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Align between language, thought and architecture

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Rice University, 1992
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ALIGN BETWEEN
LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND ARCHITECTURE

by

DAVID WILLIAMS MCKEE

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARCHITECTURE

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

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ABSTRACT

Align Between
Language, Thought and Architecture

by
David Williams McKee

The Modern Epoch was characterized by a move to control discourse and to achieve a criterion of critique and meaning commensurate with notions of wholeness, consensus, clarity, closure, telos, and order. Yet the postmodernist critique has rendered such a criterion and notions inappropriate and inapplicable. The separation that seemingly existed between words and things has been shown to be but a thing of language. This altered understanding has brought discourse in architecture to a state of crisis. In modern building we continue to push the dualities in which we think and live further apart. Our representations seem divided and our sense of the built world may correspondingly be reduced to an incongruity of doubles. We do not understand the logic of our own language, yet restoration and recuperation of a criterion of critique and meaning is precisely dependent on an understanding of the relationships that exist between language, thought and architecture.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In memory of my father

Also in memory of the philosopher

Kanstantin Kolenda

For

Elysabeth

With special thanks to

Stephen Crowell, Philip Davis, Sydney Lamb,
David Pears, Albert Pope, William Sherman,
Stephen Tyler, Peter Waldman, Mark Wamble, Richard Wolin,
Peter, and Gary

In appreciation of the sense of inspiration

found in the work of architects

Will Alsop and John Lyall
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PREFACE

"Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were, all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)

"What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground on which they stand."

-Ludwig Wittgenstein¹

"And to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life."

-Ludwig Wittgenstein²

¹ Philosophical Investigations. (New York, Macmillan Company), 48e.

² Ibid. Pgh. 19, p. 8e.
"...in the middle...

as Aristotle says, is the place to begin a reminiscence...

...which is another way of saying that the tropes that configure our thinking, perceiving, and remembering about remembering, perceiving, and thinking are themselves figured by perceiving, thinking and remembering."

- Stephen A. Tyler

In the middle of the muddle, references to the "middle ground," the "nondialectical third," and the "other" are characteristic of a continuing yearning and fervent desire in architecture to escape the dogma of Modernist thought, of the "plain style", and to arrive at a new plane of discourse, an other way of thinking about what it is that we do. Such a desire was clearly demonstrated in the language and the performances which took place at "The City Imagined" Symposium. The contrasts between the logical analyses of Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas in their reading or re-reading of the city, to that of Jennifer Bloomer's figurative construction, to

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3 Introduction to a paper entitled "Critique of Cognitive Studies" for the Linguistics Colloquium, Rice University, Spring, 1991.

4 Rice University, March 14, 1992.
Peter Eisenman’s nomination of the "fold" as the discourse of the "other" and his re-
iteration of a third supposedly not-classical, not-referential discourse, to Rem
Koolhaas’ mute architecture of enabling\(^5\) describe the middle of the muddle and
point to the appropriateness of the re-examination of the relationships of language
and architecture, rhetoric and logic, and hermeneutics.

Our subject isnarred and intertwined, this notion of language and architecture
and all the other terms just mentioned. They are easy to rattle off in mere speech,
but difficult to wrestle with in the text, the interminable text, where thoughts become
visible for all eyes, especially your critics. Where is the voice, but fleeting.

There is no way to begin except by sketching, like the design process itself
which stands not far removed from the act of writing. But let us sketch, rather than
focus on the popular term of "writing" as in "writing an architecture". Our purpose
here is drawing a paper, in all of the senses given by the word "drawing".\(^6\)

Drawing on a variety of sources, we take on the challenge of re-examination,
and in so doing, we have to admit that we cannot realistically cover all of the topics

\(^5\) This terminology was not used by Rem Koolhaas in his description of his work.
However, we have taken the liberties here to make the association between "an
architecture of enabling" and Koolhaas’ work because of the clear lineage and
influence that exists between Cedric Price, who coined the term, and Koolhaas.

\(^6\) See appendix for our search notes on the subject of "drawing" [a paper].
mentioned in the last utterance of the first paragraph. However, it is within the scope of this endeavor to draw out a number of the issues which have constituted the research in preparation for our work here. The relationships between language and architecture\(^7\) will be the central focus, with a chapter devoted to the logic of our language. The topic of rhetoric and architecture will, at this point, only be treated obliquely, and at that tenderly; a credible discussion of rhetoric will be postponed to a later time. Hermeneutics will necessarily be present throughout the discussions herein, yet will also not be directly brought under the light.

In undertaking this task, we necessarily begin with a multitude of suppositions. As alluded to in the opening paragraph, the desire to articulate a position other than certain perceived paradigms has led various thinkers at times to claims of finding the new, the "other". It then becomes a bit of a puzzle and takes a period of time to sort out whether in fact the work represents what it claims to be, or whether it remains within existing paradigms of thought. We suppose that our discipline is not free of this perilous desire. A potential concern we face in architectural theory and criticism is the production of critical essays and projects which offer only terminological shifts without a shift to new ideas or new ways of thinking about architecture. The words shift. The framework which the words describe stays the same. That is to say, critical essays purporting to offer an other interpretation, other than the framework

\(^7\) Or the so-called "linguistic analogy", although we deliberately shy away from this term because of its exhaustion.
which is familiar to us, do not offer us an other. They offer us the same in different
terms. The framework to which we are referring is this:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
(  \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
(  \\
\]

Figure 1.1

This simple line is used to represent difference, this from that, an 'x' term over
a 'y' term, x/y. It represents binary opposition or a binary system. It implicates (or
encodes) all of the following given in Figure 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causality</th>
<th>After/before</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(telos, priorness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Governors/governed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dominance, authority)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Upper/lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Good/bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Right/wrong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Death/life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Civilized/primitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2

In a sense, this framework seemingly is, or - not to exhaust a Heideggerian
term - is "always already" given. In many respects, it is difficult to escape because it
is part of our very consciousness; reinforced in so many aspects of our perceived world. But we ask, is it a part of our consciousness, or only a part of the consciousness given to us by Modernism? In other words, is this framework for thinking a particular manifestation of our modern consciousness?

This is a project which attempts to critique the various frameworks of our thinking in architecture through an exploration of language. It stems from the supposition that we do not understand the logic of our own language. It also questions the whole project of "writing an architecture", which has become a fashion, or a rhetorical ploy. In the language analogy, we question whether "writing" is perhaps a less interesting alignment to make than an alignment to "speech." We suppose that architecture has, in a sense, lost its voice in its pre-occupation with "writing an architecture" and the incessant need to "read" it back. (encode-decode) It could be otherwise.

Figure 1.3

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8 Adapted from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus,
Our investigation also begins with a question about architecture's discursivity. We say that language is discursive. Can we say that architecture is discursive? That is to say, if architecture is a form of writing, then should it not also share in a description of being discursive? We say that discourse is communication of thought by words in speech and writing. Discursive is the adjectival form of this word which describes speech and writing as proceeding, in one sense, by reasoning or argument. The implication is that it is not intuitive. Yet, in another sense of the term, discursive means digressive or rambling, which seemingly invokes the opposite, the intuitive. If we take the word "discursive", which is usually associated with written or spoken language, or thought (reason), and form the collocation "discursive architecture", we question whether this is a meaningful association or an empty collocation. Arguably, these terms have been put together in postmodernist architectural discourse. Are they happy bedfellows, though? One can poke fun at what is implicated in their association, but even if we did not, we sense the oddity of the two terms together and recognize the conundrum presented therein is just an inkling of the story to be told.

So the first theme that we are presented with is this notion of architecture's discursivity. The author Susanne Langer becomes central to the discussion because

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9 See Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). In particular, see chapter four on "Discursive and Presentational Forms."

10 See the Appendix for a drawing out of the associations.
of her writings on this very issue wherein the defining characteristic she gives to a
discursive form is linearity or the notion of the line. She draws the distinction
between discursive and what she calls presentational forms on this basis, where
"words have a linear, discrete, successive order; they are strung one after another like
beads on a rosary; beyond the very limited meanings of inflections, which can indeed
be incorporated in the words themselves, we cannot talk in simultaneous bunches of
names. We must name one thing and then another, and the symbols that are not
names must be stuck between and before or after, by convention."\(^{11}\) Conversely,
"visual forms - lines, colors, proportions, etc. - are just as capable of articulation, i.e.
of complex combination, as words. But the laws that govern this sort of articulation
are altogether different from the laws of syntax that govern language. The most
radical difference is that visual forms are not discursive. They do not present their
constituents successively, but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual
structure are grasped in one act of vision."\(^{12}\) From this account, the collocation
"discursive architecture" makes no sense. Instead, Langer would probably suggest we
stick with a notion of "presentational architecture."

A thematic condition which arises out of our own "discursive discussion" of
discursivity which interests us is this notion of architecture not being characteristically

\(^{11}\) "Discursive and Presentational Forms." In Philosophy in a New Key: A study
in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 93.
understood in a discursive manner, according to Langer architecture is not a
discursive symbol system, yet there is a sense in which our thinking about
architecture is in fact discursive in the linear sense, and arguably, the representation
of our thoughts in the architecture expresses this linearity. That is to say, in a
manner of definition which our discussion is beginning to draw to the surface, we
might say that "discursive architecture" has a line or a linear sense to it given to it by
its author. The line to which we are speaking now is the line in the framework of
our thinking to which we referred at the opening of this section between terms,
between dualities, between the x and the y.

The author/architect John Whiteman, in a vitally important essay expressed
this thematic condition most eloquently. He writes, "in our age there is a strong
sense in which the central intentions of architecture have been turned inside out. In
modern architecture we find difficulty in managing the relation between the physical
presence of a building and its intimations of the mental and the spiritual. Our
architectural works rarely serve as objects of intermediation between the ordinary,
the physical and the present on the one hand, and the mystical, the spiritual and the
abstract on the other. Instead of participating in the symbolic construction of the
lived world, the representations with which we fill our buildings most often serve only
to confirm our belief in the incompatibility of the ordinary with the mystical, of the
moment with the eternal, and of the instance with the general. ...in modern building
we push the dualities in which we think and live further apart. As a result, we are
left with a paradoxical world that seems at one irreducibly hard and physical and yet equally ethereal and infinite." The condition to which Whiteman is speaking is represented by the line which we argue is a characteristic of what we call "discursive architecture;" it serves to push apart the dualities in which we think and live rather than a course of action otherwise.

A second theme arises out of this discussion of "a line between" which also is the title of this paper, that being "align between." The theme of align between suggests the possibility of a thought structure, or rather we should say, a way of thinking to diffuse the idea of the imposition of "structure", about architecture which presents us with a alternatives to the dualities to which we have been speaking. It was already in the expression "discursive architecture", this other sense. Not the sense of exalting the dualities and insuring their re-articulation in our lives, but that other sense.

Dis-cursive Architecture
Align Between

Figure 1.4

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14 See the Appendix for our search notes on the development of this theme.
It is this other sense that is reinforced by Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is also reinforced by the philosophy of the pragmatists (Rorty et al). The question we also ask: Is it possible to relate Wittgenstein's writing to the tradition of architectural practice or are we limited to a discussion of architectural theory? (cf. Linder, 1989). We ask this question in light of a kind of tension set up between what has been properly called the "use of play" in architecture, which is actually a misuse of the term in the sense with which it is given to us by Wittgenstein. What we see occurring is the negation of any possibility of distinction between misuse and use. Architecture, we believe, is an activity of interpretation, persuasion and communication as opposed to a discussion of the dichotomous distinctions given to us by theory. So we are critical of a particular form of theory or theorizing about architecture which takes it out of the realm of the everyday world and elevates it to the position that hovers as a discourse on a discourse, as opposed to a discourse of the everyday.

One final note about discursive architecture. We suppose that already embedded in the collocation are the familiar dichotomies of reason versus intuition, logic versus rhetoric or "plain style" versus figuration, and in the broad sense modernism versus postmodernism.

Before leaving this section, we might also say that this is a historical
project.\textsuperscript{15} Although our investigation\textsuperscript{16} addresses what have been termed theoretical and philosophical issues, it would be presumptuous on our part to say that what we are doing here is itself theoretical or philosophical. That is to say, given the immensity of the project, the complexity of the issues, and the amount of scholarly research which addresses this subject - of which we have only been able to review a part - we steer away from any claim that what we are doing here is original. It is not. The scholars contributing to our understanding here are duly cited.

This is also not a self-reflective (or self-reflexive) text. In taking language as our subject\textsuperscript{17}, or more precisely, the interweave of language and architecture as our subject, the reader might expect to encounter a form to this text and a form of writing which would exemplify aspects of the study itself. That is to say, its own textuality would become part of the project or in fact central to the project. It is not. At this point in its development, the concentration has been on an understanding of the subject matter, and while the impulse to play with our subject through the medium of writing is a constant enticement, we have tried to hold what might be

\textsuperscript{15} This can also be read as "a-historical", meaning not historical.

\textsuperscript{16} When we say "our" as in "our investigation" we put into use a voice similar to that found in Wittgenstein's writings. And when we use the term "we", the "we" to which we are referring and the concern which we will say is "ours" is meant in a similar sense to the manner with which Wittgenstein is speaking in the opening quotation. Throughout his writing, he invites the reader to participate in a project which, because of its very nature, involves all of us: the use of language. The voice of the author in this instance stresses a common sense notion.

\textsuperscript{17} Language then becomes object-ified, is our object.
termed formal textual play to a minimum in light of our interest to enter into and engage the issues and arguments which constitute the research.\footnote{18}

In the interests of providing orientation to the reader, we might also add that our investigation is overwhelmingly horizontal. From its inception, it has been conceived of and represented as a project constituting a body of research for a "laying-out of the field."\footnote{19} In a sense, this project is a kind of operation, like performing surgery, which warrants comment and a description of the body which is under our knife. Or, we should assert the plural and verbal in this statement: that what we are up to is operating, and in fact there are multiple bodies and various instruments, knives for cutting, other tools for probing and prodding, scopes for gaining alternative views, etc. Hence, this paper is divided into six sections, each attempting to focus on an aspect of the operation.

\footnote{18} Some would argue that you cannot address the subject of language without being concerned with the form of one's own writing, that is, its representation. We are concerned. However, we have also had two other concerns: that the formal play or move to textualization did not become a project for the project which consumed the project itself; and, that a move to textualization not be read as a mere aestheticizing move weakening the entire project, that is, a move to please the eye only and not to engage the readers mind (a prevalent move made in architecture).

\footnote{19} See the Appendix for a "laying out of the field" in terms of the site [map] of our language investigation and architecture.
LANGUAGE AS AN IDEAL FOR ARCHITECTURE

"The elements are to architecture what words are to speech, what notes are to music, and without a perfect knowledge of which it is impossible to proceed further."

- J.N.L. Durand, lecture delivered at the Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France (1802)²⁰

"Language, after all, has one great advantage over the biological and mechanical analogies, in that neither of the latter tells us anything about human emotions or the way these emotions are experienced. They undoubtedly give architectural theorists many clues about the nature of structure and function; but they are useless when it comes to solving the aesthetic problems which constitute, and always have constituted, the main dilemma of the modern age. Language, on the other hand, unlike the biology and mechanical engineering, but like architecture, is both functional and emotional. It has a basic functional purpose, which is to fulfill the needs of communication; but in fulfilling this need it can be made to attain an emotional power which raises language to the ranks of the Fine Arts."

- Peter Collins²¹

The architectural historian Peter Collins, in a chapter of his book Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture entitled "The Linguistic Analogy", is one of the first modern historians to single out the subject of language and architecture and name

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²⁰ As quoted in Peter Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture. op. cit., p. 179.

it, in his terminology, as "an ideal", which presumably implies that it has a design application and is not just of literary and historical interest. His treatment of the subject, however, is in fact much more directed to the relationship between literature and architecture than any application of linguistic theory, hence the title now in retrospect is a bit misleading. And it is unclear how he thought the analogy could be put into use. While he offers us little help in this regard, there are a few points he makes which are still pertinent to our discussion which should be noted before moving on.

In his interpretation, the analogy between architecture and language has been in use in various forms for centuries and vague analogies between architecture and literature can be found beginning as far back as the seventeenth century. He claims its use noticeably increased in the middle of the 18th century, and it remained active thereafter right up through to the end of the period which was the focus of his historical research, that being 1950. From this we note the need to be very precise in our interest and claims about what particular aspect of the analogy we desire to address, for it is not our interest to review the whole history of the relationship

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22 In fact Collins does not make use the terminology "linguistic theory" but does, however, note the influence of comparative philological research on such individuals as Quatremere de Quincy. See our section on Language Patterning and Thought.

23 The word "linguistic" and the expression "linguistic analogy" having been given a very particular sense meaning an analogy to "linguistic theory" in the way that the analogy was put into use in architecture after the late 1950's, beyond the purview of Collins' work.
between language and architecture in its many manifestations. Such a review is beyond the scope of this paper and would take us away from more interesting and pressing questions. As we are interested in how the analogy operates to assist us in doing architecture, in the act of making, we are interested in the history of the analogy insofar as we can begin to talk about the analogy's application as a way of thinking about architecture in the design process. We have a particular interest in the past thirty five year period in architecture, but acknowledge that we should look beyond this period alone for help in our pursuit. We are skeptical as to the progress of our thoughts on this subject, and therefore do not want to close the door on earlier productive accounts of thinking. Hence our purview will be wide yet selective, stopping where pertinent information is to be gained.

Collins goes on to make the obvious observation that literary language involves "expression",\textsuperscript{24} and that the same can be said of art. His claim is that this in fact led various authors including Giambattista Vico and R.G. Collingwood to assert that art is a kind of language. Of course, it followed from this that architecture is a kind of language too, although Collins notes that Collingwood's theory of aesthetics never explicitly addressed architecture. The term "expression" will resurface in our discussion later.

\textsuperscript{24} ibid., p. 174. We also assume that he means ordinary language when he uses the term "literary" here, for certainly ordinary language is not without expression; the distinction being that literary language implies the language used in literature versus the common ordinary language of daily life.
Described in these terms, Collins goes on to show that art and architecture have been regarded as a "kind of eloquence", whereby "its virtue is not in the form produced so much as in the emotion which produces it; not in the object created but in the intensity and sincerity by which expression is achieved." He explains there are certain aspects of literature which show a close parallel with architecture, whereby the analogy between language and architecture has proved a useful catalyst in the formulation of certain architectural ideas. He does not elaborate, however, on what these ideas are or how they operate in the design process.

Collins rightly points out that "language, after all, has one great advantage over the biological and mechanical analogies, in that neither of the latter tells us anything about human emotions or the way these emotions are experienced. They undoubtedly give architectural theorists many clues about the nature of structure and function; but they are useless when it comes to solving the aesthetic problems which constitute, and always have constituted, the main dilemma of the modern age. Language, on the other hand, unlike the biology and mechanical engineering, but like architecture, is both functional and emotional. It has a basic functional purpose, which is to fulfill the needs of communication; but in fulfilling this need it can be made to attain an emotional power which raises language to the ranks of the Fine Arts." The aligning of language with architecture is a simple yet significant and

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25 ibid., 174.

26 ibid., p. 174.
fundamental point to note here. All too often language is conceived of as being architecture's other, that which has to be overcome in order to get our thoughts out and onto the page; that language is the constraint. But as Collins suggests, it is only language that shares with architecture the power of emotion, of poetry in fact, and thereby it offers the greatest potential. Collins' mention of the biological and mechanical analogies also is in the forefront of our minds as numerous architects in the recent past\textsuperscript{27} have sought to invoke these other forms to assist in the design process on a number of different levels and for a variety of reasons.

Before taking leave of Collins' account, we must give our attention to one very peculiar example. In a paragraph of his text wherein he is actually addressing counter-arguments to the linguistic analogy, he quotes the historian James Fergusson as saying "Architecture imitates nothing, illustrates nothing, tells no tale; it barely manages to express an emotion of joy or sorrow with the same distinctness with which they can be expressed by the unphonic brutes." Collins goes on to say that Fergusson later added that "a building might become phonetic by the addition of sculpture and painting; but it was important nor to confuse the two modes of utterance, since the eloquence was in the last named arts, not in the technic."\textsuperscript{28} Our first reaction is to recoil with utter dismay as to how anyone could make such an inane comment, especially from a learned historian. However, what interests us in

\textsuperscript{27} For example, Peter Eisenman's proposal for the biology center at Carnegie-Mellon University and its appropriation of the biological analogy as a form of logic for the project.

\textsuperscript{28} ibid., p. 176.
this quotation, once we are able to move beyond the shock value of the claim, is the particular expression used by Fergusson, "a building might become phonetic," and then later in the utterance where he likens sculpture to what? to a mode of utterance. He specifically invokes the verbal relation as opposed to the literary, phonetics or spoken language as opposed to writing in an analogy to architecture. Now, when was the last time you heard the expression, "a building might become phonetic?" Have you ever heard this expression before? What Fergusson is doing, probably unwittingly (or perhaps that is being unfair, it may have been an expression which was popular in another period) is to align architecture with speech, not with writing; to align architecture not with literacy, but with orality. He is aligning voice with architecture, and in this particular example he is making this move in a very unusual way by saying in effect that since voice was absent; that the building might become phonetic if it was given voice, and in this case by means of the addition of sculpture. What we have to say to this example is that Fergusson used the right expression, he made the right alignment, however, he just didn’t know architecture well enough at make the attribution of voice to architecture in the positive sense. Here we find a thematic condition which is central to our argument. In the linguistic analogy, architecture is to be aligned with speech in a much more fruitful and interesting manner than with writing.
THE CRITICAL TURN

"Each person begins his work anew from different foundations, the same ground is covered again and again with inclusive results, there is no way to discriminate among the research 'accidents' and 'essential novelties' (Kuhn 355-56), and there are no systematic commitments which can motivate serious innovation (Kuhn, 349)."

- Thomas Kinneavy\textsuperscript{29}

"And what about architectural theory? As it is commonly understood, architectural theory is not a theory which is architectural, but is an attempt to make architecture theoretical. But it seems that being theoretical means to borrow the approach of the scientist or the philosopher, and while this may be enlightening or potentially very sophisticated, it ignores the fact that architecture does not share all the features of philosophy or science. Would it make a difference if architects could be architectural in their formulation of theory, rather than theoretical in their formulation of architecture?"

- Mark Linder\textsuperscript{30}

The past thirty years in architecture have been most significant. In this time, we have seen the introduction and constitution, or re constitution, of what may be

\textsuperscript{29} Making an alignment between an aspect of Thomas Kuhn's thesis regarding a "preparadigm" stage and the current state of English Composition as a discipline, in A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1971), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{30} In "Architectural Theory is No Discipline," a paper delivered at the Conference on Architectural Theory, Chicago, September 11, 1988.
termed the discipline of architecture.

The expression, "the discipline of architecture," is fraught with difficulties. Historically, the discipline was grounded in practice, having embraced from its beginnings a notion that learning took place as a form of apprenticeship to a master builder, and then later to an architect as master builder. But the central concern was always with practice. The architectural historian Peter Collins writes, "following the medieval tradition, an architect was essentially a man versed in the craft of building... It was only in the nineteenth century that architecture was merged into the Academy of Fine Arts in France; before the French revolution, the Academy of Architecture was a quite distinct organization."\(^{31}\)

Our interest in these early descriptions is to merely take note of the place from which we have come, and to say that architecture has moved away from this conception to a conception of the discipline as one with theoretical foundations. What we can also say about this change is that it is a move largely to find legitimation, or in a sense, to "slip new signifieds under the signifiers."\(^{32}\) The

\(^{31}\) Peter Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture., p. 174.

\(^{32}\) Stephen Tyler refers to this as an expression used by Lacan, "that signifieds can slide under signifiers." In a legitimizing move, theory may be used to conjure up the notion of the originary condition, the "before" and "behind", which in this sense is like the tale of signification where we knew the unsignified before it was signified as the unsignified and became the unsignified signified (the originary condition). See The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue and Rhetoric in the Postmodernist World. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 11.
change has, of course, evolved over some time. Yet, it is fair to say that it has most prominently been observed in the last thirty-five years. The change that has taken place in this period is the introduction of what has been termed "critical theory." It is referred to as "critical" because the authors writing in this period are for the first time beginning to analyze, or dissect, discourse in architecture and speak of it in the following terms: architecture as "a text", as a "kind of writing", architecture "to be read" and understood as discourse (cf. Eisenman, Gandelsonas, and others). That is to say, it was not until this period that we see architects and writers taking language no longer as merely an instrument but as their object of study.

The particular sense to this last claim is crucial. We are speaking here of the treatment of architecture as "text" and as a "form of writing", and at the same time speaking to the use of the analogy between structures of literary language and architecture, or more particularly, theories of language (linguistics) and architecture. The claim is that is was not until the late twentieth century that we see this particular application taking place. Architecture has metaphorically been called a language and referred to as such for centuries. However, it was often only understood in this manner in a rather loose and uncritical sense. A diagram will assist.
Traditionally, the realm of language has been thought of as including speech and writing, with a privileging of speech as the object of language study (linguistics). Architecture was something altogether different, existing in the realm of things. In the realm of language, speech and writing were seen as being manipulations of mere words. In the realm of things, architecture was the manipulation of things: beams, pillars, slabs, blocks, etc. A crossing over of words to describe architecture was seen as a departure from the realm of words to the realm of things and in this manner could only be understood in the sense of ornamented language use, i.e. metaphorical.

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33 See Wittgenstein’s famous illustration of the language between builder A and assistant B (an example of a language game), Philosophical Investigations, beginning with paragraph 2, p. 3e.
The sense of architecture as a kind of writing, as a text, is diagramed in Figure 3.2. Beginning somewhere in the late 1960's and early 1970's, we see the move by a number of architects and writers to seat architecture in the place of writing, no longer in the realm of things (cf. Eisenman, 1973). Such publications as "Notes on a Conceptual Architecture" and "Cardboard Architecture" signaled a shift in thinking about how language, and language theory, was to be treated. No longer did architecture have to exist in the realm of things. Rather, we now had the claim that architecture could exist in a conceptual realm and in a realm described as a kind of writing; a realm previously the domain of literary language. This move just described was articulated by Rosalind Krauss as "anomalous behavior" on the part of Peter Eisenman and a number of other architects and writers. She perceived the condition at the time as being characteristic of "the circumstances that precede...a paradigm shift" fitting the description of change given by Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. From this she went on to assert that it signaled the beginnings of a significant change and potential new paradigm in
Whether Krauss' interpretation was right or wrong, what we can say is that this activity became prominent if not central to the generation of a field of discourses which heretofore was not present in architecture.\textsuperscript{34} The author James Kinneavy talks about a similar condition in the field of English. He writes "the field of discourse [in English] is still in what Kuhn, a notable historian of science, has called the preparadigm period (Kuhn, 354). That is, there has not yet been erected a comprehensive system of the discipline which has received some general acceptance and which could serve as a framework for research, further speculation, innovation, even repudiation."\textsuperscript{35} Here he is addressing the field of English, and at first blush, for us in architecture one finds it hard to imagine that the discipline of English could be in a period likened to Kuhn's definition of the "preparadigm". It would seem, if this is the case, that architecture hasn't even begun to construct its field. But as he goes on to construct his argument, it begins to sound suspiciously more and more like our condition. He continues, "Kuhn sketches the pattern of development of some other disciplines before the advent of a workable paradigm, and the sketch looks very much like a portrait of the field of composition at the present time. Each person

\textsuperscript{34} See "Death of the Hermeneutic Phantom: Materialization and the Sign in the Work of Peter Eisenman." A + U (Architecture and Urbanism), p. 189.

\textsuperscript{35} The establishment of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies (IAUS), the rise of critical journals like "Oppositions" evidenced this fact.

begins his work anew from different foundations, the same ground is covered again and again with inconclusive results, there is no way to discriminate among the research 'accidents' and 'essential novelties' (Kuhn, 355-56), and there are no systematic commitments which can motivate serious innovation (Kuhn, 349).\footnote{ibid., p. 3. We might note here before proceeding any further with the example brought on by Kinneavy's argument, namely Kuhn's theory of change, that we are not endorsing the validity of Kuhn's thesis in particular. Kinneavy himself, is his example, uses the concept which underlies Kuhn's work and some of the Kuhn's terminology as a framework for discussion to argue for a condition which he perceives to exist in the field of composition. Later in his work, he goes on to show that Kuhn's thesis is not unique but only one of a number of ways various writers, philosophers and researchers have structured their thoughts regarding the nature of change in discourse. In fact, the structure is also not unlike the structure of the folk tale, which encodes a move from the familiar, to the unfamiliar, and then returns back to the familiar again after some stage of resolution (cf. Tyler).} We in architecture cannot deny that this description sounds all too familiar, hence its appropriation and appropriateness to our discussion.

The title of Kinneavy's work is A Theory of Discourse, and one wonders immediately why we need a theory of discourse, a discourse on discourse, or a metadiscourse?\footnote{A familiar term used in the discussion of discourse but also related to the title and the concept of Hayden White's book, Metahistory.} In the back of our minds is Bohr's diagram of the atom and we have just taken another quantum leap to an energy level or shell further out, away from the center, or what is central; another removal.\footnote{This trope conjures up a number of thoughts, none of which are central to our discussion, yet are interesting just the same. If we recall correctly the physics of the atom, the levels furthest out are the most unstable; electrons in the outermost ring are susceptible to spinning off. The core of the atom, of course, has represented the focus of our attention in science and still does. It does so for a variety of reasons,} Our first reaction is to say
that it is a move in the wrong direction, seemingly outward. We should instead be moving inward, towards the heart of the matter. Our second reaction is to say that the term "theory" is difficult because of all of the scientistic notions that it conjures and the devaluation this term has undergone in the past thirty years.

From an architectural perspective, the idea of needing a theory to do architecture raises questions with its practitioners. It draws out the dichotomy between theory and practice wherein the perpetual debate is invoked over which presides, theory or practice, and in which direction knowledge flows: theory informs practice, or conversely, practice informs theory. That the two could be framed as being co-emergent or always already in a dialectical relationship with one another is not always the position or understanding to which our thought defaults, and we see evidence of this in our discourse.

True, we disagree with the term with the term "theory". Yet the nature of the project, and we are speaking now in the broader sense to include any number of

not the least of which are notions of the origin, the elemental, and the fundamental. These, of course, represent the building blocks, the stuff out of which all things are made. The core encodes the story that we tell ourselves about our desire to break things down into their most fundamental elements, and when we do, everything will be clear to us as to why things are the way they are. If we could just get to the core. Working in the outer shell is insignificant by comparison. Nothing more can be learned by considering the outer parameters. Or is there? If we consider that other atomized model, the universe, we see that the highest energy is in the center and, if we travel to the center, we would die. Conversely, our interest is in the outer limits, the outermost. But then when we consider the outermost shell, we are "way out in space" and, therefore, irrelevant. Right?
authors which have focused on the nature of discourse, is valid. It is directed towards an understanding of how discourse operates, the ways of discourse. Arguably, at the same time, it is an examination of how the mind operates. If we think back now to the quotation from Wittgenstein in our opening, the project is one of cutting down through the layers and clearing up matters for our understanding, a kind of therapy.  

From the discussion up to this point, we can already begin to sense a recurrent theme which points to a kind of tension which exists. That tension was correctly identified in a playful manner by our second author at the opening of this section. Mark Linder asks, "What about architectural theory?" in much the same way that the question implicitly, if not explicitly, is being raised here. His distinction between a "theoretical architecture" and an "architectural theory" conjures for us the distinction between a "conceptual architecture" on the part of Eisenman, for example, and an alternative which does not seek "to borrow the approach of the scientist or the philosopher" but rather finds its resources in another manner. Linder argues for the potential positive consequences of philosophical criticism upon architectural theory using the writings of Richard Rorty. In a very insightful manner, Linder observes that one of the most obvious strategies which is available to both

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40 For our patient, which is us, after the dissection is through. Perhaps we should change our trope slightly to that of surgery and an operation, from which there is recovery, as opposed to dissection, from which one imagines a table of pieces at the end. In fact, who ever performed a dissection on something alive!
architecture and theory is the choice of vocabulary. He writes, "in Rorty's culture, one chooses among incommensurable vocabularies, not between verifiable propositions. The object is not to refute the arguments of your opponents, but to problematize the vocabulary which they use."\textsuperscript{41} In the sections which follow, we attempt to problematize the vocabulary by re-examining the alignments that have been made between architecture and language.

\textsuperscript{41} "Architectural Theory is No Discipline", op. cit., p. 6
CRISIS AND CRITICISM

"Now the ocular fairy tale is finished, the mirror broken. Modern science, begun by Bacon and Descartes, accomplished the first assault on the trinity, on the object, on nature, on the signified, and now we know, because science tells us so, that there really wasn't anything real out there, just the discourse of science. The language of things was but a thing of language. And because of psychoanalysis, we now know we no longer know but only give the illusory appearance of a cogito. And, what of the "prison house of language?" The prison has become an amusement park, an autopoetic hall of mirrors. The moderns left the mirror intact in their attempt to remake discourse on the model of the unconscious, as the discourse of the other, but postmodernism dismantles the hall of mirrors and builds no new prisons."

- Stephen A. Tyler

In the dichotomies presented at the beginning of this paper, an attack needs to be formulated with respect to a notion of "plain style" which has been invoked by numerous authors.\textsuperscript{43} In so doing the groundwork will be established for a later


\textsuperscript{43} "Plain style" refers to a kind of reductionism in language, a controlled discourse. In architecture, the plain style became a term associated with the Modern Movement dictum "Less is more", and also a form of reductionism to "no style". Peter Eisenman in his earlier essays attempted to diffuse and at the same time critique the existing paradigm of styles by calling what he did "conceptual", "a cardboard architecture", implicitly if not explicitly stating the move to plain, no style.
discussion and development of the concept of what will be referred to as "Tractatus thinking." The reason for an attack on "plain style" is that it is an ideology, that is to say, an ideology of discourse. It says that the only way to do discourse is to do it as if the paragon of discourse was mathematics and logic, and all other discourses are relatively defective. It is only by transforming them into something that approximates as closely as possible the structure of mathematics or logic that discourse can be cleaned up and made to serve the purposes for which it is intended. Among the purposes that it is intended to serve is clarity of representation so as to limit or eliminate all of those cases in which words are polysemous, for example, where they have more than one meaning or where the meaning is said to be ambiguous. There is a imperative in this ideology for clear, simple, "plain style" which is highly puritanical and which has, in fact, as one of its motivations the idea of purity. The idea is that it is possible to purify language of all of its inconsistencies and ambiguities, to burn out all of the dross that has accumulated as the result of language's historical emergence out of everyday activities. In order for it to be a fit means of communication for the celestial realm for logic, mathematics and science it has to undergo a series of purifications to transform it into another proper form.

All of these moves in effect define the idea of Modernism. That is to say, there are moves which say that we need to have a method of discourse which

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44 This argument, and the particular sense of the use of the term "Plain Style" in the structure of the argument, was formulated by Stephen A. Tyler. See the Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue and Rhetoric in the Postmodern World. op. cit., chapter one. Adaptions have been made for our use here drawings out the similarities of this discourse with discourses in architecture.
constitutes itself as a method of inquiry. Then we have to have a notion that in
effect the main function of discourse is to represent ideas and things. From this
move, the notion of representation moves to the center and occupies the position
from which everything else is sort of accessory. The questions then become questions
about how does language perform the role of representation. The answer is badly.
Then the next question is, "how do we fix it up?" The way that we fix it up is
encoded not only in the dictates of "plain style" which emerged over a period of time
in the modern period. It can be found in a variety of places. It can be found, for
example, in Descartes, in the idea of clear ideas, the metaphors of clarity and
transparency, and also the accompanying metaphor of the mirror. That is what
language is. It is a mirror that reflects back to the things that are mirrored in it or
the things that are mirrored in your mind, or both.\textsuperscript{45} The project is one of
clearing up the distortions in the mirror, the idea being that the mirror is defective.
The remedy is to call upon a spectacle grinder in order to re-grind the lens of
language.

In effect all of the metaphors used in reference to language become
metaphors about light, and metaphors about lens, and metaphors about refraction,
and metaphors about reflection. These metaphors then constitute the sources out of
which the discourse of purification is woven. There are lots of names that go along

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., See Chapter One entitled "Breaking the Mirror" In The Unspeakable:
Discourse, Dialogue and Rhetoric in the Postmodern World.
with this, logical positivism obviously being one of the primary names.

One of the chief planks in the platform of logical positivism was that ordinary language was all wrong and that it needed to be cleaned up. This is also the kind of thing that put forward the idea that there is an appropriate style which says there are no "I's" in scientific discourse and there are as few adjectives as possible in a scientific report. It says whatever is being represented in a scientific report has to fit as closely to what is being represented.

There is another urge here, which is the urge towards pictorialization. That is to say, what you want language to do is to enhance its "picturing function" so that language then will provide you with a picture of reality in which the distance between the picture and reality becomes as small as possible. Ultimately the picture gets so good that it is no longer possible to tell the picture from reality. This is the Baudrillardian kind of take on the idea of picture. What happens is that the representation consumes what it represents. Then the representation comes to be not just a representation, but the representation comes to be the reality. But it is a funny kind of reality because it is a "hyper-reality", a reality that constitutes itself out

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of itself.

"Plain style" is about the appropriate sequence of ideas. That is to say, the idea is that ideas follow one another\textsuperscript{48}. Of course, this is what becomes taught in the notions of logic, that x doesn't follow from y or that x does follow from y, so there has been another metaphor about following from, so that things follow from if they descend appropriately from a source or they follow from if they are linked appropriately to one another as in the cars in a freight train. The idea here is that there is a perfectible form of discourse which will accomplish the job of representation.

One of the peculiarities about this notion is that it accepts the terms of the structure of indo-european grammar. That is to say, it accepts the terms that what are important are the distinctions of subject and object and what it is that constitutes any relationship between the subject and object. As a result, it recapitulates the standard grammar of what one would call following Benjamin Lee Whorf Standard Average European (S.A.E.), in which there are the ideas that a sentence consists of a predicate and its argument, which is simply another way of saying that a sentence consists of a verb and its noun in the relationship of subject and object. The interplay between logic and language is constituted in the relationship between these

\textsuperscript{48} See our discussion of discursivity (cf. Langer, 1957), Chapter one of this text; "like beads on a rosary..."
ideas of subject, subjectivity, object, objectivity, and the relationship of relatio to realia. All of these become the terms of the language reform.

What happened ultimately is that there is a continuing suspicion of anything that isn't either the subject or the object. There is a continuing suspicion of the verb. A part of that suspicion manifests itself in the preference for nouns. One of the reasons for the preference for nouns is that nouns are names of things, whereas verbs do not have stability; they do not have the appropriate "thing-like" character.

An attack on the idea of this "plain style" as a style is a means of relativizing it to the idea of rhetoric. To say "plain style" and by that conjure up the notion of scientific discourse, of referential discourse is to relativize it to rhetoric; in effect saying that it is a mode of rhetoric. This is a rhetoric that functions ideologically to tell you what can be known and how it can be known. It rules out of its domain anything that doesn't fit the set of criteria that it establishes as its own defining essence. What it rules out are what can be characterized as paradigmatic associations.

Ferdinand de Saussure made the distinction between the syntagmatic axis and the paradigmatic axis in language.\(49\) The syntagmatic axis says this is the movement

of signifiers along a line in which one follows another. That is a notion of signs in a concatenated relationship to one another moving through time so that you move from one point to another point in something like the way a road goes from its origin to its terminus. On the other hand, there is the paradigmatic axis of language which is not lineal but which is synchronous, that is to say, it does not manifest the characteristic of lineal time but it is synchronous and simultaneous.

There are two ways in which you can think about this. One of them is to think, well..., and the word just used, "well," could have been some other word; another word could have been fit into the sentence in its place. Then the move is to pile up a whole list of possible words that could have been in place of "well", and those then are the paradigmatic substitutes for "well". But they are all there. Saying "well" is to say that the word "well" happened to be picked out of all of the possibilities that could have happened in that particular slot. That is the paradigmatic axis.

One way that people have attempted to limit the paradigmatic axis was to say that it had to have a specific grammatical functions which were linked in such a way that the syntagmatic function had dominance over the paradigmatic function. That is to say, whatever it is that can occur in that slot has to be defined by the syntagmatic function. What this does in effect is to put the notion of syntax in the dominant position because it says that whatever it is that can fall into this place has
to be a legitimate possibility for this particular place. Of course, then that notion of syntax fits in with the set of rules that governs the possibilities of how sentences can be constructed. That set of rules then accommodates as closely as possible how logical propositions are assembled. This is how the whole thing fits together.

But there is another reading of syntagmatic, however, which is alluded to by Saussure but which is marginalized by him. That is the reading which says that the syntagmatic axis is defined by association. It is not defined by what can fit into a particular slot in terms of its syntactic function, but it is defined in terms of some kind of psychological phenomenon in which the word "well" goes with "water", and so then our choice of "well" to put in there is only another way of saying "water." There are a lot of reasons for why we might have said "well" rather than water, but none of which had to do necessarily with the prior structuring of discourse by syntax.

If a sentence is read that somebody produced simply as the concatenation of syntagmatic elements with the idea that each element has a little tag tied to it, which is the meaning of it, then one idea which has been put forth is that an understanding of the sentence comes by virtue of knowing the rules for assembling a sentence and knowing the meanings of each of the constituent elements.

But there is a contrary argument to this reading which can be illustrated in the
following diagram which asserts that there is a lot more going on than just linear sequential movements.\textsuperscript{50}

The argument here is that the sequential lineal movements along the syntagmatic axis are shadowed, or accompanied by, or associated with an instantaneous expansion into probably infinite realms of meaning. In this example, the author Stephen Tyler is illustrating that "movement" doesn't really mean motion of this thing going from here to there, but it also means that other thing that we mean by "did you have a good motion today?" This in turn has some idea of bowels. With the word "along", it is asserted, there is no reason to read it as "along", that is, it could be a-long, in which case it conjures in your mind the opposite of a-long, which is short. Of course, the word "the" is close in sound to the word "tea", so "tea"

\textsuperscript{50} Stephen A. Tyler. The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue and Rhetoric in the Postmodern World. op. cit., p. 6.
enters the mind of the reader. With the word, "Syntagmatic", the reader is obviously going to hear the fundamental first part of that as the "sin" part, and "tag" is a name that is given to something like a dog tag. Then "atic", well that sounds like "ack", and that resonates in the mind as "ack", and then when you think "ack" you think "ack" "ack". This also resonates with the next word which plays on the phonology of the word "axis". In the reading, then, of "movement along the syntagmatic axis", the reader is simultaneously thinking "bowel short tea sin tag ack ack Hitler". The argument is that this is what was really going on in the mind. Not only that, but "short tea" means a "spot of tea", and then a "sin tag" is associated with a "sin name", or a name of some kind of a sin. That leaves the question of what "ack ack" is all about? This conjures "World War II", where they had a lot of it. Then the association of "sin names, World War II and Hitler", all three combine in a single kind of paradigm of association. What the reader ends up with, it is argued, is an opposition finally between the British who are the paragons of the spot of tea and the Germans who are the paragons of sin, World War II and Hitler. The author then concludes that what was really in the mind of the reader in the process of reading "movement along the syntagmatic axis" is all of this other stuff which is wound up in an idea about warfare.

What this example does is to deconstruct the notion of the universalizing claim. It plays with one version of the idea of association, which is exemplified above. The notion is that words become associated in the mind by whatever the
peculiar circumstances of the reader's own biographical past might be, to say nothing of what the perversions of the readers mind might be. It plays with that notion of association which has always been problematic for theories of meaning. The example raises numerous questions, too. How is it that person "A" can know what another person "B" means if person "A" is really thinking all of this funny stuff, as in the example, and person "B" is thinking its own funny stuff, and neither is meaning the same thing. That is one idea of the version of association.

The other version of the idea of association actually works on the syntagmatic axis. It is the kind of thing which is done when word classes are set up in a relationship to one another by saying, for example, that this is a noun and this is a verb, and the verb goes in its particular position and the noun goes in its position. What is then established is a series of concatenations that are based on the idea of association, of contiguity, i.e. this goes with this, and is located next to this, etc. This is the kind of argument that is made in syntax, so it is a different usage of the word association which is more akin to that other meaning of association that you find in Hume, for example, where it is the action of one billiard ball on another. What is problematic, then, is the idea of association itself. What arguably happens is that one of these ideas of association gets ruled in, the other one gets ruled out. The one that gets ruled out is the one illustrated in Figure where an understanding of what "movement along the syntagmatic axis" is in fact closer to what really takes place. That one gets thrown out because it is characterized as the "devils dialectic". That
is how it is characterized by the advocates of plain style. The idea is that there is obviously a dialectical process there, but it is an evil one.

After this evaluation, the question returns as to why an attack on "plain style" is justified? It seems on its own grounds to be superior in terms of its truth functional possibilities as compared to a kind of association which encourages the branching off and forking off into all of these other possibilities. The argument against plain style gains its force in the recognition that plain style involves the play of a rhetorical trick, making you think that what it is doing is somehow or another fundamentally different from what this other form of association is doing. The reason it can say that is because it invalidates one kind of association while validating the other.

Tyler has explained that this example also speaks to that which is commonly referred to as "the repressed." In this manner, it is like the argument about the Id and Ego, that if we go off into this repressed stuff, we are going to be in bad shape. Ultimately, what we are going to end up with is word salad or schizophrenic speech. We have to have an exercise of will, of conscious application of rules and procedures to keep us on the straight and narrow so that we do not stray off into these inviting and seductive pathways like "bowel" and "Hitler". It is an act of will.

The other thing that plain style does is that it emphasizes the idea of
conscious, control of language. It says in effect that we can have total conscious control over discourse, except this is impossible; all the time the sort stuff that is illustrated in the example is there ready to creep in. Even when we are engaging in the clearest, purest form, it in fact is polluted. It is polluted everywhere by the kinds of things that are illustrated in the example as going on and trying to be repressed. These repressed things simply do not stay repressed, and they keep moving up into our purification.

The question then arises out of this investigation, "Is this the other?" That is to say, if it doesn't itself constitute a discourse, it must be "other than" the discourse that is nominated? The plain style as a form of discourse constitutes it as the other which is not discourse. That is to say, movement along the syntagmatic axis constitutes all this other stuff as not discourse.

What is problematic for the discipline of architecture is that language is taken to be the medium by which architects go about doing what is that they do, which is probably analogous to many other disciplines. When we allow this "other" to be the instrument by which we produce architecture, one questions how the things we make are intelligible or understandable or why they don't go off in as many different directions as the example does. In fact, some might argue this is precisely what is going on in architecture right now; that it is going in as many different directions as the example shows. What we need to do is to somehow control the discourse or use
a different discourse.

This is the other aspect of the purification of the sick discourse. The idea is that we are going to have absolute control over it and manipulate it. But again, this is an illusion, because every time we establish control over one part of it, we establish control over that part by being in a part of it already that we haven't established control over, and so when we have established control over one little territory. What happens is that suddenly we turn around and creeping up ready to gobble us up is this other territory that we hadn't purified yet. Ultimately what happens is the best purification is total silence, because there is no way to accomplish this purificatory act and to clean up the whole of language. We are always in a position of having to start somewhere that we haven't cleaned up and so that there is some place that is no longer under our control. It slips out from under our control constantly. The slipperiness of language argues against the possibility of the desire to controlling it.

There is more to it than just the desire for controlling the language. It is a desire for thought control. These are all of the modernist movements of thought control that we can identify as nazi socialism, communism, modern art, social realism, modern literature, semantics, logical positivism... Almost anything that we want to name that is part of the modern era as we think about it is an attempt to control thought, and focusing on all of the systematic means of "the expression of thought",

the way in which thought is represented. The notion is that we have to clean it up so that we prohibit writing like people did in the nineteenth century. We have to get rid of adjectives and all of that sort of baroque nonsense that they engaged in. Even in the case of those who attempted to write differently, this is true. The standard disclaimer is to say, well, what about James Joyce? What kind of control was Joyce trying to exercise over language when it looks like Finnegans Wake is totally out of control? But as Tyler draws out, it is just the opposite case. What he is attempting to do is to control the out of control. What were all of the verbal games and all of the plays on words and the use of strange etymologies and so on? This work was interestingly enough enabled by the fact that the Oxford English Dictionary was published for the first time when he began doing his work, so there was this enormous source that he could go back into and find all of these interesting words. He was really doing it, but what happened in the really doing of it was that it began to look more like this prohibited form.

Peter Eisenman is an individual through the 1960’s, 1970’s and early 1980’s who looked to Chomsky and Transformational Generative Grammar as a methodology to produce architecture. The idea was that he wanted to reach an a-historical architecture that was purely a manipulation of syntax. It is also a reversal of all of the dichotomies: the work lacks hierarchy, it lacks transparency to function and to structure, it lacks a sense of order...
The readability has consistently been central. An order presumably can be read in relationship to the text which sets up the discourse for the architecture. Architecture has paralleled many of the conditions and explorations in language. The whole search for meaning in language is matched by a corresponding search for meaning in architecture. One can chronicle the shifts that happened in the study of language with the shifts that were happening in architecture, except architecture is always one step behind.

One of the standard things we think about when considering the differences between modern architecture and non-modern architecture is the move to get rid of all that junk on buildings, all that chewing-gummed on decoration that wasn’t really there essential to the function of the building. In architecture, we have this whole vocabulary which is exactly like the vocabulary of everything else in Modernism. The idea is that there is something here that needs to be cleaned up and purified, and the way that we do this is by getting rid of the excess stuff that hides and obscures the real logical and functional character of what it ever it is. One can generalize the Modern Movement in terms of that idea.

The Modern Movement had in it an interesting complication which was a weird orientation toward both the future and the past. The orientation to the future was that this was all going to create a utopia in which consciousness will be changed because our consciousness is determined by the kind of language we speak and the
kind of environment within which we function. And so the utopia will be a utopia of changed consciousness. Part of that utopia will also have to come out of the rationalization of irrationality. But the interesting thing about irrationality is that irrationality is productive. But even though it is productive, it is something that has to be. Even in the consideration of the example (Figure 4.1), there is the potential for much greater results than following out the rest of that sentence; all of the things that you can think just by following out the other possibilities. It is not the phony productivity of arriving at the end of a sentence like arriving at the end of a train line and picking up our baggage and going home. There is no "going home" here.

We see there is an orientation here to the past, that the past has to be overcome, but we feel a little bad about it. There is a kind of lingering nostalgia for this past that has been overcome, and that is read in a whole variety of ways in Modernism. One of the ways in which we overcome the past is by going in to it, and so we go into it by psychoanalysis or we go into the past by going off to some primitive culture and learning how to paint right. There is this whole role of the primitive which has a dual function. The primitive is also elemental. What is it we are trying to do? We are trying to get to the elemental so that we can then construct new things out of the elemental by specifying rules. There is a very peculiar relationship to the past and to the thing that we are trying to overcome because it is also the source out of which we get what we are at once overcoming.
Modernism is a very weird period in terms of the structure of consciousness that operates and is created by it. And of course this is also what this is about, well it is not about a new kind of consciousness, but it is documenting the kind of consciousness that understands Modernism. The consciousness that we just said Modernism is, is no longer the consciousness of Modernism. It is a consciousness in which Modernism itself has been now marginalized and that consciousness that understands and marginalizes Modernism is also a different kind of consciousness.

It seems that Modernism offered a criteria of meaning that one could put a finger on, at least in architecture there was a transparency to function and structure in buildings that set up a way of critiquing the objects that were put out in the built environment. We could say that it was a great building because we could see the entrance and we could see the structure and we could read the different functions in the building. But we have lost all that, and so there is a crisis of a criteria of meaning.

There is, however, another way of trying to find new criteria, which is to say that we contextualize the building. What is the context of the building but cities? We are trying to find a new sort of criterion which says that the criterion is not the autonomy of the building itself but it is the building in relationship to the context which the building also helps to create. It is not this neutral idea of context in which the building in done. There are two notions of context, and one of the things that
is critical in the whole discussion in postmodernism is the idea of context. One idea of context is that it is a knowable phenomenon. We can say that the context of \( x \) is \( w \) and \( y \), so we know that it is delimitable and it is finite, and so we know that we are just going to manipulate within a certain framework. Instead of \( x \) being in the middle, we will put it in front of \( w \), in which case we will have created a new arrangement of this context.

The other idea of context is that the context is constantly creating itself, so that any change in the relationship of things that were in the context not only changes the relationship but creates a whole new context. Rather than context being something that is automatically specifiable and delimitable, context begins to look much more like "bowels" and "Hitler".

An other point which has been articulated (cf. Rem Koolhaas) is the myth of the city as an entity. This is related to the Modernist notion of the city where people complain because the city is no city. That is to say, in a city like Houston, we cannot tell where the downtown necessarily is. We are making a call for the abandoning of this idea of the city but we also think it directly relates to a number of notions in language and the idea that the city is a noun and through the process of entification we want to have something which is bounded and discrete. Yet, it no longer has or embodies - if we can use that word -any of the characteristics of what the city is. Or it needs to take on a new definition.
THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE

At the same time that we speak about language, we frequently refer to "the logic" of architecture which is a related notion. How is it related? Logic has been assumed to be an underlying modality of rational thought (reason), and has been the pre-dominant form of thought in Modernism. The postmodernist or post-structuralist critique has put into question the logic of reason. The result is an incessant referral and pointing to other forms of "logic". For example, a "logic" of literary discourse involving rhetoric or what perhaps can be characterized as a tropelogical (trope-logical) structuring of thought. The "logic" of one's thought is also central to the determination of a criteria of meaning and critique in architecture.

A Logic is simply the means by which we move from one thought to the next? If this is true, than any thought would constitute a logic. What is the absence of logic, then? A "randomness" of thought, or idle thought. Can we think in a totally random way, or are our thoughts already patterned by language? In order to understand what we are thinking, to make sense of our thoughts, we do use language. Is it a logic or no logic at all? We suppose that is not a fruitful question. What

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would be more fruitful to ask is whether or not it gets us somewhere. That is to say, what does it get us in the end? Is it important in the end that the logic is intelligible, transparent? No. In the end, all that we are left with is the object, and nothing else. That the object tells its own story of being, and how it came to be, is not held universally as criteria for meaning or for "greatness". Can this be used, though, as meaningful criteria? Yes, we think it can. In which case, it is in "potentia", a part of a language, that may or may not be put into use. A discussion with examples could follow where this criteria, this kind of language, has been put into use (cf. Louis Kahn, Carlos Scarpa and others).

"Does it re-present its logic?" is another way of putting it. But are we reproducing its language or its logic? The logic of the Tractatus was thought to be underlying and inaccessible; the best that we would do was to see that which is given in factual discourse as evidence of the underlying system. Do we not say that the logic of Modernism was (or still is) functionalism and structuralism, and that the criteria of meaning was a transparency to its logic? Modernism’s project was the reduction of the building’s "factual language" for the purpose of grasping that which underlies its very being; its logic.

In architectural juries and contemporary written criticism, there has been frequent reference made to "an other" kind of logic, a third thing, other than what has made up the logic of the discourse in architecture. These comments are made
in reference to a turning away from Modernism and structuralism and to something other, although the other is never named. It is even said that the other cannot be named, it is nameless, and has to be nameless because of its very nature, that it is an "other" logic. But what is really being said here? Taking our cue from Whorf's analysis of language\(^{52}\), we can make the following formulations.

If language influences thought, and thought is made up of concepts, and you have to have concepts in order to develop architecture, then we say of course that language influences architecture. If the authority of logic derives from the rules of language which determine the meaning of sentential connectives, such as "if ... then," then it follows that all logic has its basis in language. The appeal to "an other" kind of logic is merely an appeal to language. There is no "other" kind of logic.

This formulation suggests that logic is by definition derived from thought, is of thought. In other words, thought is the medium for logic. It does not make any sense to speak of a logic that is not thought. If language influences thought, and logic is reasoning, and reasoning is thought, then language influences thought.

Lets take the first part of the above section further. One idea is that logic is the instrumentality by means of this, and we can reject this idea. That is to say, the kind of methodological idea which tells you how you get from step A to step B to

\(^{52}\) See our section on Language Patterning and Thought.
step C, etc. So say we just throw that one out, and say that in effect we never really know how we got from A to B to C, etc. At every one of these steps, there is something that might intervene between those two, but that we do know that we can get from A to Z, even though we do not know how technically to get there. We can't say all the things about how to do it, but we know that we can do it because we have done it before. In the case of architecture, there is a building there, and presumably somebody thought about the building before it got put up. No matter how unsophisticated that thinking about it may have been, that happened, even though we can also probably argue that there is no necessarily determinate relationship between the thinking about the building and the building itself. The building may have emerged from a whole set of compromises and other kinds of things that happened when it was under construction, so there that there is no smooth movement from the prior plans to finished building. We suppose one thing that we can say is that we can reject this kind of theory to action equation. That is to say, knowledge doesn't just flow from theory to action, but that it is an exchange or a dialectic. Now this may sound much more heretical in architecture where the idea is that there is a planing stage and it has to be done before and so that the building is a realization, an acting out of the plan somehow. But we do not think that means we have to buy the idea that there is a necessary sequence of steps from the plans to the building, or even in the reverse case, reasoning back from the building to the

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plans that produced the building.

We could think of it in terms of all of the kinds of conditions that might impinge on that whole narrative, and doing architecture is a kind of narrative. One would be all of the stories that would be told about the planning stages, for example the stories about the students who worked for nothing to do things, and that in the official story that would be left out. When we are writing a biography or writing about a work, it is probably never mentioned that students did this work for free and the community..., etc. And so there would be this kind of thing, the difference between a reconstructive analysis or something like that. So you might want to go back in and fill in all of the nasty details by means of which the plans got to the plans which would sort of deconstruct the whole notion of the totalizing quality of the plans themselves, that is to say to show that they have built into them this whole social system, and that also the making it problematic the relationship between the plan and the thought in the mind of the Eisenman, for example. So you are also making that step much more problematic, right. So each one of these stages in the narrative is made much more problematic in relation to the appearance of the smooth flow of the narrative and thought to execution and now it begins to look a lot more interesting than it did before. That might be one way, and the way that it relates to the notion of language is that the role of language would be local now in the interrelationship between the people who were involved on the project, right. That is to say, you might want to go back and see how people talk to one another
or whether or not Eisenman even looked at the project. And now the role of
language now would be located in specific locales and in specific locations, and this
would get you out of that kind of totalizing of language as semiotic. You wouldn't
make that automatic move then into the symbol structure of the language of
architecture. Now it wouldn't prevent you from doing that, you could if you wanted
to, but you wouldn't be trying to do in a sense what they were trying to do was to
locate the concatenation of architectural symbols of some kind that constitute either
the shape of the city or the shapes of a specific project and so on. I think you would
now be locating that kind of language within more specific situations than you just
did.

An other way we could approach this is to look at the way language was used
to get the building built. How architects talk to contractors and how contractors talk
to laborers, and all of the conversational discourse that goes on. The process is
mediated by language; not language in the semiotic system, but language as
something that happens in specific locations involving relatively small groups of
people relating to a specific project in much the same way that a discourse
community might relate to a text. And in this case a text emerges out of out of the
various situations.

Now this strikes us as not a very appealing program to work on as it seemingly
is too fine grained; you could spend an enormous amount of time doing this and you
might come away feeling you hadn't accomplished anything. This is not the kind of thing that we need to do but it is the kind of thing that we can do without doing it.

We of course can describe what it would be if we did that, and just by doing that we would automatically make that situation problematic. We would not have to fill out all the details in order for somebody to get the details of how this assessment of what appears to a smooth and logical progression maybe actually involves problematic aspects. It is much like deconstructing the author here, by showing that there are a multiplicity of authors in the process and the autonomous author merely kind of narrates to himself the position of the integrator, putting the whole thing together.

We could do that without providing much of a description of what people are actually saying. By doing this what we could show would be this mediating role of language, but that it would be this much different kind of sense of language than the one in which the semiotics sense where everything gets sort of funneled back into the semiotic system itself. It is like the old competence and performance distinction where there is system of signs and rules or that there are architectural rules where if we do this, then we get this.

If we slip the langauge metaphor away from the one to this other one of localized discourse, of multiple voices or whatever kind of metaphorical use we wanted to use to conger up that image.
What we have is a structure of decisions that we use to trace back and trace forward and the whole sequence of decisions that go into the final product. We have a set of decisions about the making of the frames, and then you have another set of decisions about the instantiation of them and the two would actually move back and fourth. That is another kind of model of this kind of thing that is totally inappropriate. The real world sense of people interacting to get things done.

A great deal of those thought structures rely on the idea of the way that language attempts to mirror the world, and the parallel situation in architecture attempts to mirror a condition that is perceived in the environment, either a structure or a behavior that is seem in the environment; so that it is re-presented in architecture. So then how do you move away from that kind of structure?

One way to approach this is to make more problematic the whole thought structure, to say that the thought structure itself is kind of an illusion, there is no thought structure there by showing all of actions that influences that come together inasmuch as they in fact do come together. The other one would be to show all of the problems in the "translation factor". The other thing to do would be to look at a building and create a thought structure.

This reminds us of "discourse ready-mades", and we can say that they are present in architecture. In fact one can re-read eclecticism as a discourse of "ready-
mades'. And also this brings into question the thing our profession uses, which is
graphic standards, which gives you the dictionary of standard sizes. The critique here
is one of viewing these as being noting more that "discourse ready-mades", the ready-
mades by which we make architecture out of. And then what are the social and
political implicates of using these standards. [the parallel of the notion of linguistic
relativity is well with the grammar of materials that we as architects manipulate,
right. Linguistic relativity says that we see the world, we conceive of our own
particular reality, because of the language that we speak. It follows that graphic
standards and Sweets Catalogs provide us with two things. These provide us with a
language of materials and discourse ready-mades. Each of these serve to explain why
go much of our environment looks the way that it does, relative to the
standardization of the discourse. We would argue that this is certainly a parallel with
what Whorf was saying, albeit on a very mundane level]. In the hands of the less
imaginative.
"It is obvious that Ludwig Wittgenstein always strove for clarity. This compulsion is illustrated in his life as well as in his philosophy. Wittgensteinian clarity differs from Cartesian clarity or phenomenological clarity in Wittgenstein's recognition that there is no transcendental point of view from which clarity can be achieved. Clarity is reached through correct forms of expression in language that we already use, not through the discovery of supposed clarifying philosophical doctrines. We cannot get outside the interweave of language and life; all distinctions must be drawn within it, and clarity is simply a level of interpretation at which we can stop, at which a particular use of language makes sense."

-Robert John Ackermann

The sense of the word "clarity" which Ackermann so aptly points out in Wittgenstein's work is a subtle yet vital distinction to our discussion of architecture on many levels. The move from Modernism to postmodernism seems to some commensurate with a move from clarity to confusion, that a sensibility has been lost; the word clarity has seemingly taken on a negative connotation. Yet Wittgenstein's work solicits our attention for an alternative interpretation of our fall from beliefs in transcendentalism and Truth. The means by which we can obtain

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54 Wittgenstein’s City (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press), ix.

55 The Modernist dictum of "Less is More" becoming re-written as "Less is a bore" gives voice to this negative connotation.
clarity in terms of a "level of interpretation at which we can stop, at which a particular use of language makes sense," remains, given to us in the "interweave of language and life."\(^{56}\)

What is the criteria of critique? It still seems to us that in the discussion of discourse as an alternative to logic, or discourse as the logic, that what we then have is a question of criteria of critique. When an architectural project is given in that manner, then the criteria of critique becomes one of how well does the object mirror the discourse, and in effect that is one of the only measures we have left. If this is true, then the question arises as to why it is that architects do not concentrate on discourse as a component of study. In general, we don’t. We slop around in discourse and what we say is that we are manipulating objects in the real world, that we manipulate things and not words.

But it is not just architects. It is most people. Most people don’t want to admit that the discourse is what they are really doing. That would make them sound like they are not really doing what they should be doing. They are lost in the thought of talking about it and not really doing it.

The author Tullio Maranhao brings out this idea in his article "Psychoanalysis:

Science or Rhetoric?" that the critique of reason is the critique of representation. For all of the pointing that is going on to an alternative logic, but no one naming what the alternative logic is, this is the answer. The alternative logic is discourse in language. It can't be otherwise unless we are all caught up in a form of tractarian thinking.
EPILOGUE

An epilogue justifiably is a site for the self, a presentation in the first person, the "I". Elsewhere in the text, the self recedes, much like the student who pins up his or her drawings for jury, and then releases the work for the critics review.

I began the writing aspect of this project working in the spring semester under the assumption, or rather I should say the conviction, that a thesis was an ARGUMENT. Without meditating much on this word I had chosen to describe what it was I was going to be doing in the context of this project, I charged off on my "crusade," if your will, as I have a tendency to do. I must admit the more I enter into the opportunity (not the problem) of language, and into the examination of the structure of discourse, the more curious I find the terminology used by other writers in their descriptions of what they are doing. In encountering the writings of both Husserl and Heidegger for the first time, what I naively believed to be philosophical arguments were quickly shown to me to be of a different nature, namely, "inquires"; bound up in the phenomenological tradition is a notion that one is on a life long inquiry, circling (or perhaps more fittingly, spiraling) ever closer to transcendental truths. Wittgenstein's writings are yet of another nature, namely "investigations" and "descriptions" rather than explicit arguments. Or further, as Konstantin Kolenda taught us so very well, Wittgenstein might have even preferred to have me understand his writings as "reminders", a kind of therapy.

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The author, George Steiner, in one collection of essays prefaced his work thusly:

"Administrative and bureaucratic practice has disseminated the terms 'working papers' or, notably in American idiom, 'position papers'. These terms could be useful in defining a certain stage and style of intellectual argument. A 'working' or a 'position' paper puts forward a point of view, an analysis, a proposal, in the form which may be comprehensive and assertive. It seeks to clarify the 'state of the art' at some crucial point of difficulty or at a juncture from which alternative directions can be mapped...

University practice has disseminated the term "thesis." Accordingly, let me say what was perceived to be the task. What I perceive I am beginning to do here is much more like cutting or slicing or dissecting; verb-like. I admit at this juncture, too, that there has been a privileging of the horizontal over the vertical, Saussure's crosswise cut through the stem versus the longitudinal cut, the plan or horizontal section through a buildings versus the vertical section. In this manner, the activity is also more akin to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which is characteristically horizontal, versus the vertical nature of the Tractatus. In any event, it no less attempts to put forward points of view in as comprehensive a manner as time would allow for the purpose of clarifying a set of relations at this juncture from which "alternative directions can be mapped." The on-going process of assemblage here warrants a brief comment. Wittgenstein is known to have developed a body, a corpus of thoughts and statements, that became the source for an incessant process of cutting, juxtaposition, positioning, and numbering, then re-
cutting, re-juxtaposition, re-positing, re-positioning and re-numbering. I have found myself in a similar mode of operation, not for want of mimicry or emulation, but out of necessity in the process of collating my thoughts. As a consequence, there are disjunctures, and I have no doubt the discursive nature of my own thoughts is at times a question.

Also by way of a summary remark I should say something about the project of writing (a thesis in) architecture. My critics tell me this is not architecture. To which I am a bit puzzled, for I agree; this is not architecture. My puzzlement comes from the fact I do not claim that it, this writing, to be architecture. This is a discourse, and more particularly a discourse on discourses in architecture. Is the discourse theoretical? I do not consider what I am doing to be theory; this is not a search for a clarifying theoretical or philosophical doctrine. I say this for a number of reasons. First of all, the word theory conjures up a tremendous amount of baggage, like there is a science or a scientific methodology applicable to architecture. It also conjures up the duality between theory and practice and the old narrative that theory necessarily informs practice, that theory exists in the realm of academia and practice exists in the real world; theory is supplementary whereas practice is essential, it is real, where it is at. Theory manipulates words, practice is the manipulation of things, real stuff. This is not theory.

Is it architectural. The answer is yes.
This is a discourse on architecture about the integral and intertwined relationship of discourse and architecture. They are complementary, and at the same time, this writing is supplementary, that it goes beyond the object of its subject. An earlier notion I had was that this was a mode of action directed toward developing a philosophy in architecture. To which my critics say I am engaged in philosophizing about architecture without really doing it, without doing the real stuff. The net result is by these definitions everything here can be deemed trivial and irrelevant and can be dismissed by invoking the distinction between words and things, that what architects do is manipulate things, not words. And by things I mean drawings, models, plans, sections, elevations, materials, dimensions, etc. As if one could somehow circumvent language and work in a direct mode, the designer and his/her things, without having to enter into language at all.

The other criticism that will be levied is that this project represents thinking too much; that, in fact, is the problem with architecture at the university. Too much thought and words, not enough action. Architects exist in the realm of action. "Troubled" architecture comes out of the realm of thought and thinking too much; all the rationalization that goes on. I admit that this does in fact happen, but I would submit that it happens in an uncritical way. Supposedly the architect Alvar Aalto was asked in an interview once why he didn't write, or why he wrote so little. His now
famous retort was, "I build!" Louis Kahn didn't produce a building until he was..., how old?; yet he was engaged in discoursing about architecture for years before. Carlos Scarpa wrote little and sketched. He work was carried out not by means of construction drawings and written specifications, but rather from his sketches and his direction (verbal discourse) in the field; showing. This inquiry is not about the words that appear on the pages. It is about the thought structures and about the unsaid. It is not my intention to create a holistic diagram or present a holistic account in this medium, writing, about architecture. It is a supplement and complement at the same moment. In this sense it has everything to do with doing architecture. If the reader cannot see beyond the words on these pages, then you'll miss grasping that which was important to this author, which is o.k. because in an alternative sense, the reader of this text will create this work in his or her own absent the author, which is the nature of the medium. Put down into words, object-ified (or subject-ified) as it is here, its life becomes re-created by the reader in accordance with all the "funny stuff" that is going on in the reader's mind.

In reflecting on the oral thesis pre-defense, I was asked to state an hypothesis, a methodology, and conclusions; the model of scientific investigation; the encoding of the all to familiar narrative structure of beginnings, middles and ends. All "things" have beginnings, middles and ends, right? That is to say, I was supposed to tell my audience a hypothesis (beginning), a methodology (middle) and conclusions (ends). One of the things that you will note in the reading of this document is that there is
no beginning, middle or end, but there are multiple beginnings, middles and ends-of-sorts. It could not be otherwise. To be otherwise would be to fit this discourse into the very mode that I argue invokes a train of thought that is much less interesting and less productive to the manner with which thought structures in architecture should be encouraged. Why do we keep re-imposing the same thought structures and limitations on students? Is it that we are so entrained that we are incapable of seeing otherwise?
APPENDIX

One could say that this project stems from a "part of speech". It attempts to test the following hypothesis: That an architectural project can be generated from a "part of speech" by means of an interpretation of the logic it presents." The part of speech to which we are referring is the following:

drawing a line between two cities

Figure 2.1

There are a number of things that are peculiar about this particular part of speech. There is no subject, which is a deliberate accident on our part; when we first chose the expression, it was not with this in mind. Yet the thing that is interesting is that at the same time that it has no subject, it is our subject. The expression is a remnant of an earlier project, which means that it is pre-figured in our memory, or is in fact a memory itself, and therefore our engagement with it is a reminiscence of sorts. So we say that it has a number of "readings", and these fall quickly into two categories. We can try to say that the expression has a literal meaning, in which the operation to understand its literal meaning is to "read it as it is", to "not look beneath, below, above, behind, around" it; just read it off like beads on a string. Susanne Langer writes, "But words have a linear, discrete, successive order; they are

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strung one after another like beads on a rosary; beyond the very limited meanings of inflections, which can indeed be incorporated in the words themselves, we cannot talk in simultaneous bunches of names. We must name one thing and then another, and the symbols that are not names must be stuck between, or before or after, by convention.  

This formulation, of course, is familiar to us as part of Langer's presentation of the discursive nature of language, which in her assessment is juxtaposed to the presentational nature of forms. She goes on, "that is why the laws of reasoning, our clearest formulation of exact expression, are sometimes known as the 'laws of discursive thought'." Following the laws of discursive thought, then, we might be led to and understanding that what this expression is about is a form of mapping, or literally "connecting the dots" with a line that one would draw with a pencil between two points; in this case perhaps two cities on a map.

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58 Langer claims that visual forms (or presentational forms) - lines, colors, proportions, etc. - are just as capable of articulation, i.e. of complex combination, as words. But the laws that govern this sort of articulation are altogether different from the laws of syntax that govern language. She claims the most radical difference is that visual forms are not discursive. They do not present their constituents successively, but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual structure are grasped in one act of vision. See chpt. 4, "Discursive and Presentational Forms." op. cit., p. 93.

59 ibid., p. 82.
The expression, however, offers up many more figures than what our discursive, linear reading will allow. For example, the expression readily breaks down into three segments.

I.       II.       III.

drawing a line between two cities

Figure 2.2

And in segmenting the line, we could examine each part in the following manner. In the first instance, we consider all of the different senses of "drawing". (figure 2.3)
I. drawing

1. draw a wagon down the street
2. draw straws to see who goes first
3. draw attention to a word
4. draw a picture

5. draw an argument
6. draw air
7. draw on images
8. draw a conclusion
9. draw a paycheck
10. draw interest
11. draw a turkey
12. draw a pond
13. draw bath water
14. draw taffy
15. draw a bow
16. draw wire
draws six feet
18. draw!
19. draw in a game of chess
20. draw the stone
21. draw tea
22. draw a head
23. draw oneself up
24. draw up to the curb

"pull"
"pick out, choose"
"bring toward"
"delineate, compose, layout"
"frame or formulate"
"inhale, suck in"
"derive, use"
"deduce, infer"
"receive from"
"produce"
"disembowel"
"to drain"
"to put in, fill"
"stretch"
"pull back"
"to reduce in sectional area"
17. she
"specific depth in water"
"pull out in a hurry"
"leave undecided"
"to slide gently"
"t o s t e e p i n b o i l i n g water"
"p a s s s o m e t h i n g while moving"
"assume posture"
"to stop"

Figure 2.3

Second, there are two sense to the middle of this expression: "a line" and "align" (Figure 2.4 and 2.5)
II(a). a line between

Some of the associations of a line.

1. syntagmatic axis (Saussure)
2. movement along a line "like beads on a string" (Langer)
3. discursivity
4. horizontal, horizon
5. the horizontal line between the signifier and the signified in the diagram of the sign (Saussure)
6. signification
7. division, x/y
8. border, boundary

Figure 2.4

II(b). a line between

align between

to arrange or adjust in a straight line.
2. to bring into line.
3. to ally oneself with a group, cause, etc.
4. to adjust for coordinated performance.
5. to join with others in a cause.
6. making alignments
7. drawing (because drawing is a form of alignment)

Figure 2.5

What we find, then, is that the expression "drawing a line between two cities" yields a methodology and a series of thematic conditions for our project. The methodology is given by all of the different senses of the word, "drawing." The
thematic conditions are established by the play between "a line between" and "align between".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Thematic Conditions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drawing</td>
<td>a line between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pull</td>
<td>syntagmatic axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pick out, choose</td>
<td>discursivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bring toward</td>
<td>horizontal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delineate, compose</td>
<td>signification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>layout</td>
<td>bar between signifier/signified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frame or formulate</td>
<td>division x/y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inhale, suck in</td>
<td>this/that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derive, use</td>
<td>border, boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deduce, infer</td>
<td>align between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>receive from</td>
<td>adjust into a straight line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>produce</td>
<td>to bring into line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disembowel</td>
<td>to collapse difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to drain</td>
<td>multiply, diversify, play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to put in, fill</td>
<td>to ally oneself with a group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stretch</td>
<td>adjust for coordinated performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pull back</td>
<td>to join with others in a cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to reduce in</td>
<td>making alignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sectional area</td>
<td>drawing (a form of alignment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific depth</td>
<td>alignments between categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pull out in a hurry</td>
<td>of thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leave undecided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to slide gently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to steep in boiling water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pass something while moving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assume posture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to stop</td>
<td></td>
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Figure 2.6

Methodology       Thematic Conditions
"drawing"          a line between
                   "align between"

Figure 2.7
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