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THE AESTHETICS OF SOME SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY PLATONIC POETS

by

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Thesis Director's signature:

[Signature]

Houston, Texas

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For Linda
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Aesthetic historians have been well aware that attempts to trace their subject to its origins reveal that early aesthetic theory is inextricably involved with anthropomorphic cosmology. The reasons for this relationship were probably twofold: The instincts of the early cosmologists led them to seek a principle of order which embraced all things in the universe, weaving them into a coherent scheme; the predication of such a principle of all-encompassing order necessitated the inclusion of man's aesthetic impulse among everything else in the grand scheme:

The history of esthetics demonstrates the weight and power of the cosmological tradition. If a metaphysical account is to be given of the human susceptibility to beauty, the world must be interpreted as naturally responsive to the emotional demands of human nature. Precisely this intimate congruity with the human being constitutes a marked feature of the Universe in archaic cosmology.¹

Any theory positing such a human-oriented world tends to envision an anthropomorphic cosmology and, moreover, this cosmology will be imagined as an ascending series of correspondences. The world, the universe, the creation of the whole are conceived of as successively larger-scale manifestations of the pattern of composition embodied in man. Theoretically, of course, the scale descends to man, but psychologically man's mind works from the tangible
microcosm to the intangible macrocosm. The persistence of the basic interrelationship of aesthetics and such a cosmological theory is evidenced by the fact that "... whenever a later esthetic doctrine tried to trace the source of beauty in the universe at large, whenever, in other words, a metaphysic of beauty was attempted, this early type of cosmology was sure to be reinstated."2 The suggestion has been made that such a cosmology is itself an aesthetic creation, insofar as its validity lies more nearly in the area of mythology than science:

For the form of cosmology is clearly much closer to that of poetry, and the thought suggests itself that symmetrical cosmology may be a branch of myth. If so, then it would be, like myth, a structural principle of poetry, whereas in science itself, symmetrical cosmology is exactly what Bacon said it was, an idol of the theatre. Perhaps, then, this whole pseudo-scientific world of three spirits, four humors, five elements, seven planets, nine spheres, twelve zodiacal signs, and so on, belongs in fact, as it does in practice, to the grammar of literary imagery. It has long been noticed that the Ptolemaic universe provides a better framework of symbolism, with all the identities, associations, and correspondences that symbolism demands, than the Copernican one does. Perhaps it not only provides a framework of poetic symbols but is one...3

It is thus possible, and perhaps illuminating, to understand such an anthropomorphic cosmology as per se the gratification of an aesthetic impulse to establish an order in existence; aesthetic and cosmology in this sense exemplify a cause and effect relationship with cosmology providing amplification and embodiment of the theory germinal in the impulse. Such an amplification and embodiment of
the desire to order the universe in terms of man's own comprehension may be seen in Plato's *Timaeus*.

It is in the *Timaeus* that A. O. Lovejoy finds the source of the ambivalent, logically-contradictory conception of God that has played such a significant part in the development of western thought. God, Plato had explained in the *Republic*, is self-sufficient; but this leaves unanswered the question of why God created the material world. *Timaeus* states that God's goodness caused him to create the world and to make all things as much like himself as they can be. "The concept of Self-Sufficing Perfection, by a bold logical inversion, was--without losing any of its original implications--converted into the concept of a Self-Transcending Fecundity." This theory of God creating all things possible because He is, in effect, overflowing with love, Lovejoy refers to as "the principle of plenitude" by which he means

... not only the thesis that the universe is a *plenum formarum* in which the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deductions from the assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the extent and abundance of the creation must be as great as the possibility of existence and commensurate with the productive capacity of a "perfect" and inexhaustible Source, and that the world is the better, the more things it contains.\(^4\)

Now this principle means, as Lovejoy correctly infers, that "A timeless and incorporeal One became the logical ground as well as the dynamic source of the existence of a
temporal and material and extremely multiple and variegated universe."5 When extended to its logical extreme the principle obviously implies the existence of an infinite, rather than a finite, universe. Plato himself did not so extend the theory to its logical consequences. Timaeus raises the question, "Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite?" Answering his own question, he replies, "There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with the original."6 Lovejoy notes that most Greek philosophers felt an "aesthetic aversion" to the concept of the infinite; at any rate, it is a matter of record that the major Greek philosophers rejected the theories of the infinite universe proposed by the atomists.7

The fact that Plato himself envisioned a finite universe is not so important as the fact that, in the very dialogue in which he describes this universe, he formulates the principle of plenitude, which provides metaphysical justification for an infinite universe. Plato's cosmology is as radically ambivalent as his God, and this cosmological ambivalence is the direct result of the ambivalent deity. The interrelation of cosmology and aesthetic suggests that the seeds of an alternative aesthetic theory always have been implicit in the principle of plenitude. Plato's epistemology to a considerable extent is based on analogy. The world of ideas must reveal the same pattern as the
material world, the only difference being that the ideal is unflawed. He hypothesizes an anthropomorphic cosmology because the cosmos must be analogous, on a larger scale, to the world that he perceives. What he perceives is a finite world; therefore, the cosmos itself, though indefinitely large, in a real sense must be finite.

A cosmos hypothesized by process of analogy implies an aesthetic based on analogy; if there is a principle of order in such a creation, it is an order established by the proportional relationship of the corresponding planes—individual, world, and universe. The whole of God's creation is imagined as a set of Chinese boxes (or, to correct the analogy, balls). However, once man is able to perceive that his universe is not finite, the aesthetic standard will shift to accord with the cosmology, justification for both changes being provided by the metaphysical sanction of Plato's plenitude theory. A proportional size relationship between corresponding planes, between microcosm and macrocosm, can exist only if both microcosm and macrocosm are, in a sense, "measurable." When the universe is imagined as infinite, it is obviously impossible to maintain that there is a scaled or proportional relationship between the immeasurable microcosm and the immeasurable macrocosm. Thus, the "finite aesthetic" becomes inappropriate and new standards of beauty must be evolved to describe the fitness of the new cosmology.
The present study will attempt to demonstrate the interdependence of cosmological and aesthetic theory in platonic thought, to determine the nature of the aesthetic changes which occur when the conception of the universe does shift from finite to infinite, and to show the practical effect of these changes upon the poetry of certain platonic poets in the transitional period of the seventeenth century. It has been well recognized that important changes in taste do occur in the seventeenth century and that the acceptance of the Copernican system is an important factor in the rise of the new "aesthetics of the infinite." As yet, however, studies of the problem have been broadly suggestive and there remains a need for a more precise definition of the aesthetic changes as well as the establishment of a causal relationship between aesthetic conceptions and philosophic currents.

It is hoped that the restriction of the present study to the examination of platonic poets will render the course of the shift more apparent. Renaissance platonists were sympathetic to and closely allied with the "new science" since any further knowledge about the material world was taken by them as increased knowledge of the ideal world of which the material is an imperfect copy. Moreover, the close involvement of God, cosmos, and aesthetics in the scheme of platonic metaphysics means that any real change in the nature of the universe will be accepted more
immediately and reflected in aesthetic standards. For these reasons the platonists particularly are likely to be in the vanguard of any change and thus become particularly valuable for tracing the course of the change.

By the terms of Coleridge's distinction that every man is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, the seventeenth century swarms with platonic poets. But the particular poets here examined have been selected on the basis that they are "platonic" in the technical sense of the word: each poet considered was seriously acquainted with and influenced by platonic philosophy; those poets who are simply idealistic, "naturally platonic," or those who may have been influenced by platonism, but whose primary allegiance lies elsewhere, have been excluded. The examination begins with the work of two poets, writing in the first decades of the seventeenth century, who conceivably might have been affected by Galileo's demonstrations of the validity of the Copernican hypothesis.

Before proceeding to these seventeenth century English platonists it will be necessary to define the nature of the traditional platonic aesthetic and establish the continuity of this aesthetic, as well as its correlation with platonic cosmology, to the beginning of the seventeenth century.
II

Timaeus is a seminal document for English platonism, not merely because it provides the fullest exposition of Plato's cosmology, but in the form of the epitome attributed to Albinus it was the main source of platonism for English writers prior to the mid-sixteenth century. As late as 1660 Albinus remained an important staple in English platonist thought; Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy, which appeared in that year, draws upon three sources for its account of Plato: biographical information is taken from Diogones Laertius, and Stanley's own translation of Pico's commentary on the Benivieni sonnet is included, but the "critical" discussion of Plato's philosophy is a translation of Albinus. Therefore, it was possible for English platonists to deduce their master's aesthetic standards through the "Middle Platonism" of Albinus' Timaeus-centered epitome, even without the intermediary of the more aesthetically-oriented Florentine commentaries.

The idea of the microcosm and the macrocosm, Rudolf Allers has maintained, is—when historically considered—demonstrably "... a part of a more or less Platonic or especially, Neo-Platonic philosophy." It is this idea which is perhaps the all-pervasive one, the one from which all others stem, in the Timaeus. In its most elementary form the idea consists of the notion that man contains within himself all of the elements which compose the world
or universe; he is for this reason a small world. The idea is very commonly extended to the belief that man not only is composed of the same elements as the macrocosm, but that these elements are dispersed and ordered by the same principles as the macrocosm. Man becomes a part of the operational system of the universe and may explore the nature of this system by observing its workings within himself. The similarity of the two entities allows the definition of the unknown by analogy with the known. Man may be compared to the macrocosm which he duplicates in miniature:

Within this view, the discovery of the world in man becomes possible. The relation between the micro- and the macrocosmic laws may be one of identity or of analogy; in any case it is in man that the key to the cosmological riddle may be found. Man thus understands himself as imbedded in the whole of the *kosmos*, an organic part of the latter, and determined by panceismic principles. One arrives at the conception of an all-pervading harmony and correspondence (cosmocentric microcosmism).13

On the other hand, the universe may be compared to man, as it is in *Timaeus*. While the effect is largely the same, there is one important difference:

... here the cosmic laws appear as projections, as it were, of those governing human nature. The primary standpoint being chosen within man, the whole perspective is another. This view leads, with a certain necessity, to the assumption of a World-Soul as the intrinsic principle of existence and growth within the universe.14

The underlying implication is that the order created by man is the one order, the principles of composition and behavior
exhibited by himself are the only principles; therefore, everything else—be it politics, peace, painting, or poetry—is governed by the same law or laws. What is discoverable within any particular entity provides the only answer to the structure of any corresponding entity on whatever scale. The composition of an individual, for instance, will exhibit the same disposition of elements as a family, a city, a nation, mankind as a whole, the angels and heavenly bodies.

This mode of thought is exhibited throughout Timaeus. The world was fashioned after the eternal pattern (28), which is a macrocosmic animal comprehending all intelligible animals in the same way that the copy is one animal comprehending all visible animals (30). The human soul is made of the same elements as the world soul, and is distributed into souls that are equal in number to the stars (42). Just as the soul of man is a small replica of the world soul, his body is a copy of the visible world body. The object containing the movements of man's soul is the head, formed like a sphere because the universe is spherical (44). The full number of microcosmic correspondences in the dialogue is too extensive to catalogue here; the basic relationship which encompasses the others is reiterated by Timaeus in concluding his explanation:

We may now say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has an end. The world—has received animals, mortal and immortal, and
is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible—the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect—the one only-begotten heaven. (92)

Allers explores refinements and variations of the microcosmic conception that are not germane to the present question. With all the metamorphoses the idea undergoes, however, he finds a remarkable consistency in the essential conception:

There is one basic idea underlying the various interpretations. It is the conviction that all ordered wholes, which have somewhat of an existence of their own, are essentially constructed on the same pattern. There is but one principle of order which is discovered in the universe, in human nature, in society, and even in the products of the human mind exhibiting proportion, harmony, and order. The ἴσος aiōnios, unios and πολιτικός are, qua κόσμος, identical.

A mentality which finds microcosmism to its liking and sees in it an adequate expression of its tendencies, ought to be, it would seem, one to which the aspects of wholeness order, proportion, and harmony appear as particularly important.15

The requirements of order, proportion, and harmony invariably are the aesthetic determinants and it is just these qualities stressed by Plato in Timaeus. Order or harmony is the desired end, the structural and operational principle of the world Timaeus describes, and this end is attained by proportion, the proper apportioning of the elements or parts.

The word, harmony, denotes an arrangement of parts in relation to one another which produces a unified whole in composition, design, or effect. Since order denotes a
similar subordination of parts or elements to the logic of a unifying scheme or design, the two words can be regarded as synonyms, with the possible qualification that harmony refers usually to composition and order to movement, action, behavior. The proportionate arrangement which results in harmony is attained by one of two means: the reconciliation of opposites (usually implying two antithetical elements) or a balance achieved by the proper distribution of several elements or parts (usually implying equal quantities of the several parts). It is not always possible to distinguish between these types if the word proportion or harmony is used without elaboration, but it is valuable to make the distinction whenever it is possible.

Leo Spitzer traces to Heraclitus the conception that the world is predicated on a harmony of integrated contrasts:

... harmony dominates, but, a harmony which comprehends strife and antagonism as a synthesis is beyond thesis and antithesis (an idea for which Hegel is indebted to Heraclitus). The lute and the arrow are alike in form; this fact, and the fact that both are attributes of Apollo, are for Heraclitus symptomatic of the ease with which strife (the arrow) can turn into harmony: for the name of the bow (βλός) is life (βλός) and its work death. The Greek mind has been able to see harmony in discord, to see the triumph of "symphony" over the discordant voices.

This reconciliation of opposites or concordia discord is implied throughout Plato's treatment of the created world; because his perception of life is essentially dualistic, the purpose of his system is to harmonize the various
oppositions he perceived—the eternal and the mutable, ideal and material, soul and body. Perhaps as a result of Plato's awareness of these fundamental oppositions and the difficulty of bridging them, Timaeus tends to explain proportion in terms of the balanced arrangement of several parts. In the composition of the soul, for instance, God does not strike a harmony from the juxtaposition of opposing elements, but creates a new element from the original, antithetical elements and makes the harmony of the soul from a proper distribution of these three elements:

Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and the other, and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same. (35)

The whole is now divided into a number of parts, each a compound of the three elements, which are distributed in an arrangement designed to conform to the proportions of the Pythagorean Tetractys and of the Diatonic scale. The numerical harmony of the Pythagoreans, very frequently expressed in musical metaphor, actually preceded the integrated contrast theory of Heraclitus, which was a later complication. Spitzer has speculated on the origins of the musical-cosmological analogy:
Observing the wondrous regularity of the movement of the stars, they may have come to imagine a musical harmony in them: the seven planets were comparable to the seven strings of the heptachord of Terpandros (ca. 644 B.C.) and the (assumed) sounds of the spheres revolving around the central fire at different distances to the seven intervals of this lute—the distances between the spheres themselves were "tones."  

The mathematical proof of the proportional similarity between measurable differences in sounds and the regular movements of celestial bodies was provided by Plato's friend Archytas. *Timaeus* applies the mathematical theories of Archytas to build a cosmology which unites the realms of physics, religion, psychology, and music by means of proportional relationships worked out in numerical terms. Spitzer concludes of Plato's system:

... the element of numbers, guaranteeing beauty, order, and measure to the cosmos, is the one important and lasting element of the world-soul—consequently, of the human soul: a beauty hidden to mortal man, though graspable by the mathematically trained philosopher and musicologist. Man must regulate his senses to the *Nous* underlying the revolutions of the celestial spheres and make straight the irregularity and disorder in the view of attaining harmony.

In terms of the musical analogy the proportional arrangement of several parts to achieve a balance might well be called *polyphony*; however, since the presence of metaphor often complicates rather than clarifies when it is not especially pertinent, the most convenient description might be *symmetry*. Symmetry or the proportional distribution of parts is everywhere prevalent in *Timaeus*. The composition of the world body utilized the four basic
elements which were "harmonized by proportion" (32). These elements God perfected "by form and number" (53), assigning to each the geometrical form appropriate to its kind (56). Like the world body, the human body is an elaborate combination of the elements "in due proportion." Diseases of the body arise when there is an inbalance or displacement of any one element and death is a dissolution of the elements, for

... a thing can only remain the same with itself, whole and sound, when the same is added to it, or subtracted from it, in the same respect and in the same manner and in due proportion; and whatever comes or goes away in violation of these laws causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and corruptions. (82)

The body itself, of course, must properly harmonize with the soul in Plato's scheme:

Everything that is good is fair, and the fair is not without proportion, and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them, but of the highest and greatest we take no heed; for there is no proportion or disproportion more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice, than that between soul and body. This however we do not perceive, nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then the whole animal is not fair, for it lacks the most important of all symmetries; but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. (87)

The equation here is extremely important: The good is fair; the fair exhibits correct proportion. Moreover, the correlation between harmony of mind and harmony of body implies
that physical appearance is the visible manifestation of soul; the proper vehicle for the fair mind is the fair body. That the physical mirrors the spiritual is made plain by Timaeus' mode of expression: The due proportion of mind and body is the fairest of sights to him who has the seeing eye. Plato's adherence to the symmetrical harmony here magnifies greatly the significance of physical beauty in platonic doctrine. If he had stressed more the concordia discors scheme, Socrates' own physical ugliness, commented upon by Alcibiades in the Symposium, would be the perfect complement to the fairness of his mind; but--while allowing both conceptions through the basic ambivalence of his treatment--Plato, through his employment of the symmetrical scheme of proportion, encourages a primary emphasis on visible beauty.

The exact scheme which constitutes "due proportion" in a particular entity evidently varies with the function and role of the particular entity in the over-all harmony. Man can recognize proportion and disproportion, but the particular arrangement in any individual situation may well be beyond man's powers of perception. Hence, the actual order of parts frequently is expressed in highly general terms. Of the disposition of elements in the world body, Timaeus merely states: "And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God, as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected,
and harmonized in due proportion" (56). The components of a particular substance within the world body, salt, harmonize "in combinations pleasing to the palate" (60).

With the blending of colors Timaeus flatly admits the limitations of man's knowledge:

The law of proportion, however, according to which the several colors are formed, even if a man knew he would be foolish in telling, for he could not give any necessary reason, nor indeed any tolerable or probable explanation of them. (68)

But, if man cannot detect the law of proportion, he can determine the effect of the law by means of his senses and order himself accordingly. Sight permits man to perceive the order of the heavens and apply it to his own course of action; hearing allows man to detect harmony and rhythm, which are applicable to the movements of his own soul and body (47).

The matter of form is the final factor of major aesthetic consequence in Timaeus' description of the universe. The form which God provided for the world is that of the sphere:

And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its extremes in every distance equidistant from the center, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. (33)

This spherical world, encompassing all geometrical forms within itself, is assigned the one movement most appropriate
to mind and intelligence and, therefore, revolves in a circle (34). In the center of this revolving sphere God placed the world soul so that the universe consists of "a circle moving within a circle." In the heavens the planets themselves revolve in orbits corresponding to the circles of the Same and the Other (36-37). The sun was created to provide a measure of the movements of the planets, which enables man to conceive of time and, thereby, the passage of the cyclical year (39). The spherical form of the world and circular movement of the cosmos provide the model for various entities on a smaller size. While in man's body ideal form is adapted to meet the requirements of movement and existence, the head does copy the spherical shape of the universe, for it contains the circular movements of the soul (44).

Thus, within the exposition of a finite cosmology in Timaeus, Plato provides the nucleus of an aesthetic theory predicated upon that finite cosmology. Proportion or harmony is the keynote to the whole and, since this proportion is the one principle of order in all creation, visible or invisible, all things—both great and small—partake of it, can be measured by it. Whether the proportion is effected by the symmetry of several qualities in balance or the harmonious mean of paired contrasts does not matter, for it is the end result, harmony, epitomized by the perfection of the circle, that counts.
III

Lovejoy has explained how the principle of continuity—the idea that qualitative differences in things can be considered as an ascending sequence or gradations of forms constituting a continuous series—may be deduced directly from the principle of plenitude:

If there is between two given natural species a theoretically possible intermediate type, that type must be realized—and so on ad infinitum; otherwise, there would be gaps in the universe, the creation would not be as "full" as it might be, and this would imply the inadmissible consequence that its Source or Author was not "good," in the sense which that adjective has in the Timaeus.22

Taken to its logical extreme, the notion of the continuity of the universe is imagined as the "Great Chain of Being," in which all of creation is pictured as a hierarchy of perfection leading by minute gradations from God at the top to the most imperfect object at the end of the series.

Plato's Timaeus provides the germinal substance for this conception, but it was first developed into a coherent theory of emanation by Plotinus.23 The perfect and self-sufficient One necessarily produces any feasible variation of being in the ascending chain of the Many; each hypostasis in the sequence produces the gradation immediately below itself until the chain of being is complete. The Scale of Being, then, as implied by the principle of the expansiveness and self-transcendence of 'the Good,' becomes the essential conception of the Neoplatonic cosmology.24
If Plotinus' cosmology is dependent on his idea of a continuum of emanations from the One, it is also true that Plotinian metaphysics centers entirely in his astronomical theory of the sensible world, the Timaean geocentric system in which the cosmos is imagined as a series of concentric spheres. Plotinus selects, adapts, and reemphasizes platonic elements in his use of *Timaeus*. For instance, he minimizes the anthropomorphism of Plato's conception, which implies that the world had a beginning, insisting, instead, that the world always existed in time, without beginning or end. Taking Plato's triad of hypostases, Demiurge, World Soul, and the lower demiurges, Plotinus transforms them into his own graduated sequence of One, *Nous* (divine intellect, mind, or spirit), and the Soul of All, from which hierarchy all things emanate.

Plotinus adapts the finite Timaean cosmology as a vehicle for the metaphysical theory, also originating in *Timaeus*, that the bountiful One must have created every possible gradation of being—that the world is "full" of all possible forms of life. How far, then, does Plotinus extend the conception of plenitude? Does he transform the finite cosmos of *Timaeus* to an infinite one? The question of infinity is considered most directly in *The Enneads* in the discussion of matter and number. Matter, Plotinus argues, is essentially boundless, limitless, indefinite; Matter is, therefore, similar to Privation—it is a
nonexistent (II, 4, 14-16). This definition is entirely negative: The One imposes order, limit, pattern on whatever it is to which he gives form; consequently, the matter that is formed must have been lacking in these qualities. Since the cosmos does have form and pattern, clearly it must be limited, definite, and finite. Plotinus' attitude toward form is even more distinctly suggested when, in his consideration of evil, he states unequivocally, "the Measureless is evil primarily . . ." (I,8,8).27 Lovejoy comments that because Plotinus is unable to distinguish between the indefinite and the infinite, he rejects the infinite.28 In the realm of number Plotinus is willing to allow infinity only in application to our inability to count the numbers that already exist. The Real is definite and complete—" . . . no number has been or could be omitted to make addition possible." While it is beyond man's capacity to measure the Real, which differs from the limited nature of the sensible world because it was never undefined, all there conforms to a higher order. "There every being is Measure; and therefore it is that all is beautiful" (VI, 6,18).

Plotinus begins his consideration of beauty (I,6) by rejecting symmetry as an adequate criterion. If symmetry is beauty only a compound can be beautiful, and there are indisputably many beautiful single objects in the sensible world, let alone the fact that this would disqualify
the One. Yet as Plotinus discusses beauty it becomes clear that his quarrel is not with symmetry, but with those persons who mistake the symmetrical, material object for the beautiful, failing to realize that the form of the material is only a showing forth of the divine beauty. "We hold that all the loveliness of this world comes by communion in Ideal-Form." The sensible object becomes beautiful "by communicating in the thought that flows from the Divine" (I,6,2). In this sense it is certainly true that "beauty is something more than symmetry . . ."; however, since Plotinus must understand the pattern of eternal beauty by the pattern shown forth in the visible world, he ultimately places more reliance on symmetry and proportion than his caveat would suggest. As Gilbert and Kuhn remark, "Sooner or later Plotinus makes Beauty both transcendent and immanent and thus strains to the breaking-point the logical consistency of his system."  

Harmony and order do not exist in the Intelligible World since perfection is inherent there; but it is by our possession of the virtues of order, distribution, and harmony that we become like the Intelligible World (I,2,1). It is the perception of Absolute Beauty in the material form that leads man to participate in the One:

Man must be drawn by the tone, rhythm, and design in things of sense: he must learn to distinguish the material forms from the Authentic-Existent which is the source of all these correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme
in the work of art: he must be led to the Beauty
that manifests itself through these forms; he must
be shown that what ravished him was no other than
the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the
Beauty in that sphere. . . . (I,3,1)

The whole universe is imagined as a harmony in which, by
means of proportion and symmetry, all members are brought
into sympathy with the whole (II,3,6). This harmonic cos-
mos is a symbolic microcosm—"All teems with symbol"—al-
lowing man to perceive the nature of the macrocosm: "All
things must be enchained; and the sympathy and correspond-
ence obtaining in any one closely knit organism must exist,
first, and most intensely, in the All" (II,3,7).

Not simply the cosmos but life itself is symbolic;
just as the dance follows a pattern designed to symbolize
life, life is a pattern of the higher reality (III,2,16).
The wise man does not scorn the sensible world, but recog-
nizes it for what it is:

For who that truly perceives the harmony of the
Intellectual Realm could fail, if he has any bent
towards music, to answer to the harmony in sensible
sounds: What geometrician or mathematician could
fail to take pleasure in the symmetries, corres-
pondences, and principles of order observed in
visible things? Consider, even, the case of pic-
tures: those seeing by the bodily sense the
productions of the art of painting do not see the
one thing in the one only way; they are deeply
stirred by recognizing in the objects depicted to
the eyes the presentation of what lies in the idea,
and so are called to recollection of the truth. . . .
Not to answer thus could only be to have neither
fathomed this world nor had any vision of that
other. (II,9,16)
Though Plotinus begins by denigrating the conventional standards of beauty, his metaphysics actually forces him to place exceptional dependence upon them. "Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight" (I,6,1), he concedes, tacitly suggesting his dependence on symmetry or visual harmony, even as he attacks it. His explanations of "The Heavenly System" (II,1) and "The Heavenly Circuit" (II,2) abound with proportional relationships and circular cosmic movements symbolizing the spiritual, just as, indeed, throughout The Enneads references to harmony provide a continuous motif. Plotinus extended the principle of plenitude; but, by stopping short of infinity, he remained true to the aesthetic principles of Plato's finite cosmology.

IV

For Plato Eros was the means of bridging the ontological gap between the world of ideas and the world of matter. In Timaeus and the Symposium Plato is able to transcend the body-soul dualism by positing love as the cause of the sensible world and the intermediary between God and man. To Plotinus love is not merely the divine impulse which passes essence down the chain of being; love is the innate desire of being to return to its source in the One. According to Diotima's myth, love is the desire for beauty (Symposium, 201-07). Since the One is Beauty, the chain of being becomes not an ignominious descent, but a "ladder of love" by which the individual can be led back
to the source as he ascends the rungs, the necessarily further manifestations of real beauty in the form of each stage of being. The motion of the universe thus symbolizes the circular movement of the individual spirit in its life course. Ernst Cassirer stresses Plotinus’ dynamic application of the platonic Eros:

The doctrine of Eros has here acquired a new and decisive function. Now it is the function of Eros to establish the final sanction and justification of the world in this apparently other-worldly system, wholly preoccupied with the transcendent.  

The descent of the soul into the body is a fortunate fall, rather than a calamity, and the beauty of the sensible world demonstrates the existence of the intelligible. Perception of this beauty ceases to be the snare of flesh and becomes for the beholder the token and reassurance of divinity in matter—what Wordsworth called “Intimations of Immortality.”

It is this Plotinian emphasis on the positive function and value of material perfection in approaching the divine that constitutes the essence of Renaissance platonism. For English poets of the seventeenth century—George Chapman, Herbert of Cherbury, Henry More—this lesson was codified in the writings of Marsilio Ficino and disseminated through his Careggian Academy.  

Comprehending the primary orientation of this group toward a metaphysic based on love and beauty is a crucial factor in recognizing their importance:
The total accomplishment of the Florentine Academy, comprehensive as it is, can be condensed to this. The Platonic doctrine of Eros and the Platonic doctrine of beauty stand as the nucleus of the philosophy of the Florentine Circle. The epistemology and metaphysics, the ethics and theology, of the Florentine School are all simply variations on this one great theme. Ficino's work on the Platonic theology did not influence his contemporaries or their successors so powerfully and directly as did his commentary on Plato's Symposium, in which the main emphasis is deliberately centered on this theme.33

The emphasis on beauty thus shifts attention from Timaeus to the Symposium as the central platonic document. For Ficino himself Timaeus remains essential in the formulation of a cosmological aesthetic growing out of the conceptions of numerical proportion and musical harmony,34 and Ficino makes the same limitations upon his cosmos as did Plato and Plotinus—that is to say, it is finite. In Ficino's conception the mind has an infinite potential of thought, but being can only be finite:

The whole of real Being constitutes . . . a closed sphere in which each substance with all its parts and attributes occupies a definite place. . . . This structure excludes the concept of infinity in all its aspects from the realm of Being. The world is finite in size and power. It is not extended through infinite space. It has an unlimited smallness, but a limited largeness. By unlimited smallness is implied that each corporeal particle can be divided again, but the individual particles exist only potentially as long as the division is not yet achieved. It is considered altogether impossible for an infinite number of particles actually to exist in nature. What has been said of power, size, and divisibility is valid also for all other aspects, and therefore in nature there can be no infinity of genera, of specific differences, of forms, or of acts of knowledge.35
This finite cosmos is presented by Ficino as a microcosm that is everywhere strongly symbolic of the intelligible world. André Chastel comments, "Il n'y a là qu'une anticipation apparente de la conception dynamique du réel acquise par le physique moderne, car la cosmologie de Ficin est dirigée par une interprétation radicalement symbolique des faits physiques."\(^{36}\) The material world is everywhere suffused with a light that emanates from the divine beauty. Ficino explains in his commentary on the *Symposium* (II,v) that the light of the sun illuminating the physical world is analogous to the light of God illuminating the mental. As Chastel suggests, an equation of this kind allows Ficino to shift rather easily to a habitual metaphor: The sun is the eye of God and stands as a macrocosm to the microcosm of man's eye.\(^{37}\) Ficino's cosmology tends to be distinctly more anthropomorphic than Plotinus'. From a preoccupation owing, perhaps, to his early medical training, Ficino is given to tracing the correspondences between human physiognomy and the macrocosmic features discernible in the "face" of the universe.\(^{38}\) Again the shape and pattern of the cosmos is mapped by first examining the form of the individual and applying that pattern to the macrocosm.

Because of its particular significance in cultural and literary history, it seems most reasonable to focus upon Ficino's *Commentarium in Convivium Platonis* in attempting to specify his aesthetic standards.\(^{39}\) Here in
describing the formation of the world out of chaos Ficino states: "This composite of all the Forms and Ideas we call in Latin a mundus, and in Greek, a cosmos, that is, Orderliness /Ornamentum/. The attractiveness of this Orderliness is Beauty." Love, Ficino agrees with is predecessors, is the desire for beauty:

Beauty is, in fact, a certain charm which is found chiefly and predominantly in the harmony of several elements. This charm is threefold: there is a certain charm in the soul, in the harmony of several virtues; charm is found in material objects, in the harmony of several colors and lines; and likewise charm in sound is the best harmony of several tones. There is, therefore, this triple beauty: of the soul, of the body, and of sound. That of the soul is perceived by the mind; that of the body, by the eyes; and that of sound, by the ear alone. Since, therefore, the mind, the sight, and the hearing are the only means by which we are able to enjoy beauty, and since Love is the desire for enjoying beauty, Love is always limited to the pleasures of the mind, the eyes, and the ears.

It is evident that harmony to Ficino means symmetry. Here beauty is found "in the harmony of several elements" and immediately following this passage he states that "human beauty of the body requires a harmony of various parts." Ficino mainly is consistent in employing harmony as the proper apportioning of several parts. His use of the Venus-Mars myth (V,viii) and reference to Empedoclean harmony (III,ii) utilize the concordia discors mode of harmony, but symmetry occurs much more frequently in the commentary:

... in precious stones, as the natural philosophers claim, a well-balanced combination of the four elements in the interior produces the sparkle
of the exterior. Likewise, an innate fecundity in the heart and roots clothes plants and trees with the most pleasing variety of fruit and foliage; and in animals, a salutary complexion of humors provides an appearance pleasing both in shape and color. Virtue of the soul likewise manifests itself in a most noble kind of beauty in words, actions, and deeds.\textsuperscript{43}

Perfection almost invariably is associated with fullness, a pleasing diversity in composition. As the consequences of the principle of plenitude are explored, it may be that the increasing emphasis on fullness and diversity is expressed by an increasing aesthetic preference for multiple, symmetrical composition.\textsuperscript{44}

Sensible beauty, Ficino stated, is limited to sight and sound; of these two, primary emphasis is given to sight.\textsuperscript{45} Ficino closely parallels Plotinus' position, insisting that beauty is something incorporeal and, therefore, cannot consist merely of an orderly disposition of corporeal parts (V,iii). Yet, like Plotinus, Ficino is forced to rely upon visible beauty as a standard because this is the only real intimation he has of the divine:

Of course, the soul itself we do not see, therefore we cannot observe its beauty. But we see in the body a shadow of the soul, and its image, and judging from its image we conclude that there is a beautiful soul in a handsome body. . . .\textsuperscript{46}

Or as he again expresses his belief in the symbolic correspondence of microcosm and macrocosm, " . . . the appearance and shape of a well-proportioned man agrees most clearly with that concept of mankind which our soul catches and
retains from the author of everything." Thus a beautiful physical appearance comes to have considerable significance because it is the external reflection of a beautiful soul and that particular soul provides a link to the One.

What constitutes physical beauty, according to Ficino? The light or splendor emanating from divine beauty will not descend into matter until the matter has been properly prepared:

The preparation of the living body consists in these three things: Arrangement, Proportion, and Adornment \([\text{Ordo, Modus, Species}]\). Arrangement means the intervals of its parts, Proportion means their quantity, and Adornment means its shape and color.  

Arrangement considered as the intervals of the body’s parts suggests the Pythagorean number heritage that seems omnipresent in theories of proportion. Ficino computes mathematically the proper size relationships of parts to maintain the correct overall proportion; eight heads, for example, will compass the height of the whole body. Arrangement is distinct from the matter, Ficino claims, because it consists of the appropriate spacing of parts and spacing can only mean the distance between parts. Similarly Proportion and Adornment refer to management of matter, not the material itself:

... Proportion is not quantity, but the limit of quantity; these limits are surfaces, lines, and points, which, since they lack mass and depth, are not considered bodies. Adornment also, we place
in a pleasing harmony of lights and shade and lines, not in matter.\textsuperscript{49}

The basis of these three qualities is a temperate combination of the four elements; since the nature of heaven is temperance, the same quality in a corporeal body will allow the heavenly splendor or light to permeate that body. Ficino concludes the discussion by remarking that sounds receive their beauty in exactly the same way as corporeal bodies; the restrictions of these three qualities combine to produce proportion.\textsuperscript{50}

Ficino next illustrates his conception of physical beauty by explaining the form of Eros (V,vii), whom, Agathon states, mythology has traditionally embodied as a human. Agathon's description of Eros, as Ficino interprets it, exemplifies a judicious balance of differing qualities. He is "soft, delicate, and Tender" because the texture of his flesh exhibits a "moderate participation" in the four elements; yet Agathon calls him "agile and flexible" as well, indicating that his softness does not degenerate into effeminate weakness. He is represented as a young man because at this age the body is in its maturity, neither still unformed nor in process of decay. Along with this, naturally, he is "well-proportioned" and "handsome" or pleasingly adorned with color, all of this combining to produce corporeal harmony. Because proportion in a man also consists of moderate and decorous behavior (I,iv), the ideal man is temperate in this realm as well.\textsuperscript{51} The proper
harmony in both areas, body and spirit, is indicated by the traditional symbol of ideal form, the circle. Ficino explains:

The ancient theologians were not far wrong when they placed Goodness in the center and Beauty on the circumference of a circle; goodness, I say, is in a single center, and Beauty is in four circles. The single center of everything is God. Around this continually revolve four circles: Mind, Soul, Nature, and Matter.\(^52\)

Paul Kristeller has remarked that "If we try . . . to describe briefly Ficino's 'aesthetic' position and begin with the fine arts, we must not expect too much." This may be granted easily. Kristeller continues, "The notion of visible beauty, which has some importance for Ficino and might have been a starting point for aesthetic analysis, is entirely orientated toward the theory of love. . . ."\(^53\)

The inference seems to be that an aesthetic theory is an art-for-art's-sake conception and is somehow negated when it is made integral with metaphysical theory. But this is what Ficino does with aesthetics:

The splendor of the highest Good itself shines in individual things and where it shines more fittingly, there it especially allureth him who contemplates it, excites him who looks at it, enrapTURES and takes possession of him who approaches it. . . . There it is apparent that the Soul is inflamed by the divine splendor, glowing in the beautiful person as in a mirror, and secretly lifted up by it as by a hook in order to become God.\(^54\)

This vital application of aesthetics is precisely what so attracts the Renaissance poets, who did not themselves conceive of aesthetics as a separate discipline, to Ficino's
writings. His theory, as we have seen, in the main continues the theories of harmony and proportion stemming traditionally from the platonic finite cosmology. Ficino revitalizes these theories and becomes the main source for platonic aesthetics in the high Renaissance period until the acceptance of the infinite-universe theory.

The fact that Copernicus' De revolutionibus orbium coelestium was published less than fifty years after Ficino's death does not limit the span of Ficino's influence as severely as one might suppose. Copernicus' document is immensely important for removing the earth from the center of the universe, but in other matters his theory is not so revolutionary. As Alexandre Koyré states, Copernicus' world is well-ordered, retains a hierarchial structure, and--most important--is finite. Of far greater practical significance was Galileo's invention of the telescope and his telescopic observations, which--as described in Sidereus Nuncius (1610)--dramatically demonstrated that the universe is imperfect, disorderly, and indefinite or even infinite. From this date it is only a matter of time until the significance of Galileo's discoveries is absorbed and the finite aesthetic is replaced with one appropriate to an infinite universe. Rudolf Allers concludes:

Microcosmism continued to flourish for a long time, but it succumbed to the spirit of the new natural
sciences. The very notion of the cosmos, as held by the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance mind, disappeared. The principle of harmonious order and proportionality, which still proves powerful in the thought of Kepler, lost its meaning with the physicists and philosophers of the seventeenth century. Newton still speaks in such terms, but their significance has become totally different.
NOTES


2 Gilbert and Kuhn, pp. 5-6.


5 Lovejoy, p. 49.

6 Timaeus, 31. It is noteworthy, however, that the stars are conceived as being "infinite in number and admirable for their variety" (39). Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (1892; revised, New York, 1937). Timaeus, II, 3-68.

7 Lovejoy, p. 66. On the rejection of the atomists' theories see Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (New York, 1958), p. 5.

8 I have chosen the designation "platonic" in recognition of the fact that these poets would have made no historical or critical distinction between "Neoplatonic" and the strictly "Platonic." Moreover, it is well to remember P. O. Kristeller's caveat against regarding platonism as a fixed body of theory:

The history of platonism, like that of every living tradition, must not be conceived as an endless repetition of identical doctrines, but rather as a continual adaptation and transformation of certain basic ideas. 'Platonism' is not a label that establishes a simple equation between various thinkers classified as Platonists but a kind of general orientation which assumes a new meaning in each particular case, and each representative of Platonism must hence be understood in his own right before his dependence on, or difference from, other earlier Platonists can be properly evaluated. "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," Traditio, II (1944), 257.
9 I borrow the phrase from Marjorie Nicolson, the scholar who has done the most spadework in seventeenth century literary taste. See Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics of the Infinite (Ithaca, 1959) and The Breaking of the Circle (rev. ed., New York, 1960).


11 See Jackson I. Cope, Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist (St. Louis, 1956), pp. 132-36, for a consideration of Stanley's History. Albinus was available to the Renaissance reader in a fourteenth century Latin translation by Petrus Balbus and Ficino's Latin and Greek editions.

12 Rudolf Allers, "Microcosm from Anaximandros to Paracelsus," Traditio, II (1944), 319-407. The quotation is from p. 331; Allers' introductory explanation, pp. 321-37, is especially helpful.

13 Allers, p. 322.

14 Allers, p. 323.

15 Allers, p. 403.


17 Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word 'Stimmung'" (Part I), Traditio II (1944), 415.

18 Spitzer, p. 414.

19 Spitzer, p. 418.

Aristophanes' myth of the Androgyné in the Symposium provides a humorous explanation that allows original man a spherical body; it was taken seriously by the neoplatonic mythographers. See Robert V. Merrill and Robert J. Clements, Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry (New York, 1957), pp. 99-117.

Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, p. 58.

Aristotle, of course, played an important role by defining the principle of continuity, but Plotinus fused continuity with plenitude. See Lovejoy, pp. 55-58.

Lovejoy, p. 63.


Bréhier, pp. 167-68.

The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna, (rev. ed., London, 1956), p. 73. This translation has been used throughout.

Lovejoy, p. 66.


Gilbert and Kuhn, p. 117.


For the Academy and the persons associated with it see André Chastel, Marsile Ficin et l'Art (Geneve and Lille, 1954), pp. 7-35.

Cassirer, p. 102.


36 Chastel, p. 82.

37 Chastel, p. 83.

38 Chastel discusses this, pp. 93-95, citing specific examples.


41 Jayne, *Commentary*, I, iv, p. 130; Latin, p. 40.

42 The latter of these usages is by no means positive. Since Ficino wrongly refers to Empedocles as a Pythagorean he may have had no clear idea what "Empedoclean" did represent. See Jayne's note, p. 150.

43 Jayne, V, i, p. 164; Latin, p. 64.

44 This imbalance is remedied by Ficino's most independently-minded student, Pico della Mirandola, for whom beauty consisted in an Empedoclean reconciliation of opposites. See *A Platonick Discourse Upon Love*, II, v-vi, *Poems and Translations of Thomas Stanley*, pp. 206-07.

45 Lately more attention has been given to Ficino's treatment of music and musical harmony, most notably in D. P. Walker's *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella* (London, 1938). Yet scholars have generally agreed the commentary on the *Symposium* is Ficino's most influential treatise and here the emphasis is heavily on visual harmony. Erwin Panofsky notes an interesting difference in the employment of visual and aural beauty in the art of Florence and Venice. See *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance* (New York, 1939), p. 148, n. 69.

46 Jayne, VI, xi, p. 204; Latin, p. 94.

47 Jayne, V, v, p. 171; Latin, p. 70.


Jayne, II, iii, p. 135; Latin, p. 44.

Kristeller, p. 305.

Trans. and quoted by Kristeller, p. 267; original, Opera Omnia, p. 306.

André Chastel's studies suggest that the nature of Ficino's system is almost totally aesthetic. See Marsile Ficin et l'Art and Art et Humanisme a Florence au Temps de Laurent Le Magnifique: Études sur la Renaissance et l'Humanisme platonicien (Paris, 1959), passim.

Koyré, pp. 28-34.

Ironically Galileo himself had a pronounced bias toward an aesthetic of order and proportion, which influenced his scientific attitudes. Kepler, in accepting the ontological difference between geometrical forms and physical bodies was not a more modern thinker, only a more strict platonist. See Panofsky, "Galileo as a Critic of the Arts: Aesthetic Attitude and Scientific Thought," Isis, XLVII (1956), 3-15.

CHAPTER II

GEORGE CHAPMAN

George Chapman was, by his own account, "a poore man, whose Pen is his Plough";¹ and the course of his life was determined largely by the vicissitudes of his profession. His pen produced little that was not immediately salable in the theater or in terms of anticipated patronage. Little is known about Chapman's life or his thought other than what is stated or implied in his plays, poems, prefaces, and dedications. An attempt has been made to ally Chapman with an alleged group of heretical free-thinkers,² but actual evidence is so slight as to be negligible. Regrettably, from the standpoint of the intellectual historian, Chapman wrote no letters concerning the structure of the universe, as did Henry More, and no aesthetic treatise, as did Lord Herbert of Cherbury. One feels that the demands of Chapman's profession in themselves were sufficient to preclude any expectation on our part of his producing such documents. As a result it is impossible to ascertain except by implication his attitude toward the new cosmology or any concomitant effects this attitude may have had upon related areas of thought. The scant testimony provided by Chapman's works does not of itself allow a decision regarding the effect of the burgeoning Ptolemaic-Copernican controversy
upon his own Weltanschauung. Chapman's silence on the matter can be taken as one indication that the issue adumbrated by Copernicus' theory and articulated by the publication of Galileo's Sidereus Nuncius in 1610 had no particular effect upon him. In order to determine the cosmological beliefs of this man, who was not sufficiently preoccupied with the subject to approach it directly, it is necessary to formulate the implicit assumptions of world order which are reflected in his poems. In the same way it is necessary to derive from the poems the interrelated aesthetic assumptions about which Chapman was equally unselfconscious. Herbert wrote poems on the nature of beauty, but Chapman's primary poetic method was allegorical and the bent of his mind moral rather than aesthetic, thus precluding any such direct analysis of the problem.

Yet, even with the almost total lack of direct evidence, an analysis of Chapman's poetry provides the material for reliable generalizations and discriminations about his basic assumptions. As a platonist Chapman adhered to the doctrine that physical appearance mirrors spiritual condition. In Hero and Leander he wrote:

For as a glasse is an inanimate eie,
And outward formes imbraceth inwardlie:
So is the eye an animate glasse that showes
In-formes without vs. (III, 235-8)

This belief causes the guilty Hero to believe "Her inward guilt would in her lookes haue wrought" (III, 252). Chapman's strict adherence to this platonic doctrine means that,
although his poems are primarily engaged with moral issues, his treatment of them inevitably provides glimpses of aesthetic values. As the moral standard implies the aesthetic, the aesthetic suggests the shape of the universe as Chapman perceived it. The interrelatedness of the platonists' "single focus" allowed them to perceive the world in a perspective which integrated all formal parts into a whole. Ficino attempted to articulate the vision provided by this perspective:

Certainly the universal motion of the cosmos itself cannot be lacking in perfect order. . . . In this common order of the whole, all things, no matter how diverse, are brought back to unity according to a single determined harmony and rational plan. Therefore we conclude that all things are led by one certain Orderer who is most full of reason.  

The dominance of this harmonious vision of God's creation is one of the more striking symptoms of the pervasiveness of platonic thought in the Renaissance period. Wylie Sypher, in attempting to analyze the common elements of style in the Renaissance arts, comments, "The renaissance humanists brought their world into a single focus, though it is hard to say whether the focus was scientific, platonic, or Christian." Despite the caution of this disclaimer, Sypher's conclusions invariably point to the causal supremacy of platonic theory. He finds that "in the renaissance the practice of the arts grew out of theory, and the renaissance artist, unlike the medieval artisan-builder-sculptor-craftsman, was often a doctrinaire scientist attempting to
impose upon his aesthetic world a unity, a closed system of ratios." The relation between scientist and artist is a significant one, "for the world of renaissance art and science was founded upon a theory of correct proportions." Sypher might have added that the "single focus" extends beyond science and art; for the philosopher and theologian as well, the true and the beautiful are synonymous when the harmony and order of the whole cosmos are recognized. At any rate he acknowledges the platonic origins of this "theory of correct proportions." The renaissance painter and poet created a formal domain of Beauty regulated by algebraic equations and platonic notions of harmony." If Chapman's conscious allegiance to platonism is then not atypical but completely typical of the Renaissance artist, his standards may provide a touchstone for the period in general as well as to the situation of the platonist in particular.

Harmony was attained for Chapman through a theory of correct proportions which was ultimately numerical in origin. D. J. Gordon has explained the role of the goddess Ceremony as an emblem of order in Hero and Leander, arguing that the central issue of the poem is the violation of the rite of marriage, itself a type of the divine order. Gordon aptly compares Chapman's numerical treatment of order with that of Jonson's masque, Hymenaei:
The sin of Hero and Leander obviously implies such a wild violation of cosmic order as that threatened in Hymenaei; for ... Chapman's goddess is a version of this order. Further, Ceremony is specifically related to marriage rites. The five of Ceremony's pentacle is repeated in the five of the five torches carried during the marriage of Hymen, and known, by both Chapman and Jonson, to be carried in the actual Roman ceremony. There were five torches because ... five was the nexus omnia ligans, and the marriage number. Jonson, as well as Chapman, knew the reason why, with its Pythagorean and Platonic sources:

For five the special number is,
Whence hallow'd UNION claymes her blisse.
As being all the summe, that growes
From the united strengths, of those
Which male and female numbers wee
Doe style, and are first two, and three.
Which, joyne thus, you cannot seuer
In equal parts, but one will euer
Remaine as common; so we see
The binding force of Vnitie ... 9

Thus it is that Chapman explains:

The odd disparent number they did chuse,
To shew the vnion married loues should use,
Since in two equall parts it will not seuer,
But the midst holds one to rejoyne it euer,
As common to both parts. ... (V, 323-327)10

Like Jonson he knows that five is held "in most especiall prise, / Since t'is the first od number that doth rise; From the two formost numbers vnitie / That od and euon are" (V, 335-338). One, as a unity in itself, "no number is" but rather is regarded as the generating source of the "powerfull race of number." With an understanding of this somewhat mystical conception of ideal proportion or harmony as achieved by the numerical, even mathematical, grouping of parts into a formal whole, Chapman's notion of beauty and
its function takes on clearer dimensions. He describes
the power that the mental image of Leander exerts over
Hero's mind:

Such was his beautie that the force of light,
Whose knowledge teacheth wonders infinite,
The strength of number and proportion,
Nature had plaste in it to make it knowne
Art was her daughter. . . . (IV, 140-4)

Gordon comments on the passage:

To explain these lines and what follows about the
force of the image we have to go to the Platonists.
Chapman knew from his reading in Ficino's com-
mentary on the Symposium that beauty lies in the con-
cord of a certain set of proportions (and propor-
tions are stated numerically); he also knew, from
the same source, that beauty is the splendour of
the divine countenance, a ray shining through
created things; this too goes with "number and
proportions," for the study of light--optics--is
a mathematical science and leads to knowledge of
the harmonies of God's intelligible world. The
stirring, soothing and healing effects of Leander's
image are--like the magical effects of music--the
effects of harmony and concord.11

Gordon's analogy between the effect of the image and
the effect of music is worthy of comment. Since the
Pythagoreans found that their numerical conception of re-
ality was most readily demonstrated by music, it has been
the cornerstone for most theories of harmony.12 However,
as Gordon's analysis indicates, Chapman attaches more im-
portance to visual than to aural harmony. In this Chapman
only follows Ficino, who developed Plotinus' suggestion of
beauty existing in sight and hearing, but predominantly in
sight, into a full theory of the visual image.13 For
Ficino no single element constitutes beauty since harmony,
by definition, requires the coordination of several parts. In his commentary on the *Symposium* he explains that this harmony of elements operates in all areas responsive to beauty. One responds to music when there is consonance or a balance of several tones; material objects evoke pleasure when there is a harmony of several colors and lines; and the mind responds in similar fashion to a spiritual harmony. Therefore, the means by which we enjoy beauty are threefold—the mind, the eyes, and the ears.\(^{14}\) Despite this basic tripartite division of beauty, in practice Ficino is unable to avoid placing ultimate importance on the visual:

> From all these arguments it follows that the entire charm of the divine countenance, which is called universal beauty, is incorporeal, not only in the Angelic Mind and in the World-Soul, but also in the sight of the eyes. Nor do we love only this whole beauty all at once; but moved by our admiration, we love also its parts. There is born a particular love for a particular beauty, and so we are attracted to some man, a part of the world order, especially when in him a spark of the divine beauty clearly shines. Love of this kind springs from two causes: first, the image of the Father's countenance pleases us, and second, the appearance and shape of a well-proportioned man agrees most clearly with that concept of mankind which our soul catches and retains from the author of everything.\(^{15}\)

In similar fashion Chapman does utilize aural harmony through the harmony of the spheres concept, usually in terms of the microcosmic analogy. In *Euthymiae Raptus*, for instance, he describes the man attuned with his universe:
Then, (like a man in health) the whole consort
Of his tun'd body, sings; which otherwise,
Is like one full of weward maladies
Still out of tune; and (like to Spirits raisde
Without a Circle) never is appaisde. (671-75)

D. P. Walker succinctly explains assumptions which underlie
the passage:

The effectiveness of music for capturing planetary or celestial spirit rests on two principles,
which ultimately connect. The first is the ancient
and persistent theory, deriving from Plato's *Timaeus*
or the Pythagoreans before him, that both the uni-
verse and man, the macrocosm and microcosm, are
constructed on the same harmonic proportions; that
there is a music of the spheres, *musica mundane*,
of man's body, spirit and soul, *musica humana*, of
voices and instruments, *musica instrumentalis.*
Thus the use of anything having the same numerical
proportions as a certain heavenly body or sphere
will make your spirit similarly proportioned and
provide the required influx of celestial spirit. . . . 16

A similar usage occurs in Ovid's *Banquet of Sense* when Chapman
describes the effect of Corynna's kiss upon Ovid:

The motion of the Heauens that did beget
The golden age, and by whose harmonie
Heauen is preserued, in mee on worke is set,
All instruments of deepest melodie
   Set sweet in my desires to my loues liking
With this sweet kisse in mee theyr tunes apply,
As if the best Musitian's hands were striking:
This kisse in mee hath endlesse Musicke closed,
Like Phoebus Lute, on Nisus Towrs imposed. (st. 98)

However, if it is true that Chapman merely pays con-
ventional obeisance to aural harmony, it is perhaps sig-
nificant that this speech is Ovid's own and thus a part of
the systematic sophistry by which Ovid progressively se-
duces Corynna. Frank Kermode has demonstrated that this
difficult poem is not an aberration from Chapman's customary
moral platonism, nor an "Extasie"-like attempt to reach the spiritual by means of the flesh, but a dramatic and ironic presentation of the sensualist's folly. The fact that Ovid, who seeks the glutton's feast rather than the platonist's banquet, finds his soul musically tuned with the heavens possibly suggests a conscious and reasoned preference for the supremacy of visual harmony. In a digression (stanzas 52-5) the poet speaks directly in order to oppose the proper use of the senses to Ovid's amoral abuse of them:

For sacred beautie, is the fruited of sight,
The curtesie that speaks before the tongue,
The feast of soules, the glory of the light,
Enuy of age, and everlasting young,
Pitties Commander, Cupids richest throne,
Musick intransed, neuer dueley sung,
The summe and court of all proportion. . . . (52, 1-7)

Here it is true Chapman still uses music to help describe the "sacred beauty" that is "the fruited of sight"; but it is "Musick intransed, neuer dueley sung." This music is spatialized, suspended in a static condition, and thus bearing about the same relation to actual music as the figures on Keats' urn have to mortal men. It is only this music that is the "summe and court of all proportion." This insistence on the visual image is by no means surprising in a writer as deeply influenced by platonic iconography as was Chapman. George Boas, in attempting to explain the curious popularity of the hieroglyphics attributed by the
Elizabethans to Horapollo, notes that "true knowledge was
a contemplation of Platonic ideas in visual form."\textsuperscript{18}

Chapman the moralist is concerned with man's thought
and behavior; Chapman the platonist agrees with Ficino that
the appearance and shape of a well-proportioned man figures
the ideal conception of mankind. Erwin Panofsky, who has
documented the history of theories of human proportion,
summarizes the development in the Renaissance:

The theory of human proportions was seen as both a
prerequisite of artistic production and an ex-
pression of the pre-established harmony between
microcosm and macrocosm; and it was seen moreover,
as the rational basis of beauty. The Renaissance
fused . . . the cosmological interpretation of the
theory of proportions, current in Hellenistic
times and in the Middle Ages, with the classical
notion of "symmetry" as the fundamental principle
of aesthetic perfection.\textsuperscript{19}

Chapman's contemporary, William Austin, explains that the
human body not only is governed by proportion, but provides
in itself the standard for proportion:

For, as all numbers and proportions, for measure,
(both of inches, spans, digits, cubits, feet, etc.)
are derived from the members, and dimensions of the
human body: so is also the body answerable to all
proportions, buildings, and figures, that are. Not
only answerable (I say) to the whole World, (of
which it is an epitome) but, for the most part, to
every particular figure, character, building, and
fabrick, in the World.\textsuperscript{20}

This is true for Austin because the body is "Microcosmus or
the little earth" and through its proportions, "... the
Geometricall art signifie\textasciitilde{s} things both divine and
humane. ..."\textsuperscript{21} Hence, Chapman often devotes scrupulous
attention to physical beauty for good and serious reasons. The standard of beauty, whether for gods or mortals, is, of course, the harmonious interrelationship of elements. In *Hero and Leander* the tale of Teras provides a description of "Hymen that now is god of Nuptiall rites," and suggests the relevance of his physical perfection for human norms. "In such pure leagues his beauties were combinde;/ That there your Nuptiall contracts first were signde" (V, 97-98). As has already been indicated, the concatenation of correspondences merely involving the topic of marriage is a complicated and subtle one, providing one key to Chapman's conception of God's creation. Moreover, Chapman's treatment of the harmony represented by fulfillment of the marriage sacrament, fitly embodied in Hymen, suggests the particular distribution of disparate components which for him constitutes correct proportion.

The hymeneal union, symbolized figuratively by the combination of "od and euen" numbers, is a *concordia discors*, a harmonic fusion of opposing or unlike qualities. When seen in broader perspective, this microcosmic union forms only one opposing element in the larger strife of things, for, as the poet reveals in the *Epithalamion Teratos* (neatly inverting Milton's better known version of primordial conflict), nuptial night defeats the discord of day. If this Hymen's youthful beauty adumbrates the "Nuptiall contracts" of mortals, the beauty mirrored in his
image must be this reconciliation of opposites, rather than a symmetrically harmonious type:

For as proportion, white, and crimsine, meet
In Beauties mixture, all right cleere, and sweet;
The eye responsible, the golden haire,
And none is held without the other, faire:
All spring together, all together fade;
Such intermixt affections should inuade
Two perfect louers: which being yet vnseeene,
Their vertues and their comforts copied beene,
In Beauties concord, subject to the eie;
And that, in Hymen, pleasde so matchleslie,
That louers were esteemed in their full grace,
Like forme and colour mixt in Hymens face;
And such sweete concord was thought worthie then
Of torches, musick, feasts, and greatest men. . . .

(V, 99-112)

Chapman emphasizes the harmony of opposites by his insistent repetition of the word "mixture" ("... white and crimsine, meet/ In Beauties mixture ...," "Such intermixt affection ...," "Like forme and colour mixt in Hymens face . . ."), which stresses the balancing of disparate qualities. The Elizabethan ideal of beauty required striking contrasts of red and white coloring; however, here Chapman is concerned, not with the bold contrasts, but the harmony of the whole effect. Color, like proportion in figure or form, is only one component, without any of which the "sweet concord" of beauty would be lacking. It is incidentally important that the mode of perception of this concord, that is to be translated by human beings into intangible qualities, is consistently visual. The two perfect lovers "which being yet unseeene" will copy their virtues and comforts from Beauty's concord, which is
"subject to the eie." The same design to be seen in Hymen's face is the substance of the tale that Teras tells; Hymen's own marriage could only dramatize his ultimate divine role. Even so, Chapman takes care consistently to remind his readers of the import of the story. Love comes with Proteus to assist in the wooing, and assumes the form of the "flowre/ That Junos milke did spring, the silver Lillie . . ." (V, 214-15). Hymen offers this token to Eucharis:

She wondrous coy
Drew back her hand: the subtle flowre did woo it,
And drawing it neere, mixt in one their light,
So did the Lillie and the hand their white. . . . 23
(V, 218-22)

The visual effect of the symbol of love in a physical juxtaposition, suggesting the hoped-for union, is transmuted in Eucharis' mind to an intellectual perception of essence in form:

She viewd it, and her view the forme bestowes
Amongst her spirits: for as colour flowes
From superficies of each thing we see,
Euen so with colours formes emitted bee:
And where Loues forme is, loue is, loue is forme. . . .
(V, 223-27)

This process of the transmutation of the visual image is important for it enables Chapman easily to apply his compositional pattern to such intangible areas as the workings of man's mind, which interchangeably can be figured back in visual terms:

Proportion still, must trauerse her accesse
Betwixt his powre, and will; his Sense and Soule;
And euermore th' exorbitance controule
Of all forms, passing through the bodies Powre,
Till in the soule they rest, as in their Towre.
_(Euthymiae Raptus, 867-71)_

In recognition of the fact that for the Renaissance the most universally acknowledged symbol of perfection--moral, aesthetic, and geometric--was the circle, Marjorie Nicolson appropriately entitled her study of aesthetic shifts in the seventeenth century _The Breaking of the Circle_.24 Chapman is unexceptionable in his devotion to this commonplace. The dedicatory epistle to _The Iliads_ contains a justification for the versification of "Truth," arguing that poetry provides a necessary order that the raw material lacks:

So, Truth, with Poesie grac't, is fairer farre,
More proper, moving, chaste, and regular,
Then when she runnes away with vntruss't Prose;
Proportion, that doth orderly dispose
Her vertuous treasure, and is Queene of Graces;
In Poesie, decking her with choicest Phrases,
Figures and numbers: when loose Prose puts on
Plaine letter-habits; makes her trot, vpon
Dull earthly business (she being meere diuine). . . .
_(102-110)_

The argument itself is conventional enough; however, when he seeks a simile to express the standard of proportion that in this way can be attained, what comes to mind is the pattern made when an object falls into a body of water. The water

. . . puts her motion out
In perfect circles, that moue round about
The gentle fountaine, one another, raising:
So Truth, and Poesie worke; so Poesie blazing,
All subjects faine in her exhaustlesse fount,
Works most exactly; makes a true account
Of all things to her high discharges giuen,
Till all be circular, and round as heauen.

(116-23)

Chapman conceives of the circle, then, as the ideal emblem
of correct proportion. Assuming a translator's selections
indicate something of personal affinity, Chapman's version
of "Virgil's Epigram of a good man" is pertinent to this
discussion.25 The good man is, by virtue of his goodness,
a microcosm, "He, in himselfe, worldlike, full, round, and
sure" (1.8). The form of this well-rounded gentleman is
due to his harmonious disposition of parts, though here
Chapman's original compels him to represent proportion as
a union of "equall parts"—hence, symmetry rather than his
more usual reconciliation of opposites:

Lest any crannie gaspe, or angle swell
Through his strict forme: and that he may compell
His equall parts to meete in such a sphere,
That with a compass tried, it shall not erre... .

(17-20)

One supposes that Chapman sufficiently agrees with Virgil's
advocacy of symmetry not to quarrel about the means by
which it is achieved.

Although Chapman uses physical beauty to express cor-
rect proportion and plainly means the circle to be taken
as the ultimate achievement of correct proportion, he sel-
dom makes the seemingly obvious connection. Rather than
use the circle to express the beauty of human appearance,
the poet consistently reserves it to describe—as in
"Virgils Epigram"--actions, attributes, states of mind, modes of behavior. One might infer that Chapman's awareness of the associations of the circle figure as a pattern of cosmic motion, encompassing the whole Ptolemaic paraphernalia of spheres, orbits, cycles, and epicycles leads him to consider it more applicable descriptively to the intangible courses of mental attitude and physical action, which of course require the governing discipline of proportion or decorum, but constitute proportion in motion, as it were.26 "Contentment," Chapman observes "is our heauen, and all our deedes/ Bend in that circle ..." (O.B.S., 54, 1-2). Vandome, the exceedingly platonic lover of Chapman's comedy, Monsieur D'Olive, praises his mistress in a speech which provides a compendium of circle and proportion analogies.

Hinc Amor ut circulus, from hence 'tis said That love is like a circle, being th' efficient And end of all our actions." (I, 1, 11-13)

"Hinc Amor ut circulus" is suggestive of Dionysius the Areopagite's "Amor circulus est bonus a bono in bonum perpetuo revolutus" which Ficino quotes in explaining the continuous circular attraction of love for the Divine Beauty:

This single circle, from God to the world and from the world to God, is identified by three names. Inasmuch as it begins in God and attracts to Him, it is Beauty; inasmuch as, going across into the world, it captivates the world, we call it Love; and inasmuch as it returns to its source and with Him joins
its labors, then we call it Pleasure. In this way Love begins in Beauty and ends in Pleasure.27 Chapman seems to use lightly here a doctrine that he doubt-
less took very seriously. Similarly, he allows Leander the dramatic gesture of signifying his love for Hero by his arms "held vp in circle" (III, 101). Yet it must be remembered that there is nothing wrong with such an atti-
tude toward the mistress if her role as microcosm is taken seriously. The lover only errs when his devotion is short-
circuited and the mistress becomes the end of love rather than a reflection of the divine splendor.

Having described his relationship to his mistress, Vandome considers her virtues, which consist of noble be-
havior governed by judgment and together providing a harmony of graces:

Noble she is by birth, made good by virtue,
Exceeding fair, and her behaviour to it
Is like a singular musician
To a sweet instrument, or else as doctrine
Is to the soul that puts it into act,
And prints it full of admirable forms,
Without which 'twere an empty idle flame.
Her eminent judgment to dispose these parts
Sits on her brow and holds a silver sceptre,
With which she keeps time to the several musics
Placed in the sacred consort of her beauties:
Love's complete armoury is managed in her,
To stir affection, and the discipline
To check and to affright it from attempting
Any attain might disproportion her,
Or make her graces less than circular.

(1, 1, 17-32)

The image of decorous behavior as circular is repeated in Eugenia wherein Lord Russell is commended because "In Belgia,
The Nurce and Schoole of Warre;/ Through Sieges, Battailies,
he made circulare/ His militarie skill" (338-40). Though
Russell's proficiency in the arts of war is flawless,
Chapman only wishes for such men to restore peace and har-
mony; therefore, the same poem expresses the hope that
knowledge will "make our generall peace so circulare;/
That Faith and Hope, at either end shall pull/ And make it
come: Round as the Moone at full" (939-41). Russell's own
life evokes only admiration for his nobility of purpose and
action which in intention partook of the formal perfection
exhibited by the full moon and in execution followed the
spherical course of the moon's orbit. The orbit of
Russell's life is completed by death envisioned as the
closing of the circle, suggesting not the breaking of the
pattern, but rather its apotheosis:

Rising and setting, let the sunne
Grace whom we honor;
And euer at her full, the Moone
Assume vpon her,
The forme his Noblesse did put on;
In whose Orb, all the vertues shone,
With beames decreasneuer;
Till faith, in her firme Rocke reposde;
Religion, his lifes Circle closed,
And opened life for euer. (1054-63)

The example of the moon as model and pattern for
behaviour suggested in Eugenia Chapman had used earlier even
more explicitly in "Hymnvs in Cynthia," wherein it served
him as the poem's basic metaphor. "Great Cynthia" is
lauded as
The greatest, and swiftest Planet in the skie:
Peacefull, and warlike, and the powre of fate,
In perfect circle of whose sacred state,
The circles of our hopes are compassed:
All wisedome, beautie, majestie and dread,
Wrought in the speaking pourtrait of thy face. . . .
(4-9)

The trope comes readily to Chapman's mind, it would seem, because it conveniently satisfies in one image his various conceptions of harmony. For Chapman harmony is primarily numerical, as it is in music; yet his preference for the visual image renders musical imagery in itself inadequate for his purposes. Through the Pythagorean myth of the harmony of the spheres Chapman is able to unify the two impulses, in effect visualizing the numerical harmony of music through cosmological imagery. The process is illustrated by the passage already quoted from Euthymiæ Raptus in which the situation of the man whose body is "out of tune" is likened to that of "Spirits raisde/ Without a Circle." A related instance occurs in Hero and Leander; Chapman here describes the soul as the "bodies starre,/ (That euer is in motion circulare)." The metaphor is extended to a statement of Chapman's platonic epistemological theory with the role of the visual faculty both creating and responding to appearance further emphasized. The "firie soule," Chapman explains, is like the sun, which even though "he in clowdes be closde" still projects rays that are "Cast in a circle round about the skie." Just so it is that the soul
Conceives a forme; in seeking to display it
Through all our clowdie parts, it doth conuey it
Forth at the eye, as the most pregnant place,
And that reflects it round about the face.
(III, 247-50)

Gordon, concentrating on the idea of ceremony as
form in a teleological sense, has analyzed Chapman's ontology in *Hero and Leander* in Aristotelian terms. Quite rightly, however, he emphasizes the synthetic quality of the philosophic background, remarking that "these elements are as much Ficinian as Aristotelian." Indeed, Gordon calls attention to specifically non-Aristotelian passages such as the description of the soul's circular motion, in which Chapman "is using notions that are explicitly rejected by Aristotle in the *De Anima*, where the Platonic notion of the circular motion of the soul is criticized at length."28 The extent to which Chapman's treatment of form is Aristotelian, then, is open to question. Although Gordon cites precedents from Aristotelian texts, his own account of the function of form makes Chapman's ontology sound even more Ficinian than Gordon has suggested:

There is an ambiguity in the word form: its meaning can shift—and does so almost imperceptibly—between "visible form" and "internal or organizing form"; and it is of course this that permits ceremony to be conceived of in the terms we have displayed. By stressing the first meaning so that form means appearance or outward manner and behaviour in the simplest sense, Chapman extends the range of his subject so that he can introduce the problem of the relation of "appearance" and "reality" considered particularly in its moral implications.29
As in Ficino's consideration of the function of appearance, outward form mirrors the inward form, thus providing an index to the condition of the soul. The figure of the light shining forth through "all our clowdie parts" is an appropriate one for it suggests the manner, remaining to be discussed, by which Chapman unifies through myth and allegory his conflicting desires to reveal his meaning through visual images and yet conceal his meaning from the profane masses.

II

In order to appreciate fully the primary role which Chapman's visual conception of order and harmony assumes in his poetry, it is helpful to examine its effect upon the structure and meaning of an entire poem. During recent years, despite (or possibly because of) T. S. Eliot's commendation, Chapman's verse has appealed to a fit audience and few, indeed. One of the obvious reasons for this neglect has been the inaccessibility resulting from insufficient knowledge of the tradition and technique of platonic allegory in the Renaissance. Since Battenhouse's pioneering effort at explicating The Shadow of Night, other scholars equipped with a sounder knowledge of platonic iconography and mythology have attempted to part the veil of obscurity by reestablishing a coherent intellectual and historical context and have enhanced our understanding of
several of the difficult poems, notably Hero and Leander and Ovid's Banquet of Sense. It may be time to examine a poem which has not generally been considered difficult, to determine to what extent the previously defined outlook permeates Chapman's verse.

Andromeda Liberata provides an interesting subject for several reasons: It is an occasional poem composed for so beguiling an occasion that critics have been unable to wrench their attention from the history to the poetry; the prose "Justification" Chapman was forced to write conveniently embodies his most explicit and detailed statement of allegorical method; and, regardless of the poetic merit of Andromeda Liberata, it demonstrates Chapman's remarkable skill in adapting classical mythology to a specific occasion, while using the occasion itself to express his personal political philosophy.

The spectacular aftermath of the Somerset-Howard wedding, which underscores the apparent gross ineptitude and tactlessness of Chapman's epithalamion, has seemed far more interesting than the poem itself. Douglas Bush remarks:

In the first place it is a little disconcerting to find our grave and high-minded moralist celebrating the virtues of that precious pair, the Earl of Somerset and the Countess of Essex, whose marriage, with its train of intrigue and murder and executions, was the scandal of the age.
Jean Jacquot dutifully devotes more attention to the poem, but with hardly more penetration:

Parmi les grands poèmes de la maturité, l'Epicedium et Andromeda Liberata ne retiendront pas longtemps notre attention. Leur intérêt est surtout biographique. La louange extravagante et l'invective occupent tant de place dans Andromeda que l'auteur n'a quère le loisir de développer le recit légendaire qui donne son titre au poème. On peut cependant mentionner certains vers aux graces précieuses, où il prête à la nature, dont la beauté est le reflet de celle d'Andromède, des sentiments de pitié ou d'adoration. Lorsque la malheureuse tente d'échapper au sacrifice, les vents la poursuivent avec d'amoureux soupirs, jouent avec ses tresses, ou la retiennent par son voile. Mais les aimables lieux communs de la mythologie érotique ne suffisent pas à Chapman et il a recours, une fois encore, aux commentaires de Ficin sur le Banquet de Platon. Il cèlèbre la procréation, signe de l'Inépuisable bonté de Dieu et formé terrestre de l'immortalité. Il proclame la souveraineté et l'absolue liberté de l'amour. Mais il ne se contente pas d'emprunter au Florentin ses idées maîtresses, il le suit dans ses trop subtils commentaires, en y ajoutant de son cru, et cette ingéniosité est mise au service d'une cause bien douteuse, celle de Somerset et de Frances Howard.32

Yet the mere fact that the poem is an epithalamion in itself might indicate that it is of more than biographical interest, for as we have seen, the wedding rite was of particular significance to Chapman as a microcosmic harmony of opposites. It could be argued that the epithalamion inevitably involves a consideration of harmonic unity, but in practice emphasizing such a quality would depend entirely on the individual. Puttenham, for instance, in no wise stresses the harmonic implications of the form in his account of "The maner of rejoysings at mariages and vvedings."33 To
a platonist like Spenser, however, the harmony symbolized by the hymeneal union is of marked importance. In an exposition of the number symbolism of Spenser's *Epithalamion*, A. Kent Hieatt summarizes his conclusions:

By all of this he signifies that microcosmic-macrocosmic consolation by which our pathetic, individual, temporal and spatial imperfection is seen as only one aspect of a paradoxical strength by which we as humans, through marriage and generation, partake in the cyclical harmony of an according whole, although this mutation-filled perfection must finally yield place to the immutable perfection of God's Eternity.\(^{34}\)

The crucial role of the goddess, Ceremony, as well as the significance attached to the violation of the marriage rite in *Hero and Leander* and the object lesson of the "*Epithalamion Teratos,*" should provide sufficient indication that the wedding, and hence the wedding poem, is of comparable importance to Chapman.\(^{35}\)

The story of the Somerset-Howard wedding and its ramifications is both too well-known and too complex to warrant a detailed summary here.\(^{36}\) It will be sufficient to recall that for political reasons James had arranged in 1606 a child-marriage between Frances Howard, daughter of Thomas Howard, Earl of Suffolk, and the third Earl of Essex. Frances began an intrigue with Robert Carr, James' powerful Scottish favorite, and petitioned for an annulment of her marriage on the pretext that Essex was impotent. With the approval of James the marriage was annulled on September 25, 1613. Carr's fortunes for a time improved
remarkably: On November 3, he was made Earl of Somerset; on December 23, Treasurer of Scotland; on December 26, married to Frances; in 1614, appointed Lord Chamberlain and Keeper of the Privy Seal. It was in March of 1614 that Chapman's poem celebrating the wedding was registered.

The vehicle Chapman chose as the appropriate one to embody his poetic reaction to this affair was the Perseus-Andromeda myth. Several factors would have governed Chapman's choice of a traditional myth as poetic vehicle. His preference for expressing abstractions by means of suitable visual images--already seen in his employment of Hymen, Ceremony, and his whole conception of *Hero and Leander*--would have directed him again to mythical narrative. Moreover, Chapman's "obscurity" is a relevant concern. In the fullest consideration of this problem Margaret Bottrall concludes that Chapman had a "natural tendency" toward obscurity in expression which determined his adoption of obscurantist literary theories. Miss Bottrall acknowledges the high seriousness of Chapman's conception of poetry--"its power of conveying truth and persuading men to virtue"--and finds in his various statements of theory a consistent defense:

This defense of difficulty as a literary artifice is based upon Chapman's belief in the power of poetry to discover and express truth and his anxiety lest its scope be limited to mere entertainment. He advocates a heightened style, suitable to the lofty and philosophic subject-
matter which he thinks proper to true poetry; a style ornate, not for the sake of attractiveness, but for dignity. The ingenuity of the style is said to be no mere ornament imposed from without, but the natural expression of profound meaning; and its difficulty is a grace, since the serious poet does not address himself to the pleasure-seeking multitude, but to those who are prepared to take pains to arrive at the poet's meaning. 37

While Miss Bottrall overemphasizes the psychological motivation in her discussion, nevertheless her conclusions regarding stylistic obscurity are germane to Chapman's use of mythology.

In the dedicatory epistle prefixed to Ovid's Banquet Chapman, in justification of stylistic obscurity, comments that

... it serves not a skilfull Painters turne, to draw the figure of a face onely to make knowne who it represents; but hee must lymn, giue luster, shaddow, and heightening; which though ignorants will esteeme spic'd, and too curious, yet such as haue the judicall perspectue, will see it hath, motion, spirit, and life.

Chapman's analogy of the painter's technique is interesting both in light of his visual-image theory and because it is an art historian, Edgar Wind, who has provided the best description of "the language of mysteries" in stating a method of explicating platonic iconography of the Italian Renaissance. Wind believes the "hidden mysteries" concept to have been disseminated mainly from Plato's fanciful idea that a true philosopher is like one who has undergone a religious initiation and passed beyond the level
comprehended by the vulgar populace. Thus inspired by Plato, and later systematized by Plotinus, a figurative use of religious terminology and imagery became a staple of philosophic discourse. Armed with this historical precedent the Renaissance platonists, particularly the Florentine group and their followers, as a matter of course figured their profound truths in poetic myths which were deliberately expressed in exotic styles, and equally as a matter of course read in the same spirit.

It is in this spirit that Chapman explains, "The prohane multitude I hate, & onelie consecrate my strange Poems to these serching spirits, whom learning hath made noble, and nobilitie sacred..." Abraham Fraunce sees the function of allegory as identical in the poetry and painting of the platonic school:

Both poetry, a speaking picture, and paynting, a dumbe poetry, were like in this, that the one and the other did under an amyable figure and delightsome veyle, as it were, couer the most sacred mysteries of auncient philosophie. Nay, Pythagoras himselfe by his symbolicall kinde of teaching, as also Plato by his conceited parables and allegorical discourses in his bookes called, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Symposium, may make any man beleeve, that as the learned Indians, Aethiopians, and Aegyptians kept their doctrine religiously secret for feare of prophanation, so the Grecians by their example, haue wrapped up in tales, such sweete inventions, as of the learned unfoldere may well be deemed wonderfull, though to a vulgar conceit, they seeme but friuolus imaginations.

When Andromeda Liberata, whether misinterpreted or not, created such a furor that Chapman apparently earned the displeasure of both Essex and Somerset, he prepared in
verse and prose "A Free and Offenceles Jvstification" containing both a general explanation of his poetic theory and Andromeda. The prose apology offers a thoroughly traditional account of the allegorical technique:

As Learning, hath delighted from her Cradle, to hide her selfe from the base and prophane Vulgare, her ancient Enemy; vnder divers vailes of Hieroglyphickes, Fables, and the like; So hath she pleased her selfe with no disguise more; then in misteries and allegoricall fictions of Poesie. These haue in that kinde, beene of speciall reputation; as taking place of the rest, both for priority of time, and precedence of vs; being borne in the ould world, long before Hieroglyphicks or Fabels were conceived: And delivered from the Fathers to the Sonnes of Art; Without any Aucthor but Antiquity. Yet euer held in high Reuereence and Auctority; as supposed to conceale, within the vttter barke (as their Eternities approve) some sappe of hidden Truth: As either some dimme and obscure prints of diuinity, and the sacred history; Or the grounds of naturall, or rules of morall Philosophie, for the recommending of some vertue, or curing some vice in generall. . . .42

It is not surprising, therefore, to find Plato the first authority Chapman calls to his aid with the statement, "Est enim ipsa Natura vniuersa Poesis aenigmatum plena, nec quibus eam dignoscit," for which he provides the marginal note, "Plat. in Alcib. 2."

It was with this serious conception of poetic allegory in mind that Chapman turned to the Perseus-Andromeda myth. Always an attractive vehicle for allegory, the story has been used by as recent a poet as Hopkins, who cast Andromeda as the human soul and Perseus as Christ.43 In Chapman's own day the fable was interpreted variously.
Like Hopkins, Christine de Pisan (du Castel), who was available to Chapman in Stephen Scrope's translation, interpreted Andromeda as the soul. Francis Bacon's *The Wisdom of the Ancients* makes no mention of Andromeda, but represents Perseus as "Warre" and interprets the slaying of the Gorgon as an allegory of military strategy.

Abraham Fraunce regards the Gorgon episode as an allegory of celestial grace and wisdom overcoming mortality, while George Sandys reads Andromeda as "innocent virtue" and Perseus as "honour and felicitie." Sir John Harington cites a succinct definition of allegory, which "Plutarch defineth to be when one thing is told, and by that another is understood," and offers a three-level interpretation of the Perseus story—historical, moral, and theological—considerately concluding, "The like infinite Allegories I could pike out of other Poeticall fictions saue that I would avoid tediousnes."

From this welter of possibilities, what exactly is allegorized by Chapman's Perseus and Andromeda? Natale Comes' *Mythologiae* provides the source of the story as Chapman uses it, but on this occasion Chapman consults the handbook for plot, rather than meaning. John Marston, who—perplexed by poetic obscurity—called upon Comes to "... ayde me to unrip/ These intricate deepe oracles of wit/ These dark enigmaes, and strange ridling sence,/ which pass my dullard braines intelligence," might here have
been thwarted if he could not penetrate the surface of the poem itself. Chapman's employment of the myth does not rely on Comes or the other commonplace books of mythological interpretation. An acute reader would have found it unnecessary to consult the handbooks, for Chapman's concerns in the poem are sufficiently obvious that his whole treatment implements his particular employment of the myth.

Briefly, the theme of the poem is order and disorder. Disorder, Chapman explains in the dedicatory epistle, "To the Right Worthily Honored, Robert Earle of Sommerset, Etc. and His Most noble Lady, the ladie Frances," was the condition of things before the formation of the world, "all confus'd, like waues struck with a storme," and "in no set being, staid":

All comprehension, and connexion fled;  
The greater, and the more compact disturb'd  
With ceaseles warre, and by no order curb'd,  
Till earth receiuing her set magnitude  
Was fijxt her selfe, and all her Birth indu'd  
With state and law: so this small world of ours  
Nor yeelds his mixt parts, forms that may become  
A human Nature; But at randome rome  
Past brutish fashions, and so neuer can  
Be cald the ciuill bodie of a man. . . .  
(d.e., 124-34)

This chaotic, disorderly state of human nature which echoes the primordial condition before God created law, form, and order, is seen as an inbalance of elements, wherein one quality goes to excess: "The more great in command, made seruile more,/ Glutted, not satisfied: in plenty, poore . . ." (d.e., 137-8). The poet consciously opposes himself
to these unbalanced lawless spirits; "And therefore, should no knowing spirit be druen/ From fact, nor purpose; for the spleens prophan/ Of humours errant, and Plebeian . . ." (d.e., 8-10). Within the poem proper this condition is identified as the property of the "rauenous Multitude," the people at large, "Whose poysons all things to your spleenes peruert,/ And all streames measure by the Fount your Heart,/ That are in nought but misrule regulare . . ." (A.L., 9-11). It is this rabblement that sullies Andromeda's innocence with their malicious scandal: "... virtues lighted euen to starres,/ All vicious Emuies, and seditious Jars,/ Banespitting Murmures and detracting Spels,/ Bannish with curses to the blackest hels . . .." (A.L., 29-32). Allied with this mob are the "Neireides," who persecute Andromeda for reasons of jealousy. Both are represented in the myth by the sea monster which threatens Andromeda:

And then came on the prodegie, that bore
In one masse mixt their Image; that still spread
A thousand bodies vnder one sole head
Of one minde still to ill all ill men are
Strange sights and mischiefs fit the Populare.
(A. L., 166-70)

Opposed to the discordant multitude are the temperate soul of Perseus, the harmonious beauty of Andromeda, and their transcendent union in marriage, which supplies the already admirable Perseus with the one moderating quality he needs to produce a sort of quintessential
concordia discors. The poet states the causes for Andromeda's intended sacrifice, sets the scene of her ordeal, and provides a lengthy description of her beauty (125-54). As she is threatened by the "whale" Perseus appears, "He that both virtue had, and beauty too/ Equall with her . . ." (237-8). The emphasis on this superlative physical beauty is deliberate; Chapman explains again the interconnection between the beautiful or divinely attuned soul and its reflection in external form:

The minde a spirit is, and cal'd the glasse
In which we see God; and corporeall grace
The mirror is, in which we see the minde.
Amongst the fairest women you could finde
Then Perseus, none more faire; mongst worthiest men,
No one more manly: This the glasse is then
To shew where our complexion is combinde:
A womans beauty, and a manly minde:
Such was the halfe-diunique-borne Trojan Terror
Where both Sex graces, met as in their Mirror.
(A.L., 241-50)

The function of Perseus as a concordia discors emblem becomes evident through Chapman's depiction of him as a spiritual hermaphrodite, who encompasses the desirable characteristics of each sex. Perseus is described as "of Loues owne forme" which would suggest that his beauty is well-proportioned or, more elaborately, may allude to the Eros-Anteros legend, reinforcing the hermaphroditic suggestion. Eros and Anteros were held to be either identical or mirror twins, the offspring of Mars and Venus, thus combining the qualities of each. The particular qualities for which Perseus is commended are enumerated and grouped
in units of three and two, a total of five; one recalls from *Hero and Leander* that *three* and *two* are the female and male numerical equivalents, while *five* is the ritual marriage number.

Young was he, yet not youthfull, since mid-yeeres,  
The golden meane holds in mens loues and feares:  
Aptly composde, and soft (or delicate)  
Flexible (or tender) calme (or temperate)  
Of these five, three make most exactly knowne,  
The Bodies temperate complexion:  
The other two, the order doe expresse,  
The measure and whole Trim of comelinesse.  
A temperate corporature (learn'd Nature saith)  
A smooth, a soft, a solid flesh bewrayeth:  
Which state of body shewes th'affections State  
In all the humours, to be moderate. . . .  

(A.L., 255-66)

The resultant balance of qualities produces a mean of temperance and moderation, actually a harmony of harmonies, since each of the particular qualities specified is, in itself, a judicious compromise between extremes. As Perseus is young, but not too young, he is "pliant," but not excessively so:

Not flexible, as of inconstant state,  
Nor soft, as if too much effeminate,  
For these to a complexion moderate  
(Which we before affirme in him) imply,  
A most unequall contrariety. (A.L., 277-81)

It is exactly this same temperate moderation in all things, this personal *concordia discors*, for which Chapman, as if to make his meaning explicit, praises his patron in the dedication. Somerset is young, but already possesses the accumulated wisdom of age—"All fruits, in youth, ripe in you . . ." (d.e., 95). In the same fashion that evening
dew preserves the quality of day's beauty, "So you (sweete Earle) stay youth in aged bounds . . ." (d.e., 105). Rhetorically and syntactically Chapman suggests the median state achieved, through his employment of balanced antithesis in an *eclipsis*, "Your grace, your virtue heightening: virtue, grace . . ." (d.e., 108). The eulogy of Somerset for his temperamental reconciliation of opposites even pictures his mind as consisting of a *marriage* of contrary properties:

\[
\text{The peacefull mixture then that meetes in yow} \\
\text{(Most temperat Earl) that nought to rule doth ow:} \\
\text{In which, as in a thorough kindled Fire,} \\
\text{Light and Heat marrie Judgement and Desire . . . .} \\
\text{(d.e., 69-72)}
\]

Chapman allows no possibility of error; the qualities embodied by Perseus are the qualities he attributes to Somerset.

Having characterized the principals, Chapman next explains the process by which Perseus falls in love with Andromeda:

\[
\text{"As to be lou'd, the fairest fittest are;} \\
\text{To loue so to, most apt are the most faire,} \\
\text{Light like it selfe, transparent bodies makes,} \\
\text{At ones act, th'other joint impression takes.} \\
\text{(A.L., 284-87)}
\]

In essence this is the doctrine proposed by Socrates in the *Symposium*, love is the desire for beauty, keeping the motivation of the action in a consistently platonic context. Chapman then describes at considerable length the effect of love upon Perseus, the consequences of love, the
seriousness of thwarted love, and much more briefly the
dispatching of the sea-monster. The narrative proper
closes at the point of the marriage ceremony, the
Parcarum Epithalamion celebrates the union itself, prophe-
saying "Progenie," and the Apodosis closes by moralizing
generally on the implications of Perseus' triumphs—the
whole thus following the general rule that an epithalamion
be divided into three parts.52

Since Schoell's source study revealed the fact that
key ideas in the latter half of Andromeda originated in
Ficino's Commentary on the Symposium,53 this indebtedness
frequently has been regarded as evidence of the feebleness
of Chapman's poetic inspiration and proof of his surpassing
pedantry. The tone of Jacquot's previously quoted appraisal
is typical: "Mais les amiables lieux communs de la myth-
ologie érotique ne suffisent pas á Chapman et il a recours,
une fois encore, aux commentaires de Ficin sur le Banquet
de Platon." Miss Bartlett finds the passage concerning
homicide (A.L., 487-97) pertinent to the circumstances of
the childless Essex marriage and so accepts it as the moral
crux of the poem,54 but does not comment on the relevance
of the other Ficino-based passages.

The first of these occurs following Perseus' reali-
zation of his love for Andromeda, developing and clarifying
the explanation of the effect of this love upon Perseus.
Despite the impressive harmony of Perseus' character, it
appears that he was deficient until fulfilled in love: "No wisdome, noblesse, force of armes, nor lawes, Without loue, wins man, his compleat applause ..." (A.L., 296-97). The process resulting in this completion is explained as the tempering of Mars' nature by Venus', Mars being the culmination of masculine virtues and Venus of feminine. She "tames" Mars, who is "Most full of fortitude (since he inspires Men with most valour)." This domination of the male principal by love, exemplified by the Mars-Venus myth, is acted out on cosmic scale by the planets that are the namesakes of the gods. Don Cameron Allen has noted the astrological correspondence:

The planetary infatuation between Venus and Mars was also known to Renaissance literary men, who had long been acquainted with the mythological romance of these immortals. According to the astrologers, Venus was one of the most gregarious planets, for it was the friend of all the other stars save Saturn; on the other hand, Mars had no friends except Venus. Children born with Mars in the ascendant were cursed with evil natures, but when Venus was in conjunction with Mars, these qualities were often altered and sometimes dignified. 55

Robert Greene's Planetomachia provides a prose illustration in which Saturn and Venus debate the question of which has the greater influence on the natures and actions of mortals. 56 Chapman puts the theory into verse:

For when in heau'ns blunt Angels shines his flames, Or he, his second or eight house ascends Of rul'd Natiuities; and then portends Ill to the then-borne: Venus in aspect Sextile, or Trine doth (being con'joyn'd) correct
His most malignitie: And when his starre
The birth of any gouernes (fit for warre
The Issue making much to wrath enclin'd
And to the ventrous greatness of the minde)
If Venus neere him shine; she doth not let
His magannerity, but in order set
The vice of Anger making Mars more milde
And gets the mastry of him in the childe:
Mars neuer masters her; but if she guide
She loue inclines: and Mars set by her side
Her fires more ardent render, with his heat:
So that if he at any birth be set
In th'house of Venus, Libra, or the Bull,
The then-borne burnes, and loue flames feels at full,
(A.L., 302-20)\textsuperscript{57}

This passage with its harmonic implications ("in order set/
The vice of Anger") comes directly from Ficino's elaboration
on Agathon's explanation of the virtues of love:

Mars is outstanding in strength among the planets,
because he makes men stronger, but Venus masters
him. For the man at whose birth Mars is in his angle
in the heavens, either in the second or the eighth
mansion, he portends misfortune. Venus, when in
conjunction with Mars, in opposition to him, or in
reception, or watching from sextile or trine aspect,
as we say, often checks his malignance. Again, when
Mars is dominant at the birth of a man, Mars bestows
upon him greatness of soul and a temper; if Venus
comes next, she does not check that virtue of a
great soul given him by Mars, but she does suppress
the vice of temper. Hence she seems to master and
appease Mars, "but Mars never masters Venus." If,
indeed, she comes first, she bestows the passion
of love. If Mars comes next, he renders Venus'
passion hotter by his heat. So, anyone at whose
birth Mars has been in a mansion of Venus, either
in Libra or in Taurus, because of the presence of
Mars, will love most violently.\textsuperscript{58}

The meaning of the Mars-Venus myth is discussed by Sandys,
who tells us that the astrological sense of the legend "was
invented to expresse the sympathy that is necessary in
nature. . . . Mars likewise signifies strife and Venus
friendship; which as the ancients held, were the parents of all things. 59

The ancients seized upon the legend of the adulterous passion between Mars and Venus to explain the contrary nature of things, Plato's principles of the Same and the Other. 60 The product of this union was Harmony (or Hermione), 61 who combined the qualities of her notable parents—Harmonia est discordia concors. This interpretation of the story as warlike contentiousness being tempered to harmony by love and friendship was commonplace in the Renaissance, and classical precedents were not hard to find. Since Schoell found Chapman heavily indebted to Xylander's translation of Plutarch's Moralia, 62 the analysis of the myth in De Homero is very likely one that Chapman knew firsthand:

This is what the fable of Mars and Venus suggests, of whom the latter corresponds to Empedoclean friendship, the former to Empedoclean strife. . . . And with this agrees what is transmitted by other poets, that Harmony was born from the union of Mars and Venus: for when the contraries, high and deep, are tempered by a certain proportion, a marvellous consonance arises between them. 63

A more systematic and philosophic exposition of the allegory is provided by Pico della Mirandola, for whom concordia discors was the basis of a formal theory of beauty:

Beauty in general is a Harmony resulting from several things proportionably concurring to constitute a third; in respect of which temperament and mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the composition of one, every creature is Fair; and
in this sense no simple being is beautiful; not God himself; this Beauty begins after him; arising from contrariety, without which is no composition; it being the union of contraries, a friendly enmity, a disagreeing concord; whence Empedocles makes discord and concord the principles of all things; by the first, understanding the variety of the Natures compounding; by the second, their Union: adding, that in God only there is no Discord, he not being the Union of several Natures, but a pure uncompounded Unity: In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety; otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved. Thus in the Fictions of Poets, Venus loves Mars: this Beauty cannot subsist without contrariety; she curbs and moderates him; this temperament allays the strife betwixt these contraries. And in Astrology, Venus is plac'd next Mars, to check his destructive influence; as Jupiter next Saturn, to abate his malignancy. If Mars were always subject to Venus, (the contrariety of principles to their due temper) nothing would ever be dissolved. 54

It is this background of accepted interpretation that Chapman postulates in order to establish his own treatment of the Perseus-Andromeda myth. Perseus' mind, working—like Chapman's own—in terms of correspondences, interprets his experience by means of the Mars-Venus relationship, revealing plainly enough the typological resemblances between the stories. Perseus and Andromeda are to be considered types of Mars and Venus, thus indicating that Chapman wishes the story to be read as a concordia discors allegory. The apparently contradictory treatment of Perseus as already embodying a concord of both masculine and feminine qualities (and, by implication, Andromeda doing the same) can be explained satisfactorily. Not only would it be impolitic for the poet to represent the subjects of his
poem as much less than perfect, the reproduction of the
unity of the whole in the composition of its parts is a
matter of established doctrine. Edgar Wind comments on a
similar instance:

... we find that the roles of Mars and Venus, which
would normally be divided between man and woman, both
recur within man and woman as such. The principle of
the "whole in the part" entails this rather baffling
conclusion: that Venus is not only joined to Mars,
but that his nature is an essential part of her own,
and vice versa. True fierceness is thus conceived
as potentially amiable, and true amiability as poten-
tially fierce. In the perfect lover they coincide
because he--or she--is the perfect warrior. But
whenever their "infolded" perfection is "unfolded,"
the argument requires two opposing images which,
by contrasting the martial with the amiable spirit,
reveal their transcendent unity.65

Perseus has learned well his Ficino; he continues
the analogical account of the planetary romance with a
learned exposition of why it is that Venus always dominates
Mars:

Besides, Mars still doth after Venus move
Venus not after Mars: because, of Loue
Boldnesse is hand-maid, Loue not so of her:
For not because men, bold affections beare
Loues golden nets doth their affects enfold;
But since men loue, they therefore are more bold
And made to dare, eu'n Death, for their belou'd,
And finally, Loues Fortitude is prou'd
Past all, most cleerly; for this cause alone
All things submit to Loue, but loue to none.
Celestials, Animals, all Corporeall things,
Wisemen, and Strong, Slaue-rich, and Free-borne Kings
Are loues contributories; no guifts can buy,
No threats can loue constraine, or terrifie
For loue is Free, and his Impulsions still
Spring from his owne free, and ingenious will.
Not God himselfe, would willing loue enforce
But did at first decree, his liberall course:
Such is his liberty, that all affects
All arts and Acts, the minde besides directs
To some wish't recompence, but loue aspirs
To no possessions his owne desires:
As if his wish in his owne sphere did move,
And no reward were worthy Loue but loue.
(A.L., 321-44)

The doctrine in the passage again emanates immediately from

the Commentarium:

"Again, Mars follows Venus, Venus does not follow
Mars," since boldness is the foot-follower of love,
not love of boldness. For it is not from the fact
that they are bold that men are caught by love, but
usually from the fact that they are wounded by love,
they become most bold to undergo any dangers for the
sake of their beloveds. Lastly, the most obvious
proof of Love's strength, which surpasses everything,
is that everything obeys Love, but He Himself, no
one. Certainly the heavenly beings, the animals,
and all bodies love; likewise both the brave and
the wise. Rich men and exalted kings bow their
necks to the rule of Love, but Love is subject to
none of these. For the bribes of the rich cannot
buy love, nor can the threats or violence of the
mighty force us to love or cease loving, for love
is free and rises of its own accord in free will,
which not even God, who decreed that it should be
free in the very beginning, controls. . . .
. . . So great is His freedom that, although the
rest of the desires, powers, and functions of the
soul usually seek other ends, different from
themselves, love is content to be its own reward,
as it there were no other end except love which
was worthy of it.66

The myth invariably presents Venus' domination of Mars
through love; since Mars cannot conquer, strife or war
must always submit to amity and love. The triumph of
Venus is a favorite theme in Renaissance iconography:
Veronese portrays the theme as Fortezza submissive to
Carita; Botticelli and Piero de Cosimo both reveal Mars
weary of the ardors of love, sleeping bereft of his armor;
Francesco Cossa's fresco shows an enchained Mars, formally submissive to Venus. It is this variant of the tradition that Shakespeare invokes in *Venus and Adonis* when Venus boasts of Mars, "Yet hath he been my captive and my slave . . ." (I. 101). The same conception is used less overtly, but more extensively, in *Antony and Cleopatra* when the Egyptian Queen reminisces of her lover's defeat: "I drunk him to his bed,/ Then put my tires and mantles on him whilst/ I wore his sword Philippian" (II, v, 21-23) or when Cleopatra and Eros arm Antony for a disastrous battle (IV, iv). The allegorical overtones are even harder to ignore when Eros teaches Antony how to die for love (IV, xv, 95-102). Indeed, the whole play is an exposition of concordia discors; neither the opposites of Roman or Egyptian life are sufficient in themselves, which the lovers realize before their deaths, and are thus able to die happily, Shakespeare's use of nuptial imagery suggesting union and fulfilment after death.

Perseus' meditation completed and necessary relationships established, the rescue itself is attended to, with Chapman emphasizing the dangers concomitant on the rescue. Not only is the monster itself to be dreaded, but the probable reaction of the multitude must be considered. Some acts are "too hie" for "Plebian wit" to comprehend and, therefore, Andromeda, exhibiting the fortitude of Mars, resolves to die, rather than expose Perseus to the censure
of the crowd,

... ... . for if he ouercame
The monstrous world would take the monsters part
So much the more: and say some sorcerous art
Not his pure valour, nor his Innocence
Preuail'd in her deliverance, her offence
Would still the same be counted, for whose ill
The Land was threatned by the Oracle.

(A.L., 388-94)

Perseus, as a true lover, is above such concerns. He is,
in fact, dead, "for he dies that loues." Closely following
Ficino's argument,68 Chapman maintains that the lover no
longer conscious of himself because "his every thought,/ (Himself forgot) in his belou'd is wrought" (A.L., 401-02),
can no longer properly be said to exist. Since the primary
function of mind is consciousness, the mind that is un-
conscious of itself does not exist, function and existence
being synonymous. As Chapman phrases it, "For, these two
are in man joynt properties,/ To worke and be; for Being
can be neuer/ But Operation, is combined euery" (A.L., 408-
10). Therefore, no true lover is alive because he exists
only in the object of his love—"whosoeuer is in loue, is
dead." Such a selfless lover as this hesitates not a whit
to kill monsters since he has nothing to lose.

The noble deed done, Chapman returns to his de-
scription of the condition of reciprocal love. Even though
the individual lover must be considered as dead in himself,
the loss is not fatal, for he recovers himself in the loved
one: "Louve did both confer/ To one in both: himselfe in
her he found,/ She with her selfe, in onely him was crownd
..." (A.L., 454-56). Ficino explains the process as exemplifying the difference between the power of love and the power of Mars:

It is in this that the power of Cupid differs from the force of Mars; indeed it is in this way that military power and love differ: the general possesses others through himself; the lover takes possession of himself through another, and the farther each of the lovers is from himself, the nearer he is to the other, and though he is dead in himself, he comes to life again in the other.69

It is this unity out of opposites that love has wrought in Perseus and Andromeda:

O gaine, beyond which no desire can craue,
When two are so made one, that either is
For one made two, and doubled as in this:
Who one life had: one interuenient death
Makes him distinctly draw a two fold breath:
In mutuall Loue the wrecake most just is found,
When each so kill that each cure others wound. . .
(A.L., 480-86)

The succeeding passage includes the description of the person who frustrates procreation as a "Homicide," which Miss Bartlett takes to be a justification of Lady Frances' divorce and, thereby, the raison d'être of the poem. It is difficult to avoid seeing here an allusion to the Essex marriage, but the emphasis of the passage is on the impending union of Perseus and Andromeda. The offspring of Venus and Mars was Harmony and, as the narrative comes to a close, Perseus places the focus of attention on the product of their union:
All morall good defectiu is, and fraile;  
Vnlesse in place of things, on point to faile,  
We daily new beget. That things innate  
May last, the languishing we re'create:  
In generation, re'creation is,  
And from the prosecution of this  
Man his instinct of generation takes.  
Since generation, in continuance, makes  
Mortals, similitudes, of powers diuine,  
Diuine worth doth in generation shine.  

(A.L., 499-508)

Thus as the main poem ends with "admired Nuptialls" and "the  
rere banquet, that fore ranne the Bed," the epithalamion  
song picks up the generation motif,

O you this kingdoms glory that shall be  
Parents to so renownd a Progenie  
As earth shall emuie, and heauen glory in,  
Accept of their liues threds, which Fates shal spin  
Their true spoke oracle, and liue to see  
Your sonnes sonnes enter such a Progenie,  
As to the last times of the world shall last. ...  

(A.L., 431-37)

While the nuptial act, the supreme concordia discors,  
"which only two makes one" (596), is consummated, the pros- 
ppect of their "Progenie" remains at the forefront of atten- 
tion through the iterated refrain, Haste you that guide the  
web, haste spindles haste. Chapman's manipulation of the  
myth again parallels the Venus-Mars story with the implied  
fruit of the union: Harmonia est concordia discors.  

The reasons that Chapman had for using the vehicle  
of the Mars-Venus allegory to honor the Somerset wedding  
are not difficult to guess. Beyond his own basic allegiance  
to the concordia discors conception of harmony, this par- 
ticular myth was a favorite one for a nuptial occasion.
Erwin Panofsky has discussed the Titian painting called the "Allegory of the Marquis d'Avalos" as a visualization of a newly-wed couple in the guise of Venus and Mars. The "Venus" of the painting holds on her lap a glass sphere indicative of harmony. This painting, Panofsky notes, set a style for marriage portraits, inspiring a host of imitations. Don Cameron Allen has remarked that astrologers believed the conjunction of Mars and Venus to be a favorable date for the wedding ceremony. Firk in The Shoemakers' Holiday exclaims, "Is he married? God give him joy; I am glad of it. They have a fair day, and the sign is in a good planet, Mars in Venus" (V, ii, 134-37). The whole treatment of the marriage union as a concordia discors probably owes still more of its impetus to parts of the Symposium, some of which have not yet been mentioned. Aristophanes' myth of the Androgyne, the round, double man that, severed by an angry god, continually seeks to reunite its parts, provides another fanciful explanation for the marital urge. So Donne, hoping to form the small world of flesh, asks his mistress, "Where can we finde two better hemispheres?"

With good reasons, personal and conventional, for using the occasion to exemplify the reconciliation of opposites, it remains to be asked why Chapman did not employ the Mars-Venus legend directly rather than through a typological variation. The answer comes readily enough once the question is formulated: The particular circumstances of this wedding render the desired myth sufficiently
inappropriate that a substitute must be used. Chapman's loyalties in this marital triangle lay with the Somersets; it is his task to make their case as sympathetic as possible, which conversely means that Chapman's presentation will hold no brief for Essex. That the poet accomplished his purpose perhaps too successfully is evidenced by the "Justification of Andromeda Liberata," wherein he is forced to disclaim any intention of allegorizing Essex in the form of the "barraine Rocke" to which Andromeda is chained. Disingenuously the poet's mouthpiece, Theodines, protests: "As if that could applied be to a Man?/ O barraine Malice! was it euer sayd/ A man was barraine?" (122-24).

While the Renaissance mythographers, interested primarily in utilizing the harmony of opposites implicit in the Venus-Mars affair, tend to isolate this phase of the goddess' life from the context of the whole, they doubtless were aware of the more discordant passages as well. The tradition which emphasizes the fact of her marriage to Vulcan casts a somewhat different light on her passion for Mars. Panofsky has argued, on the basis of evidence in Hesiod and Pausanias, that the earliest version treated Mars as the legitimate husband of Venus and should take precedence over the account given by Homer, wherein Vulcan is cuckolded by Venus and Mars.73 Whichever legend was the original, it is obvious that whenever Vulcan is allowed to enter a narration of the romance with Mars,
contradictory suggestions of discord arise. Chapman would have been particularly sensitive to the problem at this time, since when writing *Andromeda* he certainly must have been engaged in his translation of the *Odyssey* which was published later the same year with a dedication to Somerset.

Homer records that "Vulcan" (as Chapman translates it), upon becoming aware of the intrigue, contrived a net with which to ensnare the lovers; the next time they violated his bed he trapped them in the very act of intercourse and called in the other gods to witness the shameful scene. This account admits a number of uncomfortably close parallels to the Essex-Somerset relationship. Adultery as the provocation of a ribald public scandal calls attention to unsavory features of the scandal surrounding the Essex divorce. Lady Frances' attachment to Somerset was open enough before the suit to provoke talk, and this was later intensified by her action of marrying Somerset with her hair unbound, the conventional token of virginity. Moreover, Frances' suit on the ground of Essex's alleged impotence provides an even more sensational parallel to Vulcan's situation, for Vulcan's lameness is the cause of his own cuckoldry. Chapman translates Vulcan's complaint to the gods:

*Come and witnesse, how, when still I step from home (Lame that I am) Jove's daughter doth professe*
To do me all the shamefull offices,  
Indignities, despitcs, that can be thought;  
And loves this all-things-making-come-to-nought  
Since he is faire forsooth, foote sound, and I  
Tooke in my braine a little, leg'd awrie—  
And no fault mine, but all my parents' fault  
Who should not get, if mocke me with my halt.  
(Odysse, VIII, 428-37)

The lameness is clearly regarded as affecting Vulcan's masculinity and it takes no great stretch of the imagination to see lameness as an impotency symbol; Vulcan's disability would have been subject to such an interpretation by Renaissance audiences.

The themes of scandal, adultery, and impotence in the Venus-Vulcan myth not only bear too close a resemblance to the facts of the Essex embroglio, but their treatment in Homer is designed to provoke sympathetic reactions directly contrary to the ones Chapman would desire. Mars and Venus are exposed to the gaze and humor of the male deities—"No She-Deitie,/ For shame, would show there." All of the Gods, "Gave length to laughers; all rejoyc't to see/ That, which they said that no impietie/ Finds good successe at th' end" (VIII, 456-58).

And this is that which growes  
To greatest justice, that Adulterie's sport,  
Obtain'd by craft, by craft of other sort  
(And lame craft too) is plagu'd—which grieves the more  
That sound lims turning lame the lame restore.  
(VIII, 461-65)

In Chapman's words, Vulcan is a "good king," whose bed is "defile[d]" by the "mixture" of the lovers. Vulcan's own dismissal of Venus serves as the operative judgment:
"She's faire, but was no maide" (VIII, 449).

However, by using the Perseus-Andromeda myth in place of Venus-Mars, Chapman is able to recast the same situation in terms favorable to the lovers. The adultery factor is eliminated entirely and the scandal and impotency motifs are so altered as to shift sympathy from injured husband to courageous lovers. The inanimate personification of a "barraine Rocke" does not elicit the moral response demanded by the pathos of the crippled god; similarly, when Venus the promiscuous and lascivious wife is unencumbered by marital ties, Chapman is free to treat her as Venere Celeste rather than Venere Vulgare, so she emerges as Andromeda, the "pious virgin." The Andromeda myth allows Chapman to present Lady Frances as the epitome of innocence and nobility, the recipient of the sympathy that in the original had been accorded to Vulcan, as the public scandal is transformed from the just censure of Venus' peers to the malicious envy of Andromeda's inferiors.

The shifting of sympathy extends to Mars-Perseus as well as Venus-Andromeda. In the detached Mars-Venus story he is the culmination of manly virtues, but the Mars of the Vulcan episode is something of a laughing-stock. His virility is no match for Vulcan's "shrewd mind"; the spectators of his humiliation comment humorously on the irony implicit in Mars' defeat: "The slow outgoes the swift. Lame Vulcan, knowne/ To be the slowest of the Gods, outgoes/ Mars the
most swift" (VIII, 459-61). Perseus, on the other hand, as the hero of a quest-romance with a dragon-killing theme, appears as a significantly English kind of hero, for—as Northrop Frye has observed—the Perseus myth conforms to the typology of England's own St. George legend.\(^77\)

Therefore, by substituting the Perseus-Andromeda story while at the same time using it as a Mars-Venus story, Chapman is enabled to utilize the desired implications of the latter and to dissociate the undesirable associations, in the process of which he reinterprets the salient features of the public scandal to the advantage of the Somersets on this, the occasion of their harmonious union.

III

The similarity of Perseus to St. George suggests the final level of meaning to be explored in the poem, that of political allegory. When Somerset is lauded poetically as hero and savior, this praise can be translated in practical terms into the only realm of action in which Somerset's accomplishment was notable. As in Spenser's version of the St. George myth where the savior appears as Redcross Knight, it is impossible to ignore the political implications.\(^78\)

In the conception of the nature of things as a sequence of corresponding planes, the state or political body is a microcosm constructed on the same principles as
the smaller microcosm of man; since the state is only an organized group of men, the composition could in no way differ from part to whole. In each, harmony is established through the orderly apportioning of the parts. Chapman's preference for the harmony resulting from the reconciliation of opposites predicates his theory of political organization, but the native factiousness of politics caused many of his contemporaries as well to envision the state as a concordia discors maintained by a ruler god-like in his wisdom. Bacon's essay, "Of Empire," is illuminating:

To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. But it is one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian asked him, What was Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could touch and tune the harp well, but in government sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is that nothing destroyeth authority so much as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.79

The image of the leader tuning the instrument of state is employed impartially by Puritan and Royalist alike. Marvell writes in honor of the "First Anniversary of the Government under Cromwell": "Such was that wondrous Order and Consent/ When Cromwell tun'd the ruling Instrument."80 Will Davenant, having survived the regimes of both Stewart and Cromwell, feels qualified to offer good advice to Charles II, in a "Poem to the Kings most Sacred Majesty":
You keep with prudent arts of watchful care
Divided Sects from a conjunctive War;
And when unfriendly Zeal from Zeal dissents,
Look on it like the War of Elements;
And, God-like, an harmonious World create
Out of the various discords of your State. 81

In each of these formulations the ruler functions as the
overriding agent that controls the balance of parts. The
republican theory of mixed and balanced government reduces
the ruler to simply one of the contrarieties, 82 but even
with this reemphasis, the operative theory of government
as a concordia discors remains the same.

The use of the Mars-Venus myth to illustrate such a
theory of political organization may be found in that
fountainhead of concordia discors poems, Denham's Cooper's
Hill, in which Windsor Hill is represented as the place
"where Mars with Venus dwells/ Beauty with strength. . . ."
Earl Wasserman argues that the reference is not merely a
conventional compliment to Charles and Henrietta Maria,
but a significant and integral part of the dialectic of
concordia discors that provides structure and meaning for
the whole. The rhetorical function of the poem, Wasserman
finds, "... is as much to caution Charles both against
tyranny and against too benevolently yielding up his royal
prerogative to the demands of Parliament, lest the public
assume all power, as it is to caution the populace against
excessive demands lest they drive the monarch to tyranny."
Within this rhetorical scheme Windsor Hill, the dwelling
place of Mars and Venus, is a... symbolic of the polit-ico-cosmic harmony arising from the proper tension of strength and beauty, war and religion, severity and kind-ness... From the structure of the whole gradually appears a full statement of political philosophy:

Harmoniously competitive government can come about only in such a mixed form as England's parlia-
mentary monarchy, whose structure has been symbolically elaborated in the description of Windsor, and whose activities are represented in the description of the Thames. Its basic form is the wedding of two contending factors, but one can also detect the harmonious tension of such a government by observing that no one power runs to excess and that therefore it must be held in check by some assumed opposition. 83

To turn from seventeenth century political theory in general to concerns immediate to Chapman's poem, one discovers that James I, among others, conceived his duty as king to be the maintenance of a harmony of opposing ele-
ments in the body politic. The union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland, a subject of intense concern to James at the beginning of his reign, reveals the same turn of mind. James' parliamentary speeches on the Union employ the inevitable marriage metaphor: "What God hath con-
joyned then let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife." And again, "Union is a Marriage." 84 Indeed, marriage was such a natural meta-
phor for the political union that Ben Jonson took this as the theme for the allegory of his masque, Hymenaei, which--ironically enough--celebrated the wedding of the Earl of
Essex and Frances Howard, a union of political factions expected to be dynastic in result. Beyond the obvious reconciliation of dissident factions and the microcosmic symbolizing of universal harmony, "Hymenaei" is a dramatic and symbolic representation of the Union of the Kingdoms as it was conceived in the propaganda issued by men who had the approval of the king himself." D. J. Gordon interprets the multi-layered symbolism as basic to Jonson's conception of the genre:

To relate present occasions to sublime and removed mysteries, to link Whitehall, the marriage of the Earl of Essex with Frances Howard, James and his cherished plan to the union of man, the universe and God: this for Jonson was the art of the Masque. Rarely has it been so ingeniously exemplified as in Hymenaei, where the altar that meets the curious eyes of the spectators becomes the nodal point on which the lines that connect the universe converge.85

Jonson's sense of decorum must have been outraged by the course of the Essex marriage, for Lady Frances' second marital venture inspired no similar outburst of poetic craftsmanship. Jonson produced two masques for the Somerset wedding, A Challenge at Tilt and The Irish Masque, the latter of which explains James' failure to establish harmony thus far:

This is that James of which long since thou sung'st, Should end our countries' most unnatural broils; And if her ear, they deafened with the drum, Would stoop but to the music of his peace, She need not with the spheres change harmony.86

But neither entertainment contains anything like the sustained and complex allegory of Hymenaei. On this occasion
it is left to Chapman to elucidate the various corresponding phases of unity that are symbolized in the marriage.

The importance of the possible political realignment indicated by the marriage of Somerset to a Howard must have been obvious in court circles. Robert Carr had accompanied James from Scotland in the capacity of a page and for a dozen years was the king's favorite: Carr was knighted in 1607; against strong protest James insisted on presenting him with Raleigh's estate in 1609; he was the first Scot placed by James in the House of Lords; and upon the death of Salisbury he became James' Secretary, conducting all of the King's correspondence. It was at this time, 1612, that the affair with Frances Howard began. For several years Somerset must have been one of the most influential men in England; he reached the position of Lord Chamberlain and Keeper of the Privy Seal before the combination of George Villiers' rising favor and the disclosure of the Overbury murder unhorsed him in 1615. For her part Frances was the daughter of Thomas Howard, Earl of Suffolk, future Commissioner of the Treasury, and grand-niece of Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, Commissioner of the Treasury in 1612, and leader of the Catholic political faction. Northampton personally played a considerable role in manipulating the Somerset marriage. The alliance, then, is between James' most influential courtier, a protestant Scotsman, and the leadership of the Catholic political
group, which was dedicated to a pro-Spanish foreign policy.

James' equivocal foreign policies extended to the use of his children as counters. Upon the death of Prince Henry in 1612 the choice of a wife for Charles became of pressing importance. James had married his daughter Elizabeth to Frederick V, a German protestant; no doubt thinking to harmonize the distribution of his children by balancing opposites, he determined to marry Charles to a Catholic, either Spanish or French. The Howard family supported the Spanish cause. Somerset personally seems to have had no strong convictions about the matrimonial alliance at this stage, although Sir Thomas Overbury, who functioned as the "intelligence" of Somerset's sphere, as a matter of policy in Somerset's personal advancement, did not want his man committed to such an alliance, and—belatedly realizing the significance of a Howard marriage—opposed the match on this account. It probably cost him his life.

The Somerset wedding took place, December 26, 1613. In the same month it had been discovered that a number of persons highly placed in James' court (among them Frances Howard's mother) had been receiving pensions from the Spanish government for furthering a pro-Spanish policy. Somerset, who had received no pension, remained in high favor with James; but in January Somerset quarreled with
the leading advocates of a French alliance, becoming an open supporter of the Spanish marriage. Northampton, pushing toward a Spanish alliance, managed to instigate a quarrel between the king and the House of Commons, resulting in the dissolution of the Addled Parliament on June 7. Northampton died June 15, and thereafter Somerset was the leading advocate of Spanish policy, receiving in July, 1615, permission to conduct a marriage treaty. Before the treaty could be effected, however, the story of Overbury's murder came to light in September, effectively ending Somerset's career.

The entry in the transcript of the Stationer's Register for Chapman's poem is revealing:

Laurence Lyle Entred for his Coppie vnder the handes of the Duke of Lennox, the earle of Sulfolke, the earle of Marr, Sir Julius Caesar, Master warden ffeild and master Adames a booke called Perseus and Andromeda, by George Chapman. (16 Martii 1613 [16])

Suffolk was, of course, Frances Howard's father and Caesar was a member of the commission that granted the marriage nullity. Andromeda Liberata was subscribed by the Howard faction.

Despite its title the poem shows full awareness of the primary importance of Somerset in the alliance. Perseus is described as "the man that next to Joue comptrold/ The triple world; got with a shoure of gold ... " (A.L., 217-18). In view of the facts this hardly seems hyperbole; next to James, Somerset may well have been the ruler of
the "triple world"—Great Britain and Ireland—and he almost literally was begotten with a "shoure of gold" (though here Chapman could scarcely have intended the immediate association—the possession of Raleigh's estate was something of an embarrassment). Perseus is "Joues sonne" and—by extension—Somerset is James'.

The importance of James in the poem becomes increasingly evident as Chapman explains the source of Perseus' strength, "... of Joue he wann'e/ A power past all men els ..." (A.L., 380-81). Perseus is the minister who imposes the order willed by Jove; their relationship is that of God the Creator and His Son, who becomes the instrument of God's will to restore the proper order. Here the typological similarity of Perseus to Christ is significant. Somerset, transformed to harmony in this marriage uniting contrary political elements, will be the means of enacting James' plan of peace and harmony through concordia discors on a national, if not international, level. Puns and word similarities suggested to Donne the mysterious correspondences between all things, and the role of James in the scheme of Chapman's allegory is enlarged by the probable play upon Joue and Loue. As it is Jove who creates Perseus and endows him with extraordinary power, it is Love that motivates Perseus to complete himself through Andromeda and slay the monster that is disorder personified.
If in one sense the poem celebrates the wisdom and benevolence of James, who is the cause of all things political and whose design comes to fruition in the person of Somerset, it is also advice of the "Mirror for Magistrates" sort for Somerset. The dedication recommends to Somerset policy that steers a middle ground befitting a temperate ruler: "... true Policie/ Windes like a serpent, through all Empery,/ Her folds on both sides bounded, like a flood/ With high shores listed ..." (d.e., 87-90). Reason, the regent of the soul, Chapman proposes, will bring order to the chaotic, natural, political state:

Peace, Concord, Order, Stay proclaim'd, and Law
And none commanding, if not all in Awe,
Passion, and Anger, made to vnder lie,
And heere concludes, mans mortall Monarchie
In which, your Lordships milde Soule sits so hie
Yet cares so little to be seene, or heard,
That in the good thereof, her scope is Sphear'd.
(d.e., 145-51)

Chapman is well aware that the concord he envisions as resulting from Somerset's policies is only potential, as his emphasis on generation and the forthcoming "Progenie/
As earth shall enuie, and heauen glory in ..." suggests. The Apodosis looks beyond the day of Somerset's favor and bids "you, that Perseus place supply/ In our Joues loue, get Persean victorie/ Of our Land Whale ..." (610-12). Somerset's successors may order their policies on the pattern of concordia discors which produced the harmony celebrated in the poem.
It is futile to speculate on Chapman's naiveté or credulity in writing a poem in support of Somerset and a Spanish alliance; his continued loyalty to Somerset eliminates simple greed as a motive." It is perhaps sufficient in itself that he wrote a poem embodying his conception of the harmonious order of all things, exemplified through the principle of *concordia discors* on three corresponding levels--individual, governmental, and cosmic--by adapting platonic mythology to suit the particular circumstances of the occasion of his allegory. The substitution of the Perseus-Andromeda myth is both practically strategic and theoretically valid--theoretically in that it exemplifies as clearly as Venus-Mars the Empedoclean theory of according opposites. By establishing the substitution within the context of the poem Chapman is able to en fuse the substitute type with the greater flexibility and established connotative range of the Venus-Mars type, especially in relation to the microcosmic harmony of the wedding and the macrocosmic harmony of the lovers' planetary correspondents. The interrelated cosmic and aesthetic assumptions of *concordia discors* hereby determine structure and meaning even in a situation wherein the conventional vehicle of the allegory will not harmonize with the tenor.
NOTES

1Quoted by Bertram Dobell, "Newly Discovered Documents of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Period," The Athenaeum, III (April 6, 1901), 433.

2See Muriel Bradbrook, The School of Night (Cambridge, 1936).

3Corpus autem umbram animi, imaginemque videmus; itaque ex eius imagine suspicantes in corpore formoso speciosum esse animum confectamur." Ficino's Commentary, ed. Sears Jayne, VI, xi, 94; trans., p. 204. Divorced from the platonic system the theory was, of course, an Elizabethan commonplace. Carroll Camden has documented the popularity of the sciences of physiognomy and metoposcopy. See "The Mind's Construction in the Face," in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hardin Craig, ed. Baldwin Maxwell et al. (Stanford, 1941), pp. 208-20; also his The Elizabethan Woman (Houston, 1952), p. 23.


5Sypher, p. 55.

6Sypher, p. 58.

7Sypher, p. 57.

8Sypher, p. 57.


"Among Philosophers, Pythagoras seems to have played the leading part; which was long after continued by his disciples, and the Italick School. The philosophy of Plato, and most of the Platonists abounds in numeral considerations: above all, Philo the learned Jew, hath acted this part even to superstition: bestowing divers pages in summing up everything, which might advantage this number." Pseudodoxia Epidemica: or Enquiries Into very many Received Tenents and commonly presumed Truths (6th ed.; London, 1672), IV, xii, p. 245.
A similar treatment of marriage as emblematic of harmony can be seen in Chapman's "A Hymne to Hymen for the Most Time-Fitted Nuptialis of our thrice gratious Princesse Elizabeth."

Gordon, pp. 76-77.


Jayne, Ficino's Commentary, I, iv, p. 130; Latin, p. 40.

Jayne, Commentary, V, v, p. 171; Latin, pp. 69-70. See also De Vita, III, xvii.


William Austin, Haec Homo: Wherein the Excellency of the Creation of Woman is described; by Way of an Essay (London, 1639), pp. 75-6.


It is interesting in this context that the word, mixt, carried a secondary denotation of sexual union (see NED). Chapman utilizes the word in this sense in his
translation of the Odyssey: "She mixt with Neptune in his hollow caues" (I, 123).


25 Chapman's notes indicate that the Epigramma de Viro Bono is translated from the edition with commentary by Todocus Badius Ascensius (see Bartlett, p. 447).

26 It is relevant that Picino regarded goodness or God the single center of everything, while beauty, the radiance of divine goodness, is in four circles--Mind, Soul, Nature, and Matter--which continually revolve about the single center. Commentary, II, iii, pp. 44-46; trans. 135-37.

27 Jayne, Commentary, II, ii, p. 134; Latin, p. 43.


29 Gordon, p. 70.


35 In view of Hieatt's exposition of the Spenser poem one might stress further similarities in the employment of number symbolism, though Spenser's elaborate and subtle structure, of course, far transcends Chapman's few, gnomic references.


40 Epistle to Royden, prefixed to Ovid's Banquet.


42 The emphasis on "Hieroglyphickes" is helpful in placing Chapman in the platonic intellectual milieu. See George Boas' introduction to The Hieroglyphicks of Horapollo and Fraunce, quoted above.


44 Bush, Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition, p. 32.


48 The prose "Argument" of the poem is, as Miss Bartlett notes in her text, translated directly from portions of Comes' chapters. See "De Andromeda" (VIII, xxvi), and "De Perseo" (VII, xviii), Mythologiae sive explicationis fabularum libri decem (Geneva, 1632), pp. 804-08, 929-31.

See *Ficino's Commentary*, V, vii, p. 72; trans., p. 175.

See Merrill and Clements, *Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry* (New York, 1957), p. 169, for the parentage of Eros and Anteros. Ben Jonson treats the two as identical twins, one of whom ministers to male, the other female, lovers, in *A Challenge At Tilt*, a masque performed for the Somerset nuptials.

Puttenham, p. 51.


Miss Bartlett prints line 302, "For when in heau'ns blunt *Angels* shines his flames," with no textual note, but Allen, *Star-Crossed Renaissance* (p. 175), prints angles, following the Swinburne edition.

Jayne, *Commentary*, V, viii, pp. 176-77; Latin, p. 73.


In my exposition of this allegory I am much indebted to the discussion by Edgar Wind, "Virtue Reconciled With Pleasure," *Pagan Mysteries*, pp. 78-88.

See Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (New York, 1939), p. 163, n. 120.

See Schoell, pp. 197-245 for Chapman's use of the *Moralia*. 
Translated by Wind, *Pagan Mysteries*, p. 82.


Wind, p. 87.

Jayne, *Commentary*, V, viii, p. 177; Latin, p. 73.

Wind discusses these paintings, *Pagan Mysteries*, pp. 84-85.


Jayne, II, viii, p. 145; Latin, pp. 50-51.


Allen, *Star-Crossed Renaissance*, p. 175.


Panofsky, *Iconology*, pp. 163-64.


Abraham Fraunce, commenting in *Amintas Dale* upon the thigh wound of Adonis, allegorizes it as a nature-fertility myth, while taking for granted the sexual implications:

"By Adonis is meant the sunne, by Venus, the upper hemisphere of the earth (as by Proserpina the lower); by the boare, winter: by the death of Adonis, the absence of the sunne for the sixe wintrie moneths; all which time, the earth lamenteth: Adonis is wounded in those parts, which are the instruments of propogation: for, in winter the son seemeth impotent, and the earth barren: neither that being able to get, nor this to beare either fruit or blowres. . . ."


Actually, the productiveness of Essex's second marriage would seem a de facto proof that the impotency charge was false. The divorce commission decided in favor of Lady Frances only after James intervened by "stacking" the committee.


87 For the facts in the following account I have relied on Gardiner, *History of England . . . , 1607-1616*, vol. 2, 166-86 and 304-63, and the *DNB* articles on the persons involved.

89 Cf. Frye, "The ritual analogies of the myth suggest that the monster is the sterility of the land itself. . . ." *Anatomy*, p. 189.

90 Norma Dobie Solve, *Stuart Politics in Chapman's Tragedy of Chabot*, University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, IV (Ann Arbor, 1928), demonstrates the consistency of Chapman's adherence to Somerset's cause. Most scholars accept Solve's explication of Chabot as an allegory of the Somerset affair, though the date of the play remains unsettled. Recently, Irving Ribner has argued that Chabot dates from 1612 or 1613 and was rewritten sometime after 1621 by Shirley and Chapman in order to make it reflect the Somerset affair. See "The Meaning of Chapman's Tragedy of Chabot," *MLR*, LV (1960), 321-31.
CHAPTER III

EDWARD, LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY

Although Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, unquestionably was aware of the astronomical advances occurring in his lifetime, the metaphysical significance of discoveries pertaining to the true nature of the physical universe seems to have escaped him. Ernst Cassirer has reminded us that in three consecutive years Galileo, Herbert, and Grotius published works describing the laws of nature, the religion of nature, and the rights of nature;\(^1\) but Herbert, at least, was unconscious of the fact that Galileo's work had any implications relevant to his own. One cannot determine whether Herbert's platonism prevented him from reacting negatively—as did his friend Donne—to the implications of Galileo's discoveries,\(^2\) or if, more simply, he never troubled to think through the implications. In either event Herbert's neutrality on the question points again to the fact that it was necessary for Descartes to formulate the philosophical issues raised by Galileo's work before they became obvious to the seventeenth century. The example of Henry More perhaps indicates this most clearly: Galileo's *Dialogue* inspired More to renovate his cosmological preoccupations to the extent described in *Psychathanasia*, but he needed Descartes' *Principia* to push
him into the commitment to infinity described in Democritus Platonissans.

It is true that Herbert touches upon the infinity of space incidentally in De Veritate and he does so in a way that has been construed as an acceptance of the modern position. In his analysis of Herbert's "common notions" or universal characteristics of religion, Basil Willey has explained:

The attributes of Omnipotence and of Liberty are questioned by some, but that of Infinity, Herbert thinks, is proved "by the infinity of space, which God surpasses as comprising all things, for the common notion teaches us that God is above and beyond all things." The notion of the infinity of space, first celebrated in the previous century by Bruno, was of course an essential part of the new world-picture which, in our period, was replacing the Ptolemaic.3

Herbert does not discuss the infinity of space as such but only as it is pertinent to a consideration of God's attributes. His only extensive discussion of infinity occurs in the chapter, "On Possibility":

When you have left the womb of this lower world, will you not attain what you formerly conceived as ideal? On this journey you will first encounter the blue which is commonly supposed to be the ceiling of heaven; but this is ignorance. For in reality it consists of the most refined region of the air which appears to be this colour owing to its distance, as experts in optics tell us. When you have passed through this tract you will discover that the stars have been created not merely to sparkle, but to be new worlds. And at last, to prolong the account no further, the infinite itself will unfold. What reaches and illimitable depths may there not be in the infinite? You may gain some idea of them by reflecting that there is no number which can fill or empty it. It cannot be
increased by addition or diminished by subtrac-
tion, but at one moment passes into the Nature
which is its own, at another returns to infinity.
At every point it is identical, and occupies no
space nor is limited by any boundary. Conse-
quently whatever the expanse into which our souls
may emerge, masters of themselves, when this life
is over, the infinite will increase rather than
diminish. What need is there, then, to confine
the reward or punishment of souls which depart
this life to any narrow dwelling when you contem-
plate the infinite? It is true that a small urn
holds our ashes, but the whole visible world can-
not afterwards comprehend the soul, and in view of
its sublime nature it may be the only object we do
not comprehend in this world. The authors may
therefore be right in holding that there is ample
opportunity for rewards and punishments in the in-
finte, and in maintaining that so far from the in-
finte being capable of any addition, it extends
to, and reaches, every point of space. In short
everything we can imagine exists in the infinite,
and everything beyond this. God is beyond all
things, and alone independent of all. He tran-
scends transcendence, and fills, informs and en-
compasses the infinite itself in the vastness of
His unity.4

The beginning of this passage might easily lead
Willey to believe that Herbert accepts the concept of in-
finte space, has been led from the new astronomy to ad-
vocacy of the new world-picture. The reference to "experts
in optics" makes it appear that Herbert has progressed
from the Sidereus Nuncius to a conscious formulation of a
theory of infinite space. Indeed the assertion that "the
stars have been created not merely to sparkle, but to be
new worlds" would seem to align Herbert with Bruno and the
Henry More of Democritus Platonissans. Yet Herbert's dis-
cussion of "the infinite" counteracts the initial impression.
He explains: "At every point it [the infinite] is
identical, and occupies no space nor is limited by any boundary." If the infinite occupies no space, it does not affect material extension; therefore, Herbert is describing, as the remainder of the passage clearly reveals, a theological infinity. "The infinite" is an expression of God's supreme transcendence—a description strictly of His attributes, not of His creation. It is relevant to remember the medieval conception of space does not make provision for the boundless immensity of extension containing the solar and stellar systems. Such a notion is necessarily post-Galileo. To the medieval, space denoted either duration or position, the dimension necessary to contain a given body. Thus when Herbert says that the infinite "occupies no space" and that it extends to and reaches "every point of space" he is using space in the medieval, not the modern, sense. The specific passage which Willey translates is probably taken from the earlier chapter, "Common Notions Concerning Religion." There Carré has translated:

In addition to these qualities there are certain attributes, such as Infinity, Omnipotence and Liberty, concerning which I find there is much difference of opinion. But His infinity is proved by the infinity of position or space.²

The qualification "of position" radically alters the meaning of the phrase Willey translates "infinity of space." Willey works from the 1639 French version of De Veritate of which Carré comments:
This version (which was probably made by Mersenne) is indispensable for the labour of elucidating Herbert's strange Latin. But a comparison of it with the original text proved it to be defective and inaccurate, omitting some passages and offering in others interpretations rather than translations of the author's words. Moreover, it had the disadvantage of being based on an early edition of De Veritate; for to the 1645 edition... Herbert added some significant paragraphs.6

Since the 1645 Latin edition was the last prepared by Herbert, it necessarily stands as the final statement of his convictions. Therefore, Willey possibly has been misled by the corrupt text into reading Herbert as a proponent of the infinity of space. Herbert's careless remark that the stars have been created to be new worlds shows a familiarity and perhaps uncritical acceptance of Bruno's theories,7 but Herbert seems not to have grasped the import of those theories. Whenever he refers to space in this context he uses the word in the scholastic fashion. Infinity is a quality of God for Herbert and not, so far as one can discern, a description of the physical universe. Since it was scarcely new at this time to describe God by means of his infinity, Willey's inference that Herbert accepts the infinity of space and associates it with God is untenable.

It is apparent from the poetry that Herbert's values and beliefs were not threatened by the changing cosmological picture. There are comparatively few references to celestial phenomena of any sort in the poems, and those which
do occur are conventional staples of petrarchanism or an invocation of microcosm-macrocosm:

Shoot out in light, and shine those rays on far,  
Those much more fair than in the Queen of Love  
When she doth comb her in her sphere above,  
And from a planet turns a blazing star.  
(Upon Combing Her Hair," 5-9)

Let timely kisses call to life again  
Him whom thy eyes have planet-strucken dead.  
("Why dost thou hate return . . ."  
19-20)

This said, in her uplifted face,  
Her eyes which did that beauty crown,  
Were like two stars, that having fall’n down,  
Look up again to find their place;  
("An Ode Upon A Question Moved,"  
133-136)

Leave then thy country soil and mother’s home,  
Wander a planet this way.  
("La Gialletta Gallante," 25-26)

Very occasionally he will use cosmological imagery in such a way as to reveal some acquaintance with his subject.  
The "Elegy For Doctor Donne" develops a more detailed comparison:

But since praise that wants truth, like words that want  
Their proper meaning, doth itself recant,  
Such terms, however elevate and high,  
Are but like meteors, which the pregnant sky  
They either be by some dark cloud o’ercast,  
Or, wanting inward sustenance, do devolve,  
And into their first elements resolve.  
(15-22)

And in one instance he parades his erudition by annotating the line, "When, more than meteors, they stars create,"  
("Meditation Upon His Wax Candle Burning Out," l. 34) with the explanation, "In the constellation of Cassiopeia, 1572."
The first of these allusions reveals a "handbook" knowledge of Renaissance meteorological lore and the second a familiarity with recent science, but neither explores the implications of cosmological discoveries. In the same fashion the few references to "the infinite" in the poems (e.g. "To Her Hair," l. 24, "Meditation Upon His Candle," l. 53) exhibit none of the tensions and extensions predictable in a serious reader of Bruno. Thus, the poetry only substantiates the impression derived from De Veritate: Herbert was superficially aware of developments engendered by the emergent status of astronomy as an exact science, but the significance of these developments remained hidden to him. Therefore, he found no need to reevaluate his aesthetic standards.

II

"Beauty," John Donne tells us in a great aesthetic and cosmological document, "that's colour, and proportion." Herbert, drawing upon the same traditionalist context for his theory, more elaborately offers the same theory. Signor Rossi has printed a manuscript fragment somewhat misleadingly entitled, "The new Philosophy of Beauty"; in this document Herbert sketches a general outline:

Beauty consists in Proportion and is defined by number & Proportion of the parts.

Proportion is 3fold, there is Proportion of Colavour, Figure or signature, Order.
Incomplete though the essay is, Herbert's remarks are nonetheless valuable for depicting some basic attitudes. "Because Beauty is the most visible part of knowledge," Herbert states (Knowledge emphasizing the connection of Beauty with epistemology in the pre- Shaftesbury--Baumgarten era, rather than taste), "I will beginne at the most visible part of beauty, whch \textit{sic} is Collour."

Herbert apparently regards color as proportional in the sense that a balance is maintained between extremes or opposites through which a \textit{concordia discors} is achieved. It is difficult to state his opinion with complete assurance because his writing on this point is extremely obscure:

I say then that Collour is nearly proportionall and hath his calme light and the \textit{Phaenomenon} of the sky and like it consists more in \textit{white and blew}, then white and red, only as light shows it selfe and \textit{others also}, so Beauty. . . .10

He is not dogmatic about the particular quality of the color since the beauty is established through the balance, the mediation between extremes. Herbert explains, "Now as these are the first and essential parts of Beauty, so is the variation of them infinite. Since collour, for wee doe not exclude red, is amended with blushinge. . . ."11

The reference to red is indicative of his aversion to the primary colors, which, of course, being extremes partake by nature of a disproportion which must be tempered--red amended to the blush of pink. Thus, white, despite its
traditionally favorable associations with goodness, the light of God, and the sun, lacking the harmony of parts, is not considered beautiful by Herbert:

In colour the white is not always the fairest for then the sapphire were more Beautiful then the Diamonde, the white must have somewhat in it of the Orientall and ferne, like the orientall stones. It seems that Collour having somewhat in it of Temper hath that way in it much of Proportion for there is difference betweene paleness and whiteness.¹²

Conversely, the strictures about the imperfect beauty of the color white explain in large part the attraction which black has for Herbert, and suggest the metaphysical implications of the color, especially as it is treated in the important sequence of poems devoted to "Black," which will be considered in detail elsewhere. Unlike the favored blends of chromatic colors, which consist of a simple harmony of paired opposites, Black encompasses all colors in a symmetrical harmony. It is perfectly proportional, consisting of the Many drawn together into the One, and therefore reflects something of the nature of God. Herbert reveals this conviction when, in the poem, "To Her Hair," he muses on the powers of blackness and asks:

Is it because past black there is not found
A fix'd or horizontal bound,
And so, as it doth terminate the white,
It may be said all colours to enfold,
And in that kind to hold
Somewhat of infinite? (19-24)

The next aspect of Beauty to be considered is figure, in which Herbert shifts from an aesthetic to a
utilitarian standard. A thing is beautiful in accordance with how well its figure conforms to its purpose:

... we find a particular Signature fitt for Plants, another for living and moving Creatures, and in them, that the figure of a ___ had not bene a fitt figure for a horse, nor the figure of a Dogge wch was as well fitt to catch the Hare as to fight with the Lyon. ..."13

The argument is circular: the nature of a creature or thing should determine its form, but it is the form that reveals the nature to us. "In this part of Beauty consists a great deale of understanding since the figure of evry thing may give an estimate of the use of it. ..." Yet even in this functionalist context Herbert tries to analyze Beauty in terms of his organizing schema; figure "consists in a 3fold proportion according to the Genus, Species, and Individu. ..."14

Herbert's third criterion, the beauty of Order, suggests at the same time his acceptance of the harmonious vision of creation as adumbrated in the chain of being and his belief in the analogy of corresponding planes—the macrocosm of heaven and the microcosm of man:

By it [Beauty of Order], wee find man to bee the Mediû proportionale betweene Heaven and Earth the visible and invisible Beings, By the Beauty of Order wee find that as man was the nakedest of Creatures, it was fitt hee should bee the wisest as well as the Creatures whereof hee should make use to bee the most obedient wch wee see in sheepe oxen horses etc.15

Proportion is maintained by the correctness of the order of parts in the whole creation while man as "Mediû
proportionale between Heaven and Earth suggests the innumerable proportional resemblances Renaissance man was so willing to detect between the Many (as represented by himself) and the One. Carre's critique of De Veritate has called attention to the importance that the theory of correspondence has in Herbert's philosophic system, explaining that, while in part the idea derives from Christian doctrine, it stems primarily from neoplatonic and cabbalistic sources. He states:

It conceived the Universe as an infinite series of corresponding elements. Every item mirrored its counterpart; affinities pervaded all phenomena. The Universe is in fact an organism in which all natural processes harmonise and sympathise with each other. This cosmology was the sixteenth-century interpretation of the systematic order of Nature; it accounted for the continuity of things in a manner which modified the Scholastic assumption of God's direct Providence. In particular this belief in a preestablished harmony of events was applied to the relations between man and the world. Man is the epitome of the Universe. His body and mind form a microcosm in which are reflected all the elements of nature and the spiritual realm.  

Herbert uses extensively the correspondence of microcosm and macrocosm in De Veritate. In discussing the faculties of perception he employs it to explain emotional response. Noting man's instinctive fear of the serpent despite its external similarity to familiar creatures such as eels and lampreys:

It is reasonable to suppose that his fear is not due to the common differences with which of course he is already acquainted, but to some influence of the form itself. It reveals itself through these
emotions, both for external and internal apprehensions by some secret analogy. We can distinguish this serpent from other animals and we perceive that we are frightened by it because of the common nature of things or the law of correspondence between man and the world as a whole.\textsuperscript{17}

Like Lear, Herbert detects a correspondence between the passions of man and nature:

I may add something concerning the analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm, a subject of which recent writers have notably treated, especially in medical matters. We may notice that the agitations of passion, anger, suspicion, envy, etc., which are rebuked as evil by conscience when it is in due conformity, are analogous to that region in which hurricanes, whirlwinds, and meteors rage; only they fall upon the body instead of upon the earth when they are set in motion. Some affections, further, are relegated to a position lower than mind but above the humours. Man should not find this any more extraordinary in his own case than in the macrocosm.\textsuperscript{18}

In his analysis of truth Herbert arrives at the belief that truth consists of a correspondence between the subjective mental faculty and the object upon which the mind is directed. This relationship he expresses in terms of microcosm and macrocosm:

\ldots as I have often observed, it is only our intellectual faculties which possess objects which are both particular and common. They form an analogy between God and the world and between the mind and the body. And so our mind clearly corresponds to God and our body to the world, and the principles of all the differences in the world are inscribed in man. From this follows my proposition that the number of differences in the faculties corresponds to the number of differences in things, provided that the latter are distinguished by some principle of individuation. So our spiritual intellectual faculties are readily adapted to the divine attributes and our bodily faculties with bodily ones whenever the
conditions of conformity are present. I hold, then, that the entire order of things is represented in the humours or elements of the microcosm and that they produce their effects whether they enter by physical generation, or food, or by the air we breathe. And when they have been concentrated in the body, that is to say, in a unity, they act upon their particular objects through their sympathies and antipathies and are also at the same time acted upon by them, so that, according to their changing activity, different feelings arise in us.\footnote{19}

Ultimately, then, Herbert's epistemology is a theory of innate ideas, with unmistakable platonic origins. Carré explains:

In Herbert's hands, in fact, sixteenth-century theosophy provokes a unique account of knowledge. Every movement of experience includes a mental counterpart of the objective features of the experience. These mental correlates are activities; for what is mental is never passive. They are not, therefore, psychological impressions resulting from the influence of the object on the sensitive mind. The theory is a representative theory of perception in a peculiar sense. No doubt the faculties are sometimes said to be altered or affected by objects. But it is clear that what is meant by such expressions is that the presence of objects is normally required in order that faculties should be "aroused" or "awakened." The faculties are conceived as existing in a latent form in the mind, and the usual description is that they "unfold" or "expand" when the appropriate object is present.\footnote{20}

Disharmony between the two components is error; when the proportional relationship of parts—"conformity"—is established, truth is the result. Truth itself is a matter of a proportional relationship of parts in corresponding planes—the correct faculty responds to the appropriate object. It would not be wrong to say that, for Herbert, truth as the harmony of the perceptive faculty
with extra-mental object is a matter of intellectual beauty, being based upon a scheme of proportion as firmly as he analyzes all visible beauty from the same criteria. Here, in a very real sense, "Beauty is truth, and truth beauty" with no ambiguity involved.

The originality of Herbert's epistemological speculations in *De Veritate* lies in the systematic persistence with which he pursues the platonic conception of mental harmony in its ramifications, rather than in the basic conception. The same is true of the related aesthetic theory in which it is Herbert's particular application of harmony achieved through proper proportioning that makes his proportional aesthetic interesting. His concept differs from Donne's remark only in that Herbert subsumes color, too, under the all-embracing standard of proportion and, of course, by no means is the concept unique to them at this time. Sir Henry Wotton, in his *Elements of Architecture* (1624), remarks that beauty consists in a

... secret harmony in the Proportion. This lead me to contemplate the Fabrique of our owne Bodies wherein the High Architect of the World had displaied such skill, as did stupifie all human reason.21

Referring to the visual arts, Ben Jonson approvingly comments: "Picture took her faining from Poetry; from Geometry her rule, compasse, lines, proportion, and the whole Symmetry."20 Yet the fact is that these men are advocating traditional theory that even at this time is
being undermined by the inroads of baroque sensibility. Donne, aware of the changing nature of things to an extent that Herbert was not, deplored the fact that, "All their proportion's lame, it sinks, it swells," but Bacon cast his lot with the new, declaring, "There is no excellent beauty that hath not some strangeness in the proportion." Jonson's conception of painting is brusquely dismissed by the educational reformer:

A man cannot tell whether Appeles or Albert Durer were the more trifler; whereof the one would make a personage by geometrical proportions; the other, by taking the best parts out of divers faces, to make one excellent. Such personages, I think, would please nobody but the painter that made them.23

It is perhaps only appropriate that Bacon, advanced in so many areas of thought, should be an adherent of the new aesthetic theory as well.

Since order and proportion are central to Herbert's whole mode of thought, as well as his specifically aesthetically-oriented writing, a reader might properly expect to find these aesthetic standards invoked in the poetry, and he would not suffer disappointment. "A Description" is an anatomical catalogue of a beautiful lady, conceived in such strict accord with the microcosm-macrocosm analogy that Herbert feels obliged to footnote his usage (Μίκρόκόσμος μεγάλοκόσμος). The poem begins:
I sing her worth and praises high,
Of whom a poet cannot lie.
The little world the great shall blaze:
Sea, earth her body; heaven her face . . .
(1-4)

and thereafter the analogy is worked out with rigorous
consistency, if not entirely fortunate results. Since
"Her each brow a celestial bow,/ Which through this sky
her light doth show," her nose has to be "th' equator of
this globe,/ Where nakedness, beauty's best robe,/ Presents
a form all hearts to win." He is platonist enough, how-
ever, that he cannot resist subordinating the whole face
in proper proportion to the first cause:

In this celestial frontispiece,
Where happiness eternal lies,
First arranged stand three senses,
This heaven's intelligences,
Whose several motions, sweet combin'd
Come from the first mover, her mind.
(31-36)

Progressing to her body, Herbert employs the con-
vention of describing the human microcosm in terms of
geographical resemblances, a device frequently utilized
by Donne, who envisioned his naked mistress as "O my
America! my new-found-land" ("Elegy 19"), and himself on
his deathbed as a "map" for his physicians who "by their
love are grown/ Cosmographers" ("Hymn to God, My God, In
My Sickness"). Herbert's analogies indicate rather clearly
that he was concentrating on the ingenuity of the whole
correspondence rather than the propriety of any particular
detail. Hence, "The weight of this harmonic sphere
"The Atlas of her neck doth bear," and her thighs become the straits of Gibraltar:

Two alabaster pillars stand,  
To warn all passage from that land;  
At foot whereof engraved is  
The sad Non ultra of man's bliss.  

(57-60)

When he is unable to arrive at a geocosmic analogy, he substitutes purely geometrical forms—"Her waist's an invers'd pyramis/ Upon whose cone love's trophy is." Elsewhere man—or, more correctly, woman—as microcosm is employed, again trivially as in the puzzle poem, "A Vision," in which a lady combing her hair is pictured:

Within an open curled sea of gold,  
A bark of ivory one day I saw,  
Which striking with his oars did seem to draw  
Tow'ards a fair coast which I then did behold. . . .  

(1-4)

The poem continues for five more stanzas exhibiting the same shallow cleverness.

Occasionally, though, Herbert uses the device more seriously. "The First Meeting," a poem in which the imagery indicates associations with the "black" sequence, describes the affinity of the souls of two lovers, a theme certainly well-known to Herbert from tradition and, contemporaneously, from Donne's verse. The poet recounts the effect of the meeting upon him, and figures his resolution through the loadstone metaphor:
Only as we in loadstones find
Virtue of such a kind
That what they once do give,
B'ing neither to be chang'd by any clime
Or forc'd by time,
Doth ever in its subjects live. . . .
(61-66)

Herbert's familiarity with the properties and behavior of the loadstone, of course, stems from William Gilbert, of whom Dryden wrote, "Gilbert shall live till loadstones cease to draw," and from Gilbert's great work, _De Magnete_ (1600). In the _De Magnete_ Gilbert constructs his entire consideration of the subject around the framework of the microcosm-macrocosm analogy. The loadstone to Gilbert is a terrella, a little earth, and the magnetic force of the great loadstone, of which the terrella is a vastly reduced reproduction, is no more than the _anima mundi_ itself. "The Magnetic Force," Gilbert writes, "is Animate, or Imitates a Soul; in many Respects it Surpasses the Human Soul while that is United to an Organic Body." Thus, Herbert has in the loadstone a prefabricated platonic metaphor. Herbert has already implicitly associated the lady analogically with the One through stressing her "blackness" ("sable cloud," l. 1, "black hair," l. 6, "your hair, night's hemisphere," l. 60); now he is able to extend a pretty compliment by making the association explicit through the meanings attached to the loadstone. The compliment is extended further and the precise impact of this meeting on the poet defined by means, not of emphasis
simply on the loadstone itself, but the virtue of the loadstone. Gilbert writes:

... the loadstone possesses the actions peculiar to the globe, of attraction, polarity, revolution, of taking positions in the universe according to the law of the whole; it contains the supreme excellences of the globe and orders them: all this in token and proof a certain eminent combination and of a most accordant nature. ... The loadstone far surpasses all other bodies around us in the virtues and properties that pertain to the common mother of us all.26

"Only as we in loadstones find/ Virtue of such a kind" connotes, then, not only the magnetic force in the lady, which is as the soul of the world to the soul of the individual, but that virtue contains and orders "the supreme excellences" of the globe and establishes relationships in accordance with the law of the universe. Moreover, the virtue of this magnetic power once given is immutable. The poem concludes with an expression of the relationship in terms strongly reminiscent of the compass image of Donne's "A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning":

So though I be from you retir'd,
The power you gave yet still abides,
And my soul ever so guides,
By your magnetic touch inspir'd,
That all it moves or is inclin'd
Comes from the motions of your mind.

(67-72)

Indeed, Herbert's verses do not suffer drastically by the comparison in that Donne's famous touchstone of "metaphysical wit" is mechanically appropriate only. The "stiff, twin compasses" is a striking comparison
superficially, but by utilizing the implications of pre-established platonic associations, Herbert is able to make his loadstone's behavior appropriate conceptually and thematically as well as visually. Moreover, by concluding with the thought, "That all it moves or is inclin'd/ Comes from the motions of your mind," Herbert re-establishes the overall perspective. The lady's soul is geocosm to his microcosm, herself in scaled harmony with the large One on which her mind is patterned. The entire poem is a subtle and effective variation of the platonic doctrine that the lover progresses to appreciation of heavenly beauty by means of earthly beauty. The perfection of the soul of God is as much larger than the lady's as hers is to the poet's; yet harmony with the intermediary can only imply ultimate harmony.

If the microcosm-macrocosm analogy is a means by which Herbert can provide a structural order in a poem, when he expressly remarks on beauty in the course of a poem Herbert invariably praises the proper ordering of parts or symmetry. In addressing a poem, "To Her Body," he rhapsodizes:

Oh! how can I
Enough admire that symmetry, express'd
In new proportions, which doth give the lie
To that arithmetic which hath profess'd
All numbers to be hers?

(7-11)

The ambiguity of numbers, implying as it does both verses
of music and numerical units, refers implicitly to the
Pythagorean theory which attempted to systematize an
explanation for the differences of sounds with a mathe-
matical explanation of the movements of celestial bodies
and which received its finest expression in the Timaeus. 27
It comes, then, as no surprise to have Herbert conclude
by commenting on the derivation of the harmony of the
microcosm from the macrocosm:

Thy Harmony
Comes from the spheres, and there doth prove
Strange measures so well grac'd, as majesty
Itself like thee would rest, like thee would move.
(11-14)

"To Mistress Diana Cecil" reiterates the same thought in
almost the same words; when Herbert wishes to analyze any
singular beauty he can only determine that the harmony of
parts is so subtly balanced that a "new" perfection in
proportion has been achieved:

Nor is that symmetry of parts and form divine
Made of one vulgar line,
Or such as any know how to define,
But of proportions new, so well express'd,
That the perfections in each part confess'd
Are beauties to themselves and to the rest.
(13-18)

Here is perhaps an intimation that the old aesthetic
standard sows the seeds which grow into its own successor.
Herbert's admiration for "proportions new," which ap-
parently are attained by an increasing refinement of a
static ideal, finally precludes satisfaction of the desire
for novelty. The novelty can most easily be attained by
a change of emphasis: from Herbert's desire to refine the old proportions into new ones to Bacon's substitution of "strangeness" for "newness" in the proportions.

Herbert, however, is oblivious to the implicit contradictions in his standard of beauty; one could not expect otherwise for, as De Veritate reveals, the concept of proportion is not merely an aesthetic standard for Herbert, but he sees reality as a hierarchy of corresponding parts. In the satire, "The State Progress of Ill," he asserts, "State a proportion'd colour'd table is," and this conception of the state in terms of proportion leads him to a curiously democratic position. When one views the state as a picture, the artist's treatment of perspective initially produces a distorted impression on the beholder:

Nobility, the master-piece, in this
Serves to show distances, while being put
'Twixt sight and vastness they seem higher but
As they're further off.

(82-85)

In actuality this seeming elevation of the nobility serves only as "blue hills" would in the border of a painting and should not usurp attention from the more important parts. To an "Exalted spirit," fully aware of the deceptions of the "painter's art," "All in the frame is equal" (96). Moreover, such an exalted soul easily recognizes other distortions of earthly perspective and knows, for instance, that "honours are/ Figures compos'd of lines irregular"
(99-100). The platonic homogeneity of thought is rather strikingly illustrated by a mind that perceives both beauty and intangible values as figures composed of regular lines. Socrates, who once demonstrated the theory of reminiscence by eliciting from an ignorant slave boy the fact that a square erected on the hypotenuse of a right isosceles triangle contains twice the area of a square erected on either of the other sides, would surely have approved.

Given a propensity for conceiving values in images of geometrical figures, it is not unexpected to find Herbert setting high value on the figure universally conceded to illustrate the most perfectly regular symmetry of line—the circle. 28 "To a Lady Who Did Sing Excellently" celebrates both the beauty of the lady's song and the lady's person; Herbert chooses the metaphor of the harmony of the spheres to bear the dual concept of aural and visual harmony. Here, again, he employs the hyperbole of describing the lady as the Prime Mover or One, opening the poem with an image of the lady as Creator, breathing form and life into chaos:

When our rude and unfashion'd words, that long
A being in their elements enjoy'd,
Senseless and void,
Come at last to be formed by thy tongue,
And from thy breath receive that life and place,
And perfect grace.

(1-6)
The poet inverts a familiar Pythagorean theme, that of the individual soul as musical instrument attuned with the harmony of the spheres, to imagine the "rude and un-fashion'd words" as "Tun'd by thy soul, dismiss'd into the air,/ To us repair,/ A living, moving, and harmonious noise" (12-14), continuing the established role of the lady as First Cause of musical harmony. The initial description of the lady's creation of song in terms of the creation of the world, insofar as it allows a visual image to form, permits an image of the world shaped into globe or sphere, and behind the "living, moving, harmonious noise" of her song lies the harmony of the spheres and the whole scheme of ptolemaic cosmology. The praise of the song consistently implies images of circles; when Herbert turns to description of the lady's visible presence he allows the potential image to be realized in physical description, which, of course, only mirrors the image of her soul:

When again all these rare perfections meet,
Composed in the circle of thy face,
As in their place,
So to make up of all one perfect sweet. . . .

Herbert uses a similar scheme in the first of two poems entitled, "Platonic Love." The poem is cast in the form of a direct address to a beautiful lady, first reproving her for the damaging effects of her beauty, then admitting the benefits, "The virtuous habits you infuse" in suitors.
He concludes the proposition by urging her, an angel in
a "starry orb," to descend "unto this orb" that she might
improve man even further:

Do not refuse then, madam, to appear,
Since every radiant beam comes from your sphere
Can so much more than any else endear,
As while through them we do discern each grace,
The multiplied lights from every place
Will turn, and circle, with their rays, your face.
(25-30)

As in "A Description" the face is a "harmonic sphere";
here, like the Ficinian conception of Eros, the "radiant
beam" that comes from her sphere raises up that which is
below it. However, here the conception of Eros is short-
circuited into a pattern that is only mutually reciprocal,
rather than endlessly reciprocal through the chain of
being. The magnetic force ennobles the lovers, but, in-
stead of passing through them to effect the next stage in
the hierarchy of being, the force is pictured as turning
back upon itself in glorification of the lady's beauty,
encircling the circle of her face with the rays of their
adoration.

"A Meditation Upon His Wax Candle Burning Out,"
reveals a belief in the idea that man's soul, once in
harmony with heaven, passes into a condition of discord
during his mundane existence, and is reharmonized through
death. The theory was most frequently expressed through
the topos of soul as a musical instrument. Milton's "At
A Solemn Music" gives the idea a Christian dressing;
regarding Original Sin as the cause of discord, he prays:

That we on Earth with undiscovering voice  
May rightly answer that melodious noise;  
As once we did, till disproportion'd sin  
Jarr'd against nature's chime, and with harsh din  
Broke the fair music that all creatures made  
To their great Lord, whose love their motion sway'd  
In perfect Diapason, whilst they stood  
In first obedience and their state of good.  
(17-24)

Herbert states the belief directly without recourse to the  
music analogy and his assignment of causes is strictly  
platonic. The disharmony is simply the descent of the  
soul into this tenement of clay, the unfortunate event  
which so mortified Plotinus that, Porphyry records, he  
could not be induced to discuss the matter and, conse-  
quently, never revealed his place of birth. Herbert's  
"Meditation" upon the consumption of the burning candle  
leads him to speculate on the souls of men departing their  
odies, "Til they with all their faculties do reach/ Unto  
that place from whence at first they came." (23-4). Lest  
anyone fear that the separation is unjust to the body,  
Herbert explains:

Nor need they fear thus to be thought unkind  
To those poor carcasses they leave behind,  
Since, being in unequal parts commix'd,  
Each in his element their place will get;  
And who thought elements unhappy yet,  
As long as they were in their stations fix'd?

Man can never attain real harmony in this world since his  
very existence here is a condition of "unequal parts com-  
mix'd." Donne's exaltation of the body with the argument
that, "Else a great Prince in prison lies," is answered directly by the platonist Herbert:

Hear, from my body's prison, this my call,  
Who from my mouth-grate and eye-window bawl.  
("To His Mistress for her True Picture," 141-2)

Of course, just as any earthly beauty is only a shadow of the Divine Beauty, proportion or harmony, the measure of beauty, in this world can never equal the Heavenly harmony. The platonist's simultaneous attitudes toward the material world—on the one hand, his contempt for anything but the reality of ideas, and, on the other, the "ladder of love," the theory that appreciation of corporeal beauties leads by stages to appreciation of the divine—are no doubt as logically contradictory and untenable as Lovejoy finds his conceptions of God. People are seldom logical about irrational matters. Platonists frequently solve this inherent ambivalence about the material world simply by admitting only one attitude at a time. Usually Herbert is content with the hierarchical vision of the material world since it involves him with the process of becoming and, if Herbert would not necessarily agree with Yeats that we cannot know the dancer from the dance, certainly for him spiritual advancement promises spiritual fulfillment.

Herbert most often expresses the possible harmony in these terms: regularity of line or form, as in the perfect symmetry of the circle, or the orderly correspondence
of parts, the state as a proportioned table. The latter form is offered in still another variant in "An Ode Upon a Question Moved," in which:

The well-accorded birds did sing
Their hymns unto the pleasant time,
And in a sweet consorted chime
Did welcome in the cheerful Spring;

To which soft whistles of the wind,
And warbling murmurs of a brook,
And vari'd notes of leaves that shook,
An harmony of parts did bind...

(5-12)

These are the most persistent modes of describing harmony or proportion to be encountered in Herbert's verse; yet, though it appears less frequently, he is not averse to the concordia discors formula. The Pythagorean theory of musical and cosmic harmony is, of course, in a sense inseparable from the concordia discors conception; but when Herbert deals with either musical harmony or the harmony of the spheres he treats it as a ready-made harmonic unit and does not emphasize the reconciliation of opposites that it involved. In a few poems, though, the harmonious whole wrought of antithetical elements is treated directly.

The sonnet, "Made Upon the Groves Near Merlou Castle," in its distaste for extremes is reminiscent of Herbert's strictures upon primary colors in the aesthetic treatise, which, of course, derive from a concordia discors color theory. He commends the setting.
You well-compacted groves, whose light and shade,
Mix'd equally, produce nor heat nor cold,
Either to burn the young or freeze the old,
But to one even temper being made,
Upon a green embroidering through each glade
An airy silver and a sunny gold,
So clothe the poorest that they do behold
Themselves in riches which can never fade.

The reconciliation of opposites is linked with the perfect
circle in the poem addressed, "To the C of D," in which
the woman's face is like a "Beauteous sphere." Within the
sphere of the face discordant qualities are balanced in a
harmonious mean which itself produces a reaction of bal-
anced oppositions in the beholder, knowing as he does
that face is but mirror of soul:

Delight and state so sweetly mix'd appear
That love's not light, nor gravity severe,
All your attractive graces seem to draw
A modest rigour keepeth so in awe,
That in their turn each of them gives the law.

Elaborating on the intellectual possibilities opened by
his initial procedure, Herbert develops as a structure for
the poem the tensions and resolutions of carefully bal-
anced oppositions. He imagines the woman possessing
"desire," which he qualifies as "chaste and virtuous"; the
desire is counterbalanced by the "native mildness" of her
nature, against which it must aspire "Until a just regard
it doth acquire." Once love has generated, he instructs,
it is necessary that the projected "forward hope" (of his
sexual desire, presumably) be tempered by means of her
"sweet neglect," which will then harmonize the conflicting
chaste and carnal impulses of love, "Convert it straight
to reverend respect." The excellence of her "rare temper"
in so acting upon and transforming his love is itself the
result of the beneficial concord between those most basic
opponents, body and soul, which, though opposites, work
together and reflect one another:

Thus, as in your rare temper, we may find
An excellence so perfect in each kind,
That a fair body hath a fairer mind. . . .
(13-15)

The concatenation beginning with "fair body" and extending
in a direct causal relationship to the effect her mind has
upon his mind is organized in a rigorous formal pattern
which could extend as far as the poet wished: one "extreme"
quality or condition is opposed to another and the two
combined produce a satisfactory median; but each "extreme"
is itself the result of such a merger and each resolution
may in turn serve as one of the extremes of a new oppo-
sition. Having begun with the visible mixture of delight
and state in the woman's face, Herbert examines her mind,
virtue, and love, his love and the effect of her and hers
upon him, ending with a proclamation that she affects and
reforms, not only his love, but mind and virtue as well:

So all the beams you diversely do dart,
As well on th' understanding as the heart,
Of love and honour equal cause impart.
(16-18)
In "The Brown Beauty" preoccupation with the *concordia discors* theme induces Herbert to violate his normal color values by treating black, habitually for him the ultimate color harmony, the gathering of the many into the one, as an extreme:

While the two contraries of black and white
In the brown Phaie are so well unite
That they no longer now seem opposite,
Who doubts but love hath this his colour chose,
Since he therein doth both th' extremes compose,
And as within their proper centre close?

(1-6)

The standard of excellence is explicit; brown is the chosen color of love because in it the extremes are composed. The poet condemns the partial and extreme conceptions of beauty particular to geographical extremes. Brown avoids "That whitely raw and unconcoted hue,/ Which beauty northern nations think the true" (8-9) as well as the opposite extreme which "The Moor and Indian so much affect." The conciliatory brown combines the qualities of each so "That each in other equal part doth bear,/ All in so rare proportion is combin'd . . ." (15-16). Moreover, this visual harmony of the woman's "outward form" is the external manifestation of "the fair temper which adorns her mind."

Having progressed from physical to mental coloration, Herbert compliments the woman for having the character of a trimmer—"quitting all extremes on either side,/ You more than any may be dignifi'd" (23-24)—presenting *concordia discors* as standard of beauty, object of love, model of disposition, and finally standard of conduct.
III

The only unusual feature of Herbert's aesthetic theory is his customary treatment of color in which application of his basic principle of proportion leads him to a scheme of color value contrary to the one traditionally accepted by both Christians and platonists. Ficino, in a letter to Cavalcanti, discusses the range of colors which may be refracted from the light of the sun. Characteristically, he arranges the diverse hues in a hierarchy of order and identifies them with the elements. At the bottom of the hierarchy, furthest from the light of divinity (splendor), is black, not simply the color of earth like the browns, but identified with pure matter. Don Cameron Allen tells us that for the sixteenth century Englishman black universally signified sorrow and mourning, with occasionally a specialized connotation such as disappointed or forsaken love. Ben Jonson utilized associations with black that were undoubtedly obvious and acceptable to his court audiences in the highly platonic Masque of Blacknesse (1605) and Masque of Beautie (1608). The first of these was devised at the request of Queen Anne in order that she and her ladies might have the opportunity of first disguising themselves as "Black-mores" before revealing the native hue of their beauty. This basic conception is in itself revelatory of the status assigned to black as a condition of beauty. The action of the two
masques involves the color transformation of twelve "Aethiopian Nymphs." Throughout Jonson's use of color is consistent with Ficino's: the lighter and brighter hues provide gradations of beauty and the fair coloration of the English ladies corresponds most completely to Ficino's splendor.

In his inversion of accepted color values, Herbert thus repudiates English tradition and platonic tradition, particularly immediate in Jonson's example. Warnke has suggested possible sources for Herbert's usage of black:

Herbert's attribution of mystical significance to black is probably derived from neo-platonic and early Christian sources, specifically from the De divinis nominibus and the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite, though similar views on blackness were held by thinkers as diverse as St. Bonaventure, Leone Ebreo, and St. John of the Cross. However, Warnke fails to provide substantiation for his ascription to Dionysius the Areopagite, and the other possible sources he names are so diverse and remote from Herbert that one can put little weight upon them. Moreover, there is a distinct difference between attaching a "mystical" significance to black and associating it with God or the One as Herbert does; thus, while both Herbert and John of the Cross attribute unusual significance to the color, one still does not find them treating it in anything like similar fashion.
Black is the only color on which Herbert dwells at any length or to which he assigns any unusual significance because it is the only one which can assimilate all the others. In this he parallels Ficino's use of the "primum in aliquo genere" doctrine. Ficino explains in *Theologia Platonica*:

The first in every genus is the cause of the whole genus. Whatever is the cause of the other members contains the succeeding members in itself. Whatever, therefore, is first in its genus lacks nothing of its genus. For example, if the sun is the first among the light-bearing things, it does not lack any degree of light. The other light-bearing things below it, like stars and elements, cannot receive the whole fullness of light. Since the first form contains all perfections of forms and so cannot be imperfect, that form which is called imperfect cannot be the first.  

Black fills the primary position of the genus given to splendor in Ficino's color scheme, but Herbert's does not seem to follow Ficino in arranging the "imperfect" colors in a hierarchy or order. For Ficino it is metaphysically necessary that brown be above black in this chain of being. Herbert is indifferent to the discordant colors and makes no attempt to order them. Brown sometimes meets his approval as a harmonious color ("The Brown Beauty" and "La Gialletta Gallante, Or the Sun-Burn'd Exotic Beauty"), but no other is singled out for particular attention. White, for instance, traditionally the symbol of purity, virtue, and innocence as well as the color of light, is mentioned approvingly in only one poem, "The Green-Sickness Beauty,"
and there the approval is accorded only because whiteness is an appropriate element in a larger scheme of harmony. The poet commends the young lady for the perfection of her form:

... like a statue of yourself, you stand
in such symmetric form as doth require
No lustre but his own.

(7-9)

Just as Herbert believes it would be foolish to mar the perfection of marble statues by adding "flesh-coloring"

So were it to your native white a stain,
If it in other ornaments were clad
Than what your rich proportions do give...

(11-13)

Clearly, Herbert disregards any connotative values of the color and considers it as simply a factor in the proportion of the whole figure, a factor which is correct in this particular circumstance.

Probably the most distinctive characteristic of Herbert's poetry is his continual movement from the concrete to the abstract; his poetic method might be described as the process of a "meditation" upon any given subject, leading him from the particular to the general through an analysis of the causes of the particular. In this sense the poems dealing with black constitute a "meditational sequence." The concrete and particular starting point of the sequence is indicated in the title of the first poem, "To Mistress Diana Cecil"; focusing his attention on the essential aspects of her beauty, the poet devotes the succeeding poems "To Her Eyes" and "To Her Hair." However,
just as his mind elements the essential qualities of her beauty from the whole, he separates the genus of the beauty from its particular manifestations in "Sonnet of Black Beauty" and completes his meditation with an examination of the final cause in the abstract with "Another Sonnet to Black Itself." This sequence is metaphysical in the literal sense of the word: Herbert analyzes a particular phenomenon to determine its constituents and traces its intermediate causes back to the first cause. More particularly, the metaphysic involved is the platonic doctrine of the ladder of love by which the individual is led by love, the desire for beauty, through the successive gradations of beauty (in this instance blackness in successive stages of immateriality) to God.40

"To Mistress Diana Cecil" first defines the lady's "rare beauty" as "Not of milk or snow/ Or such pale and whitely things do owe" (2-3). Consistent with Herbert's color aesthetic in rejecting the extreme of white, her beauty is a harmony suggesting a combination of several shades and colors, "an illustrious oriental bright,/ Like to the diamond's refracted light,"/ Or early morning breaking from the night" (4-6). "Oriental bright" carries connotations of the East and the region of the rising sun, which are made specific in line six with "early morning breaking," while, since the NED indicates that in Renaissance heraldry diamond was interchangeable with sable or black, line five introduces a suggestion of darkness that
becomes definite with the concordia discors image of "morning breaking from the night." The color movement of the first stanza from "milk or snow" to "diamond" and "night" anticipates the argument of the second stanza in which the poet elaborates on specific components of the beauty:

Nor is thy hair and eyes made of that ruddy beam
Or golden-sanded stream
Which we find still the vulgar poets' theme,
But reverend black, and such as you would say
Light did but serve it, and did show the way
By which at first night did precede the day.

(7-12)

The third stanza considers the form of her beauty, a symmetry of parts consisting of "proportions' new," and the poem ends with hyperbolic praise for Diana Cecil as a whole.

"To Her Eyes" returns to the theme of black beauty that occupied the poet's attention in the first half of "To Mistress Diana Cecil" and examines in detail one of the two specified color parts of her visible beauty. Herbert traces the effect of the eyes to its cause: "Black eyes, if you seem dark,/ It is because your beams are deep,/ And with your soul united keep" (1-3). The structure of the poem is entirely logical and intellectual. With the relationship of eyes and soul established, Herbert proposes that a sufficiently perceptive person might discern still another step in the chain of causality, beyond
the intermediary of mind, and determine the final source of "All the wonders which proceed from thence,/ Affecting more the mind than sense" (8-9), and which "Are not so much the works of light as influence" (10-11). Herbert uses "influence" in the sense of an emanation of a spiritual force, reinforcing his statement that the power of these eyes affects mind more than sense. Light itself is a sensory phenomenon and thereby more gross than the darkness emanating through the eyes. The second stanza fulfills the expectation aroused in the first, supplying the answer to the implied question:

As you then joined are
Unto the soul, so it again
By its connexion doth pertain
To that first cause. . . .

(12-15)

This first cause is itself hidden "Within the veil of an eternal night," and has framed this "second light" of the world only that it might "serve for ordinary sight."

The poem is developed with the exactitude of a syllogism. The first two stanzas state the minor premises, the relationship of black eyes to soul and soul to first cause, and the third stanza the major premise: "His image then you are." The unique quality of "reverend black" as the only color partaking of this totality of elements, which for Herbert is the essence of beauty and the One, is stressed in the last lines:
If there be any yet who doubt
What power it is that doth look out
Through that your black,
He will not an example lack,
If he suppose that there
Were grey or hazel glass,
And that through them though sight or soul might shine,
He must yet at the last define
That beams which pass
Through black cannot but be divine.

"To Her Hair" is in one sense a regression in the sequential ascent to Herbert's god of abstraction because the force of black is here derivative from the eyes—"Black beamy hairs, which so seem to arise/ From the extraction of those eyes . . . " (1-2). But an important progression is made through a more extensive analysis of the relationship between black and divinity than Herbert has attempted heretofore. The meaning of the poem is conveyed through a rather complicated structure of light imagery employing both the conventional platonic and the personal connotations of blackness. The poet opposes to the blackness that represents the infinity of God the blackness that is the sign of man's limits of comprehension, the spiritual condition inevitably resulting from the imperfect vision attainable in this imperfect world. The initial description "Black beamy hairs" stresses the connection between hair and eyes since into the hair "she destine-like doth spin/ The beams she spares, what time her soul retires,/ And by those hallow'd fires/ Keeps house all night within" (3-6). The platonist believed
sight to be the least mundane of the senses, consequently placing vision at the top of the sensory hierarchy, closest to reason. Vision is doubly important, however, because through vision love is generated. Ficino writes:

The appearance of a man, which because of an interior goodness graciously given him by God, is beautiful to see, frequently shoots a ray of his splendor, through the eyes of those looking at him, into their souls. Drawn by this spark like a fish on a hook, the souls hasten toward the one who is attracting them. This attraction, which is love, since it derives from the beautiful, good, and happy, and is attracted to the same things, we do not hesitate to call Goodness, Beauty, Blessedness, and a God, concurring in the judgment of Agathon and the rest of the previous speakers. But since it is in a soul which is already aroused through the presence of that beautiful ray, we are forced to call it a certain mean passion between beauty and the absence of beauty. Since the soul so long as it has received no image of a beautiful thing does not yet love that thing, which is still unknown, as it were; so also one who possesses the whole beauty is not vexed by the prickings of love. For who desires what he has?

This, then, is the origin of the "fatal rays" of the hair, afterwards brought "to vulgar light and praise." Yet it is the very blackness of the hair, the direct line to the One, which frustrates total apprehension on the part of the beholder. Attempting to ascertain the reasons for his failure the poet pleads, "Lighten through all your regions, till we find/ The causes why we are grown blind" (13-14) for, when he comprehends the glories of blackness, "Our sight recoils and turneth back again" (16). The answer he supplies is twofold, lying first in the nature of black:
Is it because past black there is not found
A fix'd or horizontal bound,
And so, as it doth terminate the white,
It may be said all colours to enfold,
And in that kind to hold
Somewhat of infinite?

(19-24)

And secondly in the limitations of his own perception:

Or is it that the centre of our sight
Being veiled in its proper night
Discerns your blackness by some other sense
Than that by which it doth pi'd colours see,
Which only therefore be
Known by their difference?

(25-30)

Upon expressing this lack of assurance in the dependability of his own visual faculty, which, even if it is not the agent through which he perceives the One, leaves him dependent on another "sense," Herbert ends the poem with a request for reassurance in the seeming validity of the black hairs' "reflected forms" that may make us know "That shining light in darkness all would find,/ Were they not upward blind/ With the sunbeams below" (34-36).

"Sonnet of Black Beauty" eliminates consideration of any particular manifestation of the conception and approaches it directly. Concerned with the ideal and not immediately with the communication of the ideal, Herbert can work out the problems of the preceding poem from the opposite end and in this way proceed with more confidence. Black beauty is "above that common light,/ Whose power can no colours here renew/ But those which darkness can
again subdued" (1-3). The significant fact about the ideal is its immutability, remaining "unvari'd to the sight," "neither chang'd with day, nor hid with night" (4,6). All the colors "which the world calls bright" will pass away leaving no trace of their existence, while black beauty endures:

Thou still abidest so entirely one,  
That we may know why blackness is a spark  
Of light inaccessible, and alone  
Our darkness which can make us think it dark.  
(11-14)

The phrase "alone/ Our darkness" means "it is only our darkness"; therefore, here Herbert is suggesting a solution to the problem of perception, stated in "To Her Hair," that is itself dependent on the inherent limitations of man in this world. The immutable impression of black beauty is caused by the fixed relationship of beauty and man's imperfect apprehension of this ideal through his senses; the darkness of a mind in which all absolutes are filtered through the senses results in perceiving inaccessible light as darkness.

"Another Sonnet to Black Itself" abstracts the meditation to the ultimate plane. Black is the infinite, the source and end of all color: "Thou Black, wherein all colours are compos'd,/ And unto which they all at last return" (1-2). It is the color of the sun's burning and the sun's absence, enclosing "Whatever Nature can, or hath dispos'd/ In any other hue" (5-6). This totality of
possibilities encompassed in blackness is what makes it analogous to the One, and causes Herbert to look upon it as an actual force or power—"when thou dost reign,/ The characters of fate shine in the skies,/ And tell us what the Heavens do ordain" (9-11). In the face of this recognition of the nature and power of black, Herbert is left with the paradox that the light of the world blinds man to the nature of the hereafter and it is only in blinding himself to the false light of the world that man can make of black a spark of light accessible.

By approaching the conventional aesthetics of proportion with relentless logic, Herbert arrives at a highly unorthodox color theory. If beauty consists in the correct apportioning of several parts, the principle of plenitude allows Herbert to reason that a "full" proportion makes the microcosmic beauty more nearly like the divine splendor of the real Beauty. The One is an infinite God and, therefore, the microcosm that is most inclusive of the Many, the refracted particularizations of the multiple facets of the One, provides the truest glimpse of the eternal pattern. At the same time the presentation of blackness—the color that subsumes all other "hues," thereby partaking of the infinite—as man's closest perception of the splendor of the divine countenance seems to imply that spiritual union with essence, while encumbered with the sensible world, the prison of the flesh, is a hopeless goal. If so, this
is in direct contradiction to the orthodox "ladder of love" platonism expressed in "The Idea," one of Herbert's last poems. In this poem "Fàir is the mark of Good, and foul of Íll" (25) and, through the attractiveness of the fair form in which the good is arrayed, one is led back to the origin of good and beauty: "You in them see so exact a line,/ That through each sev'r'al part a glimpse doth shine/ Of their original and form divine" (37-39). Like De Veritate, the "Black" sequence of poems paradoxically reveals Herbert as a man who becomes an original theorist by being overly conventional.
NOTES


2The question of Herbert's platonism has been subject to discussion. Mario Rossi, *La Vita, Le Opere, I Tempi* de Edoardo Herbert di Chirbury, 3 vols. (Firenze, 1947), minimizes the importance of neoplatonism for Herbert, emphasizing instead the eclecticism of his philosophic sources, and such neoplatonism as he admits in the poetry is, moreover, corrupt:

Ma vedemmo altresì che il platonismo di Herbert è in realtà neoplatonismo, è il neoplatonismo è ben più lontano da Platone che non sia lontano San Tommaso da Aristotile. E al neoplatonismo nelle forme più degeneri Herbert inclinò sempre, più nelle poesie che nella filosofia (I, 293).

This interpretation of Herbert's poetry as displaying only a veneer of fashionable platonism has been challenged by Frank J. Warnke, *This Metaphysical Lord: A Study of the Poetry of Herbert of Cherbury* (Columbia University dissertation, University Microfilms, 1954), who maintains that, while the philosophic sources of the *De Veritate* are extremely eclectic, "the philosophy of the poems is unified and, within its limits, coherent. It is a specifically neo-Platonic philosophy" (p. 153). He believes that "the neo-Platonic elements which occur in Herbert's philosophical works are those which are stressed in his poems" and that

... a developing pattern of Platonic thought may be perceived in Herbert's poetic work, a pattern which begins with the casual and conventional references of an early poem such as "I Must Depart," continues through a miniature dialogue such as the "Ode upon a Question moved, Whether Love should continue for ever," and concludes in a heavenly doctrinal exposition such as "The Idea." In the early period the references seem to be directly to Plato's works, but in the middle influence from the Platonist tradition as expressed in the writings of Plotinus and Ficino. In the last period the Platonism of Herbert takes on a very individual tone; it is largely the synthesis of a mature man to whom the doctrines have an importance which is personal and deeply felt rather than conventional and artifical (p. 154).
Considering the problems of establishing an indisputable chronology with a number of the poems, Warnke's "pattern" is probably overly schematized, but it seems undeniable that a general development on the order he describes can be perceived in the poems. To the charge that Herbert's platonism is superficial, "platonic love" trappings, one must answer that for a courtier-poet Herbert's compliments to earthly beauty leads him with surprising regularity to contemplation of the divine.


6Carré, p. 6.


8For contemporary theory on unstable meteors see S. K. Heninger, Jr., A Handbook of Renaissance Meteorology With Particular Reference to Elizabethan and Jacobean Literature (Durham, 1960), pp. 91-101.

9Rossi, "Appendice XVIII.—Una Nuova Estetica?", III, 442.

10Rossi, III, 442.

11Rossi, III, 443.

12Rossi, III, 443.

13Rossi, III, 442.
Rossi, III, 442.

Rossi, III, 442.

16 Carré, pp. 17-18. The conception was, of course, omnipresent in sixteenth and seventeenth century thought. See, for instance, C. A. Patrides, "The Microcosm of Man: Some References to a Commonplace" (N & Q, n.s. VII, 54-56), who quotes passages and lists appearances of the notion in over fifty prose works; see, also, Marjorie Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle (rev. ed., New York, 1960), pp. 11-46.

17 Carré, p. 111.

18 Carré, p. 171.

19 Carré, p. 169. More succinctly Herbert states: "The whole of my doctrine of truth is based upon the proper conformity of the faculties with their objects. Everyone will find various types of these in himself according to the various types of objects. Whatever is true, however, is readily believed, because here objects correspond harmoniously with faculties, and faculties with objects" (p. 80).


22 Ben Jonson, Timber, or Discoveries, ed. Ralph S. Walker (Syracuse, 1953), p. 34. It should be noted, however, that Jonson's greatest originality as a writer occurs in the area of prose comedy. According to the recent analysis of Jonas Barish, Jonson developed as a vehicle for satire a highly unique "baroque" prose style of which asymmetry is the predominant characteristic. See Ben Jonson and the Language of Prose Comedy (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 56 ff. Underlying Barish's discussion is the assumption that use of a baroque style implies a failure to perceive the world and oneself as a part of a harmonious, ordered cosmos (pp. 85-89). Regrettably Barish offers no comment on the highly ordered style of Jonson's poetry.

24 For the sake of clarity I adopt the terminology employed by Marjorie Nicolson to distinguish between man-world analogies (microcosm-geocosm) and man-universe analogies (microcosm-macrocosm). See The Breaking of the Circle, p. 28.


The lodestone confers upon iron a certain quality of its own by which the iron, made like the stone, is drawn to it. This attraction, inasmuch as it rises in the stone and attracts toward the stone, is said to be certainly the stone's attraction, but inasmuch as it is in the iron, it is equally the iron's and the stone's, for the magnetism is not in the pure matter of the iron, of course, but in the iron conditioned by the magnetism of the stone. Therefore, it includes the property of each (p. 183). Latin, p. 78.

26 Gilbert, Mottelay trans., p. 66.


28 See Nicolson, Breaking of the Circle, pp. 47-80.

29 See, for instance, Donne's "Hymne to God My God, In My Sickness":

Since I am comming to that Holy roome,
Where, with thy Quire of Saints for evermore,
I shall be made thy Musique; As I come
I tune the Instrument here at the dore,
And what I must doe then, thinke here before.


36. Jonson's early influence upon Herbert was direct and considerable. The verse satire, "Of Travellers: From Paris," dated three months before the performance of *Beautie*, is addressed to Jonson (Rossi, I, 125-126, considers the influence of Volpone upon this satire), while another verse of this period bears the title, "To his Friend, Ben Jonson, of his Horace Made English." Indeed, several of the early poems have obvious stylistic resemblances and verbal echoes of Jonson (e.g. "Ditty," l. three, "Keep time with my sad thoughts . . . ").

37. Warnke, p. 106. He also cites for comparison Browne's "Digression on Blacknese," Bk. VI, Ch. XII, of *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, and passages in *The Garden of Cyrus*, but these are not relevant. In his analysis of Chapman's *The Shadow of Night* Roy Battenhouse allies Herbert's use of black with Chapman's fondness for mystical darkness and night, and both of them with platonic doctrine. However, Battenhouse blurs important distinctions. He regards the Hermetic reverence for the darkness of pre-creation as platonic, but takes no account of the importance light holds in the schemes of Plotinus and Ficino. He lumps together Cusa's epistemological precept of learned
ignorance with the poetic doctrine of veiled mysteries. More important, by Battenhouse's reading "true Night" in Hymnus in Noctem is a condition of darkness preceding the illumination that is supplied by the moon of Hymnus in Cynthia. Blackness is not the end in itself as it is in Herbert. See "Chapman's The Shadow of Night: An Interpretation," SP, XXXVIII (1941), 584-608.

38 Trans. by Kristeller, Philosophy, p. 147.

39 This process might be described as analogous to that poetic technique which is the result of the application of the procedures of formal religious meditations to the writing of poetry. Louis L. Martz would seem to encourage such an application by his singling out as the fundamental element in the art of meditation a mental discipline dedicated to the act of pure concentration, which discipline he finds underlying even poems in which the threefold development of the Jesuit meditations is lacking. See The Poetry of Meditation: A Study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, 1954), esp. pp. 67-70 and 321-330. If Martz' assumptions concerning the religious poetry of George Herbert and Donne are correct, it would indeed be surprising for Edward Herbert not to be aware of the procedure.

40 See Kristeller, Philosophy, pp. 265-269. Merrill and Clements, Platonism in French Renaissance Poetry, p. 79 and p. 204, n. 1 and 2 cite the origins of the theory in Plato and Plotinus.

41 Herbert uses black both in schemes of color and schemes of light. As E. H. Gombrich has remarked in expounding the importance of visual imagery to platonists, color is a kind of light. "Icones Symbolicae: The Visual Image in Neo-Platonic Thought," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, XI (1948), 177.

42 This, of course, explains the significant role given to visual imagery in platonic art. Frank Kermode, "The Banquet of Sense," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 44 (1961), 68-99, has analyzed the relationship of the hierarchy of senses to the banquet of sense topos. See esp. pp. 68-79.

43 Trans. Jayne, Ficino's Commentary, p. 183; Latin, p. 79.
CHAPTER IV

HENRY MORE AND DESCARTES

The aesthetic dilemma which the new astronomy presented to the seventeenth century is neatly summarized in this exchange between Fontenelle's countess and her tutor:

You have made the Universe so large, said she, that I know not where I am, or what will become of me: What is it all to be divided into Heaps confusedly, one among another? Is every Star and the Center of a Vortex, as big as ours? Is that vast Space which comprehends our Suns and Planets but an inconsiderable part of the Universe? And are there as many such spaces, as there are fixed Stars? I protest it is dreadful. Dreadful, Madam, said I; I think it very pleasant: When the Heavens were a little blue Arch, stuck with Stars, methought the Universe was too strait and close; I was almost stifled for want of Air: but now it is enlarg'd in Height and Breadth, and a thousand and a thousand Vortices taken in, I begin to breathe with more freedom, And think the Universe to be incomparably more magnificent than it was before.1

These are the aesthetic alternatives which accompany the acceptance of Galileo's truth: the countess' feeling of dread, which earlier Donne had utilized as a somewhat conventionalized poetic melancholy, and the philosopher's everlasting yea, initiated by the messianic Bruno. It is worth noting that with Donne and Bruno, in each instance, the man's choice is predicated by his dominant metaphysical orientation. Donne, despite his occasionally strong platonic overtones, is fundamentally a traditional Christian of Anglo-Catholic persuasion. In Bruno, as the inquisitors
who condemned him to the stake justly concluded, a less orthodox brand of Christianity prevailed. Had Donne been more of a platonist, he would have accepted scientific advances as a good and necessary illumination of God's processes. Studies of intellectual history in recent years have dispelled an easy acceptance of the dominance of Aristotelianism and documented the inextricable relationship of platonism and science. In a pioneering work, Francis R. Johnson concluded:

We have discovered that the philosophical background of the chief scientists was predominantly Platonic, and that they emphasized the Pythagorean element in Platonism which sought to interpret nature in mathematical or quantitative terms and thus provided the philosophical sanction for the new experimental method. The mystical attitude which saw God as the great geometer and looked upon the mathematical harmonies to be found in the material world as direct revelations of the Deity, also had its roots in Platonism, and was the source of inspiration for the religious glorification of the new discoveries of science as manifestations of the wonderful workmanship of the Creator.²

Thus, for More, as a serious platonist, the dilemma is especially acute: the enlargement of the cosmos necessitates metaphysical reassessment and a corollary aesthetic adjustment. Since the form of the cosmos represents the mind of God, which is also the source of real beauty, it is all one problem. The expansion of the universe enables—or even forces—More to carry the principle of plenitude to its logical extreme by means of what Leibniz has called "the principle of sufficient reason," i.e., the argument that, God's goodness being unlimited, it is impossible
that he could have created only a limited good. Moreover, once the matter is seen in the proper light, unrestricted plenitude is not merely necessary and desirable but pleasing. Fontenelle's philosopher comments, "Nature hath spar'd no cost, even to profuseness; and nothing can be so glorious, as to see such a prodigious number of Vortexes, whose several Centres are possess'd by a particular Sun, which makes the very Planets turn round it."3

It may facilitate an understanding of More's position and alternatives to review briefly Bruno's role as the first man in the cosmic drama to state explicitly the essential infinitude of space.4 Bruno's De l'Infinito, Universo, e Mondo was written in 1584, significantly, some eight years after Tycho Brahe's discovery of a new star. Despite the logical possibility of an infinite universe, intimated by Bruno's precursor Nicholas of Cusa, the fact is that the theory was not unequivocally stated until after discernment of the physical expansion of the cosmos had undeniably begun. Bruno was not disturbed by the thought that Brahe had destroyed Copernicus' orbs as surely as he had Ptolemy's spheres for while the impetus for his philosophy came from such sources as Tycho's observations, the philosophy itself was derived from metaphysical speculation rather than astronomical observation. A. O. Lovejoy has observed:
... while he may have owed his interest in the question to the innovation of Copernicus, whose greatness he never tired of celebrating, it is certain that he was not led to his characteristic convictions by reflection upon the implications of the Copernican theory or by any astronomical observations. Those convictions were for him primarily, and almost wholly, a deduction from the principle of plenitude, or from the assumption on which the latter itself rested, the principle of sufficient reason. The Timaeus, Plotinus (for Bruno "the prince of philosophers"), and the Schoolmen, not the De revolutionibus orbium, were the chief sources of his theory. ... His premises are at bottom the same as those from which Dante argued to the virtual infinity of the celestial hierarchies and the actualization of all the possibilities of being; but they are brought to bear upon the question of the number of potential stellar systems to which the Eternal Power must be supposed to have imparted actual existence. Bruno is, in short, precisely in those features of his teaching in which he seems most the herald and champion of a modern conception of the universe, most completely the continuer of a certain strain in Platonic metaphysics and in medieval theology.5

Lovejoy stresses the principle of plenitude, then, as the dominant and governing factor in Bruno's thought. André Koyré concurs, but presents a caveat to Lovejoy's analysis:

The importance for Bruno's thought of the principle of plenitude cannot be overvalued. Yet there are in it two other features that seem to me to be of as great an importance as this principle. They are: a) the use of a Principle that a century later Leibniz—who certainly knew Bruno and was influenced by him—was to call the principle of sufficient reason, which supplements the principle of plenitude and, in due time, superseded it; and b) the decisive shift (adumbrated indeed by Nicholas of Cusa) from sensual to intellectual cognition in its relation to thought (intellect).6
These three factors are the essence of Bruno's system and the significant elements of his innovation, and they are the three conceptions which provide the structure for More's thought in the latter part of the Philosophical Poems. In Democritus Platonissans More makes this explicit:

If God's omnipotent,
And this omnipotent God be everywhere,
Where 'er he is, then can he eas'ly vent
His mighty virtue thorough all extent, . . . (48, 2-5)
Unless omnipotent power we will impair
And say that empty space his working can debar . . . (49, 8-9)

Wherefore this precious sweet ethereall dew,
For ought we know, God each where did distil
And thorougli all that hollow voidness threw,
And the wide gaping drought therewith did fill,
His endless overflowing goodness spill
In every place; which streight he did contrive
Int' infinite severall worlds, as his best skill
Did him direct and creatures could receive:
For matter infinite needs infinite worlds must give. (50)

The Centre of each severall world's a sunne
With shining beams and kindly warming heat,
About whose radiant crown the planets runne,
Like reeling moths about a candle light;
These all together, one world I conceit.
And that even infinite such worlds there be,
That inexhausted Good that God is hight,
A full sufficient reason is to me,
Who simple Goodnesse make the highest Deity. (51)

Wherefore who'll judge the limits of the world
By what appears unto our failing sight
Appeals to sense, reason down headlong hurld
Out of her throne by giddie vulgar might.
But here base senses dictates they will dight
With specious title of Philosophie,
And stiffly will contend their cause is right.
From rotten rolls of school antiquity,
Who constantly denie corporall Infinitie. (9)
This is not to imply that More was directly influenced by Bruno; on the contrary, indications are that, if More knew Bruno at all, he was not directly influenced by him. Bruno's ideas seem to have had little currency in his own time; he was prophet rather than a leader. Koyré notes: "It was only after the great telescopic discoveries of Galileo that it Bruno's influence was accepted and became a factor, and an important one, of the seventeenth century world-view." The significant point is that for a man with Bruno's—or More's—intellectual components, a combination of Renaissance platonism and medieval scholasticism, faced with such a problem at such a time, the conclusion is rather predictable. And Bruno's positive approach to the problem, as Ernst Cassirer indicates, set the direction for modern philosophy:

They modern philosophy and modern science had to prove that the new cosmology, far from enfeebling or obstructing the power of human reason, establishes and confirms this power. Such was the task of the combined efforts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These systems go different ways, but they are all directed toward one and the same end. They strive, so to speak, to turn the apparent curse of the new cosmology into a blessing. Giordano Bruno was the first thinker to enter upon this path, which in a sense became the path of all modern metaphysics.

Bruno's intellect, however, was one of uncommon sensitivity to trends. Few of his contemporaries noticed that Tycho Brahe had knocked a hole in the outer wall of the cosmos. Men like Chapman and Lord Herbert, as we
have seen, were still at ease in their finite cosmos. The challenge of Copernicus, in itself, did not necessarily constitute a threat to the harmonious, interrelated universe. Koyré has commented upon the traditional elements in the Copernican system: although it is less hierarchically structured, it is still well ordered; the sun and the sphere of the fixed stars provide two poles of perfection; it is still finite. Indeed, formulating his theories prior to the discoveries of Galileo, Kepler was able to use the Copernican system to refute Bruno and reassert the finite cosmos.

The principal effect of the Copernican theory was to pave the way for the break with tradition by enlarging the cosmos. Lovejoy rightly has insisted that we remember the medieval world was by no means as small as we customarily think of it, but it seems indisputable that the intermediate expanded state was indispensable as a psychological preparation. Koyré remarks that

... it remains clear that it is somewhat easier, psychologically if not logically, to pass from a very large, immeasurable and ever-growing world to an infinite one than to make this jump starting with a rather big, but still determinably limited sphere: the world-bubble has to swell before bursting.

The Copernican theory itself did not provide the catalyst. The comment of Lord Conway to his daughter-in-law would seem to suggest the attitude of the intelligent, but uncommitted layman:

Copernicus hath divers followers not bycause his opinion is true but bycause the opinion is
different from what all men in all ages ever had, for he hath not proved that there is any ill consequence by holding that the Earth doth stand still and the heavens move, or discover the least error in this Tenent, but only he hath very ingeniously shewed that it may be as well demonstrated that the heavens stand still as that the earth stands still, we shall know no more then we doe if we think as he doth. . . .14

It remained for Galileo to provide the proof, to focus his perspective glass on the holes in the finite universe. The impact of the Sidereus Nuncius cannot be overemphasized. In this treatise Galileo announced to the world that--by means of the perspicillum, a new instrument allowing him to overcome the limitations of the human eye--he had discovered the presence of mountains on the moon, new planets in the sky, and new fixed stars in tremendous numbers. Moreover, the perspicillum changed the aspect of the fixed stars by penetrating the haloes surrounding them, which gave a distorted impression of their size. This fact destroyed the most important of Tycho Brahe's objections to the Copernican system.15

The pessimistic reaction to the Sidereus Nuncius, typified in Donne, has been amply documented by modern scholars. The destruction of the finite, ordered cosmos and the devastating knowledge that the cosmos, as well as man and earth, is subject to decay need not be rehearsed here.16 Much more important than the fact that "new Philosophy calls all in doubt," is the ultimate triumph
of optimism. When all the fashionable lamenting was done, mankind had to adjust to the situation, as it has always done, and the platonists comprised the vanguard of those who accepted. Bruno's vision had triumphed. Lovejoy concludes that the "truly revolutionary theses in cosmography" came to be "pretty generally" accepted before the end of the seventeenth century:

The five significant innovations were: (1) the assumption that other planets of our solar system are inhabited by living, sentient, and rational creatures; (2) the shattering of the outer walls of the medieval universe, whether these were identified with the outermost crystalline sphere or with a definite "region" of the fixed stars, and the dispersal of these stars through vast, irregular distances; (3) the conception of the fixed stars as suns similar to ours, all or most of them surrounded by planetary systems of their own; (4) the supposition that the planets in these other worlds also have conscious inhabitants; (5) the assertion of the actual infinity of the physical universe in space and of the number of solar systems contained in it.17

As Lovejoy notes "none of them [was] entailed by the purely astronomical systems of Copernicus or Kepler."18

It remained for the metaphysicians, following Bruno's lead, to adapt the astronomical systems to human experience. Cassirer has explained the fundamental element in this adaptation:

What is characteristic of the philosophy of Giordano Bruno is that here the term "infinity" changes its meaning. In Greek classical thought infinity is a negative concept. The infinite is the boundless or indeterminate. It has no limit and no form, and it is, therefore, inaccessible to human reason, which lives in the realm of form and can understand
nothing but forms. In the sense the finite and the infinite, *peras* and *hapeiron*, are declared by Plato in the *Philebus* to be the fundamental principles which are necessarily opposed to one another. In Bruno's doctrine infinity no longer means a mere negation or limitation. On the contrary, it means the immeasurable and inexhaustible abundance of reality and the unrestricted power of the human intellect. It is in this sense that Bruno understands and interprets the Copernican doctrine. This doctrine, according to Bruno, was the first and decisive step toward man's self-liberation. Man no longer lives in the world as a prisoner enclosed within the narrow walls of a finite physical universe. He can traverse the air and break through all the imaginary boundaries of the celestial spheres which have been erected by a false metaphysics and cosmology. The infinite universe sets no limits to human reason; on the contrary, it is the great incentive of human reason. The human intellect becomes aware of its own infinity through measuring its power by the infinite universe.¹⁹

Henry More reacts immediately to the dramatic discoveries of Galileo and, especially, the philosophical stimulus of Descartes, who formulated the implications of Galileo's discoveries. Galileo, like Copernicus himself (whether through lack of interest or mere prudence), never worked out the philosophical implications of his discoveries. Koyré states, "... it is not Galileo, in any case, nor Bruno, but Descartes who clearly and distinctly formulated principles of the new science, its dream de *reductione scientiae ad mathematicam*, and of the new, mathematical cosmology."²⁰ Descartes' *Principia* appeared in 1644, only two years after More's *Platonicall Song of the Soul*. Frequent mentioning of Descartes in
the notes and apparatus of the 1647 edition of the
Philosophical Poems indicates that More completed the
1642 poems before encountering Descartes' work, but
thereafter became increasingly preoccupied with them—a
preoccupation that became more and more urgent until it
finally culminated in the composition of Democritus
Platonissans. Thus, it is possible to observe the stages
of metaphysical adjustments involved for More in the ac-
tual course of his Philosophical Poems, and hence, the
corresponding aesthetic shifts within the poems as well.

II

It is necessary to trace as precisely as possible
More's intellectual positions in the late 1630's and the
1640's, and to examine the early stages of his quarrel
with Descartes, in order to understand what More was at-
tempting to do in the poems. More began the period of
his independent intellectual activity (he received his
Fellowship in 1639) as an eclectic platonist and mystic.
He had denied the central doctrine of his native Calvinism
while still a boy, and was shaped intellectually by the
liberal platonic Cambridge milieu presided over by Benja-
min Whichcote. His mysticism, Ward's account would indi-
cate, was innate and he must have been first attracted
to the platonists because of their compatibility with
this temperament. He found in their writings systematic
support for the natural bent of his mind,

... having begun to read now the Platonick Writers, Marsilius Ficinus, Plotinus himself, Mercurius Trismegistus; and the Mystical Divines; among whom there was frequent mention made of the Purification of the Soul, and of the Purgative Course that is previous to the Illuminative; and if the Person that expected to have his Mind illuminated of God, was to endeavour after the Highest Purity.22

A typical Renaissance platonist, More lacked the perspective that would enable him to distinguish between orthodox platonism and neoplatonism. Geoffrey Bullough cautions, "More's approach to Platonism, like that of most Renaissance scholars, was quite unhistorical."23

Marjorie Nicolson emphasizes the same eclecticism:

More was a Cambridge Platonist, with all the connotations and contradictions that the word Platonism involved in the seventeenth century. Like his fellow-student at Christ's College, John Milton, he read into Plato much that would have surprised that philosopher. His Platonism was a fusion of many sources: the mysticism of Pythagoras, the magic of the Hermetic books, interpretations of Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Porphyry, most of all "Plotin," as he called Plotinus. His was the Platonism, too, of Kepler, by whose mysticism More was influenced.24

As a group the Cambridge Platonists, of whom perhaps More was the most representative member, were simply tolerant moralists, who—in their efforts to combat materialism and atheism—were forced into metaphysics. Paul R. Anderson has described them as a moderate middle group, who emphasized toleration from within the broad Anglican church. They deplored the vanity of dogmatizing
and offered as their alternative, a personal and individual Christianity based on the conscience and reason of the individual. Not naturally epistemologists, of necessity their attempts to reconcile differing sects, and later to quell outright atheism, took the form of a theory of knowledge. The immediate source of knowledge for man was the "Candle of the Lord," a microcosmic reflection of divine knowledge. In More's personal epistemology he makes provision for the reception of knowledge by three means; in order of increasing importance they are sensory impressions (which category includes memory), reason, and innate ideas or "common notions." By innate ideas More explains he does not mean that a certain number of ideas are implanted in one's mind, "... but I understand thereby an active sagacity in the soul, whereby some small business being hinted to her, she runs out presently into a more clear and larger conception." Like Socrates, More bases his argument for the existence of innate ideas on man's conception of perfect geometrical form, such as circles and triangles, which can not be derived from observation of sensory phenomena (Antidote against Atheism, I, vi, 1). A further proof of innate ideas may be found in the existence of relative ideas, which, since they cannot be derived from the senses

... it will necessarily follow that they are from the Soul her self within, and are the natural furniture of humane Understanding. Such as are these, Cause, Effect, Whole and Part, Like and
Unlike, and the rest. So Equality and Inequality, Proportion and Analogy, Symmetry and Asymmetry, and such like: all which Relative Ideas I shall easily prove to be no material Impresses from without upon the Soul, but her own active conception proceeding from her self whilst she takes notice of External Objects."  

More is saying, in effect, that the aesthetic principles of proportion and symmetry, which are perceived by analogy with the macrocosm, can only exist because the recollection of divine form implanted in man's mind allows him to make such a comparison.

The desire to harmonize, then, which More must have regarded as innate, is implicit in More's poems. Ficino's grand scheme was a conscious attempt to demonstrate the essential unity of Christianity and platonism; More so takes for granted the essential harmony of the two systems that he deploys this correspondence as a major weapon against the common enemy of atheism. According to Ernst Cassirer the ideational crux of Renaissance platonism may be found in the emphasis upon Eros. More's writings are an attempt to help fulfill the cosmic design of the Creator by guiding other souls to perceive and desire union with the beauty of the One. In his poems More unites Eros with his interest in the knowledge of causes to produce a metaphysical analysis of the Trinity and the soul. He wants to establish the immortality of the soul, both macrocosm and microcosm, and in order to "prove" this
immortality he is forced into a philosophic explanation. Anderson states:

It is impossible to understand the poems until we know the motive which prompted them. More was convinced that one of the essential beliefs in Christianity was the Trinity. He sought, in Psychozoia, to defend the Trinity by virtue of its analogous relation to the Platonic triad. He was also convinced of the immortality of the soul. He sought, in Psychathanasia, to describe the nature of the soul and, by thus doing, to prove its eternity. 29

Elaboration of the analogy between the Christian and platonic trinities is the basic device in Psychozoia. A discussion of the soul of God entails a consideration of God's creation, since this is the mirror of God. The dominant part is given to Psyche, the world-soul. In the involved platonic allegory employed by More, the concept becomes merely an elaborate series of abstractions, which convey an understanding of this cosmic creation no better than the naked idea would. More then shifts to the individual soul which undergoes a pilgrimage to self-knowledge and, hence, union with the oversoul, that is--in its poetic machinery--strongly reminiscent of Spenser.

More apparently was dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of his allegory in conveying his conception of the universe (which he needed to establish prior to the argument for the immortality of the individual soul). In Psychathanasia he takes up the same subject, but largely shelves the cumbersome allegory he constructed
in *Psychozoia*. *Psychathanasia* is a discursive, meditative poem, which for the most part conveys More's ideas by direct statement, beginning with the problems of the individual soul, but inevitably discussing the world-soul in terms of the Copernican system.

At this time, apparently after the completion of the poems in 1642 and before 1646, More discovered Descartes’ writings and was immediately excited by them. The reasons for the attraction are numerous. There is, first, the basic affinity of platonism and new science. Then the platonic elements in Descartes’ thought and his mysticism established a personal affinity. More likened Descartes’ divine illumination and dedication to his own experience. 30 Anderson finds the relationship to be founded upon certain shared interests: a mutual distrust of scholastic learning; fundamentally platonic theories of knowledge and metaphysics; Descartes’ experience of doubting which corresponds to More’s mental purgation preceding illumination; intuitive knowledge of the existence of self and God; Descartes’ interest in reducing physical nature to mathematical measurement and development of an intuitive source of knowledge in this connection. 31 Cassirer concludes:

... Descartes is praised neither for his logic nor for his method, nor as the founder of a new doctrine of knowledge and certainty. What attracts
More, and for a time fascinates him in the new philosophy, is the hope of finding in Descartes' doctrine of the thinking substance an invulnerable foundation for that metaphysical spiritualism which More saw as his goal. 32

R. I. Markus does much to explain the historical origins of Descartes' metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. Markus begins by examining Nicholas of Cusa's concept of the relativity of knowledge and his stress on the subjective mind as the starting point of knowledge. He asserts that Pythagorean metaphysics—"which is inevitably the outcome of taking mathematical knowledge as the archetype of our knowledge of reality"—was quite essential to Nicholas' theology. 33 A platonic theory of reminiscence is implied by Nicholas' epistemology, and by Ficino's as well. Ficino argues for the immortality of the soul by means of the infinity he finds immanent in the soul's function. 34 Ficino's major problem becomes that of the harmony of the object and of the function of knowledge; like Nicholas', his solution consists in asserting a pervasive "proportion" between the mind and the intelligible world. Against a background of such neoplatonic spiritualism as Ficino and Pico were committed to, the notion of a world-organism was developed. "The mechanistic view," Markus continues, "was to grow from this aesthetic conception of Nature as an organism, each part of it possessing life, the substance of which is force."
The concept of substance is gradually replaced by that of function, being becomes synonymous with activity. But whereas in Paracelsus, Cardano, and Telesio such a view of nature was held in juxtaposition with a crude sensationalistic theory of knowledge, it was Giordano Bruno who finally completed the parallelism of epistemology and cosmology, hinted at by so many of his predecessors. Inspired, perhaps, by Nicolas of Cusa, he shifted the focus of interest from empirical things in Nature to Nature as a whole, single organism, animated by a world-soul—the infinite object of an infinite immanent dialectic of thought. The epistemology of Cusanus, which Bruno echoes even in the very words in which he expresses it, finds here additional support from a characteristically Pythagorean, pantheistic cosmology.

Ultimately, Galileo reduces the concept of function to that of law, and it is at this stage that Descartes enters to develop the mechanistic universe out of this finally complete fusion of platonic cosmology and epistemology, which, in turn, provided the stimulus for More's Democritus Platonissans.

More's first response to Descartes was enthusiastic. He felt that through the mathematical approach to physical nature he could prove the existence and action of spiritual agents in nature, being hesitant to allow the strict cartesian opposition of matter to spirit.

The crux of the disagreement lies in the differing concepts of soul. Whereas Descartes regards cognition as the defining quality of soul, More—accepting the animistic,
spiritualistic views adumbrated by Ficino, Pico, Bruno—sees soul simply as a vital force (closely related to the concept of Eros developed by the Carregian Academy of Ficino). Cassirer explains:

... the soul, taken in its widest and most general sense, is not so much the principle of self-consciousness as the principle of life and of living forms. It is the creating and generating force in all organic processes; it weaves the living robe of the Godhead. In his philosophical poems Henry More tried to give a poetic representation of this panpsychism (All-Leben der Seele).

Soul is a vital impulse; Eros specifies and defines the direction of that impulse.

In terms of historical development the Cambridge school advances to the stage of Bruno, but cannot go on to Galileo. In classical philosophy—and Bruno is by no means a "modern" thinker—becoming was restricted to the world of phenomena and appearances and had little relationship with the realm of intelligibility.

The modern era, however, has discovered the truth of becoming, that is, the knowledge of becoming and about becoming. This step is made possible by mathematics, which offers a model in the form of infinitesimal analysis for the logical control of change; and mathematics makes it possible to grasp with rigorous precision the relations and conditions existing between changing magnitudes. Thus a new path is also opened up for the knowledge of physical becoming. Galileo, as a convinced Platonist, can venture the transference of motion itself to the realm of ideas. The Cambridge School could neither accomplish this step nor appraise its real significance. ... Their problem is not whether and in what manner purely ideal knowledge, as exemplified by mathematics, conditions and makes
possible knowledge of the real and of nature; but whether the origin of motions is to be sought in matter or in an immaterial, spiritual power. The answer to this question stands ready for them in advance.39

Thus, at the time when philosophy is first becoming truly modern, More is reviving the original Renaissance attitude toward nature. Nature is but the appearance of creativity, the garments of Psyche; the essence of soul is the vitality which is the source of the material creation. More and Cudworth redefine the old world-soul concept and offer it anew as "Plastick Nature." This "nature" is the impulsive medium employed by God for his purposes—governing the growth of plant-life, the instincts of animals, and the motion of heavenly bodies.40 It is more basic to soul than cognition, for, Cassirer observes, "Ethical reason is preceded by plastic reason as that reason which is, as it were, merged in and confined to matter."41

So it is that in More's initial exchange with Descartes, despite More's considerable and open admiration for Descartes, the French philosopher remains cool toward More, quite rightly making the inference that More's "trivial" doubts and objections indicate that More has no real comprehension of his philosophy. The issue is sharply defined in More's first letter and the question at stake is, of course, the concept of the soul:
For the rest, my spirit, through sensitivity and
tenderness, turns not with abhorrence from any
of your opinions so much as from that deadly and
murderous sentiment which you professed in your
Method, whereby you snatch away, or rather with-
hold life and sense from all animals, for you
would never concede that they really live. Here,
the gleaming rapier-edge of your genius arouses
in me not so much mistrust as dread when, solic-
itous as to the fate of living creatures, I rec-
ognize in you not only subtle keeness, but also,
as it were, the sharp and cruel blade which in
one blow, so to speak, dared to despoil of life
and sense practically the whole race of animals,
metamorphosing them into marble statues and
machines.42

Descartes counters with an explanation of his distinction:

... there are two different principles of our
movements to be distinguished—viz., one which is
plainly mechanical and corporeal, which depends
upon the sole force of the animal spirits and the
configuration of the various parts of the body,
and which may be called the corporeal soul; the
other incorporeal, that is to say, mind or, in
other words, that soul which I defined as think-
ing substance (after this realization, I say)—
I sought quite diligently whether animal move-
ments arise from these two principles, or simply
from one.43

And having postulated his definition, he arrives at his
conclusion—animals have no "soul" because they cannot
think:

It must nevertheless be remarked that I speak of
cognition, not of life or sense; for to no animal
do I deny life, inasmuch as that I attribute solely
to the heat of the heart; nor do I deny sense in so
far as it depends upon the bodily organism. And
thus my opinion is not so much cruel to wild beasts
as favourable to men, whom it absolves, at least
those not bound by the superstition of the Pythag-
oreans, of any suspicion of crime, however often
they may eat or kill animals.44
Unfortunately for Descartes, his suspicions were well-founded—Henry More was "bound by the superstitions of the Pythagoreans," and, though the Beast-Machine controversy extended through another exchange of letters, the argument did not progress beyond this point, with neither man willing to alter his stand.45

The disagreement did force More to clarify his conception of plastic nature, actually an attempt to justify scientifically the familiar world-soul idea, which he had not done heretofore. In the second letter to Descartes, "souls" ("animas") is glossed merely as "vitae mundi, ut appellat Ficinus."46 Ten years later he is more careful to explain:

The Spirit of Nature therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe and Exercising a Planistical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts of the Matter and their Motion as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.47

The attempt to make the theory harmonious with science is noteworthy. Burtt comments:

It is chiefly in this respect that More wishes to distinguish his conception from that of the ancient and medieval anima mundi (an interest which itself reveals the widespread influence of the exact ideal of the new science), and hopes thereby to obviate the objection of those who, like Descartes, opposed the injection of such a principle into natural philosophy while it seemed still possible that all the phenomena might be explained on a purely mechanical basis. In effect, his position is that
mechanical causes produce types of motion that are not exhaustive of all motion—they produce only the kind of motion that obeys the basic laws of motion.\textsuperscript{48}

The attempt to meet Descartes on his own terms is, of course, futile. The discrepancy between his purpose and More's is sufficiently great to prevent, when understood, any agreement on a middle ground. Cassirer explains that there can be no compromise position because each side uses different standards—Descartes a norm of logic and epistemology, More and the Cambridge men a norm of metaphysics and theology—to proceed with perfect logical consistency to opposing conclusions.\textsuperscript{49} More is convinced that Descartes' theory, treating all nature as merely geometrical extension, robs nature of its essential life. Thus, under the guise of plastic nature, the world-soul of Plato's Timaean cosmology and Ficino's spiritualistic universe, becomes More's chief weapon against a system which threatens to rob the world of its divine motivation.

Futile though the attempt is, More makes it, and his anachronistic conception of soul as \textit{anima mundi} leads him to challenge Descartes on an issue of more enduring interest than that of the Beast-Machine. Descartes' geometrical explanation of the world leads to his celebrated identification of extension and matter. He rejects the concept of the void and asserts, instead, that matter is
identical with space. To More and the Cambridge Platonists this is anathema, because Descartes has, in effect, shut God out of the world. Descartes is, as More was later to proclaim, a "nulubist"—he has allowed spirit to exist nowhere, thus dangerously approaching the conclusion that spirit does not exist. At this stage More does not yet realize the disparity in his aims and in Descartes'; therefore, he attempts to "correct" Descartes by boldly redefining extension and space. More's criticism of Descartes' identification of space or extension with matter follows, Koyré concludes, two main lines of attack:

On the one hand it seems to him to restrict the ontological value and importance of extension by reducing it to the role of an essential attribute of matter alone and denying it to spirit, whereas it is an attribute of being as such, the necessary precondition of any real existence. There are, as Descartes asserts, two types of substance, the extended and the unextended. There is only one type: all substance, spiritual as well as material, is extended.

On the other hand, Descartes, according to More, fails to recognize the specific character both of matter and of space, and therefore misses their essential distinction as well as their fundamental relation. Matter is mobile in space and by its impenetrability occupies space; space is not mobile and is unaffected by the presence, or absence, of matter in it. Thus matter without space is unthinkable, whereas space without matter, Descartes notwithstanding, is not only an easy, but even a necessary idea of our mind.

Again the issue is formulated in More's first letter to Descartes. More objects that the definition of matter
is too wide, arguing that all spirit, including God, is extended in accordance with Descartes' description of extension, though—More believes—in a different manner than is matter. Since extension is then no valid distinguishing quality between spirit and matter, More suggests that matter ought to be defined by tangibility—its relation to sense objects—since matter is primarily sensory. However, if Descartes wishes to avoid all references to sense perception, matter then can be defined by its impenetrability. Spirit and matter can share the same physical location through the ability of spirit to penetrate matter as well as other spirit, while matter, of course, cannot penetrate any other object.

More's second and third objections are to Descartes' denial of the possibility of the vacuum and Descartes' rejection of the existence of atoms. It is clear that More is trying to avoid Descartes' strict dualisms and maintain the distinction between space and the things in space: the special property of impenetrability by which material objects exclude one another from positions makes it definite that things are really moving in space and not merely in a relative sense.

It is More's fourth objection, however, that is most significant:

Fourth, I do not understand your indefinite extension of the world. Indeed this indefinite extension
is either simpliciter infinite, or only in respect to us. If you understand extension to be infinite simpliciter, why do you obscure your thought by too low and modest words? If it is infinite only in respect to us, extension, in reality, will be finite; for our mind is the measure neither of the things nor of truth. And therefore, as there is another simpliciter infinite expansion, that of the divine essence, the matter of your vortices will recede from their centers and the whole fabric of the world will be dissipated into atoms and grains of dust.\textsuperscript{52}

Descartes' reply takes up each objection that More has raised and dismisses them: it is an error to define matter by sensory phenomena for matter would remain the same if human beings did not exist; his identification of extension and matter is demonstrably clear and accurate; it is unnecessary to hypothesize the special property of impenetrability in order to define matter since it is only a consequence of extension. Concerning More's concept of immaterial extension, Descartes will not dispute the fact that because God is everywhere, he is \textit{in some sense} extended ("\ldots si ex eo quod Deus sit ubique, dicat aliquis eum esse quodammodo extensum, per me licet");\textsuperscript{53} but this is not a true extension of the kind the word is commonly conceived to mean. Absence of extension in the normal sense is precisely the quality that God, Angels, and human souls hold in common. In regard to his denial of the existence of atoms and the possibility of the void, Descartes explains that these notions are contradictory to our conception of reality and that,
therefore, God would not allow them to exist.

To More's objection to his distinction between "infinite" and "indefinite" Descartes replies that it was not made, as More had insinuated, through false modesty, but is a necessary distinction:

When I say that the extension of matter is indefinite, I believe it to be sufficient to prevent one imagining a place outside it, into which the small particles of my vortices could escape; because wherever this place be conceived, it would already, in my opinion, contain some matter; for, when I say that it is indefinitely extended, I am saying that it extends farther than all that can be conceived by man.

But I think nevertheless, that there is a very great difference between the amplitude of this corporeal extension and the amplitude of the divine, I shall not say, extension, because properly there is none, but substance or essence; and therefore I call this one simpliciter infinite, and the other, indefinite. 54

The distinction Descartes is trying to preserve is the traditional one between the "complete" infinity of God, which can be neither limited nor divided, and the endless indefiniteness of physical or mathematical space and numbers. More is not opposed to this distinction; he expresses it in his theory as the difference between material and divine extension. However, he states in his second letter that it is irrelevant to Descartes' attempt to limit space by supplying an intermediate condition between finite and infinite. The world must be one or
the other. Since God is infinite and omnipresent, his being must be "placed" as it were in infinite space. If space is infinite, More reasons by means of the "sufficient reason" principle, matter must be infinite as well. More asserts the infinity of the world, and even goes so far as to argue that Descartes' own physics imply this infinity:

You can hardly ignore that it is either simpliciter infinite or, in point of fact, finite, though you cannot as easily decide whether it is the one or the other. That, however, your vortices are not disrupted and do not come apart seems to be a rather clear sign that the world is really infinite.55

Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason indicates that God could not do other than create an infinite world:

Yet if one recognizes God to be positively infinite (that is, existing everywhere), as you yourself rightly do, I do not see whether it is permitted to the unbiased reason to hesitate to admit forthwith also that He is nowhere idle, and that with the same right, and with the same facility with which He created this matter in which we live, or that to which our eyes and our mind can reach, He produced matter everywhere.56

The argument continues on related topics—the validity of More's statement that infinite in respect to us is really finite; whether there can be a duration of something that does not exist—and then shifts in succeeding letters to topics such as rest and motion. On the crucial question of extension, the positions remain effectively unchanged. Descartes' God has nothing to do
with the material world, and, in fact, breaks completely with platonic tradition in that the material world is in no way symbolic or reminiscent of the ideal. Since this God of pure mind is infinite the material world cannot be called infinite, even though Descartes is unwilling to impose definite limits. In the exchange Descartes clarifies his position to the extent of explaining that the world or space is indefinite, not because its limits are beyond the perception of man, but because it is logically contradictory to impose limits. Descartes must preserve infinity as an attribute of God, just as he must adhere to the identification of extension and matter in order to maintain the logic of his theory. On the opposite side More remains adamant. All material substance and all spiritual substance are extended, and the interconnection between God and the material world is direct and vital. Therefore, if the world is not finite, it must be infinite, mirroring in its material extension His spiritual extension. More, approaching Descartes' theory from premises grounded in theology and metaphysics rather than logic and epistemology, causes this tree to yield fruit that its owner cannot acknowledge. The two approaches, epitomized by the differing concepts of soul, have profoundly affected the course of modern philosophy and science. Descartes' role is the better known, but as Koyré acknowledges "... . . . Henry More succeeded in
grasping the fundamental principle of the new ontology, the infinitization of space, which he asserted with an unflinching and fearless energy.57 Applying the principles of plenitude and sufficient reason to the physically and mathematically expanded cosmos, like Bruno before him, More became intoxicated with the concepts of infinite matter and infinite space, and was the first English poet to celebrate them.
NOTES


6 Koyré, *Closed World*, p. 44.

7 The editions used for More are as follows: for *Psychozoia* and minor poems, Geoffrey Bullough's *Philosophical Poems* (Manchester, 1931); for the later philosophical poems, Grosart's *Complete Poems* (Chertsey Worthies' Library; Edinburgh, 1878), checked against Lee W. Haring's *A Critical Edition of Henry More's Psychathanasia and Democritus Platonissans* (Columbia University dissertation; University Microfilms, 1961).

8 See Haring, pp. 64-65.

9 Koyré, p. 55.

11. Koyré, p. 30. In a note he further comments, "In the technical sense of the word, Copernicus is a Ptolemaean" (p. 281, n. 1).


13. Koyré, p. 34.


17. Lovejoy, p. 108.


21. "I was mentioning somewhat of his body; and this reminds me of some things that were Peculiar in that also as well as in his Mind. He hath told us Occasionally, in a Discourse concerning the Famous Greatrakes, and what was extraordinary in that Person, That his Breast and Body, especially when very young, would of themselves send forth flowry and Aromatick Odours from them, and such as he daily almost was sensible of, when he came to put off about the end of Winter or beginning of Spring, he did frequently perceive certain sweet and herbaceous smells about him; when yet there were no such external Objects near, from which they could proceed." Richard Ward, *The Life of The Learned and Pious Dr. Henry More, Late Fellow of Christ's College Cambridge*, ed. M. F. Howard (London, 1911), p. 147.
22Ward, Life, p. 64. Howard states: "His earlier works are full of quotations and allusions that show how eagerly he had studied Plato's dialogues on the life of the soul—the Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo, and Timaeus, and the sixth and seventh books of the Republic. It is difficult to trace the extent of Neoplatonic influence, because it is pervasive, but in 1673 Dr. More wrote to a friend: 'Plotinus is raised to a great price, it seems; I bought one when I was Junior Master for 16s., and I think I was the first that had either the luck or the courage to buy him.' He also studied and appreciated Porphyry, Proclus, Jamblichus, and the writers of the Florentine Renascence under the Medici patronage, Marsilio Ficino, and the fascinating 'lord of Padua,' Pico della Mirandola, the friend of Savonarola" (intro. to Life, pp. 38-39).

23Bullough, intro. to Philosophical Poems, p. xxii.


27Antidote against Atheisme, I, vi, 3, in MacKinnon, p. 16.


31Anderson, pp.: 120-27.

32Cassirer, Platonic Renaissance, pp. 1-2.


35 Markus, p. 376.

36 Markus, p. 377.


38 Cassirer, *Platonic Renaissance*, p. 139.


41 Cassirer, *Platonic Renaissance*, p. 141.


43 Cohen, p. 52.

44 Cohen, p. 53.


50 See The *Easie, True, and Genuine Notion, and Consistent Explication of the Nature of a Spirit*, Sect. II, "That Cartesius is the Prince of the Nullibists," in MacKinnon, p. 184. This essay is a translation of chapters 27-28 of *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* and was first issued with Joseph Glanvill's *Saducismus Triumphatus* (London, 1681).

51 Koyré, pp. 126-27. In the following analysis I am much indebted to Koyré's discussion, pp. 110-154.


53 Adam and Tannery, *Correspondence*, V, 269.

54 Koyré's translation, p. 118.

55 Koyré's translation, p. 119.

56 Koyré's translation, p. 119.

57 Koyré, p. 126.
CHAPTER V

HENRY MORE

I did . . . about the Beginning of the Year 1640, comprise the chief Speculations and Experiences I fell into, by persisting in the Enterprise before mention'd, in a pretty full Poem call'd Psychozoia, or the Life of the Soul: Stir'd up to it, I believe, by some Heavenly Impulse of Mind; since I did it at that time with no other design, than that it should remain by me a private Record of the Sensations and Experiences of my own Soul.¹

Such is the account More provides of the composition of his first poem. From the distance provided by age, he is openly depreciating toward this first effort:

Quod ut magis celatum esset, praeterquam quod rudi stylo & impexo, licet aliàs satis vivido, scriptum erat, tam multis praeterea nominibus propriis ex Fonte Graeco & Hebraico derivatis & tam frequentibus linguae Anglicanae Archaismis obscuratum est, ut vix quisquam, qui in ipsum incidisset, quid sibi vellet Poeta, intellecturus esset, & tamen nè in ullius manus incideret saepius de eo cremando mecum cogitavi. In scriniis igitur utcumque privatis sic jacebat ad tempus suppressum.²

Whatever the original intention behind the poem though, by 1642 when it was issued with the distinctively didactic Psychathanasia and shorter pieces, Psychozoia was aimed for a public audience. Bullough, More's best modern editor, states that:

... the poem as printed in 1642 bears ample evidence of a deliberate didactic purpose. The first seven stanzas of the First Canto must have been written with a public in view.³
In *Psychozoa* More is attempting to refute materialism and atheism by establishing the spiritual nature of all existence. He does this primarily by means of the analogy between the Christian and platonic trinities, through which he hopes to reveal the Christian implications of the Plotinian theory of immanence as well as to indicate the gradations of spirit in the world of human experience. The tenor of More's platonism at this time is perhaps most readily illustrated by the relationship More perceived between the two trinities. In the *Preface to the first Canto* he explains:

> Ahad, Aeon, and Psyche are all omnipresent in the World, after the most perfect way that humane reason can conceive of. For they are in the world all totally and at once everywhere.

> This is the famous Platonick Triad: which though they that slight the Christian Trinity do take for a figment; yet I think it is no contemptible argument, that the platonists, the best and divinest of Philosophers, and the Christians, the best of all that do professe religion, do both concur that there is a Trinity. In what they differ, I leave to be found out according to the same direction of that infallible Rule of Faith, the holy Word.⁴

Though More does not specify precisely the relationship of Triad and Trinity, his treatment suggests that he privately personifies the Plotinian hypostases in terms of the Christian hierarchy with the One becoming God the Father and resemblances between Aeon and Christ, Psyche and the Holy Spirit stressed beyond the limits of orthodoxy. More's mind, like Ficino's, is one that thrives on
harmony and the presence of the same pattern in each system is taken as demonstration that there is a principle of order pervading the creation by divine fiat. More must have found some readers unwilling to accept this relationship as the best evidence of God's existence in all things; in 1647 he expanded his prefatory explanation, "... that I may not seem rather forcibly to break out here out of Platonisme into Christianisme." The additional explanation attempts to substantiate the significance of the analogy by enumerating parallels which prove "... a strange concordance and harmony betwixt the nature of each Hypostasis in either of their order."  

Within the framework provided by the basic analogy More concentrates on the third hypostasis of the Plotinian Triad, Psyche, the world-soul, and organizes the poem to display systematically her phases. The conception of the world-soul stems, of course, from the anthropomorphic cosmology of Timaeus and flourished in the Renaissance following Ficino's vitalization of the concept by providing it with a positive metaphysical function. Robert V. Merrill, who has examined the usage of the world-soul idea in Renaissance poetry, concurs in finding the Florentine platonists, particularly Ficino and Pico, the fountainhead of this notion: 

Ficino's Convito is probably the most effective single agent of its diffusion among the cultivated
readers and writers of the Italian Renaissance; Pico della Mirandola's commentary on the *Canzone dello amor celeste e divino* of Benivieni [a translation of which was included in Thomas Stanley's *Poems* (1651)] reinforces the current. . . . 6

Psyche is presented as the daughter of the Absolute. Given several names to represent his various attributes, Psyche's father is most commonly referred to by the poet as Hattove ("the Good") or Ahad ("the One"). Canto I is an account of Psyche's parentage (stanzas 1-15), marriage (33-39), and clothing (16-33, 40-61), while Cantos II and III deal with her offspring, describing the life of particular souls. Canto II begins with the origin of souls (1-23), describes the country which they inhabit (24-29), and the manner of their lives in terms of religion (31-125), politics (126-133), and social life (134-138), before focusing on the pilgrimage of the particular soul, Mnemon, towards union with Psyche (139ff. and III).

The cosmic nature of the allegory is readily apparent in Canto I. Ahad or Hattove is also Abinoam ("Father of Delight"), Adonai ("Lord of all Things") and T'Agathon ("the good"). Being in his own nature infinite and incomprehensible, Ahad is represented as hidden in his own light:

. . . . deeply cover'd o're  
With unseen light. No might imaginall  
May reach that vast profunditie.  

(I, 16, 7-9)
More's Absolute is not represented in Plotinian terms, in which the One is a passive being in whom beauty is the predominant quality, but it is cast in the mode of the Florentine neoplatonists. **Eros** is the creative force which preserves the harmony of the universe and is the active agent of individual salvation:

Now can I not with flowing phantasie
To drowse sensuall souls such words impart,
Which in their sprights, may cause sweet agony,
And thrill their bodies through with pleasing dart,
And spread in flowing fire their close-twist heart,
All chearing fire, that nothing wont to burn
That Atove lists to save; and his good Art
Is all to save that will to him return,
That all to him return, nought to him is forlorn:

For what can be forlorn, when his good hands
Hold all in life, that of life do partake?
O surest confidence of Loves strong bands!
Love loveth all that's made; Love all did make:
And when false life doth fail, its for the sake
Of better being. Riving tortures spight,
That life disjoynts, and makes the heart to quake,
To good the soul doth nearer reunite:
So ancient Atove hence all-joyning **Ahad hight.**

(1, 6-7)

The second Hypostasis is the son of Ahad, known as **Aeon** (Eternity), **On** (Being), or **Autocalon** ("the first beauty"), who can be equated with the realm of intelligible ideas:

This is that ancient Eidos omniform,
Fount of all beauty, root of flowing glee.
**Hyle** old hag, foul, filthy, and deform,
Cannot come near. Joyfull **Eternity**
Admits no change or mutability,
No shade of change, no immination,
No nor increase; for what increase can be
To that that's all? and where **Hyl** hath no throne
Can ought decay? Such is the state of great **Aeon.**

(1, 9)
Aeon is thus the universe conceived as intellectual forms, the act of intellectual contemplation emanating from the One, corresponding to Plotinus' *Nous*. The object of the individual soul's existence is the complete apprehension of Aeon. In orthodox platonic fashion, spiritual progress is the process of advancing from the incomplete material beauties to the contemplation of the ideal world:

And this I wot is the Souls excellence,  
That from the hint of every painted glance  
Of shadows sensible, she doth from hence  
Her radiant life, and lovely hue advance  
To higher pitch, and by good governance  
May wained be from love of fading light  
In outward forms, having true Cognizance,  
That those vain shows are not the beauty bright  
That takes men so, but what they cause in humane spright.  
(I, 12)

The ideal world itself is eternal and immutable. "Nought here increaseth, nought here hath it's fall:/ For *Aeons*  
Kingdomes always perfect stand,/ Birds, Beasts, Fields,  
Springs, Plants, Men and Minerall/ To perfectnesse nought added be there can". (I, 14, 5-8).

Psyche, the third Hypostasis, is the daughter of Hattove and the bride of Aeon. She has obvious affinities with the Holy Spirit, but More qualifies the relationship by describing Psyche as an emanation of Ahad and a partner with Aeon in the act of creation. As Uranore ("the light of beauty of heaven") she is described as the aspect of God which is most clearly perceptible in the material world.
On this point More's treatment seems directly analogous to Ficino's conception of the "divine splendor" or light of God, which must pervade matter before form and proportion can be established. In alternate explanation, Psyche encompasses the principle of plastic nature (15), which is the basic energy impulse of raw matter to seek form. The world-soul is naturally invisible in essence and can be perceived only partially through the form of the physical universe, which More represents as Psyche's clothing—"her fourfold ornament" (17).

More's preoccupation with the spatial extent and dimensions of the universe is evident, even at this early stage, prior to his discovery of Descartes and Galileo. He hypothesizes that the universe is round, although he is very conscious of the fact that man cannot determine the form and size of the universe without a knowledge of its limits:

Its unseen figure I must here omit:
For thing so mighty vast no mortall eye
Can compasse; and if eye not compasse it,
The extreme parts, at least some, hidden lie:
And if that they lie hid, who can descry
The truth of figure? Bodies figured
Receive their shape from each extremity.
But if conjecture may stand in truths stead
The garment round or circular I do aread.
(I, 19)

He lavishes attention upon the coloration of the sky (20-25), describes the intermediate daemons who oversee
the affairs of men for Psyche (26-27), and then, descending to the lower plane of the astronomical sky, sketches in a Copernican solar system as the design on the hem of Psyche's robe:

But yet one thing I saw that I'll not passe,
At the low hem of this large garment gay
Number of goodly balls there pendent was,
Some like the Sun, some like the Moones white ray,
Some like discoloured Tellus, when the day
Descries her painted coat: In wondrous wise
These coloured ones do circle, float and play,
As those farre shining Rounds in open skies:
Their course the best Astronomer might well aggrize.

(I, 30).

Dominant in this solar system, of course, is the fixed sun:

These danc't about: but some I did espie
That steddy stood, 'mongst which there shined one,
More fairly shineth not the worlds great eye,
Which from his plenteous store unto the Moon
Kindly imparteth light, that when he's gone,
She might supply his place, and well abate
The irksome uglinesse of that foul drone,
Sad heaveie Night, yet quick to work the fate
Of murd'red travellers, when they themselves belate.

(1, 31)

Having portrayed the physical manifestation of the world-soul, More then defines the relationship between the material world and the ideal world through the allegory of Psyche's marriage to Aeon (33-39). With the world-soul united to the intellectual component of the Absolute in the person of Aeon, all things are shaped after the intellectual patterns of "Aeon-land" and, thus, the entire universe is suffused with the presence of God. This working relationship having been established, More
describes Psyche's three-fold inner garments, the phases of spiritual activity through which she operates upon the material world.

The first level of this "inward triple golden film" is the principle of plastic nature, "Physis," which infuses unformed matter, or "Hyle," with the impulse to model itself upon the pre-existent intellectual patterns. It is interesting to find More here already pursuing the logical consequences of the principle of plenitude. An unjealous God could not begrudge any possible form of life its existence; therefore, all possible creatures are in existence:

Snakes, Adders, Hydraes, Dragons, Toads, and Frogs, Th' own-litter-loving Ape, the Worm, and Snail, Th' undaunted Lion, Horses, Men, and Dogs, Their number's infinite, nought doth't avail To reckon all, the time would surely fail:
(I, 42, 1-5)

However, as if instinctively cautious of any doctrinal unorthodoxy, immediately he reasserts the conventional aesthetic standard:

But it according to the imprest Art (That Arts impression's from Idea-Lond) So drives it forth before it every part According to true Symmetry: the bond and just precinct (unlesse it be withstand) It always keeps. (I, 44, 1-6)

Arachnea, the "web" of sensory-perception is the second inner level. More presents Haphe (touch) as the representative of all the senses since all sensation is a kind of contact—"She is the center from whence all the
light/ Dispreads" (I, 49, 2-3). Not merely the impression made upon the mind by exterior objects, Haphe is the contact of the outgoing soul meeting the soul in other objects—-the soul of each being, of course, a part of the parent world-soul: "Haphe's the root of felt vitality;/ But Haphe's mother hight all-spread Community" (I, 49, 8-9). While exploring the role of the sensitive soul in man and animal, More comments on the greater powers of the world-soul, and reveals in the relationship of the many to the one his dependence on the traditional aesthetic touchstones at this time. Harmony and proportion in the form of symmetry are for More the visible manifestations of the divine order or beauty:

All sense doth in proportion consist,
Arachnea doth all proportion bear;
All sensible proportions that fine twist
Contains: all life of sense is in great Haphes list.
(I, 55, 6-9)

Sense and concent, and all abhorrency,
Be variously divided in each one
Particular creature: But antipathy
Cannot be there where fit proportion
 Strikes in with all things in harmonious tone.
(I, 56, 1-5)

Closest to Psyche herself is the third inner veil, Semele or Imagination. Semele is the intellectual imagination which transcends sensation to apprehend the world of ideas and attain a vision of Aeon (57-58). Semele produces poetic inspirations, represented by Bacchus, who unifies the intuitions and sensory images of the individual mind in the imaginative oneness of Psyche, the world-soul.
Having thus described the three Hypostases, concentrating on the conception, function, and manifestations of the world-soul, More concludes the first canto and his outline of the metaphysical universe:

Great Psyches Parentage, Marriage, and Weeds
We having song according to our power,
That we may rise more fresh for morning deeds,
Let’s here take Inne and rest our weary sweating steeds.
(I, 61, 6-9)

Canto II descends from the macrocosm of the world-soul and the physical-metaphysical universe to the microcosm of the individual soul—Psyches’s offspring as Everyman—and the spiritual quest of this Everyman, whom More calls “Mnemon.” The scene of the pilgrimage is Psychania, the Land of Souls, which is divided into two parts—Theoprepia, wherein dwell the souls most like God, and Autaesthesia, the land of brute sensation. Mnemon wanders in Autaesthesia, passing through provinces (Beiron, the country of mere sensation) and subdistricts (Psittacusa-Land, the home of parrot people who know not what they speak). Mnemon’s adventures and encounters in Autaesthesia are devoted mainly to providing More with the vehicles for topical religious and political satire. The characters, Psittaco, Pico, Corvino, Graculo, represent various sects whose excesses Mnemon exposes in debate. Mnemon finally acquires a guide, Simon (“obedientall Nature”), who provides him with the key (“Obedience”) which enables him to pass the wall of Self-Conceit,
and to leave Beiron for Dizola, the land of dual life
in which man opposes his will to that of God. Canto II
ends with this first step toward spiritual salvation--
the abandonment of self-will. Canto III describes the
succeeding steps toward spiritual purgation and illumina-
tion to which Mnemon progresses, accompanied by Simon
and Simon's parents, Autaparnes ("Self-denial") and
Hypomone ("Patience"). After many errors and trials
Mnemon is finally purged of all self-will, whereupon
Autaparnes and Hypomone--no longer necessary--expire;
Simon becomes the involuntary, instinctive obedience of
the soul in harmony with God, and Mnemon transcends to
Theoprepy, the state of union where all is love and peace.

Cantos II and III are interesting from a number
of standpoints. The extensive religious and political
satire illuminates contemporary situations; the cantos
provide still another example of the significant seven-
teenth century vogue for spiritual autobiography; and
they are of minor interest for the profusion of Spenserian
borrowings and adaptations. However, the significant
fact about the pilgrimage of the particular soul is that
the transition from macrocosm to microcosm involves a
drastic shift in method, and an apparent recognition, on
More's part, of failure in Canto I. The use of macrocosm-
microcosm as the principal structural device is
doctrinally correct, but fails to unify the poem conceptually or artistically. Bullough notes that the division of the poem is in accordance with Whichcote's theory of twofold enlightenment—intellectual and moral—but objects:

But this artificial division is unsatisfactory. . . . If the first part describes the place of the human soul in the hierarchy of spirit, the second reveals the workings of the spirit in the individual thought, their poetic presentation involves him in difficulties of allegory which he can overcome only at the expense of artistic unity. ⁸

The difficulty is that More, a trained philosopher, in attempting to elucidate the nature and relationship of man, universe, and God chose a method so cumbersome that any reasonably accurate exposition of his ideas required an elaborate system of allegorical abstraction more obscure, complicated, and difficult than a direct statement of ideas. The problem is illustrated by Canto II, stanzas 1-23, in which More tries to indicate the relationship between the world-soul and the individual soul as a transition from the One, represented by Psyche, to the Many, represented by Mnemon. More uses the familiar image of the sun to symbolize the emanation of the individual souls from the One; however, More's anxiousness to avoid oversimplification and to present a technically correct exposition leads him to complicate and contradict this image until its effectiveness is nullified.
Awareness that God is in all things forces More to qualify the basic image to present the sun as containing within itself the light emanating from it, and, in simply summarizing his previous exposition of the hierarchy of spiritual gradations, he cannot refrain from adding new levels to the scale. However, this process of metaphysics outdistancing poetics is typical of Canto I as well; it is only more noticeable at the beginning of Canto II because of the greater concentration. Here More’s writing obviously lapses into that method which he had previously verged upon—“naive allegory.” This, Northrop Frye explains, is a form of allegory that lacks any essential literary center, being no more than a disguised presentation of discursive writing:

... any allegory which resists a primary analysis of imagery—that is, an allegory which is simply discursive writing with an illustrative image or two stuck into it—will have to be treated less as literature than as a document in the history of ideas.

More’s allegory is dense enough in imagery, but distinctly lacks the symbolic continuity that is requisite for "sophisticated" allegory. That More is conscious of the inadequacy of his allegorical vehicle is made clear by his lament:

But phancie's so unfit such things to clear,  
That oft it makes them seem more intricate. . . .  

(II, 10, 3-4)
Having reiterated the cosmic plan, More is prepared to descend from the One to the Many: "My mind is mov'd dark Parables to sing,/ Of Psyches progeny that from her came ..." (II, 6, 1-2). The shift should be a manageable one because of the integral connection between macrocosm and microcosm:

Upon this universall Ogdoas
Is founded every particularment:
From this same universall Diapase
Each harmony is fram'd and sweet concert.

(II, 15, 1-4)

However, with the introduction of Mnemon in stanza thirty, More adopts an entirely different descriptive mode to trace the development of the particular soul. The literary merit of Cantos II and III has been somewhat overpraised by More scholars in reaction against the difficulty of Canto I. But the very fact that these commentators are able to praise the pilgrimage of the individual soul to the detriment of Canto I only emphasizes the structural failure of the whole. If Mnemon is a true microcosm of Psyche, the relationship will be apparent in the correspondences; the individual soul should harmonize with the world-soul, being composed of the same elements and patterned on the same proportional scheme. However, the descriptive modes of macrocosm and microcosm are so dissimilar that the relationship becomes tenuous.

As the cosmological imagery ceases, the Spenserian mannerisms of style become more prominent, More finding
them more adaptable to the conventional pilgrimage topic. The thoughts and actions of Mnemon imply a continued emphasis on the necessity of harmony. *Daemon* and *Duessa* are illustrations of "foul duality" (II, 26-27), *Glaucis* represents excess and disorder:

> Nor stopt he here, but told me all her guise  
> How law-lesse quite and out of shape she's grown  
> Affecting still wilde contrarieties,  
> Averse from what for good all others own.  
> (II, 117, 1-4)

Mnemon lectures *Graculo* on epistemology of a kind that sounds reminiscent of Lord Herbert's correspondence theory:

> "Every faculty/ and object have their due Analogy./ Nor can reach further than it's proper sphear" (II, 97, 4-6).

Given his choice of roads Mnemon adheres to temperance and decorum: "My purpose I held on, and rode quite through/ That middle way, and did th' extremes eschew" (II, 138, 3-4). Since satire in conception involves the exposure of a deviation—disproportion, excess, or whatever—from an implicit order, all of the religious and political satire of Canto II can be taken as a plea for harmony. But the terms in which this harmony is presented are sufficiently different from the exposition of cosmic harmony in Canto I that the connection is made only by logical deduction. This criticism holds true for Canto III as well, wherein More presents, but does not actually describe, the achievement of the particular soul's harmony and union with the One. "Too hard it is, said he
that kingdoms glee/ To show, who list to know himself
must come and see" (III, 69; 8-9). Mnemon can only
describe the "biformity" of the souls that have not
achieved the harmony. Interestingly, the final stanza
of Psychozoia expresses the proposition that "The Good
is uniform, the Evil infinite in diversity, suggesting
not only the exaltation of ordered harmony, but also
More's conception at this time of infinity as a negative
quality.

Even though the structure of Psychozoia breaks down
through More's inability to establish a consistent rela-
tionship between macrocosm and microcosm, a consistency
can be seen in More's dependence upon the conventional
touchstones of proportional aesthetics--symmetry, order,
harmony. His acceptance of the analogy of corresponding
planes determines a considerable emphasis upon proportion
and harmony. Most obviously this is evidenced in his use
of microcosm-macrocosm, which appears in numerous lesser
instances, as well as the over-all structure.12 Yet,
despite this traditionalism in commitment to finite
aesthetics, More's attitude is already ambivalent in
Canto I, in which he is pleased to celebrate--albeit
cautiously--God's fecundity, the multiplicity and variety
of His creatures; and he is attracted by the spatial
grandeur of the Copernican universe.
II

Psychathanasia or the second part of the Song of
the Soul, Treating of the Immortality of Souls, especially
Mans Soul reveals More moving still further away from the
method of Psychozoia, I, in an effort to find a poetic
vehicle that will bear the weight of his philosophic dis-
course. Haring, struck by the dissociation of modes, is
moved to remark:

Psychathanasia, hardly allegorical, is an exposi-
tion of arguments for the immortality and inde-
pendence of the soul. More's own account . . .
mentioned no connection of thought between the two
poems. There is indeed little to bind them to-
gether except their titles, their use of the
Spenserian stanza, and their religious subject
matter.13

The title of the poem is a fairly accurate index
to content. More here uses the view of the universe out-
lined in Psychozoia--but largely without allegory--to
refute the "Naturalists" denial of immortality. The
longest of the poems, Psychathanasia is divided into
three books of four, three, and four cantos respectively.
Canto I condemns the "Naturalists"--presumably Aristote-
lians14--and evokes and praises the muse, whom More,
appropriately enough, conceives of as Platonissa:15

When I with other beauties thine compare,
O lovely maid, all others I must scorn.
For why? They all rude and deform'd appear:
Certes they be ill thew'd and baser born:
Yet thou, alas! of men art more forlorn.
For like will to its like: but few can see
Thy worth; so night-birds flie the glorious morn.
Thou art a beam shot from the Deitie,
And nearest art ally'd to Christianitie.
(I, 1, 20)

Canto II, drawing heavily upon the Fourth Ennead of Plotinus, describes the nature of the soul. More defines soul, fundamentally, as a "self-moving substance" which vitalizes vegetable and sensible natures and finds its highest function in the religious instinct. Reason he rules out as the defining quality for it is shared by some animals. "The Dog, the Horse, the Ape, the Elephant,/ Will all rush in striving to make up one/ And sternly claim their share in use of right reason!" (I, 2, 17, 7-9). Religion, on the other hand, is unique to man--"This was the Image of the highest God,/ Which brutes partake not of." (I, 2, 19, 1-2). Since spirit is the informing principle of all life, immortality may be possible for lower forms of life, although More leaves the question unresolved. In Canto III, by means of a vision in which a Nymph interprets a rainbow in terms of More's world system, the eight orders of nature are enumerated:

This number suits well with the Universe:
The number's eight of the Orbs generall,
From whence things flow or wherein they converse,
The first we name Nature Monadical,
The second hight Life Intellectual,
Third Psychical: the forth Imaginative,
Fifth Sensitive, the sixth Spermaticall,
The seventh be fading forms Quantitative,
The eighth Hyle or Ananke perverse, coactive.
That last is nought but potentiality, 
Which in the lower creature causeth strife, 
Destruction by incompossibility 
In some, as in the forms Quantitative, 
All here depend on the Orb Unitive, 
Which also sight Nature Monadically; 
As all those lights and colours did derive 
Themselves from lively Phoebus life centrall. 
Nought therefore but vain sensibles we see caducall.

And that the first Every-where-Unitie 
Is the true root of all the living creatures, 
As they descend in each distinct degree, 
That God's the sustentacle of all Natures; 
And though those outward forms and gawdy features 
May quail like rainbows in the roscid sky, 
Or glistring Parelies or other meteors; 
Yet the clear light doth not to nothing flie: 
Those six degrees of life stand sure and never die. 
(I, 3, 23, 24, 25)

On the basis of this structure he develops his argument: Matter is finite, extended, and divisible. Only soul is eternal, and the body exists by virtue of the soul's "plastick might." The incorporeality of the soul can be demonstrated by examining the functions of the mind. The senses are fallible, but reason, memory, and common sense are all incorporeal essences. More pictures the soul extracted from the bodily dross:

But now that grosnesse, which we call the heart, 
Quite take away, and leave that spark alone 
Without that sensible corporall part 
Of humane body: so when that is gone, 
One nimble point of life, that's all at one 
In its own self, doth wonderfully move, 
Indispers'd, quick, close with self-union, 
Hot, sparkling, active, mounting high above, 
In bignesse nought, in virtue like to thundring Jove. 
(II, 2, 9)

That the soul is, in fact, self-animated, More proves by
the progressus in infinitum argument frequently used by Ficino: 

"therefore one spirit goes/ Through all this bulk, not by extension/ But by a totall Self-reduplication" (II, 2, 33, 7-9). The climactic proof for the incorporeality of the soul More bases squarely on "rational" demonstration, of which piety is the most important evidence. "I'll sing of piety: that now I mean/ That Trismegist thus wisely doth define,/ Knowledge of God" (II, 3, 3, 1-3). It would be irrational to suppose that man's soul, which wills knowledge of and unity with God, can ever die. The soul has an innate, though imperfect, idea of God:

So that its plain that some kind of insight
Of Gods own being in the soul doth dwell
Though what God is we cannot yet so plainly tell.

(II, 3, 10, 7-9)

The soul perfects its understanding of God "By curbing sense and the self-seeking life" (II, 3, 13, 6) and adhering to the correct diet: "The souls most proper food is verity/ Got and digest by contemplation." (II, 3, 17, 1-2) It has powers of abstraction, synthesis, generalization, and independent creation. All of these factors indicate, More believes, that the soul is unconfined to any one part of the body, is incorporeal in essence.

Book III, Cantos I and 2, conclude the argument for immortality of the soul. More recapitulates the Plotinian theory of the triune nature of the soul,
already described briefly in Book I, Canto II. "Our body is but the souls instrument (III, 1, 6, 1). . . . Therefore I'll sing the Tricentreity/ of humane souls" (III, 1, 8, 1-2). The first and lowest function of the soul is the "plantall," the energy set in motion by the act of generation through which Psyche creates an organism which is both a part of her and an independent entity. The "centrall essence" of the soul is the life of imagination, but the highest function is the "deiform," the consciousness of the unity with God, which is symbolized by the union of the individual with Christ through the Eucharist. The deiform function transcends the lower activities and the perpetuation of its unity is the object of existence.

Canto 2 is an exposition of various theories concerning the pre-existence of the soul. More denies that any of these theories implies the extinction of the soul at death. Emanating from God, the soul, like sunlight, is indestructible, He demonstrates in a number of ways that mind is in no way dependent on body. It is essential to distinguish between "Thansy" which is "the impression of those forms that flit/ In this low life" (III, 2, 46, 1-2) and "Intellect" which is formed on "eternall idees." A reliance on fancy and sensory impressions will lead to such gross error as acceptance of the Ptolemaic system:
Flies she to sense? sense pleads for Ptolemees.
Flies she to her low phansie? that's so swayd
By sense, and fore-imprest Astronomie,
By botch'd inculcate paradigmes made
By senses dictate, that they'll both persuade
That Philolaus and wise Heraclide
Be frantick both, Copernicus twice mad.
She cannot then this question well decide
By ought but her own forms that in her self reside.

Which she calls out unto her faithfull aid,
Commands deep silence to fond phantasie,
Whose odious prating truth hath oft betrayd,
And in her stead brought in rash falsitie,
Seated in sowr inert stupiditie.
Then farewell sense, and what from sense hath sprong.
Saith she, I'll contemplate in puritie,
And quit my self of that tumultuous throng:
What then she finds shall be unfold in my next song.

(III, 2, 60, 61)

With no more preamble than this More launches into
a canto-long demonstration of the validity of the Coperni-
can system. His argument proclaims: "That th' earth doth
move, proofs Physicall/ Unto us do descrie;/ Adde reasons
Theosophical,/ Als adde Astronomie." He begins by as-
serting the superiority of modern astronomers over the
ancients, who could not account for the phenomena which
have been explained in modern times. "A subtile Parallax,/ A
dark Eclipse do quite obscure their braving acts."
(III, 3, 1, 8-9) Again, he urges the necessity for
examining the cosmos with pure reason rather than mis-
guided sense impressions:

The busie soul it is that hither hent
By strength of reason, the true distancies
Of th' erring Planets, and the vast extent
Of their round bodies without outward eyes
Hath view'd, told their proportionalities,
Confounded sense by reasons strange report
(But wiser he that on reason relies
Then stupid sense low-sunken into dirt)
This weapon I have got none from me may extort.

(III, 3, 4, 4)

And More does not hesitate to abuse the unrepentant. "O
You stiff-standers for ag'd Ptolemees," he harangues his
audience, arguing that "reason ought to bear away the
bell." Sun analogies come as readily to More's mind in
expounding the Copernican system as they did to Kepler's
mind: 17

But let them bark like band-dogs at the Moon,
That mindlesse passeth on in silencie:
I'll take my flight above this outward sunne,
Regardlesse of such fond malignitie,
Lift my self up in the Theologie
Of heavenly Plato. There I'll contemplate
The **Archetype** of this sunne, that bright **Ide**
of steddele Good, that doth his beams dilate
Through all the worlds, all lives and beings propagate.

(III, 3, 7)

More bulwarks his sun-God metaphor through the identifi-
cations of pagan mythology:

These names do plainly denotate the sunne,
In Spring call'd **Zeus**, from life or kindly heat;
In Winter, 'cause the day's so quickly done,
He Aides hight, he is not long in sight;
In Summer, 'cause he strongly doth us smite
With his hot darts, then **Helios** we him name
From **Eloim** or **Eloah** so hight;
In Autumn **Jao**, **Jehovah** is the same:
So is the word deprav'd by an uncertain fame.

So great similitude twixt Phoebus light
And God, that God himself the Nations deem
The sunne. The learned Seventy 've boldly pight
A tent therein for the true Eloim;
The sensible Deity you'll reckon him,
If Hermes words bear with you any sway
Or if you Christian Clerks do ought esteem,
In Davids odes they make Gods Christ a day;  
His father’s then the sunne from whence this light  
doeth ray.

Then by all the wide worlds acknowledgment,  
The sunne’s a type of that eternall light  
Which we call God, a fair delineament  
Of that which Good in Plato’s school is hight  
His T’agathon with beauteous rayes bedight.  
(III, 3, 9-11)

Having satisfactorily established his metaphor, More turns  
to platonic theology and, commanding, "casheering sensi-  
bility/ Then in clear reason view this correspondency,"  
he bursts into a curious description of the universe that  
can be said to be neither metaphysical nor physical, but  
only both. The cosmos here is directly symbolic of God.  
While More is careful to explain that the sensible world  
cannot duplicate the intelligible, it is evident that the  
cosmic mirror presents a reasonably accurate and satisf-  
fying reflection of the One:

One stedyd Good, centre of essencies,  
Unmov’d Monad, that Apollo hight,  
The Intellectuall sunne whose energies  
Are all things that appear in vitail light,  
Whose brightnesse passeth every creatures sight,  
Yet round about him stird with gentle fire  
All things do dance; their being, action, might,  
They thither do direct with strong desire,  
To embosome him with close embracements they aspire.

Unseen, incomprehensible He moves  
About himself each seeking entity  
That never yet shall find that which it loves.  
No finite thing shall reach infinity,  
No thing dispers’d comprehend that Unity,  
Yet in their ranks they seemly foot it round,  
Trip it with joy at the worlds harmony  
Struck with the pleasure of an amorous stound,  
So dance they with fair flowers from unknown root  
ycrownd.
Still falling short they never fail to seek, 
Nor find they nothing by their diligence; 
They find repast, their lively longings eek 
Rekindled still, by timely influence, 
Thus all things in distinct circumference 
Move about Him that satisfies them all. 
Nor be they thus stird up by wary sense 
Or foresight, or election rationall, 
But blindly reel about the heart of Lives centrall.

So doth the Earth one of the erring Seven 
Wheel round the fixed sunne, that is the shade 
Of steddy Good, shining in this Out-heaven 
With the rest of those starres that God hath made 
Of baser matter, all which be array'd 
With his far-shining light. They sing for joy, 
They frisque about in circulings unstay'd, 
Dance through the liquid air, and nimbly toy 
While Sol keeps clear their sprite, consumes what may 
accloy. 
(III, 3, 12-15)

From this triumphant vision of the celestial dance, 
More moves on to certain standard topics. We cannot 
actually hear the sound of heaven's harmony because the 
sound is either too subtle or too immense to be perceived 
by human beings. He "proves" the stability of the sun 
by displaying the correspondence between the light of the 
sun and the light of Plato's divine essence. The sun being 
fixed, "Then must the earth turn round, or we want day,/ 
Or never be in night." (III, 3, 21, 1-2) Here More un- 
dertakes to answer five objections raised on the basis of 
sense impressions against the theory of the earth's rota- 
tion. None of these five objections were original with 
More; Copernicus had treated all five of them in his De 
Revolutionibus, which was partly translated into English
by Digges. Moreover, the same objections appear in Galileo's *Dialogue on the Great World Systems*. Haring, who has made the most recent attempt to trace More's sources, demonstrates that Galileo was the most likely source:

The notes, we know, appeared only in the omnibus volume, *Philosophical Poems*, the second printed edition of *Psychathanasia*. They contained abstracts of Galileo's proofs, redrawings of Galileo's diagrams, and evaluations of his ideas. They also contained references to Copernicus's system, but no direct references to the text of Copernicus's treatise, nor to Digges's translation. One of the diagrams, the central one of the solar system which was most important, was credited by More: "Copernicus System of the World as it is described in Galileo, page 242." There were three possible editions of Galileo's *Dialogo* to which More might have been referring here: the original edition—but More probably knew no Italian; a Latin translation published at Strassburg in 1635; and a second edition of that translation, published at Lyons in 1641. Only the last of these had on page 242 the drawing of the solar system which Henry More reproduces. On this edition of Galileo, then, More relied in writing at least his explanatory notes.

Haring thinks, on the basis of structural and verbal parallels, that this 1641 Lyons edition was probably available to More at the time he was writing the poem.

More refutes these five objections at a single blow by recourse to the world-soul. "This lore if we but once had learnt aright/ All what was brought afore would vanish at first sight" (III, 3, 27, 8-9). Descending to specifics, More explains how "centrality" prevents the earth's movement from shattering buildings, the clouds follow the rotation of the earth, and falling bodies participate in
the earth's motion. With Galileo he argues that gravity is an effect, not a cause. Finally, again with Galileo, he shreds Ptolemaic theory by applying Occam's razor to the cosmos:

Why then, O busie sonnes of Ptolemee! Do you that vast star-bearing sphere constrain To hurl about with such celerity, When th' earth may move without such strange velocity? (III, 3, 44, 6-9)

The remainder of the canto reveals the extent of More's preoccupation with even the more abstruse technical aspects of heliocentrism. He is convinced that the stellar sphere is fluid, differs from Galileo in his explanation of equinoctial winds as being caused by the eastward rotation of the earth. Only the Copernican theory, he asserts, adequately explains the mystery of tides, and Galileo's telescopic observations of the phases of Venus confirm her rotation about the moon. Certain, finally, that he has vanquished the slower minds tied to "Aged Ptolemeee," and thus established the immortality of the soul, More concludes this canto.

The final canto of Psychathanasia is concerned with the goodness of Providence, and More interconnects his subjects by first discussing the religious problems contingent upon astronomical theory. Man should not take the egocentric view that a heliocentric universe is a denigration of man's position; rather, in shifting forcibly
man's attention from the worldly, he can focus fully
on the divine:

But if the rolling starres with mutuall rayes
Serve one another; sweet fraternity
And humble love, with such like lore we'll raise,
While we do see Gods great benignity
Thus mutually reflected in the skie,
And these round-moving worlds communicate
One with another by spread sympathy:
This all things friendly will concatenate,  
(III, 4, 7, 1-8)

Philosophy without religion is sterile folly; therefore,
More ends by celebrating God's goodness in a poetic vision
of the God of the Timaeus— at once supremely self-suffi-
cient and spontaneously, infinitely generous:21

Also is the rule of his Oeconomie:
No other cause the creature brought to light
But the first Goods pregnant fecundity:
He to himself is perfect full delight;
He wanteth nought, with his own beams bedight
He has glory enough. O blasphemy!
That envy gives to God or soure despight!
Harsh hearts! that feign in God a tyranny,
Under pretense t' encrease his sovereign Majesty.

When nothing can to Gods own self accrue,
Who's infinitely happy; sure the end
Of this creation simply was to shew
His flowing goodnesse, which he doth out-send
Not for himself; for nought can him amend;
But to his creature doth his good impart,
This infinite Good through all the world doth wend
To fill with heavenly bliss e'ch willing heart:
So the free Sunne doth 'light and 'liven every part.  
(III, 4, 15-16)

More then summarizes his belief with the stanzas of which
Ernst Cassirer has said, "In these verses Henry More has
given the fullest and most pregnant expression to that
attitude towards life which prevails among all the
Cambridge thinkers."\(^22\)

Nor of well being, nor subsistency
Of our poor souls, when they do hence depart,
Can any be assur'd, if liberty
We give to such odde thoughts, that thus pervert
The laws of God, and rashly do assert
That will rules God, but Good rules not Gods will.
What ere from right, love, equity, doth start,
For ought we know then God may act that ill,
Onely to show his might, and his free mind fulfill.
O belch of hell! O horrid blasphemy!
That Heavens unblemish'd beauty thus doth stain
And brand Gods nature with such infamy;
Can Wise, Juste, Good, do ought that's harsh or vain?
All what he doth is for the creatures gain,
Not seeking ought from us for his content:
What is a drop unto the Ocean main?
All he intends is our accomplishment.
His being is self-full, self-joy'd, self-excellent.

(III, 4, 21-22)

The poem closes with a stout denial of the possibilities of
infinite time and infinite extension.

The structure and meaning of *Psychathanasia*, More's
fullest poem, have not been comprehended adequately by
More's commentators. The exposition of the Copernican
system has been most commonly regarded as a curious and
perhaps interesting digression, the result of More's "en-
thusiasm," but ultimately a distressing blemish in the
poem's construction, both conceptually and artistically.
Haring criticizes the weakness of the logical connection,
and, in Bullough's judgment, "The whole Canto is an ir-
relevance. . . ."\(^23\) Yet it is important to understand
that for More the physical universe is extremely relevant
to the question of personal immortality. As he
demonstrates in *Psychozoa*, the individual soul is from and in the world-soul, and the physical universe, the appearance of Psyche's outer robe, is the key we have to her appearance. Sky is soul, writ large. Indeed, as More later clarifies his position under the increasing stimulus of Descartes, he very nearly goes all the way toward identifying sky, or rather space, with God. Canto 3 of Book III is in no way a digression, but, considered as a unit with Canto 4, is the fitting and proper climax to the poem. More anticipated criticism for this section, but nevertheless was confident that he had chosen the right method to demonstrate his belief:

Many other reasons from those heavenly motions
Might well be drawn, but with exility
Of subtle Mathematicks obscure notions,
A poets pen so fitly no'te agree;
And curious men will judge't a vagrancy
To start thus from my scope. My pitched end
Was for to prove the immortality
Of humane souls: But if you well attend,
My ship to the right port by this bow'd course did bend.

For I have clearly show'd that stout resistance
Of the pure soul against the Mundane spright
And body, that's the lower mans consistence;
How it doth quell by force of reason right
Those grosse impressions which our outward sight
Seald in our lower life: From whence we see
That we have proper independent might,
In our own mind, behold our own Idee,
Which needs must prove the souls sure immortality.

(III, 3, 73-74)

The comparison of method with that of *Psychozoa*
is illuminating. The Spenserian pilgrimage allegory is eliminated. There are a few satiric passages directed at
Aristotelians and Ptolemaics, but the satire is direct and open, not veiled in the Spenserian "dark parables" of the Psittacusaland religious satire. As might be expected, the contrived stylistic archaisms occur less often as More gets into increasingly complex concepts. One allegorical passage in the manner of *Psychozoa*, I, occurs; in Book I, Canto 3, the Nymph interprets the vision of the rainbow, a device used to convey the scheme of natural order. However, this is a comparatively brief episode in a lengthy poem, and very predominantly the method in *Psychathanasia* is that of direct exposition. The Copernican canto comes, not as a digression, but as an anticipated climax, for the whole poem moves toward a full scale exposition of the physical universe. The astronomical theme is suggested as early in the poem as the second stanza when More compares the unawakened mind

Like to a Meteor, whose material
Is low unwieldy earth, base unctuous slime,
Whose inward hidden parts ethereal
Ly close upwrapt in that dull sluggish sime \[\text{sic}\],
Ly fast asleep, till at some fatal time
Great Phoebus lamp has fir'd its inward spight,
And then even of it self on high doth climb;
That earst was dark becomes all eye, all sight,
Bright starre, that to the wise of future things
gives light. (I, 1, 2)

To a certain extent the cosmological imagery is the inevitable consequence of More's platonic heritage—as when he pictures "Cynthia in her stouping Perigee" to convey the idea "This is the state of th' evermoving soul/
Whirling about upon her circling wheel" (I, 2, 8, 1-2)
--but it is the conception of the imagery which is sign-
nificant. In this poem, unlike *Psychozoia*, "Cynthia"
and "Phoebus" are challenged by the "Meteor" and "Polar
starre"; the poet fluctuates between these two norms of
expression, the now stale mythology and the almost un-
adorned scientific. In one canto he will write "the Suns
bright waggon gan ascend/ The Eastern hill" (I, 3, 31, 1-2)
and in another the virtually bare statement, "So must it
be upstreach'd unto the skie/ And rub against the Stars,
surround the Sun/ And her own parts to every part apply,/Then swiftly frige about the pallid Moon" (II, 3, 22,
5-8). Both styles will even merge in the same passage,
apparently with no sense of contradiction:

Or when quite heedlesse of this earthie world
She lifts her self unto the azure skie,
And with those wheeling gyres around is hurld,
Turns in herself in a due distancie
The erring Seven, or a strech'd line doth tie
O' th' silver-bow'd moon from horn to horn;
Or finds out Phoebus vast soliditie
By his diametre, measures the Morn,
Girds the swoln earth with linear list, though earth
she scorn. (I, 2, 42)

Even though his allegiance is in this way divided between
the trite staples of platonic mythology, conventional
poeticism, and more accurate description of celestial
phenomena inspired by his scientific interests, when he
is required to think about conveying an idea accurately,
More usually sacrifices the poetic adornment to make his
description readily comprehensible:
Next light's, the Planets dark opacitie,
Which long time hath been found in the low Moon:
Hills, Valleys, and such like aspereitie
Through optick glasses thence have plainly shown:
By the same trick it hath been clearly shown
That Venus Moon-like grows corniculate
What time her face with flusher light is blown:
Some such like things others have contemplate
In Mercurie; about the Sunne both circulate.

When Venus is the furthest off from us,
Then is she in her full. When in her full
She seemeth least; which proves she's exterous
Beyond the Sunne, and further off doth roll.
But when her circling nearer down doth pull,
Then 'gins she swell, and waxen big with horn,
But loose her light, parts clad with darknesse dull
She shows to us, She and Mercury ne're born
Farre from the Sunne, proves that about him both do
turn. (III, 3, 62-63)

The constantly recurrent references to the "bright
starry skies" would in themselves be sufficient prepara-
tion for the final direction of the poem, beyond the al-
ways implicit relationship between soul, world-soul, and
cosmos; however, More is still careful to prepare for the
discussion of astronomy. His consideration of the nature
of light (III, 2, 13-20), for instance, certainly antici-
pates the scientific cosmological exposition, which it
immediately precedes. Here More hypothesizes a situation
in which the sun's rays are extinguished by absolute dark-
ness, poses the question, "what's become/ Of that infinity
of rayes that shone?" (15, 1-2), and concludes that the
rays return to the sun or else, as Bacon thought, "then
like to flowing stream/ You deem the light that passeth
still away,/ New parts ever succeeding." (16, 1-3).²⁴
It is true, moreover, that at every stage of the poem the poet threatens to lapse into astronomy. Canto 2, Book I, ends with an argument that if atoms are finite, then a mathematical point can have dimension; but a discussion of mathematics and abstract, absolute relationships leads More as naturally to the universe as it does Descartes:

And that the moon (though her circumference
Be farre more strait then is the earthie ball)
Sometime the earth illumineth at once
And with her grasping rayes enlights it all;
And that the Sunnes great body sphericall
Greater then the' earth, farre greater then the moon,
Even at midday illumines not at all
This earthy globe in his Apotheon;
So that we in deep darknesse sit, though at high noon.  
(I, 2, 58)

In this way the whole poem constantly anticipates and foreshadows the great argument of the closing cantos.

It is significant to realize that the Copernican cosmos is made to seem not only the intellectually inevitable proof of the immortality of the soul, but that this cosmos itself provides aesthetic gratification. Earlier in the century Sir John Davies had described the "comely order and proportion fair" that was then implicit if not visually evident in the Ptolemaic galliard performed by the heavenly bodies:

First you see fix'd in this huge mirror blue
Of trembling lights a number numberless;
Fix'd they are nam'd, but with a name untrue;
For they are mov'd and in a dance express
The great long year, that doth contain no less
Than threescore hundreds of those years in all
Which the sun makes with his course natural.
What if to you these sparks disorder'd seem,
   As if by chance they had been scatter'd there?
The gods a solemn measure do it deem
And see a just proportion everywhere
And know the points whence first their movings were,
   To which first points when all return again,
The axle tree of heaven shall break in twain.
Under that spangled sky five wand'ring flames,
Besides the King of day and queen of night,
Are wheel'd around, all in their sundry frames,
And all in sundry measures do delight,
Yet altogether keep no measure right;
For by itself each doth itself advance
And by itself each doth a galliard dance.25

In More's cosmic dance the unity is too vast for the mortal
to comprehend or--to keep the metaphor consistent--the
sound of the harmony to which the heavens dance is "so big
that it cannot retire/ Into the windings of a mortall ear"
(III, 3, 17, 7-8). Yet, though the harmony cannot be
comprehended by the mortal, there can be no question that
the even imperfect apprehension of the cosmic scene gives
the viewer a distinct sense of pleasure. "Trip it with
joy at the worlds harmony/ Struck with the pleasure of an
amorous sound,/ So dance they with fair flowers from un-
known root ycrownd" (III, 3, 13, 7-9). God's presence
and goodness pervade all of creation and the knowledge
of this truth does much to supply the heady feeling of
pleasure, rapture and gratification:

Better the indigent be mov'd then he
That wanteth nought: He fills all things with light
And kindly hear: through his fecundity
Peoples the world, by his exciting sprite
Wakens the plants, calls them out of deep night,
They thrust themselves into his fostring rayes,
Stretch themselves forth, stir'd by his quickning might.
And all the while their merry roundelayes
(As lightsome phansies deem) each Planet spritely
playes. (III, 3, 16)

Time after time More describes the sense of aesthetic
satisfaction he receives from contemplating or watching
the heliocentric universe:

About the great the lesser lamps do dance,
The Medicean four reel about Jove;
Two round old Saturn without Nominance,
Luna about the earth doth nimbly move:
Then all as it doth seemly well behave,
About the bigg'est of all great Phoebus hight
With joy and jollitie needs round must rove,
Tickled with pleasure of his heat and light:
What tumbling tricks they play in his farre-piercing
sight! (3, 3, 65)

Very much like Davies, More delights in the apparent dis-
order of the heavens while piously taking the majestic
unseen order on faith. He cannot detect it himself, being
only a part of the whole, but, he tells us, "There ought
to be certain proportion/ Betwixt the object and the out-
ward sense" (III, 3, 18). "The Eternall Son of God, who
Logos hight,/ Made all things in a fit proportion" (III,
3, 59, 1-2). One of the flaws in the Ptolemaic system
is that orbits of unequal length cannot be traversed in
equal time—it is an offense against divine proportion.
Copernicus solves the difficulty and "The world so's
setten free/ From the untoward disproportionalitie" (III,
3, 60, 8-9). Yet this is all intellectual faith; what
pleases More in the visible portion of the cosmos is the
seeming disorder, variety of movement, and asymmetry.
"What tumbling tricks they play!" Planets and stars "fisque" and "nimbly toy" while the Moon "nimbly moves."
Everything "reels" and "dances" and "spritely playes."
The order is a divine one but the execution seems peculiarly tipsy and eccentric.

_Psychathanasia_, then, shows More abandoning the elaborate machinery of the earlier poem in favor of a direct didactic, expository method that is more adequate to carry the heavy conceptual burden. Correspondingly, his diction avoids the artifically archaic, and though still hidebound by conventional poetic clichés moves toward a natural, accurate expression that is really more effective. These changes are concomitant upon his preoccupation with the simultaneously physical and metaphysical universe, which by now can be discerned as the ideational kernel of the whole poem. Increasing preoccupation with the universe, and intellectual acceptance of it in all forms, necessitates an acceptance of aesthetic standards which are contrary to those formulated, traditional criteria to which More still gives intellectual allegiance. His taste, based on physical manifestations of ideal patterns, is at variance with his intellectual apprehension of the ideal patterns. At this stage, like Davies before him, More solves the difficulty by humbly declaring the totality of God's plan beyond the comprehension of man; but this solution is more traditionally Christian than platonic, and
as Bruno had seen one of the possibilities raised by the Copernican system is that of an infinity of worlds, a conception which renders proportion, and proportion's darling, microcosm-macrocosm, meaningless.

III

The title page of Psychozoia is adorned with a quotation from Ficino ("Tot vitae gradus cognoscimus, quot in nobis metipsis expedimur"); on the title page of Democritus Platonissans or an Essay upon the Infinity of Worlds out of Platonick Principles a legend that Plato, in his old age, accepted the Pythagorean cosmology is cited—providing a convenient index to the shifting focus of More's interests from 1640 to 1646. More had begun his Song of the Soul as an indiscriminately eclectic platonist attempting to establish the immortality of the soul. As he wrote he came more and more to realize that the structure of the cosmos was of crucial importance to his argument. Finding the allegorical method of Psychozoia inadequate for his purposes, he changed his method in Psychathanasia and composed a paean to Copernicanism, depending largely upon Galileo's Dialogue for his scientific theory. After he had written the poem, More discovered Descartes' Principia, which More at this time felt to be in close alignment with his own thinking. The correspondence of 1648-49 has revealed More's
acceptance and transcendence of Descartes' position on
the extension of the physical universe. Once started
down the primrose path to infinity, More outdoes his se-
ducer. Descartes' description of corporeal extension as
"indefinite" is to More either mistaken modesty or mistaken
logic. The physical world is either finite or infinite
and Descartes has demonstrated to More's satisfaction that
it is not finite. Democritus Platonissans allows the op-
portunity of examining More's ideas on the subject of in-
finity at the actual time of their change.

Psychathanasia concluded with a denial of the possi-
bilities of infinite time and infinite space:

Why was this world from all infinity
Not made? say'st thou: why? could it be so made
Say I? For well observe the sequency:
If this Out-world continually hath wade
Through a long long-spun-time that never had
Beginning, then there as few circulings
Have been in the quick Moon as Saturn sad;
And still more plainly this clear truth to sing,
As many years as dayes or fleeting houres have been.

For things that we conceive are infinite,
One th' other noe'te surpass in quantity.
So I have prov'd with clear convincing light,
This world could never from infinity
Been made. Certain deficiency
Doth always follow evolution:
Nought's infinite but tight eternity,
Close thrust into itself: extension
That's infinite implies a contradiction.
(III, 4, 34-35)

He elaborates on this position for six stanzas—"Yet never
will it be that long twist/ Of time prove infinite . . ."
--but, in the original version of the poem, in no way
alters it.
The preface "To the Reader" of Democritus

Platonissans proclaims a startling reversal of conviction:

Reader,
I present to thee here in its proper place what I have heretofore offered to thee upon lesse advantage, but upon so little, no where (I conceive) as that I should despair of thy acceptance, if the overstrangenesse of the Argument prove no hinderance. INFINITIE OF WORLDS.²⁹

More is aghast at the daring of his thoughts—"A thing monstrous if assented to, and to be startled at . . . ."—and would almost disown belief in his own conception:

"But I onely make a bare proposall to more acute judgments, of what my sportfull phancie, with pleasure hath suggested. . . ." Yet he is prompt to suggest "respectable" classical precedents for his views ("Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius"), and when he ventures to name a modern proponent it is not difficult to discern the source of his inspiration:

Nay and that sublime and subtill Mechanick too, Des Chartes, though he seem to mince it, must hold infinitude of worlds, or which is as harsh, one infinite one. For what is his mundus indefinitè extensus, but extensus infinitè? Else it sounds onely infinitus quoad nos, but simpliciter finitus. But if any space be left out unstuffed with Atoms, it will hazard the dissipation of the whole frame of Nature into disjoyned dust; as may be proved by the Principles of his own Philosophie. And that there is space whereever God is, or any actuall and self-subsistent Being, seems to me no plainer then one of their κοιναν ἐννοια.

Lovejoy believes that the wide acceptance in the second half of the seventeenth century of theories of infinite space and the plurality of worlds should be attributed to the influence of Cartesianism rather than any
direct effect of Bruno's theories, and with More this assignment of influence would seem indisputably true. In addition to the evidence of the preface itself, there is the quotation prefixed to the poem (along with another from Lord Herbert's De Causis Errorum):

De generali totius hujus mundi aspectabilis constructione ut rectè Philosophemur duo sunt imprimis observanda: Unum ut attendentes ad infinitam Dei potentiam & bonitatem nè vereamur nimis ampla & pulchra & absoluta ejus opera imaginari: sed è contra caveamus, nè si quos fortè limites nobilis non certò cognitos, in ipsis supponamus, non satís magnificè de creatoris potentia sentire videamur.

Alternum, ut etiam caveamus, ne nimis superbè de nobis ipsis sentiamus. Quod fieret non modò, si quos limites nobis nulla cognitos ratione, nec divina revelatione, mundo vellemus affingere, tanquam si vis nostra cogitationis, ultra id quod a Deo revera factum est ferri posset; sed etiam maxime, si res omnes propter nos solos, ab illo creatas esse fingeremus. Renatus Des Cartes in his Princip. Philosoph. the third part.

More is not a little self-conscious of the fact that this direct contradiction of his earlier position will seem curious to his readers, but explains his inconsistency with a forthright candor that could bring no discredit to him:

For mine own part, I must confess these apprehensions do plainly oppose what heretofore I have conceived; but I have sworn more faithful friendship with Truth than with my self. And therefore without all remorse lay battery against mine own edifice; not sparing to show how weak that is my self now deems not impregnable strong. I have at the latter end of the last Canto of Psychathanasia, not without triumph concluded, that the world hath not continued ab aeterno from this ground:

--------------------Extension
That's infinite implies a contradiction. And this is in answer to an objection
against my last argument of the souls immortal-
itie, viz, divine goodnesse. Which I there make
the measure of his providence. That ground limits
the Essence of the world as well as its duration,
and satisfies the curiosity of the Opposer, by
shewing the incompassibilitie in the Creature,
not want of goodnesse in the Creatour to have
staid the framing of the Universe. But now roused
up by a new Philosophick furie, I answer that
difficultie by taking away the Hypothesis of
either the world or time being finite: defending
the infinitude of both.

The Infinitie of Worlds is, unlike its predecessors,
not a complicated poem. Stanzas 1-32 reveal that the author
has changed certain of his ideas—"Strange sights do strag-
gle in my restlesse thoughts"—and at least part of this
preliminary orientation is familiar. Erroneous thinking
about the world is the result of judging sensory impres-
sions rather than reason:

Wherefore who'll judge the limits of the world
By what appears unto our failing sight
Appeals to sense, reason down headlong hurld
Out of her throne by giddie vulgar might.
But here base senses dictates they will dight
With specious title of Philosophie,
And stiffly will contend their cause is right.
From rotten rolls of school antiquity,
Who constantly denie corporall Infinitie.

(9)

It is reliance on sensory impressions, in fact, which
caused man to conceive of mistaken limitations to the world
originally. "And what hath wall'd the world but thoughts
unweigh'd/ In freer reason?" (6, 3-4) The trinity of
Psychozoa reappears as an emblem of perfection, but Ahad,
Aeon, and Psyche are abandoned for Nicholas of Cusa's con-
cept of the nature of God as "A circle whose circumference
no where/ Is circumscrib'd, whose Centre's each where
set . . . " (8, 6-7). More employs the image of the
world-soul--"Each flaming Circle that we see from farre/
Is but a knot in Psyches gament tide"--though he seems
equally beguiled by such scientific imagery as the "Cuspis
of the Cone." Sensitive to the atheistic associations of
the ancient atomists, More carefully explains that he ac-
cepts only part of their theories:

And to speak out; though I detest the sect
Of Epicurus for their manners vile,
Yet what is true I may not well reject.
(20, 1-3)

Finally getting down to the central issue, "I will not say
our world is infinite,/ But that infinity of worlds there
be." (21, 1-2) He develops the idea that each star in
the firmament is a sun at the center of its own world sys-
tem:

And as the Planets in our world (of which
The sun's the heart and kernal) do receive
Their nightly light from suns that do enrich
Their sable mantle with bright gemmes, and give
A goodly splendour, and sad men relieve
With their fair twinkling rayes, so our worlds sunne
Becomes a starre elsewhere, and doth derive
Joynt light with others, cheareth all that won
In those dim duskish Orbs round other suns that run.

This is the parergon of each noble fire
Of neighbour worlds to be the nightly starre,
But their main work is vitall heat t' inspire
Into the frigid sphere that 'bout them fare;
Which of themselves quite dead and barren are,
But by the wakening warmth of kindly dayes,
And the sweet dewie nights, they well declare
Their seminall virtue, in due courses raise
Long hidden shapes and life, to their great Makers praise.
These with their suns I severall worlds do call,
Whereof the number I deem infinite:
Else infinite darkness were in this great Hall
Of th' endlessse Universe; For nothing finite
Could put that immense shadow into night.
But if that infinite Suns we shall admit,
Then infinite worlds follow in reason right,
For every Sun with Planets must be fit,
And have some mark for his farre-shining shafts to hit.  
(24-26)

The next section of the poem deals with possible objections to infinity, which More simplifies at once by reducing everything to one point: "For if we do with steddy patience mind,/ All is resolv'd int' one absurdity,/ The grant of something greater then infinitie."  
(33, 7-9)

One particular issue is interesting because it indicates that More had already formulated another of the specific objections to Descartes' theory which he raised three years later in the correspondence. Stanzas 37-50 examine the problem of void space and More comes close to formulating his later position in which he virtually identifies space with God's presence: "Who dare gainsay but God is every where/ Unbounded, measureless, all infinite... "  
(47, 1-2) Yet in 1646 More was not ready to make the bold equation of the Enchiridion Metaphysicum. Here he decides:

Wherefore this precious sweet Ethereall dew
For ought we know, God each where did distill,
And thorough all that hollow Voidnesse threw,
And the wide gaping drought therewith did full,
His endlessse overflowing goodnesse spill
In every place; which streight he did contrive
Int' infinite severall worlds, as his best skill
Did him direct and creatures could receive:
For matter infinite needs infinite worlds must give.  
(50)
Stanzas 51-64 elaborate on the idea of the infinity of worlds, arguing at last against those who would insist on physical demonstration of the concept that the theory is no harder to accept than that of the earth's solidity, which also is not susceptible of empirical demonstration:

For who did ever the Earths Centre pierce,
And felt or sand or gravell with his spade
At such a depth? what Histories rehearse
That ever wight did dare for to invade
Her bowells but one mile in dampish shade?
Yet I'll be bold to say that few or none
But deem this globe even to the bottome made
Of solid earth, and that her nature's one
Throughout, though plain experience hath it never shown. (62)

More's confidence in the popular acceptance of the earth's solidity was destined to be shaken by the wide acceptance of the "Mundane Egg" theory. In this conception, as presented by Thomas Burnet's *Telluris Theoria Sacra* (1681), the center of the earth or yolk of the egg is solid, but suspended in liquid which is released when the shell cracks, at the time of the Deluge.33

Turning from the question of the infinity of worlds, More takes up the question of infinite time:

And still and still even to infinity:
Which point, since I so fitly have propos'd,
Abating well the inconsistency
Of harsh infinitude therein suppos'd
And prov'd by reasons never to be loos'd,
That infinite space and infinite worlds there be;
This load laid down, I'm freely now dispos'd
A while to sing of time infinity:
May infinite Time afford me but his smallest fee. (64)
Despite his professed preference for purely intellectual and rational speculation, one suspects that the visual stimulus is of considerable importance in More's cosmological preoccupation, and the lack of the stimulus may explain his comparatively unenthusiastic response to the question of infinite time. At any rate, he shortly manages to return the question to cosmology. In answer to the hypothetical objection, that if the world has existed in an infinity of time it should be perfected, More replies, with an argument he attributes to Origen, that worlds are finite and subject to eventual destruction.

To weet that long ago there Earths have been
Peopled with men and beasts before this Earth,
And after this shall others be again
And other beasts and other humane birth.
Which once admit, no strength that reason bear'th
Of this worlds Date and Adams efformation;
Another Adam once received breath
And still another in endlessse repedation,
And this must perish once by finall conflagration.

(76)

The "flaming Comets wandering on high,/
And new fixt starres found in that Circle blue" (77, 1-2), he explains, are other worlds in the final state of conflagration. Ten stanzas are devoted to the phenomena of the "beards" and "tails" appended to comets. The conventional explanations offered for the beards and tails are that "their tayls are streams of the suns light/
Breaking through their near bodies as through clouds" (84, 1-2) or that they are "routs of wandering starres." However, More's theory of novae
and comets as dying worlds causes him to conjecture that
the appendages are sparks of fire and smoke which naturally
accompany the holocaust of destruction. The deluge was
sufficient foretaste of the inevitable end for More to
have no hesitation in prophesying the penultimate scene:

The burning bowels of this wasting ball
Shall gullop up great flakes of rolling fire,
And belch out pitchie flames, till over all
Having long rag'd, Vulcan himself shall tire
And (th' earth and asheap made) shall then expire.

(98, 1-5)

Yet More's vision of the future, like that of Cudworth and
even Glanvill, was an apocalyptic one, and the millenium
is to be a new golden age of perfection.35 It is the tri-
umphant picture of this new world rising Phoenix-like from
the ashes of the old with which More concludes his poem:

For all the while her purgèd ashes rest,
These relicks dry suck in the heavenly dew,
And rosclid Manna rains upon her breast,
And fills with sacred milk, sweet, fresh, and new,
Where all take life, and doth the world renew;
And then renew'd with pleasure be yfed.
A green soft mantle doth her bosome strew
With fragrant herbs and flowers embellished,
Where without fault or shame all living creatures bed.

Ne ought we doubt how nature may recover
In her own ashes long time buried.
For nought can e'er consume that centrall power
Of hid spermatick life, which lies not dead
In that rude heap, but safely covered;
And doth by secret force suck from above
Sweet heavenly juice, and therewith nourished
Till her just bulk, she doth her life emprove;
Made mother of much children that about her move.

Witnesse that uncouth bird of Arabie
Which out of her own ruines doth revive
With all th' exploits of skilfull Chymistrie,
Such as no vulgar wit can well believe.  
Let universall Nature witnesse give  
That what I sing's no feigned forgerie.  
A needlesse task new fable to contrive,  
But what I sing is seemly verity,  
Well-suting with right reason and Philosophie.  
(100-102)

Marjorie Nicolson has quoted Masson's observation that "Shakespeare lived in a world of time, Milton in a universe of space" and through the studies of Miss Nicolson and others it becomes increasingly evident that spatialization was one of the deeply significant events which transformed the seventeenth-century mind. The development of a concept of absolute space—in which Henry More played no mean role—has been thoroughly documented by intellectual historians. Yet the profound pervasiveness of the preoccupation with space is only now being examined in other areas. The studies of Walter J. Ong indicate that the development of a simplified place-logic, popularized by Peter Ramus and combined with the diffusion of mechanical printing, had such far-reaching effect on the way in which people perceived reality as to supply a new epistemology. In the realm of artistic style Helmut A. Hatzfeld has stated:

Whatever may be one's theory regarding the possibility of comparing literature with the other arts, it is a fact that the ideological views of life of an epoch appear in both literary and plastic motifs, the fundamental conceptual inner forms of culture find a similar stylistic expression in different media, and human responses to the mysteries of life are bound to become embodied in parallel verbal and iconic symbols. Whatever may be one's theory
of the baroque, the Baroque Period (roughly 1550-1680) is an attempt to spiritualize Renaissance hedonism and to open the closed boundaries of humanism by a paradoxical new experience of space and time. 39

It is against this philosophical and cultural background, as broad as the cosmos with which it was so inextricably connected, that it is necessary to examine More's poetic preoccupation with the universe of space. Burtt, Baker, and Koyré have given More the credit due him in the history of ideas; it is perhaps no less important to recognize his significance for the history of aesthetic taste.

As in *Psychathanasia* More holds to an implicit belief in the unverifiable and imperceptible larger plan of harmony and order in the universe. He imagines the stars as "Lamping lights" which "bright shining over all,/ Were set up in due distances proportionall" (17, 8-9), with "All in just bignesse and right colours dight" (7, 9). When he is required to visualise newly created beings in the future world, his aesthetic standards are the familiar ones:

Fair comely bodies, goodly beautifi'd,
Snow-limb'd, rose-cheek'd, ruby-lip'd, pearl-teeth'd, star-ey'd:
Their parts, each fair, in fit proportion all combined.
(99, 7-9)

But, just as his visual response to physical space is more intense than his intellectual response to infinite time, in More's responses to invisible order and visible
disorder it is not difficult to discern another head- and-heart opposition. All of More's intellectual conditioning demanded that beauty be strictly based on order, proportion and harmony.

As a Platonist, More remembered the "regular solids" of the Timaeus, repeated throughout the universe, the graphic pictures of the creation of the world from "geometrical seeds" of isosceles and scalene right-angled triangles, and the Platonic emphasis upon the harmony of the universe found in proportions existing everywhere in the cosmos. As a Christian he was equally familiar with Augustine's adaptation of earlier ideas to his own mathematical conception of the nature of the universe, his stress upon harmony in music and proportion in architecture and in the human body.40

The new cosmology destroys the time-honored patterns in the heavens. If earth and man are only one Eden and one Adam in an infinity of world systems, it is logically obvious that the apparent disorder visible in the heavens seems such only because man's observation platform is now so far from comprehensive that the grand plan is beyond the limitations of his vision. More offers this consolation--the defect seems rather than is.

Tell me therefore
When you behold with your admiring eyes
Heavens Canopie all to be spangled o're
With sprinkled stars, what can you well devize
Which causen may such carelesse order in the skies?

A peck of peasen rudely pourèd out
On plaister flore, from hasty heedlesse hond
Which lie all carelesse scattered about,
To sight do in as seemly order stond,
As those fair glistering lights in heaven are found.
If only for this world they were intended,
Nature would have adorn'd this azure Round
With better Art, and easily have mended
This harsh disord'red order, and more beauty.lended.

But though these lights do seem so rudely thrown
And scattered throughout the spacious sky,
Yet each most seemly sits in his own throne
In distance due and comely Majesty;
And round their lordly seats their servants high
One from another, doing cheerfully
Their daily task.

(53, 5-55, 8)

Even so, such intangible consolation would hardly seem
abundant recompense for the loss of visible order. Mario
Praz has remarked, "... for since man fashions God in
his own image, and a cannibal imagines God as a man-eater,
so a seventeenth-century man had an idea of God as a 'witty
speaker, who, talking in riddles to Men and Angels, clothed
his most exalted concepts with various heroical Devices,
and pictorial Symbols."

And, of course, Every-
man's vision of God, not only the cannibal's or the meta-
physical's, is projected from his own condition; likewise,
if his notion of beauty stems from his conception of God,
it too depends, actually, on what he experiences, what he
sees, rather than on what God "looks" like. Therefore,
More's logical consolation is hardly satisfactory to him
even as he formulates it:

But the appearance of the nightly starres
Is but the by-work of each neighbour sun;
Wherefore lesse marvell if it lightly shares
Of neater Art; and what proportion
Were fittest for to distance one from one
(Each world I mean from other) is not clear.
Wherefore it must remain as yet unknown
Why such perplexed distances appear
Mongst the dispersèd lights in Heaven thrown here
and there. (56)

Donne, the pessimist, had lamented, "And, Oh, it can no
more be questioned,/ That beauties best, proportion, is
dead." More would have debated the problem on a theoretical level, but reluctantly would have been forced to admit that, on a practical level, "what proportion/ Were fittest ... is not clear." Emotionally, however, he was
a man to accept beauty as he found it, and the infinite universe evoked two new aesthetic responses in More's platonick bosom: with Fontenelle's philosopher he began to breathe with more freedom and to think the universe incomparably more magnificent than before; with Herrick he found a delight in disorder. The response is implicit even when he is arguing for the opposite side. It is, after all, More's "admiring eyes" which visualize "Heavens Canopie all to be spangled o're/ With sprinkled stars"; and "A peck of peasen rudely pourèd out/ On plaister flore, from hasty heedlesse hond" is a far more vivid metaphor than "each most seemly sits in his own throne." There could be little dispute which picture has had more impact on the poet's imagination. In "Cupids Conflict," which
was printed with Democritus Platonissans, More expressed
his preference directly:
The meaner mind works with more nicetie
As Spiders wont to weave their idle web,
But braver spirits do all things gallantly
Of lesser failings nought at all affred:
So Natures careless pencill dipt in light
With sprinkled starres hath spattered the Night.42

As he first began to conceive the idea, More was less certain. The very thought of God's infinite fecundity could be somewhat overwhelming:

And if these globes be regions of life
And severall kinds of plants therein do grow,
Grasse, flowers, hearbs, trees, which the impartiall knife
Of all consuming Time still down doth mow,
And new again doth in succession show;
Which also's done in flies, birds, men and beasts;
Adde sand, pearls, pebbles, that the ground do strow,
Leaves, quills, hairs, thorns, blooms; you may think the rest
Their kinds by mortall penne cannot be well exprest.

And if their kinds no man may reckon well,
The summe of successive particulars
No mind conceive nor tongue can ever tell.
And yet this mist of numbers (as appears)
Belongs to one of these opacious sphears,
Suppose this Earth; what then will all those Rounds Produce? No Atlas such a load upbears.
In this huge endless heap o'rewhelmed, drown'd,
Choak'd, stifled, lo! I lie, breathlesse, even quite confound. (31-32)

"But braver spirits do all things gallantly" and, though the thought of infinity might give any man pause, it does not stop More. "Yet give me space a while but to respire;/ And I my self shall fairly well out-wind" (33, 1-2). Space, if any thing, he did have: "Boundlesse dimension," "withouten limits," "endlesse," "unstop'd," "unstaid," "measurelesse," "unbounded," "immeasurable." These are the adjectives and phrases repeated again and again in
Democritus Platonissans, and More's reaction is identical with that of the countess' mentor who realizes in retrospect that he "was almost stifled for want of Air" in the narrow old universe. More remarks that "lively forms with orient colours clad/ Walk in my boundlesse mind, as men ybrought/ Into some spacious room" (2, 2-4). As he further dramatized his new perspective in "Cupid's Conflict":

My mightie wings high stretch'd then clapping light
I brush the starres and make them shine more bright,
Then all the works of God with close embrace
I dearly hug in my enlarged arms. . . .

The enlarged world in turn emancipates More's mind to God's greater grandeur which dazzles his "stonished sight."

The visual impact is primary in motivating his reaction:

An hint of this we have in winter-nights,
When reason may see clearer then our eye,
Small subtil starres appear unto our sights
As thick as pin-dust scattered in the skie.
Here we accuse our seeing facultie
Of weaknesse, and our sense of foul deceit,
We accuse and yet we know not why.
But the plain truth is, from a vaster hight
The numerous upper worlds amaze our dazzled sight. (60)

The tremendous effect of Galileo's telescopic experiments in transforming the Copernican hypothesis from the neutral cocoon, which Kepler could misinterpret, to the butterfly is plainly underlined by the poem.43 "Besides the Optick glasse has shown to sight/ The dissolution of these starrie clouds" (84, 3-4). "But while they stay any may see that lists/ So be that Optick Art his naturall sight assists" (92, 8-9). And again:
But that experiment of the Optick glasse
The greatest argument of all I deem,
Ne can I well encounter nor let passe
So strong a reason if I may esteem
The feat withouten fallacie to been,
Nor judge these little sparks and subtle lights
Some ancient fixed starres though now first seen,
That near the ruin'd Comets place were pight,
On which that Optick instrument by chance did light.

H. V. S. Ogden has traced the development of variety as a seventeenth century aesthetic principle and discussed Milton's use of it in his poetry. Ogden finds the principle founded upon a fusion of two traditions—one psychological and rhetorical, based on the notion that the human mind is naturally pleased with change, and the second a tradition of "Christian optimism" which is in ultimate origin Platonic. As it developed into a formal principle, variety was commonly given one of two different emphases, which evolved into corollary principles: multiplicity or contrast. Ogden heavily concentrates upon contrast, by which he would seem to imply that contrast is the dominant aesthetic direction of the period. However, what Ogden terms "contrast" can be subsumed under the more familiar heading, concordia discors. One of Ogden's key examples from mid-seventeenth century is Denham's Cooper's Hill, which, more recently, Earl Wasserman has examined to reveal illuminatingly the political implications of the concordia discors structure of the poem. Thus it is not surprising to find by Ogden's analysis,
Milton, who theologically was forced to deny the possibility of infinite space, adhering mainly to a traditional Christian use of variety. For More, the visible framework of the cosmos has vanished and the canvas stretches farther than the eye can see. Accordingly, he celebrates infinite variety, infinite multiplicity, rather than the controlled variety of concordia discord. This celebration frequently takes the form of cataloguing: "Which also's done in flies, birds, men and beasts; Adde sand, pearls, pebbles, that the ground do strow,/ Leaves, quills, hairs, thorns, blooms" (31, 6-8). In observing comets he is struck by "Their colours changeable varietie,/ First clear and white, then yellow, after red,/ Then blowly pale, then duller still, till perfect dead" (94, 7-9). Even when enumerating the survivors of the Deluge, More appears to be impressed by the number of survivors rather than the scarcity:

All else beside
Men, birds, and beasts, the lion, buck, and fore
Dogs, kine, sheep, horses all that did abide
Upon the spacious Earth, perish'd in water wide.

(96, 6-9)

Insomnium Philosophicum (1647) reveals More with a cosmic point of view not unlike that of God, Himself—"Free as in open Heaven more swift then thought/ In endless spaces up and down I flie"—which enables him to shift his examination from celestial to terrestrial abundance and variety:
Thus, turning round by turns all came in view
What ever did that massie Ball adorn.
Hills, Valleys, Woods, themselves did plainly shew,
Towns, Towers, and holy Spires to Heaven born,
Long winding Rivers, and broad foaming Seas,
Fair Chrystall springs fierce scorching thirst t'
appease.

And all bespread were the huge Mountain green
With Fleecy flocks and eke with hairy goats.
Great fields of Corn and Knee-deep grasse were seen,
Swine, Oxen, Horses, Carriages, Sheep-cotes,
What ere the Countrey or the walled town
Can show with us, the like things there were shown.

This is a prefiguration of the formula by which, Marjorie Nicolson tells us, the eighteenth-century man arrives at the "natural sublime." "From the discovery of the new cosmic heavens, vastness and irregularity passed to terrestrial Nature." Later the mountain would become Gothic, but even this early the emphasis is upon its hugeness.

Endless terrestrial variety is worth passing attention, but More's predominant interest is clearly the infinite kind and infinite numbers of the cosmos. "We find new worlds, that still new worlds there be,/ And round about in infinite numbers lie" (61, 2-3). All possible kinds of creation occurred in infinite quantities and have existed for all eternity.

Now what delay can we suppose to be,
Since matter always was at hand prepar'd
Before the filling of the boundlesse sky
With framed Worlds. . . .

(68, 1-4)

In the philosophical justification for infinity, More draws directly upon the picture painted in the Timaeus, that of
the self-sufficient God pouring out his unselfish love
in every possible form of creation. Lovejoy has explained:

The concept of Self-Sufficing Perfection, by a bold
logical inversion, was—without losing any of its
original implications—converted into the concept of
a Self-Transcending Fecundity. A timeless and in-
corporeal One became the logical ground as well as
the dynamic source of the existence of a temporal
and material and extremely multiple and variegated
universe.49

Or as More poetically expresses it:

Wherefore this precious sweet Ethereall dew
For ought we know, God each where did distill,
And thorough all that hollow Voidnesse threw,
And the wide gaping drought therewith did fill,
His endlesse overflowing goodnesse spill
In every place; which streight he did contrive
Int' infinite severall worlds, as his best skill
Did him direct and creatures could receive;
For matter infinite needs infinite worlds must give.

(50)

The reason More gives to explain the creation of
such a multiple and varied universe hinges upon the nature
of God's goodness, which makes such a creation a matter of
necessity, not a matter of His will. Like Abelard before
him, and Leibniz and Spinoza after, More attempted to work
out with logical consistency the ramifications of the prin-
ciple of plenitude as it was implicit in the accepted con-
cept of God's goodness. "Since the divine 'goodness' ad-
mittedly meant creativeness, the conferring of the gift
of actuality upon things possible," Lovejoy comments, "it
seemed at once irrational and irreligious to say that the
ens perfectissimum is not thus 'good' by its essence."50
It is appropriate that More's explanation for this process employs the very phrase that Leibniz later was to use for his theory—the principle of sufficient reason:

And that even infinite such worlds there be,
    That inexhausted Good that God is hight,
A full sufficient reason is to me,
Who simple Goodnesse make the highest Deity.
(51, 6-9)

This is the universe of More's vision, already not far from the notion expressed by More's pupil, Newton, that infinite space is the "sensorium of God." Man constantly seeks new metaphors for God, and since the analogy of corresponding planes, macrocosm-geocosm-microcosm, had been destroyed by the telescope, man in the mid-seventeenth century was in particular need of new metaphors. Ernest Tuveson finds in Nicholas of Cusa the probable origin of the new attitude toward the relation of God and space:

Nicholas . . . took the revolutionary step of regarding the universe, the sum of existing beings, as not the opposite of the infinite God but His complement and (imperfect) image. The infinite spirit, Nicholas reasoned, must have a concrete manifestation. The world of material things is not an emanation or a descent from the apex of the divine perfection, or a limited, arbitrary creation, but rather it is the "explicatio" or "unfolding" of the divine essence. "So infinite truth," Nicholas wrote, "is the precision, measure, truth and perfection of everything finite." Such a conception made possible a new avenue between the divine and the physical worlds. The cosmos, since it is a shadowy image of God, must have characteristics similar to those of God. Thus the universe of finite things must be without limit (although it cannot be perfectly infinite); it must have no circumference, since it is impossible to think of a limit beyond which there is no space.
Having no circumference, it can have no center--
or its center can be anywhere. But these character-
istics are exactly those which theologians
had always ascribed to God alone.51

Bruno correlated Nicholas' metaphysical conclusions with
scientific theory, and, reacting to the contemporary
writings of Galileo and Descartes, Henry More creates the
actual fusion of thought that is implied in Nicholas'
statements. The vast and variegated universe everywhere
suggests God's immediate presence. "Who dare gainsay but
God is every where/ Unbounded, measurelesse, all Infinite"
(47, 1-2), More queries. "That God is infinite all men
confesse" (34, 1), and it is equally true that "this wide
and wast Vacuity,/ Which endlessse is outstretched
thorough all . . . lies even equall with the Deity" (45,
1-3). God's precise relation to space is somewhat am-
biguous. The emptiness occupied by space may be con-
ceived of as God's throne:

That same extension forward on doth run
Withouten limits, endlessse, infinite,
In plain from Space, that ever paceth on
Unstop'd, unstaid, till it have filled quite
That immense infinite Orb where God himself doth sit.
(36, 5-9)

Which might seem to imply that whatever occupies this throne
is God, since everything created partakes of God:

Whatever is, is Life and Energie
From God, who is th' Originall of all;
Who being every where doth multiplie
His own broad shade that endlessse throughout all
doth lie. (10, 6-9)
From largest to smallest, his presence suffuses the universe:

For in each Atom of the matter wide
The Totall Deity doth entirely won,
His infinite presence doth therein reside,
And in this presence infinite powers do ever abide.

(69, 6-9)

As More's ideas evolved later, he reached the point where he was willing to declare that space is actually an attribute of God, and in *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* he attempted to substantiate his belief by the famous catalogue of the qualities which are held in common by Space and God: "Unum, Simple, Immobile, AEternum, Completum, Independens, A se existens, Per se subsistens, Incorruptible, Necessarium, Immensum, Increatum, Incircumscrip-
tum, Incomprehensibile, Omnipraesens, Incorporeum, Omnia
permeans & complectens, Ens per Essentiam, Ens actu, Purus
Actus."52 However, the *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* was published twenty-five years later than *Democritus Platonissans*
and More's thought underwent a subtle and complex developmental process during the interim. In 1646 he plainly is not certain quite what relation Space has to God, and, while in the course of the poem space is treated as a metaphor for God, the logical relation remains unsettled.

Nevertheless, More is convinced that, before the enlargement of his perspective, he never properly appreciated the scope of God's immensity, and it is only now that his expanded sensibilities give him any real idea
of the nature of God and His creation. The wonders wrought by the telescope are not limited to the sense of boundless physical expansion, but allow men an immeasurably fuller glimpse of God's own image.

An inward triumph doth my soul up heave
And spread abroad through endless 'spersèd air.
My nimble mind this clammie clod doth leave,
And lightly stepping on from starre to starre
Swifter than lightning, passeth wide and farre,
Measuring th' unbounded Heavens and wastfull skie.(5,1-6)

Tuveson has observed of infinite space that "the great emptiness itself is a reassurance and not a terror, for it is the guarantee of a divine Mind that sustains order in the frightful multiplicity and impersonality of the cosmos."53 It is well to keep in mind the fact of this reassurance and guarantee in attempting to comprehend Henry More's attitude toward this exploded cosmos with its infinity of space, of worlds, of variety. As the passages quoted from Democritus Platonissans amply illustrate, More reacts to this "monstrous" revelation in the most positive of terms. The infinity of worlds provides the space-drunk spectator with a corresponding infinity of pleasure. More here finds immense aesthetic gratification in things that are distinctly antithetical to any formal aesthetic theories he held, and that were repellent to him as recently as four years prior. The keynote of Democritus Platonissans is sounded immediately in the poem:
Wherefore with leave th' infinite I'll sing
Of Time, of Space: or without leave; I'm brent
With eager rage, my heart for joy doth spring,
And all my spirits move with pleasant trembling.

(4, 6-9)

The new aesthetic note here, obviously, is the "pleasant trembling." Erotic religious verse had accustomed seventeenth century man to reacting to God in a manner that originally had been the province of secular love poetry; however, here the "pleasant trembling" is inspired not by God, but by Time and Space, which, while they do provide a metaphor for God, cannot be equated with God. Here More is deriving from the physical universe an aesthetic response which formerly could only be extracted from the contemplation of divinity. Marjorie Nicolson has described the process:

His is a delight in vastness, an emotional response to something that arouses and fills the emotions to overflowing, that causes imagination to stretch its wings and take off into the vastly expanded universe, to delight in the fullness, the diversity, the richness of infinite space, filled with infinite worlds, the expression of a superabundant Deity, "the inexhausted Good that God is hight." His imagination expanded with the expansion of space. Exulting in spaciousness, he experienced an "enlarg'd delight" as "unbounded joys" filled his "boundless mind."

... Henry More had always loved beauty, but beauty had been associated in his mind with the finite, the limited, the proportioned. Beauty satisfied the emotions; it did not confound them. Infinity overwhelmed. In his conversion to infinity Henry More had an experience he was never to forget. If he could not write as a poet, he felt as a poet, and felt something no poet before him had attempted to express. He was the first English poet who attempted to put into language man's feeling for what was not yet called Sublime—a Sublime which came from the "new Philosophy" that no longer
called all in doubt, but rather released human imagination to a spaciousness of thought man had not known before. The Idea of Infinity had demolished the Circle of Perfection.34

IV

In the realm of formal aesthetic theory, More's Democritus Platonissans has been an indispensable element in the formulating of what Toveyson and Miss Nicolson have called "The Aesthetics of the Infinite" and in their analyses of the development of the natural sublime in seventeenth-century England prior to the importation of rhetorical theories of the sublime. As Miss Nicolson has summarized her findings,

Scientifically minded Platonists, reading their ideas of infinity into a God of Plenitude, then reading them out again, transferred from God to Space to Nature conceptions of majesty, grandeur, vastness in which both admiration and awe were combined.35

But these scholars, concentrating on developing their theory of aesthetic history, have ignored the problem of aesthetic form that More faced. When More set out to write Psychozoia his platonic intellectual heritage had equipped him with "finite" aesthetic standards of order, harmony, proportion, and symmetry. These standards, which emanate from the One of Plato's finite cosmology in Timaeus, provide More with a well-defined poetic structure in Psychozoia. More's limitations as a poet and ambitions as a philosopher severely hamper the effectiveness of
Psychozoia, but failure in execution does not detract from the conception of form supplied by the structural device of microcosm-macrocosm. It is not the form which produces a faulty poem, but More's inability to achieve a descriptive mode and primary image patterning which will support that form.

Democritus Platonissans inverts the situation of Psychozoia. A consistent, coherent descriptive mode and verbal texture is provided by More's preoccupation with spatial extension. Words such as "boundless," Measureless," "endless," "limitless," and "infinite" appear with the regularity of a musical refrain, and More dramatizes his delight in multiplicity and variety with catalogues designed to display God's limitless bounty. In the catalogue More has seized upon a device later used by an American poet dealing with very similar problems; but, whereas Whitman—who could imagine himself sauntering Manhattan's streets, "pondering/ On Time, Space, Reality"—uses the catalogue to impose form, More only uses it to control surface texture. Democritus Platonissans is essentially a formless poem. Even in the organization of his thoughts More tends to be uncontrolled; the development is discursive, rather than strictly logical. The problem is that the expansion of the cosmos has enlarged the scope of the universe to such an extent that More cannot perceive the order he believes is there. With the pattern of the cosmos beyond
the limits of his perception he must respond to what he can see—an unlimited cosmos. It might be argued that an orderless poem is the appropriate vehicle for this vision; but such an argument leads the poet into what Yvor Winters has called the fallacy of imitative form. In reference to Eliot, Winters has argued that a poet cannot effectively represent a chaotic society by means of a chaotic poem, \textsuperscript{56} and \textit{Democritus Platonissans} presents a similar dilemma for More. If he is convinced that there is a proportion in the universe, even though he cannot determine it, then the poem should have a determinable order, for its limits are definite.

It is perhaps this conflict between formal theory and subjective response that caused Henry More to revert to his original position. Just as he ultimately reversed his stand on the infinite spatial extension of the material world, deciding that an indeterminate finite world suspended in infinite space was the correct distinction between the created and the eternal, \textsuperscript{57} More later rejected the aesthetic expressed in \textit{Democritus Platonissans}. In \textit{An Antidote against Atheism} (1652) there is a formal discussion of the thesis that "there is such a thing as Beauty, and that it is the Object of our intellectual Faculties."\textsuperscript{58} Impelled to discuss beauty in the abstract rather than, as he did in \textit{Democritus Platonissans}, describe
his aesthetic response to a particular experience, More, as one might expect, adheres to traditional theory. "I think it undeniable," he remarks, "but there is comely Symmetry and Beautifulness in sundry living Creatures, a tolerable useful Proportion of parts in all." More's standards here are in direct harmony with the images of mathematical forms so prevalent in Timaeus, and, as Marjorie Nicolson observes, are also in accord with the random aesthetic attitudes to be found in Descartes' writings.59 More comments on the forms of rocks and stones:

It is observable, that if Nature shape any thing near this Geometrical accuracy, that we take notice of it with much content and pleasure; as if it be but exactly round ... or ordinately Quinquangular, or have the sides but Parallel, though the Angles be unequal. ... These Stones, I say, gratifie our Sight, as having a near cognation with the Soul of Men, that is Rational and Intellectual, and therefore is well pleased when it meets with any outward Object that fits and agrees with those cognize Ideas her own Nature is furnish'd with. For Symmetry, Equality, and Correspondency of Parts, is the discernment of Reason, not the object of Sense.60

The distinction here is consistent with More's argument that "relative notions," such as proportion, analogy, symmetry, are not derived from sensory impressions but are innate (Antidote, I, vi, 3). If More seriously maintains this position, the conflict between objective theory, "discernment of Reason," and subjective response, "the object of Sense," is resolved by the simple expedient of separating them. One ignores the "outward objects"
that do not correspond to the innate form; those that
do correspond "gratifie" the sight. Theoretically,
platonists typically have denied that sensible objects
reveal the nature of the intelligible forms, but--as we
have seen--in practice, sensible appearance is frequently
taken as similar to, representative, and even symbolic,
of the ideal. Here More seems to be trying to reimpose
a distinction that will allow him to pick and choose among
"outward objects." If applied to the universe, this con-
ception would allow More to focus on any particular things
that agree with his standards of symmetry and proportion
and dismiss those that do not, instead of attempting to
cope with the whole, as he did in Democritus Platonissans.

The implication is that the vital connection be-
tween cosmology and aesthetics that has characterized the
platonic mentality is here circumvented. This supposition
is borne out by More's steady conformity to proportional
aesthetics in his later writings.61 More first approached
the expanding universe with aesthetic principles derived
from finite cosmology; responding to the infinite uni-
verse, he disregarded his original aesthetic. Finding
that the aesthetic standards are too essential to his en-
tire thought to be dispensed with, however, he rejects
the aesthetic implications of the new cosmology he has
accepted intellectually, so that he may retain the older
aesthetic standards. Thus, Henry More finally reaches
the ironic position of measuring his response to the infinite universe by standards that are his heritage from the finite cosmology.
NOTES

1Quoted by Ward, Life, p. 68.

2Henrici Mori Cantabrigiensis Opera Omnia, Tum quae Latine, tum quae Anglice scripta sunt; Nunc Vero Latinitate Donata (London, 1679), Praefatio generalissima, p. viii.

3Bullough, Introduction to the Philosophical Poems, p. xxxix.

4Bullough, p. 7.

5Grosart, Complete Poems, p. 10.


7Marjorie Nicolson has argued that the conventions employed in Psychozoia—the pilgrimage theme, the marriage of abstractions, the figure of Nature, the contest of virtues and vices, the assault of the castle of the soul, the birds' matins—stem more directly from medieval allegorical tradition than from Spenserian allegory. However, she adduces little evidence to bolster her argument, and the direct and dominant evidence (e.g. the preface, the stanza form) of Spenser's influence is irrefutable. Miss Nicolson states that the description of Corvino and Graculo "is strongly reminiscent of Chaucer," but does not elaborate. Shefaultily dates the first publication of Psychozoia as 1648. "More's Psychozoia," MLN, XXXVII (1922), 144-148. Bullough presents the case for the Spenserian influence: ". . . the second part of Psychozoia derives most of its incidents from Spenser, while the phraseology and imagery of the whole poem, e.g. Narcissus (I, 11) and Phaeton (I, 17), echo the Faerie Queene" (p. xlii).

8Bullough, p. xlii.

9Bullough criticizes the transitional break-down in greater detail, pp. xlvi-xlix.


12 More calls the reader's attention to one of these with an explanatory note on II, 34, 9.

13 Haring, p. 11.

14 Haring, p. 14, makes the identification on the basis of the word, Entelechies (I, 11, 9; I, 15, 2).

15 Cf. Psychozola, III, 60, in which More supplies his own version of the three Graces: "... the eldest Nymph Pythagoriassa, Next Platonissa right; the last right Stolicissa."


19 Haring, p. 37.


21 See A. O. Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, pp. 46-55.

22 Ernst Cassirer, Platonic Renaissance in England, p. 128.

23 Bullough, p. 246; Haring, p. 36.

24 Descartes' theory of light was published in the Principia Philosophiæ in 1644—after the poem was written but apparently before More wrote the notes to the poem, in which he observes that Descartes' idea "is far more solid and ingenious agreeing exactly with all the properties of light." See Haring, p. 31.


27 The 1642 edition of Psychozoea appeared with a glossary but without notes; the 1647 Philosophical Poems has quite extensive notes. The ones pertaining to Psychathanasia make frequent reference to Descartes. The Discourse on Method (1637) and Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), were apparently known to More at the time the poems were written for the 1642 volume. Miss Nicolson has suggested that More became acquainted with Descartes' writing between 1637 and 1644. This would indicate that only the 1644 Principia had a profound effect on More's thinking. See Nicolson, "The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England," SP, XXVI (1929), esp. 361-362.

28 In the first edition of the poem the last stanza was 40; after the composition of Democritus Platonissans More revised stanza 40 and added stanzas 41 and 42 for the 1647 edition. The 1647 edition is the text of all modern editions.

29 Grosart, Complete Poems, p. 90. More's reference to "what I have heretofore offered to thee upon lesse advantage" presumably is an allusion to his consideration and rejection of the idea in Psychathanasia.

30 It is interesting that the need for precedent is stronger for More than whatever qualms he feels about the reputations of the men he cites; he tries carefully to dissociate himself from their supposed atheism (20, 1-3). On the reputation of the atomists see Charles Harrison, "Ancient Atomists and English Literature of the Seventeenth Century," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, XIV (1934), 1-80.

31 Lovejoy, pp. 124-25.


33 See Nicolson, Mountain Gloom, pp. 201-06. In More's immediate circle Joseph Glanvill, working to justify More's theory of a "vital congruity" uniting body and soul, hypothesizes an earth similar to a "suckt Egg"
into the interior of which evil spirits are drawn by terrestrial congruity. See Lux Orientalis (London, 1662), pp. 130-40, and the discussion by Jackson I. Cope, Joseph Glanvill, Anglican Apologist (St. Louis, 1956), pp. 89-90.

34 John Swan, Speculum Mundi or a Glasse Representing the Face of the World (Cambridge, 1635), presents the Aristotelian theory that comets have one of two basic forms:

For first either they seem round, having beams round about them; which cometh to passe when the matter is thin on the edges, and thick every where else:
or secondly, they seem as it were with a beard or tail: which cometh to passe when it is but meanly thick towards some one side or other, and rather long then round. But some would have these two fashions to be three, because the tail sometimes hangs downward as well as sidelong: and so there is by this means stella crinita, stella caudata, and stella barbata; concerning which I am not much solicitous (pp. 99-100).

35 Cope, Joseph Glanvill, pp. 87-90, explains that these platonists evolve an apocalyptic view of history to bulwark their belief in the pre-existence of souls; thus suggesting a connection for More between the theory of history and the infinite spirit world. See also Ernest Tuveson, Millennium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress (Berkeley, 1949).

36 Milton and the Telescope," ELH, II (1935) 7


is right in reinterpreting one of Wolfflin's formal baroque categories, namely Depth versus Renaissance Surface, as nothing but the projection of the sense of the infinite into space. Such a fundamental feeling is not ideological but an unconscious, interior, cultural necessity, the urge of boundlessness . . . (p. 75).

40 Nicolson, Mountain Gloom, p. 123.
42 "Cupid's Conflict" is a poem that has not been without its admirers. F. O. Matthiessen reports of Bronson Alcott, the Brook Farm experimentalist, "that on one occasion when a contribution was expected from him for The Dial, he sent instead Henry More's 'Cupid's Conflict.'"
44 For a broad survey of the effect of the telescope on literary imagination, see Nicolson, Science and Imagination.
45 H. V. S. Ogden, "The Principles of Variety and Contrast in Seventeenth Century Aesthetics, And Milton's Poetry," JHI, X (1949), 159-182. As authority for the rhetorical tradition Ogden cites Aristotle and Dionysios of Halicarnassus (who in turn cite Euripides, Herodotus, Plato, and Demosthenes), Scaliger, Peacham, Spenser, and others. The complex of ideas Ogden designates "Christian optimism" can be traced through the scholastics to the Church Fathers, back ultimately to the seminal description of the unselfish God in the Timaeus.
46 For an analysis more willing to see Milton vacillating between limitation and superabundance, see Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle, pp. 182-88.
47 More is conventional in attributing the color variation of a comet to consumption by fire. See Swan, Speculum Mundi, p. 105.
48 Mountain Gloom, p. 270.
49 Lovejoy, p. 49.

50 Lovejoy, p. 70. See further pp. 144-182.

51 Ernest Tuveson, "Space, Deity and 'Natural Sublime,'" MLQ, XII (1951), 22.

52 Opera Omnia, Part I, p. 167.

53 Tuveson, "Space, Deity and 'Natural Sublime,'" p. 31.

54 Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle, pp. 164-165.

55 Mountain Gloom, p. 143.


57 Of course it was this position which led More to develop the concomitant divinization of space by making it an attribute to God. See Koyré, pp. 125-154. More recanted the stand taken in Democritus Platonissans: "Ita sermone patrio composui, cui Democritus Platonissans, sive de Mundorum Infinitate, nomen inscriptum est. Nec etiamnum satis causae subesse deprehendo cur mutem sententiam. Neque enim semper requiritur ad realem Infinitatem extremorum interminabilitas, sed solummodo innumerabilitas partium actu extensorum, ut palmorum, pedum, stadiorum, & similibum." Opera Omnia, I, p. 180.


59 Mountain Gloom, pp. 122-125. It is worth noting, however, that Miss Nicolson exaggerates the extent to which More remained under the influence of Descartes at this time. The earlier correspondence between the men gives full evidence that the seeds of discontent were well planted. Moreover, Miss Nicolson discusses the Antidote as if it were representative of More's earliest aesthetic attitude, then, puzzlingly, goes on to discuss the "change" in Democritus Platonissans, which, of course, was published six years earlier. See pp. 121-125 and 134-137.

60 An Antidote against Atheism, in A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings, p. 54; Opera Omnia, II, pp. 66-67.
Miss Nicolson believes that More's *Divine Dialogues* (1667) fulfills his flirtation with plenitude aesthetics, and celebrates all possible fullness, variety, diversity. See *Mountain Gloom*, pp. 138-40; but *Divine Dialogues* seems only to utilize traditional harmony and symmetry standards—variety and diversity on a limited scale. The fact that Miss Nicolson can adduce no specific quotations or references to this "overflowing bounty" would seem to detract from her argument.
CONCLUSION

The nature of platonic metaphysics is such that traditionally there has been a close interrelationship between cosmology and aesthetics with both mutually dependent upon a controlling principle of order. Whether the individual observed the universe and read the pattern of composition there discernible into himself or vice versa, microcosmism became perhaps the most basic characteristic of platonic cosmology. The proportional aesthetics resultant from microcosmism place supreme value on such qualities as harmony, symmetry, order, balanced proportions, and these qualities are the standards of platonic aesthetics. They pervade Plato's explanation of the cosmos in *Timaeus* and are even further emphasized by Plotinus and Ficino. Plotinus' metaphysical conception of the vital function of Eros placed a new importance upon the role of sensible beauty and provided the theoretical impetus for Ficino's writings, wherein the conception of an animistic, symbolic cosmology led to a metaphysical orientation that is almost wholly aesthetic.¹

However, as Rudolf Allers' survey suggests, the theories of proportion stemming from microcosmism lose their meaning when the cosmos changes shape.² A proportional relationship between microcosm and macrocosm can be
posited only when the cosmos is considered to be finite. Thus, crucial reassessment of both cosmological and aesthetic theory is necessitated for the platonists by the telescopic observations of Galileo, which demonstrate that whatever limits there might be to the physical universe extend vastly beyond the limits of man's perception. Galileo's perspicillum explodes the traditional order and pattern of the macrocosm.³

George Chapman's works, written during the time that Galileo's experiments were made and reported, reveal the fact that the implications of the astronomical discoveries were not immediately grasped. Throughout his poetry there is a marked dependence upon the traditional touchstones of proportional aesthetics--order, harmony, proportion, and, emblematic of perfect proportion, circular form or movement--suggesting that his belief in the correspondence of the microcosm and the macrocosm had not been shaken. In particular Chapman's poetry displays his predilection for the concordia discors theory of proportion, in which the tension between balanced opposites is considered to produce harmony. An examination of the mythic narrative poem, Andromeda Liberata (1614), shows Chapman's use of concordia discors, as embodied by the Perseus-Andromeda myth, to provide both structure and meaning for the poem, which is designed as an appeal for
harmony upon three analogous planes—personal, political, and cosmic.

Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, was a younger man than Chapman and began his literary career when Chapman's was in its maturity. Herbert's prose writings indicate an awareness of the theories of Bruno and the optical experiments of Galileo, but the manner in which he refers to them implies that Herbert did not realize that the experiments had philosophic ramifications relating them to Bruno's speculations upon the infinity of worlds. The implication that Herbert accepted the conventional finite cosmology is borne out by his epistemology and aesthetics. He conceives of knowledge and beauty as being achieved by means of a proportion established between the microcosm and the macrocosm. Knowledge consists in a harmony between the individual mind and the ideal; beauty is the visible manifestation in the microcosm of the same proportion that is the order of the invisible macrocosm. The aesthetic standards that Herbert evokes in his poetry are much the same ones noticeable in Chapman's poetry—harmony, order, proportion, the circle of perfection—with the important exception that, whereas Chapman's harmony usually consists of a reconciliation of opposites, Herbert's harmony most often is symmetry or the equal apportioning of several parts. This difference in conception is the result of Herbert's preoccupation with the relationship of
the One and the Many. The One contains all things and the microcosm is most like the One when it contains as many things as possible; hence, the symmetrical disposition of several parts more nearly exemplifies ideal proportion than balanced opposites. In the sequence of philosophical love poems devoted to "Black" Herbert explores the implications of the color he considers most nearly like the One because it partakes of all other colors. By his rigorous application of proportion aesthetics Herbert thus arrives at a theory of color which inverts the traditional platonic and Christian color values.

In the poetry of Henry More it is possible to observe the effect of the physical expansion of the cosmos upon a poet's aesthetic principles. *Psychozoia* (1642) attempts to demonstrate the spirituality of all existence by explaining the nature of Psyche, the world-soul, and her relationship to the individual soul. More's traditional orientation is indicated by the form of *Psychozoia*, in which structure is provided by the macrocosm, the microcosm, and the relationship between them. Within the structure of the poem More relies upon the conventional standards of order, harmony, and proportion. *Psychatanasia* is concerned with the immortality of souls, particularly man's soul. More's belief in the correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm is reiterated by the fact that the demonstration of this immortality takes the form of an exposition of the Copernican theory of the universe. The poet's aesthetic reaction is ambivalent. Intellectually
he is committed to belief in an order and harmony he can no longer perceive in the universe, and the questions about it suggested by Copernicus and Galileo lead him to observe and appreciate qualities that are at variance with his intellectual position. Increasingly, *Psychathanasia* tends to find beauty in disorder, asymmetry, and vast spatial expanses in which no just proportion can be seen.

In *Psychathanasia* More is able to satisfy his doubts about the universe with the thought that its order is simply on too large a scale for man to grasp. However, after the publication of the 1642 poems, More's reading of Descartes convinced him that the universe is infinite; thus, the correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm is destroyed for him. *Democritus Platonissans* or *The Infinity of Worlds* (1646) reflects this change. Its very formlessness, in contrast to *Psychozoia*, gives testimony to the failure of microcosmism, and the shift is correlated in aesthetic terms by the pleasure the poet takes in multiplicity, variety, disorder, and asymmetry. Yet the formlessness of the poem is indicative of the aesthetic dilemma facing More. As a platonist he is convinced that the ideal world has form and order, which should be reflected in the microcosm of a poem, even if it is not in the universe, for the limits of the poem are definite. More's solution in writings subsequent to *Democritus Platonissans* is to return to proportional
aesthetics, which—since they are no longer embodied in
the physical universe—nullifies the previous theoretical
relationship of aesthetics and cosmology.

Henry More's later recantation of the infinity of
matter and his final conception of an indeterminate finite
world surrounded by infinite space fails to alleviate the
aesthetic problem. Galileo and Descartes have demonstrated
to him that the cosmos is extended beyond the limits of
man's comprehension; accepting this extension, whether
he considers it indefinite or actually infinite, negates
the validity of proportional aesthetics. The "Aesthetics
of the Infinite," attractive though they may be, provide
no effective substitute for the platonist because he con-
ceives of the ideal world in terms of order, to which in-
finity, the logical extension of the principle of pleni-
tude, reveals no clue. More's exuberant response to the
conception of infinity in Democritus Platonissans must
have seemed to him, in retrospect, particularly repro-
hensible because it did not penetrate to the order that
must exist in the sensible world. The compromise, appro-
priately presented in An Antidote against Atheism (1652),
of applying proportional aesthetics on a limited basis
will not bear logical scrutiny, for it only dodges the
question of over-all order and form in the sensible world.
The increasing pressure of mind-matter dualism forces More
to revamp his cosmology and thereby relegate aesthetics to
a subordinate position—a radical departure from the Renaissance platonism epitomized by Ficino and adapted to poetry by Chapman and Herbert.

The compromise aesthetic solution adumbrated by An Antidote and More's later aesthetic comments become sharply defined later in the century in the poetry of John Norris of Bemerton. Norris has a perhaps legitimate claim to be the spiritual descendant of Henry More since in 1685 he engaged in an exchange of philosophical letters with the elder man. Philosophically, Norris is interesting as a transitional figure. He obviously feels a strong attraction to the absolute idealism later advanced by Arthur Collier and Bishop Berkeley, but his unwillingness completely to eliminate the spirit-matter opposition keeps his theory tied to Descartes and Locke. Norris identifies the ideal world with the mind of God and concludes that we have greater certainty of the existence of the ideal world than the sensible world; as a result Norris never adequately explains the relation between the ideal and sensible worlds. Norris's poems published in 1687 depict a traditionally platonic version of a finite cosmology that is clearly inconsistent with his philosophical writings. In the realm of aesthetic standards he relies heavily upon harmony, particularly the harmony of the spheres, and symmetry; however, the numerous poems expressing
a completely transcendent attitude indicate well enough the fact that for Norris sensible beauty and standards for evaluating it have no essential function.\textsuperscript{7}

The collapse of the aesthetics of More and Norris suggests the reason why platonic poetry in England all but vanishes during the larger part of the eighteenth century, and why platonic aesthetics, once directly relevant to poetic practice, survive only in the semi-platonic speculation of men such as Shaftesbury, who formulated a theory of intuitive understanding proceeding from the whole to the parts, but with a subjective emphasis the seventeenth-century platonists would have disowned.\textsuperscript{8}

In platonic poetry aesthetic standards derived from cosmology directly dictated poetic form which itself reflects the world-view, as one finds in Chapman's \textit{Andromeda Liberata} or even More's \textit{Psychozoa}. This vital congruity of metaphysical and aesthetic belief in poetic form vanishes with More and reappears only when cosmology and aesthetics are reintegrated in the fearful symmetry of a Blake.\textsuperscript{9}
NOTES

1See André Chastel, Marsile Ficin et l'Art (Genève and Lille, 1954), and Art et Humanisme à Florence au Temps de Laurent le Magnifique (Paris, 1959). It should be noted, however, that Chastel's aesthetic interpretation of Ficino is in opposition to the orthodox position represented by Kristeller. See the review of Marsile Ficin by Sears Jayne, Renaissance News, XI (1958), 144-46.

2Rudolf Allers, "Microcosmus from Anaximandros to Paracelsus," Traditio, II (1944), esp. 393-96.


5The correspondence is printed as an appendix to Norris' The Theory and Regulation of Love (London, 1688).


7Norris versifies the Timaean cosmos in "A Divine Hymn on the Creation." For his employment of harmony see "Content," "Seraphic Love," "To the Memory of my dear Neece, M. C.," "Love," "On a Musician Supposed to be mad with Musick," "To Himself" and "The Elevation" are representative of the most "other-worldly" poems.


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