INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Consensus politics and Japanese defense budget policy, 1960–1975

Campbell, Sally Howard, M.A.
Rice University, 1990
RICE UNIVERSITY

CONSENSUS POLITICS AND
JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET POLICY
1960 - 1975

by

SALLY HOWARD CAMPBELL

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

Dr. Fred von der Mehden, Chair
Professor, Political Science

Dr. Robert Dix, Professor
Political Science

Dr. Richard Smith, Professor
History

Houston, Texas
April, 1990
CONSENSUS POLITICS AND JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET POLICY 1960 - 1975

Sally Howard Campbell

ABSTRACT

During the Vietnam War period, the Japanese defense budget grew eight-fold, from 158 billion yen in 1960 to 1367 billion yen in 1975. In spite of the opposition parties' aversion to growth in the military, little was heard in the way of protests to such growth. In this political system where consensus decision-making dominates, it is unusual not to hear accusations of "tyranny of the majority" when the opposition is shut out of decision making, as was the case with the 1960 Treaty Crisis. However, the growing Japanese economy allowed the LDP to satisfy its desire for increased funds for the military while at the same time appeasing the opposition by restricting the defense budget's percentage of GNP to a minimum. The combination of a tradition of consensus decision making, the desire to avoid a political crisis and an expanding economy led to the ability to reach a minimum consensus on this very divided issue in Japanese politics.
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. von der Mehden, for his generous advise and guidance. It is through his patience that I was able to finish on schedule. I would also like to thank Dr. Dix and Dr. Smith for their time and interest. Osewa ni natte orimasu.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
1. The Role of Consensus
2. The Political Parties
3. The Japanese Public and Defense Issues
5. Consensus and the Defense Budget

Selected Bibliography

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Distribution of Seats in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors
3. Changes in the Ground Self-Defense Forces
5. Changes in the Air Self-Defense Forces
The role of consensus in Japanese political decision making has been widely discussed over the years. In Diet debate, victory is not declared when one side has enough supporters to constitute the necessary majority. The Japanese parliament prefers to continue debate until (almost) all members are satisfied with, or at least prepared to accept, the proposed decision. Although the majority (namely the LDP) has been known to force votes in order to get a bill passed, this is considered an undesirable way to conduct political business. The quest for consensus is particularly evident in domestic policy-making, but it is also an important part of foreign policy decisions.

Diet members' attitudes on the role of the Japanese military run the gamut from pro-nuclear hawks to anti-Self-Defense Force doves. This wide range of attitudes exists not only across the political parties, but within them as well. Yet, in spite of these conflicting opinions, as well as highly anti-militaristic public sentiment, the Japanese defense budget grew every year from 1960 - 1975 (and continues to do so today). As a percentage of GNP, the defense budget was quite stable, decreasing from just over to just under 1%, during these years. As a percentage of total government expenditure, defense decreased from 10% to
just over 6% during the same years. Actual total yen expenditure, however, tells quite a different story. Because of the rapidly growing Japanese economy, defense spending in 1975 was 1,367 billion yen but only .84% of GNP, compared to 158 billion yen and 1.23% of GNP in 1960. This type of growth was not only unsupported by some LDP members, but it was vehemently opposed by the major opposition parties (Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party, Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito) as well as much of the general public.

How was the Japanese government able to conduct a policy of steady growth in the military as well as generally consistent, though sometimes passive, support of U.S. policy in Vietnam in the face of domestic opposition? It is not hard to find some incentives for such actions, such as pressure from the United States for support, particularly in view of the anti-U.S. demonstrations in Japan in 1960 and 1970, and the economic benefits that Japan enjoyed as a direct result of the Vietnam War, but even such incentives would not exempt the LDP from pressure by the opposition. Was the enforcement of these policies a departure from the usual policy-making practice of seeking consensus? It is possible that pressures and/or incentives were so strong that the LDP ignored the practice of consensus when making these defense decisions. If this was the case, however, where was the outrage by the excluded opposition parties?
In spite of the opposition's intense aversion to any increase in the military, there were no protests or boycotts, not even strong condemnation of the growing defense budget. Protests were limited to moderate criticisms in the press.

There must be an explanation for the opposition's relative silence on an issue that they were usually so outspoken about. I propose that the opposition was not as excluded as they may appear to have been. I don't believe that the expanding defense budget was an example of the "tyranny of the majority". I propose that the LDP was able to pursue a policy that satisfied the opposition and furthered LDP interests at the same time. Because of the burgeoning Japanese economy, it was possible to give the appearance of a stable defense budget, hovering around 1% of GNP, while actually making significant annual increases in actual yen amounts. This would have allowed the LDP to appease the opposition with the assurance of a stable or shrinking defense budget in percentage terms, while at the same time substantially increasing the annual budget in actual yen, thus allowing for additions and modernizations to the defense forces. This is not to say that the opposition would have allowed the LDP free reign on defense. With an issue as sensitive as defense, the LDP had to be very aware of the limits to the opposition's cooperation.
This paper will look closely at Japanese defense budgets (and how they were allocated) from 1960 – 1975, and at the roles of the opposition parties and public opinion in defense policy making. In doing so, I hope to determine the applicability of consensus decision making in Japanese defense budget policy during that time. The years encompassing the Vietnam War were chosen because of the war's potential impact on Japanese attitudes regarding defense. Not only was the Vietnam War the second war to be fought in Asia in the post-World War II period, but Japan, through its supportive position to the U.S., played an important role. There was considerable fear in Japan that the Vietnam War could grow to involve Japan directly and considerable opposition among the Japanese citizens as well as among Diet members of the opposition parties toward the United States' actions and therefore toward the Japanese government's fairly consistent support of such actions.* Yet the defense growth taking place was not an effort to free Japan from its military relationship with the U.S. I believe that this heightened focus on defense issues makes the 1960's and early 1970's a valuable time for examining Japan's defense policy.

The majority of sources employed in this paper are secondary sources, primarily English language books and articles written by American and Japanese scholars on Japan. Several of these sources included rather extensive public
opinion data. In the post-war period, and particularly from about 1960 on, public opinion surveys became quite common in Japan. Among the most extensive surveys were those conducted by Japan's daily newspapers, but considerable information also comes from surveys conducted by the Japanese government, individual scholars, research centers, and others. Public opinion surveys in Japan, unlike most other Asian countries at that time, were not only commonplace and broad in scope, but employed up-to-date survey techniques, making them both interesting and reliable sources of information.

Two important primary sources employed here are The Japan Times daily newspaper and the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. The Japan Times is an English language newspaper published by a Japanese company and primarily distributed in Japan. It is considered to be a reliable and unbiased news source. It gives frequent and extensive coverage to Diet proceedings and other political news, and annually gives substantial detail regarding budgetary debates. The Political Department of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. was a source of Japanese defense budget statistics.
Notes  Introduction


4. Japanese Embassy, Political Department.

5. Ibid.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS
In order to understand the factors that contribute to the Japanese defense budget, one must first have some understanding of Japanese policy making in general and of budget policy in particular. In Japan, each ministry authors the original proposal for that ministry's budget. For defense, which is not officially a ministry, this is done by the Defense Agency. Once compiled, the budget is submitted to the Ministry of Finance, and an official from each ministry appears before the Budget Bureau to explain that ministry's requests. Based upon these proposals, the Ministry of Finance, with the aid of the Cabinet, comes up with a budget draft to be submitted to the Diet.¹

Once it reaches the Diet, the budget draft it debated, but substantive changes are rare. Between 1955 and 1977, Diet debate resulted in only one substantive budget change.² Because of this, those with particular interest in the budget must make their wishes known to the ministry beforehand. This is where the potential for influence lies. This type of behind-the-scenes influence is common among the opposition parties. Most of the Japanese government's policy making takes place in the Ministries and within the Cabinet, which are almost exclusively run by the LDP. This means that opposition party members rarely participate directly in actual policy making.³ Opposition influence on
policy often comes in the form of informal suggestions made to members of the advisory committees. Such suggestions are almost always taken into consideration, and frequently impact upon policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{4} This has been particularly true for domestic matters, such as educational reforms and social welfare issues, but has also been an important part of foreign policy, such as recognition of and trade with the People's Republic of China.\textsuperscript{5} In exchange for the LDP's willingness to accommodate many of the opposition's ideas, there has been considerable opposition party support for LDP policy. Of all the government-sponsored proposals voted on between 1967 and 1971, over one third were supported by the Communists and over two thirds were supported by the Socialists (JSP). Support from Komeito and the Democratic Socialists was even higher.\textsuperscript{4}

For the Japanese, there are cultural as well as political benefits to the practice of consensus politics. Of critical importance in Japanese society is the idea of "saving face". This leads the Japanese to go to great lengths to avoid direct confrontation and even to avoid direct answers to seemingly simple questions. By avoiding a confrontation between conflicting ideas, they avoid the impression of a "right" and a "wrong" side. The practice of consensus politics allows compromises to be made behind the scenes so that there is no public confrontation and no "losing side". Another important element of Japanese
society is the sense of group unity. Historically in Japan, the group has taken precedence over the individual, and an individual who does not work (or does not work hard enough) for the group, may be ostracized. Throughout their lives the Japanese people are members of various (often unstated) groups, from the family to schoolmates to colleagues, etc. In the Japanese language the politeness of one's speech depends upon whether the person they are speaking to (or about) is part of their "in-group" or "out-group". The Japanese are often expected to sacrifice the good of the individual for the good of the group (e.g.; the nation, the company). This strong emphasis on group unity amplifies the importance of avoiding confrontation. Arguments within a group undermine that group's ability to work as a cohesive unit. The sense of group loyalty is so strong among the Japanese that one may feel pride not just for his own accomplishments, but for those of his colleagues and neighbors, as well. Hence, there is personal satisfaction in being a part of a successful decision-making group, even if the decision is not to one's personal liking. There is also a strong sense of obligation to one who has conceded to the majority will in spite of his own opinion. Therefore if the opposition parties support the majority on a disputed issue, they can be confident that they will be repaid with a similar concession, and vice versa. Consensus is less a reflection of unanimous support for the issue at hand, than
it is a reflection of unanimous support for the manner in which issues are dealt with.\textsuperscript{10} It is not usually the case that an issue is debated until all agree on a solution, but concessions and compromises are made until all can agree to move forward with a decision, whether they personally support the decision or not.\textsuperscript{11} The desire for harmony is so strong among the Japanese that if consensus cannot be reached, the decision making is likely to be postponed until circumstances or attitudes change such that a consensus can be achieved. This was the case with ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Japanese government signed the treaty in 1971, but sufficient consensus for ratification could not be reached until 1976.\textsuperscript{12}

Although the goal of consensus politics is unanimity, the Diet is usually satisfied if a majority of 80\% can be achieved.\textsuperscript{13} The LDP's willingness to compromise with the minority parties has not only won it increased minority cooperation on other issues, but it has also helped to avoid deadlocks and boycotts by the opposition, which could undermine the Diet's credibility and the LDP's public image. As mentioned earlier, to force an issue simply because one side has the necessary majority to do so is not considered fair play among the Japanese. There is strong contempt for what the Japanese consider to be the "tyranny of the majority".\textsuperscript{14} This is apparent in the attitudes of the Japanese public who, during times of conflict in the Diet,
tend to blame the LDP rather than the opposition. The public expects a high degree of unity from the Diet, and during periods of conflict, public opinion regarding the Diet is very negative.\textsuperscript{13}

Consensus politics can be instrumental in preserving unity among political parties or factions. As practiced in the Japanese Diet, consensus politics has served effectively as a tool of self-preservation for the LDP.\textsuperscript{14} Because of the LDP's perpetual dominance of Japanese politics, efforts to force LDP policies through the Diet without the approval or consent of the opposition have been met with quite heated reactions, as was the case with the ratification of the 1960 Security Treaty. According to Japan's 1970 white paper on defense, "a national consensus is the very basis of defense".\textsuperscript{17} National defense is a particularly emotional issue for the Japanese, and it is perhaps the most critical dispute between the LDP and the opposition parties. Because of the sensitivity of the defense issue and its potential for heated conflict, the LDP must be particularly sensitive to the opposition and not give the appearance of forcing its hand.

Given the importance of consensus in Japanese politics, it is unlikely that it (consensus) could be ignored in ongoing policy-making. The opposition parties expect their views to be taken into consideration, and the Treaty Crisis
exemplifies what happens when they are not. In view of the opposition parties' strong feelings regarding defense and their general willingness to speak out against the LDP, the relative silence regarding defense growth seems to indicate one of two possibilities: (1) the opposition did not oppose the growing defense budget; or (2) opposition members opposed the growth but felt compelled not to openly protest it. The second possibility does not conflict with what we know about the opposition's stand on defense, and it would be indicative of a situation in which policy was the result of compromises made by both sides.
Notes Chapter One


4. Ibid., p.75.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p.74.


9. Ibid., p.41.


13. Ibid.


CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL PARTIES
In spite of its one party dominance, the Japanese party system has been active and competitive over the years. This chapter will look briefly at the backgrounds and support levels for the five major Japanese parties - the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party and Komeito (Clean Government Party). I will then look more closely at each of the five parties' attitudes on the defense issues covered in this paper. These include military buildup, nuclear weapons for Japan and the Vietnam War (and U.S. policy).

THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

For virtually all of the post-war period, and indeed for all of the time period studied here, the Japanese government has been run by a conservative majority. The Liberal-Democratic Party was formed in 1955 through a merger of the Liberal and the Democratic parties. At the same time, a similar merger took place in the socialist parties but, although the resulting Japan Socialist Party has been the LDP's primary competition, it would be difficult to call Japan a true two party system. Although these two parties have been dominant over the other, smaller parties, the LDP
has been consistently dominant over all. The LDP held a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives until 1974 when it slipped to 48.7%, and maintained a comfortable plurality in the House of Councillors (see Table 1). Because of the nature of Japanese politics, wherein the Diet elects the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister selects the cabinet, the opposition parties have been theoretically excluded from decision making.

Several reasons account for the LDP's enduring dominance. One crucial factor is that, in spite of factional divisions and periodic turbulence, sometimes even scandal, the LDP has managed to stay unified. Although LDP support is rather broad based, and its financial backing comes primarily from corporations and business organizations, it is particularly strong in the rural areas. This was of significant advantage to the LDP during the 1960's and 1970's because Japan's rural areas were substantially overrepresented. The migration of people from the rural areas into the cities in the post-war years led to a serious malapportionment problem that the government was reluctant to deal with. Although some changes have been made in recent years, representation remains quite inaccurate. Additionally, although it is Japan's conservative party, the LDP actually represent quite a broad spectrum of political attitudes, from the moderately liberal to the staunchly conservative. One of the main reasons for
the LDP's continuing success, however, was the chronic disorganization and lack of unity that plagued the opposition parties, particularly and most importantly, the socialists.

THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

Japan Socialist Party

The Japan Socialist Party is unquestionably the largest and most politically powerful of the opposition parties. It was formed in 1945 as the Socialist Party, but suffered a split in 1949 over the issue of the Peace Treaty. The party reunited and has existed in its present form, as the Japan Socialist Party, since 1955. During the 1960's and 1970's, the bulk of support for the JSP came from the Sohyo labor unions and the strength of the JSP was highly dependent upon the popularity of the unions (in recent years Sohyo's support of the JSP has slipped and thus the JSP's popularity is not as closely tied to that of the unions).

Like the LDP, the JSP is highly factionalized, but unlike the LDP, factionalism has, at least in part, cost the Socialists political success. During the years examined here, the JSP suffered a substantial decline in both houses in percentage of Diet seats (see Table 1). These seats were not lost to the Liberal-Democrats, however, who likewise
were suffering from decreased popularity. The decline in popularity of the ruling party and its main opposition reflected an increase in popularity for the other opposition parties.

Democratic Socialist Party

The Democratic Socialist Party was formed in 1960, the result of a merger between two former JSP factions. These factions were part of the right-wing of the JSP, and the split occurred largely over the JSP's uncompromising opposition to the Security Treaty. The DSP's support base comes from the labor union Domei, a right-wing offshoot of the Sohyo unions. In addition, the DSP finds substantial support in corporations and business organizations. The organization of the Democratic Socialist Party is similar to that of the Socialists and the Liberal-Democrats. The party is loosely organized and factions form around individual politicians.

The DSP occupied an ideological position between those of the JSP and the LDP (a position that they share with Komeito). In local elections it had, at times, been willing to form coalitions with the LDP. In general terms, however, the DSP's domestic political platform did not differ much from that of the JSP. The main rifts between the two parties have been regarding defense policy - where the DSP is more open to compromise with the LDP - and in the
DSP's lack of willingness to cooperate with the Communist party.  

Between 1960 and 1975, the DSP controlled an increasing number of Diet seats, but due to the growing popularity of the other opposition parties, this did not translate into a growing percentage of political power. The party held more Diet seats in 1975 than it had in 1960, but in the lower house it had replaced the Communists as the weakest of the five main parties, and in the upper house the position of third in power had been taken by Komeito.

Japan Communist Party

The Japan Communist Party was originally formed in 1922, but was outlawed and disband during World War II. When the Occupation Forces released Japan's political prisoners (among whom were many communist leaders) following the end of the war, the party quickly reformed. The following two decades were difficult and unpopular ones for the party, but support began to grow around the mid-1960s. During the following decade the JCP's percentage of Diet seats grew significantly, peaking in the early 1970's (see Table 1). Along with this increased strength came increased independence, and the Japanese Communists distanced
themselves from the Soviet Union and China during this period. ¹³

The Japan Communist Party differs significantly in structure from the three parties discussed above. It has a well organized party structure and, since the early 1960's, has not suffer too greatly from factionalism.¹⁴ Another unique characteristic of the Communist party is its monetary base. It is one of the richest of Japan's political parties, and is financially independent. The vast majority of the JCP's money comes from its publishing business, primarily from the circulation of its daily newspaper, Akahata.¹⁵ This allows the JCP an independence from outside organizations and interests not enjoyed by the other political parties.

Komeito

Komeito (Clean Government Party) officially became a political party in 1964. It was formed as the political representative of Soka Gakkai, a lay organization affiliated with a Buddhist sect.¹⁶ The religious affiliation was both a help and a hindrance for Komeito's popular support. In 1970, formal ties with Soka Gakkai were severed in an attempt to broaden its support base. In the next elections, however, Komeito suffered greatly. In reaction, Komeito
swayed to leftist policies briefly in the early 1970's, then swung back toward the right. 17

Komeito is a well organized, well disciplined party. It is staffed by dedicated workers and is uncharacteristically free of factionalism. 18 Like the DSP, Komeito's ideological position is centrally located, between the JSP and the LDP. Almost immediately after its organization, Komeito replaced the DSP as the third most popular political party. Though its popularity fluctuated in the 1960's and 1970's, in the mid-1970's Komeito held approximately twice the percentage of Diet seats as did the DSP. 19

PARTY ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE - 1960-1975

Although there was great disparity in Japanese attitudes on defense, the differences were perhaps not so great as in other countries. It is true, attitudes varied from those who wanted no defense force at all to those who wanted a strong, independent defense, possibly including nuclear weaponry, but the distribution of attitudes favored the non-militaristic side. Whereas all the opposition parties were anti-rearmament and anti-nuclear weapons, only the far right of the LDP actually favored nuclear weapons
and/or rapid rearmament. Japanese anti-war sentiment was not confined to the political left.

**Liberal-Democratic Party**

In November of 1960, the LDP stated its defense policy to include upholding the Security Treaty with the United States and making gradual qualitative improvements in the Self-Defense Forces.²⁰ While these do not appear to be particularly hawkish ideals, they were enough to put the LDP in strict opposition with the other parties. The LDP favored a defense plan that included modern Japanese defense forces supplemented by the security agreement with the U.S. When the treaty came up for renewal in 1970, the LDP voted to have it continued indefinitely. Though gradual defense increases were being made, the government showed no desire to alter the security relationship as it existed.

Although very few members actually called for Japan to possess nuclear weapons, the LDP was reluctant to say that it would never happen.²¹ Even so, under considerable pressure from the opposition, the LDP put forth the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1970. These included non-production, non-possession and non-introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan.²² In 1971 Japan reluctantly signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, putting forth three
conditions that would have to be met before the treaty would be ratified. These conditions were: (1) steps toward disarmament by the nuclear countries; (2) protection of the national security interests of the non-nuclear countries; and (3) a "fair and equal system of international safeguards". Nuclear weapons testing in India and China in the early 1970's gave Japan further reservations about ratification of the treaty, and its ratification in 1976 was strongly opposed by certain factions in the LDP.

Japan Socialist Party

The Socialist's stance on the defense issue was one of unarmed and permanent neutrality. The position of neutrality was first adopted in 1949 and included the following three principles: (1) peace treaties with all belligerent powers; (2) permanent neutrality; and (3) no military bases to be given to foreign powers. The JSP considered the Self-Defense Forces to be unconstitutional, arguing that no military force could be strictly defensive. In 1960 the JSP's defense goals included abrogation of the Security Treaty, immediate withdrawal of U.S. military forces, and prohibition of all nuclear weapons. The Socialists strongly opposed the 1960 Security Treaty with the United States largely because they felt it meant eventual rearmament. In their effort to
block approval of the treaty bill, Diet proceedings were obstructed and delayed and mass demonstrations were staged. After the bill was passed, many Socialists boycotted Diet proceedings for the remainder of the session. The Socialist's non-nuclear policy included the proposal of an Asian-Pacific denuclearized zone, a ban on the deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

Democratic Socialist Party

Like all of the opposition parties, the DSP strictly opposed nuclear weapons for Japan, and wanted to see a worldwide ban on them. The DSP's defense platform in 1960 called for minimization of the Self-Defense Forces and the gradual abolition of the Security Treaty with the U.S. Unlike the JSP, the DSP viewed the Self-Defense Forces as being within constitutional bounds, but wanted them kept at the smallest possible size. The DSP advocated a purely defensive armed force, and proposed complete civilian control. In 1970 the Democratic Socialists revised their stance on the Security Treaty. Rather than calling for its abolition, as they had in 1960, they now desired only a revision. They wished to keep the protection of the U.S. military, wanting only to be rid of U.S. forces on Japanese
soil. They proposed that the conditions of protection under the treaty be upheld from beyond Japanese borders.  

Japan Communist Party

The defense position of the Communist Party was similar to that of the JSP. The Communists wanted to see a global ban on nuclear weapons, although they did not support the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of its U.S. backing. They desired an end to the military alliance with the U.S. because it was seen as impinging on Japanese sovereignty as well as leading to the revival of militarism. The JCP advocated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan, and wanted to disband the Self-Defense Forces. It viewed the SDF as being unconstitutional and subservient to the United States. Unlike the JSP, however, the Communists did not want to see Japan left unarmed. They wanted to replace the SDF with some other form of defense force that would be at the will of the public.

Komeito

Komeito's view of an ideal security arrangement was quite different from those of the other political parties. Initially, it wanted to see an end to the U.S.-Japan
military alliance and defense of Japan through a minimal self-defense force. This was only an interim step, however. Komeito's final security goal was one of global collective security. It proposed that international peace be kept through a United Nations-based international police force. ¹¹ Such a force would alleviate the need for any nation to have its own defense forces or to form military alliances. In accordance with this view, the party desired the removal of all U.S. forces from Japan, and the gradual abrogation of the Security Treaty. ¹² Like the other parties, Komeito opposed any involvement for Japan with nuclear weapons, and aimed toward eventual global nuclear disarmament. ¹³ In recent years, Komeito's defense platform has become significantly more conservative, looking more like that of the LDP than like those of the opposition parties. ¹⁴

THE VIETNAM ISSUE

The varying opinions on the Vietnam War were distributed similarly to attitudes on defense in general, with the opposition parties clustered together in a face-off with the LDP. For the LDP, however, attitudes regarding the war were not always as they appeared publicly. The LDP felt considerable pressure to support the United States on the Vietnam issue. This was due in part to Japan's allied position, but mostly because the LDP didn't want to anger
the U.S. government before or during the negotiations for the return of Okinawa." In the early 1970's, once the Okinawa issue had been settled, the government began to take a slightly more independent stand on the Vietnam issue." Another intervening factor in the LDP's Vietnam policy was economic in nature. It is estimated that in 1964 Japan earned about $314 million dollars as a result of the U.S. military presence there. Approximately one third of this was due to increased war-time activity." During the peak years of the war, from 1965 - 1972, Japan is believed to have profited at least $11.5 billion from war related enterprises." Sony, Mitsubishi and Honda were among the Japanese corporations who did major business with the U.S. military and war-time Saigon.""

The LDP's position, however, was not as simple as merely pleasing the U.S. government. At home, the LDP tried not to incite the opposition parties, who were vehemently and vocally opposed to the war. The party was forced to search for the delicate balance between the U.S. government and the Japanese political left. The result was that the official LDP position was one in support of the United States, but the Japanese government was rather quiet on the issue at home. This was often difficult, because a large portion of the LDP Diet members actually opposed the war and the U.S. position." At times these negative attitudes would become public, such as when certain LDP members
criticized the bombing of North Vietnam as excessively militaristic.\textsuperscript{31}

In contrast, the opposition took every opportunity to make their opposition to the war known. The JSP was particularly active in this regard. Throughout the latter half of the 1960's and the early 1970's the JSP organized and participated in mass anti-war rallies and demonstrations.\textsuperscript{32} Unfortunately, although the socialists were exceptionally well united and organized in its opposition to the Diet's position on the war, it was in no way united on a chosen alternative.\textsuperscript{33} The Communists, too, adamantly opposed the war and the U.S. role in it. Their opposition tactics were often, though not always, in cooperation with those of the JSP. To the Communists, the Vietnam War was another example of American imperialism.\textsuperscript{34} Komeito and the DSP were far less vocal in their positions on the war. Neither party supported the U.S. and both wanted to see an end to the war, but Komeito avoided taking a strong stand on the issue, and the DSP saw Japanese efforts to change the course of events as being futile.\textsuperscript{35} The non-activist stance taken by these two parties contributed greatly to the fact that, although all the opposition parties opposed the war, they never had the strength and/or the commitment to affect official Diet policy.
This chapter outlines the significant degree of conflict between the LDP and the opposition on defense issues. It also indicates, with the example of Vietnam, the opposition's willingness to voice their displeasure with government policy. Although excluded from much of the actual decision making, the opposition parties were strong enough to necessitate consideration in policy making. During the years examined, LDP strength in the Diet suffered some significant loses and the importance of cooperating with the opposition could not be overlooked.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>JCP</th>
<th>Komeito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE TWO

**HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS**

(percentage of seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>JCP</th>
<th>KOMEITO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes Chapter Two


5. Ibid., pp. 182-183.

6. Ibid., pp. 185,194.


8. Ibid., p.196.

9. Ibid., p.201.


11. Ibid., p.111.


17. Ibid., pp.111-112.


22. Ibid., p.42.


29. Ibid., p.220.


32. Takehiko, *New Japan*, p.27.


34. Takehiko, *New Japan*, p.34-35.

35. Ibid., p.35.


37. Takehiko, *New Japan*, p.27.


41. Takehiko, *New Japan*, p.35.
42. Ibid.
43. Endicott, *Japan’s Nuclear Options*, p.80.
46. Ibid., p.162.
50. Ibid., p.43.
52. Havens, *Fire Across the Sea*, p.45.
53. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p.47.
CHAPTER THREE

THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AND DEFENSE ISSUES
Prior to World War II and the American occupation, and especially during the 1930's, the Japanese public did not get many opportunities to publicly express their opinions, and did not have many avenues for influencing government policy. Although the lower house of the pre-war Diet was popularly elected (through universal male suffrage, after 1925) the legislative power of the Diet was minor in comparison to that of the executive. In spite of its relative powerlessness and its lack of competence in comparison to the aristocratic upper house, however, the public showed a great deal of interest in the lower house.¹ During the militaristic decade of the 1930's, however, the power of the Diet and of the general public became increasingly insignificant as the elite and military leaders took even greater control of Japan's government.² With the post-war occupation and the new constitution came freedoms and rights greater than the Japanese people had ever known in the past. Following that time, there was universal suffrage for all citizens over the age of twenty. In addition, public opinion surveys - most of which were conducted by the government or one of the major daily newspapers - were common, and public demonstrations regarding some of the more critical issues (e.g., the Security Treaty) began to occur.³ One of the most important
elements of the government's new found public responsiveness related to the Peace Constitution. Because the constitution mandated that the Japanese armed forces must only be defensive in nature, it stood as an important barrier to offensive rearmament. The constitution could only be revised through voter referendum, and the public was less supportive of rearmament than the government.

ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE

The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not lead the Japanese to a hatred of the United States, as one might have expected. It led, instead, to a bitter hatred of war and violence. Immediately following the war, under the guidance and encouragement of the U.S. occupying forces, the Japanese set out to eradicate all forms of violence from their culture. Even traditional Japanese fencing (kendo) was banned during this period.* This aversion to violence evidenced itself in the lack of support by the Japanese people for their exclusively defensive Self-Defense Forces. In the mid-1950's only slightly more than half of the Japanese public approved of the Self-Defense Forces, and SDF members were often the victims of ridicule and harassment.* These attitudes began to change in the 1960's, due in part to a vigorous public relations campaign put on by the government, and in part to the disaster relief work that was
being done by the SDF. The Forces were used in the relief efforts for the victims of floods, earthquakes and other natural disasters. They did so quickly, efficiently and frequently - in 1969 the SDF was involved in 590 relief efforts. These efforts sometimes overshadowed their function as a defense force, and did a lot to raise public opinion. By 1969 public approval of the Forces was up to 75%.

This increased support for the SDF, however, did not mean a weakening of the Japanese' anti-war feelings. The Self-Defense Forces are inherently non-aggressive, and even though they were eventually accepted and even supported by a majority of the Japanese public, there was no desire by the general public to increase or strengthen the Japanese military. In 1970, only 16% of those interviewed felt that the Forces should be increased, compared with 74% who felt they should not. In the early years of the SDF, the public felt that an increase in military power would bring with it such consequences as an increased risk of war, economic burden and a resurgence of domestic militarism. A 1972 Asahi Shim bun poll that asked respondents what they believed to be Japan's best course for the future found that over 50% of the people thought Japan's best course was that of a welfare state, while only 3% thought that Japan should pursue the course of military power (only one answer was permitted). A national survey conducted in 1970 revealed
that although 39% of the people approved of extending the Security Treaty (10% disapproved), only 17% approved of the U.S. military bases in Japan (57% disapproved). Belief in the U.S.'s promise to defend Japan was more evenly split, with 30% accepting the promise and 39% rejecting it.\textsuperscript{10} Significant to these responses, only 22% of those who were interviewed felt that Japan was at risk of being attacked by a foreign country in the near future.\textsuperscript{11}

The public's attitudes on nuclear weapons reflected their aversion to war and their awareness of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. They also reflected a feeling of inefficacy. A survey in the early 1970's showed that although more than 70% of the people did not want nuclear weapons for Japan, more than 30% expected to have them within ten years.\textsuperscript{12} It should be noted that this poll occurred before Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976. An \textit{Asahi Shimbun} poll in 1975 showed that the public supported Sato's Three Non-Nuclear Principles (non-production, non-possession and non-introduction) by a margin of 8 to 1.\textsuperscript{13}

A series of polls in the 1960's and 1970's revealed a connection between the Japanese public's attitudes toward nuclear weapons and the international political climate. During the period when the Japanese people expressed the greatest fear of the People's Republic of China (1967-69),
they also expressed higher support for Japan's possession of nuclear weapons. This support was perhaps as high as 45% at one time. One of the most difficult questions to be answered regarding Japan's possession of nuclear weapons has been whether it could be done in accordance with the “defensive only” nature of the Japanese military.

ATTITUDES ON VIETNAM

In spite of a tendency to focus on domestic issues over international issues, by 1965 the Japanese public showed a very high awareness (94%) of the Vietnam War. Of those who placed blame for the war on a particular country, over 30% blamed the United States, while less than 10% blamed any other single country. In addition, 75% of those interviewed opposed the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. In spite of this, a relatively small portion of the public actively protested the war or U.S. involvement. In 1964 on the eve of the escalation of the war and the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam, U.S. popularity in Japan was at an all time high. A record 49% of poll participants listed the United States as their favorite foreign country, and only 4% expressed dislike of the U.S. By 1973 this had drastically changed. Only 18% now identified the U.S. as their favorite, and 13% expressed dislike of the United States. During those nine years many things had happened to alter Japan's image of the United States, from the racial
turbulence in the U.S. in the late 1960's to U.S.-Japan trade disputes as well as Japan's increasing independence and self-confidence. The high percentages of Japanese who did not support the Vietnam War, held the U.S. responsible for it, and particularly condemned the bombings of the North, however, lead one to believe that the events of the war contributed greatly to Japan's disillusionment with the United States.

With the passage of time, there were some changes in the Japanese people's feelings about the best course to be taken regarding the war. As early as 1966, 49% of the Japanese people thought that Japan should be more active and independent (from the U.S.) in seeking an end to the war. Thirty-eight percent of those interviewed thought that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam, and 14% thought that the U.S. should continue defending the South, but cease bombing of the North. By 1968 those who favored withdrawal had risen to 56%, while those who favored defense of the South remained at 14%. The number wanting to continue the bombing of the North was below 2%. Another poll taken in 1972 found 50% to favor U.S. withdrawal and 15% favoring continuation of the war. From the same poll, only 20% of the people felt that U.S. withdrawal would be detrimental to Japanese security, while 37% felt that it would not. A primary concern of the Japanese people regarding the Vietnam War was that it could grow to involve them more directly.
The 1965 *Asahi* poll revealed that 57% of those interviewed feared an escalation of the war to involve the U.S. and China, and 60% feared that Japan could become directly involved.\(^2\)

As the various polls indicate, the majority of the Japanese public was not in favor of growth in the military. Even at a time when the Japanese people felt particularly concerned about the safety of their country and feared possible direct involvement in the Vietnam War, they maintained the desire to keep their own military at a minimum. It seems that there were still many questions in the minds of the Japanese people regarding their country's defense. There was not widespread support for the Security Treaty and far less support for the U.S. bases in Japan, yet the Japanese people were not ready to shoulder the defense burden on their own, either. The dominant belief at that time was that the best way to avoid involvement in a war was to avoid any venture of a military nature, including rearmament.

With the majority of the population siding with the opposition on this very critical issue, the LDP would have been taking a considerable risk to ignore these desires. Instead, by pursuing a policy that was acceptable to the opposition parties, the LDP could feel relatively secure that it would be acceptable to the general public, as well.
Notes Chapter Three


6. Ibid., p.118.


8. Ibid., p.84.


10. Mendel, "Nation Against Arms", p.36.


22. ---- "A Nation Against Arms", p.36.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Japanese military, as it existed in 1960, had a history of only about a decade. Following the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese military was dismantled, and no military-type force existed during the early part of the occupation. Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution read as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the proceeding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.¹

During the occupation, Japan's domestic policing duties were being performed by the occupation forces. In 1950, when those U.S. forces were needed to fight in Korea, Japan's National Police Reserve, as it was then called, consisting of 75,000 men, was established.²

A more permanent solution to the Japanese security question came with the signing of the Peace and Security Treaties in 1951. The United States agreed to continue providing Japan's external security, but Japan's right to provide for its own defense was recognized and the Japanese agreed to eventually take over that duty from the United States.³ Shortly thereafter, naval and air forces were
added to the existing ground forces and the three branches became collectively known as the Self-Defense Forces. To accommodate the existence of these forces, the 1951 Security Treaty revised Japan's ability to possess military forces. It stated that:

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

These forces steadily grew in number before levelling off in the late 1950's at a total of slightly more than 200,000 men. By 1960, however, the Japanese were still not prepared (and not eager) to take over as defenders of their own security. As a matter of fact, with the 1960 Security Treaty the Japanese government finally got the security assurances from the U.S. that it had been seeking in 1951. The U.S. renewed its commitment to assist in defending Japan in the event of an external attack, and both countries reaffirmed their desire to preserve the U.S. military presence in Japan.

In 1960, The Japanese Defense Agency was completing its First Defense Plan. The aim of the first plan was to fill the void created by the withdrawal of U.S. forces. As
previously mentioned, the Self-Defense Forces were comprised of slightly more than 200,000 men (89% of their authorized strength). The ground forces made up about 70% of this number, with the other 30% fairly evenly distributed between the air and maritime divisions. The Maritime SDF possessed a fleet tonnage of about 99,400 and the Air SDF was equipped with approximately 1133 aircraft, just less than 500 of which were combat planes. The defense budget in 1960 was approximately 158 billion yen. This was 1.23% of Japan's Gross National Product, and just below 10% of the general expenditure.

Japan's Second Defense Plan, which began in 1962, was aimed at shifting from American to Japanese produced military equipment. To facilitate this, Japanese arms production went through a period of expansion and modernization. The defense budget for 1962, the first year of the plan, was 210 billion yen. Although this was a 35% increase over the 1960 budget, it was only 1.18% of GNP and 8.59% of general expenditure. By the last year of the Second Defense Plan (1966), the defense budget was up to 347 billion yen. The defense budget now comprised 1.10 of the GNP and less than 8% of general expenditure.

During the course of the Second Defense Plan, troop strength grew to a total of about 226,000 men. This was an overall increase of almost 10% from the 1960 level. The
ground forces experienced the smallest growth, only 4%, to over 153,000 men in active duty.\textsuperscript{17} The GSDF's equipment included 1,340 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 250 aircraft and 48 HAWK missiles.\textsuperscript{18} The Maritime Self-Defense Forces had experienced a 30% increase in manpower and now had over 34,000 men in active duty.\textsuperscript{19} Fleet strength was up to 141,398 tons and included more than 20 destroyers and 7 submarines. In addition, the MSDF possessed approximately 250 aircraft.\textsuperscript{20} The Air SDF had also experienced a substantial growth in manpower. Their forces now numbered about 39,000, up 22.5% from 1960.\textsuperscript{21} The air fleet was not substantially larger than it had been in 1960 but its composition had changed and the ASDF had acquired 72 Nike-Ajax missiles.\textsuperscript{22}

By 1971, the end of the Third Defense Plan, the defense budget was 694 billion yen.\textsuperscript{23} Annual defense spending had doubled during the course of the Third Plan. The Self-Defense Forces had grown to over 231,000 men. This was still slightly below the authorized number.\textsuperscript{24} The ground forces now possessed fewer tanks and armored vehicles, almost 350 aircraft and the same number (48) of HAWK missiles.\textsuperscript{25} The maritime SDF had added 23,000 tons to its fleet. They now had 27 destroyers and 11 submarines (4 more than in 1966). Their air fleet had dropped slightly in number.\textsuperscript{26} The air SDF in 1971 had fewer aircraft than in 1966 and the same number (72) of Nike-Ajax missiles.\textsuperscript{27}
The Fourth Defense Plan went into effect in April of 1972. Some of the government's objectives for this five-year plan included increasing the number of servicemen, increasing military pay, stepping up research and development, adding more armored vehicles and helicopters to the GSDF, and adding more submarines to the MDSDF. The total budget for the Fourth Plan was 4,630 billion yen, about double the budget for the previous plan.

As evidenced by the previous account, Japan's defense spending during the Vietnam War period was deceptive on two levels. First, the declining percentage of GNP going to defense gave the illusion of a decreasing defense budget. By 1975 the defense budget accounted for only .84% of the GNP and 6.23% of the general expenditure. This can be compared to the defense budget of 1960, which accounted for 1.23% of the GNP and 9.99% of general expenditure. In reality, however, the budget for 1975 alone was 1,367 billion yen, over eight times the defense budget of 1960. Thus, the government could give the appearance of restricting the defense budget by allotting it a smaller percentage of the overall budget, and at the same time be giving defense large increases in actual yen.

Second, in spite of these large increase in the defense budget, there were not large increases in defense. As we have seen, only modest growth occurred in the strength of
the Self-Defense Forces. Certainly not the type of growth one might expect from an eight-fold increase in the budget. Although much of the money in the defense budgets went toward purchasing new equipment, much of this new equipment replaced, rather than supplemented, the existing equipment.\textsuperscript{32} The government's plans to purchase or build new military machinery was often an indication of modernization, but not necessarily growth, in the military.

Even in spite of this emphasis on modernization, the Japanese air force was hardly "state of the art". Throughout the 1960's the ASDF's combat force was dominated by Sabre fighter planes.\textsuperscript{33} Designed in the late 1940's, Sabre's were the dominant plane of the United States Air Force in the Korean War.\textsuperscript{34} By the mid-1960's, they had been phased out by the U.S. Air Force.\textsuperscript{35} In 1970 they comprised more than half of the ASDF's combat planes, and many were still in use in 1975.\textsuperscript{36} From the mid-1960's on the Japanese air force also relied heavily on the Starfighter.\textsuperscript{37} This plane was designed in the mid 1950's and used by the United States until the late 1960's.\textsuperscript{38} In the mid-1970's the Japanese began using the Phantom F-4, with plans to make it the dominant tactical aircraft in the coming years.\textsuperscript{39} The Phantom was designed in the early 1960's and still remained in use by the United States in 1975.\textsuperscript{40} The above comparison of the use of these aircraft indicates that although Japan was making progress in the modernization of their military,
they lagged well behind the dominant military powers. In addition, the dominant type of tactical plane used by the Japanese at this time was the interceptor. Although not without potential offensive capabilities, interceptors are primarily employed for defensive action. With a full weapon load, these planes had combat radii of under 800 miles, although the addition of more fuel tanks or the lessening of the payload would substantially increase this range.¹ Interceptors, however, are generally defensive in nature and do not conflict with the constitutional restrictions on the Japanese military.

Although it is a fact that the defense budget grew in actual yen and that it accounted for very significant amounts of money, it remained minor in two important respects. First, Japan could have afforded a much larger defense budget. If the commitment and priority had been with a growing defense, the resources were certainly there, particularly in the later years of this analysis. Although all three forces experienced growth and modernization, for a fifteen year period and ample economic resources, the changes were moderate. The Japanese economy would not have suffered greatly from larger defense allocations. Second, Japan's expenditure on defense lagged well behind the other industrial nations, and behind many developing nations as well. This was particularly true in terms of %GDP and per capita expense. In 1966 the Japanese defense budget (in
dollars) was approximately the same as that of East Germany. The per capita expenditure, however, was $10 for the Japanese and $57 for the East Germans. As a percentage of gross national product, the Japanese defense budget was less than half that of any of the other developed nations, and about one tenth that of the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. In 1975, Japan's defense budget (in dollars) was about 1/3 that of England or France, 1/4 that of West Germany, 1/22 that of the United States and 1/31 that of the Soviet Union. It remained under 1% of the gross national product, while no other developed nation allotted less than 2% of GNP to defense. Had the LDP been intent on creating a large, modern military, surely they would not have allowed Japan to lag so far behind other nations. Particularly in light of the fact that the existing military equipment was not very sophisticated.

The consistent growth of the Japanese military and the lack of reaction to it seems to indicate acceptance of such growth by both sides of the defense issue. The LDP did not push for more rapid growth or a larger percentage of the budget for defense expenditures. The opposition parties did not come out in opposition to the steady defense growth. Frequently, when the annual budget was revealed, reports would detail military equipment to be bought with that year's defense budget. Even so, comment by the opposition
was minimal and news of a new destroyer (for example) did not result in accusations of romilitarization.
**TABLE THREE**

**JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING 1960 - 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spending in Billions of Yen</th>
<th>Spending as % of GNP</th>
<th>Spending as % of Gen Exp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>9.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>8.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.46<em>¹</em>²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>8.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>7.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>7.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES*

1960
Approx. 147,000 personnel, 6 divisions, 4 combined brigades, 216 aircraft.

1965
Approx. 152,000 personnel, 13 divisions, 255 aircraft, 900 tanks, 2 Hawk missile battalions.

1970
Approx. 156,000 personnel, 12 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, 1 airborne brigade, 1 artillery brigade, 1 engineer brigade, 1 signal brigade, 140 planes, 190 helicopters, 740 tanks, 2 Hawk missile battalions.

1975
Approx. 155,000 personnel, 12 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, 1 airborne brigade, 1 artillery brigade, 5 engineer brigades, 1 signal brigade, 1 mixed brigade, 1 helicopter brigade, 360 aircraft, 600 tanks, 8 Hawk missile groups.

* Only selected equipment listed.

MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCES*

1960
Approx. 27,000 personnel, 4 destroyers,
1 submarine, 2 escorts,
18 frigates (acquired from U.S.),
14 destroyers, 1 submarine, 3 frigates (new,
Japanese made),
87 anti-submarine patrol bombers, 80 training
aircraft, 25 helicopters.

1965
Approx. 35,000 personnel, 1 guided missile
destroyer, 20 destroyers,
28 frigates, 7 submarines,
121 anti-submarine patrol bombers,
112 trainers, 62 helicopters,
11 other aircraft.

1970
Approx. 36,000 personnel, 1 guided missile
destroyer, 27 destroyers,
16 frigates, 10 submarines,
118 anti-submarine patrol bombers,
65 trainers, 43 helicopters,
11 other aircraft.

1975
Approx. 30,900 personnel, 1 guided missile
destroyer, 29 destroyers,
18 frigates, 16 submarines,
89 anti-submarine patrol bombers,
65 trainers, 69 helicopters,
11 other aircraft.

* Only selected equipment listed.

Sources: The Statesman’s Year-Book, 1960-61 – 1976-77; The
Military Balance, 1965-66 – 1975-76; John K. Emmerson, Arms,
Yen and Power.
AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES*

1960
Approx. 32,000 personnel,
Approx. 484 combat aircraft:
377 Sabre day fighters,
107 Sabre all weather fighters,
257 jet trainers, 288 trainers,
47 transports, 25 helicopters.

1965
Approx. 39,000 personnel,
Approx. 500 combat aircraft:
7 squadrons Starfighters, 8 squadrons
Sabre day fighters,
4 squadrons Sabre all weather fighters,
1 squadron reconnaissance fighters,
2 squadrons transports, 30 helicopters,
2 Nike-Ajax missile groups,
(trainers not listed).

1970
Approx. 40,000 personnel,
Approx. 500 combat aircraft:
200 Starfighters, 300 Sabre day fighters,
1 squadron reconnaissance fighters,
2 squadrons transports,
30 helicopters, 2 Nike-Ajax missile groups,
(trainers not listed).

1975
Approx. 42,000 personnel,
Approx. 450 combat aircraft:
280 interceptors: (170 Starfighters,
80 Phantoms, 30 Sabres),
150 Sabre fighter-bombers,
1 squadron reconnaissance fighters,
2 squadrons transports, 25 helicopters,
5 Nike missile battalions,
(trainers not listed).

* Only selected equipment listed.

Sources: The Statesman's Year-Book, 1960-61 - 1976-77; The
Military Balance, 1965-66 - 1975-76; John K. Emmerson, Arms,
Yen and Power.
Notes Chapter 4


17. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power, p. 133.


30. Japanese Embassy, Political Department.


37. Ibid.


43. -----, 1978, p. 287.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONSENSUS AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET
There are several possible explanations for why the LDP would pursue military growth in spite of strong domestic opposition. One possible explanation is that pressure was being put on Japan by the United States. In the Security Treaty that was signed in 1951, Japan had agreed to "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."¹ This statement obligated the Japanese to expand upon the existing Self-Defense Forces, although limits to this expansion (minimum or maximum) were conspicuously absent. Due to the strong role played by the United States in the birth of Japan's post-war defense forces, and the ties of the Security Treaty, Japanese officials were particularly sensitive to American attitudes on the issue of Japan's defense. The opposition parties were frequently accusing the LDP of rearming in concert with U.S. military strategy. There was considerable confusion on the part of the Japanese in the decades following the occupation due to the mixed messages that were coming from the United States regarding Japan's defense. At the same time that American's were accusing the Japanese of becoming rich while allowing the U.S. to shoulder their defense burden, a report by two congressmen to the House Foreign Affairs Committee accused the Japanese of planning to become a large-scale military power.² If the
Japanese were going to be mindful of U.S. attitudes, they needed first to determine what those attitudes were.

In spite of the apparent contradiction, it seems that Americans wanted the Japanese to take greater responsibility for their own defense, but without building a strong military. A Gallup poll conducted in 1971 at the request of a Japanese daily newspaper revealed that 67% of American respondents thought that an increase in Japanese military strength could be harmful for the U.S.3 Along with this absence of pressure by the American public, the United States government's official position was never one of explicit pressure on the Japanese to rearm. The official U.S. position was always one of respect for the Japanese Peace Constitution and Japan's commitment to non-militarism.4 Based upon this, it does not appear that pressure from the United States was strong enough to cause the LDP to act against the will of the opposition parties and much of the public. In addition, in looking at the changes that took place in the Japanese military during this time we see that, although expansion and modernization were occurring, the Japanese were far from achieving military independence from the United States.

Another potential source of pressure to rearm was the Japanese defense industry. Rearmament would obviously have been in the best interest of the arms manufacturers. This
proposal must be viewed in light of the fact that, in spite of its growth, the Japanese defense industry remained only a minor portion of the economy as a whole. During the 1960's, the percentage of industrial production related to defense dropped from .6% to .4% (about $750 million in 1969). For Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which in 1969 handled over 30% of Japan's total defense production, defense accounted for only 10% of total business. This lack of dependence on defense production was typical of Japan's large manufacturing firms and seems to indicate that, in spite of the close relationship between business and government, the defense manufacturers were probably not the influencing factor behind the growing defense budget. In addition, if it were the case that the LDP acted in disregard for the other parties and in response to some external force, why was there no outward opposition to their policies?

If it was not some external influence that caused the LDP to override the wishes of the opposition and forsake the practice of consensus politics, then what was it? As I stated in the introduction, I don't believe that an overriding of the opposition occurred. I believe that there was some degree of consensus on Japanese defense budget policy during the Vietnam War period. This was possible because of the astounding growth occurring in the Japanese economy during these years. The consensus among the
Liberal-Democrats was to pursue growth in the military. Not rapid growth or growth that required constitutional revision, but steady growth. The consensus among the opposition parties was to avoid such growth. Some groups wanted to maintain the status quo while others wanted to be rid of the military entirely, but all agreed that growth was undesirable. The policy that was actually pursued addressed both of these preferences.

The opposition parties wanted at most a stable defense force, many wanted the existing forces scaled down or even abolished. The defense budget gave them a slowly declining defense - as a percentage of GNP (and general expenditure). Although some may see this as a purely symbolic and perhaps meaningless gesture, it had real value. If, in 1960, the LDP was committed to rapid expansion and modernization of the then out-dated military, it could not have limited itself to such a small percentage of GNP. Although the two groups (the LDP and the opposition) had very different aspirations for the military, a minimum consensus could still be achieved. Consensus does not necessarily mean that all groups have like ideas, only that there is universal desire to reach an agreement, and that this agreement is tolerable by all. In my view, consensus was reached on this issue not by one side conceding to the other's desire, but through mutual compromise. The opposition tolerated some
growth in the military and the LDP kept that growth at a low level.

A multitude of factors contributed to the Japanese government's ability to reach a consensus on this extremely controversial issue. First, there is simply the desire and the pattern of practicing consensus politics. As discussed in Chapter One, for the Japanese there is a strong sense of group unity and the desire to be part of a cohesive and successful group can outweigh the desires of the individual. Second, there is the desire on the part of the LDP to avoid a crisis like that of 1960. The inability of the Diet to reach an agreement on the Security Treaty and the violence and chaos that ensued not only forced the dissolution of the lower house and the resignation of the Prime Minister, but damaged the credibility of the Japanese government at home and abroad. The third and perhaps most enabling factor that contributed to consensus was the state of the Japanese economy. The rapid growth in the Japanese economy prevented budget allocation from being a zero-sum game. There was enough money in the budget for growth in several areas. Although the Socialists complained that less money should go to defense and more to social programs, the growth in defense did not result in a loss for social programs. If the economy had not been growing and increased defense spending had meant an increase in GNP percentage and possibly a spending cut elsewhere, things might have looked
very different. It seems doubtful, given the intense domestic opposition to military growth and the LDP's desire to avoid a crisis like that of 1960, that substantial growth in the percentage of the budget going to defense could have taken place. Under different economic circumstances, the necessary compromises would have been much greater and thus consensus would have been far more elusive.

It may be the case that prior to the 1960 Security Treaty the LDP was not fully aware of the importance of defense issues to the opposition. The events surrounding the signing of the Treaty serve as an example of what the LDP faced when it forced a critical policy through without consensus. Prior to its ratification, the Socialists declares "absolute opposition" to the 1960 Security Treaty. They, along with the other opposition parties, went to great lengths to prevent the treaty bill from being passed. Diet proceedings were obstructed and delayed in an effort to let the Diet session end without a vote, and when the Speaker attempted to extend the Diet session, he was physically blocked from addressing the Diet. The disruptive Diet members were eventually removed by police. The majority of the DSP agreed to resign from the Diet, but the plan was aborted due to its expected futility. When the LDP forced a vote on the bill in spite of the Socialists opposition, the demonstrations grew. Sohyo organized three nationwide strikes protesting the treaty, and similar mass
demonstrations continued throughout the month between passage of the bill and its automatic ratification.\textsuperscript{10} Many of these demonstrations turned violent resulting in hundreds of injuries and one death. Although most of the protests were held near the Diet building, a mass demonstration against the U.S. Ambassador and the White House Press Secretary was held at Haneda Airport, forcing Prime Minister Kishi to cancel President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Japan just three days before he was to arrive.\textsuperscript{11} In the meantime, the Socialists had declared a boycott on the remainder of the Diet session, and did not return until the LDP agreed to dissolve the lower house and hold a general election.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, Prime Minister Kishi resigned in an effort to appease the angry opposition and to bring some order back to Japan's political arena.\textsuperscript{13}

If the wishes of the opposition were ignored at the time of defense budgeting, evidence of their displeasure would surely have gone beyond mild criticisms in the newspapers. Following Diet approval of the 1963 budget draft, \textit{The Japan Times} reported that, "The Socialists condemned the increase in defense expenditures, contending that the Government should ... give more consideration to improving land and water mains".\textsuperscript{14} In 1968 the opposition parties accused the Sato cabinet of planning to rearm Japan in accordance with the U.S.'s strategic plans for Asia. This, they believed, was the real motivation behind Sato's
call for a more self-reliant defense. Increases in the budgets of the SDF, the National Police Agency and the Public Security Investigation Agency were cited as proof that Japan was becoming a "militaristic police state". These statements are evidence that the attitudes and rhetoric of the opposition parties had not changed in favor of the LDP's defense policy, but a willingness to back up these condemnations with actions of protest did not exist. In view of the opposition's commitment to action during the 1960 treaty crisis, its lack of action regarding the defense budget seems to indicate that it did not feel shut out of the budgeting process. This is not to say that the opposition approved of the defense growth, or that it accepted the LDP's desired position. As shown by their comments in the press, the opposition members were strictly opposed to increasing the defense budget, and the LDP was no doubt keenly aware of how much growth could be pursued without losing the cooperation of the opposition parties. In discussing the ways of Japanese politics, Jon Woronoff says that, "Policies are put through disjointedly as hints, a few words now, a few words later..." It appears that this practice was true of defense policy, as well. Defense growth appears to have taken place "as hints", with a few ships, planes, etc. added now, a few later. This slow, rather piecemeal growth helped to protect the Japanese government from accusations of militarism.
Although the 1% (of GNP) cap on defense spending was not formally created until 1976, it really came into practice much earlier. In 1967 defense spending dropped below 1% of GNP, and it remained there through the creation of the spending cap. It has been said of the 1% cap that, to groups seeking greater defense expenditures, Japan's expanding GNP promised more money, in real terms, for defense; to groups opposing greater defense spending, the 1 percent limitation imposed a ceiling that promised to alleviate concern over plans for massive and rapid rearmament.

My analysis suggests that these effects began long before the actual cap, when the 1% limit was still unprescribed.

Thus in spite of the LDP's control over the decision making bodies of government, and in spite of the opposition parties' anti-militaristic stance, the policy of growth in defense in the 1960's and 1970's was not forced upon the opposition. Through the desire to work in cooperation with the opposition, the desire to avoid a political crisis and the benefit of a rapidly expanding economy, the LDP was able to pursue its general defense policy with the acceptance of the opposition. Although both sides of the defense issue would likely have pursued a different policy independently, through compromise and cooperation they were able to find a mutually acceptable course. Had the economy not been so enabling, the tradition of consensus might not have been strong enough to allow for a defense budget policy that was not openly condemned by any of the parties. The combination
of factors at work in Japan at that time, however, allowed
the LDP to move in the desired direction with virtually no
interference from the opposition.
Notes  Chapter Five


2. Ibid., p. 55.

3. Ibid., p. 56.

4. Ibid., p. 54.


6. Ibid., p. 65.

7. Ibid., p. 67.


9. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p. 14


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Graham, Keith (1986); The Battle of Democracy: Conflict, Consensus and the Individual. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.


Ishida, Takeshi and Ellis S. Krauss (1989); Democracy in Japan. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Japan: analytical bibliography. (1972); Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.


---- "Planks of Three Parties", November 1, 1960.


---- "Trouble Brewing on Defense Question", January 8, 1968.


---- "LDP Leaders Fail to Satisfy Critics of Defense Funding", February 9, 1972.


Japan Quarterly (1965); "The Asahi Poll on Vietnam" 7:4, 463-466.

---- (1967); "Stepping Up Defense" 14:2, 135-137.

---- (1972); "Militarism? No!" 19:2, 132-139.


Kishimoto, Koichi (1988); Politics in Modern Japan: Development and Organization. Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc.

Kuno, Osamu (1973); "The Vietnam War and Japan" Japan Quarterly, 20:2, 143-150.

Langdon, F. C. (1973); *Japan's Foreign Policy.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Langdon, Frank (1967); *Politics in Japan.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.


Lipset, Seymour Martin (1985); *Consensus and Conflict; Essays in Political Sociology.* New Brunswick: Transaction Books.


McIntosh, Malcom (1986); *Japan Re-armed.* London: Frances Pinter.


---- (1969); "Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues" *Asian Survey,* 9:8, 625-639.

---- (1970); "A Nation Against Arms" *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March, 26, 35-36.


Pempel, T. J. (1975); "The Dilemma of Parliamentary Opposition in Japan" Polity, 8:1, 63-79.

---- (1977); Policymaking in Contemporary Japan. Ithica: Cornell University Press.


---- (1968); Nippon: a charted survey of Japan. Tokyo: Kokusei-Sha.

---- (1975); Nippon: a charted survey of Japan. Tokyo: Kokusei-Sha.


Tsurutani, Taketsugu (1977); Political Change in Japan: Response to Postindustrial Challenge.


Watanabe, Seiki (1965); "The North Vietnam Bombings - The Balance Sheet" Japan Quarterly, 12:3, 298-302.


Yui, Myung-Kun (1971); "The Prospect of Japanese Rearmament" Current History, April, 231-236.