INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
Determination through production: The structure of imagination in Kant's theory of judgment

Miller, Charles Claude, III, M.A.
Rice University, 1987
RICE UNIVERSITY

DETERMINATION THROUGH PRODUCTION:
THE STRUCTURE OF IMAGINATION IN KANT'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT

by

CHARLES C. MILLER, III

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

MASTER OF ARTS

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

Steven Crowell, Assistant Professor
of Philosophy, Chairman

Mark Kulstad, Associate Professor
of Philosophy

Konstantin Kolenda, McManis Professor
of Philosophy

Houston, Texas

December, 1986
La réalité même, si elle est nécessaire, n'est pas complètement prévisible.

Proust
DETERMINATION THROUGH PRODUCTION:
THE STRUCTURE OF IMAGINATION IN KANT'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT

ABSTRACT

Kant's theory of imagination is deeply imbedded in his other more celebrated views, particularly those in regard to judgment. This does not mean, however, that imagination is insignificant. On the contrary, its pure form, the productive imagination, is the basis for the possibility of aesthetic judgment. Imagination is of two types; reproductive and productive. The reproductive type is limited in its employment to empirical objects, while the productive type is confined to the non-empirical side. The central function of the productive imagination in the theory of judgment is the non-conceptual determination of sensible particulars for judgment. In the case of determinative judgment, productive imagination performs as the schematism, which must be strictly temporal. In reflective judgment, it establishes itself as the finality of the form of the beautiful object, and takes the place of the sensible intuition alongside the understanding for the production of harmony.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks are due Steven Crowell, Ph.D., for his patient consideration of many versions of the manuscript, without which my work would have been much impoverished.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................ vi

Chapter

I  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1
II  THE REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN JUDGMENT'S DEDUCTION... 6
III THE IMAGINATIVE SCHEMATISM OF DETERMINATIVE JUDGMENT . 33
IV IMAGINATION AND FINALITY IN AESTHETIC JUDGMENT .......... 59
V  CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 96

REFERENCES ............................................................................ 103
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The serious student of Kant's theory of judgment must be prepared to cope with a number of controversial issues which have emerged in the minds of scholars since Kant's time. Secondary work has been going on for a long time now, and many areas of Kant's theory have been so carefully studied that the contemporary student of Kantianism would be foolish not to consider them. That is, no one today can study Kant's work from the text alone.

A large amount of what we have learned about Kant since his time has been of importance to the heart of his work; many of the issues raised would concern Kant a great deal, if he were here. An equally large amount of what has been done with Kant's work in the intervening years since his death, however, would not concern him. Kant's theories have been adapted to many different projects - from analytical ethics to existentialism - and Kant would likely not have cared about any of these.

Unfortunately, it is often difficult to tell the difference between the actual outcome of the two types of scholarship. Some of the strictly Kantian commentators
have produced works which slant their presentations of the views according to the author's beliefs about the Kantian project. Norman Kamp Smith's view, for example, is such a profound example of this that I have not been able to use it. Alternatively, some philosophers who have used Kant's theories for other purposes have pointed up important features that had previously gone unnoticed. Heidegger, though hardly a Kant scholar, has made some very interesting insinuations about Kant's theories of temporality and understanding with respect to the imagination. However, I have not used Heidegger here either, because his project is so different from Kant's.

The fact that the text alone is no longer sufficient for the study of Kant makes it necessary for the contemporary student to weigh the secondary material carefully in the attempt to select those treatments that are the most reasonable. This dilemma, interestingly, affirms the fact that secondary material, alone, is not sufficient. Scholarship requires a foundation in the text.

In my attempts to make sense of the theory of judgment in this thesis, I have been guided primarily by the following maxim: "Be true to Kant's project". To pursue this maxim, I have stayed as close to the text as possible, and have included many quotations. On the other hand, I have attempted to rely on seasoned commentators in order to
remain aware of the intellectual community's nomenclature and consensus, where it exists, on Kant's views. Where I believe commentators are infusing their own beliefs, I say so, and I try to give textual evidence for my departure from their views. Of course, I would be dishonest if I said that I have no views of my own, and have made no attempts to squeeze support for my views out of some difficult portions of the text. As I remark in Chapter II, with Eva Schaper, Kant's text is resistant to any other method of interpretation. Nonetheless, I believe that I have stood by my maxim throughout, so that I have not just produced a constellation of arguments designed to push through my own ideas, but have kept my claims true to Kant's own project.

In the essay that follows, I will examine three important portions of Kant's writing which constitute the core of his work on the imagination in the theory of judgment. Each of these portions receives its own chapter, and each of which, to keep interpretational artifact to a minimum, begins with quotations and background material, and concludes with my own arguments about the structure of imagination in that particular portion of Kant's theory. However, none of the chapters stand alone. Together they describe a theory of imagination that is central to the projects of both determinative and reflective judgment, and
they show why this particular theory works.

Kant's theory of judgment is a dynamic and complex process that accounts for much of the constitution of experience. Determinative judgments, which are the judgments of knowledge, occur when the particulars of sensible intuition are brought under the pure categories of the understanding. Reflective judgments, alternatively, occur when some sensible particular lacks a concept; the occupation of reflective judgment is then to seek a concept appropriate to the intuition. But one of Kant's key worries is that both of these sorts of judgment require some 'third thing' to mediate between the sensible particulars and the understanding. The way that Kant gets the constituents of judgment to come together for determinative judgment is quite complicated, and the level of complexity for reflective judgment is even greater. In fact, in the latter case the intricacies never get completely worked out. But the means for making Kant's theory of judgment work do exist, and they are contained in the theory of the productive imagination.

My immediate task will be to sort out the function of the imagination in judgment in the critical places where Kant does not do it. This requires the construction of arguments for an important distinction between productive and reproductive imagination which is deeply imbedded in a
fairly generic theory of 'imagination', and which Kant does not appear to have been too clear about anyway. A further task will be the construction of arguments for the usefulness - and in fact indespensability - of the productive imagination in the theory of reflective judgment, primarily in relation to that subclass of the reflective judgment that constitutes aesthetic judgments.

Finally, my overall purpose in this thesis will be to produce a working model of what I am convinced Kant's theory of productive imagination must be in order for his theory of determinant judgment to be plausible, and for his theory of reflective judgment even to be possible. The success of such a model will make Kant's difficult theory of determinative judgment, and obscure theory of reflective judgment, much less mysterious.
CHAPTER TWO

THE REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN JUDGMENT'S DEDUCTION

The two editions of the "transcendental deduction" contain a large portion of what Kant has to say about imagination. Indeed, it would be foolhardy to attempt a discussion of Kant's view of imagination without consulting the "deductions". Unfortunately, though, the picture they present is far from clear. This fact makes any approach to the problem of imagination in Kant difficult; difficult enough, in fact, that support for any position must be taken at least as much from Kant's larger views as from what he has to say about the imagination specifically. Eva Schaper puts the dilemma well in the introduction to her paper, "Kant on Imagination".

... there are some central, but baffling elements in Kant's arguments which I have not yet been able satisfactorily to sort out. Nevertheless, I am fairly clear about what Kant is not saying; or, if he sometimes appears to be saying it, cannot have meant; or, if sometimes meant, ought to be judged against the background of Kant's general purposes in the critical philosophy. ([7]p.430)

Though unfortunate for those of us who prefer to take Kant at his word when possible, these statements are absolutely
true. What Kant has to say about imagination in this section of his work is murky and sometimes even contradictory, and while the discussion seems to become more consistent in the second edition, it does not become easier. Occurrences of the term 'imagination' in the "B Deduction" represent only a fraction of those that arise in the "A Deduction", and this feature represents a certain paucity of relevant discussion from which to draw conclusions. Therefore, the arguments for my position in regard to Kant's 'first Critique' conception of imagination will draw from appearances of the notion in the "schematism" chapter and from my understanding of Kant's larger project, rather than from Kant's remarks in the "deduction" alone.

An additional preliminary point should be made here: As it is unwise to consider the imagination in Kant without considering the two "deduction", it is equally unwise to consider the imagination in the "deductions" without considering the transcendental unity of apperception as well. The conceptions of both apperception and imagination change from A to B, and the changes that affect the transcendental unity are at least as important to the development of a satisfactory picture of imagination as the revisions to which the theory of the imagination is itself subjected. In this chapter, therefore, it will be my aim
to offer an explanation of Kant's final conception of imagination in the "deduction" through careful scrutiny of the structure of both imagination and apperception. Furthermore, I will look forward toward the "schematism" and third *Critique* conceptions where allusions to such material can shed light on the rest. I must caution the reader that the first two sections of this chapter consist of close readings of Kant's discussion which retain his own sequence of presentation, so that they are necessarily tedious. A large part of the reason for this is that it is simply impracticable for me to reproduce each of Kant's arguments in a discussion of this small size. The best I can hope is that simple descriptions of Kant's myriad interlocking conclusions will be intelligible without complete explication of the arguments themselves. Careful attention to these sections by the reader is crucial, because it is only in the face of subtle changes that the real differences in the conception of imagination appear.

The last portion of this chapter contains my own arguments as to what Kant is up to, and I intend for it to make the earlier parts worth reading.

At *A 95*, section 14 of the "transcendental deduction", which is the paragraph prior to the traditionally described "A deduction", Kant lists the three original sources of the
possibility of all experience. These are sense, imagination, and apperception, and they provide the services of synopsis of the manifold, synthesis of the manifold, and unity of the syntheses, respectively. Sensibility, of course, provides the raw materials for perception and, hence, all empirical forms of knowledge. Apperception and imagination join forces to make up the understanding ([3]A 119), which constitutes the means by which sensibility can be synthesized, and thus provides the possibility for categorial knowledge and judgment. Imagination on this view plays quite a central role in the genesis of knowledge, and needs to be explained carefully. Unfortunately, Kant, who was just the one to do it, seems to have left elaborate clues rather than explanations. It is left to us, therefore, to make sense of these clues.

The first substantial description of the synthesis of imagination appears at A 100, where Kant describes the reproductive function of imagination.

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in
accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. But this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules. Otherwise our empirical imagination would never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its powers, and so would remain concealed within the mind as a dead and to us unknown faculty. ([3]A 100)

Here Kant describes our capability to reproduce representations on the basis of his antecedent view that these are subject to the rules of consciousness because consciousness is responsible for their existence - representations are capable of being reproduced by us because they originate (mostly) with us. Furthermore, representations must be reproduced in the mind in order for things like counting to be possible; that is, if we were not capable of retaining the absent (or "already counted") representations in some way, we could not tell that one followed another. From this Kant concludes that:

The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever - of those that are a priori no less than those that are empirical - the reproductive synthesis of imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination. ([3]A 102)
The idea that imagination holds a transcendental position leads Kant to the conclusion that reproduction of empirical objects is possible because imagination, like the other faculties, has a pure form that exists prior to and therefore conditions all empirical employments of imagination ([3]A 101).

From the identification of the transcendental ground underlying the possibility of apprehension, Kant moves on to the necessity for a transcendental ground underlying the possibility of a unitary consciousness ([3]A 106). A unitary consciousness is, he reasons, required for the apprehension of a unitary object over time. Unity in an object has to be determined according to a rule by which an intuition is always capable of being represented ([3]A 105). These rules are furnished by concepts. The concept of body, for example, is a rule which governs certain "marks" or determinations - i.e., "attributes" such as extension, solidity, etc. - which therefore necessarily belong to all bodies. "Unity of rule", Kant points out, "determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible" ([3]A 106). This condition of unity constitutes the transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendental unity of
apperception collects these conditions into a unity of self-consciousness that makes it both possible and necessary for us to differentiate objects of intuition from ourselves, while maintaining the identity of a single consciousness.

The unification of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, and pure apperception supplies a principle of unity to provide structure for all intuitions arising from that manifold. ([3]A 117) Intuitions are, we have seen, recognizable, countable, etc., because they can be combined in imagination. Since the transcendental synthesis of imagination is involved in any act of combination, and since combination has to take place in one consciousness for it to be intelligible, imagination is linked to transcendental apperception in one knowledge. ([3]A 118) So far, so good. But at this point, Kant pens a phrase that contradicts what he said back at A 102:

But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of all knowledge, especially of experience. ([3]A 118, parentheses are Kant's own)

Here I simply point out the fact that at A 102 Kant refers
to the synthesis of reproduction as the "transcendental faculty of imagination". Though I will make remarks as to the significance of this contradiction at the close of this chapter, it needs a bit of explanation at this early stage, if only to keep the reader out of the dark with regard to the line of thinking I will pursue. Fundamentally, I am disturbed by Kant's attempt to elevate an empirical faculty to transcendental status. To my very pleasant surprise, I discovered that H. J. Paton shares my concern.

The chief difficulty which I see in the passage [A 100-106] is the phrase 'necessary reproduction'. We have two statements to consider. There is first of all the general assertion - illustrated by the example of 'triangle' - that 'the function of synthesis in accordance with a rule' makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori, [A 105]. And secondly there is the assertion that the concept of 'body' can serve as a rule for intuitions only if it 'represents the necessary reproduction of the manifold of given appearances' [A 106]. In spite of the differences between a pure and an empirical concept, it seems to me probable that Kant's doctrine in these two statements is intended to be the same.

It may be thought that Kant means something comparatively simple, namely, that the concept of the object controls the synthesis of reproduction, whether that synthesis be empirical or pure. For example, in knowing a triangle the concept of 'triangle' will compel me to reproduce the side AB when apprehension has gone on to side BC; and again in knowing a body, the concept of 'body' will compel me to reproduce extension when apprehension has gone on to impenetrability.

I cannot bring myself to accept this simple explanation, and I believe that Kant is trying to state something more difficult and more obscure. I think he is concerned with that necessary synthetic
unity of the object upon which rests the possibility, and indeed the necessity, that all appearances should in themselves be 'associable'. He appears to me to be suggesting that the synthesis in accordance with a rule (or a concept) imposes necessary synthetic unity on the manifold. To do this is to make possible a thorough-going synthesis of reproduction, or to make appearances necessarily reproducible. This doctrine offers no difficulty in the case of pure concepts like 'triangle'. In the case of empirical concepts the statement can be accepted only as a provisional analysis of our experience, the proper significance of which is explained in the following paragraph [paragraph 2, A 106] by reference to the unity of apperception. ([5],393-394, brackets mine, parentheses Paton's)

I present this long quotation here only to describe the basis for my concern with reproductive imagination, and not to argue against its use. That will come later.

In the meantime, Kant's discussion of interactions between the imagination and apperception continues, and the conclusion he draws becomes quite significant. Kant specifies an amalgamation of the two a priori principles necessary for cognition/recognition - combination (imagination), and unity (apperception) - as they act to constitute the understanding "The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding. ([3]A 119) This is a tremendously important fact to recognize, because the idea that the imagination actually plays a part in the constitution of the understanding drops out altogether in the B edition.
Finally, at A 124, Kant begins to wind up the "deduction" and makes two very important comments. First, he returns to the problem of pure imagination - on which he has already contradicted himself - and remarks that "...since the synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in intuition, as, for instance, in the shape of a triangle, it is, though exercised a priori, always in itself sensible". Secondly, a little further on, he remarks that "...while concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition".

At the outset of the "B deduction", Kant omits his previous list of the three faculties, and any mention at all of the imagination. Instead, he launches directly into an explanation of the structure of combination (combination without mention of the imagination this time) in the understanding. Combination of the manifold is performed by an act of synthesis in the understanding.

From combination Kant moves on to apperception, which is, in this edition, expressed in the idea that the Cogito ("I think") must be able to accompany all representations. ([3]B 132) Next, the unity of apperception active in
ordinary empirical knowledge is said to originate from a transcendental unity of apperception, which grounds the possibility of apperception in general. ([3]B 132) In this edition, the unity of the manifold of experience gains the advantage of being conceptually self-evident – the necessity of unity does not have to be justified through a transcendental faculty of reproduction – and so produces analyticity, after a fashion. Kant puts it this way:

Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. ([3]B 133)

What follows analytically from the general concept produced by the transcendental unity of apperception is the following: Any perception I can have is subject to the Cogito. ([3]B 138) The synthetick act that produces this analytically characterizable situation, namely, combination of the manifold under one consciousness, grounds the possibility of understanding. Now Kant can make the claim that the concept of a unified object produced in apperception is based on an objective unity, that is, the transcendental unity that makes anything possible which could be called "my" knowledge. ([3]B 139) It is important
to keep in mind that transcendental conditions — those conditions that necessitate the possibility of some cognitive function — are the sole justification for claims to objective knowledge. This, he notes, is different than the subjective unity of a consciousness determined by inner sense, which is given strictly in empirical terms. In the 'subjective' case, the empirically unified consciousness is simply an appearance of a unified consciousness and not one which is guaranteed epistemically through transcendental channels. ([3]B 140)

In the midst of a later ([3]B 141) discussion of the relationship of apperception to judgments, Kant makes the remark in passing that the reproductive imagination has only subjective validity. Though the passage in which it occurs is unenlightening in itself, Kant's point seems to be that any arrangement of representations initiated by the "laws of reproductive imagination" must be contingent and therefore "subjective". This signals the "demotion", as it were, of the imagination from the powerful, necessitating function it served in the "A deduction". When Kant next mentions imagination in the setting of the "B deduction", he describes it as an extension of the "figurative synthesis". ([3]B 151)

As he begins to describe the categories, Kant's suggestion is that they are pure forms of thought, and are
for that reason involved in "intellectual synthesis". But he also wants them to have a certain structural affinity with sensibility, and this requires that there be a transcendental, 'figurative' synthesis.

The [pure] concepts are, however, ... mere forms of thought, through which alone no determinate object is known. The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them relates only to the unity of apperception, and is thereby the ground of the possibility of a priori knowledge, so far as such knowledge rests on the understanding. This synthesis, therefore, is at once transcendental and purely intellectual. But since there lies in us a certain form of a priori sensible intuition, which depends on the receptivity of the faculty of representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense through the manifold of given representations, in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception, and so to think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition — that being the condition under which all objects of our human intuition must necessarily stand. In this way the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality, that is, application to objects which can be given us in intuition. These objects, however, are only appearances, for it is solely of appearances that we can have a priori intuition. This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled figurative synthesis ...(3)B 150-1; emphasis is Kant's own)

Kant distinguishes the figurative synthesis from the intellectual synthesis by entitling the figurative synthesis "the transcendental synthesis of imagination". He then reports that imagination is "the faculty of
representing in intuition an object that is not itself present" ([3]B 151). Furthermore, since all intuition is sensible, imagination is tied to sensibility. But since, as Kant has just stated, imagination represents in intuition an object which is not there, it is not wholly conditioned by the description of sensibility as 'receptive'; in some sense the imagination must be thought as spontaneous, as determining, and not only receiving, intuitions. The productive imagination expresses spontaneity (i.e., determinability), while the reproductive imagination is subject only to empirical laws (is determined). ([3]B 152)

Next Kant describes the "paradox of inner sense", which is the idea that we cannot know ourselves directly but must instead know appearances of ourselves through representation in inner sense. ([3]B 153) Inner sense is itself determined by understanding, which is described in the following way:

Now the understanding in us men is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and cannot, even if intuitions be given in sensibility, take them up into itself in such a manner as to combine them as the manifold of its own intuition. Its synthesis, therefore, if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself, even without sensibility, but through which it is yet able to determine the sensibility. ([3]B 153)
In this paragraph Kant describes the inability of the understanding to cope with sensibility directly. But he also describes the determinative/synthetic powers it exercises over the structure of sensible knowledge. What the understanding needs is a way to structure sensibility without approaching it too closely, and the resolution of this problem comes in the form of inner sense. Kant remarks that "The understanding...in respect of the manifold which may be given to it in accordance with the form of sensible intuition, is able to determine sensibility inwardly." ([3]B 153). The act of this determination, interestingly enough, is performed by the understanding "under the title of" transcendental synthesis of the imagination ([3]B 153). This is only the second time in the B edition that Kant has mentioned the imagination in connection with the understanding. Though I will have more to say about this later, it is important to pay attention to the distinctly diminished role imagination plays for the understanding in this setting. In Kant's next sentence, he reaffirms the claim that apperception is the source of all combination. Again, this represents a significant departure from the first edition, in which imagination alone is responsible for combination of the manifold. Going on, Kant associates combination of the manifold with the determination of intuitions within inner
sense, and attributes this process of determination once again to the transcendental act of imagination. Our understanding of ourselves, therefore, is based on a consciousness of the cogito in any representation of the manifold, representation of the manifold in one consciousness through combination of the manifold in apperception, and determination in "respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception" ([3]B 152) of the manifold in inner sense through the transcendental synthesis of imagination.

Shortly before the close of the B Deduction, Kant makes the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition. The form of intuition only stipulates the conditions for the possibility of intuition of a manifold as such; the formal intuition specifies the unity of a given representation ([3]B 160ff). This distinction is an important one to recognize in this context because Kant's description of imagination in the B edition as a determinant of inner sense - the form of inner intuition, or time - is different from the description of imagination in the A edition, in which imagination is designed to replicate characteristic experiences, or formal intuitions, so they could be recognized by apperception. I will come back to this later, but it is important to see this development where it occurs.
Finally, to close out the "B deduction", Kant reviews the Copernican arguments in a discussion of the apodicticity guaranteed our knowledge by the categories and the structure of experience in general. During the course of this, he returns briefly to the imagination. "Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility. ([3]B 164) The reader should note here that Kant says "connects" rather than "combines" in this instance, and that understanding is mentioned separately from imagination. Imagination, instead of being part of the understanding, now lies between understanding and sensibility; a view that strongly foreshadows the "schematism" view.

Although the changes in the imagination that have the greatest theoretical impact are revealed by subtle differences in employment, there are some broader, more obvious changes that deserve attention as well. The best thing will be to work from the latter to the former, so that we can develop perspective on the important issues.

By far the most obvious change in the status of imagination between the "deductions" is its virtual disappearance from the second edition. It is striking that
Kant struggled so with the notion in the first edition, yet has so little to say about it subsequently. Interestingly, though, he decreases the obvious activity of the imagination in the edition, but he does not abandon the functions that it was assigned in the first edition.

A major occupation of the imagination in the A edition is the combination of the manifold of intuitions. This act is performed by the imagination in order to provide the groundwork for the unifying function of apperception; intuitions are combined by the imagination into a form that makes them ripe for recognition, and apperception unifies consciousness so that it is able to recognize the intuitions as unities. These two faculties, imagination and apperception, combine to constitute the understanding. In the B edition, imagination is no longer mentioned in the activation of unitary consciousness — apperception does it all. The manifold is both combined and unified in consciousness by apperception in an unspecified but presumably singular stroke. Understanding becomes a faculty unto itself under whose jurisdiction apperception falls, and which is itself conditioned by the transcendental unity of apperception. Imagination receives a small amount of coverage in the latter half of the B edition, and is also considered to be under the jurisdiction — in rather a peculiar way, as we shall see
later - of the understanding.

This sort of "broad outline" view of the imagination predicament is advanced by Eva Schaper, whose well taken comments about the difficulty of reading Kant we saw at the outset of this chapter. As she is inclined to read Kant's work on the imagination for its place in the larger project, so she seems inclined to sketch its conclusions with a large pen. She sets out primarily to discount several of the more popular apologies for Kant's mess in the "deductions", but in the end advances a very interesting explanation of her own. Her conception of the shifting structure of the imagination between the editions is characterized by the idea that Kant dropped any real attachment to the imagination completely in the second edition, and replaced it fully with the faculty of apperception.

If the technical sense of 'imagination' is acceptable at all - and I believe that it is the only way in which Kant's insistence on the necessity of imagination in his transcendental arguments can be reconciled with the overall purpose of the first Critique - then 'imagination' does not refer to a subjective agency for welding together a precarious artifice of experience, but to that part of the set of conditions for knowledge claims which the Transcendental Deduction, perhaps not completely successfully, brings to the fore as 'transcendental unity of apperception'. ([7]p.441)

Schaper's conclusion is that Kant can have meant to use
"imagination" only to hold empirical expirical experience together until the transcendental unity of apperception could justify the conglomeration of empirical objects by uniting it in one consciousness; and that, following appropriate revision, he was able to replace the entire rickety notion with a broader view of the transcendental unity of apperception.

While this is a very interesting view, it is, as Schaper admits herself, an incomplete one. ([7]p.430) Nonetheless, it is not without its virtues. First of all, it demonstrates the dramatic shift in the kind of tasks performed by the imagination in the two editions. This view resolves the conflicts and contradictions that plague the imagination by distinguishing its function sharply between the editions. In the first, imagination helps to congeal experience by reproducing its sensible features for recognition by apperception. In the second, apperception takes over the whole business of the solidification of consciousness, and imagination is either ignored or seen to be a derivative, 'first' function of understanding. The multiple, conflicting descriptions in the first edition pale before the overriding theme of the synthesis of reproduction, while the few mentions of imagination in the second edition can be disregarded in favor of the transcendental unity of apperception. As useful and
attractive as this view is, however, it fails to highlight an important feature of the shift between the first and second edition concepts of imagination. Shaper's view fails to recognize the importance of the distinction between the productive and reproductive employments of the imagination, and consequently, cannot account for the relative importance of the two editions.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that the significance of the shift which occurs between the first and second editions of the "transcendental deduction" is not exhausted by the superficial changes in duties assigned to our troubled faculty in each. My fundamental claim will be, rather, that the shift between the editions is not only task-related, but is a change in emphasis as well. The latter change consists in the fact that the first edition emphasizes a reproductive employment of the imagination, while the second emphasizes a productive employment. Comparison of the more salient points in A and B, and a quick look back to Schaper, will substantiate my claims.

We already know, at this point, that apperception takes over the most discussed function of the imagination. I will not belabor this further. What I wish to do is examine changes that occur within that portion of the imagination which is preserved in the second edition.
In edition A the reproductive synthesis of imagination is a transcendental act of the mind that is required for apperception to be possible. Since any condition for something's possibility is a transcendental condition, and reproduction is a condition for the possibility of apperception, Kant calls reproduction the 'transcendental faculty of imagination'. To my mind, this is unacceptable. Fortunately, it seems to have been so to Kant as well. Nearly everywhere else he mentions the reproductive imagination, he says that it is limited to empirical employment. If this is the case, reproduction can't be a transcendental condition. That is, nothing empirically determined can ground the possibility of anything else. Nonetheless, the requirement that imagination must perform the combination necessary for apperception in fact requires that an empirical situation - namely the way a mass of sensibility is arranged (and not only that it is arranged) on any apperceptible occasion - must condition the possibility of apperception in general. As we saw in the Paton quote at the beginning of this chapter, the attempt to make empirical reproduction a necessary constituent of experience gives appearances the character of necessary reproducibility. This is clearly unacceptable for the true Kantian architecture. I suspect that Kant saw this the
second time around, and I would submit that he abandoned the combining function of the imagination because it leads to exactly this problem. By taking the combination requirement out of the hands of imagination in the second edition, the problem of an empirical transcendental condition drops out. If apperception provides its own combination, it does not need imagination to ground its possibility.

With this problem out of the way, the reproductive employment of the imagination can continue to exist as an empirical device for use in thought association and the like, but it has no obligation to function transcendentally. The productive imagination, on the other hand, does have transcendental responsibilities. Productive imagination exists "prior to apperception", and "is the ground of all knowledge" (A 118). This is an important move for Kant, because it serves as the foundation for the "schematism" and, ultimately, for the theory of aesthetics in the third Critique. At the early stage in which we find the conception at A 118, however, Kant has not yet made his decision to abandon the reproductive prelude to apperception, so he does not quite know how to go about distinguishing between the 'transcendental' employments of production and reproduction.
The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. ([3]A 118, emphasis is Kant's own)

Here we see that Kant leans toward the purification, as it were, of imagination in a productive employment, but we see also that he has yet to abandon the tie between imagination and combination of the manifold.

It is not until the B edition conception of determinability that a substantive distinction between the productive and reproductive employments is made in the "deduction". I personally conjecture that this is because he constructed the B edition after having wrestled with the imagination in the "schematism". Whatever the reason, however, there is no denying the fact that Kant has a distinctly different view of the productive imagination in the B edition. The concept of determination is what provides the functional distinction (as opposed to the fundamental distinction) between reproductive and productive imagination in the second edition. The fundamental distinction is, of course, the one he tried and ultimately failed to make in the "A deduction" - that productive imagination is a transcendental condition while
reproductive imagination is an empirical condition. The functional distinction is more useful to us in determining Kant's rationale for the fundamental structure of the employments of imagination, however, and it appears much more reliably in the text besides. Hence, the proximity of "determination" to "imagination" in the text should send up a flag with Kant's readers. The functional distinction consists in the fact that 'determination' places productive and reproductive imagination in heirarchical order according to their use of it. Productive imagination determines intuitions, while reproductive imagination is determined by the productive imagination (when productive imagination functions as the agent of inner sense).

The concept of determination is, alas, also a difficult one to specify rigorously, but a general idea of its utility will suffice to get us through this long hour of Kant's view. Things are always determined in Kant's architectonic world according to some rule, and rules in this world are always some sort of synthesis. Perhaps the best example of determination is found in the notion of determinative judgment. A determinative judgment is accomplished when a concept is brought to bear on some intuition; that is, when a certain intuition is found to be subsumable under a category. The concept is the determiner, and the intuited particular is the
'determinee', as it were. If we extrapolate to the smaller field of apperception, we see determination at work through the agency of imagination. In the B edition, we learned that sensibility is determined through inner sense. Inner sense, which is composed if the first pure form of sensible intuition (time), determines sensibility by requiring that all intuitions are capable of being represented temporally. The pure a priori (productive) imagination has the job of determining sensibility through time as the agent of the understanding, while any particularization of experience by the reproductive imagination is determined by inner sense, and so by productive imagination. I will have a great deal more to say about this in the chapter on the "schematism". But for now, what all this means is that Kant has finally been successful in establishing an heirarchy of imagination, with the reproductive employment limited to empirical function, and the productive employment assigned to pure or formalized function. This is the main point that I set out to establish in this chapter: The function of productive imagination is necessarily manifested at the formal level, and it is also necessarily distinct from the reproductive employment.

The marked distinction between the functions of the two kinds of imagination is established dramatically by Schaper's view. If Kant's conception of imagination were
to be confined strictly to reproduction, the position adopted by Schaper would be fully correct. Everything required of the imagination in the first edition would be taken over en bloc by the unity of apperception in the second, and the whole problem of a transcendental imagination would disappear. However, if the whole notion of transcendental imagination were banished from the "deductions", determination of sensibility would be impossible. Sensibility is determined by the transcendental faculty of imagination on behalf of the understanding by means of a transcendental schematism. Though the details of this will be explained in the next chapter, the point is that if imagination could truly be described as "that which is absorbed into apperception in the B edition", the schematism itself would be impossible.
CHAPTER THREE

THE IMAGINATIVE SCHEMATISM OF DETERMINATIVE JUDGMENT

There is perhaps no more important picture of the imagination at work in all its multiplicity than that found in the "schematism" chapter of the first Critique. The "schematism" chapter is designed to bring the unifying activity of the imagination to bear upon the problem of the gulf which exists between the pure concepts of the understanding and the particulars of sensible intuition. If this gulf cannot be spanned, the Kantian theory of determinative judgment must be rendered impossible. At issue, therefore, in the "schematism" chapter, is the question of whether or not sensibility and the pure concepts of the understanding can be brought into a relationship of subsumption, especially since the dynamics of the relation are not unusually transparent. Since the "schematism" chapter is quite compact, and since it is full of controversial issues, I will enlist the help of two major commentators to bring the problems to light. By this method I hope to explain, in a reasonably clear fashion, the structure of imagination in the schematism.

Careful examination of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
reveals a not insignificant difficulty concerning the nature of the relationship between the pure concepts of the understanding (categories) and the data collected in sensibility (intuition). The relationship between these elements of knowledge is determinant judgment itself, and a good ability to make sense of it will be crucial to an understanding of Kant's larger project. Kant's discussion of determinant judgment is found primarily in the "schematism" chapter, but other sections on the forms of intuition and the pure categories are quite relevant as well. We will look at these other relevant portions of the view as the need arises. The substance of Kant's actual view of the schematism is a matter of some dispute, as we will soon see, but the only reasonable way for us to tackle the problem is to get clear about the project of determinant judgment in Kant's theory of knowledge first.

That which is available to us human knowers falls into two general classes: 1) raw sensible representations, and 2) radically non-empirical (i.e., pure) categories of understanding. The first class of available material is subject to all the worries Hume had about inductive validity; sensible events with no conceptual substrate are random, and cannot give us any reliable information. The second class is composed of concepts which are entirely
devoid of empirical content – without traction, as it were, on the world – and which are of no use to us by themselves. Intuitions alone have no form, while pure concepts alone have no content. The problem, as Kant sees it, is that of getting these two classes of the constituents of knowledge to work together.

But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition. ... How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible? ([3]B 176-177)

In the "schematism" chapter ([3]B 176-187) Kant worries about the apparent inhomogeneity between the categories of the pure understanding and the sensible intuitions, which must be able to be brought together if experience is to be possible. He advances the claim that since the categories and intuition have little in common with one another, a mediating 'third thing' ([3]B 177) must be available to intercede for their cooperation. But in order for this to happen, the 'third thing' must be sufficiently like both the categories and intuition to make their natural heterogeneity yield to an homogeneous relation. The third thing must, that is, bring something to the two classes which they can hold in common. This thing must be at the
same time intellectual and sensible, so time, the form of
inner sense and one of the forms of sensible intuition
itself, is chosen for the job. Time allows for the
relation of sensibility to concepts by providing a
substrate common to both of them; all knowledge—in both
its sensible and intellectual components—must be
conditioned by time. A discussion of the component of the
Kantian view which actually takes on the responsibility for
the temporal conditions of knowledge, and the particulars
of the institution of this component into the view itself,
provides the theater of discourse for our commentators.
With the help of the issues they help to clarify, we will
be able to see the importance of the productive imagination
for the synthesis of time in knowledge.

The exegetical controversy, generally speaking,
revolves around the fact that Kant is often less than clear
about the details involved in his particular notion of
determinative judgment. The controversial issues have
distilled into two basic kinds of questions: 1) what is
the nature of; a) pure categories, b) 'schematized
categories', c) the transcendental schema? 2) should there
be included spatial schemata to go with the temporal? None
of these questions are, of course, easily answered, and I
am not so deluded to believe that I can take care of them
all within this particular forum. I will, however, be
forced to deal with them in at least some capacity as I work toward a solution to my central topic for this chapter, that is, the role of the imagination in the schematism of determinative judgment.

The puzzle in which I will be most interested for the purposes of this chapter will be that involved in question three above; the complete and unexplained absence of space—the other form of sensible intuition and, it would seem, an equally likely candidate for the job of schematic mediator—from Kant's discussion in the "schematism" chapter. I have chosen this issue because it will best uncover the peculiar properties of the productive imagination, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is a guarantor of unity which must remain pure; that is, the productive imagination can have no empirical content. In seeking some resolution to the space problem, I will comment fairly extensively on the work of two well-known Kant scholars who have treated this problem; but since their approaches often depend upon issues related to questions one and two above, I will when necessary point out what I believe to be fundamental errors in their treatments of these as well. Noticeably absent from this discussion will be Norman Kemp Smith's large Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is well known and has been extremely influential. Kemp Smith's commentary is
excluded here due to the fact that its interest is focused primarily on distinctions between 'critical' and 'pre-critical' periods of Kant's work - an important set of questions, to be sure, but of little use here - rather than to the problems of unity in judgment which are addressed by the two commentators we will examine. Since this thesis is concerned exclusively with the problem of the imagination in the theory of judgment, and since the main role of the imagination in the early critical view is unity and its application to knowledge, a discussion of Kemp Smith must be left to another project. For now, we should turn to the commentators who help us make sense of the structure of imagination in the theory of determinative judgment.

Two important views on the 'space-in-the-schematism' problem have emerged from the extensive works of H. J. Paton and D. P. Dryer. The positions taken by these commentators toward the problem diverge substantially, and add to the depth to which one is required to go to find satisfactory explanations for Kant's problematic chapter. The existence of these different attitudes toward the schematism reflects to a large degree the diversity of interpretive orientations toward Kant's general project in the first Critique, and I suspect that it will become evident that the more general opinions held by the commentators must in fact lend a considerable amount of
color to their exegetical work, thereby doing more to support certain idiosyncrasies of interpretation than to address the substantial issues. To characterize the views initially in a general way, I make the following observations: Paton's view is that the project is one which is designed to give an overall metaphysic of experience ([5]vol.I 72). Dryer's view is that Kant's fundamental goal is to show "how metaphysical principles can be verified" ([1] 16). The arguments of the commentators are much more easily understood when their interpretive attitudes are kept in mind.

We shall begin our examination of the commentaries with H. J. Paton's work. His commentary, which we met with briefly in the previous chapter, is entitled Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, and the title describes his project. Paton's treatment of the schematism is quite extensive – about 70 pages – and very thorough. His approach seems to be one on the order of common sense, in the good British tradition, and he stays away from the messier ontological issues that tend to hover about concepts like 'schemata'. That is, he stays clear of the ontological issues until he comes to postulate the existence of an entirely different set of categories. He avoids attributing qualities to the transcendental schema itself, and instead saves such attribution for what he
calls the 'schematized categories', which we will become familiar with presently. Early on, he keeps things simple, and advances what we might call the 'necessary succession' view of the schematism; that is, that since the manifold, to be understood, must be combined in terms of ground and consequent, and since we do not apprehend such combination by sense alone, we must come across something which corresponds to ground and consequent in our experience if we see that all objects must be combined, in virtue of their succession, in one time. "Necessary succession is supposed to be the characteristic, or way of combination, which must be found in all objects so far as their qualities change in one objective time". This "characteristic of succession" is called the transcendental schema ([5]vol.II 18).

The schematic succession belongs, not as given in sensation, but as combined by the transcendental synthesis of imagination in one time ([5]vol.II 19-20). The synthesis of imagination, in producing the schema, aims only at unity in the determination of sensibility, and in that interest produces a schema which unifies all objects in one time, thereby conditioning them for subsumption under the categories. The thing I like about this interpretation is that it recognizes the great importance of the unity given in time for the project of the
schematism. We shall see later that this quite important insight fails to recognize some further aspects of the theory.

Paton does not seem to be overly concerned with the problem of the absence of space from the schematism, at least as a singular issue, for he devotes little discussion to it; but he does remark that it should have been included. "...if time — and I would add space — is to be known as a unity, certain ways of combination must be found in objects the manifold of which is combined in one time (and space)" ([5]vol.II 30-33). And in a later footnote he writes: "I think it is necessary, in the light of the 'principles', to bring in space as well as time for the understanding of Kant's view" ([5]vol.II 43, ff.2). Paton's greatest interest, instead, seems to be focused primarily on morphological (if not eidetic) changes in the categories after the introduction of the notion of schematism. Paton, that is to say, thinks that the categories referred to by Kant throughout most of this *Critique* are not the pure ones. However, he does not think that what Kant calls the categories are really the schemata themselves. Rather, he believes that Kant's references in the table of the categories and beyond are, properly speaking, to 'schematized categories':
The pure category as applied and restricted to its corresponding schema becomes the schematised category; for example the pure category of ground and consequent as applied and restricted to the transcendental schema of necessary succession becomes the schematised category of cause and effect...it is all - important that at the outset we should distinguish both the pure category and the schematised category from the transcendental schema. ([5] vol. II 41)

In order not to dwell extensively here upon criticism of this view, to which I shall return in a later section of this chapter, I remark here only that the pure categories are all the categories there - Kant makes no reference to 'schematized categories' - and that the schematism itself does not do anything to the pure categories.

The other commentator who worries about the function of the schema in determinative judgment is D. P. Dryer. The overall aim of Dryer's commentary is to establish that Kant's critical philosophy is an attempt to provide for a method of verification for metaphysical principles ([1] 17 and on). The pursuit of this end shows itself in his arguments for the autonomy of temporal schemata, and, interestingly, Dryer is the only commentator I have seen who holds the view that space should not in fact have been included in the "schematism" chapter ([1] 253). His conviction follows from his views about time, the linch -
pin of which being that time is necessary in order for us to discover whether the manner in which we are conscious of it affords a means for verifying categorial principles ([1] 227). Time is held to be a necessary condition of observation ([1] 228-229), and this conception is used to mount an argument against a view like Paton's 'schematism - as - necessary - succession' in the following way. Paton thinks that Kant's motivation for using time as the schematism is founded on the fact that time is a necessary condition of succession. Dryer points out that showing that time is necessary for succession does not show that it is not an empirical concept. Instead, on Dryer's view, time must be the condition for observation at all, for it is observation that makes empirical concepts possible ([1] 228-229). Time conditions observation because it is only through time that we can be made aware of our states of consciousness; the succession of states allows for both consistency and change in experience. Dryer's concern is, true to his verification project in general, with judgments which admit of verification, and verification must be carried out in temporally conditioned experience.

...we cannot verify judgments empirically without being aware of what presents itself in observation. We therefore cannot obtain knowledge by means of the categories without being conscious of how what presents itself in observations presents itself in
time. Consciousness of temporal determinations of objects that are observed is thus a necessary condition of obtaining knowledge of things by the categories. ([1] 253)

This passage points out not only that Dryer places a great deal of confidence in the role of time for observation, but that he thinks that it does provide the link between sensibility and the understanding. His reading of Kant as greatly committed to time is strong enough to give him both freedom to dispense with any notion of the insertion of space into the schematism, and to advance a fortiori the claim that time is all that is required.

Kant also argues that temporal determinations are sufficient criteria for the categories. ... We cannot observe anything about us without observing it in space. Yet spatial determinations are not to be found of whatever is observable. However, temporal determinations must be capable of being found in whatever is observable. It is for this reason that temporal determinations alone can serve as criteria for application of the categories. ([1] 253)

It seems to me quite right to leave space out of the conception of the schematism, yet I think that Dryer's motives for such a move are tainted by his concern for observation, and that his arguments are incomplete. I shall say more about this in a moment. Suffice it to say for now that Dryer is onto an important feature of what I
take to be Kant's main point about the autonomy of temporal schemata, but he loses that thread in his pursuit of verification.

It is at this point that we can take what we have learned from the commentators and combine it with what Kant himself teaches, in order to produce a reasonable account of the work that the imaginative schematism is supposed to do. Grounded in an understanding of that sort, we should be better able to see what is at stake in the space controversy.

Kant's initial worry, and his reason for having written the "schematism" chapter, lies in his view that the application of the categories to objects of intuition meets with a difficulty – the pure forms of the understanding and the objects of sense are inhomogeneous with one another ([3]B 176-177). This difficulty cannot go unresolved, for the whole theory of knowledge-based experience rests upon the subsumption of intuitions under the categories in determinative judgment ([3]B 178).

It is the function of the schematism to be a liason to the heterogeneous components of constituted experience. Kant gives the job of schematizing to time, which is at once both a pure form of intuition, and the form of inner sense. From Paton we get the 'necessary succession' view
of the schematism, which tells us that the transcendental schemata are 'universal characteristics' which must belong to all objects as objects in one time ([5]vol.II 19). He seems to be mostly concerned with the way the temporal schematism conditions objects for the understanding. Dryer takes Paton's view further, and argues that time is not so much useful for putting objects into temporal succession as it is for making observations of these objects possible. This it does by allowing succession of states of consciousness, which in turn allows us to be aware of consistency and change. Without time we can have a stream of consciousness, but we cannot be aware of it. Dryer, therefore, seems interested more in the need for temporal schemata relative to the transcendental unity of apperception.

Paton, with his interest in the temporalization of objects, is quite interested in pointing out that the schematism is a function of the synthesis of imagination. He reports that "...the synthesis of imagination, in producing the schema, aims only at unity in the determination of sensibility" ([5]vol.II 33). This unity of sensibility which the schematism produces in appearances makes individual intuitions able to match up with the unity already found in the transcendental unity of apperception, and this 'schematized compatibility', as it were, clears up
the heterogeneity. But Paton is concerned that this compatibility is manifested in principles of synthesis; that the subsumption of all sensible objects under the pure categories must take the form of judgments ([5]vol.II 40). To deal with this problem, he introduces the 'schematized categories'. Since I have already described this notion, I will not lay it out here, but will proceed instead with an examination of the idea in relationship to Kant's own view.

Kant, first of all, never mentions the term 'schematized category'. Paton himself admits this ([5]vol.II 41), yet he attributes them to Kant in virtue of what he takes to be Kant's conception of the work to be accomplished by the categories. This view seems to me quite mistaken. Of course Kant holds that the categories cannot come together with the intuitions in the absence of schemata, but he does not ever insinuate that the schemata in some way attach to the categories. The categories are not transformed by the schemata, they are only brought into relation with sensible objects in virtue of them. Judgments do the work of bringing objects of intuition under the categories, but cannot themselves be 'schematized categories' either. The schemata only make it possible, by grounding consciousness and objects in a temporal unity, for judgments to do their work. 'To-be-schematized', at least in the case of determinative judgments, means only
'to-be-capable-of-a-subsumption-relation'; this makes no morphological change in the category whatever. Kant himself points out that the pure concepts of the understanding have a meaning independent of that of the schemata ([3]B 186-187).

More importantly, if we take Paton at his word, we find the beginnings of a regress. If the schemata cannot mediate directly between the pure forms of understanding and sensibility without the further mediation of a 'schematized category', it becomes difficult to see what connection the 'schematized category' in its production of empirical concepts, has with the radically nonempirical pure category. Indeed, Kant points out that the pure categories are so devoid of empirical content as to be indefinable ([3]A 245). If we allow Paton to schematize the categories, we must be led to wonder what is to mediate between the pure category and the 'schematized category'. If schemata as they occur independently of the categories cannot communicate with the categories, it is hard to see that schemata which actually become part of the categories can make any more sense of the relation. Paton's interpretation takes no strides toward the resolution of the difficulty. It seems to me that Paton's emphasis on the side of the object has led him to try to work the categories themselves into less 'speculative' entities.
I cannot, for these reasons, concur with Paton's belief in 'schematized categories'; they can serve only to push the heterogeneity problem back a step. One might object to my view by pointing out that, if as Paton says, the categories Kant does in fact talk about are truly the schematized ones ([5] vol. II 41, ff.1), we should believe that Kant too was serious about them. This does not seem a problem to me. Kant maintains that the pure categories are indefinable ([3] A 245), which makes them very difficult to talk about. His talk of the categories is designed to make them visible as the side of experience contributed by the understanding ([3] e.g., B 150), and, for the sake of clarity, they must not be too abstract. It is only reasonable, therefore, that Kant should talk about the categories as they would appear when they are in the process of making experience; and they always have something under them during that process. This way of talking in no way implies a conflation of category with schema, and any such conflation ought to be strenuously avoided.

Dryer's approach is different. He does not attempt to schematize the categories, because his orientation toward the schematism is not weighted to the object side. Since he is not looking for the succession of objects as Paton does, he is not obliged to 'stabilize' the categories by
sticking schemata onto them. Instead, he wants a schematism which allows a temporal succession of states of consciousness; by which alone observation is made possible. But Dryer is unclear about the other part of what is necessary for the succession of conscious states. In order for there to be consciousness of succession, there must be not only time but also some body of consciousness which is reflexive. Dryer stops short of any admission of this, and I think that this makes his account incomplete. I shall therefore take up his thread from here.

In order to look seriously at the notion of unified consciousness, we must return to the transcendental unity of apperception. I quote from Kant:

We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all, representations. For they can represent something only insofar as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. This principle holds a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and consequently also in intuition. Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.

([3]A 116)

The transcendental unity of apperception organizes the
representations which make up our experience, and acts as a unity which provides for reflexive self-consciousness. As we saw in the previous chapter, the transcendental unity displaces the need for a reproductive synthesis of imagination for unity, and avoids the problem of empirical necessity.

The question remaining now is that of what the schematism as such is supposed to do. Paton points out that it can be thought of as a relation of subsumption, and that it is important for the experience of objects in time. Dryer has shown that it is equally important for the organization of consciousness into the successive states which make observational experience work. My claim is that it provides a structural determination for otherwise unstructured particulars of sensible experience, in order for such particulars to be made available to the understanding. To say more fully why I think this, I return to the things which remain from my long-winded criticism of the commentators.

The heterogeneity between the pure categories and sensible intuition exists in the fact that, as they are by themselves, the constituents of knowledge share nothing. Yet we see upon examination that they are, and for experiences'sake must be, temporally determinable, and also that they are not both spatially determinable. Time,
therefore, is the only thing that the categories and sensible intuitions can possibly have in common, so it is time alone, as regards the forms of intuition, which must provide the schematism. Perhaps most significantly, as regards space, Kant points out that the schemata are products of the synthesis of imagination, yet are not images ([3]B 179-180).

The schema is in itself always a product of imagination. Since, however, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the image. If five points be set alongside one another, thus,......, I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself. For with such a number as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept. Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. ([3]B 179-180)

Here Kant says that the schemata are always of the imagination. This, of course, is just what I like to hear, but in order to avoid extracting an unfair amount of mileage from this casual mention, I will make a few arguments as to why the productive imagination is the one
involved, and why this is important for the question of space in the 'schematism'.

Kant claims, as we have seen, that the schemata are produced by the imagination. This is important. We recall from the previous chapter that the imagination has two roles in regard to sensibility. The simplest role is that of the reproductive imagination, which has the task of reproducing representations which are no longer present. That is, the reproductive imagination produces images of non-present (or present but selectively ignored, as in "already counted") objects. The other task of imagination in relation to sensibility is the non-conceptual determination of intuitions. This is the task of the schematism.

As Kant says, in the case of the schematism, "imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility." ([3] B 179)
This is a determination which is accomplished prior to the determination by concepts, because, as we recall from the very motivation for the "schematism" chapter, concepts cannot come into contact with unconditioned intuitions, and so cannot determine such intuitions. The process of schematism, is an imaginative conditioning of intuitions prior to their exposure to concepts.
But why does this conditioning need to be accomplished by the productive imagination rather than the reproductive imagination? The simplest reason is that Kant says so. In the passage quoted above, he says that "the synthesis of the imagination aims at no special intuition", that is, at no particular intuition. But anything brought to consciousness by the reproductive imagination must be a particular intuition. That is not to say that the reproductive imagination is doomed to copy only those things that have already been perceived once in intuition. That would certainly not be true. We can imagine a unicorn, for example. But if this unicorn is a fruit of the reproductive imagination, it must be an image, so it must therefore be particular. It is important to note here, parenthetically, that the "Berkeley's cow" problem, as we might call it, that is occasioned by this description of reproduction, is not injurious to Kant's more general theory of imagination. It is conceivable that we could have an idea of a unicorn that is not an image of one. Though certainly the existence of such an idea would be attributable to the imagination, this idea would always be the result of a determination by productive imagination. If it were some sort of didactic idea, it would be determined by productive imagination before it was assigned a concept by an act of determinative judgment. If,
alternatively, the idea were an aesthetic idea, it would be
determined by productive imagination before the faculties
of imagination and understanding could be brought into
harmony for a judgment. In neither case would the
imaginative construct be an image. We will look in a
moment at Kant's peculiar use of 'image' for a concept;
which, I will argue, must be kept separate from any other
conception of 'image'.

That the schemata cannot be particularized images Kant
illustrates with the example of the thousand dots. As we
saw, he says that a thousand dots in an image could never
be compared with their concept. This is true of any number
I 'think in general', even if it is only five. ([3]B 179).
What we are to understand by this is that images are not
the means by which intuitions are schematized, but that
images must be distinguished from the schemata. ([3] 179)
This is true for two reasons. First, as we just saw, not
only intuitions, but also images, have to be determined
before they can be 'shown' to the understanding. This
makes the point that reproductive imagination cannot be the
schematism an academic point. Second, and importantly for
the purpose of this chapter, the rejection of images puts
Paton's suggested inclusion of space into schemata into a
very difficult position. What, after all, would the
spatio- temporal idea of a thousand be? It would be a
thousand *something*. That is, if spatial relations were admitted to the schematism, the imaginative constructs would turn out to be images. But if space is rejected, and time alone is retained, we come up with a 'modified image' of sorts, which squares with Kant's claims without employing the particularity of images turned out by the reproductive imagination. At B 180, Kant calls the schema a "representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept". This *image for a concept*, I suggest, is the idea of an image conditioned by inner sense, and stripped of any spatial relations.

To conclude this chapter, we should look at what it means for imagination to determine something non-conceptually. A quick look back to the B "deduction" reminds us of the following:

Inner sense...contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and therefore so far contains no *determinate* intuition, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of imagination. ([3]B 154, emphasis Kant's).

Here we see determination of intuition by imagination based on the form of inner sense, which is time. Notice that this determination is accomplished without the governance of concepts (although Kant does call this a "synthetic
influence of understanding on inner sense" ([3]B 154).
This kind of determination is exactly what is required for
intuitions to be made compatible with the concepts, or to
be schematized for them.

Now a transcendental determination of time is so
far homogeneous with the category, which
constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and
rests upon an a priori rule. But, on the other
hand, it is so far homogeneous with appearance, in
that time is contained in every empirical
representation of the manifold. Thus an
application of the category to appearances becomes
possible by means of the transcendental
determination of time, which, as the schema of the
concepts of the understanding, mediates the
subsumption of the appearances under the category.
([3]B 177-178)

From what we see here and what we know, we can tell that
Kant makes two important claims with respect to
determinative judgment. First, he points out that the pure
concepts are determined by time according to an a priori
rule which makes such determination necessary. Second, he
makes it absolutely clear that the occupation of the
schematism is to provide for the determination of
sensibility in accordance with time through the agency of
productive imagination and prior to concepts, so that the
relation of subsumption can take place. Productive
imagination has to provide its schematizing function for
each new intuition to be judged, because there can be no a
priori rule governing the structure of particular empirical
intuitions, which would prepare them for audience with the
categories. The impossibility of an a priori rule for
empirical intuitions will come up again in the next
chapter. The important thing to recognize here, however,
is that the particulars of sensibility have to be
determined by the schematism as a function of the
productive imagination prior to any commerce with concepts.

From here, I see absolutely no reason to suppose that
space ought to have been added to the "schematism" chapter.
Its inclusion would only doom the schemata to the
production of images, which would pave the way for the
presence of the reproductive imagination where it clearly
does not belong. The intricate and delicate theory of
schematism that Kant has developed seems quite satisfactory
on its own.
CHAPTER FOUR
IMAGINATION AND FINALITY IN AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

What has transpired in the previous chapters has largely been designed to establish an important point: There is a fundamental distinction between the productive and reproductive employments of the imagination in Kant's theory. Reproductive imagination is an empirical faculty which displays non-present objects of experience to the understanding. Its commerce is in images (which may be visual, tactile, auditory, etc.), and it is therefore conditioned by space as well as time. Productive imagination is, on the other hand, a pure faculty which determines sensibility and provides it consanguinity with understanding. The determination of sensibility makes possible the determinative judgment, in which sensible intuitions are brought under the jurisdiction of the categories; productive imagination in this case functions as the schematism. Determination by the productive imagination is an act of inner sense rather than an object (image), so it is not governed by space, but only by time. Hence, the productive imagination is the 'transcendental' manifestation of the faculty, while the reproductive
imagination is the empirical manifestation.

It will take some work to uncover the activity of the imagination in the Critique of Judgment. A fairly detailed explication of the general structure of Kant's theory will be required, so I encourage the reader to remember that the purpose of this chapter is to examine the theory of imagination, even in the long stretches during which the imagination is not mentioned. As we look more closely at the third Critique, we will see additional evidence for the importance of the productive imagination, and therefore in the importance of maintaining the distinction between reproductive and productive employments. Equally important, the third Critique will introduce another function of judging in virtue of which the productive imagination is active, and which will become the central focus of the Kantian aesthetic project. The new kind of judgment is entitled 'reflective' judgment. It differs significantly from determinative judgment on the basis of an important functional principle. As determinative judgments establish objectivity in knowledge by structuring experience according to concepts, reflective judgments provide the possibility of subjective judgments (not simply subjectively formed ideas), which can utilize concepts without being governed by them, and which are universalizable. Such judgments can be universalized, not
because they are governed by concepts, but because they turn on the relationship that obtains between understanding and imagination in all humans. The universalizability component of reflective judgment allows the possibility of a 'respectable' subjectivity, as it were, and therefore becomes the foundation of the theory of aesthetic judgment.

In this chapter I will attempt the very difficult task of applying the concept of imagination developed in the first two chapters of this thesis to Kant's most important work on imagination and its relationship to judgment. Consistent with what has gone before, my main occupation will be to establish the superiority of the productive employment of the imagination relative to the reproductive imagination, in regard to purity of origin and order of influence. The Critique of Judgment is probably the most difficult of Kant's Critiques to understand, but it may well be the most interesting with regard to the final determination of the important theories of imagination and judgment. I should point out that the study of Kant's Critique of Judgment which appears in these pages is of necessity confined to the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", which constitutes the first half of the third Critique. The second half of the third Critique considers the problem of teleology, which is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

Much of what Kant has to say in the "Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment" revolves around the central issue of "finality". Finality is divided into finality of nature on the one hand, and finality of form on the other. The idea of finality will be very useful throughout this chapter, because it will be the vehicle through which the two employments of the imagination are best seen. As we will see at the conclusion of this chapter, the productive imagination, as it affects the finality of form, is responsible for the project of aesthetic judgment itself, while the reproductive imagination leads the concept of finality to a dead end. There are, to be sure, many trouble spots in Kant's text where the explanations are incomplete, and at least as many more where impenetrable analogies are used in the attempt to provide explanations. But, thankfully, Kant's commitment to architectonic provides a reliable guide toward the heart of the views, so I will often rely on structure to get through the rough spots. The discussion in these pages will begin with the theory of reflective judgment, which is the central pole of the entire third Critique.

Kant begins the introduction to the Critique of Judgment with the claim that this work will establish the foundation for interaction between the realms of nature and freedom, which have, up to now, been radically separated by the conditions of our knowledge.
Albeit, then, between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that it is not possible to pass from the former to the latter (by means of the theoretical employment of reason), just as if they were so many separate worlds, the first of which is powerless to exercise influence on the second; still the latter is meant to influence the former—that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other. ([3] 175-176)

I am inclined, following Paul Guyer [2], to suppress emphasis on Kant's attempts to reconcile the realms of nature and freedom through the use of the concept of judgment. The attempts at reconciliation raise problems of teleology, ontology, and, as we will see, "finality of nature", which do not really affect the structure of the theory of reflective judgment as it pertains to the productive imagination. Kant's attempt to reconcile the disparate realms of nature and freedom can therefore be
considered separately from his theories of reflective judgment and productive imagination, so I intend to consider the latter theories while leaving aside the problem of communication between the realms, which is less relevant to my general project. Nonetheless, it is important to be clear about the fact that Kant himself was very interested in the possibility of getting judgment to connect the realms of nature and of freedom, so many of his structural claims are motivated toward that end.

Kant is careful to distinguish reflective judgment from determinative judgment. As we saw in detail in the chapter on the schematism, determinative judgment consists of the subsumption of sensible particulars under the concepts of the understanding. Reflective judgment, on the other hand, does not utilize concepts to determine its relation to sensible particulars. Its only real commerce is with the particulars of sensibility, and its occupation is the search for concepts appropriate to these particulars, rather than the subsumption of particulars under concepts. Kant describes the two types of judgment in the following way:

Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle or law) is
given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. This is so even where such a judgment is transcendental and, as such, provides the conditions a priori in conformity with which alone subsumption under that universal can be effected. If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgment is simply reflective. ([3] 179)

The judgments made by reflection are not grounded a priori in concepts. This type of judgment is placed in a somewhat different position compared to determinative judgment, because reflection is not capable of establishing objectively valid knowledge in the Kantian architecture. Only the determinative form of judgment can produce objectivity in knowledge. Kant's Copernican epistemology is based on the idea that experience is made possible not by the sensible qualities of objects, but by the organization of sensibility according to concepts. Nonetheless, while the determinative judgments guaranteed by the transcendental constitution of knowledge are exactly what we need for the organization of experience in general, they are not sufficient to determine all the features of particular experiences. In fact, there is no faculty that can provide widespread determination of the contingent realm of empirical experience. Yet Kant does leave a gate open to the empirical world as it concerns day-to-day life, and this gate is kept by reflective judgment.
While reflection cannot offer any of the epistemic assurances guaranteed by determinative judgment, it is capable of a unique form of regulative description that provides for intelligibility in the details of 'empirical' life and in inquiry. This is embodied in a system of empirical laws that can, with the support of a principle and with some important limitations, arrange the particulars of experience into a system. But reflection alone does not have the capability to establish these empirical laws - reflective judgment requires a principle. The need for a principle is an important fact to recognize in the distinction between determinant and reflective judgment, and it is based on their respective relationships to concepts. Determinative judgment is established by the rules of objective knowledge, which arise from the structure of transcendental idealism. Knowledge is possible because the pure concepts of the understanding can be brought to bear on particular intuitions, so the rules for knowledge are authenticated on transcendental grounds. The structure of determinative judgment is therefore established a priori according to concepts, and requires no further principle for its activity.

Reflective judgment, on the other hand, is not a faculty which subsumes sensible particulars under universal concepts, but instead has only some given particular upon
which to act. Its responsibility is to locate a concept for any particular with which it is charged; but once it finds a concept, subsumption occurs and determination takes over. Consequently, reflective judgment cannot be involved with concepts and continue to be reflective judgment, and so cannot, therefore, be a ground of objectively valid knowledge. By the same token, however, reflective judgment, whose structure requires it to search for a concept for whatever object it encounters, cannot simply cast about blindly for its appropriate concept. The objects of empirical experience are so myriad, and the pure concepts of the understanding so limited in their application, that reflection requires some kind of principle for the guidance of its search.

But there are such manifold forms of nature, so many modifications, as it were, of the universal transcendental concepts of nature, left undetermined by the laws furnished by pure understanding a priori as above mentioned [in the discussion of determinative judgment], and for the reason that these laws only touch the general possibility of a nature (as an object of sense), that there must needs also be laws in this behalf. These laws, being empirical, may be contingent as far as the light of our understanding goes, but still, if they are to be called laws (as the concept of a nature requires), they must be regarded as necessary on a principle, unknown though it be to us, of the unity of the manifold. -The reflective judgment which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal stands, therefore, in need of a principle. ([3] 179-180)
A principle is a useful device for this type of judgment because it allows the attachment of a kind of quasi-universal to a faculty that is not otherwise capable of being guided by 'conventional' universals. A 'conventional' universal means a conceptual universal, as opposed to a 'regulative' universal. A regulative universal, such as the principle of reflective judgment, is some rule that allows us to assume that a particular field of experience satisfies the qualifications for objective knowledge when the actual knowledge of that field is outside the boundaries of our epistemic capabilities. Their purpose is to regulate our thought and action when the grounds for knowledge cannot be employed ([6] 268). Such rules should never be considered necessary.

The reflective act can function with subjective intentionality by some process such as free association, but it can, at the same time, utilize the regulative features of the principle to justify a universalizable reflection, without being forced into determination and hence objectivity. Through the use of a free process of reflection coupled to a regulative principle, reflective judgment retains both subjectivity and universality, and so becomes an independent faculty which is capable of orchestrating judgments of value without relying on any
unjustified objectification.

The principle of reflective judgment is in itself a complex idea with a simple purpose, which guides the process of reflection by allowing it to suppose that its domain is systematic.

Now the principle sought can only be this: as universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (though only according to the universal concept of it as nature), particular empirical laws must be regarded, in respect of that which is left undetermined in them by these universal laws, according to a unity such as they would have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws. This is not to be taken as implying that such an understanding must actually be assumed (for it is only the reflective judgment which avails itself of this idea as a principle for the purpose of reflection and not for determining anything); but this faculty rather gives by this means a law to itself alone and not to nature. ([3] 180)

Kant justifies the ability of this particular principle to provide support for the reflective process with the claim that we must attribute the systematic occurrence of empirical events to the agency of some mind. This for Kant, could be the only justification for any empirical regularity, because it is understanding alone which makes knowledge possible; and though knowledge of empirical regularity is not possible for us, we have to be able to
think of it as being possible for some other mind, because then the conditions for knowledge would have to be present, even though not for us. That is to say, knowledge has its origin in concepts, and 'regularity' is a conceptually governed function of knowledge, so any attribution of regularity to anything presupposes the conditions for knowledge.

It is tremendously important to recognize here that Kant is careful not to allow the principle to be attributed to nature itself, but only to reflective judgment ([3] 180). Kant is adamant about the fact that the principle of reflective judgment is one prescribed to reflective judgment alone, by reflective judgment. The principle does not make any claims as to the behavior of natural objects themselves; it is a regulative principle.

The principle supposition of a knowledge-based justification for empirical consistency is for Kant a favorable turn toward the reconciliation between freedom and nature that he hopes to accomplish in this Critique, even given the fact that the principle is regulative only. As he pursues his interest in inter-realm dialogue more closely in the development of his theory of reflective judgment, he begins to describe the very important concept of finality, which will be the fulcrum for many of his claims. We first meet up with the idea of finality shortly
after Kant affirms his commitment to the regulative nature of the principle of reflective judgment.

The idea of finality is an offshoot of the principle of reflective judgment. Kant's initial and somewhat compact description introduces finality in its relationship to ends, but on the heels of that description comes an explanation of the finality of nature, which is a functional conceptualization of reflection's principle.

Now the concept of an object, so far as it contains at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, is called its end, and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to ends, is called the finality of its form. Accordingly the principle of judgment, in respect of the form of the things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of nature in its multiplicity. In other words, by this the concept of nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of unity of the manifold of its empirical laws.

The finality of nature is, therefore, a particular a priori concept, which has its origin solely in the reflective judgment. ([3] 181)

In this explanation, Kant points out that something's finality is not the same as its end, but that finality is the 'agreement' of something with a world that can be conceived as being constituted of ends. Unfortunately, he does not give us a very clear picture of what 'end' are. He says that something's concept is its end, as long as the concept contains the ground of the thing's actuality.
This cannot be literally true. If we take the concepts in question to be the pure concepts of the understanding, objects would have ends like 'Modality', 'Quality', and 'Relation'. Such ends would cause the following problems: 1) all objects or relations of objects that we could know according to concepts would have the same ends, so there would be nothing to differentiate them (e.g., all objects that bore causal relations to other objects would have 'Relation' as their end), and 2) something's having such an end would fail to tell us anything.

The idea of ends becomes a little more useful, however, when we look at what is necessary in addition to concepts for ends to be possible. The end must not only be conceptual, it must also be the ground of something's actuality. That is to say, the end is not the concept itself, but is instead the fact that something is grounded in a concept. This solves problems one and two above in the following way: 1) only objects and relationships that have the ground of their actuality in concepts - (e.g., a relationship grounded in the pure concept 'Relation' rather than according to the empirical law 'thermodynamics') - could be said to have ends, and 2) something's having an end would tell us a great deal about what we can know about that object. The products of synthetic a priori (necessarily determinative) judgments can be said to have
ends because they are grounded in concepts of the understanding. Natural objects cannot, however, be said to have ends, because they do not have their grounds fully in concepts — our knowledge of these objects and their relations is phenomenal only. We can say that any causal situation has an end in the fact that it is grounded in relation, but we cannot say that something has an end in entropy because it is grounded in the second law of thermodynamics.

We can, however, say that natural objects have finality, because they can be conceived as being agreeable with things that have ends. Kant says that "we cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a reference of nature in them to ends, but we can only make use of this concept (finality) to reflect upon them in respect of the nexus of phenomena in nature" ([3] 181, brackets mine). Finality, hence, is the concept which ties the principle of reflective judgment to a functional conceptualization of nature. Finality of nature is held by Kant to be necessary for the use of understanding in the world; upon it is based the principled development of a system of contingent, empirical laws. Furthermore, the understanding must regard such empirical laws as necessary, "for otherwise they would not form an order of nature" ([3] 185), even though it recognizes them as being in point of fact contingent.
Here we may recognize the similarity of Kant's 'transcendentalization' of finality of nature to a similar move in the A Deduction with regard to the necessity of the reproductive imagination. This similarity and the problems it raises will come up again later in this chapter. Additionally, we will see that Kant's characterization of the finality of nature as "a particular a priori concept" leads to a powerful architectonic objection which calls its position with regard to reflective judgment into question.

As Kant's conception of finality develops, we see a return in his attention to the 'finality of form; which he has mentioned above, but not yet described. Kant intends the finality of form to serve as the linch pin of the theory of aesthetic judgment, and its employment is somewhat different than that of the finality of nature. When he ventures onto the rocky terrain of real explanations for his conceptions, Kant speaks of finality as being established in one of two ways: subjectively or objectively.

There are two ways in which finality may be represented in an object given in experience. It may be made to turn on what is purely subjective. In this case the object is considered in respect of its form as present in apprehension prior to any concept; and the harmony of this form with the cognitive faculties, promoting the combination of
the intuition with concepts for cognition
generally, is represented as a finality of the
object. Or, on the other hand, the representation
of finality may be made to turn on what is
objective, in which case it is represented as the
harmony of the form of the object with the
possibility of the thing itself according to an
antecedent concept of it containing the ground of
this form. We have seen that the representation of
the former kind of finality rests on the pleasure
immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of
the object. But that of the latter kind of
finality, as it refers the form of the object, not
to the subjects cognitive faculties engaged in its
apprehension, but to a definite cognition of the
object under a given concept, has nothing to do
with a feeling of pleasure in things, but only in
understanding and its estimate of them. ([3] 192)

Here Kant tells us that finality of form is conceived only
as the harmony of the form of an object with our cognitive
faculties. It is something which takes place between the
form of the object and the mind, so it cannot give us any
objective knowledge of the world. Hence, Kant calls
finality of form the subjective side of finality.

Kant is careful to distinguish the objective side of
finality from the subjective side. Objective finality is
produced by the existence of a harmony between the form of
the object and what Kant calls "the possibility of the
thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it
containing the ground of this form" ([3] 192). Though not
the most limpid of descriptions, the business about an
antecedent concept grounding something's form is heavily
indebted to Kant's concept of an end, which we saw above.
An end is, we recall, the concept of an object which grounds the actuality of the object ([3] 180), and finality is attached to the end on the basis of an agreement with the way things are organized according to ends. Objective finality, therefore, seems to arise as a harmony of the form of an object with an end. What this means, ultimately, will take a bit of work to establish, and I am not yet ready to present this. Nonetheless, for purposes of clarity I will advance what is at this point a mere conjecture: Though Kant does not state it explicitly here, objective finality is the finality of nature he has been talking about in an abstract and generalized fashion, and its function is to serve as a prelude to his teleology. Therefore, as we can think of finality of form as the subjective side of finality, we can think of finality of nature as the objective side.

Imagination appears with the two types of finality according to the kind of harmony each one requires. Subjective finality involves imagination in the production of harmony between the form of the object and the mind. In this case, imagination adopts the form of the object, leaving aside any of the object's sensible qualities, and becomes what Kant calls the "faculty of intuitions a priori ", which goes on to harmonize with the understanding. The subjective component of finality then becomes a harmony
between the faculties themselves instead of a harmony between a sensible intuition and the concept of an end. Imagination converts the form from a feature of an intuition to a product of the imagination. The objective type of finality, on the other hand, uses imagination to "realize a preconceived concept of an object which we set before ourselves as an end" ([3],193). This we would do in the case of art, where an empirical situation, or some impression of one, is displayed in order to reveal a certain concept. That is, by the reproduction or permutation of empirical images, we can set forth some end, and therefore express the concept that grounds the represented object as its end.

From this lengthy explication of Kant's views I now turn to the discussion of the well-known commentator on the third Critique, Paul Guyer. Guyer's view is extensive and well-developed, so any treatment of it here must necessarily be only partial. Nonetheless, the portions I will discuss are relevant to absolutely central areas of the Kantian project, and their commentary provides important insight into some of the problems.

Guyer's Kant and the Claims of Taste is occupied mostly with the problems involved in Kant's principle of reflective judgment, and the interaction of this principle
with other components of the theory. Guyer characterizes Kant's principle as the "principle of systematicity", which, as we have seen, allows Kant to account for the law-like status of empirical regularities. Empirical laws are generated by a principled assumption that the objects governed by such laws function as though they had been designed to do so by an understanding.

But Guyer also points out - quite rightly - that Kant holds to more than one sense of reflective judgment, and that the application of the principle to these separate senses is not at all the same. Reflective judgment can be of either of the following types: 1) the type in which a given representation is compared and combined with other representations, and 2) the type in which a given representation is compared and combined with the cognitive powers. The first type is governed by what Guyer reports to be Kant's a priori principle of judgment, that is, the principle of systematicity, which is simply the idea that nature has to be systematic in order to be comprehensible. The second type of judgment, which compares and combines representations for the cognitive powers, is the one that makes aesthetic judgment possible (we will get to the structure of aesthetic judgment in due course). There is, in addition, a stronger argument for the differentiation of the two types of judgment in Kant's theory. This lies in
the fundamental variance in structure between objective and subjective finality.

Objective finality, we remember, is based on the harmony of an object with an end. This is the function that guides what Guyer calls comparison and combination of representations with other representations, which are all subject to the principle of systematicity. Subjective finality, on the other hand, is based on the harmony of the form of the object with the cognitive faculties. This, to Guyer, is the combination of a representation with the cognitive powers, and it seems to lack any structural consanguinity with the systematicity principle. In fact, he makes the very important observation that Kant does not specify a principle for this latter type of reflective judgment ([3],58). I will have more to say about the importance of the absence of systematicity from aesthetic judgment when we reach the aesthetics portion of this chapter. For now, though, the reason Guyer ignores the relationship of objective and subjective finality to the two types of reflective judgment, is worth looking into.

Guyer's explanation of the appearance of finality is the following:

Then Kant introduces the special concept of the "finality of nature"; explicitly, it refers only to the fact that even in its multiplicity nature is
subsumable under a system of empirical laws, but it seems to be introduced because of the explanatory significance of the concept of finality. For Kant's claim is that through the concept of the finality of nature "nature is represented as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of empirical laws". To say that nature is final is apparently to refer to the ground of its systematicity. ([2],55)

Here he is already hinting at the idea that the concept of finality is weak in term of explanatory significance. It fails to add anything to the principle of systematicity, and even clouds the issue. Finality, apparently, is supposed to provide a rationale for the principle, but the success with which it accomplishes this is tenuous at best. Guyer says that "Kant's argument supposes that systematicity can be understood only if explained by reference to an agent, and yet denies that we are really entitled to believe that any such agent exists". ([2],56)

The lack of explanatory significance leads Guyer to abandon the concept of finality altogether, because it adds nothing to Kant's theory, and its loss detracts nothing.

No further and more specific form, appearance, quality, or history of an object is invoked by calling it final, no criterion of systematicity established other than the indeterminate maxims of natural science already stated. Any property on the basis of which an object may be subsumed under a system of empirical laws, or in virtue of which it fulfills another objective of reflective judgment, entitles it to an ascription of finality. Thus no new property of objects which might be
directly manifested in their individual or collective appearances is provided; the concept of finality cannot found a schematism for reflective judgment.

The concept of finality is thus a purely grammatical addition to Kant's theory of reflective judgment. ([2], 57)

This claim is a strong one, and it demands careful consideration.

I am inclined to hold the view that this drastic ejection of finality from Kant’s theory is overly hasty. There are many more positive reasons to hold onto the idea of finality than Guyer realizes, and there is at least one good negative reason to avoid rejecting it. This good negative reason, ironically, arises out of one of Guyer's more incisive points.

I made a remark above about the importance of Guyer's observation that the principle of systematicity fails to apply to the subjective kind of reflective judgment. This is why it is important: The conception of finality we are given in his objection is a conception of a 'determination' that is intended to ground the systematicity of nature. Unfortunately, this intended ground fails to provide the necessary goods. However, the fact that finality is unable to support a rationale for empirical systematicity in no way shows that it is useless in reflective judgments that do not seek ends. That is to say, the type of reflection
that does not adhere to the principle of systematicity might not find the concept of finality useless. Kant does not speak of finality as though its only function were the justification of systematicity. Rather, he also applies it to a domain of reflective judgment for which, as Guyer himself says, he specifies no principle, where it appears as subjective finality of form. The negative reason for keeping at least some conception of finality, in short, is that it has only been shown to fail in explanatory significance in one employment of reflective judgment.

Guyer's objections do an admirable job of showing up the hollowness of the objective side of finality, but they have absolutely no effect on the subjective side, which is not governed by the principle of systematicity anyway. The objection that finality ought to be driven from the theory of reflective judgment throws the baby out with the bathwater, by abandoning an extremely useful subjective principle on the basis of the uselessness of its objectified counterpart. Although I disagree with his complete ejection of finality from the theory, I do support Guyer's contention that objective finality should be abandoned, for somewhat different reasons. In order to get to those reasons, and to the positive reasons for retaining the subjective employment of finality, we will do well to consider an important subclass of reflective judgment —
aesthetic judgments.

Aesthetic judgment conform structurally to the subjective employment of reflective judgment, rather than the objective employment.

That which is purely subjective in the representation of an object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to the object, is its aesthetic quality. ([3], 188)

This is because aesthetic judgments focus on harmony between the form of the object and the faculties of the mind rather than on the harmony between an object's form and its end. Harmony between the form of the object and the mental faculties produces a pleasure—the trademark of the aesthetic moment—which represents a quality of an object which can never be subjected to logical analysis. For that matter, the pleasure cannot even be affected by any subjective analyses that require reports of sensible qualities.

But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition, is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it; for through it I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may easily be the result of the operation of some cognition or other. Now the finality of a thing, so far as represented
in our perception of it, is in no way a quality of the object itself (for a quality of this kind is not one that can be perceived), although it may be inferred from a cognition of things. ...Hence we only apply the term 'final' to the object on account of its representation being immediately coupled with the feeling of pleasure: and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality. ([3], 189)

The pleasure we experience during the consideration of some object is not the aesthetic judgment itself, but it is a maker that informs us of the object's aesthetic quality. At the moment of aesthetic pleasure, however, we also become capable of establishing that a given representation is "final" for the aesthetic judgment, a conception which provides the key to Kant's theory of subjective harmony of the faculties.

If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of intuition, apart from any reference it may have to to a concept for the purpose of a definite cognition, this does not make the representation referable to the object, but solely to the subject. In such a case the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgment, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely subjective formal finality of the object. For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgment, even when it has no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its faculty of referring intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this comparison, imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a priori) is undesignedly brought into accord with understanding
(as the faculty of concepts), by means of a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for the reflective judgment. A judgment of this kind is an aesthetic judgment upon the finality of the object, which does not depend on any present concept of the object, and does not provide one. ([3], 189-190)

This is not an easy paragraph, but it does contain the heart of Kant's view of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgments are a subclass of reflective judgments of the subjective type. Subjective reflective judgments function by reflecting not from any object toward a concept (end), but from and object toward the mind. This form of reflective judgment needs no principle of systematicity, because it foregoes empirical concepts and hence outer sense altogether, and searches for a harmony between a given object and the faculties of inner sense. In the case of the aesthetic judgment, harmony is easy to recognize because it is marked by a 'disinterested' sort of pleasure. Kant's rationale for this is too complex to go into at this late stage of the discussion, but quickly, the disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure is what distinguishes it from the 'consumptive' pleasure that characterizes desire. On Kant's view, there is a means for separating desire from true aesthetic pleasure, which seems to be a sort of contentedness with the harmony of the faculties. Aesthetic judgment can therefore use pleasure
as the guide for its search, without having to rely on an external principle, and it can also use pleasure to identify objects whose forms are final for reflective judgment.

The idea of finality for the reflective judgment is not very well described by Kant, and this makes any thorough explication of it difficult. Nonetheless, the theory cannot be left idle at this point, because we still require a positive justification for the retention of subjective finality of form.

In his discussions of finality as a general idea and his comparisons of its subjective with objective employments, Kant describes finality as a more or less autonomous quality of that aspect of the object he labels 'form'. When he contrasts the subjective and objective types of finality, he describes the moment of subjective finality as "harmony of this form with the cognitive faculties" ([3], 192). In this case, some individual, the finality of the form, is brought into harmony with the faculties from outside them: "in such a case the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgment".

But when Kant comes right down to the mechanics of the harmony that produced aesthetic pleasure, we find that a
separate, extramental finality of form does not fit into the formula. All of a sudden, in the midst of the thickest portion of the explanation of aesthetic pleasure, Kant switches from talk about finality to talk about the imagination.

For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgment, even when it has no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its faculty referring intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this comparison, imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a priori) is undesignedly brought into accord with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), by means of a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for the reflective judgment. ([3] 190)

The difficulty that arises with the recognition of this shift is essentially one of how to handle the lack of clarity with regard to the function each element of the aesthetic experience is to have. The most direct way to approach this difficulty is to ask whether or not finality in fact gives way to imagination at the critical moment of harmony. The answer to this has to be found in Kant's use of finality and imagination in his development of the theory.

When he describes the subjective reflective process, Kant says that it is the form of the object - which is in no way quality of the object itself, for reasons we will
soon see—that comes into harmony with the faculties. This form is usually associated in some way with the idea of finality. But the idea of the form of an object is not confine to finality alone; The theory of form plays a very strong role in Kant's conceptualization of reproductive imagination. Before we continue with the finality of form, we should look back to Kant's handling of form and imagination in the first Critique.

In chapter II, I argued for the separation of reproductive and productive imagination on the grounds of both function and transcendental position, and showed that the productive imagination is the pure (as opposed to empirical) branch of imagination. In the Transcendental Deduction, the task of the productive imagination is to 'determine' the particulars of sensible intuition prior to their being brought under the pure concepts of the understanding in determinative judgment. The determination performed by the reproductive imagination is a determination of sensible intuitions without concepts, which is a preparatory step in the process of judgment. At B 151-152, Kant says the following:

But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception,
imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination ([3]B 151-152, emphasis)

The synthesis of intuitions by productive imagination at this particular point is conformable with the categories because productive imagination is functioning as the schematism for determinative and not reflective judgments. But the important thing to note here is that productive imagination is fully capable of interacting with sensibility in respect of its form. We saw in Chapter III that when productive imagination functions as the schematism, it does not concern itself with any empirical conditions of the sensible particulars, but only conditions them for use by the understanding according to the form of inner sense. That is, the productive imagination retains its transcendental status during schematism because it provides a necessary consanguinity between intuition and understanding which is temporal only. As a faculty which is concerned with the conformity of representations to the form of inner sense alone, the productive imagination is not capable of producing images of these representations (which would require a spatial component). Its only commerce with empirical objects is with respect to form.

A return to the third Critique with this in mind gives
us a better look at what happens to finality of form when it apparently disappears during the entrance of imagination to aesthetic judgment. Here we are faced with the task of determining what finality is in relation to the act of reflective judgment. On the one hand, finality can be taken as being posterior to the judgment. We could say that finality simply is the harmony between the faculties (imagination and understanding) occasioned by the form. In this case, conformity of the object to the faculties is indeed the ground of the aesthetic moment, but it becomes difficult to say how this occasion comes about - how the productive imagination gains access to the form. On the other hand, we could say that the finality of something's form is anterior to the reflective judgment. Here we could say that the finality of the form is what makes the form compatible with the imagination. The is similar to the task of productive imagination in the non-conceptual determination of sensibility in the first Critique; the exact function of the schematism. That productive imagination is capable of determining sensibility apart from concepts is crucial to its utility in aesthetic judgment. Any contact between and object for reflective judgment and a concept would immediately convert the reflective act into determination, and would therefore eliminate the possibility of the aesthetic project. But,
since the 'determination' of sensibility by imagination - which is really nothing more than the abstraction of an object's form by a pure, temporally governed faculty - has nothing to do with concepts, the productive imagination can act freely on the sensibles of reflective judgment, and can abstract the form of such sensibles for comparison with the understanding.

It is these imaginative abstractions which are capable of harmonizing with the understanding at the aesthetic moment, and, it seems to me that these abstractions from the objects are exactly what Kant has in mind for the phrase 'finality of form'. He instructs us to call something final for reflection when its form harmonizes with the mind. ([3], 189) Kant was certainly not explicit about the relationship I have postulated between finality of form and imagination, but there is nothing contradictory in this view, and it provides a neat explanation for Kant's otherwise sudden and inexplicable shift between the claim that the harmony of aesthetic experience obtains between the form of an intuition and the mind, and the claim that the harmony is between imagination and understanding. Furthermore, as I have disagreed with Guyer on the point of his full rejection of finality, I likewise disagree with his claim that finality cannot provide a schematism for
reflective judgment. As an imaginative, temporally conditioned abstraction of the form of an object of intuition, finality of form is indeed the schematism of subjective reflective judgment.

Now that we have seen both the positive and negative reasons for the retention of subjective finality of form in the theory of reflective judgment, we should turn back to a more complete rationale for the rejection of objective finality. While Guyer's complaint that finality ought to be rejected on the grounds of its lack of explanatory significance is certainly correct for objective finality, this complaint only scratches the surface of the real difficulty involved in the objectification of finality. At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that one of Kant's guiding concerns in the production of the third Critique was the reconciliation of nature and freedom. This, as we have seen, he attempted to accomplish through a series of complementary arguments. The series begins with the idea that we require a system of empirical laws in order to be able to make sense out of empirical life, and ends with the claim that we are obliged through the principle of finality of nature to suppose that empirical systematicity is grounded on the agency of some mind (though it be not ours). There are a number of problems with this view.

Kant's dilemma for the unification of the realms is
based on the following: If he had held fast to the conviction that finality of nature can be no more than a regulative principle, his theory would not have had teeth enough to support the project of reconciliation. On the other hand, any commitment to the reality of the principle could be no more than a plunge into speculative metaphysics, which Kant would never allow himself to take. Therefore, he attempted to solve the problem by claiming for the principle a transcendental status, which would guarantee the necessity of the finality of nature for the possibility of empirical laws, which in turn condition the intelligibility of the stream of empirical experience.

This move is structurally similar to the one he made with reproductive imagination in the subjective deduction, where he tried to show that reproduction — which is by definition always empirical — is a necessary condition for the possibility of the unity of experience. Fortunately for that argument, Kant wrote a second edition of the "transcendental deduction", and abandoned the issue the next time around.

But Kant's attempt to impart transcendental necessity to a principle whose function is the simple regulation of empirical regularities persists in the published introduction to the third Critique, so the general problem requires a definitive treatment. Kant's basic mistake in
the attempt to preserve a transcendental position for the finality of nature lies in the supposition that its relation to objects is **conceptual**

In this way, as I shall show presently, the principle of the finality of nature (in the multiplicity of its empirical law) is a transcendental principle. For the concept of objects, regarded as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition generally, and involves nothing empirical. ([3] 181)

In his attempt to dissociate this principle of empirical laws from the contingency inherent in such laws, and therefore to retain a claim to transcendental status for the principle, Kant commits an error which is deadly to reflective judgment. He suggests that the clustering of empirical objects under the umbrella of systematicity is a pure concept of possible empirical cognition. Even though Kant is verbally committed to the idea that the principle has regulative (as opposed to constitutive) validity, he is more deeply committed to the idea that we should act as though empirical laws are necessary on the basis of this regulative principle. While this in itself is not particularly objectionable, the ultimate claim that we must attribute such regularity to the agency of some epistemically occult mind is. A regulative principle which points us toward an unnamed agent in order to ground the
possibility of empirical life, and which at the same time derives sanction for its own existence from that agent, begs the question of regulativity. To add insult to injury, Kant makes the further claim that "the representation of finality may be made to turn on what is objective, in which case it is represented as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form". ([3], 192)

To claim that any empirical object is necessarily governed by empirical laws in order to provide a ground for systematicity — even if the laws are themselves regulative — is to subsume the plurality of empirical laws under a concept of systematicity. This act alone is sufficient to convert a reflective judgment about an empirical object into a determinative judgment about the position of empirical intuitions relative to empirical laws. Finality of nature cannot, therefore, function transcendentally if it is to remain a feature of reflective judgment, and it cannot maintain its regulative guise if it becomes subject to a determinative judgment. Finality of nature must either be limited to regulative employment, in which case it cannot support any real reconciliation of the realms, or else it must be removed from reflective judgment altogether.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

In the course of this long thesis we have seen a number of things going on with respect to imagination and the theory of judgment. The three main chapters, II, III, and IV, each dealt with a different feature of imagination as it is relevant to judgment. The thing to do now is to bring all that we have learned about judgment and the imagination to some philosophically interesting conclusion.

The hardest part about getting to know the Kantian theory of imagination lies in the fact that Kant never talks about it by itself. Any time he mentions the imagination, it is always in relationship to something else - usually judgment - where the theories of reproductive and productive imagination seem to be developing in small parts right before our eyes. This is probably not far from the truth. Naturally, in this investigation of the productive imagination, all the citations we have access to are those in which Kant is trying to explain his way out of tight spots in the theory. His attention, at these times, is directed more toward what he is trying to explain with the theory of imagination than toward the theory of imagination
he is developing itself. This, of course, does not make
for a comfortable view of the imagination.

But remarkably, the picture of the imagination Kant
presents throughout the course of his work is relatively
consistent. He still abides in the third Critique by
things he said about the productive imagination in the
first. More interesting than his consistency in use,
though, is his consistency in mistakes. In the third
Critique he is still trying to use a group of empirical
rules (which can be reproduced in imagination) to ground a
transcendental synthesis, just as he did in the 'A
deduction'. This consistency is a good prognostic sign for
the general health of the theory of imagination; even though
it is fragmented in its presentation, it is solid in its
efficacy.

The theory of imagination in its essence is quite
simple. It is composed of two elements, one pure and one
empirical. That even something developed on the fly would
bear these fundamental characteristics is not surprising in
Kant. Many of the pillars of his architectonic house are
situated just this way. Concepts can be empirical or pure,
as can intuition. Kant's tendency to organize things this
way has proved to be very useful to the attempt to
understand imagination.

The empirical side of the imagination is the
reproductive employment. This is what we usually think of when we talk about imagination. It, quite simply, is the capability to produce images of representations which are not present. Its commerce is in spatiotemporal images, reproductions of empirical objects, but this is not limited to visual objects. We can reproduce tactile, auditory, olfactory, and taste images through this faculty, and we can even combine various kinds of images to produce new images of things that never existed, like unicorns. In short, this type of imagination does everything we have come to expect from our own pedestrian conception of imagination. But: objects of the reproductive imagination are confined strictly to the empirical realm. There is no way to reproduce the pure parts of experience. Fortunately, we never need to - they are never absent. We cannot deploy the reproductive imagination toward the pure faculties, because the faculties are not spatiotemporal. As we saw in the chapter on the 'schematism', the pure faculties are governed by time alone, as the form of inner sense, and are not themselves subject to spatial relations. Reproduction is strictly an empirical function, as both Paton and I have argued, and it can never function on the pure side.

It is much more difficult to provide a satisfactory description of the production. Productive imagination is
resistant to simple characterization because Kant designed it to be more or less transparent. That is, its function is fleshed out as an act rather than an image. The productive imagination provides the service of non-conceptual determination of intuitions, without getting involved in their empirical properties. Where the reproductive imagination issues forth an image which is nothing but a constellation of empirical properties, the productive imagination determines objects in respect of their form, which is not an empirical property at all. As it is governed by the productive imagination, the object's form is something on the basis of which it has a relationship with the understanding. In the case of determinative judgment, the productive imagination, as the schematism, is concerned with the object only in respect of its being conditioned by time, the form of inner sense. In the case of aesthetic judgment, productive imagination, as the finality of the object's form, abstracts this form and seeks harmony with the understanding on that basis. We can see, therefore, that the productive imagination is useful—in fact essential—to the project of a transcendental theory of judgment, while the reproductive imagination is not so.

We have already seen in detail in chapters II, III and IV how the productive imagination functions in each case.
for judgment. Yet the key function of the productive imagination throughout the full spectrum of Kant's work, to my mind, has to be the non-conceptual determination of sensibility. In an investigation that sticks as close to the text as the one we have just been through, it is easy to lose sight of this. But the question as to what the productive imagination actually contributes to the overall significance of Kant's view should not be ignored.

Though it is hard to see all at once, the determination of sensibility by a non-conceptual means is inevitable in Kant's view. As Proust well observed in the quote at the beginning of this thesis, even inevitable truths are not always conceivable at once, and Kant's lengthy theory proves this. As important as the imaginal determination of sensibility is in the Critique of Pure Reason for the provision of synthesis of intuitions prior to their subsumption under the categories, the theory of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment hasn't a leg to stand on without such determination. As we have seen, determination of sensibility by concepts cannot be utilized by reflective judgment. Any contact at all between concepts and sensible particulars converts reflection immediately into determination. But, as we have also seen, the aesthetic moment depends upon the understanding, which is the faculty of pure concepts, for the production of
harmony. Aesthetic judgment therefore stands in need of a method by which it can occasion harmony between the form of the beautiful object and the understanding. Kant's solution to this problem is to shift the form of the beautiful object from the empirical intuition to imagination itself, so that it is ultimately the imagination and not the intuition at all which is brought into harmony of the understanding.

But two questions arise if the explanation is let go at this point: 1) how does the reflective judgment continue to be reflective judgment if it must bring the particular into contact with the understanding, and 2) isn't the imagination reproducing the form of the object? The solution to the first problem is simple enough. When the reflective judgment brings the particular into contact with the understanding, it does not bring the particular into a relation of subsumption with a concept of the understanding, but brings the form of the particular into harmony with the understanding. This is not just a grammatical distinction. In a relation of subsumption, the understanding determines the particular according to a concept. In the reflective judgment, determination is carried out by the productive imagination.

In the solution to problem number two lies a very interesting consequence of Kant's aesthetic theory. The
productive imagination does not, of course, reproduce the form of the object. Rather, it determines the intuition in respect of its form, and in so doing produces an imaginative construct called the finality of the form, which, though not a reproduction of the form, itself bears the form as the schematism for reflection. This process was explained in chapter IV. When this determination occurs, the imagination conforms to the 'finality' of the form of the object, and becomes the schema for this beautiful object without generating any image. In more than a superficial sense, when the productive imagination conforms to the object as its finality, the beauty of the object actually "captures" the imagination, without requiring any sort of reproduction. In the absence of the ability to determine sensibility in the absence of concepts, Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment would not even be conceivable.
REFERENCES


