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ALLIANCE DISINTEGRATION IN A REALIST? WORLD

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis extends the existing research on alliance disintegration by more fully specifying the values which motivate states' foreign policy behaviors. Previous research held that security is the foremost good which states pursue. An implication of this assumption is that states forge alliance commitments solely in an effort to gain this good. I contend that not only do states desire security, they also desire proaction, defined as the ability to implement changes in those aspects of the status quo which are less than satisfactory. Furthermore, states may pursue one or both of these goods through their alliance activity. From this altered set of assumptions, more precise predictions are made with respect to the timing of alliance disintegration. I find that asymmetric alliances have the greatest probability of terminating when both parties are losing power while symmetric alliances are more likely to break up when only one state is decreasing in strength.
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INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1991, the political consultative committee to the Warsaw Pact met for the last time. The purpose of the meeting was to remove all vestiges of the defunct alliance (the preceding February had seen the end to all military cooperation between alliance members) by formally agreeing to dissolve any remaining political ties (Greenhouse 1991). This course of events, spurred on as it was by the fall of the Soviet Union, would have taken most international relations scholars by surprise at the height of the Cold War just a decade earlier. Even during those times in the late 1980's of nascent cooperation between the Superpowers, no one was predicting that the Cold War, along with the institutions through which it was played out, would come to such an abrupt end.

In response to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the conventional wisdom within the field of IR held that NATO would soon follow in its former enemy's footsteps. It was argued that the organization no longer had a driving force which could justify its existence. The threat which had spurred on its creation was gone. NATO was an alliance in need of a new mission. Whether it could find this mission was doubtful. However, five years later, the organization is still with us, with no indication that its end could be near.

Given the mis-predictions (or non-predictions as it were) regarding
the fate of what have arguably been the two most important instruments in
the game of power politics this century. I believe it is a fair assessment
that the field of international relations still has something to learn
about alliance disintegration.

If one were to look at the state of the literature on the subject,
however, it would appear that the field itself sees things differently.
Generally speaking, theorists in this discipline have not devoted much
attention to the topic, and when the subject is addressed, it is usually
mentioned only in passing. This fact reveals an obvious lack of interest
on the part of scholars in alliance disintegration. But more than that,
it reflects a general feeling held throughout the discipline that there is
not much to uncover on the topic that hasn't already been exposed.

Even with this widespread notion that the dynamics of alliance
termination are no mystery, I contend that there is more to the process
that we need to understand. The Warsaw Pact and NATO are cases in point.
This feeling of incompleteness in our understanding stems from a somewhat
novel way of conceptualizing the world. For most theorists, security is
the first and foremost good a state acquires. Without it, a nation will
not be able to focus on anything else, as its very existence will be in
question. Consequently, all other goods are secondary. Furthermore,
because security is given such priority, theorists tend to see most
actions undertaken by states, including their decisions involving
alliances as attempts at acquiring more security.

But what does this gain us? When everything becomes a struggle for security, the concept loses meaning. There can be no useful predictions made with respect to states' foreign policy behavior when every action is reduced to an attempt to gain this one good.

I argue that a more a plausible way of viewing the world exists. More specifically, states can and do value more than just security. They also value proaction, defined as the ability of a state to implement changes in those aspects of the status quo which are less than desirable. Now, this is not to say that all states value the two goods equally. In fact, the theory presented here, based on the work of Morgan and Palmer (1994, 1995a, 1995b), allows for a wide variety of preference types. It simply recognizes that there is more out there which states value than just security. This assumption, along with several others regarding the production advantages which different states have for these two goods, leads to specific predictions regarding the timing of (and motivations underlying) alliance disintegration.

What we find from the theory is that alliance termination is overwhelmingly associated with losses of power on the part of member states, relative to that of non-members. However, the exact conditions under which alliances are most likely to terminate will change depending on the power status of the states represented within these arrangements.
More specifically, the conditions most strongly associated with alliance termination are different for asymmetric alliances (those involving a major and a minor power) than they are for symmetric alliances (those involving two major powers or two minor powers). In the former case, the likelihood of an alliance breaking up is greater when both states are losing power than when only one state is declining in strength. The opposite holds true for alliances of the latter type. That is, the probability of a termination is greater when only one state is losing power than when both states are doing so.

These expectations are tested empirically on the set of bilateral alliances contained in the COW generated dataset, using information on states' capabilities collected under the auspices of Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972). Conclusions are drawn for the state of our knowledge on the subject and prospects for future research are laid out.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The notion of two or more states committing themselves to one another through an alliance has been of great interest to international relations scholars for hundreds, even thousands, of years. This tradition of interest has been carried into the present day and is reflected in the vast amount of work which has been completed on the subject. Monographs on alliance formation, the relationship between alliances and states' conflict behavior, and the types of burden sharing agreements to be found in these arrangements are all too familiar among devotees of the field.

But for as much attention as alliances have gotten over the years, it is hard to miss the fact that the concept of their disintegration has been little discussed. Simply put, scholars have not often asked the questions of when and why a state would choose to leave an alliance. Instead, theorists have focused their attention on such indirectly related questions as which factors impact the duration and/or cohesion of alliances.

To be fair, a couple of studies have moved closer than the work on alliance duration and cohesion to probing the questions of when and why states break their alliance commitments. I am referring mainly to the work of Berkowitz (1983). His basic aim was to identify the factors that would lead a state to reinforce its commitment to an International Treaty
Organization (ITO) when undertaking new foreign policy initiatives, and alternately, the factors that would encourage a state to undermine its existing commitments to ITO's when adopting new policies. Utilizing concepts from social choice theory, the author developed a model to predict when one or the other of these two behaviors was more likely to occur. Berkowitz's reasoning was that as the advantages from ITO membership increased, the likelihood of a confirming action should increase as well. On the other hand, as the advantages of membership decreased, the likelihood of such an action should decrease. Thus, what his model was really designed to do was determine when the benefits from ITO membership were on the rise and when they were on the slide.

Three variables were considered important in making this determination. They are similarity in the expressed policy preferences of an ITO member and its allies, similarity in the expressed policy preferences of an ITO member and non-members, and the capabilities of an ITO member relative to non-members. With respect to the first variable, Berkowitz argued that as a state's policy preferences diverged from those of its allies, the potential benefits from leaving the ITO would increase for that state. Thus, we should expect new foreign policy commitments undertaken by the state to be at odds with its existing commitment to the ITO. With respect to the second variable, the author reasoned that as a state's policy preferences diverged from those of non-members, the
potential costs of leaving the ITO would increase. As that happened, new foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the state should reinforce its existing commitment to the ITO. Lastly, Berkowitz argued that as a state's capabilities increased relative to that of non-members, episodes of new foreign policy initiatives which undermine existing ITO commitments should be more common. This is due to the fact that the state would be less likely to suffer negative consequences if it left the ITO as its enemies are now relatively less powerful.

In order to test his model, Berkowitz looked at thirty six cases in which a state either reinforced or undermined an existing commitment to an ITO when adopting new policies. Using probit analysis, Berkowitz was able to correctly predict the cases one-hundred percent of the time. And with a chi square significant at the 0.001 level, there is no doubt that his model has exceptional overall predictive power.

But for as well as Berkowitz's model does taken as a whole, it is important to note that none of the coefficients of the variables in the model were significant. Altfeld and Paik address this point in a 1986 piece. They feel that by only including instances of re-alignment in his analysis, Berkowitz was not adequately testing his model. To correct for this. Altfeld and Paik replicated Berkowitz's analysis, but this time, they included instances where a state neither confirmed nor disconfirmed. In other words, it did nothing. Forty-two such cases of non-realignment
were added to the study. Interestingly enough, the authors found that similarity in the expressed policy preferences of an ITO member and its allies had a statistically significant impact on a state's decision to re-affirm or undermine its existing commitments to ITO's. Capabilities of an ITO member relative to non-members, on the other hand, remained non-significant. This led the authors to the somewhat novel conclusion that "[I]ssue considerations tend, on the whole, to be more important than power considerations in making realignment decisions."

While these two studies come closer than the work on alliance duration and cohesion to probing the question of when and why states break their alliance commitments, they still do not address the question directly.

This observation, that alliance disintegration gets so little attention in the scholarly literature, should seem odd to the reader. Given all the time and energy that has been devoted to the topic of alliances more generally, one can not help but get the impression that they have important implications for the international arena. After all, why would scholars be interested in a phenomenon that was not relevant for the system as a whole? But if the existence of alliances impacts the workings of the international scene, would not their absence have implications for the system which are just as important?

The lack of interest on the part of scholars in this facet of
alliances is most likely a by-product of the way in which these entities are perceived. Overwhelmingly, theorists see alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities against external threats (Chaterjee 1972; Niou and Ordeshook 1986). That is, they replace internal efforts, such as increasing one's economic base and/or devoting more resources to one's military infrastructure, at deterring and defeating threats. Given this security enhancing function of alliances, the inevitable conclusion that most theorists reach is that once the threat that spurred on a particular alliance is gone, the reason for that alliance's existence will also evaporate (Holsti, Hoppmann and Sullivan 1985; Liska 1962; Kegley and Raymond 1994). Thus, an alliance commitment will be broken after the threat that generated it disappears. And this line of reasoning, being as straightforward as it is, does leave very little to discuss.

Admittedly, the level of theorizing on this subject is more advanced than what has been reflected above. Many scholars recognize that, in addition to providing benefits in the form of enhanced security, alliances may also impose costs on its members (Snyder 1984). Altfeld (1984) has pointed out one particularly important cost. That is the loss of autonomy which can accompany the decision to enter into such an arrangement. For Altfeld, the concept of autonomy relates to a state's freedom of choice when adopting positions on international issues. As a state increases its ability to make the policy choices it wants on salient issues, it
increases its level of autonomy. Now, when a country commits to a fellow system member through an alliance, it is pledging to act (or not act) in certain ways in the future. And in so doing, it is essentially limiting the options it can pursue, which limits its autonomy.

Another potential cost for a state, pointed out by Kegley and Raymond (1994), is the possibility of becoming embroiled in a conflict situation it would rather avoid. When a nation makes a commitment to another system member through an alliance, it takes on many of the interests and concerns of its ally as its own. Thus, when these interests and concerns are threatened, the state will often help to protect them, even though it is not in the country's own national interest (in the strictest sense of the word) to do so.

Scholars working from this costs vs. benefits view of alliances have overwhelmingly concluded that a state will remain committed to such an arrangement only as long as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. And not surprisingly, when the costs begin to exceed the benefits, this is when we should expect to see states break their alliance commitments. While this makes perfect intuitive sense, there is one problem. It is the fact that it is nearly impossible to tell exactly when a state no longer derives sufficient benefits from an alliance, given the costs, to want to remain in the arrangement. This is due to the fact that it is extremely hard to quantify the benefits a state derives from any one alliance. This
aside, theorists have been able to pinpoint some situations in which the probability of costs outweighing benefits, for at least one member to the arrangement, is fairly high.

Morgenthau (1960) has reflected on one such situation. When a state experiences increases in its capabilities, to the point where it no longer needs an ally or allies to meet existing threats, it is very likely that the benefits the state derives from the arrangement are no longer sufficient to warrant the costs. Before its increase in capabilities, the state was relying on its ally to help meet its security needs. But now, it no longer has to do that. It can rely solely on its own resources. And given the fact that the costs of the alliance have probably not been affected, this decrease in benefits raises the likelihood that costs exceed benefits.

The flip side to the above situation is the one in which an ally's capabilities decrease to the point where it is no longer able to keep its end of the bargain. In other words, the benefits a state was receiving from an alliance are no longer forthcoming from its ally. When this happens, one of two things could result. Either a renegotiation occurs to put the costs to the state whose capabilities remained the same more in line with the decreased benefits it is receiving, or the state could simply decide that the alliance is not worth maintaining and decide to break it up.
Yet a third situation in which the costs of an alliance may come to exceed the benefits for a member state has been analyzed by Scarborough and Bueno de Mesquita (1988). They looked at the severity of threat to one's allies and tried to determine what effect this variable has on the resiliency of alliances. Their argument was that anytime an ally is threatened, the costs of associating with that nation will be high. Moreover, the costs which accompany a severe credible threat to an ally are higher than those which accompany a modest credible threat. From this, the authors concluded that the likelihood of costs exceeding benefits will be greater the more severe the threat. Thus, there is a greater probability that a state will terminate an alliance commitment when an ally is faced with a severe credible threat than when faced with a more modest threat (see also Ward 1982).

Now of course, being pulled into the conflicts of one's allies (the worst possible result of threats to one's allies) was discussed above as a potential cost to states. However, it is a cost that states take on all the time. So threats to an ally do not, in and of themselves, imply that the costs of an alliance will exceed benefits. Thus, one may think Scarborough and Bueno de Mesquita's argument contradicts this line of reasoning. But not really. Their point is simply that as the threat to an ally becomes more severe, the costs to a state rise, making it more likely that costs will exceed benefits and that the alliance will be
terminated.

Even with these refinements to the logic of alliances, the topic of their disintegration is still pretty straightforward. Anything that increases the costs of remaining in such an arrangement, relative to benefits, or decreases the benefits of adhering to such a commitment, relative to costs, will contribute to the dissolution of an alliance. However, Morrow (1987, 1991) has gone on to argue that the motivations underlying alliance dynamics are more complicated than even what the theorists working from a costs vs. benefits basis believe. What scholars have not recognized is that alliances do not merely bring security to the parties involved. They can advance other interests as well. More specifically, alliances can lead to increases in states' autonomy.

Morrow first made this point in a 1987 piece whose main purpose was to develop a measure of national risk attitude toward conflict. With respect to this, Morrow argued that the more a state values what it could potentially gain in war relative to what it could potentially lose, the more risk acceptant that state is. But by assumption, a state gains autonomy if victorious in war and loses security if defeated. Thus, the more that autonomy is valued relative to security, the more risk acceptant a state is. Furthermore, this valuation can be inferred from a state's alliance behavior. This is possible because alliances can bring either security or autonomy benefits to a state. In fact, every decision to
enter into such an arrangement involves a "substitution judgment" between the two. So the more of one benefit a state seeks from its overall alliance profile, the less important the other benefit must be in the eyes of that state.

Given the way that we have seen autonomy defined before (Altfeld 1984), it is hard to imagine how Morrow's assertions could hold true. But in fact, Morrow adheres to a definition of the term which is somewhat different from the normal usage and which makes the notion of a state gaining autonomy from an alliance possible. It is to this that I now turn the reader's attention.

In the international realm, there are a series of issues over which states will disagree. On some of these issues, the current resolution may be close to that which a state would consider an ideal resolution. On other issues however, the status quo could be nothing like a state's ideal position. In these instances, it may be the case that the state would like to see changes made to the status quo. It is this situation which gives rise to Morrow's definition of autonomy. More specifically, the greater a state's ability to adopt desired policies aimed at seeking changes in the status quo, the greater that state's autonomy.

Thus, an alliance which in any way furthers a state's ability to adopt policies seeking change would be, according to Morrow, an alliance which furthers that state's autonomy. An example of such an alliance.
provided by Morrow (1991), would be an instance where a major power aligns with a minor power with the former pledging to come to the aid of the latter and the latter offering concessions to the former. These concessions could involve the placement of military bases on the minor power's land or simply changes in the policies adopted by the minor power. Either way, these concessions place the major power in a more advantageous position with respect to its attempts to bring about change in the status quo.

Given this new way of looking at alliances, the questions of when and why a state will choose to terminate an existing commitment is not so straightforward anymore. The motivations for entering and exiting such arrangements have been made more complicated than previously thought. Thus, let us turn our attention to what this new way of thinking implies for the topic of alliance disintegration.
THEORY

In the preceding chapter, I introduced the idea, first developed by Morrow (1987, 1991), that alliances may provide benefits beyond that of increasing a state's security. More specifically, I argued that these arrangements also have the potential to enhance a nation's ability to initiate changes in those aspects of the status quo which are less than satisfactory. This assumption, while intuitively plausible (of course states consider more than just their security when making alliance decisions), is fairly radical in the sense that it contradicts most work which has gone before it. But more important than that, it influences the way we perceive alliance dynamics. No longer do these arrangements merely serve as a way of meeting and overcoming threats. They fulfill other needs as well. Thus, it is clear that the motivations for entering (and leaving) alliances are more complicated than once thought. Given this, it is only fair to assume that many of the conclusions reached by theorists, based as they are on an incomplete understanding of the workings of alliances, are somewhat suspect.

The above point begs the question of just what this unconventional assumption implies for our reasoning on alliances. While I do not have the space here to discuss what is implied for all aspects of these arrangements, I can probe the implications for one particular facet of
these entities - their termination. To see how this altered way of thinking on alliances affects our thinking regarding their disintegration. I present a formal model of foreign policy decision making.

The model to be propounded here is based heavily on the work of Morgan and Palmer (1994, 1995a. 1995b). From a series of assumptions on the motivations underlying state behavior (including the assumption of interest) and the ability of nations to pursue desired behaviors, a number of general hypotheses regarding state action are derived. The hypothesized relationships, being general in the sense that they do not specify any one particular foreign policy action, serve as the conduit through which inferences are made on the specific behavior of interest here, i.e., alliance disintegration. Of course, the implications of the model are not limited to states' alliance decisions. A wide range of activities can be explained with this theory. Thus, what is to be presented here is actually just one part of a general theory of foreign policy behavior.

Now, it should be pointed out that, while the model is different enough to encompass this new thinking on alliances, it nonetheless has many of the attributes which more traditional treatises in the field have. For example, the model is decidedly state centric. Assumptions are made regarding the values which states pursue in their foreign policies, not the values sought by other types of actors. Also, as the reader will see
shortly, the factors assumed to affect the ability of nations to pursue various behaviors of interest are all grounded in the international environment: factors internal to a state are not considered. This is not to say that the theory is incapable of accommodating assumptions which focus on the role of domestic political constraints in states' foreign policy decision making. Just the opposite is true. However, before I move on to such refinements of the model, the explanatory value of the more simple set of assumptions needs to be explored first.

The Assumptions

At any point in time within the international arena, there are a number of issues over which states struggle. In effect, the nations within the system are always trying to implement those outcomes on the issues which are most favorable for them. Now, with respect to any one particular nation, it will likely be the case that the status quo on some issues will conform to that state's preferences while the status quo on other issues will not. For those dimensions on which a state is relatively pleased, we should expect a nation to engage in activity which attempts to maintain the status quo. This will be defined as security seeking behavior. Alternately, for those dimensions on which a state is relatively displeased, we should expect activity which attempts to undermine the status quo. This will be defined as proaction seeking
behavior. Thus, any action undertaken by a state will be either security seeking or proaction seeking, and the entire set of policies adopted by a state will reflect its desired levels of security and proaction (Morgan and Palmer 1995b).

It should be noted that any particular action undertaken by a state can be interpreted as a security enhancing measure in one instance while being judged a proaction seeking measure under a completely different set of circumstances. The meaning imparted to an action will depend on the motivation underlying it (Morgan and Palmer 1995b). Take defense spending as an example. If a nation increases the amount it spends on defense because it sees its neighbors doing so, we would most likely say that that is a security seeking measure. On the other hand, if a state increases its spending on defense with no provocation from others, but rather with the intent of projecting its forces at some point in the future, we would say that that action is a proaction seeking measure.

While it is the case that states actively pursue security and proaction, there are limits to how much of these two goods any one state can provide itself. These limits are dictated by the foreign policy environment (Morgan and Palmer 1995b). Several factors play into the determination of the amount of security and proaction a state can acquire. Among these are the foreign policies of other actors on the international scene, the existing level of technology, and geography. But the most
important factor by far is one's power relative to other states. Holding everything else constant, the stronger a state is, the more of these two goods it can gain for itself.

This line of reasoning can be depicted graphically. In Figure 1, we have a two dimensional space. The horizontal axis represents the level of proaction available to a state and the vertical axis reflects the amount of security which a state could obtain. The particular mix of security and proaction for a state is simply represented as a point in this 2-space (note that every state will fall in Quadrant I, reflecting non-negative levels of these two goods). The line with the negative slope cutting across the first quadrant of the space is the production possibility frontier. It shows the maximum amount of security and proaction possible given all the factors mentioned earlier - relative power, the foreign policies of others, etc. If a state is at a point below this frontier, it can increase its amount of both goods. However, if a state falls on the frontier itself, it can only increase the level of one good at the expense of the other. The other curves represented in Figure 1 are a state's indifference contours. Nation-states derive more utility from points on curves further out from the origin than from points on curves closer to the origin. However, states are indifferent between points on any one particular curve. These indifference contours determine exactly where on the production frontier a state will fall. The specific security-
Figure 1: Security and Proaction: The Goals of Foreign Policy

Source: Morgan and Palmer, 1995b
proaction mix for a state will be the point at which an indifference contour is tangent to the frontier. This insures that a state will get the largest amount of the two goods which is possible that also gives it the maximum amount of utility possible. The point of tangency in Figure 1 is indicated by the letter A.

Now, to see how a state can acquire more security and proaction as it increases its power, I turn the reader’s attention to the production possibility frontier. As a state enhances its capabilities, again holding everything else constant, its production frontier moves out in the space, away from the origin. As this happens, it is the case that the specific security-proaction mix the state enjoys also moves further away from the origin, since it falls on the new frontier. And the farther away from the origin a point is, the more security and proaction a state enjoys. Point B in Figure 1 reflects an enhanced security-proaction mix.

The last set of assumptions which the model makes specifies the relationship between a state’s power and its ability to acquire security and proaction. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2. In the first graph of Figure 2, security is plotted as a function of power. The horizontal axis represents the level of power attained by a state while the vertical axis shows the amount of security which would result from the various power levels if all available capabilities were channeled into producing security. The second graph in Figure 2 is similar to the first
Figure 2: Provision of Security and Proaction as a Function of Power

2a) Power and Security

Amount of Security that Can Be Purchased

Power

Source: Morgan and Palmer, 1995b

2b) Power and Proaction

Amount of Proaction that Can Be Purchased

Power

Source: Morgan and Palmer, 1995b
except that proaction is now being plotted as a function of power. Not surprisingly, the curves in both graphs are increasing, implying that as one's power increases so does the amount of security and proaction obtained. This is consistent with what was said earlier. However, the more interesting information provided in Figure 2 is the rate at which these two functions increase. Note how the two differ. With respect to security, every additional unit of power buys a state smaller and smaller increments of the good. The graph is increasing at a marginally decreasing rate. On the other hand, where proaction is concerned, each additional unit of power buys more of the good than the preceding unit. The graph is increasing at a marginally increasing rate (Morgan and Palmer 1995b). Thus, any gain in power put towards security seeking behavior will yield greater benefits for a state when it is weak than when it is strong. However, any gain in power put towards proaction seeking behavior will yield greater benefits for a state when it is strong than when it is weak.

General Conclusions

Having just detailed the major assumptions of the model, we can now move on to the derivation of several general hypotheses regarding the relationship between environmental factors and states' foreign policies. These hypotheses, while being general in the sense that they do not
specify any particular foreign policy behaviors, are important to discuss in that they will guide us later in the derivation of specific hypotheses regarding alliance disintegration.

We saw earlier that as a nation experiences increases in its ability to provide security and proaction for itself, due to increases in its level of capabilities relative to others, these new circumstances will be reflected in the production possibility frontier. What was not addressed was the form of the relationship between increases in power and the level of security and proaction which a state can acquire. In other words, we know that as a nation's power increases, the production possibility frontier for that state will move out in the space. However, we do not know the manner in which it will do so. That is, we do not know how the slope of the frontier will be affected. Yet, from the assumptions embodied in Figure 2, we do know that an increase in power will have different effects on different states. More specifically, an increase in capabilities will enable a state to see greater gains security-wise when it is weak than when it is strong but enable it to see greater gains proaction-wise when it is strong than when it is weak. It is this "fact" that will be reflected in the production frontiers. Figure 3 should help in making this point.

Depicted there-in are five production possibility frontiers and five indifference contours. With respect to the former, notice how the change
Figure 3: Power, Changes in Power, and Foreign Policy
State Prefers Security and Proaction About Equally

Source: Morgan and Palmer, 1995b
in slope from one production frontier to the next is initially steeper with respect to the security axis, reflecting the production advantage that weak states have in security. Gradually however, the change in slope becomes steeper with respect to the proaction axis, reflecting the production advantage that strong states have in proaction. Now, to see how these changes affect the levels of security and proaction which can be gained, we need to look at the points of tangency between the production frontiers and the indifference contours. These are connected by a solid line in Figure 3. We see that as a state moves from the first to the last frontier, the ratio of security gains to proaction gains changes. First, the state receives more of the former than the latter. However, as the state keeps moving out, just the opposite happens. Proaction gains begin to outweigh security gains.

But what about decreases in power? What can we say regarding state behavior in times of power losses? Figure 3 can again serve as a guide. Instead of moving from the production possibility frontier closest to the origin out into the space, if we start at the frontier furthest away from the origin and move in (reflecting a situation of decreasing power), we see that power cuts affect both the security and proaction behavior of states. That is, they pursue less of both in such situations. However, the type of behavior which will be given the most attention will, again, depend on where a state falls in the power spectrum. Stronger states will
make larger cutbacks in their proaction seeking measures (moving from frontier 5 to 4) whereas weaker states will focus their efforts on their security seeking behavior (moving from frontier 2 to 1).

It should be pointed out that the indifference contours in Figure 3 reflect a state with approximately equal preferences for security and proaction. Would the above conclusions change if we were dealing with a state who preferred more of one good than the other? Well, let us look at a state with a more traditional set of preferences, i.e., one who values security highly, and see if the same holds true. In Figure 4, we see the same five production possibility frontiers, but now have contours which are elongated horizontally, reflecting a state with a strong preference for security. As the reader can see, every increase in power, regardless of where the state is on the power spectrum, will have an overwhelming percentage going to security seeking behavior. Proaction gains never outweigh security gains in an absolute sense. However, it is still the case that the level of proaction gains are greater when the state is stronger than when it is weaker while the level of security gains are greater when the state is weaker than when it is stronger. And this is something that will hold true regardless of preference type.

An example with some concrete numbers may help clarify this exposition. Say a state which values security and proaction about equally garners ten additional units of power when it is on the low end of the
Figure 4: Power, Changes in Power, and Foreign Policy
State Prefers Security More Highly Than Proaction

Source: Morgan and Palmer, 1995b
power spectrum. From the assumptions made above, we should expect the state to devote a larger percentage of the increase to security seeking behavior. So let us say it breaks the ten units down into six units going to security and four going to proaction. Now, several power additions later, the same state gains another ten units, but this time, it is on the high end of the power spectrum. From the assumptions made earlier, we should expect the state to devote a larger percentage of the increase to proaction seeking behavior. So let us say it breaks the ten units down into only four units going to security and six going to proaction. Moving on to similar scenarios for a state that values security much more highly than proaction, a ten unit power increase in the first situation would have the state devoting most of the units to security seeking behavior. So we should see something like an eight-two split in favor of security behavior. When such a state is on the high end of the power spectrum, the additional power units will still be overwhelmingly devoted to security, but this time, more of the units will go to proaction seeking behavior than was the case before. Thus, we should expect to see something like a six-four split in favor of security.

But what actual conclusions do we draw from all this? The main conclusion is that the impact on a state's foreign policy of a given change in capabilities will depend on the state's standing within the power spectrum. Since states are able to see greater gains security-wise
from increases in their power when they are weak compared to when they are strong, they will devote a larger amount of any increase to the pursuit of security in the former situation. It only makes sense that they do this because in doing so, they get the most back from their investment (of increased capabilities). With respect to proaction benefits, states are able to see greater gains from increases in their power when they are strong than when they are weak. Thus, we should expect to see states committing a larger amount of any increase they experience to the pursuit of proaction during times of relative strength.

So what we are really seeing is that changes in power do have an effect on the security and proaction seeking policies of states. But again, the strength of this effect depends on where a state is relative to others on the power spectrum. Changes in power will have an impact on the security behavior of all states, but the magnitude of this impact will vary inversely with the relative power of the state. That is, changes in capabilities will have more of an impact on the security seeking behavior of states when they are weak than when they are strong. On the other hand, the magnitude of the impact of a change in power on a state's proaction behavior will vary directly with the relative power of the state. Changes in capabilities will have more of an impact on the proaction seeking behavior of states when they are strong than when they are weak. And as a state becomes more indifferent between the two goods,
what we should expect to see is that a change in power will have much less of an effect overall on the state's security seeking behavior when it is strong while such a change will have little impact on the state's proaction seeking behavior when it is weak.

Implications for Alliance Disintegration

The main conclusion reached in the last section was that changes in power have less of an effect on the security seeking behavior of states when they are strong compared to when they are weak while just the opposite holds true for states' proaction seeking behavior. Using this as the point of departure in the effort to derive hypotheses on alliance disintegration, one of the first things which needs to be done is to determine how a state's alliance activity corresponds to the notions of security seeking and proaction seeking behavior.

Morrow (1991) is useful in this respect. He looks at the relative power of states and from this, determines the types of benefits that different pairings of nations bring to its members. For example, Morrow looks at the situation where two strong powers come together in an alliance. He argues that such a pairing of states will have each country gaining security benefits at the expense of autonomy benefits. The situation is similar for two weak nations that align with one another. Both parties to the alignment will experience increases in their levels of
security while undergoing decreases in their levels of proaction.¹

Alliances of these types closely resemble that which more traditional theorists propound as the typical alliance. Threats, or other events in the international environment, have convinced two states that it would be in their interest to work together and combine their resources. While this puts them in a better position to deal with any contingencies, there are costs involved in the decision to ally. Each state has to devote a certain amount of its resources to the alliance just to keep it going. This means that fewer resources will be available to devote to other efforts. Thus, the states participating in the alliance will be in a worse position to go on the offensive and work for changes in the system.

The third (and last) type of state pairing which Morrow analyses involves a strong power aligning with a weak power. He argued that when a large, strong state forms an alliance with a small, weak state, the arrangement would see the former giving up some of its security for proaction benefits whereas the latter would relinquish some proaction for security benefits. The large state, having security benefits to spare, typically pledges to aid in the defense of the small nation's security interests. This has the effect of putting the large state at risk of becoming involved in disputes it would otherwise not want to take part in, thus decreasing its security. In return for this aid, the weak state, not
having much in the way of security to offer but having an abundance of proaction with which to bargain, makes one or more concessions called for by the large state. This could involve the weak state changing its position on a salient issue to more closely match the preferences of the large state. It could mean that the weak state has agreed to allow the large state to place bases on its territory, which could also involve an outlay of resources on the part of the small state. But whatever form these concessions take, the weak nation will not be as able as before to call for desired changes in the status quo, thus experiencing a decrease in its level of proaction benefits.

Now that I have outlined the three types of alliance dyads possible and have discussed the benefits provided by each, it is time to determine what is implied for alliance disintegration in each of these situations.

Let me begin by discussing the strong state-weak state alliance pairing with the former receiving proaction benefits and the latter gaining security benefits. What we need to be asking ourselves is what happens when one or both parties to the alliance experience a decrease in their power. Let's look first at the consequences of only the weak state losing capabilities. When a relatively weak state experiences a power loss, it will have to cut back on some of its security seeking behavior. Getting out of an alliance in which it receives security benefits is one way of doing this. But remember, it probably has a number of options to
choose from when cutting back. And it is very likely that the security benefits the state is receiving from the arrangement are large enough that it will seek out other, less beneficial, means of cutting back on its security seeking behavior. Thus, while there is a positive probability that the state will want to terminate the alliance, it is not going to be that high given that there are other ways to accomplish the necessary cut backs. In addition, it should be pointed out that the weak state's power decrease should have no impact on the strong state's desire to maintain the alliance. Because it is receiving proaction benefits from the weak country which are not based on power considerations, the strong nation will not experience less satisfaction from the arrangement because of its partner's power loss.

Turning the tables, let us look at what happens when the strong state experiences a loss of capabilities. The probability of alliance termination is also positive in such situations, and in fact, is higher than when the weaker country loses power. This is true for a couple of reasons. First, the larger nation will want to cut back on its proaction seeking behavior. Again, terminating the alliance is one way of doing this. But in this instance, the desire of the larger state to make the necessary cut backs through the alliance will be greater than it was for the weak state. This is due to the fact that the ratio of costs to benefits is different for the two types of states. Generally, the level
of security benefits the weak state receives far outweighs any costs (in the form of decreased proaction benefits) it incurs. But what this means is that the amount of proaction benefits the strong state receives is only a small fraction of what it gives up in terms of security. So the probability of there being other things which give the strong state more proaction benefits (and which it wants to preserve more) is higher than the probability of there being other things which give the small state more security benefits (and which it wants to preserve more).

By far, the largest probability of an alliance termination in these kinds of dyads occurs when both states lose power. In addition to the separate dynamics working against the life of the alliance mentioned above, the weak state is now going to be more likely to focus on the alliance as a way of decreasing its security seeking behavior due to the fact that it will be more disillusioned with the arrangement.

When the strong state loses power, even if it does not target the alliance directly in its efforts to cut back on its proaction seeking behavior, it is going to have to make cuts somewhere. This will affect the standing of the nation within the international arena. The state very likely will not be regarded as highly as before. And this will affect the weaker country's perception of the benefits it receives from the arrangement. In other words, even though nothing may objectively change in the alliance, the weak state will think its ally is not as able to
provide the benefits it once did, and consequently, will be more disillusioned with the agreement. The probabilities of disintegration for each of the situations discussed above are comparatively displayed in Figure 5.

Next, let me turn the reader's attention to those alliances which pair two strong states together and which have both parties to the alliance receiving security benefits. When either state experiences a decrease in power, it has to cut back on its proaction seeking behavior. But this does not affect the alliance directly since the alliance is bringing security benefits to both parties. In other words, we should not expect to see the state who has lost power to take resources away from the alliance. However, the state whose power is not decreasing will feel that it is not getting the amount of security benefits from the alliance that it once did. The logic is the same as before. Given this, the state whose capabilities are not changing will experience a decrease in benefits while its costs stay constant. Thus, there is a positive probability that the state who is not experiencing a power loss will want to terminate the alliance. But what if both states are decreasing in power? If both are losing capabilities, each state perceives the other as being less able to provide benefits which makes them both more disillusioned with the arrangement. But at the same time, each country should realize that its ally is also unhappy with the agreement. This dissatisfaction on both
Figure 5:
Probability of Termination in Asymmetric Alliances

Figure 6:
Probability of Termination in Symmetric Alliances
Involving Two Major Powers

Figure 7:
Probability of Termination in Symmetric Alliances
Involving Two Minor Powers
parts will more likely lead to a re-negotiation of the terms of the arrangement than a termination. However, it is possible that both countries will agree that it is no longer in either state's interest to maintain the alliance and will break off any commitments. Thus, the probability of a termination is positive in such situations, but it is not as high as when only one state is losing power. This expectation is reflected in Figure 6.

Lastly, I will discuss those alliance dyads which pair two weak states together and which also have both parties to the alliance receiving security benefits. Again, the probability of an alliance termination is greater when only one state is losing capabilities than when both are doing so because of the same dynamics discussed above. However, when taken in absolute terms, the probability of an alliance disintegrating when one state loses power is greater than the probability given a strong state-strong state pairing. This is due to the fact that a weak state will need to cut back on security seeking behavior when it finds itself in such situations whereas this was not the case for the strong state. Thus, in addition to the party whose capabilities remain unchanged being disillusioned with the arrangement, the state whose capabilities are declining will also feel some kind of a pressure to break off its commitment. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Having specified the conditions under which various types of alliances are likely to disintegrate, I am now in a position to operationalize and test these contentions. The specific hypotheses to be tested will be laid out and a discussion undertaken regarding the data sources used, the measures constructed as proxies for the relevant concepts, and the forms of the various tests.

In looking at states' power levels and changes in those levels, the model produces a number of hypotheses on the timing of alliance termination.

H1: An alliance between a strong state and a weak state will be terminated by the strong state more often than by the weak state.

H2: The likelihood of an alliance between a strong and a weak state being terminated increases as the power of the strong state declines.

H3: In an alliance between two strong states or two weak states, the probability of the alliance being terminated is greater when one state loses power than when both states lose power.

H4: In an alliance between two strong states or two weak states, the greater the loss of power by one state, the greater the probability that the alliance will be terminated.

The first step in testing these hypotheses is to classify a state as either weak or strong. For this, I use Singer and Small's distinction between major and minor powers (Small and Singer 1982). Undoubtedly,
there is some slippage between this measure and the concept as propounded in the theory. A major power on the slide may look more like an advancing minor power than any of its major power companions. For the most part, however, major powers are the influential players in the international arena and are on the high end of the power spectrum. At the same time, minor powers do not generally carry as much weight in the system as major powers and are overwhelmingly on the low end of the power spectrum.

For my universe of cases, I used the list of alliances generated by the Correlates of War project (Small and Singer 1969), as updated by Sabrosky (1980), with one important qualification. And that is that the analysis was restricted to those alliances on the Sabrosky list involving two and only two states. The reason I chose to limit the study this way is that the theory is developed at the dyadic level of analysis. And while we should expect some similarity in the dynamics of bilateral and multilateral alliances, there may in fact be more at work in multilateral agreements than is the case for their bilateral counterparts. Thus, in order to stay true to the theory, I prohibited alliances involving three or more states from the analysis.

While the focus of the study is on bilateral alliances, the alliance itself is not the unit of analysis. For this, I chose to use the alliance year. This means that every alliance included in the study will contribute as many cases to the analysis as there were years in which the
agreement was in existence. For example, if an alliance was formed between two countries in 1856 and ended in 1864, there would be nine observations for that one alliance. My reasons for structuring the tests in this way will become clearer when I discuss the measurement of the dependent variable.

Aside from knowing which alliance to include in the study, information is required regarding the capabilities of the states who are parties to these arrangements. For this, I used the composite indicator of national capabilities score (CINC) developed by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972).

The Independent Variables

In the first hypothesis, the independent variable is the power status of the state initiating termination. Unfortunately, however, information on the identity of the state terminating an alliance has not been coded into Sabrosky's data set (or any other data set of which I am aware). Thus, the only way to get this information would be to go back to the historical record itself. And given the complexities and time-consuming nature of such a task, I have elected not to test this hypothesis.

The next hypothesis has as its independent variable the direction of change in the power of the strong member to an asymmetric alliance. For
each state in the study which matched this description, change in power scores were calculated by taking the CINC score for any one particular year a state was in an alliance and subtracting its CINC score from the preceding year. Of course, no change in power scores were calculated for the first year a state was in an alliance. It is from these change in power scores that the independent variable was created. If the change in power score for the major power to an asymmetric alliance was positive or zero, the independent variable took on a value of zero. If this number was negative, the independent variable took on a value of one. Thus, when the strong state in an asymmetric alliance was increasing in power (or staying the same), the independent variable was valued at zero. But when the strong state was decreasing in power, the independent variable took on a value of one.

For the third hypothesis, I looked at all cases involving two major powers or two minor powers. I then calculated change in power scores similar to those described above. This information allowed me to create a trichotomous independent variable. If both parties to an alliance were not losing power (were increasing or staying the same), the independent variable took on a value of zero. If both were losing power, the variable took on a value of one. And if one state was losing power while the other was increasing or staying the same, the variable was given a value of two.

Unlike the previous two hypotheses, Hypothesis 4 has an independent
variable which is measured continuously, but like the last two hypotheses, this variable also involves the change in power scores described above. Once these scores were calculated, the independent variable was created by first taking this change score for every year in which a state was in an alliance and dividing it by the country's CINC score for the previous year. This gives the rate at which a state was changing power. Of course, no such values were generated for the first year of alliance participation. Now, because the hypothesis only speaks to symmetric alliances in which one state is losing power, it was this subset of observations which was used to create the independent variable. That is, years of participation in symmetric alliances in which both states were gaining power, losing power, or staying the same were ignored. Given this select group of observations from which I was working, the construction of the independent variable was straightforward. The variable simply took on as its value the rate of change score for the state losing power. An example may help clarify what I mean. Say there was an alliance between two major powers and in the second year of the agreement's existence, one state lost power at a rate of .05 from the previous year while the other gained power at a rate of .25. For this observation, the independent variable would take on the value of -.05. Thus, while the rate of change variable can theoretically take on any value between -1 and infinity, in reality it only took on values from -1 to zero (non-inclusive).
The Dependent Variable

For all three hypotheses which will be tested, the dependent variable is the probability of alliance termination. The measure I constructed for this variable is dichotomous in nature and was coded zero for those years in which an alliance did not terminate and one for the year in which an alliance did terminate.3

The Tests

The test I ran for Hypothesis 2 was a simple 2 x 2 contingency table. What the theory leads us to expect is that a greater percentage of instances of alliance termination will occur when the independent variable is valued at one (the major power is decreasing in strength) than when it is valued at zero (the major power is not decreasing in strength).

For the third hypothesis, I ran a 2 x 3 contingency table. If the theory is supported, we should see the percentage of instances of alliance termination increase as the independent variable goes from zero (neither state losing power) to one (both states losing power) to two (one and only one state losing power).

With the last hypothesis, since the independent variable is measured continuously and the dependent variable is dichotomous in nature, I ran a probit analysis. The theory states that the greater the rate at which a state loses power, the greater the probability that termination will
occur. Thus, given the way the independent variable is measured, we should expect a negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables. That is, as the former variable gets closer and closer to -1, the likelihood of getting a value of one on the latter variable should increase.⁴
RESULTS

The results of the analysis are displayed in Tables 1 through 5. In Table 1, the plot of the independent variable for Hypothesis 2 with the dependent variable is shown. To see whether support for the theory is present, we must look to the column percents of the independent variable within the category "terminate" of the dependent variable. The percentage of observations in the first category of the independent variable (major power not decreasing in strength) which terminated is 4.8 while the percentage of observations in the second category of the independent variable (major power decreasing in strength) which terminated is 6.8. This fits with the expectations of the model since it was hypothesized that asymmetric alliances which have the major power declining in power are more likely to terminate than those in which the major power is not declining in power.

This support for the theory is welcomed. However, it should be noted that the chi square statistic for the table is 1.71, indicating a lack of statistical significance in the relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, the appropriate measure of association, Yule's Q, is only .183, implying a lack of substantive significance as well.5

Table 2 depicts the plot of the independent variable for Hypothesis 3 against the dependent variable. Again, evidence for or against the
Table 1: Test of Hypothesis 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Major Power Not Decreasing in Strength</th>
<th>Major Power Decreasing in Strength</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Termination</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.17</td>
<td>64.83</td>
<td>93.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>72.73</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.69</td>
<td>65.31</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

N=1081
Yule's Q = 0.183
Table 2: Test of Hypothesis 3 Involving All Symmetric Alliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency Row Percent</th>
<th>Neither State Losing Power</th>
<th>Both States Losing Power</th>
<th>One State Losing Power</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column Percent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Termination</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>651</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27.19</td>
<td>39.02</td>
<td>33.79</td>
<td>89.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.85</td>
<td>89.44</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>10.15</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.95</td>
<td>38.85</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=731  
Gamma = 0.063
theory will be found in the column percents of the independent variable within the category "terminate" of the dependent variable. Support would come in the form of increasing column percents as we move from the lowest value on the independent variable (neither state losing power) to the highest value on that variable (one state losing power). And this, in fact, is what we find. Of those observations falling within the "neither losing" category, only 10.15 percent were recorded terminations. Meanwhile, 10.56 percent of the observations in the "both losing" category were coded as terminations while 12.00 percent of the observations in the "one losing" category fell in the "termination" category of the dependent variable. This is consistent with the expectations as laid out in Hypothesis 3.

As was the case with Table 1, the variables in Table 2 display a lack of statistical and substantive significance. This is revealed through the chi square and gamma statistics. The former is .4549 and the latter is .063, both imperceptible given the critical value of 4.6051 for the significance measure (.1 level) and the -1 to 1 range on the association statistic.

If one will recall, I ran two additional contingency tables for Hypothesis 3. One included only major powers while the other included only minor powers. The results of these additional runs can be seen in Tables 3 and 4. On the whole, there does seem to be differences between
Table 3: Test of Hypothesis 3 Involving Symmetric Alliances Between Major Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency Row Percent</th>
<th>Neither State Losing Power</th>
<th>Both States Losing Power</th>
<th>One State Losing Power</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Termination</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
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<td>24.64</td>
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<td></td>
<td>88.14</td>
<td>90.91</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22.86</td>
<td>57.14</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Column Totals</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.98</td>
<td>35.77</td>
<td>40.24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N=246

Gamma = 0.273
Table 4: Test of Hypothesis 3 Involving Symmetric Alliances Between Minor Powers

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Neither State Losing Power</th>
<th>Both States Losing Power</th>
<th>One State Losing Power</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Percent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Termination</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>141</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.41</td>
<td>39.55</td>
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<td>90.58</td>
<td>88.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
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<td>28.89</td>
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<td>28.45</td>
<td>40.41</td>
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</table>

N=485
Gamma = -0.113
the two groups of states. With respect to the major powers, the 
distribution of the independent variable along the category of interest 
within the dependent variable is very similar to the overall distribution. 
The greatest percentage of terminations occur when only one state is 
losing power. Some discrepancy comes in, however, when the comparison is 
made between the first and second categories of the independent variable. 
Observations where neither state is losing power have a greater percentage 
of terminations than do the observations where both are losing power.

In contrast, the minor powers are consistent with the overall 
expectations when the column percents for the first two categories of the 
independent variable are compared. It is the category "both losing" which 
strays from the expectations. One can see that it has the smallest 
percentage of observations recording a termination, in distinct contrast 
to the theory. In fact, the measure of association for this table, gamma, 
is a -.113, which is quite different from the positive association 
predicted by the theory and seen in the other two tables of this type.

With respect to the last hypothesis, the results of the probit 
analysis can be seen in Table 5. Recall that the theory predicts a 
negative relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
That is, the greater the rate of loss of power by any one state in a 
symmetric alliance, the greater the probability of a termination. In 
looking at the table, however, we see a positive coefficient on the
Table 5: Tests of Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Symmetric Alliances</th>
<th></th>
<th>Symmetric Alliances Between Minor Powers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Symmetric Alliances Between Minor Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>Significance Level</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Power Change</td>
<td>1.633</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>4.136</td>
<td>1.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>249</td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
independent variable. This is due to the fact that the SAS program used to generate this output predicts to the zero value on the dependent variable, not the other way around. Thus, the results are consistent with the expectations. And what is more, the rate of loss variable is significant at the .056 level, reinforcing the substantively significant findings.

As was the case with Hypothesis 3, two additional runs were completed for Hypothesis 4, based on the power status of the states contained in the alliance. These results are in Table 5. If we compare the coefficient of the independent variable for the run including only the major powers with the coefficient for the run including only the minor powers, it is clear that the major powers are the ones which contribute most of the force behind the relationship found in Table 5. More specifically, the rate of loss variable is valued at 4.1 for the major powers and is significant at the .1 level whereas this variable is valued at a mere .3 for the minor powers and is far from being significant.

But what does all this imply for the theory? Overall, support is found for the theory. It is somewhat disturbing, however, that the primary runs for Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not significant. But it must be remembered that many of the factors thought to affect alliance disintegration, the level of threat most prominent among them, have not been controlled for in the analysis. Only those factors mentioned in the
theory were included in the study. Thus, once these other variables were taken into account, it could very well be the case that more robust findings would result. It should also be remembered that the theory is not deterministic in nature. It tells us whether the probability of an alliance termination increases or decreases, but nothing more. Thus, it is not completely surprising that such weak relationships were found.
CONCLUSIONS

Alliances have been an integral part of statecraft from the earliest times after the inception of the nation-state system to the present. They are often the primary instruments through which states play their games of power politics. Thus, to understand their implications for the international arena is a goal few would argue against. The idea of understanding the implications of their absence, however, does not generate as much consensus within the field of IR. This is understandable given the way the phenomenon is perceived throughout the discipline. But given that states rely on alliances to achieve their goals, without them, the landscape of the international scene should look very different. States will have to find other ways to pursue desired policies, and the means that they choose could have important implications for the system in and of themselves. Thus, knowing when to recognize the signs of alliance termination is just as important as knowing when they will form, or what their relationship is to war, or what the burden sharing arrangements within them will be.

In an effort to get a handle on this phenomenon, a formal model of foreign policy decision making was presented which diverged from more traditional treatises on the subject. While it is still decidedly state-centric and incorporates such standard variables as power and changes in
power, it makes significant modifications to the way we perceive states' motivations. More specifically, the theory allows for the fact that nations can pursue values other than security. It recognizes that states often desire changes in the status quo, and as a consequence, desire the means with which to make these changes a reality.

From this more fully specified set of values pursued by states, I was able to refine the existing expectations regarding the timing of alliance termination. What the theory tells us is that alliance disintegration is more common when member states are losing power, relative to that of non-members. However, the particular conditions which are most conducive to a termination differ from alliance to alliance, depending on the power status of the parties to the arrangement. That is, in alliances involving two major powers or two minor powers, the likelihood of a termination is greatest when one state is losing power. In contrast, for alliances involving one major power and one minor power, the probability of an alliance breaking up is greater when both states are losing power.

These expectations were tested on the set of bilateral alliances contained in the alliance data set generated by the Correlates of War project. Three different types of analyses were conducted, and in every instance, the results produced were consistent with the theory. This is much welcomed support for the theory, even taking into account the fact
that all of the runs were either statistically insignificant or revealed a weak relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is most likely due to the fact that the theory is not deterministic in nature. That is, it does not predict to the behavior of interest per se, but rather, specifies when states will engage in more or less proaction-seeking and security-seeking behavior. And given that there are a wide range of foreign policies which qualify as security-seeking and/or proaction-seeking, finding results which are consistent with the expectations is an indication that we are on the right track and that further research in the area should not prove fruitless.

Our understanding of the phenomenon of alliance termination has been advanced through this study, but there is definitely more that can be done. One of the first areas to which attention should be given is the theory itself. If a study was done which combined the more traditional thinking on alliances, i.e., incorporated the concept of threat, with this new way of looking at the world, greater explanation would be possible. Also, the notion of internal constraints, while not as prevalent in the thinking on this subject throughout the field, could still prove useful if incorporated into the explanatory model.

But more than seeing what understanding can be gained for just the isolated topic of alliance termination, the work here has implications for a much broader set of studies. I believe the other facets of alliance
research - alliance formation, the relationship between alliances and war, etc. - can all benefit from a re-evaluation of their fundamental assumptions along the lines posited here. And if we as a discipline are able to achieve greater understanding on these other fronts as a result of this new perspective, this could very well have implications back for alliance disintegration.

Alliances are a common tool used by states to help achieve their foreign policy goals. And in recent times, they have often become the primary settings in which nations conduct their affairs with one another. Their importance within the international system can not be understated. With the new perspective the foregoing theory affords us, an opportunity exists to advance our thinking on the underlying processes which account for their initiation and termination, and consequently, their impact on the system. Is it not prudent that we take advantage of it?
1. Morrow allows for the possibility that alliances between two strong states and/or two weak states can have both parties receiving autonomy benefits at the expense of security benefits. I, however, disregard this possibility because, while it is true that two states can from an arrangement which brings each proaction benefits, such situations tend not to correspond to the general notion of alliance used here. Take, for example, NAFTA. This agreement has brought proaction benefits to both Mexico and the United States, but no one would consider this to be an alliance.

2. It should be noted that two changes to Sabrosky's data were made. First, the alliance between Afghanistan and Russia was coded as terminating in 1979, when Russia invaded Afghanistan. However, no termination date was given by either Singer and Small or Sabrosky. Second, the alliance between England and Malaysia formed in 1957 terminated in 1971, after the data set was compiled. Thus, while Sabrosky gives no termination date, I coded this alliance as ending in 1971.

3. The reasons for using the alliance year as the unit of analysis now become clear. If I had chosen any other measure as the unit if
analysis, I would not have been able to construct such a straightforward measure of the dependent variable.

4. It is interesting that the theory does not predict different outcomes for alliances involving two major powers and those involving two minor powers. This is somewhat surprising due to the fact that a substantial amount of research in the field has shown that major powers tend on the whole to behave differently from minor powers. Given this, I will run two more analyses for each of Hypotheses 3 and 4. One set will involve only the major power pairings while the other set will involve only the minor power pairings. By doing this, I can determine if in fact major and minor powers behave similarly in this respect.

5. I chose Yule's Q as the measure of association based on the forms of the perfect and null relationships for these two variables. For a detailed discussion on how to select relationship measures for contingency tables involving two dichotomous variables, see Herbert F. Weisberg (1974).
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