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The World As Horizon:
Husserl's Constitutional Theory Of The Objective World

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Preface

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my teachers and fellow students for all they have contributed toward bringing my program of graduate studies to the climax represented by the submitting of this dissertation. The patient guidance and inspiration of Professor James Street Fulton has contributed immeasurably to my work.

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T.E.K.
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**BIBLIOGRAPHY**
1. Transcendental Problems
Pertaining To The Objective World

Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy claims to have solved, in principle if not in detail, the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. These are problems concerning the possibility of transcendent and objective knowledge. Such problems are the crux of Husserl's philosophy. The solution he offers takes the form of "a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego." (I,121) His conclusion is that there is and can be only one objective world, an intersubjective world that is actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its objects to everyone.

This initial statement of Husserl's claim is of course quite compact. My investigations that follow are an unpacking and critical examination of it. The claim is most explicitly made and most thoroughly defended in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, which he viewed as the definitive compendium of his phenomenological philosophy. These texts guide my investigations. As the descriptive term "compendium" suggests, however, the Cartesian Meditations are something of an outline or embodiment in brief of Husserl's work. They may be supplimented at certain
points by other texts, which present his analyses in greater detail.

A comparison with the widely discredited project of traditional epistemology after Descartes is strongly suggested by Husserl's claim to be able to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world by means of an egological and constitutive approach. Husserl himself was well aware of this comparison and of the inconsistency of the traditional project as it was formulated. However, in contrast to some contemporary philosophers who therefore dismiss the whole project as a pseudo-problem, Husserl was convinced that there are genuine philosophical problems concerning the possibility of transcendent and objective knowledge. He therefore sought to understand the inconsistency of the traditional approach more deeply and to find a way to raise transcendental questions that would be truly coherent.

We now have available in published form the extensive texts in which Husserl examines this epistemological tradition from Descartes to Kant. However, a survey of them is unnecessary here, since two brief sections of the * Cartesian Meditations* summarize Husserl's views with regard to the present issue thoroughly as well as concisely.

Having thoroughly explicated in the first four Meditations the problems of phenomenology as concerned with "the (static and genetic) constitution of objectivities
of possible consciousness", Husserl says that phenomenology may be "rightly characterized also as transcendental theory of knowledge." (I,114-115) On the basis of this, he proposes to contrast theory of knowledge as transcendental in his own sense (which of course, we have not examined yet) with traditional theory of knowledge. The latter's problem, as Husserl interprets it, is "transcendence." Its project is to clear up the essential possibility of transcendent knowledge. To Husserl that seems to be a valid and important aim, and yet this project was inconsistent as formulated. The clue to this inconsistency lies in the fact that "the problem arises for it, and is dealt with, in the natural attitude." (I,115)

With this mention of "the natural attitude," we bring into focus one of the most fundamental concepts in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. By an "attitude," Husserl means something like a point of view or an orientation. We sometimes speak of a person's attitude (Ein-stellung) in this sense as the way he takes things or the way he looks at things. In general, an attitude is a way in which consciousness is oriented toward its objectivities. The character of the orientation or point of view will depend upon the person's interests and concerns.

This concept of attitude clearly implies a concept of "correlation." Fundamental to Husserl's philosophy is the correlation of the world and consciousness of the world. It is often called "intentionality." Late in his
career Husserl wrote: "The first breakthrough to this universal apriori of correlation of object of experience and mode of givenness (during the working out of my Logical Investigations about 1898) shook me so deeply that since then my whole life's work has been dominated by this task of a systematic working out of this apriori of correlation." (VI, 169, fn. 1)9 It is in terms of this insight that Husserl understood the error of traditional epistemology.

Much more attention will have to be given to this concept of intentionality later, but for the present purpose of understanding Husserl's critique of traditional theory of knowledge it is enough to grasp something of his view that there is an apriori (epistemologically ultimate and original) correlation of the world and consciousness of the world. For Husserl, this involves "the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me - in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is" - is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life's constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification." (I, 123) Whatever else we may get out of this later, here it clearly suggests that if the correlation of consciousness and the world undergoes any modification of attitude, there will be correlative changes in sense and status at both poles of the correlation. This is the point we need to understand Husserl's criticism of traditional epistemology as inconsistent.
This point may be illuminated by the distinction between the use and the mention of a word. Suppose that in a conversation someone were to say: "Texas is a state." Then suppose that shortly thereafter he were to say, "'Texas' has five letters." No one would be likely to misunderstand him or be confused, nor would anyone be likely to charge him with confusion. The reason is that everyone would easily make the necessary change of attitude. In the first instance he would be using the word and in the second mentioning it. In writing we usually resort to single or double quotes to mark the change of attitude, but in speaking we seem to get by without them.

Husserl charges traditional epistemology with an attitude mistake which is somewhat similar to a confusion between the use and the mention of a word. As the name I have chosen suggests, it bears comparison with what Gilbert Ryle calls a "category mistake." Confusion in the example used here would be most unlikely, but in trying to deal with transcendental problems the situation is much more conducive to confusion. The reason is that transcendental problems simply do not correlate with the natural attitude.

So far we have only considered Husserl's concept of attitude in general; now we need to focus on his concept of the "natural" one. This notion offers an important clue for understanding phenomenological philosophy. By calling it "natural," Husserl meant to identify it as epistemologically basic or original in principle for human
conscious life. If we make use here of what has been said of the correlation of the world and consciousness, we understand him to mean by the natural attitude the fundamental orientation in which consciousness is straightforwardly or unreflectively immersed in the world. This orientation gets its character from what Husserl calls its "general thesis." (III, Sec. 27ff)\textsuperscript{10} This is the fundamental unstated belief underlying the original situation of persons in the world which holds in effect that there is a real, external, existent world which persists in space and time and which is much the same for all men. It is the unproblematic background of all natural problems, because in varying ways they all take the world of the natural attitude for granted.

Husserl's own description of this merits being quoted: "I find constantly at hand over against me the one spatio-temporal actuality, to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it, who are related to it in the same way. This 'actuality', as the word already tells us, I, the waking I, find to be out there, and also accept it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural attitude. 'The' world is always there as actuality; at most it is at odd points 'other' than I supposed, this or that under such names as 'illusion', 'hallucination', and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but
the 'it' remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there. To know it more comprehensively, more trustworthily, more perfectly than the naive lore of experience is able to do, and to solve all the problems of scientific knowledge which offer themselves upon its ground, that is the goal of the sciences of the natural attitude." (III,63)

Transcendental knowledge is, then, knowledge in the natural attitude and of the world of the natural attitude. In Husserl's view, the problem of clearing up the essential possibility of such knowledge arises for traditional epistemology, and is dealt with by it, in the natural attitude. The epistemologist begins to reflect in the natural attitude and finds himself there as a man in the world, at the same time as experiencing and perhaps scientifically knowing the world, himself included. To a man in the natural attitude this seems paradoxical. Husserl imagines him as saying next: "Whatever exists for me, exists for me thanks to my knowing consciousness; it is for me the experienced of my experiencing, the thought of my thinking, the theorized of my theorizing, the intellectually seen of my insight." (I,115) This is, of course, very similar to what we earlier noticed Husserl calling his "insight" into the apriori correlation of the world and consciousness of the world, but we must see that the attitude makes the difference.

If Husserl's traditional epistemologist were to
call his insight intentionality, he would have to say, according to Husserl: "Intentionality, as a fundamental property of my psychic life, is a real property belonging to me, as a man, and to every other man in respect of his purely psychic being." (I,115) This is what Husserl fought as "psychologism" throughout his career. The mistake has to do with the first person singular. In terms of our earlier discussion, it is still used when it ought only to be mentioned. That will have to be explained, but here Husserl's point is that by this the epistemologist confines himself and the whole treatment of his problem within the realm of the given world of the natural attitude.

Once this epistemologist makes his natural attitude beginning, he quite understandably goes on to argue that whatever exists for a man like himself and is accepted by him exists for him and is accepted in his own conscious life. Further, he argues that this "own conscious life," even in all its consciousness of the world and scientific cognition, keeps strictly to itself. He says that all his distinguishing between genuine and deceptive evidence and between being and illusion in experience goes on within the closed sphere of his conscious life. Every grounding of a judgment, every showing of truth and being, now seems to him to go on wholly within himself. Its result is only a characteristic in the cogitatum of his cogito. "Therein," Husserl says, "lies the great problem, according to the traditional view. That I attain certainties, even
compelling evidences, in my own domain of consciousness, in the nexus of motivation determining me, is understandable. But how can this business, going on wholly within the immanency of conscious life, acquire objective significance? How can evidence (clara et distincta perceptio) claim to be more than a characteristic of consciousness within me? Aside from the (perhaps not so unimportant) exclusion of acceptance of the world as being, it is the Cartesian problem, which was supposed to be solved by divine veracitas." (I,116)

Every student of modern philosophy learns the story of the endless controversies which arose, once that question was asked and taken seriously, between idealists and realists or rationalists and empiricists. Even up to his own time, Kant said: "it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof." In a sense, for Husserl the scandal is that anyone should want to "prove" anything of the sort.

Husserl's judgment is that "the whole problem is inconsistent. It involves an inconsistency into which Descartes necessarily fell, because he missed the genuine sense of his reduction to the indubitable - we were about
to say: his transcendental epoché and reduction to the pure ego. But, precisely because of its complete disregard of the Cartesian epoché, the usual post-Cartesian way of thinking is much cruder." (I,115) We must not be misled by the phrase "the whole problem" in this judgment. Husserl is simply charging the traditional posing of the problem with a radical inconsistency which makes its solution in principle impossible. When he points out the reason for this inconsistency: an attitude mistake, he also points the way to a consistent formulation of the problem concerning the possibility of transcendent knowledge, knowledge of the objective world. This problem is called "transcendental" because it inquires into the essential possibility of the "transcendent." Let us examine more fully now this attitude mistake and then begin to follow out Husserl's way to a consistent formulation of the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world.

In exposing the attitude mistake, Husserl asks a revealing question: "Who then is the I who can rightly ask such 'transcendental' questions? As a natural man, can I rightly ask them? As a natural man, can I ask seriously and transcendentally how I get outside my island of consciousness and how what presents itself in my consciousness as a subjective evidence-process can acquire objective significance?" (I,116) The question would sound very odd without the concepts I have developed so
far, but with them it is intelligible. Husserl is asking whether a man in the natural attitude ("a natural man" — Nothing mysterious is implied in contrast!) can consistently ask questions about the possibility of knowledge of the objective world. In view of what has been said about the natural attitude and its general thesis, clearly he cannot. The reason, concisely put, is that "when I apperceive myself as a natural man, I have already apperceived the spatial world and constructed myself as in space, where I already have an Outside Me. Therefore the validity of world-apperception has already been presupposed, has already entered into the sense assumed in asking the question." (I, 116)

For a man in the natural attitude to raise questions about the possibility of objective knowledge is to raise sceptical questions. Scepticism is part of the result of the attitude mistake. Husserl's argument on this issue fits rather well with P.F. Strawson's characterization of the sceptic's position: "He pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but at the same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment. Thus his doubts are unreal, not simply because they are logically irresoluble doubts, but because they amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within which alone such doubts make sense. So, naturally enough, the alternative to doubt which he offers us is the suggestion that we do not really, or should not really, have the conceptual scheme that we do have; that we do not really, or should not really, mean
what we think we mean, what we do mean. But this alternative is absurd. For the whole process of reasoning only starts because the scheme is as it is; and we cannot change it even if we would."\(^{14}\) The comparison of Strawson's alternative to this sceptical confusion with Husserl's alternative to the attitude mistake is quite illuminating. An entire book might well be written on this comparison, but here we are pursuing Husserl's alternative by itself.

At this point it is important to see that there at least may be an alternative to the confusion and scepticism of the attitude mistake. There has been a tendency in twentieth century philosophy to think that merely showing up a traditional question to be in itself inconsistent, and thus having no answer, warrants dismissing the whole issue involved as a pseudo-problem. In Wittgensteinian terms,\(^{15}\) Husserl has found a fly in a fly-bottle and discovered how it got in there. Now, in principle, if a fly could be shown how it got into its dilemma, it could get out by the same route. There would then be no more dilemma. Are the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world solved by pointing out the attitude mistake of traditional theory of knowledge? Not for Husserl.

According to Husserl, transcendental problems, as questions about the essential possibility of transcendent and objective knowledge, can be raised and formulated consistently. What this requires is a change of attitude. "Manifestly," says Husserl, "the conscious execution of
phenomenological reduction is needed, in order to attain that I and conscious life by which transcendental questions, as questions about the possibility of transcendent knowledge, can be asked.\(^1\) (I,116) This change of attitude, known as phenomenological reduction,\(^1\) will occupy our attention in the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter I


2 Ibid., p. 116, 174.

3 Throughout this essay texts quoted from the Husserliana edition of Husserl's collected works will be identified in parentheses following the quotation. The Roman numerals indicate the volume and the Arabic numerals indicate the page.


5 Ibid., p. 123.

6 Ibid., p. xxvii.


2. The Way To Transcendental Subjectivity

Transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world are, as we have seen, the general motivation for the conscious execution of what Husserl calls phenomenological reduction. This is the change of attitude which leads the way to transcendental subjectivity, Husserl's name for the realm wherein these problems are said to have their solution. The next part of the task of unpacking Husserl's claim involves mapping out this "way" and interpreting the transcendental subjectivity to which it leads.

In Husserl's terms, a "way" to reduction is a consideration which is supposed to motivate us to turn to transcendental subjectivity and to see in it the source of constitution. In other words, a "way" is an argument that is designed to prompt or even force us - given the aim of solving the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world - consciously to execute phenomenological reduction, to adopt the phenomenological attitude in place of the natural attitude.

Negatively, as we have seen, phenomenological reduction is said to be necessary in order to avoid an attitude mistake in formulating transcendental problems. Positively, as we shall see now, it is said to be required by the character of transcendental problems. What is in question in such problems is the pure possibility of objective knowledge. The technique of phenomenological
reduction is supposed to result in a change of attitude that will enable us to inquire reflectively into pure possibilities without presupposing them, instead of unreflectively attending to facts while presupposing their possibilities as in the natural attitude. What it means to do this must be made clear.

Transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world are concerned to clear up the essential possibility of objective knowledge. This concern is intimately related in Husserl's thought to the ideal of scientific knowledge. Descartes is clearly Husserl's mentor in this respect. According to Husserl, Descartes' aim was "a science grounded on an absolute foundation." (I,43) Husserl says that his own meditations "show the concrete possibility of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation." (I,178) This ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science guided Husserl's work throughout his career.

The demand for a science grounded on an absolute foundation could take several directions of development. Husserl notes that "with Descartes this demand gives rise to a philosophy turned toward the subject himself." (I,44) For Husserl everything hinges on how we understand this turn toward subjectivity. In the present context I am not interested in judging the validity of Husserl's interpretation of Descartes. My aim is to understand Husserl's own turn to transcendental subjectivity in order to solve
the problem of the possibility of transcendent knowledge. To accomplish that it is helpful to see how Husserl thought Descartes initiated the turn and then misunderstood his own achievement.

Husserl understands Descartes' turn toward the subject as a "regress" to the philosophizing ego in the sense of "subject of his pure cogitationes." (I, 45) Descartes executed this regress by his method of doubt. Husserl says that Descartes aimed with radical consistency at absolute knowledge and refused to accept anything as existent unless it be secured against every logically conceivable possibility of becoming doubtful. He subjected everything that is certain in the natural attitude to methodic criticism with regard to the logical conceivability of a doubt about it. He sought to obtain a stock of things that are absolutely evident by excluding everything that leaves open any possibility of doubt. The certainty of sensuous experience, "the certainty with which the world is given in natural living," (I, 45) cannot withstand Descartes' methodic criticism. This motivates a suspension of the acceptance of the being of the world, "at this initial stage." (I, 45) Husserl thinks that Descartes is then left with "only himself, qua pure ego of his cogitationes, as having an absolutely indubitable existence, as something that cannot be done away with, something that would exist even though this world were non-existent." (I, 45) Descartes is then seen seeking apodictically certain ways
by which, within his own pure inwardness, an objective outwardness can be deduced. "The course of the argument is well known: First God's existence and veracity are deduced and then, by means of them, objective nature, the duality of finite substances - in short, the objective field of metaphysics and the positive sciences, and these disciplines themselves. All the various inferences proceed, as they must, according to guiding principles immanent, or 'innate,' in the pure ego." (I,45)

It would be a serious mistake at this point to assume that Husserl's solution to the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world follows this Cartesian pattern. His claim to have uncovered "for the first time the genuine sense of the necessary regress to the ego" (I,48) warns against that. What Husserl takes from Descartes is the idea of a radical turn "from naive objectivism to transcendental subjectivism" (I,46) in the context of the ideal of a science grounded on an absolute foundation, not the interpretation he thinks Descartes put on either the turn or the ideal.

Husserl treats the ideal of a science grounded on an absolute foundation as a mere possibility. This is an anticipation of his method, which restricts him to "possibilities" in a peculiar sense which is yet to be explained. In anticipation, I think we should consider a Husserlian "pure possibility" as a concept. It is the concept of science he begins to investigate. "Concept" here means
more than mere "word-meaning." It is akin to what Peter Geach calls a "capacity" for certain mental acts. Husserl suspends judgment, so that he does not have at his disposal any science already given which he takes for granted as an example of such grounded science. He refuses to presuppose the validity of this ideal. In contrast, he criticizes Descartes for doing just that. "Descartes himself presupposed an ideal of science, the ideal approximated by geometry and mathematical natural science. As a fateful prejudice this ideal determines philosophies for centuries and hiddenly determines the Meditations themselves." (I, 48f) Husserl refers here to Descartes' assumption that the sought for science has the form of a deductive system resting on an axiomatic foundation. Husserl rejects that, but not the ideal itself. How can he avoid taking the ideal for granted?

Naturally, he admits, he gets the general idea of science from the actually given sciences. However, in his radically critical attitude they are transformed into merely alleged sciences, alleged examples of a pure possibility which remains to be investigated. He takes this general idea as a "precuratory presumption," (I, 49) and asks how it might be thought out as a possibility. A first step in this process is to "make distinct" (I, 50) the guiding idea of science. This is not done by a process of abstraction based on comparing the de facto sciences. Rather, it is done by "immersing ourselves in the scientific striving and
doing that pertain to them, in order to see clearly and distinctly what is really being aimed at." (I,50)

In this progressive immersion in the sense of the characteristic intention of scientific endeavor, the constituent aspects of the concept of science are said to be explicated. It is not my intention to follow in detail Husserl's phenomenology of science.¹ I am merely trying to explain the relationship of transcendental problems and phenomenological reduction to the ideal of rigorous science and to show how this ideal leads to the turn toward transcendental subjectivity. It does so by way of the concept of evidence. Only a preliminary discussion of evidence will be proper here, for it is a recurring theme which becomes progressively elaborated in the argument.

In his investigations, Husserl finds that the concept of science involves "the striving for grounded judgments." (I,50) He distinguishes between immediate and mediate judgments, in that the latter presuppose the former as their ground. "Grounding" shows the truth of the judgment. To an already executed grounding one can in principle always return at will. This defines the concept of a "cognition": (I,51) an abiding acquisition or possession to which one can return at will as grounded. In genuine grounding there is an agreement of the judgment with what is judged. In Husserl's own expression of it: "Judging is meaning - and, as a rule, merely supposing - that such and such exists and has such and such determina-
tions; the judgment (what is judged) is then a merely supposed affair or complex of affairs: an affair or state-of-affairs, as what is meant. But, contrasted with that, there is sometimes a pre-eminent judicative meaning, a judicative having of such and such itself. This having is called evidence. In it the affair, the complex (or state) of affairs, instead of being merely meant 'from afar', is present as the affair 'itself,' the affair-complex or state-of-affairs 'itself'; the judger accordingly possesses it itself. A judging that merely supposes becomes adjusted to the affairs, the affair-complexes, themselves by conscious conversion into the corresponding evidence. This conversion is inherently characterized as the fulfilling of what was merely meant, a synthesis in which what was meant coincides and agrees with what is itself given; it is an evident possessing of the correctness of what previously was meant at a distance from affairs." (I,51)

Many of the concepts operative here will have to be made thematic in succeeding investigations, but this statement may serve as a basis for our present discussion. As Husserl understands it, the scientist intends to accept no judgment as objective knowledge unless he has grounded it perfectly and can return at will to this repeatable act of grounding. This may be only a claim, but as such it is an ideal goal and central to the concept of science.

Evidence is the crucial notion here. In a very broad sense, it means simply "an 'experiencing' of some-
thing that is and that is thus." (I,52) Husserl conceives this as a process, so that in the course of the experiencing the meaning of something as "being" and as "being thus and so" is either verified or nullified. Perfect evidence is thus correlated with pure and genuine truth. These concepts vary from pre-scientific to scientific life. "For everyday life, with its changing and relative purposes, relative evidences and truths suffice. But science looks for truths that are valid, and remain so, once for all and for everyone; accordingly it seeks verifications of a new kind." (I,52f)

This is the locus of the problem of the possibility of objective knowledge. Husserl thinks that science itself realizes that it does not actually attain a system of absolute truths. It is obliged to modify its "truths" over and over again. Nevertheless, Husserl thinks that science is guided by the idea of absolute or perfectly grounded truth, in terms of which it is an infinite horizon of approximations tending toward that goal. He sees in this the idea of "an order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions."(I,53)

This, he believes, gives him a measure of clarity sufficient to let him fix his "first methodological principle," namely not to make or accept as scientific any judgment that he has not "derived from evidence, from 'experiences' in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as 'they themselves'." (I, 54)
This coincides with what he calls the principle of all principles of phenomenology in *Ideas*, Vol. I: "that every originally giving intuition is a source of rightness for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in originary form (so to speak in its bodily reality), is simply to be taken as what it gives itself to be, but only within the limits in which it gives itself." (III, Sec. 24) This principle is Husserl's general normative principle of evidence. It derives from his ideal of rigorous science and motivates phenomenological reduction. It sets in motion a quest for "those cognitions which are first in themselves and can support the whole storied edifice of universal knowledge." (I, 54) It is not yet clear whether there are any such cognitions or, if so, what they are; but we now know that they must be "recognizable as preceding all other imaginable evidences" and that "they must have a certain perfection, they must carry with them an absolute certainty." (I, 55) These two requirements state the two themes which function most significantly in Husserl's "way" to phenomenological reduction. They must now be followed out. The first theme has to do with the perfection of evidence here called "absolute certainty." The second theme has to do with the apriori function of evidences which precede all others and make them possible. These two themes are actually interdependent in Husserl's way to phenomenological reduction.
In clarifying this theme of "absolute certainty," the perfection of evidence involved becomes differentiated for Husserl. First, there is the wealth of pre-scientific evidences which are only more or less perfect. With regard to them imperfection means incompleteness: "a one-sidedness and at the same time a relative obscurity and indistinctness that qualify the givenness of the affairs themselves: i.e., an infectedness of the 'experience' with unfulfilled components, with expectant and attendant meanings. Perfecting then takes place as a synthetic course of further harmonious experiences in which these attendant meanings become fulfilled in actual experience." (I,55) The perfection in question would be what Husserl calls "adequate evidence," a somewhat misleading choice of terms probably stemming from the traditional concept of truth as the "adequation" of intellect and object. This sort of evidence will be discussed in detail at a later stage of the argument. Here the point is to notice that the cognitions sought do not have to be "adequately" given. In the Cartesian Meditations this demand was dropped, whereas it had been accepted in the Ideas. A different perfection of evidence is required, namely "apodicticity" and it can occur in evidences that are "inadequate."(I,55)

The cognitions Husserl seeks in order to solve the transcendental problems concerning the possibility of objective knowledge must have a certain perfection, an absolute certainty. He specifies this as "apodictic evi-
dence," but what does that mean? Any evidence at all, in
Husserl's sense, is a grasping of something "itself" as
being or as being thus and so. It is a grasping in the
sense of having "it itself" present in one's consciousness,
and so it excludes doubt in a sense. There is no room for
doubt about this having, but this certainty does not
necessarily exclude the logical conceivability that what
is evident could subsequently become doubtful, or the
logical conceivability that the being could prove to be an
illusion. This happens; it is always an open possibility
in the case of one sort of evidence. "An apodictic evidence,
however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-
complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it
discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the
signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute
unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being,
and thus excluding in advance every doubt as 'objectless,'
empty." (I,56)

With this we have before us the Cartesian principle
of absolute indubitability "in a clarified form." (I,56)
The two themes which function most significantly in Husserl's
way to phenomenological reduction are embodied in it. The
first is the theme of a required region of apodictic evi-
dence or logically indubitable cognitions. The second is
the theme of a region of evidences which are prior to all
others and function to make the others possible. This
second theme is still relatively unclarified, but will be
developed as we begin to examine Husserl's conception of the apriori.

What we have considered so far shows the relationship of phenomenological reduction to the ideal of rigorous science. Transcendental problems themselves arise in connection with this ideal of objective knowledge of the objective world, all founded on an absolute basis. The considerations of the attitude mistake made in the traditional formulation of these problems shows that they cannot be raised consistently in the natural attitude. When asked in the natural attitude, transcendental questions as questions about the possibility of transcendent knowledge presuppose what they question and in questioning deny what they presuppose. This at least suggests the possibility of a change of attitude which would allow for the consistent formulation of the questions. Further, since the attitude mistake involved a failure to distinguish fact from possibility, these considerations suggest that transcendental problems can only be raised consistently when we reorient ourselves so as to attend to pure possibilities instead of facts as in the natural orientation. That in itself is a significant aspect of Husserl's "way" to phenomenological reduction - or at least to "eidetic" reduction, as we shall see. In itself, however, this says nothing that we can detect immediately about what would count as a "pure possibility" in the required sense. For all these considerations tell us, pure possibilities could be "word-meanings"
or even the essences reached by eidetic method in the natural attitude. They would not necessarily have anything to do with the "transcendental" in Husserl's fullest sense. It is the ideal of rigorous science, however, which also provides the two themes which do lead to transcendental subjectivity by way of phenomenological-transcendental reduction.

The pure possibilities which Husserl thinks can function to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world are "evidences" which are both apodictic and, in his sense, apriori: that is, cognitions which are both indubitable in themselves and function to make possible all other cognitions. To establish radically and ultimately the possibility of objective knowledge of the objective world requires tracing the concepts involved in the question back to evidences that are apodictic and apriori. The question now becomes one of whether there are any such evidences.

From the natural point of view it appears that the question of evidences that are first in themselves can be answered without any trouble, for the existence of the world seems to present itself forthwith as such a cognition. Husserl states the case like this: "The life of everyday action relates to the world. All the sciences relate to it: the sciences of matters of fact relate to it immediately; the apriori sciences, mediately, as instruments of scientific
method. More than anything else the being of the world is obvious. It is so very obvious that no one would think of asserting it expressly in a proposition. After all, we have our continuous experience in which this world incessantly stands before our eyes, as existing without question."

(I,57) This is quite correct from the natural point of view. However, it must be subjected to critical examination if there is question as to its possibility. Is this evidence actually first in itself?

Husserl's statement of the case suggests a distinction between the world of daily life and the world of science. The distinction is important for answering the question about evidences first in themselves, although in the first Cartesian Meditation it seems that Husserl wanted to say only that daily life and science both relate to "the world." This must be the world of the natural attitude, and surely daily life and science relate to it in significantly different ways. The difference is emphasized in Husserl's last work, The Crisis in European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. ³

We can understand what Husserl means by "the world" here in terms of the previous characterization of his philosophy as a reflection upon the correlation of object and consciousness of object. The distinctive quality of phenomenological research into this correlation comes from the special interpretation Husserl gave to Brentano's concept of "intentionality." Intentionality means first
of all that consciousness is possible (i.e., logically conceivable or conceptually possible) only as consciousness of something or other. The significance of this insight is that it makes accessible the correlation of consciousness and object of consciousness. Along with that correlation an essential structure of every case of "consciousness of an object" is also accessible to reflection. Every perceived thing contains within its sense an indication of a possible continuation of experience of the same sort. For example, if I see a house from the front, there is implied in that the possibility of moving around so as to see the rear. This yields the formal concept of "horizon," which is basic to the present essay. An horizon is here the context which includes all conceivable continuations of experience to which the given thing is an index. This horizon is the world. The world is not given in experience like an object "in" the world, but as the horizon of all such objects. This is essential to the concept of world as we have it in either science or daily life. "World" is thus not merely the total group of things that are, the objects of possible experience. Rather, it is the essential structure of experience as the correlation of consciousness and object.

We are, in this whole inquiry, concerned with the relation between the conceptual scheme and the reality conceptualized in and by that scheme. The point here is that we could encounter the real objective world (which
by virtue of being conceived as such is already interpreted) only because the structures can become explicit which always and essentially determine the relation of consciousness and its object. This makes it intelligible how "the world" is present in every actual experience, even though it may be unthematic.

This being the core of the concept of the world, we can distinguish between the life-world (Lebenswelt) and the objective world of science. Husserl understands these to be two fundamentally different ways of determining the relation of consciousness to its object, two different orientations, so to speak. Both, however, are within the natural attitude. The objective world of science is essentially defined by the fact that the correlation of consciousness and object becomes irrelevant for the scientific determination of its object. This irrelevance is the ground of the objectivity of the sciences. For scientific knowing the world is "in itself;" its correlation to conscious life drops out of consideration. Nevertheless, it is constituted as such through the consistent exclusion of all subject-relative modes of givenness and the production of a universe of objects through "mathematization." (VI, 20ff) Husserl explains in detail in the second part of The Crisis the genesis of the mathematical physical sciences out of the spatio-temporal world of life. He sees this genesis to be a product of a process of "idealization." (VI, 30) The world becomes in this process mere
"nature" in the sense found in the natural or physical sciences. Their basic "thesis" is that nature in its true being in itself is mathematical. As a science of fact, this mathematical physical science necessarily has a foundation in what Husserl calls (in one of his usages) an apriori science or a science of essences. In this case it is geometry in the widest sense. This is a very brief outline of Husserl's point that the objective world of science is defined through a definite relation of consciousness to its objects, but that here the orientation is one in which the relation itself remains concealed. Husserl says that it is "operative" but "unthematic."

In contrast, the life-world is the horizon of perceptual experience which is essentially relative to a subject. As Husserl puts it, "the contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the 'objective,' the 'true' world lies in this: that the latter is a theoretical superstructure, which is in principle not perceptible, in principle not experiencible in its own self-being, while the subjective life-world is distinguished in all and each case just by its actual experiencibility." (VI, 130)

Clearly this is Husserl's argument to the effect that the objective world of science is not the evidence that is first in itself and apriori for all other evidence. If the objective world of science is constituted by the method of idealizing and by forgetting the method, then it is founded on the perceptible life-world. The subject-relativity of
the life-world is precisely the determining motive for the idealization through which that relativity is overcome and the universe of objects in themselves is constituted. Husserl's point is that idealizing and the mastery or control of nature made possible by it would not be possible if the life-world did not already contain in itself the structures which made idealization possible. The life-world has in all its relativities its own "general structure," (VI, 142) which can be made the theme of a proper science. "The world as life-world already has pre-scientifically the 'same' structures as those which the objective sciences, with their superstructure of a world existing 'in itself' in 'truth in itself' (become self-understood in this century), presuppose as apriori structures and develop in apriori sciences." (VI, 142)

This becomes quite clear in the case of the structure of spatio-temporality. On one hand, it is that to which idealization is applied, while on the other hand, it is the "formal-universal" (VI, 145) which comes into focus in a first reflection on "that which remains invariant in the life-world in all changes of relativities." (VI, 145) The mathematical sciences of the world presuppose spatio-temporality as their apriori structure. This apriori is then unfolded in the mathematics of spatio-temporality. This mathematical apriori takes as a basis the spatio-temporality which is the structure of the life-world.
Husserl then calls this "the life-worldly apriori." "It is a certain idealizing performance which brings about the higher level sense-formation and acceptance of being of the mathematical apriori, and every objective apriori, on the ground of the life-worldly apriori." (VI, 143)

The bearing of this on our consideration of the way to phenomenological reduction is that the objective world of science is not the evidence we are seeking. The distinction between the life-world and the objective world of science is founded upon a distinction of aprioris. An "apriori" here is a realm of evidences that make possible other evidences. In the case of "spatio-temporality" being investigated, a science of the life-world would be an apriori science of life-worldly "spatio-temporality." Such a science or inquiry is set in motion by what Husserl calls an "epochê" (VI, 138) of the objective sciences, an exclusion from consideration of all idealizations. In the Cartesian Meditations this was quietly done at the beginning of the first meditation. By such a move we thematize the correlation which makes possible spatio-temporality and other such structures as the form of the life-world.

While we are exploring this matter, there is a further characterization of "the world," in both senses, which should be made explicit. The world is always characterized as "pre-given"; that is, it is given with the sense of already having been there before we "consti-
tuted" it. "Natural life is, whether pre-scientific or scientific, theoretically or practically interested life, life in a universal unthematized horizon. In natural life that is just the world always pre-given as the existing world." (VI, 148) For the objective sciences the world is pre-given as a mathematical universe that becomes determined and known in such science univocally. This pre-givenness, however, is grounded in a "naivety" which does not see or forgets that the supposed pre-given world is the result of an idealization arising out of subjective interests in cognition. This first naivety is "seen through" and "broken through" by an initial epoché or suspension. This also makes the life-world thematic.

We might be tempted to stop here and consider the life-world to be the evidence we seek. A good bit of so-called phenomenology in America today, under the guidance of John Wild, does just that. We must not, however, overlook the fact that Husserl never stopped there. He says: "In the performance of this epoché we still stand obviously on the ground of the world; it is now reduced to the world holding for us pre-scientifically." (VI, 150) This world is still characterized as pre-given; it is grounded in the naivety of the natural attitude. Only through a suspension of this natural attitude by "transcendental epoché" (VI, 151) can this ultimate naivety be overcome and the universal correlation of consciousness and object of consciousness be made the theme of a transcendental reflection. To this transcendental epoché we now turn.
With reference to the apparent obviousness of the being of the world to the natural attitude, Husserl says: "But, however much this evidence is prior in itself to all the other evidences of life (as turned toward the world) and to all the evidences of all the world sciences (since it is the basis that continually supports them), we soon become doubtful about the extent to which, in this capacity it can lay claim to being apodictic. And, if we follow up this doubt, it becomes manifest that our experiential evidence of the world lacks also the superiority of being the absolutely primary evidence." (I,57) The inter-connectedness of the two themes is clear in this remark.

Concerning the first theme, Husserl argues that "the universal sensuous experience in whose evidence the world is continuously pre-given is obviously not to be taken forthwith as an apodictic evidence, which, as such, would absolutely exclude both the possibility of eventual doubt whether the world is actual and the possibility of its non-being." (I,57) This argument presupposes Husserl's analysis of the kind of "sensuous evidence" in question. As presented in section seven of the first Cartesian Meditation it is not convincing and is perhaps misleading. He simply argues that a particular experienced thing, for example a die, may "suffer devaluation as an illusion of the senses." (I,57) Furthermore, he argues that this is true not only of particular experienced things but also of their actual horizon ("the whole unitarily surveyable nexus,
The point seems to be that the world as the horizon of the objects of external experience could, in the sense that it is logically possible, "prove to be an illusion, a coherent dream." (I, 57)

This sounds very much like the traditional argument from illusion, which has been thoroughly discredited by philosophers like John Austin. We must be careful, however, about imputing to Husserl an argument he does not actually use and a use to which he does not put it. Austin shows that "the primary purpose of the argument from illusion is to induce people to accept 'sense-data' as the proper and correct answer to the question what they perceive on certain abnormal, exceptional occasions; but in fact it is usually followed up with another bit of argument intended to establish that they always perceive sense-data."6 I believe that Husserl rejects much of what Austin rejects in all of this. At this point, I only want to show that he is not using the traditional argument from illusion, and that in any case he is not making this use of it.

In order to do this, I will need to anticipate his argument in the Cartesian Meditations and refer to section twenty-eight in the third meditation. Husserl's argument concerns the search for apodictic evidences. He finds, upon examination, that sensuous experience does not have apodicticity. This has to do with the fact we have
already noted in connection with the concept of a horizon, that external evidences (the manner in which real things are given to us in sensuous experience) refer us to infini-
ties of evidences relating to the same object. This is because "they make their object itself-given with an essentially necessary one-sidedness." (I, 96) If I see a building, it is presented to me one-sidedly or at least in what Husserl calls "profiles." In principle, at least, there are infinitely many possible profiles correlated with infinitely many possible perspectives. In the case of sensuous experience of real objects, the evidence is never all in, at least in principle. This seems to be a lack of "adequate evidence," and yet Husserl treats it as a lack of "apodictic evidence." Perhaps he is confused, but I doubt it. The point is that if the evidence in such a case is even in principle never all in, then in principle the continuation of experience could result in the initial intention being nullified.

The point at issue, however, is not whether an object in the world possesses for us adequate or apodictic evidence. Even in the natural attitude we could grant that no such object does, although we might find it irrele-
vant. The point at issue, however, is the world's apodic-
tic evidence. Husserl moves from the lack of apodictic evidence in things to say that "that is the case with nothing less than the totality of evidences by virtue to which a real objective world, as a whole and in respect
of any particular objects, is immediately there for us intuitionally." (I,96) He uses the term "intuition" usually in the sense of present and immediate sensuous experience. While his point about objects in the world may be granted, his point about the world in which we experience objects is more difficult to accept. We must be careful not to take him as arguing for more than he is, however.

The evidence pertaining to particular objects in the real objective world is "external experience." The real objective world is only given to us along with such experiences as the horizon. This kind of evidence has an essential one-sidedness: "a multiform horizon of unfulfilled anticipations (which, however, are in need of fulfillment), and, accordingly, contents of a mere meaning, which refer us to corresponding potential evidences." (I,96) Of course, this imperfect evidence becomes more nearly perfect in the course of experience, but Husserl finds that in essence no conceivable synthesis of continued experience of this kind could be completed as purely adequate evidence. Any such synthesis would always involve unfulfilled expectant and accompanying meanings. What does this lack of adequacy have to do with apodicticity? Simply this: "at the same time there always remains the open possibility that the belief in being, which extends into the anticipation, will not be fulfilled, that what is appearing in the mode 'it itself' nevertheless does not exist or is
different." (I,97) The world, then, simply is not given with apodictic evidence. When I think about it, I wonder that I ever thought it was - in this sense. There may be another sense in which it is apodictically given, however. As we shall see, Husserl finds that the apodictically given "I" is essentially a "world-experiencing I", and in that sense "world" is given apodictically too.

This leads us to see that Husserl was not employing the traditional argument from illusion. It is not "abnormal, exceptional occasions" that function in this argument, but very ordinary experiences. Further, Husserl is not arguing to anything like a sense-data theory. That would involve as much of an attitude mistake as any traditional theory. We shall return to his theory of sensations later. After his brief argument in section seven, he says: "We need not take the indicating of these possible and sometimes actual reversals of evidence as a sufficient criticism of the evidence in question and see in it a full proof that, in spite of the continual experiencedness of the world, a non-being of the world in conceivable." (I,57)

An important distinction must be made between "open possibilities," which are merely logically possible, and "problematic possibilities," which are motivated. Here we only have to do with open possibilities.

In concluding this part of his argument, Husserl says: "We retain only this much: that the evidence of world-experience would, at all events, need to be criticized
with regard to its validity and range, before it could be used for the purposes of a radical grounding of science, and that therefore we must not take that evidence to be, without question, immediately apodictic." (I, 57f) He says that it follows from this that the epoché of the sciences and the objective world of science is not enough. "Their universal basis, the experienced world, must also be deprived of its naive acceptance. The being of the world, by reason of the evidence of natural experience, must no longer be for us an obvious matter of fact; it too must be for us, henceforth, only an acceptance-phenomenon." (I, 58) In fact, this represents the conscious execution of phenomenological reduction. It results in a new attitude in which we no longer posit the objectivities of our consciousness as being but consider them as "phenomena" in a sense which is yet to be explained. The realm of phenomena must be the region of evidences that are apodictic and apriori, but we must see how they are and what they are in Husserl's sense.

If we persist in taking "the world" as the name for the universe of whatever exists, it will be difficult to understand how this "transcendental epoché" gains access to anything that could solve the problems about the possibility of objective knowledge. However, Husserl's argument thus far is supposed to have made us see that the world is not the absolutely first basis for judgments, not the apodictic and apriori ground for objective knowledge,
but that there is "a being that is intrinsically prior to the world" which is "the already presupposed basis for the existence of the world." (I,53)

This is the most problematical stage in the development of Husserl's solution to the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. At this point, following Descartes in a certain sense, he makes "the great reversal that, if made in the right manner, leads to transcendental subjectivity." (I,53) He is correct in stressing the need to do it "in the right manner," for we have seen what happens when the attitude mistake is not avoided. Avoiding it is foremost in Husserl's mind, and yet his way of expressing himself often confuses just this point. It will help if we remember that once we perform the phenomenological reduction, no pronoun has its natural attitude sense any longer. Some convention like single or double quotes, consistently employed, would have helped Husserl more than a simple reliance on holding to the new point of view. However, if we try I believe we can follow his argument without attitude mistakes.

After the conscious execution of the two epochés, we no longer have before us either the objective world of science or the life-world. Have we then lost the world? Not in any ordinary philosophical sense, for what is before us is the world as phenomenon. It makes no more sense to say that Husserl has lost the world at this point than to say that someone who wishes to say "'Texas' has five letters"
has lost his state. However, Husserl's way of speaking about this can be quite misleading. The difficulty has to do with his tendency to say both that phenomenological reduction thematizes "transcendental subjectivity" and that it thematizes his own "transcendental ego." Just as transcendental epoché turns things around so that the world is for us who meditate in this way only something that claims being (a concept), so that move also "affects the intramundane existence of all other I's, so that rightly we should no longer speak communicatively, in the plural. Other men than I, and brute animals, are data of experience for me only by virtue of my sensuous experience of their bodily organisms; and, since the validity of this experience too is called in question, I must not use it. Along with other egos, naturally, I lose all the formations pertaining to sociality and culture. In short, not just corporeal nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is." (I,59) That kind of statement is liable to lead to the attitude mistake. Husserl himself saw this and added in a marginal note opposite the talk of "all other I's": "Likewise the intramundane existence of my own I as human." (I,239) However confusing his way of putting it, I believe that all he is trying to say here is that once we make the transcendental turn absolutely everything transcendent is transformed into phenomena, including the phenomenologist himself in a sense. If we
decide to study the conceptual scheme, then anything we study will be a concept in the scheme and not a real object conceptualized by it. For the moment at least, let us understand by phenomenon something like concept, where the latter is more than a mere word-meaning in a dictionary but rather some unity of sense in human conscious life. If one understands "subjectivity" in, for example, a Kierkegaardian sense, then there is hardly a turn to "subjectivity" here at all.

How, then, are phenomena or the whole system of phenomena, the apodictic and apriori realm of evidence we seek? After what has been said, this part of the argument is rather simple. Husserl says that "no matter what the status of this phenomenon's claim to actuality and no matter whether, at some future time, I decide critically that the world exists or that it is an illusion, still this phenomenon itself, as mine, is not nothing but is precisely what makes such critical decisions at all possible and accordingly makes possible whatever has for me sense and validity as 'true' being - definitively decided or definitively decideable being." (I,59,cf. Sec. 9) The individual phenomenon (or concept) and the system of phenomena (or conceptual scheme) is the ultimate epistemological apriori. Furthermore, the phenomenon is apodictic, for "if I abstained - as I was free to do and as I did - and still abstain from every believing involved in or founded on sensuous experiencing, so that the being of the experienced
world remains unaccepted by me, still this abstaining is what it is; and it exists, together with the whole stream of my experiencing life. Moreover, this life is continually there for me. Continually, in respect of a field of the present, it is given to consciousness perceptually, with the most originary originality, as it itself; memorially, now there and now those pasts thereof are 'again' given to consciousness, and that implies: as the 'pasts themselves.' Reflecting, I can at any time look at this original living and note particulars; I can grasp what is present as present, what is past as past, each as itself. I do so now, as the I who philosophizes and exercises the aforesaid abstention." (I, 59)

Thus, when I consciously execute phenomenological reduction what I have in view then is the universe of phenomena, the conceptual scheme, or simply transcendental conscious life. In this the world goes on being "experienced" as in the natural attitude with precisely the content it has at any time and in general. The only difference is now I reflect rather than live straightforwardly, I no longer keep in effect the general thesis of the natural attitude, though in a sense that is there too for me to reflectively examine. This is true not only of the world and its objects, but as Husserl says also of "all the processes of meaning that, in addition to the world-experiencing ones, belong to my lifestream: the non-intuitive process of meaning objects, the judgings, valuings,
and deciding, the processes of setting ends and willing means, and all the rest, in particular the position-taking necessarily involved in them all when I am in the natural and non-reflective attitude - since precisely these position-takings always presuppose the world, i.e., involve believing in its existence." (I, 59)

Nothing disappears from my field of experience by executing phenomenological reduction. The world experienced, the processes of experiencing, and the I who am experiencer: all this remains as phenomenon, as the system of phenomena or conceptual scheme.

This conceptual, or as Husserl calls it, phenomenological scheme is apodictic and apriori. The world is for me in this new orientation simply the world existing for and accepted by me in a conscious cogito. It gets its whole sense, universal and specific, and its acceptance as existing, exclusively from cogitationes. In these acts of meaning or intentions my whole life-world is constituted, including also my scientifically inquiring and grounding life. When Husserl says that "by my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me, myself," (I, 60) we must remember that it is not a matter of the natural first person pronoun. It is the "pure I" with his "pure cogitations" intending his "pure cogitata." This is "a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the
world." (I,61) The "being" here is not Edmund Husserl, the man, or even his psyche, but the conceptual scheme which as we might say is "embodied" or manifest in his conscious life. Thus natural being or reality or the world simpliciter has a secondary status, in that it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being. We gain access to this realm by means of transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

By carefully observing the restrictions which reduction places on first person singular pronouns in reading Husserl we can avoid the attitude mistake. He says that Descartes did not avoid it, for he thought that with the access to the apodictic pure "I" he had "rescued a little tag-end of the world, as the sole unquestionable part of it for the philosophizing I." (I,63) This is the attitude mistake that made Descartes "the father of transcendental realism, an absurd position." (I,63) From our discussion of the attitude mistake and the two themes leading to phenomenological reduction, it is clear that Husserl intends to avoid any transcendental realism. It would be a serious mistake to understand his discussion of transcendental subjectivity as if it were a tag-end of the world. For this reason, I think we do well to understand it as the pure conceptual scheme. If his way to the system of concepts seems long and tortuous, we must not forget its pioneering character. The linguistic way to the conceptual scheme was not quick and easy either. Whether Husserl's position is best characterized as a transcendental
idealism in contrast to all transcendental realisms is a question to which I shall return at the end of this essay.

So far I have mapped out Husserl's 'way' of phenomenological reduction to transcendental subjectivity and suggested a general interpretation of the latter. The transcendent and the transcendental are intentional correlates, just as the world and consciousness of the world are intentional correlates. The reduced 'I' is not a piece of the world, and the world is not a piece of the transcendental 'I.' As a rough analogy, 'Texas' is not a state in the Union and Texas is not a word in the English language. The world is transcendent and objective; this is part of the sense of the concept of world and of any worldly object. Nevertheless, the world "acquires all the sense determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my (remember the reduction!) experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times - notably the status of an evidently valid being is one it can acquire only from my own evidences, my grounding acts. If this 'transcendence,' which consists in being non-really included, is part of the intrinsic sense of the world, then, by way of contrast, the I himself, who bears within him the world as an accepted sense and who, in turn, is necessarily presupposed by this sense, is legitimately called transcendental, in the phenomenological sense. Accordingly the philosophical problems aris-
ing from this correlation are called phenomenological-transcendental." (I, 65) Throughout the remainder of this essay we shall be examining this relationship between the conceptual scheme and the world conceptualized in and by the scheme. Next, we shall explore the structure of the scheme called transcendental subjectivity.
Notes to Chapter 2

2 Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana* Band III, *op. cit.*, Sec. 36-46, especially 42-44.
3. The Structure Of Transcendental Subjectivity

Phenomenological reduction has been mapped out as the way to transcendental subjectivity, the realm of evidences in which the problems about the possibility of objective knowledge are to be solved. This realm has been initially interpreted as the conceptual scheme in and by which the world is experienced and conceptualized. The next step in unpacking Husserl's claim to be able to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world is to explore the general structure of transcendental subjectivity. This structure holds the key to the kind of solution Husserl offers to his problems: constitutional theories based on intentional analyses of transcendental subjectivity.

After finding the way to transcendental subjectivity in the first Cartesian Meditation, Husserl asks at the beginning of the second: "As one who is meditating in the Cartesian manner, what can I do with the transcendental ego philosophically?" (I,66) It may seem odd at this point that he should begin to talk about the transcendental "ego" rather than about transcendental "subjectivity." The transcendental ego is called a "being" which is prior in the order of knowledge to all "objective being." Husserl is prepared to speak of both the transcendent and the transcendental as "being." In a certain sense, he says,
the transcendental ego is the underlying basis on which all objective knowledge of the objective world takes place.

The question he raises concerns the philosophical use to which the transcendental ego can be put. In general, we seem to have been prepared for the answer. The transcendental ego seems to be, in some sense, the realm of evidences to which access has been gained by phenomenological reduction. That realm of apodictic and apriori evidence is to be used to solve transcendental problems. The question, however, is more specific than that. It asks how such solutions can use the transcendental ego. It is surely a great source of difficulty that Husserl begins at this point to speak of the transcendental ego instead of transcendental subjectivity in the pregnant sense already mentioned. Let us notice these difficulties and see whether there is an explanation.

Phenomenological reduction was supposed to open the way for the development of a new science of transcendental subjectivity, which I have interpreted as a science which studies the conceptual scheme as it is experienced in the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. Now Husserl says that "apparently my (the philosopher's) transcendental ego is, and must be, not only its initial but its sole theme." (I, 69) It is apparently going to be a pure "egology." Two problems arise in connection with this move in Husserl's argument. First, why does he begin
to talk about the "ego" instead of about "subjectivity" in the pregnant sense? Second, how can he rightly speak of his own de facto transcendental ego in this new attitude? These questions must be answered before we can proceed to explore the structure of transcendental subjectivity. We do well to attack the second problem first.

How can there be any justification for Husserl's speaking of his own de facto transcendental ego, when he has adopted the phenomenological attitude? The situation here is similar to that encountered with respect to "science" when we were considering the way to transcendental subjectivity. Husserl wanted to clarify the pure possibility or concept of science, but in order to get the clarification started he had to begin with the actual and familiar sciences as examples or clues to the concept.¹ Now in the second meditation he wants to clarify the essential structure of transcendental subjectivity or the conceptual scheme. Here too he will need an example or clue to get the clarification started, and his own actual transcendental ego serves the purpose. There is nothing more mysterious about it than that, but that needs to be explained.

Having affirmed a certain priority of the transcendental ego, he asks: "But can this priority rightly signify that the transcendental ego is, in the usual sense, the knowledge-basis on which all objective knowledge is
grounded?" (I, 66) In raising this question, he is not abandoning the attempt to find in transcendental subjectivity the deepest grounding of objective knowledge and even of the sense and being of the objective world. He is, however, opening the way for a new conception of this "grounding," a phenomenologically transcendental conception of it. As he puts it: "instead of attempting to use ego cogito as an apodictically evident premise for arguments supposedly implying a transcendent subjectivity, we shall direct our attention to the fact that phenomenological epoché lays open (to me, the meditating philosopher) an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience."

(I, 66) It must be an "experience" in Husserl's very broad sense of the term, because the normative principle of evidence requires that it be. It will be recalled that Husserl's principle requires him to refrain from accepting or making any judgments as grounded that he has not derived from evidence, from experiences in which the affairs or states of affairs in question are present to him directly as "they themselves" or "in person."

Transcendental subjectivity or the transcendental ego (for the moment I am neglecting the distinction) must be brought to self-givenness according to this principle if it is to serve its purpose. This can only be accomplished by the reflecting philosopher taking his own
transcendental subjectivity as his clue for critical analysis. He reflects on his own conceptual scheme and the way he uses it in his conscious life. There is nothing logically odd about speaking at once of "the" conceptual scheme and of "my" conceptual scheme. The latter is surely just a variant of the former. "Transcendental experience," Husserl says, "consists then, we can say, in our looking at and describing the particular transcendentally reduced cogito, but without participating, as reflective subjects, in the natural existence-positing that the originally straightforward perception (or other cogito) contains or that the I, as immersing himself straightforwardly in the world, actually executed." (I,72)

This view of transcendental experience suggests the answer to the question of how Husserl can be justified in speaking of his own de facto transcendental ego. It is taken simply as a clue, and phenomenological method is "eidetic" from the start, at least in so far as it is philosophical. It will scarcely be a digression at this point for us to give some initial attention to eidetic method, for Husserl says that "along with phenomenological reduction, eidetic intuition is the fundamental form of all particular transcendental methods." (I,106)

In the Ideas this method was introduced at the beginning, before phenomenological reduction or intentional analysis. In the Cartesian Meditations, however, its
introduction is postponed until late in the fourth meditation. Once it is introduced, Husserl claims that it "pervades the whole phenomenological method" and "signifies a transfer of all empirical descriptions into a new and fundamental dimension." (I,103) The delay in explaining eidetic method is excused on the ground that it facilitates entrance into phenomenology. I find it quite the reverse, as the present difficulty about Husserl's talk of his de facto transcendental ego shows. Husserl himself must have had second thoughts on the issue. In his earlier discussion of transcendental experience he said: "When we take it into consideration that, for each kind of actual experience and for each of its universal variant modes (perception, retention, recollection, etc.), there is a corresponding pure phantasy, an 'as-if experience,' with parallel modes (as-if perception, as-if retention, as-if recollection, etc.), we surmise that there is also an apriori science, which confines itself to the realm of pure possibility (pure imaginableness) and, instead of judging about the actualities of transcendental being, judges about its apriori possibilities and thus at the same time prescribes rules apriori for actualities." (I,66) As far as explicit use in the second and third and early fourth meditations goes, he leaves eidetic method at that. However, in a later note on this passage he raised the question of whether eidetic method
should not be introduced earlier.² I think it should be, in order to clear up the possible misunderstanding of the description of "my own transcendental ego" as transcendental empiricism or transcendental realism of the traditional sort.

When Husserl finally does introduce eidetic intuition in the fourth meditation, he review's the course of his preceding meditations.³ Part of this we have not yet considered, but the train of thought will be clear enough. By transcendental reduction, he says, he was led back to his own transcendental ego, with its "concretemonadic contents." When he kept on meditating on this he found descriptively formulable, intentionally explicable "types." He progressed step by step in the intentional uncovering of his "monad" (or pregnant transcendental subjectivity, as we shall see) along the fundamental lines that became evident. Now, in all of this seemingly "empirical" description, he says "for good reasons, in the course of our descriptions such expressions as 'essential necessity' and 'essentially determined' forced themselves upon us - phrases in which a definite concept of the Apriori, first clarified and delimited by phenomenology, receives expression." (I,103) Husserl's phenomenological philosophy is always eidetic.

In order to understand how the eidetic method works, at least in a preliminary way, let us take an
example. On the desk before me, illuminated by the lamp, stands a brown metal cube used as a paper weight, of two-inch dimensions. In the natural attitude I use it, and if I attend to it at all, I perceive it as unquestionably real, having the qualities and characteristics I have mentioned. In the phenomenologically reduced sphere the phenomenon cube - the cube as it appears to me or is conceived by me - keeps the same qualities but now as an intentional object of my intentional act. Suppose that I am interested in finding what are the qualities common to all cubes. I do not want to do it by an inductive method, which not only presupposes the existence of similar objects but also implies certain unwarranted logical assumptions for my purpose. I have before me only this single concrete object perceived. I am free, Husserl shows me, to transform this perceived object in my fancy, by successively varying its features - its color, its size, the material of which it is made, its perspective or profile, its illumination, its surroundings and background and so on. Thus I am free to imagine an infinite number of cubes varied in many ways. But these variations do not touch a set of characteristics common to all conceptually imaginable cubes, such as rectangularity, limitation to six squares, corporeality and so forth. This set of characteristics, unchanged among all the imagined transformations of the concrete thing perceived - what Husserl
calls the "kernal" of all the conceivable cubes - we may call the essential features of the cube the "eidos" of a cube. No cube may be conceived that would not have these essential features. All the other qualities and characteristics of the concrete object under consideration are non-essential. Of course, I could use the same object as a point of departure for other freely imagined variations in order to find the eidos of color, or corporeal thing, of object of perception, of something objective, or something temporal, and so on. Indeed, I could phantasy the object used as clue in the first place just as well as see it in fact. Eidetic method does not deal with concrete real things but with possibly conceivable things, with their "meaning." It is a method of conceptual clarification.

In this method we shift some actual (or phantasied) objectivity into the realm of non-actualities or pure possibilities or phenomena. They are "pure" in the sense of abstracted from everything that restricts to any fact whatever. Thus removed from all factualness, it becomes the pure "eidos" of whatever is in question. (We might say, in another technical vocabulary, that we gain the "intension" with no regard for the "extension." ) By eidetic method we study not only the empirical "types" or concepts of our own conscious life but the eidetic universals of any conceptual scheme at all that does what is in question. When Husserl says that "every fact can
be thought of merely as exemplifying a pure possibility" (I,105) he is stating the fundamental condition for phenomenological investigation. A possibility is "pure" not only when phenomenological reduction has been executed but when eidetic method has been applied.

With reference to the question of Husserl's talk of his own transcendental ego, we see that it is merely the example taken so that by eidetic intuition he can gain "a purely possible ego" or the "eidos ego," (I,105) He says that "we could have started out by imagining this ego (i.e., his de facto ego) to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever. The new phenomenology did so from the beginning; and accordingly all the descriptions and all the problem-delimitations treated by us up to now have in fact been translations from the original eidetic form back into that of an empirical description of types. Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility." (I,105f) With this understanding of the eidetic dimension of phenomenology the problems arising from Husserl's talk of his own trans-
The transcendental ego are cleared up.

What bothered us was actually the current criticism of "starting from one's own case" which this seemed to be. It is now seen to be something else, or at least this rendered harmless and fruitful for a conceptual investigation. To be sure, Husserl is dealing with problems relating to subjectivity, but nothing about his procedure renders it essentially subjectivistic in the sense of being essentially dependent on or relative to a particular person. The situation with the transcendental ego is just like that with the cube. In phenomenology we need examples to serve as clues for intentional analyses. Eidetic intuition, by free variation, transforms the example into an eidos by finding the invariant structures of meaning with regard to that kind of phenomenon or concept.

Now, this discussion has only answered the second of our questions so far. We see the warrant for Husserl's beginning with his own transcendental ego, but we do not yet see the justification for his beginning with his transcendental ego instead of with full transcendental subjectivity. What bothers us here is actually the current criticism of the concept of the self as a private consciousness, which is implied by Husserl's beginning of the second meditation. According to this criticism, once we conceive of the self as private, we cannot conceive of outward actions of the self and cannot be certain of the
existence of other selves or of a common world. Some who accept this criticism seem to lose the world to save the self, while others seem to lose the self to save the world. Husserl's original insight into the apriori of correlation motivates him to take neither way. He tries to so conceive the self as a private consciousness that he can also conceive the outward action of the self and be immediately certain in a sense of the existence of other selves and of a common world. How can he hope to do this by beginning with his own transcendental ego?

Husserl's beginning reflects his understanding of the ego. As he will attempt to demonstrate in the second, third, and fourth meditations, "the transcendental ego...is what it is solely in relation to intentional objectivities." (I,99) Among the intentional objectivities which Husserl finds essentially included in the eidos "human ego" are not only immanent ones but also some that are transcendent and objective. This simply means that the transcendental ego turns out to be "a world-experiencing ego," (I,166) turns out to have the conceptual scheme we in fact have. All Husserl wants to do is to make it "philosophically intelligible" (I, 164) that we have this conceptual scheme. The aim of the second, third and fourth meditations is to lay out the basic structure of this scheme or of transcendental subjectivity.

Then why does he begin the task with talk of a
transcendental ego? It will be recalled that the attitude mistake of traditional theory of knowledge involved the attempt to formulate transcendental questions in terms of the "I" of the natural attitude. Husserl responded that "manifestly the conscious execution of phenomenological reduction is needed, in order to attain that I am conscious life by which transcendental questions, as questions about the possibility of transcendent knowledge, can be asked."(I,116) In a sense this "Cartesian" turn does gain access to an "ego," but even here it is called an "I and conscious life," indicating that it is not a bare and purely private ego that is reached. Husserl continued immediately to say that "as soon as - instead of transiently exercising a phenomenological epoché - one sets to work, attempting in a systematic self-investigation and as the pure ego to uncover this ego's whole field of consciousness, one recognizes that all that exists for the pure ego becomes constituted in him himself; furthermore, that every kind of being - including every kind characterized as, in any sense, 'transcendent' - has its own particular constitution. Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being." (I,116f)
There is nothing so mysterious in that, if you understand that by transcendental subjectivity Husserl meant the conceptual scheme present in and used by conscious life. In a rather unproblematical sense, then, this conceptual scheme is "in" the transcendental ego. Where else would one say it is? In the Oxford English Dictionary? Perhaps it is there too in a sense.

In beginning with talk of the transcendental ego, then, Husserl is not forgetting that the reduction leads to the ego with his cogitationes and with their cogitata. That is precisely the point he wants to elaborate, for this is the structure of transcendental subjectivity: ego-cogito-cogitatum. He begins with reference to the ego, because in a sense that is where the reduction takes him, but he immediately abandons any discussion of the ego in favor of an explication of the cogito and cogitatum. The ego does not come up again until the fourth meditation. This seems odd in view of Husserl's willingness to call his work "egology," but the oddness is removed by the considerations we have just followed. The transcendental ego is simply one structural member of transcendental subjectivity or the conceptual scheme. In a sense "he" is the fundamental member, for the system of concepts may be said to be "his." This simply means that in an epistemological sense the "-er" (e.g. perceiver) is prior conceptually to the "-ing" (e.g. perceiving) and the "-ing"
to the "-ed" (e.g., perceived). This answers the first of the two questions, and the second has already been answered.

The second meditation begins with the question of what can be done philosophically with the transcendental ego. We are now in a better position to appreciate Husserl's question and to follow his answer. Nothing could be done with it if the transcendental ego were the "empty" ego Husserl finds in traditional epistemologies. Therefore, he aims "to show that the absolute evidence of the ego sum does, after all, extend into those manifolds of self-experience in which the ego's transcendental life and habitual properties are given, even if there are limits that define the range of these evidences (the evidences of recollection, retention, etc.)." (I,67) The bare identity of the "I am," Husserl will argue, is not all that is given apodictically and apriori as evident in transcendental experience. When I reflect upon my "self," my own transcendental life of intending objectivities of all sorts or of using the conceptual scheme, and when I employ in this reflection reductive and eidetic methods, I discover "a universal apodictically experiencable structure of the I," (I,67) namely the basic structure of ego-cogito-cogitatum. The next task is to explicate this structure.

In order to explore the field of transcendental experience in respect of its universal structures, Husserl
finds it necessary to "shift the weight of transcendental
evidence of the ego cogito (this word taken in the broadest
Cartesian sense) from the identical ego to the manifold
cogitationes, the flowing conscious life in which the
identical I (mine, the meditator's) lives." (I, 70)
The I attained by phenomenological reduction, I meditating
in the transcendental attitude, can direct his reflective
attention to his "conscious life." He can contemplate it,
explicate and describe its contents. This means that he
can examine the conceptual scheme in and by means of
which the world is there for him.

Although we have already found reasons for dis-
tinguishing Husserl's phenomenology from transcendental
empiricisms and realisms, perhaps we should at this point
join him in distinguishing it from "transcendental psy-
chology." (I, 70) There is, Husserl thinks, a purely
descriptive psychology of consciousness. Whether there is
or not, it seems to me, is a topic we can leave for psy-
chologists. In any case, Husserl's philosophy is not
dependent on it. A transcendental psychology simply
neglects to execute phenomenological reduction and use
eidetic method.

If we avoid all such attitude mistakes, we must
not overlook the fact that "epoché with respect to all
worldly being does not at all change the fact that the
manifold cogitationes relating to what is worldly bear this
relation within themselves, that, e.g., the perception of this table, still is, as it was before, precisely a perception of this table. In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless of the circumstance that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object as well as from all my other natural acceptances. The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, 'means' something or other and bears in itself, in this manner, peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum." (I,71) Here is the structure of transcendental experience, in its essential order of "founding." The ego has his cogito and the cogito has its cogitatum. Conscious life is thus "intentional," for Husserl uses that term to signify precisely "this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum." (I,72) Because conscious life is intentional in this sense, we can do something philosophically with the transcendental ego. We can engage in conceptual clarification of a radical kind.

The principle of pure evidence restricts the phenomenologist to the pure data of transcendental
reflection. Such data must be "taken" precisely as given in simple evidence and kept free of all secondary interpretations. Husserl follows this methodological principle in the case of laying out the structure of conscious life as ego-cogito-cogitatum. For the moment, we are focusing on only part of that structure: namely, cogito-cogitatum. It becomes "evident," then, that different kinds of descriptions are to be made with regard to each of the correlative sides. On the one hand, there are descriptions of the cogitatum, of the intentional object as such. For example, this would be a description of the cube on my desk purely as a "cube," a description of the phenomenon "cube" or the cube as conceived in the conceptual scheme. It would be described with respect to the determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned, e.g. as a visual or as a tactile object. It would be described also with respect to the determinations attributed with corresponding "modalities," e.g. the modalities of "being" (like being certain, being possible, being improbable, etc.) or the subjective-temporal modalities (like being present, past or future). Such description is called "noematic" because it analyses the "noema" or cogitatum, the intentional object purely as intended. This is what would usually be called conceptual clarification. For Husserl there is more to clarifying a concept than noematic description. There is also "noetic" des-
cription which concerns the modes of the *cogito* itself. Here we analyse the modes of consciousness (e.g. perception, recollection, anticipation) and these with their modal differences (like the varying degrees of clarity and distinctness.).

With respect to the question of loss of the world in phenomenology, we can see now that "the world" is still before us in the phenomenological attitude, *qua cogitatum*. This is true of the world as the universal *cogitatum* and of all worldly objects as well. Particular actual objects in the world are what we "intend" for the most part in our conscious life, but it becomes evident now that "their particularity is particularity within a unitary *universe*, which, even when we are directed to and grasping the particular, goes on 'appearing' unitarily. In other words, there is always a co-awareness of it, in the unity of a consciousness that can itself become a grasping consciousness, and often enough does. This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its own peculiar form, that of spatiotemporal endlessness. Throughout every change in consciousness the universe - changeable in its experienced (and otherwise selectively meant) particulars, but still the one and only universe - remains as the existing background of our whole natural life." (I,75)

The world is not lost in phenomenology; rather world-experience is clarified. Here we are examining only a suggestion of it.
When Husserl reflects on his conscious life or transcendental subjectivity, he finds an essential two-sidedness at this point. On one side, there is the "noetic," "the openly endless life of pure consciousness." On the other side, there is the "noematic," "the meant world, purely as meant." (I, 75) Minus the ego-member for the moment, this is the basic structure of transcendental subjectivity. It is no accident that the structure is examined in this order, for the only access we have to the ego is via the cogito, and the only access to the cogito is via the cogitatum. Phenomenology may be an egology, but it also is a kind of cosmology.

We have now reached another decisive point in the argument. Husserl claims that "only by virtue of this new attitude do I see that all the world, and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time - that it exists for me only as cogitatum of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes; and I now accept it solely as that." (I, 75) He accepts it "solely as that" because he is in the phenomenological attitude! So far Husserl has emphasized that the life of consciousness is intentional; now he is going to emphasize that it is also synthetic in a rather unique sense of that term, as this text suggests. By means of this concept of synthesis Husserl will account for the unity and identity of the ego.
and its stream of cogitationes, of the real and ideal
objectivities of consciousness, and of the world itself.

By "synthesis" Husserl means a mode of "combination"
which is peculiar to consciousness. It must be understood
here as a purely conceptual relation and not at all as a
psychological relation. Ultimately we shall have to dis-
tinguish between "active" and "passive" syntheses, but
for the present we can neglect the distinction and try to
understand Husserl's general concept of it. To introduce
his concept of synthesis he uses an example of a "die"
visually perceived. When he reflects on such a phenomenon,
he sees that the die is given continuously as "an objective
unity." It is given as such a unity in "a multiform and
changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing." These
are, in one sense, "sensations," but at bottom sensations
are constituted out of mere unconstituted temporal phases
of conscious life - not out of "hyle" as Ideas, Volume I,
had it. The multiple appearances of the die, in their
temporal flow as a succession of "now-instants," are not
an incoherent sequence of subjective processes which must
be somehow "constructed" into something they are not.
Rather, "they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such
that in them 'one and the same' is intended as appearing."
(I, 78) The one identical die appears in a variety of
"manners of appearing": e.g. now as "near appearance,"
now as "far appearance," in changing manners of "here" and
"there" but always over-against an always co-intended though perhaps unheeded absolute Here, which is "my" animate organism. Even the manner of appearing determined as "near," for example, shows itself to be the synthetic unity of multiple manners of appearing: now this "side" and now that. Regardless of what feature of the die we consider, we always find the feature as a unity belonging to a passing flow of "multiplicities" or temporal phases. Looked at unreflectively in the natural attitude, the die is one unchanging shape or color or thing. Looked at reflectively in the phenomenological attitude, we see its manners of appearance following one another in continuous sequence. These, we must understand, are not something "other" than the die; they are the die showing itself in conscious life in the only way it can. Thus each respective cogito intends synthetically its cogitatum. It does this not with an undifferentiated blankness, but as a cogito with a describable "structure of multiplicities." Such a structure has a quite definite noetic-noematic composition.

With this new insight into the structure of transcendental subjectivity, admittedly too sketchily drawn, we see that phenomenological investigation can and must also describe facts of synthetic structure which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes in themselves and in relation to one another. It is only by virtue of
synthesis becoming thematic that there can be fruitful use of transcendental subjectivity philosophically. By virtue of the intentionality and the synthetic nature of conscious life, "unities of sense" are there for me. These unities of sense are the concepts or phenomena we are to investigate in solving the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world, especially "the objective world" as a constituted unity of sense.

The fundamental form of synthesis is called "identification." (I, 79) We encounter it as "an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time." Husserl devoted careful study to the fact that every subjective process has its own internal temporality. Here I can do little more than indicate the role of such considerations in working up the "problematic" which is to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world.

Let us return to the example of a visually perceived "die." This is a conscious process (visual perception) in which a worldly object appears as cogitatum. Therefore, we must distinguish the "objective temporality" that appears from the "internal temporality" of its appearing. (Time as "-ed" and time as "-ing.") (X) The internal temporality of the appearing "flows away" in Husserl's model for it. It is the image of stream with temporal phases as its basic elements, "now-instants" which are
only partial intentions and are unconstituted. They are continually changing appearings of the object in question. Their unity is unity of synthesis. This unity, however, is not a mere continuous connectedness of cogitationes "stuck" on one after another, but "a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as 'the same' objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes 'constituted'." (I,79f) Constitution, then, is the intentional and synthetic "process" by which an object becomes a phenomenon for conscious life; it is a process of concept formation. In a fuller sense, constitution is the whole network of intentional-synthetic acts that consciousness must carry out in order to "allow" a given worldly object to appear as a phenomenon.

There is nothing mysterious involved when Husserl speaks of the die, or the objective world for that matter, as being constituted "in" conscious life or as being a constituted sense. To one meditating in the phenomenological attitude all that is in focus is the conceptual scheme of transcendental experience. The natural attitude with its existence-positing has been suspended, so Husserl says "the one identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously 'immanent' in the flowing consciousness, descriptively 'in' it; as is likewise the attribute 'one identical!' This being-in-consciousness is a being-in
of a completely unique kind: not a being-in-consciousness as a really intrinsic component part, but rather a being-in-it 'ideally' as something intentional, something appearing — or, equivalently stated, a being-in-it as its immanent 'objective sense'." (I, 80) This surely refutes any claim that Husserl makes the world internal to consciousness, and also makes good sense out of the claim that "the world" is in an intentional or conceptual sense "in" consciousness. "The world," or "this die," is a synthetic-intentional effect or result produced by constitutive consciousness as it "allows" something to appear to it as it "is."

Such synthetic acts as we have been considering give rise to the consciousness of identity and thereby make any knowing of identity possible. To understand this is, for Husserl, to ground radically the possibility of knowing identical objects. Something similar is the case in every consciousness in which the "non-identical" is intended unitarily, such as a consciousness of a plurality or a relational complex. This too is ultimately a synthesis constituting its peculiar cogitatum. It makes no essential difference to this whether the synthesis be "passive," going on in pre-predicative conscious life, or "active," going on in predicative experience.

So far we have considered in outline form how Husserl uses the concept of synthesis to account for the
unity and identity of objectivities of consciousness. He also uses it to account for the unity of the stream of conscious life itself. "The whole of conscious life is unified synthetically. Conscious life is therefore an all-embracing 'cogito,' synthetically comprising all particular conscious processes that ever become prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum, founded at different levels on the manifold particular cogitata." (I,80) Both the identical "I" and the "one objective world" are intentional results produced or achieved by synthetic consciousness. The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time, with its "intentions," "protentions," and "retentions." To explore this basic form of synthetic conscious life would be a study in itself of considerable magnitude. Here only its role is mentioned.

We have seen that, according to Husserl's analysis, the universal fundamental property of consciousness is to be consciousness of something. As cogito, consciousness always bears its cogitatum within itself as a constituted sense. We also saw that one basic feature of intentionality has to do with the multiplicity of intentionality belonging to any cogito and unified synthetically. Now we must add the second basic feature of intentionality, equally important for the solution of transcendental
problems. This feature is seen in the distinction between the "actuality" and the "potentiality" of conscious life. The multiplicity of intentionality belonging to any cogito is a theme not exhausted in consideration of cogitationem as actual. On the contrary, Husserl says, "every actuality involves its potentialities, which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally predefined in respect of content - namely, in the actual subjective process itself - and, in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the I." (I,81f) With this we have in view the other fundamental feature of intentionality needed to solve the transcendental problems.

For every subjective process, such as visual perception, there is a process horizon, an intentional horizon of reference to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process in question. For example, there belongs to every process of external perception of a thing its reference from the genuinely or directly perceived "sides" or profiles of the perceived thing to the sides "also meant" in the process as not yet perceived but in principle perceivable. This, again, is made possible by the structure of inner temporality which is not merely intentional but also protentional (anticipatory) and retentional (recollective). There are always internal and external horizons, always spatial and temporal and meaningful horizons.
This concept of the horizon structure of intentional life is important for the solution to transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world because it opens the way for constitutive theories, as we shall see. We can always explicate the horizons of an objectivity and clarify the concept involved. An "objective sense," a cogitatum qua cogitatum, is never present to actual consciousness as a finished datum. It can, therefore, become "clarified" only through explication of the given horizon and the new horizons continually awakened. The "prede-lineation" of these is always imperfect, but in its indeterminateness there is a determinate structure, and this is the eidos we seek to clarify a concept: the rule-structure for the "use" of the concept. The upshot of this is that "the object is, so to speak, a pole of identity, always meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized; in every moment of consciousness it is an index, pointing to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according to its sense, an intentionality that can be asked for and explicated. All this is concretely accessible to investigation." (1,83) The method here is intensional analysis, and it results in constitution theories. We shall consider this in the next section, but now we must turn to the neglected member of the structure of transcendental subjectivity: the ego.

The aim of this section of my essay has been to
explore the general structure of transcendental subjectivity. We have seen that this structure is fundamentally ego-cogito-cogitatum. Up to this point, however, we have examined only the cogito-cogitatum, neglecting the ego. I am of course following Husserl's order in this matter, and it is not an accidental one. I have interpreted his "insight" that objects exist for anyone, and are for him what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness. I have begun to interpret what, he says, makes up concretely this existence and being—thus for anyone, what sort of actual and possible consciousness is concerned, what the structure of this consciousness is, what "possibility" means here, and so forth. This can be done only by constitutional investigation, the theme of my next section. Before moving on to it, however, we must complete the general exploration of the structure of transcendental subjectivity. We have, with Husserl, been centering on the objective pole of conscious life. Intentionality has been investigated as oriented toward objectivities, and its structure has been described as the condition of possibility for the constitution of objects. This turn to the object first has been essentially required by Husserl's view of the ego as inseparable from the processes making up his conscious life. The transcendental ego is what he is solely in relation to his intentional objectivities. The only way to the ego, phenomenologically
speaking, is via the cogitatum and then the cogito. Now we are ready to turn to the ego.

Husserl investigates the ego-structure of transcendental subjectivity in a formal and general way in the fourth meditation. This should be considered an analysis of transcendental self-constitution. We shall return to it in a more material form after we have examined the nature of constitutional theories. Here the preliminary analysis is designed only to complete the general structural investigation of transcendental subjectivity.

We have seen that objects exist for an ego, and are for him what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness. That is, concepts must be formed into a conceptual scheme if there is to be a conceptualized world there for anyone. "The ego," Husserl now argues, "is himself existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is continuously constituting himself as existing." (I,100) This transcendental self-constitution takes place, as Husserl formally explains in the Cartesian Meditations, in three stages. There are three layers of meaning in the concept of the ego: there is the ego as "identical pole," as "substrate of habitualities," and as "monad" or "taken in full concreteness." When this concept of the ego is clarified in all three stages we have a "world-experiencing-ego" who is the center of his horizon. Let us now follow Husserl's description.
In our investigation of the cogito-cogitatum structure of transcendental subjectivity, we have already come up the "flowing cogito." Now Husserl points out the fact that "the ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that cogito, as the same I." (I,100) This is the first stratum of sense in the concept of the ego, the lowest level in the formation of the concept. Up to now we have been concerned with the intentional relation of consciousness to its objects, cogito to cogitatum. The "synthesis" that came into focus was the one that "polarizes" multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects. Objects were in view as "poles" or synthetic unities of sense or concepts. Now Husserl points out that along with this synthesis there takes place always a second "polarization" or second kind of synthesis. This one embraces all the particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively as belonging to the identical I. This identical I is by that constituted as the "active and affected subject of consciousness" who lives in all processes of conscious life and is related through them to all object poles. Volume one of the Ideas dwelt on this aspect of the concept of the ego, perhaps too much. There the ego is largely presented as the empty identity pole to which all intentional acts are referred, but which is unaffected by them. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl is correcting that, as we shall see.
Perhaps someone will object that this is not a proper stratum of sense in the concept of the ego as we find it in transcendental subjectivity or the conceptual scheme. In fact it is not presented as such, but is found by going back from the ordinary concept to its original formation. Husserl's order of presentation is backwards with respect to the order of analysis.

It might be further objected that this ego as self-identical is not truly "individuated" as it must be to be an "I" in the sense of our conceptual scheme. The point of the objection is probably that the ego first becomes individuated only in contrast with "you" and "him." Something seems to have been left out of the analysis that is essential. Difficulties for understanding others and the common world are being created. We shall return to these problems later, but now Husserl would point out that "individuality" simply means at this level "itself." This selfness is experienced and constituted as the basis for all the later contrasts founded upon it. To be sure, it is first brought into relief "in contrast with another" when "another" is given. However, in Husserl's view, the "I" does not become individualized because another faces it; rather its individuality or its "itselfness" is brought into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other.

The ego is more than the "identical I." Husserl
next shows that "this centering I is not an empty pole of identity, any more than any object is such." (I, 100) He is the active and affected subject of conscious life. It is important to notice that he is "affected." This corrects the emphasis of the Ideas, and brings in the emphasis of the Logical Investigations. There the "ego," in what is called a non-egological conception of consciousness, is simply the stream of conscious experiences.¹¹ As such it is of course not empty, but then its status as identical pole is lacking. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl presents something of a synthesis of these two views in which the ego retains its identity throughout the flux of conscious life, and thus in a sense transcends this flux, but at the same time is affected by what occurs in the flux. In and along with his intentional acts directed towards objects the ego is continually constituting himself too. By virtue of what Husserl calls a law of "transcendental generation," along with every act of the I which has a new objective sense, "he acquires a new abiding property." (I, 100) These new and lasting properties which keep the identical ego from being "empty" is what Husserl calls "habitualities."¹²

What he means by habitualities can be explained in terms of the examples he gives. In general, he means something like a "conviction" as in the expression, "I am of the conviction that..." He illustrates this in terms
of intellectual judgments, value decisions, and acts of will. If in an act of judgment I decide for the first time that something is and is thus and so, the fleeting act passes but I am affected by it. From then on "I am abidingly the ego who is thus and so decided." (I, 100) Perhaps on a first occasion I judge, "Reading Husserl's German is difficult." From then on, I am of the conviction that reading Husserl's German is difficult. It is not merely that I do or could remember the act later. I could do that even if I had given up my conviction. An habituality is a lasting conviction, one that is habitually mine. It is a capacity or disposition to take things in certain ways. An act institutes the conviction at first, but then the conviction remains not as an act but as a modification of transcendental subjectivity, as an abiding property of the ego or "habitus." The same is true of all sorts of conscious acts, such as value decisions or acts of will. Thus "by his own active generating, the I constitutes himself as identical substrate of I-properties." (I, 101) In doing so the I also constitutes himself as a fixed and abiding "personal" I. It is at this point, then, that the concept of a person is introduced. Of course the I can give up old convictions and form new ones, can make new value decisions cancelling old ones, and can revoke acts of will by new acts. However, in all this Husserl says that the I shows "an abiding style with a
unity of identity throughout all of them: a 'personal character'." (I,101) Since the identical ego "bears" these habitualities in himself, he is called their "substrate." The I acquires a personal character.

From the I as identical pole, and as substrate of habitualities, Husserl distinguishes "the ego taken in full concreteness." (I,102) This he calls the "monad" or monadic ego, with obvious reference to Leibniz. At first, it might seem that the monad is just the identical ego together with his habitualities. That is not the case. The habitualities are "concepts" as capacities of the ego-pole, but there are also the cogitata or unities of sense at the object-pole. As Husserl puts it: "The I can be concrete only in the flowing multiformity of his intentional life, along with objects meant - and in some cases constituted as existent for him - in that life. Manifestly, in the case of an object so constituted, its abiding existence and being-thus are a correlate of the habituality constituted in the I-pole himself by virtue of his position-taking." (I,102) Clearly the monadic ego, as the choice of a descriptive term implies, is the ego conceived as a "world-experiencing-ego."

With this concept of the ego we have reached a decisive stage in the unpacking of Husserl's claim to have solved the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. I noted earlier the difficulties associated with the concept of the ego as a private consciousness. I also pointed out the fact that Husserl wants to
avoid both losing the world to save the ego and losing the ego to save the world. The monadic ego is private in the sense that he is the ego in his full concreteness as a perspective on the world. In this sense the ego is "separate" and even "closed," but only in that he is complete in himself as a perspective, as a way in which the world is judged, conceived, and appreciated. This is the difference between "the" conceptual scheme and "my" conceptual scheme.

Husserl's exploration of the general structure of transcendental subjectivity leads him from cogitatum to cogito to ego. He begins, in one sense, with the world as phenomenon or as noematic correlate of conscious life. From that he moves "back" to consciousness as an intentional-synthetic process. Finally he moves to the ego as identical pole and as substrate of habitualities and as world-experiencing. As ego, he says, I have a surrounding world (Umwelt) which is continually existing for me, and in it objects are existing for me. There is always the distinction between those objects with which I am acquainted and those with which I can anticipate becoming acquainted. The former I have by an "original acquisition." As he puts it "in my synthetic activity, the object becomes constituted originally, perceptively, in the explicit sense-form: 'something identical with itself and undergoing determination in respect of its manifold properties.' This,
my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a habituality in my I, by virtue of which the object, as having its manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions make up my surrounding world, so far as I am acquainted with it at the time, with its horizon of objects with which I am unacquainted - that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this formal object-structure." (I, 102) This is Husserl's explication of the eidos "ego" as one member of the structure of transcendental subjectivity. There are not several different egos in Husserl's thought, as is often said. There are only different strata of sense in the concept of the one eidos "ego." Then, too, there are perhaps different senses of "ego" as I am now oriented in the natural attitude and now in the phenomenological attitude. Most completely clarified the ego is the identical pole of consciousness with his habitualities and his world, a "world-experiencing" ego. The further explication of the "body" of this ego will be considered in a later section.

It is clear now why Husserl can call his phenomenology an "egology" and yet hope to solve with it the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. The "I" includes "its" conceptual scheme, which in its invariant structures or "eides" is "the" conceptual scheme. The solution to the transcendental problems takes the form
of conceptual clarifications which establish the validity of the concepts in question in terms of their origins in the apodictic and a priori evidences of transcendental subjectivity. Such clarifications are achieved by means of intentional analyses which result in constitutional theories. The structure of transcendental subjectivity explored in this section is the key to these. Now we are ready to see how Husserl uses this key.
Notes to Chapter 3


2 Ibid., p. 240.

3 Ibid., Sec. 34.


6 Ibid., p. 77f.


4. Intentional Analysis And Theories Of Constitution

The exploration of transcendental subjectivity, a field of apriori and apodictic evidences to which access is gained by phenomenological reduction and eidetic method, reveals that its fundamental general structure is ego-cogito-cogitatum. It also discloses particular structures pertaining to each of these members: the structures of founding and founded layers of sense in the cogitatum, the structures of founding and founded levels of acts of intentional synthesis in the cogito, and the structures of founding and founded habituality and constitutions in the ego. It is this "structure" of transcendental subjectivity, or of the conceptual scheme used and formed in conscious life whose reflective examination is called transcendental experience, which makes possible and determines the philosophical use which Husserl makes of it.

The next step in unpacking Husserl's claim to be able to solve in principle all the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world is to investigate how he "works" this field of apriori and apodictic cognitions. He does it by intentional analyses which yield a harvest of theories of constitution. Such theories are, for Husserl, the solutions to the transcendental problems as questions about the pure possibility of objective knowledge in general and in respect of specific kinds. If the
"constitution" of some objectivity of actual or possible consciousness can be made evident by intentional analysis, then the concept or rule of that kind of objectivity is had as apriori and apodictic evidence. The "possibility" would be evident and the problem solved. We would not, in the strictly phenomenological attitude, know whether there were actually any such objects but we would know what it would be like to experience them if there were any.

Intentional analysis of consciousness or transcendental subjectivity is thoroughly different from what is called "analysis" in the natural attitude, as we should expect. Consciousness is not merely a whole made up of parts called "data." If it were, then it would be "analyzable" into its "elements." In a sense, something like that is possible, but it is not what is distinctive about intentional analysis. Husserl tells us that "its peculiar attainment (as 'intentional') is an uncovering of the potentialities 'implicit' in actualities of consciousness - an uncovering that brings about, on the noematic side, an 'explication' or 'unfolding,' a 'becoming distinct' and perhaps a 'clearing' of what is consciously meant (the objective sense), and, correlatively, an explication of the potential intentional processes themselves." (I, 83f) Intentional analysis, then, does not merely take an already accomplished unity of sense
and then show what layers of sense or "sedimentations" are contained in it by a regressive movement of thought or an unpacking. It might do that, and does do so at first. It does this whenever it analyses an empirical concept or a "typicality" of consciousness. However, it does not stop there, and that is not what is distinctive nor what solves transcendental problems. Intentional analysis in its "peculiar attainment" is also itself constitutive: it results in the first constitution of the eidetic concept which is the "rule" for the empirical concept. In a sense it was operatively present all the time, but now it is made thematically evident. A universal or essence is achieved. This is what Husserl means by uncovering the potentialities implicit in the actualities of consciousness.

Intentional analysis, then, is made possible and necessary by a structure of transcendental subjectivity which Husserl discovered and brought to evidence in his exploration of it. Every cogito, he finds, is "a meaning of its meant" or an intending of its intended, but at any single moment "this something meant is more - something meant with something more - than what is meant at that moment 'explicitly'." (I,84) This may be illustrated with the example of the visually perceived die. In each phase of such a perception what is meant (seen) is a mere profile or side of "the" object, as what was perceptually meant in the act. Husserl considers this "intending-
beyond-itself" implicit in any consciousness to be an essential moment of it. The possibility and necessity of intentional analysis in its "peculiar attainment" depends upon it.

So far this interpretation of intentional analysis has focused on the cogitatum. This is always where such an analysis begins, as we shall see, but it is not where it ends. In an intentional analysis we do not merely investigate an intentional object as such, describing it straightforwardly and explicating its meant features, its meant parts and properties. If that were all there is to it, the "intentionality" which makes up the intuitive and non-intuitive consciousness itself would be operational but unthematische: it would remain "anonymous." To make it thematic is, of course, the main point of an intentional analysis. Such an analysis brings into focus the noetic multiplicities of consciousness and their synthetic unity by virtue of which we have one intentional object, this definite one, continually meant and before us as meant thus and so. It brings into focus the "hidden constitutive performances" by virtue of which we find straightforwardly as explicata of what is intended such things as "features," "properties," "qualities," and "parts."

This simply means that when a phenomenologist doing an intentional analysis explores everything "objec-
tive" exclusively as a correlate of consciousness he does not consider it or describe it merely unreflectively and as "somehow" related back to the correlative I and the cogitationes of which it is the cogitatum. Rather, as Husserl puts it, he "penetrates the anonymous 'cogitative' life, he uncovers the definite synthetic courses of the manifold modes of consciousness and, further back, the modes of I-comportment, which make understandable the objective affair's simple meantness for the I, its intuitive or non-intuitive meantness." (I,34f) What he finds in this "penetration back" makes transcendentally intelligible how consciousness in itself and by virtue of its actual intentional structure makes it possible and even necessary that such and such an "existing" and "thus-determined" object intended in it occurs in it as just such a unity of sense. The concept in question is thus radically clarified in terms of its origins in consciousness. This makes it intelligible to us that we have the conceptual scheme we have, ultimately intelligible according to Husserl when the pure concept or eidos is thus explicated and made thematic.

To illustrate this we can use the "die" again. Suppose we want to use it for an example in an intentional analysis of "the perception of a spatial thing." First, we must prepare our transcendental clue by abstracting from all predicates of "significance" such as its being
a "die" and restrict ourselves purely to it as "res extensa."¹ This move is called preparing the transcendental clue. We shall return to this concept shortly. Next, we use this clue or model to explore the manner in which the varying "sight things" and "tactile things" and so forth have in themselves the character of being appearances "of" this same res extensa. In the case of a "spatial thing," we explore its changing perspectives. We attend to its temporal modes of givenness, for example the modifications of its being still intended while it sinks "retentionally" into the past. With respect to the I, we explore the modes of his specifically "own" acts of "having still" and "holding" the given object in consciousness, his varying modes of attention.

In doing this sort of analysis of a "spatial thing" we are, of course not restricted to that perceptual explication of it, in respect of its features, which actually comes about as the perceptual process continues. As we have seen, intentional analysis "makes clear" what is included and merely non-intuitively co-intended in the sense of the cogitatum in question by "making present" in eidetic intuition by free variation of it the potential perceptions that would make the invisible visible.

This feature of intentional analysis is absolutely crucial for the problem of the possibility of an objective world. As intentional, an analysis of this sort "reaches
out beyond the isolated subjective processes that are to be analyzed. By explicating their correlative horizons, it brings the highly diverse anonymous processes into the field comprising those that function 'constitutively' in relation to the objective sense of the cogitatum in question - that is to say: not only the actual but also the potential subjective processes, which, as such, are 'implicit' and 'predelineated' in the sense-producing, intentionality of the actual ones and which, when discovered, have the evident character of processes that explicate the implicit sense." (I,85) Obviously, there would be no hope of solving the transcendental problem about the objective world if this were not the case. The world is not given in conscious life in the way that a thing is given. It is given precisely as horizon of objects.

By means of intentional analysis, then, one can make understandable to himself how - within the "immanency" of conscious life and in specific modes of consciousness belonging to this stream - something like "fixed and abiding objective unities of sense" can become intended. He can discover how the process of constituting identical objects is done in the case of each "category" or type of objects. When I do this, the result is a theory of constitution for the type of object in question. Such a theory "grounds" the possibility of experience of the
type in question. Whether actual encounters with representatives of the type ever occur is, of course, a question to be pursued in the natural attitude.

Earlier we noted that the cogitatum as intentional object plays the role of "transcendental clue." This needs to be explained. A clue is always a clue to something. Here the intentional object, eidetically purified for the particular investigation, is the clue "to the typical infinite multiplicities of possible cogitationes that, in a possible synthesis, bear the intentional object within them (in the manner peculiar to consciousness) as the same meant object." (1, 87) The intentional object can play this role of "clue" to its constitution because of the structure of transcendental subjectivity. The only way to begin an intentional analysis is with an intentional object purified as a transcendental clue. Since the arguments leading to reduction were a kind of intentional analysis, the only valid "way" to phenomenological reduction moves from "the world" as clue via and structural form of cogitatum-cogito-ego. 2

At this point we may consider the role that a "linguistic phenomenology" 3 might play in an intentional analysis. Husserl unfortunately neglects to make this explicit. However, the meant object which serves as clue is essentially "expressed" in a judgment which involves language. 4 Husserl expressly recognizes that "initial
guidance can be furnished by the verbal sense." This is a part of phenomenological method that needs developing methodologically, although we can be sure that Husserl employed it anyway. Here is a point where linguistic philosophy and phenomenological philosophy might be brought to a working relationship, although they are clearly distinct and intend to work on different levels or in different fields. The one is a description of language and the other is a description of experience of a kind - transcendental experience as we have defined it. However, is language not itself a kind of experience? Surely language and what Husserl calls transcendental subjectivity are too intimately related to let the relation go unexplored.

The experience Husserl describes is not at all chaotic, though there is an element of facticity as we shall see. He did not think of theories of constitution as isolated from one another. Just as types of objectivities belong together and transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional processes, so Husserl says "it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: the allness of objects and types of objects conceivable for me - transcendentally speaking: for me as transcendental ego - is no chaos; and correlatively the allness of the types corresponding to types of infinite multiplicities, the types correspond-
ing to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis." (I,90) Transcendental theories of constitution form a universal system, itself structured with respect to founding and founded strata. This system corresponds to the conceptual scheme we have and explicates and renders it intelligible. In so far as phenomenology seeks to work out this system of transcendental constitution theories it is an "infinite task." Nevertheless, in its actual practice, working on some "relatively closed constitutional theory," (I,91) it is guided by this "infinite regulative idea" of a universal system.

This system of constitutional theories is divided into "formal" and "material" or non-formal ones.\(^6\) The former have to do with any conceivable object in general. The latter have to do with "material-ontological particularizations" of object in general into what Husserl calls "regions": such as, natural thing, animate organism, person, etc. Also, types of real and possible objects intended as "objective" are not the only clues for intentional analyses. There are also "the types of merely subjective objects, such as all immanent subjective processes themselves." (I,89) A final distinction among these theories brings us to the central issue of this essay. Husserl says that "problems of particular, separately
considered kinds of objects and problems of universality become distinguishable. The latter concern the ego in the universality of his being and living and in his relation to the corresponding universality of his objective correlates. If we take the unitary objective world as a transcendental clue, it leads back to the synthesis of objective perceptions and other objective intuitions, which extends throughout the unity of life as a whole, and is such that the world is at all times intended - and can become thematic - as a unit." (I, 89) In this sense, a theory of the transcendental constitution of the objective world is entirely too extensive an undertaking for an essay such as mine. We can, however, "purify" our transcendental clue and work out "a relatively closed constitutional theory" about the objective world as a world "there for everyone." To this we shall turn in the next section, but there are two more aspects of Husserl's concept of intentional analysis and constitutional theory that must be brought into the picture.

The concept of constitution developed so far, and with it the understanding of intentional analysis, is not yet sufficiently "pregnant" according to Husserl. In the third Cartesian Meditation he adds one further dimension to it and in the fourth adds still another. The first concerns the constitution of the predicates "being" and "non-being" and all their modal variants on the side of
the cogitatum and the predicates "truth" and "falsity" or "reason" and "unreason" on the side of the cogito. The second has to do with the notion of "genetic" constitution. Let us consider these additions in order.

The objective world, whose concept Husserl claims to be able to clarify, has the evident character of "existing" and even of existing "in itself." It might seem, however, that the reductive method of phenomenology with its "bracketing of existence" cannot as a matter of principle deal with these evident characters. This is a complete misunderstanding. Phenomenology can handle problems of being, but of course it does so transcendently or conceptually.

By the epoché we effect a change of attitude, so that we are now "reduced" in our attention to our pure intending and to the intended, purely as intended. We make no existential judgments or posittings about either side, as a methodological technique designed to make available pure possibilities or eidetically grasped pure concepts. In reference to this structure of intending-intended, Husserl now adds: "The predicates being and non-being, and their modal variants, relate to the latter—accordingly not to the objects simpliciter but to the objective sense. The predicates truth (correctness) and falsity, albeit in a most extremely broad sense, relate to the former, to the particular meaning or intending." (I,91f)
Although these important "predicates" are not given ipso facto as phenomenological data when the cogitationes and cogitata are given (which means that they are not "real" predicates), they do have a phenomenological "origin." This makes it possible to deal with them in an intentional analysis.

The phenomenological origin of these predicates of being is this. As we have seen, the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any intended object of any category can be investigated as to their phenomenological types. Among such multiplicities Husserl finds those syntheses which have the typical style of "verifying" and "evidently verifying" synthesis with respect to the initial intending. The opposite style is "nullifying" and "evidently nullifying" synthesis. Suppose I initially intend some money in my billfold to pay for my meal. Upon opening it at the cashier's stand, if I find some and pay my check that is a verifying synthesis, but if I find it empty that is a nullifying synthesis - and rather embarrassing. When such synthesis takes place we have a variation of what Husserl calls in general "fulfillment" of an intention. In such synthesis "the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of 'cancelled' being)." (I, 92) This is why Husserl says that "being" is a predicate pertaining to the "objective
sense" rather than to the object simpliciter. Predicates of being are given phenomenologically in this kind of synthesis, not in the way that color or shape predicates are given.

Such synthetic occurrences Husserl calls "intentionalities of a higher order." (I,92) They are acts and correlates of what he calls "reason" and pertain to all objective senses.¹⁰ Reason refers to possibilities of verification and verification refers ultimately to making evident and having as evident. With this, "evidence" becomes a central theme of intentional analysis.

Evidence, according to Husserl, is "a universal primal phenomenon of intentional life." It is "the quite preeminent mode of consciousness that consists in the self-appearance, the self-exhibiting, the self-giving of an affair, a state of affairs, a universality, a value, or other objectivity, in the final mode: 'itself there', 'immediately intuited,' 'given originaliter'." (I,92f)

In the case of "evidence," I aim at something, not confusedly or with an empty expectant intention, but in such a way that I am "with it itself." I view it itself. As we saw earlier, all evidence is "experience" or encounter in a broad sense. In the case of most objects that I encounter, evidence is only an occasional occurrence if you take it in Husserl's sense. Yet it is always a possibility a goal or ideal. Any consciousness at all is either
already evident or has an essential tendency toward conversion into evidence through the appropriate syntheses.

To say that an object "exists" for me is not to say anything necessarily about evidence. It only says that the object is accepted by me, there for me as a cogitatum intended in the positional mode in the natural attitude. We know that we would have to abandon such an acceptance if a course of evident identifying synthesis were to lead to conflict with an evident datum. We can be sure that something is "actual" only by virtue of a synthesis of evident verification.

This brief discussion of evidence suggests how an objectivity, for example "the objective world," can be constituted or conceived as "actually existing." Like the identity of any meant object as meant, neither the identity of the actually existing object nor the identity constituted in the synthesis of evident verification is "a really intrinsic moment of the transient conscious process of evidence and verification." (I,95) We are only investigating how the concept is formed in consciousness, not how being is created. With the concept of an object as "actually existing," we have what can be called an "ideal immanence" or a conceptual immanence. Husserl says that every evidence "sets up" or institutes in the transcendental I an "abiding possession" to which he can return in a synthesis of fulfillment. Without such "possibilities" there could be for him no "fixed and abiding being," no
real objective world and no ideal worlds. "Being" has its own peculiar phenomenological origin.

It is clear that in this analysis of it, a particular evidence does not produce the conception of any "fixed and abiding being." Everything objective which exists is something "in itself" and stands in contrast to the accidental being "for me" of particular acts. The predicate "in itself" is constituted in evidence. However, it is not in a particular evidence as a de facto experience; rather, it refers "to certain potentialities, which are grounded in the transcendental I and his life: first of all, to the potentiality of the infinity of intendings of every kind that relate to something as identical, but then also to the potentiality of verifying these intendings, consequently to potential evidences which, as de facto experiences, are repeatable in infinitum." (I,96)

At this point we may examine Husserl's solution to one of the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. It is not the problem which is central to my concern in this essay, but it is nonetheless fundamental and interesting. It has to do with the sense the concept "world" has of something that "transcends" consciousness and the evidence of this predicate.

Evidences refer us to infinities of evidences relating to the same object in the cases where they make their objects present "one-sidedly." Husserl now says
that this is also the case with "the totality of evidences
by virtue of which a real objective world, as a whole and
in respect of any particular objects, is immediately there
for us intuitionally." (I,96) The evidence pertaining to
particular objects in the objective world is "external
experience." The only mode of self-presentation possible
in the case of these spatial objects, as we have seen, is
one-sided or profile givenness. This is necessarily
"inadequate" evidence in Husserl's sense of the term.
It may become progressively more adequate but no possible
synthesis could complete it. Thus there remains the
"open possibility" that the belief in being which extends
into the anticipation of the further evidences will not be
fulfilled in a verifying synthesis. What now appears as
and is believed to be actually existing in itself could
possibly turn out to be otherwise. This is, of course,
only an "open" and not a "motivated" possibility: there
is no reason to expect it.

The point of this explication of the kind of
evidence in which the real objective world is given, and
we should add its givenness as horizon which we have already
considered, is that it shows the "transcendence" of the
world and worldly objects. They are not included in
consciousness, because they are "more" than is ever present
to consciousness - even in principle. Of necessity, only
"external experience" can verify objects of external
experience. It does so only so long as the actively or passively continuing experience in question has the form of a "harmonious synthesis." In principle, in the case of world-experience this continuing evidence is infinite. Thus the objective world transcends consciousness and is not a really immanent part of it or item in it. Of course the concept of the world is formed in consciousness, but as the concept of something existing as horizon and as "in itself." If the world were given as "adequate" evidence in Husserl's sense, and not as merely "presumptive" or "assertoric" evidence, it would be immanent to consciousness. Husserl's critics, like Marvin Farber and Harmon Chapman to whom I shall refer later, are thus mistaken when they wish to guarantee the transcendence of the world by ascribing to it adequate evidence. Far from being a cause for saying we have lost the real world by conceiving of it as given in presumptive evidence, this insight into the nature of world evidence grounds the possibility of our concept of the real objective world as itself actually existing. Now, however, we have good reason to refrain from absolutizing the world as naive objectivisms of all sorts do.

That the world transcends consciousness in this way necessarily does not alter the fact that "it is conscious life alone wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted, as something inseparable from consciousness,
and which specifically, as world-consciousness, bears within itself inseparably the sense: world - and indeed: 'this actually existing' world." (I,97) This simply means that the world as conceived or intended is an intentional object or concept which can be clarified by intentional analysis. If we remember the "peculiar attainment" of intentional analysis, we understand why Husserl says that "only an uncovering of the horizon of experience ultimately clarifies the 'actuality' and the 'transcendence' of the world, at the same time showing the world to be inseparable from transcendental subjectivity, which constitutes actuality of being and sense." (I,97) Both the everyday empirical concept of the world and the eidetic concept of the world which an intentional analysis yields are "achievements" of consciousness, concepts formed in consciousness and inseparable from it. "The world" is, as a concept in our scheme, "an infinite idea, related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiences - an idea that is the correlate of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible experiences." (I,97) An intentional analysis does not produce this evidence actually, since that is in principle impossible. It clears up the essential structure of such evidence, clarifies the concept involved.

This results in the problem of the transcendental constitution of existing objectivity in all its variety.
Such a problem is, of course, an infinite task: as Husserl puts it, the task of finding "the (static and genetic) constitution of objectivities of possible consciousness." (I,114) We could not begin to examine even Husserl's treatment of these problems in a single essay, but I shall examine a central one in the next section. First, however, the above parenthetical phrase points to the remaining task of this section: an explication of Husserl's concept of genetic constitution and its place in intentional analysis.

Husserl says that "with the doctrine of the I as pole of his acts and substrate of his habitualities, we have already touched on the problems of phenomenological genesis." (I,103) Whereas the structural and static analyses carried out in the first three meditations give us an eidetic and formal description of transcendental subjectivity, once we have the doctrine of the monadic ego we can describe transcendental subjectivity in its genetic constitution, describe it as it concretely exists. Only in this can we make it fully intelligible to ourselves that we have the conceptual scheme we have.

The principle Husserl uses in the Cartesian Meditations to move from static into genetic phenomenology is that not all habitualities are "composable" in a given ego at a given time. As he states it, "in a unitarily possible ego not all single possible types are composable, and not all composable ones are composable in just any
order, at no matter what loci in that ego's own temporality." (I, 108) There is a certain "historicity" then, but it is a conceptual history. There is a certain necessary sequence in the formation of any conceptual scheme whatever. Tracing this sequence and showing the "motivation" of one conviction on those which follow is the work of genetic phenomenology. Objectivities are solidifications or crystallizations of the life of consciousness in judgments and they are explained by showing what pre-predictive experiences lead to them. This is done "regressively."

We may turn to a text in Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic to explain how he understands the intentional process he calls genetic constitution. He claims that once a judgment is performed on a given object, the object thereafter carries a sense that is the result of the judgment. He gives a formalized illustration. If, in an original judgment and on the basis of experience, I judge that \( S \) is \( p \), from then on \( S \) will appear to me as carrying the sense \( p \). "At the same time," he says, "there is co-engendered the categorical resultant \( Sp \): that is, \( p \) emerges as a 'deposit' in the sense of \( S \), as now determined in this way." In principle then, \( Sp \) can become the subject of a further predication, \( Sp \) is \( q \), in which the new predicate is a development or determination of the first one. In this case the pre-
dicate \( q \) depends on the predicate \( p \). If \( p \) had not been predicated earlier, \( q \) could not have been predicated now. The process could be continued indefinitely, and then the result would be an object with multiple layers of sense: \( \text{Spor}\ldots \), each of which presupposes those which have gone before.

This is essentially the same thing we noticed in the case of habitualities. Here categorical acts\(^{14}\) deposit a sense which remains in objects and has an effect on the way we subsequently experience such objects. The categorical act which constitutes a sense as a predicate is equivalent to the act which establishes our conviction, and the deposited sense is equivalent to the conviction itself. Considering such senses as convictions or habitualities is simply a matter of considering them in regard to the ego of the fundamental schema.

The condition that each layer of sense presupposes those which arise before it is central to genetic constitution. The senses or predicates are not simply juxtaposed. They build upon each other in a step by step progression. Husserl says that one is the "motive"\(^{15}\) for those which follow it. This does not mean, of course, that one judgment springs immediately out of another. Husserl affirms that judgments come from an experience of reality: "everything known to us points back to an original becoming acquainted" (I,113) and this is basically per-
ceptual encounter with reality. Suppose that I have already made the judgment, "S is p." Before I can move on to the genetically later judgment, "Sp is q," I must again experience the reality of S. From this second encounter a subsequent judgment results, which adds a new sense to the subject S.

Further, the consciousness of the reality of S, which intervenes between my true judgments is pre-delineated in a sense. When I encounter S, I no longer stand before it as though I were perceiving it for the first time. By virtue of my first judgment, "S is p," I now "see" S as characterized by p. I encounter it with the sense I have "deposited" in it, as Sp rather than as simply S. It is precisely because I encounter Sp that my experience is pre-formed so that I can arrive at the subsequent judgment, "Sp is q." Through the intermediary of experience the sense in one judgment motivates the sense of the next. There is a kind of dialectic of Experience and Judgment.\(^{16}\) Judgments arise from our experience of reality but they also determine and illuminate our subsequent experience out of which further judgments arise.

On the basis of the analyses indicated here, Husserl speaks of "universal laws of genesis." (I,109) The theory of genetic constitution maintains the ideal of an apriori and apodictic science. However, the "necessity" involved in genesis is not something deducible from
subjectivity as such. It is a necessity in our conceptual scheme and comes from our experience of reality. As such, it presupposes a certain facticity or givenness on the part of objectivity. As Husserl recognizes, "the particular fact is irrational; but it is possible only in the apriori form-system pertaining to it as an egological fact." (I,114) Within the facticity and our experience of objectivity, there are certain apriori interconnections of sense which govern the development of the content of objective knowledge. These are "the eidetic laws of compossibility (rules that govern simultaneous or successive existence and possible existence together, in the fact)..." (I,109)

How is the method of intentional analysis expanded to deal with constitutive genesis? Notice the situation we would want to analyze. When we experience an object whose sense we have not investigated phenomenologically, it always carries within itself the layers of senses deposited by previous judgments. Schematically, we experience \textit{Spqr...}. If we make an original judgment about this object, we do so on the "concealed" basis of such "hidden" layers of meaning. Suppose we make the judgment "\textit{Spqr is } t\text{.}" Then the experience leading to the predicate \textit{t} has been motivated by the implied and operative but unthemetic senses \textit{pqr...}. These senses are the "sediment" of previous judgments, the implied
horizons or contexts which exert a decisive influence on our present judgment and experience. Now, the task of an intentional analysis would be to "uncover" these deposits of sense and show how they work upon the experience and judgment that follow them, how they work upon our present intentional activity. In order to clarify the objectivity *Sponsored*, phenomenology will in an intentional analysis describe how t depends on pqr, how r depends on pq, and how q depends on p. It will show what categorical formations have been constituted along this history or genesis of sense, and what sort of experience with reality took place between them.

Husserl states the heuristic principle that governs the method of doing this. He claims that it is possible for a phenomenologist to "reactivate" the experience which leads to a given judgment. Instead of simply accepting the object *Sp*, he says, "I can really reactivate it, genuinely re-produce it, engender it, the very same thing, in renewed and real activity. I can take the *Sp* that simply comes to mind and change it back into *S is p*, and thereby, in renewed activity and thus originally, constitute *Sp.*"\(^{17}\) In this way, by going back through the layers of sense which an object possesses, we will gradually clarify the hidden implications present in it. We do so by ourselves performing the constituting experience and judgment through which the sense was originally deposited in the object.
Husserl deals with the two fundamental forms of principles of constitutive genesis as principles of active and principles of passive genesis. The former govern predicative and the latter govern pre-predicative constitution. This distinction of principles is important, for the aim of intentional analysis in this sense is "to lead predicative evidence genetically back into non-predicative evidence, which is called experience." The example I have been using illustrates what he calls active genesis or constitution. We need not consider it further here, except to note that with it the problem of inter-subjectivity is brought to the fore. The genetic origins of the layers of sense in our noemas are not all produced originally by the individual transcendental ego. Each ego accepts many of them as tradition from his culture. In order to uncover the genetic origins of our intellectual convictions, we are forced eventually to investigate the first constitution of them performed in human history.

Passive genesis is fundamental, for "anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation. The 'ready made' object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all the 'spiritual' or 'cultural' characteristics that make it knowable as, for example, a
hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality of the 'it itself,' in the synthesis of a passive experience. As such a thing, it is given beforehand to 'spiritual' activities, which begin with active grasping." (I,112) While these predicative activities are producing their synthetic results, the passive synthesis that supplies all their "material" still goes on. This "matter" is not sense-data, nor does it even appear to be the unconstituted "hyletic data" of the Ideas. Rather, the "material" supplied by passive genesis is sensation and it is already constituted in passive genesis. Only the partial time phases are unconstituted or non-intentional.

The insight into passive genesis achieved by genetic phenomenological inquiry is very significant for the solution to the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. Such solutions put much emphasis on the question of pre-predicative intentionality. In attempting to analyze the origins of a meaning, we are continually led from completed judgments to the experience from which they arise. The place where discovery of a new sense or predicate occurs is pre-predicative awareness. The experience of reality that takes place in passive genesis is the phenomenological "origin" of the new sense. The series of discoveries motivating the growth of a sense
arise in the experience spaced between the judgments that mark each observable step in the development of a meaning. Genetic constitution, then, is not simply "deductive" explication of the content of our concepts. It is the result of a continually repeated experience of reality by conscious life.

Such experience is particularly important when we come to the limit of the "history" of a sense. Following the genesis of a sense ultimately means being led to its origin, its very beginning. Here the first anticipations of the sense we wish to make intelligible will be found in the pre-predicative experience which was the basis for a first categorical formation in active genesis. This is the climax of the quest for the origin of sense. Here is where Husserl means he has taken us when he says "the investigations concerning the transcendental constitution of a world, which we have roughly indicated in these meditations, are precisely the beginning of a radical clarification of the sense and origin (or of the sense in consequence of the origin) of the concepts: world, nature, space, time, psychophysical being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture, and so forth." (I, 180) It is a radical clarification because it leads to this climax.

Husserl describes pre-predicative experience in what he calls his "transcendental aesthetics." Speaking
of genetic constitution, he says: "As the basic level there functions 'transcendental aesthetics,' taken in a new sense... It deals with the eidetic problem of a possible world in general as the world of 'pure experience,' as it precedes all science in a 'higher' sense. It is thus eidetic description of the universal apriori without which unified objects could not appear in simple experience, before categorical acts; ...the apriori without which the unity of a nature in general, the unity of a world, could not be constituted as a passive, synthesized unity."²² What he calls his transcendental aesthetics here deals with what he calls the "primordial world." (I,173) which we shall explore in the next section.

Objects are given to us through the offices of pre-predicative intentionality. As Husserl says it: "Experience is the achievement in which experienced being 'is there' for me, the experiencing subject."²³ As a sense is developed through genetic constitution, it is carried by an object. The object itself is constituted as object in the type of awareness described in transcendental aesthetics. "Experience is the primary establishment of the 'being-for-us' of the objects of its objective sense."²⁴ In the pure pre-predicative experience, we achieve the presence of objects before any sense is deposited in them by judgment. It is an anticipation of sense but not yet its crystallization as a concept.
Also, because experience is fixed on concrete objects, the judgment that arises from it is always an individual judgment. Universalization comes later, and is founded on the former in one sense but limits the former eidetically in another sense. 25

Even on this rudimentary level of conscious life, according to Husserl, there is an essential genesis. Even the constitution of objects as presences in pre-predicative experience occurs as a development or a formation. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl notes that "in infancy we had to learn to see physical things" and that "such modes of consciousness of them had to precede all others genetically." He even claims that "in 'early infancy,' then, the field of perception that gives beforehand does not yet contain anything that, in a mere look, might be explicated as a physical thing." (I,112) Learning to see things, then, does not involve any categorical acticity. It does not presuppose the constitution of any judgments, for it takes place in passive genesis. An extreme "intellectualism" is not, therefore, a weakness of Husserl's philosophy.

The universal principle of passive genesis is what Husserl calls "association." 26 By this principle all objectivities given completely prior to all categorical activity are constituted. Here we must be very careful
to keep to the phenomenological attitude. Husserl does not use the term "association" with its old empiricistic connotations, but gives it a strictly phenomenological sense. It is an "association" of sense (Sinn) not of sense-data. Association is an important part of the structure of transcendental subjectivity, as we shall see in the next section in connection with the problem of intersubjectivity.

The principle of association is at work in the organization of sensations in pre-predicative experience. In connection with this principle Husserl speaks of "sensuous configuration in coexistence and succession." (I,114) Sensations are not given to us chaotically even when we experience some which are entirely new to us. Even these are organized, by association with past sensory formation, into some sort of coherent order. Such organization is only preliminary and must be followed by a more definite constitution, but in a sense the conceptual scheme is anticipated in it. Sensations are a state of awareness that precedes the presence of things, and thus represent the most rudimentary level of constitution. Prior to sensation there is only the absolute flow of inner temporality.

Having reached the level of genetic constitution, I have now unpacked Husserl's claim to be able to solve in principle the transcendental problems pertaining to
the objective world. We have seen what he means by "a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendently reduced ego." (I,121)

It remains now to evaluate it critically. This can best be done in terms of "a relatively closed constitutional theory" which he offers concerning "the objective world" as such and in so far as it bears the sense: "actually there for everyone." This is the task of the next section.
Notes to Chapter 4


4 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op. cit., p. 52.


6 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op. cit., Sec. 29.

7 Ibid., p. 91.

8 Ibid., p. 92.

9 Ibid., p. 55.


13 Ibid., p. 275.

14 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op. cit. p. 111.

15 Ibid., Sec. 37.

16 Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit.


18 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op. cit. Sec. 38.


24 Ibid., p. 147.

25 Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, op.cit., Pt. III, Ch. II.

5. **Husserl's Transcendental Theory**

Of The Constitution Of The Objective World

In unpacking Husserl's claim to be able to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world by means of a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego, we now come upon a truly critical question. Can the constitution of the objectivity of the world as a world actually there for everyone, and thus of the existence of others which this presupposes, be uncovered within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego? All of the transcendental problems Husserl claims to solve come to a focus in this one. Unless he can show how the concept of the objective world is constituted within the conscious life of a monadic ego, his phenomenological philosophy fails to do what he claims for it. Of course, what fails to do one thing may very well do another; about that we shall see later. For the present, let us first try to understand why this problem is so crucial and then examine Husserl's theory that is supposed to solve it.

The problem of the objective world, and with it the problem of intersubjectivity, arises in a significant way in several of Husserl's works.¹ However, the most systematic and thorough presentation of his transcendental
theory of the constitution of intersubjectivity and the objective world is found in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations*. Let us see how the problem arises there and acquires such central significance.

The first three Meditations attempt to communicate the *phenomenological* insight that every sense that any existent object whatever has or can have for me is a sense "in" and "arising from" my intentional life. This is true both in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is." The sense, or better unity of sense, becomes clarified and unfolded for me in consequence of my life's constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification. As Husserl puts it: "The objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me - this world, with all its objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental I, the I who comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological epoché." (I,65) Objects exist for me, and are what they are for me, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness. That is, objects are intentionally present to an ego as unities of sense, and these unities are inseparable from the transcendental ego which constitutes sense and being. They are correlated, as cogitata with their respective cogitationes. In a universal synthesis,
they are constituted as the world horizon. All of this is conceptual rather than empirical.

The fourth Meditation deals with the self-constitution of the ego. The other side of the correlation just mentioned is that the transcendental ego is what he is solely in relation to intentional objectivities. The I is inseparable from the processes making up his conscious life. Correlated to the universal synthesis which constitutes the world is the universal synthesis which constitutes the identical self. Husserl distinguishes three strata in self-constitution. First, there is the "identical I," the continuously constituting I who lives in all of its experiences. Second, there is the personal I, which in being a substratum of habitualities or acquisitions from previous experiences rather than an empty pole of identity - constitutes itself actively out of the centering I which is the first stratum. Third, there is the I taken in its full concreteness, the I taken in the manifold of its intentional life, including all the objects constituted for it in this stream. This is the ego which embraces all the real and potential contents of its conscious life. This ego in its full concreteness is called a "monad" by Husserl, who deliberately borrows the term from Leibniz.

The result of these four Meditations is the insight that the problem of the self-constitution of this
monadic ego must embrace all problems of constitution. Phenomenology is an egology or monadology only in this sense. However, in order to approach this ego, the phenomenologist must, by an eidetic method called free variation, extend his own de facto transcendental ego into the universal eidos "transcendental ego in general."3 That amounts to its transformation into the universe of all forms of experience that can possibly be conceived by my de facto transcendental ego. To the eidos "ego", then, there belongs a universal apriori (the conceptual scheme!) that embraces an infinite multiplicity of types of conceivable actualities and potentialities of conscious life, ordered as to co-existence or compossibility and succession, subject to specific laws of motivation within the universal unitary form of inner-time-consciousness. In short, they are ordered according to the formal laws of egological genesis.4 Objectivity is to be accounted for by a process in the conscious life of the ego that, beginning from the now instant, finally solidifies into the constitution of things, persons, and categorical objects. To establish the pure possibility of objectivity, Husserl traces the pre-objective, lived anticipations of it in the conscious life of the ego.

Husserl conceives of consciousness as a flow of temporal phases or fundamental intentions that emanate from the flowing present moment. The first level in the
development of this life is called passive genesis of pre-predicative experience. It is characterized by the absence of any categorical activity on the part of the ego. It is pre-linguistic. Various sub-levels can be distinguished in this region. The basic stage of passive genesis is pure sensation. Next, there is the stage in which sensations are externally spatialized and constituted into what Husserl calls "phantoms." Finally, there is a stage of passive genesis in which things as such are constituted. These "things" are fixed identity points that solidify within the "world" of phantoms. The objective correlate to this level of conscious life is a "world" in which there is the mere presence of things but no judgment or predication. It is a "world of things," a horizon of experience, but there is no firmly defined, conceptualized sense. However, within passive genesis Husserl finds that there are already anticipations of sense, and so the development which subjectivity undergoes to this point leads on essentially into active genesis, where permanent senses or meanings are constituted.

The second major level in the development of conscious life is active genesis or predicative experience. It is linguistic. When the ego makes judgments on the things it has already experienced in passive genesis, when it carries out active intentional performances on the "world of things" of pre-predicative experience, it thereby
deposits fixed, permanent senses in the world. On the basis of such senses, the ego finds its subsequent experience of the world modified. It can go on to make further judgments and deposit further senses which depend on the prior ones. Eventually a whole network of interdependent "scientific" senses is constituted, and so the world of science. Each of these senses has its roots in the pre-predicative experience which precedes it, and if we want to clarify a sense we must trace its anticipations in such experience - and in the dialectic of experience and judgment. Ultimately this means tracing a unity of sense or concept, to its phenomenological "origin," to its first anticipation in our experience of things, then more deeply to its realization in the "world" of phantoms, and finally to the "world" of pure sensation arising from the immediate present. Such investigation is genetic intentional analysis and is the ultimate phenomenological method for Husserl.

The problem of the objective world, and with it the problem of intersubjectivity, becomes critical in this context in two ways. First, it is quite clear that the genetic origins of the layers of sense in our cogitata are not all constituted originally by each individual transcendental ego. Rather, each ego accepts many of them as tradition from his culture, in large measure by learning his language. Thus we are forced to investigate the
possibility of intersubjective constitution. Furthermore, in order to uncover the genetic origins of some intellectual convictions we are forced eventually to investigate the first constitution of them performed in human history.  

The problem arises in a second way in this context. When he reflects, Husserl finds that "there are transcendentally constituted in me, the transcendental ego, not only other egos but also (as constituted in turn by the transcendental intersubjectivity accruing to me thanks to the constitution in me of others) an objective world common to us all." (I,117) The question arises how that is possible. The objectivity and intersubjectivity of the world is clearly part of the sense the world has for us prior to any philosophizing. Phenomenology is supposed to explicate this but not alter it.  

How can this sense be explicated as a sense "in" and "arising from" the intentional life of an individual ego? How, by means of alien constitutings constituted in my own self, can there become constituted for me the common world "for us all?" Husserl admits that for him this is "a very puzzling possibility." (I,120) Thus a truly critical question arises.

In one sense, as Alfred Schütz and Marvin Farber maintain in quite different spirits, this question arises because of the problematic Husserl developed. In another sense, that problematic was developed precisely in order
to answer this question. Husserl remarks that "for philosophical children this may be the dark corner haunted by the ghosts of solipsism, psychologism, or relativism. The true philosopher, rather than avoiding it, will throw light on it."\(^3\) He makes a bold attempt to do so, which we must now examine and evaluate.

In attempting to elucidate this "very puzzling possibility," Husserl refuses to engage speculatively in the controversy between idealism and realism which arises at this point.\(^9\) To do so would probably involve what I have been calling an attitude mistake. Instead, he proposes that "it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connection by the 'alter ego' and carry it through in concrete work. We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense 'other ego' becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner. These experiences and their results are facts belonging to my phenomenological sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its aspects?"(I,122) The task to be carried through is an
intentional analysis of objectivity and intersubjectivity.

Husserl's proposal is that we treat the problem of intersubjectivity and the objective world as a conceptual question rather than as an empirical one. The somewhat elaborate method of transcendental-phenomenological reduction and eidetic intuition is supposed to insure that transcendental problems, as problems about pure possibilities, be treated conceptually and that the attitude mistake thus be avoided. But Husserl's way of expressing himself - which assumes that he and his reader remember to execute consciously the reduction at all appropriate times - is always in danger of misleading. In the passage just quoted he recognized this, when he later crossed out the phrases "in me" and "belonging to my." He wrote a marginal comment saying: "The dangerous I-talk, mine-talk! This should be expanded terminologically." (I, 243) His use of the first person singular pronouns is always in danger of being interpreted in the natural attitude way, and thus confusing the character of the problems. Perhaps Husserl himself slips from a conceptual to an empirical problematic at times, but that is not his proposal. I have tried in the preceding chapters to interpret his problems and methods so that they are coherent, and now I shall try to interpret his theory of the constitution of intersubjectivity and the objective world in that light.
Where it is a question of intentional analysis, we have already seen the necessity of preparing a transcendental clue. Husserl does not claim to be able to deduce the development of knowledge from subjectivity. He always takes what is already acquired in constitution and probes back into the steps it must have taken to get where it is, and probes ahead in eidetic fulfillment of the potentialities. The clue for analysis is what is already there in the conceptual scheme, what has already issued from intentional relations with the world. Husserl does not start with subjectivity and then show where it must go. He is not doing that in the text we are about to examine. Subjectivity alone cannot account for the facticity of what we have constituted. It only provides the "conditions of possibility," both static and genetic, for what is constituted.

What then is Husserl's transcendental clue for the proposed intentional analysis? In general, of course, it is the unity of sense or concept of "the objective world." However, there is more to the preparation of a clue for analysis than merely stating the concept in question. An initial investigation must unpack it a bit in order to abstract from the aspects that are irrelevant to the particular analysis and bring into focus the relevant strata of sense.

In the preceding chapters I have tried to mention
enough about some of the theories of constitution Husserl worked out to have his general concept of the world clear by this time. It is a thoroughly correlational conception, in which the world is essentially correlated with consciousness of the world. It is an egological conception in that the centering ego constitutes the world as horizon in a universal synthesis. For Husserl, the world is a unitary totality of spatio-temporal endlessness, divided into regions with respect to its objects. It is "pre-given" as always already actually existing in itself and as transcendent to consciousness. Finally, it is there for us all and accessible to us all with respect to its objects and structures, both as the life-world of everyday thought and action and as the universe of science. The latter is founded upon the former. This is a very complex unity of sense or concept, with several strata of sense. In the fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl is chiefly concerned with the "objectivity" of the world, which he identifies with its being "actually there for everyone." Even this is not a fully prepared clue.

Husserl's analysis and theory is largely determined by the way he prepares his clue. This seems to me to be an inherent risk in his kind of analysis: as you prepare the clue, so goes the analysis. In his preparation, the stratum of sense pertaining to "other egos" is prior to the "objectivity" of the world and founds it.
That may be true, but only the actual analysis can show it to be so.

In the preparation of his clue, Husserl turns first to "the experienced other." Upon initial investigation, this phenomenon unfolds the following strata.
"In changeable harmonious multiplicities of experience I experience others as actually existing and, on the one hand, as world objects - not as mere physical things belonging to nature, though indeed as such things in respect of one side of them. They are in fact experienced also as governing psychically in their respective natural organisms. Thus peculiarly involved with animate organisms, as 'psychophysical' objects, they are 'in' the world. On the other hand, I experience them at the same time as subjects for this world, as experiencing it (this same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing me too, even as I experience the world and others in it."
(I,123)

This is the unity of sense: "other ego," which is to be intentionally analyzed. Only after initially unfolding it does Husserl turn to the "world" in preparing his clue. When he does, he says that "within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, I experience the world (including others) - and, according to its experiential sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than
mine alone, as an intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its objects to everyone. And yet each has his experiences, his appearances and appearance-unities, his world-phenomenon; whereas the experienced world exists in itself, over against all experiencing subjects and their world-phenomena." (I,123) This is the transcendental clue for his analysis, then.

The problem is thus stated with two levels. First, it is a "special" problem, namely to do an intentional analysis of the "thereeness-for-me" of others. This yields a transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, which Husserl calls "empathy." It is significant that he sees this as the first stage of the problem, but as he says "it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a transcendental theory of the objective world and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards objective nature. The existence-sense of the world and of nature in particular, as objective nature, includes after all, as we have already mentioned, thereeness-for-everyone. This is always co-intended wherever we speak of objective actuality. In addition, objects with 'spiritual' predicates belong to the experienced world. These objects, in respect of their origin and sense, refer us to subjects, usually other subjects, and their actively constituting
intentionality. Thus it is in the case of all cultural objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover carry with them at the same time the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, everyone belonging to the corresponding cultural community, such as the European or perhaps, more narrowly, the French cultural community, and so forth.)" (I,124)

These remarks prepare us to see that what Husserl actually presents in the fifth Meditation is not primarily an intentional analysis as such, but the constitutional theories which result from a previously executed but unreported analysis. There are, however, indications of the course of the analysis. It is most important to notice what is presented, for an analysis and a theory move in opposite directions. What comes out at the end of the analysis is presented first in the theory. This could be a serious source of confusion, leading us to think Husserl is "deriving" objectivity from subjectivity. We must keep it in mind, then, that what we are now to examine is a theory of constitution, one which is supposed to be the solution to the central transcendental problem pertaining to the objective world.

We have seen that Husserl proposes to clarify concepts in terms of their phenomenological origins. Ultimately this means tracing a sense back to its first anticipation in pre-predicative experience or passive
genesis. An intentional analysis would lead back step by step to the pre-predicative level of conscious life. However, Husserl begins his theory of constitution on this level. That creates a need for a special technique which will enable us to orient ourselves toward passive genesis without having to move back step by step through the intentional analysis. Husserl refers to this technique as the "reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness." ¹⁰ We must examine it and see what it accomplishes, other than confusion. Alfred Schütz raises five difficulties with this technique, all of which seem to stem from his failure to see its function in focusing on the pre-predicative level. ¹¹

The technique is used within the sphere of transcendental experience, which is the reflective experience of examining the transcendental subjectivity that becomes thematic with phenomenological reduction. Husserl speaks of this new technique as "a peculiar kind of epoché with respect to our theme." (I,124) It might be called a "thematic reduction" or exclusion. It is akin to his technique of "visual reduction" which abstracts from the tactile aspects of experience in order to make the visual aspects thematic first. "Abstraction" is the key to this technique, operating as it does within the reduced sphere. It is also "reduction" in the sense of leading back to the condition of possibility for a founded stremum
of sense, to its founding stratum. "For the present," Husserl says, "we exclude from the thematic field everything now in question: we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness." (I, 124) Certain layers of sense of the unity of sense "world" are in question, so we abstract from them for a moment to examine the prior layers which are their condition of possibility. In this case it is the "world" constituted in passive genesis.

Operating within the phenomenologically reduced sphere of transcendental subjectivity, or within the conceptual scheme, this technique has an unusual significance. If a similar abstraction were carried out in the natural attitude, where the self and others are already differentiated and posited, I would simply be left "alone;" the sense the world has of being "experienceable by everyone" would be undisturbed. Something quite different happens when the proposed abstraction is carried out in the phenomenological attitude. Here the conceptual scheme is in focus or thematic as such. Within the conceptual scheme there is also a differentiation between ego and other egos, but no position taking. The concepts are essentially related in systematic ways of founded and
found as pure possibilities. The abstraction in question simply breaks apart the two basic layers of the scheme: the one pertaining purely to the individual ego in his ownness and the other pertaining to inter-subjectivity. As Husserl puts it, the new reduction or abstraction concerns "an essential structure, which is part of the all-embracing constitution in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an objective world, lives his life." (I,125) The two "reductions" are quite different then. The phenomenological reduction is from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. The reduction to "ownness" is a narrowing of the field of vision for the phenomenological attitude. It is probably terminologically preferable to call the new "reduction" something like "thematic exclusion" and leave the term reduction for the change of attitude.

What is achieved by the technique of thematic exclusion which narrows transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness? Of course, the answer must be that this sphere of what is peculiarly the individual ego's "own" is thematized, but what is included in that? Husserl says that as a result of thematic exclusion of everything pertaining to intersubjectivity, "we retain a unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon 'world,' a stratum of the phenomenon that is the correlate of continuously harmonious, continuing world-experience. ...This unitary
stratum, furthermore, is distinguished by being essentially the founding stratum - that is to say: I obviously cannot have the 'other' as experience, and therefore cannot have the sense 'objective world' as an experiential sense, without having this stratum in actual experience; whereas the reverse is not the case." (I,127) Thus the thematic exclusion achieves a thematization of pre-predicative experience or passive genesis - what is peculiarly the individual ego's "own." This is the realm where the first "anticipations" of the sense we wish to clarify are found. The "other ego" must first appear in passive genesis. We must now see how Husserl says this is possible.

After the thematic exclusion of everything pertaining to intersubjectivity, there remains in the thematic field "the 'nature' included in my ownness." (I,127) That is, even at the level of passive genesis consciousness is intentional, the ego is always in some sense a world-experiencing-ego. The structure of pre-predicative experience is ego-cogito-cogitatum. What is the cogitatum of passive genesis as synthesized universally? In a sense, it is a uniformly interconnected stratum of the phenomenon "world," which is of course by abstraction no longer a world for everyone, but is "nature" reduced to the ego's sphere of ownness. This is clearly not the "nature" of natural science, though that too is for Husserl the product of an abstraction.¹² Nor is it the nature of
the life-world: it is an abstraction from that intersubjective nature. It is merely the "private" world of the ego as constituted in passive genesis, the first anticipation of the sense "world." In fact this character of being anticipatory is so strong that Husserl says that it "must not by any means be taken for an abstract stratum of the world or of the world's sense." (I, 128) It has lost its intersubjectivity by abstraction from the fully constituted unity of sense "the objective world" and is only a primordial anticipation. It is an horizon prior to the world in the proper sense, the horizon of the "things" crystallized in pre-predicative experience. Finding this "nature" is the first stage in Husserl's constitutive theory of the objective world. Its exploration leads to the second stage.

Within the primordial "nature" of pre-predicative experience, Husserl finds "bodies" (Körper). As the second stage of his theory, Husserl points out that "among the bodies (Körpern) belonging to this 'nature' and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my animate organism (Leib) as uniquely singled out - namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism." (I, 128) Thus the second stage of the theory is the constitution of my own living body as such or the constitution of the sense "embodiment."
This second stage of the theory of the constitution of the objective world is in fact the theory of the self-constitution of the psycho-physical individual. It deserves a detailed investigation itself, which I cannot give here. But one passage in the fifth Meditation concisely summarizes Husserl's theory, however, and may be quoted in full. He says that an individual ego's own animate organism, "mine" to speak in the dangerous first person singular, is uniquely singled out in passive genesis as "the sole object within my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with experience, I ascribe fields of sensation (belonging to it, however, in different manners - a field of tactual sensations, a field of warmth and coldness, and so forth), the only object 'in' which I 'rule and govern' immediately, governing particularly in each of its 'organs.' Touching kinesthetically, I perceive 'with' my hands; seeing kinesthetically, I perceive also 'with' my eyes; and so forth. Moreover, I can perceive thus at any time. Meanwhile the kinesthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the mode 'I am going,' and are subject to my 'I can.' Furthermore, by calling these kinesthesias into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth, and can thereby 'act' somatically - immediately, and then mediately. As perceptively active, I experience (or can experience) all of nature, including my own animate organism, which therefore in the process is reflexively
related to itself. That becomes possible because I 'can' perceive one hand 'by means of' the other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth - a procedure in which the functioning organ must become an object and the object a functioning organ. And it is the same in the case of my generally possible original dealing with nature and with my animate organism itself, by means of this organism - which is therefore reflexively related to itself also in practice." (I,128) We should add to this concise summary of the constitution of the ego's living body, the sense Husserl says the body has of being "the zero body, the body in the absolute Here." (I,152)

Thus the sense "my animate organism" has at least four layers: It is the bearer of the central orientational point with respect to which other objects are organized in the spatio-temporal surrounding world. It is an organ of perception. It is that organ on which "my" fields of sensation are spread out. It is that organism which most immediately actualizes the strivings of my conscious life, at higher levels, my willings. 14

The point of this stage in the theory of the constitution of the objective world is to bring to light the essence of a "psychophysical individual." If we wish to see how the sense "other ego" is constituted in the conscious life of an ego, we must see first what is the sense of a "psychophysical individual" or concrete, embodied
ego. The constitution theory outlined above indicates how Husserl understands "I, as this man." He says that if I reduce "other men" to what is included in my sphere of ownness, to the correlate of my passive genesis, I get mere "bodies" (Körpern) at this stage, with thematic exclusion. However, "if I reduce myself as a man, I get 'my animate organism' (Leib) and 'my psyche,' or myself as a psychophysical unity - in the latter, my personal I, who operates in this animate organism and, 'by means of' it, in the 'external world,' who is affected by this world, and who thus in all respects, by virtue of continual experience of such unique modes of I- and life-relatedness, is constituted as psychophysically united with the animate corporeal organism."\(^{15}\)

At this stage of the theory, then, thematic exclusion has left us with "a kind of world," which Husserl calls "nature" reduced to what is included in an ego's ownness or pre-predicative experience. Further, the psychophysical I, with live body and soul and personal I, has its place in this "nature" by virtue of the bodily organism. It is a unique member of this "nature." Husserl even says that in this reduced "world" of passive genesis there occur "predicates" of a sort.\(^{16}\) This is odd, since it is a world constituted in pre-predicative experience. The oddness is diminished if we think of them as anticipatory "predicates" in something less than a full sense of the term predicate. Further, the "bodies"
of this "world" are organized in a spatio-temporal form and are thus "outside one another." (I,129)

A major division of the field of transcendental experience has been made by this theory so far, namely the division into a sphere of "otherness." I suppose that there is nothing so odd about thinking of the conceptual scheme divided like that abstractively. However, the point of the division goes beyond this. Husserl further says that "every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere. Whatever the transcendental ego constitutes in that first stratum, whatever he constitutes as non-other, as his 'peculiarly own' - that indeed belongs to him as a component of his own essence (as we shall show); it is inseparable from his concrete being. Within and by means of this ownness the transcendental ego constitutes, however, the 'objective' world, as a universe of being that is other than himself - and constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: alter ego." (I,131) In order to understand the significance of this claim, we must complete our examination of the second stage of the theory of world constitution.

This stage is, as we have seen, concerned with the clarification of the fundamental concept "my own." So far Husserl has really only characterized it indirectly as "non-other." That presupposes the concept "other,"
and so must be surpassed. He also gives a positive characterization of "my own." \(^{17}\) When I reflect on myself phenomenologically, I find that I am always given to myself as "this ego." Although I was not thematic to myself prior to reflection, I find that I was always "already given" prior to reflection. I also notice that I am given with "an open infinite horizon of still undiscovered internal features of my own. My own too is discovered by explication and gets its original sense by virtue thereof. It becomes uncovered originaliter when my experiencing-explicating regard is directed to myself, to my perceptually and even apodictically given 'I am' and its abiding identity with itself in the continuous unitary synthesis of original self-experience. Whatever is included in this identical being's own essence is characterized as its actual or possible explicatum, as a respect in which I merely unfold my own identical being as what it, as identical, is in particular: it in itself." \(^{132}\) Thus the sphere of ownness is characterized as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities of the stream of subjective processes.

This is not the full positive characterization of "my own," however. As we already know to expect, at this point Husserl also argues that the intentional object belongs to the full monadic concretion of "ownness." \(^{18}\) Thus, just as ownness includes the constitutive systems
(cogitationes), so "it comprises the constituted unities - but with a certain restriction. That is to say: Where, and so far as, the constituted unity is inseparable from the original constitution itself, with the inseparableness that characterizes an immediate concrete oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete very-ownness." (I, 134) This is an important restriction, basic to the constitution of an objective world. We must examine its import in some detail.

Constituted unities are included in the sphere of ownness, with a restriction. First, what is included without restriction? We have already seen that the ego's own stream of subjective processes or cogitationes are included. This is now said to be the case with "sensuous data" which Husserl says "become constituted as peculiarly my own: as 'immanent temporalities' within the limits of my ego. It is also the case with all my habitualities, which are likewise peculiarly my own." (I, 134) That much inclusion does not surprise us, but Husserl also says that "transcendent objects" such as the objects of "external sensuousness" also belong in the sphere of ownness. "We see forthwith that the entire reduced 'world,' which we previously obtained by excluding the sense-components pertaining to what is other, belongs in this sphere and is rightly included in the positively defined concrete
make-up of the ego: as something peculiarly his own." (I,134) Now, where is the restriction? It is at the point of intersubjective sense-strata. All this elaborate claim means, I am convinced, is that the world is present to me even in passive genesis and in a sense that presence is "within" my pre-predicative experience. It is not something other than the world that is present here, but simply the world as so present. The objective world, because of the thematic exclusion, is not present.

When we thematically exclude everything pertaining to intersubjectivity, we have a "nature" that is constituted as a unity of spatio-temporal objects transcending the stream of subjective processes (because they are "more" than what is given, as we have seen), yet is constituted on this level as merely a multiplicity of objects of possible experience - this experience being purely "my own life." At this level, what is experienced in this experience is merely a synthetic unity inseparable from this life and its potentialities. To achieve that separation which the world surely has requires the removal of the thematic exclusion. How to understand its removal is the problem. With it in effect we have only a "transcendent world," which is "more" than is given at any moment and so transcends the cogitationes, but which is not "objective." (I,135) The problem is not to "derive" the objective world from the transcendent world, or even the
latter concept from the former. It is to uncover the dialectic of "experience and judgment" that is the condition of possibility for having an objective world rather than a merely "transcendent" one.

This problem moves us to the third stage of the theory. The "transcendence" of the objective world, transcendence proper, belongs to a higher level of constitution than that of primordial "transcendency." Husserl prepares for the next stage of the constitution by remarking: "that my own essence can be contrasted for me with something else, or that I (who am I) can become aware of someone else (who is not I but someone other than I), presupposes that not all my modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness." (I, 135) His argument is that since "actual being" is constituted originally by harmoniousness of experience, as we saw in the third Meditation, my own self must contain, in contrast to self-experience and the system of its harmoniousness, still other experiences united in harmonious systems. The problem is to understand how the ego has and can always go on forming in himself such intentionalities as those with a sense of being whereby he completely transcends his own being.

Here we are at the core of the problem of the objective world which Husserl claims to be solving by this theory! "How", he asks, "can something actually
existent for me - and, as that, not just somehow meant but undergoing harmonious verification in me - be anything else than, so to speak, a point of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis? As concretely inseparable from my synthesis, is it peculiarly my own?" (I, 135)

Of course not! The fact of experiencing something "other" is always present as experience of an objective world and other egos in it. The answer to the first question is that things "become" objective, i.e. there for us all, by others "becoming" there for me. How they do so is the question, not whether they do.

This question is to be answered by an "intentional explication" which has at least four major stages. The first of these is the third in the overall theory we are examining. At the third stage, then, there is to be distinguished and explicated the constitutional level pertaining to the "other ego" or to "other egos" in general, that is, to egos excluded from my own concrete being as "primordial ego." As a result of this constitution, there occurs as a fourth level a universal super-addition of sense to the ego's primordial world whereby it becomes the appearance of an objective world. These two levels, three and four, are central. The "other" that is first in itself (apriori in Husserl's sense) is the other ego, for it is the condition of possibility for "objective nature" and the objective world. Husserl does not argue that we empirically encounter beings with the
sense, "other ego," chronologically first. There is a "world" of transcedency constituted in passive genesis as mere "nature," but it becomes "objective" only on the condition of experiencing other egos. The other ego here does what God did in Descartes meditations, although in a quite different way.

The third and fourth levels of this theory of constitution only pertain to egos in a one to one relation. However, other egos do not remain isolated like that. On the fifth level of constitution a community of egos is constituted in the primordial ego. That is, the "sense" of this community is formed in each ego. This is a community of egos existing with and for each other, in various scopes on up to the universal community of all monadic egos. This level makes possible a sixth, in which one identical and objective world is constituted. To what extent Husserl succeeds in establishing the objectivity of the world in this way is the critical question to which I shall return in conclusion. First, however, we need to examine these four stages of constitution in some detail. The first of them, third in the overall theory, pertains to the constitution of "someone else."

For Husserl, as we have seen, "experience" is original consciousness of something that is and is thus and so. In the case of experiencing another man, Husserl's phrase used in discussing evidence in general is not at
all odd: the other, we say, is himself there before us "bodily" or "in person." However, Husserl says, "neither the other I himself nor his subjective processes nor his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, he would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same." (I, 139) The point is well taken, and the situation would be similar if the other's "body" were a mere thing in my primordial sphere. The significance of the point is that "a certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum, 'primordial world,' (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a 'there too,' which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an 'itself-there.' We have here, accordingly, a kind of making co-present, a kind of appresenta- tion." (I, 139)

The concept of "appresentation" is of fundamental importance for Husserl's theory. In the sphere of ownness "another man" appears, first of all as a mere body (Körper). Upon this body I (the ego in question) now bestow the sense "living body" (Leib) and more particularly "living body other than mine." I do this through an "appreceptive transfer of sense" from my own living body, through a
process that Husserl says involves "analogy" although it is not "inference" by analogy. The concept of "apperception" needs to be understood first. It is a special form of mediate intentionality. The essence of it is that in connection with a presentation that is a genuine self-giving of an A, there is effected a co-presentation of a B that itself never comes to actual self-givenness but is continually interwoven with something perceived in self-givenness, namely the A.

This phenomenon of apperresentation is only a special case of the universal phenomenon of "pairing," which itself is nothing but a primal form of passive synthesis. We have already examined this. Such a synthesis may be called "association" in a specific case. In pairing association two salient data are intuitively given in the unity of one consciousness. Whether they are noticed or not, they provide the basis for a unity of "similarity" insofar as they appear as "different." An intentional overlapping takes place between both elements of the pair, a reciprocal stimulating and coinciding. As a result of this coincidence, which would yield the limiting case of "perfect likeness" if it were total, a transfer of sense is carried out among the paired elements. The one is apperceived in conformity with the sense of the other unless sense-moments realized in that which is experienced cancel out this transfer in the consciousness of the difference.
An appresentation occurs in external experience of material objects, since the strictly seen "front" always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content. Now, experiencing someone else is a distinct kind of appresentation with regard to this example. The appresentation of a rear by a front of a material object involves the possibility of a verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation. In the case of the appresentation of someone else, we have already seen that there can be no original experience of the other's ownness. Then how can appresentation of another "original sphere" or ownness, and thus the sense "someone else," be motivated in my original sphere as experience? By pairing, of course. Not every non-originary making-present can do it. One can do it only in combination with an originary presentation, as we have seen. Thus Husserl says that "the perception proper that functions as the underlying basis is offered us by our perception of the primordially reduced world, with its previously described articulation - a perception going on continually within the general bounds of the ego's incessant self-perception." (I,139) The question is how this "motivation" works.

We are trying to understand how an "alter ego" is motivated in another ego's conscious life. The key is the word "alter." The pairing takes place between
"my" ego as already constituted in the primordial sphere and the "other" ego who appears there. Everything we have seen to be involved in self-constitution is available for this apperceptive transfer of sense.

Suppose that another man enters my perceptual field. Primordially reduced, that would mean that in my primordial perceptual field a "body" is present. As such it is a mere possibility within my conscious life, what Husserl calls an "immanent transcendency." (I, 140) In the primordial sphere my animate organism is the only live body that is or can be constituted originally as an animate organism. Therefore, the body "over there," which is to be sure, apprehended as an animate organism too, must have received this sense by "apperceptive transfer" from mine. Thus Husserl says that "only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the 'analogizing' apprehension of that body as another animate organism." (I, 140) This intentional situation needs to be more closely examined.

How does it happen that the transferred sense is appropriated, with the status of "existing," as a set of "psychic" determinations existing in combination with "that body over there," even though they can never show themselves as themselves in original experience? The appresentation which gives that component of the other man
that is not accessible "originally," according to Husserl, is combined with an original presentation: namely "his" body as part of my "own" sphere of "nature." It is essential that this be given originally. In the combination, then, the other's animate organism and his "I" are given in the manner that Husserl says characterizes "a unitary transcending experience." (I,144) By this he means that every experience points to "more," to further experiences that would fulfill and verify the appresented horizons. The other man is given, like anything else transcendent, with "inner horizons" which include, in the form of non-intuitive anticipations, potentially verifiable syntheses of harmonious further evidence.

The point here has to do with the built-in "correction" of empathic acts. I can be mistaken, but I can also be proven correct by the course of evidence. The experienced animate organism of another man continues to "prove itself" as an actually existing animate organism in its changing but incessantly harmonious behavior.21 This harmonious behavior has a physical side that indicates appresentatively something psychic. It must present itself as fulfilling the intention in original experience, and do so throughout the process. Any discordant presentations are falsifying of the original intention.

Even this discussion of the way an "other" is appresented is insufficient for Husserl's theory, for
what has been said would not account for the constitution of the objective world. I have already mentioned what is needed in connection with the constitution of "embodiment:" namely, the body as zero point of orientation. This is a fundamental structure. Husserl notices that "as reflectively related to itself, my animate bodily organism (in my primordial sphere) as the central 'Here' as its mode of givenness; every other body, and accordingly the 'other's' body, has the mode 'There.' This orientation, 'There,' can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesias. Thus, in my primordial sphere, the one spatial 'nature' is constituted throughout the change in orientations, and constituted moreover with an intentional relatedness to my animate organism as functioning perceptually." (I,145f)

This is Husserl's version of "taking the place of the other," which is limited to spatial location changed by locomotion. He would also grant other kinds of "reciprocity of perspective," such as temporal and intellectual.

The "other" is constituted in a course of associational experience, first in passive and then in active genesis. It is not fair to criticize his theory for seeming to neglect the important way of knowing another through talking with him, for he is concentrating on the more basic level of passive genesis which founds the possibility of "talking with another." What has been outlined here is basic to all forms of communication and community.
With this mention of "community" we turn to the fourth stage of the theory of the constitution of the objective world. Husserl finds that community develops at various levels. He says that "the first thing constituted in the form of community, and the foundation of all other intersubjectively common things, is the commonness of nature, along with that of the other's organism and his psychophysical I, as paired with my own psychophysical I." (I,149)

There may appear to be an enigma here. How can I speak of the same body appearing within my primordial sphere in the mode there and within his and to him in the mode Here? It might seem that Husserl is confronted with an aporia here, there being an unbridgeable abyss between the two egos. In fact, of course, we bridge the gap all the time. As Husserl puts it, "the enigma appears only if the two original spheres have already been distinguished - a distinction that already presupposes that experience of someone else has done its work." (I,150) The answer to the question how it does this work is given by the explication of the intentionality actually observable in our experience of someone else, by the discovery of the "motivations" essentially implicit in that intentionality. We already have the elements of the theory of this constitution, but we have not examined it in detail. The section in which Husserl presents it is the longest single section
of his *Cartesian Meditations*. 23

The principle governing the theory is that "appre-
sentation as such presupposes a core of presentation." (I, 150) The presented and the appresented form a "func-
tional community of one perception." Every such percep-
tion is transcending in that it posits more than is
actually present at any time. This is true of the case
of experiencing someone else. This appresentation can
exist only in functional community with presentation, so
what this experience presents must belong to the unity of
the object appresented. It could not be the case that
the body belonging to my primordial sphere and indicating
to me the other I could appresent his factual existence
and being there "also" unless this very body had acquired
the sense: "a body belonging to the other ego.", "someone
else's animate organism." There are not two bodies here,
but one body presenting itself in two modes. This is an
essential feature of Husserl's position. The "phenomenon"
is not some third thing between an "other" and "me:" it
is the other appearing to me. Further, because of the
functional community of presented with appresented, I
do not have two "natures," "mine" and "his," but one nature
as it appears Here and There. As Husserl says, "what I
actually see is not a sign and not a mere analogue, a
depiction in any natural sense of the word; on the contrary,
it is someone else." (I, 153) Further, "it is implicit
in the sense of my successful apperception of others
that their world, the world belonging to their appearance-
systems, must be experienced forthwith as the same world
belonging to my appearance-systems; and this involves an
identity of our appearance-systems." (I, 154)

Lest this seem too neat, Husserl takes into ac-
count "abnormalities," such as blindness. Abnormality
itself must be constituted on the basis of an intrinsi-
cally antecedent normality. Further constitutions could
then be examined as possibilities. They would belong to
"a higher level of phenomenological analysis of the con-
stitutional origin of the objective world - as the objec-
tive world existing for us and only by virtue of our
own sense-producing sources, a world that can have neither
sense nor existence for us otherwise. The objective
world has existence by virtue of a harmonious confirmation
of the apperceptive constitution, once this has succeeded:
a confirmation thereof by the continuance of experiencing
life with a consistant harmoniousness, which always be-
comes re-established as extending through any 'corrections'
that may be required to that end." (I, 154)

This theory of constitution, Husserl claims,
removes all trace of "enigma" as to how intersubjectivity
- on the third and fourth levels - can be constituted.
It is no more an enigma than any other synthetic identi-
fication: wonderful, yes; but not a puzzle. The synthesis
we have examined, identifying the same nature both as
primordially given and as appresentatively given and verified, also serves to institute the co-existence of my I and of the other's I, and thereby a common time-form is instituted. There is one objective world and one objective world time. This is the first level of communalization and the first constitution of a truly "objective" world, starting from a primordial "transcendent" world-horizon.

Next, we turn to the fifth and sixth stages of Husserl's theory of the constitution of the objective world. He thinks that these higher levels offer only "relatively minor difficulties," (I,157) compared with the fundamental level we have just examined. Perhaps that is because he is "satisfied with rough general indications." (I,157) At any rate, my concern is more with the overall structure of his theory than with its details. The details fill tens of thousands of pages.

The fifth stage of Husserl's theory of the constitution of the objective world has to do with the constitution of "higher levels of intermonadistic community." The co-existence of my I and another I, and hence the institution of a common temporal form and a common nature, establishes only the first level of community between ego and alter ego and only the first level of objectivity. Husserl emphasizes that all other intersubjective communities are founded upon this one. This is said to be true of "the human community," you and I and the others and
everyone as man among men who experience each other and whom I experience as such. The transcendental correlate of this is the community of monads of transcendental intersubjectivity, which is likewise constituted in each transcendental ego exclusively from sources of his own intentionality. The claim also holds for the social communities arising from "I-thou" acts to which there correspond in the objective world social communities considered as objectivities of a mental or spiritual sort, among them what Husserl puzzlingly calls "personalities of a higher sort." Finally, this foundedness is said to be true of the "cultural world," which by its constitution presupposes what is already constituted on different levels, both primordially and secondarily. Its constitution is also oriented with respect to a "centering" member or with respect to a person: "I and my culture." Let us examine these possibilities of higher levels of intermonadic community.

Husserl's central insight is that, essentially, starting from an ego who is constitutionally the primordial monad, this ego acquires what are for him other monads and others as psychophysical subjects. This implies that the ego does not acquire others merely as "over against" him somatically and as related back to his psychophysical existence, which is always the central member; rather, in
the sense of a community of men and in the sense of the community of man there is implicit a "mutual being for one another." (I, 157) This entails an objectivating equalization of an ego's existence with that of all others: "they too" are centering members of the community of man, and so "I too" am a man among men. Those who dismiss Husserl's view of this must forget how difficult it is to achieve that constitution.

Husserl is trying to account not only for the "I-thou" experience but for the "we" experience. Suppose that I "understand" another man. If I penetrate more deeply into him or into the horizon of his conscious life, I soon run into the fact that just as his animate organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate organism lies in his field of perception. He experiences me as an other for him, just as I experience him as my other. This happens with a plurality of others, and I find that "they" are experienced also by one another as others. I find that I can experience any given other not only as himself an other but as related in turn to his others and perhaps as related to me at the same time. This process goes on and on. Then, as Husserl puts it: "openly endless nature itself then becomes a nature that includes an open plurality of men (conceived more generally: animalia), distributed one knows not how in infinite space, as subjects of possible intercommunion. To this community there
naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open community of monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity. We need hardly say that, as existing for me, it is constituted purely within me, the meditating ego, purely by virtue of sources belonging to my intentionality; nevertheless it is constituted thus as a community constituted also in every other monad (who, in turn, is constituted with the modification: other) as the same community - only with a different subjective mode of appearance - and as necessarily bearing within itself the same objective world." (I, 158)

The point is simply that it is essentially necessary to the "world" constituted in any individual conscious life, and similarly in any community of conscious life, that it be "a world of men and that, in each particular man, it be more or less perfectly constituted intrapsychically - in intentional processes and potential systems of intentionality, which as 'psychic life,' are themselves already constituted as existing in the world." (I, 158)

An examination of any large dictionary will confirm the primacy of the world's sense as "world of men." By "psychic" constitution of the objective world here, Husserl means a man's actual and possible experience of the world, as an experience belonging to him, an ego who experiences himself as a man. Such experience of the world is essentially only more or less perfect; it always has its open undetermined horizon.
The constitution of "humanity" is not complete with what has just been described. On the basis of this constitution, Husserl says that we are to understand "the possibility of acts of the I that reach into the other I through the medium of representative experience of someone else, and, indeed, the possibility of specifically personal acts of the I that have the character of mine directed to you, the character of social acts, by means of which all human personal communication is established." (I,159)

The study of such acts makes the essence of "sociality" transcendentally intelligible. With communication proper, which is social communalization, there become constituted within the objective world various types of social communities. Husserl calls them "spiritual objectivities of a peculiar kind" (I,160) and says that they are arranged in a hierarchical order. Among these some have the form of being "personalities of a higher order." This must be understood in terms of his doctrine of "person" which we considered earlier. Among the forms of sociality would be the "scientific community." Here we would expect to understand the constitution of the specific world of science. This suggestion leads us to a problem which forms the transition to the sixth stage of Husserl's theory.

Correlative to the constitutions just outlined, there arises the problem of the constitution of the
specifically human surrounding world (Umwelt), a surrounding world of culture for each man and each human community. With this there arises the problem of understanding the genuine though restricted kind of objectivity belonging to such a world. A surrounding world is given with the sense: "accessible to everyone," but for obvious reasons this accessibility is not unconditional. \(^{28}\) There is thus a difference between a "surrounding world" and the "nature" first constituted as its basis.

As Husserl describes the difference, we see that "everyone, as a matter of apriori necessity, lives in the same nature, a nature moreover that, with the necessary communalization of his life and the lives of others, he has fashioned into a cultural world in his individual and communalized living and doing - a world having human significances, even if it belongs to an extremely low cultural level." (I,160) This, of course, does not exclude the fact that men belonging to one and the same world live in a loose cultural community, perhaps so loose as to be scarcely a "community" at all, and thus constitute different surrounding worlds of culture as "concrete life-worlds" in which the relatively separate communities live their passive and active lives.

As Husserl has clarified the conceptual scheme and its employment and formation, each man understands first of all, as a "core" having an unrevealed horizon, his own concrete surrounding world or his culture. He
does so precisely as a man who belongs to the community which historically fashions this surrounding world of culture. This has significant implications for the problem of cross-cultural understanding. An understanding that opens up horizons, the past for example, is essentially possible to members of a community. The earlier stages of "my" culture are possible to me with an originality not possible to someone from another community who enters into relation with mine.

However, an "outsider" is not finally barred from understanding. At first such an individual necessarily understands the men of the alien cultural world generically as simply men, then as men of a certain cultural world. Starting from there, he may produce for himself step by step the possibilities of further understanding. Of course, this involves his constitution of many other "types" already. A very provincial person is limited here. Starting from what is most generally understandable, the "alien" first opens up ways of access to a sympathetic understanding of broader and broader strata of the present and then of the historical past, which in turn helps him to gain broader access to the present. Husserl's account of this shows how far he is from having "lost" the objectivity of the world. There still remains the question of how well his approach clarifies it. To find out we must make the transition already set up to the sixth stage of the theory.
According to Husserl the constitution of "worlds" of any kind, horizons with any degree of transcendence and objectivity, "is subject to the law of 'oriented' constitution." (I,161) This law is simply a version of what we considered in connection with genetic constitution and the progressive depositing of layers of sense. In this case Husserl means that world constitution presupposes at each level something "primordially" and something "secondarily" constituted. At each level the primordial enters with a new stratum of sense into the secondarily constituted world. This occurs in such a way that the primordial becomes the central member in the new constitution. The secondarily constituted world is then given as a horizon of being that is essentially accessible from the primordial and is discoverable in a particular order. Of course, it is discoverable in reflection as the founded layer referring back to the founding layer in a dialectic of experience and judgment.

Husserl gives us only an outline of this constitution, but we must examine it anyway. The law holds already for the first layer, the "immanent" world which he calls the stream of subjective processes and their correlates. He says that "this stream is given in an orientation around the primordially constituted living present, from which everything else outside it (but belonging to immanent temporality) is accessible." (I,161)
On the second level, and within the sphere that is primordial in his basic sense, he says that "my animate organism is the central member of 'nature'." (I,161) Here, as we have seen, the "world" is this "own nature" that becomes constituted by means of the phenomenon of embodiment.

My psychophysical organism, on the third level, is primordial for the constitution of the objective world of "mutual" externalities made possible by the constitution of "others." The world in the mode of Here is primordial with respect to the mode of There, and "my" world is the central member. As Husserl puts it, "the multiplicity of the other's world is given as oriented peripherally to mine, and is thus a world, because it becomes constituted with a common objective world immanent in it, and the spatiotemporal form of this objective world functions at the same time as a form that gives access to it." (I,162) The world of this third level is simply the nature common to "you and me," and by implication common to everyone.

On the fourth level the world of I and thou is primordial for the secondarily constituted world of "we." Turning to the cultural world, Husserl says that "it too, as a world of cultures, is given orientedly on the underlying basis of the nature common to all and on the basis of the spatiotemporal form that gives access to nature and must function also in making the multiplicity of
cultural formations and cultures accessible." (I, 161)

This level of world-constitution could be expanded and explored in detail. However, it is clearly at this level that the truly "objective" world as a world there for us all is constituted.

The further stages of the constitution of the objective world are only indicated by Husserl's text. With this, however, he says that he has made it understandable that "with the systematic progress of transcendental-phenomenological explication of the apodictic ego, the transcendental sense of the world must also become disclosed to us ultimately in the full concreteness with which it is incessantly the life-world for us all. That applies likewise to all the particular formations of the surrounding world, wherein it presents itself to us according to our personal upbringing and development or according to our membership in this or that nation, this or that cultural community. All these matters are governed by essential necessities; they conform to an essential style which derives its necessity from the transcendental ego and then from the transcendental subjectivity which discloses itself in that ego - accordingly, from the essential forms of transcendental motivation and transcendental constitution. If we succeed in uncovering these forms, the aforesaid apriori style acquires a rational clarification that has the highest dignity, the dignity
of an ultimate, a transcendental intelligibility." (I, 163)

This concludes Husserl's theory of the transcendental constitution of the concept we have of the objective world. The claim just cited, to have made possible "a rational clarification that has the highest dignity, the dignity of an ultimate, a transcendental intelligibility," returns us to the claim I have been attempting to unpack and examine critically throughout this study. That claim was to be able to solve in principle the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world. How one reacts to the claim depends to a large extent on his interpretation of it. As I understand it, the claim is to be able to clarify radically all the concepts pertaining to the objective world, and especially the most difficult and complex concept of "the objective world" itself.

This reformulation of the transcendental problems into conceptual questions seems to me to be a major achievement, one that makes it necessary to compare Husserl and various other philosophers such as Wittgenstein, who also learned to distinguish between conceptual and empirical questions. Furthermore, there is A. N. Whitehead, who considered "assemblage" or conceptual elucidation to be the first stage of philosophy, prior to "the work of systematization."29 Obviously, there are different ways to clarify concepts, some more "radical" than others.
Husserl was unwilling to stop short - at least as the ideal - of apriori and apodictic evidence with regard to the concepts or pure possibilities in question. "Philosophy, after all," he said, "demands an elucidation by virtue of the ultimate and most concrete essential necessities; and these are the necessities that satisfy the essential rootedness of any objective world in transcendental subjectivity and thus make the world intelligible concretely: as a constituted sense." (I, 164)

In my judgment Husserl's claim is valid in general and in principle, if I have correctly unpacked and interpreted it as conceptual. Of course, there are details to be challenged in his theories and further intentional investigations to be carried out. The question of the apodicticity of lived conceptual evidence is largely left open, as Husserl recognized. Perhaps it need only be an ideal anyway. The major difficulty with Husserl's solution to the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world is his egological conception of consciousness. To many other philosophers today the idea of the self as a private consciousness seems to make it very difficult if not impossible to understand conceptually the outward action of the self, the existence and thereness for the self of other selves, and the existence and thereness for us all of the real world. I have tried to
present Husserl's theories of the constitution of embodiment, intersubjectivity, and the objective world in such a way as to answer these difficulties. It seems to me that he does well neither to lose the self to save the world nor to lose the world to save the self. I am sure that to a large extent his position in this regard hinges on the way he says "being" is phenomenologically constituted. To investigate his ontology further will require a new series of inquiries, and perhaps an attempt to integrate phenomenological philosophy and process philosophy. It remains, in conclusion, to confront the charge of "idealism" which would interpret Husserl's claim in a quite different way.
Notes to Chapter 5

1 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band III, op.cit., #29, 46, 53, 135, 140, 151, 152; Husserliana IV, op.cit.; Formale und transzendentielle Logik, op.cit., Part II, Ch. 6, esp. #95-96; Husserliana VI, op.cit., #53-54; Husserliana VIII, op.cit., #53.

2 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op.cit., #31-33.

3 Ibid., #34.
4 Ibid., #36-39.
5 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band VI, op.cit.
6 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana I, op.cit., p. 177.
9 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op.cit., p. 122, 177.
11 Alfred Schütz, op.cit., pp. 58ff.
17 Ibid., #46.
18 Ibid., #47.
19 Ibid., Sec. 49.
20 Ibid., #51.
21 Ibid., p. 144.
22 Ibid., Sec. 55.
23 Ibid., Sec. 55.
24 Ibid., p. 154.
25 Ibid., p. 156.
26 Ibid., #56ff.; cf. Husserliana Band IV, op.cit., Third Section, #48-61.


30 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op.cit., #63.
6. Conclusion: Phenomenological Philosophy
And The Controversy Between Idealism And Realism

Husserl calls his phenomenology "transcendental philosophy" (I,121) and further characterizes it as "transcendental idealism." (I,118) He sharply contrasts it with "transcendental realism, an absurd position." (I,65) This is his own mature characterization of the solution he offers to the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world in the form of a constitutional problematic and theory working within the limits of transcendental subjectivity.

The terms employed are thoroughly ambiguous in themselves, and yet this characterization clearly places Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in some relation to the traditional controversy which arose after Descartes between idealists and realists over the existence of the external world. The question of the nature of this relation is the one to which I shall address myself in concluding this essay.

It may seem that the question is easily answered. Did not Husserl himself call his philosophy a transcendental idealism? Then surely we must be correct in interpreting it as taking a position on the idealist side of the controversy. This is the view of Sidney Hook,¹ Marvin
Farber,² and Harmon Chapman.³ According to them, and others who share this interpretation, Husserl holds the world to be internal to consciousness. He loses the real world.

If this view were correct, then of course the interpretation I have given of Husserl's claim to solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the objective world would be mistaken. On the other hand, if my interpretation is correct, then it would be a mistake to say that Husserl's phenomenological philosophy is merely a variant of traditional idealism, in the sense that idealism holds the world to be really internal to consciousness. It would also be a mistake to say that Husserl's phenomenological philosophy is a traditional realism, in the sense that realism tries to prove the existence of the world in itself independent of consciousness. Husserl's key insight, in my interpretation, is the apriori correlation of the world and consciousness of the world in our conceptual scheme. The transcendent and the transcendental are not reducible to one another, nor are they separable from one another.⁴

On the basis of my unpacking of Husserl's claim, I am convinced that his phenomenological philosophy is neither an idealism nor a realism in terms of the controversy over the existence of the external world. It is a unique position prior to both. Whether there are
"idealistic" or "realistic" themes in Husserl's philosophy depends upon the sense given to those variously used terms. Whether Husserl holds the world to be really internal to consciousness, on the one hand, or proves its existence in itself independent of consciousness, on the other, is a more clear-cut question. He does neither, as my investigations have shown. He rejected the whole controversy over the existence of the external world as inconsistent. The "problem" of traditional idealisms and realisms is merely a puzzle into which one falls when an attitude mistake is made by trying to raise and deal with questions of possibility in the natural attitude. Part of the answer to the question of the relation of Husserl's philosophy to the controversy, then, is seen in the fact that he holds "every form of current philosophical realism to be in principle absurd, and no less so every idealism to which in its own arguments that realism stands in contrast, and which it in fact refutes." (V,151) That clarifies the relation negatively.

In order to clarify the relation positively, we must state what Husserl himself means by "transcendental" philosophy and why he prefers to call this transcendental "idealism" rather than "realism." For Husserl transcendental philosophy is that philosophy which asks and answers questions about the pure possibility of trans-
cendent knowledge. These are conceptual rather than empirical questions. Since such questions can be neither asked nor answered consistently in the natural attitude, this philosophy must consciously adopt a new point of view. Depending on the emphasis, Husserl calls this new attitude transcendental, phenomenological, and eidetic. Instead of remaining oriented toward empirical facts, transcendental philosophy is oriented toward pure or conceptual possibilities. In the natural attitude we are always directed toward the world; in the transcendental attitude we turn toward the way we think of the world.

This transcendental turn is accomplished by a "reductive" movement of thought which leads "back" from transcendent facts to their transcendental conditions of possibility. These conditions are logical or conceptual. What comes into focus with the transcendental turn is called "transcendental subjectivity." This is the universe of possible sense or the conceptual scheme. It is called "subjectivity" not in order to refer to the worldly subject but because the conceptual scheme is formed and used in conscious life, first monadic and then inter-

monadic.

If there is a question of how, for example, visual perception of material objects is possible, the answer will be found in a clarification by intentional analysis
of the concepts involved. To know whether there actually is visual perception of material objects is not a transcendental problem. It is an empirical issue rather than a conceptual one. Such questions can only be answered by the appropriate kind of experience and judgment in the natural attitude, and in fact are already answered prior to transcendental philosophizing.

Positively characterized, then, Husserl's transcendental philosophy makes it intelligible to us that we have the conceptual scheme we have, that we think of the world in the way we think of it, that we do in everyday and in scientific thought and action what we do. It is purely descriptive, although in making the invariant structures of the conceptual scheme eidetically thematic it moves this scheme to a new level of formation. It is dynamic rather than static, for the conceptual scheme is always in formation by experience and judgment. In carrying out its intentional analyses, transcendental philosophy in Husserl's sense achieves a system of conceptual clarifications called theories of constitution. These make the objectivities of possible consciousness intelligible to us as "constituted unities of sense." Is such a philosophy best called transcendental idealism or realism?

"Carried out with this systematic concreteness," Husserl says, "phenomenology is eo ipso 'transcendental idealism,'" though in a fundamentally and essentially new
sense. It is not a psychological idealism, and most certainly not such an idealism as sensualistic psychology proposes, an idealism that would derive a senseful world from senseless sensuous data. Nor is it a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves." (I,118) We must now inquire about the new sense in which phenomenological philosophy is transcendental idealism in terms of these qualifications. First, why the "eo ipso?"

Why does Husserl think it is so self-evident that his transcendental philosophy is not a "transcendental realism?" Precisely because he thinks it should be clear to everyone that he does not attempt to do what Chapman, for example, thinks he does. "Transcendental realism" is the label Husserl gives to Descartes' position. Husserl argues that Descartes missed the point of his own reduction to the indubitable and so failed to make the transcendental turn in the true sense. Descartes thought that with his "ego cogito" he had rescued a little tag-end of the world which was the sole unquestionable part of it for the radically critical philosopher. Then for Descartes the problem became to infer the rest of the world by correctly conducted deductive arguments according to principles innate in the ego. "Unfortunately", Husserl says, "these prejudices were at work when Descartes introduced the
apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a \textit{substantia cogitans}, a separate human \textit{mens sive animus'}, and the point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality - in short, the change by virtue of which Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, an absurd position..." (I,63) Descartes fell into this absurdity, in Husserl's opinion, because of his attitude mistake. He did not thoroughly distinguish conceptual from empirical questions, the transcendental from the natural attitude. Transcendental realism operates with "inconsistent inferences leading from a supposed immanency to a supposed transcendency." (I,118) It may even allege some thing-in-itself to be unknowable. In this sense it seems to join the psychological and Kantian idealisms from which Husserl is so concerned to distinguish his transcendental idealism.

Husserl's transcendental idealism is not a psychological idealism, not a sensualistic psychologists. Such a theory is bound to the natural attitude. It attempts to derive a senseful world from senseless data of sensation. Husserl explicitly rejects and criticizes any such beginning with a theory of sense-data. Of course, he provides a place for data of sensation in his theory too, as I have indicated. The state of pure sensation is a stage in genetic constitution, and sensations are not senseless. This is a conceptual account of them in the
transcendental attitude rather than an inferential use of them in the natural attitude.

Further, Husserl's transcendental idealism is not a Kantian idealism. For Husserl, the fundamental error there is the implicit denial of the apriori correlation of the world and consciousness of the world by assuming that the world "for us" is constituted in consciousness but that there is also a world with its sense and being "in itself." Husserl later added a note to the passage I cited earlier, saying that the possibility of a world of things in themselves "would signify for the I a realm in itself, belonging to him mythically. And Kantian transcendentalism would by no means turn into the phenomenological transcendentalism treated here, even if such doctrines were eliminated." (I,243) There is a completely different notion of synthesis, for one thing, since the Husserlian notion is bound up with intentionality. For Kant consciousness puts sense data together by the imposition of forms and categories. For Husserl to say that a thing is synthetically constituted in consciousness is to say that it is presented to consciousness in a series of active and passive acts as having a certain noematic-objective sense. It "acquires" this sense for consciousness due to the synthetic organization of these acts through which the object is presented. For Husserl, to synthesize is simply to
actualize a certain sense. Husserl's intentional theory of consciousness is a correlational theory.

In Husserl's transcendental philosophy, then, we have "a transcendental idealism that is nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a systematic egological science, an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to every sense of what exists, wherein the latter might be able to have a sense for me, the ego. This idealism is not a product of sportive argumentations, a prize to be won in the dialectical contest with 'realisms.' It is sense-explication achieved by actual work, an explication carried out as regards every type of existent ever conceivable by me, the ego, and specifically as regards the transcendency actually given to me beforehand through experience: nature, culture, the world as a whole. But that signified: systematic uncovering of the constituting intentionality itself." (I,113f)

I have interpreted this "sense-explication," which is transcendental idealism in Husserl's terms, as a radical sort of conceptual clarification which clarifies the sense of a concept in terms of its phenomenological origins in passive and active synthesis. In the theory I have chiefly examined, it makes the world as horizon there for us all intelligible as a constituted unity of sense. It no more reduces the world to a constituted unity of sense or concept than it severs the intentional relationship of the world in its sense and being to consciousness.
Husserl calls this transcendental or conceptual philosophy an "idealism" because he wants to emphasize the irreducibility of the transcendental to the transcendent. The transcendental sphere of consciousness is ideal; the transcendent sphere or world real. A transcendental philosophy would be a "realism" only if it made the transcendental into something "real." Husserl does not; nor does he make the world into something "ideal." The only sense in which the world is "immanent" to consciousness for Husserl is as a constituted sense and this is an "ideal immanence." (I,95) The way we think of the world is subjective and intersubjective, but the sense this world has for us in our thinking of it is correctly objective.

It seems to me then, in answer to the question of this conclusion, that Husserl's phenomenological philosophy is neither idealism nor realism in terms of the traditional controversy over the existence of the objective world. It is transcendental philosophy in that it is a conceptual clarification. If anyone thinks it well to call this transcendental idealism in Husserl's sense and for his reasons, I see no harm in it: except that it is likely to confuse people. For this reason I prefer to drop the labels and call it simply phenomenological philosophy.
Notes for Chapter 6

2 M. Farber, op. cit.
3 H. M. Chapman, op. cit., cf. esp. Ch. VII.
4 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band I, op. cit., p. 65.
5 Ibid., p. 116.
6 Ibid., p. 118 and 122.
7 Ibid., p. 76f.
8 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band III, op. cit., #43.
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This list includes books and articles cited in my study and others which have contributed to it.

I. Husserl's Works


The following English translations of Husserl's works are presently available. In my essay I have used them whenever possible, but freely modified them where a comparison with the German original called for it. I take the translation by Dorian Cairns as the standard to be followed.


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