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Factors influencing the proportion of women nominated and elected to the legislatures of eleven western democracies

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Rice University, 1993
RICE UNIVERSITY

Factors Influencing the Proportion of Women Nominated and Elected to the Legislatures of Eleven Western Democracies

by

Mary Kathryn Frazier

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Factors Influencing the Proportion of Women Nominated and Elected
to the Legislatures of Eleven Western Democracies

by

Mary Kathyrn Frazier

The pertinent literature concerning explanatory variables affecting the selection and election of women in western democratic legislatures is reviewed. A cross-national study of eleven western democracies, from 1960 through 1990, finds significant influence of party executive quotas on the number of women nominated and elected in the countries studied, although there is no predictable time lag evident. An empirical study was conducted on the effects of country, ideology, and yeargroup on: (1) the proportion of women on party executive committees, (2) the proportion of women nominated, and (3) the proportion of women elected to the national legislatures. Results indicated a statistically significant difference for each factor. The study shows there is little substantive difference between parties of the left and parties of the non-left in terms of effect on the number of women on party executive committees, nominated, or elected to national legislatures.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank the thesis committee: Dr. John S. Ambler, Dr. John R. Alford, and Dr. Keith E. Hamm; without whose guidance, direction, and support this project would not have been possible. Thanks also to Dr. Martha Sabin for her encouragement and comments. A debt of gratitude is also due to Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair et. al. for a monumental effort to collect the comparable time-series data on which much of the empirical work is based. It is also necessary to acknowledge two people without whom the last five years would not have been possible - Ray M. Frazier and Dr. Michael J. Meyer - thank you.
LITERATURE REVIEW

In almost every nation the female gender composes slightly more than half the population yet nowhere are women elected to legislatures in anything close to this proportion. The number of women elected to parliaments and legislatures ranges from less than 5% in the United States to approximately 35% in Norway (Katz & Mair, 1992b; Matland, 1991).

The literature concerning factors influencing gender discrimination in recruitment and election of female candidates for national legislatures is fragmented and somewhat sparse, especially empirical studies. There have emerged, however several general theories and ideas about why women are not nominated and elected in proportion to their numbers in the general population. These explanations fall into three general categories: cultural, supply and demand, and institutional.

On a most generic level are the cultural explanations. At the turn of the century many nations did not allow women to vote let alone hold office. There is a tradition of patriarchal hierarchy in most western democracies that extends throughout societies. The Christian churches, particularly the Catholic Church, have tended to reinforce this hierarchy. "Female suffrage was rarely presented as a way of expanding equality; it was frequently debated exclusively in terms of its contribution to competing visions of French society as Republican or Catholic (Jenson, 1987)." This traditional approach tends to continue the stereotypical role modeling which sees women as more nurturing and passive
than men, therefore less suited to the aggression and competition necessary for political activity (Caldwell, 1989; Studlar and McAllister, 1991; Sapiro, 1983). In Klatch's description of American women of the "New Right" she indicates two types of conservatism: social conservatives and laissez-faire conservatives.

These varying views of feminism are intricately connected to each world's view of gender - that is the 'proper' roles of men and women in society. Social conservatives envision gender as a divinely ordained hierarchical ordering in which men have natural authority over women. Women's roles are essentially defined in terms of support for men and a general orientation toward others. In line with traditional notions of gender, women are characterized by their roles within the family - as wives and mothers.... Laissez-faire conservatives, on the other hand, hold no such notions of male authority, female submission, or women's 'natural' orientation toward others.... Extending their view of human nature to women as well as to men, they envision both sexes as rational, self-interested, and autonomous actors (Klatch, 1987 p9)."

Much of the literature focuses on the perception that women as candidates will have a different agenda than males; that is, that they will be more concerned with liberal or 'women's issues' such as reproductive rights and child care. Beckwith (1987) defines feminist issues as legislation or legislative issues that benefit women, whether by promoting greater sexual equality, by expanding women's life options, or both. Generally women legislators are thought to be more liberal in their voting behavior than men. A good deal of this "gender gap" in voting patterns is due to the difference constituency base of men and women; women tend to represent more urban areas which are generally more liberal than rural areas (Welch, 1985).
There is evidence that the greater the support within the legislature, whether through a greater number of female legislators, or the presence of an active caucus, the greater the tendency of women to introduce and pass priority bills dealing with issues of women and families (Thomas, 1991). There is also evidence, however, that as more women are elected to public office at higher and higher levels, not only will recruitment of a woman have a broader base but pressures for conformity with males in voting behavior will also increase (Welch, 1985).

Another explanation of the changing political culture may be attributed to industrialization. This may be due to "post-materialism" as described by Dalton (1988), or changes in the position and legitimacy of women candidates within the nominating conventions (Matland, 1991).

Matland's study of Norway (1991) indicates that in forty years women have moved from the periphery of politics to one of the central considerations in composing a party slate. He divides this time period into four patterns:

1. A Giant Among Men (1909-1953) - in which women representatives were so few as to be unique. There was, therefore, no predictable pattern to when they would appear.

2. One is Enough (1957-1973) - during which, while pressure to increase female representation resulted in some representation, that representation was far from equal.
3. The Breakthrough (1977-1981) - where for the first time women make up a noticeable part of county delegations comprised of only one or two members. Also, arguments for equal representation, rather than simply some representation were heard with increasing force in this period.\(^1\)


These patterns provide specific examples of what Dalton (1988) describes more generically as "issue cleavages that identify only communities of like-minded individuals," issues which may eventually coalesce into social movements that will realign electorates as well as the respective party systems.

One form of this coalescence is that of feminist movements, which have gained increasing focus in recent years. There are many studies available concerning the cause and effects of feminist movements in various countries over the years. An excellent, though by no means definitive, collection of these is provided in Katzenstein & Mueller's *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe* (1987). The editors argue that the feminist movements in the seven countries studied share a common transformational agenda which "has led to a common attack on culture as well as institutional practice, on consciousness as well as the distribution of resources." This
agenda would certainly conform to Dalton’s (1988) description of a social movement designed to realign electorates.

These movements have attempted to influence both politics and policies and have, at different times and in different places, worked either within or upon political parties. Costain & Costain’s (1987) overview of the political tactics of the women’s movement in the United States describes three periods:

1. The formative period (1966-1972) - which utilized two competitive tactics: protest and working through political elites.

2. The routinizing period (1972-1977) - in which the movement had become more cohesive and where there was a fairly broad consensus within the movement that all political tactics must now be tried to get a positive response from government².

3. The institutionalizing phase (1978 to 1987) which represents an effort to consolidate the gains made in the preceding stage and added new initiatives in electoral politics to bring movement groups into closer alliance with political parties.

Other studies examine the nature of feminist movements and their consequent method of influence in society and thereby political culture. One typology of feminism is: radical, wherein the oppression of women is taken to be the root of all oppression; socialist, which attempts to combine feminist insights with socialist paradigms; and liberal, whose basic premises are self-determination and individual rights (Ferree, 1987). This study indicates that
in the United States the liberal strand predominates whereas in West Germany it is the radical view which is uppermost. Ferree argues that this difference in goals influences strategies and the historical and political contexts in which these strategies are pursued. She thus concludes that the strong liberal tradition of the United States movement tends to create opportunities for feminists to find allies (particularly among the Democratic party) whereas the radical tradition of the West German feminists tends to marginalize them in the political process. There is evidence that "minimal contact and coordination may have hampered some efforts to help women articulate and advance their own interests politically (Katzenstein & Mueller, 1987, p189)." It is obvious that these cultural and contextual factors have an influence on the number and type of women nominated and elected but there is no consensus on exactly what that influence is.

Another category of explanation is that of supply and demand based on an economic model. In this case party members decide to pursue a political career based on their resources and motivation; selectors choose candidates depending upon their qualifications, skills and experience; while externalities affecting the political market including incumbency turnover, the electoral system, and the political culture determine the opportunity structure for candidates (Norris and Lovenduski, 1992).

Resource explanations, which include cultural-socialization, education, job, the availability and affordability of child care, and income, among others,
form the supply side of the supply/demand model of candidate selection (Norris, 1991; Studlar & McAllister, 1991). It has been argued that women are frequently lacking in both resources and ambition. The resource patterns of women have changed over time (Gertzog, 1979); an increasing number of women candidates have legal or previous electoral office experience. A larger number of female candidates are getting funding from sources such as Emily's List and PACs rather than depending on family wealth and political ties.

The demand side of this equation includes the factors affecting candidate selection such as voter bias, bias of the selection committee, the depressing effects of incumbency, single member plurality districts, and placement on party lists (Studlar & McAllister, 1991; Norris & Lovenduski, 1992).

The most persistent predictor of election results, across all non-proportional representational systems regardless of gender, is incumbency (Kim, 1967; Haavio-Mannila et. al. 1983; Carroll, 1985; Studlar & Welch, 1987; Welch & Studlar, 1988, 1990; Darcy, 1988; Katz, 1986; Studlar & McAllister, 1991). The influence of incumbency is especially important to women as the cycle works against them. Incumbents are reelected at rates approaching 90%. Women are seldom the incumbent and therefore, women are seldom elected. They must break into the circle and this is often difficult because some parties are reluctant to risk 'safe' seats. "Incumbency is at the heart of the problem of women's electoral disadvantages in advanced industrial democracies, and
only when it is solved will the electoral prospects of women come to approximate those of their male counterparts (Studlar & McAllister, 1991)."

The third general category of explanations deals with institutional factors. Any attempt to either influence or work within political parties must contend with the structural and ideological restrictions of those parties - the rules of the game. These institutional factors affect the participation in party elites, party nomination of candidates, as well as election of candidates.

The nature of the particular party system is one determinant of its openness to women as members of the party elite. Over the course of time many political parties have instituted quotas concerning membership on party executive committees. These quotas have ranged from a simple statement of desiring to promote gender equality to a requirement for parity such as the German Green party instituted in 1986 (Katz & Mair, 1992a).

Institutional factors also affect the proportion of women elected in several ways, including electoral system and incumbency. There is general agreement that proportional representation enhances women's chances of election (Duverger, 1955; Darcy Welch & Clark, 1987; Norris, 1985, 1987; Studlar & Welch, 1987; Welch & Studlar, 1988, 1990; Darcy, 1988; Rule, 1991). Matland (1991) argues however, that party magnitude rather than district magnitude has more influence on election rates.

The common difficulties of operationalizing variables and collecting sufficient data over time have made obtaining empirical evidence for theoretical
propositions or cross-national generalizations troublesome. Most efforts have been in individual countries such as Australia (Studlar & McAllister, 1991) and Great Britain (Norris & Lovenduski, 1992). Cross-national comparisons have been difficult due to lack of equivalent measures and lack of sufficient data; where they have been undertaken they tend to focus on one area of the model such as Rule's 1991 study of electoral arrangements and contextual factors in 23 democracies.

The following study attempts a first cut analysis which explores the influence of several factors on the proportion of females who are members of party executive committees, who are nominated and who are elected to legislatures in eleven western democracies. The primary unit of analysis is the individual party. We look at the effects of three independent variables: country, ideology, and time, on three dependent variables: proportion of women on party executive committees, proportion of women nominated to legislatures, and proportion of women elected to legislatures.

If cultural explanations are accurate we would expect to see different rates of participation by women in all three areas under examination based upon country. We might also expect that certain groups of countries with similar cultural values, such as Scandinavia, would have similar proportions of women in all three categories. There is also the expectation that countries would change in relative position to each other.
As part of the supply and demand model one might be persuaded that the increasing activity and acceptance of feminist movements would affect the rate of female participation by increasing feminine ambition and resources. If this were the case we would expect to see increased female inclusion over time (corresponding to increasing influence of these movements), although caution must be exercised in that time may encompass several other factors.

In terms of institutional factors, this study focuses on two: quotas in the party executive committees and ideology. Throughout the literature there permeates the idea that involvement in political parties, particularly holding party office, is a factor influencing candidate recruitment. It would seem that this idea should also hold true for a recruitment subset based on gender. "The involvement of women in policy functions affiliated to the party executive provides important political experience beyond established party structures both in the regions and localities (Kolinsky, 1991, 1992)."

Regarding the question of what effect, if any, the establishment of quotas in party offices has on the proportion of women nominated to the legislature we would expect that increasing the participation of women in party leadership roles would generate a significant increase in the proportion of women candidates. This hypothesis is tested by exploring the relationship of quotas in the party executives as a factor in the proportion of women on executive committees, nominated and elected. The least restrictive type of quota is a simple affirmative action statement in which a party declares a desire
to increase female participation; without a more concrete rule, we might expect some slight increase in the proportion of women on the committee, nominated, or elected. The next most restrictive type of quota is one suggesting a percentage of positions either on the committee or candidate list be set aside for women. The expectation is that the number of female candidates will be greatest where there are the most restrictive party requirements for number of candidates. Denmark's Socialist People's Party (SF) requires, since 1989, alternating positions on the party list by gender and the German Greens guarantee equal representation of men and women on the party list (Katz & Mair, 1992).

Another factor to be explored in this study is the relationship, if any, of party ideology to the proportion of women on party executive committees, those nominated, and those elected to office. There have often been assumptions that parties on the left have been more sympathetic to women's issues and the representation of women based on labor and socialist interests. "Leftwing parties are expected to nominate and elect more women to office than rightwing or center parties, because of their traditional (if frequently unhappy) relationship to women's movements and because leftwing parties historically have considered women an important political constituency (Beckwith, 1992)." If this expectation were valid it would be consistent that the Italian PCI, as the strongest Left political party, would "given its ideology always be more responsive to organized feminists than other parties..."
(Beckwith, 1987). There are conflicting views of this concept however. In the 1980s all of Norway’s parties except the Progress Party (a far right party) have been sympathetic to women’s demands for representation (Matland, 1991).

There is dissent in the literature about the correct operationalization of the left-right axis and the place of the Green parties. This discussion centers about the arguments as to whether the Greens are a part of a new axis of the post-materialist or New Politics, which is orthogonal to the traditional left-right continuum, or whether they can be absorbed on this traditional continuum. Since this argument is outside the scope of the current study, the theoretical implications will not be discussed here. However, the empirical and operational problems of this issue do impact this study and will therefore be addressed.

Since the Green parties are relatively recent arrivals on the political scene, and since they constitute a relatively small number of observations in the data set, their inclusion tends to skew the distributions. Simply excluding them would result in a loss of pertinent information, especially in regards to the inclusion of women in the political process at the party level; therefore they will be eliminated from statistical analyses and included for descriptive purposes only.

DATA AND METHODS:

A data set was constructed for eleven western democracies. These were chosen to represent a broad range of electoral styles ranging from single member districts to party list systems. The countries used are: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. The primary data source is Katz and Mair's extensive work on parties in *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook* (1992). This made possible a compilation of information about the number of women as candidates, the total number of candidates, the number of women elected, total party seats per election, the number of women and total number of party executive committee members, and information on the institution and type of quotas for party executive committees for each party in each country by election. The time span covered is 1960-1990.

Other data were obtained from additional sources including: *Demographic Yearbook 1983: Thirty fifth Issue* (United Nations Publication) for total population data; Interparliamentary Union Reports and Documents No. 18 1991, *Distribution of Seats Between Men and Women in National Parliaments: Statistical Data from 1945 to 30 June, 1991* for total legislative seats; and Mackie and Rose *The International Almanac of Electoral History: Fully Revised Third Edition* (1991) for missing data for total party seats.

The primary unit of analysis for this study is the individual party. The three independent variables used are: country, time, and ideology. Eleven dichotomous variables were created for country with each assigned a code number from one to eleven. The overall time span was divided into six groups (coded one through six) in order to capture at least one election per group. Each party was given a designation of Left, Non-left, or Green. Left parties are
those which are described as Communist, Socialist or Labor. Questions regarding placement were resolved in consultation with Dr. John Ambler and verified by at least one other source, generally Katz and Mair (1992b).

With the availability of the raw numbers three dependent variables were calculated (per party) as follows:

1. PCAN (Proportion of women candidates) = (# women candidates/total candidates)*100

2. PELEC (Proportion of women elected) = (# women elected/total party seats)*100

3. PEXEC (Proportion of women party executives) = (# women executives/total executives)*100

An analysis of variance was conducted to test the following seven null hypotheses⁴:

1. There are no statistically significant differences in the proportion of women in party executive committees, women candidates or women elected based on country.

2. There is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of women party executives based on ideology.

3. There is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of women candidates based on ideology.

4. There is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of women elected based on ideology.

5. There is no significant difference in the proportion of women on the party executive committee based on the institution of a quota in the party executive.

6. There is no significant difference in the proportion of women candidates based on the institution of a quota in the party executive.
7. There is no significant difference in the proportion of women elected based on the institution of a quota in the party executive.

This analysis of variance was done with the general linear model (GLM) technique due to the unbalanced design and resultant unequal cell sizes. A planned investigation of the differences in levels of the independent variables was done using the Duncan multiple-range test for each model.

Testing hypothesis one involved aggregating data to the country level; for hypotheses two through four, the data was aggregated into party classifications and the thirty-year span was divided into five year increments in order to capture at least one election per group; for hypotheses five through seven the graphs were plotted using the actual years of elections in order to place the introduction of quotas.

**FINDINGS:**

What has happened to women in politics over the last three decades? In every category, as members of party executive committees, as candidates, and as elected representatives, the proportion of women has more than doubled. Table 1 shows that members of the party executive committees started out at a slightly higher proportion (13.38%) than women did as candidates (10.27%), and considerable higher than the proportion of women elected (6.55%), this measure of status doubled by the end of the time period studied (see Figure 1).
Percentage of Female Representation Over Time

Figure 1
Over the entire range of countries the inclusion of women as political candidates has steadily increased from an average of 10.27% of the total candidates in 1960 to 25.91% in 1990. For whatever reasons or combinations of reasons, women are being nominated in increasing numbers, more than two and one half times what they were at the beginning of the study.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Party Exec.</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>8.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>9.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>16.78</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>16.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>21.59</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>18.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>25.95</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>24.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of the proportion of women elected is even greater. When you compare the number of women elected to the legislature to the total number of seats won by each party it nearly quadruples, from 6.55% in the early 1960s to 24.45% by the late 80s (see Table 1).

The table shows the expected funnelling effect with the highest percentage in each time period being the number of females on the executive committee, followed by the number of females nominated, and the smallest percentage being the number of women elected as legislators. It is interesting
to note that in the mid-seventies, about the time the feminists movements were supposedly gaining the most ground, the number of women nominated and elected caught up to the number of women on executive committees. From this point the rate of growth was nearly the same for each group; during the period 1985-90 there are only one and one-half percentage points separating the women elected and the women on executive committees.

Figures 2-1 through 2-11 show the comparison by time periods and individual country of all three models (party executive members, candidates, and elected). These graphs show three general patterns of development: a flat, relatively stable proportion of women such as Britain (Figure 2-10) and the United States (Figure 2-11); a steady increase such as that shown by Belgium (Figure 2-2), Denmark (Figure 2-3), Finland (Figure 2-4), Norway (Figure 2-8), Sweden (Figure 2-9); and finally a sharp increase such as that shown by Austria (Figure 2-1) and the Netherlands (Figure 2-7). Germany (Figure 2-5) shows a very low and steady rate for all three categories until the 1980-84 time period when the number of women on the executive committee doubled and the number of women candidates was 150% of what it had been in the previous period. In Italy (Figure 2-6) the mean percent of women candidates jumped from 2.70 in 1970-74 to 15.15 in 1975-79. Figure 2-8 (Norway) shows a steady increase in candidates from 18.85% (1960-64) to 42.82% (1985-90) and a relatively large increase in the percentage of women elected, from 2.2% in 1960-64 to 29.06% in 1985-90.
GERMANY - Time Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Group</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Party Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-89</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

ITALY - Time Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Group</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Party Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1985-89</td>
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<td>1970-74</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITED STATES - Time Line

Figure 2-11
The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Figure 2-3; Finland, Figure 2-4; Norway, Figure 2-8; and Sweden, Figure 2-9) have the highest percentages of women candidates and women elected. Information on the number of Swedish women candidates was unavailable. Britain (Figure 2-10) and the United States (Figure 2-11) have the consistently highest percentages of women on the party executive committees; they also have among the lowest percentages of women nominated and elected, less than 10% for the entire period of the study.

Table 2 shows the percentage of parties with no quota over the entire period dropped from seventy percent to less than half. Those parties maintaining some form of quota for the entire period almost doubled from the first three year groupings to the last three (27% to 47%). Those parties either adding or dropping a quota at some point during the time period were a relatively small percentage. Breaking this down further, we see in Table 3 that the percent of parties with some form of quota increases from 21% in 1960-64 to over 50% in 1985-90, while those with no quota dropped from 79% to 45%.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of Parties with Quotas on Executive Committee 1960-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Parties with no Quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties with Quota Entire Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Which Added or Dropped Quota</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65-69</th>
<th>70-74</th>
<th>75-79</th>
<th>80-84</th>
<th>85-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Quota(^1)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota(^2)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change(^3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percent of parties with no quota during time period
2 The percent of parties maintaining quota during entire time period
3 The percent of parties adding or dropping quota during time period

The analysis of variance was run for each of the three dependent variables and the summaries of each model are shown in Table 4. The coefficient of variation (CV) ranges from 32% on the candidate model to 58% on the elected model. The proportion of women on party executive committees included all parties except the Greens the number of observations [N] (which is a single point of one party at one election) = 592. The proportion of women candidates includes only parties presenting at least ten candidates in an election (N = 427); and the proportion of women elected includes only those parties electing at least ten members to the legislature (N = 403). Table 4 indicates that all models were statistically significant (p < .0001); it also indicates that there is a reasonable amount of variance explained by each model with an R\(^2\) ranging from .69 for the elected model to .81 for the candidate model.
Table 4

Analysis of Variance Summaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Women Executives</td>
<td>(CV = 41.66 R^2 = .76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between SS</td>
<td>46827</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>6.65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within SS</td>
<td>14967</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Candidates</td>
<td>(CV = 32.29 R^2 = .81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between SS</td>
<td>40044</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>357.54</td>
<td>11.65*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within SS</td>
<td>9330</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>30.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women Elected</td>
<td>(CV = 57.67 R^2 = .69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between SS</td>
<td>35542</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>4.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within SS</td>
<td>15789</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

* p < .0001

ANALYSIS OF PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES:

Figures 3-1 through 3-13 show the percent of women on the party executive committees for each party by country as well as the timing of the installation of quotas, if any. It appears as if the institution of a quota for the number of women on the party executive committee is not necessarily an indication that the quota will be met. For example in Denmark (Figure 3-3) the SF required, in 1977, that 40% of the committee should be women, the party fell slightly short with only 36.59% women. The Denmark SD party required 40% female members of the executive committee in 1984 at which time the percentage was only 22.45; it rose to only 33.33% in 1987 and fell to 27.45% in 1988, well below the quota.
Figure 3-1

1 = SPO Proportional number of women required on executive committee - 25%
2 = GA Parity on both the national party committees and candidate lists
Figure 3.2

1 = PSB: Quota for women on candidate selection committee
2 = CVP: Minimum number of women required on Executive Committee

Percent of Women on Party Executive Committees
Belgium


18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Legend:
- PSB
- CVP
- VU
Figure 3.3

1 = SF Proportional representation-40% on executive committee in 1989 added requirement for alternating positions on candidate list
2 = SD Proportional representation-40% on national executive with affirmative action statement for candidates
Percent of Women on Party Executive Committees
Finland

1 = KESK  Proportional number of women required on committee
2 = KOK Quota of women as non-voting members of party executive
Percent of Women on Party Executive Committees
Germany

Figure 3-6

1 = SPD 1961 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement
2 = SPD 1965 Proportional plus minimum number
3 = SPD 1971 Rule Abolished (No Quota)
4 = SPD 1988 Proportional representation required on executive committee
5 = CSU 1969 Women as non-voting members of party executive
6 = G 1986 Parity required
Figure 3-7

1 = MSI 1963  Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = MSI 1979  Proportional plus minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = VER 1987  Minimum number of women on executive committee
Figure 3-8

1 = PvdA 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = PvdA 1981 Proportional number of executive committee also general affirmative action guidelines for candidates
3 = ARP 1967 Minimum number of women on executive committee
4 = CHU 1962 Non voting women on executive committee
Percent of Women on Party Executive Committees
Netherlands - Part Two

Figure 3-9

1 = CDA 1977 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = VVD 1967 Minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = GL 1989 Aim at parity both on executive committee and candidates (no obligation)
Figure 3-10

1 = SV 1977 Proportional representation required on executive committee
2 = DNA 1985 Proportional representation required on executive committee
3 = SP 1989 Proportional representation required on executive committee
4 = V 1981 Proportional representation required on executive committee
5 = FRP/ALP 1973 Proportional representation plus minimum number required on executive committee
Figure 3.11

1 = S 1969 Women as Non Voting Members of Party Executive
2 = M 1965 General Guidelines/ Affirmative Action Statement
Figure 3-12

1 = All three parties have required a minimum number of women on the party executive since 1980.
In 1988 the Liberal Party required all local parties to include a minimum number of women candidates on local lists
Figure 3.13

1 = DEM 1980 Party on executive committees
2 = REP 1980 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement

Percent of Women on Party Executive Committees
United States


Legend: DEM, REP
Several countries such as Austria (Figure 3-1), Germany (Figure 3-6), Britain (Figure 3-12), and the United States (Figure 3-13), show a relatively stable rate. Others such as Belgium (Figure 3-2), Denmark (Figure 3-3 and 3-4), Finland (Figure 3-5), the Netherlands (Figure 3-8 and 3-9), and Norway (3-10) are much more volatile with the percentage sometimes rising sharply after the institution of a quota and sometimes, as in the case of Norway, declining sharply. Caution should be exercised in making any inferences from these figures since there are a number of missing data points and in the case of Italy (Figure 3-7) entire parties have no available data at this time.

Table 5

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF VARIATION</th>
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<th>MEAN SQUARES</th>
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<td>569.92</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>.0020</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEARGROUP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1053.66</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
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<td>333.83</td>
<td>5.73</td>
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<td>80.65</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.0587</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOL*YEARGRP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>.9351</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNTRY<em>IDEOL</em>YRGRP</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47.18</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>.7919</td>
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The analysis of variance presented in Table 5 indicates statistically significant effects of country, ideology, and yeargroup on the proportion of female party executive committee members. There is a statistically significant
interaction between country and ideology and no significant second order interaction. Figure 4 shows a country by country comparison of the mean percentage of women members of party executive committees. A Duncan Multiple Range test shows that Finland, Austria, Germany, and Belgium are not statistically significant from each other in the effect of country on the proportion of women on party executive committees. Another group of countries which are not statistically significant from each other in the proportion of women on executive committees is Denmark, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United States are each significantly different from any other country in the proportion of women on party executive committees.

Table 5 showed that there was a statistically significant effect of ideology on the proportion of women on executive committees. Figures 5-1 through 5-11 show individual country comparisons of the mean percent women on party executive committees by ideology. In most countries there is very little substantive difference between the Left versus Non-Left parties in the proportion of women appointed or elected to the party executive, especially in the first three yeargroups. Generally there is less than ten percentage points difference in the mean number of women on executive committees between parties of the left and parties of the non-left within each country. Italy (Figure 5-6) Left and Non-left are almost identical, both at less than 5%, through 1975. Also in most cases the parties of the left have generally higher percentages than
Percent Females on Party Executive by Ideology

Denmark


- Left
- Non-Left

Figure 5-3

Percent Females on Party Executive by Ideology

Finland


- Left
- Non-Left

Figure 5-4
Figure 5-5

Figure 5-6
Figure 5-9

Percent Females on Party Executive by Ideology
Sweden

Figure 5-10

Percent Females on Party Executive by Ideology
Britain
Percent Females on Party Executive by Ideology
United States

Figure 5-11
non-left parties, with the exception of Belgium (Figure 5-2) and Sweden (Figure 5-9). The Greens appear in only five of the eleven countries: Austria (Figure 5-1), Germany (Figure 5-5), Italy (Figure 5-6), the Netherlands (Figure 5-7), and Sweden (Figure 5-9), and are shown on the graphs for descriptive purposes only. In every case except Sweden the Greens have more than double the mean percent of women in the executive committee, in that country, for the time-periods in which they appear. We conclude that there are statistically significant differences in the proportion of women serving on party executive committees based on country and ideology.

ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATES:

In testing the hypotheses concerning factors affecting the proportion of women candidates we look first at the comparison of parties within countries and then at the statistical analysis of country and ideology. Figures 6-1 through 6-13 show a party by party comparison for each country and indicate the timing and presence of quotas for party executives and/or candidates for each party. The general pattern is fairly steady through the nineteen sixties; in the early to mid-seventies (partly depending on the election cycle) most countries exhibit a gradual increase. The graphs at the individual party level are relatively volatile and it is difficult to tell from this examination whether there is any predictable time-lag effect from the imposition of quotas concerning the percentage of females on the executive committee to an increase in the proportion of females
Figure 6.1

1 = SPO  Proportional number of women required on executive committee
2 = OVP  Proportional number of women required on executive committee
3 = GA  Parity on both the national party committees and candidate lists
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Belgium

![Graph showing percent female candidates by election in Belgium over time](image)

Figure 5-2

1 = PSB Quote for women on candidate selection committee
2 = CVP Minimum number of women required on Executive Committee
3 = PVV Minimum number of women required on executive committee
4 = VU Proportional representation required on executive committee
Figure 6-3

1 = SF  Proportional representation on executive committee in 1989 added requirement for alternating positions on candidate list
2 = SD  Proportional representation on national executive with affirmative action statement for candidates
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Finland

Figure 6-5

1 = KESK Proportional number of women required on committee
2 = KOK Quota of women as non-voting members of party executive
Figure 8-6

1 = SPD 1961 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement
2 = SPD 1965 Proportional plus minimum number
3 = SPD 1971 Rule Abolished (No Quota)
4 = SPD 1986 Proportional representation required on executive committee
5 = CSU 1969 Women as non-voting members of party executive
6 = G 1986 Parity required
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Italy - Part One

Figure 6-7

1 = PSI 1987 Proportional representation
2 = PSDI 1976 Minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = PSDI 1983 Proportional representation
Figure 6-8

1 = MSI 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = MSI 1979 Proportional plus minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = VER 1987 Minimum number of women on executive committee
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Netherlands - Part One

1 = PvdA 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = PvdA 1981 Proportional number of executive committee also general affirmative action guidelines for candidates
3 = ARP 1967 Minimum number of women on executive committee
4 = CHU 1963 Non voting women on executive committee
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Netherlands - Part Two

1 = KVP 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = CDA 1977 Minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = VVD 1967 Minimum number of women on executive committee
4 = GL 1989 Aim at parity both on executive committee and candidates (no obligation)
Figure 6-11

1 = SV 1977 Proportional representation required on executive committee
2 = DNA 1985 Proportional representation required on executive committee
3 = SP 1989 Proportional representation required on executive committee
4 = V 1981 Proportional representation required on executive committee
5 = FRP/ALP 1973 Proportional representation plus minimum number required on executive committee
Percent Female Candidates by Election
Britain

Year of Election

Percent


LAB
LIB
CON

Figure 6-12

1 = All three parties have required a minimum number of women on the party executive since 1960. 1
In 1988 the Liberal Party required all local parties to include a minimum number of women candidates on local lists
Figure 6.13
Percent Female Candidates by Election
United States

1 = DEM 1980 Parity for executive committees
2 = REP 1980 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement
nominated. Although we cannot observe any predictable time-lag some countries such as Norway (Figure 6-11) contribute to the rise of quotas after the mid-seventies the same time period in which the proportion of female candidates rises cross-nationally. Examination of the figures for Austria (6-1), Germany (6-6), and the Netherlands (6-10) indicate that requirement for parity on candidate slates contribute to higher percentages of women candidates. In 1986 the Green party rule stated that:

In order to guarantee equal representation of men and women there shall be separate voting procedures for men and women. All uneven positions on electoral lists are reserved for women. In case of no female candidate for a position, the respective assembly decides. In this case, women have veto power (separate vote for female part of assembly) (Katz & Mair, 1992, p374).

Moving to the statistical analysis of the factors influencing the proportion of women candidates we find that the analysis of variance presented in Table 6 indicates statistically significant effects of country, ideology, and yeargroup on the proportion of female candidates for parties gaining ten or more seats in a given election. Of the first order interactions country*yeargroup and country*ideology were statistically significant; ideology*yeargroup and the second order interaction were not statistically significant.
Table 6

Analysis of Variance Summary
Percent Women Candidates (PCAN) Parties Presenting 10+ Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF VARIATION</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>MEAN SQUARES</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2213.85</td>
<td>72.13</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>122.52</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>.0466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARGROUP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1535.82</td>
<td>50.04</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNTRY*IDEOL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63.14</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>.0332</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNTRY*YEARGRP</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>71.45</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>.0001</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEOL*YEARGRP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.5753</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNTRY<em>IDEOL</em>YRGRP</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>.9926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 shows a comparison of all eleven countries, across time, for the proportion of female candidates. The Duncan Multiple Range Test for country shows more of a diverse effect than in the party executive model. The following are pairs of countries whose mean percent of women candidates are not significantly different: Denmark and the Netherlands; Austria and Belgium; the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States also is grouped with Germany and Italy in that each of their mean percentage of candidates does not differ significantly from the others in that group. Norway and Finland (with the highest mean percentage of female candidates) are significantly different from each other and from every other country.
The analysis of variance, as indicated in Table 6 above, shows a significant interaction between country and yeargroup. A subsequent Duncan range test for multiple comparisons applied to the means for yeargroup associated with country indicates that the means for 1960-64, 1965-69, were not significantly different from each other. Groups 1965-69 and 1970-74 showed no significant difference from each other. The means for 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-90 were significantly different from any other group (see Table 7). By the final time period the mean percent of female candidates was more than two and one half times that of the early nineteen sixties. Across all countries the rate of women nominated for legislatures has steadily increased. Overall the mean percentage of females nominated remained fairly steady for each country through the 1970-74 time-period; this percentage the rose gradually over the remaining time periods with Norway, Finland and Denmark showing the greatest rates of increase.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65-69</th>
<th>70-74</th>
<th>75-79</th>
<th>80-84</th>
<th>85-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N=44</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td>N=74</td>
<td>N=86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>25.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups sharing underline are not significantly different.
The final portion of the analysis of the proportion of women candidates deals with the influence of party ideology. As shown in Figures 8-1 through 8-10, there is little substantive difference, within countries, based on Left or Non-Left ideology. The Scandinavian countries show considerable higher percentages of female candidates but this difference is not based on ideology in traditional terms. Generally there is less than a five percentage point difference between Left and Non-Left parties in any one country (with the parties of the Left usually being slightly higher). In the analysis of female members of the party executive committees, we found that the two countries with Non-Left parties having a higher proportion of women executive committee members were Belgium and Sweden. This pattern is repeated in Belgium for the proportion of women as candidates (candidate data are not available for Sweden). There is very little difference between Left and Non-Left parties in Denmark (Figure 8-3) and Finland (Figure 8-4), although Denmark shows a slight gap in favor of the Left in the late nineteen eighties. Germany (Figure 8-5) shows a remarkably confluent path of Left and Non-Left throughout the period of the study. Italy (Figure 8-6) show a very low percentage (2.55 for Left and 2.77 for Non-Left) in the first time period; this remains stable through the mid nineteen seventies when it makes a sudden jump to 13.58 for the Left and 16.13 for the Non-Left.

There are much higher percentages of female candidates nominated by Green parties (included for descriptive purposes only) in countries where they
Figure 8-5

Percent Female Candidates by Ideology
Germany

Figure 8-6

Percent Female Candidates by Ideology
Italy
Percent Female Candidates by Ideology

Britain

Figure 8-9

Percent Female Candidates by Ideology
United States

Figure 8-10
exist, such as Germany (Figure 8-5), Italy (Figure 8-6), and Netherlands (Figure 8-7). This may be a function of what Dalton refers to as the New Left, the post-materialist, non traditional alignment of parties. In terms of candidate findings there is also the case of countries such as the Netherlands, where the aim for parity in candidate selection may contribute to a proportion approximating 50% of female candidates for Green parties. In any case, the relative newness of the Green parties (the last, or at most last two, election cycles) provides slim basis for anything more than speculation at this point. Based on the analysis of the proportion of women candidates, we find that there are statistically significant differences in country and ideology and we reject the null hypotheses.

ANALYSIS OF WOMEN ELECTED TO NATIONAL LEGISLATURES:

The analysis of the proportion of women elected is carried out along similar lines to that of the proportion of women candidates. We look first at the effects of quotas and then the statistical effects of country and ideology over time on the proportion of women elected to legislatures. Figures 9-1 through 9-13 show the effect of quotas by parties gaining ten or more seats on the proportion of women elected to national legislatures. There seems to be a general increase in number of women elected after the institution of quotas but this may be more the result of the intervening effect of quotas on the number
Figure 9-1

1 = SPO  Proportional number of women required on executive committee
2 = OVP  Proportional number of women required on executive committee
Percent Females Elected by Parties with Ten or More Seats
Belgium

1 = PSB Quota for women on candidate selection committee
2 = CVP Minimum number of women required on Executive Committee
3 = PVV Minimum number of women required on executive committee
4 = PVV2 Proportional representation required on executive committee
Figure 9-3

1 = SF Proportional representation on executive committee in 1989 added requirement for alternating positions on candidate list
2 = SD Proportional representation on national executive with affirmative action statement for candidates
Figure 9.5

1 = KESK Proportional number of women required on committee
2 = KOK Quota of women as non-voting members of party executive
Percent Females Elected by Parties with More than Ten Seats
Germany

1 = SPD 1961 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement
2 = SPD 1965 Proportional plus minimum number
3 = SPD 1971 Rule Abolished (No Quota)
4 = SPD 1988 Proportional representation required on executive committee
5 = CSU 1969 Women as non-voting members of party executive
6 = G 1983 Parity required

Figure 9-6
Percent Female Elected by Parties with More than Ten Seats
Italy - Part One

1 = PSI 1987 Proportional representation
2 = PSDI 1976 Minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = PSDI 1983 Proportional representation
Percent Females Elected by Parties with More than Ten Seats
Italy - Part Two

1 = MSI 1963  Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = MSI 1979  Proportional plus minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = VER 1987  Minimum number of women on executive committee
Figure 9.9

1 = KVP 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
2 = CDA 1977 Minimum number of women on executive committee
3 = VVD 1967 Minimum number of women on executive committee
4 = PA 1963 Minimum number of women on executive committee
5 = PA 1981 Proportional number of executive committee also general affirmative action guidelines for candidates
Figure 9-10

1 = SV 1977 Proportional representation required on executive committee
2 = DNA 1985 Proportional representation required on executive committee
3 = SP 1989 Proportional representation required on executive committee
4 = FRP/ALP 1973 Proportional representation plus minimum number required on executive committee
Figure 9-11

1 = S 1969 Women as Non Voting Members of Party Executive
2 = M 1965 General Guidelines/ Affirmative Action Statement
Figure 9-12

1 = All three parties have required a minimum number of women on the party executive since 1960.
   In 1988 the Liberal Party required all local parties to include a minimum number of women candidates on local lists.
Figure 9-13

1 = DEM 1976 Parity on executive committee
2 = REP 1980 General Guidelines Affirmative Action Statement
of candidates nominated by parties. In other words, there is probably not a
direct effect since parties do not elect representatives.

The statistical analysis of the model for proportion of females elected to
national legislatures looks at the effects of country and ideology over time. The
analysis of variance summary of Table 8 shows the statistically significant
effects of country, ideology and yeartgroup on the proportion of females elected.
Of the first-order interactions country times yeartgroup is significant at the .05
level. There is no significant second order interaction.

Table 8

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<th>SOURCE OF VARIATION</th>
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<td>18.32</td>
<td>.0001</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CNTRY<em>IDEOL</em>YRGRP</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>.9994</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

All countries exhibit a relatively low mean percentage of women elected
until the mid-seventies when they all make a substantial jump. Figure 10 and
the graphs of individual countries show a relatively sharp upturn in the
proportion of female candidates elected starting in the early to mid-70s. This
analysis would seem to indicate that this upturn is more the result of some factor other than the institution of quotas. It may be perhaps the influence of the women’s movements as described by Beckwith (1987, 1992), Costain and Costain (1987), and Ferree (1987); however, this analysis does not address that specific issue. The effects of country are explored in the Duncan Range Test which indicates several overlapping groups of countries with means that are not significantly different. Finland Sweden and Denmark, with the highest mean percentage of women elected, form one group while at the lower end is a group containing Germany, Italy, the United States and Britain in descending order of mean percent women elected.

The Duncan Range test of multiple comparisons applied to the means for yeargroup associated with country indicates that there is no significant difference among the first three yeargroups. The periods of 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-90 are each significantly different from each other and significantly different from each of the first three yeargroups (Table 9).

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yeargroup</th>
<th>60-64</th>
<th>65-69</th>
<th>70-74</th>
<th>75-79</th>
<th>80-84</th>
<th>85-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>N=68</td>
<td>N=93</td>
<td>N=95</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td>N=95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>19.34</td>
<td>24.45</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Groups sharing underline are not significantly different.
Moving on to look at the influence of ideology on the proportion of women elected we find patterns similar to those of the proportion of women candidates. Figures 11-1 through 11-11 show the individual country results of percentage of women elected by Left, Non-Left, and Green (included for descriptive purposes only. There is little substantive difference between Left and Non-Left parties; this may be partially due to the fact that the dependent variable is the proportion of women elected by party ideology rather than the number of seats won by a party which would possibly show more of an ideological influence. This may also reflect the fact that in party list systems, once the candidates are nominated there is no way to separate voting based on gender. Norway (Figure 11-8) is the most obvious instance of the Left showing a relatively large difference in Left and Non-Left; in most cases there is little relative difference. In the United States and Britain (Figures 11-11 and 11-10) there is little discernable difference between Left and Non-left; these are also the two countries with the smallest percentage of women elected (see Figure 10). Based on this analysis we reject the null hypotheses about the influence of country and ideology on the proportion of women elected.

CONCLUSIONS:

The findings of this analysis reinforce the conclusion that there is a difference in the proportion of women serving on the party executive committees, nominated, and elected to legislatures cross-nationally. The
Figure 11-1

Percent Females Elected by Ideology
Austria

Figure 11-2

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Belgium
Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Denmark

Figure 11-3

Percent Females Elected by Ideology
Finland

Figure 11-4
Figure 11-5

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Germany

Figure 11-6

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Italy
Figure 11-7

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Netherlands

Figure 11-8

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Norway
Figure 11-9

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Sweden

- Left
- Non-Left
- Green

Figure 11-10

Percent Female Elected by Ideology
Britain

- Left
- Non-Left
Percent Female Elected by Ideology
United States

Figure 11-11
Scandinavian countries are consistently higher in the percentage of women candidates and legislators. What specific cultural or contextual variables account for this difference is a subject for further investigation possibly by combining this data set with the appropriate Eurobarometer data on attitudes and demographics. It is evident across all nations studied, however, that some event or combination of events occurred during the mid-seventies that greatly increased the proportion of women on executive committees, nominated, and elected to the national legislatures. Whether this was the result of the feminist movements *per se* or the result of feminist movements as an intervening variable on such factors as education, income, and executive experience remains to be studied. All eleven countries have made little change *relative to each other over* the time period studied.

This mid-seventies increase does not appear to be directly related to any imposition of a female quota on the party executive level. While there seems to be an influence of the quota system, it shows no particular or predictable time lag at the level of this analysis; further time-series analysis might give some insight into this matter. In cases where the placement of candidates on the list are alternated as in Denmark in 1989, or alternated on the short list as in Britain's Liberal party in 1988, or where parity in candidate selection is required as in the German Greens in 1986, the influence of a quota is much more pronounced. All of these requirements do not explain, however, the giant strides made by women in the mid-seventies. Due to their appearance relatively
late in the time frame of this analysis not much can be said about the Green parties without further extension of the study.

A priority in the next stage of analysis is to obtain the missing data on Swedish candidates since Sweden shows a decidedly higher Non-Left proportion in number of women on the executive committee and a convergence between Left and Non-Left in the 1985-90 time period as regards the number of women elected. The Green parties are appreciably higher in the percentage of women in all three categories; extension of the study past 1990 would result in an increase in the number of data points for these parties and enable statistical as well as descriptive analysis.

Using this data as a starting point lends itself readily to one further area of study: whether party magnitude as described by Matland is really a better basis of increased participation by women than simply proportional representation.
Notes:

1. This breakdown is especially of interest when evaluated in terms of the jump in female representation during the mid-seventies found in the data analysis of the eleven western democracies studied. Note that the previous period ended in 1973.

2. Again, as in Matland's pattern groupings, there is indication that significant effort was underway in the 1970s to institutionalize the gains in representation; this also corresponds to the time period of significant increase in representation shown in the data analysis.


4. ANOVA was used rather than regression because the variables analyzed are discrete and not continuous.
Bibliography:


Duverger, Maurice. 1955. The Political Role of Women. UNESCO.


APPENDIX A

LIST OF PARTIES BY COUNTRY

AUSTRIA
X C E  SPO: Austrian Socialist Party
   C E  OVP: Austrian People’s Party
X C E  FPO: Austrian Freedom Party, Before 1965, VdU:
   League
       of Independents
GA: Greens

BELGIUM
X C E  PSB: [Francophone] Socialist Party

   BPS: [Flemish] Socialist Party
   PSC: [Franophone] Social Christian Party
X C E  CVP: [Flemish] Christian People’s Party

   PRL: [Francophone] Liberal Reform Party Until
   1979, PRLW: Party of Reforms and of Wallonian
   Liberty
C E  PVV: [Flemish] Party of Liberty and Progress

X C E  VU: People’s Union
ECO: [Francophile] Ecology Party
AGA: [Flemish] Ecology Party

DENMARK
X C E  SF: Socialist People’s Party
X C E  SD: Social Democrats
X C E  RV: Social Liberals
X C E  KRF: Christian People’s Party
X C E  CD: Centre Democrats
X C E  V: Liberal
X C E  KF: Conservative People’s Party
X C E  FRP: Progress Party

FINLAND
X C E  SKDL: Finnish People’s Democratic League
   (Includes SKP: Finnish Communist Party; in 1990
   merged with DEVA: Democratic Alternative to form
   Left-Wing Alliance)
X C E  SDP: Finnish Social Democratic Party
X C E  KESK: Centre Party Before 1965, MAAL: Agrarian
   Union
X C E  SFP: Swedish People's Party
X C E  KOK: [Conservative] National Coalition

GERMANY
X C E  SPD: German Social Democratic Party
X C E  CDU: Christian Democratic Union
X C E  CSU: Christian Social Union
X C E  FDP: Free Democratic Party
X C E  G: Greens

ITALY
C  DP: Proletarian Democracy
E  PCI: Italian Communist Party
C  PSI: Italian Socialist Party (Between 1966 and 1969 merged with PSDI to form PSU: Unified Socialist Party
C  PSDI: Italian Social Democratic Party except between 1966-1969
E  DC: Christian Democracy
X C E  PRI: Italian Republican Party
X C  PLI: Italian Liberal Party
X C E  MSI: Italian Social Movement
C E  PR: Radical Party
      VER: Greens

NETHERLANDS
X C  CPN: Dutch Communist Party
X C E  PvdA: Labour Party
X C  PSP: Pacifist Socialist Party
X C  PPR: Radical Political Party
X C  ARP: Anti-Revolutionary Party
X C  CHU: Christian Historical Union
C E  KVP: Catholic People's Party
X C E  CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal
X C E  D66: Democrats '66
X C E  VVD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
        GL: Green Left

NORWAY
X C E  SV: Socialist People's Party
X C E  DNA: Norwegian Labour Party
X C E  SP: Centre Party
X C E  KRF: Christian People's Party
X C E  V: Liberals
X C E  H: Conservatives
X C E  FRP: Progress Party Before 1977, ALP: Anders Lange's Party
SWEDEN
X E VPK: Swedish Communist Party, Since 1977
X E S: Swedish Social Democratic Worker's Party
X E C: Centre Party
X E FP: People's Party, Since 1990 FPL: People's Party
the Liberals
X E M: Right Party, Since 1969 MSP: Moderate Union
Party
MP: Environmental Party, Since 1985 MPG:
Environmental Party the Greens

UNITED KINGDOM
X C E LAB: Labour Party
X C E LIB: Liberal Party Since 1988 SLD Social and Liberal Democrats
also known as Liberal Democrats
C E CON: Conservative Party

UNITED STATES
X C E DEM: Democratic Party
X C E REP: Republican Party

* X = Parties used in analysis of proportion of women executive committees
C = Parties used in analysis of proportion of women candidates
E = Parties used in analysis of proportion of women elected