', (iii) 'You use a particular opening gambit'. He says, "Here the word 'use' seems to mean that the thing or technique used plays an unspecified part in some activity, and it is assumed that everyone knows the sort of use that such a thing or technique has."¹ Three possibilities arise: The sentences may indicate the fact that a particular version, translation, or gambit is ordinarily used by an institution or individual. Second, such a fact may imply that the user may not know why such-and-such is used; i.e., it is a custom which has come about without asking, "Why?" or the reason has been forgotten. Thirdly, the user is able to give reasons for preferring the particular version, translation, or gambit. In the third case 'use' is that of purpose. (The former two cases correspond to 'usage' which is discussed below.) It may be contended that in the third case purpose is eliminated when one uses a thing or technique merely because he likes it; no reasons related to the accomplishment of a goal can be given, and on some occasions the thing or technique preferred may hinder the accomplishment of a goal. But purpose is not eliminated, because the achievement of a specific goal is simply relegated as secondary to the purpose of satisfying certain likes and dislikes.

(b) Wood also gives three other examples in which, he claims, the uses of 'use' are less clear: (i) 'What is the use of worrying?', (ii) 'It's no use doing that', and (iii) 'It's useless to try'. These examples are negative variations of 'use' as purpose, for they are reducible to (i') 'What is the purpose in worrying?', (ii') 'There is no purpose in doing that', and (iii') 'There is no purpose in trying that', or 'Nothing can be achieved in trying'.

(c) Pitcher describes 'use as', e.g., 'A hammer can be used as a paper weight'. This is a variation of 'use' as purpose, because the example is essentially the same as 'A hammer can be used to weigh down paper'. The latter sentence has a descriptive phrase which replaces 'paper weight' and shows the connotation of the name includes purpose. Pitcher also describes (d) 'use for', e.g., 'Olive oil is used for frying'. This is also a variation of 'use' as purpose, for the example is reducible to 'Olive oil is used for the purpose of frying.

Two additional uses of 'use' listed by Pitcher are (e) 'use in' and (f) 'use to do', e.g., 'A hammer is used in the building of a house' and 'A hammer is used to do a specific task'. Use (e) refers to several acts in which the use of a hammer is involved in the building of a house, etc.

1Wood, p. 315.
3Ibid.
whereas (f) refers to one specific act. Both of these are variations of 'use' as purpose, because both refer to the accomplishment of a task.

Pitcher uses the distinction between (e) and (f) to introduce a distinction between "speech-act" and "speech activity." A speech-act is a linguistic job accomplished by a single word, whereas a speech-activity is a linguistic job requiring several sentences to accomplish. For example, a command such as "Hurry!" is a speech act, but when it is used within a larger linguistic context, e.g., to tell a joke or give instructions, it becomes part of a speech-activity.

The above examples suffice to show what is meant by variations of 'use' as purpose. 'Use' in such instances is more closely concerned with a goal to be accomplished than with how something is used in the process. Thus, 'use' as purpose is more like 'utility' than is 'use' as method.

2. 'Use' As Method.

Variations of 'use' as method can be considered by examining how one explains the proper use of a set of tools, i.e., the sorts of answers that are given the question, "How are these tools used?" (i) 'Tool x is used only under the following circumstances. . .' (ii) 'Tool x is used according to the instructions given on the lid of the box'. (iii) 'Tool x is used like this' (followed by a demonstration).

2Ibid., p. 235.
(iv) 'Tool x is used in the same way as y is.' (v) 'Tool x is used in the same ways as y is up to this point, then it is used like z.' (vi) 'There is no established way of using tool x; you just have to fiddle with it until you get the desired results.' (vii) 'Tool x is used by placing it in this position, and then it functions very well by itself.'

The point to be noted is that all the answers, except (i) and (vii), are solely concerned with an act or activity. Answer (i) concerns the conditions under which a tool is to be used, and hence can also answer the question 'When is tool x used?'

Knowing how to use a tool includes knowing when to use it and is distinct from the purpose of the tool. Answer (vii) concerns an act which results in a state, i.e., it is used by placing it in a particular place under certain conditions, where it works by itself. Furthermore, the tools make some acts possible which would otherwise be impossible. Though some jobs can be accomplished without tools, other jobs cannot, and in any case, the tools facilitate the accomplishment of the job.

A contextual distinction is to be noted with respect to (iii). Consider one person showing another a small electrical tool which has a thin point that vibrates when turned on. The question, "What is that used for?" may be answered by giving a demonstration to show that it is an engraving tool. After the demonstration, a second question - "How do you do that?" - may be answered by another demonstration. To a non-participating observer, A, there would seem to be no
significant difference in the point of the demonstrations, but to the participant, B, the former concerns what the tool is used for, and the latter, the manner of using the tool. The difference is that B was, and A was not, aware of certain aspects of the context surrounding the demonstrations.

This example not only shows that some explanations of 'use' as purpose and 'use' as method are context dependent, but also that the two are related in some important respects. First, there are some circumstances wherein a demonstration of how x is used depends upon what is obtained by the use of x, as shown in the example. Secondly, the acts or activities referred to in (ii) through (vii) are purposeful activities. That is, the acts requisite to the proper use of tools are acts designed to accomplish some goal by means of the tools.

3. 'Use' and 'Usage'.

Ryle makes a distinction between 'use' and 'usage'. A "usage", he says, is a custom, vogue, or convention; it connotes something that is already in progress. 'Use', on the other hand, is used by Ryle in the sense of 'use' as method described above. They are distinguishable, he says, because (a) a description of a usage presupposes a description of a use; (b) whereas it does not make sense to speak of a 'miscustom', it does make sense to speak of a 'misuse'; and (c) information about a use is independent of information about a usage. For Ryle, 'usage' is not a use in itself, but a linguistic symbol which refers to a custom about a use.¹

Fodor criticizes Ryle's distinction on three counts: (i) the distinction is unclear; (ii) it is not critical for understanding a theory of ordinary language analysis; and (iii) Ryle is wrong in saying information about a use is independent of information about usage.¹

(i) Though there is a distinction between how a thing is done and that it is done, it is a misdescription for Ryle to call one 'use' and the other 'usage'. "Whenever we are willing to say that U is a correct usage in some language L, we are also willing to say that U is used in L in that way."²

(ii) A usage is also a way of using words, even if it is a customary way. To say of a particular usage that it was prevalent at a given time also implies that it can be described and learned. And to learn a usage is to learn how to do something. Fodor says this is important because it indicates that some of the linguistic behavior of speakers must be explained for a theory of language to be adequate.³

(iii) Ryle fails to note there are three different senses of 'how to...'. (a) One can speak of how x can (or could) be done, and this does not imply that anyone does do x that way; (b) one can speak of how x ought to be done, and neither does this imply x is ever done that way; and (c) one can speak of how people do do x.

²Ibid., p. 7.
³Ibid., pp. 8-9.
The objection 'x is not done that way' is legitimate only to sense (c), whereas 'x cannot be done that way' is a legitimate objection to all senses of 'how to...' Ryle uses (c) in his distinction of 'use' and 'usage' and is misleading, says Fodor, because he confuses the rules of language with things like recipes. For example, he says if Mrs. Beeton tells us how one can make omelets, she clearly is not giving any information about how certain chefs do, in fact, make omelets; i.e., Mrs. Beeton's recipe need not correspond to those of Parisian chefs.¹ But, claims Fodor, recipes tell "how to" in sense (a), rules of language tell "how to" in sense (c).² Fodor's point is that rules of language are not analogous to directions which tell how omelets can be made; rules which define linguistic practices tell how people do use language.

Ryle, however, is not saying that information about a usage does not give information about a use, for a usage presupposes a description of a use. But, Ryle is saying that information about a use need not necessarily also be information about a usage. Usages are uses which have become customs, but a use need not be a custom. That is, all usages are uses, but not all uses are usages.

Fodor's criticisms, then, miss the point. Ryle explicitly says that a usage implies a use, but Fodor fails to

¹Ryle, "Ordinary Language," p. 175.
²Fodor, "The Uses of 'Use'," pp. 10-11.
see that Ryle's point here is that a use does not imply a usage. In criticism (ii) Fodor says the distinction is not important to a theory of language. Presumably, this is because of the further claim that the rules which define linguistic practices tell how people do use language, rather than telling how people can use language, regardless how they do use it. That is, linguistic rules tell 'how to' in sense (c) rather than (a). Fodor's claim will not do, because if linguistic rules define only uses which are usages, then a theory of language could not account for innovations and new uses of terms. Mrs. Beeton's recipe may be unique and not imply that Parisian chefs, or anyone, make omelets the same way, but the recipe still defines a way of making omelets. Likewise, linguistic rules indicate which speech-acts are permissible in a language-game, rather than just those acts which people do perform. If a person is able to innovate uses of certain terms in a language-game to facilitate a clarification of the concepts involved and to promote the purpose of the language-game, no one can accuse him of a misuse of language just because people do not normally use the terms in just that way. It was noted in Chapter III that though Wittgenstein claims to only describe the use of language, he is also interested in exposing inadequate grammars which lead to philosophical confusion and recommending more adequate grammars which avoid those confusions. These grammatical rules are intricately related to the use of a term as referred to in the locution on meaning - a use which tells
'how to' in sense (a) as well as sense (c).

4. The Uses of 'Meaning'.

Since Wittgenstein does not distinguish the different senses of 'meaning', it is important to distinguish those senses in order to determine that sense which is consistent with his locution. Consider the following:

(1) There is a sense of 'meaning' similar to 'important'. For example, 'I can't tell you what your friendship means to me at a time like this.' 'Means' expresses the importance of the friendship.

(2) There is a sense of 'meaningful' similar to 'relevant'. Consider a conversation between three persons about the foreign policy of the United States. Suddenly one says, "Research has found that habitual smoking is harmful to one's health." One of the other two is apt to say, "Comments about smoking are meaningless to the present conversation." Again, consider one of a group saying, "Jones made a very meaningful contribution to the conversation." 'Meaning' and 'meaningless' in these contexts are similar to 'relevant' and 'irrelevant', because the sentences are reducible to "Comments about smoking are irrelevant to the present conversation," and "Jones made a very relevant contribution to the conversation."

These examples can be used to make explicit a distinction between senses of 'meaning' important to Wittgenstein's locution. Just because a sentence is irrelevant, or meaningless, to a present topic of conversation does not
imply it is without sense. It is said to be meaningless be-
cause the sense of the comment is not relevant to the topic.
Anyone slightly versed in the hypothesis that various ail-
ments are related to smoking cannot question the sense of
the statement. Thus, a distinction can be made by consider-
ing two questions: (a) 'Is the expression meaningful or not?'
and (b) 'What is the meaning of the expression?' In Witt-
genstein's terms, question (b) asks how the expression is
used in a particular language-game, and (a) asks whether or
not there is a language-game in which it has a use.

(3) Pitcher discusses an example similar to "I meant
what I said," where one is emphasizing the fact that he is
not speaking absentmindedly or in a joking manner. Such an
utterance emphasizes the seriousness of the context in which
the speaker's words are to be taken.¹

(4) Several illustrations show the different uses of
'meaning' that have to do with elliptical statements: (a)
Pitcher gives the example, "When I said, 'Take a few,' I
meant 8 or 10, not 55."² Here 'meant' refers to the speak-
er's intentions, which were not clear in the original state-
ment. Consider also, "I meant you to...", when referring
to the fulfillment of a formula. (PI, 185-186) The expres-
sion is completed by citing a set of conditions necessary
for the application of the formula. For example, Wittgen-

²Ibid., p. 261.
stein speaks of someone using a formula with which he is not familiar, 'x!2 = y'. "If by 'x!2' you mean x², then you get this value for y, if you mean 2x, that one." (PI, 290) (b) Another illustration concerns reference to sentences containing technical words. For example, "When you open the hydraulic valve by the surge tank, the flow recirculates through the basins, making possible a better chlorine residual control in the clearwell." One not acquainted with the technical jargon might reply, "That may mean something to you, but it is meaningless to me." (c) A final illustration is one submitted by Pitcher: "What did he mean by that cryptic remark?" The elliptical nature of the previous utterance leaves doubt as to whether it was descriptive or slanderous.

These examples illustrate cases where the meaning of the statement is vague or ambiguous because the context of the language-game is incomplete. In (a) some previous remark indicated an act was permitted, but the extent of the act permitted was not explicit. In (b) the speech-act is obviously descriptive, but the description itself is vague because the listener is not familiar with the technical terms used. The ambiguity of (c) concerns the speech-act itself; the cryptic remark commented upon might have been to describe or to slander. However, all of the elliptical statements could be clarified by comments which precise the context of the particular language-game.

(5) In such statements as 'To do (or be able to do) y means x', 'means' is similar to 'implies'. The value of x may either be a set of conditions necessary to the doing of y, or a state of affairs which results from or accompanies the doing of y. For example, (a) "To be able to run the 100 yard dash in less than ten seconds means (implies) you have a chance to be a member of the sprint-relay team," (b) "To be able to believe in such an ideal means (implies) you have had unique training," and (c) "To be able to get a job as an electrician means (implies) you must know how to use an amp meter, know the difference between AC and DC currents, etc."

(6) 'Meaning' may be used in a manner similar to 'reference'. For example, "By 'x' I mean this," which may also be expressed by, "By 'x' I refer to this." The symbol 'x' is being defined by indicating a sample of its extension.

(7) The most obvious philosophically interesting use of 'meaning' is found in such expressions as "By 'x' I mean . . .," or "'x' means. . . ." This use differs from (6) in that the meaning of 'x' here is not given ostensively; in (6) 'this' is accompanied by a gesture, whereas here '. . . .' takes any number of definiens. The definiens may state the connotation of 'x', precise criteria, descriptions of a state of affairs, synonyms interchangeable with 'x', or any expressions suitable to an "explanation of the meaning of 'x'."

There is no doubt but that this sense of 'meaning' is primary to Wittgenstein's location. The account above is
vague, but an elaboration of the notion is the prime concern of this chapter. What is to be determined is whether or not any of the other senses of 'meaning' are involved with this one in the locution, and, if so, to what extent. That is, the senses of 'meaning' briefly described in this section form language-games which may, or may not, have family resemblance; if so, the question arises concerning the nature of the resemblance and its influence on sense (7). The question which remains concerns the relation of 'use' to 'meaning'. These questions are considered in the next section.

II

Wittgenstein says the use of language is an activity, a form of life, and the kinds of activities performed by language are just as much a part of human life as walking, eating, drinking, playing, etc. (PI, 23,25) Language is an institution which includes signs (written or spoken) and uses of the signs. The marks or noises which function as signs can be no more than marks or noises unless they have uses. (PI, 198,432) The signs are put together by users of the language to perform a linguistic act, and the use of signs by a speaker to perform a linguistic act is what Wittgenstein calls a 'language-game'. "I shall . . . call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'." (PI, 7) That he calls it a language-game is to stress the point that the use of language is an activity. (PI, 23) Thus, the use of language
involves (a) signs, (b) the formation of signs into groups, (c) the relation between signs and that for which they stand, (d) the relation between signs and people who use them, (e) the activities performed by the use of the signs, and (f) the conditions appropriate to the significant use of signs. These factors are all discussed below under the general headings of "semiosis" and "speech-acts," after which explicative claims about the locution are given.

Charles Morris divides semiosis into three dimensions: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntactics is the study of the relations of signs to one another according to formation and transformation rules. Formation rules determine the permissible combinations of signs to make sentences, and transformation rules determine the sentences obtainable from other sentences. Syntactics, says Morris, does not treat the individual properties of the sign vehicle or any of their relationships except the syntactical relations. The syntactical use of words involves the correct use of words with the logical connectives of language.¹

Semantics concerns the relation between signs and their designatum. The "designatum" of a sign is such objects or situations which can be signified by a sign according to semantical rules. That is, the sign designates the conditions under which it is applicable.² 'Designates' here

²Ibid., pp. 24-26.
is used in a quasi-technical sense and does not imply that a sign "denotes" or "names" the conditions under which it is applicable. Rather, the series of marks or noises become a sign only when they are given a use within the language. Some of the rules which govern this use are called "semantical rules" - rules which determine under which conditions a series of marks or noises can significantly function in a language. If a series of marks or noises is a sign, then there are certain conditions under which it is applicable. The semantical aspect of the use of words concerns the conditions under which a word, or set of words, has a specific meaning; but the conditions are not the meaning. Rather, they are an integral part of the explanation of meaning.

Pragmatics, for Morris, concerns the relation of signs to their interpreters, and this includes "all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs."¹ When an interpreter interprets a sign he does so out of habit when a sign arises in a social context. The habit (or technique) of using a sign, or set of signs, under certain conditions is a correlate of the semantical rules. That is, the habit, technique, or facility of using linguistic signs consistently in specific circumstances corresponds to the semantical rules which determine those circumstances under which the

¹Morris, p. 30.
linguistic sign(s) can be used. Furthermore, when an interpreter sees or hears a sign used, he expects those circumstances to obtain. That is, an interpreter, A, who correctly uses the sign(s) to perform a speech-act does so only when the appropriate circumstances obtain, and the interpreter, B, who interprets A's use of the sign(s), can intelligently respond only by assuming the circumstances obtain.¹

In his later writings, Wittgenstein seldom refers to any notion which corresponds to syntactics. But the Tractatus is indication enough that he is aware of that aspect of semiosis called "syntactics". It may be assumed that Wittgenstein presupposes syntactics in his post-Tractatus writings, for he is mainly concerned with the semantical and pragmatic aspects of the use of language, i.e., he is more concerned with depth grammar and presupposes surface grammar.² (PI, 664) The illustrations of grammatical investigations given in Chapters II and III clearly show the extent of which Wittgenstein is concerned with the semantical and pragmatic dimensions of semiosis. In these investigations he shows the appropriate and inappropriate conditions for the use of a linguistic expressions in the formation of concepts. He shows that speech-acts, which are congruent with semantical rules, yield clear concepts. That is, a grammatical analysis clarifies the logic of language by showing

¹Morris, p. 32.
²Above, p. 129.
whether or not certain linguistic acts are permitted in particular language-games; if one is not clear about the logic of language, philosophical confusion is apt to arise through a misleading grammar which allows incongruent inferences. If one is aware of the conditions under which a particular sign is used (or under which a particular use of a sign is applicable, in case a sign has more than one use) to yield concepts sufficiently consistent to perform the task of the language-game, philosophical confusion will not arise.

The notion of 'grammar' discussed in Chapter III consists of rules which permit or do not permit the occurrence of certain utterances in a language-game; the language-game is identified by the conditions surrounding the playing of the game, the speech-acts made or attempted, and the subject matter. The semantic and pragmatic rules of a language concern these three aspects of a language-game, whereas grammatical rules concern the consistency and clarity of the concepts. However, a grammatical investigation aims at a clarification of all three sets of rules, for grammatical rules are not applicable until a language-game is sufficiently identified. It is in this sense that clear concepts are the results of speech-acts congruent with semantical rules.

'Speech-act' is used here to correspond to Wittgenstein's claim that the use of language is part of ordinary human activity. For example, language is used to give orders, describe, report, speculate, etc. (PI, 23) The use
of language, Wittgenstein claims, is an institution or, in
Rawls' terms, a practice, and speech-acts fall under the
practice. Austin distinguishes speech-acts into three basic
types, locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary.¹
Though Wittgenstein does not make such a distinction, it
may be used to help clarify his locution. Alston uses the
distinction to point out the issues involved in clarifying
the notion of 'use' as meaning. Since a consideration of
Alston's analysis is involved in the clarification of the
locution given below, it is Alston's formulation of the
distinction which is given.

A locutionary act is simply the presentation of lin-
guistic signs. That is, it is the act of uttering or writ-
ing the signs. An illocutionary act presupposes a locution-
ary act, i.e., it is an act which includes in its perform-
ance the performance of a locutionary act. It is an act
which does not strictly depend upon any other interpreter
than the performer for its accomplishment, though another
person may respond to the act in some way. The main point
is that the response of any interpreter other than the per-
former is not essential to the performance of the illocu-
tionary act. For example, one can make a report, announce,
predict, admit, request, suggest, etc., without any response
from others. A perlocutionary act, on the other hand, re-
quires a result of some kind as a necessary part of the per-

¹ J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge,
formance of the act. For example, A cannot "distract" B without B's being distracted, nor can A "deceive" B without B's being deceived. Other perlocutionary acts are to persuade, encourage, frighten, amuse, inspire, embarrass, etc. ¹

Three important distinctions between illocutionary and perlocutionary act are: (1) a perlocutionary act involves the accomplishment of some effect, while an illocutionary act does not. (2) An illocutionary act includes the performance of a locutionary act, but a perlocutionary act does not. For example, A can deceive B by the slight of hand, but A cannot make a report without using signs. (3) An illocutionary act can be used to perform a perlocutionary act, but not vice versa. For example, A can deceive B by lying, but, strictly speaking, A cannot lie by deceiving B. ²

These brief accounts of semiosis and speech-acts are used to facilitate an explication of the following claims about Wittgenstein's locution: (1) The locution is primarily concerned with the "explanation" of the meaning of a term, rather than the "lexical" meaning. An "explanation" of the meaning of a term is a description of a technique or practice of applying the term. (2) The locution expresses the empirical approach and pragmatic meth-


² Ibid., p. 36.
odology of Wittgenstein's analysis. (3) A description of a technique or practice is an account of how (in what manner) a term is applied under certain conditions in order to significantly occur in a language-game. Thus, the use of 'use' in the locution pertains primarily to the class of 'use' as method, but other uses of 'use' may be involved in the description of the practice. (4) The locution is a grammatical statement about the use of 'meaning' as sense (7) above.¹ (5) The locution applies only to a single linguistic sign so far as that sign is a possible constituent of a speech-act or can be used by itself to perform a speech-act. (6) The locution constitutes a criticism of any theory of reductionism which seeks to resolve all indeterminacy in language. Thus, any attempt to precise the locution into a set of definite rules, which can be applied to determine the exact meaning of a term in any given language-game, would be at cross-purpose with the locution itself. The degree of precision necessary in the description of a practice depends upon the need inherent in the particular language-game in which the term occurs. These claims are discussed below in that order.

(1) Alston attempts "to make a beginning at elucidating a suitable sense" for 'use' as meaning by trying to "make explicit just what we would look for if we set out to determine whether two expressions are used in the same

¹Above, p. 165.
He seeks to do this by elaborating on the formula,

'x' means y (the meaning of 'x' is y) =df. 'x'
and 'y' have the same use. 2

He suggests that the use of 'x' and 'y' can "be tested by determining whether 'x' and 'y' can be substituted for each other in a wide variety of sentences without, in each case, changing... the potentiality of the sentence for performing whatever job(s) it was used to perform before the alteration."3 Since uses of expressions primarily concern linguistic jobs (speech-acts), Alston suggests that the meaning statements primarily concern sentences, because they are the smallest linguistic elements which can be used to perform a single linguistic job. (Single words functioning elliptically as sentences are expanded to complete sentences.) Thus, with 's' and 't' used as sentence variables, the formula becomes,

's' means t =df. 's' and 't' are uttered for the performance of the same linguistic act. 4

Because of the distinctions between illocutionary

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2 Ibid., p. 111. The expression to the right of 'means' is italicized to indicate "there is something special about this notation." For example, in "'Procrastinate' means to put things off", the expression 'to put things off' is not used in the ordinary way, for it does not function as a verb; neither does it function as a mentioned expression requiring quotes, e.g., "'Procrastinate' means 'to put things off'". Thus, Alston takes the occurrence of the expression to the right of 'means' to be unique and notes it by italics.

3 Ibid., p. 112.

4 Ibid., p. 113.
and perlocutionary acts, Alston takes sameness of illocutionary acts as more basic to sameness of meaning than sameness of perlocutionary acts. Therefore, 'linguistic act' in the meaning formula is restricted to illocutionary acts.\(^1\) By considering the problems of multivocality and the intransitive substitution relation of sentences (i.e., 'u' can be substituted for 'v' in most 'v'-containing sentences, but not necessarily vice versa), Alston concludes that the analysis of meaning statements for sentences is:

What A meant by 'u' on 0 [a particular occasion] was \(v = \text{df.}\) If we substitute 'v' for 'u' in the sentence which A uttered on 0, the resulting sentence would usually be used to perform the linguistic act which A was performing on 0.\(^2\)

This way of explicating the meaning of terms is not essentially different from giving the "lexical meaning". That is, some term 'x' is given as a synonym of term 'y', and if one knows 'x', then he can be taught 'y' on the basis of the synonymity of 'x' and 'y'. Alston's account is more philosophically apt, however, because he carefully spells out the problems which accompany such a meaning idiom. What is important to note, however, is that while Alston purports to be laying the groundwork for explicating the notion of 'use' in the locution which says the meaning of an expression can be "elucidated in terms of the use of that expression,"\(^3\) the very method he assumes is not consonant with

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\(^1\) Alston, "Meaning And Use," p. 117.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 119.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 107.
Wittgenstein's claims about meaning in the PI. Wittgenstein says,

"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule." - That is not what we ought to say, but rather: every interpretation, together with what is being interpreted, hangs in the air; the former cannot give the latter any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. (PI, 198  Latter italics mine.)

Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. (PI, 201)

Correlated expressions of a rule may be substituted for one another; but this does not determine their meaning. A may be told that 'x' means 'y', but this only implies that 'y' can be substituted for 'x' and says nothing about their meaning. Even though A may already know the use of 'y', to say, "'x' means 'y'," simply says that another expression of 'y' is 'x' and says nothing else about the meaning of either. What must be included is the regular use of 'x' and 'y', which specifies the response(s) appropriate to their use. To give the meaning of 'x' and 'y' is to give the regular use they have, which amounts to a description of the practice under which their uses fall. The statement, "'x' and 'y' are interchangeable," may be included in the statements comprising the description of the practice, but it need not be included.

Alston admits both that (a) "pointing out that 'u' has the same use as 'v' will do nothing to help you master
the use of 'u' unless you already know how to use 'v,'" and (b) that the meaning idiom depends upon a method for identifying specific illocutionary acts.\(^1\) With regard to (a), it is clear from Wittgenstein's remarks that the comparison of synonymous terms is what he calls "interpretation," and that does not explain the meaning. Though it may often be helpful to associate two signs which are used in the same way, the association does not explain (describe) the use which both signs have in common. That is, the meaning of the term is explained (clarified) by describing the practice or technique of employing the term to perform a certain linguistic act. The description of the practice is a description of the use a term has in a specific language-game. Since Alston's analysis only associates terms with a practice and does not describe the practice, his admission of (a) constitutes a fundamental difference between his analysis and Wittgenstein's locution.

In a subsequent analysis of linguistic acts (no doubt associated with admission (b)), Alston concludes that the identification of a specific linguistic act primarily concerns a description of a practice. That is, he says a linguistic act is a "rule-recognition act," i.e., they are acts which are (at least in part) "constituted. . . by the fact that the agent recognizes his behavior to be governed by cer-

\(^1\) Alston, "Meaning And Use," pp. 114, 117.
tain rules."¹ More specifically, he says a certain linguistic act (e.g., person A asking someone to open the door) is performed if the following conditions have been satisfied:

(1) A has uttered a sentence, s, in a certain kind of context; in some language community s is regularly held subject to the following rule when uttered in that kind of context:

s is not to be uttered unless the following conditions hold.
1. There is a particular door to which something in the context is calling the hearer's attention.
2. That door is not open.
3. It is possible for the hearer to open that door.
4. The speaker has an interest in getting that door open.

(2) The person addressed is actually in the vicinity.

(3) A recognizes the rules listed in (1) to govern his utterance.²

'Recognize' in (3) means the speaker would countenance as relevant any complaint which questions whether any of the conditions cited in (1) obtain. Thus, A need not be consciously aware of all the conditions necessary for the significant utterance of s (i.e., A can habitually use s) nor be able to satisfactorily answer the complaint, but A must be ready to recognize the complaint as relevant to the propriety of this utterance of s.³

Several points need to be noted about this analysis.

²Ibid., p. 144.
³Ibid., p. 141.
Alston is seeking to establish the conditions which facilitate the recognition of a specific linguistic act, and he implicitly recognizes that this involves a consideration of the relation between a particular type of linguistic act and a particular type of sign. That is, 'language-game' is ambiguous with regard to type. On the one hand, a language-game can be spoken of as an activity (e.g., reporting, asking, persuading, etc.) and, on the other, as pertaining to certain concept words (e.g., sensations, knowing, intuition, understanding, etc.). In this sense, a language-game may be ambiguous with regard to type, i.e., type of linguistic act and type of constituent signs. A language-game is more narrowly defined when certain signs are related to certain linguistic acts, and only then does it become feasible to list specific conditions for playing the language-game. For example, Alston considers the act "ask" in connection with 'door' and 'open'. The conditions would be different if A were asking someone to open a topic of conversation, and the conditions would be a puzzle if he were asking someone to open a virtue. The description of practices has to do with specific signs connected with specific linguistic acts. Thus, Alston's analysis of linguistic acts shows that he considers an explanation of the meaning of a term, in Wittgenstein's sense, to concern a description of the technique of using that term, rather than associating the meaning, or use, of that term with another synonymous term whose meaning is already known. That is, Alston's analysis of "linguistic act" seems to mod-
ify his earlier approach. Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with "explanations" of meaning, rather than "lexical" meanings. (PI, 560)

(2) The locution on meaning is the result of Wittgenstein's move from the a priori perspective of the *Tractatus* to the empirical perspective of the PI. It also reflects a pragmatic methodology which accompanies the empirical approach.

Wittgenstein, in the PI, stresses the point that a grammatical investigation only describes language and does not attempt to explain it. That is, the grammatical investigation does not set out to discover an essence of language which causally explains why language is as it is. (PI, 109, 496) Such an essence is assumed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. He seeks to clarify the logic of language by showing the relation between language and reality (PI, 89), which he tries to subsume in the expression of the general form of a proposition. The assumption of an a priori order in the world and its connection with language leads him to affirm super-concepts which only entangle him in his own rules. (PI, 114, 125) The method by which Wittgenstein disentangles himself in the PI is an empirical one. Rather than asking what the rule of language must be a priori, he asks what, in fact, are the rules which govern the use of a particular term. (PI, 120, 124) From the empirical point of view, the logic of language arises as a result of the form of life, and a causal explanation of language would involve a determination of the causal relations between the facts constituting the form of
life and the fact of language. This problem, Wittgenstein says, is a task for the natural sciences. (PI, p. 230)

Wittgenstein says the use of language is part of the normal behavior of man, i.e., language is an instrument used in fulfilling the ordinary functions of life. An adequate analysis of language, then, concerns the use of language as a normal function in the activities and chores of human life. This is why Wittgenstein is interested in the kinds of occasions in which certain expressions occur and the actions which accompany them. (PI, 489) The sense of a proposition (even the genuineness of a proposition) is, for Wittgenstein, connected with the application of the expression in ordinary life. He says that in philosophy, when one is tempted to count something which is useless as a proposition, it is usually because he has not sufficiently considered its application. (PI, 520) A sentence, he says, should be considered as an instrument and its sense as its employment, and even though a sentence appears to be in order, if nothing can be done with it, it is senseless. (PI, 421,348-349)

The, so to speak, "cash value" of a linguistic expression is the job it does in a specific context. And that it has cash value depends upon the context in the same sense that the significance of any event depends upon its context. For example, the exchange of money is insignificant without the institution of money, and placing a crown on someone's head is insignificant if it is cut off from the institution of coronation. (PI, 583-584) Events become significant as parts
of institutions, established for the satisfaction of certain
human needs, desires, or interests. 'Significance' here is
more than 'importance', for without the institutional context
the events are meaningless.

One's concepts are acquired in such contexts, and the
significance of the concepts is that they are instruments
with which one can operate to do certain jobs. (PI, 569)
Language influences our concepts both by being part of the
context in which they arise and by being the primary means by
which they are expressed. Wittgenstein is concerned with the
clarification of the logic of language so that our concepts
can be made clear and consistent, for it is with language and
the concepts it expresses that we build roads, construct
machines, influence people, etc. (PI, 491)

(3) When a description of a practice is given, the
conditions which are appropriate to the act(s) constituting
the practice are cited. Unless the conditions cited obtain,
the act(s), so to speak, do not count, i.e., the acts are not
performed as constituents of a certain practice. A practice
is precluded by insufficient conditions as well as by inap-
propriate moves. For example, one is not playing checkers
when figuring strategies by moving pieces about the board by
himself any more than when he moves one of his pieces off the
board to avoid being "jumped". In the former case he is not
playing checkers because certain conditions are not satisfied,
viz., an opponent who agrees that this opening move counts;
in the latter case, if one is allowed to move off the board,
the move is so contrary to the rules of checkers that no one can say that it is "checkers" that is being played.

However, if one knows the conditions under which a game piece may be appropriately moved, it may be said of him that he knows how to play the game. That is, he knows how to move the pieces so that they count as moves in a game. The point is that the use of a game piece which is significant to the playing of a game is 'use' as method, as explained above.\(^1\) Analogously, certain conditions must obtain before the use of a linguistic term can count as a linguistic act. In most cases, however, when one is requested to list the conditions under which the term (or terms) is appropriately used, he is unable to do so, but he is usually able to give examples (demonstrations). The point is that whether a technique is described by listing the conditions under which the term is employed or whether the conditions are implicit in a demonstration, the use of the term is 'use' as method.

Consider, for example, the sentence 'Sensations are private'. It was shown in Chapter III that this sentence can function significantly only as a grammatical statement. Hence, if one who uses it is to avoid philosophical confusion, it is incumbent upon him to make it clear to his listeners that it is being used as a grammatical statement, rather than an empirical one. Otherwise, while it may seem as if a genuine linguistic act has been performed, a grammatical anal-

\(^1\) Above, pp. 155-157.
ysis will show such a use will not do because it introduces incompatible inferences. It is to this sort of case that Wittgenstein refers when he says, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (PI, 109)

Although to know the meaning of a linguistic expression is to know how it is used, a description of the use need not exclude reference to the purpose for which the word is used. That is, reference to the results of a use may facilitate the description of the practice, and this in no way denies the claim that the sense of 'use' in the locution is 'use' as method. No one would want to consider the results of using an engraving tool to be identical with the manner in which it was used. Yet, to note what the tool is used for may contribute to the description of how it is used. Likewise, though some expressions can be clarified by referring to the results obtained from using them, their uses are not to be identified with their results. For example, one can respond to the question, "When you asked your pupil 'What is two plus two?,' for what purpose did you use 'is'?," by pointing to the student and saying, "Look, he is adding two and two." But to answer, "How did you use 'is'?," involves a detailed description of a practice or technique.

(4) The sense of 'meaning' employed in the locution has been shown to be that found in such idioms as "'x' means. . ." where the dots are variables whose values are sentences which describe the practice or technique of using
'x'. And it is only this sense of 'meaning' which is consistent with the locution. The reason is that the other senses of 'meaning' are reducible to other terms which can be clarified by application of the locution, but the sense of 'meaning' consistent with the locution is irreducible to anything other than the locution itself. That is, the idiom, "The meaning of 'x' is the practice of using 'x' under conditions. . .," is reducible to nothing but, "The use of 'x' is the practice of using 'x' under conditions. . .," which is circular. The other senses of 'meaning' are reducible to 'important', 'relevant', 'implies', 'intend', etc., and the uses of these terms can be clarified by the locution. The point is that any talk about the meaning of 'meaning' which occurs in idioms such as "the word 'x' means. . ." is necessarily circular, irrespective of what theory of meaning one is advocating. The word 'means' in the above idiom must be, in some sense, intelligible for the idiom to be meaningful; and if the variable 'x' is replaced by 'meaning', which signifies the same notion as the word 'means' in the idiom, then if the idiom is to be significant, one must already know the meaning of the term to be clarified. Thus, inquiry about the meaning of 'meaning' appears to be conceptually inconsistent.

However, this "conceptual inconsistency" is dissolved if one takes Wittgenstein's account of meaning. He is concerned with describing the function of terms as they occur

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1 Above, pp. 160-164.
Therefore, he is primarily interested in the way 'meaning' is actually used, and the analysis of the use is possible only by examining the contexts in which it, in fact, occurs. He says,

"The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning." I.e.: if you want to understand the use of the word "meaning", look for what are called "explanations of meaning." (PI, 560)

The point of Wittgenstein's locution is that, most of the time, when one explains the meaning of a term, he explains (describes) the use it has in certain contexts under certain conditions, i.e., to explain the meaning is to explain the use. Since one talks about the meaning of a word when he talks about how the word is used, it makes perfectly good sense to say the meaning of a word is its use; and to talk about the use of 'meaning' is to talk about how it is used. For Wittgenstein, 'meaning' correctly occurs when one uses it to refer to a description of a use which aims at clarifying a term, i.e., its grammatical function is to indicate that the subsequent comments are to be taken as statements about the use of a term.

Thus, the locution is itself a grammatical statement about the use of 'meaning'. That is, Wittgenstein is recommending the grammar which implies that 'meaning' (as it occurs in meaning idioms) significantly occurs only under the condition that it refers to the use the word mentioned in the idiom has. This grammar is recommended in lieu of the theories which say the meaning of a word is the object to
which it refers, or that meaning is a mental activity which somehow accompanies the word. Wittgenstein shows the inadequacies of both these views in the PI. Not all linguistic terms denote objects, and when certain concepts are construed on the basis of that grammatical model, philosophical confusion arises (e.g., the grammar of sensation words). 'Meaning' cannot be construed after the model of mental activity, because whether or not one has understood what another person means is not determined by looking into his mind to see if the appropriate mental activity is going on. Rather, criteria are used which determine whether one has acquired the technique of using the word, formula, etc. (e.g., consider the justification for 'Now the student understands how to read,'¹ and 'Now I can go on' when learning a number series.²)

The locution is circular but not viciously so, because it is a grammatical statement. That is, it is circular in a manner similar to other grammatical statements, e.g., "All bodies are extended." The concepts 'body' and 'extension' are so related that what is said to be a body is also said to be extended, and what is said to be extended is said to be a body. This is just the way language is used. Wittgenstein is recommending the locution on meaning as a grammatical statement which expresses the rules for the use of 'meaning' just as the grammatical statement, "All bodies are

¹Above, pp. 67-70.
²Above, pp. 65-67.
extended," expresses rules for the use of 'body' and 'extended'. The locution is not a necessary statement such as the latter, for its opposite can be imagined (i.e., there are other alternative theories of meaning). But he is maintaining that it expresses a grammar which influences a concept of 'meaning' more adequate than the alternatives mentioned above. That is, its application yields less philosophical confusion.

(5) The locution, as stated in section forty-three, says, "The meaning of a word is its use in the language." (Italics mine.) But Wittgenstein often talks about the use of sentences and phrases. (PI, 500) This raises the question as to what pieces of linguistic symbols the locution is applicable. It is maintained here that the locution applies to a single linguistic symbol only in so far as it is a possible constituent in the performance of a linguistic act or can be used by itself to perform a linguistic act.

One of the theses of the Tractatus is that simple objects must be possible constituents in an atomic fact. So, since proper names (simple signs) have as their meaning the simple objects they denote, it is essential to them that they be possible constituents of propositional signs that picture atomic facts.¹ (T, 3.3,3.14a) Signs, then, are meaningless unless they can occur as a part of language. This point is carried over into the PI. The very fact that a

¹Above, pp. 7-8.
sign can have a use implies it can have a meaning. But that it has a meaning and what that meaning is depends upon its actually being used. That is, the meaning of a sign is dependent upon its actual occurrence in a language-game. Wittgenstein says,

Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life? (Pl, 432)

As a matter of fact, when the meaning of an isolated word is given (e.g., a lexical definition) contexts for the word are often included, and when they are not, one who is familiar with the language can be said to understand the meaning only when he is able to supply appropriate contexts. Furthermore, when a single word has several subtle distinctions of meaning (e.g., 'responsibility'), to show those distinctions it is necessary to compare the different contexts in which the word appears. One knows the meaning of a term if he can properly employ it to perform a speech-act.

Sentences, on the other hand, can be constituents of speech-activities, but constitute speech-acts, in Pitcher's sense of the terms.\(^1\) Wittgenstein does not explicitly make this distinction, but it is implicit. For example, (a) in the list he provides to illustrate the multiplicity of language-games, both of what Pitcher calls speech-acts and activities are included, e.g., reporting an event, forming and testing an hypothesis, making up a story, etc. (Pl, 23)

\(^1\) Above, p. 155.
(b) He describes a senseless sentence as a "combination of words. . .withdrawn from the language, withdrawn from circulation."¹ (PI, 500) (c) He speaks of a sentence as an instrument and its sense as its employment; also, he says that the reason some philosophers consider pseudo-propositions as genuine is because they fail to sufficiently consider their application.² (PI, 348-349, 421, 520) Though Wittgenstein does not explicitly do so, an appropriate distinction for him to make is that 'meaning' is applicable to words and 'sense' to sentences - a distinction which he does make in the Tractatus. (T, 3.142, 3.202) Thus, the meaning of a word is its use in a sensical sentence, and a sentence is sensical if it can be used to perform a speech-act or activity. The fact that the sentence can be used to perform a speech-act or activity is sufficient for it to constitute or be a constituent of a language-game, i.e., be a part of language. And, if a sentence is to be a part of a language-game, the constituent signs of the sentence must be congruent with the syntactical, semantical, and pragmatic rules of the language. Finally, if the sentence is to be consistent and be an influence toward clear concepts, it must be congruent with grammatical rules of the language-game which prohibit incompatible inferences.

(6) It was shown in Chapter II that the criticisms

¹Above, pp. 112-113.
²Above, p. 180.
which Wittgenstein levies against his own view in the Tractatus employs the locution on meaning given in the PI. The general basis of the criticisms is that from an empirical perspective ordinary language is shown to be irreducible to a complete determinancy, because the attempt to do so violates its grammatical rules, a violation which itself produces philosophical confusion. The attempt to reduce all language to a precise calculation, devoid of any indeterminancy, is a respectful one, because it aims at the clarification of concepts, but it goes too far by implying that a vague concept is no concept at all, or that it is useless, e.g., Frege (cf. PI, 71) and the Tractatus ("Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly." T, 4.116) Wittgenstein, in the PI, maintains, not only that vague concepts are usable,\(^1\) but that indeterminancy is unavoidable in the use of language. This claim is based primarily on an argument which shows that rules are necessarily vague.

Wittgenstein says,

I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? where rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up all the cracks where it might? - Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a rule, and a doubt which it removes - and so on? (PI, 84)

Regardless of how one might try to precise the game by stringent rules, it is still possible to imagine cases where the application of any one of those rules can be doubted. Thus,

\(^1\)Above, pp. 58-60.
other rules are needed to mediate between the rule and its instance. In such a case, as Rorty puts it, "we are at once caught in the 'third man' regress," i.e., "they generate infinite regresses."¹ The problem cannot be avoided by postulating an intuition which removes the doubt, for there is no way to know "that it doesn't mislead me... if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong." (PI, 213) The point is that "the kind of indetermination involved in understanding or following a rule is not removed by postulating any determinate entity to eliminate it, for the original indefiniteness reappears at the level of the new entity."²

The difference between searching for linguistic determinacy in the Tractatus and the claim in the PI that indeterminacy is unavoidable marks one of the primary distinctions between the two books. The dyadic relation of a sign "mirroring" a fact in the Tractatus is replaced in the PI by the quadratic relation "W means X to Y in Z", where Y is a human being and Z is a context. Thus, the meaning relation is much more complex in the PI, and consequently, determinancy throughout language is unobtainable. The reason is that 'human being' is not determinate in the sense that a picture of an atomic fact is in the Tractatus, and the context in which an utterance is appropriate is indef-

²Ibid., pp. 215-216.
finite in extent. It is precisely this relation between the sign and its user which Wittgenstein fails to take into account in the Tractatus, but which he emphasizes in the PI. When the pragmatic relation (in Morris' sense of the term; cf. Above, pp. 167-168) is considered as an integral part of an adequate theory of meaning, one sees the interdependency of rules and language-games. That is, behind the use of any one rule are all the rules of the language-game, and behind these rules are the rules of another language-game which helps determine the meaning of the former. This also yields an infinite regress, but it is not harmful like the regress involved in the attempt to reduce language to complete determinancy. This can be shown by using the distinction Rorty makes between "vertical" and "horizontal" regress.

A vertical regress "looks at each new step as a transition to a new level - a level which is a necessary condition for the existence of the previous step(s)." A horizontal regress, on the other hand, looks at each new step as giving "something which is of essentially the same kind as what we had in the last, but something which renders the last step more determinate than it was." That is, each new step is like a commentary on the former - everything that

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1 Rorty, p. 217.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 219.
4 Ibid.
was in the preceding step is in the subsequent, but more explicit. However, each step, though more determinate, is yet indeterminate; and because it is in some respect indeterminate, it can never be rendered perfectly determinate. Vertical regress is condemnable precisely because it seeks to "make determinate the relationship between the purely determinate and the purely indeterminate."\(^1\) Wittgenstein's argument shows that the original indeterminancy reappears at each new step.

However, that a concept is indeterminate does not imply that it cannot be used. A concept can be used so long as its determinacy is sufficient to fulfill the needs of the particular language-game. The rules of the language-game in which the concept term occurs and the "degree" to which the concept is determinate coincide, i.e., the grammatical rules influence the concept so that it is compatible to the purpose of that language-game. For example, the term 'area' is more indeterminate in, "Stand over in that area so I can take your picture," than in, "The surveyors will show you the area the building is to occupy," But 'area' is still to some degree indeterminate in the latter case. Though it would be impractical, it is conceivable that one could ask, "But which side of the surveyor's mark are we to take?" What makes such a question impractical is that nothing is gained by asking it. In ordinary circumstances, when a sur-

\(^1\) Rorty, p. 220.
veyor shows a contractor where a building is to stand, it is beside the point to ask such a question - the practice does not call for it, so the contractor does not doubt as to which side of the mark really bounds the area. The point is that in both cases the concept is indeterminate, but that does not prevent it being used within either.

The unavoidability of indeterminancy in language is a corollary of the locution itself because the locution says a term is meaningful in a language-game so long as it has a use in that language-game, even if the concept signified by the term is vague. Thus, any attempt to precise the locution into a set of rules which can be applied to determine the exact meaning of a term would be at cross-purpose with the locution itself. That is, any claim that the locution has been completely precised would also be a denial of the locution. This is so because (a) indeterminancy is a real (but harmless) part of language, and (b) on the basis of (a) any expression which claims to be a precision of the locution would itself be indeterminate, but not harmlessly. That is, if the locution were reduced to a set of rules which were purported to be able to show the exact meaning of any term, then it is conceivable that other rules would be needed to determine the application of any one rule of the set, and so on. In other words, an exact precising of the locution would be susceptible to the verticle infinite regress which condemns any theory of reductionism that seeks to resolve all indeterminancy in language.
However, that the locution cannot be so preciséd does not imply that it is of no philosophical value. An explication of the locution shows that it is connected with grammatical investigations (as illustrated in Chapter III). It was shown that grammatical investigations are of great import in avoiding philosophical confusion because of their contribution to the clarification of concepts. It is to such investigations that the locution points, and the application of the locution concerns the sorting out of grammatical statements which indicate the adequacy and inadequacy of concepts in particular language-games. Though there is no criterion for determining in every case whether a sentence is a grammatical one or not, a consideration of the notion of 'grammar' supplies guidelines which help. A preciséd of the locution, then, which aims at a method for applying the locution concerns an analysis of the notion of 'grammar', which provides a method for identifying grammatical statements, i.e., an analysis such as that provided in Chapter III.
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