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WILLIAM GILMORE SIMMS: THE ARTIST AS PUBLIC MAN
A POLITICAL ODYSSEY, 1830-1860

by

Jon Louis Wakelyn

A THESIS SUBMITTED
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Thesis Director's Signature:

Frank J. Vandervolt

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PREFACE

The role of the man of letters in public life has always intrigued me. From the time that I first discovered William Gilmore Simms in Vernon Louis Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought, I have been interested in him both as a public figure and as an artist. Simms is known to most people today as a rather mediocre novelist who was the ante-bellum South's most important man of letters. But Simms also had an active public career. As novelist, essayist, poet, critic, editor, publisher, legislator, and political advisor, he completely dominated the literary culture of South Carolina. Simms was also influenced by his beloved South. Thus I have chosen to study Simms's public career during the thirty years preceding the Civil War in order to try to understand why the South seceded from the Union.

Necessarily there are many people who deserve my gratitude for helping me complete this dissertation. Mrs. Mary C. Simms Oliphant, Simms's granddaughter, offered many research hints and, more important, gave me a feeling for South Carolina which I had never understood before. Professors John C. Guilds and John R. Welsh of the English Department at the University of South Carolina helped place Simms in literary perspective. Professor George Williams of the English Department at Rice University read the finished thesis very carefully and made many stylistic suggestions.

In many lengthy conversations Professor Francis L. Loewenheim of Rice University has given me much insight into the importance of analyz-
ing historical works for their political and propagandistic significance. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to my thesis director, Professor Frank E. Vandiver, without whom this thesis would never have been finished. He not only studied the rough manuscript for stylistic and structural errors, but also imparted to me some of his vast knowledge of the old South.

There are two people who deserve special thanks for the completion of this thesis. My wife, Catherine Carl Wakelyn, spent many hours discussing ante-bellum South Carolina culture with me and served as a sounding board for many of my foolish ideas. She has carefully read the thesis and offered many suggestions to improve my writing. She also typed the entire final copy. Professor Thomas Stirton of Long Island University was my major professor as an undergraduate. His brilliant teaching and thoughtful criticism of his students' ideas helped me decide to enter the academic profession. Professor Stirton has been a constant source of inspiration throughout my graduate career and a careful critic of the development of this thesis. As a token of my appreciation, I dedicate this thesis to my mentor, Thomas Stirton, and my wife, Catherine Carl Wakelyn.
PROLOGUE

It was late in the afternoon on the docks of Charleston. Young Gilmore had listened too long, as usual, to the tales of adventure spun for him by the Portuguese, English, and Greek sailors. He ran through the streets of Charleston hoping to be home in time for Grandmother Gates's supper. Out of the lengthening shadows stepped a man dressed in buckskin. He grabbed the youth and told him that his father was expecting him in Mississippi. The boy screamed. A crowd gathered. The man in buckskin released his hold and the boy ran off. Later that night, settled by the fire, Grandmother Gates soothed the frightened youth and filled his head with heroic tales of the American Revolution.¹

The boy's father, William Gilmore Simms, Sr., had emigrated as a youth to Charleston. By 1804 he had prospered enough as a merchant to marry Harriet Singleton, a young Charleston lady. The winter of 1805 brought their first son John, and on April 17, 1806, the father's namesake was born. In the autumn of that year the first son died and the father's business went bankrupt. In the winter his wife died. Simms, Sr., no longer enjoyed his adopted city, and one day he rode west to Tennessee, to a life of adventure and wandering.² He volunteered to fight with Jackson at New Orleans in 1815 and served under him during the Indian Wars.

Young William Gilmore Simms was left in the care of his maternal grandmother, Mrs. Jacob Gates. She had remarried after the death of her
first husband, John Singleton. The Singleton family was originally from
Virginia but had moved to Charleston prior to the Revolutionary War.
Simms's great-grandfather, Thomas Singleton, had been a large landowner
who had fought heroically in the defense of Charleston. John Singleton,
Simms's grandfather, had ridden with Marion in Revolutionary campaigns
throughout South Carolina.³ Mrs. Gates inherited much of the family
prestige and honor, but there was little money left to raise young Simms.

Both Simms's grandmother and father wanted to raise him. There was
a court hearing over custody of the boy. His father had become a success-
ful planter in Mississippi and wanted the child to come West where he
could receive a good education and lead a responsible life. Grandmother
Gates refused to give him up and Simms, who had grown attached to her,
would not leave Charleston.⁴ Years later he said that his father's rights
had been set aside, "I now think improperly, and as I now believe, to my
irretrievable injury in many respects."⁵

Mrs. Gates was a kindly woman who delighted in entertaining her
grandson with stories. But the boy led a lonely life. He had few friends
and spent most of his time alone or in the company of older people. Al-
though his schooling was meagre, young Simms read many poems, novels, and
histories.⁶ He was poor in mathematics and learned only a smattering of
French, Italian, and German. He began to write poetry, choosing as topics
his country's Revolutionary victories over Great Britain.⁷ Simms best
summarized his own childhood in a poem entitled "Involuntary Struggle,"
written in the 1850's. The poem is of a creative youth who spends too
much time by himself, has no friends, and leaves his boyhood behind at
too early an age.⁸

His grandmother was a practical woman. She interrupted Simms's
schooling, both formal and informal, to apprentice him to a pharmacist, perhaps hoping that he would become a physician. He continued to write, but now only at night. At eighteen his apprenticeship ended abruptly. Both Simms and his grandmother knew that he would never be a doctor, so they decided that he should study law. He read Blackstone, briefed cases, and learned the legal trade, studying with Charles R. Carroll, a lawyer not much older than himself.¹⁰

Early in 1825 the young law student interrupted his studies to visit his father on the Mississippi plantation. For several months he traveled with his father. They rode in the backwoods, visited settlers, hunted, fished, and spent some time with both the Creek and Cherokee Indians. His father attempted to persuade him to remain in the West. He promised him a fortune from land or law, a seat in Congress, and room for his fertile ideas to grow. But the younger Simms was determined to return to South Carolina.¹¹

Back in Charleston Simms continued to write and to study law. Since he was too young to take the bar examination, he contented himself with odd jobs and writing poetry. He chose the state's history as a topic for his poems. In 1825 one of South Carolina's leading Revolutionary War heroes, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, died. Simms wrote a poem honoring the hero and the patriotic dead of South Carolina. The poem was privately issued, bearing the name of no publisher.¹² It was his first published work.

Before entering the legal profession Simms began to edit his first magazine, The Album. It appeared in 1825 and was completely literary, placing no emphasis on politics.¹³ Over twenty of Simms's poems were published in the Album, and it is apparent that the young author was
pleased to edit a magazine which would present him in print. As an editor
he also learned something of the sensitivity and perversity of his fellow
authors. These writers questioned Simms's judgment and helped to teach
him the politics of writing. The Album, however, ceased publication
after only two issues.

On April 17, 1827, Simms was admitted to the South Carolina bar.
But he was not interested in practicing law. He soon began another liter-
Immediately there was the necessity of raising funds and insuring sub-
scriptions, so Simms and his partner, James W. Simmons, sought to appeal
to a Southern audience. The prospectus printed in the Charleston Courier
stated that the magazine would solicit work from American, especially
Southern, writers, and would not be adverse to printing the fiction of
local authors. "Above all," the prospectus said, "it will be their object
to encourage the efforts and do justice to the claims of native genius;
and to show that the natural products and flowers of our soil want but
the dew and sunshine of notice, to vie in value and beauty with the most
costly exotics which we import from abroad."15

The magazine underwent a slight change from its opening prospectus.
It appeared as The Southern Literary Gazette, and was to be a monthly
rather than a weekly publication. In March of 1829 Simmons withdrew, and
Simms attempted to edit the Gazette alone. By October he realized there
were not enough subscribers to keep the magazine running. A printer named
James S. Burges then planning to issue a magazine entitled The Pleiades,
A Weekly Literary Gazette, knew of Simms's reputation as a talented young
editor and wanted to hire him. With his own magazine failing, Simms took
over the Pleiades, which lasted only one issue.
A short analysis of the writing in *The Southern Literary Gazette* should demonstrate some of Simms's early literary, social, and political beliefs. The introduction to the first issue stated his literary aims. He felt it was time that America took on a national identity. The United States had been separated from England politically for fifty years; why couldn't it separate socially? He first proposed that writers use native themes for their work. The United States had many interesting historical events in its past, and these could well serve for plot structure. Also, since the American language was indigenous to its own people, why write stilted English prose? If the United States would cease to rely on European publishing houses, it could have its own native literature.17

As early as 1828, Simms felt some hostility toward the North and its superior literary attitudes.18 He knew that Southerners were downgraded by both the English and the North, and to assure the South's literary representation he suggested Southern writers have their works published locally. However, he praised Northern newspapers for discussing Southern literature and politics. He hesitated to attack the North more vociferously, because it still was an ally against Great Britain.19

Besides poetry, comments on biography and writers, on the Charleston theatre, and general statements to promote a Southern literature, Simms wrote on slavery, the coming topic of his age. In the January, 1829, issue of *The Southern Literary Gazette* he refused to oppose the slave colonization societies. He claimed that he had always favored colonization, but he did not believe the government should interfere with or become a party to the scheme. "If it be practicable," he said, "let us . . . restore him [the Negro] to the country originally assigned him by the Creator, and there assist him to better his lot and improve the con-
dition of his race." Perhaps Simms foresaw the later argument over slavery and envisioned colonization as a means of halting the growing differences between the North and South. 21

After the Gazette and the Pleiades folded, Simms returned to his law practice. As a young lawyer he became interested in local politics. He supported Thomas Smith Grimke for intendant (mayor) of Charleston. Grimke, a unionist, was running against Henry Laurens Pinckney, a low-tariff, state rights nullifier and editor of the Charleston Mercury. Already the state was involved in the question of the right to nullify a federal law. The election for intendant revolved around national issues. As a unionist Simms was unhappy to see Pinckney win the election. 22

After the election Simms realized that he was more interested in writing and editing than in practicing law. He welcomed the opportunity to join E. Smith Duryea, a printer, in purchasing the Charleston City and Carolina Gazette, an old and respected unionist newspaper. 23 They bought the paper on December 31, 1829, and the first issue of the City Gazette and Commercial Advertiser with Simms as editor appeared on New Year's Day, 1830. Simms would continue the paper's unionist tradition. The Charleston Gazette would oppose Pinckney and his nullificationist paper, the Mercury. Simms's long, varied, and active career in politics had begun.
NOTES


4. Sketch of William Gilmore Simms, 1895, MSS, Charles Carroll Simms Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


16. Hoole, pp. 48-49.


II (February-March, 1829).


21. Ibid., II (January, 1829), passim.

22. Letter from Grimke to Miles' Register, Sept. 4, 1829, explaining his position in South Carolina politics, MSS, Thomas Smith Grimke Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

SECTION ONE:

SIMMS THE NATIONALIST, 1830-1840
I. THE ARTIST AS NEWSPAPER EDITOR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY

As editor of the Charleston City Gazette Simms entered politics. He made the paper into an important unionist political organ and actively campaigned for Unionist party candidates in city and state elections. He vociferously opposed the nullificationist movement and often clashed with its leaders, including John C. Calhoun. But the Nullification party proved to be too strong in South Carolina, and within two years Simms would lose the Gazette. Although his first venture into public life would be a failure, Simms would learn much about the political world of South Carolina.

When Simms became editor of the Gazette, the tariff controversy between the North and South had been going on for years, and the nullification movement in South Carolina was two years old. Calhoun, soon to become the state's most important politician, had a varied voting record on the tariff. He entered the Congress of 1811-1812, became an intense nationalist, and introduced the resolution to declare war on Great Britain. He also encouraged the federal government to enact tariffs for protecting America's growing manufactures and to construct a system of highways which would connect the North and the South to the West. During Madison's second term he was instrumental in passing the Tariff of 1816.¹

In 1817, Calhoun became James Monroe's Secretary of War. While he was Secretary of War two important events occurred which were to have

10
lasting significance for his future plans. The Panic of 1819 caused a severe business depression that all but crippled America’s manufacturing interests and touched off political and sectional problems. The Missouri Compromise of 1821 revealed increasing sectional differences over the admission of new states and made Calhoun ponder his national ties. Although the South had voted against the tariff of 1816, it had really been indifferent to the protective system. But the struggle over admitting new states into the Union also aroused the South to the connection between slavery and the tariff. The South knew that slavery made the growth of Southern manufactures almost impossible and compelled Southerners to purchase manufactured goods from Europe or the North. A protective system would not only raise import prices, but England would also tax or exclude the South’s economic staple, cotton.

Calhoun was not immediately affected by the South’s increasing distrust of the tariff. He was still Secretary of War, a national figure with presidential ambitions for 1824. When the emergence of Andrew Jackson as a strong Western candidate killed Calhoun’s chances for the presidency, he sought the vice-presidency on both the Adams and Jackson tickets. But against increasing agitation for lower tariffs in his own state, Calhoun was forced to support a higher tariff in 1824.

In 1820 the advocates of protection were unsuccessful in their attempt to raise the customs duties. Southern congressmen voted forty to three against it. Yet in 1824 a tariff to protect manufactures passed Congress and raised the average rate of duties 37 per cent over the protective measures of 1816. James Hamilton, Jr., Joel R. Poinsett, and George McDuffie, all of South Carolina, made important speeches in the House of Representatives against the tariff of 1824. Robert Y. Hayne,
also of South Carolina, led the Southern Senate forces against the bill.

South Carolinians sought to show Congress their position toward the tariff with memorials and long legal protests. In 1816 they had objected to the effect which a protective tariff policy would have on the South. But in 1823 they began to question the constitutionality of the protective system. By 1824 both Hayne and Hamilton were attacking the constitutionality of the tariff. When the tariff of 1828 was contemplated, William Drayton suggested it be tested in the courts to ascertain its constitutionality. "From this date the unconstitutionality of protection was nearly universally conceded in South Carolina." 

Part of South Carolina's anti-tariff stand was a result of slavery and its economic problems. The threatened slave revolt of Denmark Vesey in 1822, the anti-slavery trend of the colonization societies, and the fear of growing central powers in a government which might at any time turn against slavery, fed the flames of the state's economic discontent. During the period 1800-1830, South Carolina's white population increased an average of 9 per cent per decade; this was "one-fourth the percentage of the average increase of the white population in the whole United States for that period." From 1823 to 1828 there was a 50 per cent decrease of imports into Charleston Harbor. The average annual decline reached $350,000.00 by 1828. Many South Carolinians blamed the protective tariff system—which protected only Northern interests—for the emigration of their youth to the fertile lands of the Southwest and the decline of Charleston as a large mercantile port.

Thus Calhoun was torn between his state's increasing anti-tariff position and his own national political role favoring a protective tariff. As Vice-President he was forced to cast the deciding vote on the Woolens
Bill (part of the "Abominable" Tariff) of 1827. A faction of radicals in South Carolina, headed by Thomas Cooper and Robert Turnbull ("Brutus") demanded drastic action against the tariff of 1828. Most important, the radicals were rapidly moving toward a majority position in the state. Calhoun had run with Jackson and was to be Vice-President for another four years. He still had presidential ambitions. To succeed Jackson, Calhoun would have to maintain national ties, but he could not remain in politics without appeasing his home state.\(^{10}\)

To satisfy the radicals in South Carolina, Calhoun voted "no" on the Woolens Bill. That was the beginning of the end of his career as a nationalist. In defeating the Woolens Bill, he antagonized the Northern businessmen who had renewed their efforts to pass a higher level of duties than those in the tariff of 1824. They demanded a higher tariff, and the result was the Tariff of Abominations of 1828. Once he had placated South Carolina, Calhoun had to silence the radicals who talked of secession. His answer was "The South Carolina Exposition," a document which the state legislators published in the winter of 1828 without his name.

"The Exposition" was a legal work, containing the doctrine of nullification as opposed to state secession. Calhoun claimed that the protective tariff was unconstitutional. The people of a state had the right to nullify an unconstitutional law. Once the government had amended the Constitution by making that law a part of the Constitution, a state could secede. But until such steps were taken the people of South Carolina should give Congress an opportunity to change its constitutional mistake. Some radicals in South Carolina took this statement to mean immediate action, while others decided to await the outcome of the presidential election of 1828.\(^{11}\)
Many Southerners supported Jackson for President because they thought he would reduce the tariff. Jackson was elected, but did nothing about the tariff. By his dislike of Peggy Eaton, Calhoun antagonized the President. This gave Jackson's Northern supporters an opportunity to ruin Calhoun's chances for the presidency. They reminded the President of Calhoun's attempt to censure him for his actions in the Seminole War of 1817. Calhoun was purged from power in Washington. Realizing that he could be elected President only with the support of the entire South, Calhoun became the leading theoretician and political spokesman of the nullification movement. He moved toward sectional leadership by seizing political control in South Carolina.

Charleston newspapers were to become the center of the debate between nullifiers and unionists, and "among the Union newspapers none possessed a wider influence than the Charleston Courier and the City Gazette." If the City Gazette had long been recognized as a unionist newspaper, it had become equally well-known for its advocacy of state rights. These two traditions—state rights and unionism—were reaffirmed and strengthened during the two years before Simms became editor.

When they became the Gazette's editors, Simms and Duryea planned many improvements for the paper. They ordered new type from the North and began to campaign to solicit subscribers. All citizens of Charleston were invited to contribute to the Gazette. Politically the paper would seek to support the "holy bond" of the Union. Simms added that the sanctity and protection of "our common liberty" of freedom of speech would be upheld at any cost. "Our politics," he said:

Are those of the American Citizen. Of him, who looks upon our Union, as of the last importance, and who however he may regard as futile and ridiculous the ravings of those who would dismem-
ber and overturn it, cannot but grieve to behold the diminished awe and respect with which its portals have been bitterly approached. We shall advocate the reserved rights of the States, in opposition to the latitudinarian principles contended for on the part of the general Government—and while we avow our right of protest against encroachment, we are satisfied that the expediency of the case will require nothing further. There are some men, who would destroy the body, to preserve a member—we are not of the class.

Though a unionist, Simms thought the tariff was oppressive, for it inhibited South Carolina's economic growth. It was also unconstitutional, and the federal government's practice of increasing the tariff would ruin the South. But he saw that immediate tariff relief would not help the South. He knew that the South's problem was increasingly unequal representation in Congress. He could not join the nullifiers, however, because the South would be in a worse position if it left the Union. It must be faced, Simms said, that the South is the weaker section, laboring under a great disadvantage.

The Charleston Mercury, realizing that Simms's pro-Union and anti-tariff editorials might damage the nullification movement, claimed that he was anti-Jackson. Simms replied that the Mercury was calling the Gazette anti-Jackson to hide its own desertion of the President. How could the editor call Simms anti-Jackson when Pinckney himself had denounced Jackson in the South Carolina legislature? Simms praised Jackson in his paper. For him, Jackson was the man who would restore "simplicity of manners in the intercourse between the President and his fellow citizens." This was characteristic of Jackson's "genuine republicanism," a political view that Simms favored in 1830.

After carefully studying the Mercury's editorials, Simms predicted that it would oppose Jackson in 1832. Francis W. Pickens, state legislator and nullifier from Edgefield, knew that the administration was
weak, and he hoped Clay would beat Jackson. He thought that if Clay could defeat Jackson, Calhoun could defeat Clay in 1836. The country would then be in Southern hands. As editor of the Gazette Simms felt bound to attack Calhoun's "pious crusade" in order to save the republican principles of Jackson. As far as Simms was concerned, Jackson still preserved all the essential "Rights of the State." He wanted to protect Jackson's administration in order to save the Union.

Simms knew that the nullification movement could cause civil war. He was convinced that no Southern state would co-operate with South Carolina, and the state could not possibly fight the entire country. The bluster of the nullifiers would not make Congress rescind the tariff. But Simms agreed that a state could leave the government which passed laws that were unconstitutional and unfavorable to the state's interests. He said that "this is clearly the right to Revolution--a right inherent in, and inseparable from every political society." Since the tariff was legal, Simms opposed any act by South Carolinians to nullify it.

But there was growing political excitement both in Charleston and in Washington, as legislators sought to protect their own or their section's interests. Simms wanted a national political consensus on the questions of tariff and state rights. Unless such a consensus could be found, he feared that the South would become too much of a minority in the Union. He was certain that the security of a government could be found in the absence of a minority. "There should be no minority in a nation like ours; and where there is, justice can no longer be hoped or looked for, by the body which fails any longer to oppose, by a correspondent balance, the interest which may come in collision with its own." In his opinion, the South should tolerate its few ills rather than dis-
rupt the Union and cause greater evils. He even praised a speech of George McDuffie's, in which McDuffie placed "the sacred fabric of the Constitutional bond" above petty sectional squabbles.23

There was no longer time for Simms to theorize. Charleston city elections were approaching, and the Gazette must support the unionists.24 The election was held in the first week of September. An intendant (mayor) and twelve wardens (aldermen) were to be chosen. Henry L. Pinckney, editor of the Mercury, headed the nullifier ticket, or State Rights and Jackson party, as it preferred to be called.25 James R. Pringle was the Unionist party's candidate for intendant. The unionists also claimed to be Jacksonians, calling themselves the State Rights and Union party.26 The issues had state and national significance. The unionists' form of state sovereignty opposed nullification and the protective tariff; it also opposed holding a state-wide convention to determine the constitutionality of the tariff. The Nullification party supported nullification as a state's only way of declaring an unjust act unconstitutional and favored a state-wide convention for redress of grievances.27

The Gazette reported the opposing political meetings, in hopes of persuading Charlestonians to support the Unionist party. Simms was pleased that 500 men attended a King Street unionist meeting, presided over by James Louis Petigru. The nullifiers had been able to muster only 430 members out of a city voting strength of 2,800 at their meeting. Petigru, a business partner of James Hamilton, Jr., leading Charleston nullifier, had refused to attend. Simms, who also declined an invitation to attend, took pleasure in reporting the nullifiers' poor showing.28 By demonstrating that nullifiers were actually a minority in the city, Simms thought the voters would support the unionist.
The election was close, but Pringle defeated Pinckney by a vote of 838 to 754. The union men also won most of the elections for wardens. In an editorial Simms stated that "the friends of good order and the Union have triumphed!" As far as he was concerned the people had made their choice; they had supported the security and strength of their country. "The Republic is secure." The majority of Charlestonians obviously were opposed to a state nullification convention. 29

Throughout the month of August Simms printed articles from other newspapers in South Carolina to show that the state did not want a convention. In Abbeville, Pendleton, Laurens, Camden, and Greenville there was strong unionist sentiment. Simms claimed that Greenville voted almost unanimously against a convention, and that Benjamin Franklin Perry, editor of the Mountaineer, opposed nullification. He used editorials from other papers to demonstrate to Charlestonians growing unionist solidarity in the state. 30

For Simms a convention in 1830 would have spelled utter ruin to the state. He said in an editorial that a convention would cause too much excitement, and that the excitement would stampede the convention into nullification. "Nullification will compel our Venerable Jackson, . . . using the strong Arm of Power to reduce you and your deluded followers to submission," he wrote to the nullifiers. Simms attributed the entire nullification crisis to the cynical manipulations of politicians. These men, he felt, did not seek a convention to consolidate the rights of Southerners. They were simply ambitious and wanted political power for themselves. 31

The Charleston nullifiers knew that they could not win elections by calling for a state convention. The Mercury did not openly favor a
convention in the fall elections for state representatives and senators. Richard Cunningham was the nullification candidate and James Louis Petigrue the Union party nominee for the state senate. Cunningham was elected by a vote of 1,268 to 1,243. Simms claimed he was elected because the convention was not used as an issue. However, the unionists elected eleven out of sixteen men to the state house of representatives. Simms attached national significance to the Charleston election. An editorial in the New York Commercial had claimed that the defeat of the nullifiers was a blow to Jackson, but Simms denied the accusation. He was certain that every unionist was loyal to Jackson. The Clay people had no support in South Carolina, he said, except from the Mercury. But he also claimed that the Mercury would soon come out for Calhoun. This would disrupt pro-Jackson feeling in the South, and would probably benefit "the Kentucky man." When the state senate voted on the convention issue, the nullifiers were clearly in the majority, twenty-nine to eleven. But they lacked the two-thirds vote necessary to call a convention. Simms was elated. The unionists had been given a reprieve. They could reorganize the party throughout the state and prepare for 1831. Simms knew that he must convince the voters that neither the Unionist party nor the Gazette was submissionist. They were patriotic and would support South Carolina regardless of its ultimate action. But he also knew that nullification meant lunacy and determined to continue to oppose it. But the Gazette did not survive the year 1830 unscathed. The Mercury vehemently attacked both the paper and Simms for unionist sympathies. Simms claimed that Pinckney too closely controlled the Mercury, stating that he would "admit no views into his Journal, which met not his
own sanction, and of which he did not approve." Pinckney did not want freedom of the press; he wanted a newspaper to serve only as a party organ. While Simms used the Gazette to further the unionist cause, politics were not his motive. In 1830, Simms placed the Union above all else.\textsuperscript{35}

Simms began the year 1831 with a plea for a calm and reflective attitude by both parties. "There was probably as much to be apprehended from a too frequent discussion of revolutionary doctrines as from the general apathy which was supposed to precede despotism," he wrote in January. His greatest consolation was that the attacks against the Union party and the federal government came "not from sound patriots, the men of matured intelligence virtue, and acknowledged patriotism," but from discontented office seekers.\textsuperscript{36} He hoped that the political struggles in South Carolina would soon end.

With the state relatively calm Simms decided to visit the Southwest. His father had died in late 1830, so the young editor went to Mississippi in the spring to settle the estate. During his travels he sent articles to the Gazette describing frontier life. He wrote of the many South Carolinians who had moved West stating that they still considered themselves Southerners. He was intrigued by the spaciousness and the fertile soil of the Southwest.\textsuperscript{37} But he was away from the paper too long, and late in May he returned to South Carolina.

Back in Charleston, Simms saw that both the Union and the Nullification parties were holding meetings in private and preparing their position papers for the Fourth of July speeches. The Mercury claimed that the Union party would celebrate the Fourth of July in order to revive party excitement, to organize party power, and if possible to obtain and
secure party ascendancy and domination. Simms countered that above all the *Mercury* objected to a viable Union party to counteract the nullifiers in Charleston. He also claimed that the nullifiers were losing power. Commenting on a Disunion party meeting in June, he noticed that "the number of persons present, fall far short of their expectations, ..." He said that they deserved more members after all the recruiting they had done.  

The Union party met on the Fourth of July to honor their Revolutionary War heroes and to perpetuate their legacy of a union of all the states. On that day, Hugh Swinton Legaré made a speech before the Union and State Rights party in Charleston. Legaré opposed the tariff, calling it anti-American, unconstitutional, unjust, and inexpedient. For Legaré, "the cause of Free Trade is the great cause of human improvement." But he was opposed to the nullification movement, because it meant revolution. He saw nullification as an attempt to divide South Carolinians, ruin the relations of the united "agricultural" states, and involve Southerners "in difficulties from which we could not persevere without inevitable and irretrievable ruin."  

Simms was also a speaker at the Fourth of July meeting. As editor of the Charleston *Gazette* and a prominent man of letters, he was invited to read a poem. The poem, entitled "Our Union--A National Ode," ended in praise of loyalty to the South, its war heroes, and the Union:

> Despite the tyrants ban--
> Let him, who sees all this--the fruit,
> Of our proud Union's glorious root,--
> The offspring of whatever state,--
> Let him come forth, and calculate,
> Its value--if he can!  

The union and nullifier meetings of July fourth widened the political split in Charleston. Hayne called upon South Carolina patriots
to support the nullifier cause. The unionists countered with President Jackson's famous letter quoting Washington's "Farewell Address," and promising tariff reduction. Most important, the unionists demanded that Calhoun announce his position publicly. The nullifiers claimed him as their own, and the unionists did not know where he stood. Calhoun felt confident that the nullifiers would win the September election in Charleston, thus putting nullification in political power. With that in mind he issued the famous letter on the "Relations of the States and the Federal Government" on July 26, 1831, and joined the nullifiers, committing himself irrevocably to sectionalism.  

The Gazette attacked Calhoun for becoming a nullifier. Simms said that Calhoun had no support outside South Carolina. Calhoun could count on no co-operation from Georgia, since that state "held him in perfect abhorrence." He pointed out that both South Carolina and Georgia opposed a protective tariff, but they would not join Calhoun in a suicidal attempt to destroy the Union. A prominent Georgian pointed out that Calhoun's growing unpopularity would serve to make Jackson a stronger candidate.

Jackson's re-election was of utmost importance to Simms. He thought that Jackson was losing support in the South, so he put the editorial page of the Gazette behind the President. Simms tried to convince the South that the only way the tariff could be lowered and the South regain its economic strength was to support Jackson. After all, Jackson was a Southerner. In August Simms openly nominated Jackson for President and advertised that fact on the Gazette's front page. He wrote:

Resolved, That we have undiminished confidence in the integrity, public virtue, and faithful administration of Andrew Jackson, and recommend him to the enlightened patriotism of our Fellow Citizens of every party, and in every section of the Country, as the only suitable Candidate for the high office of President of the U. States during the next term of four years.
Simms decided to publish his and the Gazette's stand on the right of nullification. Covering the "Meeting of the Union and State Rights Party" of July 18, 1831, he took the opportunity to write an editorial on nullification. As far as he was concerned, a state could not nullify the country's revenue laws and still remain a member of the Confederacy of states. Simms was sure that an act of nullification by South Carolina's legislature would be unconstitutional. Furthermore, it could not be executed without force of arms. He again stated that he was against the system of protective duties, and that he would attempt any "peaceable and constitutional means" to lower the tariff. Charleston, as a port town, was deeply interested in the question. But Simms was not willing to see his city turned into a political and warlike arena for such a struggle.46

The Gazette renewed its attack against Calhoun and nullification in preparation for Charleston's local elections. Seeking a united unionist front, Simms quoted letters and editorials showing that the people of Colleton, Sumter, Georgetown, and elsewhere, supported the Union. He wanted to defeat the nullifiers at the polls and then to cut the tariff. He said, "The Clay faction and the Calhoun faction, occupying two extremes, are alike remote from the centre, which is our true medium." He was certain Jackson would eventually lower the tariff. Simms told Charlestonians that the President supported the Union party in the election.47

But the nullifiers carried the city. Pinckney defeated Pringle for intendant, 1,040 to 932. Since Simms knew that the majority might soon return to the union side, he cautioned the nullifiers not to "exult too largely in their success." The nullifiers did not listen to him. They claimed that nullification was victorious. Charleston had voted
against the unionists and would support the calling of a nullification convention, if the nullifiers decided it was necessary. 48

William Aiken, a Union party legislator from Charleston, died in early October. Although elections were only held on even-numbered years, Aiken's death necessitated another election. Both parties were determined to win this important contest. Through an editorial in the Gazette, the Union party nominated John Robinson, a unionist who opposed the tariff. Simms said that "he [Robinson] is opposed to Nullification, and friendly to the election of Andrew Jackson, as President of the United States." An anonymous writer, "Pulaski," wrote in the Gazette that all lovers of the Union should vote for Robinson. By his one vote in the state legislature, "Pulaski" pointed out, Robinson could "change the whole fortunes of South Carolina." 49

Again the Union party was defeated. This time they lost by only eight votes. Simms considered the election's outcome a moral victory, because four weeks earlier the unionists had lost by 108 votes. He said, "Republicanism only warms from defeat, and learns to secure as well as to deserve, victory." But Edwin P. Starr, an astute political observer, saw no reason to rejoice over the election. As far as he was concerned, Robinson's defeat gave the nullifiers Charleston's vote in the state legislature, and made the calling of a state convention inevitable. 50

Besides the failure of the unionist movement, Simms noticed two other events which would trouble the South in the future. William Lloyd Garrison had begun his anti-slavery crusade with the first issue of the Liberator. North Carolina indicted Garrison on charges of inciting slaves to riot. Simms said that there was nothing in the Constitution that could cause Garrison to be extradited, let alone convicted. He wrote
in the Gazette, "But if there be no remedy for the offense with which this man stands charged, should not the representatives of the slaveholding States make a point of amending the deficiencies of the Constitution, in this respect for their common protection?" As long as any fanatic could scatter his literature throughout the South, in defiance of state laws, Simms said, South Carolina would have no security or sovereignty of any kind.\(^{51}\)

He was also concerned with John C. Calhoun's ambitions. "Leonidas" wrote in the Gazette that to the "vaulting ambition" of the Vice-President might be ascribed the cause of the present agitated condition of South Carolina. Calhoun was "intent only on self-aggrandizement and careless of the mischief resulting to his country, has pursued it with an ardor and perseverance, that derives new vigor from obstacles and disappointment." The Gazette pointed out that when Jackson had consented to run for re-election in 1832, Calhoun, driven to desperation, entered into open war with Jackson and his Cabinet. When Calhoun shifted his support to Henry Clay, he had completely thrown over his republican principles. The Gazette editorial closed with a question: "What could have led him to raise a whirlwind, so fearful in its howlings, and terrible in its aspects, but the hope that he would be chosen as the master-spirit to control and direct it?\(^{52}\)

With those fears in mind, Simms began 1832 with a certain degree of optimism. By the first week in January the Gazette had 496 new subscribers. Previously the paper had lost customers because of its unionist sentiments. But there were many people in South Carolina who began to fear the nullifiers' power. Simms praised the new subscribers for not panicking over Northern aggression. He believed that a united and moderate South could
counteract the tariff without resorting to nullification. 53

Simms himself advocated gradual tariff reductions through the national Congress. But when Secretary of the Treasury Louis McLane introduced a compromise bill, the nullifiers in Congress refused to support it. The Gazette called the bill a compromise which neither party could oppose. Simms said that McLane's bill brought down duties to a scale which the militant state rights men could accept. Always suspicious of the nullifiers, Simms questioned their rejection of a bill that would obviously remove some tariffs. He knew that the South Carolina nullifiers feared loss of power in the state and were determined to keep excitement and agitation at a fever pitch. By doing this, the nullifiers knew they could demand a convention and thus solidify their power in the state. 54

The Gazette hoped that the election of 1832 would settle the tariff difficulties. Simms supported Jackson but was skeptical about Martin Van Buren as a candidate for Vice-President. Simms thought that the South should oppose Van Buren, and questioned the New Orleans Courier's early decision to campaign for him. He wanted either Judge William Smith or William Drayton, both Southerners, to balance Jackson's ticket and to strengthen the party in South Carolina. 55

In March Simms changed his mind about Van Buren. Calhoun had accused Van Buren of causing the breach between himself and Jackson. But Simms knew that the break had been entirely Calhoun's fault, and Calhoun had attempted to blame Van Buren in order to wreck the latter's chances for the vice-presidency. 56 Van Buren was Jackson's choice and an avowed advocate of free trade. Yet Simms did not personally favor him. "But," he said, "if, in order to save the country from the con-
tending factions who seek to make it a common spoil, if it be held necessary to take up Van Buren, as combining the greater vote of the country, then let him be the man." 57

Turning back to the South's problems, Simms realized that a convention of all the Southern states would be far more effective than a single state convention in South Carolina. He thought that, through co-operation, Southern grievances would be settled in Washington. The objects of such a convention, Simms said, would be to look closely at the protective system and to understand fully both the nature of the Federal compact and the extent of the government's jurisdiction over the South. The convention should also seek to delineate "the boundary at which the State authority begins, and that of the United States, terminates." It should devise a means for settling constitutional differences between the two sections. Still another important topic of inquiry, Simms said,

... should be the propriety of a General Convention of the U. S. for a revision of the constitution, according with, and accommodated to, the present circumstances of our country—having an eye to the altered condition of its interests, and the loss of balance of power, in the old States, from the annexation of them to the new. 58

Almost daily in the Gazette Simms called for a Southern convention. He cited other newspapers to strengthen his point. The Greenville Mountaineer, the Sumter Whig, the Camden Journal, the Georgetown Union, and even the Winyah Intelligencer, all desired a united Southern convention. They all regarded a convention as the only means likely to "command success in the prosecution of any measure of redress." Even the Richmond Enquirer, a Jacksonian political organ, desired a Southern convention, Simms claimed. 59

That was to be Simms's last service to his state and to political
life as a newspaperman. His partner, E. S. Duryea, long sick and unable to participate in the editing of the paper, had died on March 25, 1832, leaving Simms sole proprietor and sole debtor. 60 Offering the newspaper for "moderate and accommodating terms," he sold it to William Laurens Poole on June 7. Poole promised to continue the general political position advocated by Simms in the Gazette. The paper would be unionist, but it would not take outspoken or unpopular stands; Poole sought no enemies and wanted the paper to survive financially. He said, "It is not [my] object, nor is it [my] interest to court the political, much less the personal enmity of political rivalship." 61

Wanting to escape the hectic political struggles in South Carolina, Simms traveled North in the late spring and summer of 1832. He visited Philadelphia, New York, and perhaps even Boston. He met interesting members of the New York literary world and began his first novel. But he returned to South Carolina in time to participate in the fall elections. 62

Charleston served as the indicator for the rest of South Carolina. There had been what must have amounted to open civil war in Charleston throughout the year. The Union and Nullification party quarrels often erupted into violence. 63 In the election for intendant Pinckney, the nullifier, defeated DeSausser the unionist. Petigrue wrote his friend William Elliott that he feared the consequences of the state elections. The unionists knew much was at stake, and they were certain that the state elections would also go against them. 64

The Union party tried to rally and make a good showing in state elections. Simms knew that Robert Y. Hayne, the hero of South Carolina since the Webster-Hayne debate, would be the nullifier candidate for governor. He attacked Hayne's speeches, finding his quotations mangled
and his political philosophy lacking in depth. Writing a guest editorial for the Gazette, he disapproved of the bargain made by Hayne and Calhoun. The agreement was that in return for giving up his senatorial seat to Calhoun, Hayne would be the State Rights and Free Trade candidate for governor. But Hayne was elected governor by a large majority. His victory was a mandate for a state convention, with nullifiers in control.

When Hayne's election was known, Governor James Hamilton, Jr., a nullifier, issued an order for an extra session of the state legislature to convene on October 22, 1832. On October 25 the legislature passed a resolution to hold a convention in November and directed each election district to elect delegates to the convention. The convention met on November 19 and adopted a series of resolutions expressing the "sovereign will" of South Carolina. Chancellor William Harper, of the state university, drew up the Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance nullified the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832, stating that they "are authorized by the Constitution of the United States, . . . and are null, void and no law." The Ordinance also asked for a "Test Oath" for all persons holding office in the state of South Carolina. The Test Oath would require that office holders (including military) and even jurors take an oath that they "will well and truly obey, execute, and enforce this Ordinance, and such act or acts of the Legislature as may be passed to carry the same into operation and effect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof."

George McDuffie made a plea to other Southern states to join South Carolina in defense of their rights. He stated that South Carolina was willing to do everything in its power to preserve the Union. McDuffie then claimed that if South Carolina were driven out of the Union, all
other planting states would join it, because they could no longer afford to be economic vassals of the North. 71

But McDuffie was mistaken. Most of the South repudiated South Carolina's aggressiveness. The Georgia legislature even warned other Southern states of the danger of South Carolina's "mischievous policy." 72 Alabama’s legislature called on South Carolina to avoid use of its military power. 73 The legislature of North Carolina claimed that the doctrine of nullification was revolutionary and "subversive of the Constitution of the United States and leads to a dissolution of the Union." 74 The legislature of Mississippi simply called nullification unconstitutional and said that any further action by South Carolina would be ruinous to the Union. 75 Even the legislature of Virginia, whose governor, John Floyd, was Calhoun's ally, would not support South Carolina. 76

South Carolina had no allies in the South, but it proceeded with the convention and prepared to stand alone. Immediately after the convention adjourned, the state legislature convened and soon passed the acts necessary to carry the nullification ordinance into effect. Governor Hayne's inaugural address was "compact, forcible, impassioned." He was determined to uphold the sovereign authority of the state. He recognized "no allegiance as paramount to that which the citizens of South Carolina owe to the state of their birth." Hayne was bound to enforce the ordinance of the convention, and he recommended that a state militia of 12,000 men be raised. 77

In October President Jackson had alerted the forts in Charleston Harbor against surprise attack, and on December 9 he talked of sending troops to South Carolina. James Henry Hammond, a nullifier and ex-editor of the Columbia Times, predicted to Governor Hayne that a Reign of
Terror similar to the one in France in 1798 would sweep the United States. Hammond offered to recruit volunteers for the militia. Hayne immediately commissioned Hammond a colonel, made him his aide-de-camp, and put him in charge of military arrangements in the district of Barnwell. Simms was disturbed by the convention's actions. On the one hand he wanted to do all he could to lower the tariff and aid his state, but at the same time he deplored the tyranny of the nullifiers. Most of all, he found the Test Oath oppressive. He told his Northern friend James Lawson, "You will readily understand the occasion, if you have read the villainous ordinance of our convention, embodying tests the most dishonorable to honest men, and the most degrading to free men." He said that the union men of Charleston would not take the oath, even if it caused civil war.

Aside from the Test Oath, unionists feared that the federal government would declare war on South Carolina. But Petigru was certain that the state would not have to go to war. The nullifiers had learned the lessons of history and did not want to be involved in a fruitless struggle. "Many Nullifiers say they have been deceived," Petigru said. They were for constitutional nullification (as proposed by Calhoun in the "Exposition") and had no idea that violence would result from their actions.

Joel Poinsett was pessimistic. He wrote William Drayton, a staunch unionist who later left South Carolina, that he was "afraid that all hope of putting down nullification in this State by moral force must be abandoned." Poinsett feared that the militant nullifiers would upset the Congressional hearings on the tariff. He claimed to be no abstract metaphysician, but merely a man urging practical political results. South Carolina could not disrupt the Union, and the tariff question must be
settled without violence. Poinsett stated emphatically, "If a State should be allowed to secede our government is at an end." 32

Simms wrote to Lawson that he would only remain in South Carolina until "something takes place." He was tired of being called a submissionist. He was distraught enough to think only of vengeance against the nullifiers. "A deep and deadly hostility and hate has been engendered in the bosoms of our party by the odious ordinance of that petty dictatorship, which has broken up all the bonds once sweet and sacred of our society," he told Lawson. 33 Simms actively politicked throughout the state in early 1833, hoping to unite his fellow unionists against the nullifiers and their odious test oath. As far as he was concerned the nullifiers had ruined South Carolina. Commerce and trade were disrupted, even the planters were having financial difficulties and talked of moving West to more fertile fields. 34

But the nullification movement was almost over as Congress began to debate a compromise tariff. Governor Hayne, however, had no confidence that Congress would lower the tariff. "We must be prepared militarily," he said. Hayne told Waddy Thompson, an up-country nullifier, that regiments should be ordered out and put in preparation. He thought the Verplanck compromise tariff would be rejected in the Senate, and South Carolina would have to fight. 35 George McDuffie, also a nullifier, was in Charleston in January. He counselled his fellow nullifiers not to attempt to provoke the United States army. 36

The nullifiers still had few men under arms. They held a meeting in Charleston on January 21, and decided to postpone putting the ordinance into effect. They wanted to give Congress an opportunity to modify the tariff. The Nullifier party endorsed the Charleston resolu-
tions and nullification was suspended. Governor Hayne told his aide, Francis W. Pickens, that public opinion "has already suspended the Ordinance . . . and that no appeal to force is designed on our part unless to repel unlawful violence."\(^87\)

The Verplanck bill was superseded by the Clay compromise bill. Calhoun had tentatively supported Clay for President in 1832,\(^88\) and now, as a senator, he joined with Clay to pass the compromise tariff. Petigru praised Calhoun the Whig for joining Clay and ending the threat of war. But Petigru did not trust Calhoun. He said that Calhoun had joined Clay in a political deal merely to advance his own political power. William J. Grayson explained that it was strange to see Calhoun and McDuffie in the same ranks with Webster and Clay.\(^89\) H. L. Pinckney stated that in 1833 a true Southerner's place was with the Whig party rather than the Tories of the North. To the state rights men of South Carolina, Pinckney rendered the "profound respect and cordial gratitude of the Whig Party." For him, South Carolinians were in the same position as their Whig forbears of 1776. Any Southerner would have been proud to call himself a Whig.\(^90\)

A South Carolina convention met again on March 11 at Columbia. On March 13 a report on the Clay tariff bill, along with an ordinance rescinding the Ordinance of Nullification, was read to the delegates assembled. On March 15, the ordinance and the report were accepted by a vote of 153 to 4. The nullification controversy was practically over. Yet there would be many political struggles in South Carolina before nullification was finally put to rest.\(^91\)

One example of the unrest that was to follow was the controversy over the Test Oath. Governor Hayne praised the Test Oath to Francis W.
Pickens. The union men, Hayne was certain, could not stand up to an intelligent and patriotic community and deny their duty to the country which protected their persons and their property. Hayne predicted that the Test Oath would fragment the Union party. Petigru wrote to Hugh Swinton Legareé claiming that Calhoun favored a test oath. "Calhoun is incessantly agitating," Petigru said. "He lectures now on the necessity of a test oath. . . . It is disfranchisement, but in what way can the minority help themselves against two-thirds?"

Simms saw the political world of South Carolina grow gloomier than ever. In a letter to Lawson he said, "The Nullifiers will doubtless pass an act this winter in the legislature requiring from the citizens an oath of paramount allegiance to the State; which if our party have any soul left will drive them to arms or emigration en masse." Above all, Simms wanted South Carolinians to maintain a spirit of independence. The Test Oath would compel them to think as one mind. This Simms opposed vehemently.

Throughout 1834 there was much Union party agitation against the Test Oath. The unionists did not want the oath in the South Carolina constitution. Simms was a delegate from Charleston at a union convention in Columbia that sat "for the purpose of devising measures and means to resist the supposed domestic usurpations of the Nullification party."

Most of the nullifiers, including Calhoun, Preston, Hamilton, and McDuffie, favored the Test Oath, and Governor Hayne refused to modify his position. Petigru, in a Fourth of July speech in 1834, talked of the evils of a Test Oath. He said the nullifiers used the same suppression of freedom of speech against the unionists that the British had used against the colonists.
When the legislature met in November, almost everyone knew that there had to be some compromise over the Test Oath. Governor James Hamilton, Jr., recommended the Test Oath be maintained. The unionists, believing that the Test Oath would be permanently adopted, began to make plans to resist it. But a compromise was achieved, with neither side the victor. A bill was introduced which would allow the unionists to take the oath, yet in no way impair the obligations which they felt toward the United States. The nullifier legislature said that the allegiance which every citizen owed to his state was consistent with the allegiance owed to the Constitution of the United States. Large majorities in both houses adopted the compromise oath. Unionists considered the act of conciliation as an understanding reached between the two great political parties in South Carolina.

The election for governor in the state legislature was held shortly after the political compromise. George McDuffie, a moderate among the nullifiers, received the unanimous vote of the legislature. Not only did his fellow nullifiers support him, but the unionists voted for him to a man. The compromise sealed the end of a viable two-party system in South Carolina. From 1834 on, the state under Calhoun's leadership slowly moved toward one political voice, toward a Calhoun "mandate."

The nullification controversy was merely a prelude for things to come. Instead of fighting among themselves, South Carolina politicians would unite around one man and seek to further that man's ambitions, for what they and he thought would be the greater good of the South. After all, had not Calhoun, by his own personal strength, restrained the fire-eating nullifiers and guided a potentially revolutionary outburst into conservative and nonviolent channels? Moreover, the nullifiers knew
that their doctrine had forced a lower tariff on the national government.
South Carolina would lead the South in the sectional struggle, and Cal-
houn knew that a united will of the state would mean victory.102

James Petigru, one of the state's most astute unionists, wrote
Hugh S. Legaré that "nullification has done its work; it has prepared the
minds of men for a separation of the States, and when the question is
mooted again it will be distinctly union or disunion."103 The contro-
versy was at last out in the open. Time was now on the side of disunion.

Besides actively voicing nullification, sowing the seeds of dis-
union, and furthering the emergence of Calhoun as a sectional leader ever
striving for consensus, the nullification movement did something to the
politics of South Carolina. For some time to come there would be per-
sonal animosities in the state. The unionists understood that they could
never hope to win a party struggle. As a minority group they resolved
never again to be found on the wrong or less numerous side in a state
political struggle. What damage this did for the hopes of any political
opposition in South Carolina in the years to come is incalculable.104

The nullification controversy also affected the artist who tried
to be a newspaperman and an active politician. Simms's editorial writ-
ings were those of a crude and inexperienced party zealot. He was rash,
hasty, frequently violent and unjust, though never as abusive as the
opposition. For a while Simms increased the circulation of the Gazette.
He was convinced that if he had not taken the unionist side in politics,
the Gazette would have succeeded. Simms eventually lost nearly half of
his subscribers because they were nullifiers. He also lost a great deal
of money because of the Gazette; his debts had still not been paid by
1840. Death had deprived him of several who were close to him during
the hectic years of nullification—first his father and then his wife, leaving him a widower with a small child. He stated to his friend Lawson:

... my mental sufferings during this period from domestic trials and privations and the accursed cases which came with the necessity of raising money, nearly drove me mad, and must account for if they may not excuse, the frequently savage and bitter character of my public essays.105

Simms remained a unionist. True, he was skeptical of federal redress of grievances and began to question the North's sincerity, but he was no follower of the state rights men. In November of 1834, Simms was still campaigning for unionists. "We are improving here," he told Lawson, "and I think in three years will win the ascendent." Simms also told Lawson to stay out of politics because it was a dirty business, and that those in the minority were seldom victorious anyway.106

Years later, he told Thomas Caute Reynolds, the young editor of the Petersburg, Virginia, Republican, that he had been too outspoken during the nullification period. Simms stated that he had spent twelve years repenting the errors of two years. He advised Reynolds never to let the zeal of party drive him into slanderous statements that would shake his state. Remember, he said, your present opponents may someday be your allies.107 In 1834 Simms was a strong unionist, but he had realized the power of majority rule, and he had learned a bitter lesson.
NOTES


3. Taussig, p. 73.

4. Van Deusen, p. 18.


14. Van Deusen, p. 50. Boucher quotes heavily from the Gazette, yet does not mention that Simms was the editor.


17. Boucher, pp. 81-82; Gazette, June 16, 1830. Simms was not alone in this view; Thomas Cooper said approximately the same thing in the Gazette on July 13, 1830.

18. Gazette, Aug. 3, 1830; Boucher, p. 87.


22. Ibid., June 30, 1830.

23. Ibid., June 9, 1830.


25. Mercury, Aug. 30, 1830. For this entire section see the old but still useful Boucher, chap. iii.


27. Boucher, pp. 88-89. Boucher sees this argument over holding a convention as directly related to the pro- and anti-suffrage debates in South Carolina. Simms was to become one of the leading advocates of the pro-suffrage political faction.

28. Theodore D. Jervey, Robert Y. Hayne and His Times (New York, 1909), p. 279; Gazette, Aug. 30, 1830. See also Gazette, Aug. 12, 24, 1830; Sydnor, p. 52. Simms reported a resolution passed by the unionists against the Mercury's treatment of the Gazette:

"Resolved, That the increasing and disgraceful attacks made by a portion of the Press in this city, on the principles of those, who from conscientious motives, are arranged against the novel and dangerous doctrine of Nullification, and the no less deprecated measure of a Convention of the People, are hostile to freedom of opinion, and groundless in fact."
30. Ibid., Aug. 6, 17, 20, 24, Oct. 1, 1830.
31. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1830.
32. Ibid., Oct. 16, 1830; Boucher, p. 102; Mercury, Sept. 11, 1830.
33. Gazette, Nov. 1, 1830.
34. Ibid., Dec. 20, 21, 1830.
38. Gazette, June 2, 8, 1831; Mercury, May 31, June 1, 1831; Boucher, p. 146.
40. Hugh S. Legarde, Writings of Hugh Swinton Legarde . . . , edited by his sister (2 vols.; Charleston, 1845), Speech, July 4, 1831.
42. Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist: A Reappraisal (Gainesville, Fla., 1960), pp. 146-147 (hereinafter cited as Capers); Gazette, Sept. 1, 1831. The Gazette was quoting William H. Crawford's comments from the Georgia Journal. Crawford said: "The Vice President's past conduct, and present situation reminds me strongly of one of Aesop's fables in which he relates that an ass having obtained a lion's skin, put it on him, and went into the forest where his appearance spread affright and dismay among the tenants of the woods, who fled to their most secret coverts and hiding places. Shortly after the ass began to pray. The spell was dissolved; the affrighted beasts returned . . . they stripped him of the lion skin, and exposed him to the scorn and ridicule of the assembled beasts. For about 20 years the Vice President had assumed the post and mien, and exterior of a patriot, and man of strict honor. . . . Unfortunately in the month of February last, he came out with his address to the people of the U. S. . . . That publication has produced enquiry and criticism. And enquiry and criticism cannot fail to expose the Vice President to the scorn and ridicule, not of the assembled beasts, but of the citizens of the United States."
43. Gazette, July, 30, 1831; Robert Campbell to Edwin P. Starr, Aug. 29, 1831, Starr Papers.


46. In his excellent study of Calhoun, Gerald Capers comments on Calhoun's role in the nullification crisis. He says: "Calhoun used the South Carolina Unionists and Nullifiers, and they used him. Not until it was obvious that the Nullifiers would be victorious in the state did he join them openly, and then only because they forced his hand" (p. 117; see also pp. 119, 136); Richard K. Cralle (ed.), The Works of John C. Calhoun (6 vols.; New York, 1851-1856), VI, 59-74; Boucher, pp. 118, 122; Wiltse, II, 112; Current, p. 15.

47. Gazette, Sept. 3, 1831.

48. Ibid., Sept. 7, 1831; Courier, Sept. 7, 12, 1831; Mercury, Sept. 7, 1831; Boucher, p. 156.


50. Ibid., Oct. 13, 1831; Starr to Campbell, Oct. 30, 1831, Starr Papers; Southern Review, VIII, 260 (an article by Turnbull on state convention).

51. Gazette, Nov. 7, 1831; see also Current, pp. 19-20.


53. Gazette, Jan. 6, 30, 1832.

54. Ibid., May 8, 1832; Boucher, p. 194.

55. Gazette, Feb. 29, 1832.

56. Ibid., March 9, 1832; Jervey, p. 314.

57. Gazette, April 5, 1832. Simms supported Van Buren for President in both 1836 and 1840.

58. Ibid., March 6, 7, April 17, 1832; Boucher, pp. 197-198.

59. Gazette, May 10, 1832.

60. Ibid., March 31, 1832. Durryea had been sick for nearly three years.

61. Ibid., April 10, June 7, 1832. Poele edited the paper for the rest of the year.

63. *Gazette*, April 17, 1832; James Hamilton to Waddy Thompson, June 8, 1832, MSS, Waddy Thompson Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


68. Paul Hamilton Hayne, *M. M. S. of Volume First of the Work Entitled "Politics of South Carolina, . . . F. W. Pickens’ Speeches, Reports, &c." (1834[?]), hereinafter cited as Politics . . .. This manuscript was never published. Although invaluable for the life of Pickens, this work has never been used in any study of Pickens.

69. *Courier*, Nov. 28, 1832; Preston to Thompson, Nov. 8, 1832, Thompson Papers; unsigned letter to Edward Rutledge, Nov. 19, 1832, Rutledge Family Papers.

70. Ames, pp. 38-41.


72. Ames, pp. 179-180. The Georgia House of Representatives voted 102 to 51 against joining South Carolina.


77. Hayne, *Hayne and Legaré . . .*, pp. 67-69; Wiltse, II, 153; Boucher, p. 219; *Gazette and Mercury* for December, 1832. On December 12, 1832, Calhoun was elected to the Senate, and on December 23 he resigned as Vice-President.

78. Hammond to Hayne, Dec. 20, 1832, Hammond Papers; Boucher, p. 235; Samuel C. Jackson to Elizabeth Jackson, MSS, Samuel C. Jackson Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


81. Carson, pp. 113-114.


84. Ibid., I, 52.

85. Isaac W. Hayne to Waddy Thompson, Jan., 1833, MSS, Waddy Thompson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina; Boucher, p. 268; Thomas Cooper to Joseph Priestly, Jan. 26, 1833, MSS, Thomas Cooper Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


88. Wiltse, II, 123.


90. Henry Laurens Pinckney, Oration on the Fourth of July, 1833 (Charleston, 1833), pp. 3, 4, 9-10. This honeymoon with the Whigs was not to last for long.

91. M. King to Legaré, May 5, 1833, MSS, Hugh Swinton Legaré Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


95. Ibid., I, 166.

97. Carson, pp. 147-149; see also Legaré, Writings . . ., pp. 216-217.

98. Mercury, Nov. 29, 1834.

99. The vote was 36 to 4 in the Senate and 90 to 28 in the House (Boucher, p. 357).

100. Miles' Register, Dec. 20, 1834; Boucher, p. 366.


102. Wiltse, II, 154; Van Deusen, pp. 57-58; Capers, p. 165.

103. Sydnor, p. 220; Carson, p. 125; Rhett, Charleston . . ., p. 221.


II. THE ARTIST AS SOCIAL CRITIC: SIMMS VS.

MRS. TROLLOPE AND MISS MARTINEAU

Disappointed in his first political venture, Simms began to write about the South's past. Though he spent the rest of his life writing novels and Revolutionary romances, he was unable to remain entirely separated from public life. As a writer he felt the need to comment on the social and political events of the remaining years of the 1830's. In two reviews of famous books about the United States he utilized the political knowledge which he had gained from the nullification controversy. These early social essays illustrate his progression from a unionist position to a growing need to defend the South and the Southern way of life.

Shortly after giving up the Gazette, Simms reviewed Mrs. Frances Trollope's Domestic Manners of the Americans for the American Quarterly Review. "Fanny" Trollope, an Englishwoman who had traveled throughout the United States during the years 1827-1831, wrote a critical account of her travels and the people and places she had visited along the way. The United States did not favorably impress Mrs. Trollope. Of English gentry stock, she was appalled by the rough edges and crudeness of American society.¹ Domestic Manners of the Americans, published in 1832, was the result of her impressions of America. Mrs. Trollope considered her book a philosophical tract, concerning the "moral and religious condition" of the Americans, especially those of the South and the
Western frontier. ²

Simms began his review by poking fun at "thin-skinned" American journalists. He said that they did not like Mrs. Trollope's sense of humor, because she had stirred up the bile among them. However, the well-informed and educated classes in America understood her and evaluated the book on its merits rather than its attacks on the actions of the inhabitants. Simms was amused by the American reprint of Mrs. Trollope's book because the editor prefaced the work "with an exordium, conceived in a peevish and fretful spirit, and altogether written in a puerile taste." Mrs. Trollope had written Domestic Manners of the Americans as a serious study of the American character and intellectual tastes, and Simms proposed to review the work on those grounds.³

Simms sought to explain why Mrs. Trollope had found little of cultural value in America. Obviously Mrs. Trollope had not seen the forests of the West, he said. For there were the men who would build the greatest empire the world had ever known. Unfortunately, "she can see nothing in a people who are triumphing over nature." No nation ever came to to its birthright through a more perilous time of trial than did the United States. America was growing too fast, and it needed the pioneer adventurous spirit. There was no time for great works of art and literature. Mrs. Trollope did not understand that this was why America had to build, and art had to await, the settling of a continent. "Afterwards, Americans will write great epics and sing songs in praise of the conquest of the elements," Simms said. Out of their experience Americans would create a great art.⁴

The author of Domestic Manners of the Americans was concerned with America's lack of aristocratic traditions. Americans, she said, were
not refined, nor did they know the graces of proper English society. There were "no glorious pictures--no cultivated scenes--no marble dwellings--no entire communities devoted to the creation of new luxuries" in the country. On the other hand, Simms said there was no "sheltered misery," no poverty and degradation, and no starving masses in the United States. Americans had no reason to threaten insurrection against their rulers and destroy the traditions of a country. For Simms, it was better to be coarse and ill-bred than to have a class-oriented society, where the people went without food. On the basis of equality of opportunity Americans would build a tradition, and they would never fear destruction of the country by their own people.\(^5\)

Mrs. Trollope, a member of the Church of England, condemned the religious camp revival and America's lack of an accepted, established church. She claimed that America's many religious sects were harmful. Simms disagreed. He found that security for social and civil welfare (apart from increasing intelligence through mass public education), lay "in the great variety and number of religious sects which inundate our country." Many religious sects neutralized the influences and efforts of any one church to rise above the others. Simms pointed out that this kept any single church from becoming powerful enough to control the actions of the citizens.\(^6\)

When Mrs. Trollope turned to a discussion of slavery, she was on dangerous grounds with Simms. He considered the Southern slave society an economic and social necessity. Besides, he opposed discussion of the merits of slavery at that time, especially from a foreigner. He stated:

The topic in our country can scarcely be held sufficiently legitimate to merit further remarks from us, but there is none that we can now call to notice so truly important, or so highly interesting in the consideration of our national des-
times—none, around which so many doubts and so much diversity of opinion will be found to gather.  

On her journey through the South, Mrs. Trollope found nothing but contempt for its institution of domestic slavery. Simms realized that her book would seriously damage the South's image of a benevolent slave society. Therefore he claimed that she knew nothing about slavery. Besides being too philanthropic, her statements about the South were much too superficial and flippant. Slavery was becoming a touchy subject in many parts of the United States and could not be treated so casually. Simms claimed that the foundations of the institution of slavery lay far below the visible surface of society and could not be seen, let alone understood, by the outsider. Slavery could be judged and known by those alone who were intrinsically involved.  

Essentially Simms disagreed with Mrs. Trollope's interpretation of American society. He knew that there was no culture in the United States. But as a nationalist he spoke of the development of a future literature which would rise out of a national experience. A multitude of religious sects and beliefs would help make America a great and free country. Also, a classless society would benefit the development of a rich and prosperous country. On the slavery issue, a matter that was becoming increasingly sectional, Simms openly and violently disagreed with Mrs. Trollope. He was still a nationalist, but he supported his section on the slavery question. Simms, like so many Southerners, was close-minded on that issue.

During the latter stages of the nullification crisis, after he gave up the Gazette and before he became a famous novelist, Simms again entered the editing profession. Along with two other young men, Charles and Edward Carroll, he edited a literary journal, The Cosmopolitan: An
The magazine was entirely the work of the three editors, who solicited no outside contributions. It was not a periodical in the strict sense; it was merely issued whenever the editors had enough literary material with which to fill it.

In the introduction to the first issue Simms lamented South Carolina's recent political fight over nullification. He did not want Charleston to be known for "the turbulent and temporary notoriety of a partisan harangue or a political and vexing controversy." The state had too long been a fighting ground for political and legal polemics, and it was now time to show the country some of its literary and artistic talents. Nevertheless, he dedicated the issue to Thomas Smith Grimke, a strong unionist leader. Politics were important to Simms and there were political overtones in many of his publications.

The Cosmopolitan did show the country some of South Carolina's literary talent. Its editors also wanted to help in creating a uniquely American literature. In the first issue Simms wrote an article on James Fenimore Cooper's work, praising Cooper for his use of "native materials." He cautioned Cooper to write only about the United States, preferably the new West. For it was in the West that an American artist could find ideas for his work. This theme persisted into the second issue, as the young authors praised their own small efforts to create a native literature.

The first issue of the Cosmopolitan appeared in May, 1833. On May 25, the Charleston Courier ran an excellent review of the occasional, praising its literary merits. A second issue appeared in July, 1833. The Courier again praised the magazine, stating that the work was of high literary quality. But the Cosmopolitan failed after the second number, perhaps because Simms was not interested in publishing a perma-
nent magazine at that time. From 1833 to 1840 Simms frequently contributed to Southern periodical literature. His literary reputation grew, and although he edited no magazine, he wrote for the Southern Literary Messenger, the Southern Rose, and the Southern Literary Journal. His most important contributions were to Daniel K. Whitaker's Southern Literary Journal, published in Charleston. Whitaker was Simms's close friend, and they supported each other's literary efforts. The Journal praised Simms's attempt to create a national literature by writing about America's past and by defending the country from outside criticism. Simms soon learned that a well-written essay could persuade others to accept his views.

Simms contributed many poems and some short stories to the Journal. From September, 1835, through February, 1838, when Francis W. Pickens bought out Whitaker, Simms was the Journal's leading literary contributor. The magazine also dabbled in politics. From the editor's box and in unsigned articles came many political pieces on such subjects as Senator Preston's actions in Washington, a memoir on slavery by Chancellor William Harper, an article entitled "The Slave Question," comments on Texas, and many others. Since most of the articles were unsigned, it is impossible to tell exactly which political articles, if any, were written by Simms. However, articles on "American Literature, its conditions and Prospects," "American Criticism and Critics," and the "Law of Copy Right Protection of Authors," were all written in Simms's style, and were certainly themes that concerned him.

Besides his social criticism of Mrs. Trollope's Domestic Manners of the Americans and his essays for literary journals, Simms wrote a review of Harriet Martineau's Society in America. The book, because
of its anti-slavery and anti-Southern tone, deeply offended Simms and prompted him to write a stinging reply to her comments on slavery. "Miss Martineau on Slavery," an attempt to justify the morality of slavery, was published in the November, 1837, issue of the Southern Literary Messenger.\textsuperscript{22} This essay was the beginning of Simms's return to active political life.

Much had happened in South Carolina since the nullification settlement. The politics of the state, which were controlled by Calhoun, influenced Simms's political and social writing. Before he could completely dominate the state, Calhoun had to destroy the political faction controlled by Senator William Campbell Preston.\textsuperscript{23} Calhoun's split with Preston had begun during the presidential election of 1836. Calhoun was against Van Buren and anything else that smacked of Jacksonianism, and he actively supported Henry Clay for President. Preston ran for re-election to the Senate, and there was some question as to which presidential candidate he was supporting. Calhoun suspected that Preston would back Van Buren. Even Dr. Thomas Cooper, a noted political theorist and ex-president of South Carolina College, suspected Preston of being too "Van Burenish."\textsuperscript{24} Preston supported neither candidate openly, but doubt was cast on his sincerity and loyalty to Calhoun and South Carolina.

For months prior to the presidential election, South Carolina's leading political figures had been in a turmoil. Senator George McDuffie wanted all the planting states to unite against Van Buren. He thought South Carolina should run a national rather than a sectional candidate in opposition to Van Buren. Francis W. Pickens feared Clay and the Whigs; he was certain that Clay could not defeat Van Buren. Representative John M. Felder preferred Van Buren to either Daniel Webster or Judge Hugh Lawson White of Virginia. Preston told Waddy Thompson, congressman from
Greenville, that there were many Van Buren men in Charleston. Finally, South Carolina was able to get out of a political dilemma by supporting neither major party candidate, giving its presidential vote to Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina and its vice-presidential vote to John Tyler, governor of Virginia.\textsuperscript{25}

Calhoun was not pleased over Van Buren's being elected. If the opposition had known its strength, he said, Van Buren could have been easily defeated. Nevertheless, Calhoun knew that the principle of stability was strong in the presidency and that the South had nothing to fear from Van Buren on the slavery issue. But the abolitionist problem was becoming increasingly more important, and Calhoun said that he feared it was "destined to shake the country to its centre."\textsuperscript{26} As far as he was concerned, the South could not yield to abolitionism.

The next and most important issue which divided the Preston and Calhoun forces was the national bank question. President Van Buren had called Congress into session in September, 1837, to consider the nation's economic depression. Calhoun's forces supported Van Buren's subtreasury plan, while Preston favored the system of depository banks.\textsuperscript{27} The Whigs, led by Clay and Preston, turned against Calhoun. Preston secretly thought that Calhoun wished to gain control of the Democratic party, knowing that Van Buren was rapidly losing support.\textsuperscript{28} But Preston wished to avoid open political warfare in South Carolina. However, when the state legislature met in November, 1837, Christopher G. Memminger, a unionist who had become a Calhoun supporter, introduced resolutions opposing a national bank and favoring the subtreasury. The Robert Barnwell Rhett-Franklin Harper Elmore political machine joined Calhoun, and the subtreasury resolutions were adopted. Preston was forced openly into the Whig camp and lost most
of his power in South Carolina. 29

Late in 1837, Calhoun formally abandoned his Whig colleagues. He openly supported the Van Buren administration in its Independent Treasury plan. Calhoun was now political master of South Carolina. His next internal compromise would be to elect an ex-union man governor and thus cement his nullifier-unionist coalition in South Carolina. To control state politics and regain national power, he rejoined the Democratic party in 1839. Calhoun sought political gain because he thought his position as a political power would aid the South. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the political switch was well-timed, and had the effect of thrusting Calhoun back onto the national scene as a politician to be reckoned with. 30

Calhoun sought to increase his power in the South. On December 27, 1837, he introduced six pro-slavery resolutions in the Senate. Four were adopted, but Clay and Preston succeeded in blocking the other two, which concerned slavery in Texas and the District of Columbia. Previously, James Henry Hammond, a freshman congressman from South Carolina, had made a speech in Congress against receiving abolitionist petitions. Hammond was clearly speaking for Calhoun, who was using the slavery question to strengthen his hold on South Carolina politicians. 31 Hammond was not convinced that a mere refusal to receive the abolitionist petitions would end the struggle. He suggested that the state legislatures would have to pass laws regulating the mail, by "prohibiting the circulation of incendiary pamphlets through the mail within their limits." 32 He said that the South would not give up the institution of slavery. Hammond promised ill treatment for any abolitionist who came South. 33

The defeat of Preston and the Whigs and Calhoun's return to the
Democratic party pleased Simms. Calhoun's defense of slavery may even have prompted Simms's review of Miss Martineau's book. Having learned never again to take a minority position in South Carolina, Simms perhaps saw an opportunity to prove that he now sided with Calhoun and the majority. His essay "Miss Martineau on Slavery," later printed as the "Morals of Slavery," was one of the first and most important defenses of slavery as a moral good for the South. 34

Boasting to his friend James Lawson, Simms said that he had written a long article on slavery in reply to Miss Martineau. 35 He thought Miss Martineau had written her book in good faith, but that she was extremely biased. He said that she would not believe the truth when Southern planters told her of the benevolence of slavery. Obviously the abolitionists had had too great an influence on Miss Martineau. She claimed that the abolitionists did not send any "incendiary materials" to the slave states, and that South Carolinians were afraid of their slaves. Simms said this was not true and that furthermore, in her attack on the South, Miss Martineau had missed many of the North's social problems. "Her ear is open to all that may be said against slavery," Simms said. "All that is said in its defense, she dismisses as not worth hearing." 36 Simms took it upon himself to show the differences between the Northern and Southern Negro and to demonstrate the benevolence and inherent goodness of slavery.

Miss Martineau believed that the Southern whites despised their colored population. Simms knew that it was the North instead who hated the Negro. Where the Negro "contends for an equality with a people to whom he is morally and physically inferior," there he "provokes hatred, and lives in a state of continual personal insecurity." 37 In the South
the laws protected the Negro; he was as secure as any white man. Simms claimed that there were few people as happy and as satisfied with their social position as the slaves. Besides, said Simms, "in the North they have wage slavery—the white is enslaved there." If the overseers were hired to keep the slaves in line, how did one explain the foremen in Northern factories? For every attack on slavery and its condition in the South, Simms showed by comparison the evils perpetrated on both black and white laborers in the North.

Simms particularly attacked Miss Martineau's chapter on the "Morals of Slavery," which was devoted to abuses of slavery. He admitted that not all slaveholders were kind and benevolent masters, but these men were atypical. Most Southerners treated their slaves better than they had been treated in Africa or in the North. The slaveholder had elevated his slaves' minds and morals, Simms boasted. "Indeed," he further stated, "the slaveholders of the south, having the moral and animal guardianship of an ignorant and irresponsible people under their control, are the great moral conservators, in one powerful interest, of the entire world." Simms said that the duty of the slaveholder was to uplift his slaves.

After all, every primitive culture in the world's history had been subjected to long periods of bondage. Slavery "is simply a process of preparation for an improved and improving condition, to work out their own moral deliverance." Great Britain had freed its slaves, yet denied equality to much of its white population. "The time will come," Simms expressed confidently, "when the negro slave of Carolina will be raised to a condition, which will enable him to go forth out of bondage."

Obviously Miss Martineau had come to the United States with preconceived notions of the nation's political institutions. One of
these was the doctrine of majorities. But the doctrine of the majority was simply one of physical power. Simms added, "There is no abstract charm, in mere numbers, to compel the obedience of those who are wronged, and who think themselves so." When Miss Martineau claimed that all men were created equal, Simms called upon the works of the Deity to repudiate her. He advised her to look at the endless varieties and the boundless inequalities of God's creation.

In *Society in America* Miss Martineau stated that the South relied upon the North for its economic livelihood. She was certain that the slave system caused the South's inability to subsist economically independent. But Simms contended that slavery was the source of the entire country's financial strength. Far from being a dependency, he said, the South was in a position to hold an economic balance of power because of the North's need for cotton.

Simms's review showed that he had become a social critic of his times. He saw slavery as a positive good, leading toward better economic conditions. It also uplifted the Negro race to near equality. He still believed in the basic tenet of democracy, the equality of opportunity for all white men. Yet as a politician he began to doubt the concept of majority rule, especially when the North was powerful. He had moved to a position of power politics, in which the majority if strong will rule; otherwise, it could not force its will upon a minority.

Throughout the remaining years of the thirties, Simms carefully watched the power struggle in South Carolina. The Preston-Calhoun quarrel was becoming more bitter in late 1838. Preston had actively joined Clay and was trying to promote his presidential candidacy. Calhoun retaliated by attempting to destroy Preston's supporters in South
Carolina. He tried to unseat Waddy Thompson, a Whig who lived in his Congressional district. Calhoun lost on this issue, but in Charleston he succeeded in having the Rhett-Elmore machine nominate Isaac E. Holmes for Congress in opposition to Legaré. Legaré was a Van Buren man, but he had opposed the subtreasury plan and therefore had to be defeated. Holmes, an incompetent, was elected, and Legaré, one of South Carolina's most distinguished statesmen, temporarily retired from politics. 48

In the fall of 1839, Preston's entire political backing in South Carolina fell to pieces. The only Clay paper in the state, the Columbia Telescope, stopped publishing on November 27, 1839. The Whigs met in Pennsylvania and nominated General William Henry Harrison for President. Preston did not even attend to support Clay. 49 Calhoun was now in complete power, and he gave South Carolina to Van Buren in 1840. 50 In destroying the Whigs he had achieved his most cherished aim--almost complete unity within the state. He could give the hated Van Buren to the nullifiers, and they would support the President as if he were Calhoun himself. 51

Meanwhile, the state's unionists, at least those who did not join the Whigs, were pleased that South Carolina supported Van Buren. As a Jacksonian democrat, Simms actively supported Van Buren. The author had received some material success and much state and national fame, but he could tell his friend James Lawson, who was writing a biographical sketch of him for a Northern periodical:

You may add that I am a Democrat of the Jackson School a State Rights man, opposed to Tariffs, Banks, Internal Improvements, American Systems, Fancy Rail Roads, Floats, Land Companies, and every Humbug East or West, whether of cant or cunning. I believe in the people, and prefer trusting their impulses, than the craft, the cupidity and the selfishness of trades and Whiggery. 52
Yet in late 1840 Simms declined an invitation to dine with President Van Buren. He told Joel R. Poinsett that he had another engagement and asked Poinsett to convey to the President his disappointment at not being able to attend. Simms would have written to Van Buren himself, but he claimed that he did not know the forms of court. Perhaps this was a very politic refusal, since Simms realized that he could not be too zealous a supporter of Van Buren.⁵³

Although he had again entered politics, Simms found time to further the movement for a distinctive American literature. Advocating writing which appealed to Americans because of its native settings and themes, Simms was still a nationalist. Writers North and South called for a national literature based upon American ideals.⁵⁴ Simms, in a long letter to Phillip C. Pendleton, later published in the Magnolia, claimed that a strong national literature was essential to a national independence. He said that America had no literature of its own, and he contended that those writers (such as Washington Irving) who were considered American were actually more interested in British themes and settings.⁵⁵

Simms blamed much of America's lack of a national literature on English influence, English literature, and the failure of an international copyright law. He told James Kirke Paulding, Van Buren's Secretary of the Navy, that "the original literature of a Nation is no less important to its interests, than its valour and its virtue; and indeed, it can never be of any high value, if the material of thoughts and the form of opinion, that depend so entirely upon the National writing, are derived from foreign shores."⁵⁶ In America, he said, we too much "ape the habits and follow the guidance of the English."⁵⁷ He wanted Paulding to write more and not to allow politics to encumber his literature.⁵⁸ Simms was
no Anglophobe. He said his anti-English feelings derived from his nationalism. He claimed to have friends in England, but he was "an ultra-American, a born Southerner, and a resolute loco-foco." 59

As a "Southerner," Simms knew the problems of writing in the South. He knew that many writers who turned to English themes and even removed to England did so because America was no market for their work. Especially was this true in the South. If one looked carefully, Simms said, he would see that the failure of the South to possess a literature of its own had not arisen from lack of talent or literary material. The South was a veritable mine of stories and tales, enough to fill countless books. No, Simms said, the South had no literature because of the "humiliating insensibility of the great body of her people to the value of such possession." 60 If the South did not come to understand the usefulness of art, it would never have any.

Even this early in his literary career Simms showed a preference for Southern writers and Southern themes. While he maintained that American literature must have native themes, he also insisted that Southern literature must have Southern themes. It would not be long before Simms would realize the value and necessity of writing for a Southern audience. As the South became increasingly introspective, Simms assumed his role as its defender and propagandist. 61

James Henry Hammond quickly recognized Simms's value to the South. He wrote Simms in 1841, asking him to visit his plantation, Silver Bluff. Perhaps Simms could find something at a Southern plantation on which to "hang a tale." Hammond realized that Simms still wanted to maintain a degree of independence, with obligation to no one section. But he cautioned Simms not to go too far. After all, Simms owed something to
his native South, and his pen and quick mind could be useful in the struggle to come. 62

Simms had learned many lessons during the thirties. He was no longer the naive youth who had edited the Charleston City Gazette. He remained a unionist, yet he began to see some advantages in being a Southerner. Still a Jacksonian, maintaining a belief in the equality of the common man, he nevertheless supported Calhoun. Above all, he used his legal, editorial, and literary skills to become an excellent essayist and a leading social critic. Although well aware of the advantages of living in the North, he chose to remain in and write about the South. He would some day become the foremost advocate of a distinctly Southern literature. By 1837, Simms had already begun to question his nationalist sentiments and wrote a polemical defense of slavery. He was to be the South's most important social commentator, as well as its most brilliant literary defender.
NOTES


3. William Gilmore Simms, "Domestic Manners of the Americans," by Mrs. Trollope, _The American Quarterly Review_, XII (September, 1832), 110.


6. _Ibid._, pp. 122-123. Later Simms would change his mind on the two-party system. He would become a staunch advocate of one-party sectional politics.

7. _Ibid._, p. 112.

8. _Ibid._, p. 128; see also Trollope, II, 40-57.


12. _Ibid._, pp. 5-7; Guilds, "Simms and Cosmopolitan . . .," p. 36.


15. _The Cosmopolitan_, II (1834), 120-121.


17. Guilds, "Simms and Cosmopolitan . . .," pp. 35-36. Guilds attempts to discount Trent's view that the _Cosmopolitan_ was unpopular (see Trent, p. 83; _Courier_, July 27, 1833).


19. _Southern Literary Journal_, I (September, 1835-February, 1836), 284.

20. _Ibid._, I, II, n. s. III, IV (n. s. also called I, II).
21. For an excellent sketch of Miss Martineau, see Pope-Hennessy, pp. 211-304.


25. Sydnor, p. 318; George McDuffie to Richard H. Wilde, May 10, 1835, MSS, George McDuffie Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Preston to Waddy Thompson, March 29, 1835, Thompson Papers (N. C.); Francis W. Pickens to Hammond, May 9, 1835, Henry Nott to Hammond, March 8, 1836, John M. Felder to Hammond, Dec. 31, 1835, Hammond Papers; Oliphant, Simms Letters, I, 77-81. Simms actively supported Van Buren for President.

26. Calhoun to Hammond, Feb. 18, 1837, Hammond Papers; John P. Richardson to James Chesnut, March 14, 1836, MSS, James Chesnut Papers, South Carolinians Library, University of South Carolina.

27. William Gordon of Virginia was the actual author; Hayne, Politics . . ., pp. 44-47, 52; Calhoun to Hammond, July 4, 1836, Hammond Papers.


30. Current, p. 23; Capers, pp. 178, 180, 189; Stoney (ed.), "Grayson," SCHM, L (1949), 87-88; Lander, p. 29. For another view, see Wiltse, II, 358-361.


33. Hammond, Letters and Speeches, p. 50; Tucker, pp. 242, 244.

34. John R. Welsh, "The Mind of William Gilmore Simms" (unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of English, Vanderbilt University, 1951. pp. 99-100, 151; Professor Welsh has relied too heavily on the conservative agrarian mind of Donald Davidson in the writing of this dissertation.


36. *S. L. M.*, III (November, 1837), 644; see also 641-643.


38. *S. L. M.*, III, 645. Simms pre-empted the thought of George Fitzhugh by twenty years.


46. Oliphant, *Simms Letters*, I, 114. Southern Literary Journal comments on Simms's review as the most able vindication of slavery in the South (*S. L. J.*, n. s. [January, 1838]).

47. Hammond to Elmore, March 22, 1838, Hammond Papers.


49. Courier, Dec. 7, 1839; Maigs, II, 225. Maigs was of the opinion that Calhoun actually thought that he would run as Harrison's vice-presidential candidate.


53. Ibid., I, 179-180.


56. Ibid., I, 144-145, 217.

57. Ibid., I, 144-145; Hubbell, p. 178.


60. Ibid., I, 220; see also 219, 221.


SECTION TWO:

SIMMS THE SECTIONALIST, 1840-1850
I. THE ARTIST AS AN ACTIVE POLITICAL FIGURE:
SIMMS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE

Simms was unable to remain in private life. Although he continued to write, he returned to an active role in politics. However, he would never again actively support the unionists. A political position that was so far beyond the accepted consensus in South Carolina was inconceivable for anyone in public life. Besides, the author who so vehemently defended slavery found little in common with the unionist cause. Simms also came to understand Calhoun's political position. Since they both sought a united South based on sectional issues, he supported Calhoun as leader of the Southern bloc in the national Congress. But he often took a more radical position than Calhoun on local and national issues.

After returning the state to the Democratic party, Calhoun attempted to reunify its dissident political factions. He sought a more peaceful internal political situation, one that would silence old political enemies and unite the state as a single political voice under his leadership. Calhoun also wanted to prove to the country that South Carolina no longer advocated nullification.

The South Carolina gubernatorial election of 1840 gave Calhoun an opportunity to unify the state. James Henry Hammond, an ex-nullifier, opposed John P. Richardson, formerly a staunch unionist. By refusing to support Hammond openly, Calhoun showed the state's important political figures that he sought a compromise with the unionists. When approached
by the unionists, Calhoun also refused formal support to Richardson, and thus both candidates were forced to campaign without his aid.\(^2\) Secretly, however, Calhoun favored Richardson. The election of a unionist would prove that South Carolina was no longer nullificationist and would help to unify the state's political factions.

On January 10, 1840, the Charleston Mercury, edited by John A. Stuart, Rhett's brother-in-law, nominated Richardson for governor. Early in February, the Charleston Courier nominated Judge David Johnson, a staunch unionist. Hammond, who campaigned as the state rights candidate, was without newspaper support, although his friends wrote many letters in his behalf to the major papers of the state. Without newspaper aid, he seemed to have little chance for victory.\(^3\) His one hope was to receive an open declaration of support from Calhoun.\(^4\)

But Calhoun could not support Hammond. A nullification candidate running against Richardson would disrupt the attempt at consolidation within the state that Calhoun so sorely needed to maintain his national prestige. The Mercury could not understand how Hammond, if he was a friend of Calhoun's, could allow himself to be nominated and cause such a political disruption in South Carolina.\(^5\) Calhoun wrote Hammond that he regretted the party division in South Carolina, that he liked and would be pleased with either Hammond or Richardson, and that he had to claim strict neutrality. Hammond replied that he was running for governor to keep the unionists from destroying South Carolina. He also said that it would be difficult for Calhoun to hold power in Washington if the Union party carried the state. Hammond told Calhoun that his influence would elect any man governor.\(^6\)

This was the beginning of a series of letters between Calhoun and
Hammond throughout 1840, in which Hammond cajoled Calhoun and Calhoun fended off Hammond by refusing to back him openly. Since Calhoun believed that South Carolina's political power came from the absence of any local parties, he wanted nothing to do with organized parties. Therefore, as far as Calhoun was concerned, to restore the old nullification-unionist parties of 1832 would harm South Carolina. He said:

... there is nothing I would regret more, than to see you and others upon whom the hope of the state must rest, waste your talents and usefulness in party struggles at home instead of uniting to maintain the ascendency of our principles and doctrines in the Union. ...?

Although Hammond repeatedly claimed to Calhoun that his election would unite the state, Calhoun withheld his support. Hammond thought that his State Rights party would permanently destroy the old party lines and strengthen the state. Calhoun was convinced that both the State Rights and Unionist parties should become one under his leadership. Hammond despondently wrote his brother Marcellus that he knew Calhoun secretly favored Richardson. He was convinced that Calhoun wanted to be President and was willing to break up the State Rights party and rejoin the National Democratic party. He knew that Calhoun had been deceived. For if the Union party gained control of South Carolina, Van Buren in Washington and Poinsett in South Carolina would become more powerful. Hammond said that the result would mean Calhoun's destruction both in state and national politics.

But Calhoun's aloofness was carefully calculated to give the governorship to the old unionists, thus pacifying them and making them his allies. This way Calhoun could destroy all political opposition in his own state and appear nationally as a moderate and a conciliator. Hammond realized this as he was forced to release many of his supporters who
shifted their backing to Richardson. He learned that his friends in Charleston would be defeated for the legislature if they supported him. Even Ker Boyce, a strong Hammond supporter and close friend of Simms, asked to be released from his obligation to support Hammond. 10

Simms was also involved in the election. He had become Hammond's close friend and had persuaded many important men to support him. Among these men were Simms's old and close acquaintances, Charles and Bartholomew Carroll. After promising to campaign for Hammond the Carrolls began to waver. Simms realized that Hammond, a certain loser, could do nothing politically for the Carrolls. He learned that in order to keep allies they had to be assured political rewards.

Simms already knew the disadvantages of belonging to a minority political party. He was certain that Calhoun actually favored Richardson. But he still supported Hammond, although his own political ambitions required his loyalty to the Calhoun, or majority, party. Conveniently, Simms scheduled a business trip to the North and was absent during the political struggles of the fall. 11

The outcome of the gubernatorial election was known well in advance. Hammond debated withdrawing, but Calhoun would not even advise him on that point. Perhaps Calhoun felt that if Hammond withdrew, he would always be convinced that he could have won. As far as Calhoun was concerned, it would be best for Hammond to know exactly where he stood. 12 He soon found out. Immediately after the legislature met to vote, Judge Johnson withdrew, and Hammond was left to face the unionist. Richardson easily defeated him by a vote of 104 to 47. The old unionist-nullification controversy was buried in South Carolina's one victorious Calhoun party. 13

Hammond learned that he could never fight Calhoun's power. Now
that he had lost, there was no reason to resent the Calhoun party. He realized that if he agreed to co-operate, he could be very useful to Calhoun. Simms again learned that backing a loser was no way to advance oneself politically. The Carrolls' betrayal of both his and Hammond's trust made him forever wary of political maneuvering. Simms had learned that Calhoun was determined to lead South Carolina--determined to use South Carolina to enhance his national aspirations. Perhaps he too had decided to join the Calhoun bandwagon.

But Simms immediately turned his attention to national issues. With Harrison as President, Simms knew that the South would need intelligent leadership. He worried over the Texas question and the prospects of war with Mexico. He knew that South Carolina was poorly represented in Congress. Thus, he wanted Hammond to remain in public life, in hopes that he would enter Congress and give the state adequate leadership. That was not the last time that Simms showed his patriotism toward South Carolina by suggesting that its ablest leaders serve as representatives in Congress.¹⁴

Hammond replied that he realized that the state had poor Congressmen, but he wanted to stay out of politics. He knew that Calhoun controlled the state and that a Congressman from South Carolina would be forced to follow Calhoun's political views. He also thought that Simms should prepare himself for political office. He then suggested that Simms run for the state legislature. Hammond was certain that he could secure Simms's election. He asked Simms to think over the matter carefully. If Simms preferred to run for Congress, Hammond would be pleased to support him. But Hammond feared that he might be leading Simms away from more honorable pursuits.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the idea was planted, and
Simms spent the rest of his active career seeking political office and appointment.

Although Hammond told Simms that he was retiring from active politics, he did not act like it. Soon after he was defeated for governor, he wrote to Francis W. Pickens, a close Calhoun aide, to find out what Calhoun thought of the election. He also wrote Calhoun that he was able to bear defeat "with a becoming spirit." Hammond was willing to submit to the will of the majority, and he emphasized that he bore no hostility to those who had opposed him. Calhoun quickly answered Hammond. He was pleased that the past election had caused no disunity in South Carolina, and he hoped Hammond would be elected governor in the next election. After all, Hammond was still the nullifiers' political leader. And Calhoun knew that there were still some dissident old nullifiers left in South Carolina. To pass the governorship from a unionist to a nullifier would further demonstrate Calhoun's control of the state, and further conciliate both old political factions.

Hammond wrote Simms that he would be elected governor in 1842. He received increasing coverage in the Charleston Courier, a Calhoun paper. Obviously he was Calhoun's choice and, after some deliberation in caucus, the powers in South Carolina would choose him as candidate for governor. At the last moment, however, some opposition to Hammond arose. A minority group in the legislature nominated R. F. W. Allston for governor. But Hammond was victorious as the Calhoun candidate, by a vote of eighty-three to seventy-six.

Meanwhile, election fever had caught up with Simms. Hammond exercised great influence over him and, after tempting him with the duties of public office, finally persuaded Simms to run for the state legislature
in 1842. Simms had previously been an unsuccessful candidate for the legislature in 1840. He was then opposed to electioneering commitments, such as barbecues, Sale days, and other gatherings. Although he was not elected, Simms learned much about the actual trials of campaigning in his 1840 race for the legislature.21

In a long letter to Hammond, Simms clearly stated his reasons for accepting the nomination to public office. He was pleased that Hammond wanted him in the legislature. As a public figure he would be able to acknowledge the approval of his fellow citizens and to "receive their suffrages." Simms stated his views as a public man: "I am of the opinion that no man being under a representative Government, has a right to withhold himself from the duties of state, whenever there is a call upon him ... He should obey the voice of duty not of vanity or his own ambitious heart ... ."22

Simms began to calculate his political opportunities. Hammond accused him of showing more reflection on political events in one letter than he himself could show in a year. Hammond felt that it was ludicrous for Simms to call him an "incorrigible Politician" in the light of Simms's own political perceptivity.23 Simms thought of himself as a politician. He told Lawson that he had the proper skills to become an excellent public speaker and political figure. Certainly great fluency of speech and a logical mind had destined him for public life. Perhaps he might some day be an important politician. After all, some of his friends had entered politics, and they were urging a political career upon him.24

By December, 1841, Simms was ready to follow his friend's suggestions and become a candidate for the legislature. A political faction had defeated an appropriation for the printing of his History of South
Carolina, and Simms was prepared to take an active role in the legislature to protect his personal interests. He hoped that if Hammond were elected, his own position would be enhanced. He did not want to campaign actively, but he knew that he must go to his constituents if he wanted to win. His friends warned Simms that although he was known in his district as a novelist, few people knew him personally. But Simms was confident of election as he slowly made the rounds of the towns in his district, meeting and committing the important political leaders to his support. He even expected Hammond to make him a leading lieutenant in the legislature.

But Simms would have to wait until 1844 to take his seat in the legislature. Scheduled to give an important Fourth of July lecture in Aiken, which would have greatly enhanced his chances for election, he had to decline because of illness and sorrow in his family over the death of one of his children. He was unable to continue the campaign. In June he became editor of the Magnolia, a Southern literary periodical. Simms withdrew as candidate for the legislature, because he was busy with the magazine, was unknown in his election district, and was unable to campaign.

At the same time that Simms was planning his campaign for the legislature, Calhoun was preparing his campaign for President. Simms had the greatest respect for Calhoun's power, both within and outside South Carolina, but he did not trust him. Nevertheless, Simms ardently supported Calhoun's candidacy. He believed the Democratic party would support Van Buren, but he was convinced that Calhoun could attract more votes than Van Buren. Simms knew that for the South to maintain its strength in the Union, Calhoun had to be elected President.
Naturally Calhoun had almost the complete support of his native state. His supporters suspected Tyler's political position. They expected the proposed repeal of the Subtreasury Act but were thoroughly against any new, higher tariff rates. Calhoun told Hammond that he wanted the state to be moderate and to refrain from offering nullification as a solution to political problems. Calhoun felt that if a united South could elect a Southern president in 1844, it would assure repeal of the tariff act of 1842. Did anyone doubt whom Calhoun had in mind for President? Calhoun closed a letter to Hammond with the warning, "If we should fail ... no alternative will be left except nullification ..."\(^{32}\)

Calhoun's strategy was to achieve unanimous support from the Southern states. He knew that South Carolina was unable to support him openly because the North would believe that he was merely a Southern radical candidate. Therefore, another Southern state had to put his name in nomination at the National Democratic Convention. A nomination from South Carolina would appear as though Calhoun had nominated himself. Above all, the Calhoun movement for President in 1844 had to appear as a spontaneous movement throughout the entire South.\(^{33}\)

The next important maneuver was for Calhoun to change his political image.\(^{34}\) He would resign from the United States Senate, thus appearing as an elder statesman ready and willing to defend his country. Ever aware of reactions in South Carolina, Calhoun told Hammond that much depended upon the Mercury's notice of his resignation. He also instructed Hammond to ask the Columbia Carolinian to notice the great statesmanship and the obvious non-political motive of his resignation.\(^{35}\) Calhoun told Hammond that the reason he wanted to be President was to effect national political reforms and abandon the protective policy, assuring the South
its rightful economic position in the Union.36

However, there was some Whig opposition to Calhoun in South Carolina. The remnants of the old Whig party sought to ruin Calhoun's chances for national approval by making him seem radical. William C. Preston, a Whig senator, exclaimed that the entire state legislature would nominate Calhoun, and Clay would have no opportunity to carry South Carolina. Waddy Thompson, also an ardent Whig, wrote to his friend Brantz Mayer that there was no longer any Whig party in South Carolina. Thompson thought that Calhoun stood an excellent chance of being the Democratic nominee. Thompson's only hope was that the radicals in South Carolina would embarrass Calhoun enough to make him unpopular at the Democratic convention.37

At the close of the South Carolina legislature session of 1842, Calhoun's presidential campaign manager, Robert Barnwell Rhett, wrote a vehement letter warning his constituents that if the tariff of 1842 were not rescinded, South Carolina would again nullify an act of Congress.38 When the state legislature reconvened in the fall of 1843, Governor Hammond made a fire-eating speech. Simms had previously convinced Hammond that a brief, but radical speech, designed to stir the legislature into collective action, might cure some of the economic evils which plagued South Carolina. It would also enhance Hammond's political prestige in the state.39 But the rest of the country thought that Hammond was obviously Calhoun's political tool, and that he was speaking for Calhoun. Inadvertently Thompson's wish was fulfilled.

Hammond took a radical position on the tariff of 1842. He seconded the views of many state rights men, including Rhett, and thus made Calhoun appear too moderate in South Carolina and too radical for the rest of the country. He called for universal trade, for "an unrestricted
exchange of the surplus production of one country for the surplus of another." He also advocated an end to speculation on the world agricultural market, an economic plight which he attributed to too high a domestic protective tariff. He lauded England's economic growth, maintaining that free trade had built Great Britain into the world's most powerful country. Hammond closed his speech on the tariff with this request: "I look with confidence for a vast amelioration and early abandonment of the whole system of protective duties." Implied was the threat of the return to nullification as a political method of blocking the oppressive tariff.

The governor also placed Calhoun in an awkward position on the Texas question. Calhoun appeared to favor annexation of Texas. In his speech to the state legislature, Hammond claimed that Great Britain and Texas were about to sign a treaty. Great Britain would protect Texas' drive for independence, and in return, Texas would abolish slavery. He exclaimed that the true interests of Texas and the South demanded that Texas become part of the United States. Hammond asked the legislature to express its opinion on the annexation of Texas. As leader of his state, could Calhoun be expected to tolerate, let alone follow, the advice of a mere governor?

Some members of the South Carolina legislature, obviously under the direction of Calhoun or his lieutenants, attacked Hammond's speech. Simms heard of these attacks and wrote to Hammond explaining that he knew who Hammond's enemies were. He said that Hammond was the victim of Calhoun's political clique. He suggested that Hammond quickly collect or organize his allies and gather support in the legislature. After all, Simms said, "Your message was excellent." He considered Hammond the
leader of the political opposition in South Carolina. He then told
Hammond that there could be no political debate in the state until Cal-
houn was deposed. Simms emphasized his point: "You see that your favor-
ite remedy 'nullification' has been suspended in reference to the late
wretchedest of all tariffs, simply because its present application would
be fatal to his [Calhoun's] national pretensions." As far as Simms
was concerned, South Carolina could never function in a normal political
manner as long as Calhoun dominated the state.

Besides finding opposition in South Carolina, Calhoun was having
difficulty organizing his national support. His supporters wanted to
have a Democratic party convention in the summer of 1844, giving him an
opportunity to gather an opposition bloc against Van Buren, who was Cal-
houn's strongest opponent. This would also give Rhett time to launch an
attack on the undemocratic features of the convention. Rhett advocated
a district plan whereby separate districts of a state would name their
own delegates, who could then vote as individuals--hopefully for Calhoun.

The district plan would upset any advantage that a state party candidate
would have over Calhoun. But the Calhoun forces were not given enough
time, since Van Buren had scheduled the Democratic convention for the
spring of 1844. Knowing he could not defeat Van Buren, Calhoun refused
to be nominated.

Calhoun was no longer a presidential candidate. He wanted to re-
turn to national office. His friends in South Carolina began secretly
to inquire whether Governor Hammond would appoint Calhoun to the Senate
if the occasion arose. But that was unnecessary, because on March 4,
1844, President Tyler sent Calhoun's nomination as Secretary of State to
the Senate.
Ironically, Calhoun as Secretary of State pursued a vigorous pro-Texas policy and ruined Van Buren's chances for the nomination. Van Buren, certain he would win, united with Clay, the Whig nominee, in attempting to de-emphasize the Texas question. This caused Van Buren irreparable damage, allowing James Knox Polk, the first "dark horse" candidate, to win the Democratic nomination.47

Meanwhile, Simms was preparing his campaign for the state legislature. Governor Hammond was pleased that Simms had declared his candidacy for the legislature. He assured Simms of a strong vote in his district and was willing to gather votes for him. Talking as a politician, he told Simms that "you must go enough yourself among the people to countenance your friends and that is all I trust that will be necessary to insure your election."48 But Simms claimed that he would not campaign. Electioneering and political speechmaking was beneath his dignity.49 Hammond, however, knew his man. Before March was over, Simms was giving speeches throughout the district, and there was every hope that he would be elected. He told his friend Lawson that the voters kept him busy making stump speeches. He even began to feel sorry for himself for working long and hard hours. Simms was too practical, however, to miss the opportunity to deliver a Fourth of July oration at the town of Aiken in the interior of his district.50

The events which necessitated such a speech were based on South Carolina's bitterness towards the Congress' lack of attention to its economic and territorial needs. In the throes of a seven-year depression, the state expected some redress on the tariff of 1842. Also, the abolitionists were growing stronger in the Union, and there was some fear that the Texas annexation bill would not pass Congress.51 Hammond wrote
Calhoun that there was great unrest in the state caused by fear of Great Britain and of losing Texas. He claimed that the slave states had to protect their interests. The South had to be able to extend its borders in order to remain a first-rate political power. Thus, the South had to have Texas. But on June 8, 1844, the United States Senate defeated the Texas treaty by a vote of thirty-five to sixteen. After that, there was no possible way to stop the flow of radical sentiment in South Carolina; the Bluffton movement was on the horizon.

On June 27, 1844, Rhett's address to his constituents was printed in the Charleston Courier. Rhett asked for a convention of Southern states to meet and take positive action on Texas. He also called for a special convention in South Carolina to meet in April, 1845. Rhett wanted the convention to nullify the tariff of 1842—if the new President (Rhett thought Polk would be elected) did not give South Carolina some indication of his faith by instituting a bill to repeal it.

Simms campaigned for the state legislature on those issues. But there is no exact explanation as to why he supported Rhett and the radical elements in South Carolina. His growing antagonism to the North, especially over the slavery question, had pushed him into a more radical position. From a practical political position, Simms's advantage was with the radical element. He was running for the legislature in Barnwell district, which was part of Rhett's congressional district. As Rhett became increasingly disillusioned with national politics and especially Calhoun's failure to aid the state on the tariff and Texas, Simms became increasingly radical. He also had no love for Calhoun and his political domination of the state. Thus, Simms may have regarded the new radical movement as one last opportunity to wrest political power from Calhoun.
Simms made a definite commitment to radicalism on the afternoon of July 4, 1844. His oration, later printed as The Sources of American Independence, became a leading pamphlet in support of Rhett and the Bluffton movement. He began the speech with a short discussion of South Carolina's past struggles against outside forces. From the Spanish to the Indians and finally the British, the Carolina settlement had constantly been under fire. The settlement had arisen, defied the British, and become a sovereign state. Yet even in the united effort of all the colonies to drive out the aggressors, it had been apparent that the colonies had been too dissimilar to work together for long. In colonial times, Simms pointed out, there had been no unity of feeling, "nay, there was a positive diversity, if not dislike, between them." The North was still trespassing upon Southern interests. Worst of all, the North was attacking Southern pride by interfering with the institution of slavery. Simms said:

Have they not converted the halls of our common council,—where we are required to meet on equal terms, for the common benefit,—in pacific consultation, and mutually indulgent intercourse,—into an arena for most fearful conflict, and the least justifiable passions; and, in their insane fury, have they not flung from our possession a vast and noble territory, acquired by our kindred, and essential to the natural expansion of our race, simply because its acquisitions might afford additional strength and new securities to the people of the South?

Because of the North's aggressiveness, Simms called for a united Southern front. If the South showed itself as one force, or voted as one man, there would be no power on earth that could disrupt its way of life. But without a Southern union, Southerners could do nothing. Simms blamed Southern politicians for not helping to create this union. Politicians were too interested in their own political gain; too easily they saw fellow Southerners as rivals rather than allies. Simms was positive
that many of the evils facing the South were caused by its unwillingness to meet in convention and form a united front. He said:

We can reduce the tariff—we can recover Texas—we can bring statesmen once more back to the Constitution, without strife, without violence or bloodshed,—we can strengthen the old, and acquire new securities for our sectional rights, and all by the simple act of union among ourselves. 59

Turning to Texas, Simms attacked Great Britain for separating the North and South on so important a territorial problem. This led him to desire a united American front against England. He then spoke in harsh imperialistic tones, claiming the entire continent, including Cuba and the West Indies, for the American people. Texas was part of the "natural dependencies of the hemisphere" and must become part of the United States' national domain. He was certain that the American people would rise up and protect Texas from Great Britain, making it a state in the United States. 60

But more sober political reasons, as well as imperialistic ones, demanded that Texas join the Union. Simms again attacked the politicians North and South for not understanding why Texas had to be part of the Union. The South demanded the annexation of Texas, he stated, because Texas was necessary to maintain a proper political balance of power in Congress. Without this balance of power the South would have no security within the Union. 61 Simms immediately sought to pacify anyone who believed that the Texas issue would result in war with Mexico. He assured his Aiken audience that if there was war with Mexico, Texans could defeat the Mexicans by themselves. 62

Simms closed his oration on an unhappy note. Realistically he said that the South should not fool itself into thinking that it had strong moral and social relations with the North. Political union had grown out
of necessity and common concessions, and those conditions alone could preserve it. A relation that was originally one of compromise could not resist the "insolence of despotism, and the unreckoning violence of a minority, conscious only of injustice." The South had to calculate carefully the value of the Union. A noble experiment, one which the world had learned much from, could not rest merely on the conscience of the South. If the Union were to break up, and Civil War result, Simms closed, the North would be at fault.

Simms's oration was the rallying cry of the Bluffton Movement. On July 23, the Charleston Mercury issued an invitation to all citizens of St. Luke's parish to meet and honor their Congressman, Robert Barnwell Rhett, at a dinner to be held in Bluffton. The Mercury lost no time in spreading the news of a new political organization in the state. Isaac E. Holmes wrote to Hammond that it was the beginning of the end of Calhoun's conservative policy, and perhaps the end of Calhoun's political domination of South Carolina. At the dinner Rhett, completely disillusioned with Polk, called again for a Southern convention, and a state convention to nullify the tariff. He offered a toast to his constituents: "The Convention of South Carolina in 1845—May it be as useful as the convention of 1776."

Niles' National Register reported that the majority of Southern congressmen opposed holding a convention. The Register quoted the Charleston Mercury as despairing of hope and said the South Carolina radicals wanted separate state action. Many politicians asked if Calhoun would take the leadership of South Carolina's radical movement? A toast was drunk to Calhoun, carefully stating that the radicals would follow him as long as he was true to his state. The Richmond Enquirer
was convinced that Calhoun would not align himself with the Bluffton men. At the same time, the Richmond *Whig* knew that Calhoun would never join Rhett and Hammond. The *Whig* claimed that Calhoun insisted upon being a national figure and would not join the radicals.\(^69\)

Obviously, Rhett sought to splinter Calhoun's support, and he demanded a new party in South Carolina. The party would be disunionist, using Texas and the tariff as pretenses for its actions. It would appeal to the state's young politicians who were not aligned with Calhoun's party.\(^70\) Simms was one of those young men. Since he could no longer support Calhoun, who was too conservative, he joined the radical Bluffton Movement.

But Calhoun was by no means defeated in South Carolina. Franklin Elmore refused to join Rhett's Bluffton group and determined to back Calhoun.\(^80\) Even Hammond temporarily supported Calhoun. He found it unpleasant to differ with so powerful a man.\(^71\) Meanwhile Elmore called a meeting of all Calhoun supporters in Charleston to discuss action against the radicals. The meeting was held on August 19, and those present recommended that it was inadvisable for South Carolina to resort to separate state action. They also voted full support to Calhoun and praised his actions as Secretary of State, especially on the Texas question.\(^72\) Calhoun believed that his supporters had cut off the radical threat, and that "the excitement in a portion of Carolina . . . has gradually subsided, and will give no further trouble." He told a friend that "I had to act with great delicacy, but at the same time firmness in relation to it."\(^73\)

The Bluffton Movement was far from over. Hammond realized that Calhoun was too conservative, and he joined the Bluffton group. Ham-
mond's last message as governor was a good example of his eloquent and persuasive oratorical powers. He covered the same grievances as Rhett did at Bluffton, but was much more forceful and logical in his argument.  

Hammond opened his speech with a comment on the long economic depression that was plaguing South Carolina. He said that the protective tariff had cut off the flow of goods to the South and had raised the price of cotton on the foreign market. Then he asked how the state could restore its previous economic affluence. He answered by stating that the South had to have a lower tariff. He elaborately described how the tariff of 1842 was actually higher than the tariff of 1832. He claimed that the Northern Democrats had shown bad faith in the Congress of 1843. The Northern Democrats claimed to be free trade men, but the South had no reason to believe them. The governor said that they had never helped the South lower the tariff, let alone support its abolition. Hammond's solution for the South's economic problems was to hold a convention to unite the Southern states in their grievances against the Northern states.

The governor next spoke on slavery and the Texas question. The previous session of Congress had rejected a bill for Texas' annexation, claiming that it would violate a treaty with Mexico. Hammond was certain that the annexation treaty was rejected because of the North's animosity toward domestic slavery. Abolitionists and Northern politicians alike feared that slavery would be both extended and perpetuated. In closing he claimed that the South had to have both slavery and Texas. "I cannot doubt," Hammond said, "that you will be justified by God and future generations, in adopting any measures, however startling they may appear, that will place your rights and your property exclusively under your own
control, and enable you to repel all interference with them, whatever shape it may assume."  

Pickens, then in the state Senate, offered counter measures to Hammond's message. Calhoun obviously was behind Pickens' action, and because of Calhoun's power in the state, Pickens' resolutions passed the Senate unanimously. In the state House of Representatives the committee on Federal Relations was supposed to review Hammond's message. But Christopher G. Memminger, Calhoun's leading spokesman in the House, forced the discussion into a Committee of the Whole. His actions assured the passage of Pickens' resolutions and the defeat of Hammond's message.  

Simms had just been elected to the legislature, and he resolved to keep silent until certain of his position. For some time he quietly watched the fiery debate over Hammond's message. But after he was placed on the Federal Relations committee, Simms spoke in support of the Governor's message. In order to counteract Memminger's action, Simms offered alternate proposals to Pickens' resolutions. He told his friend James Lawson, "I felt nervous and awkward enough, but they tell me I got on well, and with some fluency."  

Simms's resolutions which related to the tariff, Texas, and abolitionism, demonstrated his sound knowledge of the political situation. He reminded his fellow legislators of South Carolina's past experiences with the federal government and told them they must maintain strict watch "over those vital interests upon which the fortunes and the safety of The South depend." He asked that the legislature pass a bill urging the United States Congress to repudiate the protective tariff and protect the agricultural interests of the South. As for Texas, Simms said that it was important to the welfare of the entire country. Not only did
Texas have to be safely protected from British arms, but Texas was essential to the proper growth and expansion of the Southern people.\textsuperscript{84}

Next Simms advocated a Southern union. He said that while the North added new states and territory, it forced the slaveholding states to "remain stationary—circumscribed in boundary—fettered and enfeebled by position, until gradually environed by communities hostile to their institutions, and no ways scrupulous in the expression of their hostilities."\textsuperscript{85} Simms's solution to this problem was to invite all the Southern states whose interests were aligned with South Carolina to co-operate in combatting their mutual enemy. He called for a Southern convention to meet on March 4, 1846, in order to redress mutual grievances.\textsuperscript{86}

But the Bluffton Movement was losing steam. Simms's resolutions were misunderstood in the legislature, and an unfavorable report of the Committee of the Whole tabled them indefinitely.\textsuperscript{87} Hammond, Rhett, and Simms were no match for Calhoun. Memminger sought to silence them by urging the legislature to vote unanimous support of the Democratic nominee for President. He wanted it to vote a show of confidence in Polk and be certain that South Carolina would take no separate action which might embarrass the new administration. Then James W. Walker, also a Calhoun aide, moved that Hammond's message and Memminger's resolutions be considered together. Simms attempted to keep the Walker proposal from coming to a vote. However, Walker's proposal passed the House by a vote of seventy-seven to forty, with Simms voting nay.\textsuperscript{88} At the legislature's last meeting on December 18, Pickens' resolutions expressing confidence in Polk's administration, and opposing Hammond's message, passed the House by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-nine.\textsuperscript{89}

The Bluffton Movement was over. Calhoun, through his aides in the
legislature, had destroyed the radicals and kept the state conservative. Hammond knew that Calhoun completely controlled the state legislature. Curiously, Hammond still admired Calhoun, and would prefer him as President to any other man. He believed Calhoun was sound in support of the South, but in the critical period just past Calhoun had "crushed South Carolina and destroyed her cause forever." Some of Calhoun's opponents doubted his loyalty, and found him foolish in his attempts at national office. But his allies claimed that their leader was doing what was best for South Carolina. Pickens told Calhoun that he need never fear a political split in the state. He said, "The state never has been as united as at present since I have been acquainted with public matters." Pickens was certain that the radicals were a small threat to Calhoun's political dominance of South Carolina. Besides, except for their belligerent and often irrational tone, the radicals were actually close to Calhoun's own beliefs. As long as he lived, Calhoun would manage to keep his opposition under control. He paved the way for a South Carolina that would some day speak as one mind. But Simms continued his radical activities in the state, especially in regard to national issues. He wrote Armistead Burt for information about the Texas question. Simms wanted a new map of Texas and documents on territorial matters to aid him in legislative debates. He foresaw a long struggle on the subject of Texas, and he told Burt that Texas would form a political part of the South. But Simms hesitatingly proposed that perhaps Texas should not join the United States at all. He had been insisting upon annexation "simply with an eye to our increased political strength, and to the balance of power in our Confederacy." Simms thought that if Texas joined the Union it would merely be involved in a connection
that stood an excellent chance of breaking up.\textsuperscript{94}

That view of Texas did not remain long with Simms as he imperialistically contemplated foreign policy. He opposed going to war with England over the Oregon territory, because the United States already possessed the land. Besides, Texas was England's real objective. Therefore Simms expected England and all the European powers to be expelled from the North American continent. This deed should be accomplished as soon as the United States was militarily strong. Then, Texas and Oregon were to become states. He also wanted to annex Cuba, California, and the West Indies.\textsuperscript{95} One suspects that Simms realized that slavery and the cotton economy needed all the \textit{lebensraum} it could get.

Turning to South Carolina politics, Simms sought to organize an effective opposition party. In a closed society governed by one powerful man there was bound to be an element in the population, usually its young men, that resented the leaders. Simms knew that such a group could be turned into an effective political opposition. Knowing that Calhoun had the support of the entire state, Simms attacked Calhoun's lieutenants, who were unpopular with the younger politicians. Since the abolitionist problem was the major issue upon which the entire South should be united, Simms attacked men like Pickens who refused to take any action against the abolitionists. He claimed that Southern leaders had been blundering too frequently, and that the people doubted their competence. Therefore, South Carolina needed a new political party and active political leadership.\textsuperscript{96}

Simms had a leader for his new political group. As far as he was concerned, Hammond was the only man who could protect South Carolina from the abolitionist threat. Simms immediately wrote Hammond to inquire
whether he was interested in a Senate seat that had just become vacant.
He offered to support Hammond and work openly for him and lend his name
to Hammond's campaign. He suggested that Hammond not seek the position
immediately, but slowly build his own support among the young, independ-
dent, and ambitious politicians of the state.97

In search of a political organization for Hammond, Simms studied
Alfred Proctor Aldrich's proposed Southern League. Simms was convinced
that a Southern League would force the Federal Government to listen to
the South. He wrote to Hammond, "It will need thorough digestion, and
some considerable suggestion, so as not to offend prejudices and fears,
but it properly addresses itself to a topic, and fights under a flag,
which once lifted will rally the whole South."98 Hammond replied in a
bitter and sorrowful letter. He told Simms that that was what he had
advocated in November, 1844, but then South Carolina had belonged to Cal-
houn. Calhoun and his lieutenants would not agitate. They controlled
the state so tightly that they could choke off any agitation that either
Simms or Aldrich commenced. Hammond decided to stay out of politics,
claiming that he would never again be a candidate for public office.99
Without a leader Simms's political opposition party collapsed.

Meanwhile the state legislature met in November, 1845. Simms tem-
porarily forgot about his opposition party and became a participant both
in debate and in the formation of new legislation. After the battles
over Hammond's message in the previous session, Simms expected this legis-
lature to be mild. Yet he thought that in such an inflammable atmosphere
any disturbance could quickly arise.

The legislators first discussed South Carolina's economic future.
Simms favored the introduction of manufacturing on a large scale into the
state. There were several applications for corporate charters, all of which Simms approved. Yet he was concerned that some state rights advocates might confuse Southern manufacturing with a need for a high tariff, and vote against the issuing of corporate charters. Still an ardent free trader, Simms was convinced that the South could have a strong industrial complex and yet oppose the protective tariff system. He also supported the state's growing banking system by submitting a resolution calling for the establishment of a branch United States mint in the commercial city of Charleston. Thus Simms realized that South Carolina, in order to prosper in the Union, had to have a strong industrial commercial system.

Like other politicians seeking re-election, Simms attempted to aid his constituents in Barnwell district. He introduced a bill which asked that the Committee on Privileges and Elections establish a new election district at Silverton, in Barnwell district. He thought that another precinct would afford his constituents more opportunity to vote, hopefully for him.

On December 10, Simms made an important speech in the state legislature as a member of the Committee on Federal Relations. He asked the state legislature to set a uniform time for holding the elections of presidential electors. He also moved that the election of electors be given to the people of South Carolina. Thus ensued one of the most vicious political fights in the history of the state legislature. The argument was an old one; for years, members of the state House of Representatives had been initiating such legislation. The bill, after much debate, passed the House by a vote of fifty to nineteen. But the Senate voted Simms's measure down.

When the legislative session ended, Simms prepared to run again
for office. He was confident of re-election, and decided against campaigning. He wrote to Hammond to enquire whether his actions in the legislature had been well-received. Hammond said that he was certain that Simms would be re-elected. But he wondered, "Why should you love Carolina so and love her at the sacrifices you do . . ." Simms could not answer that question. He had always been a political outsider and his books were not even read in his home state. But he felt a sense of public duty to South Carolina, especially as the leading literary spokesman in a period of sectional unrest.

But there was strong opposition to Simms. He had been away from the district and his plantation too long, and his constituents had nearly forgotten him. There was some clamor that Simms was a Northern man. After all, he did spend much of his time in New York negotiating contracts and sales of books. Also, Simms's political ally, A. P. Aldrich, was commissioner-in-equity for the district and had strong opposition for re-election. As that office was elected by the legislature, the opposition especially wanted to defeat Simms. Simms felt that he must win in order to aid Aldrich in retaining his position. Simms resolved to campaign for office.

But Simms was defeated for re-election. Hammond blamed the defeat on "mobocracy." He claimed that Simms wasn't known in the district. He had entered politics on the Rhett-Bluffton Movement coattails, and lost because there were no longer any issues. John M. Felder, another ex-Bluffton man, reassured Simms, saying that Simms was growing steadily in the general estimation of his fellow South Carolinians. Felder was certain that the state was in serious trouble, and that Simms's talents would be useful in the struggles ahead.
Simms bemoaned the faithlessness of political supporters. Hammond told him that treachery was an important political weapon. In attempting to aid Aldrich, Simms committed a foolish political error. Aldrich was unpopular, and Simms made himself unpopular by supporting him. Hammond advised Simms to have no principles, attachments, or sentiment if he would be successful in politics. He closed his lecture by deriding Simms's great faith in popular elections. 110

If Simms had been re-elected, Hammond and his other supporters would have definitely nominated him to the Congress. Hammond suggested that Simms run for Congress anyway. He was certain that Simms could be elected to Congress if he ran from Charleston. Charleston was much more sophisticated than the backcountry. Besides, Simms had an excellent reputation and many friends there. With Hammond's support and his own popularity in Charleston, Simms had a good chance of being elected. But Simms had temporarily wearied of politics and refused to give his supporters any encouragement. 111

When his name was mentioned for lieutenant governor of South Carolina, Simms was flattered. Newspapers throughout the state praised him as one who deserved the office. After all, he was one of South Carolina's most important national figures. The Columbia South Carolinian noticed with pleasure the announcement of his candidacy. The paper said that his election would do great honor to the state. "We have heretofore conferred no distinctions on him, nor acknowledged his labors in public life," said the South Carolinian. "It is due ourselves, that he should receive, as he deserves, this proof that he has done the State some service, and she knows and appreciates it." 112

Influential men supported him for the lieutenant governorship and
Simms thought that he would be elected. But he lost the election by only one vote. Simms claimed that had it been an office of greater trust, he would undoubtedly have been elected.\textsuperscript{113}

Hammond knew that too many people regarded Simms as a mere novelist, and novelists were not supposed to be capable of governing others. Some thought that Simms entered politics only for diversion. Hammond, however, said that Simms had become an excellent politician. He suggested that Simms make a name for himself in South Carolina as a politician. He praised Simms for having a wide range of intellectual powers, which were suitable for any office. In order to avoid oblivion, Simms must choose either politics or writing.\textsuperscript{114} But he could never choose between the two. Writing was his livelihood, yet he felt an obligation to participate in the public life of South Carolina.

After so many political reverses, Simms should have doubted himself. But that never happened. More than ever he considered himself one of the most popular men in the state. He received many offers to run for office but declined, waiting for the proper position. Besides, Simms could never leave politics. He told Hammond:

> In seeking an office my sole aim would be to be useful. It is the exercise afforded us in making the development of the endowment we possess, that is grateful, and not the empty honor which attends the name. I have no wish for political place except as affording a field in which I may work accord-
> to my vocation—and, as I believe—according to my destiny.\textsuperscript{115}

Simms's election setbacks made him more determined than ever to remain in public life. He wanted to aid in creating a viable political opposition to Calhoun. Simms did not believe that one man should dominate a state's thoughts and actions. He attempted to force Hammond out of retirement and into a political campaign against Elmore for the United States Senate. Hammond knew that Calhoun would support Elmore, and that
Elmore would be impossible to defeat. Hammond was certain that he had no chance to be elected to the Senate, and he declined to campaign. Both Simms and Hammond were positive that Elmore would be Calhoun's voice in the Senate. They hoped that Elmore would not completely follow Calhoun's dictates. At last Hammond returned to active politics. He told Simms that his political friends would have his support in any future elections.\textsuperscript{116}

Fully aware of Calhoun's political power, Simms sought to organize a "Young Carolina" political party to counteract him. Simms wanted to keep Hammond active politically so that he could be "Young Carolina's" next senatorial candidate. Simms even thought of organizing an anti-Calhoun newspaper in order to promote Hammond's name.

After searching for some method or issue on which to challenge Calhoun and his group of "Hunkers," Simms at last decided to attack the Bank of the State of South Carolina.\textsuperscript{117} He knew that the Bank supported the powerful political organ that he wanted to destroy. Elmore, the Bank's president, was the most powerful man in the state, next to Calhoun. The Bank had become a political machine, and politicians received loans with the consent of the Board of Directors.\textsuperscript{118} Hammond joined with Simms in a long and involved battle against Elmore, Calhoun, and the Bank. He, too, recognized that as president of the Bank, Elmore could easily dictate political terms in South Carolina. He volunteered to aid Simms in all anti-Bank projects, and was pleased that Simms finally realized where the enemies were.\textsuperscript{119}

Many young politicians, unionists and radicals alike, joined in the anti-Bank war. They all had one object in mind, toppling Elmore from power. This would loosen Calhoun's hold on state politics and
pave the way for some recognition of these young office seekers. Not the least of the anti-Bank group was Christopher G. Memminger, a young politician and entrepreneur. Not only did the Bank represent a threat to his political career, but it also refused to lend him funds to finance his economic schemes. \textsuperscript{120} Neither Simms nor Memminger, however, had much success against the entrenched power of the Bank. But they did force Elmore to defend the institution spiritedly. \textsuperscript{121}

Unable to defeat Calhoun, Simms sought to further his own public career. He thought that a foreign position would help to broaden his literary and political views. He had some knowledge of foreign languages and was well-trained in the politics of society. Most important, Simms knew that as an artist, he would be very perceptive to what he saw around him. He would closely observe European traditions and learn from the antiquities and manners of the people. He would make copious notes and some day write an excellent account of his travels. As an historian, Simms could gather material for a detailed history of Europe. Thus he thought himself well-qualified to hold a diplomatic post. \textsuperscript{122}

Simms's friends in Congress planned to present his name to President Polk for a foreign appointment. But Polk had rejected Calhoun for a cabinet post, and the entire South Carolina congressional delegation turned against the President. Simms later found out that his name had not even been mentioned to Polk regarding a foreign appointment. \textsuperscript{123}

Late in 1845, Simms again tried for a foreign position. This time Hammond wrote a lengthy letter to Polk, suggesting Simms for the diplomatic post at Naples. Hammond called Simms the most distinguished literary man in the South. He told Polk that Simms was destined to become an outstanding literary figure to future ages. Besides, Simms
had an excellent literary reputation in Europe. Hammond said that the appointment of a Southerner to a diplomatic post would aid Polk in the South. He tried to clinch Simms's appointment by telling Polk that

Mr. Simms is by no means deficient in political information and experience. He has served with much credit to himself in our State Legislature. And it may not be amiss to add, that he was entirely in favour of your election to the Presidency, and so far as I know cordially approves, in common with yourself, the leading measures of your administration.124

Polk did not appoint Simms to a diplomatic post. But Simms refused to end his quest for a diplomatic appointment. He thought that foreign service was the best way that his talents could be utilized in a public career.125 Keeping the diplomatic post in mind, Simms again entered national politics. Late in 1847, he sought a seat in the House of Representatives. With Hammond's support, he planned a campaign. But he discovered that Rhett was also running for office. Simms refused to run against him. Besides, Hammond told him that another political defeat would end his career. Therefore, Simms quietly withdrew from the race and retired from active politics until the presidential election of 1848.

The artist served his state in a political capacity throughout the 1840's. Active in public life, he often tangled with Calhoun and his allies. But Simms was not anti-Calhoun. His means for protecting the South were merely different from Calhoun's. Unable to work with the Calhoun group, he attempted to organize an opposition party. He thought that Calhoun was mistaken in trying to silence all opposition and speak alone for South Carolina. As long as Calhoun lived, he would remain a national figure, conservative on the sectional issue, and opposed to the radicals in his own state. But Simms realized that Calhoun's attempts at purging the political opposition in South Carolina would some day create a fully unified state, conditioned to think as one person.127
NOTES

1. Elizabeth Merritt, James Henry Hammond (Baltimore, 1923), p. 45; Chauncey S. Boucher, "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," MVHR, VIII (June, 1921), 17; Francis W. Pickens to James H. Hammond, Feb. 8, 1839, Hammond to Pickens, Jan. 18, 1840, Hammond Papers.


4. Hammond to Pickens, Jan. 18, 1840, Hammond Papers; Merritt, p. 48.


11. Simms to Hammond, June 15, 1840, Hammond Papers. Simms learned that it was better to work with Calhoun than to oppose him.


13. Wiltse, III, 59; Merritt, p. 54; Courier, Dec. 11, 1840; White, p. 55; Hammond to Marcellus Hammond, Dec. 14, 1840, Hammond Papers. Wiltse said that after the 1840 gubernatorial election South Carolina spoke as one voice.


16. Hammond to Francis W. Pickens, Jan. 27, 1841, MSS, Francis W. Pickens Papers, South Carolintiana Library, University of South Carolina.


27. Simms to Hammond, Jan. 29, 1842, Hammond Papers.


29. Simms to Hammond, June 17, 1842, Hammond Papers.


35. Calhoun to Hammond, Nov. 27, 1842, Jan. 23, 1843, Hammond Papers; Albert Rhett to Robert B. Rhett, June 18, 1842, Jan. 9, 1843, Elmore to Rhett, May 4, 1843, Rhett Papers.

36. Current, p. 25; Calhoun to Hammond, Nov. 27, 1842, Hammond Papers.


40. Hammond, Letters and Speeches, p. 53 (see also p. 52).

41. Ibid., p. 77.

42. Simms to Hammond, Dec. 30, 1843, Hammond Papers; Houston, pp. 136-137.


46. Wiltse, III, 161-163; Fitzsimmons, p. 60; Niles' Register, XLVI (March 30, 1844), 66.

47. Fitzsimmons, p. 60; Elmore to Rhett, Feb. 24, 1844, Rhett Papers; Pickens to Calhoun, May 28, 1844, Pickens Papers.


50. Ibid., I, 418-419, 421, 425; Hammond to Simms, March 27, 1844, Hammond Papers.

51. White, p. 46; Dixon Lewis to Franklin H. Elmore, May 9, 1844, MSS, Franklin Harper Elmore Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.


54. See Wiltse, III, chap. xiv; Chauncey S. Boucher, "The Annexation of
Texas and the Bluffton Movement in South Carolina," MVHR, VI (June, 1919), 3-33 (hereinafter cited as "Texas and Bluffton Movement").

55. Boucher, "Texas and Bluffton Movement," pp. 17-18; Courier, June 27, July 3, 10, 1844; White, p. 73.

56. William Gilmore Simms, The Sources of American Independence (Aiken, S. C., 1844), pp. 13-14. Simms also made numerous other speeches and proposed resolutions throughout his district. He set down the Ashly Resolutions, which were proposals concerning slavery and Texas. Unfortunately no copies of the Ashly Resolutions have survived. For further information on this subject, see Hammond to Simms, June 18, 1844, Ham- mond Papers.

57. Simms, Sources . . ., p. 19.

58. Ibid., p. 24; see also p. 20.

59. Ibid., p. 27; see also pp. 25-26.

60. Ibid., p. 28.

61. Ibid., p. 29.

62. Ibid., p. 30.

63. Ibid., p. 31.

64. Ibid., p. 31.

65. White, pp. 74, 75, 77; Mercury, July 23, Aug. 2, 8, 1844; Oliphant, Simms Letters, I, 427.


67. Niles' Register, Aug. 17, 1844, pp. 411-412; Mercury, Aug. 8-10, 1844.


69. Niles' Register, Aug. 17, 1844, pp. 410-411; Richmond Whig, Aug. 10, 1844.

70. Niles' Register, Aug. 17, 1844, pp. 411-412; see also Mercury, Aug. 10, 1844.


72. Niles' Register, Aug. 31, 1844, pp. 431-435; Maigs, II, 253-254; Mercury, Aug. 16, 1844.
74. Van Deusen, p. 87; Tucker, pp. 436-439; Wiltse, III, 193.
75. Hammond, Letters and Speeches, p. 80.
76. Ibid., pp. 94-98.
77. Ibid., p. 102; see also pp. 98-100.
78. Charleston Courier, Nov. 28, 1844.
79. South Carolina Journal of the House of Representatives, 1844
(Columbia, 1844), pp. 19-21. Simms was also placed on the Committee of
Public Printing.
82. Oliphant, Simms Letters, I, 448.
84. Ibid., p. 42; see also p. 41.
85. Ibid., p. 42; Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 9-10.
86. S. C. House Journal, 1844, p. 42; clippings from Benjamin F. Perry's
88. Ibid., pp. 31-33.
91. Ibid.; Capers, pp. 221-222.
93. Ibid., pp. 1016-1017; White, p. 84; Meigs, II, 259.
94. Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 3-4; Miller, p. 136; William Gilmore
Simms, The Charleston Book: A Miscellany in Prose and Verse (Charleston,
1845), pp. 275-312.
96-274.
97. Ibid., II, 45-46.
98. Ibid., II, 88; see also p. 87.
100. Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 120-121; Calhoun to Pickens, April 1, 1845, Pickens Papers.
102. Ibid., p. 45.
104. S. C. House Journal, 1845, pp. 40, 139, 140-141 (also see p. 142 for the vote); Pickens to Armistead Burt, Dec. 11, 1844, Pickens Papers; Jameson (ed.), "Calhoun Correspondence," p. 420; Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States (Chapel Hill, 1930), pp. 251, 262, 249-250; Columbus Andrews, Administrative County Government in South Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1933), pp. 15, 16, 19; Hammond to Noble I Cunningham, Dec. 29, 1833, Hammond Papers; Hayne, Politics ..., pp. 17, 19.
106. Hammond to Simms, July 8, 1846, Hammond Papers.
112. Greenville Mountaineer, Nov. 13, 1846; Columbia South Carolinian, Nov. 18, 28, 1846.


120. Christopher G. Memminger to Franklin H. Elmore, Dec., 1847, MSS, Christopher G. Memminger Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Hammond to Simms, Jan. 7, 1849, Hammond Papers.


123. Ibid., II, 24-25, 45, 48.


II. THE ARTIST AS PROPAGANDIST I: SIMMS AS SOUTHERN HISTORIAN

Knowing that Simms's literary tastes centered on political themes, James Henry Hammond suggested Simms write "a study of the rise and progress of the American Republic from 1760 to the present day." He wanted Simms to chronicle political issues and write a detailed analysis of the division in political parties. Because Simms was undoubtedly the old South's finest writer and an excellent student of politics, he was the ideal person to write a political history of the sectional controversy.

Although Simms never found time to write a specific history of the sectional struggle, his historical works reflect a particularly Southern view of the growing sectional antagonism between the North and the South. His histories and historical biographies illustrated the common heritage of all Southerners. Simms was most interested in the South's past, its heroes and heroics. For him, historical writing was a potent weapon of Southern sectionalist propaganda.

Through his many historical novels Simms developed a love for the South's history. But he knew that a novelist, although able to capture a nation's character, was merely a story teller. The historian's task was realistically to picture his section's past. He had to use original source materials, and to be a philologist, a geographer, and an archaeologist. By actually visiting ancient ruins or sifting through the remains of a deserted village, Simms saw that...
Each man becomes his own historian. . . . Reasoning of what should have been from what is before us, we gather the true from the probable. . . . The inquiry is not idle, and his-
tory itself is only valuable when it provokes this inquiry--
when it excites a just curiosity--awakens noble affections,--
elicits generous sentiments,--and stimulates into becoming
activity the intelligence which it informs. 6

Simms found that the nation's leaders created its history. This
belief led him to write about the lives of the men who had helped to
build the United States. He wrote four biographies and numerous charac-
ter sketches in the space of only ten years. Most of his biographical
studies were of military heroes and men of adventure--especially the
South's military men of the Revolutionary War. Most of his biographies
and short stories concerned Southerners, men whose actions set an exam-
ple for others to follow.

Everett A. Duyckinck, then an editor of the Democratic Review,
asked Simms to prepare an article on George McDuffie for the Review.
Simms had a short but informative correspondence with Calhoun on the
merits of writing biography. He told Calhoun that he would take utmost
care in preparing the McDuffie article. He would present no facts and
venture no opinions without receiving the sanction of those best informed
on McDuffie's life. Simms wanted to know McDuffie's political ethics,
his manner, and his peculiarities. He promised to avoid all matters
likely to provoke political discussion. Simms wished only to do McDuffie
honor and to present him as a loyal and patriotic Southern statesman. 7

Simms's essay on Daniel Boone elevated the Kentucky hunter into
a mythical image of the frontier personality. Simms said Boone was born
to be a pioneer; during the Crusades he would have been a knight errant.
Not merely a hunter, Boone was a man with a mission. He represented the
spirit of adventure and expansion for the South. 8
In the same vein, Simms chose to write about Cortes, the Conqueror of Mexico. In defeating the Aztec Empire, Cortes had fulfilled Spain's destiny. In governing Mexico he had proved to be as much a statesman as he was a warrior. But when Cortes had accomplished all that he could for Spain, his country cast him out. That was exactly what the South so often did to its great statesmen and military leaders. In order for the South to have true greatness, Simms said, it must glorify its heroes and learn from their examples. Thus, in writing biography, Simms sought to teach a moral lesson through the actions of his heroes.  

Rufus Wilmot Griswold, editor of *Graham's Magazine*, compiled a study of Washington and the Generals of the American Revolution. Long a friend of Simms's, Griswold asked him to contribute short biographical sketches of famous generals. Simms was to write eight articles. He discovered that Griswold's purpose in publishing such a collection of sketches was exactly the same as Simms's reasons for writing them. "It is believed that while they will gratify a laudable curiosity," Griswold said, "they will also, in most cases, deepen the reverence with which the people of this country regard the purchasers of their liberties."  

There were five famous generals from South Carolina, all of whom distinguished themselves in defense of their native section. Simms wanted to set down the most important event in each of their lives in order to give Southerners pride in their ancestors. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, born in Charleston, served with Washington in the North until his native state was endangered. Simms praised Pinckney for his brilliant military actions in South Carolina and for his statesmanship in helping to write the state's constitution. Thomas Sumter was an early advocate of separation from Great Britain. When Charleston was surrendered to the British,
Sumter went into the swamps to organize military resistance. For Simms, Sumter was a symbol of the independent South Carolinian fighting to preserve his state from the English. 12

Isaac Huger, a distinguished military leader, was of French Huguenot heritage. Simms knew that South Carolina had indeed been fortunate to have such people contribute so much to its strength and reputation. Like Huger, William Moultrie was almost wiped out financially by the Revolution. Simms pictured Moultrie as a man who dedicated his life to service for his section and country. 13 Christopher Gadsden was a visionary. He also was one of the first Americans to seek complete independence. Gadsden viewed the Revolution as a war to maintain the rights of man and the representative system. 14 Simms summed up his comments on Gadsden by stating his reasons for writing on Revolutionary War heroes. "His name, deeds, and virtues, constitute a whole portion of American character, to which we may point the attention of our sons, with a sure confidence in the excellence of his example." 15

The actions of famous foreigners who served the Southern cause also fascinated Simms. He was intrigued with the life of Charles Lee, a romantic military figure who fought throughout Europe. When the Revolutionary War began Lee, an Englishman, supported the Americans. But he was too impulsive and erratic and soon broke with Washington. Simms used Lee to warn the headstrong to control their actions, but he praised him for his loyalty to his adopted country. 16 Also, the American Revolution had furnished an excellent opportunity for patriots of foreign countries who were denied the right to struggle for the liberty or beliefs of their own nations. Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a Polish nationalist, gained fame with Nathanael Greene at Ninety-Six. For Simms, Kosciuszko was in the finest
tradition of romantic nationalism. "He was one of those noble and humane spirits which honor the best conceptions of chivalry," Simms said.17

Simms wrote four excellent biographies of men who were both warriors and statesmen. Each man either directly or indirectly served the South, and each was to become an important symbol of a growing Southern nationalism. Simms used historical facts combined with literary descriptions to support the South's role in creating the nation. He was able to create a feeling of Southern unity by using history as propaganda.

In writing about Captain John Smith, Simms sought to create a symbol of adventure and noble spirit. "It is as one of the master spirits of this period and of modern times, that the subject of our biography challenges the consideration of our people."18 More than any other single person, Smith was responsible for the permanent English settlement of Virginia. Simms was awed that one man's powers of leadership were able to dominate such a great transition period in Western history. Orphaned at thirteen, with little education and a spirit of wanderlust, Smith had become the military and political leader of that tiny colony which first settled the South.19

John Smith had not sought political leadership; it had been thrust upon him. Those who had political power usurped their privileges and almost allowed the colonists to starve to death. They realized that Smith, the military hero who had fought off the Indians, was the only man to govern the colony. Since the colony received no aid from England, he was forced to become a tyrant and make the colonists work for themselves. Out of a sense of duty to his fellow man Smith saved the colony from starvation and attack.20

Yet when the crisis was over, the colonial politicians ousted Smith
from leadership and forced him into obscurity. He had outlived his usefulness. That Smith was neglected after the completion of his duties, did not lessen the value of his actions for posterity. Smith had learned to have confidence in his own genius, something that the neglected statesmen of Simms's own day should remember. Above all, Smith was the symbol of dedication to his own people, a man who unselfishly answered his countrymen's call for help. Thus Simms warned his readers of the public's fickleness and cautioned future generations to be careful in their treatment of their truly great men.21

By the use of documents, messages, and a vast store of personal letters, Simms was able to piece together a biography of Francis Marion, one of the South's greatest military heroes. Born in St. John's Parish of Huguenot parents, Marion was the savior of South Carolina during the Revolutionary War. Simms pointed out that because of the long British occupation of South Carolina, few records were kept of the South's heroes. Therefore Northern military men were eulogized, while Southerners were forgotten. He wanted to restore Marion to his rightful position in the history of the Revolutionary War. Simms said that not only should Southerners know of their own heroes, but the North should also have some idea of the service rendered by Southern generals in winning the war.22

Drawing a parallel with his own life, Simms claimed that a lack of education had lessened neither Marion's energies nor his self-confidence. Marion's mind was practical rather than intellectual. His genius prompted him to action rather than study. He became one of the South's noblest models of the citizen soldier, assuming leadership only when called upon. He had elevated his native section to honor and independence, "and secured to her the blessings of liberty and peace." Maintaining that he re-created
history to teach by example, Simms said that Marion's actions were designed to influence the rising young generation of South Carolinians. Simms re-created the life of Nathanael Greene as the symbol of Southern heroism. Born in a New England Puritan environment, Greene was brought up too strictly. His father refused to allow him to read, regarding books as a form of idleness. But the son educated himself and in 1770 was elected to Rhode Island's general assembly. In 1774, Greene realized that England was coercing rather than conciliating the colonies. Joining the continental army, after his performances at the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, he rose to the rank of Major-General. After Horatio Gates's defeat at Camden, South Carolina, Greene succeeded in command of the Southern army.

Greene had found the South dominated by the enemy, and in two years had defeated them. He helped to restore both the Carolinas and Georgia to their original possessors. Greene was always outnumbered, but through maneuvering and courage he managed to defeat the British. Simms pointed out that Greene's reputation was still rising, and that he stood next to Washington as the greatest general of the Revolution. Above all, Southerners should be proud of the man who so well defended their section. Simms closed his biography with the comment that Southerners could learn much from Greene's character and actions. He said that the South needed more such men.

To find an heroic figure for his next biography Simms looked back to the early sixteenth century. He knew that it was a time when chivalry was at its lowest condition in Christian Europe. Hand-to-hand mounted combat was on the decline and would be replaced by cannon and footsoldiers. But one Frenchman, the Chevalier Bayard, remained faithful to the ancient
code of chivalry. He was a knight who sought to do service for his crown and country. His name, according to Simms, "has grown into proverbial identification, in modern times, with all that is pure and noble in manhood, and all that is great and excellent in the soldier."26

Pierre Terrail Bayard, exemplar of the Chevalier sans Peur et sans Reproche, was the classic embodiment of romantic nationalism. His rule was to sacrifice himself always to his duties. His interests, his rights, and his vanity were secondary to the needs of his country. Simms said that Bayard had faults, but no one could accuse him of any vice. He never received the baton as marshal of France because he refused to enter into the politics of office-seeking. Bayard's modesty taught him to express himself moderately in reference to his own position. Thus, he was the victim of lesser men. The Chevalier Bayard died on the 30th of April, 1524. Simms spoke of his death as the end of the chivalric tradition. Perhaps, said Simms, the South was still in need of men such as Bayard.27

It is evident that Simms used biography to illustrate both the needs and the actions of the South. History could teach young Southerners how to act in the face of encroaching danger from the North. But Simms was no reactionary attempting to return to the past. He merely wanted his fellow Southerners to learn from the actions of the heroes of an earlier age.

Simms also wrote a geographical history of South Carolina and gave many lectures in which he sought to protect the South by drawing parallel examples of past dangers. In his Geography of South Carolina, Simms warned the state against an increasing reliance upon agriculture for its economic existence. Charleston, once a center of commercial trade, had lost its shipping industry. In his own time, British and Northern mer-
chants had taken over Charleston's commerce. Simms suggested that the city attempt to become a powerful trade center. After all, there were numerous towns in the interior which depended upon Charleston's commercial prosperity. Someday the city might have to feed and clothe a united South with its imports. Simms also warned that Charleston was dominated by Northern trade in the same way that England controlled colonial trade. It was time that Charleston threw off Northern commercial control.  

Simms's speech on *The Sources of American Independence* was not only a commitment to radicalism but also a work of history chronicling the South's grievances in the Union. He spoke of the South's role in the Revolutionary War and how South Carolina had borne itself as one of the Confederacy of States. Though the War of 1812 was costly to its economy, the state was faithful to the Union, sending many troops to fight in the War. South Carolina had never interfered with or disturbed the security and prosperity of its fellow states. Simms spoke out against the people of the North who had violated the "great object of our revolution." Why had South Carolina fought so hard to uphold the Union, Simms asked? What had happened to independence? The North had violated every tenet of the Revolution. It had turned the national Congress "into an arena for most fearful conflict, and the least justifiable passions." Would history prove that the South had fought to make a confederacy of states in vain?  

Since the American Revolution helped to create sectional antagonisms, Simms sought to re-create the war's origins. The Revolutionary War actually began on the battlefield at Hastings, and the horrible battles at Marston Moor and Naseby had served as forerunners of the final victory in America. When the gallant Cromwell died, England once again came under control of divine right monarchy. There was no battlefield in
Europe "sufficiently large or unincumbered for the working out, by the masses, of that great problem, on the solution of which depended the divine right of kings or people." Simms said that America was the appointed battlefield for European liberty. There the common people would take on their hereditary foe the monarch. Therefore, the Revolution was not fought for the cause of the colonists alone. It was fought for the cause of man. What was more natural, Simms asked, than that man, from every portion of the world, should unite against the enemy? There, "may be found a sufficient and splendid subject for the orator, who would dilate on the sources of American liberty. He has but to follow the stream of English history,—for it was really the old spirit of the Anglo-Saxon, warring with his Norman tyrant, that made the revolution of America!"

Thus the Revolutionary War was the dominant theme in Simms’s historical writings. Most of his biographies centered on the heroics of the War. Simms’s History of South Carolina was devoted to the causes of the War and to South Carolina’s role in winning it. Therefore, he was upset when Northern congressmen and abolitionists attacked the state for its role in the War. Many Northerners claimed that South Carolina was a Tory state that fought on the side of Great Britain. How else, they asked, could the state have remained under British domination for so long a time? Simms replied to the abolitionist charges with a stirring defense of South Carolina’s role in the Revolutionary War. Through the use of history as a propagandistic tool, Simms succeeded in defending his section. But he also pointed out the growing differences between the North and South, especially in their divergent interpretations of their country’s past and the way that past influenced the present.
Since people were ignorant of their past, Simms said that the historian's duty was to enlighten them. Because the "story of the Revolution in the southern colonies has been badly kept," Simms rectified it by writing a history of the Revolution. In his *History of South Carolina*, he revealed the War's causes. After the Peace of Paris the French and Indians were driven from the Western portions of the colonies. Then the colonists turned to a consideration of their relation with Great Britain. They felt that England could no longer protect them. Besides, they had grown accustomed to the idea of fighting their own battles. The colonists' united struggles against the elements, the Indians, and the French and Spanish, gave them a feeling of mutual accomplishment and pride. In 1775, a provisional congress met in Charleston, aired its economic grievances against England, and voted unanimously to support the Continental Congress. Because of their mutual enemy, North and South joined to fight the War.

In the *History of South Carolina*, Simms wrote of the patriotic defense of the state during the Revolutionary War. In 1840, he had not been fully aroused by Northern attacks on the South. By 1848, in an article for the *Southern Quarterly Review*, entitled "South Carolina in the Revolution," Simms had become an ardent defender of his state. Commenting on Lorenzo Sabine's *Loyalists in the Revolution*, Simms asked, "If the record fails to honor the past, and cannot interest the future, why make it?" Sabine's attack on Tory families only served to dig up old wounds and injure Southern character. Sabine failed to point out that South Carolina rose above its own civil war and helped to win the Revolution. South Carolina's merits, said Simms, "consist in having been able, while contending at home against a powerful and bitter faction, to make contributions of
strength, valour, wisdom and patriotism, to the common cause, which no other state in the union ... has ever exceeded." 39

Simms pointed out that New England had not supported the South in the Revolutionary War. Northern troops disappeared when the war moved South, while Southern troops fought in the Northern campaigns. Sabine claimed that Northern soldiers would not fight in the South because of slavery. He insisted that the South was militarily weak because of its slave economy. Simms said that such an idea could exist only in the twisted mind of an abolitionist. In the wake of Northern attack on slavery, Simms was able to draw upon his knowledge of history to defend the South. He discovered that the Negro slave remained loyal throughout the Revolutionary War. 40 Against the charge that South Carolina troops refused to defend Charleston, Simms countered with the statement that New England troops never ventured farther south than Virginia. 41 He asked that the history be written out in full on both sides, with all the facts and nothing set down in malice. Simms summed up his views on the North's growing antagonistic attitude by stating, "We do not fear but the deeds and sacrifices of Carolina, and of the whole South will bear honorable comparison with those of any part of this nation." 42

Intrigued by the heroics of the defense of Charleston during the Revolution, Simms wrote a long and detailed account of the incident. His theme was the valor of the handful of Southerners who defended the city with few provisions against an overwhelming British force. The South received no aid from the Congress and no help from Northern troops. For Simms, the brilliant defense of Charleston would forever refute "the unjust and ungenerous insinuations that the Carolinians shrunk from the defense of their chief city." 43 He concluded that Southern people were
slow to defend their way of life. Only after repeated disasters did the back-country Carolinians join their Charleston neighbors in the Revolutionary War. Once aroused, however, they fought with great tenacity, even after being forced to leave Charleston and take to the forests, until they were victorious. This was a lesson that all should understand, Simms warned.44

Simms also drew important parallels between the Revolutionary War and the economic crisis in the 1840's, in order to warn the South of its predicament. He compared the congressional action towards a high tariff, which hurt the cotton industry, to the action of Charles II in restricting the tobacco trade from Virginia. Above all, Simms constantly used history to warn Southerners of their danger in the Union, and to aid in creating a united Southern front by stressing a common Southern heritage.45 History served Simms well in organizing a verbal Southern resistance to Northern aggression. Much of the insolence of the Northern attack, he said, was derived from false histories. He said that Southern historians must rescue and protect Southern history from Northerners who dominated the writing of history in America.46

Not only was Simms an historian, biographer, historical reviewer, and adviser to numerous young historians, but he also understood the politics of historical writing.47 Hammond again asked Simms to write an elaborate history of South Carolina. A good chapter on the politics of nullification would serve to support the Southern view, Hammond claimed. Simms thought of writing on the important political transition periods in South Carolina history, bringing the study down to the 1840's. Hammond knew that, although Simms would never find time to write such a work, his historical writings well served the South in its struggle for sectional
Simms was no straight-out secessionist in the 1840's, but he was part and parcel of the South. The South was his home, and naturally his themes were Southern. Serving in public life, he came to know the political struggles between the sections. Steeped in Southern history, he naturally leaped to the defense of his section against unjust Northern distortion of historical fact. Feeling a responsibility to his section, Simms reacted with his most potent weapon, his pen. As the South moved, in the 1840's, toward secession, Simms, the public man who had so conditioned himself to defend his section, readily joined the movement for Southern independence.\(^4^9\)

William Henry Trescot, also a South Carolina historian, praised Simms in an address to the South Carolina Historical Society on May 19, 1859. He said:

I cannot refer to this glorious portion of our history [the Revolutionary War] without acknowledging the debt which, I think, the State owes to one of her most distinguished sons for the fidelity with which he has preserved its memory, the vigour and beauty with which he has painted its most stirring scenes, and kept alive . . . the portraits of its most famous heroes. I consider Mr. Simms's [work] . . . as an invaluable contribution to Carolina history.\(^5^0\)

Throughout his career, Simms used history as propaganda. His study of history was a lifelong love affair with his country, his South. For such a man, Trescot's tribute was a just reward.
NOTES


2. Oliphant, Simms Letters, I, 207; see also Magnolia, III (January, 1841), 1-6.


5. Simms, Views and Reviews in American Literature, History and Fiction (2d ser.; New York, 1846), pp. 50, 124, 125, 127, 139 (hereinafter cited as Views and Reviews, II); Kraus, pp. 159-162.


9. Ibid., pp. 255-257; see also II, 101-122.


11. Griswold, II, 313-320. (For verification that Simms wrote these unsigned articles, see Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 342-343.)


13. Ibid., II, 282-290.
15. Ibid., II, 57.
16. Ibid., II, 133-162.
17. Ibid., II, 258; see also 253-257. Simms also wrote a character sketch of Nathanael Greene, but most of that work was incorporated into his biography of Greene (see Griswold, I, 61-104).
19. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
20. Ibid., pp. 123, 124, 127, 299, 300, 301, 349, 351.
21. Ibid., pp. 373-374, 351.
22. Wallace, History of South Carolina, pp. 300-301; William Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (Boston, 1856), preface.
23. Simms, Marion, pp. 30-31; 346-347.
25. Ibid., pp. 340, 357; Russell's Magazine, III (September, 1858), 481; Griswold, I, 104.
27. Simms, Bayard, pp. 393, 395, 396, 397.
29. Simms, Sources . . ., pp. 23-24; The Orion, III (September, 1843), 46.
30. Simms, Sources . . ., p. 9.
31. Ibid., p. 10; Simms, Greene, pp. 9-10.
32. Simms, Sources . . ., pp. 11-13; Edmund Sears Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89 (Chicago, 1956), p. 6. Morgan states what many saw in the Revolution. He says, "It was more myth than reality. . . . Throughout the war and after, Americans maintained that they were preserv-
ing the true tradition of English history, a tradition that had been up-
set by forces of darkness and corruption in England itself."

33. Simms, Sources . . ., p. 13; see also Views and Reviews, II, 78.

34. Simms, Marion, p. 12; William Gilmore Simms, The History of South
Carolina . . . (New York, 1840), vii; Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 318-
319.

35. Simms, History of South Carolina, pp. 120-122; Simms, Marion, p. 76.

36. Simms, History of South Carolina, pp. 123, 126, 128, 129; Simms,
Marion, pp. 325-326.


39. Southern Quarterly Review, XIV (July, 1848), 47; see also 39-45
(hereinafter cited as S. Q. R.).

40. Ibid., p. 61.

41. Ibid., pp. 64, 70, 77; Simms, Views and Reviews, I, xxxiv.

42. S. Q. R., XIV (July, 1848), 76; Simms to Hammond, Dec. 15, 1848,
Hammond to Simms, Dec. 22, 1848, Hammond Papers.

43. S. Q. R., XIV (October, 1848), 264; see also 266-321.

44. Ibid., p. 335.

45. Southern and Western Monthly Magazine, I (February, 1845), 142;
S. L. M., XI (March, 1845), 138.

46. Hubbell, p. 195; see S. Q. R., n. s., I (April, 1850).

47. A. P. Butler to Simms, Dec. 28, 1845, Lawrence Labree to Simms, Oct.
20, 1846, Charles Carroll Simms Papers; Hammond to Simms, March 2, 1845,
Hammond Papers.

48. Hammond to Simms, Jan. 14, Aug. 8, 1848, Aug. 17, 1849, Simms to

49. Ridgely, preface; S. L. M., XXII (April, 1856), 283; Simms, Views
and Reviews, I, xxxvi.

III. THE ARTIST AS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNER: SIMMS AND
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1848

The presidential election of 1848 would greatly influence Simms's future actions regarding the South. Hoping to receive some political reward, and thinking of the South's welfare, Simms decided to support Zachary Taylor for President. Taylor was a planter, slaveowner, and Southern Whig, and he appeared to be an excellent choice for the South. Simms, however, had previously favored Calhoun for the presidency. He thought that as President Calhoun could unite the entire South and greatly enhance the South's position in the Union. When it became evident that Calhoun, who refused to campaign openly, would have no chance for the Democratic party nomination, Simms would switch his support to Taylor. He would become an active campaigner for Taylor throughout South Carolina.

Personally aware of Calhoun's political power in South Carolina, Simms at first was an active member of the Calhoun movement for the presidency. Although he disagreed with Calhoun's conservative national politics and his political domination of South Carolina, he admired his pro-Southern statesmanship. But his motives for supporting Calhoun were not entirely out of dedication to the man. Simms was certain that Calhoun's friends were pushing his presidential candidacy in order to remove him from the state. They knew that Calhoun, if defeated, would be on the political shelf forever. One reason Simms supported Calhoun was to free South Carolina politics from his control.¹
Meanwhile, many Southerners were taking steps to promote Calhoun's candidacy. Dixon H. Lewis, senator from Alabama, wrote Calhoun that he had caucused with the political leaders of South Carolina to decide the best policy of placing Calhoun in the presidency. He cautioned Calhoun to conciliate Polk and to attempt to unite the Democratic party. If Calhoun could do that, perhaps they could do away with the troublesome national nominating convention.  

Edward J. Black of Georgia consulted his political friends and concluded that Calhoun was that state's only choice for President. Other friends throughout the country urged Calhoun to consider running for the office and to remain in the Democratic party.

Calhoun was determined to control the outcome of the election in his own state. He prepared a paper giving his views on the manner of appointing presidential electors. He sought the Democratic nomination but did not want the state Democratic party to draw up a political ticket. Calhoun was also opposed to South Carolina's sending any delegates to a national party convention. He refused to accept the national convention system and would allow none of his people to dignify such a convention with their presence. Calhoun was well aware that his chances of being President were directly related to ending the national nominating convention.

Following Senator Lewis's advice, Calhoun outwardly supported Polk. However, he secretly thought that the President's policies aided the Whigs. He claimed that there was great unrest and dissatisfaction with Polk over Oregon and the Mexican War. He thought that the Democratic party's only chance to retain the presidency was to name him as its candidate. That was in late 1846, and Calhoun still maintained that he would not openly seek the office. His reputation as a great statesman, he
claimed, was more important to him than being President. But if the country and his party needed him, Calhoun would make the sacrifice. Therefore Calhoun sought issues to separate him from the other presidential candidates. Previously he had protested going to war with England over Oregon. Although he advocated Texas annexation, Calhoun opposed war with Mexico. He thought that the conflict over the number of states that would be formed from the Texas territory would increase the sectional controversy. His friends convinced him that the Mexican territory was unsuited for slavery. If that land were turned into free states, it would upset the balance of power in the Senate. Hammond thought that Calhoun's opposition to the Mexican War, if well-explained, would make him popular both in the North and the South.

Simms, however, did not agree with Calhoun. He favored the Mexican War because he felt that the South would gain political power as a result of the war. He asked Calhoun to define clearly his position on Mexican relations. Simms claimed that the South desired the Mexican territory because it would make slavery much more secure. He thought that the entire country's clamor for additional territory would quiet any abolitionist opposition to the war. He counselled Calhoun that the South could not withhold guns and supplies from the military for any length of time. Besides, South Carolina had already committed troops, thus necessitating support of the war.

Unfortunately, Calhoun did not listen to Simms's advice. He continued to advocate an anti-war position. In February, 1847, the Ten Regiment Bill to increase the arms and army in Mexico was debated in Congress. Calhoun attacked the bill and was partly responsible for its defeat. Shortly thereafter, an article attacking Calhoun's Mexican stand
appeared in the Washington Union. A Calhoun lieutenant moved that the Union's editor, Thomas Ritchie, a powerful Virginia newspaperman, be excluded from the floor of the Senate. This was a terrible political blunder. Virginia was an important Southern state because of its allegiance with the Northeast. Calhoun lost Virginia's support and damaged his presidential chances.  

There was, however, an issue that could recover Calhoun's position and even make him a leading candidate for President. Debate was progressing in Congress on the Wilmot Proviso, a bill designed to keep slavery from the Texas territory. On February 19, 1847, Calhoun attacked the Wilmot Proviso in a series of resolutions stating that Congress could pass no laws to prevent a man from taking his property (including slaves) into the Texas territory. Later called the "Southern Platform," those pro-slavery resolutions showed that Calhoun had left the conservative nationalist camp for good. Although still a moderate, Calhoun had damaged the national party system. He tried to create a sectional political alignment for the presidential election.

Soon a caucus of Southern congressmen met and drew up an "Address of the Southern Delegates in Congress to Their Constituents," attacking the North for tolerating antislavery feeling. Southerners were told that unity among themselves was the only method by which the South could protect itself within the Union. There was no turning back; the South was gradually moving to a position of united political strength.

Thomas Hart Benton, Missouri senator and presidential aspirant, immediately attacked Calhoun's pleas for Southern unity. Calhoun's anti-Wilmot Proviso position permanently labelled him a political opportunist who would enhance his own ambitions by advocating sectional unrest. As
far as Benton was concerned, the Calhoun of Missouri Compromise days was no more. 14

On the other hand, Simms, along with many other Southerners, favored Calhoun's new politics. He regarded Calhoun as "moved wholly by a conviction that the presidency was not to be reached through the Polkites." 15 He was certain that Calhoun wanted to align Southern Whigs and Democrats behind him in an independent party. But for Simms, the Wilmot Proviso was offensive to Southern pride rather than politically dangerous. Simms did not want to break with the Polk administration until after Texas was safely in the Southern political structure. Besides, no abolitionist "could keep our people with their slaves from any contiguous Southern territory," he stated. Thus he was positive that the presidential election meant everything to Calhoun, and suspected that he had always felt that way. 16

Calhoun returned to South Carolina to explain his actions and to unite the state behind his drive for sectional political power. At a meeting of Charleston citizens on March 9, 1847, he formally assumed leadership of a movement to unite the South in protection of slavery and to promote his own presidential ambitions. 17 He told the audience that the non-slaveholding states were threatening to appropriate all the territories of the United States, to the exclusion of the slaveholding states. If the non-slaveholding states could carry out this threat, the South would become a permanent minority in the national Congress. Constitutionally, Calhoun pointed out, the North could not control all the new territory. But the North would usurp the Constitution to place the South in the position of a political minority. 18

Why did the North oppose slavery? Calhoun said that slave labor
enhanced rather than conflicted with the economic position of Northern capitalists. He wondered what would happen to the great shipping, commercial, and manufacturing interests of the North if there was no slave labor. Since the crusade against slavery did not originate in hostility of economic interest, the "possibility of arresting the threatened danger" was not hopeless. Then, to answer why the North opposed slavery, Calhoun said Southerners should look at "party operations," especially in relation to the presidential election. The danger lay among the political leaders: "They, for the most part are perfectly indifferent about abolition, and are ready to take either side, for or against, according to the calculations of political chances." 19

Both Northern Whigs and Democrats would cultivate the abolitionist vote, Calhoun claimed. But if the South, by its "promptitude, energy, and unanimity," defended its rights, then that large portion of the North which sought to avoid civil conflict would oppose the Northern party leaders. If they knew that they would lose Southern votes, they would drop the abolitionist minority and support the Southern position. Calhoun claimed that a new party of Northern anti-abolitionists, together with a united South, would organize to put an end to abolitionist agitation. 20 Most important, the South must present a united political front in the next presidential election.

Calhoun did not want any slaveholding state to send delegates to a national party convention. After all, the Northern states would outnumber the Southern states and completely control the convention. Only the political opportunists of the South would participate in such a convention, Calhoun claimed. He wanted the election left to the electoral college. "Henceforward," he said, "let all party distinction among us
cease, so long as this aggression on our rights and honor shall continue, on the part of the non-slaveholding States." Yet Calhoun feared that unless the situation was handled quickly and carefully, the Union would break up. He closed his address by calling for peace and preservation of the United States.

The Southern Quarterly Review, the South's leading literary and political magazine, responded to Calhoun's speech with a long article on "Slavery in the United States." The author agreed with Calhoun that any national party affiliation would be to the South's disadvantage. But the article went beyond Calhoun's political position. According to the Review, abolitionism was more than a political crusade, and voting alone would not combat the danger to slavery. The author called for a moral and intellectual defense of slavery, claiming that slavery was the basis of all lasting civilizations. Agreeing with Calhoun, the writer wanted a united South to destroy the abolitionist threat intellectually and politically.

Others did not look upon Calhoun's March 9th speech so kindly. On April 6, 1847, President Polk wrote in his diary that Calhoun wanted to make slavery a test in the presidential election. Polk said that Calhoun had become desperate in his aspirations for the presidency and used sectional allegiance as the method of sustaining his drive for the office. He hoped that the voters of the country would refuse to follow any sectional alignment and support their own party's candidate for President. Although impressed by Calhoun's abilities, Polk had never cared for him personally. His opinion of Calhoun was now lower than ever. Polk found him a complete political opportunist, with no patriotic feeling whatsoever for his country.
South Carolinians regarded Calhoun's speech with mixed emotions. Simms and Hammond, long members of the state's political opposition, were both pleased and disgusted. Calhoun was advocating their radical sectional position of 1842-1844. Whether Calhoun's radicalism was merely expedient and would die after the 1848 election, neither Simms nor Hammond could be certain. Hammond immediately wrote to Simms, his close political confidant, that Calhoun's speech was designed to gain Southern votes for himself for President. Many would say that he was agitating the slavery question for selfish purposes. Looking at Calhoun's speech from a political standpoint, Hammond said, "South Carolina under present auspices can do nothing if she puts herself foremost but divide the South and insure disastrous defeat."^24

Hammond accused Calhoun of maneuvering South Carolina strictly for his own political ambitions. There was certainly no principle involved in Calhoun's agitation over the slavery issue. As far as Hammond was concerned, Calhoun was agitating the slavery issue merely for selfish political reasons. He had forsaken patriotism and common sense for his presidential ambitions.^25 Still, Calhoun so controlled South Carolina that a man as strong as Hammond would not dare openly oppose him. Besides, Hammond preferred Calhoun as President to any Northerner.

Simms found Calhoun cold to his allies in South Carolina. Of his Southern supporters, nine out of ten despised Calhoun's supremacy and domination of his own state, Simms said. Simms knew that the logical conclusion to Calhoun's ninth of March speech was the call for a Southern convention. For years, Simms and other radicals had contended that a convention was the only way to save the South. Now Calhoun had stolen their thunder while he still refused to conciliate the radicals. But
Simms cautioned Hammond not to speak out against Calhoun's policy. Some-
day Hammond's talents would be needed, and he should not permanently ruin
his own political career. Curiously, Simms still wanted Calhoun as Presi-
dent, but his motives were no longer patriotic. As long as Calhoun's
ambitions lasted there would be no independence of political thought
among South Carolinians. Calhoun's "shadow falls heavily upon our young
men, and darkens all their pathways . . . ." Satiated his political hunger,
Simms said, and he might allow South Carolina to govern itself. 26

Soon Calhoun's campaign began to waver. It became obvious that the
Whigs were going to nominate Taylor, and there would be no opportunity
for a third-party Southern candidate to force the election into the House
of Representatives. Richard K. Cralle, a Virginian who was Calhoun's
trusted advisor, thought that Calhoun had retired from the race. Cralle
was certain that Calhoun would support Taylor. 27 But Calhoun had decided
to hold off on any formal commitment to Taylor. He wanted his friends to
keep silent on Taylor's campaign. Somehow Calhoun still had hopes of
being elected President.

Just when many Southerners were planning to support Taylor, Calhoun
was preparing to establish a sectional newspaper in Washington to enhance
his own position in the South. Hammond received a circular signed by
leading South Carolinians, announcing the need for a Southern newspaper.
The advertisement mentioned South Carolina's apathy and spoke of the need
for a national Southern newspaper "to unfurl the banner of Southern
equality." For the South to be equal in the Union, it must have a press
free from party influences and united in support of statesmen, not poli-
ticians. The circular asked that Hammond lend his name and pen to the
cause of Southern equality. 28
Hammond wrote on the circular that the newspaper venture was merely a ruse to promote Calhoun’s candidacy. Simms, who would have been the perfect man to edit such a sectional political organ, also opposed the establishment of a Southern paper in Washington. Both Hammond and Simms knew that Calhoun wanted such a paper to denounce caucus and convention nominations for the presidency. Such a paper, Hammond was convinced, would antagonize Southern Whigs and Democrats alike. He agreed with Simms that the paper would obviously be a Calhoun political sheet. The newspaper scheme failed and Calhoun was to have no Southern political organ in Washington.

Calhoun knew that his campaign was over when the Democratic National Convention met in May, 1848. Without much enthusiasm the Democrats nominated Lewis Cass for President and William O. Butler for Vice-President. Many South Carolina congressmen were offended by the equivocal Democratic platform and decided to await the results of the Whig convention. The Whigs met in Philadelphia on June 7, and on the fourth ballot they nominated Zachary Taylor, the hero of Buena Vista. The Whigs attempted to conciliate the high tariff men by nominating Millard Fillmore of New York for Vice-President. Calhoun’s sectional party movement was defeated. The country would once again choose its President from a national party candidate.

South Carolinians wondered whom Calhoun would support. He had previously leaned toward Taylor, perhaps because Taylor most ideally represented the South and would support slavery. But in December, 1847, Calhoun had refused to back either candidate. Both political factions (the state was divided into Taylor Whigs and Democrats and Cass Democrats) courted Calhoun’s support, but to no avail. Calhoun was the only man
powerful enough in South Carolina to refuse aid to both major political parties. 31

Many of Calhoun's colleagues asked him to support openly either Cass or Taylor. E. M. Seabrook found something wrong with both candidates but still thought the state, as a united political body, should back only one man. James Gadsden told Calhoun that he was wrong to remain neutral because neutrality would only disrupt the state. He warned that if Calhoun declared for Cass he would divide the state. But if he settled upon Taylor as the safest candidate, South Carolina would be united. But Calhoun insisted upon remaining neutral, watching to support whichever candidate was elected, provided he was acceptable to the South. He said, "I see much to condemn and little to approve in either candidate." 32

Meanwhile the state's other political leaders thought of Taylor as pro-Southern and planned their campaigns accordingly. 33 James Louis Petigru, a Charleston attorney and unionist Whig, was skeptical over Taylor's pro-Southern position. He remembered Calhoun's suggestion that a Southern Whig might be better than a Northern Democrat. Petigru noticed that Taylor Democratic clubs were being formed throughout the state. He found the election to be one of utmost confusion. He was so disgusted with the Taylor Democrats "that I am perfectly willing to see them routed." 34 Petigru would not hinder Taylor's chances but would do nothing for him. But by September his basic Whig conservatism got the best of him, and he was actively campaigning for Taylor. 35

Benjamin Franklin Perry, Greenville newspaperman and unionist Democrat, was running for Congress. He was pro-slavery and would support no candidate who was not safe on the slavery question. As late as February,
1848, he was supporting Calhoun for President. His opponent, James L. Orr, a moderate Whig, came out for Taylor, and Perry's friends advised him not to support Cass openly. If Perry supported Cass, who obviously was going to carry the state, he would unite all the Whigs behind Orr. But Perry, always an outspoken man, considered Taylor unsuited to be President and detested the Whig party. He openly campaigned for Cass, even in Pickens, a Taylor stronghold. Attempting to stop him, Perry's wife wrote that Armistead Burt, Perry's chief political advisor, would no longer support him if he campaigned for Taylor. Perry lost the Congressional seat to Orr and blamed his defeat on the presidential election.  

Robert Barnwell Rhett, South Carolina's leading radical, was an avowed Democrat. He believed in working with the State Rights party as long as it supported the South. In May, 1847, Rhett was for Taylor, but said he could not support him if the Whigs nominated him. Rhett did not care for Cass's politics; he opposed Cass's position on territorial sovereignty. But when the Free Soil party under Van Buren splintered from the Democrats, Rhett made an about-face and supported Cass. He accepted the responsibility of running the Cass campaign in South Carolina, and spoke throughout the state for Cass and the Democratic party. He told his fellow Democrats in Washington that he would carry the state for Cass despite Calhoun's neutrality. Rhett had tried many times to work with Calhoun, often to no avail, and he would not throw away South Carolina's vote merely to please Calhoun's vanity.  

On August 21, he openly announced the Mercury's full support of the regular Democratic ticket and refused to print any more letters concerning Taylor's candidacy.  

When it was evident that Calhoun was out of the race, Sims decided to campaign for Taylor. Previously he had been a Jacksonian Democrat.
He had supported Jackson and Van Buren, and had reluctantly backed Polk in 1844. Simms’s switch to the Whig candidate in 1848 was something of a surprise to his friends, who thought that he would always be a Democrat. But the presidential election in 1848 did not mark a major departure from his previous position. Because he lived and worked in the South, Simms became more and more pro-Southern. He learned the political lesson that one could not be entirely outside the state’s predominant political position and remain in public life. In 1837 he had written of the advantages of slavery. By 1842 he was a leading radical. In 1848 Simms found Taylor to be the best candidate for the South, and he became an active political organizer and campaigner for him.

Simms had early recognized that Zachary Taylor could be an instrument to protect the South. Since Taylor was obviously pro-slavery, Simms said there was no reason for Calhoun to form a slavery party. Such an organization would have forced the North to form an anti-slavery party and insure the South’s defeat in the election. Simms had thought that Taylor would receive the Democratic nomination if Calhoun supported him. But Calhoun would not aid Taylor, and Simms had to reconcile himself to supporting Taylor as a Whig. He wrote to Hammond that "a Southern Whig is a very different animal from the same sort of person in the North." Also, Simms was certain that Taylor, an ardent slavery expansionist, would aid in uniting the South and West, thus defeating the abolitionist North.

Simms faced three dilemmas in organizing the campaign for Taylor. Since Taylor was the Whig candidate, he must convince the normally Democratic state that Taylor was more Democratic than Whig in his policies. Also Simms had to have the open support of some of South Carolina’s political leaders. He actively sought the help of Hammond, who was certainly
the strongest anti-establishment politician in the state. Simms also knew that he must have newspaper support in order to promote Taylor's campaign. If there were no Taylor newspaper in the state, then Simms wanted active political figures to campaign by speeches and letters to the press.

Early in the campaign Hammond promised Simms that he would support Taylor. However, he told Simms that it was uncertain whether South Carolina would support a Whig nominee. He warned Simms, "Any movement in favour of any man unless it originates with Calhoun would be instantly crushed." Hammond suspected that Calhoun secretly preferred Taylor, but Calhoun so controlled the South Carolina vote that it was impossible to speculate on the election's outcome. He cautioned Simms to be careful in his campaign methods, lest he incur Calhoun's wrath.

Simms knew that Taylor would have difficulty carrying South Carolina simply because Taylor was running as a Whig. He was certain that the people of the state favored Taylor, but the politicians were Democrats and would not find their interests best aided through the Whig party. Perhaps the political leaders might even waste South Carolina's vote on a third-party candidate. Simms thought that the leaders were foolish, especially when a Taylor victory would protect slavery. He wrote Hammond asking for his view of Taylor. Apparently many politicians wanted Simms to make certain that Hammond favored Taylor, since his support would lend dignity to Taylor's South Carolina campaign.

Unfortunately Hammond began to equivocate. Fear of Calhoun caused Hammond to become wary in his political behavior. Hammond would say nothing outward in support of Taylor. He told Simms that the active campaign for Taylor was causing serious dissension in South Carolina.
What he really meant was that no one could oppose Calhoun in the state without being destroyed politically. Thus Simms had temporarily lost his foremost ally and the most important political name associated with the campaign.

Simms went ahead with the campaign, giving speeches, writing newspaper articles, and still hoping for Hammond's support. At a Taylor meeting in Charleston, Simms gave a brilliant speech attacking Elmore and his political friends. Simms used the theme of "hunkerism" to identify the conservative political forces in the state. He maintained that the "Hunker" or Calhoun-Elmore regency, successfully muzzled thought and political action in the state. For Simms the election of Taylor would prove that the conservatives did not control the state.

Hammond praised Simms's speech, and claimed that he was again an open Taylor man. But Hammond spoke for Taylor only in connection with his own anti-bank views. He still pursued the Bank of South Carolina, hoping to destroy it and disrupt the local political powers. Obviously state politics were more important to Hammond, and Taylor's election was merely a temporary expedient in his anti-bank war. He believed that Taylor's victory would break down the "old hunkers" and give people a taste of political freedom.

In order to force Hammond to join him, Simms too took an anti-bank position. He associated the Bank with the conservative element in the state. Using the Bank as a symbol of discontent, Simms again tried to enlist the support of the young South Carolina politicians, this time to work for Taylor. Speaking on July 27, Simms announced that he "belonged to the school of 'young Carolina . . . ." He cultivated the young politicians by opposing them to "hunkerism" and "that unreasoning submission
to authority which had so long stifled the free voices of the people of Carolina." Simms then attacked the Bank, calling it the instrument of party domination that had prevailed in South Carolina for twenty years. "In a word," he said, "the old hunkers must leave the Barn or have it burned down over their heads."\(^{48}\)

But Simms still could not gain Hammond's open support. He instructed Andrew Gordon Magrath, who had served with him in the legislature, to plead with Hammond to take the lead in the Taylor movement. Hammond maintained, however, that he was out of public life, and that his support would probably hinder rather than help Taylor. He asked Simms not to make Taylor the candidate of broken-down politicians and political outcasts. Besides, if Hammond supported Taylor, people would accuse him of using the presidential election to further his own chances for political office. Hammond still lived within a world of state politics; he refused to recognize Simms's genuine interest in protecting the slave society with a slaveholder as President.\(^{49}\)

Hammond was certainly no political has-been. Simms told him that he could be the most important man in South Carolina after Calhoun died. Hammond, however, must commit himself to politics and to some political position. Simms told him that Calhoun, Butler, and Burt secretly inclined to Taylor. If Hammond would only speak out, perhaps he could build a strong political party in opposition to Rhett who had recently become Cass's campaign manager in South Carolina. Thinking he could get Hammond to commit himself if Calhoun supported Taylor, Simms again attempted to persuade Calhoun to join the Taylor campaign. He was certain that Calhoun's refusal to speak out was causing dissension in South Carolina. "Strange," said Simms, "that the moment when it is important that he should
speak he should be silent." But Simms knew that his plea for Calhoun's support was hopeless.

Many South Carolinians supported Taylor because he was pro-Southern, or because they wanted to build an anti-establishment party. Some regular Democrats supported Cass out of habit. Far and above the largest percentage, however, kept quiet because the state's leader refused to support either candidate. Thus Hammond secretly supported Simms and advised him to work harder in Charleston. Seeing Simms's hand in some political writing, Hammond wished that Simms could be victorious. Still, Hammond would not openly commit himself. At last he told Simms that as a Democrat he could not support Taylor. "Do not ask for any more help," Hammond said.  

Certain that he had lost Hammond, Simms turned to the newspapers for assistance. Early in the summer the Taylor supporters still thought that they could get a share of the press's support. Simms wrote an article as an "Independent Democrat" in the Mercury, and wanted that paper, as the leading radical newspaper in the state, to support Taylor. He even attempted to buy a share of the Mercury's editorial page. Simms also wrote for the Charleston Courier and attempted to argue the logic of the South's support of Taylor. But he knew that his organization needed a newspaper of its own. The Mercury, under Rhett's leadership, eventually went over to Cass. After that, no pro-Taylor articles appeared in the Mercury's columns. Try as he could, Simms could find no important newspaper in South Carolina that would openly support Taylor.

Without a newspaper the Taylor cause was lost in South Carolina. Simms continued to campaign. He seemed to enjoy giving stump speeches and confided to Hammond that he had become a popular figure in Charleston.
Friends considered him for Congress, and many people suggested that he run for public office. But Simms was too busy to think of his own career. He was the principal speaker at a "Charleston Democrats for Taylor" meeting on October 31, 1848. He advocated strong support of slavery in the territories, and even called for a Southern convention if Taylor was defeated. Simms was certain that Taylor would uphold the South in all its political and economic needs.

Simms wound up his campaign for Taylor in mid-November. He made his last pro-Taylor speech on November 9, and settled down to await the election outcome. Simms knew that Taylor would be elected, and he finally began to think in terms of a political or diplomatic appointment for himself. After all, he was one of the leaders of Taylor's campaign in South Carolina. He had accomplished much in the way of enlightening the state as to the power of the conservative establishment. Young Carolinians should flock to his political banner, making Simms an important leader in the state.

However, Simms was not primarily interested in his own political gain. Years later in a long and penetrating article entitled "The State of Parties in the Country," Simms elaborated the reasons for his active support of Taylor. He had been suspicious of Cass because of his Northern background. Taylor, as a "Southron" and a slaveholder, was the perfect Southern candidate. Most of all, Taylor's election forced the Democratic party back to its Southern alignment, Simms said. Besides, many leading Democrats were unsound on the slavery question. Taylor's election would force them to silence the slavery controversy, thus protecting the South. And Taylor was "one who might be relied on as faithful to an interest which the South cherished as its very breath of life, and con-
ceived to be threatened with greatest danger."

Simms wrote to Calhoun to explain why he had so ardently supported Taylor. He advised Calhoun that the new President would protect the interests of the South. Simms also wanted Calhoun to suggest qualified counsellors for Taylor. The President would obviously look to the South for his close advisors and administrators. The days of sectional antagonism were over, Simms told Calhoun, because Taylor was pro-Southern.

Although reward was not his primary motive for supporting Taylor, Simms did expect to be named Ambassador to Naples. Hammond advised Simms to select and request his foreign mission early. Surely Taylor would give "his faithful friend" any political position that he wanted, he said. Hammond offered to do what he could to promote Simms's appointment. Simms thought that Isaac Holmes, also a Taylor supporter in South Carolina, would be his only competition. Simms needed the mission, claiming that literature was in a wretched condition and that his books were not selling. The Italian mission would save Simms financially and give him a needed change of perspective and new literary themes. After all, Simms was read in Italy and he was the South's leading man of letters.

Some of Simms's friends again proposed him for lieutenant governor, especially after he had made such an excellent political reputation among South Carolinians. But Simms considered the office honorary and without power. Besides, he preferred a diplomatic post. Hammond, however, did not want Simms to have too great expectations for the appointment. He did not know Taylor personally and suggested Simms get a close ally of Taylor's to mention his request to the President. He wondered whether Simms's recent appointment as editor of the *Southern Quarterly Review* had not entangled him too much to keep him from taking the foreign appointment.
But all of Simms's planning was to no avail. Taylor appointed another candidate to the foreign post. After risking his own political future for Taylor, Simms received no political reward.

Moreover, Taylor was inaugurated on March 5, 1849, and his address was noncommittal on many of the territorial questions that disturbed the South. He called for a national patriotism that would transcend sectional lines and spread American democracy throughout the territories. It soon became apparent to Simms that President Taylor was indeed a Whig, since he sought the advice of William H. Seward, a New York Whig with abolitionist leanings. Also, Taylor received word of a band of patriots who wanted to plant the American flag in Cuba, perhaps to extend slavery.

He immediately moved to cut off the small army, calling it treasonous, and he threatened to imprison any citizen who invaded the territory of an ally.

Throughout 1848 there had been agitation in South Carolina to call a Southern convention to unite the South as a section. But this was mitigated by the hopes that Taylor would serve the Southern cause as President. Calhoun now knew that Taylor would not protect the South. He called for the South to present an "unbroken front" to the North. But he added that it would be impossible to present such a front, "except by means of a Convention of the Southern States." Only by a united front could the South prevent a disruption of the Union. Calhoun claimed it was the South's duty to hold a convention and thus preserve the Union. He suggested a committee meet in Charleston or Columbia to prepare for a Southern convention.

The final blow came with Taylor's first annual message to Congress delivered on December 4, 1849. Gold had been discovered in California,
and the President insisted that the territory be admitted as a state under any circumstances. He was not disturbed that California would enter the Union as a free state and completely disrupt the North-South sectional balance. Taylor closed his message with an appeal to the value of the Union, asking that no section attempt to disrupt the orderly proceedings of the federal government.68

The South could only speculate that New Mexico and Utah would follow California, and the Southern states would forever remain a numerical minority in Congress. The Charleston Mercury immediately denounced Taylor as an abolitionist. Taylor, the Mercury said, would give the North the Wilmot Proviso without bothering to pass it through Congress.69 Calhoun immediately suggested to Hammond that South Carolina lead the other Southern states. He wanted the state legislature to move for a convention. Hammond was to have the legislature appoint delegates to a convention. Calhoun said, "If South Carolina backs it, the Convention will meet ... ."70

South Carolina prepared for convention. Taylor, a Southern slaveholder, had betrayed the South. But what of Simms, Taylor's leading supporter in South Carolina? He resolved never again to support a Whig for President. He had favored the Union, thinking the South could cooperate with the rest of the country. Simms became an open advocate of co-operation among Southern states, favored a convention in 1850, and for a few years, was a leading radical advocate of secession.71 He wrote to Hammond that he would like to be a delegate to the Southern convention.72

Was Taylor entirely responsible for the sudden change in Simms? Since 1836 Simms had been pro-Southern, especially in his defense of slavery. He had been a "Bluffton boy" and an early advocate of a Southern convention. But toward the end of the 1840's, Simms thought that the
South could remain in the Union on an equal basis with the North. He was certain that a slaveholder like Taylor would be a perfect compromise candidate. He would be a Southern executive in a Northern-dominated Congress. Taylor could protect both the expansion of slavery and the Southern cotton economy. So Simms, the artist as campaigner, worked and risked his political future in South Carolina for Taylor. Then Taylor betrayed Simms’s beloved South. Simms lost all faith in national politics and became an ardent Southern nationalist.

But Calhoun still controlled the state and, although he sought a united South, he counselled moderation. He would die in 1850; who would control the state’s radicals after he was gone? Calhoun had built the state into a machine of destruction, using the radicals to form a sectional party. Simms had become a radical. If he could not serve as an active politician, the artist would use his talents elsewhere. As a stump speaker, a newspaper editorialist, and an influential letter writer, Simms would preach Southern unity. As editor of the Southern Quarterly Review, he would transform that magazine into a forceful propaganda machine for Southern nationalism.
NOTES


2. Boucher and Brooks (eds.), "Correspondence to Calhoun," p. 293.

3. Ibid., pp. 326, 338-339; Meigs, II, 286.


5. Ibid., p. 712; Calhoun to Hammond, Jan. 23, 1846, Hammond Papers; White, p. 86.


7. Capers, pp. 233-234; Current, pp. 28-29; Boucher and Brooks (eds.), "Correspondence to Calhoun," p. 365; Wallace, Political Life of Rhett . . ., p. 22.


18. Gare, IV, 383-384.

19. Ibid., p. 388; see also pp. 386-387.

20. Ibid., pp. 390-391.

21. Ibid., p. 394.

22. S. Q. R., XII (July, 1847), 134; see also 91-134.


25. Hammond to Simms, March 26, 1847, Hammond Papers.

26. Simms to Hammond, March 29, 1847, April 2, 1847, Hammond to Simms, April 1, 1847, Hammond Papers.


31. Wiltse, III, 372 (see also 370-373); Raybeck, pp. 354-356.


34. Carson, p. 265.

35. Ibid., pp. 275-276.

36. Mrs. Perry to Perry, late in 1848, MSS, Benjamin F. Perry Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Lillian Adèle
Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry, South Carolina Unionist (Durham, N. C., 1946), pp. 222-225.

37. White, pp. 93-100; Wallace, Political Life of Rhett . . ., p. 23.

38. Mercury, Aug. 21, 1848.


41. Simms to Hammond, June 4, 1847, Hammond Papers.


43. Hammond to Simms, May 29, 1848, Hammond Papers.

44. Simms to Hammond, June 15, 1848, Hammond Papers.

45. Hammond to Simms, June 20, 1848, Hammond Papers.


47. Hammond to Simms, July 26, 1848, Hammond Papers; for a careful study of Hammond's vacillation on support of Taylor, see Merritt, pp. 82-85, 87.

48. Columbia South Carolinian, July 28, 1848; Simms to Hammond, July 29, 1848, Hammond Papers.

49. Hammond to Simms, Aug. 13, 1848, Hammond Papers. Hammond accused Simms of writing a political lampoon on Cass. He could not understand how Simms could get so excited about a national election.


52. Hammond to Simms, June 26, July 26, 1848, Hammond Papers.

53. Mercury, Aug. 22, 1848; Courier, Sept., 1848; Simms to Hammond, July 20, 1848, Hammond Papers; Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 430.


57. S. Q. R., VIII n. s. (July, 1853), 28 (also see pp. 16, 20, 21, 29); Simms to Hammond, Nov. 11, 1848, Hammond Papers.

58. Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 469, 475, 482-483; Crallet, VI, 290-313.

59. Hammond to Simms, Nov. 17, 1848, Hammond Papers.

60. Simms to Hammond, Nov. 24, 1848, Hammond Papers.


64. James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902 (20 vols.; Washington, 1903), V, 4-6.

65. Ibid., V, 7; Wiltse, III, 405; Perkins, p. 157.


68. Richardson, V, 9-24.


SECTION THREE:

SIMMS THE SOUTHERN NATIONALIST, 1850-1860
I. THE ARTIST AS THEORETICAL POLITICIAN: SIMMS AND
THE SECESSION AND CO-OPERATION MOVEMENTS
IN SOUTH CAROLINA

During the 1850's Simms became a Southern nationalist. Although he
never again held political office, he remained politically active. Be-
sides editing the Southern Quarterly Review and contributing to many
periodicals, he often gave speeches in support of a nationalistic South.
But he realized that the South could never control a national political
party and that its only recourse was to develop a sectional party. Simms
also knew that his own state was divided over a debate on immediate seces-
sion or co-operative secession among all the other Southern states. At
first a straight-out secessionist, he soon realized that South Carolina
would be able to leave the Union only with the co-operation of most of
the South. Thus Simms became a leading co-operationist and served as a
moderating force in his own state.

Ironically, Calhoun would help to bring on the straight-out versus
co-operationist debates in his own state. Writing to John H. Means,
active secessionist and governor of South Carolina in 1850, he said that
the time was close at hand "when the South will have to choose between
disunion and submission . . ."1 The South had to present an "unbroken
front" to the North to keep the Union from being divided. The only way
such a "front" could be achieved was by a "Convention of Southern States"
to iron out their difficulties. He suggested that South Carolinians meet
in convention and prepare the way for a Southern convention. But the state convention should only suggest that the entire South meet in convention. Considered too radical, South Carolina would have to take a moderate position and follow the rest of the South.²

The other Southern states were carefully polled on the merits of holding a Southern convention. A Mississippi convention issued an "Address to the Southern States," calling for a convention to meet at Nashville on June 3, 1850. Calhoun asked Andrew Pickens Calhoun and Hammond to correspond with important political figures in South Carolina to make certain that the convention would not fail for lack of backing. He also suggested that Hammond persuade the South Carolina legislature to endorse the Mississippi "Address." Since another state had taken the lead, South Carolina no longer had to hold back.³

Calhoun's quest had been accomplished. Whig and Democrat alike were to meet in Nashville to discuss Southern grievances. He wrote to Hammond claiming that the convention would be well attended. The debate in Congress on the California admission bill would soon begin, but Calhoun knew that many Southern congressmen, since they saw little chance of saving the Union, would meet at Nashville. He hoped that Hammond and the other delegates would not merely debate territorial questions, but would say "that the South ought not to remain in the Union, without a complete restoration of all her rights, a full recognition of our equality [in] every respect, and ample security for the future."⁴ Let the South be as one, was Calhoun's advice to all parties in the South.

There remained one final act in Calhoun's long career. On the 4th of March, 1850, his speech refusing compromise was read in the Senate by James M. Mason of Virginia. By that time Calhoun was too weak to speak
for himself. He claimed to have grown old in public service trying to
save the Union. His speech was primarily concerned with territorial expan-
sion and the South's position in the country. Because the North ruled
Congress, it could determine whether the Western territories would be
slave or free. He asked how the South could give up slavery. The system
was an economic and social way of life, and if the government limited
slavery, the system would die out. California had become the test ques-
tion. "If you admit her, under all the difficulties that oppose her ad-
mission, you compel us to infer that you intend to exclude us from the
whole of the acquired territories . . .," he said.\(^5\) Calhoun was not seek-
ing compromise. He wanted to know exactly where the South stood in the
Union.

Calhoun closed his speech having done his duty, having expressed
his opinions "fully, freely, and candidly":

In doing so, I have been governed by the motives which have
governed me in all the stages of the agitation of the slavery
question since its commencement. I have exerted myself, during
the whole period, to arrest it, with the intention of saving
the Union, if it could be done; and if it could not, to save
the section where it has pleased Providence to cast my lot,
and which I sincerely believe has justice and the constitu-
tion on its side. Having faithfully done my duty to the best
of my ability, both in the Union and my section, throughout
this agitation, I shall have the consolation, let what will
come, that I am free from responsibility.\(^6\)

On March 31, 1850, the South's most powerful statesman died.\(^7\)
Immediately Calhoun became a symbol of Southern nationalism. Simms and
other public figures who had so long opposed Calhoun now saw him as the
South's great defender. Benjamin F. Porter said that Calhoun was both
politically and morally honest. "Mr. Calhoun, like one of ancient times,
was destined continually to be prophesying truth; but alas! alas! he
found few to believe him."\(^8\) For Porter, Calhoun was the guardian of
both the Constitution and the Union. He had sacrificed his ambition, which was in most men's nature, to being just, patriotic, and morally right.

Thomas Prentice Kettell, editor of the Democratic Review, a party organ, praised Calhoun for having been a free trade advocate. He was the champion of Southern rights, said Kettell. "This endeared him to a large portion of the Southern people, particularly the people of his native State, which never failed to sustain him in every emergency." Calhoun was not merely a sectionalist but a noble and patriotic American. As a speaker, he was not eloquent but spoke with sincere conviction and without sinister or selfish motive. Now that he was dead, Kettell said, Calhoun's thought would rise above party strife and perhaps have some influence in uniting the South.  

There were others, however, who considered Calhoun a menace to the South. Joel R. Poinsett denied his wisdom. He was convinced that Calhoun had sacrificed the South for his petty ambitions. Benjamin F. Perry, long an admirer of Calhoun, regarded his death "as fortunate for the country and his own fame."  

Calhoun's opposition to the Compromise of 1850 permanently alienated Perry, and he thought Calhoun's uncompromising attitude endangered the South. "His death has relieved South Carolina of political despotism," Perry said. He was glad that there would be division in the state. At last, Perry and his fellow unionists could unite in opposition to the state's radicals.

Thomas Hart Benton, senator from Missouri and long a colleague of Calhoun's in Congress, best summed up his passing. He said:

Mr. Calhoun is dead. Peace to his manes. But he has left his disciples who do not admit of peace! who rush in where their master feared to tread. He recoiled from the disturbance of the Missouri Compromise; they expunge it. He shuddered at
the thought of bloodshed in civil strife: they demand three millions of dollars to prepare arms for civil war.13

But if there was praise and some condemnation for Calhoun, there was also the political matter of who would receive his Senate seat. Simms assumed that Hammond, as the leading statesman in the state, would fill Calhoun's unexpired term. "In the Senate you will have a part to play which will enable you to bring on the catastrophe," Simms said.14 He reminded Hammond that South Carolina must not appear to lead the rest of the South. He knew that Hammond could do much to pacify other Southern senators, unite the South, and lead the section to secession.

Governor Whitmarsh B. Seabrook had other ideas. Seeking the office himself, he suggested that Elmore, Rhett, and Hammond were all capable of replacing Calhoun. Unable to decide between these leaders, Seabrook chose James Hamilton for the Senate.15 Simms was disappointed but he resolved to do all that he could to place Hammond in a position where his leadership would be recognized.

The city council of Charleston chose Hammond to give the funeral eulogy for Calhoun, and Seabrook chose Robert Barnwell Rhett to give an oration in Columbia. Hammond did not want to give the speech, because he thought that Simms should have been chosen. He claimed that he could not write biography and wanted Simms to help him. Besides, the Nashville convention was too close at hand, and he had little time to write a speech. Hammond asked whether Simms had collected any material for a biography, or could describe some incidents in Calhoun's life that would be useful in a eulogy.16

Another factor in Hammond's reluctance to give such a eulogy was that he had no true feeling for Calhoun. As far as he and Simms were concerned, Calhoun had been in power too long. He had delayed the move-
ment for Southern independence for years, they complained. Both Simms and Hammond had proposed a Southern convention twenty years before Calhoun called for one. Calhoun had also resented the brilliance and independence of the two men. They damned Calhoun for resisting Northern attacks without relying on his fellow Southerners. In doing so, Calhoun had prevented the South from uniting to resist Northern aggression.17

Nevertheless, Simms knew what Calhoun could come to represent for the South. He advised Hammond first to glimpse into Calhoun’s family life and education, and to mention the evidences even while at college of "an intense spirit, an impatient will, an acute [sic], logical and greatly grasping mind." Hammond should then mention Calhoun’s years of public service and his clash with Jackson over defending the South. As nullifier and sectionalist Calhoun was the South’s champion. Simms pointed out that since he had died in harness, Calhoun was even more of a martyr. He cautioned Hammond to avoid the pathetic, because there was nothing to weep for. Calhoun died in the fullness of his fame, and he had lived the life of a hero. Simms suggested that Hammond close with a comment on Calhoun’s "singleness in his devotion to the South."18

Although never an active follower of the living Calhoun, Simms realized that the great statesman could become in death a symbol for the South in its drive for secession.19 Understanding that Calhoun must first become a legend in South Carolina, Simms dedicated a long political poem to him. Delivered at the consecration of the Magnolia cemetery in Charleston, the poem praised Calhoun’s leadership and his love for a united South. Simms wanted to turn the cemetery into a state shrine where all its leading statesmen and military heroes would be buried. Ranking Calhoun with Moultrie, Hayne, and Laurens, Simms wanted a monument raised to
symbolize the statesman's dedication to South Carolina. Simms also wrote about Calhoun in the second edition of his History of South Carolina in 1860. He said that from the close of 1812 to 1850, Calhoun's history was the history of South Carolina. "He was her ruling spirit—the embodiment of her thought and policy." For Simms, Calhoun died in the "harness," while he was in Congress asserting Southern rights. Calhoun always opposed the aggressions of one section upon another. It was his duty to speak for the South, to counteract the inevitable attack of a larger body upon a smaller one. For this he would forever remain a symbol of a united South. In this manner Simms helped to build the Calhoun myth.

But Calhoun left another legacy besides his name. The Nashville Convention would meet in June, 1850. Before the convention met, Simms had given up compromising with the North and was for immediate Southern secession. The idea of a Southern confederacy intrigued him, and he began to think of the South as a united people. He had considered secession inevitable; now it had become necessary. "The Union depends wholly upon the sympathies of the contracting parties," he said, "and these are lost entirely." Simms no longer had any faith in political compromise, and he was no longer willing to be "gulled" by the North. Compromise at that time would represent cowardice and evasion on the part of the South and fraud on the part of the North. But he knew that the North would attempt to conciliate the South. By pacifying the South, political parties would subvert the secession movement. The South must reject national party affiliations. Therefore, the Southern convention should represent an uncompromising Southern Confederacy.

As an authority on politics and a keen student of Southern national
feeling, Simms should have been nominated to the convention. Hammond
wanted him there, thinking that his oratory and pen would influence the
Barnwell were chosen to attend the convention. Simms could only vicari-
ously enjoy the proceedings, influence Hammond's actions, and hope that
the convention would at last unite the entire South. 25

But Simms was active in pre-convention meetings, pursuing his
hatred of the two national political parties. He wanted to discredit the
Southern politicians who accepted the Clay compromise and in doing so,
destroy the political parties. After all, those organizations were respon-
sible for forcing Southern politicians into disloyalty to their section.
He was certain that South Carolinians were prepared for secession. Simms
doubted, however, the loyalty of such states as North Carolina, Kentucky,
and Tennessee. If only politics could be taken out of the hands of the
demagogues and given to the people, then the South could count on united
strength. Thus, Simms hoped to instill in kindred spirits such as
Beverly Tucker and Hammond the proper spirit that should prevail at Nash-
ville. In that convention no national parties would be represented, and
the South could act outside of the political system as a united section. 26

Delegates came to Nashville from nine Southern states, but at
least 100 of the 175 members were from Tennessee. 27 Most of the members
were for moderation, and the South Carolina delegation of "fire-eaters"
was forced to remain in the background. Hammond and Barnwell were
appointed to the Resolutions Committee, which prepared the convention's
platform. Since the concessionists sought to preserve the Union, they
agreed to accept the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the
Pacific Ocean. 28 [This paved the way for the Compromise of 1850, which
was finally settled in September.] Hammond and Simms were disappointed. As far as they were concerned, the only things the convention had accomplished were that a few politicians would be purged from the Southern ranks and that the delegates had resolved to meet again in November.  

Hammond left the Nashville Convention believing that South Carolina would have to moderate its radical position. He had succeeded in convincing the other delegates that South Carolina opposed immediate secession. Simms also realized that the rest of the South temporarily had to be placated. On Simms's advice, Hammond refused to attend the second Nashville Convention, believing nothing would be accomplished there. The convention met and attacked the Wilmot Proviso, refused to think of a Southern Confederacy, and sought the restoration of the South's constitutional rights. That action had a great effect on Simms's radical position. He modified his straight-out secessionist position and began to think in terms of seeking a united South through co-operation.

Also at that time, a group of Charleston politicians considered Simms for the national Congress. But his candidacy fell through, and Simms realized that because of his radicalism, he had no chance for public office. Hammond told him that he was too radical, too outspoken, and too abusive of Charleston's political leaders. He recommended that Simms try to be discreet—not subservient, but politic. Simms learned that one could be a strong Southern nationalist in Charleston but not an outspoken and independent "fire-eater."

Meanwhile both secessionists and co-operationists were planning to gain control of the state legislature. Robert Barnwell Rhett called a "meeting of those citizens of Sumter District who prefer secession to ultimate submission" for the 6th of October. Governor Means, W. F. Col-
cock, ex-Governor John P. Richardson, Henry Laurens Pinckney, and many other secessionists went to the meeting. Its purpose was to plan the calling of a convention for the entire state. Ostensibly such a convention would vote to secede. Rhett would not submit to the Compromise of 1850, and he knew that there would be no co-operation from other Southern states because of the Nashville Convention's failure. He thought that the rest of the South would have to follow South Carolina's lead. 34

Benjamin F. Perry and Waddy Thompson began a co-operationist organ in Greenville called the Southern Patriot. They called a Southern rights meeting in Greenville to plan their strategy for the state legislature. Both men tried to convince the up-country voters that while they had grievances against the North, the Compromise of 1850 had satisfied most Southerners. They hated the abolitionists and Northern aggression and advocated a united South for redress of grievances. But they would not join the radicals in their movement for single-state secession. The co-operationists united to forestall any immediate action by the legislature concerning the calling of a state convention. 35

As the legislative session opened in early December, two resolutions—the election of delegates to a Southern congress, which was recommended at the second Nashville Convention, and the calling of a state convention—were discussed. 36 There were all shades of political belief, from immediate secessionists to staunch unionists, represented at Columbia in those important winter days of 1850. Almost all of the delegates insisted upon voicing their opinions, and it was almost impossible to find any single faction that could control the delegates. Most knew that something had to be done about Northern relations, but few advocated that South Carolina secede immediately.
Perry addressed the legislature on the dissolution of the Union and its results for the South. He knew that South Carolina was on the eve of a revolution, and that the state was bound by its duty to the other Southern states to eventually dissolve the Union. "I yield to none of her [South Carolina's] sons in my readiness and willingness to defend her interests and honor," he said. But Perry was unwilling to see South Carolina pursue a course that would prove disastrous to the cause of the South. He was certain that no Southern state would follow South Carolina or attempt to rescue the state if it seceded. After all, the state had been unsuccessful in its attempt to rally the South in 1832. "If we rush ahead of them without concert of action, it will excite their jealousy and their resentment." He closed by claiming that South Carolina was bound in honor to co-operate with the Southern states. Perry advocated a movement for a united and nationalist South. Such a union would secure the South in its political position within or outside the Union.

After much debate a motion passed, 60 to 57, to postpone indefinitely the resolution calling for the election of delegates to another Southern convention. The vote to hold a state convention was 75 for and 42 opposed. As a two-thirds majority was required to pass the bill, the measure providing for immediate action by South Carolina was defeated. A compromise measure was passed, however, calling for a state convention in the following year and for the popular election of delegates to a Southern congress. The immediate secessionists had been defeated. The state legislature had successfully passed a bill which satisfied almost every faction in the state for the time being.

As a result of the radicals' defeat in the legislature, many of the
state's men of letters joined the co-operation movement. William J. Grayson pointed out that many of the old nullifiers advised the state to delay separate action. He did not believe that the other Southern states would join South Carolina if it seceded alone. He suggested that the South boycott the North, but refrain from acting politically against the national government. If secession were to become necessary, Grayson wanted a united South to announce its grievances and then secede. 42

In an article which later appeared in Simms's Southern Quarterly Review, William Henry Trescot, historian and diplomat, commented upon the "position and course of the South." He knew that the North and South were irrevocably opposed to each other's political systems and principles:

Will not the establishment of a Southern confederacy, with a homogeneous population, and a united government, relieve the South from this false and dangerous situation, enable her to control her own fortunes, and use, to the best advantage, the strength of her natural position. 43

Obviously Trescot wanted South Carolina to unite with the entire South in order to protect itself.

But what of Simms? He had been so disillusioned by President Taylor's actions and by Southern congressmen's conciliatory practices that he had become an ardent secessionist. But the Nashville Convention and the vote in the state legislature against radicalism convinced him that co-operation with the other Southern states was the only way to achieve the separation of the sections. He wanted to help build a united South. Knowing that South Carolina obviously could not lead in the drive for Southern nationalism, he suggested that Georgia become the leader. He told Beverly Tucker that he would use the Southern Quarterly Review as an instrument to create a co-operationist South. 44

That a dissolution of the Union was inevitable Simms was certain.
Nothing could save the Union, he said, but the adoption of such a tone on the part of the North, as I do not expect to see until they learn the evil by its fruit.\textsuperscript{45} He again attacked the national party system. He thought that the abolitionists would eventually control one major party and in their insolence, push the South to extremities.\textsuperscript{46} Simms knew that it would take time for the national parties to divide completely along sectional lines. His duty was to expedite the split by constantly attacking the nation's political party structure. If he allowed his true feelings to enter into his decisions, he would have urged immediate secession. But Simms also knew that since none of the Southern states had joined South Carolina in 1833, none of them would join it in 1850.\textsuperscript{47}

Although there was no longer a split in South Carolina over the ultimate objective, there was disagreement on the means to be used to achieve secession. The more moderate group, along with Simms and Hammond, counselled a united South before secession. The groups again clashed over the election of delegates and who would control the state convention.\textsuperscript{48}

The election for delegates to the state convention was held in February, 1851. The immediate secessionists claimed 127 out of the 169 delegates elected.\textsuperscript{49} Rhett was certain that the immediate secessionist faction would control the state convention, which was to be held in May, 1852. But the tide was slowly turning, because many important political figures joined the co-operationists. Hammond knew that Rhett had overplayed his position. Rhett wanted every delegate to declare for immediatism or co-operation. He feared a cooling of emotions. Hammond knew that Rhett's revolution would turn into an insurrection against him, and that South Carolina would become a co-operationist state.\textsuperscript{50}
Simms agreed that Rhett was too rash in his actions. He knew that Rhett had harmed the secession movement by not realizing that the co-operationists were anything but "submissionists." Simms feared that morale had suffered in South Carolina because of Rhett's views. He explained to Beverly Tucker that the co-operationists would best aid the secessionist movement.51 And, since the abolitionists infuriated the entire South, soon the other Southern states would join South Carolina in secession.

The co-operationists were gaining power in the state. Simms was pleased with the results of a co-operationist meeting in Charleston. Robert W. Barnwell, a converted immediate secessionist, spoke of the necessity for a united South. If South Carolina decided to secede alone, Barnwell would follow. But he knew that the entire South harbored the same resentment against the North, and he asked for time in order to convince the South to united action.52 Simms called the proceedings of that convention "manly and dignified, and sufficiently indeterminate to leave the future free."53 Thus a strong opposition party was forming against Rhett's position of immediate secession. By a nearly unanimous vote the Charleston co-operationists resolved to fight Rhett's attempt at immediate single-state secession.

As the co-operationists gained in strength, Simms spoke more openly for them.54 But he warned them to avoid trying to lead the South. For too many years the state had assumed the leadership of the South without asking for the advice and opinions of other states. South Carolina, Simms said, must wait for the rest of the South to catch up. He knew that the only way the South could secede was for South Carolina to follow, not lead, the rest of the South.55 He also was certain that the secessionists
would eventually succeed. After all, the co-operationists only differed from the immediate secessionists in methods of expediency. Simms and his allies were thoroughgoing disunionists. "In fact," he said, "there can be no Union Party in South Carolina. The Union is not urged by any of the parties who yet oppose separate state Secession." Simms contributed to the co-operationist movement in many ways. He wrote a play, Norman Maurice, about the political struggles of a young idealist. According to Paul Hamilton Hayne, Simms sought to "depict the peculiar genius of our people and institutions." The play was set in Missouri, because the West symbolized a lack of aristocracy. Simms felt that old, established families had kept young, talented men from public service. That was a major problem for the South's leaders. New blood, men with imagination, must lead the South, he said. Young Norman would follow, if not lead, his state wherever it went. But he was no fire-eater. Maurice, like Simms, knew that the co-operation of Southern states would be best for the South.

Through the summer and early fall of 1851 the debate in South Carolina continued. The co-operationists insisted they were not submissionists, and the immediate secessionists insisted that they were. When a vote was taken on deputes to the Southern congress to be held in 1852, the co-operationists emerged victorious. Only in the seventh congressional district (made up of Orangeburg, Barnwell, Beaufort, and Colleton), Rhett's stronghold, were the immediate secessionists able to elect their candidates. The co-operationists trounced the secessionists, 24,909 to 17,471. Clearly, the immediate secessionist crisis was over. There only remained the state convention before South Carolina would begin slowly to convert the entire South.
When the state legislature met, it voted to hold the South Carolina convention, whose outcome was a foregone conclusion, in April, 1852. Maxcy Gregg, a co-operationist, addressed the convention. South Carolina was in a difficult position, he said. Suffering from injuries that made remaining in the Union "incompatible with honor or safety," the state was deserted by other Southern states and could not act alone. The majority of the state's citizens were opposed to immediate secession. Gregg then asked if the secessionists could propose some method of solving the state's problems. Since he knew they could not, he proposed that South Carolina continue to resist Federal aggression by working through the national Congress. South Carolina had to bide its time, he said, and await the opportunity to strike at the North with a united South. 61

Governor John H. Means suggested that the convention rise above party strife and attempt to settle its differences peacefully. The South had to unite, he said. "But, unfortunately for us and the great cause of the South, we are not united." 62 However, South Carolinians were united in their declaration of the state's right to secede from the Union. As an independent state, South Carolina could do anything to protect its interests. A resolution stated:

It is her right, without hindrance, or molestation from any power whatsoever, to secede from the said Federal Union; and that for the sufficiency of the causes which may impel her to such separation, she is responsible alone, under God, to the tribunal of public opinion among the nations of the earth. 63

Perry, who submitted a minority report, ultimately agreed with the convention's resolution. He claimed that the state had a tradition of union, and would not "exercise our God given right to secede." 64 For him the issue was to protect slavery. "Slavery is moral and correct, and it will be maintained by South Carolina at all hazard. We will oppose
alone, if need be, any interference with slavery," he stated.65

Slavery seemed to be the major issue that would make South Carolina secede alone. But the convention convinced all Southerners that South Carolina would not openly lead the South's move to secession. The Rhett faction had been permanently forced from leadership in the state. When South Carolina finally seceded, it would be the co-operationists such as Hammond, Orr, and Simms who would lead the state. Feeling condemned in his actions, and shorn of his powers, Rhett resigned from the Senate and returned to private life. He would never cease secession agitation, but his position was irrevocably damaged.66

Noting the importance of pro-slavery feeling in the state, Simms turned his pen to a defense of that institution. He attempted to remind South Carolina that it must keep secessionist sentiment alive. Thus the most important character in his novelette *The Golden Christmas* was a fierce secessionist and slaveholder, Major Bulmer. The Major had been a co-operationist, and had even voted the co-operation ticket for the Southern Congress. Since then, however, he had feared that the state would become submissionist in sentiment. So his position was to damn all co-operationists and plea for secession. Of course, Simms made the Major admit that South Carolina could not secede alone.67

Major Bulmer was a romantic hero who wanted to protect the plantation from outside forces seeking to change it. "It was the rare pride and passion of Major Bulmer," Simms said, "that 'Bulmer Barony' should be the last to surrender those social virtues which constituted the rare excellence of our old plantation life in the South."68 He was proud to emulate the character of his English forebears. The Major introduced jousting to the surrounding community. Because of feats of courage and
romantic single-handed combat, the sport became so popular that even the Charleston Courier printed articles about it. For Simms, the Major was a combination of wise politician and romantic hero who would preserve the South's way of life.

Above all, Major Bulmer was a kind and benevolent slaveowner, the prototype of all plantation masters. His slaves were well cared for. Simms said that the Major's slaves were rich in security, for they were protected against cold and hunger. Their work load was adapted to their capacities. "Cuffee and Sambo are thus secure and thus made happy."69

Among the guests at the plantation was the proverbial Northern schoolmaster, a man who loathed slavery. But when he saw that old slaves who could no longer work were fed and cared for, the Yankee changed his mind. For Simms, Southern slavery was in reality charity for the Negro. The slave was given freedom for play and pleasure. At last the schoolmaster was forced to admit that slavery was indeed benevolent toward the Negro. With some humor, Simms pointed out that the schoolmaster began to think that perhaps the slave was too contented.70 But Simms was perfectly serious. Slavery was a Southern way of life, economically and socially, and he would defend it to his death.

He again turned to the question of the morals of slavery and revised his article on Miss Martineau. This time the essay was included with a group of eminent Southerners' articles in a book entitled The Pro-Slavery Argument. In the introduction to his completely revised article Simms stated that in 1837 the issue of slavery "had not so greatly engaged the attention of the Southern people," because the abolitionists had not been so active.71 In 1852, however, Simms found it necessary to re-state his pro-slavery position emphatically.
He now regarded slavery as "constituting one of the most essential agencies, under divine plan, for promoting progress of humanity and civilization." He realized that his essay was old, and that much had been written on the subject since 1837. He was thus forced by outside pressure to re-examine the entire question of slavery. "It should be a subject of great gratification to the people of the South," he said, "that abolition, with all its annoyances and offenses against our peace and safety, has resulted in our moral reassurance of slavery." The abolitionists had succeeded in relieving the South of all its moral doubts. Simms said that the South had recognized its social obligation to keep slavery because of the foolish hostile pressure against it.

With Carlyle suggesting a return to slavery in England, Simms had a strong ally. He suggested that Miss Martineau talk to Carlyle and learn the benefits of slavery. Miss Martineau should have read Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Simms said. Far from praising the abolitionists, Mrs. Stowe found them a disruptive and evil force in society. Why, he asked, would she make the villain of her novel a Yankee? But Mrs. Stowe was as deluded as Miss Martineau in claiming that slaveowners were cruel towards their slaves. Slaveowners were not cruel, but kind and benevolent masters. Simms suggested that all Northerners and foreigners who questioned slavery should visit the South and see how the system actually operated.

Through use of the concept of private property Simms sought to justify slavery. He philosophized that natural rights depended entirely upon the degree of obedience which one paid to the laws of creation. "All our rights, whether from nature or society—and these are the only two sources of right known to us—result from the performance of our
duties." Thus man had no rights unless he complied with the laws of nature, and unless he did his duty. This duty was to work hard. Man had to labor for what he got. The result of labor was property. Thus man, by natural law, had the right to hold property—in this case his slaves.

Simms denied that the South was not upholding the Declaration of Independence. After all, Jefferson had taken his views from French philosophy, and they simply had not held up. The founding fathers had not implied equality in the same manner that the abolitionists claimed it in 1850. God did not create men alike, or equal, Simms said. The laws of the universe called for diversity and inequality among the races. Quoting from Alexander Pope, he said,

Order is heaven's first law, and this confess,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest.76

For Simms, man had to strive above his fellow man. If the founding fathers were democrats, their notion of democracy "was not leveling in its character," he said.77

Thus Simms rejected a free society. Slavery was natural, because man dominated his fellow man. After all, the slaveholder provided a better home for the slave than the slave could provide for himself. Slave society was based on the principle of protection, where the weak were cared for. Man competed for property in true nineteenth-century laissez-faire terms, but the result was a collective society based on paternalism.78 Simms had changed since the thirties. His arguments were better, and his beliefs were firm. Slavery was the rock of the South, he said. Not only would his pro-slavery argument give the South a common feeling, but it would also help create a Southern nationalism.

Although actively writing and speaking for the co-operationist movement, Simms continued to avoid politics. Though he was opposed to
national parties, he favored Pierce as the best candidate for the South in the presidential election of 1852. Hammond also favored Pierce, but he refused to campaign for him. The two men would no longer support national parties. They resolved to watch political events carefully, knowing that their state would someday call on them to take an active part in political life. Meanwhile, their objective would be a united one-party section which would provide for a nationalist South.

But the presidential election of 1852 did have some significance for future events in South Carolina. As a result of the election a new political organization was formed in the state. Despite the Mercury's attempt to keep the state out of the campaign, a group of co-operationists led by James L. Orr ardently supported Pierce. They formed the National Democratic party in the state. Orr's objective was to continue to participate in national elections and to seek redress of grievances for South Carolina in the national Congress.

If Orr was to succeed, he had to have South Carolina's support for Pierce. He knew that Pierce's nomination was an attempt to conciliate the South, and that Pierce would aid the South. "Although General Pierce may not believe in the doctrines of State rights and State remedies to the extent which we go, yet he is a better Republican than we ever expected to see again in nomination for the Presidency," said Orr. Above all, Pierce was devoted to the Constitution and to the protection of slavery. Orr was able to carry the state for Pierce and to put South Carolina into national politics. He helped to preserve the national party system in his own state for at least four more years.

Simms could not avoid some form of political maneuvering for long. Apparently there had been some chance that President Pierce might have
nominated him to a diplomatic post. Hammond was convinced that Simms would receive the appointment as ambassador to Naples. He did, however, caution Simms to beware of disappointment. Neither Hammond nor Simms trusted Pierce. Simms, unfortunately, began to think in terms of the appointment and was certain that this opportunity would give him much time to write and think.\textsuperscript{83}

Perry knew that Simms was seeking the position and wrote an article in a Charleston paper vehemently denouncing him, calling him a secessionist who sought an Italian mission. Simms believed that Perry had done him a great injustice. He claimed to have been a constant opponent of the secession party and offered Perry written proof of his political position. As the editor of the \textit{Southern Quarterly Review} Simms was compelled to print articles of both political factions. He stated that he did not support either the secession or the co-operation party, and that he questioned both of them. He also told Perry that the diplomatic post was not important to him. What did bother him was that his views were so often misrepresented. He wondered how Perry, a close friend, could possibly have done him such an injustice.\textsuperscript{84}

By May it was apparent that Simms would not receive the Naples appointment. Apparently Christopher Gadsden, also a South Carolinian, was going to receive a post. Hammond lamented that no one was willing to give either himself or Simms an opportunity to re-enter public life.\textsuperscript{85}

He complained to the influential James L. Orr that Simms had been denied the position that he so richly deserved:

\begin{quote}
I have to thank you for your attention to my suggestions in regard to our friend Simms and regret most deeply that there is so little prospect of his obtaining any relief in his present critical condition from General Pierce. He has been treated all around in a manner that will in future time reflect great dis-
\end{quote}
grace on his countrymen. I say in future times for he will have a position when nearly if not quite all of those who have positions now will be utterly forgotten.  

However, Simms quickly forgot about the diplomatic position. He even half-heartedly thought of running for political office. He considered campaigning for either state comptroller or treasurer in the 1854 fall elections. Hammond suggested that Simms run for treasurer, since it was the least troublesome of state offices. Hammond also cautioned him to campaign hard. "Don't begin by saying you won't help yourself," Hammond told him. Simms should immediately enlist the support of his political friends. He should go to Columbia and canvass the legislature. Hammond promised Simms his active support. He offered to write campaign letters to important politicians and even to make speeches for Simms. But Simms was not really serious about state office. He preferred the role of political commentator and theoretician.  

Still considered a leading public lecturer and political figure, Simms was often invited to speak before various political, social, and learned organizations. In July, 1855, he was invited to Anderson, South Carolina, to speak at a dinner honoring James L. Orr. Always politically minded, Simms accepted. Orr was rapidly becoming one of the most important political figures in the state. Simms and Preston S. Brooks were the featured guests. Addressing the audience, Simms said that he and Orr had been close friends for a long time. He thought Orr a worthy leader of the Southern forces in Congress. Dealing more with the past than with the present, Simms drew some historical parallels. Above all, he warned Orr that his position must always be to seek a united South. The Anderson Gazette and Advocate, commenting on Simms's speech, said: "The Doctor was very happy in blending wit, literature and politics together,
in his address, and the most profound attention was paid to the greatest poet, novelist and historian of the South. 89

In the same vein, Simms gave the inaugural address to the Spartanburg Female College on August 22, 1855. His topic was the purpose of education. Simms stated that proper education served as the growth and strength of a state. Southern children had to be educated in the South and protected from outside interference. Education was culture, Southern culture. Since many of the young women in the audience were future teachers, Simms cautioned them to know and understand their state's history. He predicted ultimate secession of a united South, and stressed many times the importance of Southerners' knowing their section's traditions. 90

Simms was also available as an advisor both to political and literary figures. He congratulated William Porcher Miles on being elected mayor of Charleston. He was particularly happy that a literary man would have the opportunity to demonstrate his governing powers. But Simms cautioned Miles against being too virtuous in political office. Too much virtue would only alienate Miles from the city's political leaders. Above all, Miles was to serve as a Southerner and must always protect Southern interests. 91

Although supposedly out of politics, Simms still watched the political events in South Carolina. He was especially interested in the state Democratic convention in May, 1856. The National Democrats under Orr seemed to control the state. They planned to work for a united national Democratic party. Their opposition, including Simms, sought a united South consisting of both Whigs and Democrats. The Orr group planned to send delegates to the national Democratic convention. This was in direct
violation of Calhoun's requirement that South Carolina remain aloof from
national politics. However, the national Democrats would have their way.
Politics would continue on a national scale. Orr still thought that the
Democratic party could aid the South in its grievances against the North. 92

Approximately 120 delegates attended the state convention. After
tracing the history of South Carolina's involvement in national politics,
Francis W. Pickens, the convention's chairman, commented that the state
had lost much by not attending national conventions. After all, the
Democratic party had always defended the South's tariff struggles. Since
the North was divided, Pickens said, it was time to form a united party
so that the South would emerge victorious. "We must rid ourselves of
this view that to serve in National politics is to dishonor South Caro-
olina," he said. As long as the state remained in the Union, being a mem-
ber of the party system was the best way to preserve the rights of the
South. 93

Orr stated that the Democratic convention in Cincinnati was impor-
tant to South Carolina. He attempted to silence those politicians who
wanted a purely sectional party by stating that he also knew South Caro-
lina would eventually secede. But in the meantime,

It is impossible for her [South Carolina] to act otherwise,
for it is certain that the next Presidential contest will be
between the nominees of the Democratic and Black Republican
parties, and this State could not but prefer the most fishy
Democrat to a Black Republican. 94

Besides, if South Carolina joined the national party, it would have some
control in the selection of the presidential candidate. Orr also trusted
Buchanan, Douglas, and Pierce, because he knew that the abolitionists
would support none of them. He believed that the national government,
especially after the favorable action on the Kansas question, was the
South's protector. 95

Orr was convinced that a national platform would be framed that the entire South could support. Since the government was committed to the doctrine of non-intervention in state or territorial actions, the South must trust it. Orr was a Douglas supporter, while many of the delegates still favored Pierce. He attempted to show that Douglas would be an excellent President for the South. However, the state convention voted to support Pierce and to send delegates to Cincinnati. 96

The South Carolina Democratic convention resolved that there were certain requisites for supporting the national party. It demanded that the Democratic party recognize and adopt the principles contained in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Also, South Carolina wanted to make certain that neither the Missouri Compromise nor any other anti-slavery restriction would be extended over any territory of the United States. Moreover, the fugitive slave law had to be enforced and made permanent. The convention closed by stating:

Franklin Pierce is the first choice of this Convention for President of the United States, and that thorough identification in sentiment and opinion with the principles embodied in the foregoing resolutions is a pre-requisite, indispensable to our support in any candidate of the Democratic party. 97

An ardent sectionalist, Simms believed that the South should keep out of national politics. He knew that Orr ultimately favored a united South outside of the Union. But in 1856 Orr and Simms disagreed on how disunion should be accomplished. Both were co-operationists, but Simms had completely forsaken national parties, while Orr believed in using them for expediency. That South Carolina sent delegates to the national Democratic convention and eventually supported James Buchanan for President did not mean the state had lost its secessionist drive. The contro-
versy in the state was merely over how the co-operationists would achieve a united South. There was no longer any debate in the state over union or disunion.

Simms warned Orr to calculate seriously the value of the Democratic party for himself and the South. He was convinced that the party could not keep its pledges to the South. Simms never doubted that Buchanan would be elected. But even if Buchanan were elected the party could not control enough administrative power to benefit any single section. Simms suggested that Orr organize a sectional political party. He knew that a united South could rule the country. It could acquire the commerce and manufactures to "grow eminently great for all our purposes." Orr must show the South that he was not merely a nationalist, but one who sought to aid the South at all times.98 Orr was a man of some power. Simms did not want him tied to a party, for that would put him outside the South's course to secession. Simms astutely added:

I am satisfied that the disintegration of all existing parties is inevitable—an opinion formed long ago—... which every day's experience seems to confirm. ... But that all existing organisations must perish under strife of Sections, I hold now to be apparent to all eyes that common sense can counsel. ... See that you are not slow to such an identification with the extreme Southern wing, as will make it easy to take the field under the new banner of our country.99

As an advocate of Southern nationalism, Simms served his section in many ways. Not only did he counsel men such as Orr in their political actions, but he also used his pen and oratorical powers to defend a united South. In August, 1856, he told Orr that he saw long labors ahead in the sectional historical controversy. Simms had always attempted to identify his fictional work with historical scenes of South Carolina. Thus, when given the opportunity to lecture in the North, Simms accepted. He planned the lectures to cover Southern scenery, society, habits, and
manners. Simms thought that when the North knew more about the South, better relations would be established between them.\(^{100}\)

But there was great agitation in the North over the recent Brooks-Sumner affair. If Simms had stopped to think about the potential consequences of his lectures, he might never have gone North. In the South Brooks was a hero. Sumner's speeches had greatly offended Southerners; South Carolina was especially misrepresented by his pronouncements. But in the North, Sumner was a martyr. The abolitionists named him their leader. Besides, as Paul Hayne told a friend, Simms was a noble fellow, but reared in solitude. His lectures would be egotistical, perhaps offensively pro-Southern, and Simms had the bad habit of speaking \textit{ex cathedra}.\(^{101}\)

Throughout the fifties South Carolina congressmen asked Simms to defend the South from Northern attacks. Pierce Butler especially had come under fire. He asked Simms, as the South's leading historian, to write answers to the Northern press.\(^{102}\) John R. Thompson, editor of the \textit{Southern Literary Messenger}, stated that Simms was the foremost student of the South in the American Revolution. He had heard many congressmen use Simms's books to defend the South without acknowledging the author. The \textit{Messenger} was pleased that Simms would lecture on the Revolutionary South to a Northern audience. Thompson wished him success in his Northern lecture series.\(^{103}\)

Simms was optimistic about the lecture series. He told George Bancroft and William Cullen Bryant, who had invited him North, that he would be highly pleased to lecture again in New York. He talked carelessly of the dangers which addressing such an intelligent and critical audience would involve. His object was "to disabuse the public of the
North of many mistaken impressions which do us wrong."\textsuperscript{104} He was confident of success. After all, Simms only meant to tell Northerners the truth about the South.

Unfortunately Simms prefaced his lectures on the Revolution with harsh comments about Charles Sumner. He spoke without weighing his words and actually insulted his Northern hosts. His lectures were similar to his articles in the \textit{Southern Quarterly Review}. Politicians had slandered South Carolina's role in the Revolution. Simms hesitated to talk about "the miserable politics of today." But he was often present-minded, and he wondered why the North attacked the South so violently. He said that Massachusetts gained nothing by claiming that South Carolina was faithless and worthless. Simms vehemently asked "of a just and conscientious people; in a moment of comparative calm; in a hall sacred to peace [Simms lectured in a church], letters and the arts; I demand justice for my mother country."\textsuperscript{105}

South Carolina had been faithful to the Union, Simms said. If the South were to perish, it would not fall easily. "Only a fratricidal hand would destroy this Family." Simms accused the North of fomenting discontent. He claimed a Southern national feeling that was growing stronger than the Union. Then, Simms subsided. He realized that he had gone too far. Quickly he apologized, saying that he spoke heatedly only because he loved the South.\textsuperscript{106}

Simms's second lecture was poorly attended, and he was forced to cancel the series. Northern newspapers viciously attacked him. The \textit{New York Tribune} said that Simms was a hero to the South, but he was not as popular as Brooks. After all, Simms made so little money in the South that he had to be sent to the cold, austere North to earn his keep:
But, zealous even under this neglect and these difficulties to exhibit himself as an embodiment of South Carolina patriotism, Mr. Simms undertakes a somewhat needed sort of vindication of that damaged Revolutionary reputation of that State, more suitable than Bully Brooks's method to civilized society and to cultivated minds like his own. He laboriously endeavors to show, not by the force of gutta percha, but by appeals to historical facts, that whatever may be thought of South Carolina now, the South Carolina of the Revolution was really, a perfect marvel of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and warlike exploits.¹⁰⁷

Simms had made a fatal mistake. He had interjected too much present-mindedness into his lecture and had actually preached Southern nationalism to a Northern audience.

His letters cancelling the lecture tour reveal Simms's feelings on the matter. He considered the Northern attack not only a personal insult, but an insult to his state. He had discovered that his topics alone furnished a pretext for an assault "upon my State and people." "It has become a matter of pride and feeling with me now, not to obtrude myself upon any community that matter which has been found to be unwholesome, and which has been subjected to so much misrepresentation."¹⁰⁸

Hammond knew that the North would receive Simms poorly, but he had no idea that feelings were so intense there. Besides, he told Simms that Brooks and the South would do nothing for him. His courageous stand was unappreciated.¹⁰⁹ Simms claimed that all he had wanted to do was to vindicate the South. He did not mention Brooks. Sumner was discussed only because he had misrepresented the South. He agreed with Hammond that South Carolina had no claim of self-sacrifice upon him. But he could not escape from his own impulse. "I expect nothing from South Carolina," he said, "But I have been too long accustomed to toils and sacrifice for her, to feel her injustice now. . . . She will probably never acknowledge my performances."¹¹⁰
In his own mind Simms justified his performance. True, it had been tactless, but he insisted upon telling the truth. Many Southerners praised Simms for his defense of the South. From as far away as Missouri came congratulations. That lecture series made Simms, the public man, a minor hero in Southern eyes. Here was a man of letters, an intellectual, who had actually entered enemy territory and taught them a lesson. The cause of Southern nationalism was greatly strengthened.

But what of Simms himself? After the Nashville Convention he had resolved on secession through co-operation. He sought ultimate secession by a united South. When secession would come was not of primary importance. After the lecture tour Simms remained a co-operationist, but he began to advocate immediate secession. A Southern nation had always been his goal. After his New York experience he stepped up his demands for a nationalistic South.
NOTES


5. Crallé, IV, 573 (see also 542-572); Kibler, pp. 239, 241.


8. James L. Orr to Scoville, May 5, 1850, MSS, James L. Orr Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Benjamin F. Porter Scrapbook, MSS, Porter Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

9. United States Magazine and Democratic Review, n. s. XXVI (May, 1850), 401.


15. Simms to Hammond, April 4, 1850, Hammond Papers; Franklin H. Elmore to Governor Whitmarsh Seabrook, April 11, 1850, Elmore Papers.

16. Hammond to Simms, April 9, 1850, Hammond Papers; Rhett, Charleston . . ., p. 222.
17. Simms to Hammond, April 10, 1850, Hammond Papers; Meigs, II, 119-121.


29. Hammond to Simms, June 16, 1850, Hammond Papers; Benton, II, 781-784.

30. The Resolutions and Address, Adapted by the Southern Convention, Held at Nashville, Tennessee, June 3d to 12th Inclusive, in the Year 1850 (Nashville, 1850), pp. 5-26; Hammond to Simms, June 27, 1850, Hammond Papers; Tucker, "Hammond and Southern Convention," pp. 11-12; Perkins, "Neglected Phase . . .," p. 174.


33. Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 67; Charleston Sun, Oct. 5, 1850.
34. White, pp. 109, 113; Bass, pp. 232-233.

35. Boucher, Secession and Co-operation . . ., pp. 109-110; also see Mercury and Courier for the month of October, 1850.

36. Boucher, Secession and Co-operation . . ., pp. 111-114; also see Courier, Nov. 30, Dec. 31, 1850.

37. Speech of the Hon. Benjamin F. Perry, of Greenville District, Delivered in the House of Representatives of South Carolina on the 11th December, 1850 . . . (Charleston, 1851), p. 5.

38. Ibid., p. 31.

39. Ibid., p. 39; see also pp. 3, 4, 6, 28-29, 34-36.

40. Boucher, Secession and Co-operation . . ., p. 114.

41. Courier, Dec. 20, 21, 1850.

42. Bass, pp. 233-235; William J. Grayson, Letter to His Excellency White-march E. Seabrook, Governor of the State of South Carolina, on the Dissolu-
tion of the Union (Charleston, 1850), pp. 7, 10, 13, 20-21.

43. William Henry Trescot, The Position and Course of the South (Charleston, 1850), p. 17; see also pp. 6, 8, 9-11.

44. Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 64-65.

45. Ibid., V, 412.

46. Ibid., III, 76.

47. Ibid., III, 77; Van Deusen, p. 103.


53. Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 121-123; Mercury, May 6-8, 1851.

54. Hammond to Simms, July 1, 1851, Hammond Papers; Harold S. Schultz,

55. Simms to Hammond, June 9, 1851, Hammond Papers.

56. Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 133.

57. Russell's Magazine, II (December, 1857), 178; Trent, p. 199. Trent makes no attempt to analyze the play, Norman Maurice, for what it is—he misses much of the play's political significance.

58. Russell's Magazine, II (December, 1857), 247, 251, 254; see also William Gilmore Simms, Norman Maurice; or, The Man of the People (Richmond, 1851).


60. Osterweis, p. 147; Hammond to Simms, Nov. 21, 1851, Hammond Papers.

61. Addenda to the Journal of the State Convention of South Carolina; together with the Resolution and Ordinance (Columbia, 1852), p. 25.

62. Journal of the State Convention of South Carolina; together with the Resolution and Ordinance (Columbia, 1852), pp. 9-10.

63. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

64. Ibid., p. 23.

65. Ibid., p. 24.


69. Ibid., p. 152.

70. Ibid., pp. 152-153.


73. Ibid., p. 179.

74. Ibid., pp. 198, 217, 219, 222; also see Gerald M. Straka, "The


82. Rhett, Charleston, p. 223; Schultz, p. 46; James L. Orr Scrapbook #1 (speech in House, sketch of actions in Congress), MSS, Orr-Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.


85. Hammond to Simms, May 17, 1853, Hammond Papers.

86. Hammond to Orr, June 19, 1854, Orr-Patterson Papers.


90. William Gilmore Simms, Inauguration of the Spartanburg Female College, on the 22nd August, 1855 . . . (Spartanburg, S. C., 1855), pp. 13-15, 28, 60.


Legend: 'Climate or Climate of Opinion,' *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association*, 1956, p. 18.

93. *Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention of South Carolina* . . . 5th and 6th of May, 1856, . . . (Columbia, S. C., 1856), p. 18 (see also pp. 5, 7, 9, 10-13, 16-17; Boucher, *South Carolina and South* . . ., p. 111.


95. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

96. Ibid., pp. 25, 28.

97. Ibid., p. 28 (see also p. 27); Schultz, pp. 112, 121.


99. Ibid., pp. 441-442; *S. L. M.*, XXII (June, 1856), 422-425.


104. Oliphant, *Simms Letters*, III, 454 (see also 455).

105. Ibid., pp. 521, 523, 548.

106. Ibid., pp. 548-549.


II. THE ARTIST AS PROPAGANDIST II: SIMMS AS EDITOR OF THE

SOUTHERN QUARTERLY REVIEW, 1849-1854

Simms was well-prepared for his new position as editor of the Southern Quarterly Review. When he became editor of the Review early in 1849, he had been writing for the magazine for many years. He had been offered the editorship in 1843, but had turned it down. Simms promised, however, to contribute at least one article an issue to the magazine.\(^1\) He also wanted to help the Review achieve a national reputation. Simms asked his friend Bryant to promote the magazine in New York, and to write a favorable review of it. He told Bryant that the Southern Quarterly Review was a magazine of "character and independent tone," and that it most clearly presented the Southern position on important political and social events of the time.\(^2\)

Before he became editor of the Southern Quarterly Review, Simms had many years' experience as editor of various Southern literary journals.\(^3\) He was a well-known contributor to the Southern Literary Messenger, the Southern Literary Journal, and the Southern Rose. By 1842, he had become so famous as an essayist that the Magnolia or Southern Monthly was moved from Savannah to Charleston so that he could become its editor. Simms had previously cautioned Philip C. Pendleton, the Magnolia's original editor, that he must build his subscription list to assure the magazine's survival. He also warned Pendleton to accept only first-rate articles and to pay his contributors. But the Magnolia had floundered
in Savannah, and Pendleton moved to Charleston in hopes that Simms's prestige and ability might save it.4

Agreeing to take over the Magnolia's editorship, Simms wanted to have the South's most important critics write for the magazine. He took the job because he would have the opportunity to promote Southern literature and praise Southern society. Also, he could enable young writers to have a magazine in which to publish their efforts. Then Simms could help create "a really able array of highly endowed and well educated men, who, without such an organ and an editor in whom they have confidence, would go to rust in our wilderness."5

Writing the "Editorial Bureau," Simms discovered that the job of an editor was changing with the times. Formerly the editor did nothing but accept or reject literary articles. Now he must keep up with politics, history, literature, business, and social change. He had to select topics for the magazine which would satisfy the minds and tastes of the readers. No longer would the Magnolia be merely a ladies' magazine, telling stories to please a feminine audience. The Magnolia would plead the case of the South, and praise and promote Southern literature.6

Competition among Southern writers would improve Southern letters, he claimed. "It is from the sluggishness of moral atmosphere, and not its storm, that the mental laborer has any thing to dread," he said.7 With competition in the literary world Southerners would then notice their own men of letters. What better place for literary and social debate through essays, articles, poems, and stories, than in a genuine Southern magazine? Therefore, Simms sent many letters encouraging contributions to the Magnolia. He kept his contributors supplied with many reference works, foreign periodicals, and current magazines. Simms gave
advice on writing and editing, and personally criticized contributions to the magazine. He sought to improve Southern thought, maintaining that the printed word, when stated correctly, could aid the South in its political and social struggles. Hammond said that the Magnolia was equal in quality to any magazine or review in the country. He cautioned Simms against being too harsh a critic, but praised his ability to inspire other writers.

Unfortunately, Simms's abilities as an editor did not include subscription-raising. The Magnolia rapidly went into debt. The Magnolia never appeared on time because Southern printers were poor and underpaid. Even the Southern Literary Messenger came out late, and soon was in financial difficulty. Simms was overburdened with work. Aside from editing and re-writing many of the articles he received, Simms had to write all of the "Editor's Bureau" and countless other articles. He resigned after the June, 1843 issue appeared. He could no longer afford to serve as an editor without pay. Many friends regretted his leaving the Magnolia, knowing that the magazine would fail without him. Nevertheless, Simms had set an excellent standard for literary work, and he had learned much about editing and managing a periodical.

His next attempt at editing a Southern magazine was the Southern and Western Monthly Magazine and Review, later known as Simms's Magazine. The periodical first appeared in January, 1845, and Simms immediately stated his purpose for beginning such a review. He wanted the public to realize the need for the writer, who could aid the South as much as the orator and the statesman. Simms stated, "The endeavor will be made to impart to it a more decided political complexion than was borne by the Magnolia, and, if possible, to impress upon it more of those sectional
aspects, South and West, ... Since the Northern press supplied the South with pro-Northern literature and political news, the South must counteract this with its own political views and literature. Simms wanted to give the South an opportunity to state its own beliefs in print.

In the magazines he edited, Simms printed articles from writers throughout the South. He wanted to help Southern authors succeed, because he knew they would have no luck with Northern publishers. Writers submitted their manuscripts to Northern publishers and had them rejected, because the people of the North would not buy Southern literature. Nor were Southern periodicals read in the North. Simms claimed that Southern literature would always be inferior unless the people of the South encouraged their writers. "Let us but believe in one another," he said, "as we are all willing to believe in ourselves and we shall take no more loaves of literature from the foreign oven." 

Fiction was by no means the only literature published in Simms's Magazine. From agricultural improvement to an attack on New England anti-slavery societies to the Texas question, the review took part in many of the major political issues of the day. Many Southern politicians soon realized the political power which pro-Southern periodicals could have in the South. A. P. Aldrich, who suggested a Southern Anti-Abolitionists' League in Congress, thought that Simms's Monthly would serve the League as an excellent organ of propaganda. If Simms with his "usual zeal and industry" could be persuaded to serve the Southern cause, they would have a magazine that could unite the entire South.

Since the entire South was concerned with the slavery question, Simms sought pro-slavery articles for the review. Hammond had recently written two letters to an English minister in which he defended slavery
as a positive good. He wanted Simms to point out weak and rough spots in his "Clarkson Letters," and readily agreed when Simms asked to review them in the Monthly. Simms found the letters clearly written, firm in tone, and backed with abundant materials. Taking a political position in his review, Simms commented on the need for such brilliant political men such as Hammond in public life. Hammond was needed immediately in Southern councils. Citizens of South Carolina should think before they let a talented man like Hammond remain out of public life, Simms advised.

Although the magazine was read in influential circles and praised for both its literary merits and political use, financial difficulty forced its failure. The periodical had not met Simms's expectations, and it took too much time from his writing and political activities. Simms closed his last editorial with a warning and a plea to the South:

Let us once more exhort those who read our pages, to believe more in one another and in themselves—to give their full faith to the genius of the community in which they live, and to foster it with all their most favoring affections. Their life is in their genius. That they should leave their sons to honor, and their inheritance in security, is a hope that can only be grounded upon the conviction that the domestic mind is doing its duty, with all its attributes in activity, in conserving the honorable in its past, and the meritorious in its present possessions.

After closing the Southern and Western Monthly Magazine, Simms vowed never to edit another periodical. But barely four years later he became editor of the Southern Quarterly Review, a magazine that would greatly influence the South and make Simms one of the country's finest editors. His friend J. D. B. DeBow, of the famous DeBow's Review, wrote that Simms was one of the most intelligent and certainly the hardest working man of literary merit in the South. Perhaps, said DeBow, Simms was the only professional author and distinguished public man that the South had in an editorial chair. DeBow considered his appointment as
editor of the *Southern Quarterly Review* most fortunate for the South.  "A new impulse was at once given to the work," DeBow said. He wished Simms years of honors and success in his new capacity as editor.\(^{20}\)

Simms knew exactly what he intended to accomplish with the *Review*. His editorial experience had given him a feeling for influencing the Southern mind, and he suggested that other editors accommodate their magazines to Southern needs.\(^{21}\) As editor of the *Southern Quarterly Review*, Simms wanted to maintain the rights and sustain the literary reputation of the Southern states. His review would serve "to embody the opinions of enlightened minds," and to warn the South of its political danger. He planned to discuss important social difficulties in such a manner "as to make deep and permanent impressions upon the character of the people and the destinies of the age ..." More than that, the South's institutions were peculiar,

and require a distinct organ through which they may be defended with power and spirit, when assailed as they often are, by other sections of the American Confederacy. This aggressive conduct on the part of our Country men, so prejudicial to the general harmony, requires to be met and spelled by argument, first, and by action, if necessary, afterwards.\(^{22}\)

In order to sustain his periodical Simms had to place it on a firm financial basis and build an important pool of contributors. Hammond, who sought to help Simms financially, had a plan to make the *Review* a profitable periodical. He suggested that Simms pay his contributors. Men who could write would not write for nothing, he said. For $50.00 an article, even eminent scholars like Francis Lieber would write for the *Review*. Simms could also pay himself for articles and receive a share of the profits. Hammond claimed that better articles would add between 500 and 1,000 new subscriptions. He also cautioned Simms on the use of a printer, warning him that typographical errors would cost the magazine
many subscribers and anger the contributors. 

Although financial problems would eventually cause the magazine's downfall, Simms listened to Hammond's advice, and he solicited Hammond's services as a contributor to the Review. With his speculative mind, Hammond would make an excellent reviewer, Simms claimed. Simms knew that Hammond could teach the South many political lessons. He told Hammond that the Review had few good contributors. "It is for that reason that I want your help," Simms told Hammond. "I wish to exclude much of the matter that is offered, and can only do so by the aid of a good corps of contributors." 

Simms asked Hammond's brother Marcellus, a major in the army who had spent much time in the Mexican War and on Western outposts, to contribute articles of historical significance. From Benjamin F. Perry he requested articles on literature and up-country agriculture. He told Perry that it was his duty to help establish the magazine on a permanent basis. William Elliott, distinguished writer, legislator, and able defender of slavery, was next on Simms's list of possible contributors. He told Elliott of the importance of such an organ for the mind and talent of the South. He wanted Elliott to write in defense of slavery, and to demonstrate through his essays, the South's character and grievances.

Writing to Nathaniel Beverly Tucker, famous Virginia man of letters and a leading advocate of Southern independence, Simms explained what he intended to accomplish as editor of the Review. With morality so low among Southern politicians, he said, "our recourse is really to the Southern people; and the more we enable them to receive the truth—the more we elevate their standards of intellect as well as politics—the greater the prospect for refuge and security in the day of our difficulty."
Thus the magazine would serve as an "organ of opinion and education" throughout the Southern states. It would promote free trade, maintain state rights, and defend slavery both morally and socially. Simms hoped to influence politicians and important public men, giving them an opportunity to have their views printed. He wanted Tucker to write often for the magazine. The Review would enable Tucker to elucidate his economic and political views.\textsuperscript{26}

As editor of the Southern Quarterly Review Simms soon turned to a defense of slavery. He praised Thomas Carlyle for advocating a slave society, and advised the South to support its defenders.\textsuperscript{27} In a short article entitled "Treatment of Slaves in the Southern States," Simms enumerated the "intrinsic merits" of slavery. He said the South owed it to history and the future, to insist upon the facts of the kind and beneficial treatment that the Negro received on the plantation. He claimed that the "African race" was created inferior and must always serve the white man. But he insisted that the abolitionists could not be convinced of slavery's positive good. Therefore, Simms warned that unless the abolitionists were silenced, the South would not be responsible for its actions.\textsuperscript{28}

In an article entitled "Stearns's Notes on Uncle Tom's Cabin," Simms said that the South saw no humor in the abolitionist movement. He had argued his position both logically and morally and now was tired of the discussion, convinced that no good could come of it. Southern arguments were not accepted. There remained only the final issue of "making a trial of strength between the people of the Southern states, and their philanthropic assailants." Until that time came, Simms warned the people of the South to read their own authors' writings, if they wanted to assert
the benevolence of slavery and protect their country.\textsuperscript{29}

In some of his attacks on the Northern abolitionists, Simms was not without political envy. C. Edward Lester, who had received the consulship to Genoa instead of Simms, wrote a book entitled \textit{My Consulship}, in which he said that "cotton is the support of Negro slavery." Simms chided President Pierce for appointing the incompetent Lester to a diplomatic post and replied, "Negro slavery is the soul of cotton." He claimed that there was no period when slavery was not profitable for the South, and that a slave economy was the most thriving economic system a country could have.\textsuperscript{30}

Not only did the \textit{Southern Quarterly Review} point out that slavery was humane, but it also claimed that the South could not economically survive its abolition. Simms stated that the South had moral title to the slave, based upon the slave's characteristics and nature. He claimed that the South was accountable for its slave system only to God. He refused to submit the slavery question to abolitionists' judgment. The South was a people, a nation, well-armed with a potential fighting force, and it would demand respect for its institutions.\textsuperscript{31} Thus the Review served the South well in its defense of slavery. Unwittingly, Simms was helping to create a closed Southern mind that would refuse to debate any issues.

The \textit{Southern Quarterly Review} also promoted Southern literature, especially about the South and its heritage. Charleston newspapers praised the magazine's endeavors in aiding writers. The \textit{Courier} spoke of the magazine's claims upon Southern people. Since the South could no longer look to Northern publications for truth or justice, a "high toned and able work, one ready to defend us, and commanding respect and attention by its position and conduct, should be sustained at the South." The \textit{Courier} said
that the Review had become such a magazine. It also praised Simms for doing so much to encourage Southern letters.32

Many authors wrote critical reviews of Southern literature and society for Simms's periodical. William Porcher Miles contributed literary criticism to the magazine. Miles wrote of Charleston society's influence on Southern writers. He criticized Charleston for being too business- and commercial-oriented, and for lacking a sophisticated literary taste. The city was "too proper" and thus inhibited freedom of expression in Southern literature. But that had to change. Miles said that as an urban center of Southern business enterprise, Charleston could contribute monetarily and intellectually to its own writers' literary endeavors.33

Since lectures were also part of Southern literature, Simms often reviewed orations delivered throughout South Carolina. Literature, he said, was for political use. Therefore, orations, speeches, and sermons embodied and revealed Southern politics, philosophy, and imagination. Reviewing orations and pointing out their weaknesses and virtues served to upgrade their quality. Given by kindred spirits, orations could serve the causes of virtue and patriotism, Simms claimed.34

Southerners had always loved the intricate logic and the legal terminology of the essay. Simms encouraged the essay, literary, social, and political, as a means of arousing the South to a realization of its place in the Union. He claimed that the essay, a highly intellectual form of literature, could take an active part in current politics. The essayist could no longer content himself with amusing his readers, he said. He must assume "the toils of the preacher," and his language must become that "of the prophet." The prophet must preach Southern unity.35
For Simms, periodical literature was designed specifically to impart a message. If any other periodicals disagreed with his views, the Southern Quarterly Review was the place to criticize them. Harper's Monthly, a magazine which previously prided itself on being apolitical, became a free-soil advocate. Simms claimed that Harper's was obviously an abolitionist tract. He attacked all Northern periodicals, using a defense of the South as his excuse. He asked Southerners how long they could continue to support Northern periodicals which attempted to undermine Southern institutions. Again, he asked, must the South support foreign literature, instead of developing its native talent? The Southern Quarterly Review would benefit the South more than Harper's and Putnam's together, Simms claimed. The Review would combine amusement with dignity and instruction, "with a perfect assurance to the South of freedom from insult and denunciation." 36

Simms also used the Review to promote Southern economic growth. 37 Not only did he print articles on soil care and pointers on improving the cotton crop and the plantation system, but he also supported the South's slowly emerging factory and manufacturing system. He became one of the South's most ardent advocates of economic diversity. Simms also used the Southern Quarterly Review to praise DeBow's work. DeBow's "Industrial Resources of the South and West" was a brilliant plea for Southern manufacturing. According to Simms, DeBow helped to destroy the myth of the South's complete economic dependence on the North. 38 The South would grow industrially, and someday would compete favorably with Northern manufactures, Simms claimed.

In an article comparing Northern and Southern roles in the Revolutionary War, Simms foresaw the South's economic dangers. Sixty years
ago, he said, as a natural consequence of the South's exclusive occupation in agriculture and the sparseness of its population. Southern people had left the fulfillment of all their economic and social wants to the Northern states. Because of this, the South looked to the North for books and opinions. Substantially, the North ruled the South. Simms accused the Yankees of making "it appear to us that they were really our benefactors, at the very moment when they were sapping our substance, degrading our minds, and growing rich upon our raw material, and by the labour of our slaves." He believed that the South was still the economic and social servant of the North. If only the South would diversify and mix agriculture with industry, then it could become both economically and socially independent.

Many writers contributed articles on the advantages of the plantation system and in defense of the planter class. One such article, the "Prospect and Policy of the South," claimed that Southern progress depended upon the planter's protection from the South's growing commercial prosperity. The author opposed Southern commercial conventions, maintaining that they would subordinate and ultimately destroy the planter class. In a rare note to an article, Simms took exception with the author's conclusions. Most planters erroneously ascribed the South's intellectual greatness and political success exclusively to agriculture, he said. But the South's great patriots and statesmen were trained lawyers or merchants. Competition with their fellow men "sharpened and brightened" their minds, and gave them the knowledge and courage to become leaders. Simms said that agriculture was their hobby, often their refuge from the cares and toils of public life. Far from aiding the South, the planter class, by its refusal to adopt modern inventions and
crop diversification was inhibiting its section's economic growth.\textsuperscript{41}

Turning from economic studies to biography, Simms had many works about eminent men reviewed in the \textit{Southern Quarterly Review}. He wanted to analyze the thoughts and actions of public men in order to help the South in its struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{42} He asked Beverly Tucker to write an article on Hugh A. Garland's \textit{Life of John Randolph of Roanoke}. Tucker found it to be a poorly researched work, unable to grasp Randolph's character. Tucker, like Simms, considered Randolph a great leader of the Southern cause. A brilliant man, Randolph possessed many faults. But Tucker knew that the South would probably never see a more able defender of its way of life.\textsuperscript{43}

Simms condemned the popular biographers who "make too much romance and too little facts." They converted sober history into fable, and rarely consulted their subjects' letters. To attempt to transform an ordinary man into a hero by romanticizing historical fact was to fail to capture the man at all.\textsuperscript{44} An important historical figure must be a symbol; his deeds and actions must be useful to a later generation. For instance, Washington's career was his claim to fame. He required no romantic biography. Washington had become a symbol of heroism to Southern youth.\textsuperscript{45}

Realistic biography would acquaint Southerners with their own history. Simms believed that the South's heroes could still speak for their section. Unfortunately, South Carolina allowed its great heroes to go unnoticed. That was unforgivable. Since only a Southerner could truly re-create the South's public men, Simms suggested that Southern writers turn their attention to biography. Part of the South's troubles, he claimed, was that too often Northern writers interpreted the actions of
Southern historical heroes. "It is well for the South, particularly at this moment, when its individuality is threatened," he said, "that the mind of the people demands a more intimate knowledge of what is due to its public men." 46

John C. Calhoun, who had recently died, was obviously a biographical subject for the Southern Quarterly Review. His career was eulogized in many funeral orations throughout the South. Simms knew that the proper eulogy should present the important events in Calhoun’s life as a symbol of a loyal Southerner. 47 Realizing that, he reviewed the Alabama politician George J. S. Walker’s eulogy to Calhoun. He called the eulogy part of that spontaneous outpouring of public feeling over the South’s great loss. Walker wrote of Calhoun’s "just ambition, his wonderful powers of penetration and analysis, his rapid generalization, his perfect comprehension of the political system under which we live, the pure elevation of his ambition, and the moral excellence of his life." 48 Simms took pride in reviewing such a life, claiming that the entire South should recognize Calhoun as their symbol of hope. Calhoun was now more than a mere hero; he was the symbol of the South’s defense of its sectional interests.

Both Hammond and Simms slowly reconciled their political differences with Calhoun, and they began to realize his value to the South. Simms reviewed Hammond’s eulogy on Calhoun and claimed that no other South Carolinian could estimate Calhoun’s genius. Only a statesman like Hammond could reveal what Calhoun meant to the South. Realizing that he had often disagreed with Calhoun, Hammond nevertheless said that Calhoun had struggled throughout his life for the South. His enemies were Hammond’s enemies. Above all, Calhoun’s stand against the Force Bill was the great
symbol of the South's struggle for freedom.\textsuperscript{49}

But Simms had special reasons for comparing Hammond to Calhoun, as both statesman and intellect. He said that Hammond's eulogy would survive as one of South Carolina's most important historical documents. For Simms, Hammond was among "the very first statesmen of the confederacy--perhaps of the age." What better man could replace Calhoun as the South's defender? Simms called for Hammond to become another Calhoun, to assume political leadership in South Carolina and the South. He asked Hammond to re-enter public life and assume the leadership that was rightfully his.\textsuperscript{50}

Simms also turned the \textit{Southern Quarterly Review} into one of the finest magazines of historical criticism of its day. Knowing that a section's past could help to unite it in common feeling, he reviewed many historical works about the South. He wrote with pleasure on any new contribution to America's early history. "The need of such publications is becoming daily, more and more felt particularly in our States of the South," he said. In the South, writers had seldom done justice to the past. Southern children were forced to learn their history from Northern books. Therefore, Southern historians should take their past into their own hands and realize that history could be a potent weapon in defense of the South.\textsuperscript{51}

Reviewing Pierre Guizot's \textit{Democracy in France}, Simms disagreed with Guizot's fear of a democratic form of government. He thought Guizot preferred a constitutional monarchy with a strong central government. Simms pointed out that Guizot misunderstood American history. In America, Simms claimed, the country was originally divided into self-governing communities, and in forming states, the citizens had yielded no power to a federal government. He believed that America's principle of state
rights protected the people against centralism. On the other hand, French history had demonstrated that excessive control of the country constantly created domestic friction. Simms wrote the review for the South to profit from France's experience.

Southern historians who wrote their own states' histories were often reviewed in the Southern Quarterly Review. Simms praised Charles Gayarre's early history of Louisiana but reminded the author that the artist should not let his emotions run wild. The historian must never forget his mission, that history should instruct as well as describe. Simms criticized William J. Rivers for doing a study of South Carolina without proper historical documents. He felt that more than ever, the state needed to understand its heritage and should not be misled by poor and inadequate writing. J. G. M. Ramsay's Annals of Tennessee was a sound, scholarly work, contributing to the South's western heritage. A labor of love, clearly written and well-documented, Ramsay's work brought much praise from Simms. Above all, Ramsay's description of the South's progress along the frontier, linking the Southwest to the old South, depicted a united South. Simms called for more work like Ramsay's, in which Southerners could claim a common heritage.

Simms thought that William Porcher Miles's Fourth of July oration proved that history could indeed defend the Southern way of life. Miles drew parallels between Revolutionary action in South Carolina, "and the history which is most pressing upon us in the progress of present times." Realizing that the South no longer had any constitutional security in the Union, Simms drew a parallel to the colonists' legal plight in 1776. He pointed out that "there could be no better use made of the anniversary of American freedom, than habitually to compare its objects and its acqui-
sitions with the degree of security which we enjoy its supposed guaran-
ties.  "

Therefore, the duties of the historian, as far as Simms was con-
cerned, were not simply to accumulate facts.  "History implies art, sys-
tem, arrangement, grouping," the judgment of a critic, and conclusions
drawn from many conflicting witnesses.  An historian must know the char-
acter of the times, the manners and habits of the people, and the events
which influenced their actions.  If the Southern historian could follow
those precepts, he would never worry about his people seeing history
"through Northern eyes," Simms said.  Southerners must be interested in
their heritage.  Public men, especially those in Congress, must know the
details of the past to understand the present and defend the actions of
their section.  History would serve as propaganda for the Southern cause.  "

Periodical literature was also "an important vehicle for political
writing."  Simms wanted contributors who could be relied on for their
sympathy and good faith in the Southern cause, as well as their experience
in political affairs.  When he first became editor of the Southern Quar-
terly Review, Simms asked Calhoun whether there were Southern men in
Washington who would take up the "cudgel" for the South through the
medium of periodical literature.  Not only did Simms want to teach the
South its political obligations, but he also wanted to warn the North
how little the South owed to the Union.  However, he also heeded the
advice of John P. Kennedy, who knew that the Review would have much
influence throughout the South.  Kennedy reminded him that some of the
South's zealous defenders were equally as dangerous as Northern aboli-
tionists.  Therefore, he suggested that Simms counsel moderation, thus
earning the fame and the gratitude of his section."
Simms's friends wanted him to attend the Southern convention in Nashville, but his editorial duties kept him in Charleston. He did, however, write a long and important article on "The Southern Convention," its actions and results. Simms stated that the convention met to defend the South and that Northern political and social aggression had caused the meeting. A shrewd political observer, Simms knew that the proceedings of the convention were less important than the fact that Southern states had agreed to discuss their grievances in a united body. Nine states met in June, 1850, and they resolved to meet again if necessary.

The delegates' actions at the Nashville Convention had not pleased Simms. The South was not united, he said, and it could never be united so long as two powerful political parties existed in the country. At Nashville, party politicians had eluded all important discussions, because they did not wish to bring disorder into their ranks. Simms suggested, however, that events could destroy party organization and discipline. "The two parties have survived their uses," he said. Now, a geographical alignment of parties was essential to the safety of the South. All minor political cares must be forgotten, he urged, and the South should unite as one man in defense of "our very safety and existence as a people." Thus Simms had irrevocably committed himself to sectional politics, and the Southern Quarterly Review became a sectional political organ.

At the same time that Simms turned the Review into a sectional political magazine, the South began to debate the dilemma of how to secede. Undoubtedly, it would eventually leave the Union. Whether one state would leave, forcing others to follow, or the South would secede in a single body, would be the basis of political discussion for the next ten years. The Nashville Convention counselled unity and moderation.
Some individuals, notably the radical secessionist faction in South Carolina, advocated immediate single state secession. Inevitably, the debate reached the pages of the Southern Quarterly Review.

Early in 1849 Hammond asked Simms how far the interests of the Review would permit him to put the question of North and South in its "true colors." Of course, Hammond opposed immediate disunion, but he proposed to demonstrate that the South had nothing to fear from the separation of the Union. He resolved to avoid speaking as a "fire-eater," refrain from advocating separate state action, and put the facts simply before the people. 62 Therefore, Hammond wrote a short article in the Southern Quarterly Review comparing the North and South. He claimed that the abolitionists had caused the South to question the value of the Union. Hammond then advised "that the North and South should fully comprehend their respective strength and weakness before the threatened and apparently impending breach is made . . ." 63 He counselled the South to strengthen its social and political system and to prepare for the consequences of separation.

Meanwhile, Simms asked, "Are we at the close of our experiment?" He saw no hope for the South in the Union. He suggested that it would be practical to let the abolitionists precipitate the struggle, "so that there should be no patching up of the rents, which must soon open again." Claiming that the South must separate in order to keep from sinking into colonial vassalage to the North, he proposed that the South stand together in any ensuing struggle. 64 In reviewing William Henry Trescot's The Position and Course of the South, Simms wrote that the Union's destiny had been achieved, and the time had come for the two great geographical sections to sever their bonds. Since the sections could no longer be united
in mutual interest, the South must become a united section. After assuring himself that the Union had to break up, Simms advocated co-operation among the Southern states. 65

As editor of the Review, Simms became one of the South's leading exponents of co-operation. He asked, "Shall we [South Carolina] await the approach of our tardy allies, or shall we commence the struggle single-handed?" Simms knew that the South had to be convinced that civil war would not follow united secession. He claimed that the North had to have Southern cotton and that commercial ties were too strong to allow a war to result from dissolution of the Union. 66

The entire South also had to realize that its economic interests were tied to secession. It would be an impulse to Southern trade. Every business and industry would thrive, as world markets opened to Southern goods. Simms believed the South would become a major economic power in the world. "From our union in the South we should derive strength: for we should have all our interests interwoven, connected with each other, and all our feelings would be akin." 67

Many articles advocating the co-operation of Southern states appeared in the Review. Most of them asked what South Carolina could do to unite its fellow Southerners on secession. The state could not push secession too rapidly or it would alienate the rest of the South. Yet the state had to prepare for disunion. One writer suggested that South Carolina should send delegates to a state convention to be held in Charleston. The convention, a moderate one, would enlighten the delegates and other Southerners as to the South's danger within the Union. A committee of public safety would be organized to plan future action when the convention was not in session, the writer advised. South Carolina should not instruct
its congressmen to leave the federal government. Those congressmen, the writer contended, could persuade other congressmen to join them. Most important, South Carolina should slowly prepare the rest of the South for secession. 68

Simms reviewed Francis W. Pickens's speech on secession and the calling of a state convention. Apparently Pickens opposed calling a state convention, but when the convention met he wanted to institute secession proceedings. Simms disagreed with Pickens's view of separate state secession but sought to conciliate him by praising his patriotism for the South. 69 Simms praised another address, which opposed separate state action. The author, like Simms, urged the co-operation of the other states of the South. Simms used the pages of the Southern Quarterly Review to advise moderation, knowing South Carolina and the rest of the South must unite in order to secede from the Union. 70

Understanding that national political parties were detrimental to Southern nationalism, Simms attacked them in the Review. He considered political parties immoral, for they grasped shamelessly at power. He said that the South had made a fatal error in allowing the North to write the three-fifths clause into the Constitution, making the South forever a minority section. The South could no longer hold the balance of power in politics. 71 Therefore, the two major political parties, which represented national interests, were useless to the South as a minority section. Simms concluded that the South should reject the political party system.

Commenting upon a "History of the Polk Administration," Simms found the author to be too thoroughly a party man. The author would attack any man whose ideas ran counter to the Democratic party, he said.
Simms was no longer a member of the Democratic party. In the presidential election of 1852, he was actually bipartisan, supporting Pierce because he would serve the South better than the other candidates. But Northern Whigs openly attacked Pierce for being a "tool" of the slaveholding states, while Southern Whigs, anxious to win the election, slandered Pierce by calling him an abolitionist. Simms knew that a national party would support its own candidate regardless of his political views. Therefore he decided that in future elections he would support the most pro-Southern candidate, regardless of party affiliation.

R. M. T. Hunter's speech in Congress on the Kansas-Nebraska bill was published in the Southern Quarterly Review. Simms reviewed the speech and said that Hunter would support his section and seek to compromise on that important piece of legislation. But Simms also was aware that issues like the Kansas-Nebraska bill were helping to weaken the Whig party and would someday destroy it. Then a Northern anti-slavery party would grow and attack the South. The political struggle would cease to be one of national compromise and turn into a sectional fight, thus insuring a united Southern secession.

By constantly appealing to Southern youth, their education, and their historical consciousness, Simms sought to build a core of young patriots to promote the cause for Southern independence. Let the young men begin right in receiving their first political impressions, he said. The older politicians were "creatures of self, or of party, . . . nothing can be expected at their hands." Simms would rely upon the "unbought, unbiased, the ardent and frank nature of the young," to rescue the South from her enemies. With the proper training, Simms said, "the loghouse shall yet rear its Patrick Henrys, and the playground its Washingtons and
Marion's.  

Simms also discovered that sermons could further the Southern cause. "They declare the common sentiment of the people of South Carolina, that their liberties and securities are in danger, and that there is an enemy almost within their walk, whom they must prepare to encounter, to repel, to defeat and utterly extirpate, or to perish themselves." Simms knew that it was indeed fortunate that the Southern people were sustained by their priesthood. He would aid religious leaders by reviewing and commenting upon their sermons, thus lending political, social, and intellectual dignity to religion. Simms knew that sermons could do more to unite South Carolinians than any carefully planned political harangue. The enthusiasm and ability of a minister to unite a crowd behind the moral growth of sectionalism was indeed a powerful weapon in the movement for independence.

Despite the Southern Quarterly Review's importance as an organ of Southern propaganda, it could not survive on a paying basis. Subscriptions at first grew under Simms's editorship. But such a magazine was impossible to sustain. It soon went into debt. Then it became increasingly difficult to find contributors, and Simms was forced to write many articles and all of the "Critical Notes" himself. He even put some of his own funds into the Review and found himself constantly at the printer's making last minute corrections and additions. By October, 1852, the magazine was in deep financial difficulty. Simms discovered that it was almost impossible to collect payments for the Review. He thought that such an important publication could be saved by appealing to Southern leaders. Writing to William J. Grayson, he suggested that public men and politicians contribute financially to the "success of a period-
ical which is admitted to be essential to our public and sectional objects, honorable to our character, and particularly useful in the development of the talents of our young men." 77

Simms contracted to keep the Review one more year and to receive his pay from the magazine's profits. By July, 1853, he knew that the magazine would never pay. 78 Also, he had an opportunity to buy part of the Charleston Evening News. Richard Yeadon, an influential Charleston newspaperman, wanted Simms to improve the Evening News by turning it into a strong pro-sectional political organ. Hammond advised Simms to remain with the Southern Quarterly Review, and attempt to improve that magazine, before again venturing into the newspaper business. 79 He hoped the Review could become a paying magazine.

Charles Mortimer, a Northerner, purchased the Review in 1854. Simms edited the Review throughout that year, but he was unhappy with the new owner. Simms claimed that he and Mortimer could not agree as to how the magazine should be run. Mortimer insisted upon publishing articles that Simms rejected and the editor slowly lost control of the magazine. Simms edited his last issue in October, 1854. 80

While editor of the Southern Quarterly Review, Simms wrote of the South's problems and grievances in the Union, and promoted the slowly emerging feeling of Southern nationalism. Although radical secessionists often contributed to the magazine, it remained moderate. Simms was a co-operationist, and the periodical bore the indelible stamp of its editor's political views. The Review served the co-operationists in their movement for secession. Most important, the magazine under Simms's direction had shown the entire South that secession was its ultimate end and its only recourse. 81


10. *Magnolia*, n. s. II (May, 1843), 336, (June 1843), 400; A. B. Meeks to Simms, July 1, 1843, Charles Carroll Simms Papers.


12. *Southern and Western Monthly Magazine*, I (January, 1845), 67 and advertisement.


15. A. P. Aldrich to Hammond, July 1, 1845, Hammond Papers.


17. *Southern and Western Monthly Magazine*, II (July, 1845), 71-72.


22. *Prospectus of the Southern Quarterly Review*, Charles Carroll Simms Papers; Osterweil, p. 120.


26. Ibid., II, 479, 495-497.


29. Ibid., II n. s. (January, 1854), 248-249.

30. Ibid., pp. 185-205.


34. Ibid., IV n. s. (October, 1851), 319, 322, 324.

35. Ibid., I n. s. (July, 1850), 372; Hammond to Simms, March 26, 1851, Hammond Papers.

36. *S. Q. R.*, X n. s. (October, 1854), 511, 505-510; II n. s. (November, 1850); IX n. s. (June, 1854), 224.


38. *S. Q. R.*, IX n. s. (April, 1854), 530-531, 524-525.

39. Ibid., II, n. s. (September, 1850), 31.

40. Ibid., X n. s (October, 1854), 454 (see also 434-435).
41. Ibid., X n. s. (October, 1854), 457 (see also 454-456).

42. William Gilmore Simms, The Partisan (New York, 1853), x; Views and Reviews, I, 67-68.

43. S. Q. R., IV n. s. (July, 1851), 45-46, 61.

44. Ibid., VI n. s. (July, 1852), 159-161, 203.

45. Ibid., pp. 222, 227-228, 233.

46. Ibid., I n. s. (April, 1850), 197 (see also 192-196, 228-229).


48. S. Q. R., III n. s (April 1851), 569.

49. Ibid., IV n. s. (July, 1851), 112, 112, 116.

50. Ibid., IV n. s. (July, 1851), 107-110, 112, 117.


52. S. Q. R., XV (April, 1849), 164-165, 120-130.

53. Ibid., IV n. s. (July, 1851), 69, 74.

54. Ibid., II n. s. (September, 1850), 69, 71, 82.

55. Ibid., VIII n. s. (October, 1853), 368.

56. Ibid., XVI (October, 1849), 257-258; Courier, Sept. 14, 1853.


59. Hammond to Simms, March 8, 1850, Hammond Papers.

60. S. Q. R., II n. s (September, 1850), 208-209.

61. Ibid., II n. s. (September, 1850), 209, 210, 212, 213.


63. S. Q. R., IV (July, 1849), 311 (see also 275).
64. Oliphant, Simms Letters, II, 574; Osterweis, pp. 120, 151; Herbert, p. 139.


66. Ibid., III n. s. (April, 1851), 534.

67. Ibid., pp. 537-538.

68. Ibid., IV n. s. (October, 1851), 277-298; Herbert, p. 374.

69. S. Q. R., V n. s. (January, 1852), 255.

70. Ibid., IV n. s. (October, 1851), 350, 351, 300-315.

71. Ibid., II n. s. (September, 1850), 198, 200, 204.

72. Ibid., III n. s. (January, 1851), 49-51; (April, 1851), 556.

73. Ibid., VI n. s. (October, 1852), 535-536.

74. Ibid., X n. s. (July, 1854), 260; VII n. s. (January, 1853), 205.

75. Ibid., III n. s. (April, 1851), 570-571.

76. Ibid., III n. s. (April, 1851), 555.


78. Simms to Hammond, Dec. 15, 1852, Hammond Papers; Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 244, 245.


III. THE ARTIST AS POLITICAL ADVISOR: SIMMS AS ADVISOR TO JAMES HENRY HAMMOND

During 1857 Simms's career as theoretical politician took on more significance. When his closest friend, James Henry Hammond, entered the Senate late in that year, Simms became Hammond's political advisor. Although he held no major political office in South Carolina after 1845, Simms had much influence on the speeches and actions of the state's national officeholders. Hammond, with Simms as his advisor, helped to further a Southern national feeling and to form a Southern political party. Thus Simms's actions outside of public office did much in creating the sectional political party of 1860.

Still upset over his shabby treatment in the North, Simms began a Southern lecture tour. In January, 1857, some of South Carolina's leading literary and political figures—Grayson, Yeadon, Miles, and Trescot—invited him to give a series of lectures in Charleston's Hibernian Hall. They were impressed by Simms's ability to instil in a crowd a feeling of a common Southern heritage. Also, they wanted to show their appreciation for his never-ending defense and support of South Carolina. They were moved from a strong desire to give some feeble token of our high admiration and esteem of one who, as an author, has both vindicated and illustrated his State, alike by the creations of his genius and the extent and depth of his researches; one, of whom we are equally proud as man, patriot and writer. We would acknowledge the debt, if we cannot pay it.
Because of another speaking engagement Simms was forced to postpone his Charleston lectures until late in May. When he spoke, Simms chose to focus on a single idea. The South, he said, had always allowed itself to be divided socially, politically, and morally by its Northern enemies. Now the South must defend itself against Northern encroachment on its way of life. He knew that only a united South could protect itself. Therefore, his theme in the lecture was to call for Southern nationalism.

Commenting upon Simms's lecture the Charleston Mercury said that all Southerners had learned from his ability to draw historical parallels. That paper knew that "our Southern statesmen have gathered from his historic pages their most full and conclusive arguments for the defense of a people basely and slanderously assailed." To many Southerners Simms had become a symbol of unity. The Mercury stated that his lifetime of intellectual and political energy was devoted to the South's interests.

The lecturer was also in demand as an advisor to the young Charleston literary group which gathered often at Russell's bookstore. John Russell owned a small bookstore on King Street in Charleston. He was also a publisher, and in April, 1857, founded Russell's Magazine. The periodical soon became one of the South's outstanding literary and social magazines. Actually, Russell's Magazine was the creation of Simms, Petigru, Paul Hamilton Hayne, Henry Timrod, and others who spent much of their time talking literature and politics. Simms told Russell that providing a critical literary magazine for the expression of Southern thought was an effective way of furthering the cause of Southern literature. Thus, with Simms's help the periodical began to defend Southern institutions by reflecting Southern sentiment.

Always willing to help young writers, Simms had many of their
articles published in Russell's Magazine. He was happy to know that his "young countrymen, of the South, are anxious to make themselves familiar with art and letters." His friendship with the young Paul Hayne was to last for twenty-five years. Hayne and other youths regarded Simms as a guide, philosopher, and close friend. Simms was always open and outspoken with these young men. He felt free to air his own personal grievances, political and social, against a society that often rejected the artist.

Simms's pronouncements were printed in Russell's Magazine. He was often its chief contributor and always the magazine's most respected advisor. Hayne, in an article on Simms's poetry, summed up what he meant to the group of young writers and to the entire South. Simms was the South's defender. In a country that was divided into literary and political sections, he came under great attack from the North. Yet for twenty-eight years Simms had been a prominent contributor to almost every field of letters. Hayne pointed out:

In fiction, historical, or purely imaginative, in criticism of every kind and degree, from the piquant newspaper notice to the profound analysis of Hamlet, in the delicate labor of annotation, in essays upon every variety of topic, and especially upon the engrossing topic of Southern slavery, in the editorship of reviews and journals, in history proper, even in geography, he has worked with singular energy and success.

No American writer had penetrated into the roots of a society like Simms. For Hayne, Simms was the South's and the nation's leading man of letters.

Hayne said that Simms was a victim of the South's history, a "prophet without honor." His reputation was greater in the North than in his own state. Few Southerners read or cared about their past. But Simms was responsible for influencing the South's entire intellectual and political community. Through him they learned of their peculiar society
and acquired knowledge to combat their sectional enemies. Thus Simms had pursued his life of letters and politics strictly to enhance the South's prestige, and make Southerners proud of their heritage and confident in their future. 9

Although often involved in literary endeavors, Simms was never far from politics. When he learned that Hammond was to be appointed to the Senate, he turned to help him. After having been so poorly treated by his own state in the past, Hammond refused to campaign for office. Simms knew that Hammond would risk the exposure of his past if he again entered public life. But Hammond was the best man in South Carolina, and he had to go to Columbia and electioneer. There he would dispel all rumors about his reputation and insure his election. 10

Heeding Simms's advice, Hammond actively sought the office. Rhett, Pickens, Chesnut, and James Preston were candidates along with Hammond for Pierce Butler's seat. After the first ballot Chesnut and Preston dropped out of the race. On November 30, 1857, Hammond was elected over Pickens by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-nine. Rhett received no votes. Hammond's new political career had begun and with it, Simms's career as his political advisor. 11

After Hammond's election, Simms turned to his own personal problems. His father-in-law, Nash Roach, was very ill, and Simms had to manage the plantation. He was bored and tired of his job as literary confessor to every young writer. He had written nothing in many months and feared that he would never write again. 12

But Hammond's election completely revitalized Simms. He suggested that Hammond be firm in his actions. Although he had often accused Hammond of too much self-esteem, Simms knew that the opposite was the
case. Hammond did not know his own strength; Simms would show it to him. He offered "to help your cogitations on general subjects," and to serve as a clearing house for Hammond's political ideas. If there was a speech to write or some historical research to perform, Simms would gladly help Hammond in formulating his opinions.\textsuperscript{13}

Hammond was flattered that Simms appreciated his abilities. He knew that he was ignorant of present political problems, having been so long in retirement. Simms, whose views closely resembled his own, would be the ideal advisor. Like Simms, Hammond opposed South Carolina's seceding alone. With Simms's help, he would attempt to persuade Southern congressmen to join together in defense of the South.\textsuperscript{14}

In a long letter to William Porcher Miles, who had just been elected to the House of Representatives, Simms attempted to explain Hammond's politics. "I am not authorized to say what his course in politics will be," said Simms, "but will venture to suggest that he will be a conservative."\textsuperscript{15} He restated Hammond's co-operationist beliefs and cautioned Miles on the seriousness of the Kansas question. Simms suggested that Miles work closely with that "ogre" Hammond. He told Miles that Hammond was friendly to Buchanan only as long as the President proved "superior to the stupid ambition of striving to win over the Northern democracy at the sacrifice of every thing."\textsuperscript{16} In brief, Hammond would support the Democratic party only while it was tributary to the interests of the South.

In Congress during the debates over the Kansas statehood bill, Hammond wrote Simms for "direct and distinct" advice. Southern congressmen disagreed over the importance of the admittance of Kansas into the Union. But only a unified Southern vote could make Kansas a state under the Lecompton Constitution. Hammond thought that the South should secede
if Kansas were not admitted as a slave state. However, he was divided in his own mind over the importance of the issue. Personally he opposed the extension of slave territory. He wanted the South first to develop its 850,000 square miles of territory. Besides, he was convinced that there were too few slaves to colonize new territory. Thus Hammond wanted Simms to survey the facts and send him a report on the Western lands. He expected Simms's report to verify his on on the consolidation of the Southern Empire.  

Simms quickly replied. The ultimatum should not be slavery in Kansas or disunion. Simms knew that slavery, not Kansas, was the principal issue. As to the extinction of slavery, Hammond had ignored the fact that slavery would spread naturally as land wore out. It was evident that the South had to have new states in order to protect its political power in Congress.  

Therefore, Simms advised Hammond against making a secessionist speech in the Senate. He should be calm and logical, and always remember that his duty was to organize a party of Southern Democrats. Kansas was to be an issue only to hurt the political power of Stephen A. Douglas, a Northern Democrat. Simms told Hammond to temporarily speak of the necessity for preserving the Union. "But show that the preservation of the Union can only be made sure with the due recognition of all the rights and securities of the South." Hammond's ultimate object should be a powerful congressional Southern bloc that would be prepared for secession. Hammond was not the only politician whom Simms advised during the Kansas debates. To William Porcher Miles, freshman congressman, Simms suggested careful participation in floor discussions. Miles should remain calm but firm in espousing the Southern cause. "You cannot well
err in identifying yourself without reserve with your section," Simms said. Simms also realized that Hammond would need intelligent and loyal lieutenants, and he advised Miles to cultivate the senator. Advocating a more radical position on the Kansas question than he had with Hammond, Simms told Miles to let Southerners say "we leave en masse if Kansas be rejected." If prepared for that, Simms believed Southern congressmen could accomplish anything they chose at Washington.

Simms had given Hammond sound advice on handling Douglas. Hammond, fearing that the Union might break up over Kansas, took advantage of Douglas's desperation. He knew that Douglas had destroyed his presidential chances and that the South could not be compromised. Hammond said that Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi had united with South Carolina in claiming "Lecompton or separation." He thanked Simms profusely for his long letter. "I will have to incorporate some of your thoughts . . . in my speeches," he told Simms.

Hammond's speech in the Senate on March 4, 1858 was a reply to Douglas's view on Kansas and an attack on the Republican party. Many of his comments were taken directly from his extensive correspondence with Simms over the previous two months. Hammond claimed that Congress was not sovereign and therefore could not interfere with a constitution passed by a territorial legislature. If a territory asked for admission to the Union, Congress had only to inquire as to the republicanism of its constitution. He said that the "true object of the discussion . . . is to agitate the question of slavery." Thus the true reason for debate over Kansas was that the Republican party sought to defeat the Northern Democratic party by again bringing up slavery.

The North was preparing to abolish slavery, but Hammond doubted that
it could impose its will on a united South. Relying almost entirely on Simms's historical views, he described the South's value to the Union. In every war the South had borne its share of fighting, but the North had always plundered and robbed the South in return. The North should beware how it treated the South. Cotton was king, Hammond said. Could Northerners survive without Southern cotton? Like Simms, he felt that the South's greatest strength lay in the harmony of its political and social institutions. Southern society was a class society, and the slave --far from being its dregs, or "mud-sill"--was an important member of the working class. Hammond claimed that slavery was a positive good because the Negro could not care for himself. In conclusion he warned that if the North attempted to destroy slavery, it would destroy the Union.\(^{24}\)

Immediately Hammond wrote to Simms. He wanted Simms to read the speech, and promised to send him a copy.\(^{25}\) Simms replied that many Southerners viewed Hammond, after his able defense of slavery, as the proper leader of the South. In fact, Simms found his own praise tame in comparison to most that he heard. He had known all along that Hammond was capable of great statesmanship. Although he thought Hammond could have said much more, he was certain that the speech had "struck the right chord for the South." Above all, Hammond had demonstrated Southern strength and resources and had furthered the cause of Southern independence. Simms was indeed delighted that his advice had been followed so well.\(^{26}\)

The speech made Hammond an important political figure in the South. Simms wanted to establish Hammond as the most powerful politician in South Carolina. One method of promoting Hammond's political career was through newspapers. If he would accept the Mercury as his political
organ, his career would be assured. But Hammond thought that a senator should not manufacture opinion at home except through his speeches. Besides, the Mercury was Rhett-owned and much too radical politically. Hammond opposed Simms's plan to purchase the Mercury and turn it into a pro-Hammond co-operationist organ. He told Simms that it would ruin his career. As far as he was concerned, Simms was the great man of Southern letters. To dabble in the politics of the Mercury was beneath his stature. 27

But Hammond soon changed his mind about the Mercury. Although he still refused to have his own name outwardly connected with the paper and did not want Simms to edit it, he recognized its value in the sectional struggle. Rhett wanted to sell the Mercury and Hammond wanted to be certain that the buyers were moderate yet would appeal to Southern nationalism. He told Simms that his idea was for the Mercury to conciliate the whole South. Without the Rhetts it would be the most influential paper in the South. By refusing to advocate dissension the paper would appeal to those Northern politicians who cared nothing for the Negro. Hammond was certain that the Mercury could do much to unite the South and divide the North. Following Simms's advice he proposed that an independent group of Charlestonians buy the Mercury and have Southern nationalism as their motto. 28

Simms immediately wrote Miles, stating that any change of ownership would benefit the Mercury. He did not want Hammond's name mentioned, although Hammond would have been a financial backer. Simms, however, felt too old and too involved in his profession to become the paper's editor. He suggested that the Mercury needed to be well-edited, since it had been badly run for over ten years. Of course, he would write editorials for
the paper and would serve the new owners in an advisory capacity. But the sale fell through and the Mercury continued under the Rhetts's control. Perhaps, if Simms had been the power behind the paper, it would have become the outstanding Southern nationalist organ. 29

Meanwhile, Simms was still very active in writing for and advising Paul Hamilton Hayne, who had been named editor of Russell's Magazine. Simms wrote many poems for the magazine. His topics were the despair of the artist in a land that refused to recognize him; studies of heroes and heroics; laments for a lost arcadia; and pleasing poems on nature. 30

But Simms also wrote a very serious essay on the "Literary Prospects of the South." The essay showed Simms's recognition of the need for an industrial South. 31 Northerners, he said, ascribed the South's intellectual inertia to slavery. He countered that the previous neglect of the intellect in the South was caused by "the insulting nature of our occupation." He meant that the lack of large cities in a purely agricultural population made it impossible for literature to flourish. After all, literary production had to obey the law of demand. To have "a close commerce of intellect and opinion" the South must have large cities. Only industry, Simms said, could make the South and its literature grow. 32

There was, however, some hope for the South. Simms said that there was a silent revolution occurring which would establish a publishing business in the South. No longer would Southerners be forced to listen to foreign and hostile minds criticize its writers. For even without an audience, the South's young authors continued to write. In the throes of the sectional crisis, the people of the South at last realized the value of their own spokesmen. Even as far away as Texas, there were young poets and historians writing heroic tales of the South. In defense of
their society and domestic institutions, Southerners at last recognized their own writers. Moreover, a growing population, improved communication between the Southern states, and an interest in manufacturing and trade had caused a revolution in the South. That revolution extended to literature. Simms declared that the South's writers would aid it in the ever-growing sectional crisis.33

Perhaps Simms's role as advisor to Hammond and his work with Russell's Magazine affected his fellow South Carolinians' view of him. For early in April, 1858, his name was mentioned in connection with a seat in the United States Senate. Hammond wrote that he did not want his own name involved in the Senate race. "If I could name a colleague," he told Simms, "I mean to name you... I would stay my time out here with you as a co-adjutor and I think you are the very man."34 Simms considered Hammond's pronouncement one of mere friendship. After all, he said, in South Carolina "I am regarded simply as a poet and novelist." Because of his reputation as a man of letters, Simms had long ago given up the idea of returning to public office. Although he wanted the office, he was positive that nothing would come of Hammond's suggestion.35

Yet when Senator Josiah James Evans died on May 6, 1858, Simms thought that he might have a chance for the vacant seat. He warned Hammond to take no part in the nomination of Evans's successor. He believed himself to be the most qualified man in the state for the post, but he was certain that either Orr or Chesnut would be named.36 But Governor R. F. W. Allston appointed the ineffectual A. P. Hayne to the post. Paul Hamilton Hayne, the new senator's nephew, expressed his regret that Simms had not been named. However, the regular election would take place when the state legislature met in December. Simms had hopes of being nominated
To Mary Lawson, Simms wrote with excitement that his friends were planning to nominate him. The up-country called him "one in every way worthy of this high trust, and to whom, having been for so long a time guilty of neglect, the State should now offer this well-merited tribute, and call to her service one, modest in wisdom but brave in principle and bold in defence of her honor." On October 19, 1858, the Charleston Courier formally nominated Simms. But as was usual in his career, politics conspired against him. The state wanted a more moderate man in Washington, and Simms again lost his opportunity to actively serve South Carolina.

But Hammond began to rely more and more on Simms's advice. Early in June he attacked British aggression in the Gulf of Mexico. Simms told him that those aggressions were exaggerated. After all, should the South sanction a war with Britain to protect "Yankee" commerce? "Are we to help strengthen the hands of that section which now seeks to destroy all our securities?" he asked Hammond. Excellent trade relations between Great Britain and the South had made England the South's strong ally. Now the Northern states were causing trouble with Great Britain, and Simms refused to allow the South to again fight Northern battles.

Simms told Hammond that a war with Britain would receive no Southern support. Again, he said, the Democratic party wanted to "plunge us into war." This was a trap to unite the party and destroy the growing sectional alliance. Simms summed up his antagonism to the Northern Democrats and his growing allegiance to Great Britain by saying:

But virtually, out of the South, the Democratic Party is a dead thing. Shall this Party then of the South, be suffered for its own selfish maintenance, to plunge the country into a war which,
while it lasts, must be fatal to Southern Agriculture. Cannot this danger be made clear, if not to themselves, at least to the people of the South. I am disposed to think that now is the time to effect an extrication of the people of the South from their demagogues.\textsuperscript{41}

Hammond followed Simms's advice. The threatened war with Great Britain passed, but Southern feelings towards Northern politicians became increasingly hostile.\textsuperscript{42}

Hammond served prudently in the Senate and maintained not only his state's security but its pride. Simms praised him for his performance and suggested that Hammond keep aloof from state politics. Hammond again followed Simms's advice and refused to interfere in state politics. However, he did disagree with Simms's views of the Democratic party. Simms wanted a strictly sectional party, while Hammond preferred the Orr scheme of attempting to work within a national party system. Both were still secessionists, but Hammond was the more conservative of the two. Soon he would come around to Simms's view of destroying the national party.\textsuperscript{43}

On July 22, 1858, before some fifteen hundred guests at Beach Island, Hammond spoke on his actions in the Senate. He justified his vote on the English bill, which replaced the Lecompton constitution, because he knew Kansas could not feasibly be a slave state. He advocated a united South and refused to consider separate state secession. This view was obviously the result of his political discussions with Simms. Both men wanted the South to strengthen and consolidate its position. They both prepared for the day when at least five Southern states would secede.\textsuperscript{44}

The most startling position which Hammond took in that speech was opposing the revival of the slave trade. Both he and Simms agreed on the lunacy of re-opening the slave trade because it would destroy the slave market in the South. Hammond spoke privately to many congressmen before
voting, lest someone construe his opposition as anti-Southern. Yet when he gave his Beach Island speech, many Southerners thought that Hammond had turned against the South.  

Opposition to Hammond increased during the summer, and many of his friends urged him to re-explain his political position. Hammond decided to speak at Barnwell Courthouse on October 29, 1858. But before he spoke he wanted Simms's ideas on what he should say. Simms had learned much from Hammond's previous speech. He temporarily changed his views on parties and advised Hammond to fight his battles within the national political party. Kansas was a false issue. Only those "fire-eaters" who demanded immediate action would agitate over Kansas, Simms told Hammond. Again, he cautioned Hammond against being too emphatic in his statements. Above all, the other slave states should not be frightened away. Since Hammond was misunderstood in his own state, it was imperative that he make the speech, and Simms would help him write it. 

As a political aide Simms was commissioned to read Hammond's speech in advance and to comment on how others would react to it. Hammond had promised to send the entire speech to the Mercury for publication. He wanted Simms to hire a proof-reader to scrutinize the Mercury copy before it was published. It was of utmost importance for Hammond to know exactly how his words would be accepted. Simms told him that as a public leader he must not only make opinion but must reflect the opinion of his constituents. 

Hammond's speech, covering both the Kansas and the slave trade questions, reflected Simms's thoughts as well as his own. The speech began with comments on Kansas would become a slave state. Kansas should make up its own mind about slavery, he said; Congress had no authority to
make this decision itself. No state could be coerced by Congress. Besides, the South did not need Kansas. Since developing its own resources would take years, why should the South bother to expand? He refused to sanction the re-opening of the slave trade, because he believed there were geographical limits to slavery's expansion. If slavery would not flourish west of Texas, why increase the slave population of the South? In the same way, Hammond found the filibuster scheme for acquiring Cuba nonsensical. The only way to acquire Cuba was by war. Besides, Cuba would make only two or three states, which would not restore the political equilibrium between the North and the South. Hammond counselled the slave states to forget about recovering the balance of power in Congress. The South should develop the resources within its borders and seek to unite against the North.

The South must unite on a uniform economic policy, oppose the tariff, and concentrate on growing cotton and improving its young industry. Hammond feared the political domination of the North, but as long as the North required cotton and tobacco the South was politically safe. "The North has only to be made clearly sensible how far she can go, and what the South will not submit to," he said. Above all, Hammond believed that at that time an overwhelming percentage of Southerners favored the Union. Ultimately, his and Simms's views were similar. Until South Carolina could count on a united South, there was no recourse but to remain in the Union.

Next Hammond discussed the advantages of a united South. Here he leaned directly upon Simms's views of Southern nationalism. The North would forever be divided, and the South's political power rested on a united, politically viable front. The lesson of Southern soul-searching
on slavery in the 1830's was still fresh in Hammond's mind. Many Southerners then believed slavery to be an evil. But throughout the 1840's and 50's, men such as Simms, Hammond, Chancellor Harper, and T. R. Dew proved the moral and economic value of slavery. In order to counteract abolitionist sentiment the entire South must purge anti-slavery men from its borders. For Hammond and Simms, slavery was too important to allow any further discussion on its merits and demerits. The spectre of Calhoun raised its head. Freedom of speech was acceptable in the South only within the limits of the Southern consensus. 53

Summing up his speech, Hammond called for a politically, socially, and economically united South. He considered himself merely a representative of the people. As Simms had so often said, a Southern consensus required its politicians to follow popular opinion. If the South determined on secession, Hammond would be faithful to his section. Again, a united South would be powerful either within or outside the Union. 54

Simms considered the speech a "noble and masterly" performance. Hammond had finally joined the ranks of Calhoun, Clay, and Webster. The speech was national without surrendering a piece of sectional pride. Hammond had destroyed those Southerners who still believed in single state secession. He had captured "the popular instinct in the South." Simms, however, knew that Northern fanaticism alone would not drive the South to secession. Keeping their section cool and calm but prepared, Simms and Hammond planned for the ultimate event. Simms knew that a moderate but determined South would someday be forced by Northern politicians into secession. Thus a nationalist South, void of any dissent, would be ready for the emergency. 55

Meanwhile, the election of James Chesnut, a moderate, to the Senate
in December, 1858, proved that South Carolina was determined to move cautiously. Simms would have a strong effect on the actions of both Chesnutt and Hammond during the next two years. Both men wanted his wise political advice in the coming crisis. 56

Although Simms never relinquished his job as political advisor, he spent most of 1859 worrying about his political reputation, writing copy for Russell's Magazine, and counselling young historians. He had become the hero of Southern letters. The South at last realized his importance as a literary propagandist. With fame came a certain amount of attack on his literary reputation. Simms seemed lethargic, almost tired. At times he was frightened, but often he was too busy to think about anything. Like the young man of thirty years before, Simms was in a hurry. He was anxious to see his years of work bring some success. 57

From all over the South came praise of Simms's work. Writing in the Southern Literary Messenger, John Esten Cooke best summed up the South's estimation of Simms:

Mr. Simms occupies a position in the eyes of the Southern people which is most enviable. The chivalric gentleman--the accomplished scholar--the untiring defender of the South, and all its rights and interests--he is everywhere recognized as one of our most worthy citizens, and distinguished ornaments. 58

Close to home, William Henry Trescot commented on Simms's value as an historian of his native state. South Carolina owed Simms a debt of gratitude for "the fidelity which he has preserved its memory, . . . ." 59 Trescot praised him for re-creating the truth of the state's past. Above all, Simms's portraits of South Carolina's great heroes made his name symbolic of Southern heroism.

Simms was always willing to give advice to young writers. He suggested that John Esten Cooke read old letters and papers. Cooke had al-
lowed his mind to be too inventive in his narrative work, and Simms thought that taking careful notes on original sources would improve his accuracy. 60

He also wrote a long letter to Charles Rivers, praising his History of South Carolina. Rivers was discouraged over the shabby treatment of his work. Simms told him to pay no attention to the critics. He said that if he had followed public opinion, his first printed page would have been his last. Simms offered to send Rivers some letters and to read his new manuscript. He also told Rivers of his own enemies. Although there were many writers in South Carolina who were jealous of Simms, he never lowered his standards nor accepted patronage from those who would change his writing style. He suggested that Rivers keep working and forget the critics. 61

Writing to Hammond, Simms complained of his "toils, troubles, and anxieties." His work answering letters, editing and reading all the articles submitted to Russell's Magazine kept him from better things. He was also busy revising his own History of South Carolina. He wrote Hammond:

... everybody that needs information about the South; about our History; every young author who wishes to be delivered; ... all apply to me; ... So every Editor, or Publisher that begins a Cyclopedia or a Magazine, or a Collection of any sort, writes me for succour. 62

In a letter to John Esten Cooke, Simms summed up his years of troubles in the battles over Southern literature. He was despondent. His History of South Carolina, after years of revision, was again published but disfigured by typographical errors. Yet he cautioned Cooke to always beware of trifling with the sympathies of his people. Of course, Southerners would not do justice to his work and even reproach his patriotism, but that did not matter. Only loyal dedication to one's section was
important for the artist. Simms had followed that view throughout his life. In the last few years of his career he finally realized the importance of his own words. 63

Meanwhile, Hammond returned to Washington. He was known as a moderate who would do his best to keep the South in the Union. Both Hammond and Simms opposed Rhett's one-state secessionist organization. During the maneuvering for the presidential nomination of 1860 they thought the best political strategy was to conciliate and seek a united Southern candidate. Hammond also had some aspirations for the presidency. He asked Simms for his views on his presidential chances. Simms immediately advised him against speaking out or canvassing for office. He knew that if the Southern bloc wanted Hammond, it would call him. He also knew that as a Southerner Hammond could never be elected President. 64

Perhaps without realizing the full importance of his words, Simms had predicted the end of the national Democratic party. Hammond's nomination could only be assured through the break-up of the Democratic party. Simms thought that the Republicans and Democrats would struggle for the Northern vote and that the Republicans would win. That victory, Simms knew, would fragment the Democratic party and create strictly sectional parties. Calhoun's plea for a purely sectional alignment in political parties had finally been accomplished. 65 Simms knew that the outcome could only be secession.

In order to assure a united sectional political party, Simms knew that the "hotheads" in South Carolina had to be restrained. He asked the younger Rhett to tone down the radical nature of the Mercury. He also convinced Rhett that Hammond was an excellent candidate for President, since Hammond merely rebuked extremism and by no means discouraged resis-
tance. Simms told Rhett that Hammond was in reality a secessionist. Rhett promised Simms that he would try moderation for the sake of unity. 66

But the elder Rhett was determined on a crisis before the entire South could be brought around to South Carolina's view. Frustrated in an attempt to re-open the African slave trade, he again advocated immediate secession. Taking for granted that the Republicans would be victorious in 1860, he called for an end to national politics and to the Union. 67

Immediately Hammond moved to silence the radicals. He knew that the secession pronouncements in the Mercury would divide the Southern states. Moderation, he said, was the only way to unite the South. Above all, South Carolina must not appear as the leader of the secession movement. 68

James Orr joined Hammond and Simms in opposing Rhett and the slave code. Douglas was his candidate for the Democratic nomination, and he sought to unite Simms and Hammond behind the party. Although certain that someday the South would secede, Orr still wanted to work with a national Democratic party. Since the Democratic Convention was to be held in Charleston, he asked Hammond not to oppose it. Even Orr realized that pressing Douglas's candidacy on the South was impossible. Yet Hammond was powerful in South Carolina and Orr wanted him noncommittal on that issue. Simms was active in the state, and he told Hammond that Douglas could never win the nomination. The South if not yet entirely united on independence, was united against Douglas. As Simms well knew, the Democrats could not win the election unless they agreed on a compromise candidate. 69

As the nation became more pessimistic and excited in the winter of 1859, so did South Carolina. Even Miles began to carry a weapon in Congress. Northerners and Southerners alike were tired of bickering. Both
sides had come to regard the Union as a nuisance. Neither side seemed
to care about compromising. Simms was tired, and he felt sorry for him-
self. He had spent months aiding Hammond despite severe headaches and
terrible cramps in his legs. As winter came upon the South, Simms seemed
to look forward to 1860. He was convinced that the presidential election
would decide the fate of the Union. He seemed no longer to worry about
a united South. He too was tired of bickering and politicking. 70

For Simms, 1860 began with troubles over the second edition of his
History of South Carolina. The book was entirely rewritten and enlarged
upon. "When you read this book," Simms told Miles, "you will see that I
have suffered nothing, by way of clue, suggestion, argument, or fact to
escape me—nothing, of the History, nothing of the Principle, which I have
not made clear." 71 Not only did he claim that the book was important for
the student, but it was also instrumental to the public man. He suggested
that Miles and other South Carolina congressmen have a copy of his history
with them in Washington. Yet few newspapers noticed it, and the legis-
lature would not even consider adopting it for use in the schools. Again
Simms saw that his labor was wasted upon "a people who have seemingly
deliberately decreed that, as far as my living is to depend upon their
favour, I shall die!" 72

The 1860 edition of Simms's History of South Carolina again demon-
strated the use of history as propaganda. Simms no longer attempted to
be the objective chronicler. "Though seeking rather to be useful and
sufficient than original," he said, "I have felt it a duty sometimes to
be excursive, and occasionally to introduce a conjecture of my own,
wherever the subject-matter would seem to provoke a doubt or to require
discussion." 73 Present events seemed to demand a survey of the general
conditions in the country at large. Simms wanted his readers to appreciate the responsibilities of the state in the coming struggle:

One lesson, in chief, may be gleaned, among many others, from this imperfect story of the past. It is that which teaches the citizen to cling to the soil of his birth in the day of its difficulty, with the resolution of the son who stands above the grave of a mother and protects it from violation.74

The views of the state's majority, in all questions of public expediency or policy, would be the course of patriotism, he said. "Unanimity among our citizens will always give them unconquerable strength, and invasion will never again set hostile foot on the shores of our country."75 Gone were the days of the young man who chose to sacrifice his career rather than submit to a test oath that would inhibit his freedom of expression. A South Carolina of one voice had finally been achieved. Calhoun's dream had become reality.

Calhoun, once loathed by Simms, became the symbol of Southern statesmanship. He died while attempting to unite the South against the increasing political encroachment of the North. Since the aggression of one section upon another could not fail to provoke resistance, Calhoun had advocated a national South. Calhoun's battle chronicled the history of the United States, the aggression of larger states upon the smaller ones. The outcome, Calhoun predicted, would be the utter ruin of the political system. With the breakdown of the political system would come the breakdown of the Union. For Simms as for Calhoun the South would have been better off outside the Union.76

In closing the 1860 edition of the History of South Carolina, Simms expounded the necessity for an industrial South. An agricultural section bred sparseness of population and was unfavorable to education. "It follows," he said, "... that communities purely agricultural can never
exhibit the same degree of intellectual activity with communities commercial or manufacturing . . . " Simms did not advocate an industrial South for his own selfish reasons of intellectual advancement. He realized that the South must become economically self-sufficient. When secession came there would be no more Northern manufactures to feed and clothe them.

Reviewing Simms's History in Russell's Magazine, Paul Hayne said that the work was written with much "patriotic pride." Hayne was especially pleased that Simms had updated the volume to the present. He found the work a fair treatment of the nullification crisis and of the politics of his own period. He also saw many lessons to be learned from Simms's history. The policy which had driven South Carolina to nullification was still apparent in the national Congress. Hayne said, "Its fruits will probably develop themselves in future mischiefs which will find no remedial agency." Hayne, like Simms, knew that secession was near. For him Simms's book was not only a splendid example of Southern unity but a chronicle of the South's grievances within the Union.

Hammond found that he could use Simms's historical ability in Washington. He wanted Simms to give Southern congressmen advice and perhaps take a short rest. Miles, Keitt, and Hammond thought it was appropriate that Simms, while visiting the capital, should give a speech on George Washington. Hammond was certain that this speech would increase Simms's fame and aid the South. He knew that Simms would speak of Washington in symbolic terms and picture the nation's founder as a true Southerner. But Simms refused. He was suffering from mental exhaustion and did not want to journey to Washington in such hectic times. Simms was not too tired, however, to indulge in one of his favorite
occupations. He praised Miles's actions in Congress and assured him of his importance in South Carolina. He also advised Miles to avoid writing on or talking about the Charleston convention. "I think the probabilities are that it will break up in a row—that there will be found certain irrepressible conflict there which no soft-sawdering will reconcile." Simms told Miles that he wanted the convention to meet because he knew that it would help to break up the hated Democratic party.

Simms also knew that the South's primary enemy at the Democratic Convention would be Stephen A. Douglas. The party could hold together only if Douglas were its candidate for President. When Hammond wrote him that Orr was trying to have Miles replaced in the Congress because of his anti-Douglas views, Simms immediately sought support for Miles in Charleston. Douglas found Miles dangerous and that was enough for Simms to secure him the Mercury's support. Simms warned Miles that the moderates were trying to push him out of Congress. Miles's enemies were Douglas men, and Simms did all he could to protect his seat. Simms wanted to make Douglas unpopular in South Carolina. If Douglas were defeated at Charleston, Simms knew that the Democratic party would break up.

When the state Democratic convention met, the conservatives once again controlled the vote and elected moderates to the national Democratic Convention. Alabama, however, had instructed its delegation to follow William Lowndes Yancey, who vehemently opposed Douglas. Since Douglas was certain that he could not control two-thirds of the votes, he initially moved to bring up the matter of the platform. He secured the passage of a platform, substituting the controversial squatter sovereignty principle for an endorsement of the Dred Scott case. Yancey immediately withdrew
the Alabama delegation from the convention. Although the South Carolina delegation had been pledged to Douglas, it followed the Alabama delegation. Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas also withdrew from the convention. The convention broke up without nominating a candidate and voted to meet again in Baltimore. It was a foregone conclusion that with the Southern delegation absent, Douglas would be nominated in Baltimore.84

Miles declared himself a sectional man and said that there was no longer any hope for the South in the Union.85 Simms praised Miles's statement and affirmed that the South was at last united. He claimed that the people of the South were ahead of their political leaders and that only the trading politicians cared about electing a President. "Mark me," Simms said, "the politician now, who would maintain himself long, must endeavor to get ahead of the people; not to arrest their momentum, but to direct it in the very path they are pursuing."86 Simms suggested no more political alignments with the North. No longer could the South compromise and bolster a dying party. For the South to achieve permanent nationalism it must unite on a third-party Southern candidate.87

A state convention was held in Columbia late in May for the purpose of electing delegates to the Southern Democratic Convention in Richmond. Ostensibly the convention met to aid in reuniting the Democratic party. Since the Baltimore convention was to meet after the Richmond convention, many Southern Democrats saw an opportunity to reimpose territorial rights of the South in the party platform. But Rhett was elected as a delegate and sought to impose his radical views upon the entire South Carolina delegation. Many of the delegates chose to support a united South rather than Rhett's call for separate state secession. The South Carolina dele-
gation journeyed to Richmond divided on means but united on ends. All of them knew that it was merely a matter of time before the entire South seceded. 88

Simms wanted the Richmond Convention to nominate a Southerner for President. With three candidates for the office, perhaps the election would be given to the House of Representatives and a Southerner would be elected. 89 When John C. Breckinridge and Joseph Lane were nominated, Simms was certain that they would carry the entire South. The conflict over the election had finally evolved into a purely political one. To the impatient Miles, Simms wrote that "we have done all for the present in bringing Cotton States to act together, and in absorbing so many of the Slave States." 90 Ever cautious, Simms refused to advocate immediate secession. He knew that a co-operationist South would eventually bring secession.

Although he loathed Douglas and considered him no better than an abolitionist, Simms opposed the Mercury's opinion of him. The Rhetts sought to promote Breckinridge's campaign by attacking Douglas. Since Simms believed that Lincoln would probably be elected, he wanted the Rett faction to use the Mercury openly to oppose Lincoln. Simms then outlined a four-point platform to Miles on what the state's actions should be in the upcoming election. South Carolina must stand united herself and join the rest of the South in order to redress its grievances. Under no circumstances should the state appear to lead the rest of the South. "South Carolina too long wanted to be in the front rank and this has made the rest of the South jealous," he said. 91 Lincoln was obviously the South's enemy. South Carolina should forget Douglas and the Democratic party and concentrate its forces upon defeating Lincoln. 92

There was speculation among the state's politicians as to whether
the legislature would be secessionist or co-operationist. Miles felt 
"very much inclined to think that it is just as well to break up things 
generally, which any state can at anytime do." Hammond cautiously told 
Simms that he would follow the actions of the legislature. If South Caro-
olina chose to secede, then he would follow. But he wanted the immediate 
secessionists to present a program for disunion. Simms, however, was 
prepared for disunion. He was satisfied that South Carolina was ready to 
withdraw, alone if necessary. He too looked toward the state legislature 
to make a formal decision on secession.

The election to the state legislature was held in mid-October. The 
results showed that almost the entire legislature was composed of seces-
sonianists. The legislature met on November 5 to choose presidential elec-
tors. Governor William H. Gist asked the legislature to remain in session 
until after the results of the presidential election. Simms was convinced 
that the moment Lincoln's election was certain, the legislature would vote 
to hold a state convention:

South Carolina is putting her house in order; and my impression 
is that she will secede alone, leaving the other states to fol-
low. She will await no overt act—will not wait Lincoln's inaug-
guration. She will be out of the Union by the 1st Jan'y. And I, 
too counsel this very policy. So do all my friends. Leading 
politicians of the other States counsel it, and say that the 
rest will follow.

Upon hearing that Lincoln was elected, Rhett and the radicals imme-
diately moved to hold a secession convention. The moderates opposed the 
measure because they were uncertain as to what the rest of the South would 
do. But the secessionists convinced the moderates that Georgia would fol-
low South Carolina out of the Union. Then Hammond, supposedly a lead-
ing Southern moderate in Congress, resigned from the Senate on November 
12. There was no one left to oppose calling a convention. On November
13, 1860, by a unanimous vote in both houses the South Carolina legislature called a convention to meet on December 17.\textsuperscript{98}

Simms thought it possible that he would be chosen as a member of the state convention. He declined to be a candidate, but decided to serve if elected. "If elected," he told Lawson, "I shall aim at but a single object—to separate from a Confederacy in which we are otherwise doom'd to destruction."\textsuperscript{99} He said that if South Carolina was firm in its determination to secede, the entire South would have to follow.

The election of delegates to the state convention was held on December 6. The radicals were soundly defeated as the voters of South Carolina once again elected conservatives. Nevertheless, there was unanimity in the state over the necessity for some kind of action. The conservatives were thought to have an influence on other states in the South. Their election meant only that South Carolina would again seek to force the rest of the South to follow it into secession.\textsuperscript{100}

In the short time remaining before the state convention met, Simms sought to summarize his state's grievances against the Union. He wrote a long letter to his Northern friend John Jacob Bockee explaining why South Carolina would be forced to secede.\textsuperscript{101} Simms said that his state's safety was more important than the Union. Northerners wanted to save the Union because they had "fattened" upon the South. How, he asked, could the South remain in the Union when it was a minority in the Congress? "We must cut asunder the bonds that give you such a fearful power over us."\textsuperscript{102}

Simms said that the abolitionist attack on slavery was another of the South's grievances against the North. Apparently the entire North was becoming abolitionist. He asked Bockee why no Northerners had sym-
pathized with the South after the John Brown Raid. He said that the two sections could not get along together peacefully. Slavery had helped to separate them, and the South could not exist without it. South Carolina was tired of Northern abolitionist aggression and was convinced that the entire South would join it in secession.103

Above all, Simms said, South Carolina was frightened of "Black" Republicanism. "The politicians were all opposed to the people—they have been the worst enemies of their people, and the real influencing agents which have given countenance to the encroachments and usurpations of the North."104 The national parties subsidized political leaders, and divided the people on false issues. Years before, Simms had stated that the Democratic party was a curse to the South. When the Democratic party fragmented over sectional issues, the Republican party came into power. The South could never overcome the political power of Republicans and Northern Democrats. With the break-up of the political system, Simms said, the South had no other choice but to secede in a united body.105

The state was united in its desire to secede. Simms did not anticipate any struggle in the vote on secession. His friend Jamison was president of the convention, and he expected a unanimous vote for secession. Simms's son Gilmore was eager to join the Southern army. But Simms did not anticipate war. He told Lawson that the South would precipitate no struggle if left alone. Simms did say, though, that South Carolina was prepared for war.106

The convention met in Columbia on December 17 but because of a small pox epidemic, it voted to remove to Charleston. On December 20, a unanimous vote was given for secession. There was no debate. The state of South Carolina was declared an independent commonwealth.107
Use was made of Simms's works on the Revolution in the official address of the convention. The North was compared to Great Britain. Tyranny forced the South out of the Union. Slavery, claimed to be a moral necessity, was used as a method of uniting the South. The state made a unanimous plea for the other Southern states to join it in a separate Confederacy.108

On December 21, 1860, the convention passed an ordinance in respect to the oath of public office. The new oath stated:

All persons who shall be elected or appointed to any office of profit or trust, before entering on the execution, thereof, shall take . . . the following oath: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful, and true allegiance bear, to the State of South Carolina, so long as I may continue a citizen thereof.109

Simms, who had opposed the Test Oath of 1834, actively supported this new test oath. Calhoun's goal of a united South Carolina, speaking as one mind, had been achieved.

The sensitive man of letters had greatly influenced his environment, but that environment had also changed him. Simms, the artist in politics, had become the man for whom Calhoun had searched in 1850. He had been an advocate of open debate, but he changed. He realized the artist's value for Southern society. As his writing and political actions helped to create a climate of opinion, Simms began to believe his own propaganda. The South had achieved a consensus, but the result of that consensus was civil war.
NOTES


2. Ibid., May 27, 1857; Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 502. Simms lectured May 25, 27 and June 1... Unfortunately, the lectures are still restricted but will be published in the future. Simms was toasted at a press dinner in Charleston on May 29, 1857. The toast was: "The Poet, Novelist, Essayist, Reviewer, Historian, to ornament of Southern literature—but his chief place in the picture, is as vindicator of the historic fame of his native state against Northern calumny." Also see Oliphant, Simms Letters, III, 495, quoting the Norfolk Southern Argus, Feb. 9, 1857.


8. Ibid., II (Nov., 1857), 154-155.

9. Ibid., pp. 159-160; ibid., II (December, 1857), 242.


17. Hammond to Simms, Jan. 20, 1858, Hammond Papers; Merritt, pp. 116-117.


21. Ibid., IV, 35.


23. Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 1st Sess., 35th Cong., Senate, p. 69 (also see p. 68).

24. Ibid., pp. 70-72.

25. Hammond to Simms, March 5, May 3, 1858, Hammond Papers.

26. Simms to Hammond, March 27, 1858, Hammond Papers; also see Paul Hamilton Hayne's article in Russell's Magazine, III (April, 1858), 96.


30. Russell's Magazine, "The Life of March," II (February, 1858), 447; "Heroes and Hero Worship," III (April, 1858), 35; "Arcadia," III (September, 1858), 507; "Odoriferous Shrubs," III (June, 1858), 213.


33. Ibid., III, 202-206.

34. Hammond to Simms, April 5, 1858, Hammond Papers.

35. Simms to Hammond, April 12, 1858, Hammond Papers.


37. Simms to Hammond, May 15, June 2, 1858, Hammond to Simms, May 21, 1858, Hammond Papers.
38. Mercury, July 28, 1858; Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 75-76.


40. Simms to Hammond, June 10, 1858, Hammond Papers; see Philip Shriver Klein, President James Buchanan, a Biography (University Park, Pa., 1962), pp. 318-320.

41. Simms to Hammond, June 10, 1858, Hammond Papers.

42. Hammond to Simms, June 20, 1858, Hammond Papers; Merritt, p. 121.

43. Simms to Hammond, June 26, July 10, 16, 1858, Hammond Papers; White, Rhett, pp. 147-149.

44. Merritt, p. 122; Courier, July 23, 1858.


47. Hammond to Simms, Oct. 25, 1858, Hammond Papers.


49. James Henry Hammond, Speech of . . . delivered at Barnwell C. H., October 29th, 1858 (Charleston, 1858), 3-5, 7, 9, 10; also see Charles W. Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion," MVHR, XVI (September, 1929), 151-171.


52. Ibid., p. 11.

53. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 14-15.

54. Ibid., p. 16.


60. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 168.


64. Hammond to Simms, Jan. 1, 1859, Simms to Hammond, Jan. 10, 1859, Hammond Papers; Merritt, pp. 129-130; Boucher, South Carolina and South ..., p. 128.

65. Simms to Hammond, Jan. 10, 1859, Hammond Papers; Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 118-119 (Simms also wanted Hammond to have appointed head of the Charleston Post Office); Nichols, Disruption ..., pp. 350-358; William Forcher Miles to William Henry Trescot, Feb. 8, 1859, MSS, William Forcher Miles Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.


70. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 176; D. H. Hamilton to William P. Miles, Dec. 9, 1859, MSS, William Forcher Miles Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina; Schultz, pp. 190-204, especially p. 198.


73. Simms, History of South Carolina, p. 6 (all future references to
Simms's History of South Carolina will be from the 1860 edition; Gabriel Manigault, The Signs of the Times (New York, n. d.), p. 9.

74. Simms, History of South Carolina, pp. 6-7, 391.

75. Ibid., p. 391.

76. Ibid., pp. 430-431; Manigault, p. 58.

77. Simms, History of South Carolina, p. 436.

78. Russell's Magazine, VI (January, 1860), 376 (see also 375); VI (March, 1860), 557.


82. Hammond to Simms, April 3, 8, 1860, Hammond Papers; Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 210-211.

83. Schultz, pp. 211, 213; Lillian A. Kobler, "Unionist Sentiment in South Carolina in 1860," JSB, IX (August, 1938), 349; Boucher, South Carolina and South..., p. 136; Edward G. Mason, "A Visit to South Carolina in 1860," Atlantic Monthly, LIII (February, 1884), 247


85. Mercury, May 21, 1860.

86. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 221.


93. Miles to Hammond, Aug. 15, 1860, Hammond Papers; Boucher, South Carolina and South . . ., pp. 140-142.


96. Mercury, Nov. 9, 1860; Courier, Nov. 12, 13, 1860; Cauthen, p. 369.


98. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 263; Mercury, Nov. 10, 1860; Cauthen, p. 372.

99. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 261, 265; Mercury, Nov. 21, 1860; Mason, "Visit to S. C. . . .," pp. 243-244.


103. Ibid., pp. 291, 293, 297-298, 302, 304.

104. Ibid., p. 300.

105. Ibid., pp. 300-302; also see Nichols, Disruption . . ., especially Pt. V.

106. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 308-311; Journal of the Public Proceedings of the Convention of the People of South Carolina, Held in 1860-


108. The Address of the People of South Carolina, Assembled in Convention, to the People of the Slaveholding States of the United States (Charleston, 1860), pp. 3-16; White, Rhett, pp. 188-189; T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Athens, Ga., 1961), p. 16.

EPILOGUE

Simms's political odyssey was over. The South had finally seceded. Although he had achieved his long-sought goal of Southern nationalism, his career was not completely over. His last years were trying. He was poor, almost destitute. While he published little of value, he was still active in writing and editing. The last decade of his life again showed his dedication to the South. Until he died, Simms remained a public man.

Fort Sumter immediately concerned Simms. Too old for active duty, he still was able to advise Miles of the necessity of taking the fort peacefully. When South Carolina fired upon the fort, Simms was pleased that the enemy would at last be expelled from the state. He was positive that Lincoln wanted war, but the Southern Confederacy must not take the initiative. Above all, Simms said, the South must defend its honor.¹

Simms formulated elaborate plans for the defense of Charleston Harbor. He expected the Northern army to attempt an attack at any time and was pleased that Beauregard, whom he found a capable officer, was in command. Aside from the protection of strategic cities, Simms thought that the South should mount an all-out offensive. "The secret is either to destroy the enemy in masses, or to prolong the war upon the borders, until he is worn out."² He was certain that the South could dictate the peace if it fought an offensive war.

Besides his active interest in military plans, Simms also continued his literary work throughout the war. He wrote many poems for the Charles-
ton newspapers and the Southern Literary Messenger. He also pursued the idea of preserving a distinctly Southern literature. He wanted to build a library of the Confederate states which would house the famous biographies of Southerners and the letters and manuscripts of the South's leading political and literary figures. Besides working on a biography of Hammond, Simms sought to aid a small company in Richmond that wanted to establish a publishing house. He realized, however, that the scarcities of war would allow the luxury of few publications in the South.³

On September 10, 1863, Simms lost his wife. She had been a simple woman who had borne many children, tolerated her husband's schemes and boasts, and outwardly played a small part in his life. Simms grew tired after her death. Weeks went by without his writing one word. He grieved over her and began to reflect on his wasted life. Simms realized that he had lived too much for the world. He regarded his ambitious struggle for greatness as mere vanity. At last Simms understood that the sole justification for his life's work was in what he had accomplished for the South.⁴

Although poverty-stricken, Simms reprimanded Hammond for withholding corn from the Confederacy. He asked Hammond not to collide with the authorities when they sought to impress his corn. Like Hammond, he knew that most of the local government officials were criminals and that the war was handled ineptly in Richmond. Nevertheless, the army had to be fed. Even Hammond must sacrifice his own economic interest to support the Southern army. A true Southerner must place his section above selfish desires. That was how Simms had lived and how he expected Hammond to live.⁵

Hammond died in November, 1864. Simms had lost his closest friend. They had fought many political battles together and had been a source of
constant inspiration to each other. Hammond was also one of the few people with whom Simms could be perfectly honest. He had often subsidized Simms during his long and lean literary career. After Hammond's death Simms became increasingly discouraged. Writing to Hammond's son Edward Spann, Simms said:

What awaits us in the future, is perhaps foreshown to us by our Past, of trial and loss and suffering. Or it may be that God designs that we should surrender in sacrifice of our choicest possessions, that we may become worthy of the great boon of future independence.6

The war went badly for the South. Hearing of Sherman's march, Simms prepared for the invasion of South Carolina. His own plantation, Woodlands, was burned by stragglers from Sherman's army as they pillaged their way through the state. The library that he had spent thirty years collecting went up in flames. On February 17, 1865, Sherman's army burned the beautiful capital city of Columbia. Simms was heartbroken. Most of the city was destroyed and more than half of the people had been robbed of everything they owned.7

Once again South Carolina would ask Simms to use his pen in defense of his section. Governor A. G. Magrath commissioned him to write a book on the burning of Columbia. Published in weekly installments in the Columbia Daily Phoenix, The Sack and Destruction of Columbia told of the heroic defense of South Carolina by its citizens and of the terrible destruction caused by Sherman's army. Simms sought to immortalize the sorrowful struggles of the South. "It is for us, as succinctly but as fully as possible, and in the simplest language, to endeavor to make the melancholy record of our wretchedness as complete as possible."8 Sherman's army had irresponsibly ruined the country through which it had so wantonly passed. Simms said that Sherman himself was irresponsible, and that he
had actually wanted to destroy Charleston. Above all, Simms attempted to create a united Southern feeling from the sorrows of defeat. He wanted future generations to remember Sherman as the symbol of the hated Yankee. In this way, the South would remain united in its hatred of the North.9

Yet when the war ended Simms was one of the first Southerners to realize that the South had to resume its place in the Union. He was appointed to a Committee of Twenty-One men to communicate to President Johnson the desire of South Carolina to return to the Union.10 His neighbors wanted him to attend the state convention to revise the constitution. He declined because of ill health but resolved to enter the state legislature if elected. His friend Duyckinck thought that Simms belonged in Southern politics at that time. After all, men of ability and integrity were most needed during the trials of reconstruction.11

After the war Simms collected some of the poetry which he had carefully gathered from newspapers and magazines into an anthology called War Poetry of the South. Although the book sold very poorly, it is still one of the finest one-volume collections of Civil War poetry. Dedicated to the women of the South, War Poetry served to demonstrate their heroic role in the South's defense of its homeland. Simms collected the poems because they exemplified the national feeling in "the sentiment and opinion" prevailing throughout the Confederacy. He summed up his own feelings by saying:

At the close we must express the hope that these poems will be recognized, not only as highly creditable to the Southern mind, but as truly illustrative, if justificatory of, that sentiment and opinion into which they have been written; which sentiment and opinion have sustained their people through a war unexampled in its honors in modern times, and which has fully tested their powers of endurance, as well as their ability in creating their own resources, under all reverses, and amidst every form of privation.12
Simms spent his last years attempting to sustain his family and restore Woodlands. He wrote for many newspapers, published little fiction, and served as an elder statesman to the young writers of the South. Often forced to sell some of his valuable personal correspondence to autograph hunters, Simms nevertheless maintained an air of dignity about himself. Forced to share sleeping, working, and eating quarters with two sons, he still found time to keep up his correspondence. All around him was hopelessness and despair. His section was financially and morally shattered, yet he managed to appear optimistic in public.13

His mind was active to the end. Lamenting the loss of his library, which held the precious research tools of his trade, Simms wrote to a close friend, Joseph Henry, who had some influence with Congress, to send him books from Washington. He wanted all Congressional publications that were available. Early in 1869 Simms contemplated a work on Texas' relations with Mexico. He asked Henry to find some materials on the subject that he could use. He also continued to correspond with Northern literary acquaintances. He asked Duyckinck to send him literary gossip from New York. Simms wanted to keep his state informed on literary events in the nation and wrote many articles for Charleston newspapers based on his letters from Duyckinck.14

Simms never lost interest in promoting Southern literature. He wrote for the New Eclectic Magazine and told Hayne, "I am willing to help them in order that the South shall have an organ."15 Knowing that Southern periodical literature was struggling to survive, he suggested that all the magazines combine and issue one periodical from a large city. He also continued to write for the Courier. Occasionally he was commissioned to write a sermon or an oration, and he wrote a long address for the open-
ing of the Charleston theatre.\textsuperscript{16}

Never far from the political or social scene, Simms felt that politicians failed to speak for the people. He urged the citizens of Charleston to participate more actively in public life. Accepting military defeat, he refused to believe in moral defeat. The South had to retain its social morale and yield none of its moral values to the conquerors. He believed that the South's victory would be in always realizing its heritage. Outwardly the South would integrate itself into the industrial fabric of the nation, but inwardly it would remain a unique section, true to its beliefs.\textsuperscript{17}

Tired and constantly sick to his stomach, Simms insisted upon working. He accepted a commission to write an address for the Floricultural and Horticultural Society of Charleston. He delivered the lecture entitled "The Sense of the Beautiful" on May 3, 1870. It was a speech filled with hope for the future. Essentially Simms spoke of the concept of beauty, finding it mostly in the work of the artist. Only when man could cherish the sense of the beautiful could he rise above the animal. Man then perceived a new understanding of himself. Once endowed with the sense of beauty in nature and society, the South could have confidence in its future.\textsuperscript{18}

After the address Simms was exhausted. The Charleston Courier called the speech the finest literary treat it had heard since the war. Based upon a thorough knowledge of the South's domestic needs and social life, Simms's speech became a rule of Southern living. When the South was bitterly involved in restoring its destroyed homes and businesses, Simms turned its mind to a contemplation of values. He gave the South a sense of mission, a style of life.\textsuperscript{19}

Early in May, 1870, Simms wrote to Lawson in order to cheer him up.
Lawson's business had fallen off and Simms attempted to explain to him that the country would recuperate from the economic depression. He wrote of the beauty of Woodlands, and of the atmosphere in the country. Simms invited Lawson to come South to rest.

On June 11, 1870, Simms died in Charleston, the city which had taken so much from him and given so little in return. Obituary notices appeared in many Southern newspapers. The Rural Carolinian ran a feature story on his life and service to the South. Hayne felt empty. He had lost a teacher and a close friend. The South had lost its most energetic man of literature.

To summarize Simms's career is pointless. His actions reveal his life's work. Having devoted a lifetime to create a feeling of Southern nationalism, he became a symbol of a united South. His life is the tragedy of the sensitive man of letters, self-condemned to an active public career. It cannot be fully described as the life of a literary figure. William Gilmore Simms chose public life, and he fulfilled his public mission with an artist's flair and grace.
NOTES


2. Oliphant, Simms Letters, IV, 365 (see also 370-391).


6. Ibid., p. 471.

7. Ibid., pp. 487, 484-486; Trent, pp. 279-282.


12. William Gilmore Simms (ed.), War Poetry of the South (New York, 1867), viii (see also v-vi).


14. Ibid., V, 205, 251-252; Miller, p. 343.


17. Oliphant, Simms Letters, V, 306-307, 308; McKeithan, p. 223. Hayne wrote to Simms: "Notwithstanding all the cares, anxieties, troubles, doubts, and misfortunes, physical and mental, which your last letter records, I have read it with a species of exhilaration. Your brave words embodying braver thoughts, your expressions of gallant resolution under circumstances the most trying, affect one's moral sense as with the ring of great spiritual trumpets, ... It is impossible for me to express in words my profound admiration of your moral pluck, of the true Anglo-
Saxon, I ought to say Anglo-Norman grit, and steel-like endurance, (which may be made to bend, but refuses to break,) that characterises your nature, and make you in misfortune simply great!"


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