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Henry DeLaWarr Flood: A Case Study of Organization Politics in an Era of Reform

by

Burton Ira Kaufman

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's signature:

Houston, Texas
May, 1966
To my wife
Diane
Preface

I have not intended this thesis to be either a biography of Henry Flood or a full length study of his political career. I have been concerned primarily with the problem of how an organization politician like Flood was able to enjoy political success at a time when there were strong movements in the United States against the type of machine politics which he represented. In seeking an answer to this question I have stressed certain facets of Flood's political career to the neglect of others. I recognize that several scholarly studies, published and unpublished, have dealt adequately with portions of Flood's political career, and I feel somewhat justified, therefore, in my selectivity.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and encouragement which I received this last year from my two thesis advisers, Drs. Frank Vandiver and William Masterson who suffered through the reading of this thesis and whose suggestions and comments were invaluable. I would also like to thank Drs. R. John Rath and Louis Galambos who directed the writing of my M. A. thesis and who have been of great assistance to me during my graduate studies at Rice University.
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Chapter I

Henry Flood and the Martin Organization

For most of the twentieth century Virginia's political life has been dominated by a small coterie of politicians known as the organization or the machine. These men have established a virtual oligarchy in the Old Dominion. They have controlled Virginia's county governments and legislature, they have appointed or elected their own followers to most of the state's offices, they have named the hierarchy of the state party, and they have made it extremely difficult for anyone outside of their group to rise to political prominence.

The motivation of this group has not been ideological or financial but rather the attainment of power per se. Once in office they have actually responded capably to the duties of their positions and the needs of their constituencies. They have limited their fraudulent practices almost wholly to the gaining of the vote and to the winning of elections. They have run the government honestly, efficiently, and ably and have been extremely responsive to public opinion. As a result the voters of the state have been generally satisfied. The rabble rouser who has characterized the politics of so many Southern states has played little part in the Old Dominion's political
affairs.\textsuperscript{1}

The organization first achieved power in Virginia in 1893 when the state legislature elected Thomas Staples Martin as United States Senator. Until his death in 1919 Martin was the single most important figure in the state. As founder and leader of the organization his command of Virginia's politics was absolute during most of his career.

One of the reasons for Martin's success was his ability to absorb the leading politicians of the state into his machine. As long as they supported the organization on vital state issues and at election time they were free to follow their own political course. This arrangement proved so satisfactory that the majority of Virginia's important politicians worked at one time or another with the Senator. Included among these men were Senators John Daniel and Claude Swanson, Speaker of the House of Delegates, Richard Evelyn Byrd, Congressman James Hay, and Congressman Henry Flood.

Of the five, Flood was personally and politically the closest to Martin. For twenty-five years he worked in almost complete harmony with the Senator. As his most valued friend, chief political aid, and confidant, he did more to insure his success than any other man in the

state; together they directed the fortunes of the organization.

Their first political arrangement prescribed a pattern which remained essentially the same throughout their twenty-five year association. Martin issued the directives for the machine to follow, such as appointments to be made, patronage given, legislators supported. Flood acted as advisor to Martin, gave his own commands, and saw that Martin's orders were carried out. Until his election to Congress in 1900 he also served as the organization's chief spokesman in the state legislature. Even as United States Representative he retained contact with the Richmond politicians, advised them of the organization's wishes, and closely watched the political situation in the state. 3

The rise of the Martin organization to political dominance in Virginia in the 1890's was significant for the

2. As Martin himself wrote, "I am more indebted to Flood for the success I have attained in public life than to any other man...yes, more than to any other hundred men in the state." Martin to B. F. Oden, Charlottesville, October 14, 1911, Henry DeLaWarr Flood Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Box 42.

3. For examples of Martin directives to Flood involving patronage and organizational support for office seekers see Martin to Flood, Scottsville, August 10, 1895 and Washington, May 4, 1898, ibid., Boxes 4 and 8. For Flood's influence with the legislature, especially concerning patronage and political appointments, see H. R. Pollard to Flood, Richmond, March 2, 1893, Sidney P. Epes to Flood, Blackstone, November 13, 1893, ibid., Box 2. See also Flood to John F. Ryan, Washington, November 16, 1903 and Flood to A. B. Thornhill, Washington, November 16, 1903, ibid., Box 23.
state's history. It was not only the triumph of a group of men centering around Martin and Flood; even more important it was the beginning of the corporation era in Virginia politics and the final attainment to power of a new type of business-oriented leadership which emerged in the state during the late 1870's and 1880's.

During the 1870's, after reconstruction was over in the South, a gradual expansion of industry began to take place in Virginia as well as in the rest of the former Confederacy. While industrialism grew here at no faster rate than in the rest of the nation the change was so dramatic in some areas that by the 1880's the appeal to attract new industry reached the proportions of a crusade. The preachers at camp meetings even mixed the religion of industrialism with the religion of Christ. 4

With the rise of industrialism in Virginia came the rapid expansion of railroads. By 1885 four major systems operated in the Old Dominion, the Norfolk and Western, the Chesapeake and Ohio, the Richmond and Danville, and the Richmond and Alleghany. In order to assure a minimum of government restrictions on their operations, these railroads participated actively in the state's politics. They bribed

legislators with free passes or retained them with lucrative fees, they supported their own candidates for office, and through their spokesmen assumed power within the Democratic party. Nearly every Chairman of the party (until 1880 known as the Conservative party) from 1870 to 1890 was a railroad President or Director. 5

It was not only the money and labor which railroads expended that gained them such a prominent political position. Many of the younger generation saw Virginia's real hope for the future in the rise of industry and big business. What benefited corporations, they assumed, benefited the state. They were reluctant to oppose the railroads or any utility associated with the growth of industry. They wanted leaders who shared their views. In the years immediately following the Civil War the parties in Virginia had customarily chosen war heroes as their candidates. These veterans had a strong hold on the voters who trusted in their leadership and associated them with a glorified past. The new leaders who assumed power in the late 1880's and early 1890's had fewer ties with the past. Many of them were not even born until after the war began;

others were too young to remember the struggle. 6

It is true that they still retained ties with the Old South. In accordance with Virginia's aristocratic tradition of inherited leadership, most of them were from families long active in the history of the state. 7 They naturally tended to romanticize the role of their ancestors in the founding of the state. They also found it easier to gain public acceptance of their outlook by associating their ideas with the ante-bellum South. 8


7. From colonial days the control of political life in Virginia has tended to come from relatively small numbers of families who have passed on the mantle of leadership from generation to generation. As a result a political elite developed down through the centuries of men versed and trained in the art of politics from youth. This is not to say that elective office in Virginia became an exclusive club entirely. But a study made as late as the 1940's revealed that of the 494 elective county officials in the state, close relatives of 208 of them had held or held then political office. Horn, "The Growth and Development of the Democratic Party in Virginia," p. 301.

Nevertheless their vision was of the future and not of the past; and the future they associated with business and industrialism.

Henry (Hal) DeLaWarre Flood, who was born and raised in the New South, illustrated this type of post-war leadership. He was the descendant of an old Virginia family and he gloried in his state's history. He also found real meaning in the Cavalier concepts of gentility, courtly conduct, paternalism, and personal honor. He was a brilliant orator and a master of phraseology whose addresses reflected an often romantic concept of life. Yet typical of the New South

9. He easily became incensed when his rigid code of honor was questioned or broken. On one occasion, while an attorney in a law suit, he became enraged when his opposing counsel cast a slur on a lady who was present in court. He quickly grabbed a cane and brought it down on the offender's bald head with a resounding whack which could be heard throughout the courtroom. Letter of Lester Arnold, Secretary to Flood from 1919 to 1921, to Author, Winchester, July 12, 1965.

10. During his political career he became one of the most popular speakers in Virginia and her neighboring states. In fact in 1914 he was invited by Mayor James Michael Curly of Boston to be the principal speaker at the 138th anniversary exercises of the British evacuation of Boston. The invitation was a great honor since recent speakers at the exercises included Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Champ Clark. See Curly to Flood, telegram, Boston, March 9, 1914 and Flood to Curly, Washington, March 11, 1914, Flood Papers, Box 50.

11. This romantic concept of life could be seen in his excessive use of florid language such as that in his eulogy in 1908 of a deceased Virginia Congressman, Campbell Bascom Slem. "Mr. Speaker," Flood began, "to the reflective mind there is an element of pathos in every life. However the candidate for earth's honors and ambitions may gird himself with the panoply of preparation, how eagerly soever...he may vault into the saddle and ride in triumph to the coveted goal, yet in every case 'does black care ride behind.'
spokesman he was not a romantic. And although he was basically conservative in political outlook, he was not a man of ideological principles. Ideas and thoughts meant far less to him than their translation into deeds and actions. He had a strict pragmatic view of life and he measured success almost solely in terms of tangible accomplishments. Like other spokesmen of the New South his attitude toward rising industrialism in the state and nation gave evidence of this view. He was a leading proponent of business interests. Aware of the benefits that manufacturing could bring to an area in terms of employment, salaries, and increased prosperity, he felt it was the responsibility of communities to encourage the growth of large industry.

Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 2nd Session, March 7, 1908, p. 3024. See also his eulogy of William James Bryan, deceased representative from Florida, ibid., 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, May 3, 1908, p. 5627.


13. An academic diploma, he once remarked while speaking about education, "is, of course worth something, though not a great deal after a man gets into the battle of life. It is not what kind of diploma he has that counts in the world; it is what he knows and how he is able to use it." Flood to Mrs. Sallie B. Reynolds, Washington, May 19, 1911, Flood Papers, Box 41.

14. "I recognize the fact," he noted as a Congressman, "that there are great enterprises and vast concerns beyond the compass of the individual effort or the ordinary partner-
His realistic frame of mind also shaped his view towards politics. The most obvious fact about Flood was that he was a practical politician who thought in terms of political expediency rather than political principle. Even his efforts in behalf of the corporate interests in the state were based as much on his hope of personal advantage as on his attitude towards rising industrialism. He often worked against their interests when required by the exigencies of politics. He made a number of speeches attacking corporate abuses during his career, and he supported numerous pieces of reform legislation which his constituency demanded but which his business associates opposed. It was not uncommon to see Flood make a reform issue his own in an effort to strengthen his position with the electorate.

His practical approach to politics was limited by only one factor, his loyalty to his following and to his party. He realized the need for a base of strength and he knew the easiest way for a politician to lose it was to be disloyal to his supporters. His opportunism never interfered with his vigilance for his friends and for his party. Strong political allegiance was a striking characteristic of the Martin organization.

ship of men; that a proper combination of the resources, the wealth, and the skill of communities is indispensable to the conduct of the great industrial interests of the country...." Congressional Record, 58th Congress, 3rd Session, February 9, 1905, Appendix, p. 146.

15. For the importance which Flood attached to personal
Significantly this politician of the New South was born on September 2, 1865, in Appomattox County, just a few months after the Civil War ended and less than five miles from the spot where Robert E. Lee surrendered his haggard armies to Ulysses S. Grant. The son of Major Joel Walker and Ella Faulkner Flood, he was the newest generation of a long line of Virginia planters and politicians. His lineage in America can be traced to 1754 when the first of the Flood family, John Sr., arrived in the New World. Both his parents had distinguished ancestries which included some of the largest plantation owners in the state, several war heroes cited for bravery by the General Assembly, at least two judges, and numerous members of the state legislature. His paternal grandfather, Henry Flood, was a successful farmer and politician who served in the House of Delegates. His other grandfather, Charles James Faulkner, was elected to both branches of the state legislature, ran successfully for the United States House of Representatives, and until the Civil War held the office of United States Ambassador to France. His father, Major Joel Walker Flood, who served during the war as a staff officer in the

Confederate army, was a successful farmer and pioneer in scientific agriculture and even invented a device for gathering clover seed for resowing. He was also one of the most influential and respected members of his community; soon after his son was born his neighbors elected him to the House of Delegates.16

The future politician was raised almost entirely on his father's farm in Appomattox County. Appomattox lies in Virginia's black-belt just outside the western perimeter of the flat and fertile Tidewater area and just east of the plains and short sloping hills of the Piedmont. It is bordered on its Northwest edge by the James River and is situated in what is known as Virginia's middle country. Its rich soil, moderate undulating plains, ridges, and valleys make it ideal farming land and much of Virginia's huge tobacco crop comes from Appomattox and its neighboring regions.17

Fortunately for its citizens the county was scarcely touched by the Civil War. Not until Lee began his final retreat from the beleagured city of Richmond did any major

16. This account is based on The Geneology of the Flood Family prepared by members of the family and in the private possession of Mrs. Henry Flood, Washington, D. C.

campaigning take place in the area. But as in almost all of the South the struggle left its mark on the region. The soldier who returned to his home in Appomattox found his farm wasted by neglect, his investments lost, and his entire labor system disorganized by the freeing of the slaves.

Young Hal's family managed to escape these severe rigors of the reconstruction period. His wealthy grandparents left his family a sizeable sum of money which included investments in stocks, land, and banks, and he was able to enjoy a comfortable if uneventful childhood. Even as a youth politics took up an important part of his life. He often visited with his grandparents or his two uncles, Charles Faulkner, Jr. and R. Boyds Faulkner, who were establishing political careers in West Virginia. As might be expected politics was always the chief topic of discussion during these visits. He also attended the monthly court meetings, which were the center of the social and political life in Appomattox. There he heard and met politicians from all over the state who came to address the assembled crowds. Even at home family talk centered on political matters or community affairs, and all participated in the discussions including young Hal. Since he was versed in political matters from youth he naturally turned his

18. Charles later became a United States Senator and R. Boyds a state Judge.
Because he came from a well-to-do family he received a better formal education than most young men in the state. After graduating from High School in June, 1881, he entered Washington and Lee University in Lexington. He was one of 132 students who could afford to pay the tuition that year and sign the matriculation book. At college he studied the normal curriculum of sciences, languages, and classics. After a troubled first year in which he was almost expelled for burning down a bridge, he managed to finish near the top of his class.  

As was normal in those days for one seeking a law degree, he stayed only two years at Washington and Lee before he entered the University of Virginia Law School, where he studied under the eminent legalist, Professor John Minor. Minor's work, The Institutes, made the school one of the most prestigious in the country, and students flocked there from all over the state. Under Professors Minor and Stephen O. Southall, he received a thorough education in all phases of the law.  

19. Henry St. George Tucker, "Memorial Address," Henry D. Flood: Memorial Addresses, p. 13. Tucker was Flood's first cousin and also one of his most bitter political foes.  


21. The course of study at the law school is described in Philip Alexander Bruce, History of the University of
After he received his degree in 1886 he immediately set up office in Appomattox. To be a member of a prominent family had certain advantages for a young attorney and he soon enjoyed a lucrative practice. Like most county lawyers he conducted the bulk of his business at the local courthouses in and around his county. At one of these courthouses he met Thomas Martin.

Martin had already established a reputation as a shrewd politician and talented political organizer. In 1883 he had worked with John S. Barbour to create one of the most efficient party organizations in Virginia's history. He was instrumental in wresting the state from the rule of the Readjusters and returning it to Democratic control. 22 Two years later he broke with Barbour to support his rival for the Senate, John Warwick Daniel. He proved so successful in winning support for his candidate in the party nominating caucus that Barbour later angrily singled him out as the man most responsible for Daniel's victory. 23

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At the time he met Flood, Martin was building his own political organization. As an attorney for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad he had made connections with a number of important businesses and corporations in the state who were prepared to back his political ambitions in return for political favors. He had already assembled a group of some of the most skillful and enterprising young men in the state. Among them were Peter Otey, President of the Lynchburg and Durham Railroad, James Hay, then a Commonwealth Attorney, and Francis Lassiter, a prominent Petersburg politician. All eventually served with Martin in the United States Congress.

Martin was attracted to Flood by his family connections, his practical frame of mind, his support of growing industrialism in the state, his pragmatic outlook towards politics, and his obvious talent as a lawyer. He encouraged the young attorney to join forces with him and to seek election to the legislature. Flood, who already had his own political ambitions, needed little persuasion. With the help of Martin and his family he ran successfully for the House of Delegates in 1887. 24

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24. Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965; Interview with Senator Harry Flood Byrd, August 22, 1965. This period in Flood's life remains somewhat obscure because of a fire which ravished his office in 1892 and destroyed all his papers. See Charles Faulkner to Flood, Washington, March 22, 1892, Flood Papers, Box 1.
The four year period which he served in the state's lower house was uneventful for him from a legislative standpoint. At the age of twenty-one he was the youngest member of the legislature, and his elders payed him little attention. He spoke very rarely on the floor of the Assembly and introduced practically no legislation. He was satisfied to listen and to learn the complexities of legislative maneuvering. His only major accomplishment during his two terms was his successful fight to repeal a charter which the state had granted for the formation of the American Tobacco Company. His constituents were almost all tobacco growers. They feared that the new tobacco company would monopolize the market so completely that it would determine the price of their crop. The new legislator's successful struggle in their behalf gained him their valuable support. He was soon invited to address a number of local farm meetings and was asked to do some legal work for the Appomattox Chapter of the Farmers Alliance. 25

By 1891 he felt strong enough to run for the state Senate. He was already a close friend of Martin, whose political influence was widespread, and he enjoyed the solid backing of his agrarian constituency. His popularity

25. Moger, "Industrialization and Urbanization in Virginia from 1880 to 1900," pp. 312-313; Randolph Harrison to Flood, Lynchburg, November 4, 1891 and August 25, 1894, Flood Papers, Box 3.
with the voters was so great that they elected him to
the Senate for a four year term and in the same year chose
him as Commonwealth Attorney for Appomattox County.\textsuperscript{26}

Soon after his election he returned to Richmond for
the legislative session of 1891-1892. This session proved
to be a milestone in his career, and in the fortunes of
the embryo Martin organization, for it was during this
term of office that he and Martin firmly established
their relations with the railroads and laid the basis for
Martin's election to the United States Senate in 1893.

In no state in the South did the railroads have a
freer hand in the regulation of their operations than in
Virginia. Although there was a railroad Commissioner he
had practically no regulatory powers. As a result, the
farmers of the Old Dominion were at the mercy of the roads
on whom they depended for the transportation of their
goods and crops. They had to pay whatever rates the
railroads decided upon and to accept whatever service
they were given. The situation became so unbearable that
they joined into the Farmers Alliance in the hopes of ob-
taining a redress of grievances. They sought legislation
which would limit the special privileges of the railroads,
abrogate free passes for legislators, set rates, and

\textsuperscript{26} Lyon Gardiner Tyler, \textit{Encyclopedia of Virginia
Biography}, IV (5 vols., New York; Lewis Historical Publishing
regulate the roads' operational procedures. In its 1890 platform the Alliance called for the establishment of a powerful railroad commission which would have these powers and the next year it directed its attention to electing a legislature which would vote for such a law.

In most of the state's rural areas, where the vast majority of the Virginia citizenry resided, the Alliance successfully united with the Democratic party to elect men it had supported into office. 27 Ironically one of the men they backed was Hal Flood.

Soon after the legislature convened in 1892 a delegate introduced the Kent Bill. This legislation proposed the establishment of a strong state-controlled railroad board with powers to set freight and passenger rates. Its features were very similar to those requested by the Alliance in its 1890 platform and it represented the most serious challenge to the railroads up to that time. The four systems in the state were determined to defeat the measure and all meaningful railroad legislation. To accomplish their aim they used the proffered assistance of Martin and Flood.

Martin directed the railroads' successful fight against the Kent Bill. He realized the fate of the legislation rested very largely on whether it received a favorable

committee report. He was aware also that the composition of the committee was determined by the Speaker of the House, who in 1891 was Richard Cardwell. Since the Speaker was closely associated with the railroads who had helped elect him to the position, Martin pushed for his re-election. There was great objection to Cardwell because of his known connections with the roads. But by using large sums of money which had been made available to him through J.S.B. Thompson, Superintendent of the Southern Railway Company and agent for the four systems in the state, Martin was able to bribe the supposedly pro-agrarian legislature into re-electing Cardwell to the Speakership. The Speaker, in turn, named a committee which he knew would vote against the Kent Bill. As Martin expected, it sent the measure back to the legislature with an unfavorable report. The Assembly was so thoroughly intimidated by the railroads' bribes that it was not prepared to override the committee's report. It voted the bill down and in its place,

28. An example of the funds which were made available to Martin by Thompson is a letter which the Superintendent of the Southern Railway wrote to the future Senator in September 1891. Thompson told Martin in his note that he had deposited a check for $800 in the First National Bank of Alexandria and instructed his associate to use the money to defeat the Kent Bill. Thompson to Martin, Atlanta, September 28, 1891, Senator Martin's Railroad Connections as Shown by the Barbour Thompson Letters, Campaign Pamphlets, 1911, Virginia State Library, Richmond, Virginia. See also Thompson to Leonard Marbury, n.p. November 23, 1891, ibid. At the time, of course, these letters were highly confidential, but in 1911 William Atkinson Jones, who was running against Martin for the United States Senate, obtained these letters and published them in pamphlet form.
it substituted the Mason Bill, which was a subterfuge to placate the state's agrarian interests but which provided for no important additional controls over the railroads' operations.29

Martin had helped defeat the Kent Bill. Flood now assumed the responsibility of convincing the farmer to accept the Mason Bill and of persuading the railroads not to oppose it in the legislature. He was the man to accomplish this task. As his recent election to the Senate indicated, he had the support of the farm groups in his home region. At the same time he was on close terms with many of the important business men and industrialists of Virginia whom Martin had introduced to him while he was serving in Richmond. These men included J.S.B. Thompson and William Glasgow Jr., Attorney for the Norfolk and Western Railway Co.30

Had the farmers known how closely Flood was associated with the railroads they might not have invited him to their meetings. As it was, his connections were kept secret and they welcomed him as an honored guest. At these gatherings


30. For an indication of the relations between Flood and these men, see William A. Glasgow Jr. to Flood, Roanoke, April 11, 1892, and G. P. Marshall to Flood, Danville, October 17, 1894, Flood Papers, Boxes 1 and 2.
he spoke out strongly in defense of the Mason Bill. He was a persuasive speaker whom the farmers had voted into office and in whom they trusted, and while an occasional outburst or protest was made against the worthless legislation Flood was able to convince them to back the measure. At the same time he wrote to a number of his railroad friends to warn them of the dangers of opposing the Mason Bill. By pointing out that an attempt to defeat the measure would arouse the farmers even more against the roads he successfully convinced most of these officials not to fight the legislation, and it became law without any serious opposition.31

The enactment of the Mason Bill meant the end of any hope for significant railroad legislation in the immediate future. It also meant that Martin and Flood had won a vital legislative battle in behalf of their railroad

31. "I note the work in which you have been engaged, in addressing alliance meetings," one railroad official replied to a letter of Flood's, "explaining to them the provisions of the Mason Bill....[The fervor against the railroads] will soon run its day. Still, it indicates as you well say, that the adoption of some legislation on this question was a most fortunate course upon the part of the Legislature; and you will bear me out in the statement that I never wavered in the propriety and wisdom of having some Legislation. It is all the more important that this question should be explained to our people, and in that direction I want to make a suggestion to you: when the State convention meets this Spring you ought to be careful (sic) in the selection of Electors. These men will doubtless dwell a good deal on what legislation was enacted during the last winter. It is therefore exceedingly important that the men selected as Electors should be in harmony with us on the Railroad legislation." Unidentified
associates. Their work for the railroads came at a fortuitous time in Virginia politics, for the same year that the Mason Bill was passed a vacancy occurred in the United States Senate following the death of the incumbent, John S. Barbour with whom Martin had worked so closely ten years before. Martin decided he had sufficient strength in the state by now to try to fill the vacancy and, after he was prompted by Flood and others of his young political following to do so, he entered the contest for the nomination. 32

The campaign for the Senate began in earnest when Governor Phillip McKinney named the obscure lawyer, Eppa Hunton, to serve out the remainder of Barbour's term. Hunton's nomination came somewhat of a surprise since the names of several other better known Virginians, including those of Martin and former Governor Fitzhugh Lee, had been mentioned more prominently among astute politicians. 33

The term which Hunton had been named to fill was due to expire in 1895. Undaunted by Hunton's nomination, Martin decided to be a candidate for the full six year term which would begin in 1896. His strategy was to win control


33. Moger, The Rebuilding of the Old Dominion, p. 163.
of the legislature in the state elections of 1893 and force a vote on the full term two years earlier than usual. For this purpose he began to line up support soon after Hunton was named to the Senate.\textsuperscript{34}

To manage his campaign he named Hal Flood who was now his chief political aid. Flood's first important task was to eliminate Hunton as a possible contender for the full Senate term. Hunton's nomination had been for only one year. Whether he would serve out the remaining two years of Barbour's term depended on the same politicians who had cooperated with Martin and Flood during the struggle over the Kent Bill.\textsuperscript{35} Together the candidate and his campaign manager arranged an agreement among the party leaders which provided that Hunton would receive their support for the short term (1893-1895) and Martin for the full term to begin in 1896.\textsuperscript{36}

Martin first had to gain control of the legislature.

\textsuperscript{34} "A special session will probably be held next winter," he wrote Flood, "and I desire to lose no opportunity to strengthen my hand...I have afforded no opportunity to let grass grow under my feet." Martin to Flood, Scottsville, June 2, 1892, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 1.

\textsuperscript{35} Included among these politicians were J. Taylor Ellyson, Chairman of the state Democratic party. See J. Barbour Thompson to F. M. Logan, n.p., November 23, 1891, \textit{Senator Martin's Railroad Connections as Shown by the Barbour Thompson Letters}. Others, like Richard Cardwell, owed their positions to Martin's efforts in their behalf.

\textsuperscript{36} Martin to Flood, Scottsville, June 24, 1893, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 71.
To help in the canvass he and Flood turned to the railroads, who were under heavy obligation to them for their recent legislative work. The roads responded to their request for aid by pouring huge sums into the campaign. 37 The two men spent the money through their accomplice of the Kent Bill, J.S.B. Thompson, who passed the funds to local Martin candidates and followers throughout the state without going through the regular process of referring the sums to the State Central Committee. Through this means, as well as through normal contributions, they expended as much as $8,000 in one congressional district alone—the important fourth district; 38 lesser amounts went to other areas all over the Old Dominion. Not only did the railroads contribute money, they also gave free passes to Flood and other Martin aides so that they could travel anywhere in the state gathering support for Martin's election. 39

37. One student of the period has estimated that the three leading transportation companies in the state alone contributed more than $10,000 to Martin's campaign. Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion, pp. 102-03.

38. "As he wrote to his friend in that area, Francis Lassiter, "If [with this money] the politicians of the 4th district cannot win, nobody can win in my opinion." Martin to Lassiter, Scottsville, November 3, 1892, Francis Rives Lassiter Papers, Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C.

39. Martin to Flood, Richmond, November 2, 1893 and Scottsville, July 2, 1893 and August 18, 1893, Flood Papers, Box 2.
With the help of the railroads, Flood, and an efficient organization, Martin's strength grew rapidly in the state. By the summer it was apparent to politicians that the fight for the Senate—to be decided in legislative caucus the following December—would be a two way contest between Fitzhugh Lee and Martin. As expected, Hunton had announced that he would not seek a full term, and none of the others mentioned as candidates had gained enough strength to be in the running.

Of the two leading contenders Fitzhugh Lee was certainly the choice of the vast majority of Virginians. He was a former Governor and nephew of Robert E. Lee and a great favorite among a people who venerated the name of his uncle. Moreover he had strong political backing from Senator Daniel, who had abandoned his former aide for his old Confederate friend just as Martin had left Barbour for Daniel six years before. 40

Martin knew he had to win every possible legislative seat. In order not to alienate prospective support he avoided bringing controversial issues into the campaign. He purposely remained aloof from a bitter gubernatorial contest taking place within the Old Dominion, even though great pressure was put on him to take a stand in behalf of one of the two candidates. In order to keep the governor's race from dividing the party he and Flood arranged wherever

possible to send loyal party men to the party convention regardless of which candidate they supported. Their strategy of remaining neutral in the campaign proved so successful that they avoided involving themselves without losing any significant support.

The result was that optimistic reports of Martin's strength came into his headquarters in Richmond in increasing number as the November elections approached. His organization was operating with full energy, lining up his followers and preparing to elect them in November. Flood was especially busy perfecting the organization, working closely with his railroad friends, gaining pledges of support from his acquaintances in the legislature, traveling throughout the state, and making contact with the various Democratic county Chairmen.

The support of the county Chairmen was vital to the Martin machine. They were in a real sense the most crucial men in the political structure of the state. They named the local electoral boards, which in turn appointed the judges and clerks of elections. They also saw to it

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41. G. W. Patterson to Flood, Camm P.O., June 24 and July 4, 1893, Martin to Flood, Scottsville, July 2 and 4, 1893, Flood Papers, Box 1.

(through the use of well distributed money and local pressures) that their appointees were chosen as Treasurers, Sheriffs, Supervisors, Clerks of Court, Commissioners of Revenue, and state Representatives and Senators. The Chairmen together with the other county officials composed the county organizations or courthouse cliques, who ran the local government, distributed the patronage, raised campaign funds, got out the vote, and watched over elections.\textsuperscript{43} Flood's and Martin's efforts in getting the county organizations to support their machine went far to explain the success of the organization.

While Flood and his candidate secured the backing of these local centers of power and lined up their following in the state, Fitzhugh Lee also campaigned. But he had less funds than Martin, and was less skillful as a politician. Also his association with the Confederacy had little appeal to the new politician of the corporate age. As a result reports reaching Flood from most parts of the state indicated that Martin was far ahead of Lee in the decisive legislative vote count.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44} Martin to Flood, Scottsville, August 18, 1893 and Richmond, September 11, 1893, William Murrell to Flood, Lynchburg, September 14, 1893, Flood Papers, Box 2.
The only problem which caused Flood and Martin concern was that their strength lay mainly to the west of Richmond. This was not surprising for it was precisely in the area to the west of the state capital where Martin and Flood lived and where the county organizations were most influential. Martin was nevertheless disturbed over the affairs in Petersburg. He had poured over $8,000 into the city and surrounding areas and, as he wrote Francis Lassiter, in no part of the state did he feel he "had a greater right to expect kindness" than in the fourth congressional district. Yet many of the politicians who he felt should have supported him were either not committing themselves or were announcing for Lee. 45

His concern over the eastern portion of the state soon proved to be groundless, as the November elections made it apparent that the party caucus, which would meet in the winter, would elect him to the Senate. Of the 128 Democrats elected to the new legislature it appeared that at least 65— the needed majority— would vote for him. Also many of the legislators who had previously opposed his election or who had remained uncommitted were anxious to join forces with him now that his election appeared imminent. To win the remaining uncommitted vote he and Flood urged their followers to double their efforts; they stayed in

45. Martin to Lassiter, Richmond, Confidential, September 25, 1893, Lassiter Papers.
Richmond to use their personal influence with the General Assembly. 46

The caucus to pick a new Senator was held on the evening of December 7th. Flood led Martin's forces in the gathering where he checked any last minute trouble. After Hunton was quickly endorsed to fill out the remainder of Barbour's unexpired term, nominations were taken for the full six year term. The names of Lee, Martin, Holmes Conrad, and John Goode were placed before the caucus, and the vote began. Martin's hope for a first ballot victory soon faded. His original estimate of strength was proving to be slightly off. By the fourth ballot he was well in the lead but the few votes which Goode and Conrad received prevented him from obtaining the needed majority. Flood worked feverishly to gain the necessary votes, and soon saw his efforts rewarded, for in the sixth ballot Martin went over the needed majority. As soon as the Chairman of the caucus announced that Martin was the Democratic choice for Senator the hall broke into bedlam. Two days later the legislature confirmed the caucus decision and Martin was officially proclaimed as Virginia's new junior United States Senator. 47 The organization had come of age.

46. Martin to Flood, Richmond, November 10 and 11, and December 4, 1893, Flood Papers, Box 2; Martin to Lassiter, Richmond, November 13 and 21, 1893, Lassiter Papers.

Immediately after the caucus Martin followers ran out of the meeting and down the street to headquarters where they were each greeted by the delighted nominee. In a matter of moments the champagne which had been iced in anticipation of the victory was brought out and the noisy celebration which followed lasted into the early hours of the morning. Except for Martin no man appeared happier than the state Senator from Appomatox, Hal Flood.  

It was fitting for Flood to enjoy the victory. He had done more to assure it than any other man except Martin himself. Only 28 years old at the time of the election, he had already proven himself one of the ablest politicians in the state. From a rural area he had weathered the storms of the state's early agrarian discontent. At the same time he had established important connections with influential business leaders and politicians and had successfully managed a senatorial campaign. Most important he had established himself as the kingpin of the organization which had grown around the Senator-elect and was now the dominant political factor in the Old Dominion.

Chapter II

Flood and the Politics of Expediency

Martin's organization was an opportunistic coalition of politicians and business interests bent on preserving (and advancing) their privileged positions in the state by the maintenance of the status quo. Politicians in the alignment were concerned with avoiding changes in the electoral system which threatened their political power. Business interests wanted to protect themselves by preventing regulatory legislation, increased taxation, and social measures which meant further taxes. In order to accomplish their purposes the business groups supplied their political partners with the financial assistance necessary for them to win office. In return the politicians prevented the enactment of unfavorable legislation. Together theirs was an almost perfect working agreement combining the conservative viewpoint of the businessman with the pragmatic considerations of the politician. Martin's election to the United States Senate and the defeat of the Kent Bill were indications of its success.

One difficulty with the arrangement was that the politician owed his office to his constituency as well as to his business friends and had to be responsive to both their demands. Under normal circumstances even this fact posed no serious problem. A homogeneous and inbred population,
the aristocratic tradition of inherited leadership, Negrophobia, the one party system, and a Jeffersonian philosophy of individualism and self-reliance all combined to produce an electorate as reluctant as their leaders to make changes or to extend spheres of governmental responsibility. Only under unusually trying circumstances have the voters ever agitated for major changes in the state. For this reason legislative prerogative has continued to dominate the government at the expense of a circumscribed executive and judiciary. Even major constitutional changes have not altered this basic structure of government.¹

Unfortunately for the organization the last decade of the nineteenth century was one of the few periods of great social disturbance in the Old Dominion. Unrest eventually brought the politician into conflict with his business associate and destroyed the unity of the Martin coalition. Torn between a need to satisfy the corporate elements in the Martin alignment and to cope with the agitation among his constituency, the politician rode with the tide of sentiment, even though it meant a momentary dissolution of the organization.

Causing the restlessness in the Old Dominion was the economically depressed and neglected farmer who sought relief from his plight by the expansion of the currency through the free and unlimited coinage of silver, a symbol of all rural discontent within the state. Agrarian disquietude produced a schism in the Democratic party in 1892 between Cleveland and anti-Cleveland forces, or between those against and those in favor of the free coinage of silver. Fiscal reform was also the principal question in the gubernatorial campaign of 1893. On both occasions a crisis in the Democracy was avoided by the willingness of the party leadership to lay aside their differences for the sake of party unity and in the hopes that Cleveland would adopt a program of agricultural relief.  

Much to their regret, Cleveland's administration, which was ushered in with a financial panic, made little effort to solve the problems of worsening agricultural depression. Cleveland even ended Virginia's hope for serious tariff reform. Because of the President's seeming disinterest with their situation large numbers of farmers began to desert the Democratic for the Populist party

which expanded rapidly in the state.\textsuperscript{3}

Agrarian dissatisfaction was the first crisis to face the organization since Martin's election as Senator. Although the Senator-elect was opposed to free and unlimited coinage of silver,\textsuperscript{4} he tried at first to avoid fiscal questions. His attitude towards assuming a stand on issues "was to be very careful about expressing opinions, declaring a purpose, or taking any position."\textsuperscript{5} Like other leaders in the state he hoped Cleveland would put an end to the silver issue by providing relief for the farmer. He was soon disgusted with the administration for its failure to act and for the unfavorable political reaction

\begin{itemize}
\item[3.] Disgust with the Democracy had grown so great that Democratic State Chairman, J. Taylor Ellyson, wrote urgent letters to leading party members warning them that a number of Congressional districts were in danger of being lost to Populists and Republicans in 1894. See Ellyson to William A. Bibb, Richmond, October 10, 1894, William E. Bibb Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. See also Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion, p. 49.
\item[4.] Personally he preferred a bimetallic money policy. He thought the original demonetization of silver in 1873 a grave mistake. But since conditions had changed in the more than twenty years following 1873 and since a number of countries had also gone off the silver standard, he felt that an immediate return to bimetallism would have serious consequences for American corporations. Instead he believed that a change to a gold and silver standard should be made as quickly as possible "with safety to business." Martin to E.W. Hubard, Washington, March 3, 1896, Edmund Wilcox Hubard Papers, Manuscripts Division, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, File #346.
\item[5.] Martin to Flood, Washington, November 26, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 5.
\end{itemize}
which its programs were having in Virginia. 6

By the beginning of 1896 he realized he could remain silent no longer. Agitation for fiscal reform was so widespread that the state convention which was to meet in the spring was certain to endorse free silver. Not prepared to oppose openly the will of the gathering he decided to ride with prevailing sentiment. At the convention he shocked the assembled crowd by attacking Cleveland as a "party wrecker" and by revealing his complete conversion to free silver. 7

Business and corporate elements in the organization, who were naturally against an inflationary policy which lowered the value of their assets, considered Martin's action a betrayal of their trust. They deserted the organization and the regular Democratic party for a splinter group, the Gold Democrats, after the party nominated William Jennings Bryan for President in 1896. In the campaign which followed they cooperated with the Republicans in an attempt to defeat the regular party and organization candidates.

No man in the hierarchy of the organization suffered more from the break in the Martin forces than Hal Flood.

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6. "Mr. Cleveland and the policy of his administra-
tion," he wrote, "have wrecked our political hopes for the present." Martin to John L. Hurt, Washington, May 18, 1896, Claude A. Swanson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina.

In his two terms as state Senator, Flood voted against almost every piece of reform legislation, fought a change in the electoral system, and worked in behalf of his business associates. But because he supported free silver they withdrew their support from him when, with their help, he could have won a race for the United States House of Representatives.

Flood's close relations with Martin and the railroad interests in the Old Dominion had assured him an important role in the state Senate when he entered in 1891. Although a first term Senator he was placed on the crucial Committee on Privileges and Elections as well as on the Committee for Courts of Justice and for Fish and Games. He retained these assignments and added the Committee on Public Printing during the next legislative session. 8 Few new Senators could boast so many committee appointments or one like Privileges and Elections.

In the Senate Flood soon revealed his preference to work against reform and in behalf of his corporate associates. In February 1892, he voted in favor of postponing a bill which called for the reenactment of a law regulating the sale and purity of commercial fertilizers. About the same time he voted against an appropriation of $12,500 to help construct a new building at the Southwestern Lunatic Asylum,

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and cast the only vote against an appropriation of $10,000 to the Prison Association of Virginia for the purpose of erecting and equipping workshops and buildings for the school at Laurel.9 His voting record followed the same anti-reform pattern throughout the remainder of this session and through the sessions of 1893 to 1896 as well. In 1894 he voted against a bill which would have encouraged the employment of professionally trained teachers at the public schools of the state and which would have provided for teaching licenses to graduates of certain state normal schools. Significantly, in the same session he introduced a piece of legislation which authorized the union of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company with the Buckingham Company and another which incorporated the United States Tobacco Company.10

His most significant work in his first six years as Senator came in 1896 when he successfully led the fight in the legislature against the reform of the state's electoral system. The origins of this system dated back to 1884 when the legislature passed the Anderson-McCormick law which in effect threw the regulation of elections into the hands of Democratic election boards and legislatures.11


10. Ibid., Session of 1893-1894, January 11, and February 6 and 27, 1894, pp. 156, 280, and 497.

11. For the provisions of this law, see Horn, "The Growth and Development of the Democratic Party in Virginia," pp. 175, 177-78.
Balloting became so corrupt that in 1894 the General Assembly passed the Walton Act in an attempt to reform the law's most obvious abuses. But while the new legislation was an improvement over the Anderson McCormick law and incorporated some important innovations such as the Australian ballot, it still left effective control of elections in the hands of the Democratic party.\textsuperscript{12}

Clearly a new law was needed and a movement began in the legislature to add amendments to the Walton Act which would reform the election machinery. Two particularly undesirable features of the old voting measure were the marking procedure which required the voters to draw a line through the names of all candidates except the one for whom he was voting, and the constable feature which provided for constables to read and to point out the names of all candidates to illiterate voters; this latter feature especially led to a great amount of corruption because Democratic constables often pointed out only the names of Democratic office-seekers. The proposed reforms were aimed at eliminating the constable feature, changing the marking procedure, and making voting officials less partisan.

Hal Flood opposed any major changes in a voting system which gave the advantage in elections to the Democratic party and the Martin organization, and for this reason he was determined to prevent alterations in the Walton Act.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 180-81.
At first he planned to make a floor fight against the proposed reforms, but in a party caucus he discovered that the majority of Senators were interested mainly in eliminating the constable feature. As for the other sections they were Democrats and were not against maintaining provisions which made their reelection safe. While he was reluctant to sacrifice this feature of the voting laws, he realized after the caucus that some concessions had to be made. He was aware also that even if the constable section was eliminated the other sections of the Walton Act would still assure Democratic victory in close districts at election time. As a result he arranged a compromise among party leaders in which the Senate voted for the elimination of the constable feature but defeated any attempt to reform the electoral system.  

Flood's role in defeating meaningful election reform in Virginia indicated the influence he exerted on the state's political affairs. His skill as a politician and his close association with Martin assured him an inordinate

13. "There is no ground for compromise," he wrote Martin who was closely watching the fight over electoral reform, "our weakness in the fight is going to be in the fact that all our friends will be willing to advocate the law, as well as vote for it, but with the opposition scattered. I believe we can whip them and our only chance is for a straight fight." Flood to Martin, Richmond, January 14, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 4.

amount of power in the General Assembly. Using his influence with the machine-dominated legislature he gained control with Martin of the political offices and appointments in the state. Together he and the Senator carefully distributed the patronage by following the expedient of appointing the office-seeker who could deliver them the most votes. Not the slightest position escaped their notice and more than one ambitious politician wrote Flood for his backing, fully aware that without it he had little hope of an appointment.

15. Thus Martin wrote Flood in 1897 asking him to talk with Joseph Button, a close friend of Flood and Secretary of the State Democratic Executive Committee, to see if Button could not obtain a clerkship for a Colonel Boykin who needed it to strengthen himself in his district. Boykin was a Martin follower. On the next day Martin again wrote Flood to tell him that one Massie wanted the Senator and Flood to aid a candidate for the Register of the Land Office named Drummond. In return for their help, Massie promised to support the organization. Massie was an influential politician so, on the basis of his promise, Martin advised Flood to help Drummond's candidacy and to use his influence in the legislature on Massie's behalf. Martin to Flood, Lynchburg, November 7 and 8, 1897, ibid., Box 7.

16. Indicative of how powerful Martin and Flood's influence in the legislature became after Martin's election to the Senate were letters from two politicians. The first of these was from D. M. Burgess of the Office of Public Accounts to Flood in 1897. Burgess wished to be on "the safe side" regarding the candidacy for office of a Colonel Richardson. He wanted to know if Flood would support Richardson. "I think if you were for him I could count [his election] a sure thing." Burgess to Flood, Richmond, November 27, 1897, ibid., Box 7. The second was from E. N. Wood to Flood in 1903. Wood was running for the Senate from Appomattox. In this contest, he wrote, "Mr. Martin is personally interested and Appomattox will be governed by his pleasure in nominating a candidate.... Mr. Martin can, and doubtless will name the candidate,—and if I am not his man, I am not in the fight. I understand conditions, and shall waste no energy in a canvass that will result in my discomfiture." Wood to Flood, Appomattox, ibid., Box 18.
Although his importance in state politics was assured, however, Flood was not satisfied with remaining in the General Assembly. His dream from childhood was to serve in the United States Senate,\(^\text{17}\) and to accomplish his ambition he felt he needed some more important office than that of a state legislator. Having spent almost seven years in the House of Delegates and the Senate he thought he was politically experienced and strong enough to seek national office. A seat in the United States House of Representatives seemed a logical next step towards his ultimate aim. It would give him a chance to make important political connections in Washington, to acquaint himself with national issues, and to learn the complexities of congressional lawmaking. Furthermore his uncle, Charles Faulkner Jr. was serving in the nation's capital as United States Senator from West Virginia, his close friend from law school days, Claude Swanson, was also there as Congressman from Virginia's 5th district, and soon Martin would join them. For personal as well as political reasons he was anxious for a seat in Washington.

To be elected to Congress from the 10th district he first had to defeat the incumbent, his own first cousin, Henry St. George Tucker. Until recently the Appomattox Senator had been on close terms with Tucker. The Congressman

\(^{17}\) Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965; Interview with Senator Harry Flood Byrd, August 22, 1965.
was twelve years his elder and had helped raise him as a child. During the last campaign Flood had campaigned extensively on his behalf and had done some valuable work in getting out the vote for him.  

Then, largely as a result of Flood's growing association with Martin and his political organization, the two men had drifted apart. Even though Tucker was never a reformer in the sense that he favored important social and economic legislation, he always believed in honest campaign practices. He also strongly opposed organization politics and resented the influence of business in political affairs. He refused to accept free passes offered him by the railroads, and in a speech in Congress in 1892 he attacked industry for the undue influence which it exerted over United States Senators. He was unable to accept Flood's close relations with the Martin machine and broke completely with his cousin when he became Martin's Campaign Manager in 1893. From then until Flood's death he


19. "The standard for the exalted position of the United States Senator," he remarked in his speech before Congress, "is...debased by the corporate influence." Congressional Record, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, July 12, 1892, p. 6063. For his refusal to accept railroad passes, see Tucker to A. J. Hemphill, Washington, January 2, 1892, Tucker Papers, File #113.
and the Appomattox politician were bitter political enemies.

Soon after the break with Tucker Flood announced his decision to run for Congress. In the campaign which followed he worked tirelessly, traveling throughout the district, making speeches, meeting politicians, and lining up votes for the county conventions which chose delegates to the district nominating conventions.\(^{20}\) His friend Martin was especially helpful in the campaign. He traveled with Flood on the speaking circuit, helped obtain funds, and wrote scores of letters in behalf of Flood's candidacy. He also used his influence in an attempt to get other candidates to run who he thought might cut into Tucker's strength.\(^{21}\) Sometimes his association with Flood hurt his candidacy but in most cases his influence was a great boon to the Appomattox Senator.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{20}\) Flood was an exceptionally hard worker in campaigns. The fervor with which he conducted his candidacy thoroughly intimidated Tucker's following. See Camm Patteson to Tucker, Personal and Confidential, n.p. June 8, 1894, _Tucker Papers_, File #125. See also Martin to William A. Glasgow Jr., Scottsville, June 4, 1894, _Flood Papers_, Box 3.

\(^{21}\) For example, he tried to convince Edward Echols to enter the contest since he thought Echols could take votes away from his neighbor Tucker. Richard E. Byrd to Flood, Winchester, April 1, 1894, _Flood Papers_, Box 3. When Echols still remained hesitant about running two other members of the organization, James F. Coleman and Frank P. Moon also tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to make the contest. F. C. Moon to Flood, Lynchburg, April 30, 1894 and James F. Coleman to Flood, Oak Forest, May 14, 1894, _ibid._, Box 3.

\(^{22}\) See for example P. P. Bowyer to Flood, Springfield, Mo., and I. Randolph to Flood, Augusta, January 29, 1894, and T. C. Scott to Thomas Martin, Howardsville, January 24, 1894, _ibid._, Box 3.
Had the contest been decided on effort alone Flood would have won a landslide victory over Tucker, who conducted such a lax campaign as to cause even his own followers concern. Unfortunately for the Senator effort was not enough; a combination of two factors were working against Flood which he could not overcome and which cost him the election. These were the geography of the 10th district, and his cousin's three terms as Congressman.

Flood was running for office in a district which cut across the state from his home of Appomattox in the east to the Alleghany mountains in the west. It was composed of twelve counties which were divided into three distinct geographical regions. In the east were the Piedmont and the middle counties of Amherst, Cumberland, Nelson, Buckingham, Fluvanna, and Appomattox. These counties with their ridges and plains, black soil, and fertile farming land extended as far as the Blue Ridge. Descending the Blue Ridge to the west were the valley counties of Augusta, Rockbridge, and Botetourt. A wealthy agricultural area with large apple orchards, grain fields, and bluegrass pastures and marked by gently sloping hills and prosperous well kept farms these counties composed one of the most scenic areas in the state and nation. In contrast to the valley the last three counties in the district, Alleghany,

Bath, and Highland were a poor mountain area with rocky soil, ill kept farms, and a sparse, nearly destitute population.  

Cutting the district almost in half, the Blue Ridge formed a natural political as well as geographical dividing line. The eastern counties with their former plantation economy and large colored population had closer ties with the aristocratic planter tradition of Tidewater, Virginia than the western regions where no Negro problem existed and where agriculture had always been based on the small family-operated farm. As a result the western farmer was distrustful of his eastern neighbors and a rivalry developed between the two sections for control of the district. Both sides of the Blue Ridge were anxious to nominate a man from their region for Congress. This fact worked to Flood's disadvantage, for even though he was able to rely on the support of most of the eastern counties he was practically unknown on the other side of the Blue Ridge. The same was not true for his cousin who had managed to build up a nucleus of strength throughout the district as a result of his six

24. This description is based largely on personal observation, but see also, Pearson, The Readjuster Movement, pp. 103-11; Work Projects Administration, Virginia; A Guide to the Old Dominion, pp. 427 and 511; Oren F. Morton, Annals of Bath County Virginia (Staunton; The McLure Co., 1917), p. 171.

25. For mention of this rivalry see J. M. Sheppard to Flood, Fisherville, June 9, 1894, A. F. Thomas to Flood, Lynchburg, April 2, 1895, E. A. Sneed to Joseph Button, n.p. April, 1894, Flood Papers, Box 3.
year control of the federal patronage. Flood could not overcome this disadvantage and as the contest proceeded it became clearer that he would be defeated. The final blow to his campaign came at the end of July when the Amherst delegation to the district convention announced for Tucker. With a neighboring county against him, he realized that he lacked the votes necessary to make a fight at the convention. He withdrew from the campaign after announcing that he would support Tucker in the coming election.

Discouraged by his defeat Flood had hardly time to recover from his campaign when he faced a second difficult contest, this time to maintain his seat in the state Senate. The tobacco growing area which Flood represented shared the depressed economic conditions of most one crop counties in the Old Dominion. As in these other counties the farmers were disgusted with Cleveland's administration and were leaving the Democratic party for the rapidly expanding Populist movement. By 1895 the third party movement in the region was so large that its leaders united with the Republicans to run R. T. Hubard against Flood for the state Senate. Traveling back and forth through the district,

26. "All the information I can get from Fluvanna," Martin wrote discouragingly to Flood in July, "is exceedingly unfavorable; I hear also unfavorable accounts from Nelson." Martin to Flood, Scottsville, July 5, 1894, ibid., Box 3. See also W. E. Thompson to Flood, Richmond, April 3, 1894 and C. E. Cosky to Martin, Columbia, May 23, 1894, ibid., Box 3.

27. Richmond Dispatch, July 21, 1894.
speaking wherever small crowds assembled the Fusion candidate, whom Thomas Martin described as one of the most talented and ambitious Populists in the state, presented the Appomattox Senator with the most serious challenge he ever faced for state office.

Flood's main problem was not so much Hubbard's candidacy as it was the reluctance of the railroads to supply him with any campaign funds because of his stand on free silver. In 1895 the principal campaign topic in the rural areas of Virginia was fiscal reform. Flood had always favored free silver but as a leader of the business-oriented organization he had followed Martin's course of avoiding a stand on the issue. By 1895 he realized he could remain silent no longer and still hope to defeat his Populist opponent. He had little choice except to announce publicly in favor of free silver. Even though the exigencies of office had forced him to take this stand, his action angered his business associates who showed their ill feelings by withholding their normal campaign contributions. Their lack of aid combined with Hubbard's effective attacks on the Walton Law and Flood's role in defeating meaningful

28. Martin to William A. Glasgow Jr., Richmond, October 22, 1895, Flood Papers, Box 71.

29. "I am a free silver man as I have always been," Flood wrote in 1896. Flood to W. C. Trent, Richmond, February 22, 1896, ibid., Box 6.

30. Richmond Dispatch, May 2, 1895.
electoral reform placed the Senator's campaign in jeopardy, and for a few weeks it appeared the fusion candidate might win. Reports reaching Flood spoke of a split in the Democratic party over the Walton Act and of general apathy among the Senator's followers. 31

So threatening was the situation that Senator Martin who had already promised Flood campaign funds 32 intervened in the contest to warn his railroad associates of the danger of not supplying Flood (and other candidates running against the Populists) with more financial aid. Pointing out to them that the state Senator had always worked for their interests in the General Assembly he made it clear that unless they supplied him with financial aid they could expect no more legislative favors from him. 33

Martin's warnings proved effective. Within the week


32. Martin to Flood, Confidential, Scottsville, September 19, 1895, ibid., Box 4.

33. It is of the utmost importance, he wrote William Glasgow, that something be done for the close districts, particularly the Senate districts. "If your company holds back, I do not see how we can get along. Flood, for instance, writes that he is in a close fight. Your friends have always been able to rely on Flood and he has had to bear some unpopularity on account of his supposed friendship for the railroads. If he is deserted now what can be expected of him in the future." Martin to Glasgow, Richmond, October 22, 1895, ibid., Box 71. See also Martin to Glasgow, Richmond, October 26, 1895, ibid., Box 71.
the Senator was able to send Flood a check for $650. 34 Using this money to bribe voters 35 and repeating the old shibboleth of Negro rule should the Populists win, 36 the Appomattox Senator finally won comfortably. 37

His win only encouraged him to seek the congressional nomination once more. His defeat in 1894 had not for one moment lessened his determination to serve in Congress, and as soon as he rested from his campaign he began to write his followers of his plans to oppose Tucker.

In this second contest with his cousin the advantage clearly was with Flood. As in the state elections of 1895 the chief issue in the campaign was fiscal reform. While the state Senator was now on record as being in favor of free silver, Tucker, who was one of the staunchest defenders of the Cleveland administration, was unalterably opposed to major changes in the country's monetary system, and publicly stated his position even though he knew it

34. Martin to Flood, Richmond, October 28, 1895, ibid., Box 4.

35. George Holman to Flood, Edgewood, November 13, 1895, ibid., Box 4. Corruption and fraud were practiced by both sides. Thus Flood received a report from Fluvanna County that the fusion ticket was keeping Democrats at home by offering them each one dollar not to vote. B. R. Boston to Flood, Fluvanna County, October 11, 1895, ibid., Box 4.

36. An instance of Flood's use of the Negro issue in his campaign is mentioned in Bear, "Thomas Staples Martin," p. 103.

37. A breakdown of the vote is in Flood Papers, Box 4.
would cost him his seat in Congress.\textsuperscript{38} To no one's surprise his unequivocal stand against free silver at 16 to 1 in an agrarian district assured his defeat. He and Flood were the only serious contenders for the nomination and during the first six months of 1896 the Appomattox Senator built up a solid block of delegate strength in the east while he made some inroads west of the Blue Ridge. His victory was gained at the end of June when Amherst County which had supported Tucker two years before instructed for Flood. This gave him a majority of the delegate votes and a week later he was officially nominated.\textsuperscript{39}

Almost immediately he began his election campaign against the Republican-Populist candidate, Jacob Yost, the last Republican Congressman to serve from the 10th district. Ordinarily Flood would have been assured of victory in this normally Democratic district. But by the time he campaign got under way, William Jennings Bryan had been nominated for the Presidency on a free silver platform; the organization had split into its two components, businessman and politician; and the Democratic party had divided into gold and silver wings. These events made Flood's chances of

\textsuperscript{38} See Tucker's speech delivered at the Amherst Courthouse, a copy of which is in Tucker Papers, File #128.

\textsuperscript{39} W. I. Ferel to J.S.B. Thompson, Lynchburg, June 20, 1896, and Thomas B. Murphy to Flood, July 31, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 5.
winning questionable.

Gold Democrats in Virginia were not so much interested in electing their own candidates to office as they were in defeating the Silverites. They hoped that a crushing defeat of the silver movement in the November elections would destroy that wing's prominence in the Democratic party, and pave the way for their return to power in the party's echelons. For their purpose they were willing to aid Republicans and Populists as well as to run their own candidates.

They concentrated their efforts on four regions especially, one of which was the 10th district. Working actively on Yost's behalf they poured large sums of money into the district as well as numbers of political pamphlets and pieces of literature. Their efforts soon began to bear fruit. Although Flood conducted his campaign with his usual fervor reports from numerous areas told of a split in the Democratic ranks, of Yost's use of funds to buy Negro votes, and of the fusion candidate's growing strength on both sides of the Blue Ridge. Followers of Flood who had been optimistic at the beginning of the campaign grew pessimistic as the election approached.

40. The others were the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th districts. See Thomas Martin to Edmund Hubard, Scottsville, September 26, 1896, Hubard Papers, File #347.

41. George A. Jordon to Flood, Sun Valley, September 1, 1896, G. D. Fletcher to Flood, Lynchburg, September 12, 1896, Peter J. Otey to Flood, Lynchburg, October 3, 1896,
Working within the ranks of the Gold Democrats were the majority of Virginia's important railroad officials, such as M. E. Ingalls of the Chesapeake and Ohio, who went all over the state campaigning against the regular Democratic party. These same men who had previously cooperated with Flood and the organization were determined to defeat anyone associated with the silver wing of the party. Their reluctance to give Flood aid in 1895 had been but a prelude to their present activities. The newspapers in Staunton owned by the railroads suddenly decided not to support any Democratic candidates, others came out for Republican candidates, "voting education" classes were held for railroad employees, and railroad money made its way into the Yost campaign fund.

With Yost already assured of the Republican, Populist, and Negro votes in the district, the activities of the railroads and Gold Democrats proved enough to defeat Flood. Largely as a result of their bolting the party twenty of the thirty-two counties west of the Blue Ridge and in the

G. F. Coleman to Flood, Cumberland Court House, October 19, 1896, J. Clifton Harris to Flood, Greenville, October 21 and 27, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 5.

42. Richmond Dispatch, September 9, 1900. The Dispatch mentions Ingalls' work in 1896 while discussing his political activities in 1900.

43. Martin to Edmund Hubard, Scottsville, September 29, 1896, Hubard Papers, File #347; William Allen to Joseph Button, Covington, August 1, 1896 and Staunton Democratic Club to Flood, August 4, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 5.
southwestern part of the state went Republican as opposed to only four in 1892.\textsuperscript{44} The Appomattox Senator fell victim to this dramatic reversal in his party's fortunes. His majority in the east was not enough to offset his losses on the other side of the mountains and he lost what was a close election.\textsuperscript{45}

Flood was disheartened by his defeat. His mood was not one so much of discouragement as of anger against the railroads. He felt betrayed by his former corporate friends who had worked so feverishly to defeat him. Martin shared his feelings and assured Flood that he would spare no effort on his behalf. He suggested to the defeated candidate that he tell their friend, Glasgow, that he (Flood) realized he owed his defeat to the railroads. Let him know, Martin remarked, that you and your friends are aware of how they treated you and that they will have more trouble in the future than they have ever dreamed possible unless they assure "our people" of better treatment. Make no distinctions, he went on. Alarm them all for peace can be made at the proper time. "They will want special legislation and it is not


\textsuperscript{45} Analyzing the campaign one voter rightly attributed Flood's defeat to an immense campaign fund given Yost and to the disaffection of the gold Democrats. Pembroke Pettit to Henry Tucker, Palmyra, November 9, 1896, \textit{Tucker Papers}, File #129.
well for them to think they can get it till it is clearly seen that they will align themselves properly." They must be put on proper terms "if we are to bother with them at all," he concluded. "I think I can manage it and will certainly use every care and precaution." 46

Whether Flood followed Martin's advice is unclear but it is certain that the organization put pressure on the railroads. As a result the Martin coalition was brought together again and the politicians in the alignment never had to concern themselves with opposition from the utilities and corporations; they once more counted on their business friends for financial aid and assistance.

Although the demand for free silver continued on past the nineteenth century, it reached its flag end in Virginia after 1896. By practicing the politics of expediency and endorsing free silver Flood and Martin had survived the whirlwind associated with the money question and had avoided other issues of reform such as new voting legislation. The momentary loss of a seat in Congress had been a small price to pay for political survival.

46. Martin to Flood, Washington, January 2, [1907], Flood Papers, Box 4. This very important letter is actually dated January 2, 1896, but it is certain that it was written a year later. For in his 1895 bid for the state Senate Flood did eventually receive the cooperation of the railroads. Most likely Martin made the common mistake at the beginning of a new year of forgetting to change years. Unless this letter is considered as having been written in 1897 rather than 1896 it makes no sense.
Chapter III

The Organization and Anti-Organization

Senator Martin had faced strong public resentment ever since he had won election to office in 1893. The public had expected Fitzhugh Lee to win the vacant Senate seat and they were furious that an unknown like Martin had defeated a man who was the obvious choice of the electorate. As the Senator increased his hold on the state, opposition continued to grow against him and his organization. Sometimes it came from reformers who resented his attempts to thwart what they felt were needed changes in the state. On other occasions it originated with those who personally disliked Martin. More often it stemmed from politicians who did not enjoy the political favor of the organization or who sought to challenge Martin's leadership in the state. By 1897 this group of anti-organization politicians had grown so large that at the state party convention in August it successfully named its own man, Andrew Jackson Montague, as the Democratic nominee for Attorney General despite opposition from two organization candidates, William Hodges Mann and Francis Rives Lassiter. It also almost

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2. It was significant that these two organization can-
succeeded in having a primary plan of nominating United States Senators approved by the state gathering. Only the personal popularity of Senator Daniel who spoke out against the plan and a shrewd political move by Hal Flood who succeeded in preventing unlimited debate on the measure prevented its passage.3

Led by Congressman William Atkinson Jones who sponsored the primary plan and Andrew Jackson Montague, this group of anti-organization politicians shared basically the same political outlook as the Martin wing of the party. Except for their agitation in behalf of the primary, they remained silent on all other issues of reform at the convention.

They eschewed any interest in the important social and economic problems confronting the Old Dominion, and they agreed to a platform which neglected badly needed improvements like better education, increased care for the elderly, and aid for the insane and the deaf. Even their concern with political reform was limited to the direct nomination of Senators; they showed no interest in general electoral revamping or in the destruction of the notorious Walton Law. Their attitude towards other measures of reform suggested that their interest in the direct primary was motivated primarily by a desire to weaken the organization and eventually replace it in political office.  

Despite their limited interest in reform this group of politicians had launched an attack upon the organization which had a wide base of support and had hit upon an issue (the direct nomination of Senators) which had strong public approval. Uneasy over these developments, Martin and Flood began to strengthen their political position in the state. Once again they used sizeable campaign funds supplied to them by corporation friends to elect their men to office and to defeat those who had opposed the organization.

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at Roanoke. Once again their tactics were successful. Results of the state elections in November were even better than they expected as the voters returned a legislature dominated by the organization.

To lead the organization forces in the legislature, Martin naturally relied on Flood. As a ranking member of the Privileges and Elections Committee and a recognized leader of the Martin forces, the Appomattox Senator held great sway over his fellow legislators. He not only commanded the loyalty of the organization politicians in the General Assembly, he was also able to gain the good will of many uncommitted legislators by obtaining patronage positions for their friends. Always an astute politician, he managed to maintain the support of his home district by working hard to obtain passage of those measures most

5. "In strictest confidence," Martin thus wrote Lassiter, "I can say that Ellyson is prepared to furnish you at least $200 more for Huntley's district and will do so if you will tell him that it is necessary. I do not want any risk taken with that district. By all means insist on it being necessary. Get it and make the district certain." Martin to Francis R. Lassiter, Confidential, Richmond, August 23, 1897, Lassiter Papers.

6. Martin to Lassiter, Scottsville, November 5, 1897, ibid.


8. Martin to Flood, Scottsville, November 9, 1897 and Lynchburg, November 10, 1897, Flood Papers, Box 7.
desperately sought by farmers in his region. At the same time he healed the breach with his corporation friends after the 1896 elections and became their chief spokesmen in the legislature. His efforts in behalf of such concerns as the Staunton Telephone and Telegraph Co. and the Ginn and Co. book publishers resulted in sizeable campaign "contributions" for the machine. 10

His most important effort in the Senate in 1897 was his work in defeating the Reddy Primary Bill. Martin, who expected that a primary bill would be introduced into the legislature, had written his friends in Richmond to caution them against allowing any changes in the election

9. He was a leading figure, for example, in the fight to save the Department of Agriculture. Because of his efforts in the struggle Thomas Whitehead, head of a Lynchburg farm group, wrote him, "I take this opportunity to thank you for the gallant fight which we regard as a personal favor to us. We will do all in our power when the time comes to repay the same." Whitehead to Flood, Lynchburg, March 4, 1898, ibid., Box 8.

10. In March 1898, N. C. Watts of the Staunton Mutual Telephone Co., wrote Flood to secure his aid in passing a telephone bill which would eliminate a transmitter tax that the utility company had been paying for years. Please "see to it," he wrote Flood, "that our telephone bill, with the amendment in the House, is passed in the senate. It will be a great handicap on us now, that we have the bill so near completed, to have to pay this enormous...tax for two more years...." Watts to Flood, Staunton, February 26, 1898, Box 8. Flood successfully pushed the bill through the Senate and a short while later received a second letter from Watts thanking him for the work he had done on behalf of the telephone company. "I am under many obligations to you, and... my many friends for what they did in the telephone matter," he noted. He made it clear to Flood that he was at his command. Watts to Flood, Staunton, March 3, 1898, ibid., Box 8. See also Watts to Flood, Staunton, March 4, 1898, ibid., Box 8.
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laws. When the Reddy Bill, which called for a primary system of selecting party nominees, was introduced into the Senate by a member of the anti-organization wing of the party, Flood immediately began to line up Senators against the proposal. Working behind-the-scenes and approaching a number of the legislators in private, he was so successful in obtaining votes against the measure that even before the bill was voted in committee, Martin knew it would be defeated. As he expected it was reported out of committee with an adverse report and voted down on the floor of the Senate. Because of his part in defeating the bill, an unsuccessful attempt was made to oust Flood from his controlling influence in the upper chamber.

The Senator also received a "contribution of $2000 from Ginn and Co. for his influence in its behalf in the legislature. The company's officials wanted him to have the state use their books in the public schools. They promised him a larger "contribution" when they received results. F. M. Ambrose to Flood, New York, May 10, 1897, ibid., Box 6. Flood worked actively and successfully for the company. "I have seen Dr. Southall [State Superintendent of Public Instruction], he later wrote Ambrose in 1899, "and your history is alright." Flood to Ambrose, Appomattox, December 15, 1899, ibid., Box 61. See also Ambrose to Flood, Boston, June 29, 1899, ibid., Box 9.

11. "We must see to it that no liberties are taken this winter with the election law," he wrote Lassiter a few days after the election took place. Martin to Lassiter, Scottsville, November 5, 1897, Lassiter Papers.

12. Martin to Flood, January 27, 1898, Flood Papers, Box 7.


14. John O. Reynolds to Flood, Ashby, February 25, 1898, Flood Papers, Box 7. See also S. M. Shephard to Flood, ibid., Box 8.
Having failed in their first attempt to weaken Martin's control of the electoral system in the state, Jones and his followers realized that they would have to change their strategy. With the legislature and party reins in the hands of the machine, they were aware that a primary plan had little chance of immediate enactment. They knew that the only course left to them was to organize their forces in an intra-party fight and to make a public appeal in behalf of their reform idea. Thus early in 1899 a group of Jones' friends, including Montague and Eppa Hunton (whom Martin had replaced in the Senate), met in Washington to discuss the possibility of getting the State Central Committee to call a state convention in the summer to nominate a candidate for the Senate. By having such a gathering, whose delegates would be popularly chosen, they hoped to take the election of Senators effectively out of the hands of the legislature. The lawmaking body would be honor bound to vote for the convention's choice.  

By March Jones and his friends had decided to call a general conference of all Democrats who favored a primary plan. The appeal for the conference, which appeared in the March 26 edition of the Richmond Dispatch, received such


16. Richmond Dispatch, March 26, 1899.
a favorable response that the gathering which met on
May 10 was attended by more than six hundred delegates.
The conference was conducted smoothly and rapidly. As
already agreed ahead of time, John Goode was named
Temporary Chairman and William Anderson, Permanent Chairman.
Goode, Anderson, Montague, Jones, and others made enthusi-
astic speeches in which they defended the calling of the
meeting, attacked corruption in politics, and advocated
the primary. After they finished, the delegates passed a
number of resolutions, one of which called for the Demo-
cratic State Committee to provide for a primary. In case
it refused, the gathering provided for the appointment of
a group of men to call on every Democrat in Virginia in
order to urge them to elect members of the General Assembly
who would vote for a primary plan. Finally the delegates
voted to create the Senatorial Reform League (officially
known as "The Democratic League for Reform in the Election
of United States Senators") to work for the primary plan.
The Chairman of the conference, who was to direct the work
of the League, appointed a twenty man executive committee.17

Martin and Flood had not been inactive while the events
were unfolding which led to the May Conference. As early as
January when they learned that Jones had met with a group of
his followers in Washington, they made preparations to meet

17. Wheatley, "The Political Career of William
75-78.
the challenge of the anti-organization forces. Their first task was to get the State Committee to vote against a nomination convention. The Junior Senator did not believe that the Committee had any legal right to call such a convention since the party membership in a state gathering had already voted against a primary form of nominating United States Senators. He was confident though that the Committee would vote against holding a convention. He had placed enough of his own men on the Committee since he became Senator so that he estimated two-thirds of the group were loyal to him. But in order to be on the safe side, he had Flood contact the members of the Committee who were his friends to make sure they voted against a state gathering. Flood did his work well and by the time the May Conference took place, the Junior Senator was sure of the support of the vast majority of the State Committee as well as seven of the ten members of its Executive Committee.

A few days after the May Conference adjourned, William Anderson submitted its platform calling for a nominating convention to the state party Chairman, J. Taylor Ellyson.


Confident that he controlled the party hierarchy Martin decided that the time had arrived to meet the challenge of the anti-organization forces. He advised Ellyson, who was in collaboration with the organization, to call a meeting of the entire State Committee to discuss the platform of the May Conference. Originally he had planned for Ellyson to call a meeting of the Executive Committee only. He now felt that the rejection of the primary by the entire State Committee would carry greater weight in the state. He wanted the party to go on record overwhelmingly against the primary in order to put Jones and his followers in the awkward position of being against the Democracy. As instructed by Martin Chairman Ellyson called a meeting of the entire State Committee for June. To no one’s surprise, when the Committee met it voted against the primary plan 37 to 11. The organization’s control of the Committee was so firm that practically no debate took place before the balloting.

Since the party was on record against the primary, anti-organization politicians were left with little choice except to put a candidate against Martin for the Senate and to make the primary plan the issue of the campaign. With the election of a Senator still in the hands of the

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22. Richmond Dispatch, June 13, 1899.
legislature, they had such little chance of winning that they had a difficult time finding a suitable candidate to run against Martin. Many politicians had expected the May Conference to put up its own candidate, but Jones had felt it was wiser to wait until the State Committee first acted on the Conference's request. Once the Committee rejected its demands political expediency proved to be more important than political principle and no one offered to run against Martin. Jones, who was the logical candidate to contest with the Senator refused on the grounds that if he ran, Martin would accuse him of having initiated the May Conference solely to secure his own election to the Senate. When the names of other anti-organization leaders, like Montague and William Anderson, were suggested as candidates, they also quickly eliminated themselves from the race. Only one prominent leader of the Jones' faction appeared willing to make the race. This was J. Hoge Tyler who the anti-machine wing finally selected to lead the fight against Martin.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., pp. 69-74; Larsen, Montague of Virginia, p. 79. Significantly many of the leaders of the May Conference refused to support Tyler's candidacy. They were aware of his slim chances of winning and they did not want to be on the losing side of the battle. Included among these politicians was W. F. Reddy, who had introduced the Reddy Primary Bill in the 1898 session of the legislature. See Wheatley, "The Political Career of William Atkinson Jones," pp. 74-75.
Martin had anticipated the possibility of Tyler running against him in January and he had Flood line up support for him in the General Assembly; he also made Flood his Campaign Manager. The Appomattox Senator was an especially good choice to run the Martin campaign in 1899. Elected in January as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, he had an important say in the choice of the state's electoral boards. Because of his work in behalf of the business interests in the Old Dominion, moreover, he had access to corporation money which not even Martin could obtain. Included among those who gave him campaign funds was no less person than Edward P. Meany, President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., (AT&T).

26. He was particularly interested at the time in gaining support from followers of Fitzhugh Lee who announced that he would not oppose Martin for the Senate. Martin to Flood, Washington, March 12, 1899, and Richmond, March 31, 1899, Flood Papers, Box 8.


28. Flood had met Meany during the course of his work in the legislature in behalf of the Old Dominion's telephone companies. The President of AT&T was particularly impressed with Flood's efforts to defeat the Nichols Tax Bill which would have raised telephone taxes in the state. They had a long friendship during the course of which Meany gave the Senator large campaign contributions. See, for example, Meany to Flood, New York, January 25 and December 15, 1899, Flood Papers, Boxes 8 and 10. Another corporation leader who was obliged to Flood for his "past kindnesses" and who gave the Senator money for the campaign was William J. Payne, President of the Newport News and Old Point Railway and Electric Co. See Payne to Flood, Richmond, May 11, 1899, *ibid.*, Box 9.
Flood's strategy in the contest was the old but effective one of supplying organization candidates for the legislature with necessary funds to assure their election (such as by the purchase of votes) at the mass meetings which chose the nominees. As a further precaution he kept close tabs on the organization followers throughout the state to see that they attended these meetings. Where necessary he wrote personal letters to influential politicians to secure their aid. Mainly he emphasized behind-the-scenes work rather than speechmaking but he occasionally spoke in behalf of a candidate or sent an organization leader to address a mass meeting. 29

Tyler faced a much more difficult task in his campaign. For one thing he lacked adequate backing from the anti-organization wing of the party. Many of the group, such as Montague, who supported Tyler privately, were reluctant to take the stump for him. 30 Also he did not have nearly the financial backing which the Martin machine enjoyed. He tried to compensate for his disadvantages by making an extensive traveling and speaking campaign throughout the state, but by the beginning of September it was obvious to the anti-

29. Martin to Flood, Washington, August 8, 1899, ibid., Box 9; Flood to C. R. Saunderson, Appomatox, August 18, 1899 and Flood to Joseph Bowman, Appomatox, September 4, 1899, ibid., Box 61; Sydney P. Epes to Flood, Blackstone, October 13, 1899 and William Mann to Flood, Nottoway, October 12, 1899, ibid., Box 10.

30. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, p. 79.
organization wing that his cause was lost. About one quarter of the members of the two houses had already been chosen and nearly all of them were pledged to Martin. The election of the remaining legislators during the following weeks also went heavily in the Senator's behalf, so that when the caucus to choose a Senator was held in December, Martin was renominated without any difficulty. On the advice of Martin and James Hay, Flood kept out a few Independent legislators who wanted to crash the caucus to vote for Tyler. The meeting which followed was harmonious and brief, and the few speeches proceeding the balloting gave no indication of the bitterness which had characterized the contest. When the election took place, Martin received an overwhelming 103 votes to only 27 for


32. New York Times, September 3, 1899. Martin's control over Virginia politics had already attracted nationwide notoriety. As a result the New York Times carefully followed the contest between the Senator and Tyler. In September the paper wrote a penetrating analysis of the election and of Martin's hold on the politics of the Old Dominion. The article clearly showed the paper's preference for Tyler. "The basis of the whole Martin scheme," it remarked, "is the combination into one compact syndicate of all the office holders of Virginia from members of the judiciary down to the smallest county employees (sic). With this combination he wields a power from which it is difficult to dislodge him without a counter organization equally effective. Governor Tyler is making the fight against those methods and in opposition to the office trust...."ibid.

33. Martin to Flood, Scottsville, November 11, 1899 and Hay to Flood, Madison, November 9, 1899, Flood Papers, Box 10.
Tyler's defeat was by no means the end of the anti-organization movement. Jones, Montague, and their followers were determined to replace the organization as the leading force in the state's political affairs; in the future they would enjoy somewhat more success than they had in the past. Martin's overwhelming election, however, did show the effectiveness of his organization as compared with that of his opponents. While the opposition had been disunited, his group had conducted the campaign with full organizational efficiency. His victory also dispelled any notion that might have existed about the strength of his wing of the party. Certainly he recovered whatever prominence he had lost as a result of the 1897 state convention at Roanoke.

Flood's efforts in behalf of the organization was responsible for much of the success which Martin enjoyed. He had lined up the legislators in the General Assembly to defeat the Reddy Primary Bill; he had seen to it that the State Committee voted against the platform of the May Conference; and he had directed the successful campaign against Tyler. His work for the Martin wing of the party demonstrated once more the power which he held in the state's political affairs.

His success in state politics only encouraged him to

34. Washington Post, December 8, 1899; Richmond Dispatch, December 8, 1899.
run for Congress once more in 1898. As many of his friends knew Flood still was not satisfied with being a state politician; his ambition remained a seat in Congress. He saw no reason to prevent him from attempting to gain the goal which would have been his in 1896 had it not been for unusual political circumstances in the Old Dominion. And so in the beginning of 1898, he announced for the third time his candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.

With the aid of Martin, who exerted all his efforts on his friend's behalf, and his business associates, he almost won the nomination. He gained the solid support of the counties east of the Blue Ridge and far more delegate strength at the nominating convention than anyone else. But despite vigorous efforts by the organization he failed to gain any significant strength from the western counties, most of

35. The junior Senator had informed Flood early in the campaign that he would "do anything and go anywhere" for him. Martin to Flood, Washington, May 11, 1898, ibid., Box 8. He lived up to his promise by practically making the campaign his own. He traveled throughout the district on Flood's behalf and used all his influence to get him votes. An unusually large correspondence took place between Flood and himself on campaign matters. See, for example, Martin to Flood, Washington, March 8 and 31, and May 4, 11, and 25, 1898, Flood Papers, Box 8.

36. "I assure you that at any time we telephone epople can be of service to you, we are at your command," N.C. Watts of Staunton Mutual Telephone Co. thus wrote Flood. Watts to Flood, Staunton, February 26, 1898, ibid., Box 7.

37. In order to help Flood get votes in the west, Martin had Claude Swanson write to his friends of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., in Augusta County to secure their help for the Appomattox Senator. He also suggested to Flood that he
whose votes went to the two other candidates, Julian Quarles and Frank Glasgow. Martin tried to eliminate these two men from the race by offering them political positions if they withdrew. They refused, and together they had enough votes to deadlock the nominating convention. When Flood realized that he did not have the votes for himself, he threw his support to the weakest candidate, Quarles, who then walked off with the coveted prize.

His defeat in 1898 was the nadir of Flood's political career. Having lost three times in his bid for a seat in Congress, he was so discouraged that he even considered quitting politics altogether. He might have taken this fateful step had not Hay, Martin, and others dissuaded him from doing so by pointing out certain obvious facts to him. For one thing, as they were well aware, Flood was still the most important politician in his district. As a leader in the Senate and an ally of Martin he continued to control the political offices and patronage in his area and had a powerful say in political matters throughout the state.

have his close friend, Dr. Joseph Southall, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, write to each of the local county Superintendents in his behalf. Martin to Flood, Washington, March 31 and May 11, 1898, ibid., Box 8.

38. See, for example, Martin to Judge William Coleman, Washington, March 8, 1898, ibid., Box 8.

39. As recalled in Richmond Dispatch, August 18, 1901.
Also, he retained the good will of the corporations on whom he could always rely for funds and political assistance.  

Flood's decision to run a fourth time for the House in 1900, therefore, was based on a careful analysis of his political strength in the state and in his district. He did not even decide to make the race until he had carefully reviewed the situation in the district and until he was sure that he would gain enough delegate votes from the western counties to give him a majority at the nominating convention. Frank Glasgow's announcement that he would not run a second time assured him of these needed votes. Confident that he would win, he announced his candidacy in November, 1899 and immediately began to send out letters soliciting support.  

As the Appomattox Senator expected, he easily won the nomination this time notwithstanding predictions by the Richmond Dispatch of a close race. Of the three opponents which he had in the contest two of them, Robert Catlett and

40. "Your enemies say your political career is ended," James Hay wrote Flood, "your friends believe that it will be in your power to retrieve any steps you might have lost. You can strike your enemies most effectually (sic) by continuing in public life, and if I were you I would certainly return to the senate." Hay to Flood, Washington, September 5, 1898, Flood Papers, Box 8.


42. Richmond Dispatch, March 9 and 30, 1900.

43. Another candidate, Frank Echols, had also planned to run against Flood. But Echols was closely associated with
Bennet Gordon, were darkhorses who had almost no chance of getting the nomination. The third, incumbent Quarles, had improved his political position since entering Congress and was a more serious opponent. But he had to contend with the valuable assistance and financial aid which Martin and the corporations gave Flood. Also he still lacked strength in the east which was solid for Flood and did not even have the united backing of the western counties enjoyed by the state Senator's previous opponents. Flood had spent a good deal of time in these counties since his defeat in 1898. He had made the acquaintance of enough local politicians so that by 1900 he felt confident of taking at least Alleghany, Bath, and Highland Counties.

some of the organization men in the district such as William Glasgow who persuaded him not to run in return for Flood's promise of some other political office. This led one disgruntled voter to complain to the Chairman of the party, J. Taylor Ellyson, about the power which Flood wielded in the county. Office holders, he wrote, were "afraid to acknowledge that their lives are their own." William D. Hix to Ellyson Hixburg, January 31, 1900, J. Taylor Ellyson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.

44. He was the author of a popular resolution expressing American sympathy with the Boers in their struggle against England and he had worked diligently to bring rural free delivery into the 10th district. Richmond Dispatch, March 9, 1910.

45. Meaney of AT&T, for example, sent Flood a check for $200 along with a note in which he offered to give the state Senator whatever he needed to win the election. Meaney to Flood, New York, December 12, 1899, Flood Papers, Box 10.

46. Flood to Edward Echolds, Appomattox, March 30, 1900 and Flood to A. W. Harmon, ibid., Box 61.
Quarles did his best to overcome his disadvantages. He even made the campaign lively by charging that his opponent had stolen from him a valuable patronage plum of naming the district's census enumerators. Unfortunately for his candidacy his accusation, which had truth to it, was not enough to change the outcome of the election. When the first test of strength between the two candidates took place at the Alleghany County meeting, the Appomattox Senator

47. Martin, who in addition to being head of the organization in Virginia was also an influential Senator in Washington, had somehow gotten the right to name one half of the enumerators ordinarily allotted to Quarles and had passed the much sought after patronage to Flood. The Appomattox Senator in turn wrote to his followers asking them to send him lists of parties who would be friendly to his candidacy if he secured appointments for them. Flood to J. F. Lowman and to W. F. Tinsley, Appomattox, March 23, 1900, ibid., Box 13. As soon as Quarles realized what Martin and Flood were doing, he wrote a number of bitter letters in which he complained about the loss of the enumerator patronage and in which he accused Martin of having stolen it from him. When Flood learned of Quarles' action, he instructed one of his followers, S. M. Donald, to investigate the Congressman's background in order to counter his charges about the enumerators with an attack on his political past. Flood to Donald, Appomattox, May 30, 1900, ibid., Box 13. Furthermore, he wrote Quarles to ask if the reports were true that he was sending out letters attacking Martin. If they were correct, he demanded to know the authority for his information. When Quarles reiterated his charges but refused to name the source of his information, Flood decided to press the matter. He had Martin issue a public statement in which he admitted that he made a number of endorsements for the census enumerators, but in which he denied he interfered with Quarles' patronage. He also asked what authority Quarles had for accusing him of interference. Despite his statement the question of the census enumerators remained the most important issue of the campaign. Flood to Quarles, Appomattox, May 31, 1900 and Quarles to Flood, Washington, June 1, 1900, ibid., Box 13; Flood to Martin, Appomattox, June 8, 1900, ibid., Box 61.
won the county's endorsement. The following day he gained the support of Highland County, and a few days later that of Cumberland County. With victories already won in his home of Appomattox and neighboring Buckingham County he was assured of 40 of the needed votes for nomination. Moreover, he was expected to receive 18 votes from Amherst, 9 from Fluvanna, 10 from Botetourt, and 5 from Bath when their mass meetings chose convention delegates.

Since Quarles realized that he had no chance of winning, he announced on July 12 that he was withdrawing from the race. A number of his diehard supporters who still refused to jump on the Flood bandwagon threw their support to one of the two minor candidates, Catlett or Gordon. Their action was no more than a futile gesture, for at the convention in August Flood received 95 votes to the combined total of 63 for his opponents. Harmony prevailed throughout the meeting. Frank Glasgow, who had opposed the Senator two years before, delivered Flood's nominating speech and the Senator's selection seemed to meet with the approval of all in the assembly hall.

49. Richmond Dispatch, June 22 and 27, 1900.
50. Ibid., June 27, 1900.
51. Washington Post, July 12, 1900.
52. Ibid., August 2, 1900; Richmond Dispatch, August 2, 1900.
Flood had won the Democratic nomination for Congress four years before, during a presidential election year, only to lose to his Republican opponent. The nominee was determined to avoid a repetition of 1896. Political conditions, of course, had changed since then. William Jennings Bryan was once more the candidate, but the party was united. The disruptive question of free silver was no longer the chief issue, but trust busting and imperialism. Railroads and other business enterprises which had campaigned against Bryan in 1896 were working in his behalf or remaining inactive, and it was apparent to all that Bryan would carry the state without difficulty.

Even so Flood had Republican opposition to his candidacy.

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53. Even though he was campaigning for Congress, Flood has taken an interest in the Democratic presidential nomination. In order to enhance his political stature in his district and throughout the state, he sought the Temporary Chairmanship of the state convention which met that year to choose delegates to the national gathering in Kansas City. With the aid of Martin, Hay, Swanson and his other close associates, he gained the post. Swanson to Flood, Washington, April 4, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 11. In his address to the convention which met in May he purposely refrained from making any reference to the silver question which he had so warmly supported in 1896. Instead he took what was the official party line by launching out at the Republicans for what he termed their imperialistic foreign policy and their support of trusts. He also had warm praise for William Jennings Bryan who everyone recognized would be renominated at Kansas City. Remarks of H. D. Flood, Temporary Chairman of the Democratic State Convention, Norfolk, Virginia, May 2, 1900, in private possession of Mrs. Henry D. Flood, Washington, D. C. Flood received a long applause after his address and despite the existence of the anti-organization faction, the party seemed more united than it had been in a number of years, Washington Post, May 2 and 3, 1900; Richmond Dispatch, May 3, 1900.

54. Richmond Dispatch, May 3, 1900.
from R. T. Hubard and he was worried that the Republican party might supply Hubard with sizeable financial assistance, just as it had supported Yost in 1896. He knew that the Republican leaders in the state had decided to concentrate their efforts in only a few districts and that one of these was his own. 55

He was also aware that some dissatisfaction existed in the district as a result of his work in the legislature for the telephone companies, of his hold on the district's politics, and of his connections with Martin. 56 With proper financial backing he was afraid that Hubard would wage a lively contest against his candidacy. In an attempt to avoid a serious fight he decided to write his friend Meany in New York to ask for his help. Meany knew the Chairman of the Republican National Congressional Committee. Flood asked Meany to pay the Chairman a visit in order to convince him that he would be wasting his campaign money if he invested it in the Old Dominion. 57

Flood's concern was needless. The leaders of the Republican party realized themselves that it would be unwise to invest in a sizeable campaign in Virginia, and they left

55. Washington Post, August 4, 1900.
56. S. W. Sirg to Flood, Charlottesville, September 6, 1900 and Barnett N. Bill to Flood, Buffalo Mills, September 20, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 13.
57. Flood to Meany, Appomattox, August 21, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 60.
candidates like Hubard without sufficient funds to finance their campaign. To make matters worse for Hubard, the party was badly split in his region between his followers and those who believed that Yost should have been nominated.\textsuperscript{58} Republican weakness left Democratic leaders confident that Flood would win in November by an overwhelming margin.\textsuperscript{59}

In the campaign Flood still encountered a remnant of resistance to free silver, Bryan, and the Democratic party which had been so evident four years earlier. But when the ballots were counted in the first week in November, he gained election by a vote of 16,084 for himself to 13,913 for Hubard, a margin about the same as previous successful candidates in the 10th district had enjoyed.\textsuperscript{60}

Flood's election ended a critical four year period in his political career. During these years he had been defeated three times for Congress and had even contemplated quitting politics, only to come back and win a House seat. During this time also he worked to reelect Martin to the Senate and aided him in defeating the first attempts by the anti-organization forces to oust the organization from power.

Flood and Martin had been successful in beating off the anti-organization largely because they controlled the

\textsuperscript{58} Washington Post, August 29, 1900.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., August 7, 1900; Richmond Dispatch, August 14 and 15, 1900.

\textsuperscript{60} Richmond Dispatch, November 27 and December 1, 1900.
legislature and the party machinery, and because the leaders of the rival wing of the party were too disunited to make an effective appeal to the electorate. This group of politicians, nevertheless, remained a significant source of opposition to the organization. Desirous of political power themselves, they were a faction which Flood and Martin could not easily ignore. The setbacks which they suffered in trying to gain the popular nomination of Senators did not keep them from agitating for a primary. Since they had strong public backing for their plan, the organization soon had to face the problem of a primary once more. Furthermore, a number of this wing of the party were already leading a swelling movement in the state for the calling of a constitutional convention. It was this demand for a convention which became the immediate problem for Flood and the organization.
CHAPTER IV

The Constitutional Convention

In 1900 the supreme body of laws in the Old Dominion was the Underwood Constitution, which had brought an end to the period of reconstruction in Virginia. As required by Congress this constitution had granted to Negroes in the state the privileges of citizenship, including the right to vote and to hold office. As a result, almost from the time the document was first promulgated in 1869, agitation had been prevalent in the black belt counties of Virginia's Southside for a new constitution which would disfranchise the colored voters. Here, as in most areas of the former Confederacy where Negroes were in the majority, white citizens viewed "radical reconstruction" as the bleakest period in United States history, exalted white Anglo-Saxon supremacy, and sought the legalization of what they considered to be the inferior status of the freeman.

Because of the alliance between Negroes and the hated Republican party, feeling against the freeman continued to grow during the 1870's and 1880's. When the Democrats returned to power in 1884 following the end of Readjuster rule they were able effectively to disfranchise the majority of colored voters by the Anderson-McCormick law. Still more Negroes lost the vote by the Walton Act of 1894. As the
freeman was disfranchised he increasingly despaired of advancing himself politically or socially, and as he lost hope he took less interest in political matters. Those Negroes who remained eligible to vote offered their ballot as a commodity to be purchased by the highest bid of an office-seeker. Consequently many voters and politicians who were previously opposed or indifferent to taking away the vote from the Negro came to view total disfranchisement as a progressive measure which would remove the odium of barter and illiteracy from campaigns. Exasperated by corrupt election practices within the Democratic party, they directed their resentment not at the partisan electoral system which accounted for so much of the corruption but at the Underwood Constitution whose enfranchisement clauses they felt were responsible for the dishonesty in state politics. They united with the voters of the black belt (and others who favored disfranchisement primarily for racial reasons) in calling for a constitutional convention to formulate a new body of laws for the state. They were joined by a lesser group who wanted a convention to streamline governmental operations and cut down on state expenditures.¹

Hal Flood responded enthusiastically to the agitation for a constitutional gathering, which he had been urging since 1896.² Flood had been born and raised in the heart of

¹. Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia, pp. 48-59.
². Flood to W. C. Wooldridge, Richmond, February 19, 1896, Flood Papers, Box 5.
the black belt, and he shared its feelings towards the Negro. He felt that the colored man was racially inferior to the Anglo-Saxon and therefore not entitled to the rights of full citizenship. He also bitterly resented the Underwood Constitution which he was convinced had been forced upon the state by Republican carpetbaggers and which left the citizens of the Old Dominion in "a more humiliating and degrading condition of affairs than that to which any free and enlightened people have ever...been subjected."  

His resentment of the Underwood Constitution had not prevented him from taking advantage of its franchise clauses to buy Negro votes with whiskey and money. But as Senator

3. "You and Tom Harrison have some queer notions about the rights of Negroes," he once wrote Richard Byrd. "I begin to fear, however, that a good many people in Virginia think as you do. If you and those who think with you could live in the negro belt a while, you would change your views." Flood to Byrd, Appomattox, April 22, 1901, ibid., Box 61. See also Flood to W. A. Land, Washington, November 25, 1910, and Flood to W. N. Fishburne, Washington, July 22, 1919, ibid., Boxes 37 and 77.

4. Richmond Dispatch, September 6, 1901.

5. Even in the election of 1900 his followers resorted to this method in winning the election. "We will probably need another $100," one Benjamin Haden wrote to Flood in June. "We will have to buy about 5 gallons of whiskey ($15)," he continued, "and send for it. We will have to hire wagons and teams to bring these people in from every direction, and we have got to pay a great many of them." Haden to Flood, Fincastle, June 13, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 12. A few months later another worker for the Senator complained that he would have to spend $150 at one precinct alone to buy the Negro vote. A. J. Tinsley to Flood, Cliton Forege, October 5, 1900, ibid., Box 13.
William Barksdale suggested in a debate on the floor of the state legislature, Flood had also suffered as a result of Republican purchasing of colored ballots, particularly during his campaign for Congress in 1896. For political as well as personal reasons, therefore, he was anxious to have a new constitution which would disfranchise the Negro.

As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections prior to his election to Congress, he was in an excellent position to initiate formal measures for holding a constitutional convention, since the necessary enabling legislation had to go through his committee. Accordingly, on December 6, 1899 he introduced a bill which provided for submitting to the qualified voters of the state the question of calling a convention. In writing the measure he had anticipated opposition to the gathering from groups of illiterate whites who were afraid they would be disfranchised along with the colored voters. To avoid such resistance his resolution provided that the ballots be printed with only the words "For Constitutional Convention". In order to cast a ballot against a convention, a voter had to strike out these words. Any ballot not so marked would be a vote in favor of

6. Washington Post, February 23, 1900. One of the reasons he spent money in the 1900 election buying Negro ballots was because his opponent was attempting to do the same thing. M. J. Franklin to Flood, Pamplin, October 27, 1900, ibid., Box 13.

having a gathering. If any of the words remained un-scratched, the ballot was not counted. 8

His resolution was brought before the upper chamber of the state legislature the following February. This session had already been an active one for the Appomattox Senator. He had worked closely with his business friends to obtain a charter allowing the Seaboard Airline Railroad Company to build a line from Richmond to Washington, 9 and he had been largely responsible for defeating the Barksdale Pure Election Bill which would have reformed the state's voting laws by preventing the use of money and patronage in securing the election of candidates. 10

8. In defending his measure, Flood later admitted in the convention, "the Legislature...which favored the calling of a Constitutional Convention had under the Underwood Constitution, which had been rammed down the throats of the people, either to give the advantage to those who favored a Constitutional Convention, or to those who opposed it. The Legislature did not provide for an unfair ballot, but simply gave the advantage to those who favored the calling of a Constitutional Convention. Richmond Dispatch, May 25, 1902.

9. This measure was opposed by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Co., which had a similar line already in operation, and by a number of state politicians, including Senator Martin, who felt the state should be indemnified more than the Seaboard was willing to pay for the right to establish the line. But with the support of the Richmond Dispatch, which waged a long campaign in behalf of the measure, Flood managed successfully to push the charter through the Senate. Richmond Dispatch, February 8, 1900. For Martin's opposition to the charter, see Martin to Flood, Personal and Confidential. Washington, January 26, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 11.

Even at the time that the enabling resolution was introduced into the Senate Flood was in the midst of another legislative fight, this time for reconsideration of a bill which would incorporate the Virginia Telephone and Telegraph Co. The legislation was supported by the AT&T which hoped to expand its operations in Virginia by controlling the new company, and which in turn expected its subsidiary to consolidate the numerous small telephone companies in the state into one system
11 and to provide long distance telephone service. Flood had previously succeeded in pushing the incorporation measure through the upper chamber as one of many routine bills by having it introduced on a half-empty floor and passed before anyone realized its importance. But when the cities and municipalities had discovered what had happened they had united behind the recently elected state Senator, Carter Glass, to force the Senate to revoke the company's

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11. Exactly what connection AT&T intended to have with the new company was never clarified. Since officials of the company were aware of the unfavorable reaction which voters of the state would have if they knew that a New York based operation was behind the incorporation measure, they kept their activities veiled in secrecy. Flood even denied that the Bell Company was behind the movement for a charter. Washington Post, February 15, 1900. Despite his denial the company certainly intended to exert some force of control over the new telephone line. The Appomattox Senator himself admitted "that persons in the American Telegraph Company would be largely interested in the Virginia corporation." Ibid. Furthermore, after the bill for a charter was defeated, Meany of AT&T wrote Flood in order to express the hope "that in the near future our efforts to introduce capital and good telephone service in the state of Virginia will be better appreciated." He also asked Flood to visit him in order to talk over future moves concerning a charter for the Virginia Company. Meany to Flood, New York, August 3, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 12.
charter. A regular donnybrook followed in the legislature where great pressure was applied by large lobbies representing the Virginia company on the one hand and the state's municipalities on the other. Finally, after using every parliamentary device available, Glass managed to postpone consideration of a second charter indefinitely. In doing so he effectively killed the plan for a new telephone company for the current session of the legislature and won an important victory over the politically more experienced Flood.

Defeat of the charter measure left the way clear for consideration of Flood's enabling resolution. The form of his bill soon produced a lively debate on the floor of the Senate. Opponents of the legislation argued that because the measure made no provision for printing the words "Against Convention", it would be resented by the white voters of the state. One disgruntled legislator even claimed that if the convention were called according to the provisions of the bill, "there would have to be explanations [of the meeting]."

12. Commenting years later on the fight, Carter Glass remarked, "That was the goddamnest row I think I was ever in. They had the most unconscionable lobby ever gathered together in Richmond. They brought up the judges, the clerks, the treasurers and everybody else they could corral to work on the delegates. You couldn't tell which way a man was going to jump, nor how long he would stay put." Quoted in Ferrell, "Claude A. Swanson," p. 60. See also Wm. A. Barksdale to Flood, Houston, Va., February 26, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 11.

down to the corridors of time." Despite the intensity of the discussion, success of Flood's resolution was never in serious doubt. By March 5 both houses had passed the enabling act and had set May 24 as the date for a statewide referendum on whether to have a constitutional convention.  

Although reaction to the measure followed no precise political lines, the anti-organization forces led by such men as Montague, Eugene Withers, J. C. Parker, and Carter Glass, generally pushed eagerly for the convention while the Martin wing of the party opposed holding it. Except for Flood and a few others, most officeholders and corporative representatives within the organization were satisfied with present conditions in the Old Dominion and were afraid to tamper with the political, economic, or social structure of the state, uncertain of how far the reform zeal might spread if the opportunity were presented to make changes.  

Aware of the growing stir for a constitutional convention, these members of the organization were anxious to find some way to deal with the mounting agitation and at the same time avoid calling a convention. After talking with a group of machine leaders, James Hay decided it would be best if Martin held a conference of the leadership for the purpose of defining some policy towards the convention which the organi-  

15. Richmond Dispatch, April 8, 1900.
zation could follow before the state gathering met the following May. Martin liked Hay's suggestion so much that he arranged for the meeting the next day and invited Hay, Flood, and Glasgow, Congressmen Claude Swanson, William Rhea and Sydney Epes, the industrialist Alfred Thom, and a few other less prominent members of the organization.16

The conference failed to arrive at any agreement. Flood was too committed to the holding of a convention to change his mind, while the others present at the meeting, including Martin, were firm in their opposition to the gathering. The Appomattox Senator continued to fight for the passage of the enabling act and even urged that the vote on the referendum be made a matter of party regularity at the state convention.17 At the same time others in the organization worked to defeat the measure. Since Senator Martin was aware of the sentiment in favor of a new constitution,18 he did not openly oppose calling a convention. Instead he argued against having the party come out in favor of a meeting at its state gathering.19 Swanson and Rhea, who were aware of the sentiment which illiterate whites felt at


17. Richmond Dispatch, January 26, 1900.


19. Martin to Lassiter, Washington, March 29, 1900, ibid; Richmond Dispatch, March 29, 1900.
the prospect of being disfranchised, shared his feelings. They feared that if the party convention declared for a constitutional gathering, their chances of re-election next fall would be seriously diminished. 20

With most machine leaders opposed to making a vote on Flood's enabling act a party issue, politicians generally predicted a lively fight at the Democratic gathering in May over the question. These predictions were soon proven wrong, however, as the organization was unable to prevent the election of an overwhelming number of delegates from the black belt counties who were as determined as Flood to disfranchise the Negro. Once they were chosen there were more than enough delegates to assure that the calling of a constitutional convention would be made a party matter. 21 As expected, after a strong plea by Temporary Chairman Flood, the delegates went on record as officially endorsing the enabling act. Leaders of the organization, who realized they were in minority made no effort to challenge the obvious intention of the delegates. Instead they tried to ride with the movement for a convention by either remaining discreetly quiet or by rallying around Flood in favor of a new constitution. 22


21. Ibid., April 25 and 27, 1900.

A few weeks after the convention adjourned the voters went to the polls to vote in favor of the enabling act. According to the referendum which they approved Governor J. Hoge Tyler was to call the General Assembly into special session and the legislature would then decide on the date for the convention and in the manner of choosing delegates. Since it was a presidential year, Tyler preferred to wait until the following January, when elections were over, before calling the special session. In the interim proponents of the gathering like Flood concentrated their efforts on their own elections or spelled out their plans for the coming meeting.

As father of the enabling act Flood had some decided opinions about the convention. He especially wanted its body to be small since the gathering would be easier to handle that way. Also he preferred that the delegates be chosen at the regular spring elections in May and that the legislature spend no more than a month in making arrangements for the gathering. After some discussion in the General Assembly his views prevailed. The legislature decided that members would be chosen from the districts of the House of Delegates, that 100 members would be elected, and that voting for dele-

23. For an analysis of the vote, see McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902, pp. 16-19; Washington Post, May 21 and 25, 1900.

24. Richmond Dispatch, December 1, 1900.
gates would take place on the fourth week in May. 25

Democratic primaries were held throughout March and April to select nominees for delegate positions. In order to win control of the convention for the organization, Flood actively participated in these primary fights and had his followers travel throughout the state in behalf of organizational candidates. 26 Martin cooperated fully with his efforts. 27

Despite their work results of the primary were indecisive. Enough Martin delegates were elected so that Flood and James Hay were able to predict that they would prevent the passage of any unfavorable legislation; 28 yet the majority of those chosen were either neutral in the intra-party struggle taking place within the Old Dominion or were outwardly antagonistic to the organization. Included among the convention members were several important anti-organization leaders like William Anderson and Carter Glass who would shortly assume


26. Knowing, for example, that his political rival in the 10th district, William Anderson, was sure to win a delegate seat, the new Congressman tried to win his support by offering to work in his behalf during the canvass. Flood to Anderson, West Appomattox, April 22, 1901, William A. Anderson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. See also Howard Featherstone to Flood, Lynchburg, March 27, 1901, and Martin to Flood, Scottsville, March 20, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 14.

27. Martin to Flood, Scottsville, March 20, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 14.

significant roles at the gathering.

Hal Flood headed the Martin forces at the meeting, and as delegate from Appomattox County he played an important role in committee sessions and on the floor of the gathering. As so often in his career, he identified himself with the reform elements at the convention while he attempted to prevent major changes in the governmental structure of the state (with the one exception of disfranchising the Negro). He spoke out in favor of popular sovereignty and limited government, against dishonesty in elections, against large corporations and trusts, and even against political bossism and machines. At the same time he quietly saw to it that his business friends remained protected and that the organization retained its hold on the political structure of the Old Dominion.

As a delegate Flood was placed on the convention's crucial Committee on Elective Franchise, whose function it was to frame the disfranchisement clause of the new constitution. In addition he was put on the Committee on the Executive Department, Ministerial Offices of the State Government, and Bureaus (all one committee). This was

29. Flood had not planned to attend the convention at first since he thought he would have to be in Washington for a special session of Congress. But when the session was not called he changed his mind and easily won a delegate seat. Flood to W. I. Karr, Appomattox, January 18 and Edmund Echols to Flood, Staunton, March 4, 1901, ibid., Boxes 61 and 14.

30. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Virginia Held in the City of Richmond Beginning June 12th, 1901 (Richmond;
also an important assignment for the Congressman since the committee was responsible for drafting the provisions on the organization of state government. Functions assigned to the various governmental departments were of obvious concern to the Martin wing of the party.

The convention's work was accomplished in two sessions which together lasted for a full year, with only a few brief recesses. While extensive debate took place on the floor of the convention and filled approximately 3500 pages of journal, most of the crucial work, such as the writing of the provisions, took place in committee sessions. Most important of these articles and the one which proved the most difficult to write was the one on the suffrage. Essentially, the problem which faced the Committee on Elective Franchise was how to disfranchise the Negro without doing the same to the white voters and without violating the United States Constitution. The Committee which was headed by Senator John Daniel, met twenty-five times during the course of the year to consider no less than forty resolutions on the question.31

All shades of opinion were represented on the Committee from those who thought the Negro had a right to the suffrage to those who felt he should be disfranchised at all costs.

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Clyde W. Saunders, 1901), June 21, 1901, p. 49.

Flood belonged to the latter group and offered a resolution which would have prevented the Negro from holding any constitutional office in the state. But while most members of the committee were prepared to bar the colored man from public office and the suffrage, they preferred to do so without mentioning the Negro by name, and they turned down his motion. They then spent months debating the provisions which the disfranchising plank ought to contain, so that it was September before they were able to present majority and minority reports on the problem to the convention's Democratic conference.

Their two reports were alike in many ways and included similar residence qualifications, similar registration procedures, a poll tax, and an understanding clause. Their main difference was that while the minority report called for a temporary understanding clause the majority report called for a permanent one. Adoption of the majority report meant irremovable discrimination against the Negro.

Debate in the Democratic conference on the two proposed


33. As one student of the convention has remarked, "The minority wished to give the illiterate white voter the opportunity to get on the registration books and then give the ignorant of both races the same opportunity to qualify for the suffrage, while the majority would continue the requirement of an explanation of the duties of officers, which was an open invitation to discrimination against the Negro." McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902, p. 40.
suffrage planks assumed more months of haggling and lasted from October, 1901 to March, 1902. During these discussions Flood spoke out in behalf of the majority report and understanding clause and at the same time attacked a proposed educational test which would have required a knowledge of reading and writing. In his remarks he made a forceful plea for the illiterate whites of the state. Pointing out that "the unlettered white men" had won America's independence and had spilled their blood in the war between the states, he maintained that they should not be deprived of the suffrage simply because they were never given the opportunity to learn how to read and to write. 34

After much discussion the democratic Conference voted against the educational test, but the final suffrage plank which it recommended—and which was passed by the full convention in April—called for only a temporary understanding clause to last until January, 1904. Even though the disfranchisement of the Negro after 1904 was effectively assured by other provisions of the plank, such as a three year retroactive poll tax for those registering after that date, Flood felt the measure was ineffective. He was only one of twenty-eight delegates who voted against the measure while sixty-seven cast their ballots in favor of it. 35

34. Debates in the Democratic Conference were never recorded and accounts of its proceedings must be drawn from newspapers and correspondence. For Flood's speech in behalf of illiterate whites see Richmond Dispatch, January 24, 1902.

35. McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of
In order to carry out the suffrage provisions of the constitution the convention adopted a registration ordinance on June 7 which provided for the establishment of a board of three registrars in each magisterial district of a county and in each ward of a city. They were to be appointed on the recommendation of the convention's delegates and would carry out registration for a fixed number of days at two dollars per day. Since they were a vital part of the electoral system Flood wanted to be certain that the men selected, even in Republican areas, were Democrats who were sympathetic to the organization. He wrote to a number of his friends throughout the state and particularly in Republican areas, asking for names to appoint. By using his influence with the delegates in the convention he succeeded in having a number of these men selected. Partly as a result of his

1901-1902, p. 43. Of those who voted against the measure, Walter Watson, who shared Flood's view about disfranchising the Negro, claimed that only five others besides himself and Flood opposed it because they thought it was inefficient. Other negative votes he said were cast by those who felt the understanding clause was irreligious or immoral. Walter A. Watson, "Notes on Southside Virginia," Bulletin of the Virginia State Library, XV (September, 1925), Appendix I, "Extracts from Diaries," p. 214.


37. "When the Constitutional Convention assembles," he thus wrote M. S. Cahon, "it will appoint a board of registration composed of three for each magisterial district....As your county is represented by a republican, you will have to depend on other friends in this convention to look after your interest. I will be glad to do this for you if you will let me know whom you want appointed on these boards." Flood to M. S. Cahon, Richmond, May 17, 1902, Flood Papers, Box 62. See also Flood to W. C.
efforts all the registrars appointed by the convention were Democrats. 38

Although adoption of the suffrage provision was the convention's most important accomplishment, the body also dealt with a number of other measures, some of which were of great concern to the Martin wing of the party. One such matter involved an attempt to have legislative sessions and election of delegates once every four years rather than every two years as had been the law. The measure was part of an attempt to streamline government, lower state expenditures, and reduce the power of the corporation-dominated legislature in favor of the executive department. 39

More important for the organization, the measure was also part of an attempt to oust Senator Martin from his seat in Congress. The junior Senator was not due to seek re-election from the legislature until 1905, but if the measure for quadrennial session were adopted, the General Assembly would meet in 1903 and not again until 1907. This meant that Martin would have to run for re-election in 1903 along with Senator Daniel. Since the anti-organization wing of the party showed evidence of gaining political strength in the state, as indicated by their performance at the last state convention, many politicians of this faction thought they had

Graham and to Wm. Sclater, Richmond, May 17, 1902, ibid.


39. Ibid., pp. 88-93.
a good chance of controlling the next session of the legislature. They pushed for the four year sessions, in the hopes of replacing Martin and Daniel in two years with their own men, Jones and Montague. They appealed to the desire evident at the convention to improve governmental operations and they succeeded in getting the measure endorsed by the Committee on the Legislative Department, submitted to the convention on August 28, 1901, and passed by the convention the following month.

Flood, who was aware of what the anti-organization had accomplished, worked feverishly to have the convention reverse itself. He had spoken out earlier against quadrennial sessions. He went on the floor of the convention once more to attack four years sessions and terms, and to introduce a motion which asked the gathering to reconsider its original vote. Furthermore he had influential political figures throughout the state write to the delegates and apply pressure on them to review their decision. His efforts, which were


43. Richmond Dispatch, January 14, 1902.

44. "Turnbell, Terry, Hardy and Epps voted against us,"
supported by the Richmond *Dispatch*, proved successful, and after some delay the gathering changed its mind and voted to return to biennial elections and sessions. The Appomattox Congressman thus won an important victory for the organization.

He was less successful in his attempt to place the proposed corporation commission under the power of the legislature. A demand for a commission to regulate the state's utilities—particularly its railroads—had been growing in Virginia throughout the 1890's. Agitation for some kind of regulation finally became so great that the convention was determined to establish a commission, and the Committee on Corporations issued a report in January, 1902 which established a three man agency elected by the Governor having full regulatory powers.

Because Flood realized the popular appeal of a commission he did not try to defeat the measure; in fact, he joined the chorus which attacked corporate abuses and called for a

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Flood thus wrote Francis Lassiter. "I hope I can put influence to work that will change as many of these gentlemen as possible." Flood to Lassiter, West Appomattox, November 5, 1901, Lassiter Papers. Two days later Lassiter responded to Flood's letter and said he would do what he could for the Congressman. At the same time he wrote one of his followers who had influence with delegate Terry and asked him to put pressure on the delegate. Lassiter to Flood, Petersburg, November 7, 1901 and Lassiter to Flood, November 7, 1901, *ibid*. See also James Hay to Flood, Madison, November 7, 1901, Flood Papers, Box 16.


At the same time, however, he made an effort to protect his business associates and to secure effective organizational control over the commission. To accomplish this purpose he moved to amend the report of the Committee on Corporations so as to have the commissioners elected by popular vote or by the General Assembly rather than by the Governor over whom the organization had little power. He knew that the Martin forces could probably win a general election and that the legislature could always be counted on to select machine men to the commission. The will of the people, he thus maintained on the floor of the conven-

47. "We hear a great deal of discussion about political machines in some of the cities and states of this Union," he declared on the floor of the convention. "Those machines have been built up by the concentration of the patronage of those communities in the hands of one or a few men, backed by the laws which enable the coterie to draw on the corporate wealth of the communities for the campaign funds. In the name of the people, I protest against it. . . . Why sir . . . the people of Virginia know they have not been treated right by the corporations of this State, and therefore they have demanded this commission for the purpose of adjusting their rights and remedying their wrongs." Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, February 22, 1902, p. 2786.

48. Section two of the committee report for example provided that all charters should be issued by general law and prohibited any special acts in this respect by the General Assembly. McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902, p. 67. Flood thought that the provision might adversely affect the telephone companies in the state. Consequently he wrote his friend, N. C. Watts, Director of the Staunton Telephone Company and asked him if he should fight the measure. Flood to N. C. Watts, Richmond, February 3, 1902, Flood Papers, Box 17. Only Watt's hesitation to oppose the measure prevented Flood from making a fight against it. Watts to Flood, February 3, 1902, ibid. Significantly, however, he did make a struggle to place a provision in the constitution which would allow for long distance telephone service to go into each city in the state.
tion, was the fundamental principle of government, and the people had a right at all times to elect their own leaders. To place the appointment of the corporate commission in the hands of the Governor was to abridge this right. It represented a tendency to remove government from the governed which had to be stopped. Moreover the legislature, which represented the collective wisdom of 140 men, was a safer repository for the power of selection than one man, even if he were the Governor of the state.\textsuperscript{49} Flood's plea was long and forceful, but it failed to change the sentiment in the convention which was bent on removing some of the abuses of the legislature and which left the power of appointing the commissioners with the Governor.

Establishment of the commission was the most serious defeat which the organization suffered in the convention, and it was also one of the gathering's most significant accomplishments. Other achievements included a more adequate tax structure and purification of the educational and judicial system. These changes should not obscure the fact, however, that the convention was not really a reform body and that its members were reluctant to make any but the most obviously needed reforms in the state. At the same time that


Flood to E. P. Meany, n.p., n.d., ibid., Box 63.
the delegates curbed the legislature's powers, it still left the General Assembly as Virginia's supreme political organ. Except for the right to name the members of the corporation commission and a few other extensions of his power, the Governor remained relatively powerless. How much the organization was responsible for limiting the power of the Governor in favor of the legislature is impossible to say, but with the Martin faction in control of the lawmaking body its hold on the state's politics remained firm.

Long before the convention finished its work its delegates had begun arguing over how to promulgate the new constitution. One group of the lawmakers led by Flood thought the new document ought to be submitted to the old electorate, while a second group led by Carter Glass thought it should be submitted to the new electorate, and a third group felt it should be proclaimed by the convention as the new law of the state. Disagreement between the groups resulted in some of the longest and most heated debate in the convention and consumed more time than any other issue except the suffrage plank.

Flood's feeling that the constitution ought to be submitted to a vote of the old electorate was in keeping with the defense of popular sovereignty which he made during the

50. As one historian has remarked, "Legislative control over both the judiciary and the power of the purse greatly overshadowed the gubernatorial duties of pardoning criminals and appointing notary publics. Only a machine governor who 'spoke the language of the tribe' could have exerted powerful influence in the Virginia governmental councils of 1902." Larsen, Montague of Virginia, p. 120.
corporate commission debates. The Congressman came from a rural area where individualism, self-reliance, and democracy were considered among the noblest virtues of mankind. He was from a state in which court day was the primary political institution and in which most everyone took an active interest in politics. And he entered his political career committed to the principle that "the people's voice should be heard."

It is of course true that he often practiced this principle in the breach and that he sometimes spoke out in defense of popular sovereignty for political purposes. It is also true that his primary interest in politics was one of holding office and that to stay in power he first provided for the organization and his business friends who supported him; frequently their interests ran opposite to those of the electorate. But while his principal concerns were purely pragmatic he felt a real interest for his agrarian constituency. Although he opposed most pieces of reform legislation in the General Assembly, the majority of these bills had to do with political matters such as election laws. Legislation which benefited his constituency, such as the retention of the Department of Agriculture, he worked enthusiastically to pass. Moreover, while he labored in behalf of the corporations primarily because of the financial and political assistance they gave him, as a spokesman of the New South he felt the future development of his state lay
precisely with these businesses and industries. Supporting charters to build a second line between Washington and Richmond and to incorporate the Virginia Telephone and Telegraph Company had political advantages for Flood. But another line also meant better railroad service in the state and a new telephone company better telephone and telegraph communications.\textsuperscript{51}

Similarly, although Flood frequently capitalized on his pleas in behalf of popular sovereignty, he was no demagogue. He believed the electorate was entitled by law and tradition to vote on the new constitution. He had maintained that position ever since the Democratic gathering at Norfolk made the convention a party issue. In his speech as Temporary Chairman of the Norfolk meeting he had spoken out in behalf of submission.\textsuperscript{52} He was also one of the persons responsible for having the gathering adopt a resolution favoring submission of the new constitution to the electorate.

The resolution, which was drawn by Carter Glass, was an ambiguous one that failed to stipulate which group of

\textsuperscript{51} Thus during the correspondence between Flood and Meany in regard to the charter for the Virginia Telephone Company, Meany referred to their "efforts to introduce capital and good telephone service in the state." Meany to Flood, New York, August 8, 1900, Flood Papers, Box 12. As for the charter for a new line between Richmond and Washington, Flood stated on several occasions that he believed railroad growth was necessary for the state's economy. See for example Richmond Dispatch, February 8, 1900.

\textsuperscript{52} Remarks of H. D. Flood, Norfolk State Convention, May 2, 1900.
voters it meant, the old group which existed before the new constitution, or the smaller one which would be registered according to the provisions of the new law. Flood felt it referred to the old electorate and maintained his position in the extra session of the General Assembly which passed the bill providing for the convention. Glass, on the other hand, insisted that he meant submission to the new electorate only. 53

This was not the first time that the two Senators were on opposite sides on an issue. In 1899 Glass had fought Flood's efforts in behalf of Ginn and Company book publishers and had tried to establish a special board of examiners to select the books used in Virginia's public schools. 54 Again in 1900 he successfully opposed Flood's efforts to incorporate the Virginia Telephone and Telegraph Company. This third encounter between the leaders resulted in a compromise. After some heated exchanges between Flood and Glass, the General Assembly declared that the constitution should be submitted for ratification to "qualified voters". The action of the legislature only increased the controversy over the question of submission since its declaration was interpreted by different parties to mean both the old and new

53. Richmond Dispatch, August 30, 1901 recalls the fight in the Senate between Glass and Flood. See also McDanel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902, p. 116.

54. F. M. Ambrose to Flood, Boston, June 29, 1899, Flood Papers, Box 9.
dispute continued during the campaign for convention delegates. In his bid for a seat Flood spoke so strongly in favor of submission to the old electorate that for a while Glass even threatened to take the stump against him. Once elected Flood urged his position on the floor of the convention. The issue between Glass and himself became so pronounced that when it was learned the two politicians were to deliver speeches on the same day the news was given statewide attention. For days delegates waited in anticipation of the clash between the two men, and when time for the debate finally arrived on September 5, the convention hall was filled to the rafters with spectators.

Flood spoke first and delivered one of the most able efforts of his career. Instead of an emotion packed address aimed at arousing his audience, his speech was a sound, well documented argument based primarily on historical precedents.


56. Frank Nelson to Flood, Lynchburg, May 2, 1901, Flood Papers, Box 15.

57. In describing the excitement caused by the expected clash between Flood and Glass, the Richmond Dispatch remarked, "This is to be one of the great days of the convention, for Mr. Flood and Mr. Glass are to meet in debate. The members of the convention have been looking for days to the meeting of these two, bearing in mind the great fight they had on the floor of the House of Delegates at the extra session, when the Legislature was attempting to decide whether the convention should submit its work to the whole electorate for ratification or rejection." Richmond Dispatch, September 5, 1901.
and upon the pledge of the Norfolk convention. It was delivered so effectively that when he finished, the galleries burst into applause and he was immediately surrounded by a group of men anxious to shake his hands and to congratulate him.

Not to be outdone, Glass took the floor after the clamor died down following Flood's speech. Through most of the afternoon he kept the complete attention of his audience. Like his opponent's address, his speech was well documented and well reasoned. The gist of his message was that the voters of the state were against submission, that the Norfolk convention had no right to pledge the delegates to submission, that it did not do so, and that if the constitution was submitted to the old electorate it would be defeated by the vote of 146,000 "misguided negroes". Rather than proclamation or submission to the old electorate the new constitution should

58. "Mr. Chairman," Flood remarked in one instance, "upon the authority of the Convention of 1829-1830, we must follow the rule laid down by the Legislature. If the Legislature had the right to extend the power of the convention in that respect when the right was acquiesced in and ratified by the people going to the polls, then it had the right to limit the power of the Convention when that limitation had been acquiesced in by the people going to the polls and voting under the act which contained that limitation. According to that precedent, I maintain here that we can do no otherwise than refer this constitution to the present electorate of the Commonwealth." Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, I, September 5, 1901, p. 281. For Flood's speech in its entirety see ibid., pp. 278-90.

59. Richmond Dispatch, September 5, 1901.
be submitted to the new electorate. When he finished after speaking two hours and forty minutes, delegates and visitors once more broke into loud clamor. The Richmond Dispatch the next day remarked that there had never been greater applause in the convention than that which followed Glass's speech.

Delegates who had come to the convention hoping for a great exchange between Flood and Glass had not been disappointed, but the convention was no nearer deciding how to promulgate the constitution than it had previously been. As a result it decided not to take any action on the disposition of the constitution until the substance of the document had been adopted. Since he realized it was hopeless to try to obtain immediate convention endorsement of submission, Flood voted with the majority to delay decision on the issue. The action of the convention disturbed several members of the organization, like Richard Byrd, who was sure that if the white voters of the state facing disfranchisement thought the new constitution was going to be proclaimed without their having a chance to vote against it, they would flock to the polls in November to defeat the Democratic party. He


61. Richmond Dispatch, September 6, 1901.

urged Flood to cut loose from the convention as soon as Congress assembled. 63

Flood ignored his brother-in-law's advice and retained his seat in Richmond, even though the gathering did not take up the matter of disposing the constitution until April when the final articles of the document were completed. In the meanwhile he continued to fight for submission to the old electorate. He sent out documents in support of his position to a number of mass meetings which were held in April for the purpose of sounding out public opinion on the constitution. He also wrote strong endorsements of submission in reply to the many petitions and letters he received about the new law. 64

He had some success in convincing his white constituency to support his position. A large number of the voters in the western counties of his district were illiterate small farmers who stood to be disfranchised by the new document. They opposed the whole constitutional proceedings and were vehement against proclamation or submission to the new electorate. They wanted to be able to vote against the new code of laws. 65

63. "The convention is going to be a graveyard," Byrd wrote Flood, "and I would hate to see you occupying one of the tombs." Byrd to Flood, Winchester, October 15, 1901, Flood Papers, Box 70.

64. Bland Massie to Flood, Tyro, April 15 and 23, 1902 and W. Nevins Fishburne to Flood, n.p., April 9, 1902, ibid., Box 18; Flood to W. N. Fishburne, n.p., n.d., ibid., Box 62.

65. Bland Massie to Flood, Tyro, April 15, 1902, ibid., Box 18.
Almost for this very reason, however, the convention finally decided to proclaim the constitution without giving the old or new electorate a chance to vote on it. The delegates feared that if the document was submitted to a vote, opposition on the part of those about to lose the ballot would be enough to defeat the measure, and they proceeded to defeat all motions to submit the constitution to the voters. The gathering then proclaimed their work of a year as the supreme law of the state. On June 27 Governor Andrew Jackson Montague acknowledged the legality of the new constitution and called the General Assembly into special session to take an oath in support of the new law. 66

Effects of the new constitution became readily apparent within three years. In 1905 Carter Glass made a study of the number of Negroes eligible to vote and found that of 146,000 Negroes who were eligible in 1901, only 21,000 of them had registered and half of these had failed to pay their poll taxes. 67 Besides Negroes large numbers of whites also lost the vote. Most of this number came from the poorer mountain regions of the Southwest and were Republicans, but the total amount of voters was so dramatically reduced that since the adoption of the constitution one out of every three ballots in state elections has been cast by an officeholder or by an


employee of the state. Because the government of the state has been controlled by the Democratic party and the party in turn controlled by the organization, the net result of the new constitution has been to increase the organization's hold on the state's political structure.

Even with the political advantages given to the machine by the new body of laws, the constitution was no victory at the time for the Martin forces. Most of the leaders of the organization, including Martin himself, opposed calling the constitutional convention. Their influence on the delegates was limited, and Martin preferred to spend his time on affairs in Washington and on the 1901 state elections than on convention matters. Such provisions of the new document as the corporation commission and alterations in the tax structure were opposed by his business friends, and the full effects of the disfranchisement clauses were not really felt until 1904 when the permanent suffrage provisions went into effect.

Many of the organization leaders were afraid that in the meanwhile the voters would express their opposition to the constitution by flocking to the election polls in the congressional elections of 1902 in order to cast their votes against the Democratic party. Only after the election results later that year, when all machine candidates for Congress were re-

68. Ibid., pp. 111 and 329.

69. James Hay to Flood, Madison, November 13, 1901, Flood Papers, Box 16.
turned to office, did the leaders of the organization begin to realize the advantages which the new constitution offered them.

One of the Congressmen re-elected in 1902 was Hal Flood, who had been the only organization leader in favor of having a convention and who profited the most from the gathering. As a delegate Flood had kept in communication with his business friends to see that their interests were protected, had worked to secure electoral boards favorable to the party and to the organization, had successfully fought for four year sessions of the state legislature, had opposed strengthening the executive department of the government, and had unsuccessfully attempted to place the Corporation Commission under the control of the legislature. At the same time he had increased his popularity with his constituency by introducing the enabling resolution for the convention in the state legislature and by speaking out at the gathering against dishonest election practices, against corporations and trusts, against political machines, and in favor of submission to the old electorate. He had been so successful once again in strengthening himself in his district while working for the organization and his business friends that his bid for re-election to Congress had gone unopposed.

70. As Bland Massie wrote Flood, "As a whole the people who are in favor of proclamation are opposed to you and it will strengthen you much with the more humble class of Democrats and they are the boys that are largely in the majority." Massie to Flood, Tyro, April 15, 1902, ibid., Box 18.
Chapter V

Factional Politics 1901-1905

Although Flood sponsored the enabling act for the constitutional convention and played an important part in its proceedings, most of the support for the gathering had come from the same anti-organization group who had participated in the May Conference of 1899. During the two years following their unsuccessful attempt to unseat Senator Martin these politicians had increased in strength as a growing number of voters became disenchanted with the hold of the Martin machine on the Democratic party, and as a demand for political reform continued to spread throughout the state. By 1901 they had a large enough following to nominate Attorney General Andrew Jackson Montague for Governor despite frenzied efforts by the organization to place Claude Swanson in the executive mansion.

Actually there was little difference in the platform or campaign tactics of Montague and Swanson. They both pledged their support to the national party platform and they both came out for the old trilogy of better roads, better schools, and retrenchment in government which had been included in the state party platforms for twenty years. Both men also employed powerful organizations and questionable
campaign practices to win delegate strength. While Swanson had the backing of the Martin organization, Montague had the support of important politicians like Glass, Jones, and Governor Tyler. More important, the Attorney General used the appointive power of Tyler's office and his own to create his personal ring and to win delegates to his side. 

But while Montague's organization was still in embryo form, machine control of politics in the state was recognized by politicians as well as large elements of the voting population. As a result the Attorney General was able to use the cry of machine politics effectively against Swanson. The theme in the campaign became the charge and counter charge of ring rule and corruption in local and state government; economic and social problems in the Old Dominion were distinctly subordinate issues. Swanson did his best to minimize his connections with Martin. He denied the existence of a Martin machine and tried to fix the onus of organization politics on Montague. His efforts were to no avail, for the Attorney General's uninterrupted attacks had a telling effect. Montague rolled up such an impressive score of

1. Even Henry St. George Tucker, a friend and supporter of Montague, later admitted that the Attorney General's political ambitions colored his decisions on appointments. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, pp. 103-04. See also Ferrell, "Claude A. Swanson," pp. 112, 131, and 151.

2. Three quarters of the people of Buena Vista, D. H. Rucker wrote Flood, "are carried away with the slogan of 'Ring Rule'...and join in the cry against Senator Martin
delegate victories that Swanson finally was forced to retire from the race. The convention which was held in August was completely controlled by the anti-organization forces, and the Martin lieutenants present, such as Flood, Hay, and Lassiter, played almost no part in its proceedings. Montague was easily nominated and was joined on the ticket by two other politicians from his faction of the party, Joseph Willard for Lieutenant-Governor and William Anderson for Attorney-General. A new State Central Committee chosen at the convention was comprised largely of anti-organization men and the platform which was adopted called for a party primary for all officials elected on a statewide ballot. It instructed the Central Committee to formulate a primary plan for the next regular elections. The convention was a sweeping victory for the Montague faction of the party.³

In November Montague was elected Governor over his Republican opponent, J. Hampton Hode. Almost immediately his faction sought to wrest control of the government from the Martin organization. The division of power in the state between his wing and Martin's was clear. Anti-organization forces controlled the executive mansion, the higher state officers, the party's Central Committee, and most of the


3. Richmond Dispatch, August 15 and 16, 1901; Larsen, Montague of Virginia, pp. 107-09.
important committees in the Constitutional Convention; they also had a sizeable element in the machine-dominated General Assembly. The organization still controlled the legislature, most of the county cliques, and the higher echelons of the state party. Chairman of the party, J. Taylor Ellyson, worked in close harmony with Martin, and Secretary Joseph Button was a friend and neighbor of Hal Flood. Effective control of the party machinery remained in organization hands, but a clash between the two opposing factions was inevitable. The result was some of the most bitter intra-party fighting since the Civil War, surpassing in intensity the Senate contest of 1899 and lasting until 1905 when Montague was finally defeated in his bid for the United States Senate.

Hal Flood led the Martin forces in its struggle against the Montague faction. At the same time that he was serving in Congress he acted as liaison between Martin, who stayed most of the time in Washington, and the organization in the Old Dominion. He made a number of trips to Richmond so as to be in the midst of the political battle and traveled throughout the state to cope with local difficulties. He also acted as the chief distributor of the organization's funds, patronage, and political backing. Never in its history did the always careful Martin forces devote more attention to political candidates and appointments than during its fight with the Montague faction, and as always Flood had
a major role in deciding whom the organization supported. Requests for organizational backing came into his offices in Appomattox and Washington and he carefully sifted through each application, checking the loyalty of the candidates, weighing their political influence and discussing their availability with other leaders like Martin and Hay. Then he let his decision be known through political circles. More often than not his refusal of support was enough to keep a candidate from running. His efforts were indispensable for the organization in its fight with the Montague faction for control of the Democracy.

The first phase of this intra-party struggle actually came even before Montague's election, when the anti-organization forces at the constitutional convention nearly succeeded in replacing biennial by quadrennial elections so as to force an early election for Martin's Senate seat. Even the Culpeper Exponent which had supported the anti-organization candidate for Senator in 1899, Governor J. Hoge Tyler, was amazed by the political ambitions and machinations which the anti-Martin group had shown during the fight in the convention.


5. "The first thing that the Montague faction...will
For the next three years every political issue in the state was colored by the fierce party battle. Among incidents which followed were a struggle between the two factions over an organization attempt to re-apportion several congressional districts, a number of clashes over control of city and county Democratic committees, and congressional squabbling on factional lines over the distribution of mail routes in the Old Dominion. In almost every instance real issues involved were reduced to a test have to do," the paper remarked, "will be to eradicate the growing feeling that the people of Virginia are being trifled with by the present Constitutional Convention....It looks now as, when the work of the convention is completed, it will be a choice or a "toss-up" between the "Martin ring" and the "Montague ring" with one thing in favor of the "Martin ring," which is that they have simply continued the established order of things in Virginia politics, while the "Montague ring" having discarded the opportunity and the verdict of the people to rid the state of ring rule, have set up another, and probably more powerful, ring with which to smother the voice of the people." Culpeper Exponent, November 1, 1901.

6. After Montague vetoed the re-apportionment measure, Flood's secretary wrote, "There are hot times coming in Virginia politics! It's hard to tell what will come out of the Governor's vetoing the apportionment Bill. I am afraid it will amount to the making and breaking of factions--just who will be made and will be unmade depends." J. R. Horsley to Sam [Donald], n.p. April 4, 1902, Flood Papers, Box 62.

7. The most bitter of these fights took place in the county of Norfolk and lasted almost ten years. Flood and Carter Glass both actively participated in the struggle. For an indication of Flood's role see Flood to William E. Allen, Washington, December 8, 1903 and Joe Button to Flood, n.p., December 6, 1903, ibid., Box 23. For Glass's part, see his remarks in A Political Cancer Being an Abridged History of the Norfolk County Conspiracy and an Incidental Personal Controversy (Norfolk; Democratic Executive Committee of Norfolk County, January 1, 1904), passim.

8. This controversy again involved Flood and Glass. See Flood to J. L. Briston (4th Assistant Postmaster General), West
of strength between the two wings of the party.

Characteristic of this type of struggle was the short-lived factional fight over an incident involving Judge Clarence J. Campbell. In 1902, Campbell, who was an organization politician and Circuit Judge from Amherst County, handed down a controversial decision involving sale of liquors by a druggist in his county. When one party in the case, the Reverend C. H. Crawford, criticized Campbell for his action the Judge cited him for contempt of court. At the contempt hearing Crawford's lawyer defended his client so skillfully against Campbell's charges that the Judge was forced to admit his error and to dismiss the citation. Enraged by the whole affair Campbell stopped Crawford outside the courthouse and severely beat him with a bullwhip. The incident made the headlines of almost all the state's papers. Opinion was unanimous against the Judge and the House of Delegates began an investigation of the matter.\(^9\)

Feeling against Campbell was so strong that he was eventually impeached, found guilty by the Senate, and removed from office. Sentiment in the state demanded his removal and the organization, in one of the rare instances in which it failed to come to the aid of its followers, reluctantly

\[\text{Appomattox, July 2 and 10, 1903, Flood Papers, Box 64.}\]

abandoned him to his fate. But long before he was removed from office the real issues in the case became subordinated to the power struggle in the party. Precisely because he was an organization politician the Martin forces at first prepared to save him from impeachment while the Montague faction of the party urged his removal. Reaction to the Campbell incident along factional lines was so bitter that the Richmond News-Leader feared the investigation of the incident would be based not on its merits but on individual loyalties of the investigating committee. Only the final decision of the Martin organization not to oppose the tide of public sentiment prevented a further factional struggle over the impeachment proceedings.

Because of the bitterness of their struggle Virginians began to realize how little difference actually existed between the organization and anti-organization factions.

10. "It is an unhappy and ominous fact," the paper remarked, "that a large part of the public, including men active in political life, expect the investigating committee in the Campbell case, to be divided for and with the 'machine', for or against Senator Martin. Should the committee divide on these lines in its report the public could not be made to believe that such a division was a coincidence. Such a result would disgrace the state and the legislature. It would be evidence that among the very pick and flower of the state we could not find men who...rise above the small and narrow prejudices and interests of partisan politics." Richmond News Leader, February 27, 1903, Martin Scrapbooks, I, p. 36.

Montague and his followers had been elected to office because they represented a reaction against corrupt political practices and because the voters associated them with reform elements in the state. Yet as the Richmond Times remarked, no great differences in state or national issues seemed to divide the two factions. Furthermore it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Montague wing of the party was less interested in reforming the political life of the state than in building up its organization and power; it seemed evident to this newspaper that the struggle in Virginia was not between a dominant faction and a group of reformers but between two groups of ambitious politicians.12

Actually Montague and his following were in the same tradition of leadership as Flood and most of the Martin organization. Montague's family had lived in Tidewater, Virginia almost from the founding of the colony in the seventeenth century, and Andrew Jackson Montague was from a long line of farmers, merchants, and state and local politicians; his own father had served as Commonwealth Attorney and Delegate in

12. As the paper remarked in an editorial, "No great issue divides the two factions. Indeed the only issues discussed are purely personal. This is, perhaps, the most remarkable feature in Virginia politics today. No public man stands for anything in particular. The Montague-Jones-Tyler faction was to be against the machine and machine methods. Now the general impression among the people is that the Montague machine is only in...[a] little better working order." Richmond Times, Editorial, January 11, 1902, Martin Scrapbooks, I, p. 28.
the state legislature. Since he was born into the governing class and steeped in the state's heritage, he shared Flood's basic conservative outlook and his awareness of the practical necessities of politics. Like most political leaders from both wings of the party, for example, he supported Bryan and free silver in 1896 and Bryan in 1900, but was anxious to abandon the Nebraskan for the conservative Alton D. Parker in 1904 who better represented his political viewpoint.

This is not to deny that his administration was marked by some notable reforms and achievements, particularly in the areas of electoral reform and better schools and roads, and that he had a real sense of responsibility to his constituency. When he spoke out in behalf of reforming the voting laws or in behalf of improving the school systems in the state, he certainly had the interests of the citizens in mind.

Significantly, however, the reform which Montague and his followers were most anxious to achieve was not in the economic or social structure of the Old Dominion but in its electoral system, where the strength of the organization lay. These men wanted the nomination of all party candidates removed from the state and district conventions and legislative caucuses, and placed in the hands of the voters where a

13. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, pp. 3-7. This author's interpretation of Montague and the anti-organization movement in Virginia is in contrast to that portrayed by Larsen, who sees the former Attorney-General and Governor as a "man of lofty ideals and moving eloquence who voiced from rostrums throughout the Commonwealth his scorn for the corrupt politician and his concern over the decline of public and private ethics, the rise of materialism, the decline of individual opportunity, the self-centered domination of government and politics by the nouveaux riches." Ibid., p.vi.

better chance existed of defeating the Martin forces. In
this area of reform Montague and the anti-organization
group were able to combine political ambition with real
accomplishment, for with the backing of most of the state's
voters they eventually forced the reluctant organization
to accept an effective primary system.

A resolution had been adopted by the state party
convention of 1901 calling for the formulation of plans
for a party primary. In accordance with these instructions
party Chairman, J. Taylor Ellyson, met with a number of
the State Central Committee and drew up a plan which made
the primary mandatory for all Democratic candidates for
public office.\(^5\)

Flood and Martin reluctantly accepted the new system.
They were wise enough to realize that they could not openly
fight a measure so widely supported throughout the state.
Besides, the new plan was so ineffective that they were con-
fident it would not diminish their hold on the state's
political life.\(^6\) The system adopted by the committee called
for a viva voce form of voting and assessed the cost of the
primary against the candidates. By carefully watching the
vote at elections the local county leaders of the organiza-
tion were able to account for every ballot cast. By having

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 183.

\(^{16}\) Flood to W. E. Allen, Washington, November 11, 1902, Flood Papers, Box 17.
the State Executive Committee assess large amounts against each candidate the Martin forces were also able to exclude those from running who could not pay the fee. 17

Since the organization could control the primary, the Montague forces wanted to strengthen the system of voting. Also they were anxious to have a primary adopted by legislative decree so as to make it impossible for Martin's forces to rescind it at some future party convention. Montague privately urged several of his supporters in the General Assembly to enact a statute on the subject. 18 As a result the two wings of the party once more clashed, this time on the floor of the state legislature.

At first the organization attempted to prevent the enactment into law of any form of primary system. Hal Flood came down to Richmond from Washington in the summer of 1902 and again the next spring to direct the organization's fight in the Assembly against the proposed plan. Working closely with Martin's legislative leaders, particularly Senator William Barksdale of Halifax, he not only prevented the enactment of any effective voting legislation but nearly

17. Thus in an effort to prevent state Senator John Opie from running against him for Congress in 1904, Flood wrote to his friend Joe Butron asking him to make large primary assessments. "Couldn't you get your committee," he asked, "to adopt a resolution stating that after May 9th you will assess each candidate in the primary a pro rata share of the cost. My idea is since Opie does not have a large following he will keep out of the race." Flood to Button, Washington, April 8, 1908, ibid., Box 25.

succeeded in passing a bill which would have emasculated the existing party primary. 19

Flood's work in Richmond was almost too successful, for the failure of the legislature to enact any meaningful electoral reforms gave the anti-organization forces an issue to take to the voters. They made the enactment of a primary the principal campaign topic in the 1903 state elections. Much more was at stake in the election, they realized, than just a change in the nominating procedures. Montague was already in the race for Martin's Senate seat. With no chance of winning in a primary controlled by the organization his only hope of victory lay in an effective form of popular nomination. 20

His faction's campaign for voting reform was effective. Capitalizing on the growing sentiment for a state primary they returned a legislature which, if still dominated by the organization, was sympathetic to the primary plan of nomination. Hal Flood and Martin now realized that the adoption of such a system was inevitable and they refrained from interfering in the affairs of the new legislature. 21

19. For Flood's activities in Richmond see, Flood to W. F. Rhea, West Appomattox, July 31, 1902 and Flood to James Hay, West Appomattox, April 15, 1903, Flood Papers, Boxes 62 and 63.


21. See Martin's statement in Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 20, 1904.
Their decision not to involve themselves with the work of the General Assembly did not prevent two of their men in the Senate, Barksdale and F. S. Tavanner, from filibustering against a bill introduced by Senator Lewis Machen which made the primary the mode of nomination for all state officers and which provided for effective supervision of the elections. Much to the relief of Flood the two organization politicians in the Senate were able to force the Upper House to adjourn without passing the Machen Bill.22

Their filibuster proved to be only a delaying action. During one of his many long speeches in the Senate against the primary Barksdale had stated that he opposed Machen's Bill out of friendship for Martin and antipathy to Montague. Immediately a number of newspapers accused Martin of being the party behind the bill's defeat. Hal Flood unintentionally added strength to this accusation by his untimely remarks in a newspaper interview that he was against the Machen Bill because his colleagues had been against it. His position was interpreted as being based on Martin's opposition to the primary plan. Flood immediately denied this construction of his statement claiming that he did not even know Martin's stand on the Bill. What he meant by "his colleagues", he remarked, were his fellow Virginia Congress-

men, all of who were against the measure.23 Flood's disclaimer as to Martin's views had little effect on an angry public. Until now the Senator had always managed to keep his attitude on the primary ambiguous. His fight against the plan had been waged through Flood or in private meetings and conversations. The defeat of the Machen Bill and the Appomatox Congressman's original remarks made such a stand no longer possible. Newspapers in the Old Dominion urged him to state what responsibility he had for the defeat of the bill and to clarify his position on the primary. With a Senate election less than a year away and popular sentiment for direct nomination of state officers still growing, Martin realized it would be folly to remain silent or to come out in opposition to the primary. On March 20 he publicly declared that he had nothing to do with the defeat of the Machen Bill, that he had never read the measure, and that he had never discussed it with any of his friends in the legislature. He further stated that he had been in favor of a primary ever since the party convention of 1901 and thought it should be improved and perfected.24

Having announced in favor of a primary, Martin decided to capitalize on the sentiment in favor of the plan and to steal the one issue from the anti-organization forces which they were certain to use in the coming Senate election.

23. Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 18, 1904.
24. Ibid., April 20, 1904.
At the state party convention in June he asked for the adoption of a strong primary plan and personally led the successful fight on the floor of the convention for the complete repeal of the viva voce form of voting. His was a shrewd move by a clever politician and was in keeping with the organization's successful strategy of riding with the tide of public sentiment.

As Martin planned, when the Senate election took place the next year, the anti-Martin forces were without their important issue. Their candidate against Martin, Governor Montague, could still question the junior Senator's original position on the primary but Martin's stand was now the same as his own. As for other issues there were few. The Governor could point to his advocacy of better roads and schools, but Martin also favored better roads and schools. He could accuse Martin of being a Republican Senator for having favored certain protective tariffs and ship subsidies, but both men were generally for lower tariffs and against ship subsidies. In fact there were no substantial differences between the two candidates. Both men had supported Parker for the Presidency and both men shared essentially the same conservative political outlook.

Lack of any significant issue did not prevent Montague from waging a vigorous campaign for Martin's seat. Speaking

25. Ibid., June 9 and 11, 1904.

in every corner of the state he attacked the Senator's original stand on the primary, his questionable campaign practices, his political organization, and his connections with the railroads, charged him with lacking the qualities, abilities and moral integrity of a Senator, and defended his own administration's advocacy of the primary and better schools and roads. He was an excellent orator, and his remarks made a good impression on his audiences. 27

Despite his strenuous efforts his candidacy was plagued by several handicaps, one of which was a lack of accord among his own followers. Since the Montague faction of the party was formed primarily of politicians committed to their own ambitions rather than to any ideological principles or purposes, it remained essentially an "anti" group, determined to defeat Martin but lacking any other cohesive factor. While Montague provided it with a form of leadership, he was unable to control his followers in the way that Martin and Flood directed their faction, and his wing of the party lacked unity or direction.

Because of this lack of unity the Governor did not have the entire support of the anti-organization faction in his campaign. Congressman John Lamb refused to give the Governor any aid because he felt his support of Montague

27. Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 4 and 5, July 7 and 27, and August 8, 1905. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, pp. 220-29.
in 1901 had hurt him politically. Former Governor Tyler also declined to help since he thought he should have been the candidate of the anti-Martin forces for the Senate. And Corporation Commissioner, Allen Caperton Braxton, broke entirely with Montague whom he accused of building his own political machine and "of being as much dominated by the railroad interests as Martin." Other notable anti-organization politicians who refused to aid Montague in his campaign included Lieutenant-Governor Joseph Willard who scarcely communicated with the Governor and Carter Glass who actually endorsed Martin's candidacy. 28

A certain amount of disunity also existed within the Martin machine because of the political freedom which the junior Senator allowed his followers. James Hay, for example, was at odds with Claude Swanson because of Swanson's refusal to support Hay for the Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1902. 29 Swanson was also engaged in a contest for the governorship with another organization stalwart, William Hodges Mann, and this struggle produced some ill feeling.


29. W. J. Showalter to Hay, Washington, September 3 and October 9, 20, and 28, 1902, James Hay Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 5, 1902.
within the organization. But rifts in the Martin forces were not nearly as acute as those among the opposition and the Senator managed to keep his machine firmly intact.

Organizational cohesion was not Martin's only advantage over his opponent. Also aiding his candidacy was the fact that he was a much more popular Senator than Montague's people had ever imagined. He had been highly effective in obtaining internal improvements and other governmental appropriations for his state. This was exactly what the voters expected from their Senator and his efforts gained him the support of many independents who had benefited from his term of office.

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Other factors of great aid to Martin in his campaign against Montague included an able and efficient group of lieutenants spearheaded by Flood, large financial backing from the state's corporations, a solid phalanx of supporters throughout the state, control of most of the party machinery, and allegiance of the county and city cliques, the majority of whom owed their office to the Martin faction.

30. During the campaign Montague made the error of accusing Martin of never having authored one important law, being content, he claimed, to answer letters and to run from one department to another on minor errands for his constituency. Even supporters of the Governor, like Tucker, realized the speech was a mistake and that Virginians wanted a Senator who conformed precisely to Montague's description of Martin, "a department runner" who provided for their needs instead of concentrating on national issues. Tucker to S. S. Patteson, Washington, April 13, 1905, Tucker Papers, File #177.
Even with these advantages Martin waged an active campaign. He had first prepared for the election in 1904 when he asked Flood to manage his candidacy. Working from Washington and Appomattox the Congressman conducted the campaign with his usual efficiency. He lined up the followers of the organization, took care of all the financing, arranged for speakers, kept in touch with the local political cliques, and checked out any difficulties which came to his attention. He devoted his full time in 1905 to Martin's re-election.\textsuperscript{31}

With Flood in command, every detail was carefully attended to and every plan laid out ahead of time. Confident that the campaign was in good hands, Martin was able to devote most of his time to an extensive speaking tour. His addresses undoubtedly surprised a good part of the electorate, for Martin was noted as a behind-the-scenes politician and not as a speechmaker. But he realized that victory now depended on the popular vote and he willingly mixed and talked with the voters. Within a short time he proved to be as effective a campaigner as the more experienced Montague. His speeches, which were at first defensive in tone, became more forceful and aggressive as the campaign continued, and soon he was a match for the Governor. In a series of joint debates which he conducted with Montague, he more than held his own.

\textsuperscript{31} There is an extended correspondence between Martin and Flood relating to campaign details in the \textit{Flood Papers}, Boxes 26-28. See for example, Martin to Flood, Richmond, June 2, 1904, Box 24 and Flood to S. L. Ferguson, Washington, March 8, 1905, Box 28.
defending his position on the primary, questioning the sincerity of his opponent's charges, attacking his term as Governor, and emphasizing his own record as a public servant. 32

His candidacy was never in danger. No real issues separated him from his opponent, his machine was operating with full efficiency, and voters were satisfied with his performance in Washington. With no reason to place him out of office, the electorate overwhelmingly returned him to his Senate seat in August. 33 At the same time they also chose Claude Swanson as a party gubernatorial candidate over his anti-organization opponent, Joseph Willard. Swanson was able to ride on the crest of Martin's victory and compiled a plurality approximately as large as that of the Senator. 34

Voters in the Old Dominion had thus been offered a choice in 1905 between two factions of the state Democratic party and they had decided that no reason existed for them to change from the same group of politicians who had dominated the state's political life for almost twelve years. As a result, the anti-organization which had started out so

32. See, for example, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 8, 1905.

33. In analyzing the election, the Richmond Times-Dispatch thus remarked that before casting their ballot for the Senate race each voter had asked himself whether there was any reason to turn "one prominent man out in order that another might be put in" and the majority had answered in the negative. Ibid., August 24, 1905.

34. Ibid., August 25, 1905.
promisingly in 1901 was in complete rout four years later. It would not be an effective force in Virginia politics again for another six years. Its impact on the Old Dominion, particularly in the realm of electoral reform, had not been without significance, but its lack of any real purpose or cohesive factor besides its own ambitions for office had limited the benefits it might have made to the state in arousing the voters to the need of social and economic reform.
Chapter VI

Congressional Politics 1901-1911

The intra-party struggle between the Martin and anti-Martin factions of the party had lasted four years and had consumed the energy of all the leading politicians in the state. Except for Martin and Montague no man had spent more time in the fight than Hal Flood. While he had often been at the forefront of the struggle, he had also attended unobtrusively to the duties of running a successful organization. As the election for Senator drew nearer he had assumed ever increasing responsibilities while Martin concerned himself with the work of an active campaigner. By the final weeks before the election he was spending most of his time in the Richmond campaign headquarters.

Despite his efforts for Martin and the organization he also attended diligently to the duties of a Congressman. He had been elected to Congress in 1900 and during the years of party struggle had won re-election in 1902 and 1904. Because he was a leader of the organization the anti-Martin forces had been anxious to unseat him and in 1902 Congressman William Jones and others had urged Flood's rival, Tucker, to make the race against his cousin. But Flood had become so strong in his district by this time that Tucker could not
be prevailed upon to enter a contest against him.\textsuperscript{1} Even the Republicans had difficulty finding a suitable candidate to oppose him, and finally settled on a relative unknown, James Lyons of Buckingham County.\textsuperscript{2} To no one's surprise Flood won a landslide re-election victory.\textsuperscript{3} Two years later he repeated his performance by easily defeating a Democratic opponent in the primary, Senator John Opie and swamping the Republicans in the November elections.\textsuperscript{4} From that time he had little trouble in being returned to Congress every two years.

Flood's success in winning re-election was due largely to the care he took in providing for his constituency. He made sure, for example, to distribute large amounts of seed packets (which the Department of Agriculture supplied to Congressmen) where they would do the most political good.\textsuperscript{5} He was equally careful in distributing the federal patronage and he fought hard for a number of pension and relief bills.


2. Richmond Dispatch, September 27, 1902.

3. Ibid., November 2, 5, and 8, 1902.

4. Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 14, October 9, 18, 28, and November 9, 1904.

He also kept in close contact with the people by frequent trips through his district and he saw to it that each letter he received was promptly answered. An astute politician, he early established the reputation as a true representative of the people.

Yet his record as a new member of the House was undistinguished. Because he was a well advised politician who understood the realities of political life, he was aware that the road to advancement for a freshman Congressman was to obey party's leaders, vote regularly, and remain quiet. As a result the only legislation which he introduced during his first term were his pension and relief measures and a bill to establish a national peace monument at Appomattox. His only remarks were a memorial address in memory of Peter Otey.  

During his second term he began to play a more active role and made his first important speech on the floor of the House. At the same time his committee assignments improved. As a freshman Congressman Flood had been placed on the Committees on Labor, Immigration and Naturalization, and Expenditures in the Agriculture Department.

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7. Ibid., 57th Congress, 1st Session, December 10, 1901 and May 22, 1902, pp. 2243 and 5836.
these were considered good assignments for a new Congressman the work of the committees held no interest for Flood. Even the Committee on Expenditures, which might have had some attraction for a Representative with an agrarian constituency did not appeal to him, since its main task was the routine one of keeping tabs on spending; it had little to do with agricultural appropriations and policy, which were left to a separate committee.

In 1903 he was taken off the Committee on Labor, which was an unattractive spot for a Congressman from a rural area, and placed on the Committee on Foreign Affairs. This committee was certainly not one of the important ones in Congress since its main function was making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service. But it occasionally concerned itself with the formulation of foreign policy, and for a man who had served no longer than Flood it was regarded as an excellent appointment. The Richmond Times-Dispatch considered it the best assignment made to a Virginia Congressman that session and Flood was quite pleased with his new position, believing that it gave him an opportunity to do important work in Congress.

8. Ibid., 57th Congress, 2nd Session, December 5, 1903, p. 532.

His appointment on the Foreign Affairs Committee marked the real beginning of his legislative career in Washington and indicated that party leaders were willing to let him assume a more active role in the House. He already had some seniority and familiarity with the intricate workings of the national legislature and he was no longer bound by the unwritten rules governing new Congressmen. Henceforth he was able to speak regularly on the floor of the House and to introduce important pieces of legislation.

Congress presented Flood with a forum quite different from that of the state legislature. As an elected official in Richmond he had assumed a pro-business stand on most issues because of his close association with the state's corporate interests. But in Washington he was under less political obligation and he was able to respond more favorably to the needs of his district. While he still worked in behalf of his business friends, they were not as concerned with national issues as with state matters and they usually left him alone to follow his own political course. As a result his voting record showed evidence of a reform spirit not seen in his career in the General Assembly. Also his

10. An instance of this was his efforts in 1907 to prevent the adoption of a resolution providing for the appointment of a committee to investigate telephone rates. Edward Meaney of AT&T had asked him to work against this resolution. Meaney to Flood, New York, January 27, 1907 and Flood to Meaney, Personal, Washington, January 26, 1907, Flood Papers, Box 31.
loyalty to the Democratic party and his partisan zeal were more evident here than in Richmond. In a predominantly Democratic state like Virginia party loyalty had little to do with divisions of voting and enactment of legislation. In Washington where the opposition was in the majority and where a Republican sat in the White House it often meant passage or defeat of a measure. While the vast majority of Southern Congressmen were loyal Democrats, Flood's devotion to the Democracy was a fetish; he was a partisan politician and proud of it. The importance of loyalty to followers and supporters which he had learned as a leader of the organization he carried over in his attitude towards his party. He never deviated from the party line, never repudiated a party plank, and never failed to support party leadership.\(^{11}\) He was such a partisan that he tended to see all issues in terms of the rivalry between the two national parties, and in all his speeches in Congress he invariably interposed at least one unfavorable reference to the opposition. His biting criticisms of the Republican party, his loyalty to

\(^{11}\) Once he received a letter from his cousin, John Flood, Jr., saying that he had the opportunity to obtain the Republican and Independent nomination in a contest against a Democrat for office. He asked Flood whether he thought he should accept the nomination. The Congressman replied, "I am a partisan. I believe in government by parties and I believe in respecting the considered authority of the party to which you belong." John Flood, Jr. to Flood, Lexington, July 8, 1910 and Flood to John Flood, Jr., Appomattox, July 11, 1910, Flood Papers, Box 38.
his own party and his concern for his rural constituency soon made him a leader among the agrarian element in Congress and one of the most respected members of the lower chamber, and assured him a rapid advancement in importance and influence in House affairs.

Flood made his first important remarks in the House soon after his appointment to the Foreign Affairs Committee. His address indicated the course that his career in Washington would follow. He spoke out emphatically in behalf of rural free delivery, defended the role his party had played in obtaining better mail deliveries for the farmer, and condemned Republican policy towards the post-office. 12 About the same time that he made these remarks he introduced his first measure of any significance, a joint resolution asking the President to investigate restrictions put on the sale of American tobacco to foreign lands. 13 He followed his resolution a few days later with a speech against an internal tax on certain types of tobacco which were altered from their original shape. He argued forcefully in behalf of the tobacco growers' plight, and at the same time he attacked the American Tobacco Company, which he declared monopolized


the domestic purchases of American tobacco, and the Republican party, which he criticized for not giving the farmers any relief from their depressed economic state. He called the tax "an exercise of despotic power", and urged Republican Congressmen to "vote for a measure which the trusts of the country did not ask for, but which hundreds of thousands of earnest and honest citizens do ask for and do seriously need."14

He continued his attack on the tobacco trust during the next session of the 58th Congress, where he delivered a long, heated speech against the use of tags, coupons, and redemption schemes employed in the selling of tobacco. Once more he singled out the American Tobacco Company for monopolizing the market, and again took the Republican party to task, this time for encouraging the growth of trusts and for failing to give any relief from the injustices which, he claimed, they caused.15

During the next Congress Flood again spoke and worked in behalf of the tobacco growers. He introduced a bill providing relief to the growers of this important Virginia product and re-introduced his resolution of the last Congress asking the President to investigate restrictions on the sale


of American tobacco in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{16}

By now he was also engaged with a number of other pieces of legislation. Still making an active fight in behalf of rural free delivery, he spoke out for such measures as separate statehood for Arizona and New Mexico,\textsuperscript{17} for the improvement of the United States Consular Service,\textsuperscript{18} for an employers liability act,\textsuperscript{19} and for government aid to help build new roads.\textsuperscript{20} While his speeches sometimes appeared more as an attack upon the Republican administration than as a plea in favor of the bills under discussion, he had already established a record in Congress of which any progressive or reform-minded legislator could be proud.

His obvious ability on the floor of the house and his carping criticisms of Republican policies attracted attention from a growing number of his colleagues. By 1906 his reputation as a critic of the opposition made him a candidate for the Chairmanship of the Congressional Campaign Committee. He was still too new a member of the House to receive that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 59th Congress, 1st Session, December 5, 1905, pp. 114 and 115.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 59th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, January 26, 1906, p. 24.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 59th Congress, 1st Session, March 19, 1906, pp. 3971-72.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 59th Congress, 1st Session, March 24, 1906, pp. 4607-08.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 59th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, February 15, 1907, pp. 76-78.
\end{itemize}
high honor, but his effectiveness as a speaker was so well known that Representative Champ Clark of Missouri advised him to go on a lecture tour between sessions of Congress and the Secretary of the Campaign Committee asked him to canvass for the party in Oklahoma in 1907.

Flood continued to enhance his reputation as an agrarian leader and able critic of the opposition during his next three terms in Congress. Still fighting in behalf of such measures as better roads and relief for the tobacco growers, he used every opportunity to assail the Republican party. As a result of his efforts he was in line for a chairmanship of a committee after the Democrats captured control of the House in 1910.

Flood was most anxious to head the Foreign Affairs Committee, on which he had served for seven years, but Congressman William Sulzer of New York opposed him for the position. Sulzer argued that since another Virginian, James

21. For correspondence concerning the Chairmanship of the committee, see Flood to Judge John W. Price, Personal, Washington, December 1905, Flood Papers, Box 29; J. M. Goffey to Charles J. Faulkner, Pittsburg, March 2, 1906, ibid., Box 30; Flood to Joseph Button, Washington, February 14, 1906, ibid., Box 30.


24. See for example, ibid., 61st Congress, 2nd Session,
Hay, had already been promised the chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee, the leadership of this committee ought to go to a New Yorker. While Flood had enough votes on the Ways and Means Committee to defeat Sulzer for the post he was reluctant to make a fight for fear of hurting party harmony. He was concerned with creating a rift in the House Democratic ranks and he agreed to an arrangement by which Sulzer would be named to head the Foreign Affairs Committee and he would be given the Chairmanship of the Committee on Territories.\textsuperscript{25}

Even though he would have preferred his old place, Flood was far from dissatisfied with his new position, for he knew that the Territories committee was about to deal with admission of Arizona and New Mexico into the Union and that he would have an opportunity to be in the midst of one of the key issues in Congress.\textsuperscript{26} In many ways Flood, who had never been on the Committee on Territories until he became its Chairman, was uniquely qualified to assume the responsibilities before him. He had conducted an extensive study of the problems of statehood in preparation for a

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March 17 and June 9, 1910, pp. 47-48 and 7734-35.
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\textsuperscript{25} Flood to James Hay, Appomattox, March 17, 1911, Flood to Claude Kitchin, Personal and Confidential, March 21, 1911, Flood to Judge George J. Hundley, Appomattox, April 11, 1911, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 40.

\textsuperscript{26} Flood to Judge George J. Hundley, Appomattox, April 11, 1911, \textit{ibid.}, Box 40.
speech which he delivered on the subject in 1906. 27 He had also had a chance to meet the people of the area during his campaign trip to Oklahoma in 1907 and to gain some first hand impressions of the difficulties they faced. He was more knowledgeable about the situation in Arizona and New Mexico than probably anyone else on his committee.

Flood had hoped in 1906 that Arizona and New Mexico would be granted statehood along with Oklahoma, but their admission as states had been delayed until 1910, when Congress finally passed an enabling act permitting the people of the territories to adopt constitutions in preparation for statehood. In January and February of the following year, the two constitutions were ratified by the voters of the territories. By a unique provision of the enabling act the documents were then sent to the Committee on Territories for study and recommendation before final acceptance by Congress and final admission of Arizona and New Mexico into the Union. 28 They were not acted upon during the short third session of the Sixty-First Congress, but when the Sixty-Second Congress convened on April 4th, Flood, who was now Chairman of the Committee on Territories, introduced a joint resolution making approval of both constitutions subject


28. Prior to this time territories were admitted as states by presidential proclamation after the President accepted their constitutions. They did not have to be approved by Congress.
to certain modifications. His resolution set the stage for an extensive debate on the admission of the two territories as states. The course of the discussion revealed once more Flood's progressive stand on national affairs and his partisan approach to politics.

The problem of admitting Arizona and New Mexico centered essentially on a single article in each of their constitutions. Dispute over the Arizona document involved a provision for judicial review. The proposed state body of laws was a liberal code and this measure was only one of its advanced features; others included the initiative and referendum, recall of all state officers, and an elaborate system of safeguards to guarantee honest elections. But the recall of judges soon proved to be the most controversial of these provisions, creating a storm of protest which reached even to the White House. President William Howard Taft denounced the feature in a number of public statements as a pernicious attempt to destroy the authority of the law by reducing it to the whims of the electorate, and indicated that he might veto the entire statehood bill unless the measure was removed from the Arizona Constitution.30


Hal Flood felt that as long as the constitution was
government in form and in conformity with the terms of
the enabling act of 1910, Congress was obliged to accept
the document. He did not feel that the lawmaking body in
Washington had a right to dictate its own prejudices to the
people of Arizona. But always a practical politician he
realized that some provision had to be made for changing the
recall measure in order to avoid a presidential veto. As
Chairman he persuaded the Committee on Territories to recom-
mend in their report accompanying the joint resolution an
amendment which provided that the judiciary of the state
would not be subject to the recall. A vote on the amendment
by the people of Arizona would be a prerequisite to admission
as a state, but its adoption would not be mandatory; the
amendment would be offered to the voters for ratification
or rejection and in the meanwhile Arizona would come in as
a state.31

His committee's recommendation, which was really a
compromise aimed at satisfying those opposed to the recall,
failed in its purpose and for an entire week the House de-
bated the Arizona constitution. Bitter opponents of judicial
review argued that the measure was not only dangerous but un-
republican in form. Leading the floor fight in behalf of his
committee's report, Flood responded to these opposition argu-

31. Ibid., 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 1911,
pp. 1234-35.
ments by citing a number of precedents for judicial review, including passages from the *Federalist Papers* and recall provisions in the Oregon and California state constitutions. How could anyone call the Arizona constitution un-republican, he asked, without making the same charges against the other two states. Furthermore, he noted that no one objected to the provision of the Arizona document which provided for the recall of other state officers. Was it not inconsistent, he remarked, to voice such strong objections to the recall of judges and not to this other provision.\(^{32}\)

On May 23rd the crucial test for his committee's report on Arizona came when Minority Leader, James Mann of Illinois, offered an amendment to the report which required the voters of Arizona to abolish the recall before the territory could become a state. Instead of having the option to vote for or against judicial review as provided in the report, Mann's amendment offered the voters no choice. And instead of allowing the vote to take place after Arizona became a state, his amendment delayed admission until after the election. Following a final short plea against the proposal, Flood saw it voted down 142 to 50.\(^{33}\)


Defeat of the Mann amendment left the way clear for the passage of the committee's report on Arizona. But before final House approval of the statehood resolution, its recommendations on New Mexico also had to be passed. Debate on the New Mexico constitution had been taking place at the same time as the discussion on the Arizona document. Unlike the Arizona code the New Mexico constitution was a conservative body of laws containing none of the progressive innovations in government, such as the initiative and the recall. It had been drawn by a largely Republican convention and it contained measures designed to maintain the Republican party in power in a state that might otherwise go Democratic.34

The amending section of the constitution was so designed as to prevent major changes in the document and thus guarantee that the Republicans would not be amended out of their favored position. By its provisions two-thirds of each house of the state legislature was required to approve an amendment before it could be submitted to the electorate. With four of the state's twenty-six counties having enough senators in the legislature to prevent submission, amending the constitution became a difficult process. It was made even harder by a series of complicated measures which provided that if an

34. Thomas J. Mabry, a Republican member of the constitutional convention, even admitted to extensive gerrymandering of state legislative districts to keep his party in power in the state. Mabry, "New Mexico's Constitution in the Making—Reminiscences of 1910," The New Mexico Historical Review, XIX (April, 1944), pp. 174-75.
amendment was approved by the legislature it had to receive not only a majority of the votes cast on the measure at a general election, but forty percent of the total vote at the election and forty percent of all the votes cast in at least fifty percent of all the counties. Even though an amendment was approved by the legislature and a majority of the voters, it could still be defeated.\textsuperscript{35}

With justification, therefore, the Committee on Territories believed that the amending process needed revision and recommended in its report that the voters of the state be given the opportunity to decide on a proposal which it drew up and which simplified the amending process. Following the precedent which it adopted with the Arizona constitution it made a vote on the proposal a requirement for admission but did not make its adoption mandatory.\textsuperscript{36}

Because the New Mexico constitution had been formulated by a Republican convention and was designed to insure Republican rule in the state, debate over the committee's recommendations followed partisan lines. In a long speech Flood maintained that the Republican party in the territory was owned, operated, and bossed by corporate groups such as railroads and mining companies and that the amending process was an attempt by these special interests to deprive

\textsuperscript{35} Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 23, 1911, pp. 1513-14.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 1911, pp. 1234-36.
the people of the state of self-determination. The voters had a right, he said, to shake off the onus of boss rule by having the opportunity to change the amendment section of the constitution.\textsuperscript{37} He then refuted a charge made by Representative Mann that his position on changing the New Mexico Constitution was inconsistent with his opposition towards amending the Arizona document. Any inconsistency, Flood remarked, lay not with himself but with the Representative from Illinois. It was he who just recently offered a resolution telling the people of Arizona that they must vote against the recall in order to be admitted into the Union. Proposals of the committee report made no such requirements; they merely provided the people of the territories with an option while admitting them as new states.\textsuperscript{38}

Debate ended soon after Flood concluded his remarks. All that remained was the final vote on the statehood resolution reported by the Committee on Territories. Representative Mann tried to amend the resolution, but failed. Flood had made the admission of Arizona and New Mexico into the Union

\textsuperscript{37} "The corporations have the people of this Territory by the throat," he remarked; "and under this constitution which they have forced upon them, with its unfair apportionment, they will, unless we give the relief provided in the resolution, rally its mercenaries in the counties where they are strong behind the ramparts of countless moneybags and hold the State indefinitely against the will of the people." \textit{Ibid.}, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 23, 1911, pp. 1513-14.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 23, 1911, p. 1527.
a party issue in a Democratic House and by an overwhelming vote, the lower chamber accepted the resolution.\textsuperscript{39}

Even though the Senate also approved the joint resolution, the fight for statehood was not over. On August 15, 1911, President Taft vetoed the measure singling out the recall provision of the Arizona constitution as the reason for his action.\textsuperscript{40} In spite of Taft's action Flood was determined to obtain statehood for the two territories before the session of Congress ended. As soon as the veto message was read in the House, he moved that the resolution and the message be referred back to the Committee on Territories where he pledged they would be given immediate consideration and reported back to the House as soon as possible. His request was granted and as he promised, his committee immediately turned its attention towards finding some way out of the impasse created by the President's action. Several days were spent in intensive discussion. For a while the committee considered recommending that the House override the veto, but decided that the Senate, which was still Republican, would never concur with such a move. Eventually they realized that they had no choice except to yield to the administration's demands and to recommend that the elimination of judicial

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 62nd Congress, 1st Session, May 23, 1911, pp. 1525-29.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 62nd Congress, 1st Session, August 15, 1911, pp. 3964-66.
\end{footnotesize}
review be made a condition precedent to the admission of Arizona into the Union. Otherwise no hope existed of obtaining the statehood bill in the current session. 41

Flood delivered the revised report of his committee back to the House just four days after the President's message. Reluctantly he recommended its adoption, but not before he attacked the administration for trampling on the right of self-government. 42 With the recall stipulation in the resolution both Houses passed the statehood bill, and in a few weeks it was signed by the President. When Arizona removed the source of all the trouble a few weeks later, she and New Mexico became officially the newest states of the Union. 43

Because of his work in their behalf, Flood became one of the most popular Congressmen in the two new states. He was invited by the Democrats of New Mexico to canvass their state during the first general elections following statehood. He accepted their offer and played an important part in helping pass the provision which liberalized the amending process of the state constitution. He also made numerous

41. Ibid., 62nd Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, August 19, 1911, p. 21.

42. Ibid.

43. At the next election after statehood, however, the voters put back the recall provisions in their constitution by a wide majority. Mabry, "New Mexico's Constitution in the Making--Reminiscences of 1910," p. 181.
trips to Arizona in subsequent years in behalf of Democratic candidates and became a close friend of the state's first Senator, Carl Haydn. 44

The Appomattox Congressman had fought hard to preserve the progressive features of the Arizona constitution and to liberalize the New Mexico document. It is not inappropriate to ask, therefore, whether his career in Congress was consistent with his role as a leader of the Martin machine in the Old Dominion. Certainly his moderate progressivism in national affairs, his defense of the initiative and referendum, his attacks on political machines and bossism, on trusts and corporations all were in contrast to the business-oriented, organization-dominated conservatism with which he was associated in Virginia. But it must always be remembered that Flood was from a rural area and shared certain sentiments of his agrarian constituency, particularly its belief in individualism and self-reliance and its conviction that government should be limited and never far removed from control of the people. Although these views resulted in a reluctance on his part to make major changes in the state or nation or to extend the spheres of governmental responsibility, they also led to his endorsement of a number of progressive political features such as the initiative and referendum and resulted

44. S. Ferguson to Flood, Washington, August 3, 1912, Flood to J. McDair, Appomattox, October, 1911, Flood to Thomas Martin, Appomattox, October 4, 1911, Flood Papers, Boxes 45 and 70.
in his opposition to business combinations like monopolies and trusts which imposed restrictions on the economic freedom of the individual.

In contrasting Flood's moderate progressivism in national affairs with his conservatism in state matters, it must also be recalled that he was a pragmatic politician and a loyal party man, a responsible Congressman and a leader of the state organization, and that his political career was a continual attempt to meet the responsibilities brought upon him by each of his functions. In state politics his duties as a leader of the machine and his obligations to certain interests were of first importance and led him to oppose any changes which threatened the privileged position in the state of the organization and its business associates; often he acted at the expense of his constituency and of his convictions about the control of government by the people. In Congress, however, his duties to the electorate and his loyalty to his party were of primary consideration and led him to attack trusts and corporations which were associated with the Republican party and which adversely affected his constituency such as the American Tobacco Company. They also led him to fight for a number of pieces of legislation such as rural free delivery which were sought by the farmers of his region and to favor progressive measures like the initiative and referendum which were supported by the Democrats of Arizona and opposed by the Republican President.
If Flood's activities in national and state politics are seen in the light of his agrarian background and are understood as an attempt to adjust to the obligations of his various political roles, his efforts in Washington and in Virginia become not only consistent, but predictable.
Chapter VII

State Politics 1906-1911

Hal Flood's efforts in state politics during the years 1906-1911 contrasted sharply with his activities in Congress. In the Old Dominion he was once again the expedient machine politician attending to the duties of running an organization, working closely with his business friends, taking part in the major campaigns of the period, and managing Martin's bid for re-election to the Senate in 1911.

For all his activities and achievements, these years proved to be a bitterly disappointing time in his political career. In 1910 a vacancy was created in the United States Senate following the death of the incumbent, John Daniel. Flood's efforts for the organization and his close friendship with the Governor made him the leading candidate to fill the opening. But in order to prevent a rift within the organization ranks and to avoid a bitter primary fight, he reluctantly declined the position in favor of Claude Swanson. In doing so he made the greatest sacrifice in his career and gave up his lifetime ambition of becoming a United States Senator.

Until Daniel's death in 1910 and the start of the Senate campaigns soon after, this period in Virginia politics
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Until Daniel's death in 1910 and the start of the Senate campaigns soon after, this period in Virginia politics...
was relatively unexciting. Numerous state and national campaigns and a growing temperance movement generated some activity but the intra-party fighting which had characterized Virginia's political life the previous years did not exist. The organization was in almost complete control of the state and prior to the Senate elections the anti-organization forces had difficulty mustering serious opposition against it. Furthermore politicians and their constituencies were slow to recover from the past party struggles. Apathy was so evident even within the Martin forces that it almost cost them the Governorship in 1909.

The period began with the aftermath of the 1905 senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Defeat of the anti-organization faction gave the machine the chance to control every office in the state from the executive branch to the remotest county position, and Martin and Flood took full advantage of their opportunity. Beginning in the state Senate where the two men defeated an attempt by remaining opposition legislators to re-organize the body, to the House of Delegates where they placed Richard Evelyn Byrd in the Speaker's chair, they attempted to wipe out all remaining opposition to their wind of the party. By the time they finished re-organizing the state government they had placed Martin men in control of practically every important board and committee in every branch of government.¹ Their work was so intensive that the

¹ Flood to Joe Button, Washington, May 14, 1906,
longtime Chairman of the state party and friend of the
organization, J. Taylor Ellyson, feared that he would be
replaced as Chairman by Hal Flood.2

Of course the organization suffered setbacks as well
as successes, and certain factors existed which limited its
achievements. Public opinion could not always be controlled,
machine leaders were not always in agreement, and the anti-
organization element in the state still hoped to make a poli-
tical comeback. In 1908 a combination of these factors forced
Martin and Flood to agree reluctantly to send a delegation to
the national Democratic convention in Denver instructed to
William Jennings Bryan for President.

Neither Martin or Flood were enthusiastic about Bryan's

Flood to Martin, Appomattox, April 6, 1907, Claude Swanson to
Flood, Richmond, April 7, 1907, Flood to Ned Echols, Appomattox,
September 2 and 6, 1907 and Echols to Flood, Staunton, Septem-
ber 5, 1907, Flood to Richard E. Byrd, Appomattox, April 27,
1907, Martin to Flood, Charlottesville, September 6, 1907 and
Flood to Martin, Appomattox, September 7, 1907, Flood Papers,
Boxes 31 and 32.

2. Flood had not been satisfied with the Chairman for a
number of years and had even discussed the matter of his re-
placement with Judge John Price as early as December, 1905.
Flood to Price, Personal, Washington, December 6, 1905, ibid.,
Box 29. After some consideration he had decided it would be
best to leave Ellyson in his position in order to avoid further
intra-party struggle. He had never brought the matter up again,
but rumors began to circulate in 1908 that Flood was determined
to replace Ellyson with himself as Chairman of the party.
Ellyson was so concerned by these reports that he made inquiry
throughout the state as to their validity. Much to his relief
he found they had no basis of fact. J. M. Newhouse to Ellyson,
Culpeper, May 23, 1908, James Hay to Ellyson, Washington, May
28, 1908, William Hodges Mann to Ellyson, May 28, 1908, Ellyson
Papers.
candidacy. Martin in particular thought the Nebraskan was unsound of intellect and too much of a radical; a speech which Bryan made in 1906 in favor of government ownership of railroads confirmed him in his judgment. He was willing to support him for the Presidency only because he felt that Bryan would probably be nominated and that the Democrats would lose in the election no matter whom they chose. ³ Flood was more reluctant to come out for the Nebraskan, preferring to wait until he was absolutely sure whom the convention would select. ⁴

Both men were in complete agreement against sending a delegation to the convention instructed for Bryan. They wanted to control the delegation which they could not do if it went instructed. Also they felt that if the delegation was already committed Virginia would lose her bargaining power at the national gathering in case some other candidate emerged as a rival against Bryan. Finally, the movement for instructions was led by extreme Bryan men bent on discrediting Senator Daniel who opposed the Nebraskan's nomination. Flood and Martin wanted to save from embarrassment a man who

³. "As things now stand," Martin wrote Senator John Daniel, "[Bryan] will be the next Democratic nominee. I think it is the best we can do. He will fill a gap in which someone must be sacrificed. I have no idea he will ever be President." Martin to Daniel, Scottsville, September 3, 1906, John Warwick Daniel Papers, Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina.

⁴. Flood to R. D. Haislip, Washington, January 23, 1908, Confidential, Flood Papers, Box 33; Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 18, 1908.
had given Martin his endorsement during the 1905 Senate fight. 5

The two leaders of the organization waged a vigorous cam-
paign to prevent instructions. Working closely with the state
party's Executive Committee they were able to arrange a late
date for the state convention in the hopes that the Bryan boom
which was sweeping the Old Dominion would cool. 6 But their
efforts were in vain for they could not stem the tide of public
opinion. When Martin and Flood's own political ally, Governor
Claude Swanson, announced for instructions, 7 the junior Senator
realized it would be folly to continue the struggle. Since
Bryan was likely to receive the nomination anyway, he could
not see the sense of risking dissension within the party by
opposing the prevalent sentiment. 8 Flood agreed with his
friend and they both gave up their fight. In characteristic
fashion, at the convention Flood tried to place himself at
the head of the Bryan movement by declaring in a resounding

5. Thus Flood wrote to H. H. Byrd, "You have no doubt
seen that there is an effort on the part of certain people to
humiliate Major Daniel by forcing instructions upon him at the
Roanoke convention. I think we owe it to the old man to stand
by him in this contest." Flood to Byrd, Personal and Confi-
dential, Washington, May 27, 1908, Flood Papers, Box 34. See
also, Doss, "John Warwick Daniel," p. 366.

6. Flood to Martin, Washington, May 27, 1908, and Flood to
Thomas Fortune Ryan, Washington, May 21, 1908, Flood Papers,
Boxes 33 and 34.

7. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 7, 1908.

8. Martin to Flood, Charlottesville, May 4, 1908, Flood
Papers, Box 34.
speech that the convention was assembled to send a Bryan
delegation to Denver and that it should do so. In accordance
with the will of the majority of delegates, the gathering
instructed for the Nebraskan and adjourned, but not before
Martin expressed his complete satisfaction with the work of
the body.9

At the time of the convention Flood and Martin were
more interested in state than national politics, and they
were already engaged in a campaign to elect Judge William
Hodges Mann of Nottoway as Governor in 1909. Mann was one
of the machine's most dependable stalwarts and a close friend
of Flood. The relationship between the Appomattox Congressman
and the Nottoway politicians went back over ten years. Flood
had been instrumental in electing Mann to the state Senate
in the 1890's and after that the two men had worked in close
collaboration.10 As a member of the state legislature Mann
had also performed a number of tasks for the organization,
including sponsoring a reapportionment measure in 1902 and
writing a primary bill with Flood and James Hay in 1903 which

9. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 12, 1908.

10. During the 1900 elections, for example, the new
Senator campaigned on behalf of Flood for Congress and the
next year Flood supported Mann for a judgeship on the state
Court of Appeals. Mann to Flood, Nottoway, July 7 and
October 21, 1900, Flood to Mann, Appomattox, October 13,
1899, L. S. Marye to Flood, n.p. January 22, 1901, Flood
Papers, Boxes 9, 13, 14, and 61.
would have destroyed the primary system.\textsuperscript{11} He had run for Governor in 1905 but had lost to the more powerful Swanson who had the backing of most of the organization.\textsuperscript{12}

Flood had been mentioned as a candidate himself for the Governorship but he had no desire to leave Washington.\textsuperscript{13} He was anxious instead to place the Nottoway legislator in the executive mansion and had begun to line up support for him as early as 1906.\textsuperscript{14} He was joined in his efforts by Senator Martin who felt that he owed Mann his support for his past services and that he would make the strongest candidate in a gubernatorial contest.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} Herman L. Horn, "Congressional Redistricting in Virginia," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Duke University, 1936), pp. 123 and 135; Mann to Flood, Nottoway, April 11, 1902 and Flood to Hay, Appomattox, April 15, 1903, Flood Papers, Boxes 18 and 64.

\textsuperscript{12} Including that of Flood. See Flood to S. L. Ferguson, Appomattox, March 24, 1904, Ferguson to Flood, Washington, May 26, 1904, and Mann to Flood, Nottoway, Personal, March 9, 1905, Flood Papers, Boxes 24 and 28.

\textsuperscript{13} Flood to Dr. George H. Denny, Appomattox, November 8, 1908, \textit{ibid.}, Box 35. Since a Governor in Virginia was not allowed to run for a second term, the Governorship was usually regarded as the end of a career rather than its beginning and for that reason the office did not attract Flood. Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965.

\textsuperscript{14} On December 19, Flood learned from his friend, Dr. George H. Denny of Washington and Lee University, that Clarence Campbell was endorsing Henry St. George Tucker for the Governorship rather than Mann. Flood wrote Denny that he would take the matter up with Campbell the next time he saw him and he was sure that Campbell would then be against Tucker. Denny to Flood, Lexington, December 19, 1906 and Flood to Denny, Washington, December 26, 1906, Flood Papers, Box 30.

\textsuperscript{15} Martin to Flood, Washington, November 6, 1906, \textit{ibid.}, Box 30; R. C. Kilmartin to F. R. Lassiter, Washington, November
Besides the support of the organization Mann also had the unofficial but powerful backing of the Anti-Saloon League of Virginia. This group of clergymen and influential citizens had been formed in 1901 for the purpose of bringing prohibition into the state. It had received quick prominence as a result of the bullwhipping which Judge Clarence Campbell had administered to its then Superintendent, Reverend C. H. Crawford in 1902. The headlines which the incident had received throughout the state had spurred membership in the League to a rapid pace; within five years of its birth it had become a significant factor in the political life of the state.

Mann, who was a leader of the dry forces in the Old Dominion, was closely affiliated with the League. As a county Judge of Nottoway for twenty years he had refused to grant a single liquor license. As a Senator he had introduced the Mann Bill, which essentially prohibited the manufacture or sale of liquors without a license. His efforts against alcoholic beverages in Virginia brought him the endorsement of Bishop James Cannon Jr., the League's Acting Superintendent. Although the League itself did not officially endorse any candidate, Cannon ran its affairs so that his endorsement amounted to the same thing.

14, 1906, Lassiter Papers.


17. Ibid., pp. 119-20, 124-25, 130-31; Virginius Dabney, Dry Messiah: The Life of Bishop Cannon (New York: Alfred A.
One of the main problems facing Mann's candidacy was the uncertain position of the League and the candidate on the question of state-wide prohibition. Several remarks by League officials and by Mann himself led a number of Virginians to fear that Mann, Bishop Cannon, the League, and the organization were in collaboration to capture the executive mansion and force prohibition on the state. The fact that Flood and Martin had cooperated with Bishop Cannon since 1905 strengthened their apprehensions. While the majority of Virginians were in favor of a policy of local option they were not yet prepared to endorse state-wide prohibition.

In order to end the fear of a conspiracy evident among the voters, Flood, Martin, and James Hay cautioned Mann in 1908 to state in the most unmistakable manner his opposition to prohibition. The Appomattox Congressman also warned his candidate not to rely so much on Bishop Cannon's aid, pointing out that his controversial status with members of his own

Knopf, 1949), pp. 49 and 53.


19. During the discussion in Washington on a statehood bill for the Oklahoma territory, for example, the Appomattox Congressman corresponded with the Bishop on an amendment to protect the Indians in the territory from the sale of intoxicating liquors. Two years later, Cannon and Mann helped Flood with some political affairs in Appomattox County, Flood to Cannon,
church might injure his influence on Mann's behalf. Finally, Flood appealed successfully to the Bishop through Mann to moderate his position on the liquor question. As a result of his efforts both Mann and Cannon gave their unequivocal endorsement of local option, and at the League's convention in February, 1909, Cannon was able to prevent his organization from adopting a radical platform on prohibition. The gathering was satisfied to follow the Bishop's lead and endorsed a platform approving local option.

While the prohibition question was the most serious problem which Mann had to face, his candidacy was plagued by a number of other difficulties. He had stiff opposition from Henry St. George Tucker whose stand in favor of local option was the same as his own, but who was able to unite a sizeable coalition of "wets" and anti-organization men as a result of not being associated with the Anti-Saloon League. Also Mann was so overconfident about victory that he displayed a dangerous lack of enthusiasm for the campaign and showed almost no appreciation for matters of organization. Flood did his best to run affairs until a permanent campaign

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Washington, January 16, 1905 and Mann to Flood, Nottoway, October 10, 1907, Flood Papers, Boxes 28 and 32.


manager could be found but had a difficult time arousing
the Nottoway legislator from his lethargy.\textsuperscript{23}

The campaign itself added to Mann's difficulties.
As in most election battles in the Old Dominion no substan-
tial differences existed between the two candidates. Neither
Mann nor his opponent contributed a single original or help-
ful idea toward uplifting of the state nor showed any apprecia-
tion of the complex social and economic problems facing
Virginia. They both were satisfied to iterate and reiterate
the familiar ideas about better schools and roads and they
both failed to arouse the majority of the electorate.\textsuperscript{24}

But while both candidates suffered from indifference
among the voters, Mann, who was a colorless figure with
little personal appeal, fared the worse. A poll taken in
June indicated that Tucker enjoyed slim leads in sixty-seven
of Virginia's counties while his opponent was slightly ahead
in fifty-three.\textsuperscript{25} The apathy among the voters to Mann's
candidacy was also evident within the organization, where

\textsuperscript{23} Flood to Martin, Appomattox, August 13, 1908,
\textit{Flood Papers}, Box 34.

\textsuperscript{24} Thus the editor of the Richmond \textit{Times-Dispatch}
remarked, "Commonplace talk about commonplace things is un-
doubtedly safe and sane, but it is not exciting. The can-
ididates make the campaign and not even the most fervid de-
vourer of stump oratory would keep much enthusiasm under sham
in the face of such a depressing campaign as these two have
been giving us." Richmond \textit{Times-Dispatch}, June 22, 1909.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, June 21, 1909.
local county leaders lacked enthusiasm either for the candidate or for the campaign. Until they could be aroused to deliver the vote, the state Senator's candidacy would languish. Flood realized this fact when he wrote Martin urging him to take firm hold of the campaign and to arouse his friends to action.\footnote{26}

Martin now realized the seriousness of the situation and began to whip his organization into activity. Word was passed throughout the state that the Senator expected his followers everywhere to give their full backing to Mann's candidacy. Organization men who had been indifferent or hostile to Mann now rallied to his aid and by the time of the election he had the support of large numbers of "wets" as well as "drys". More than one liquor dealer told Tucker that he had to back the Nottoway legislator because Martin had put pressure on him to do so.\footnote{27}

As important as having the machine working actively in the campaign, Martin knew, was getting the influential Governor, Claude Swanson to participate in behalf of Mann. Swanson's term as Virginia's chief executive, his deft use of political appointments, his outspoken support of popular measures like better education and better roads, and his winning personality all had made him one of the most popular

\footnote{26. Flood to Martin, Appomattox, April 28, 1909, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 36.}

\footnote{27. Hohner, "Prohibition and Virginia Politics," pp. 101-02.}
politicians in the state, so that his endorsement was essential to Mann's candidacy. But Swanson was a highly ambitious politician whom Martin did not always trust and who tended to follow his own political course. He had learned that Senator John Daniel was very sick and he was anxious to replace him in the Senate in case he died. He intimated to Martin through a colleague that he would not endorse Mann until he had assurances that the Nottoway legislator would appoint him to the Senate should a vacancy occur during his administration. 

Swanson's reluctance to endorse Mann placed Martin and Flood in a very difficult position. Since the Appomattox Congressman was Flood's closest friend, they both realized that Mann would choose Flood if he were in a position to nominate a new Senator. Martin was as anxious to see his friend join him in the upper chamber of Congress as Flood was to become a Senator and at first they hesitated to ask Mann to make the necessary commitment, hoping that Swanson

28. During the struggle over instructions for Bryan in 1908, for example, Swanson had indicated at one time that he would not fight for an instructed delegation. Nevertheless Martin was so distrustful of the Governor that he informed Flood he expected Swanson to do everything possible to get the Virginia delegation committed to the Nebraskan short of leading the fight on the floor of the state convention. Martin to Flood, Charlottesville, May 4, 1908, Flood Papers, Box 34.

29. Martin to Flood, Charlottesville, July 23, 1908, ibid., Box 34.
would change his mind and come out for him.  

Nothing of the sort happened and as the campaign continued to slacken they were forced to reconsider their position. They had placed their political reputation behind Mann's candidacy and they were determined to keep Tucker, one of their bitterest political foes, from the executive mansion. Reluctantly Flood agreed to sacrifice his long cherished dream of a Senate seat. Both men advised Swanson that in return for his endorsement Mann would nominate him to the upper house if he were in a position to do so.  

When Swanson still remained inactive, doing hardly any campaigning, Flood paid the Governor a visit to tell him that he stood a poor chance of getting the Senate appointment if the Nottoway legislator lost his (Swanson's) home district. This warning was enough to arouse the Governor who began to campaign immediately and who did some valuable work for Mann in the few days remaining before the primary.  

Flood's and Martin's efforts in stimulating the machine to activity combined with those of the Anti-Saloon League, who worked extensively in Mann's behalf, were enough to assure the Nottoway legislator victory in the August primary.

30. Ibid.  

31. Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965. The exact date of the commitment is not known except that it was during the winter of 1909.  

32. Flood to Martin, Appomattox, August 3, 1909, Flood Papers, Box 36.
During the summer a central campaign committee was finally organized headed by a full time chairman, committees were appointed for each precinct and precinct lists were drawn up of all voters together with their preference for Governor. Those for Tucker were soon besieged by campaign workers in behalf of Mann. By the end of July the campaign had so improved that both Flood and Martin privately predicted their candidate would win. 33

Voters went to the polls on August 5 and final tabulations confirmed their predictions. Mann was nominated by a majority of 5,078 out of a total of less than 75,000 votes cast in what had been one of the dullest elections in the state's history. Indicative of the effect which the machine had on the outcome was the fact that Mann carried the heavily "wet" city of Norfolk as well as Portsmouth, Richmond, and Alexandria, all of which had been expected to go to Tucker. 34

Difficulties encountered during the contest and the closeness of its results indicated to Martin and Flood the need to make changes in the organization's political strategy. They revealed for one thing that the machine, despite its control of state politics, could not easily force an unpopular candidate on an unenthusiastic electorate, and they made


clear the need for running attractive politicians rather than merely loyal followers. They also showed the desirability of pacifying the opposition rather than attempting to eliminate them from Virginia's political life. While the liquor question had obscured factional lines a large number of the votes which Tucker received were clearly ballots directed against the organization's control of the state. If the organization wished to maintain its strength in Virginia, Martin and Flood now realized they had to act on broader lines than the proscription of those who did not always cooperate with them. As a step in that direction the Appomattox Congressman backed a candidate for Secretary of the Commonwealth who had opposed Mann. He even went so far as to accept a suggestion of his uncle, Charles Faulkner, that he agree to support Tucker for the Governorship in 1913 in return for his cousin's promise to cease attacks on Flood and his friends.

35. Flood to Dr. George H. Denny, Appomattox, November 8, 1909, Flood Papers, Box 37.

36. Characteristic of the pragmatic nature of Virginia politics was the fact that Tucker, who had been so denunciatory of Flood and the organization, welcomed the Congressman's offer. "I was sorry not to have seen you to have a talk with you," he wrote Flood, "...that I might have thanked you in person for the assurances which Charles Faulkner had given me of your purpose to support me for Governor in the next race. I was greatly gratified at this, and wanted to tell you in person how gratified I was to receive such assurances...." Tucker to Flood, Lexington, February 10, 1910, Tucker Papers, File #298. See also Faulkner to Tucker, Washington, December 13, 1909, ibid., File #298.
Mann's election to the executive mansion practi-
tically made Flood Virginia's second Governor. Obliged to
Flood for most of his political success, Mann promised
that whenever possible he would appoint those whom the
Congressman recommended to political office. Flood took
full advantage of his opportunity and placed scores of his
followers in the state government including some on the
Governor's own staff.

Soon after the new Governor took office, Senator
John Daniel became so ill that his death was expected
momentarily. Immediately the question arose as to Daniel's
successor. Because of the closeness between Flood and Mann,
political pundits expected that the Governor would nominate
Flood if Daniel died. Dozens of letters poured into Flood's
office urging him to seek the Senate spot. More important,
the Congressman received a communication from Mann which

37. In November he easily defeated his Republican
opponent, William P. Kent.

38. Mann to Flood, Nottoway, December 11 and 17, 1909
and Flood to Mann, Appomattox, December 14, 1909, Flood
Papers, Box 37.

39. One of these letters was from Flood's young nephew,
future Senator Harry Flood Byrd, who informed his uncle that
he had become interested in politics in order to aid Flood
in his career. "In case of a conflict," he continued in his
remarks to his uncle, "I believe that Pop [Richard Byrd] and
I could help you to get at least 1000 majorities in Frederick
and Clark Counties." Byrd to Flood, Winchester, March 16,
1910, ibid., Box 38. When asked about his uncle fifty-five
years later, Byrd again remarked that he had entered politics
in order to work in Flood's behalf. Interview with Senator
Harry Flood Byrd, August 22, 1965. For other letters of
indicated that he could have the Senate nomination if he wanted it.  

Flood was placed in a serious predicament by the Governor's letter. He had promised Swanson that Mann would nominate the former state chief executive if a Senate vacancy occurred and that he would support Swanson's nomination; he could not easily back away from that promise. Also it was known throughout the state that Swanson had ambitions to serve in the upper house in Washington. The same political observers who expected Mann to nominate Flood also noted the probability of a primary contest for the Senate between the former Governor and the Appomattox Congressman. In such a case they expected that Flood would have the support of most of the party leaders, including Martin, but they were uncertain whether he could beat the popular Swanson in an election.  

Flood was not only aware of the difficulty he would encounter in a contest with Swanson, but he realized that if he ran against his close friend in a primary contest, the two men would split the


40. This letter is not available, but for its reply which clearly revealed its contents, see Flood to Governor William Hodges Mann, Washington, March 20, 1910, ibid., Box 38.

41. Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 18, 1910.
vote and a third party would win. Not wishing to see this happen he announced on March 22 that he would not seek the Senate nomination under any circumstances.

Discussion over a replacement for Senator Daniel proved to be somewhat premature as the senior Senator survived for another three months. But the same reasons that kept Flood from seeking the nomination in March kept him from going after Daniel's former seat in July. With Flood having eliminated himself from the contest, Mann nominated Swanson to fill out Daniel's term.

Soon after Flood made it known that he would not seek the Senate nomination, he learned from Carter Glass that neither he nor any other member of the anti-Martin forces would have opposed the Appomattox Congressman in the 1911 primary if he had been nominated to replace Daniel. Anxious to gain Flood's endorsement for his future political ambitions, this former vitriolic opponent of Flood and the organization had recently assumed a friendly attitude in his relations with the Appomattox Congressman, and his

42. Flood to Dr. A. S. Priddy, Appomattox, July 12, 1910, *ibid.*, Box 39. Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965.


44. Flood to Chas. A. Osborne and A. G. Preston, Appomattox, July 4, 1910, *Flood Papers*, Box 38.

45. Glass was on such good terms with Flood that in February, 1911, the Appomattox Congressman wrote his brother-in-law, Richard Byrd, asking him to let up in his newspaper
statement might have been only part of his attempt on his part to win Flood's favor; at least no evidence exists that any other member of the opposition except Glass was prepared to support the Appomattox Congressman in the primary. But whatever the cause for Glass's statement, his remarks greatly disturbed Flood. Since 1909 he had followed the organization's new policy of attempting to conciliate the anti-Martin forces through the formation of suitable political arrangements. If Glass's announcement had any basis of fact to it then he had lost the opportunity to reach the type of agreement he sought with the opposition wing of the party. To give up his lifetime ambition of becoming a United States Senator had been the most trying experience of his political career; 46 to make the sacrifice under such attacks on Glass. "He has been professing such warm friendship to me the last couple of years," he remarked, "that I would very much prefer that the [Winchester] Star should not criticize him too severely." Flood to Byrd, Washington, February 21, 1911, ibid., Box 40. While the reasons for Glass's change of attitude towards Flood cannot be conclusively established the most probable explanation appears to be his hope of gaining the Appomattox Congressman's endorsement for the Governorship in 1913. Certainly this was the view of the Roanoke Times and several friends of Henry St. George Tucker who were aggrieved by Glass's inactivity in the 1909 campaign. "Do you know," C. H. Harris remarked in a letter to Tucker, "I have become convinced recently that Glass held off in that [1909] campaign because of his belief that the organization would be for him the next time if he would do so?" Harris to Tucker, Petersburg, August 12, 1911, Tucker Papers, File #305. For the remarks of the Roanoke Times and a similar opinion, see J. C. Wyisor to Tucker, Pulaski City, ibid., File #305.

a circumstance only aggravated his disappointment. 47

The Appomattox Congressman realized moreover that Glass and the anti-Martin faction of the party would never accept Swanson as Virginia's new Senator. His colleague in Congress did not always approve of Flood's methods, but he at least trusted him to keep his word and his promises. He had much less regard for the former Governor whose political machinations were notorious. For this reason Flood was certain that Glass or possibly Congressman Jones would oppose Swanson in the 1911 primary. 48

Flood did not misjudge the political situation in the Old Dominion. As he expected, Glass announced in the beginning of 1911 that he would oppose the newly appointed Senator for a full term in the forthcoming primary. Swanson was not the only Virginia Senator up for election. Martin's third term was due to expire the following year and he also had to seek the Democratic nomination in the primary. He was opposed by Jones who announced for the spot after conferences with Tucker and other anti-organization leaders. 49

47. Flood to Dr. A. S. Priddy, Appomattox, Personal and Confidential, July 12, 1910, Flood Papers, Box 38.

48. Ibid.

49. The perennial candidate, Tucker, had decided not to wait until the gubernatorial campaign of 1913 before seeking office. Despite his recent agreement with Flood, he was attracted by Martin's Senate seat. A survey of opinion among his followers showed that he could not beat the powerful incumbent, but that did not seem to bother him. See, for example, Randolph Harrison to Tucker, Newport News, November 29, 1910.
Attempts by the Martin forces to conciliate the opposition thus failed; Jones and Glass ran as one ticket, Martin and Swanson as another. 50

At first the double Senate fight failed to generate much excitement. Hal Flood once more managed the campaign for the organization and in a short time he had it functioning smoothly. Jones and Glass launched vituperative attacks on Martin and Swanson, accusing them of having set up a political oligarchy in the state, of using corporate money to finance it, and of keeping political opponents out of office through corrupt political practices. 51 But these were

and Robert E. Leady to Tucker, Norfolk, November 29, 1910, Tucker Papers, File #301. He even had a lengthy correspondence with Jones about the contest. Only the Congressman's announcement that he was going to contest against Martin kept Tucker from making the campaign. During the remainder of the race he actively assisted the anti-organization candidates in their fight against the machine. Jones to Tucker, Warsaw, June 16, 1910, August 15, 1910, December 19, 1910, Tucker to Jones, Lexington, December 28, 1910, Glass to Tucker, Lynchburg, January 28, 1911, ibid., Files #299-302.

50. The organization had even tried to dissuade Jones from running against Martin by promising him an important position within the machine. Flood participated in these negotiations along with J. R. Wingfeld, a Martin follower who had been appointed to the Corporation Commission by Governor Mann. The two men failed in their attempt as Jones was too intractable to join with the organization. Wheatley, "The Political Career of William Atkinson Jones," pp. 101-104.

51. A good account of the campaign can be found in Harold E. Cox, "The Jones-Martin Senatorial Campaign of 1911," The Annual Collection of Essays in History, The History Club, University of Virginia, I (Fall, 1954), pp. 38-56. For an account of some typical speeches by Jones and Glass, see Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 15, March 3, and June 6, 1911.
the old charges made in previous campaigns against the
machine and had little effect on an electorate who were
accustomed to hearing them. Little attention was paid to
other issues, and until July Flood remained confident that
proper organization was enough to defeat the opposition.\(^{52}\)

Then Jones began to introduce a series of correspond-
dence which threatened to change the whole complexion of the
campaign. Stolen from the personal files of J. S. Barbour
Thompson, these were a highly damaging group of letters
which established clearly that organization leaders, par-
ticularly Martin and Flood, had worked closely with the
railroads during the 1890's and had accepted campaign con-
tributions from them in return for their services.\(^{53}\) They
supported many of the charges that Jones had been making
throughout the contest.

At first the letters swept Martin's campaign into
complete disarray. Flood and others were uncertain of what
course to follow. Finally, after a series of hurried con-
ferences, he and Martin decided to answer the charges
directly. Not able to deny that they had received campaign
funds from the railroads, they took the position—which had
some validity to it—that in the 1890's it was common prac-
tice for all politicians to accept railroad money; that

\(^{52}\) Flood to Judge George J. Hundley, Washington,
June 3, 1911, Flood Papers, Box 41.

\(^{53}\) These letters are to be found in Senator Martin's
Railroad Connections as Shown by the Barbour Thompson Letters,
passim.
without these funds the Democrats could never have kept the state from Republican and Negro rule. But they denied the assertion which Jones made that Martin was a railroad lobbyist. Flood wrote a number of former legislators asking them to refute the charge publicly.\(^{54}\) He also had J. Taylor Ellyson print a letter written to him in 1901 by Andrew Montague who was presently campaigning for Jones and Glass. In this letter the then gubernatorial candidate had complained of the uncertainty of the campaign in the Southwest and had urged Ellyson to raise some funds from the railroads. Calling Montague a hypocrite, Flood wanted to use this letter to support his claim that even the supposed "reformers" took money from the railroads.\(^{55}\)

Stepping up the campaign even more, Flood called on Barbour Thompson to refute Jones' charges of political corruption. Thompson followed the same line that the Appomattox Congressman had already taken by stating that the issue in the 1890's was not between railroads and fair elections but between Anglo-Saxons (the Democratic party) and Negro domination. Although he admitted that the railroads had contributed money to the Democratic party, he denied any charge of corruption and claimed instead that

\(^{54}\) Flood to R. D. Haislip, Washington, July 28, 1911, Flood to Charles Bendheim, August 26, 1911, and Flood to M. B. Booker, Richmond, August 26, 1911, \textit{Flood Papers}, Boxes 41 and 42.

\(^{55}\) Flood to J. Taylor Ellyson, Washington, August 12, 1911, \textit{ibid.}, Box 42.
every dollar was spent legitimately and with the knowledge of the party's Central Committee. 56

Injection of the volatile Negro question and the strong countercharges by the Martin forces soon ended any threat to Martin and Swanson's nominations. Even though nationally known liberals, like William Jennings Bryan, flocked to the aid of the anti-organization, 57 they could not stem the tide running clearly in favor of the incumbents. Flood felt confident as the end of August approached that the opposition was losing rather than gaining strength and that his candidates would easily win. 58

Results of the September 7th primary justified his optimism, as Martin and Swanson gained an easy victory over their opponents. Martin received about 57,000 votes to 25,000 for Jones while Swanson obtained 59,000 ballots to only 23,000 for Glass. 59

On the morning of the primary the Richmond Times-Dispatch, which had declared for Jones and Glass, had asked the voters to cast their ballot not on the basis of white supremacy twenty years ago but on the Barbour Thompson letters and other

56. Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 6, 1911.


58. Flood to S. L. Ferguson, Washington, August 17, 1911, Flood Papers, Box 42.

59. Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 8, 1911.
evidence which had shown the incumbents to be unfit for office. Voters had chosen to ignore the newspaper's plea, yet the issue of white supremacy was not really why Martin and Swanson won the election. The organization was simply too entrenched and had too much support on the county level to be defeated. Charges of corruption, furthermore, no matter how well supported, had been too often repeated in past elections. They were no longer able to arouse an electorate who believed with some justification that every Virginia politician had engaged in corrupt practices at some time in his political career. Finally, the anti-organization group had suffered from the same lack of organization and unity which had marred its campaign in 1905. Montague, Tucker, and others had formed the Virginia Democratic League to help direct the campaign. But as Carter Glass later complained, little aid had been given to him or Jones by anyone in the League except for Tucker and a few others. Ambitious politicians all, they had been reluctant to contest with the organization.

This lack of unity within the anti-organization forces cannot be overemphasized in accounting for the poor showing which it made in Virginia politics. It was in striking contrast to the loyalty shown by organization leaders like Hal

60. Ibid., September 7, 1911.

Flood. No man had more cause to create a rift in the ranks of the machine than the Appomattox Congressman. But while he had every right to expect the Senate appointment in 1910, he gave up that longtime ambition to Swanson in order to avoid disunity within the organization and to prevent an outsider from gaining the coveted post. Nor did his disappointment over the matter keep him from working as hard for the newly appointed Senator as for Martin during the campaign. 62 As he was a loyal party man in Congress, he was a devoted organization politician in the Old Dominion. Personal feelings of regret had almost no influence on his political activities and his course in Virginia politics could be forecast as easily as his role in the House of Representatives.

62. He was instrumental, for example, in getting Governor Mann to reappoint Swanson to the Senate terms which was to begin on March 4, 1911. When the Governor originally appointed Swanson to the Senate he intended the appointment to be only for the remainder of the session then in progress. He wanted to avoid appointing anyone to the new session until after the primary. But Flood put great pressure on him in behalf of Swanson and finally Mann consented to make the reappointment. See Mann to Flood, Richmond, January 26, 1911, Flood to James Mann, February 6, 1911, and James Mann to Flood, February 9, 1911, Flood Papers, Box 70.
Chapter VIII

The Wilson Movement in Virginia Politics

Even while the Senate campaign unfolded in Virginia in 1911, politicians from both wings of the state party closely followed events on the national political scene. In the 1910 elections the Democratic party had captured the lower house of Congress for the first time in many years. Its victory was an indication of growing dissatisfaction with President William Howard Taft and Old Guard Republicanism which was to culminate in the 1912 election of Woodrow Wilson as President. The movement to make Wilson the nation’s chief executive had already begun in a number of Southern states, and one of these was Virginia.

In the Old Dominion the movement assumed its own characteristics and almost from its inception became essentially an attempt by the anti-organization forces to weaken the Martin wing of the party. By focusing attention on Wilson's struggle against machine politics and boss rule its leaders hoped immediately to bring public disapproval against the organization. Their ultimate aim, however, was to strengthen their political position in the state through the control of the federal patronage.

Because the leadership of the Wilson movement in the Old Dominion was motivated mainly by political considerations,
it gave scant attention to the broader social and economic questions associated with Wilson's candidacy in other parts of the country. In this respect the movement in Virginia was only an event in the continual struggle which had been taking place since the turn of the century between the two wings of the state party for control of Virginia's politics. The attempt by the anti-organization forcee to capitalize on the movement eventually failed as a result of certain political realities which even the progressive Wilson could not ignore, and which forced him to throw the support of his administration behind the Martin organization.

Woodrow Wilson was a natural candidate for the anti-organization to back for the Presidency. A native of Staunton and a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School he had widespread support throughout the Old Dominion; he had even been mentioned as a possible favorite son Vice-Presidential candidate in 1908. As a gubernatorial candidate in 1910 he had made a reputation as a reformer and an opponent of machine politics. Since he was already considered in the running for the 1912 Presidential nomination, his candidacy offered an excellent opportunity for the anti-organization wing of the party to bring outside pressure against the Martin regime. Moreover, since he was associated with the liberal elements in politics, sup-

1. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 16, 1908.
port of his candidacy gave these forces the chance to wage their struggle with the organization as progressives striving to liberalize Virginia from a corrupt political system.

Attracted to Wilson for these reasons, Henry St. George Tucker wrote the Governor-elect on December 29, 1910 to congratulate him on his election and to inform him of an embryonic movement in his native state to make him President. Soon Wilson was assured not only of Tucker's backing for the Presidency but that of other anti-Martin leaders like Andrew Jackson Montague and William Jones.\(^2\)

Wilson, who had followed Virginia politics carefully, was greatly impressed by the offers he received from these politicians. He also sympathized with the struggle which they were making against the Martin organization. In reply to Tucker's letter he thanked the Staunton politician for his congratulations and assured him that he would pay close attention to political developments in the Old Dominion. He also began an extensive correspondence with Tucker and other anti-organization candidates like Montague.\(^3\)

In 1912 the New Jersey Governor firmly sealed his


\(^3\) Wilson to Tucker, Princeton, December 31, 1910 and Trenton, November 29, 1911, Tucker Papers, File #301 and 306.
alliance with the anti-organization wing of the state party. By now, of course, he was running openly for the Presidency and he felt it was essential to his candidacy to have the support of his native state. He was anxious to come to Virginia to establish his organization, which had first been formed unofficially in 1910, on a firmer basis and to deliver a political address. He wrote to an old classmate of his, Archie Patteson, who had opened a Wilson club in Richmond, to explain to him the importance of carrying the Old Dominion and to tell him that he would like to speak in Virginia in the winter of 1912. With the help of the Governor's aid, William McAdoo, who came down to Richmond at the end of January, and other state leaders of the Wilson movement, Patteson arranged for the candidate to address the state Senate in February.  

The message which the Governor delivered before the upper house was obviously aimed at the Martin organization. Speaking on the topic, "Opportunity of Democracy", Wilson used the occasion to lash out at machine rule and political bosses, whom he deplored for depriving the citizens of their basic political rights.  

4. For the correspondence between Patteson and Wilson, see A. W. Patteson, Personal Recollections of Woodrow Wilson and Some Reflections Upon His Character and Life (Richmond; Whittet and Shepperson, 1922), pp. 34-36.

5. Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1912.
Virginia as an example, but his meaning was not missed by the large number of anti-organization followers who had come to hear their candidate speak.

Nor was his intent misunderstood by the leaders of the organization, Martin and Flood. Under normal circumstances these two astute politicians probably would have come out for the New Jersey Governor in an attempt to gain the public favor or have tried to defeat the Wilson boom in a clandestine fashion. But because of Wilson's clear opposition to the organization and his identification with the anti-Martin faction of the party, they realized that the contest over Wilson's candidacy had become more than just a struggle between those opposing and those backing the New Jersey Governor; as Flood himself remarked, it had become a contest "between the anti-organization and the organization forces."¹⁶ He and Martin were prepared to stop the Wilson movement even if it meant an open fight in the state.

The strategy on which the men decided was the obvious one: they were determined to obtain a delegation to the national party convention in Baltimore which would be uninstructed but which would favor some candidate other than Wilson. They also wanted to have the unit rule applied so that they could throw the entire state's vote behind one candidate. At first they were undecided on whom to support,

¹⁶. Flood to C. T. Campbell, n.p. May 16, 1912, Flood Papers, Box 44.
bent only on stopping Wilson. For a time Flood even mentioned Speaker Champ Clark of Missouri as a possibility. But as the candidacy of Oscar Underwood loomed larger, they decided to throw their support behind the Alabamian who was a fellow Southerner and Flood's close personal friend.7

Facing the two leaders of the organization was the immediate task of capturing control of the state convention which was to meet at Norfolk in June, and which chose the delegation to the national gathering. In April they began to write to organization followers throughout the state to urge them to elect convention delegates opposed to Wilson and to instructions. Flood was particularly active in this work. He used the New Jersey Governor's stunning defeat in the April primary in Nebraska as reason enough not to send an instructed delegation to the national convention. He even took time out from the Virginia campaign to send letters to his many friends in New Mexico urging them to back Champ Clark in his fight there against Wilson.8


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Despite the strong support for the New Jersey Governor in the Old Dominion and his backing by the anti-Martin forces, the organization soon showed that it controlled the state's politics. The machine did so well in electing its delegates to the state convention that by May Flood and Martin felt satisfied that they would control the Norfolk gathering by large majorities. 9

Only one problem still troubled Martin and that was the fact that Flood's brother-in-law, Richard Byrd, had joined the Wilson movement and was giving his strong backing to the New Jersey Governor. Byrd had been a friend of the presidential candidate since they were classmates at the University of Virginia and he was naturally anxious to see Wilson in the White House. He had even met with the Governor's Campaign Manager, William McCoombs, in February to lay plans for a permanent organization in the Old Dominion. 10 His work in behalf of Wilson resulted in a certain amount of tension between himself and his organization friends, especially since he was collaborating with anti-Martin leaders like Jones and Tucker. 11 While the friction had not reached the


11. Byrd to Tucker, Richmond, May 1, 1912, Tucker Papers, File #309.
breaking point, both Byrd and the leaders of the organization were determined to control the state convention.

The Speaker had hoped at first to get an instructed delegation at the Norfolk gathering.\(^{12}\) He changed his tactics as an increasing number of delegates opposed to instructions were elected to the body. Instead of pushing for instructions he now wanted the convention to express a preference for Wilson's nomination. As Martin pointed out, little difference existed between formal instructions and an expression of preference. In either case the delegation became honor bound to vote for Wilson or face discredit at home.\(^{13}\) But Byrd hoped the compromise tone of his policy would appeal to the convention.

Because Byrd was Hal Flood's brother-in-law, the Appomattox Congressman was anxious to reach some kind of arrangement with him. Martin realized this fact and just before the convention met, he had a talk with Flood in which he told his chief aid that there could be no compromise. An accommodation, like accepting an expression of preference for Wilson, he pointed out, would represent a complete surrender to the opposition. If Byrd had a majority let him

\(^{12}\) Reports had even existed that Byrd would oppose the entire leadership of the Martin organization for delegates-at-large, including his brother-in-law Flood, if instructions were voted down at Norfolk. W. E. Allen to Flood, Covington, April 30, 1912, Flood Papers, Box 44.

\(^{13}\) Martin to James Hay, Charlottesville, May 8, 1912, Hay Papers.
instruct; otherwise let the delegation consist of organization men opposed to Wilson and uninstructed for any candidate. Flood agreed with Martin and went to the convention prepared to make no concessions to his brother-in-law except to vote for him as a delegate-at-large.\textsuperscript{14}

The convention which met on May 23 was a great victory for the Martin forces. They prevented instructions and succeeded in electing a delegation which included Martin, Flood, Hay, and Swanson, and the majority of which was against Wilson. Martin was its Chairman and he was sure to control the delegates for the machine. The only object which the organization failed to achieve was the unit rule, a point which Martin willingly conceded for the sake of party harmony.\textsuperscript{15} Flood was naturally satisfied with the convention's work, and he left for Baltimore convinced that the Virginia delegation at the national gathering would ultimately cast its entire vote for his personal choice, Underwood.\textsuperscript{16}

He had good reason to be pleased with the results of the state gathering since he had played a significant role

\textsuperscript{14} Martin to James Hay, Charlottesville, May 14, 1912, ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} The delegates could adopt the unit rule if they wanted after the first ballot. Richmond \textit{Times-Dispatch}, May 24, 1912.

\textsuperscript{16} Flood to Dr. George H. Denny, Appomattox, May 28, 1912, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 44.
in its proceedings. As in previous conventions he saw to
the affairs of the organization, attended to last minute
details, and made sure that Martin men would not vote
against instructions. 17 Even more important, he was res-
ponsible for an act which soon placed the Virginia dele-
gation in the spotlight at the Baltimore convention and
which gained Flood nationwide attention. This was his suc-
cessful effort at Norfolk to obtain a seat on the Virginia
delegation for his friend, Thomas Fortune Ryan.

Flood had first been introduced to the Wall St.
financier by Claude Swanson in 1903. 18 The following year
he had helped Ryan, who maintained a farm in Nelson County,
to get a delegate seat at the state and national conven-
tions. 19 Over the years an increasing correspondence took
place between the two men and by 1912 they were close friends. 20

Although Ryan had been recognized for years as a notori-
ous utilities magnate and Czar of Wall St., his reputation

17. He received a number of compliments for his work at
Norfolk. See, for example, Joe Button to Flood, Richmond,
June 6, 1912 and Samuel Graham to Flood, Pittsurg, May 27,
1912, ibid., Box 44.

18. Claude Swanson to Flood, Richmond, New York, May
10, 1904, ibid., Box 26.

19. Flood to Ryan, Appomattox, May 16, 1904, Flood to
Morris K. Estes, Appomattox, May 28, 1904, Ryan to Flood, New
York, May 23, 1904, ibid., Box 26.

20. The New York millionaire even offered to make Flood
wealthy by selling him large groups of valuable stocks at low
prices. But the Appomattox Congressman, who was more interested
in his political career, refused. Interview with Flood Family,
August 21, 1965.
was made nationwide in the winter of 1912 as the result of a much publicized story involving Woodrow Wilson's refusal to accept his offer of a campaign contribution. The unfavorable publicity which he received did not deter Ryan from seeking a delegate seat to the national convention, and because of his close association with the financier the Appomattox Congressman felt he was obliged to elect him to a spot from his home in Nelson County.

Flood was astute enough to realize that if he openly endorsed Ryan for a delegate seat he would cause a furor in the convention against the organization; and so he decided upon a clever trick. Each congressional district in the state, he knew, was allotted a number of places on the Virginia delegation. These places were filled at the state party gathering by the various district committees. The Congressman had been able to secure a majority of anti-Wilson men on his region's committee so that he could have selected delegates opposed to the New Jersey Governor's nomination. But he offered to divide his district's two delegates between supporters of Wilson and of Underwood. By the terms of his offer each group was to decide privately whom they wanted to


22. Despite opposition from Claude Swanson and Martin who felt that Flood's association with Ryan was now an embar- rassment to the organization. Ferrell, "Claude A. Swanson," p. 252; Martin to Hay, Charlottesville, May 14, 1912, Hay Papers.
send to Baltimore and the other group would abide by its decision. The Wilson men were naturally delighted with Flood's apparent generosity and went out of the meeting room to choose their representative. When they returned to report on their choice Flood announced that his group had picked Ryan. Since Ryan's son was present when the announcement was made the Wilson men assumed that Flood meant the financier's son. The Congressman did not bother to correct their misconception even though his group had actually selected the elder Ryan. It was some surprise when the Wilson men at Baltimore found that the Wall St. magnate was on the delegation. A number of newspapers protested at the fact but it was too late to remove him. 23

Recriminations from Virginia were of small consequence compared to the commotion which the seating of Ryan caused at the convention. For on the third night of the gathering William Jennings Bryan offered a resolution which stated that the Democratic party was opposed to the nomination of any candidate who was "a representative of or under J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class" and which called for the withdrawal from the convention of "delegates constituting or representing the above-named interest." 24

23. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 27 and 28, 1912; Charlottesville Progress, July 1, 1912, Martin Scrapbooks, II, p. 6; Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, pp. 441-42.

Flood was sitting next to Ryan while the Nebraskan read his astounding proposals. Because of an allergy condition the financier had to wear heavy suits, and he had been sweating all day from the heat of the hall. As he listened to Bryan, tears of perspiration started pouring down his face and he began to quiver with anger. Flood shared his feelings, and as soon as Bryan concluded, the Congressman forced his way to the podium where he confronted the Nebraskan. By now the convention was in turmoil over the Nebraskan's resolutions. Bryan offered his hand to Flood, but the Congressman refused, shaking his head in an angry rejoinder. Then, trembling with indignation he faced the audience which quieted down to hear what he had to say. In a ringing voice looking directly at Bryan, he denounced the Nebraskan as the only member of the convention who desired to wreck the party. Immediately the convention let out a roar of approval while the Virginia delegation flocked about the Congressman in a wild demonstration of support. When Bryan tried to address the gathering, he was greeted by hisses and catcalls. The Nebraskan started to tell the delegates that at the request of Virginia he was prepared to withdraw that part of his resolution calling for the removal of Ryan and Belmont, but he was drowned out by the uproar in the hall. Another delegate succeeded in making himself heard for a few minutes and then Flood returned to the platform. In a blis-

terating speech he once more denounced the Bryan resolution. Virginia asked nothing of the Nebraskan, he yelled to the audience. If Bryan withdrew the second part of his motion it was not at Virginia's request. Ryan was elected by a convention of 1000 delegates, he declared, who were as honest as Mr. Bryan could ever be. He called for a vote and dared the convention to cast a slur on his state by expelling Ryan from the gathering.

When he finished speaking he was once again wildly cheered and as he left the platform to walk back to his seat, he was surrounded by delegates anxious to congratulate him. The gathering was so clearly behind Flood that Bryan had little choice except to withdraw that part of his resolution calling for the removal of Ryan and Belmont. The Nebraskan was able to have the first part of his resolution passed, but it was a meaningless gesture. A "nay" vote on this section was virtually to declare in favor of the nomination of a candidate supported by the "privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." Even Ryan and Belmont voted for that part of the resolution.

Flood's encounter with Bryan was one of the highlights

of the convention. His defence of Virginia's Democracy and his defiance of the Nebraskan won him applause from scores of citizens and newspapers throughout the state and the nation, including some papers which just a few days before had criticized him for sending Ryan to the Baltimore convention. He also received some favorable attention for his eloquent speech seconding the nomination of Oscar Underwood for President.

As for the remaining proceedings of the convention, they were less favorable to Flood and his faction of the state party. The Martin forces could dominate the Virginia party gatherings and prevent instructions for Wilson, but they could not keep the national convention from nominating the New Jersey Governor, which it proceeded to do after

27. The New York Times wrote, "Hal Flood, of Virginia, is one of the younger men who made himself felt in the convention at Baltimore by his courage and his felicity of speech when he defied the great Nebraskan and challenged his Democracy to a comparison with the Democracy of 'the sovereign state of Virginia.' There are hundreds, probably thousands, of young Democrats of the Flood type in the South who are coming up into their rightful places in the affairs of the party." New York Times, July 10, 1912.


29. Characteristic of the small regard he had for ideology in politics was that part of his speech in which he decried the loose application of the labels "progressives" and "reactionaries" in speaking of politicians. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1912, pp. 191-93.
several days of balloting. 30

Even though the organization worked diligently for Wilson during the campaign in Virginia, his nomination and subsequent election in November were a striking blow to the Martin machine. They were what the anti-organization forces had sought for almost two years and they gave them their finest opportunity to replace the machine as the dominant faction within the Old Dominion. They wasted little time in taking advantage of their chance; almost as soon as the Baltimore convention adjourned, Tucker wrote to Cleveland Mayor, Newton D. Baker, whom he heard was on close terms with the nominee, to ask him to use his influence with Wilson against the organization. Baker replied to Tucker's letter by deploring Senator Martin's connections with the railroads and by assuring the Staunton politician that he would use every opportunity he had to aid Tucker in his fight. 31 Two months later the same anti-Martin politician wrote to Wilson to describe the political conditions in the Old Dominion as he saw them and to plead with the Governor for help in his struggle against the organization. 32 As soon as the election

30. In a last desperate attempt to court Wilson's favor, in fact, Martin helped break the deadlock in the convention by throwing the entire Virginia delegation behind the New Jersey Governor. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, pp. 460-1.

31. Baker to Tucker, Cleveland, July 24, 1912, Tucker Papers, File #310.

32. The contents of this letter is mentioned in W. A. Jones to Tucker, Warsaw, September 22, 1912, ibid., File #311.
was over, he sent off another letter, this time to William Jennings Bryan. Again he described the Martin organization in its most unfavorable light, mentioned Martin's opposition to Wilson's nomination, and appealed for assistance to crush the organization.  

In the Old Dominion itself anti-Martin men refused to cooperate with organization candidates for office or in some cases actually worked against their election. In Flood's district a move was organized to remove the Congressman's name from the banner of the Wilson-Marshall flood campaign clubs.

A number of instances indicated that the efforts of the anti-Martin forces were succeeding and that they were rallying Wilson to active participation against the organization.

33. Tucker to Bryan, Norfolk, November 8, 1912, ibid., File #313.

34. Thomas R. Marshall, the Democratic Party's candidate for Vice-President.

35. The situation became so serious in the state that Flood finally wrote a letter to the Democratic National Committee to complain of the state of affairs. He urged the committee to issue a statement saying that loyal Democrats everywhere were expected to support both the party's presidential and congressional nominees. The committee replied to Flood's request by writing a letter to J. Taylor Ellyson in which it said it would look "with disdain" upon any Democrat who undertook to create trouble within the state party. Flood to Judge George K. Anderson, Personal and Confidential, Appomattox, June 30, 1912, Flood to Senator Thomas P. Gore, Appomattox, August 23, 1912, Flood to J. Taylor Ellyson, Appomattox, September 7, 1912, Flood to Richard E. Byrd, New York, September 22, 1912, Flood Papers, Box 45.
The most notable of these occurrences came a little more than a month after his election at a banquet in Staunton in honor of the new President's birthday. All the leading Democrats of the state were present except, significantly enough, the two Senators. It had been a gay evening and Wilson appeared to be in a festive mood when he began to speak. The atmosphere abruptly changed after the President remarked that some Virginians failed to believe in the state's Bill of Rights, that these same people were afraid of him, and had opposed his nomination. Then turning almost directly towards Flood who was sitting at the head table, he stated that at least one of these men was present at the banquet. 36

Flood acquitted himself creditably under the circumstances. When he spoke a short while after the President-elect sat down, he did not enter into debate with about the attitude of the Virginia leaders towards the nomination; instead he merely wished Wilson happiness and success. 37

Wilson later stated that he did not mean anything "venomous" about his remarks at Staunton, but was only speaking in good humor to a crowd of home folk. Some newspapers even claimed that Wilson did not have Flood in mind when he made his statement and that he intended them for some

36. Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 29, 1912.
37. Ibid.
railroad President who was seated in the audience. But as most reports from those present at the banquet seemed to indicate, Wilson's remarks were directed at Flood and were meant as a warning that he intended to cooperate with the anti-organization forces against the machine.38

The activities of the anti-Martin forces and the backing which they appeared to receive from the President-elect led many observers to predict an imminent break between Wilson and the Martin organization. The manner in which Flood received Wilson's remarks at Staunton did not hide the fact that he and the rest of the leaders of the machine were offended by the incident. Martin never forgave the new President for his statement, and many Virginians regretted that Wilson should have unnecessarily antagonized the state's leaders.39 Nor did the President's denial that he meant anything by his Staunton speech surpress persistent rumors that he was going to take away the federal patronage from those who had opposed his nomination.40 It


was no wonder then some newspapers talked of the demise of the organization and its replacement by a new machine or that some Martin politicians feared for their political future.  

Yet the expected break between the new President and the Martin forces never materialized. Although a number of the leaders of the organization, especially Martin, continued to display openly their dislike for Wilson, they fought for and voted for practically every major piece of his legislative program. The President responded to their support of his administration by letting Martin, Flood, and the organization handle the awarding of most of the federal patronage after an attempt to arrange a compromise between the two wings of the Virginia Democracy failed.

41. *The Newport News Times-Herald* thus wrote on August 22, 1912, "We believe that the days of the Virginia machine are numbered. With the election of Governor Wilson to the Presidency, a new generation of public men will rise in Virginia and they will bring about a new order of things in government and a new regime in our politics. Young men who desire to have a part in public affairs hereafter will do wisely and well, we think, to join the Wilson forces.... There will come into existence a new machine, and it will work well for a time. But its cogs will wear and slip by and by; and in time it will be retired for a machine of more modern type." See also J. Brenaman to Flood, Richmond, September 24, 1912, *Flood Papers*, Box 45.

42. "A deep chasm of views separated Wilson and Martin," Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels commented. "The Senator was ordinarily suave and courteous, but he lost control of himself when Wilson's name was mentioned. [Nevertheless] he supported nearly all the President's policies. I never heard bitterness break out but once." Daniels, *The Wilson Era--Years of Peace*, pp. 521 and 523.

43. Thus Tucker wrote the President's Secretary, J. P.
Martin's machine supported the administration because of their strong commitment to party loyalty. It made no difference to its leaders who was President or what programs he sponsored. They felt obligated to support a Democratic administration under any circumstances. As the President himself was aware, they regarded politics like a military organization in which the superior officers were obeyed. They understood the needs of discipline in any organization either on a state or national level. Just as they expected to receive the support of their followers in the state party, they intended to give their allegiance to the leaders in the national party. No room existed for political animosity or differences of political ideology.

Characteristic of the type of response which the organization gave to the party leadership was the record which Hal Flood made during Wilson's administration. Soon after the new President took office, the Appomattox Congressman was made Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, replacing William Sulzer who resigned from Congress to become Governor of New York. As Chairman, Flood fought for the passage of

Tumulty, in July 1913, complaining that "there have been but four changes in post-offices in this, the 10th District represented by Mr. Flood. At each of these places... 'machine' men have been appointed. Three of them, I know, were opposed to the President's nomination." Tucker to Tumulty, Lexington, July 19, 1913, Tucker Papers, File #324.


45. Sulzer, it will be recalled, was made Chairman of
every one of Wilson's bills on foreign matters including such administration projects as reforming the diplomatic and consular service, obtaining appropriations for the erection of new embassy buildings in Mexico and Tokyo, and obtaining passage of a bill in the House to give effect to a controversial treaty between the United States and Britain for the preservation of food fishes in the waters contiguous to the United States. His close cooperation with the President was all the more noteworthy since he had to deal frequently with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan who was the same man he had bitterly reproached at the Baltimore convention, and since he did not always agree with Wilson's foreign policies.

As Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee his most important work for the administration during its first two years was to fashion the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1911 in a compromise which sent Flood to the Committee on Territories. Even though the Appomattox Congressman took on the new committee assignment, he retained his seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee. Since he was its ranking member, next to Sulzer, he naturally succeeded as Chairman when the New Yorker resigned.

46. Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 15 and 16, 1914, October 20, 1914, pp. 8506-08, 8708-24, and 16830-33.

47. Ibid. 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 12 and 16, 1914, pp. 8476 and 8716-20.

48. Ibid., 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 2, 1914, pp. 4170-78. For the correspondence relating to the treaty between the United States and Britain, including correspondence between the State Department and Flood, see the Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., File #63-A.
years was his efforts to give the President a free hand in following out his policies towards the Mexican government of General Victoriano Huerta. In an attempt to establish a constitutional government in Mexico, Wilson sought to oust Huerta (whom he felt had seized power illegally) from office. At first he followed a policy of "watchful waiting," but as Huerta continued to remain in power he applied sharper pressure. In early 1914 he stationed U. S. naval units of Vera Cruz to block the entry of European shipments of war materials to the Huerta regime. In April, a crew of one of the ships stationed in the Mexican waters went ashore at Tampico for supplies and were promptly arrested by Huerta's troops. Although they were soon released, the American commander demanded that the chief of the port apologize for the incident, promise to punish the responsible officer, hoist the American flag ashore, and give it a 21 gun salute. When the Huerta government refused to comply with these demands, Wilson went before Congress to request permission to use force to uphold United States rights and secure redress of grievances. 49 Flood assumed the responsibility of seeing that Wilson's request was granted.

When Flood had first assumed the Chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he had emphatically opposed intervention in Mexico which, he felt, meant occupation by the

United States for many years, or perhaps permanently. This amounted to imperialism and Flood had always opposed a policy based on the acquisition of foreign territory.\textsuperscript{50} But as the President's policies towards Mexico crystallized, the Appomattox Congressman retreated from his original position and, a month after the Tampico incident, when American troops had already landed on Mexican soil, the Chairman justified Wilson's action in keeping troops in Mexico as an obligation of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{51}

It was during the Tampico incident itself, however, that Flood's willingness to cooperate with the President was put to its best use. The difficulty began when Huerta formally announced that he would not salute the American flag at Tampico. Determined to take punitive action the President on the 15th called a conference of all the senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees to inform them that he might be obliged to use

\textsuperscript{50} Flood to Captain J. M. Harris, Washington, February 22, 1913, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 47.

\textsuperscript{51} "The cause of the revolution in Mexico," he wrote in May, "is due to the fact that most of the land is owned by a very small percent of the population who had the backing of the Diaz government and also of the government since Huerta has been provisional president. A large bulk of the population are kept in ignorance. The United States nominally interfered on account of the arrest of some United States sailors at Tampico. The reason the United States will keep troops in Mexico until peace is restored is because of an obligation under the Monroe Doctrine." Flood to H. B. LaRue, Appomattox, May 29, 1914, \textit{ibid.}, Box 47.
military force in Mexico. He wanted to know whether the leaders thought he should call on Congress for such authority. Present at the meeting besides Flood were Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Benjamin Shively and Representative Henry Cooper. Although Lodge expressed the opinion that Wilson had the power to act without Congressional approval, all present at the meeting, including the Appomattox Congressman, felt that it would be better if he went before Congress as long as it was still in session. 52

Wilson's address was delayed four days while a series of exchanges took place between Washington and Mexico City. Huerta finally agreed to salute the American flag in return for a simultaneous salute of the Mexican flag. The President rejected the compromise and on April 19 announced that he would go to the Capitol the following day to ask approval for punitive action. 53

When Wilson made his announcement, Flood was in New York where he was enjoying a honeymoon with his bride of one day, Ann Portner Flood. They had been married the day before at the Pan American Building in Washington 54 and had


54. Flood, who was 49 years old, had met Miss Portner in Washington and, after a short courtship, they had decided to be married. See New York Times, April 19, 1914.
left for an extended honeymoon in New York. They were in the city only a few hours when Flood received an emergency call from the White House to return to Washington at once. He arrived back the same afternoon and, after making hurried living arrangements for himself and his bride, went over to the Capitol. There he discussed with other House leaders the quickest way to gain Congressional approval for the requests which Wilson was going to make the next day. 55

Early the following morning he met with the President and top cabinet officials to review the message which Wilson was to deliver later that afternoon. He also went over with the President the steps the House would have to take in order to authorize punitive action. After they decided on the procedure to follow, they left for the Capitol where Wilson delivered his message. As soon as the President finished and returned to the White House, Flood proceeded to implement his request for force. He called his committee into special session and succeeded in getting them to approve an authorization resolution in less than an hour. Twenty minutes later he introduced the resolution on the floor of the House with the report which he personally prepared. He then gained the quick passage of a rule from the Rules Committee which allowed immediate debate on the report and resolution, and succeeded in limiting debate to two hours. He apportioned the time between the different members who

55. Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, April 21, 1914.
wished to speak and, by using every parliamentary device available, had the resolution adopted without a single amendment. 56

The fight over the authorization resolution was not yet finished, however. Strong feeling existed among Republican members of Congress against Wilson's policies in Mexico, and when the House measure was sent to the Senate, a number of the Republicans in the upper chamber assailed the administration's policies and impugned Wilson's motives for intervention. While they were unsuccessful in their attempt to make any substantial changes in the resolution, they succeeded in making some minor alterations in form so that the amended resolution had to be sent back to the House for final approval. 57

Flood was determined to prevent the House Republicans, led by their minority leader, James Mann, from following the tactics of their Senate party members in criticizing the administration. Before the House assembled to receive the amended resolution he talked privately with every member of his committee. He secured their promise to agree to the amendments without the formality of a committee meeting and without issuing an official report. He also held a series of conferences with the party leadership in the House so


57. Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, April 21, 1914, pp. 6964-7014.
that by the time the lower chamber received the resolution, he had his committee, the House Democratic leadership, and the solid Democratic majority rallied to meet the efforts of the Republicans. He offered Mann 10 minutes for debate, and the minority leader, realizing that he had been outmaneuvered, had no choice but to accept. During the debate which followed the Appomattox Congressman made an eloquent plea in behalf of the administration in which he decried the attempt by some legislators to make partisan gain out of the Mexican situation and pleaded for Congressional unity in what he termed a period of crisis for the United States. After he finished his remarks, Speaker Champ Clark called up the resolution and without debate or roll call it was agreed to by a voice vote. Largely as a result of Flood's skillful efforts the President's position had been sustained within ten minutes after the resolution had reached the House.

58. "I fear an attempt has been made by gentlemen on the other side," he remarked, "to make partisan capital of the present situation....In the bitterness of debate, the President has been assailed and his motives impugned, but when the air clears, these criticisms will be remembered only to the detriment of those, who made them, and the President's patriotic action in this matter will add to his fame and to the honor and glory of this country. The President has come to the Congress in a crisis that affects the welfare of our country, the honor of our flag and our uniform, and the glory of our country, and asks the united support of the legislative branch of our government. Let him have it so that the world may know that the American people to a man are standing behind their President." Ibid., 63rd Congress 2nd Session, April 22, 1914, pp. 7077-78.

59. Ibid.
Even though Wilson was able finally to force Huerta to abdicate, the Mexican imbroglio dragged on for almost three more years, until March, 1917 when the United States finally extended diplomatic recognition to the newly elected government of Venustiano Carranza.\footnote{Arthur Stanley Link, \textit{Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 38-39.} During all this time Flood continued to collaborate closely with the administration in its policies towards Mexico. A week after Congress approved Wilson's request for authority to use force, the Appomattox Congressman succeeded in having his committee defeat a motion by Representative Jefferson Levy which would have appointed a committee of three to confer with the President on the Mexican situation and which would have required Wilson to keep the committee informed on the events in the troubled country to the South.\footnote{Minutes, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 63rd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, National Archives, Legislative Branch, Washington, D.C., April 30, 1914, p. 50.} Less than three months later he was able to convince his committee to table a House Resolution (H.R. 561) designed to embarrass the President by requiring the Secretary of State to transmit to Congress all the correspondence of a special mission sent to Mexico by the President.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, July 9, 1914, p. 61.} Flood also conferred with Wilson about United States policy on a number of occasions such as after an attack by Mexican troops on United States
soldiers in 1916. Moreover, he made numerous remarks to Congress during these difficult years in which he upheld the administration's stand on Mexico. As Republicans grew more critical of that position during the 1916 Presidential campaign he assumed an increasingly aggressive tone in his remarks until finally he even questioned their motives. 63 Not only did he defend Wilsonian policy in Mexico, he also answered Republican objections to the manner in which appointments were made to the consular service. 64 By this time too he was playing a significant role in seeing that the President was given a free hand to deal with the war in Europe, a struggle which had already become the most vital concern to the United States. 65

Even though Flood was an organization politician, therefore, who had fought Wilson's nomination, whose political future had been threatened by Wilson's election, and whose political outlook the anti-Martin wing of the Virginia state party said was in fundamental opposition to that of the President, the Appomattox Congressman became one of the administration's leading spokesmen in Congress. But Flood was not the only organization politician who supported the


64. Ibid., 64th Congress, 1st Session, June 6, 1916, p. 9311.

65. Flood's activities as they pertain to World War I will be discussed in the next chapter.
President. As Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee and as ranking member of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, James Hay and Claude Swanson also proved to be capable committee leaders and strong advocates of Wilsonian policies. Even Senator Martin, who had developed a passionate dislike for the President, supported nearly all of his legislation, and as Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, helped him obtain the funds he needed to carry out his programs. 66

Because of the backing which the organization gave to his administration in Congress, the question of dispensing the federal patronage in Virginia became a serious problem to Wilson. He could not take the handling of the patronage from the machine's leaders and still hope to receive their valuable support on the Capitol. But he had indicated before and after he became President that he intended to do just that. To complicate matters further, anti-organization leaders like William Jones, who was Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, and particularly Carter Glass, who was Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency, also provided the administration with loyal support. 67 Since they had worked for Wilson's nomination they expected to receive the entire handling of the patronage, which they in-


tended to use as a club in their attempt to drive the Martin wing of the party from power in the Old Dominion.

After much hesitation the President decided to seek a compromise between the two factions of the party, and he gave each group their fair share of the patronage. His action failed to satisfy the anti-Martin forces. When the first appointments made by the administration indicated that the organization was not to be deprived of the patronage, Tucker complained to Wilson's Secretary, Joe Tumulty, that all the federal positions in his district were going to Flood. He noted that there were six prominent places to be filled in the state, including two District Attorneys, two Collectors of Internal Revenue, and two Marshals. He urged that anti-machine men be appointed to each of these positions and that Jones, Glass, and Montague have the opportunity to fill at least one place.\(^68\)

When several months passed and the places still remained opened, he wrote to Secretary Bryan to complain that a number of appointments in the State Department and other branches of the administration had been given to Flood. He reminded the Nebraskan of Flood's role in the convention, and of the work he (Tucker) had done to nominate and elect the President. He appealed to the Secretary to intervene in his behalf and to obtain the important patronage positions for the anti-

\(^{68}\) Tucker to Tumulty, Lexington, July 19, 1913, Tucker Papers, File #324.
organization forces. About the same time Glass, Jones, and a number of other anti-Martin politicians in the state formed a delegation to visit the President for the purpose of bringing the political situation in Virginia to his attention. They wanted to impress upon him their need for complete control of the patronage. 70

Wilson hesitated to discuss the situation in the Old Dominion with Glass. Depending upon both wings of the state party for support, he still hoped that they would iron out their differences and reach some agreement among themselves as to the six major appointments to be made in the state. He would then name to office the candidates which they had selected together.

A partial agreement was almost reached between the two factions at the beginning of 1914 when several Congressmen from the organization wing of the party, including Walter Watson and Edward Holland, met with Montague to lay the groundwork for the distribution of the patronage in the eastern district of the state. But when Montague mentioned

69. "Is this the administration," he asked Bryan, "which I for two years helped to make, for whose success I contributed a §1000 besides two months of my own time, at my own expense, to furnish the ammunition in the form of offices, to shoot the men that made it....The anti-election fight (sic) against the bosses and against Ryans and Belmonts we understood to be a real fight, and we want no compromise with them." Tucker to Bryan, Lexington, November 8, 1913, ibid., File #331.

70. William A. Jones to Westmorland Davis, Washington, November 27, 1913, Westmorland Davis Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
to Jones the possibility of an arrangement, the Warsaw Congressman vetoed the idea; he wanted no compromise, and the former Governor was unwilling to enter into negotiations without Jones.\(^{71}\)

By March it was apparent that the two factions of the state party were no closer to an agreement on the patronage than they had been at the time Wilson took office. When Senators Martin and Swanson decided to ask the administration to nominate Peyton St. Clair as a Collector of Internal Revenue for the state, the anti-organization forces voiced so much opposition to the appointment that the recommendation had to be withdrawn. The same thing happened when the Senators tried to get Lee Clark appointed Marshall of the western district of the state. The result was that Republicans still held the six leading federal positions in the state even though Wilson had been in office for more than a year.\(^{72}\)

Wilson himself added to the difficulty in the Old Dominion by his ambivalent stand on the patronage. Finally meeting with Glass in the beginning of March, he told the Congressman that he would allow him and his friends to name one appointee in the eastern district of the state and one in the western district. At the same time he assured Martin

\(^{71}\) The incident is described in Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, March 15, 1914.

\(^{72}\) *Ibid.*, March 6, 1914.
and Swanson that he would not nominate any man to a key position in Virginia who was distasteful to them. The President did not realize that this was an impossible position to take; that Glass and his friends were not likely to choose men who would meet with the two Senators' approval.  

The situation became so tangled that for a while it appeared no solution was possible. Martin, Swanson, and Glass each paid visits to the White House in an attempt to gain the patronage for their wing of the party. They left the President so confused that he was described as being at "his wits end".  

Finally the President realized he had to take matters into his own hands. In a situation where compromise was impossible, he had little choice but to give the handling of the patronage in Virginia to the organization. While the anti-Martin wing of the party had supported him and held important committee assignments in Congress, the organization was still the dominant faction in the state and their loyalty was crucial to the success of his programs. Both Senators were organization leaders; Martin, Swanson, Flood,  

73. It was certain they intended to select John Hart as Collector in the western district and Robert Allsworth as Marshal in the east. These men were such bitter political enemies of the Senators that they would never agree to let the President nominate them; and if he did they were bound to defeat their nomination in the upper chamber. Ibid., March 15, 1914.  

74. Ibid.
and Hay all held important assignments and Martin was Chairman of the most important committee of all, Appropriations. Wilson could not do without their support and, after he met with Glass and the two Senators, he announced his own appointments for Virginia; six of the big seven offices went to organization candidates.  

His patronage policies were a serious blow to the fortunes of the anti-Martin wing of the party who had supported the Wilsonian movement almost from its inception in the hopes of destroying or at least weakening the organization's hold on the state's politics. They had expected that Wilson as President would aid them in their fight against the Martin wing. Now they had to face the realization that they were to receive no help and that their chances of overthrowing the organization were dismal.

Wilson had not intentionally abandoned his followers. Certainly he had intended to regenerate the Democratic party in organization dominated states by handing control of the patronage over to new and seemingly more progressive elements. But he was versed enough in political affairs to know that he had to deal with the realities of practical politics.  

These realities as they related to Virginia politics were clear cut. The Martin organization was not

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only in control of the state; more important for Wilson, they were in control of a number of vital committees. He needed their cooperation, which they were willing to give. All they asked in return was the handling of the federal patronage to which they were entitled by virtue of their elected office. The President could do no less than give them what they had a right to have even if it meant the demise of the "progressive" movement in Virginia.
Chapter IX

War Years

While the two factions of Virginia's Democratic party were struggling in 1913 for control of the federal patronage, a primary election took place in the Old Dominion for a new legislature and state officers. Strangely enough both wings of the party were in agreement as to whom to support for Governor. Prior to the Senate race of 1911 Henry St. George Tucker had been the leading candidate to succeed William Hodges Mann. As an important member of the anti-Martin forces, Tucker was expected to receive their support, and through the efforts of his uncle, Charles Faulkner Jr., he also had made an agreement with Flood to cease his attacks on the Congressman and his friends in return for Flood's backing of his candidacy in 1913. On the basis of this arrangement Senator Martin had even been prepared to throw the full weight of his organization behind the Staunton politician. Only Tucker's activities against Martin during the Senate race changed matters.

1. "If Tucker had behaved in a dignified and proper manner in the last senatorial contest," Flood thus wrote Dr. George H. Denny, "Martin would be for him now. Tucker's activity in Lexington and Rockbridge County has precluded the possibility of his ever securing support from Martin...I heard Senator Martin say...a few days ago...that if Tucker had kept out [of] the Senatorial fight he could have been nominated
Instead of backing the Staunton politician, Martin decided to throw his support behind the only other important candidate, Henry Stuart. A farmer, businessman, and powerful political figure in southwestern Virginia, Stuart had been appointed by Governor Montague as an original member of the Corporation Commission. He had also waged a bitter battle in the 9th Congressional district in 1910 against Congressman C. Bascom Slemp in which he almost unseated the incumbent.  

Even though he was a close friend of Montague and tended to side with the anti-organization faction of the party, Stuart avoided antagonizing the Martin forces. As early as the beginning of 1912, after he had already decided to run for Governor, he reached Martin through intermediaries and made it clear that if elected he would deal fairly with the machine. Later he repeated these pledges personally to the Senator. Martin was not anxious to see Stuart in the executive mansion since he was not a regular organization politician, but he preferred him to Tucker. He offered the gubernatorial candidate his support and wrote to several of his friends in the state asking them to do the

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for Governor without much trouble." Flood to Denny, Washington, February 23, 1912, Flood Papers, Box 48.

Stuart was already assured of support from a number of leading anti-Martin politicians including Andrew Jackson Montague, and their backing with that of the Senator made his nomination certain. Tucker realized this fact and at the end of March announced his withdrawal from the race. Because of his previous pledge to the Staunton politician, Flood had stood by his cousin, albeit reluctantly. Tucker's announcement relieved him of this promise and he immediately wrote Stuart pledging his support. His backing actually meant very little, for with no opposition in the primary Stuart was automatically declared the Democratic nominee for Governor.

Quite different were the races for other state officers, Lieutenant-Governor, Attorney-General, and Commissioner of Agriculture. In each of these contests organization and anti-organization candidates were pitted against each other. Much was at stake in the race since President Wilson had not

3. "I note what you say about Mr. Stuart's candidacy," Martin thus wrote Charles T. Lassiter. "...I have had several conversations with Stuart himself, and I am sure that the wise thing to do will be to support him. I have assured him he will have my support. He is an able man and a safer man than Tucker, and I have no fear about fair treatment of our friends. I would expect nothing from Tucker except bitter antagonism. He is, in my judgement, narrow and bigoted, as well as intensely hostile to me and my friends." Martin to Charles Lassiter, Washington, February 22, 1913, Charles T. Lassiter Papers, Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina.

4. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, p. 266.

5. Flood to Stuart, Washington, March 1, 1913, Flood Papers, Box 47.
yet decided about the federal patronage or where the source of political strength lay in Virginia. Flood, who realized this fact, carefully followed the contest in the Old Dominion, helped line up support for his candidates, and made a number of speeches in their behalf throughout the state.

Of the three contests the most bitter was the one for Attorney-General between the machine candidate and incumbent, Samuel B. Williams, and his opponent, John Garland Pollard. A young Richmond lawyer, Pollard waged an aggressive fight almost from the beginning of the contest. He made an extensive speaking tour of the state during the course of which he attacked the unfair election laws in Virginia, called for such reforms as impartial choosing of election judges and the end of the fee system of paying local officials, and promised to break up the Martin organization. 7

In August the campaign reached a bitter point when Pollard accused Flood of making a bar-to-bar visit in

6. "The people who call themselves anti-machine," the Appomattox Congressman thus wrote, "are making the most desperate efforts to line up the administration against us that could possibly be made. There is not any kind of misrepresentation they will not make....The Glass-Jones crowd spend a good part of their time going from Cabinet Officer to Cabinet Officer misrepresenting the conditions in Virginia and claiming...that they can elect [their men] if they have a fair deal. If they elect either one it will seriously handicap all our efforts to help our friends, particularly as to post-offices," Flood to Sam Ferguson, Washington, June 28, 1913, ibid., Box 43.

Richmond for the purpose of lining up liquor interests there for Williams. The Appomattox Congressman, who was not even in the state capital on the day cited by Pollard, was enraged by the candidate's statement and immediately answered his charges by issuing his own statement. Mincing no words he assailed Pollard's character and called his charges a "cheap lie" made by the Richmond lawyer for the purpose of gaining a few votes. Unmoved by Flood's reply, Pollard issued a second letter stating that he did not care what the Congressman thought of him. Flood's reputation, he went on, was too well known for his opinion of character to matter the slightest. 8

How much these charges and countercharges affected the outcome of the contest is uncertain, but when the primary was held in August Pollard won a narrow victory. 9 Probably more important than the exchange between Pollard and Flood was the fact that the incumbent had alienated so many county and city officials during his tenure of office that even leaders of the organization were not able to get them to bring out the vote for the Attorney General. 10

8. Both letters are printed in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 6, 1913.

9. The final official totals were printed a month after the primary. Pollard won by about 2000 votes out of more than 60,000 cast. Ibid., September 2, 1912.

10. Harry Flood Byrd to Flood, Winchester, August 8, 1913 and Flood to Dr. George H. Denny, Washington, August 14, 1913, Flood Papers, Box 48.
Except for Pollard's victory, election results were very gratifying to the organization. Their candidates for Lieutenant-Governor and Commissioner of Agriculture, incumbents J. Taylor Ellyson and G. W. Koiner, won easy victories over their opponents while three-quarters of the legislature and county committee places went to machine men. Any sentiment which still existed against the Martin forces for their reluctance to support Woodrow Wilson in 1912 was not evident in the vote totals. As Flood wrote to his friend, Dr. George Denny, just before the primary took place, general feeling in Virginia towards the organization was better than it had been for years.

Results of the election were naturally demoralizing to the anti-Martin forces, especially since they came at a time when its leaders were bidding for the federal patronage and discovering that President Wilson intended to give at least some appointments to Martin men. Undoubtedly results of the election had some bearing on Wilson's decision a few months later to hand almost the entire patronage to the organization.

Their efforts in the 1913 elections were the last attempt by the anti-organization forces to oust the Martin wing of the party from power. Discouraged by their setback in the primary and their loss of the federal patronage, they

11. Flood to Dr. George H. Denny, Washington, August 8, 1913, ibid., Box 48.

all but gave up their long fight to replace the organization as the dominant faction in the Old Dominion.

Only occasionally did a recurrence of factional strife disturb the state's political life. Most notable of these rare instances was in 1916 and involved a fight for a spot on the Democratic National Committee. Carter Glass wanted to be appointed as Virginia's delegate to the Committee and he was angered when Senator Martin backed Claude Swanson's friend, Rorer James, for the position.  

A quarrel between Glass, Martin, and Swanson followed and became so bitter that finally a conference of all party leaders in the state had to be held in Washington. Invited to the meeting were the principles involved as well as Flood and Ellyson. After much discussion they finally reached an agreement suggested by Flood in which Glass became National Committeeman and Rorer James, Chairman of the state party.  

Except for the few instances of intra-party factionalism, the organization did not have to concern itself much with Virginia politics. Its leaders, to be sure, still kept

13. Thus Glass wrote Tucker, "The wretched committeeman business is something beyond my comprehension. The behavior of Senator Martin is almost incredible and I really do not understand what he means by it. To bring me into competition with a fellow like Rorer James is just about the worst thing I have ever had happen to me." Glass to Tucker, Washington, May 9, 1916, Tucker Papers, File #348.

watch on the political affairs of the Old Dominion, still made certain of the organization's dominant position and even suffered an occasional setback such as during the 1917 gubernatorial race when Westmorland Davis defeated their candidate, J. Taylor Ellyson, for the party's nomination. But their place in the state was so secure that they were able to devote most of their attention to affairs in Congress.

As watchdog of the organization's interests in the Old Dominion, Hal Flood always kept a careful scrutiny on the political situation in the state. Even during the 1917 gubernatorial campaign, when he was exceedingly busy with war matters in the House of Representatives, he was one of the managers of the Ellyson campaign. He made a number of speeches for the Lieutenant-Governor and solicited support for him throughout the state. When Ellyson lost the nomination, he took on a full speaking load in behalf of Davis.

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15. Ellyson's defeat was not really a major blow to the machine which spent little time in the campaign, believing that Davis would be an easy candidate to defeat. Prohibition was the central issue in the contest. Davis had the united support of the "wets" while Ellyson had to share the "dry" vote with Pollard who also entered the contest. For an account of the race see Jack Temple Kirby, "Alcohol and Irony: The Campaign of Westmorland Davis for Governor," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXXIII (July, 1965), pp. 255-59.

Like that of other leaders of the organization, however, his political position in the state and in his own district was assured and he was able to devote almost his full time to Congressional matters, particularly to the United States' increasing involvement in World War I. As Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee he was the leading spokesman for Wilson's war policies in a House whose Majority Leader, Claude Kitchin, opposed the President's position, and whose members on several occasions were on the verge of rebellion against the administration. Even his own committee was divided at times in its loyalties to the President and it was a testimony to his effectiveness as an administration leader that he was always able to obtain its approval for Wilson's foreign policy measures and then to secure their passage in the House.

Flood did not always agree with Wilsonian policy towards the European struggle. He felt the United States was involving itself too quickly in a war that was not its concern. Also he was a Southerner of Irish descent and he had some strong objections to America's close relations with England, particularly in the light of the British tobacco embargo of 1916. But just as during the Mexican crisis when he also disagreed with Wilson's policies, he never let personal

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17. Interview with Flood family, August 21, 1965. For Flood's attitude towards the British Tobacco Embargo, see Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, Editorial, September 10, 1916.
attitudes interfere with his efforts for the administration.

On only one occasion, in fact, did he ever voice serious objection to the President's position and that was in a private conversation with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan a month after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Flood had reason to fear the sinking might lead to an unpopular war between the United States and Germany. Following the incident the President had sent a strong note of protest to Germany demanding that the Berlin government abandon unrestricted submarine warfare, disavow the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and make reparations for the loss of American lives. It was common knowledge in the beginning of June that the President was preparing an even stronger note which might precipitate a break in relations with Germany. Worried about the course which the President was following, Flood, who had tried to minimize the importance of several other sinkings,\(^\text{18}\) accompanied his friend Martin to the State Department, where they had an interview with Bryan. During the course of the meeting the two important leaders of Congress told the Secretary with great earnestness that the United States did not want war with Germany and that the country expected the administration to avoid hostile acts. Martin noted that he had talked with three Senators and they all shared his opinion. Flood made a similar remark in regard

to the House saying that it would vote against a war reso-
lution.19

After his meeting with Bryan Flood complained no
further,20 even though Wilson sent his second Lusitania
note to Germany. As protests grew over Wilson's stand on
the European war, the Congressman returned to his accustomed
role as one of the President's most resolute House leaders.
During the next three years he performed innumerable ser-
VICES for the administration in Congress, conferred regularly
with Wilson on foreign policy, and spoke frequently to the
newspapers in defense of administration handling of the
war.21 On every possible occasion he made clear his con-
viction that the President should conduct his own foreign
policy and that Congress should unhesitatingly support his
decisions.22

Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The
Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, I (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.; Govern-
mment Printing Office, 1939), pp. 436-37; Link, Wilson: The
Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 416-17.

20. At the request of the Secretary of State, however, he and Martin wrote their views on paper for the President to

21. Flood to Thomas Fortune Ryan, Washington, May 14,
1917, Flood Papers, Box 79; New York Times, January 5, 16, 20
and May 9, 1916.

22. Thus he remarked during the Austrian war resolution
debate, when a number of Congressman were anxious to extend the
resolution to include Bulgaria and Turkey, "All of us realize,
Mr. Speaker, that to a great extent the burden of the great
European war is upon this country, and every member of this
body is willing to assume that burden, and willing to put into
Undoubtedly Flood's greatest service for the administration came in February, 1916, before the United States had entered the war, when he led the fight in his committee and on the floor of the House to block the passage of the McLemore resolution warning Americans against traveling on armed ships. This resolution, introduced by Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas, had its origins in the continued crisis with Germany over the Lusitania incident, and was part of a Congressional explosion against the administration's war policies.

Unsuccessful negotiations with Germany over the sinking of the Lusitania had continued throughout 1915 and into 1916. Finally in the beginning of February, an agreement was almost reached when Berlin offered to assume liability for the loss of American lives. Unfortunately Secretary of State Robert Lansing then brought into discussion the problem of how to treat armed merchantmen on the seas. He suggested an arrangement whereby England and her allies would disarm their merchant ships and Germany would agree to observe the rules of cruiser warfare in all submarine operations against that war our manpower and our resources....And I believe the President is fully apprised of all the military situations in connection with this war, and whenever it becomes necessary for the proper prosecution of the war, for the speediest winning of the war, to declare war upon any nation that is allied with Germany the President will come to Congress and recommend such a declaration and that declaration will be adopted with a practical unanimity by this body." Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, December 6, 1917, pp. 52-53. See also, ibid., 64th Congress, 1st Session, June 6, 1916, p. 9312.
merchant vessels. German negotiators readily accepted Lansing's proposal and on February 10, 1916 announced that its submarines would receive orders to attack armed merchant ships without warning. Suddenly, a few days after the German announcement, Lansing startled the country by stating that the United States would not abide by the agreement if the Allies rejected its terms. The Secretary had good reason for reversing his stand; England strongly objected to the plan so that American insistence upon disarming merchant ships would have created a rift between Washington and London and would have wrecked an attempt the President was making to mediate between the belligerent governments. Lansing's announcement, however, touched off a storm of protest in Congress.\(^{23}\)

A number of House members, including Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, had long opposed Wilson's war policies, particularly his preparedness movement, which they felt was dangerous and unneutral and might eventually lead to American involvement in the European struggle.\(^{24}\) Until 1916 these Congressmen had been in a distinct minority, but then as a result of Lansing's action, previously loyal Democrats began to fear that the President was actually maneuvering the

\(^{23}\) For the complicated story of these negotiations with Germany and England see Link, Wilson: Confusion and Crises, pp. 142-66.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 28; Alex Matthews Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston; Little Brown and Co., 1937), especially pp. 170-71.
country into war. The attempt to pass the McLemore resolution warning Americans to stay off armed merchant vessels was part of this reaction as was a similar resolution brought into the Senate by Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma. Introduction of these measures in Congress led to some of the most dramatic and sensational occurrences that had been seen in Washington in recent years, and Hal Flood was in the middle of these events.25

Flood's first reaction after Lansing's announcement of February 15 and the introduction of the McLemore resolution a few days later was to see the President to tell him of the gravity of the situation in Congress. Wilson himself requested such a meeting and on February 21, accompanied by Senate Majority Leader John F. Kern of Indiana, and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William J. Stone, Flood went to the White House. There he and the others were told by Wilson that if the Germans sank armed merchant ships without warning, he would hold Germany to strict accountability and break off relations with Berlin, and in that event he had been advised by the German Ambassador that his country would declare war against the United States. He said also that while he would ask the allied powers to disarm their merchant ships, he would regard adoption of a warning resolution as a discourtesy to his administration. His remarks angered Senator Stone who banged his fist on the

table and told the President that he had no right to make him follow such a course since it could mean war. On that abrupt note the meeting ended.  

Flood was very disturbed by his meeting with the President, especially since the next day the German government announced that German submarines would attack without warning all belligerent and armed merchant ships whether carrying passengers or not. That night he outlined the details of his meeting with Wilson to his friend and colleague, Congressman Walter Watson, and remarked that he would not be surprised to see the United States at war by March 15.  

His feelings were shared by the majority of Congressmen who were frightened at the prospect that the United States might be heading towards a war with Germany. In an attempt to stop the growing panic in the House, Flood called the Democratic membership of the Foreign Affairs Committee into session, but he only increased their apprehension by telling them that the President would not yield in his position and was ready to go to war if necessary. Not one member of the committee was found to be in sympathy with Wilson's course. Flood was only able to prevent them from reporting on McClure's resolution by promising to go to the White House the next day with other Democratic leaders to tell the

26. New York Times, February 24, 1916. The details of the meeting did not leak out until several days after it was held.  

President that the House would adopt a warning resolution unless he changed his policy towards armed merchantmen within two days.28

For the next twenty-four hours the Democratic leadership in both houses of Congress worked feverishly to prevent an outbreak against the President, but a canvass of House members indicated that a warning resolution, if brought up for a vote, would pass by a wide majority. Meanwhile Congress waited for the President's next move, which came on February 25 in a public response to a letter Wilson received from Senator Stone. In his reply the President declared that he would do his utmost to keep the country out of war but that he could not consent to the abridgement of American rights on the seas. By appealing to national honor and making clear his determination to uphold the country's rights, he rallied public support to his side and blunted the rebellion in Congress. His statement had such a tremendous effect on the House that Flood told reporters the same afternoon that he thought the situation in the lower chamber was "now under control."29

Despite Flood's justified optimism the crisis in Congress was still not over, since the McLemore and Gore resolutions remained to be acted upon. At first Wilson had been anxious

to see these resolutions die in committee and in accordance with that policy the Appomattox Congressman had refused to start hearings on the McLeomore resolution. The administration suddenly reversed its policy, however, after the State Department received reports that Germany had doubts about Wilson's ability to pursue his own foreign policy. In order to remove these doubts and to make clear his determination to follow a strong policy on armed ships, the President decided to urge a vote on the warning resolutions. Defeat of the measures, he expected, would show Germany his control over United States foreign affairs.30

Wilson's decision to press for a vote came as a shock to Congress where once more fear arose that the President was following a path towards war. Administration leaders, including Flood, urged a delay in the vote, unsure of whether Congress would support the President. Wilson remained adamant, and after conferring with the President Flood reluctantly pressed for a report from his committee recommending that the McLeomore resolution be tabled. His task was not an easy one, for as late as March 2 newspapers noted that the majority of the Democratic members on the committee were opposed to a report on any motion bearing on the international situation and that Republican members were united behind a policy of delay. Also three members of the committee, Repre-

sentatives John Shackleford of North Carolina, Cyrus Cline of Indiana, and Charles Smith of New York, were trying to line up support for passage of McLemore's resolution. 31

Because of the disunity within the committee Flood was unable to get quick action. For the first three days of March committee members reviewed various proposals but could arrive at no agreement. One suggestion which was given some consideration was that the committee bypass the McLemore proposal in favor of another which evaded the armed ships controversy, but which expressed Congress' confidence in Wilson's ability to handle all diplomatic affairs. Flood turned this idea down after he was informed by the President that he desired only action which was affirmative, in other words a vote on a resolution similar to the one offered by McLemore. 32

Finally, on March 4, after the administration applied great pressure and after the Senate defeated the Gore resolution, Flood was able to force a committee vote on the McLemore measure. The committee session lasted two hours and was marked by considerable bickering. Representative Henry Cooper of Wisconsin, ranking Republican on the committee, protested against "secret diplomacy" and demanded a showdown on whether Wilson's policies were leading to war. Flood answered Cooper by announcing that he had just talked with

32. Ibid., March 2 and 3, 1916.
the President who assured him that he did not intend to take any drastic steps in diplomatic negotiations without advising Congress in advance. The Congressman's remarks relieved many committeemen of their doubts and cleared the way for a decision to report on the warning resolution. Following Flood's statement, Representative Schackleford moved that the committee proceed to consideration of the proposal and immediately. Representative John Linthicium of Maryland, who was working closely with Flood, moved that the resolution be reported back to the House with the recommendation that it be tabled. Schackleford then offered a substitute measure warning Americans that they would be traveling on armed merchantmen at their own risk but saying that the President should have a free hand in continuing negotiations with the belligerents. With Flood completely in control of his committee the Schackleford proposal was resoundingly defeated by a vote of 14 to 1. Another resolution introduced by Representative Joseph Thompson of Oklahoma went to an opposite extreme by stating that loss of American lives as a result of the sinking of an armed merchant ship without warning would be cause for war with Germany. This motion also lost by a vote of 16 to 1. Finally, after several more proposals were easily defeated, the committee adopted Linthicium's motion to recommend tabling the McLemore resolution.33

33. Ibid., March 5, 1916; Minutes, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 64th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, March 4, 1916, pp. 23-24.
The committee's report was adopted on a Saturday and on Monday the Rules Committee set debate on the report and the resolution for the following day. Meanwhile a huge lobby led by William Jennings Bryan and the National German American Alliance worked feverishly to line up votes in favor of passing warning resolution. Flood responded by making clear that much more was at stake than the immediate proposal. "This was a question," he contended, "[of whether] in diplomatic negotiations going on between the Executive of this country and a foreign Government...we shall stand with the President or with a foreign Government." 34

Debate on the resolution began in the morning of March 7 and continued uninterrupted for seven hours. Flood, with the help of Chairman Edward Pou of the Rules Committee, had complete control of the situation and secured enough votes to sustain the administration's position. He closed the debate himself late in the afternoon by stating that the Senate action on the warning resolution was satisfactory to the country and that at stake was the right of the President to conduct his own foreign policy. At this point Republican clamor against his remarks became so loud that he had to stop and was unable to proceed again for more than a minute. Angered by the outburst he took the Republicans to task for opposing the President for what he termed political reasons. Despite

34. Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, March 6, 1916, p. 3638.
another storm of protest from the Republican side he con-
cluded his remarks by pointing out that the whole fabric of
the constitution and of international law was at stake in
the vote which the House was about to take. As soon as he
returned to his seat the critical vote was taken on the
motion to table the McLemore resolution, and it was adopted
276 to 142.35

Defeat of the resolution meant the end of the armed ship
rebellion in Congress which had begun three weeks earlier.
It was a great victory for the President since it assured him
a free hand to formulate policy. At the start of the
Congressional uproar Flood had been as fearful as any Congress-
man about the course which Wilson was following towards the
war, but in typical fashion he put his own views aside to sup-
port the administration in its most difficult days before the
war. Consequently he did more than any other Congressman to
assure the President's right to conduct his own foreign
policy.

Once the McLemore resolution was defeated and the United
States drifted into war, Flood's work as Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee became more routine. His committee
met irregularly and usually for the purpose of considering
appropriation bills for the diplomatic and consular service.
In the House he had little to do except to carry out the

wishes of the President. Still he performed a number of valuable tasks for the administration including introducing legislation to strengthen the neutrality laws,\textsuperscript{36} drafting an armed ships bill and carrying it through the House,\textsuperscript{37} writing the war resolution against Germany and leading the fight for its immediate passage,\textsuperscript{38} doing the same for the war resolution against Austria and helping prevent the lower chamber from extending it to include Bulgaria and Turkey.\textsuperscript{39}

Flood's activities following the war were actually of greater importance than his efforts during the struggle, for just before the final armistice was signed in November, 1918, the Republicans captured both houses of Congress. Replaced as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he had the burden of defending the President against Republican attacks on his foreign policies. His greatest accomplishment in this respect was his successful effort to exonerate the administration from charges of improper spending during the war.

Even before Republicans returned to power they had begun

\begin{itemize}
\item[37.] \textit{Ibid.}, February 27 and March 2, 1917; \textit{Congressional Record}, 64\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, February 26 and March 1, 1917, pp. 4368 and 4688-92.
\item[38.] \textit{New York Times}, April 4, 5, and 6, 1917; \textit{Congressional Record}, 65\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, April 5, 1917, pp. 307-10.
\item[39.] \textit{New York Times}, December 6 and 7, 1917; \textit{Congressional Record}, 65\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, December 6 and 7, 1917, pp. 52-53 and 99-100.
\end{itemize}
to criticize expenditures made by the various departments of the administration during the struggle. As was expected, as soon as they gained control of Congress, they named a special group of fifteen members to launch a full scale investigation of war expenditures. The full committee, which was headed by Representative William Graham of Illinois, was divided into five sub-committees to look into the various facets of spending. Flood was named as ranking minority member of the whole committee and placed on sub-committee three charged with investigations abroad. Its two other members, Representatives Royal Johnson of South Dakota and Oscar Bland of Indiana were Republicans.

Flood's subcommittee soon became bogged down in the partisan politics which had characterized the formation of the special committee. Instead of limiting its investigation to expenditures in Europe as demanded by Flood, it investigated the conduct of the war in the United States as well. It sought to discredit the War Department under Wilson's administration and in doing so went into matters not related to expenditures such as the conduct of the war from a technical standpoint and the treatment of noncommissioned officers. It also criticized Wilson's foreign policies, and in its findings it accused Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and, by

40. One Representative had asked, for example, how money appropriated to the State Department had been used by President Wilson to send his personal representative, Colonel Edward House, to Europe. *New York Times*, February 16, 1918.
insinuation, General John J. Pershing of improper purchasing policies, wasteful negligence, and extravagant spending. It questioned the right of General Pershing and other officers of the High Command in France to receive the Distinguished Service Medal and it charged Pershing and others of a "reckless disregard of the lives of [American soldiers] on armistice day by delaying the end of hostilities." Conclusions of the sub-committee were serious enough that had they been accepted by the full committee they would have cast a grey shadow over the American war effort, the War Department, and the United States High Command in France.

While Johnson and Bland were making their probe and preparing their findings, however, Flood made his own investigation. Working closely with General Pershing, Secretary Baker, and other important War Department and army officials, the Congressman gathered an enormous amount of statistical information which showed that the war was run as efficiently and economically as could be expected in such a major undertaking. He also produced evidence to show that the personal charges made against members of the War Department and High

41. See copies of the majority and minority reports of the subcommittee in Flood Papers, Box 69. See also Flood's remarks on the Majority Report in Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, June 4, 1920, pp. 9329-30.

Command, particularly General Pershing, were unmerited. 43

Flood incorporated his findings in a minority report which he delivered to the full committee along with the majority report. His conclusions, commending the Wilson administration and the army for their effort during the war, were based on such firm evidence and were corroborated in so many particulars by the findings of the other subcommittees and by the hearings of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that the full House committee accepted his report in lieu of the majority statement. 44 This was remarkable considering the partisan nature of the proceedings. Flood's work saved the administration, which was already under heavy Republican criticism because of its effort in support of the Treaty of Versailles, from further disrepute.

Flood's work on the committee investigating war expenditures was his last significant effort in Congress. A few months after the committee made its report Warren Gamaliel Harding was elected President of the United States and a year later Flood died. While the Congressman continued to fight for the passage of a number of post-war measures during the last year of his life, such as a bill expressing American

43. A number of folders of statistical information on war expenditures and other pertinent materials can be found in ibid., Boxes 69 and 73. For a typical speech in which he defended military expenditures during the war see his address on the aircraft industry, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, March 16, 1920, pp. 3971-75.

sympathy for Irish Home Rule, an Armenian Relief Bill, and the Treaty of Versailles, the importance of his committee diminished as the war years came to an end and he no longer had the important task of speaking for the administration in the House. His efforts on the expenditures committee were a fitting conclusion to a congressional career which had been characterized by unquestionable loyalty to the Democratic party and its leaders. It was precisely this loyalty to the administration during the war years which had made Flood such an influential and important leader of Congress during a critical period in the history of the United States.


46. Flood to T. S. Settle, Washington, July 15, 1921 and Flood to Kate R. Gary, Washington, August 8, 1921, Flood Papers, Box 69.

47. Flood to Secretary, American Legion William and Mary Post No. 90, Washington, October 29, 1919, ibid., Box 78.
CHAPTER X

Final Years and Conclusion

Although the war years had coincided with a period of relative political stability in Virginia, the political complexion of the state dramatically changed within a year after the struggle ended. In November, 1919, Thomas Martin died after a long illness. His death created a power vacuum in the Old Dominion, and it was not at all certain who would inherit his mantle of political leadership or who would replace him in the United States Senate. Governor Westmorland Davis had been building up his own organization since winning office in 1917 and he was anxious to challenge the machine for control of the state's political life. Except for Henry St. George Tucker who joined forces with Davis, this new anti-organization faction had an entirely different leadership than that of the former Montague-Jones-Glass coalition, but it posed an equally serious threat to machine domination of state politics. Thus by the end of 1919 factional rifts in the Virginia Democracy had been reopened, six years of political stability had vanished, and the course of Virginia's political life looked uncertain.

As Martin's closest political ally Flood was heir apparent to the deceased Senator. But before he could replace Martin as leader of the organization he had to defeat the
challenge presented by Governor Davis. This was no easy task, for the Governor was in an unusually strong position. Martin's death had created instability within the ranks of the machine, and also had left Davis with the opportunity to strengthen his own political position by naming Martin's successor. Davis already had plans to oppose Claude Swanson for the Senate in 1922 and by naming the right person to fill Martin's unexpired term he could gain a powerful ally for his fight. At first, rumors persisted that the Governor would name Tucker to the Senate vacancy, but the Staunton politician had only a limited following in the state and Davis was already able to count on his support. Instead the Governor decided on the clever strategy of naming Carter Glass (who was now Wilson's Secretary of the Treasury) to the spot. Glass was a powerful politician in Virginia and was still considered by many as a leader of the anti-organization faction even though he had lately cooperated with the organization. With his backing Davis hoped to be able to use the old issue of machine politics in his forthcoming race with Swanson.

1. S. R. Brame to Carter Glass, Richmond, August 15, 1919 and Glass to Walter E. Harris, Personal, November 10, 1919, Carter Glass Papers, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, Box 138.

Davis' appointment of Glass came as a surprise to most Virginians, including the Secretary himself, who had expected the Governor to nominate Tucker. Immediately Flood, Swanson, and other members of the organization recognized the significance of the announcement and realized that some kind of arrangement had to be made with Glass before the new Senator could extend aid to Davis; if possible they hoped to incorporate him into the machine. In order to achieve their aim Flood led the fight in the state to make Glass a favorite son candidate for President in 1920 and Swanson (whom Glass had bitterly resented up to this time) helped get him good Senate assignments. The two men were so successful in drawing the new Senator away from Davis and into their faction of the party that in the 1921 gubernatorial election Glass refused to aid the Davis forces, much to the resentment of the Governor.

At the same time that Flood worked with Swanson to win Glass' favor, the Congressman made strenuous efforts to assert his authority over the former Martin organization and to prepare for the election of state officers in 1921. Working closely with his brother-in-law, Richard Byrd, his nephew,


4. Thus Glass wrote in his diary on April 15, 1921, "I am certain that Swanson wants me to have good assignments and desires us to cooperate closely. He is bigger than I thought him when it comes to forgetting and forgiving. Why should not this be pleasant? It is." Glass Papers, Box 138. See also Glass to Flood, October 2, 1920, Flood Papers, Box 72.

Harry Flood Byrd, and an old friend Sam Ferguson, Flood reaffirmed his connections with the county cliques and local political organizations and soon had the organization working efficiently once again.

Much more was at stake in the 1921 elections in Virginia than the mere choice of State officers, for the campaign was the first test of strength between Governor Davis and the organization and it was also the first time that the machine participated in a political contest without Martin. A decisive victory by the Davis faction of the party could easily lead to the fragmentation of the organization and its replacement as the dominant faction by this new group of anti-organization politicians. For this reason Claude Swanson realized that his re-election to the Senate the following year would be seriously affected by the results of the state election.

Because of the importance attached to the defeat of the Davis faction, Flood at first gave serious consideration to running himself as the organization candidate, rightfully believing that he would make the strongest contest. But the Congressman still had no personal ambitions for the office and he was concerned with so many congressional matters that after much contemplation he finally decided against


7. Swanson to Sam Ferguson, Washington, April 21, 1921 and Swanson to N. R. Featherstone, Washington, Personal and Confidential, July 22, 1921, *Claude A. Swanson Papers*, Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
making the race. Instead he threw his support behind a rising young politician from Southwestern Virginia, E. Lee Trinkle, who became the organization's candidate for Governor; to no one's surprise he was opposed by Davis' close friend, Tucker.

The campaign between the two men was as heated as any of the former battles between organization and anti-organization candidates. Tucker and his faction of the party made the usual charges of corrupt organizational politics and preached an anti-machine crusade. In response the machine attacked Tucker's lack of administrative and political ability and accused him of having deserted the Democratic party in 1896. Flood had done his work well and had the organization operating actively in behalf of Trinkle. Other important leaders in the state like Swanson, Byrd, and Rorer James worked closely with the Congressman and applied great pressure to various groups under political obligation to them. Their efforts were soon rewarded, for despite the intensity of Tucker's campaign he was no match for the organization, and when the primary was held in August, Trinkle won comfortably, receiving 86,812 votes to 64,286 for Tucker.  


Trinkle's primary election was an important victory for the machine. As the Richmond Times-Dispatch remarked, the gubernatorial campaign had been "the first skirmish in the contest for the U. S. Senate" and its results boded ill for Davis. And as the paper also noted, Trinkle's victory made clear that the organization was functioning efficiently once more and that it still remained the dominant faction in the state. Any doubts about the ability of the machine to survive Martin's death were now dispelled.

Less than two weeks after the primary was held, the chairman of the state party, Roerr James, died. Because of his leadership of the organization and his work in the primary contest Flood was the logical choice to replace James. The Congressman was anxious to be named to the post since his election would reaffirm the dominant position of the organization within the Democracy and would make him undisputed leader of the party. Moreover Flood had been working closely with his nephew, Harry Byrd, during the last few years and he was preparing eventually to pass on the mantle.

July 27, 1921, ibid., Box 75; S. L. Ferguson to Claude Swanson, Richmond, April 19, 1921 and C. V. Smith to Claude Swanson, Appomattox, April 23, 1921, Swanson Papers, Alderman Library.

10. Remarkning on Trinkle's election the paper stated, "nor in studying the returns should it be overlooked that the old machine, after several rude jolts that threatened to wreck it, again is working smoothly and efficiently. Now let us have done with the discussion of blocs and sectionalism and machines." Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 14, 1921. See ibid., August 7, 1921.
of leadership to him. He felt that as Chairman of the party he would best be able to name his successor when he retired.\textsuperscript{11}

Flood had some opposition for the office from Ernest Sale, who had been Trinkle's official Campaign Manager during the primary contest, and from the Davis faction of the party, who were anxious to prevent Flood from assuming the chairmanship. Also a few leaders like Glass felt that the Congressman would be wiser to name Byrd immediately.\textsuperscript{12} They tried to dissuade Flood from seeking the office for reasons of his own health, but the Congressman realized that his nephew had little chance of being named chairman at the time and made clear his determination to head the party. Unanimity of sentiment was so strongly behind Flood that at a hastily called meeting of the party's Central Committee at the end of August he was easily named to the office despite last minute attempts by the Davis forces to block his nomination.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Thus before Flood was elected as head of the party, Byrd wrote the Congressman, "My Dear Uncle Hal, I doubt the wisdom of transferring the Chairmanship to me later on but we can discuss that at the time." Byrd to Flood, n.p., August 15, 1921, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 72.

\textsuperscript{12} "I do not congratulate you on being elected Chairman of the State Committee," Glass thus wrote Flood after the Congressman was selected to the post, "because it seems to me that you are merely taking on your shoulders a very thankless task. I had thought that it would have been best to select young Harry Byrd. My occasional contact with him impressed me with the belief that few young men in the state have more natural ability or better judgement." Glass to Flood, Lynchburg, September 3, 1921, \textit{Glass Papers}, Box 169.

\textsuperscript{13} J. N. Brenaman to Flood, Richmond, August 15, 1921, Joseph Button to Flood, Richmond, August 17, 1921, Flood to E. Lee Trinkle, Washington, August 19 and 20, 1921, Flood to
As chairman of the party and leader of the organization, Flood reached the pinnacle of his political career. Not only was he head of the party in the state, he was also one of the leading Democrats in Congress. His work in behalf of the administration during the war years had not gone unrewarded, and in 1920 he had been named Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Although he had the unhappy task of heading the committee during a campaign in which the Republicans won the Presidency and captured both houses of Congress, he still retained his post and seemed likely to lead the Democratic fight in 1922.\footnote{George H. Denny, Washington, August 23, 1921, \textit{Flood Papers}, Box 72.}

Flood had made politics his career not for ideological reasons or for the hope of personal profit but for the attainment of power per se. He had been born into a long tradition of leadership and much of his youth had been spent learning how to command. During most of his thirty-five years in state politics he had been in charge of the Martin machine and he had also been engaged in some role of leadership for better than half his twenty years in the House of Representatives. Now in 1921 he was leader of the state party in his own right and one of the four or five most important Democrats in Congress.

Unfortunately, while the two years following Martin's death had been a period of great accomplishment for Flood,
they had also been a time of great effort and exhaustion. The Congressman had long ago established a reputation as a conscientious and diligent worker who applied himself fully to the tasks before him. In 1919 and 1920, during the investigation of war expenditures, he had spent long hours gathering materials and statistics, and at the same time he had been busy trying to get the machine to function smoothly following the jolt of Martin's death. Also as Chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee he had devoted many hours to the national elections, including a long trip which he made to Arizona and New Mexico in behalf of Democratic candidates. No sooner was the election over than he had concentrated on defeating the Davis faction in the Old Dominion and had worked in behalf of Trinkle during the primary.

A short stocky man with a ruddy complexion, blue eyes, and a full head of greying hair, Flood appeared at the age of fifty-six to have survived his ordeals well and to be in good health. Except for a bronchial condition he had no known diseases and had very rarely been ill in his life. He complained of no sickness and his wife was aware of no ailments. 15 Yet perhaps Carter Glass knew more when he expressed regrets that Flood had assumed the burdens of a state party leader, for his efforts of the past few years had taken their toll of the Appomattox Congressman, and he was

15. Interview with Flood Family, August 21, 1965.
already a sick man.

Whether Flood realized his condition will probably never be known, but if he was aware he did not let the fact prevent him from assuming the full responsibilities of party Chairman and from applying himself completely to electing Trinkle over his Republican opponent, Colonel Henry W. Anderson, in what turned out to be one of the most formidable Republican challenges since the turn of the century. Inspired by the party sweep in the 1920 national elections and encouraged by the deaths of Martin and Rorer James, Republicans in the state waged a vigorous campaign in behalf of Anderson. In an attempt to divide the opposition Anderson brought forth the charges of machine politics which Henry St. George Tucker had used during the primary campaign and stated that Virginia was governed by three or four men living in Washington who only came to the state to see that they were re-elected. He also attacked the suffrage clauses of the constitution and called for electoral revamping. 16

Eventually Trinkle defeated his opponent by the usual Democratic margin of victory over Republicans. Former opponents of the organization like Glass and Montague were content to cooperate with the machine so that Anderson's charges fell on deaf ears. 17 At the same time his intro-


17. Thus Carter Glass wrote to Flood, "Colonel Anderson complains of a machine when there is no machine, and I judge
duction of the suffrage question gave Flood the opportunity to make white supremacy the chief issue in the campaign and this by itself proved enough to defeat Anderson in the November elections.

Before victory was achieved, however, Flood went all over the state organizing and speaking in behalf of Democratic candidates. Worn out by the campaign he became ill while in the southwestern part of the state. His ailment did not prevent him from fulfilling his large speaking load, but when he returned home to Appomattox he appeared to have grown worse. Even though he still felt well enough to return to Washington after Trinkle defeated his opponent a few days later, his illness continued to become more acute. Doctors diagnosed his trouble as bronchitis, gave him medicine, and ordered him to bed. Rest and medical attention seemed to improve his condition and as late as November 19 he spoke of

that he will get no sympathy or support from any Democrat who formerly belonged to either of the old factions. Since Montague and I complained of machine methods in politics two men formerly identified with the anti-machine group have been elected to high and responsible positions in the state government; Montague had been elected to Congress without factional agitation or opposition: I have been elected to the United States Senate without opposition in the primary or at the general election...Thus factionalism in the Democratic party has apparently disappeared." Glass to Flood, n.p., October 29, 1921, Glass Papers, Box 168.


being out of bed soon. Suddenly a few days later he took a turn for the worse and on December 8, after being ill for nearly a month, he died. Cause of death was later determined as heart failure superinduced by acute bronchitis. A few days later his funeral was attended by the leading Democrats in the state and national party. A mausoleum was erected in the yard of the old Appomattox courthouse and there his body lies today.

Flood's death naturally shocked the Democratic party in the state, especially since he was the second Chairman of the Democracy to die within five months, but the Appomattox Congressman had left the party well organized and less than three weeks after his death his nephew, Harry Flood Byrd, was named Chairman. Within a few years Byrd had also become undisputed head of the organization which Flood had helped to create, and which under Byrd's leadership grew even more powerful. While evidence exists that the spread of urbanization in the Old Dominion and the growing strength of the Negro vote may eventually result in the demise of the machine, it remains the dominant faction in Virginia politics.

20. Flood to E. V. Barley, Washington, November 19, 1921, Flood Papers, Box 71.


and even today Byrd is the state's political boss. This is what his uncle had wanted.

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Hal Flood's political career, which extended over thirty-five years, coincided approximately with the birth, growth, and demise of two major reform movements in the United States, Populism and Progressivism. The latter movement especially attracted support throughout the country from those who were disturbed by conditions in the United States and who were anxious for reform in areas of America's economic, social, and political structure. Inevitably they came into conflict with others who opposed change and as a result, historians of the movement have frequently viewed the period of reform which came to a climax in the first Wilson administration in terms of a struggle between "progressives" and "conservatives", or between those favoring and those opposing change.

This tendency on the part of historians has had an unfavorable consequence for the Virginia historiography of the Progressive movement. Noting the struggle for power between the organization and the anti-organization, historians have interpreted the conflict as an attempt by the "progressives" (the anti-organization) to free the state from the machine rule of the "conservatives" (the organization) and thus to wipe out corrupt political practices and to restore the Old
Dominion to honest government. 24

Hal Flood's career in Virginia politics suggests the inaccuracy of using the labels "progressives" and "conservatives" in discussing the history of Virginia during the reform period. These labels imply that the leaders of the state, particularly the "progressives", were motivated by considerations of principle and ideology, when in fact their actions were based on political expediency and necessity. The use of these labels also suggests that there was a wide difference in point of view between the two groups of politicians, when actually the differences between the Virginia "progressives" and "conservatives" (between Andrew Jackson Montague and Hal Flood) on federal and state questions were minimal. Indeed the only issue of dispute centered on certain reforms of Virginia's electoral structure which the "progressives" urged and the "conservatives" resisted. Prob-

24. Thus in discussing Wilson's patronage policies in the Old Dominion Arthur Link writes, "A large group of insurgents...had been fighting since the early 1900's to wrest control of the state Democratic organization from Senator Thomas S. Martin and Representative Henry D. Flood, and the machine closely identified with the railroad and business interests. They had fought hard to swing Virginia into the Wilson column in 1912, had nominated and elected a progressive governor in the same year [Henry Stuart, who was not nominated and elected until 1913 and who had the support of Martin and Flood], and had gone on to capture control in Norfolk, Roanoke, Petersburg, and other cities. Thus it seemed that the progressive movement in the Old Dominion was on the verge of victory...." Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, p. 161. C. Vann Woodward writes, "In North Carolina and Virginia the cleavage over Wilson's candidacy between progressive and conservative Democrats, between the antimachine faction and the machine was as clear-cut as in Tennessee and Texas." Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 475. See also Larsen, Montague of Virginia, passim.
lems of an economic or social nature received scant attention in the Virginia campaigns of this period, and even on the issue of electoral reform the motives of the "progressives" in urging change were those of political necessity. The "conservatives" were the dominant political faction in the state and controlled most of the offices and patronage. The "progressives" were the minority group, and they urged electoral reform not to put elections on a more democratic basis or to restore honest government but to oust their opponents from political office. The struggle in Virginia during the Progressive period, in other words, was not between "conservatives" and "progressives" but between those in and those out of power.

As an organization politician Hal Flood devoted a great part of his career to maintaining the machine in power. He managed most of its important campaigns, worked closely with its business associates, distributed the patronage, and kept in frequent contact with the local county organizations throughout the state. At the same time he always won re-election to office as a result of providing for his constituency and of supporting popular issues and measures. This sensitivity to public opinion combined with the lack of any real alternative to the type of leadership represented by Flood accounted for the success which the organization enjoyed during the era of reform.
SOURCES

I. Manuscript Collections.

Anderson, William A. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Anderson was an early leader of the anti-organization forces and Attorney General of Virginia from 1901-1905. Most of his papers deal with family matters, but there are a few letters which concern the intra-party struggle in the state.

Bibb, William E. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Bibb was a longtime member of the state Democratic Central Committee and a loyal Martin follower. His papers contain a few letters from Martin and Flood.

Braxton, Allen Caperton Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. This collection gives some insight into Braxton's change from the anti-organization to the organization forces around 1904. It contains a number of letters from Martin and Flood, particularly in 1904 when Flood led the movement to make Braxton Vice-Presidential nominee of the Democratic party.


Cannon, Bishop James Jr. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C. Cannon was a prolific letter writer and it was not uncommon for one of his letters to run as long as 15 pages of single space type. There are a number of letters in this collection to Martin and Flood and they clearly establish the close relations between the Anti-Saloon League and the organization.

Daniel, John Warwick Daniel Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. These papers deal with a number of political matters in Virginia during Daniel's life, but they are generally disappointing.

Daniel, John Warwick Daniel Papers. Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. Daniel was a Major during the Civil War and was very interested in the history of the war. Most of this collection contains
reminiscences of the struggle from soldiers formerly under his command. The collection is of limited importance for the political history of Virginia during Flood's life although there is some correspondence from Martin in the papers. The Daniel collection at the Alderman Library is of more value.

Davis, Westmorland Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. This is a good collection for the fight between the Davis faction and the organization. It contains numerous letters on the Gubernatorial campaign of 1917 and the Senate race of 1922. There are a number of letters relating to Flood's activities during the last four years of his life.

Ellyson, J. Taylor Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. These papers are very difficult to use. They are poorly indexed and classified and a very large part of the collection is in its original boxes. They contain correspondence relating to the activities of the Democratic party while Ellyson was its Chairman and letters concerning Ellyson's own political activities. There is some Flood correspondence.

Flood, Henry DeLaWarr Papers. Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. This collection is not only the most important source for Flood's own career, it is also the best single source on the activities of the organization. It contains over 36,000 items including letters to and from Flood. There are two press books of Flood's own correspondence as well as a number of his replies attached to letters received. It is well-organized and indexed. There are numerous letters between Flood and Martin, and other correspondents include James Hay, Claude Swanson, Francis Iassiter, Richard E. Byrd, Harry Flood Byrd, Walter Waltson and Dr. George H. Denny. The collection is disappointing for Flood's early years before he entered politics and for his activities in Congress, particularly during the war years.

Flood, Henry DeLaWarr Papers. In private possession of Mrs. Henry DeLaWarr Flood, Washington, D. C. These papers are of a personal nature. They include copies of several speeches which Flood made during his career, newspaper clippings on Flood's death, and an album of photographs.

Glass, Carter Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. A special index has been prepared for this large collection of papers and a bound copy of the index is available in many of the larger libraries in the United States, thus
making the correspondence easily accessible. The papers are somewhat disappointing for Virginia politics, especially before 1910, but a number of letters establish the relationship between Glass and the organization. Flood, Martin and Claude Swanson are among the correspondents mentioned.

Hay, James Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia. This is a small collection of less than one box of correspondence, but the letters concerning Hay's activities in the organization are useful.

Hubard, Edmund Wilcox Papers. Manuscripts Division, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Hubard was a minor politician in Virginia's 10th congressional district, a friend of Flood, and a follower of the organization. His small collection of correspondence contains about half a dozen important letters between himself and Flood which reveal Flood's activities in the organization during the early part of his career.

Lassiter, Charles T. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. Charles was the brother of Francis Rives Lassiter. Like his brother, he took an interest in Virginia politics and his small collection of papers contains some letters dealing with political matters in the Old Dominion including a few from Thomas Martin.

Martin, Thomas Staples Scrapbooks and Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. It is unfortunate that the single most important figure in Virginia politics for twenty-five years never left his correspondence. His few letters in the Martin collection are of a personal nature and of no value to the study of Virginia politics. The scrapbooks contain a number of newspaper clippings on political matters in the state and are of use, particularly for his various Senate campaigns and for the 1912 Democratic national convention.

Montague, Andrew Jackson Papers. Manuscripts Division, Virginia State Library, Richmond Library. This enormous collection of papers is the best single source for the activities of the anti-organization. Most of the important papers in the collection are mentioned by William Larsen in his Montague of Virginia.

Page, Thomas Nelson Papers. Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. Page was a close friend of Martin and Flood, and while Ambassador to Italy
kept in contact with both men. His papers give some insight into the activities of the organization in getting appointments for their followers during the Wilson administration. Also a few letters from Martin and Flood relate to the political situation in Virginia.

Swanson, Claude A. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. This collection deals exclusively with Swanson's bid for re-election to the Senate in 1922. A number of letters concern Flood's activities in behalf of Swanson before he died and make clear the importance which Swanson attached to the outcome of the 1921 gubernatorial race. The collection is well organized and is arranged alphabetically by counties.

Swanson, Claude A. Papers. Manuscripts Division, Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. This group of papers is of more use than the collection at the University of Virginia and includes correspondence from Martin and Flood. Of particular value are the letters from Martin which reveal his attitude on free silver and the Cleveland administration during the first half of the 1890's.

Tucker, Henry St. George Papers. Manuscripts Division, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. This collection is of great value for the study of Virginia politics during Flood's career. Tucker was usually running for some office and was also a leader of the anti-organization forces. There is correspondence between Tucker and other anti-organization leaders for most every campaign between 1900 and 1921 and large groups of letters concerning the congressional contests between Flood and his cousin during the 1890's. Also there are some important papers relating to the Wilson movement in Virginia including letters from Wilson, Newton D. Baker, and William Jennings Bryan about the handling of the patronage in the Old Dominion.

Wilson, Woodrow Papers. Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. This collection contains a few files of correspondence concerning matters which Flood handled for the administration as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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A. Democratic National Party.


B. The United States.

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C. Virginia.

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Patterson, Archie W. Personal Recollections of Woodrow Wilson and Some Reflection Upon His Character and Life. Richmond; Whittet and Shepperson, 1929.


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