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SCHILLER'S INFLUENCE ON DOSTOEVSKY

by

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PREFACE

For many years it has been an established fact that Fyodor Dostoevsky was influenced by Friedrich Schiller. Numerous critical investigations have pointed out that Schiller and his works are mentioned in virtually all of Dostoevsky's writings. Most comparative studies of Schiller and Dostoevsky have been content to draw attention to those passages which mention Schiller or his works by name and to analyze certain similar characters or situations. There are no studies which investigate the similarity between Schiller and Dostoevsky on the metaphysical and philosophical level. It is, however, precisely in metaphysics and philosophy where the greatest similarity between the two writers is to be found. The twofold purpose of this dissertation is to compare the views of the two authors on religion, the concept of good and evil, freedom, and the nature of suffering, and second, to show that Dostoevsky was influenced more profoundly in these matters than has hitherto been realized.
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CHAPTER I

SCHILLER'S GENERAL POSITION IN RUSSIAN LITERATURE

The impact of Friedrich Schiller on the development of Russian literature is only now being realized. Russia first became familiar with Schiller's writings through the efforts of Professor J. G. Schwarz, who was appointed to the faculty at Moscow University in 1779. In addition to giving lectures on recent German literature, he required extensive translations from Lessing and Schiller from his students. Moreover, he personally directed the first amateur performance of Die Räuber in Russia. On September 19, 1787, the first act of Don Carlos was performed at the Gatchina Castle near St. Petersburg. The entire drama was presented on November 9 of the same year. In 1793 N. Sandunov published the first translation of Die Räuber. The critic Lotman stresses the fact that Sandunov found the translation of Schiller an excellent means to spread his own democratic and radical views. Sandunov, however, employed only the revised version,


the Trauerspiel, of Die Räuber, which Schiller had rewritten on the recommendation of Dalberg. Both Passage and Lotman think that fear of censorship was chiefly responsible for Sandunov's decision to use the revised version, since in the earlier version, the Schauspiel, the ideas presented in the discussion concerning the immortality of the soul, Franz von Moor's materialistic philosophy, and Karl Moor's speeches regarding the corrupt aristocracy were unacceptable in eighteenth-century Russia. Moreover, Sandunov revised the ending of Die Räuber for a performance in 1793, in which Schweizer is made to kill Karl Moor when Karl attempts to surrender to the authorities. It is, however, amazing that a performance of Die Räuber was permitted at all, especially in 1793, the year of Louis XVI's execution. Peterson argues that the poet Kheraskov interceded with Catherine II to permit the performance. Kheraskov ostensibly said, in order to minimize the revolutionary aspect of Schiller's drama, that Russian folklore was resplendent with such robber tales.

Schiller was also popular with the new Czar Alexander I, as the following incident related by Passage attests. In 1801 Alexander had received an impassioned letter from an ardent young liberal, Karasin, who urged sweeping reforms in Russia. Alexander

3Charles E. Passage, "The Influence of Schiller in Russia," American Slavic and East European Review, V (May 1946), 137; Lotman, p. 420.

4Peterson, pp. 41-42.

5Passage, p. 114.
invited him to the capital and received him in a very friendly manner. After the first interview the Czar announced: "The Marquis Posa shall henceforth be admitted unannounced." These are the slightly paraphrased words of King Philip II in Don Carlos: "Der Ritter wird künftig unangemeldet vorgelassen." The Czar's comment indicates that Alexander's knowledge of Schiller went beyond mere superficial acquaintance. Shortly after this event, and while Karasin was still at the court, a reading of Don Carlos was organized. The new Czar listened attentively. During the performance someone said: "We have a Marquis Posa among us."

Alexander was disconcerted and left the room. Karasin was subsequently banished, although the Czar granted the young liberal's request for the establishment of a university in his native city Kharkov.

Until his death in 1805 Schiller had a limited audience in Russia. He was read and appreciated in only a few circles at the university and the Royal Court. The person most responsible for the broad dissemination of Schiller in Russia was the poet Zhukovsky. He devoted himself chiefly to Schiller's poetry, and between 1806 and 1833 he rendered over one half of Schiller's lyrics into excellent Russian. 6 Commenting on

Zhukovsky's importance, Edmund Kostka writes: "A gifted poet and translator of genius, he succeeded in making Schiller almost a national Russian bard." Zhukovsky eventually became private tutor to the Czar's son, the future Alexander II, who liberated the serfs in 1861. Peterson insists that Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* was partially responsible for this reform. He bases his argument on the fact that after Zhukovsky returned from a visit to Tell shrines in Switzerland, he repurchased the serfs he had sold previous to the journey and then gave them their freedom. To be sure, Zhukovsky was a humanitarian and an earnest Christian. His feelings were undoubtedly imparted to the imperial ward. First, although it is not possible to counter Peterson's argument, we must not lose sight of the fact that Zhukovsky saw in Schiller a reflection of his own views, which had been formulated before he read Schiller. Secondly, a firm believer in Christianity and humanitarian ideals would naturally disagree with the concept of hereditary slavery. Passage also feels that Schiller had no direct influence on the decision to liberate the serfs. But he goes on to say that it would be wrong to deny that the author of *Wilhelm Tell* had a significant indirect influence. Passage suggests that Schiller might have served as the final impulse.

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7 Edmund Kostka, "The Vogue of Schiller in Russia," *German Quarterly, XXXVI* (January 1963), 4.
8 Peterson, p. 100.
9 Passage, p. 128.
In addition to Zhukovsky, the lyric poet Tyutchev significantly enhanced Schiller's reputation in Russia. In 1822 Tyutchev was sent to the court of Ludwig I of Bavaria as a member of the Russian diplomatic mission. During his sojourn in Munich the Russian poet visited several literary circles which worshipped Schiller and Heine as gods. Tyutchev saw his own ideas of humanity and freedom reflected in Schiller. His boundless enthusiasm led him to translate a number of Schiller's lyrics into Russian. Upon his return to Russia, Tyutchev was instrumental in introducing the young progressives to Schiller's work.

Schiller rose in popularity throughout the 19th century. The German poet found his most ardent admirers among the liberal, progressive intelligentsia. Rudolf Fischer points out that almost every Russian author underwent a phase of ardent enthusiasm for Schiller's idealism. The most noteworthy writers during the twenties and thirties are Granovsky, Belinsky, Bakunin, and Botkin. Edmund Kostka draws attention to the strange fact that Schiller was equally admired by conservatives:

... Schiller's admirers did not come only from the "progressive" literary or political camp. Men of widely divergent or downright hostile views bowed in reverence before the author of Don Carlos. Thus, the Westerners and their implacable foes, the Slavophiles, both idolized Schiller and rivalled each other in poring over his poetry and translating his works.

10 M. Hellman, Deutsche Dichtung in russischer Übertragung (Weimar, 1948), pp. 343ff.
12 Kostka, p. 6.
Even Alexander Pushkin came under Schiller's spell. Because Pushkin did not know German well, he continually asked his brother to send him a French translation of Schiller's works while he was planning and writing Boris Godunov. It is interesting that such an original and thoroughly Russian author of Pushkin's stature should find inspiration in Schiller. In his article on the relationship between Schiller and Pushkin, Rudolf Fischer shows that Schiller's influence on the Russian goes much deeper than had originally been thought.¹³

Schiller's influence on Lermontov was even more profound. When the young poet witnessed a presentation of Die Räuber at the age of fifteen, he became a genuine Schiller enthusiast. His translation of the poem "Der Handschuh" introduced free rhythm into Russian poetry.¹⁴ Furthermore, Schiller's inspiration led Lermontov to write a series of Sturm and Drang dramas which imitate Schiller's early rhetoric and passionate expression.¹⁵

Schiller's popularity during the second half of the nineteenth century continued unabated. Practically all of the famous Russian writers of this period paid tribute to Schiller


in some fashion. The author of Don Carlos was imitated, studied, and admired by Bely, Turgenev, Ogarev, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Dostoevsky, Gogol, Ivanov and many others. Martin Malia quotes an excerpt from a letter written by the famous Russian critic Belinsky as one example of Schiller's impact on Russia:

I am unable to think of Schiller without gasping for breath. . . . Yes, I have recognized at last my kinship with Schiller; I am bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh—and if anything should or can interest me in life and in history then it is he, who was created to be my God and my idol—for he is my highest and noblest ideal of man.

Schiller was the great symbol of revolt for Belinsky. The German author became the inspiring force of Belinsky's crusade for a more humane Russia. Each time Belinsky speaks of his hopes, Schiller is invariably mentioned.

Schiller's role in M. A. Bakunin's development assumes a different aspect. Bakunin was a disciple of Schiller's ideal of love and women. The leftist circles in Russia during the 1840's and 1850's attached extraordinary importance to love and personal relationship. Bakunin and Belinsky disagreed on the proper interpretation of Schiller's writings on love, and a famous quarrel ensued. Martin Malia implies with extensive circumlocution that both Bakunin and Belinsky were impotent and probably homosexual.

The preoccupation with Schiller's idealization of love hinged on

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18 Malia, pp. 188-189.
the concept of hope and enjoyment. This definition of love was taken from Schiller's poem "Resignation," wherein two flowers, hope or enjoyment, beckon the children of man. Owing to their impotency, Bakunin and Belinsky chose hope, which meant abstention. Members of the circles who were ostensibly healthier, such as Stankevitch, found it extremely difficult to reconcile the ideal with the material. Malia evaluates Belinsky's relationship to Schiller:

Belinsky characteristically makes the problem more practical than Stankevitch, but it is clear that Schiller's idealization of love was taken with immense seriousness by the group, that they tried to live it in their personal lives and that it set up tensions which made satisfying relationships with women difficult if not impossible. These tensions, no doubt with the aid of deeper, less conscious causes, in fact, paralysed Stankevitch in affairs of the heart. 19

Herzen and Ogarev, on the other hand, plucked the flower of enjoyment in love. Their interest in Schiller, however, goes much deeper than matters of love. Practically the whole of their early lives are dominated by Schiller's idealism. Herzen was exposed to Schiller at the age of fourteen. At the age of sixteen he wrote:

Sometimes I lie with the book [a work by Schiller] on a hill, and how free I feel myself there! Before me stretches an infinite expanse, and it seems to me that this distance is a prolongation of myself, that the hill with everything that surrounds me is my body, and I hear it pulse, as in a living organism. Sometimes I seem to myself to be completely lost in this infinity, a leaf on an enormous tree, but this infinity does not oppress me. 20

19 Malia, p. 189.

20 The translation is by Malia in his article "Schiller and the Early Russian Left," p. 191.
The political ideal of Herzen and Ogarev was based on Schiller's aesthetic view of man. When their political activities became more intense in the forties, much of the previous aestheticism remained. Herzen wrote two autobiographies, and one of the main purposes of each was to communicate his political ideals to the world.

Schiller's popularity and fame in Russia continued into the twentieth century. His collected works in Russian translation appeared in St. Petersburg in 1900. The editor Vengerov declared in the foreword that Schiller was among the most popular of non-Russian writers.

Not even World War I and the revolution affected Schiller's immense popularity. On the contrary, the reawakening revolutionary struggle of the Russian people only served to increase Schiller's fame.\(^{21}\) Kostka says that Schiller truly became a Russian poet when the revolting masses recognized a kindred spirit in Schiller:

Schiller's ideas of human dignity and freedom, the heroic pathos of his struggle for the emancipation of the human spirit, the passionate fervor of his protest against tyranny and oppression swept like a storm through the ranks of the Russian masses which were then waging a desperate revolutionary war under the banner and in the name of very similar ideas.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) K. Demtschenko and L. Genin, "Schiller auf den Bühnen des revolutionären Petrograd," Sinn und Form, XI (Berlin, 1959), Heft 5-6, 927.

\(^{22}\) Kostka, "The Vogue of Schiller in Russia," p. 9.
In Soviet Russia, Schiller's fame persists to the present day. The Soviet World Peace Council decided in 1955 to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Schiller's death. Accordingly, a new official biography and a new Russian edition of his collected works were published. Schiller, however, has been adapted to the needs of Soviet ideology. Consequently, he has been heralded as a forerunner of communism and the classless society. The following excerpt from the introduction to Schiller's collected works will serve as an example:

Each upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian people was accomplished by a new enthusiasm for Schiller's poetry. It is well known how warmly, in the years of the Civil War, the dramas of Schiller were received by our revolutionary workers, the members of the Young Communist League, and the soldiers of the heroic Red Army. The novels by A. Tolstoy and K. Fedin, dedicated to the theme of the Civil War, testify to this with sufficient eloquence. Die Räuber, Kabale und Liebe and Don Carlos occupied a place of honor in the repertory of the Soviet theatre during the first years of the great socialist October revolution. And this popularity they have preserved down to our own times.  

Whatever the official interpretation, the Soviet critics always accord the highest praise to Schiller's poetic genius and recognize the greatness of his contribution to German and world literature.

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23 F. P. Schiller, Fridrikh Schiller (Moskva, 1955); Fridrikh Schiller, Sobraniya Sochineniya, ed. Vilmont and Samarín (Moskva, 1955).

The fact that Schiller has always appealed to the progressives and young revolutionaries in Russia permits us to make some interesting predictions concerning the future. The editor of Schiller's collected works in Russian has observed that since the great German's death, each upsurge in revolutionary activity has been accomplished by an intense renewed interest in Schiller. Writing in 1958 the Russian critic Lotman says that Russia's interest in Schiller "nicht das Produkt einer oberflächlichen Begeisterung war, sondern sich aus tiefen inneren Bedürfnissen ... heraus ergeben hatte."\(^{25}\) The East German Rudolf Fischer writes that preceding the Decembrist revolt, the interest in Schiller reached a new high.\(^{26}\) Many modern Soviet critics stress that Schiller's writings on freedom are particularly popular in Russia at the present time.\(^{27}\) If the past is any indication of the future, the renewed interest in Schiller is indicative of profound unrest in Russia. Furthermore, it is possible that the present Russian Schiller-renaissance is a precursor of future significant events.

\(^{25}\) Lotman, p. 434.


CHAPTER II

THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE

In this chapter we will establish the fact that Dostoevsky had read Schiller and that he was profoundly impressed by him. Excerpts from Dostoevsky's letters will show that his interest in Schiller was not a passing phase, but a genuine, inspiring force which continued throughout his life. Next we will show that Dostoevsky often had Schiller in mind while writing his novels. We shall see that Dostoevsky was fond of introducing quotations and events from Schiller in order to intensify the effect of a particular scene. Finally, we shall examine several of Dostoevsky's leading ideas and discover that they are unmistakably similar to those of Schiller.

Dostoevsky was first exposed to Schiller, when as a youth of ten years, he witnessed a performance of Die Räuber. In 1880, the year preceding his death, he recalled with boundless enthusiasm in a letter to N. L. Osmidov the impression this drama made on him: "When I was ten years old, I saw at Moscow a
performance of *Die Räuber*, with Motchalov in one of the chief parts, and I can only say that the deep impression which that performance made upon me has worked most fruitfully ever since upon my whole mental development."¹ Another example of Dostoevsky's admiration of the German dramatist is found in a letter dated January 1, 1840, to his brother Michael when Dostoevsky was twenty:

You said once, brother, that I had not read Schiller. You are mistaken. I have him by heart, I have spoken his speech and dreamed his dreams; and I believe that it was a peculiarly good stroke of luck that made me acquainted with the great poet in that special period of my life. I could never have learnt to know Schiller so well as precisely in those days. When I read Schiller with him [sic], I saw in him the noble and fiery Don Carlos, the Marquis Posa, and Mortimer. That friendship was of great value to me, and has caused me great pain. But I desire to keep silence about it forever. The name of Schiller is for me a beloved and intimate password, which awakens countless memories and dreams. Those memories are bitter, and that is why I have always avoided talking with you about Schiller and the impressions which I owe to him. Even to hear his name sets my heart aching.²

In an article of January, 1861, written by Dostoevsky for the Russian literary magazine *Vremya*, we read: "Yes, Schiller undoubtedly got into the blood of Russian society, especially in the last generation and in the generation before the last. We


² *Letters*, p. 12.
were brought up on him; he is one of us and has left a great
mark on our mental development.\(^3\)

Again in a letter of December 19, 1880, to an unknown
correspondent, Dostoevsky gave some advice on the general education
of children: "You do not mention how old your son is, so I shall
merely make a general statement: give your son to read only those
books that produce beautiful impressions or give rise to lofty
thoughts. If he is over sixteen, let him read Zhukovsky, Pushkin,
Lermontov. If he is fond of poetry, let him also read Schiller,
Goethe and Shakespeare."\(^4\) In Dostoevsky's writings, Schiller is
always mentioned along with a number of great literary figures
such as Goethe, Tolstoy, Pushkin, Walter Scott, Dickens,
Shakespeare, and Cervantes.

Dostoevsky was convinced that he, as other Russian
writers, owed a great deal to Schiller. In *Diary of a Writer*
Dostoevsky wrote:

Even though the French Convention of 1793, when sending the
certificate of citizenship Au poete allemand Schiller, l'ami
de l'humanité did perpetrate a beautiful, stately and prophetic
act, nevertheless it did not suspect that at the other end of
Europe, in barbarous Russia, that same Schiller was much more
national and much more akin to the barbarian Russians than to
France—not only in those days but even later, throughout our
whole century—where Schiller, the French citizen and l'ami de
l'humanité, was known, and then but slightly, only by professors

\(^3\) Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Pedantry and Literacy," *Dostoevsky's
Occasional Writings*, trans. David Magarschack (New York, 1963),
p. 155. --hereafter cited as *Writings*.

\(^4\) *Writings*, p. 315.
of literature, and not even by all of them. Yet in Russia
... he soaked into the Russian soul, left an impress upon
it, and almost marked an epoch in the history of our development. 5

In addition to having read extensively in Schiller,
Dostoevsky and his brother Michael planned an entirely new edition
of Schiller's works in Russian translation. In a letter of
September 30, 1844, to Michael, Dostoevsky exclaims about the
worth of translating Schiller: "Just think, brother. The trans-
lation of Don Carlos would be a happy occurrence for literature.
It would be bought by amateurs and would sell at least three
hundred copies. ... I'll write a preface and you write the
verses." 6

The preparation of this Schiller edition progressed
until Dostoevsky was arrested on April 23, 1849, for his part in
the revolutionary activities of the Petrachevsky circle.
Dostoevsky was sentenced to four years of hard labor at
Semipalatinsk in Siberia, after which he served another five years
in a penal battalion. He did not return to St. Petersburg until
1859. The planned edition of Schiller's works never became a
reality, although a great number of poems were translated along
with Die Räuber, Don Carlos and part of Maria Stuart. It is
regrettable that Dostoevsky never wrote the Preface to which he
alluded in his letter of September 30, 1844.

5 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Diary of a Writer, trans. Boris Brasol
(New York, 1949), I, 315.
6 Letters, p. 16.
Dostoevsky's novels also contain many references to Schiller. In *Crime and Punishment*, for instance, Schiller's name is mentioned fourteen times. The hero of this novel, Rodion Raskolnikov, knew his Schiller well, as the following episode demonstrates. Raskolnikov's sister, Dounia, planned to marry the rich, but rascally Luzhin, whom she did not love, in order to provide for her brother's future. Discovering her motives, Raskolnikov criticized her noble sacrifice by comparing her with the typical Schillerian hero. His analysis of Dounia reminds us of Karl Moor: "That's how it always is with these Schilleresque noble hearts; till the last moment every goose is a swan with them, till the last moment, they hope for the best and will see nothing wrong, and although they have an inkling of the other side of the picture, yet they won't face the truth till they are forced to; the very thought of it makes them shiver; they thrust the truth away with both hands."7

Even the evil Svidrigaylov is fond of Schiller. In a conversation Raskolnikov accuses Svidrigaylov of purposely living an immoral and depraved life. Svidrigaylov exclaims: "You preach to me about vice and aesthetics! You—a Schiller, you—an idealist! Of course that's all as it should be and it would be surprising if it were not so, yet is is strange in

reality. . . . and by-the-way, are you fond of Schiller? I am awfully fond of him." After listening to Svidrigaylov relate a particularly vile anecdote, Raskolnikov vents his outrage: "Stop! Enough of your vile, nasty anecdotes, depraved, vile sensuous man!" Svidrigaylov answers: "Schiller, you are a regular Schiller! O la vertu va-t-elle se nicher?" When Raskolnikov rebukes Svidrigaylov for secretly listening at Sonia's door while he confessed the murder of the old pawnbroker woman, Svidrigaylov laughs: "The Schiller in you is in revolt at every moment, and now you tell me not to listen at doors. But if you are convinced that one mustn't listen at doors, but one may murder old women at one's pleasure, you'd better be off to America and make haste."  

Thus, one part of Raskolnikov's varied personality is revealed in this conversation with Svidrigaylov. Raskolnikov can murder an old woman, but he is disgusted by anecdotes concerning the debauching of young girls. He can wade through blood and creep under an old woman's bed, yet he is outraged that Svidrigaylov has listened at Sonia's door. There is an interesting paradox in Schiller's and Dostoevsky's

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8 *Punishment*, p. 457.
9 *Punishment*, p. 467.
10 *Punishment*, p. 470.
characters. We are reminded of Karl Moor and the Marquis Posa, who also harbor two antithetical ideals within themselves. Karl perpetrates monstrous acts in the name of humanity, yet is revolted by the petty crimes of his band. Marquis Posa is filled with noble plans for man's happiness on earth, yet he is prepared to kill those who obstruct their fulfillment.

In the year 1929 Dmitri Chizhevsky published an article on the similarities of Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov* to Schiller.\(^\text{11}\) This is the only work dealing at length with this problem. His article was meant to give only a cursory glance at the most salient similarities. He draws attention to the passages where Dostoevsky mentions Schiller or his works by name and he investigates the manner in which Dostoevsky availed himself of Schiller to underscore an important scene. Chizhevsky discusses the possibilities of treating the two authors on a metaphysical plane, but he did not pursue the problem. It is, however, precisely on a metaphysical level where the greatest similarity between the two authors is to be found.

As indicated earlier, attention will be called to those passages in Dostoevsky's work which allude to Schiller or mention him by name. From the manner in which he avails himself of Schiller we see that he had not only read Schiller several times,

\(^{11}\) Dmitri Chizhevsky, "Schiller und die Brüder Karamazov," *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*, VI (1929), 1-44.
but that he had studied him closely and reflected at great length on what he had read. In the Brothers Karamazov, for instance, we encounter Schiller's theme of the sons ranged against the father.  

In the chapter "Why is Such a Man Alive," Fyodor Pavlovitch introduces his sons to the elder Zossima: "Most pious and holy elder," he cried pointing to Ivan, "that is my son, flesh of my flesh and the dearest of my flesh! He is my most dutiful Karl Moor, so to speak, while this son who has just come in, Dmitri, against whom I am seeking justice from you, is the undutiful Franz Moor—they are both out of Schiller's Robbers and so I am the reigning Count von Moor."

Dostoevsky apparently does not want us to forget the parallel, because at the moment of leaving the monastery he addresses Ivan as "Most honored Karl von Moor." Again Fyodor Pavlovitch mentions Schiller by name: "A kiss on the lips and a dagger in the heart as in Schiller's Robbers." And in the chapter "The Confessions of a Passionate Heart—in Verse" Dostoevsky uses Schiller's poems "Das Eleusische Fest" and "An

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12 Unless otherwise noted the following quotations have also been listed in Chizhevsky's article.


14 Karamazov, p. 73.

15 Karamazov, p. 71.
die Freude" to underscore the intensity of Dmitri Karamazov's emotional state. An explanation of how this is done follows.16

For the past several years, Dmitri relates, he was enjoying a life of sensual dissipation, vice, cruelty, and moral degeneration, for he said himself; "I loved the ignominy of vice. I loved the cruelty; am I not a bug, a noxious insect?"17 He squandered an enormous amount of money, mostly on drink and riot, but in spite of this, he was looked upon as a hero by his regiment and the town's people, with the exception of Katerina Ivanovna, the commander's daughter, who was on a visit from Moscow. She so completely ignored and scorned Dmitri that he swore revenge for his wounded pride.

It happened that the commander had been lending 4500 roubles of the regiment's money each year for interest. Finally, the person to whom the loan had been made disappeared with the money. The commander was faced with a dishonorable discharge and was on the verge of ruining his family. When Dmitri discovered this he sent word by Katerina Ivanovna's sister, in the form of a ribald joke, that she could earn 4500 roubles by visiting his rooms at night. Later, when the money was demanded by the military, the commander was stopped just short of committing suicide. Katerina Ivanovna came to Dmitri

16 Chizhevsky does not relate Schiller's poems to Dmitri's life.
17 Karamazov, p. 112.
for the money. This was to be his moment of revenge. Dmitri saw at once, however, that sacrificing her virtue for her father would only ennable Katerina. Moreover, he understood that Katerina would continue to scorn him as a scoundrel. But Dmitri had his "revenge" when he proved to her how noble he was by making her a gift of the money and bowing to her besides. Several months later they became formally engaged. Subsequently, Dmitri had fallen in love with Grushenka and now wanted to break the engagement with Katerina Ivanovna. Furthermore, he had spent 3000 roubles, which Katerina had given him to send to her aunt, on a riotous orgy with Grushenka.

It is for these reasons that Dmitri sees his own life reflected in Schiller's two poems. Dmitri recites from memory the second, third, fourth and one half of the seventh stanzas of "Das Eleusische Fest." These will be quoted and their relevance discussed below. We will use Constance Garnett's English translation of the poems as it is truer to the Russian which Dostoevsky used. We will also cite the German in order that the translation may be compared. 18

Wild and fearful in his cavern  
Hid the naked troglodyte,  
And the homeless nomad wandered  
Laying waste the fertile plain.  
Menacing with spear and arrow

18 Citations from Schiller in my text are to Schiller's Sämtliche Werke (Säkular-Ausgabe), 16 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1904-5)—hereafter cited as Werke.
In the woods the hunter strayed. . . .
Woe to all poor wretches stranded
On those cruel and hostile shores!19

Scheu in des Gebirges Kläften
Barg der Troglodyte sich,
Der Nomade liess die Triften
Wäste liegen, wo er strich,
Mit dem Wurfspiess, mit dem Bogen
Schritt der Jäger durch das Land—
Weh dem Fremdling, den die Wogen
Warfen an den Unglückssstrand!20

In the lines "And the homeless nomad wandered/laying waste the
fertile plain" Dmitri sees his own life of dissipation, immorality
and riotous philandering. All who came into contact with him had
been debauched and exploited; "Woe to all poor wretches stranded/
On those cruel and hostile shores!" Dmitri felt he was incapable
of feelings of love and pity. People had value only if they were
useful for his own selfish purposes.

From the peak of high Olympus
Came the mother Ceres down,
Seeking in those savage regions
Her lost daughter Proserpine.
But the Goddess found no refuge,
Found no kindly welcome there,
And no temple bearing witness
To the worship of the gods.

Und auf ihrem Pfad begrüsste,
Irrend nach des Kindes Spur,
Ceres die verlassne Käste,
Ach, da gründe keine Flur!
Dass sie hier vertraulich weile,
Ist kein Godeach ihr gewähr,
Keines Tempels heitere Säule
Zeugt, dass man Götter ehrt.

19 Karamazov, pp. 109-110.
20 Werke, I, 170.
For Dmitri the goddess Ceres represents in one case sensitivity and high moral values, in the second she symbolizes Katerina, who sought in "those savage regions" something noble and fine—an answer to her love—but she "Found no kindly welcome there."

From the fields and from the vineyards
Came no fruits to deck the feast,
Only flesh of blood-stained victims
Smouldered on the altar-fires,
And where'er the grieving goddess
Turns her melancholy gaze,
Sunk in vilest degradation
Man his loathesomeness displays.

Keine Frucht der süßen Ähren
Lädt zum reinen Mahl sie ein,
Nur auf grässlichen Altären
Dorret menschliches Gebein.
Ja, so weit sie wandernnd kreiste,
Fand sie Elend überall,
Und in ihrem grossen Geiste
Jammert sie des Menschen Fall.

This stanza is a concise summary of Dmitri's life as he sees it. Nothing positive resulted from his actions or Katerina's attempts to reform him; there were only his "blood-stained victims."

And when Katerina gazed upon him all she saw was Dmitri's vilest degradation and loathesomeness. Dmitri intended this poem to be applied to himself. Immediately following his recitation, we read: "Mitya broke into sobs and seized Alyosha's hand. 'My dear, my dear, in degradation, in degradation now, too. There's a terrible amount of suffering for man on earth, a terrible lot of trouble. Don't think I'm only a brute in an officer's uniform, wallowing in dirt and drink. I hardly think of anything but of"
that degraded man—if only I'm not lying. I pray to God I'm not lying and showing off. I think about that man because I am that man myself."

Dmitri asks what he must do to extricate himself from his present way of life. Schiller's poem provides him with the answer:

Would he purge his soul from vileness
And attain to light and worth,
He must turn and cling forever
To his ancient Mother Earth.

Dass der Mensch zum Menschen werde,
Stift' er einen ew'gen Bund
Gläubig mit der frommen Erde,
Seinem mütterlichen Grund,...

"We must cling to Mother Earth"—"c drevei materu zeļenu" in the Russian version—is the identical solution which Dostoevsky presents for the salvation of all his heroes. Although the problem of Mother Earth is discussed in another chapter of this study, we may say here that even if Dmitri does not understand how to realize his salvation at this point, he does believe in Mother Earth as the universal solution to man's happiness. Dmitri wonders: "But the difficulty is how am I to cling forever to Mother Earth. . . . That's the trouble, for everything in the world is a riddle!"

Continuing the description of his "debased life," Dmitri quotes first stanza four and then three of "An die Freude" so that the parallel is seen in even sharper relief:


22. Karamazov, p. 110.
Joy everlasting fostereth
The soul of all creation,
It is her secret ferment fires
The cup of life with flame.
'Tis at her beck the grass hath turned
Each blade towards the light
And solar systems have evolved
From chaos and dark night,
Filling the realms of boundless space
Beyond the sage's sight.

At bounteous nature's kindly breast,
All things that breathe drink Joy,
And birds and beasts and creeping things
All follow where she leads
Her gifts to man are friends in need,
The wreath, the foaming must,
To angels—vision of God's throne,
To insects—sensual lust.\(^\text{23}\)

Freude heisst die starke Feder
In der ewigen Natur,
Freude, Freude treibt die Räder
In der grossen Weltenuhr.
Blumen lockt sie aus den Keimen,
Sonnen aus dem Firmament,
Sphären rollt sie in den Räumen,
Die des Sehers Rohr nicht kennt.

Freude trincken alle Wesen
An den Brüsten der Natur,
Alle Guten, alle Bösen
Folgen ihrer Rosenspur.
Käse gab sie uns und Reben,
Einen Freund, geprüft im Tod,
Wollust ward dem Wurm\(^\text{24}\) gegeben,
Und der Cherub steht vor Gott.\(^\text{25}\)

Again Dmitri sees the comparison, not only to himself, but also to Alyosha. "I am that insect, brother, and it is said of me

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\(^{23}\)\text{loc. cit.}

\(^{24}\)In the Russian version "Wurm" is translated as "nacekom"—insect.

\(^{25}\)\text{Werke, I, 5.}
especially. All we Karamazovs are such insects, and, angel as you are, that insect lives in you . . . "26 Throughout the novel Alyosha is continually referred to as a "cherub" or "angel."

Dostoevsky probably had Schiller in mind, too, when he has Dmitri say: "I can't endure the thought that a man of lofty mind and heart begins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom. What's still more awful is that a man with the ideal of Sodom in his soul does not renounce the ideal of the Madonna, and his heart may be on fire with that ideal . . . just as in his days of youth and innocence."27 Dmitri perceives even further applications to man in this poem. "Yes, man is broad, too broad, indeed. I'd have him narrower . . . Is there beauty in Sodom? Believe me, that for the immense mass of mankind beauty is found in Sodom. Did you know that secret? The awful thing is that beauty is mysterious as well as terrible."28 Consequently, beauty has two forms, and each is beautiful in its own manner:

Wollust ward dem Wurm gegeben,
Und der Cherub steht vor Gott.

Schiller's heroes also share this characteristic with Dmitri. Karl Moor, for instance, began with the ideal of the Madonna and ended with the ideal of Sodom—without renouncing the ideal of the Madonna. Karl's heart, as that of Dmitri's,

26 Karamazov, p. 111.
27 loc. cit.
28 loc. cit.
has remained aflame with the lofty ideals of justice, beauty, and brotherly love. Although Karl is captain of a band of blood-thirsty cutthroats, he knows that he has nothing in common with them. Commenting on the similarity between Karl Moor and Dmitri Karamazov, a critic has written:

Dmitry, like Karl Moor, finds himself involved in a tormenting conflict with reality and society. Seeing the imperfections and downright defects of real life, both idealists aspire for a new and better and more beautiful world, for a reformed and ennobled humanity. Quoting "Das Kleusische Fest" and "An die Freude," Dmitry shows that his ideas and ideals are those of the German poet. But his agreement with Schiller is limited to the realm of dreams and poetry. Descending from the lofty heights of poetry into the degrading depths of his everyday existence, Dmitry finds himself again facing the unsolved problems of the discrepancy between life and ideal.\(^\text{29}\)

Both Karl and Dmitri are aware of their having sunk into the abyss of degradation. The awareness of their loathesomeness gives them the strength to rise from the depths and to seek expiation by voluntarily submitting to punishment. However, it is not our purpose here to decide whether or not Dmitri was the "noxious insect" he imagined himself to be. What must be kept in mind is the fact that Dmitri had violated his own code of morals. He measured himself by this standard and found that he had failed.

Other members of the Karamazov family seem to have been familiar with Schiller. Ivan Karamazov sees in Schiller's

poem "Der Handschuh" a parallel to his relationship with
Katerina Ivanovna. In this poem a young Lady throws her
glove into a pit containing lions and tigers and asks the
knight Delorges, her admirer, to prove his words of love by
retrieving the glove, which he does at the risk of his life:

Und mit Erstaunen und mit Grauen
Sehen's die Ritter und Edelfrauen,
Und gelassen bringt er den Handschuh zurück.
Da schallt ihm sein Lob aus jedem Munde,
Aber mit zärtlichem Liebesblick—
Er verheissst ihm sein nahes Glück—
Empfängt ihn Fräulein Kunigunde.
Und er wirft ihr den Handschuh ins Gesicht:
"Den Dank, Dame, begehr' ich nicht!" 30
Und verlässt sie zur selben Stunde.30

Delorges threw the glove in Kunigunde's face because he saw
that she did not love him, otherwise she would not have required
him to risk his life for a foolish whim. He also saw in her
"zärtlichem Liebesblick" that her affection for him was anything
but "ideal love." Moreover, the knight wanted to be loved as he
loved—idealistically and with genuine feeling. He wished
neither to be abused nor to be a plaything for anyone's amusement.

Dostoevsky employs this poem in analogy to the action
in the chapter "A Laceration in the Drawing Room." Ivan had
fallen in love with Katerina Ivanovna when Dmitri had sent him
to her house on an errand. She was aware of Ivan's feelings.

30 Werke, I, 95.
although he never said a word of his love. Katerina had encouraged Ivan in order that she could revenge herself on him for the insults and ill treatment she had received from Dmitri. She sent messages by him to Dmitri and required him to perform various tasks "because he was her friend." In short, she made him miserable. Katerina, like Kunigunde, was shamefully amusing herself with Ivan, although it is carefully pointed out that she was not aware of it. Ivan finally sees the truth, is reminded of "Der Handschuh" and leaves with these words:

Good-bye Katerina Ivanovna; you can't be angry with me, for I am a hundred times more severely punished than you, if only by the fact that I shall never see you again. Good-bye! I don't want your hand. You have tortured me too deliberately for me to be able to forgive you at this moment. I shall forgive you later, but now I don't want your hand. "Den Dank, Dame, begehre ich nicht," he added with a forced smile, showing however, that he could read Schiller, and read him till he knew him by heart—which Alyosha would never have believed. He went out of the room without saying good-bye even to his hostess, Madame Hohlakov.31

It is interesting to note the manner in which Dostoevsky avails himself of Schiller to emphasize a certain scene. The effect of Ivan's decision to leave Katerina is heightened by the quotation. Furthermore, the reader's attention is focused on the true nature of Katerina's attitude to Ivan by equating the scene with that presented in Schiller's poem.

Dmitri is also known to others as a lover of Schiller.

31 Karamazov, p. 199.
In the chapter "The Prosecutor's Speech," the prosecutor Ippolit Kirillovitch describes Dmitri in this fashion: "... he seems to represent Russia as she is. ... Yet here we have her, our mother Russia, the very scent and sound of her. Oh, he is spontaneous, he is a marvellous mingling of good and evil, he is a lover of culture and Schiller."\(^{32}\) It is noteworthy that the prosecutor describes Dmitri as "Russia as she is" and observes, almost parenthetically, that Dmitri, as well as all other true Russians, are lovers of Schiller. The prosecutor felt that even to mention that Dmitri loved Schiller would be sufficient to describe his personality. With Schiller in mind, the prosecutor continues his description of Dmitri's character: "Oh, he, too, can be good and noble, but only when all goes well with him. What is more, he can be carried off his feet, positively carried off his feet by noble ideals, but only if they come of themselves."\(^{33}\) The prosecutor's speech reminds us of Karl Moor as a person of noble purposes, but one who undertakes nothing toward their fulfillment "when all goes well with him." Karl embarks upon his career as a robber only after the possibility of returning home and leading a normal life has failed to materialize. The Schiller critic Gerhard Storz makes the same observation: "Trotz der Prächtigkeit seiner Figur, trotz dem düsteren Glanz seiner

\(^{32}\) *Karamazov*, p. 470.

\(^{33}\) *loc. cit.*
Hauptmannschaft ist Karls Teil weniger die Tat als das Erleiden, weniger Wagnis als erzwungenes Vollziehen.\textsuperscript{34}

The counsellor, Fetyukovitch, outlines the Russian character in his final plea to the jury. Again, he too considers that the Russian love of Schiller is a characteristic of his countrymen:

Gentlemen of the jury, people like my client, who are fierce, unruly, and uncontrolled on the surface, are sometimes, most frequently indeed, exceedingly tender-hearted, only they don't express it. . . . The talented prosecutor laughed mercilessly just now at my client loving Schiller—loving the sublime and beautiful! I should not have laughed at that in his place. Yes, such natures . . . often thirst for tenderness, goodness, and justice, as it were, in contrast to themselves, their unruliness, their ferocity—they thirst for it unconsciously. Passionate and fierce on the surface, they are painfully capable of loving woman, for instance, and with a spiritual and elevated love. Again do not laugh at me, this is very often the case in such natures. But they cannot hide their passions—sometimes very coarse—and that is conspicuous and is noticed, but the inner man is unseen. Their passions are quickly exhausted; but, by the side of a noble and lofty creature that seemingly coarse and rough man seeks a new life, seeks to correct himself, to be better, to become noble and honourable, "sublime and beautiful," however much the expression has been ridiculed.\textsuperscript{35}

This passage also gives us important insight into Schiller's popularity among the Russians. With some classes of people the highest virtue is the simulated preservation of dignity through the unnatural suppression of emotions. The Russian, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of

\textsuperscript{34} Gerhard Storz, \textit{Der Dichter Friedrich Schiller} (Stuttgart, 1963), p. 46.

\textsuperscript{35} Karamazov, p. 786.
demonstrating how one feels. Schiller approaches the Russian view when he maintains that an individual's inborn nature will, and should, express itself in his physical conduct. Schiller defends his thesis in Über Anmut und Würde (1793) and in an earlier work Über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen (1780). In the latter essay he criticizes the Stoic philosophers for insisting on the suppression of man's sensual nature. In Schiller's opinion their ideal is an extreme which degrades man and attempts to elevate him to an ideal being. Schiller wrote: "Jeder Affekt hat seine spezifischen Ausserungen und, so zu sagen, seinen eigentümlichen Dialekt, an dem man ihn kennt. Und zwar ist dies ein bewundernswürdiges Gesetz der Weisheit, dass jeder edle und wohlwollende den Körper verschönert, den der niederschächtige und gehässige in vielsehiche Formen zerreisst." Consequently, Schiller permitted Karl and Fiesko to give full expression to their feelings. This comparatively insignificant characteristic of Schiller's earlier dramas explains much of Russia's enthusiasm for Schiller. We may say that the Sturm und Drang Schiller showed certain affinities with the Russian temperament.

36 Werke, XI, 72.
CHAPTER III

THE INJUSTICE OF SUFFERING

In this chapter we will discuss another problem which occupied Schiller and Dostoevsky—the meaningless and senseless suffering of humanity. Dostoevsky was more concerned with this than Schiller, although Schiller does treat the subject to a recognizable degree in his poems and dramas. In this respect Ivan Karamazov and Rodion Raskolnikov share a number of features with Karl Moor and Marquis Posa. Each represents different aspects of the same dilemma. The protagonists are consumed by the desire to praise God, but are forced to rebel against Him. They passionately wish to accept the order of things, but are hindered at every step by their own intellectual honesty, by their rather unique conceptions of right and wrong. Ivan, unlike Karl and Posa, rebels against God, whom he considers to be responsible for the misery, injustice and callousness of man, whereas Karl and Posa relieve God of responsibility and place the blame on society. Their
sense of justice cannot reconcile the universal suffering and the beastliness of man with the concept that the established society is moral and just. For Ivan and Karl, as for Schiller and Dostoevsky, social justice ought to embody the metaphysical problem of justice. The dilemma, in brief, hinges on the thesis that the unjustifiable suffering of past and present generations can be excused in that this is partial payment for that distant point in time when mankind will live in harmony and bliss. Suffering is a necessary stage for man's future happiness. Both Schiller and Dostoevsky disagree with this thesis. They believe that the price is too high. In fact, even the unjustifiable suffering of one single child is too much to ask. Dostoevsky gives a superb illustration of man's predicament when he has Ivan say to Alyosha: "Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?"\(^1\) Ivan's answer, as well as Alyosha's, is no. Ivan proceeds to vent his indignation: "I must have justice, or I will destroy myself. And not justice in some remote and infinite time and space, but here on earth, and that I could see

\(^1\) Karamazov, p. 254.
myself. I have believed in it. I want to see it, and if I am
dead by then, let me rise again, for if it all happens without
me, it will be too unfair. Surely I haven't suffered, simply
that I, my crimes and my sufferings, may manure the soil of
future harmony for somebody else. I want to see with my own
eyes the hind lie down with the lion and the victim rise up and
embrace the murderer. I want to be there when every one suddenly
understands what it has all been for."\textsuperscript{2}

Ivan decides that the future harmony is not worth
the price of suffering. The question now is how are we to recon-
cile suffering with the belief in a kind and merciful God? Ivan's
answer is terrifying in its simplicity. Reject God! "I don't
want harmony. From the love of humanity I don't want it. I would
rather be left with my unavenged suffering. I would rather remain
with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if
I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it's
beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten
to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am
bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing.
It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully
return Him the ticket."\textsuperscript{3}

If we compare Ivan's speech to portions of Schiller's

\textsuperscript{2}Karamazov, pp. 253-254.
\textsuperscript{3}loc. cit.
poem "Resignation," we are struck by the similarity. This poem is concerned with Schiller's relationship to Charlotte von Kalb. We see him struggling with passion for a married woman. He complains that if he is to remain a Christian, then he must deny himself certain temporal enjoyments for the eternal happiness that is to follow. In lines which bear an unmistakable similarity to Ivan's "entrance ticket," Schiller writes:

Da steh' ich schon auf deiner finstern Brücke,
Furchtbare Ewigkeit.
Empfange meinen Vollmachtbrief zum Glücke!
Ich bring' ihn unerbrochen dir zurücke,
Ich weiss nichts von Glückseligkeit.
Hier, spricht man, warten Schrecken auf den Bösen
Und Freuden auf den Redlichen.
Des Herzens Kräumen werdest du entblüss'est,
Der Vorsicht Rätsel werdest du mir lösen
Und Rechnung halten mit dem Leidenden.5

In order to obtain eternal bliss, Pauline Christian theology explains that we must be willing to sacrifice everything in this life. This is recognized by Schiller:

"Ich zahle dir in einem andern Leben,
Gib deine Jugend mir!
Nichts kann ich dir als diese Weisung geben."
Ich nahm die Weisung auf das andre Leben,
Und meiner Jugend Freuden gab ich ihr.

"Gib mir das Weib, so teuer deinem Herzen,
Gib deine Laura mir!
Jenseits der Gräber wuchern deine Schmerzen."
Ich riss sie blutend aus dem wunden Herzen
Und weinte laut und gab sie ihr.6

4Chizhevsky and Kostka show that "Resignation" is one of Dostoevsky's sources for the "entrance ticket" but do not relate the poem to the problem of suffering.

5Werke, I, 196-197.

6Werke, I, 197.
Schiller here doubts that eternity is worth the sacrifice of earthly happiness; furthermore he doubts that there is even an eternity. In the absence of eternity suffering and sacrifice become absurdities:

"... Was sollen deine Götter,
Des kranken Weltplans schlau erdachte Retter,
Die Menschenwitz des Menschen Notdürft lehrt?

"Was heisst die Zukunft, die uns Gräber decken?
Die Ewigkeit, mit der du eitel prangst?
Ehrwürdig nur, weil Hölle sie verstecken,
Der Riesenschatten unserer eigne Schrecken
Im hohlen Spiegel der Gewissensangst.

"Vom Balsamgeist der Hoffnung in den kalten
Behausungen des Grabes eingehalten,
Das nennt dein Fieberwahn Unsterblichkeit?

"Für Hoffnungen—Verwesung straft sie Lügen—
Gibt du gewisse Götter hin?
Sechstausend Jahre hat der Tod geschwiegen;
Kam je ein Leichnam aus der Gruft gestiegen,
Der Meldung tat von der Vergeltung?"

Vergeltung, ich fordre meinen Lohn?

If we compare Ivan's dilemma with that of Marquis Posa, we note even further similarity. Ivan refused to accept God because to do so he would be required to affirm the necessity and value of suffering which he considered meaningless. The chief objection Posa has to serving King Philip II of Spain is similar. Posa must take part in the monarch's scheme to subject the people of Flanders to Catholicism. Posa's idealism rebels against this injustice to humanity. Several times he begs Philip to release him from service:

7 Werke, I: 198f.
Marquis.

Jüngst kam ich an von Flandern und Brabant—
So viele reiche, blühende Provinzen!
Ein kräftiges, ein grosses Volk—und auch
Ein gutes Volk—und Vater dieses Volkes!
Das, dacht' ich, das muss göttlich sein!—Da stiess
Ich auf verbrannte menschliche Gebeine—
Sie haben Recht. So i.e müssen. Dass Sie können,
Was Sie zu müssen eingesehen, hat mich
Mit schauernder Bewunderung durchdrungen.
O schade, dass, in seinem Blut gewält,
Das Opfer wenig dazu taugt, dem Geist
Des Opfers ein Loblied anzustimmen!
Dass Menschen nur—nicht Wesen höherer Art—
Die Weltgeschichte schreiben!—Sanftere
Jahrhunderte verdrängen Philips Zeiten;
Die bringen mildere Weisheit; Bürgerglück
Wird dann versöhnt mit Fürstengrösse wandeln,
Der karge Staat mit seinen Kindern geizen,
Und die Notwendigkeit wird menschlich sein.

König.

Wann, denkt Ihr, würden diese menschlichen
Jahrhunderte erscheinen, hätt' ich vor
Dem Fluch des jetzigen gezittert? Sehet
In meinem Spanien Buch um. Hier bleibt
Des Bürgers Glück in nie bewölktem Frieden;
Und diese Ruhé gönn' ich den Flämndern.

Marquis (schnell).

Die Ruhe eines Kirchhofs! Und Sie hoffen,
Zu endigen, was Sie begannen? hoffen,
Der Christenheit gezeitigte Verwandlung,
... Schon flohen Tausende
Aus Ihren Ländern froh und arm. Der Bürger,
Den Sie verloren für den Glauben, war
Ihr edelster. ...
... Verlassen von dem Fleiss
Der neuen Christen, liegt Granada öde.8

André von Gronicka has pointed out in an article that this famous scene presents an example of superb diplomatic maneuvering by the Marquis to win the King’s confidence, so that he, Posa, can better carry out his own plans for humanity. Von Gronicka is correct. Only humanity as a whole interests Posa; individuals mean nothing to him. As we shall see below, some men are indeed capable of infinite love for humanity in general, while at the same time they can despise individuals. The Marquis' concern for the suffering of millions is perfectly in keeping with his character. Clearly then, Posa sees that the King is in the process of erecting his ideal state, a state of peace and prosperity, on a foundation of the misery of his subjects. Posa's sense of morality cannot accept suffering on these terms. Even if some higher truth and condition of bliss should one day manifest itself as a reward and compensation for it all, he would reject this kind of truth as essentially invalid. Posa, as does Ivan, believes that happiness under such conditions is not worth the price. Nor, in fact, would the future harmony be worth it. In this respect, it will be interesting to see how Karl Moor reflects on the subject:

Aber wofür der heisse Hunger nach Glückseligkeit? Wofür das Ideal einer unerreichten Vollkommenheit? Das Hinausschieben unvollendeter Pläne? ... Nein, Nein! es ist etwas mehr, denn ich bin noch

nicht glücklich gewesen.

... euer schwarzgewürdiges Gesicht—eure furchterlich klaffenden Wunden sind ja nur Glieder einer unzerbrechlichen Kette des Schicksals...

... Wenn du mir irgend einen eingedrungenen Weltkreis allein liestest, den du aus deinen Augen verbannt hast, wo die einsame Nacht und die ewige Wüste meine Aussichten sind?—Ich würde dann die schweigende Öde mit meinen Phantasien bevölkern und hätte die Ewigkeit zur Musse, das verworrene Bild des allgemeinen Elends zu zergliedern.

The poem "Die Ideale" (1795) will provide one further example that the question concerned Schiller over a period of years. In this symbolic poem Schiller compares the loss of his youthful ideals to that of losing the love of a maiden. Young Schiller, full of hope, first imagined the world to hold the key to bliss; but:

Wie gross war diese Welt gestaltet,
So lang' die Knospe sie noch barg;
Wie wenig, ach! hat sich entfaltet,
Dies Wenige, wie klein und karg!

Schiller's ideals were destroyed not only by the thirst for knowledge and the appearance of doubt, but also by seeing fame bestowed on those who do not deserve it:

Ich sah des Ruhmes heil'ge Kränze
Auf der gemeinen Stirn entweiht,
Ach, allzuschnell, nach kurzer Lenz
Entfloh die schöne Liebeszeit!

10. * Werke*, III, 124-125, act IV, scene 5; In Part Four, chapter one, of Crime and Punishment, Svidrigaylov imagines eternity in a similar way: "We always imagine eternity as something vast, vast! But why must it be vast? Instead of all that, what if it's one little room, like a bathhouse in the country, black and grimy and spiders in every corner, and that's all eternity is? I sometimes fancy it like that."
The results of obtaining knowledge and truth and perceiving reality are expressed in no uncertain terms:

Und Immer stiller ward's und immer
Verlassner auf dem rauhen Steg...

It would appear that Schiller, as Dostoevsky, believed that the attainment of knowledge and harmony only at the cost of suffering and the possible loss of happiness, is not worth the price. Or in the words of Ivan Karamazov: "Without it [knowledge], I am told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known good and evil. Why should he know that diabolical good and evil when it costs so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge is not worth that child's prayer to 'dear, kind God!' I say nothing of the sufferings of grown-up people, they have eaten the apple, damn them...

Crime and Punishment will provide a final example of the senseless suffering of humanity. Sonia Marmeladov, a girl of seventeen, had been living as a prostitute for the past several months to support her family. When Raskolnikov visits Sonia in her room, he says: "It was not because of your dishonor and your sin I said that of you, but because of your great suffering. But you are a great sinner, that's true," he added almost solemnly, "and your worst sin is that you have destroyed

11.Verke, I, 162.
and betrayed yourself for nothing. Isn't that fearful? Isn't it fearful that you are living in this filth which you loathe so, and at the same time you know yourself . . . that you are not helping anyone by it, not saving any one from anything! Tell me," he went on almost in a frenzy, "how this shame and degradation can exist in you side by side with other, opposite, holy feelings? It would be better, a thousand times better and wiser to leap into the water and end it all." 

We will treat a different aspect of suffering in chapter six of this study and see that it can be the expression of man's freedom. In anticipation we may note that Schiller and Dostoevsky firmly believed that the voluntary acceptance of suffering to expiate a transgression of the social or moral laws is of value, even recommendable, to man. But the two authors insist that if suffering is to be of value it must be an act of the free will. The senseless and meaningless suffering of man as presented in this chapter is both hateful and destructive because it robs man of his freedom. In order to understand the manner in which suffering becomes an expression of freedom, we must first investigate Schiller's and Dostoevsky's concept of freedom. Chapter four of this work investigates freedom from the theological, chapter five from the philosophical standpoint.

\(^{13}\text{Punishment, p. 316.}\)
CHAPTER IV

THE GRAND INQUISITORS

In this chapter we will investigate Schiller's and Dostoevsky's theories concerning religion and its relationship to freedom and happiness. First, we will examine Schiller's drama *Don Carlos* from a theological standpoint. We will show that in one aspect the play is an attack on the Church and organized religion. According to Schiller, the Church has purposely robbed man of Christ's gift of freedom—a concept discussed in greater detail below—and replaced it with materialism in a distorted attempt to make him happy. We will then be able to show that Marquis Posa was essentially a religious, rather than a political reformer.

In the second part of this chapter we will consider Dostoevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor" in Part IV, Book 11 of *The Brothers Karamazov*. We will establish that Schiller's Gross-Inquisitor in *Don Carlos* was the main source for Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. We will see that the problem concerning the two authors is the same: Christ's gift of freedom and the
Church's distortion of it.

In the third part of the investigation we will compare several passages from Don Carlos and "The Grand Inquisitor" to demonstrate that the two authors developed their arguments in a remarkably similar pattern. We will conclude the chapter with a reinterpretation of Marquis Posa and Schiller's Grossinquisitor.

A. Schiller

The situation in Don Carlos is briefly this: After an absence of several years, Marquis Posa returns to his native Spain to discover that freedom is totally extinct. During his travels Posa had developed idealistic theories concerning freedom, and he wishes to instigate reforms. When he sees that he cannot rely on his friend Don Carlos, Posa decides to take advantage of an interview with King Philip II. During the interview Posa impresses the King to such an extent with his description of an ideal monarchy based on freedom of thought, that Philip offers him the position of personal advisor and confidant. Posa takes unscrupulous advantage of his friendship with Philip and secretly plots to assist the Dutch rebellion against Spain. Certain circumstances cause Posa to lose control of the situation, his subterfuge is discovered, and Philip orders him to be murdered. Don Carlos, also implicated, is handed over to the Inquisition.
Most of the large-scale studies of Schiller, among them von Wiese, Storz and Buchwald, have treated Posa from the political standpoint. If we examine him from the theological side as well, we shall see that several important characteristics have been overlooked. First, it must be remembered that Posa is not dangerous as a political innovator. This fact is attested to by his discovery and the suppression of the plot against the monarchy. Were Posa a purely political prisoner, the Grossinquisitor would not have been so interested in him. He relates how Posa had been watched and followed throughout Europe and that Posa's life had been prophesied in the "Holy Books." The Cardinal Inquisitor needed Posa for the Inquisition. He even rebukes Philip for ordering Posa's murder: "Was vermochte Sie, dies Opfer/Dem heil'gen Amt zu unterschlagen" (V,10). ¹ Even Posa admits that he has no political aspirations: "Die lächerliche Wut/Der Neuerung, die nur der Ketten Last,/Die sie nicht ganz zerbrechen kann, vergrößert,/Wird mein Blut nie erhitzten" (III,10). Furthermore, the ease of Posa's murder in Act V would prove that he was not a serious threat to the government. But he is dangerous to the Catholic religion, and this is where we must look to find the real Posa and thereby arrive at a new interpretation of this enigmatic person.

¹The quotations from Don Carlos are followed by the act in roman, the scene in arabic numerals.
Before continuing with our analysis we must define the word "freedom" as it is understood and used by Schiller and Dostoevsky in *Don Carlos* and "The Grand Inquisitor" only. In these two works freedom is discussed from a theological standpoint. It must not be confused with the philosophical aspect of freedom investigated in chapter five of this study.

When Christ was on Earth 2000 years ago, he promised man absolute freedom of thought and action. With Christ's life as his only example, man was to be free to decide for himself what is good and what is evil and to choose freely between the two. There was to be no reward or punishment connected with the decision. Christ intended that this way of behavior, based on a new philosophy of life, should make men happy. Before His Ascension, Christ gave His authority to the Church to rule in His name until His Second Coming. But the Church maintained that as long as man is required to choose between good and evil he will be unhappy. Consequently, the Church took Christ's freedom from man in the belief that freedom is too great a burden for him to carry. The Catholic Church has replaced Christ's freedom with a set of rules which we know today as the dogmata. A person, therefore, no longer required to distinguish between good and evil, simply refers to the rules, where the decision is made for him. Protestantism in its original form, on the other hand, demanded this freedom as its right and maintained that man is subject to no one and to no thing. Martin Luther made this very
clear in his *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*. As we shall see below, Philip, in collaboration with the Church, wishes to make his subjects happy. Philip and the Church meant to accomplish this task by replacing Christ’s religion, based on freedom, with a new religion based on materialism and sensual pleasure. If his subjects resist, there is always the Inquisition to intimidate them into conformity.

When Posa asks Philip, "Weiss ich den Menschen glücklich—eh' er denken darf?" we are now able to understand the deeper significance of Philip’s retort, "Ihr seid ein Protestant." Posa denies he is Protestant and goes on to affirm a belief in a truer form of Catholicism. This belief shows why Posa is dangerous:

Wer sichert Sie, dass mir noch heilig heisse,
Was mich zu schrecken aufgehört? Ich bin
Gefährlich, weil ich über mich gedacht. (III,10)

The Catholic monarchy in Spain regards itself as the direct heir to Christ’s authority. Posa, however, points out to Philip that the situation in Spain is entirely different from what Christ originally intended. Arbitrary laws and decisions have replaced Christ’s freedom:

... Er, der grosse Schöpfer, wirft
In einen Tropfen Tau den Wurm und lässt
Noch in den toten Räumen der Verwesung
Die Willkür sich ergetzen. (III,10)

Posa’s accusing question is how has Philip, the lord of all Christendom, administered Christ’s gift of freedom of thought?
The monarchy, he says, has distorted this gift into a "Münzstempel." For Posa the sanctity of a Catholic monarch begins when free thought is encouraged as the basis and power of sovereign authority. Posa explains that for the first time in history a king would have exercised real power, as did Christ, by making men of "toten Untertanen." The king must take the risk of freedom. Such a monarchy, based on freedom, would acquire the holiness and respect that any monarch must have as the representative of God's authority. Posa bases his own concept of any true, divine monarchy on the traditional Christian contention that the meaning and justification of Christ's power is to be found in making men free and strong. We now see Posa in a role similar to that of Christ, who has returned to chastise those powers who are ruling and judging in His name. This higher ideal of a monarchy is the one point where Philip and Posa are in essential agreement. Philip says:

... Wenn Ihr
Es so versteht, gut, so will ich mich
Auf eine neue Kronbedienung richten. (III,10)

Thus Philip indicates early in the interview his willingness to instigate certain reforms. Although it appears that Schiller disrupts the chronology of events by introducing the King's acquiescence to Posa's argument at this early point, Schiller's decision would seem to be justified in that it first permits Posa to speak more freely, and second it shows how the King's attitude to Posa's philosophy changes from hesitancy at the
beginning of the interview to enthusiasm at its end.

Posa becomes enthusiastic at his apparent success with Philip. He proceeds to point out Philip's past mistakes, criticizes his materialistic philosophy, and outlines his own plans for freedom and happiness. In the following more detailed examination we will discuss Posa's ideal of freedom and happiness.

Posa's ideal of happiness is related to the freedom to choose between right and wrong, the freedom which Christ preached. Posa explains to Philip:

... Mir aber,
Mir hat die Tugend eignen Wert. Das Glück,
Das der Monarch mit meinen Händen pflanzte,
Erschöpf' ich selbst, und Freude wäre mir
Und eigne Wahl ... .
Können Sie
In Ihrer Schöpfung fremde Schöpfer dulden?
Ich aber soll zum Meissel mich erniedern,
Wo ich der Künstler könnt' sein? -- Ich liebe
Die Menschheit... .

(III,10)

Posa criticizes Philip's policy in terms selected not to offend the monarch:

Was Eure Majestät durch meine Hand
Verbreiten -- ist das Menschenglück? -- Ist das
Dasselbe Glück, das meine reine Liebe
Den Menschen gönnt? -- Vor diesem Glücke würde
Die Majestät erzittern.

(III,10)

Posa now explains that the happiness the King has devised for man is completely wrong, that false values have been created, that the court has distorted the basis for true happiness and replaced it with material and sensual pleasure:
Ein Neues [i. e. basis for happiness] Erschuf der Krone Politik—ein Glück,
Das sie noch reich genug ist auszuteilen,
Und in dem Menschenherzen neue Triebe,
Die sich von diesem Glücke stillen lassen.
D i e Wahrheit, die sie dulden kann.

Geben Sie Gedankenfreiheit. (III,10)

Freedom to think! What Posa means by "think" is the power to decide what is right, or what is good or evil, and the freedom to choose between the two.

King Philip is convinced that man is basically evil and worthless. He has been forced to adopt this attitude because the grandees surrounding him have sold themselves, prostituted their nobility, and debased themselves for the King's favor.

Posa perceives it with keen insight when he addresses Philip:

Ich höre, Sire, wie klein,
Wie niedrig Sie von Menschenwürde denken,
Freiwillig ihres Adels sich begeben,
Freiwillig sich auf diese niedre Stufe herabgestellt.

Gefallen sich in ihrer Armut, schmücken
Mit feiger Weisheit ihre Ketten aus,
Und Tugend nennt man, sie mit Anstand tragen.

Wie könntet Sie in dieser traurigen Verstümmelung—Menschen ehren? (III,10)

Schiller does not explain in detail why the grandees have debased themselves and given up their freedom. But we are able to make some conclusions by examining the grandees as Schiller has described them in this drama. The explanation for the weakness of the grandees is to be found in Philip's new materialistic religion. The logical result of this new religion is that man
becomes a cowardly, ignoble creature who debases himself before authority to amass material wealth, and trembles with fear lest the authority withdraw its favor. After his work is complete, Philip surveys man in his new form and feels, instead of pride, profound disgust at the vile and spineless being which he has wrought. In the meantime, however, Philip has forgotten the fact that the grandees surrounding him are his own creation.

In the course of time Philip unknowingly begins to suspect that all men are born as basically materialistic creatures. He concludes that man either does not want freedom or that he is incapable of it. When, in the course of events, some men rebel at such a utopian edifice, the King intensifies his reforming efforts and the oppression increases. Posa realizes what Philip is doing and accuses him of attempting to "correct" Christ's work, of distorting nature in moulding men to suit his new religion, and of setting up himself and the hierarchy of the Church as the new god:

\begin{Verbatim}
Aber Schade!
Da Sie den Menschen aus des Schöpfers Hand
In Ihrer Hände Werk verwandelten
Und dieser neugegossnen Kreatur
Zum Gott sich gaben--da versahen Sie's
In etwas nur: . . . --und einem Gott
Kann man nur opfern--zittern--zu ihm beten!
Bereuenswerter Tausch! Unselige
Verdruessel der Natur!--Da Sie den Menschen
Zu Ihrem Saitenspiel herunterstürzten,
Wer teilt mit Ihnen Harmonie? \(\text{(III,10)}\)
\end{Verbatim}
Such a state of mental subjection is anathema to Posa. Assuming the role of Christ, Posa wants to lift men up and teach them to be proud. He would exalt freedom, just as Christ did. In order to convince the King of the rightness of his premiss, he appeals to Philip's human qualities. Explaining the King's loneliness, Posa says that if a person sets himself up as a god over men, then he must deny himself that which is necessary to ordinary men. He may not have intimate friends, he may not confide in anyone or ask for advice. He must isolate himself entirely from mankind. If he should show that he is human or susceptible to human needs, then he loses his place as a god. As we shall see below, Philip is painfully aware of his isolation and yearns for the friendship of at least one person who will accept and be fond of him as a man and not as King. Posa is aware of this weakness and uses it to gain the monarch's confidence.

Posa goes on to tell the King that when men, such as the grandees, sacrifice their freedom for temporal happiness, the happiness completely loses its value. Furthermore, the result is not true happiness, but a kind of animalistic "contentment." For those who would be gods, there is only misery and suffering. But Posa points out that Philip has suffered in vain because the monarch's plan for humanity is wrong:
Aber Ihnen
Bedeutet dieses Opfer nichts. Dafür
Sind Sie auch einzig--Ihre eigne Gattung--
Um diesen Preis sind Sie ein Gott--Und schrecklich,
Wenn das nicht wäre--wenn für diesen Preis,
Pür das zerstörte Glück von Millionen,
Sie nichts gewonnen hätten! wenn die Freiheit,
Die Sie vernichteten, das Einz'ge wäre,
Das Ihre Wünsche reifen kann? ... (III,10)

The Grossinquisitor also reminds Philip that the price of being
man-god is isolation and misery: "Der Erde Gott verlerne zu
bedürfen, /was ihm verweigert werden kann" (V,10).

Posa sets out to prove that Philip's and the Church's
solution for man's happiness is wrong. As an example he points
to the mass exodus of people from Spain, especially the middle
class who have emigrated to England. All Europe is exulting at
Philip's madness:

... Schon flohen Tausende
Aus Ihren Ländern froh und arm. Der Bürger,
Den Sie verloren für den Glauben, war
Ihr edelster. Mit offnen Mutterarmen
Empfängt die Fliehenden Elisabeth,
Und furchtbbar bläht durch Künste unsres Landes
Britannien. Verlassen von dem Fleiß
Der neuen Christen, liegt Granada öde ... (III,10)

This passage would appear to prove Posa's argument. It is
obvious, he says, that if the King's plan for creating happiness
on earth is better than his own, then the people would not leave
their native country with only the clothes they are wearing. It
is here that Philip's belief in his plan's validity falters. He
steps down from his throne of divinity for a moment, and in doing
so his life's work begins to collapse. But as Schiller portrayed
him, Philip was not truly a man-god, but a human being who had
assumed the role of immortality against his will and without actually understanding what he is doing. Although the logic of Posa's argument indeed seems to be unassailable, we shall see below that Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor offers an equally impregnable, but entirely different, explanation for man's rebellion against authority.

Further elucidation of Schiller's ideas concerning freedom is to be found in the tenth scene of the fifth act. Briefly, the situation is this: Philip has just ordered Posa to be murdered because he had deceived the King and was working for rebellion. Philip summons the Grossinquisitor and asks him to take his son, Don Carlos, also implicated in the rebellion, as a sacrifice to the Inquisition. The Inquisitor appears, described as follows in the stage direction: "Der Kardinal Grossinquisitor, ein Greis von neunzig Jahren und blind, auf einen Stab gestützt und von zwei Dominikanern geführt. Wie er durch ihre Reihen geht, werfen sich alle Graden vor ihm nieder und berühren den Saum seines Kleides. Er erteilt ihnen den Segen. Alle entfernen sich" (V,10).

The Inquisitor is angry with Philip because he has failed in his role as a monarch and has doubted the purpose of the Inquisition. Moreover, the King is rebuked for the murder of Posa:
Was vermochte Sie, dies Opfer
Dem heil'gen Amt zu unterschlagen? Spielt
Man somit uns? Wenn sich die Majestät
Zur Rehlerin erniedrigt—hinter unserm Rücken
Mit unsern schlimmsten Feinden sich versteht,
Was wird mit uns? Darf ein er Gnade finden,
Mit welchem Rechte wurden Hunderttausend
Geopfert? (V,10)

The Inquisitor rightly considered Posa as the Church's mortal enemy because Posa had the power, intelligence, and strength to wreck the Church's entire edifice. With keen acumen the Inquisitor perceived the danger inherent in Posa's fervent desire to give man freedom of thought. The Inquisitor relates that he had known of Posa and his machinations for years, but had permitted him to walk about in liberty until the proper moment should present itself. It was planned that Posa, after he had matured and had gained a reputation and following as a reformer, should be burned as a heretic in order that freedom and reason should be discredited. In this way the Inquisitor would prove the power of the Church. The Inquisitor speaks:

... Ihn schenkte
Der Notdurft dieses Zeitenlaufes Gott,
In seines Geistes feierliche Schändung
Die prahlende Vernunft zur Schau zu führen,
Das war mein überlegter Plan... (V,10)

According to the Grossinquisitor, reason is as much a danger as freedom, for reason is the first step to freedom. Philip is asked if it is justice that Posa should be spared for his ideas when others were burned for nothing worse:
Strangely, the Inquisitor admits that the burnings are not ethically valid. The Inquisitor uses the expression "schwache Seelen"—weak souls. In these two words he verifies the basic innocence of the vast majority of those who were burned. He implies that weak souls are not truly responsible for their actions—at least not to the extent that they should be burned. The Inquisitor is sincere and feels that he is morally right in his own conceptual framework of the problem. He is convinced that the ultimate solution to man's happiness on earth lies in making a mental slave of him. He considers the burnings to be only the first step of the larger plan to regiment man's mind. The Inquisitor reasons that by burning thousands whose only crime is perhaps doubting the Church's authority—the victim's actual guilt is of little importance—he is able to instill fear and panic into the heart of man. He grows fearful and timid and is cautious of his words and actions, for he fears the informers of the Inquisition. A man who is constantly afraid ceases to think rationally. Eventually, the caution of speaking his true feelings becomes an integral part of him and he ceases to question the Church's authority even in thought. We are able to make these conclusions by examining Schiller's conception of character as presented in the early Philosophie der Physiologie (1779). In this essay Schiller discusses the influence of
sensations on the mind and supposes the existence of "material ideas" whereby this influence becomes effective. Schiller concludes that the character of an individual is formed through the repeated operation of such ideas in accordance with the law of association: "Alle Moralität des Menschen hat ihren Grund in der Aufmerksamkeit, d. h. im tätigen Einfluss der Seele auf die materiellen Ideen im Denkorgan. . . . So kann es Leute geben, die zuletzt mechanisch Gutes oder Böses tun. Anfangs hatten sie es frei, moralisch getan, da nämlich ihre Aufmerksamkeit noch unbestimmt war. Itzo aber ist die Idee auch ohne Aufmerksamkeit die lebhaftere, sie fesselt die Seele an sich, sie herrscht über den Verstand und Willen. Hierin liegt der Grund aller Leidenschaften und herrschenden Ideen, und zugleich der Fingerzeig, beede zu entnerven" (Werke, XI, 37-38).

The next step, and one of the most important tasks for Schiller's Grossinquisitor, is to rid the earth of the knowledge of good and evil. This is the basis of all unhappiness on earth. An entirely new definition of good and evil must be presented. Man must be taught what is good and what is evil in terms that he can understand, and most importantly, that he can follow. And he must also be convinced that he is free to choose. But without man's awareness the Church has robbed him of his freedom in the following clever and diabolical manner. To the freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil the Church has attached a reward
for doing good—Heaven—and severe punishment for doing evil—
Hell. Now that reward or punishment is connected with an action,
man chooses between that, rather than between good and evil.
When the Church has established its authority as the interpreter
of good and evil, and man accepts this, the Church may then
distort traditional ethical values and arbitrarily decree what
is right and what is wrong. Only when the Church has reached
the point that freedom has been completely eradicated and man
is faithful even in thought can he be led like sheep to the
Church's blissful utopia. The majority of men must accept the
Church and its decrees without question. If the Church is to
maintain its authority then all who would question it and ask
others to do likewise must be burned. The Inquisitor expresses
this when he asks Philip if their object would have been
realized by listening to Posa:

War in dem Augenblick die Welt nicht mehr
Die nämliche, da Sie die Hand ihm boten?
Gift nicht mehr Gift? War zwischen Gut und Übel
Und Wahr und Falsch die Scheidewand gefallen? (V,10)

The entire purpose of the Church is reflected in these four lines.
The Inquisitor here asks Philip if the vile and vicious world
were suddenly changed by offering his hand to Posa. The ultimate
aim of the Church, he explains, is to institute a new basis for
the concept of good and evil, right and wrong. Since a reinterpre-
tation of these values is intrinsically connected with the problem
of man's happiness, Philip is rebuked for believing that their goal
to make man happy could be accomplished by adopting Posa's view.
The foregoing quotation could also be interpreted as a question posed to Philip in the following manner: Philip, were you so blind that you could neither recognize poison when you see it nor distinguish between right and wrong? There is much to be said for this interpretation taken from context. But it would be a contradiction of the Inquisitor's and Philip's declared purpose which is to create a new basis for good and evil. The Inquisitor's previous words also bear out this fact. He alludes to the decades in which Philip steadfastly pursued their common objective to create a blissful utopia in Spain:

... Wo war damals
Der Philipp, dessen feste Seele wie
Der Angelstern am Himmel unverändert
Und ewig um sich selber treibt? War eine ganze
Vergangenheit versunken hinter Ihnen? \(V,10\)

In this conversation the Inquisitor perceives that Philip is neither sufficiently strong nor dependable enough to carry out the Church's plans for humanity. Consequently, he had determined to call Philip before the Inquisition:

... --Ständig ich
Nicht jetzt vor Ihnen--beim lebend'gen Gott!
Sie wären morgen so vor mir gestanden. \(V,10\)

It will be interesting to examine the Inquisitor's reasons for this. In the first place Philip does not understand the Inquisitor's reasons for desiring Posa's sacrifice. The Inquisitor admonishes Philip for his lack of understanding:
Philip regarded Posa's treachery only as a personal affront, and he did not comprehend how much Posa's sacrifice could benefit the Church.

After the interview with Posa, the King thought that Posa's plan might be better than his own; therefore, he left his old belief and the Church to follow Posa's concept of freedom and happiness. Following Posa's example the King would rely only on his own strength to make decisions and to bear their consequence, whereas until now Philip had relied on the Church's strength in times of difficulty. The real test of Philip's strength came when he was required to accept the responsibility of his mistaken judgement of Posa and his subsequent murder. Philip also realized that he would have to murder his son as well in order to restore authority. If Philip was to return to his old beliefs, then Carlos' death was an absolute necessity. It is here that Philip realizes his basic weakness and his helplessness without the Church. We are surprised that even the King could not bear the weight of freedom and of reliance on himself. He is too
feeble to follow either Posa or the Inquisitor. The Grossinquisitor grasps the King's predicament with amazing perspicacity. Ridiculing the King's naive simplicity and innate weakness, the Inquisitor speaks more as if to a child than to a monarch:


Now we see the King as a weakling whose convictions are so shallow that he is swayed from a conviction of sixty years by a short interview with an idealist. As the Grossinquisitor states:

Nein! Ich bin nicht mit Ihnen Zufrieden.—Ihren ganzen vorigen Regentenlauf zu lästern! 
...........Was ist ein Vorsatz? Was Beständigkeit,
Was Männertreue, wenn in einer lauen Minute eine sechzigjähr'ge Regel
Wie eines Weibes Laune schmilzt? (V,10)

The Inquisitor does not chastise Philip because of Philip's weakness. Had the King rebelled out of strength, convinced in the rightness of his action, the danger to, and of, the Inquisitor's situation would have been far greater. The King, however, struggling under the weight of Posa's freedom which he had provisionally accepted in the third act, proved to
be his own best teacher. Philip is now convinced, through
experience, that freedom is indeed too great a burden to bear
alone. His experiment with free choice proved to be his
punishment. The decision to murder his son, Don Carlos, is
further proof of Philip's weakness.

Philip summons the Grossinquisitor to bring about a
reconciliation between them and to ask him to take Carlos'
asassination on his shoulders. Philip asks: "Kannst du mir
einen neuen Glauben gründen,/Der eines Kindes blut'gen Mord
verteidigt?" (V,10). The Spanish monarch is not only unwilling,
he is incapable of accepting responsibility for his son's
murder. Philip knew that if he could delude himself that his
son was a heretic in the eyes of the Catholic Church, then he
would not be subject to his conscience for Carlos' death.
Philip is like many weak men who pretend to be strong. He can
react brutally when he is affronted personally, and he can
callously sign the death warrant of a thousand men, but when he
is called upon to sacrifice an innocent person whom he loves,
he recoils from the task. The Inquisitor understands this,
although he is grieved that he had misjudged the King, and he
is disappointed that Philip is so weak. He is prepared to
forgive Philip and assume the responsibility of which Philip is
so eager to divest himself, but not before he has thoroughly
admonished Philip for his folly. It is embarrassing to observe
the King's uncomfortable situation and to see him accept the
Inquisitor's rebukes and insults. Yet the monarch accepts
every abuse without attempting to justify himself or to con-
tradict the Inquisitor, whose demeanor is that of a parent
reprimanding his child. Philip reacts in a corresponding
fashion:

Grossinquisitor.

Was sollte Ihnen dieser Mensch? Was konnte
Er Neues Ihnen vorzuzeigen haben,
Worauf Sie nicht bereit waren? Kennen
Sie Schwärmersinn und Neuerung so wenig?
Der Weltverbesserer prahlerische Sprache
Klang Ihrem Ohr so ungewohnt? . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

König.

Mich läßtete nach einem Menschen. Diese
Domingo--

Grossinquisitor.

. . . Muss ich
Die Elemente der Monarchenkunst
Mit meinem grauen Schüler überhören?
. . . Wenn S'ie
Um Mitgefühle wimmern, haben Sie
Der Welt nicht ihresgleichen zugestanden?
Und welche Rechte, möchte ich wissen, haben
Sie aufzuzeigen über ihresgleichen?

König (wirft sich in den Sessel).

Ich bin ein kleiner Mensch, ich fühle's . . . . (V, 10)

Foremost in Philip's mind is the great fear that the Inquisitor
will not relieve him of his freedom. He asks the Inquisitor if
he can justify filicide and completely relieve him of all
responsibility: "Du willst/Durch ganz Europa diese Meinung \( \bar{\sim} \) e.
justification of filicide\( \bar{\sim} \) pflanzen? . . . ich freule/An der
Natur—auch diese mächt'ge Stimme/Willst du zum Schweigen bringen?" (V,10). After the Inquisitor has assured him several times that he need not worry, Philip, relieved, lays his freedom at the Inquisitor's feet:

Ich lage Mein Richteramt in deine Hände—Kann Ich ganz zurücke treten? (V,10)

Finally Philip asks what he has been striving for all his life if he must lose his only son at the end:

König.

Es ist mein einz'ger Sohn—Wem hab' ich Gesammelt?

Grossinquisitor.

Der Verwesung lieber als Der Freiheit.

König (steht auf).

Wir sind einig. Kommt. (V,10)

If we reflect for a moment that the meaning of a monarch's entire life is summarized in these lines, we will be inclined to read more significance into the words "Der Verwesung lieber als/Der Freiheit." We must not regard the Inquisitor's pronouncement merely as another indication of his cynicism. Benno von Wiese, for example, considers it as an example of Schiller's technical skill.¹ Such an interpretation is in-

sufficient as it denies the Inquisitor an ideal. Our con-
cluding remarks will be made following, and in conjunction with,
the discussion and comparison between Schiller's Grossinquisitor
and Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. In anticipation we may say
that by "Verwesung" the Grossinquisitor means the negation of
Christ's death for humanity. When man is denied freedom, he is
also denied Christ.

B. Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor

Several critics have established the connection
between Schiller's and Dostoevsky's Inquisitors. Robert Payne
shows that Schiller's figure was the principal literary source
of "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor." Edmund Kostka in-
vestigates the parallel in somewhat more detail. He writes:

A comparison of Schiller's and Dostoevsky's Inquisitor reveals
several interesting parallels. The figures of both Inquisitors
are shrouded in an atmosphere of icy and inhuman fanaticism,
with the difference that Dostoevsky's Inquisitor, though
characterized by the same fossilized monumentality of gesture,
stands on the pedestal of apocalyptic tragedy—a petrified
monster, reminding one of the incarnate Antichrist challenging
his Creator to the last and formidable battle of Armageddon.
Christ, the opponent of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers
Karamazov, is a more powerful adversary than the feeble King
Philip in Schiller's Don Carlos who, in the last scene of the
drama, humbly submits to the authority of the Cardinal. In
The Brothers Karamazov it is only the Grand Inquisitor who is
speaking. Christ himself remains the silent partner throughout
the long and bitter tirade of the Inquisitor.3

3 Kostka, Schiller in Russian Literature, p. 244.
Unfortunately, Kostka only wishes to prove that Dostoevsky was indebted to Schiller and does not treat the similarity in sufficient detail. The critic Dmitri Chizhevsky, otherwise quite thorough, devotes only a dozen lines to the similarity. Chizhevsky thinks that Schiller intended the conflict between freedom and submission to be applied only to Philip, and that Dostoevsky was speaking of mankind in general. In the following discussion we will examine the problem of freedom as it is presented in Dostoevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor" and compare the similarities to that presented in Don Carlos.

First, we will establish the idea of freedom as presented by Christ and compare it to that of Marquis Posa. Second, we will investigate the manner in which, and the reasons why, Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor has "corrected" Christ's work and then relate him to King Philip and the Grossinquisitor. Dostoevsky's technique of development is similar to that of Schiller, differing in only one detail. In Don Carlos, Posa, who represents freedom, attacks the King's and the Church's reasons for robbing man of freedom. Philip, representing mental slavery, remains silent while Posa speaks. The manner in which Schiller develops Posa's argument also permits us to understand Philip's view. In Dostoevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor," Christ, who represents freedom, remains silent while the Grand Inquisitor, representing mental slavery, tells Christ why the Church has

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4 Chizhevsky, p. 29.
taken freedom from man. Dostoevsky constructs the Inquisitor's argument in such a way that the reader understands Christ's view as well, if not better, than if He had spoken.

Ivan Karamazov relates the legend of the Grand Inquisitor to Alyosha. He describes it as the plot of a poem he proposed to write. It concerns the appearance of Christ during the most terrible days of the Spanish Inquisition, when hundreds of heretics were burned daily. This appearance was not meant to be His Second Coming; He only visited for a few hours:

He came softly, unobserved, and yet, strange to say, everyone recognized Him. . . . The people are irresistibly drawn to Him, they surround Him, they flock about Him, follow Him. He moves silently in their midst with a gentle smile of infinite compassion. The sun of love burns in His heart, light and power shine from His eyes, and their radiance, shed on the people, stirs their hearts with responsive love. . . . He stops at the steps of the Seville cathedral at the moment when the weeping mourners are bringing a little open white coffin. In it lies a child of seven, the only daughter of a prominent citizen. . . . "He will raise your child," the crowd shouts to the weeping mother. . . . The procession halts, the coffin is laid on the steps at His feet. He looks with compassion, and His lips once more softly pronounce, "Maiden arise!" and the maiden arises. The little girl sits up in the coffin and looks round, smiling with wide open wondering eyes.5

In the midst of the cries, sobs and confusion, the Grand Inquisitor, who is described in a way similar to Schiller's description of the Grossinquisitor, happens to pass.6 He sees

5 Karamazov, p. 258.

6 Karamazov, pp. 258-259; Dostoevsky describes the Grand Inquisitor in this fashion: "He is an old man, almost ninety, tall and erect, with a withered face and sunken eyes, in which there is still a gleam of light. . . . The crowd instantly bows down to the earth, like one man, before the old inquisitor. He blesses the people in silence and passes on." Cf. Werke, IV, 276, act V, scene 10.
everything from a distance. He also recognizes Christ, frowns, and orders the Holy Guard to take Him prisoner and fling Him into a dungeon. That night the Grand Inquisitor visits Him in His cell. It is only the Inquisitor who speaks, because until His Second Coming He has no right to add or detract from what He had said during His first stay on earth: "Don't answer, be silent. What canst Thou say, indeed? ... and Thou hast no right to add anything to what Thou hast said of old. Why, then, art Thou come to hinder us? For Thou hast come to hinder us, and Thou knowest that." 7

In his conversation with Christ, the Grand Inquisitor rebukes Him for having given freedom to man. The Inquisitor explains that when Christ was on earth 1500 years ago He promised to make man free, and He exalted freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil as the highest virtue. He wanted man to follow His example without proof of His divinity. Nor did He want man to follow His example from fear of Heaven or Hell, but simply for the sake of the good. Above all, man was not to be threatened, persuaded, nor bribed into believing in Him. It is for these reasons that He refused the three temptations of Satan.

7Karamazov, p. 259.
If He had accepted them, He would have robbed man of his freedom. Although the object of Christ's freedom was to create the basis for happiness, the Inquisitor argues that freedom made man miserable. The Inquisitor knows that the vast majority are too weak to bear freedom: "Yes, we've paid dearly for it [Freedom]. . . . but at last we have completed that work [happiness] in Thy name. For fifteen centuries we have been wrestling with Thy freedom, but now it is ended and over for good." The Inquisitor also wants to make men happy. In order to accomplish this task he explains that Christ's work on earth must be corrected and a new religion must be founded. Oddly enough, the three temptations scorned by Christ have provided the basis for a new religion which the Inquisitor has conceived. It is not based on freedom, but on materialism. In the following brief examination of the three temptations we will compare Christ's religion, based on His refusal of the temptations, with the Inquisitor's religion, based on the acceptance of them. The Inquisitor explains the significance of the first temptation:

Judge Thyself who was right—Thou or he who questioned Thee then? Remember the first question; its meaning, in other words, was this: "Thou wouldst go into the world, and art going with empty hands, with some promise of freedom which men in their simplicity and their natural unreasoning cannot even understand, which they fear and dread—for nothing has ever been more insupportable for a man and a human society than freedom. But seest Thou these stones in this parched

8 Karamazov, p. 260.
and barren wilderness? Turn them into bread, and mankind will run after Thee like a flock of sheep, grateful and obedient, though for ever trembling, lest Thou withdraw Thy hand and deny them Thy bread." But Thou wouldst not deprive man of freedom and didst reject the offer, thinking what is that freedom worth, if obedience is bought with bread? Thou didst reply that man lives not by bread alone. 9

Christ scornfully refused the temptation and thereby rejected the one infallible banner which would have made all men bow down to Him: "... Thou hast rejected it for the sake of freedom and the bread of Heaven." 10 The Inquisitor goes on to say that the Church has yielded to the temptation, which functions in the assumption that if man is to be virtuous, he must be fed first. The Church has taken upon itself to accumulate and to parcel out the earthly bread in the form of favors, money, and foodstuff. Man gives up his freedom by accepting the "earthly bread" in lieu of the "heavenly bread." But in the process man has been made happy, thereby attaining the Church's object.

Continuing, the Grand Inquisitor relates that the spirit of darkness took Christ to the pinnacle of a temple for the second temptation: "If Thou wouldst know whether Thou art the Son of God then cast Thyself down, for it is written: the angels shall hold him up lest he fall and bruise himself, and Thou shalt know then whether Thou art the Son of God and shalt

9 Karamazov, p. 262; Cf. Matthew IV. 3-4: 3 If Thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. 4 But he answered and said, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

10 Karamazov, p. 263.
prove then how great is Thy faith in Thy Father." Christ refused to cast Himself down. The Inquisitor explains that in not tempting God, Christ hoped that man, following His example, would cling to God and not ask for miracles. But Christ did not know that when man rejects miracles he rejects God too: "For man seeks not so much God as the miraculous. And as man cannot bear to be without the miraculous, he will create new miracles of his own for himself, and will worship deeds of sorcery and witchcraft.

... Thou didst not come down from the Cross, for again Thou wouldst not enslave man by a miracle, and didst crave faith given freely. ... Thou didst crave for free love."12

In the third and last temptation Satan offered Christ all the kingdoms of the earth if only He would fall down and worship him. Again Christ refused, saying that only God should be worshipped. The Inquisitor wonders how Christ could be so

11 Karamazov, p. 265; Cf. Matthew IV. 5-7: 5 Then the devil taketh him up into the holy city, and setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple, 6 And saith unto him, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down: for it is written, He shall give his angels charge concerning thee: and in their hands they shall bear thee up lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone. 7 Jesus said unto him, It is written again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

12 Karamazov, p. 265.

13 Cf. Matthew IV. 8-10: 8 Again, the devil taketh him up into an exceeding high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them; 9 And saith unto him, All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me. 10 Then saith Jesus unto him, Get thee hence, Satan; for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.
naive: "Why didst Thou reject that last gift? Hadst Thou
accepted that last counsel of the mighty spirit, Thou wouldst
have accomplished all that man seeks on earth—that is, some one
to worship, some one to keep his conscience, and some means of
uniting all in one unanimous and harmonious ant-heap, for the
craving for universal unity is the third and last anguish of
men."

The Grand Inquisitor, like King Philip and the
Grossinquisitor before him, wanted to see harmony and happiness
established on earth. Unlike Philip, the Grand Inquisitor loves
mankind, and he loves it with the same intensity as does Christ.
The Inquisitor has realized that most men in their simplicity
and weakness do not even understand what freedom is. He denounces
Christ for misjudging man, claiming that in His love for man
Christ gave freedom, but instead of making him happy, it made
him miserable. Thus, Christ acted "as if he did not love men." 15
In his attitude to humanity, the Grand Inquisitor is similar to
Philip and the Grossinquisitor. The following speech by
Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor reminds us of Philip's opinion of
man as a dishonorable and weak creature, or worse yet, as the
Grossinquisitor accuses Philip: "Menschen sind/Für Sie nur
Zahlen, weiter nichts": 16

14 Karamazov, p. 267.
15 Karamazov, p. 265.
16 Werke, IV, 280, act V, scene 10.
They will understand themselves, at last, that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share between them! They will be convinced, too, that they can never be free, for they are weak, vicious, worthless and rebellious. Thou didst promise them the bread of Heaven, but, I repeat again, can it compare with the earthly bread in the eyes of the weak, ever sinful and ignoble race of man? ... I tell Thee that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find some one quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born. ... Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? ... nothing is a greater cause of suffering ... Thou didst choose what was utterly beyond the strength of men. ... Instead of taking possession of man's freedom, Thou didst increase it, and burdened the spiritual kingdom of mankind with its sufferings for ever. ... Look round Thee and judge; fifteen centuries have passed, look upon them. Whom hast Thou raised up to Thyself? I swear, man is weaker and baser by nature than Thou hast believed him! Can he, can he do what Thou didst? He is weak and vile. ... Freedom, free thought and science, will lead them into such straits and will bring them face to face with such marvels and insoluble mysteries, that some of them, the fierce and rebellious, will destroy themselves, others, rebellious but weak, will destroy one another, while the rest, weak and unhappy, will crawl fawning to our feet and whine to us: "Yes, you were right, you alone possess His mystery, and we come back to you, save us from ourselves!"17

In the discussion on Don Carlos we indicated that Philip, feeling that man unknowingly abhors freedom, and believing that he is a materialistic creature, wished to make Catholicism more materialistic in order to make man happy.

The success of his new religion was reflected in the grandees who surrounded the King, debasing themselves for his favor, and trembling before his authority lest he withdraw his favor.

Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor had created his new religion on

17 Karamazov, pp. 262-268.
the same basis as Philip. The Inquisitor explains that man does not want freedom, but demands only three things from life: someone to feed him, someone to worship, and someone to be his conscience. The Church has fulfilled all of these demands by providing the earthly bread, for all rush to bow to him who controls the bread: "But dost Thou know that for the sake of the earthly bread the spirit of the earth will rise up against Thee and will strive with Thee and overcome Thee, and all will follow him, crying, 'Who can compare with this beast? He has given us fire from Heaven!' Dost Thou know that the ages will pass, and humanity will proclaim by the lips of their sages that there is no crime, and therefore no sin; there is only hunger? 'Feed men, and then ask of them virtue!' that's what they'll write on the banner, which they will raise against Thee. ... In bread there was offered Thee an invincible banner; give bread, and man will worship Thee, for nothing is more certain than bread." 18

When man has become dependent on the Church and no longer questions its authority, the Church is at last free to create its utopia, basing its authority on the law of apostolic succession. The Inquisitor explains that inasmuch as happiness was Christ's purpose, and since He gave His authority to the Church to carry on His work, Christ has no right to object. The Grand Inquisitor goes on to describe life in his new materialistic

18 Karamazov, p. 262.
society. We are reminded of the Spanish grandees and Posa's
description of Philip's creation. Of course man will be a slave,
freedom will be a thing of the past, but man will be happy. The
Church will decree what is good and evil. It will distort
traditional moral values in such a way that should enable all
to be virtuous. Man will no longer have to make a free choice;
the Church will do it for him: "Yes, we shall set them to work,
but in their leisure hours we shall make their life like a child's
game, with children's songs and innocent dance. Oh, we shall
allow them even sin, they are weak and helpless, and they will
love us like children because we allow them to sin. We shall
tell them that every sin will be expiated, if it is done with
our permission, that we allow them to sin because we love them."

Later the Inquisitor continues:

Then we shall give them the quiet humble happiness of weak
creatures such as they are by nature. Oh, we shall persuade
them at last not to be proud. . . . We shall show them that
they are weak, that they are only pitiful children, but that
childlike happiness is the sweetest of all. They will be-
come timid and look to us and huddle close to us in fear, as
chicks to the hen. They will marvel at us and be awestricken
before us, and will be proud of our being so powerful and clever,
that we have been able to subdue such a turbulent flock of
thousands of millions. They will tremble impotently before
our wrath, their minds will grow fearful, they will be quick
to shed tears like women and children. We shall allow or
forbid them to live with their wives and mistresses, to have
or not to have children—according to whether they have been
obedient—and they will submit to us gladly and cheerfully.
The most painful secrets of their conscience, all, all they
will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all. And
they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them
from the great anxiety and terrible agony they endure at
present in making a free decision for themselves. 19

19 Karamazov, pp. 268-269.
In the discussion on Don Carlos, we drew attention to Posa's remark to Philip that when a man sets himself up to be a god over men, then he must deny himself what is necessary to an ordinary man. Schiller's Grossinquisitor also admonished Philip for desiring happiness and friendship: "Der Erde Gott verlerne zu bedürfen . . ." Dostoevsky's Inquisitor makes the same observation to Christ when he declares that the price of being God is isolation and misery. Unlike King Philip, he feels that it is a fair price to pay for the happiness of the multitude: "And all will be happy, all the millions of creatures except the hundred thousand who rule over them. For only we, we who guard the mystery, shall be unhappy. There will be thousands of millions of happy babes, and a hundred thousand sufferers who have taken upon themselves the curse of the knowledge of good and evil."20

Perhaps the strongest argument which can be raised against the Inquisitor's contention that man abhors freedom, is the fact that man is everywhere rebelling against the Church. In Don Carlos Posa observes that if Philip's plan for happiness is the best solution, then why are the people leaving Spain by the thousands to seek refuge and freedom in England? Dostoevsky's Inquisitor rejects this argument in the following manner:

What though he [man] is everywhere now rebelling against our power, and proud of his rebellion? It is the pride of a child

20 Karamazov, p. 269.
and a schoolboy. They are little children rioting and barraging out the teacher at school. But their childish delight will end; it will cost them dear. They will cast down temples and drench the earth with blood. But they will see at last, the foolish children, that though they are rebels, they are impotent rebels, unable to keep up their own rebellion. Bathed in their foolish tears, they will recognize at last that He who created them rebels must have meant to mock at them. They will say this in despair, and their utterance will be a blasphemy which will make them more unhappy still, for man's nature cannot bear blasphemy and in the end always avenges it on itself. And so unrest, confusion and unhappiness—that is the present lot of man after Thou didst bear so much for their freedom!  

When the Grand Inquisitor finishes speaking, he announces to Christ that he will burn Him the next day: "I shall burn Thee for coming to hinder us. For if any one has ever deserved our fires, it is Thou."  

Christ is considered to be the worst of all heretics, and in the eyes of the Inquisitor's new religion Christ is a heretic. If Christ should return to earth and begin His life anew, teaching man to be proud and independent, and insisting on the value of freedom, the Inquisitor's carefully laid plans for man's happiness would collapse. Schiller's Grossinquisitor also wanted Posa for the Inquisition. His reasons are the same as those of Dostoevsky's Inquisitor. Pride, individuality, and freedom cannot exist with a religion which demands as its first precept humility, conformity, and obedience.

The two Inquisitors, Posa and Christ are all striving for the happiness of man. They disagree on one vital point: the type of happiness which best corresponds to man's nature. Man is faced with two alternatives. Does happiness consist of being

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told to tread just here and not there, to think just this and not that? Is happiness possessing only the necessities for physical comfort? Is it more convenient to refer to a book of questions and answers where an individual’s problem is presented, described, and solved for him? True, those who are no longer required to make a free decision for themselves prefer this. The alternative to this state of mental subjugation is that which Schiller’s Posa and Dostoevsky’s Christ present. They would give man freedom to think and act as he would with no promise of reward or punishment, save that of acting only for the good. In this state of freedom, man will no longer evaluate a situation in terms of self-interest or self-detriment, but will act according to his understanding of good and evil with Christ as the guiding principle. But freedom entails the risk of misjudgement. Christ’s mission on earth was to free man from "The Law" which interferes with free choice. If man cannot make a free decision, his actions, therefore, cannot be moral. But God demands that man acts morally. Consequently, He demands freedom, and He sent Christ to free man. That man chooses good or evil is of less importance than that he makes a free choice.23

23 In a letter to Goethe written August 17, 1795, Schiller describes Christianity as a religion of freedom. Its distinguishing value is that it liberates man from rules and laws. Schiller also hints that when man fails to take advantage of Christianity’s power to ennoble him, the religion loses its value and becomes an object of aversion: "Ich finde in der christlichen Religion virtualiter die Anlage zu dem Höchsten und Edelsten, und die verschiedenen Erscheinungen derselben im Leben scheinen mir bloss deswegen so widrig und abgeschmackt, weil sie verfehlte
The two Inquisitors and King Philip, on the other hand, demonstrate the ultimate stage of deterioration, where freedom and the worth of the individual are no longer respected. They represent a handful of men who feel themselves to be the benefactors of mankind, whom they thoroughly despise, because they think that only they are strong enough to bear the full weight of freedom. They tyrannize and abuse the human herd, but they provide it with food and security. The two Inquisitors have carried the concept of apostolic succession, the imitation of Christ and Peter, to a logical and satirical conclusion. Briefly, it is this: After Christ had made man free, the Church declared itself as the protector of freedom and robbed man of it. In so doing, however, it destroyed the effect and reality of freedom. This leads to the question that if freedom is defied in the Church and State, what has happened to the incarnation intended by Christ? The answer is simple and terrifying: when the Church refuses to release its hold on freedom it annuls the entire meaning of Christ's life on earth. In other words, His coming was useless. Man remains the caricature which Schiller's Grossinquisitor taught Philip to despise.

In this way, the two Inquisitors become the basis of negation, and religion, by its very nature, must become

Hält man sich an den eigentümlichen Charakterzug des Christentums, der es von allen monotheistischen Religionen unterscheidet, so liegt er in nichts andern als in der Aufhebung des Gesetzes oder des Kantischen Imperativs, an dessen Stelle das Christentum eine freie Neigung gesetzt haben will. Es ist also in seiner reinen Form Darstellung schöner Sittlichkeit." Friedrich Schiller, Briefe, ed. Gerhard Fricke (München, 1955), pp. 351-352; See Kostka, Schiller in Russian Literature, p. 245.
inquisitorial. The withdrawal of freedom pushes mankind more and more to non-being. The Church, therefore, carries within itself the seeds of gradual disintegration and decay. In such a state there are only victims and victimizers. Philip himself falls victim to the unrelenting consequences of this philosophy by sacrificing his only son. If the Church and State proceed on the hypothesis that man is only a creature and is not permitted to be a creator, then the answer to Philip's question: "Wem hab' ich gesammelt?" is: permanent negation. Both representatives of negation put tradition and power before the hazard of thought and freedom. The price is, naturally, disintegration. Such is Philip's legacy. Only one ideal may triumph: that of the two Inquisitors with their concept of absolute power, which in turn is absolute negation.
CHAPTER V

FREEDOM

One of the basic problems which concerned both Schiller and Dostoevsky was that of the extraordinary person or "superman." The superman concept, however, is latent in Schiller and is recognizable in what we shall call an intense "will to freedom," in the Kantian sense. The biological-vitalistic, the philosophical, and dionysian aspect of a "will to power" as it is expounded in Nietzsche's Also Sprach Zarathustra and appearing in Dostoevsky, is found in only rudimentary form in Schiller. In order to show the similarities between Schiller's "will to freedom" and Dostoevsky's "superman," we must investigate Schiller's variegated concept of freedom. In the following pages we will first examine Schiller's theory of aesthetic freedom. We shall see that he was not satisfied with the theory of aesthetic freedom he had developed earlier in Briefe über die ästhetische
Erziehung des Menschen (1793). He felt that very few could experience this "aesthetic" state, and even then for a very short time. Second, we shall investigate the manner in which Schiller developed another, "pathetic," concept of freedom in Über das Pathetische (1793), which allows man to experience this same kind of freedom indefinitely. We shall see that for Schiller, freedom can be experienced only through the process of voluntary suffering. Finally, we shall analyze Dostoevsky's theory of freedom and note that it is very similar to that of Schiller. In anticipation, we may say that Dostoevsky's theory is related to Schiller's in that both insisted that freedom can be obtained and experienced only after undergoing profound voluntary suffering.

Schiller developed his concept of aesthetic freedom in accordance with Kant's doctrine. According to Kant, freedom is not a principle of theoretical reason—"theoretische Vernunft"—because theoretical reason contains laws which apply only to nature. Freedom, however, is a principle of man in his ethical activity. Kant attributes freedom to a principle which he calls "die praktische Vernunft." The problem for Kant and Schiller was to devise a way to bridge the gap between natural laws and

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1 See Werke, XII, 60, 15th letter: Schiller defines the "aesthetic state." He says that in the aesthetic state, "... Sowohl der materielle Zwang der Naturgesetze als der geistige Zwang der Sittengesetze verlor sich in ihrem höheren Begriff von Notwendigkeit ..." In other words, Schiller's aesthetic freedom is that state in which moral freedom—i.e. freedom from deterministic moral laws—and natural freedom—i.e. freedom from the mechanistic laws of nature—are unified and balanced in the "ästhetischem Zustand."
moral laws. The following excerpt from Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is the key to understanding the basis of Schiller's and Dostoevsky's concept of freedom:

Ob nun zwar eine unübersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs, als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs, als dem Übersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so dass von dem ersten zum anderen (also vermittelst des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wären, deren erste auf die zweite keinen Einfluss haben kann: so soll doch diese auf jene einen Einfluss haben, nämlich der Freiheitsbegriff soll den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirklich machen; und die Natur muss folglich auch so gedacht werden können, dass die Gesetzmässigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammenstimme. —Also muss es doch einen Grund der Einheit des Übersinnlichen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der Freiheitsbegriff praktisch enthält, geben, wovon der Begriff, wenn er gleich weder theoretisch noch praktisch zu einem Erkenntnisse desselben gelangt, mithin kein eigenständliches Gebiet hat, dennoch den Übergang von der Denkungsart nach den Prinzipien der einen, zu der nach Prinzipien der anderen, möglich macht.²

Here Kant very clearly states the problem of his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*: "... und die Natur muss folglich auch so gedacht werden können, dass die Gesetzmässigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammenstimme." The critic Henning Kössler asserts that there was only one problem for Schiller in his theoretical writings: how can aesthetic freedom be experienced if it is surrounded by sensual nature?³ Kössler


and Rohrmoser suggest that Schiller's concept of aesthetic freedom should be considered in connection with the history of ideas. In Rohrmoser's opinion, Schiller's concept of an aesthetic reconciliation between freedom and nature, between thought and feeling, between "Form" and "Stoff," and between natural and moral laws, is to be understood in connection with the alienation from nature which afflicted the bourgeois society of his time. Rohrmoser concludes that Schiller was concerned with only one problem from the very beginning: how can man experience freedom in society and nature? The individual had to assert himself against an absolute determinism in nature and a political absolutism in society, because the new science—represented by Kepler, Galileo, Newton—was interpreting nature in a mechanistic way. The problem was to find a method to reconcile the dualism of the material with the spiritual, which Descartes had presented as the antithesis between "res extensa" and "res cogitativa."

In the letters on aesthetics Schiller attempts to make aesthetic freedom theoretically possible. Schiller, like Kant, was not concerned with the theory of beauty, but with the state in which the sensual and the spiritual are balanced. Extreme sensual nature and extreme freedom must be moderated—Schiller designates the process as "abspannen" and "abschmelzen"—

until a new freedom is realized in the "Ästhetischem Zustand." Through Kant, Schiller created this new "aesthetic" concept of freedom, which must also be absolute. But how is aesthetic freedom possible if the sensual rebels against the tyranny of the freedom of reason? Such hostility is brought about by man and society themselves in that they have not succeeded in reconciling freedom with their natural drives. Schiller's ideal solution is what he calls "schmelzende Schönheit," which brings peace to man. The following excerpt from the thirteenth letter on aesthetics shows how divided human nature can be rejoined:

... Der sinnliche Trieb fordert zwar Veränderung, aber er fordert nicht, dass sie auch auf die Person und ihr Gebiet sich erstrecke, dass ein Wechsel der Grundsätze sei. Der Formtrieb dringt auf Einheit und Beharrlichkeit – aber er will nicht, dass mit der Person sich auch der Zustand xifiere, dass Identität der Empfindung sei.

... Beide Triebe haben also Einschränkung und, insofern sie als Energien gedacht werden, Abspannung nötig ... Mit einem Wort: den Stofftrieb muss die Persönlichkeit, und den Formtrieb die Empfänglichkeit oder die Natur in seinen gehörigen Schranken halten.5

Schiller believes that man is "Null" in the aesthetic state—a state of peace in which man experiences the beginning of the reconciliation between nature and society or between natural laws and moral laws.6 Schiller uses the term "schöne Seele" to designate the harmonious state in which nature becomes morality—"Sittlichkeit"—and morality becomes nature. But he

5 Werke, XII, 46-52, 13th letter.
6 Werke, XII, 48, 13th letter; and 81, 22nd letter.
felt that the "schöne Seele" existed only in the abstract and was thus not attainable. The following excerpt from the sixteenth letter on aesthetics shows how little faith Schiller had in the attainment of a pure "ästhetische Freiheit":

In der Wirklichkeit wird immer ein Übergewicht des einen Elements über das andere übrig bleiben, und das Höchste, was die Erfahrung leistet, wird in einer Schwankung zwischen beiden Prinzipien bestehen, wo bald die Realität, bald die Form überwiegend ist. Die Schönheit in der Idee ist also ewig nur eine untrennbare einzige, weil es nur ein einziges Gleichgewicht geben kann; die Schönheit in der Erfahrung hingegen wird ewig eine doppelte sein, weil bei einer Schwankung das Gleichgewicht auf eine doppelte Art, nämlich diesseits und jenseits, kann übertreten werden.

The figure of the Queen in Don Carlos also shows how sceptical Schiller was of the harmony of the "schöne Seele." In the last act of the drama we see the Queen standing helpless before materialistic reality, the gruesome dogmatism of the Church, and the absolutism of the Court.

Schiller's pessimism led him to abandon his theory of aesthetic freedom because he was concerned with how man can actually experience freedom. In Über das Pathetische Schiller developed another, "pathetic," concept of freedom. This pathetic freedom, he says, can be realized only through the pathos of eternal suffering. Schiller places supreme importance on the act of suffering. In suffering, man is intensely made aware of the fact that the laws of nature and society are irrefutable, and he strives "pathetisch" to achieve sublimity.

*Werke, XII, 61, 16th letter.*
over them and attain to the realm of the "freien Geister."

Sublimity, however, is obtainable only through voluntary suffering. Schiller's concept of freedom, therefore, embodies both suffering and sublimity, which he unifies in the term "pathos," an ambivalent term designating an attitude both heroic and humble. In Über das Pathetische we read: "Aus aller Freiheit des Gemüts muss immer der leidende Mensch, aus allem Leiden der Menschheit muss immer der selbständige oder Selbständigkeit fähige Geist durchscheinen." When Schiller aspires to free man from "Zwecken"--i.e., selfish interests--he approaches Schopenhauer's philosophy, according to which man remains a slave to "blinden Weltwillen" until he succeeds in raising himself to the world of the intellect.

In the essay Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen (1791) Schiller treats the deeper significance of tragedy as seen in man's attempt to assert his freedom from the forces of nature. The violence of the struggle is a mark of our strength and of our free will, or moral nature, which can only triumph through suffering: "Aus diesem folgt, 'dass das höchste Bewusstsein unserer moralischen Natur nur in einem gewaltsamen Zustande, im Kampfe, erhalten werden kann, und das höchste moralische Vergnügen ... von Schmerz begleitet sein wird." In this essay Schiller also observes that we should not

only suffer, but take pleasure in suffering as well, because
suffering makes us aware of our moral faculty which is the
basis of our freedom. 10

In Über Anmut und Würde (1793) Schiller asserts that
man can free himself from causal, mechanistic nature. He says
that although man's actions must be in accordance with natural
laws, man is free to determine how these laws shall be applied.
Man is unique in that he can break through the "ring of necessity"
and engender a new series of phenomena in himself by his will:

Der Mensch allein hat als Person . . . das Vorrecht, in den
Ring der Notwendigkeit . . . durch seinen Willen zu greifen
und eine ganz frische Reihe von Erscheinungen in sich selbst
anzufangen. 11

Although in Über Anmut und Würde Schiller connects the pathos of
suffering to the experience of a morality independent of nature,
he does not once mention this fact in his letters on aesthetics.
In the following quotation Schiller draws attention to the risks
involved in the struggle for freedom. Schiller considered that
the struggle for freedom is also the struggle for life and death
itself:

10 Cf. Werke, XI, 246; In Über das Pathetische we see Schiller's
interest in moral freedom as stimulated by suffering: "Dar-
stellung des Leidens--als blosses Leidens--ist niemals Zweck der
Kunst, aber als Mittel zu ihrem Zweck ist sie derselben äusserst
wichtig. Der letzte Zweck der Kunst ist die Darstellung des
Übersinnlichen, und die tragische Kunst insbesondere bewerkstellt
dieses dadurch, dass sie uns die moralische Independenz von
Naturgesetzen im Zustand des Affekts versinnlicht.

11 Werke, XI, 204.
. . . Es ist keine Kunst, aber Gefühl Meister zu werden, die nur die Oberfläche der Seele leicht und flüchtig bestreichen; aber in einem Sturm, der die ganze sinnliche Natur aufregt, seine Gemütsfreiheit zu behalten, dazu gehört ein Vermögen des Widerstandes, das über alle Naturmacht unendlich erhöht ist.¹²

Schiller maintains that both freedom and the awareness of freedom increases in accordance with the amount of suffering one actually experiences. He continues:

. . . Man gelangt also zur Darstellung der moralischen Freiheit nur durch die lebendigste Darstellung der leidenden Natur, und der tragische Held muss sich erst als empfindendes Wesen bei uns legitimiert haben, ehe wir ihm als Vernunftwesen huldigen und an seine Seelenstärke glauben.¹³

Schiller explains that freedom can be experienced and achieve a "sublime" victory over the world only after man has forced himself to the very limits of suffering, because the sensual can be destroyed only at the summit of supreme suffering. When the sensual is destroyed, only the supersensual—which is freedom—remains. In Über das Pathetische we read:

Pathos ist also die erste und unnachlässliche Forderung an den tragischen Künstler, und es ist ihm erlaubt, die Darstellung des Leidens so weit zu treiben, als es, ohne Nachteil für seinen letzten Zweck, ohne Unterdrückung der moralischen Freiheit, geschehen kann. Er muss gleichsam seinem Helden oder seinem Leser die ganze volle Ladung des Leidens geben, weil es sonst immer problematisch bleibt, ob sein Widerstand gegen dasselbe eine Gemütshandlung, etwas Positives, und nicht vielmehr bloss etwas Negatives und ein Mangel ist.¹⁴

Man, therefore, realizes pathetic freedom when, in the sense of the superman, he experiences profound voluntary suffering.

¹²Werke, XI, 246.
¹⁴Werke, XI, 247.
Both Schiller and Dostoevsky firmly believed in the value and necessity of suffering. The two authors reserved a very special and terrifying fate for those of their heroes who do not seek suffering: Fiesko is pushed from a gangplank and drowns; Wallenstein is murdered; and Posa expires on the dungeon floor; Svidrigaylov blows his brains out; Stavrogin hangs himself; and Ivan Karamazov borders on insanity. But Karl Moor, Maria Stuart, Raskolnikov, and Dmitri Karamazov are permitted to gain redemption in the end because they suffer. Father Zossima in The Brothers Karamazov considered that suffering was so valuable that he sent Alyosha away from the monastery with the order that he should first suffer with, and among, men before taking his final vows. Raskolnikov and Dmitri looked forward to the hardships of Siberia and to the suffering which they considered to be their great chance for redemption. Schiller and Dostoevsky felt that man must make his way through the machinery of life and suffering in order to become aware of life's real value—which is freedom.

We will now examine Dostoevsky's theory of freedom in more detail. In doing so, we will first consider the novel Notes from Underground (1864) and see that Dostoevsky's theory of freedom through suffering is similar to Schiller's concept. Next we will note briefly Raskolnikov's and Karl Moor's attitudes to mankind in order to show the similar manner in which Schiller and Dostoevsky portrayed the danger inherent in their concept of
freedom if this freedom is not balanced and restrained by other qualities.

Dostoevsky embodied his theory of freedom and suffering in the novel *Notes from Underground*. The Underground Man is a hateful, spiteful, vicious, overbearing and insulting creature. Yet Dostoevsky makes him his hero and approves of him. The reason for this is that the Underground Man represents a highly important principle to Dostoevsky: freedom. And the Underground Man will preserve his freedom at all costs, whether by committing a crime or by being totally rejected by society. Hegel criticized Schiller's concept of aesthetic freedom as too subjectivistic a solution and compared the "schöne" and "erhabene Seele" to the attitude of a criminal.\(^{15}\) Likewise, Dostoevsky's heroes' propensity to crime consists in the fact that they both separate and alienate themselves from the whole in the boundlessness of their freedom.

Although the Underground Man recognizes the possible existence of the laws of nature, he refuses to accept them even though they might be irrefutable. Dostoevsky describes the laws of nature in analogy to a stone wall or to "two times two makes four." But, as he explains, man does not have to resign himself to the laws of mathematics simply because they are laws. There are other alternatives. The Underground Man will still assert his freedom against the laws of society and nature. He says:

"Good God! but what do I care about the laws of nature and arithmetic, when for some reason, I dislike those laws and the fact that two times two makes four? Of course I cannot break through a wall by battering my head against it if I really do not have the strength to break through it, but I am not going to resign myself to it simply because it is a stone wall and I am not strong enough." Dostoevsky believed that the will is the first necessity of existence. This will is something irrational and not predictable, as are the laws of nature. For Dostoevsky, as Kant before him, the laws of nature are constructions of man. The critic Wasielek writes: "There is no 'reason' in Dostoevsky's world, only reasoners. Behind every generalization, there is a generalizer. There are no 'ideas' in Dostoevsky's world apart from the men who carry them. Every act of reason for Dostoevsky is a covert act of will."  

The Underground Man does not want to act in his own interest and for his own benefit; nor does anyone else, says the Underground Man. Dearer to man than benefit is his free will. According to Dostoevsky, laws and ideas are created for the sake of man, and for man's sake they must be eternally recreated. Consequently, we can say that the rebellion of Dostoevsky's heroes consists in the fact that they act in complete indifference to nature. This condition approaches the "indifference" of Kant's


and Schiller's aesthetic state. The world of objects retreats into the background, and man is free to determine his own individuality and his own true interests in that he dictates the law of his being. According to Kant—and Schiller—in aesthetic judgement, reason stands opposite the world without, and thereby maintains its freedom. In *Kritik der Urteilskraft* we read: "Schön ist was ohne Interesse ist." 18 Likewise, in the aesthetic state the world is conceived to be without purpose: "Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmässigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie, ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks, an ihm wahrgenommen wird." 19 The Underground Man expresses his indifference in this manner:

"... that is, man everywhere and always, whoever he may be, has preferred to act as he wished and not in the least as his reason and advantage dictated. Why, one may choose what is contrary to one's own interests, and sometimes one positively ought." 20 The Underground Man also considers suffering to be beneficial. In fact, he believes it to be absolutely necessary if a person is to be conscious of himself and his freedom. The critic Wasiolek writes: "The Underground Man wants to be insulted and humiliated, looks for insult, and provokes it when he cannot find it. Why? Because there is pleasure in being hurt, because it increases the self's awareness of itself." 21

18 Kant, p. 230.
19 Kant, p. 319.
20 *Underground*, p. 23.
21 Wasiolek, p. 47.
To be sure, there is nothing aesthetic in the Underground Man's behavior—he is hateful, spiteful and vicious. Yet through his "un-aestheticism" he attains to the sublimity and freedom which Schiller sees achieved in the aesthetic state.

Dostoevsky perceived the danger inherent in absolute freedom. Man's free will, when set loose from any moral or guiding principle, is free to perpetrate the most monstrous acts. This freedom implies a terrible truth about the actions of men and their treatment of others. If there are no inviolable laws of man—and there can be none if one is to be free—then man alone is his own law. If man is his own law, and if any one man's will is stronger than others', then it logically follows that he can make anything and anybody serve him. Dostoevsky presented one aspect of this dilemma in Rodion Raskolnikov.

In his criticism of Dostoevsky, Janko Lavrin points out that Raskolnikov was not oppressed by the crime of murdering the old woman, but by his failure to prove that he was not one of the herd.\textsuperscript{22} Raskolnikov had divided humanity into two classes, the superior and the inferior.\textsuperscript{23} Accordingly, Raskolnikov maintains that if the discoveries of Kepler and Newton could not have been made public without sacrificing a hundred or more men, they would

\textsuperscript{22}Janko Lavrin, \textit{Dostoevsky} (New York, 1947), p. 78.

\textsuperscript{23}Punishment, pp. 254–256.
have had the right, even the duty to "eliminate" the men for the sake of making their discoveries known and thereby benefiting the whole of humanity. The laws of society and nature do not exist for the superior man. Lycurgus, Solon, Caesar, Napoleon and so on were all criminals in that by making new laws, they transgressed old ones. They did not stop at bloodshed, either, if it was useful to their cause. It is noteworthy that the majority of these leaders and benefactors of mankind were guilty of terrible slaughter of men—often innocent persons fighting to uphold the old order. Great men, says Raskolnikov, must be criminals because of their very nature, otherwise they could not extricate themselves from the common rut. The men who make up this category all transgress the law; they are either destroyers or else disposed to destruction. But in different ways, they seek to destroy something in the present for the sake of a better future. Consequently, Raskolnikov reasons that: "... if such a one is forced for the sake of his idea to step over a corpse or wade through blood, he can, I maintain, find within himself, in his conscience, a sanction for wading through blood."\(^\text{24}\)

Raskolnikov's second class is composed of the common herd, men who only serve to reproduce their kind. They are conservative and law-abiding. They willingly live under control. Raskolnikov even believes that it is their duty to be controlled,
because that is their vocation. The herd will hang the superior man for his transgression in one generation, and will exalt and worship him in the next. The first class moves the world and leads it to new goals, the second merely preserves the world as it is and populates it.

After Raskolnikov developed this theory it occurred to him what Napoleon might have done in his place, if he had had no Toulon or Egypt with which to begin his special kind of career. What if there had been nothing but a ridiculous old pawnbroker-woman who had to be murdered so that he might take her money for his career? Raskolnikov wondered if Napoleon would have felt guilty that the crime was so far from monumental, or would he have committed the act without even thinking about it. Raskolnikov guessed at last that it would neither have caused him any anguish, nor have even struck him that it was not monumental, and he would thus have strangled the old woman without hesitation. Thus Raskolnikov committed the murder to find out if he was a "Napoleon" or a member of the common herd.

Schiller also realized that once a person had achieved absolute freedom and had placed himself above the law, it was possible that the person would not balance his freedom with ethical behavior. Schiller demonstrated this danger when he had Karl Moor say: "Ich soll meinen Leib pressen in eine Schnürbrust und meinen Willen schnüren in Gesetze. Das Gesetz hat zum Schneckengang verdorben, was Adlerflug geworden wäre. Das Gesetz hat noch keinen grossen Mann gebildet, aber die Freiheit brütet
Years later Schiller wrote that perhaps humanity is indeed divided into different categories. In the eleventh letter of the Briefe Über Don Carlos we read:


Critics have pointed out that neither Karl nor Raskolnikov had the right to break the law. The realization of this fact was the greatest cause of their subsequent misery and shame. In chapter six of this study we will discuss Schiller’s and Dostoevsky’s solution to the incompatibility of man’s freedom and man’s relationship to society. We may say here that the solution is to be found in love and respect for all things. If man refuses to balance his freedom with love, he condemns himself to a life of isolation and misery. Schiller and Dostoevsky make their heroes suffer profoundly until they discover the final solution in love. The nature, and value, of suffering is the topic of the following chapter.

26. Werke, XVI, 89.
CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF SUFFERING

In this chapter we will discuss the manner in which the expression of freedom inherent in the voluntary acceptance of suffering raises the moral law, which a person has transgressed, to an even higher law. We will see that in the act of voluntary suffering, man gains an understanding of the nature of moral law. The important factor for Schiller and Dostoevsky was not forgiveness by others, but rather the sinner's self-forgiveness, which is a process of his own conscience. The value suffering has for the two authors lies in its "super-fulfillment" of the moral law. Our purpose is to show the similarity between Schiller's and Dostoevsky's views on the nature of suffering. In the first part of this chapter we will analyze Schiller's Maria Stuart, Karl Moor, Maximilian Moor, and— from Der Verbrecher aus verlorenener Ehre—Christian Wolf. It will be concluded that suffering serves a dual purpose in Schiller: first, suffering allows man to gain redemption for a transgression of the moral or social law, and
second, suffering can be an expression of man's free will. In the second part of this chapter we will first investigate Russian Orthodox Christianity and establish that it places particular importance on suffering. This fact will permit us to interpret one aspect of Schiller and Dostoevsky from a theological standpoint. Next, we will analyze several characters from the novel *Crime and Punishment* who each experience a different kind of suffering. We will compare Rodion Raskolnikov with Karl Moor and establish that the similarity between them is to be found in their attitude to their crimes and to society. Both commit their crimes from similar motives and both expiate the transgression in a similar manner. Finally, we shall discuss Dmitri Karamazov and compare him with Maria Stuart. We will see that the two are similar in that they both willingly suffer punishment for crimes of which they are innocent in order to expiate other wrongful acts. In the third part of this chapter we will compare the manner in which Schiller and Dostoevsky attempt to solve the problem of man and his relationship to society. We will discuss suffering and show that the two authors believed in a "universal guilt." Second, an examination of the concept of love will reveal that the views of Schiller and Dostoevsky are nearest when they insist on the idea of brotherly love as one solution to the problem of man and his relationship to society.
A. Schiller

Perhaps the best example of the doctrine of redemption through suffering is to be found in Schiller's Maria Stuart. The background of the drama is briefly this: Maria Stuart, the Catholic queen of Scotland, has been leading a life of dissipation and moral degeneration. On February 10, 1567, an explosion demolished the royal residence, Kirk o'Field, where Lord Darnley, Maria's sottish young husband, lay recovering from an illness. Darnley, who was not a victim of the blast, was waylaid and throttled in a nearby garden. Since Maria was conveniently absent from the residence at the time of the explosion, and since it was widely known that her husband disgusted her, it was concluded that she was implicated in the plot. When Maria married the dissolute and philandering Earl of Bothwell three months later, a rage of indignation swept the country. A group of Protestant noblemen united to force her abdication. Maria fled to England and sought asylum from her cousin and longtime rival, Elizabeth. Elizabeth decided to imprison Maria, whose legitimate claim to the English throne was supported by Europe's Catholic monarchs. As a pretext, Elizabeth summoned a commission to determine if Maria were guilty of treason. On the basis of forged letters Maria's guilt was "proved" and she was sentenced to death.

Schiller's drama begins when Maria receives the news that she has lost her case before the commission. But Elizabeth
procrastinated in ordering the execution. Through the intercession of Lord Leicester, who was in love with Maria, a final interview between Maria and Elizabeth was arranged, where it was planned that Maria should humble herself before the English Queen and beg forgiveness and mercy. During the interview, however, Elizabeth used Maria's love trysts as a means for taunting her, causing Maria to become enraged and indignant and to allude to certain irregularities in Elizabeth's ancestry. Elizabeth then decided that Maria should be decapitated, and her order to this effect was forthwith executed.

The plot of the drama serves only as the background for Schiller's main interest in depicting Maria's spiritual rebirth, which is achieved through extensive suffering. The quality of her suffering lies in her mental anguish rather than in her physical destruction. In the first act of the drama Schiller portrays Maria in an unsympathetic light. We see her as proud, arrogant, and vindictive. She gives herself up to thoughts of revenge and hate towards Elizabeth. Schiller also alludes in the darkest colors to Maria's former actions as Queen of Scots. Schiller then proceeds to trace Maria's moral regeneration from act to act until we see that the Maria Stuart of the fifth act stands in direct contrast to the Maria Stuart of the first act. We can say, however, that when the drama Maria Stuart begins, her future regeneration is already indicated. She has given up her love of luxury, but on the other hand, her
pride and anger are as strong as ever. Maria is incensed that Elizabeth has refused her demand to be tried by her peers. This grievance dominates Maria's mind from the very first. The next step toward her regeneration is the extinction of this pride and anger. When the two monarchs meet in the fourth scene of the third act, Maria is able to control her anger when Elizabeth mentions the Babington plot to assassinate her, but Maria's pride is wounded when the English Queen offensively refers to Darnley's death. After the interview, Maria's execution seems certain. But this scene also marks the beginning of Maria's ascent to redemption. When she consequently abandons the deluded vision of a united Scotland and England under Stuart rule, she turns to the problem of her own salvation. The problem is solved by means of faith and penitence. Maria is deeply concerned about her implication in Darnley's death. When her maid, Kennedy, in an attempt to comfort her says: "Nicht Ihr habt ihn gemordet. Andre taten's!" Maria answers: "Ich wusste drum. Ich liess die Tat geschehen." The Queen does not rationalize, nor does she attempt to minimize her guilt. Subsequently, Maria makes her confession to Melvil, takes the sacrament and proceeds to her death in the firm belief that by suffering the unjust political execution for "treason," she will gain salvation and expiation for her real sins. When during her confession Melvil questions Maria:

"Werke, VI, 18, act I, scene 4."
So steigst du, überzeugt
Von deiner Unschuld, auf das Blutgeräte?

Maria replies:

Gott würdig mich, durch diesen unverdienten Tod
Die frühe schwere Blutschuld abzubüssen.\(^2\)

E. L. Stahl has correctly pointed out that this is "the crux of
the drama. Maria, innocent of the crime of which she stands
accused and for which she is about to be executed, accepts her
fate as a token that God has forgiven her real crime."\(^3\)

The very fact that Maria goes to her death voluntarily
instead of awaiting it underscores Schiller's theory expounded
in \textit{Über das Pathetische} that penitence and suffering have no
value unless they are acts of the free will.\(^4\) This theory is
brought out even more distinctly during the interview between
the two queens. If we examine this scene in the light of
Schiller's theory of suffering, we shall immediately arrive at
a new interpretation. Had Maria adhered to her original
intention and flattered Elizabeth's vanity, had she humbled her-
sell before the English Monarch, and had she begged forgiveness,
her life would most likely have been spared. But Maria grievously
insults Elizabeth, and thus seals her fate intentionally. Again,
the explanation for this scene is to be found in Schiller's essay
\textit{Über das Pathetische}. Here he explains that if we are to obtain

\(^2\)\textit{Werke}, VI, 171, act V, scene 7.

\(^3\)Stahl, p. 109.

\(^4\)\textit{Werke}, XI, 264.
freedom and thus triumph over death, and if our suffering is
to enable us to commit an act of sublimity, then our suffering
must be an act of the free will:

Zum Erhabenen der Handlung wird erfordert, dass das Leiden
eines Menschen auf seine moralische Beschaffenheit nicht
nur keinen Einfluss habe, sondern vielmehr umgekehrt das
Werk seines moralischen Charakters sei. Dies kann auf
zweierlei Weise sein. Entweder mittelbar und nach dem
Gesetz der Freiheit, wenn er aus Achtung für irgende eine
Pflicht das Leiden e r w ä h l t. Die Vorstellung der
Pflicht bestimmt ihn in diesem Falle als M o t i v, und
sein Leiden ist eine W i l l e n s h a n d l u n g. Oder
unmittelbar und nach dem Gesetz der Notwendigkeit, wenn er
eine übertretene Pflicht moralisch b ü s s t. Die Vor-
stellung der Pflicht bestimmt ihn in diesem Falle als
M a c h t, und sein Leiden ist blosse eine W i r k u n g.5

It might be argued that Maria's apparent disregard of her life
in the interview between the queens was an instinctive reaction
to her English cousin's taunts. Such an explanation, however,
not only contradicts Schiller's theory of voluntary suffering,
but also detracts from the value of Maria's self-forgiveness.
We believe that her "instinctive reaction" to Elizabeth's insults
was more of an unconscious realization that her situation was
hopeless and that Elizabeth would eventually order her execution
anyway. Had she been so executed, her death would have been an
act of external forces and she would have thus been deprived of
"independent choice." But by precipitating her execution, Maria's
death is more the result of an act of her will; thus she is

5 Werke, XI, 264.
better able to obtain the redemption which she desired. 6

Schiller's drama *Die Räuber* also deals with the problem of salvation through suffering, although to a lesser extent than *Maria Stuart*. 7 The plot of *Die Räuber* is briefly this: Karl Moor, the first born of Graf Maximilian von Moor and heir to his father's titles and estates, is studying at Leipzig. Karl's brother, Franz, is jealous of Karl's birthright and desires it for himself. Franz plots to discredit his brother and cause his disinheritance. With the aid of forged letters and other machinations, Franz succeeds in convincing his father to disown Karl. Karl then takes over the leadership of a band of robbers. He rationalized the correctness of his undertaking by announcing that he would correct the injustices perpetrated by the law by breaking the law. Karl is subsequently overcome by feelings of guilt and remorse over the monstrous acts his men commit. In order to expiate his transgression, Karl voluntarily surrenders himself to the authorities. 8

6Cf. Käte Hamburger, "Schiller und Sartre. Ein Versuch zum Idealismusproblem Schillers," *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schiller-gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1959), III, 64; In her comparison of Sartre's *Les Mains Sales* and Schiller's *Maria Stuart*, Hamburger shows that Maria is able to make her death a "freie Wahl" in that Maria regards her undeserved, political execution as payment for former crimes. Hamburger does not discuss the interview between the Queens in this respect.

7Our references to *Die Räuber* are from the earlier version, the so-called "Schauspiel."

8Of equal importance as the problem of suffering is Schiller's intention to show the defects and ultimate defeat of fanatical
Our first indication that Karl is unable to sustain his idealism at the summit of integrity comes in the third act. Karl's band of robbers has just carried out the horrendous destruction of the city where Roller, one of Karl's comrades in arms, is being held prisoner. When the scoundrel Schufterle jokingly explains that the only people to suffer from the destruction were children, pregnant women and the ill, Karl is indignant at such callousness and dismisses Schufterle. Karl reflects on his own guilt: "... Wie beugt mich diese Tat! Sie hat meine schönsten Werke vergiftet ... geh! du bist der Mann nicht, das Rachschwert der obern Tribunale zu regieren, du erlagst bei dem ersten Griff—Hier entsag' ich dem frechen Plan, gebe, mich in irgend eine Kluef der Erde zu verkriechen, wo der Tag vor meiner Schande zurücktritt." At this point Karl is not yet able to admit that his idealism has proven itself to be faulty. He reasserts his lofty purpose to the priest who attempts to intercede: "Sag' ihnen, mein Handwerk ist Wiedervergeltung—Rache ist mein Gewerbe." But Karl is humiliated again by wanton outrages which are committed under his leadership in the name of Justice. He finally realizes that his idealistic rebellion has cut him off from his fellow men and that his

idealism. Moreover, we see the first indications of Schiller's belief that any change in the social order must come from within the people and develop slowly over the years if the change is to have lasting value.


assumption of a divine role will lead to his damnation: "... Ich allein der Verstossene, ich allein ausgemustert aus den Reihen der Reinen—mehr nicht der süße Name Kind—nimmer mir der Geliebten schmachter Blick—nimmer, nimmer des Busenfreundes Umarmung. (Wild zurückfahrend,) Umlagert von Mör dern—von Nattem umzischt—angeschmiedet an das Laster mit eisernen Banden—hinausschwindelnd im Grab des Verderbens auf des Lasters schwankendem Rohr—mitten in den Blumen der glücklichen Welt ein heulender Abbadona!" In the final scene Karl perceives the true nature of his guilt: "Toren ihr! Zu ewiger Blindheit verdammt! Meinet ihr wohl gar: eine Todsünde werde das Äquivalent gegen Todsünden sein? meinet ihr, die Harmonie der Welt werde durch diesen gottlosen Misslaut gewinnen?" In Karl’s condemnation of himself we see the "super-fulfillment" of the moral law, because Karl, in his new attitude, attains to respect and humility before the moral law and thereby gives life to the essence of the law.

Since Karl was miserable in the awareness of his guilt, and since he wanted to pay the punishment in order to forgive himself, Karl surrendered to the authorities. He felt that this self-forgiveness would be of no value to him unless he suffered


12 *Werke*, III, 156, act V, scene 2.
voluntarily. Capture and punishment would have prevented this. Although Karl does not appear to be aware of the profound philosophical significance of his act, he does realize that his destruction should be an expression of his own free will and not the result of external forces. Karl's final words show that, at least twelve years before he had recorded it in Über das Pathetische, Schiller had developed the theory of suffering and free will: "... dann wäre mir auch das einige Verdienst entwischt, dass ich mit Willen für sie [i.e. die Justiz] gestorben bin." In order that his surrender should not appear as an act of far-sighted selfishness, Karl permits an impoverished daylaborer with eleven children to pretend that he had captured the robber captain so that the man could collect the reward.

We encounter a different aspect of suffering in Graf von Moor. Franz grew impatient for his inheritance and incarcerated his father in a tomb where the Graf would slowly starve to death. But Maximilian is neither indignant nor revengeful. Although this attitude is due in part to a sentimentalist philosophy and to his pietism, the unjust imprisonment is considered to be an opportunity to atone for former sins and as advance payment for his future joy. When he receives the news of Karl's death, the Graf despair: "Er war ein Engel, war Kleinod des Himmels! Fluch, Fluch, Verderben, Fluch über mich selber!"

13 Werke, III, 156, act V, scene 2.
Maximilian does penance for sins which we would not interpret as such today. In lines which remind us of Maria's and Karl's situation, the Graf says: "... aber der unaufhörliche Frost--die faule Luft meines Unrats--der grenzenlose Kummer... tausendmal bat ich Gott mit Tränen um den Tod, aber das Mass meiner Strafe muss noch nicht gefüllt sein... Aber ich leide gerecht." A sentimentalist considers virtues perhaps the highest ideal, but he also probably believes that the world is not capable of perfection. Morality is an abstraction which can be realized only in the next world.

Before we examine the problem of salvation through suffering as treated by Dostoevsky, we shall consider one further example from Schiller. Der Verbrecher aus verlorenen Ehre (1787) is the story of a young man, Christian Wolf, who, because of his extremely ugly countenance, was invariably spurned by the girls and laughed at by the men. In order to unlock the heart of his great love, Hannchen, Christian turned from honest labor and supported himself by poaching in the Duke's forest. When Robert, a competitor for Hannchen's favors, reported Christian's misdeeds to the authorities, Christian was apprehended and subsequently ruined. Because of Christian's ensuing extreme poverty and

offended pride, he turned to poaching a second time, and was again caught with Robert's aid. Christian was then sent to the penitentiary. On his release he attempted to find employment, even offering to herd swine as a last resort. He was refused work everywhere because of his criminal record. Christian resorted to poaching a third time, was caught and sentenced to three years at hard labor. When Christian emerged he was a changed man, full of indignity and hate for the manner in which society had humiliated him. Christian returned to poaching, murdered his rival and enemy Robert and sank ever deeper into degradation and dissimulation. He took up with a band of robbers and soon became their leader. Together they terrorized the entire district with their bloodthirsty cruelties and wanton destruction of life and property.

Christian was an unfortunate outcast who had sunk so low that he permitted himself everything that revolts humanity. But after he had been engaged in his horrid trade for one year, he grew disgusted with it. Christian's whole hatred now turned away from mankind to direct its keen edge against himself. He forgave nature and found nothing execrable but himself. After a prolonged inner struggle, Christian escaped from his band of robbers and gave himself over to the police. This action was done of his own free will. Schiller tells us that the story is true. His interest in this story is one further example of Schiller's preoccupation with the problem of guilt and salvation.
through suffering. As a true story, Der Verbrecher aus verlorenener Ehre offers Schiller proof that his notions concerning suffering do not exist entirely in the abstract. Schiller's own comment is this: "Unsre Gelindigkeit fruchtet ihm nichts mehr, denn er starb durch des Henkers Hand--aber die Leichenöffnung seines Lasters unterrichtet vielleicht die Menschheit und--es ist möglich, auch die Gerechtigkeit."\(^{16}\)

B. Dostoevsky

Dostoevsky also considered suffering necessary for the expiation of guilt, but he goes on to investigate the theory of suffering for its own sake. Dostoevsky's heroes who obtain redemption at the end, go out of their way to suffer. In the following discussion we will investigate the cosmic and mystical role of suffering as it is understood in Russian thought and life. Next we will discuss salvation through suffering in Dostoevsky's novels. Finally, we will compare Schiller's and Dostoevsky's theories and show that the two authors were very close in their reasoning on the subject.

The belief in the religious sanctity of suffering and the fulfillment of the moral law by suffering has always held an important position in Russian thought. In the Diary of a Writer Dostoevsky states: "I believe that the main and most

\(^{16}\) Werke, II, 194.
fundamental spiritual quest of the Russian people is their craving for suffering—perpetual and unquenchable suffering—everywhere and in everything. It seems that they have been affected by this thirst for martyrdom from time immemorial. The suffering stream flows through their whole history—not merely because of external calamities and misfortunes: it gushes from the people's very heart.\textsuperscript{17} The belief in the spiritual value of suffering, which was widespread in Europe during the Middle Ages, is still a strong force in Russian life and thought. If we examine Christianity as it is understood in the Russian Orthodox Church, we will be able to understand the importance which suffering held for Dostoevsky and consequently why Schiller appealed to him and to Russians in general.

In his book on Dostoevsky, Josef Bohatec explains that the Russian form of Christianity contains a great deal of Christ-mysticism.\textsuperscript{18} Mysticism may be defined briefly as the soul's attempt to approach the divine essence so as to enjoy communion with God. Mysticism thus asserts the possibility of direct communion with God. But this communion does not depend on any outside factors such as revelation, or answers to prayers; rather the highest communion is achieved by direct imitation or identification, in which the soul partakes of divine nature.

\textsuperscript{17} The Diary of a Writer, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{18} Josef Bohatec, Der Imperialismusgedanke und die Lebensphilosophie Dostojewskis (Graz-Köln, 1951), pp. 79-80.
Mysticism takes its beginning from divine nature—in preference to man and his environment—and accepts symbolism as literally or metaphysically true. Union with God is achieved by the submission of the will. Man's entire life, therefore, becomes a passive experience. God is no longer an idea; rather He becomes an experience. Since Christ's greatest moment on earth was His suffering and death for humanity, the Russian feels that when man suffers, he approaches Christ in a mystical and, theologically speaking, "real" sense.\(^{19}\)

This mystical religious disposition and the belief in the "absolutism" of suffering is a result of the peculiar history of Russia, which is a history of suffering.\(^{20}\) Christianity was the only comfort the Russian people had during the centuries of immeasurable suffering and misery when it lay at the feet of other nations. In the traditions and legends of the Russian people we see the firm conviction that the weak, the unjustly injured and those suffering martyrdom for Christianity will, at the Last Judgement, be exalted above all the rich and powerful aristocracy from whom and for whom they suffered. The dictum "The meek shall inherit the earth" has real meaning for the Russian. Continuing his discussion, Bohatec says that the Russian people have always shown a special interest in the stories of the Bible. The peasants and their children, even the


\(^{20}\) Bohatec, pp. 91-92.
bourgeois in the cities listen to such stories with emotion and sighing. The knowledge of the Bible is exceptionally widespread throughout Russia. The stories, however, are not disseminated through books, but by word of mouth. In Russia, recounting the events presented in the Book is considered to be a kind of penance and purification. Strangely enough, the people have only a hazy conception of the Four Gospels and are completely ignorant of Orthodox dogma. But the people do have an "original" knowledge of Christ by identifying themselves with His Way of the Cross. This mystical idea of the "imitatio Christi" was transmitted from generation to generation and became thoroughly ingrained in the people. 

The Russian ideal, then, finds expression in suffering as a mental bond between men. If we consider for a moment the actions and life of Christ on earth, we will understand the mental bond existing between men who suffer. We must point out the difference between the Old and New Testament if we are to understand the relation between freedom and law. The Ten Commandments were concerned chiefly with actions, whereas Jesus' law concerned states of feeling—the love of God and one's neighbor. Consequently, if action is subordinated to feeling,

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21 Cf. Ernst Benz, *Nietzsches Ideen zur Geschichte des Christentums* (Stuttgart, 1938), p. 88; Benz writes that Nietzsche called Dostoevsky's heroes "begeisterte Sucher des Martyriums" in that he thought they were similar to the original apostles in their opposition to society.
the concept of sin, freedom, and law must undergo a basic change. As Christianity developed in some parts of the world, however, the importance of actions rather than states of mind continued to be emphasized. According to Jesus, laws can be fulfilled and made real only through humility and love. Christ had infinite patience with thieves, drunkards and prostitutes, and reserved his wrath for the Scribes, Pharisees and hypocrites whose actions might have been irreproachable, but whose feelings and minds were dead and corrupt. In a like manner Dostoevsky portrayed robbers, murderers, harlots, and dissipated alcoholics as basically "good" people with only an extreme and perverted feeling, whereas he vents his spleen on the nihilists, atheists, revolutionaries, and the hypocritical bourgeoisie. Likewise, Schiller showed his readers that although his heroes' actions were blameworthy, these actions emanated from a "good," but misguided superabundance of feeling. The Russian interpretation of Christianity tries to do justice to the primitive status of being: the most primitive, but the most important, is feeling. Since Schiller constantly exalted feeling above action, we understand Dostoevsky's affinity for Schiller. It is indicative that in Schiller's Don Carlos the Marquis Posa asks of King Philip: "Geben Sie Gedankenfreiheit." In the final act of the same drama the Grossinquisitor uses the words: "Gib die Gewissen

frei." 23 It is more than just an accident that Schiller chooses freedom of thought and freedom of conscience in preference to freedom of action.

In Crime and Punishment Dostoevsky portrayed various types of suffering to which men are subject. He presented masochism in Marmeladov who "drank because he wanted to suffer doubly." Marmeladov seeks misery and poverty and chose it freely. When Raskolnikov meets him in the tiny, dirty cafe, Marmeladov had just quit his job, sold his uniform for drink, stolen the last roubles from his children's mouths, and taken money from his daughter, Sonia, who had earned it as a prostitute. Dostoevsky explains Marmeladov's reasons for desiring suffering. He had married Katerina when she was destitute, but Katerina had never let him forget that she was an officer's daughter and had even danced at the governor's ball. Since he could not fulfill the dreams of his wife's youth, he resolved to gain her attention by becoming the converse of her ideal. By his lowness he indeed succeeded in gaining her attention.

He has the sympathy of Raskolnikov, who had also been rejected by society and thus had nowhere to go. The pleasure Marmeladov derives from having Katerina pull his hair and box his ears is similar to the pleasure Raskolnikov obtains when society punishes him for his crimes.

23 Werke. IV, 279, act V, scene 10.
In Dounia and Pulcheria Raskolnikov, Dostoevsky presented the type of person who seeks someone for whom he may sacrifice himself. Dounia, Raskolnikov's sister, has accepted a proposal of marriage from the superficial, pompous, rascally, but wealthy Luzhin. She neither respects nor loves him, but will marry him so that she can relieve her brother's strained conditions and finance the start of his career. Svidrigaylov, who has followed Dounia to Petersburg for the purpose of raping her, understands her motives well: "Do you know, I always, from the very beginning, regretted that it wasn't your sister's fate to be born in the second or third century A. D.... She would undoubtedly have been one of those who would endure martyrdom and would have smiled when they branded her bosom with hot pincers. And she would have gone to it herself. And in the fourth or fifth century she would have walked away into the Egyptian desert and would have stayed there thirty years living on roots and ecstasies and visions. She is simply thirsting to face some torture for some one, and if she can't get her torture, she'll throw herself out of a window."24 Although Svidrigaylov does not suffer, he causes others to suffer in order to enjoy watching them. Consequently, he spends a great deal of his time devising ingenious methods to torture his fellow man. He mentions, almost parenthetically, that he drove his valet to suicide.

24 Punishment, p. 460.
Dostoevsky outlines the religious sanctity of suffering in Nikolay, who was one of the workmen redecorating an apartment of the house the night Raskolnikov committed the murder. Nikolay was suspected of the crime. After a few days in prison and intensive questioning by the police, Nikolay voluntarily confessed to Raskolnikov's crime. Dostoevsky felt Nikolay's reasons were typical of the Russian attitude to suffering. In his youth Nikolay had a very strict religious education. Several members of his family belonged to the Wanderers, a religious sect. Moreover, he had been under the spiritual guidance of a certain elder for two years. In the solitude of his prison cell he began to remember the elder and the Bible. Porfiry, who is relating these events to Raskolnikov, believes that Nikolay, in confessing, was seeking suffering. Not suffering as expiation for a crime, but simply suffering for its own sake. By way of example Porfiry relates that he once knew a meek and mild prisoner who spent all his time reading the Bible. So it was that one day, for no apparent reason, this prisoner seized a stone and threw it not at the governor, but to a yard on one side, so as not to injure him. He sought the appropriate punishment. Porfiry says: "Do you know, Rodion Romanovitch, the force of the word 'suffering' among some of these people! It's not a question of suffering for someone's benefit, but simply 'one must suffer.' If they suffer at the
hands of the authorities, so much the better.”

We encounter an entirely different type of suffering in Sonia Marmeladov. She represents the senseless, meaningless, and unjustified suffering which afflicts all humanity. Sonia is forced into prostitution at age fifteen in order to save her parents, brothers and sisters from starvation. But Sonia is also a victim of the sins of others. Vyacheslav Ivanov, in his study of Dostoevsky, notes in his brief treatment of Sonia that the significance and justification of suffering is that the victim of suffering not only suffers for himself, but also for others, whether he knows it or not. Sonia, therefore, by meekly accepting the suffering, simultaneously becomes a great sinner and a great savior, for, as Ivanov writes: "For albeit to save others, she deliberately and overweeningly takes upon herself not only suffering, but the curse of another's deed, by making it her own. In the sinner who expiates his sin by suffering, there is an antinomy of curse and salvation." We are reminded of Karl Moor. Schiller demonstrated that not only did Karl feel shame and remorse at his own deeds, but he also felt responsible for the actions committed by the men in his command. Likewise, when Karl set out to expiate his crimes by suffering the punishment prescribed by the law, he also took upon himself the suffering and the curse of the entire robber band. Schiller made

25 Punishment, p. 441.

this point even clearer to his readers by introducing into the plot the general pardon promised to all the band if they handed over their captain.

Whatever the metaphysical value of suffering, we must not lose sight of Dostoevsky's duality of purpose in Sonia. Her suffering is first and foremost meant to be an example of those blind, dumb, and insensitive forces of nature which indiscriminately crush all who inadvertently wander into its path. Raskolnikov keenly felt the enormity of Sonia's injustice. During his second visit to Sonia, Raskolnikov suddenly knelt before her and kissed her feet. Arising he said: "I did not bow down to you, I bowed down to all the suffering of humanity. . . . It was not because of your dishonor and your sin I said that of you, but because of your great suffering. . . . and your worst sin is that you have destroyed and betrayed yourself for nothing." 28

The varieties of suffering presented in Marmeladov, Nikolay, and Sonia are of secondary importance to the monumentality of Raskolnikov's misery. Dostoevsky embodied his entire philosophy of guilt and redemption in this one figure. Our first indication that Raskolnikov was thirsting for punishment appears during the murder itself. He had carefully planned all the details preceding the murder and had provided for eliminating

27 Cf. Hermanns, p. 73.
28 Punishment, pp. 315-316.
all clues after the crime. But later in the novel it is made clear that Raskolnikov unconsciously wanted to be caught. He was guilty of incredible oversights which were not in keeping with his meticulous preparation for the murder. First, before killing the old woman, he forgot to fasten the latch behind him. While he was rummaging in the old woman's trunk, Lizaveta walked in and he was forced to murder her as well. Second, instead of snatching up the money and valuables and hurrying away, he stood in the center of the room scrutinizing his clothes for traces of blood. Then he dallied another few minutes washing the axe. All this was done in the unconscious hope that someone would come to visit the old woman. Someone other than Lizaveta did, and thereupon follows one of the most gripping scenes in literature: the murderer standing behind the door listening while two men batter at the door and ring the bell. As they pulled at the door he watched the latch bob precariously in its catch. He did not hold the catch with his finger, but stood as if hypnotized, hoping it would pop out.

The next indication that Raskolnikov was unconsciously hoping to be caught is to be found in the scene in which he is summoned to the police station on a routine matter. While he was completing some forms, several nearby officials began discussing the murder. The agony was so great that he fainted. But it was still not enough for Raskolnikov to endure the agony of suspicion, he had to return to the empty lodging, half
delirious, to recall the bell-ringing, he wanted to feel the
cold shivers over again.

In preparing the way for Raskolnikov's regeneration,
Dostoevsky first showed that Raskolnikov's reaction to the
crime was not one of remorse, but an undefinable mood which
made him uneasy:

If it had been possible to escape to some solitude, he would
have thought himself lucky, even if he had to spend his whole
life there. But although he had almost always been by himself
of late, he had never been able to feel alone. Sometimes he
walked out of the town on to the highroad ... but the lone-
lier the place was, the more he seemed aware of an uneasy
presence near him. It did not frighten him, but greatly
annoyed him, so that he made haste to return to the town, to
mingle with the crowd, to enter restaurants and taverns, to
walk in busy thoroughfares. ... Yet he felt at once that
that was not the only cause of his uneasiness; there was
something requiring immediate decision, but it was something
he could not clearly understand or put into words. 29

The feeling of despair grew in Raskolnikov until it tortured him
to delirium. The failure of his theory of mankind had wounded
his pride to the quick: "I was in a hurry to overstep. ... I
didn't kill a human being, but a principle! I killed the
principle, but I didn't overstep, I stopped on this side. ... I
was only capable of killing and it seems I wasn't even capable
of that. ... I am an aesthetic louse and nothing more ... and
what shows that I am utterly a louse ... is that I am perhaps
viler and more loathsome than the louse I killed, and I felt
beforehand that I should tell myself so after killing her. Can
anything be compared with the horror of that! The vulgarity, the

abjectness! A Napoleon creep under an old woman's bed! Ugh, how loathsome."

To a certain extent, Raskolnikov is similar to Karl. Both heroes are young men, intelligent and idealistic. In their search for satisfaction their idealism leads them beyond the bounds of accepted morality. They stride across the forbidden line in search of fulfillment, and the action of the two works revolves around the failure of their quest. Grasping the magnitude of their transgression, both Karl and Raskolnikov repent not of their crimes, but the invalidity of their ideals.

If we compare the preceding quotation with Karl's reasoning on the subject, we see the similarity: "O über mich Warren, der ich wähnte, die Welt durch Greuel zu verschönern und die Gesetze durch Gesetzeslosigkeit aufrecht zu halten. Ich nannte es Rache und Recht--Ich musste mich an, o Vorsicht, die Scharten deines Schwerts auszuwetzen und deine Parteilichkeiten gut zu machen--aber--O eitle Kinderei--da stehe ich am Rand eines entsetzlichen Lebens und erfahre nun mit Zähnklappern und Heulen, dass zwei Menschen wie ich den ganzen Bau der sittlichen Welt zu Grund richten würden... dein eigen allein ist die Rache. Du bedarfst nicht des Menschen Hand."

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30 Punishment, pp. 269-270.

31 See Stanislaw Mackiewicz, Dostoevsky (London, 1947), pp. 118-119; Mackiewicz says that it was Raskolnikov's failure to prove that he was not one of the "herd" which caused his misery and remorse.

32 Werke, III, 155, act V, scene 2.
Schiller and Dostoevsky devised a similar technique to underscore the fact that their heroes' crimes were committed solely for their ideas. In the second act, third scene of Die Räuber Razmann relates how Karl had discovered that a rascally count had won a lawsuit through dishonesty and through the craftiness of his lawyers. Karl was determined to rectify the abuse of the law by robbing the count. During the course of the robbery he killed the lawyer, and told the count that the robbery was his punishment for abusing the law. In spite of the huge sum of money in the carriage, Karl shouts to his comrades: "Das Plündern ist eure Sache," and disappears into the forest. Schiller returned to this theme in Der Verbrecher aus verlorender Ehre. Christian Wolf felt that he had been unjustly punished for poaching in the Duke's forest. In order to avenge the injustice in his own mind, he killed enormous quantities of game, but left the best part of it to rot. He felt the justice of his action would lose its value if he took all the game.33 Similar to Karl's and Christian's disregard of material gain are Raskolnikov's actions. He murders the old harpy, and steals a few trinkets of jewelry, and some money, but he did not bother to count it and, surprisingly, overlooked 1500 roubles in a purse tied round the old woman's neck. He hid the booty under a stone and never made use of it.34

33 Werke, II, 200.
Overlooked by the main Dostoevsky interpreters is an important contradiction between Raskolnikov's theory concerning the division of humanity into two classes and his actions.\textsuperscript{35}

Although Raskolnikov presented himself as a hater of humanity, he was not. Without his being aware of it, his theory presupposes an infinite love of mankind and an infinite disdain of individuals. Raskolnikov's theory sanctions bloodshed and the murder of thousands if it is done "for the benefit of humanity." The creator of such an idea could not be a hater of humanity. Although Raskolnikov's theory might be valid, he did not act in accordance with it. He committed the murder for himself alone. If he had committed the crime in the firm belief that he was benefiting humanity he could have murdered the old woman and her sister and felt no remorse. But the whole point of his subsequent misery and suffering is to prove that he, in fact, was a great lover of mankind, even if he refused to admit it to himself. There are many incidents in the novel which bear this out: He gave his last money to pay for Marmeladov's medical expenses, he paid the policeman to protect a young girl from a rake, and he almost worried himself into a state of delirium about his mother and sister. Yet, Raskolnikov says that he hates mankind in general and individuals in particular. It will be interesting

to examine the reason.

Edward Wasiolek has advanced what seems to be a valid psychological interpretation of Dostoevsky's main characters. Wasiolek maintains that the basic psychological law of Dostoevsky's world is "the circle of hurt and be hurt," in which a person, as soon as he is hurt, wants to hurt yet another. 36 Raskolnikov wants to hurt society for its ignoring his poverty and intelligence; Katerina abuses Ivan because Dmitri has spurned her; Grushenka revenges herself on Dmitri because the Pole has debauched her; Ippolit wants to repay society for its not allowing him enough time to show what a really excellent person he is; Smerdyakov murders his father for his not recognizing him as his son. If we advance Wasiolek's theory one step further and apply it to Schiller's heroes—which Wasiolek did not do—we at once arrive at a new and equally valid interpretation. Franz von Moor hurts his father and brother for their never having given him a chance to show what a fine fellow he was; Wallenstein repays the Vienna Court for its distrusting his loyalty; Butler betrays Wallenstein for his thwarting his ambition to become a nobleman; Wilhelm Tell repays Gessler for his tyranny; and Karl revenges himself on his father and society for their hypocrisy.

Whatever the various aspects of suffering, they are secondary to Dostoevsky's primary objective to show that the

36 Wasiolek, pp. 54-55.
repentant sinner is able to gain redemption only through voluntarily accepted suffering. It was Sonia who understood Raskolnikov and pointed the way to redemption. He confessed the murder to her and explained his reasons for committing it. Raskolnikov had reached an impasse and he asked Sonia what he must do to be rid of the agony. Sonia replies: "What are you to do?" she cried, jumping up, and her eyes that had been full of tears suddenly began to shine. . . . 'Go at once, this very minute, stand at the cross-roads, bow down, first kiss the earth which you have defiled and then bow down to all the world and say to all men aloud, "I am a murderer!" Then God will send you life again. . . . Suffer and expiate your sin by it, that's what you must do.' 37

Porfiry also fathoms Raskolnikov, but in a different manner than Sonia. Porfiry perceives through psychology what Sonia felt in her heart. He has read Raskolnikov's theory of mankind and after making certain psychological deductions based on Raskolnikov's peculiar behavior, Porfiry is convinced that he has found the criminal. After he has completed the investigation he visits Raskolnikov in his garret. Although Porfiry admits that he has no facts which speak for Raskolnikov's guilt, this is of little importance. His purpose is to convince Raskolnikov that he should surrender and confess the crime because Porfiry knows that Raskolnikov will not attempt to escape. Raskolnikov

37 Punishment, p. 401.
needs the punishment and suffering to such an extent, that, even if he ran away, he would return of his own accord. Porfiry says: "If you ran away, you'd come back to yourself. You can't get on without us. And if I put you in prison,—say you've been there a month, or two or three—remember my word, you'll confess of yourself and perhaps to your own surprise. You won't know an hour before hand that you are coming with a confession. I am convinced that you will decide, 'to take your suffering.' You don't believe my words now, but you'll come to it of yourself. For suffering, Rodion Romanovitch, is a great thing. . . . Don't laugh at it, there's an idea in suffering, Nikolay is right. No, you won't run away, Rodion Romanovitch."  

Dostoevsky was obviously thinking of Schiller when he composed this scene. Porfiry, during his long monologue, inadvertently lapses into enthusiastic eloquence when describing the value of suffering, remorse, and the innate human need to fulfill the demands of justice. Raskolnikov smiles suddenly. Porfiry asks: "Why are you smiling again? At my being such a Schiller?"  

Raskolnikov confessed the following evening, at almost the same time the murder was committed. The "Epilogue" relates the events of the trial and describes Raskolnikov's

38 Punishment, p. 447.  
39 Punishment, p. 446.
conditions in Siberia. He looked forward to the hardships of penal servitude, hoping this would fill his inner vacuum. He yearned for remorse, but it did not come: "If only fate would have sent him repentance that would have torn his heart and robbed him of sleep, that repentance the awful agony of which brings visions of hanging and drowning! Oh, he would have been glad of it! Tears and agonies would at least have been life. But he did not repent of his crime." 40

Dostoevsky also portrayed Raskolnikov's regeneration and "rebirth" as a new human being in the "Epilogue" and even promised to write another story about it—which he never did. We will examine Raskolnikov's regeneration in the following part of this chapter. In that part we will discuss and compare Schiller's and Dostoevsky's solution to the problem of man and his relationship to society in more detail. At this point we may note that the solution is offered by the girl Sonia in Crime and Punishment and by Father Zossima in The Brothers Karamazov. It is noteworthy that Schiller had arrived at essentially the same conclusions. The critic Pachmuss, among others, says that the ultimate solution to the problem of man and his relationship to society is the acceptance of our condition as creatures. 41 This in turn calls for love as the heart of human existence. This does not mean the abstract and self-

40 Punishment, p. 525.

deceiving love of the rationalizing rebel, but the personal love of Sonia and Father Zossima. Both Schiller and Dostoevsky realized that when man is isolated from society he will, in the end, destroy not only himself, but all those with whom he comes into contact. For example, the tragedy of Wallenstein consists in the fact that he attempts to assert his freedom against the tradition of the Emperor in order to gain peace for the Empire. The critic Kurt May explains that this lack of inner order is fatal for Wallenstein in that his impulses have no boundaries. His actions isolate him from man and he is destroyed in this vacuum. But May goes on to say that Wallenstein's constant suffering creates a new, and truer form of humanity in him. At the end of the drama he is able to understand the deeper significance of Max's pure love and moral sense.

Dostoevsky took up the theme of guilt and redemption again in The Brothers Karamazov. Essentially, this work is a long and complex novel with only the bare outlines of a recognizable plot. Fyodor Karamazov is the father of three sons, each by a different wife. When the story begins he has given himself over to dissipation and licentious living. All the sons despise the old man and unconsciously desire his death. Whatever plot there is, however, revolves about Fyodor and his equally

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profligate and hot-blooded son Dmitri. Dmitri has returned to Skotoprigonevsk to claim the inheritance left him by his mother. But old Karamazov wants to keep it for himself. This conflict achieves wider scope in their competition for Grushenka's favors. Jealousy, mistrust and hate increase in intensity until Fyodor is murdered by his illegitimate son Smerdyakov, who is the family flunkey. Certain incidents, pronouncements and letters mistakenly cause the blame to be placed on Dmitri. He is arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to twenty years in the Siberian mines.

In *Crime and Punishment* the problem of developing the fate of one character was simple compared with the problem of resolving the fates of five major heroes and three minor ones. They are each involved inseparably in one another's fate, yet they are simultaneously separate individuals, each leading his own life. Contradictions and complexities abound, but Dostoevsky masterfully succeeds in resolving them. Our concern at this point, however, is to examine the work only insofar as it applies to the problem of guilt, suffering and salvation. We may go on to say that the leitmotif pervading this novel is the presentation of man's need for suffering.

In *The Brothers Karamazov* Dostoevsky develops this leitmotif in the person of Dmitri, who seeks salvation through sin and through the suffering he accepts in order to expiate it. 43

43 For an interesting, but fanciful comparison between Dmitri, Karl and Franz Moor see: Julius Meier-Graefe, *Dostojewski der Dichter* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 400-403.
Ivanov points out that the passionate element in Dmitri's nature had to seek its purification in suffering, because everyone must suffer who breaks away from the primary source of Being. Dmitri had never attempted to control his passions and had indulged every whim. He relates in the chapter "The Confessions of a Passionate Heart" that the rotten Karamazov blood is the cause of his moral decline. Dostoevsky also indicated Dmitri's moral decay in his physical description: "... but there was something quite unhealthy about his face. His face was thin, his cheeks hollow, his complexion a sickly yellow." Dmitri proclaims there is no hope of gaining peace of mind and purifying his decadent soul in this life except by suffering. Consequently, when he is falsely arrested for his father's murder he makes only a half-hearted attempt to defend himself. He bears witness against himself and is not even interested in facts which point to his favor. Dmitri disregards his personal freedom because his values have undergone a fundamental change. It is no longer of value to him to be free. Dmitri decided to accept the punishment unjustly imposed upon him so that he may expiate his real sins. He joyfully looks forward to the suffering in store for him. In prison awaiting transportation to Siberia, he exclaims to Alyosha: "I think there is so much strength in me now, that I think I could

\[44\] Ivanov, p. 38.
\[45\] Karamazov, p. 67.
stand anything, any suffering, only to be able to say and to repeat to myself every moment, 'I exist.' In thousands of agonies --I exist. I'm tormented on the rack--but I exist! Though I sit alone in a pillar--I exist! I see the sun, and if I don't see the sun, I know it's there. And there's a whole life in that, in knowing that the sun is there. 46

Karl and Raskolnikov accept punishment corresponding to crimes actually committed, whereas Maria Stuart and Dmitri Karamazov accept punishment for crimes of which they stand innocent in order to redeem other sins. It is a matter of conjecture whether or not Dostoevsky had Maria Stuart in mind when he constructed Dmitri's character. But the nature of suffering presented in Maria and Dmitri is indicative of the fact that Schiller and Dostoevsky wished to emphasize the supreme importance of suffering for man. Punishment, as such, is inconsequential; the problem is not the vindication of the law. The fact that Karl and Raskolnikov are punished for crimes actually committed detracts from the author's concern to show the value of suffering for its own sake and for the sake of recreating the moral law. The reader is tempted to interpret Karl's and Raskolnikov's guilt and search for suffering as a sentiment which must necessarily accompany any crime. Maria's and Dmitri's real crimes were, however, not unlawful. They alone

46 Karamazov, p. 623.
have judged themselves guilty and pronounced the sentence. By inflicting an unjust punishment on their heroes, Schiller and Dostoevsky focused the reader's attention on the real problem.

The Brothers Karamazov will provide one final example of the doctrine of salvation through suffering. Father Zossima relates that when he was a young officer in the army he challenged another officer to a duel in order to avenge his wounded pride. The evening preceding the duel Zossima underwent a change of heart. He realized the stupidity of his challenge of the previous day. Moreover, he was suddenly convinced that all men are truly brothers and each man shares the guilt of all men. When the duel took place Zossima calmly received his adversary's shot, which fortunately only grazed his cheek. Zossima, however, refused to fire and flung his loaded pistol into the forest. He then asked his adversary to forgive him. By this act of suffering he strengthened the validity of his new moral judgement and simultaneously atoned for his past life.

Subsequently, when Zossima was relating his new philosophy in the salons of the town, there was one listener who did not laugh at him. Mihail took great interest in Zossima's humblest before his adversary at the risk of ruining his career. Mihail said that this required enormous courage coupled with an unshakable faith in the rightness of his
premiss. After a month of visiting and talking to Zossima, Mihail revealed the reason for his interest.

Fourteen years previously Mihail had murdered the woman he loved to prevent her from marrying another man. Fortunate circumstances caused the blame to fall on one of his beloved's serfs, who died of a fever a few days after imprisonment. Mihail relates that he felt no remorse for several years. He married and had children. Slowly he began to regret his deed and reproached himself. He asked himself how he could give life after taking a life. How could he permit himself to love his children? How could he teach his children virtue and honesty, when he himself was guilty of such a crime? These thoughts made him miserable and prevented him from leading a happy life. He wanted to confess his crime, but was concerned for the welfare of his family. And strangely enough, he was afraid of society's reaction. Mihail has borne the suffering fourteen years and he is prepared to endure even more suffering for his sin. He has not been able to live or to love during these years. If he is to obtain happiness in this life he must confess his crime, accept the punishment and suffer: "I know it will be heaven for me, heaven, the moment I confess. Fourteen years I've been in hell. I want to suffer. I will take my punishment and begin to live. You can pass through the world doing wrong, but there's no turning back. Now I dare not love my neighbor nor even my own children. Good God, my children
will understand, perhaps, what my punishment has cost me and will not condemn me! ... I cut myself off from men as a monster." 47 The next day Mihail publicly confessed the murder. He was not believed, but he had set himself free. A few days later he took ill and died. Before his death he told Zossima of his happiness:

"I know I am dying, but I feel joy and peace for the first time after so many years. There was heaven in my heart from the moment I had done what I had to do. Now I dare to love my children and to kiss them ... my heart rejoices as in heaven.

... I have done my duty." 48 Nowhere in his work does Dostoevsky succeed in presenting the necessity and redeeming value of suffering in so convincing form as in this brief episode.

C. Man and his Relationship to Society

In the following discussion we shall investigate the manner in which Schiller and Dostoevsky attempt to solve for themselves the problem of man and his relationship to society. We shall see that their solution is based upon the concepts of suffering and love. A discussion of the first concept will show that the two authors believed in a "universal guilt." Similarly, an examination of the concept of love will reveal that the two

47 Karamazov, pp. 322-323.
48 Karamazov, p. 326.
authors are related in their insistence on the idea of brotherly
love as one solution to the problem of man's relationship to
society.

Schiller's and Dostoevsky's heroes obtain their sal-
vation by recognizing the unity of all men and by becoming aware
of a "communal sin," as Carr calls it. Carr points out that each
individual in Dostoevsky bears the guilt of all men. Suffering
for the sins of mankind is an obligation of Schiller's and Dosto-
evsky's characters, who obtain their salvation through both suf-
ferring and love. Schiller indicated his belief that mankind is
actually one family when he had Karl say: ". . . dass alles so
glücklich ist, durch den Geist des Friedens alles so verschwistert!
--die ganze Welt eine Familie und ein Vater dort oben." In the final act of Die Räuber, Karl and his father do not condemn
their fellow man, but recognize their own share in his guilt.
Consequently, Karl, his father, and Posa can be regarded as
essentially assuming the role of Christ when they take the guilt
of others on their own shoulders and suffer to expiate this guilt.
In Don Carlos King Philip describes Posa in this manner:

\[\ldots\text{Für einen Knaben stirbt}\
\text{Ein Posa nicht. Der Freundschaft arm \text{e Flammene \text{Füllt eines Posa Herz nicht aus. Das schlug}\
Der ganzen Menschheit. Seine Neigung war}\
Die Welt mit allen kommenden Geschlechtern.}\]

\[49\text{Edward Hallett Carr, Dostoevsky (New York, 1931), p. 296.}\]
\[50\text{Werke, III, 88, act III, scene 2.}\]
\[51\text{Werke, IV, 271, act V, scene 9.}\]
Dostoevsky's heroes also embody this idea. By suffering for the sins of others, the sufferer attains to the highest possible freedom. Father Zossima says: "There is only one means of salvation, then take yourself and make yourself responsible for all men's sins . . . for as soon as you sincerely make yourself responsible for everything and all men, you will see at once that it is really so, and that you are to blame for every one and for all things." In this respect the critic Witzkowski writes: "Willenskraft und freie Selbstdeterminationzeichnen also die Personen und besonders den Helden aus." Witzkowski believes that strength of will and free choice are qualities which the dramas of Schiller should awaken in the spectator. Accordingly, what the realm of the higher and "freie Geister" and "freie Selbstdetermination" means for Schiller, is for Dostoevsky the rebirth resulting from the process of suffering. Both authors believe that suffering is followed by dying, which in turn means the rebirth of the sufferer. Schiller's poem "Das Lied von der Glocke" shows that man can attain to a higher and better image of himself only by the destruction of his former self:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Nun zerbrecht mir das Gebäude,} \\
\text{Seine Absicht hat's erfüllt,} \\
\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \\
\text{Schwingt den Hammer, schwingt,} \\
\text{Bis der Mantel springt!} \\
\text{Wenn die Glock' soll auferstehen,} \\
\text{Muss die Form in Stücke gehen.}
\end{align*}
\]

52 Karamasov, p. 335.
53 Witzkowski, p. 56.
54 Werke, I, 56.
In Über das Pathetische Schiller explains that suffering will lead to a fundamental change in ourselves:

... so können wir dieses hohe Freiheitsgefühl nicht anders als mit Leiden erkaufen. Die gemeine Seele bleibt bloss bei diesem Leiden stehen und fühlt im Erhabenen des Pathos nie mehr als das Furchtbare; ein selbständiges Gemüt hingegen nimmt gerade von diesem Leiden den Übergang zum Gefühl seiner herrlichsten Kraftwirkung und weiss aus jedem Furchtbaren ein Erhabenes zu erzeugen.  

Schiller and Dostoevsky believed that the more a person suffers, the more he will love his suffering fellow men, and consequently the more he will love the earth on which the suffering appears. A man who has experienced his rebirth through suffering loves life despite his suffering--perhaps even because of it. Schiller treated the necessity of love in his poetry to a higher degree than in his prose and drama. The poem "Der Triumph der Liebe" will serve as example:

 Liebe rauscht der Silberbach,  
 Liebe lehrt ihn sanfter wallen;  
 Seele haucht sie in das Ach  
 Klagenreicher Nachtigallen--  
 Liebe, Liebe lispelt nur  
 Auf der Laute der Natur.

It must be remembered that the love which was important to Schiller and Dostoevsky was not the selfish love of one individual for another, but rather "caritas," a love which can best be described as a love for all men, for all life, and for all things. There can be no limit to this caritas. Father

56 Werke, I, 231.
Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov* alludes to Christ's example when he says that we may judge our fellow men only when we recognize our own share in the criminal's guilt: "Remember particularly that you cannot be a judge of any one. For no one can judge a criminal, until he recognizes that he is just such a criminal as the man standing before him, and that he perhaps is more than all men to blame for that crime."  

57 Schiller's poem "An die Freude" expresses a similar view:

```plaintext
Unsere Schuldbuch sei vernichtet!
Ausgesöhnt die ganze Welt!
Brüder—überm Sternenzelt
Richtet Gott, wie wir gerichtet.
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58

Schiller's theodicy, therefore, is connected with the measure of man's love, and he believes that the guilt of the world can be absorbed in universal love. Father Zossima says that if mankind is to gain happiness on earth, then each individual's actions must be based on love: "Love God's creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it... If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in things. Once you perceive it, you will begin to comprehend it better every day."  

59

Thus, we may say that Schiller and Dostoevsky base their personal solution to the problem of man's relationship to society, in part, on original Christianity and brotherly love. They take as their starting point the one great rule of Christ.

57 Karamazov, p. 336.
58 Werke, I, 6.
59 Karamazov, p. 334.
on earth—love thy neighbor. If man accepts this dictum and bases his actions upon it, then all other Biblical enjoins are of less importance. Schiller's exhortation "Unsere Schuldubuch sei vernichtet" shows that he prefers a Johanine eschatology. Suffering and pathos, as a preparation for life after death, is more than temporal salvation. It is the death, resurrection, and rebirth of the real and free human being. Schiller realized that orthodox Pauline theology rejects the possibility of man's happiness on earth in favor of promising him eternal bliss in the Hereafter. He perceived the life-destroying aspects of modern Christianity in the poem "Resignation," in which he abuses the contemporary orthodox and pietistic theology which demands faith and sacrifice of happiness while offering nothing in return. Schiller concludes the poem with the observation that whatever man has denied himself in life will not be repaid in the Hereafter: "Was man von der Minute ausgeschlagen,/Gibt keine Ewigkeit zurück."° Schiller declares himself in favor of a philosophy which returns man's dignity, recognizes his worth as an individual, and above all, which seeks to improve man's condition on earth. These thoughts find expression in his poem "Hoffnung." In this poem Schiller says that man has always

60. *Werke*, I, 199; This poem was one of Dostoevsky's favorites. As we saw in Chapter III of this study, "Resignation" was one of the sources for the chapter "Rebellion" in *The Brothers Karamazov*. 
dreamed and hoped for a future better than the present. This hope is not idle fancy, but something that can be attained:

... 

Zu was Besserm sind wir geboren,
Und was die innere Stimme spricht, 61
Das täuscht die hoffende Seele nicht. 

Dostoevsky also believed that salvation must not come through an extreme pantheism and modern activism, but through love and voluntary suffering. It is in search of this solution that he sends Raskolnikov to Siberia. Raskolnikov goes to Siberia unrepentant, still believing that the murder was not a crime. For the first few months of his imprisonment he remains sullen, uncommunicative, and disliked by his fellow convicts. He scarcely notices Sonia and accepts her presence in Siberia with indifference. After eight months he falls seriously ill and is sent to the prison hospital, where he remains a month. After he has recovered, Raskolnikov returns to discover that Sonia had also been taken ill. For the first time he misses her. When she reappears after a few days, he throws himself at her feet. He wept and threw his arms round her knees: "Love brought them resurrection; the heart of one contained infinite sources of life for the other. ... Instead of dialectic life had dawned, and in his consciousness something new was bound to evolve itself."62 The question to be answered

61 Werke, I, 211.
62 Punishment, p. 531.
at this point is: are we to accept Dostoevsky's positive solution which Raskolnikov scorned at the summit of his powers? The reader is told that this solution has no value until a person has undergone despair and suffering. There was to be more misery and infinite suffering for Raskolnikov before his final redemption: "But that is the beginning of a new story—the story of the gradual renewal of man, the story of his gradual regeneration, of his passing from one world into another, of his initiation into a new unknown life. That might be the subject of a new story, but our present tale is ended." \(^{63}\)

\(^{63}\) *Punishment*, p. 532.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The significance of Schiller's influence on the development of Russian literature is only now being realized. In Chapter I of this study it was noted that the vogue of Schiller in Russia was not merely a passing phase, but a dynamic and inspiring force. Schiller's poetry made significant contributions to the development of Russian metre. His ideal of love and his aesthetic view of man influenced many of the important Russian literary figures such as Belinsky, Bakunin, and Ogarev. One of Schiller's more important contributions was in the field of politics. The German's influence on Czar Alexander I, on the radical Russian left during the 1840's, and on the decision to free the serfs in 1862 was of great importance. Not even World War I and the Russian Revolution witnessed a demise of his influence. On the contrary, it only served to increase his popularity among the masses fighting to achieve goals similar to those held dear by Schiller.
Of all writers, Schiller penetrated deepest into the soul of Dostoevsky, who owes more to the author of Die Räuber than to any other Russian or West European writer. In Chapter II the path of Schiller's influence on Dostoevsky was outlined. We saw that from Dostoevsky's earliest childhood, when he witnessed a performance of Die Räuber, to the last year of his life, Schiller played a role of ever increasing importance in Dostoevsky's intellectual development. The whole of the Russian's youth is dominated by Schiller's impassioned idealization of love and political freedom. A manifestation of this ardent enthusiasm was the project to publish a Russian edition of Schiller's works. This plan progressed until he was arrested for his participation in Petrashevsky's revolutionary activities. During his imprisonment Dostoevsky matured in his political and intellectual outlook on life. Consequently, he became more interested in the deeper philosophical problems of Schiller's works. The influence of Schiller's manifold religious and philosophical views are discussed in Chapters IV and V.

In Chapter IV Schiller's Grossinquisitor in Don Carlos was shown to be the main source for Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov. The interest of both authors in theology is only one aspect of the larger problem of freedom and happiness. They believed that the ideal of freedom and happiness is related to the freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and
evil. Both authors viewed the Catholic Church, in its misguided attempt to make man happy, as robbing man of his free choice. Original Christianity, they believed, was intended to free man from "The Law" of the Old Testament. Instead of obeying "The Law" it was intended that man should be free to choose between right and wrong with the image of Christ as his only example. Schiller and Dostoevsky reasoned that if organized religion bases its authority on the law of apostolic succession and arbitrarily decrees what is good or evil, then man is deprived of free choice. The views of Schiller and Dostoevsky are most similar in the conclusion that if man cannot make a free decision for himself, his actions cannot be moral. But since God demands that man act morally, He consequently demands freedom. If freedom is deified in the Church and State, then the purpose of Christ's sojourn on earth to free man was useless. The two authors are also alike in their final judgement of the Catholic Church. The two Inquisitors, representing Catholic theology, are seen to be the basis of negation, for when absolute power struggles for supremacy with thought and freedom, only one may triumph: that of absolute power, which in turn is absolute negation.

Schiller's philosophical concept of freedom is investigated in Chapter V of this study, where the manner in which he attempts to free man from the mechanistic laws of Nature and deterministic moral laws is discussed. Schiller attains his goal when he develops the concept of "Ästhetische Freiheit," which
represents the reconciliation of the differences. Soon, however, Schiller discovered that his aesthetic freedom, and its representative "die schöne Seele," could be achieved only to a limited degree and only after a prolonged struggle. Schiller now saw that his problem was to devise a way which would permit man to actually experience freedom. In Über das Pathetische he develops a second concept which permits man to experience freedom indefinitely. He says that man can know and experience his freedom in the act of profound voluntary suffering. We were able to establish the connection between Schiller and Dostoevsky in that both authors base their philosophy of freedom, in part, on suffering. Dostoevsky believed that suffering is absolutely necessary if a person is to be conscious of himself and of his freedom. In Notes from Underground the Underground Man goes out of his way to find suffering and humiliation because pain, it is noted, increases one's awareness of oneself. Dostoevsky shows that he understood Schiller's theory in its finest detail when he had the Underground Man say: "The more conscious I was of goodness, and of all that sublime and beautiful! [a direct reference to Schiller's aesthetic freedom] the more deeply I sank into my mire and the more capable I became of sinking into it completely. But the main thing was that all this did not seem to occur in me accidentally, but as though it had to be so, as though it were my most normal condition, and not in the least disease or depravity." ¹

¹Underground, p. 7.
Schiller maintained that both freedom and the awareness of it increase in accordance with the amount of suffering one actually experiences. And the intensity of the suffering is a mark of our strength and of our free will which can triumph only through suffering. Thus, we are able to say that through his "un-aestheticism" the Underground Man attained to the sublimity and freedom which Schiller sees achieved through aesthetic behavior.

Schiller and Dostoevsky were aware of the danger inherent in absolute freedom. Karl Moor, Fiesko, Raskolnikov, and the Underground Man show that when man's free will is loosed from any moral or guiding principle, he is free to perpetrate the most monstrous acts. Chapter VI pointed out that the two authors devised similar methods to offset the danger of absolute freedom. If man is not to tear down the entire social structure, his freedom must be balanced by love. If man accepts the dictum "Love thy Neighbor" and bases his actions on it, then man will not knowingly transgress the social or moral law. Schiller and Dostoevsky presented another alternative to those who realize too late the validity of the law of brotherly love. The concept of salvation through voluntary suffering not only enables one to expiate a past wrongful act, but it also raises the moral law, which a person has transgressed, to an even higher one. During the act of voluntary suffering, man also gains an understanding of the nature of moral law. Furthermore, both authors stressed
the importance of a repentant transgressor's self-forgiveness. Self-forgiveness, they believed, is possible only through voluntary suffering. Schiller and Dostoevsky developed similar techniques to focus the reader's attention to this fact. Karl and Raskolnikov suffer to atone for crimes actually committed. Maria and Dmitri are punished for acts of which they are innocent, but they accept the punishment to expiate other, although unrelated sins.

In comparing Schiller's and Dostoevsky's solution to the problem of man and his relationship to society, it was shown that one of the fundamental differences between Russian and West European Christianity is that the former form is Johanine in its philosophy, whereas the latter form, represented by Protestantism and Catholicism, stresses Pauline eschatology. Schiller's insistence upon the value of love and suffering was seen to have a significant relationship with the ideas of Russian Orthodox theology. Consequently, we are able to say that Schiller's popularity among Russians is not only because he is primarily the poet of freedom, but because, to the Russian, he is also, and more importantly, the poet of love and suffering.

In conclusion, it might be said that Schiller's greatest influence on the author of The Brothers Karamazov is to be found in Schiller's final solution to the problem of man and his relationship to society. Even though the two authors might be secretly drawn to the criminal element, they feared that if
not restrained it would tear down the authority of both heaven and earth. Thus Karl, Posa, Raskolnikov, and Stavrogin go down to defeat to prove their creators right. Schiller's and Dostoevsky's heroes attempt to put their abstract notions into practice, but they end by creating confusion in society and in themselves.

The theme of harmony between man and society occupied a position of manifest importance in Schiller's and Dostoevsky's philosophy; it governed their entire creative work. The two authors portrayed the tragic failure of their heroes as a result of their unbending adherence to one-sided principles in warring against injustice and oppression. When Schiller and Dostoevsky presented the failure of Karl's, Posa's, and Raskolnikov's misguided philosophy, they defined the problem of the idealist's relationship to the world. The aim of both authors is to demonstrate that the world cannot be changed overnight to harmonize with idealistic philosophies. The ideal can be realized only through the gradual process of maturing. The perfection of society must come from within the people, and develop slowly over the years. Schiller rejected the idea of a revolutionary change of society, because in this type of radicalism man himself does not improve, but becomes even worse. Kaufmann advances a view of Karl Moor which can also be applied to Raskolnikov. Kaufmann observes that Karl—and consequently Raskolnikov—by surrendering himself to the authorities, admits that no matter how imperfect
the existing social order may be, it is better than his immediate attempt to improve it.\textsuperscript{2} Kaufmann's analysis of Karl is also valid for Posa. In the process of revolution, Posa himself changes. Through this change his theory of a higher humanity becomes valid, just as Christ's theories were validated only on the Cross. Likewise, Raskolnikov "improves" only after he is sent to Siberia.

At the conclusion of their lifelong struggle to develop a theory which preserves man's dignity and freedom while remaining within the limits of an acceptable view of morality, both Schiller and Dostoevsky ended by accepting Kant's categorical imperative. Schiller's poem "Zenith und Nadir" reflects this--and Dostoevsky's--final conclusion:

\[ \ldots \]
\[ \text{Wie du auch handelst in dir, es berühre den Himmel der Wille,} \]
\[ \text{Durch die Achse der Welt gehe die Richtung der Tat!}^{3} \]

\textsuperscript{2}Kaufmann, pp. 32-34.

\textsuperscript{3}Werke, I, 261.
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