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DETERMINANTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN SEPARATIST SITUATIONS

by

WILLIAM ROBERT MCANDREW

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER OF ARTS

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Abstract for DETERMINANTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN SEPARATIST SITUATIONS


An argument that the use of terror in cases of national separatism, particularly for the cases of the IRA in Northern Ireland and the FLQ in Quebec, is not indiscriminant or mindless, but part of an overall strategy used by groups based on societal determinants and the long term and short term goals of the terrorist group.

The main societal determinants appear to be the past use of violence in the area under question and the ability for the nationalist community to effectively control its situation through political representation. For the terrorist group, while separation is the obvious long term goal, other goals for the group, the community it represents, the system in which it acts and the government from which it wishes independence also play an important role in the choice of violence and its possible effects on interfering with accomplishment of other goals.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Violence has often been an option in the cause of nationalist separatism: the belief by a group of people within a country that they constitute a separate nation because of various assortments of common psychological, physical, and/or geographic traits and bonds; and, that they should be given the legitimacy, sovereignty and rights enjoyed by other nations and nation-states. This has been a familiar cause since at least World War II when the colonial countries of the 19th and early 20th centuries began dismantling their kingdoms and granting independence to groups and regions. However, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in this phenomenon due to its persistence in countries long thought to be beyond the disputes of national unity. Further, the fact that it was believed that many of these countries had long ago overcome the problems of political violence through their evolution into liberal democracies only emphasized the continuing importance nationalism played. Thus, this paper is concerned with the uses of violence in achieving political recognition for nationalist groups.

Violence, as an attribute of society, has been studied in its various forms by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists, and people in nearly every other field imaginable. The vast majority of this literature deals mainly with the causes and cures of violence and seldom deals with the actual logic and usefulness of it. My interest lies primarily in this second arena, the strategy of choosing
violence as a weapon in order to accomplish one's goals, particularly within a separatist framework.

When talking about violence one has to realize the possible range of situations which might result in a violent confrontation. It is not my purpose here to study the psychology of personally motivated violence. Rather, I wish to analyze violence as it occurs in structured group situations. By concentrating on group violence the goals of the individual are made secondary to the broader goals of the group, except in the rare cases when a charismatic leader may be in control of the group. This, in turn, will allow an analysis of violence without delving too deeply into human psychology because if violence is being carried out by a group then it can be assumed in most cases that their was some prior discussion and debate on its use. Even within this more specific area of analysis, the possible recourse to violence can stem from many causes. Thus, what I wish to look at is violence, directed by nongovernmental groups, which has as its end a change in the formal structure of power and authority of the society and the state as they presently stand. For the purpose of this paper a state will be defined as a territory, ostensibly ruled by a single government, with distinct and internationally accepted boundaries (with the given exceptions of various border disputes not contingent on the actual authority in the majority of the bounded areas).

Here, the government of any particular state is seen to be the only legitimate representative of that state. Given this, the violent acts being analyzed in this paper will be those carried out by non-governmental actors and therefore illegitimate. This is not intended to indicate that this type of
violence is not used by governmental actors, but to distinguish between governmental violence and nongovernmental violence for purposes of analysis. Nor does this imply that such violence is not sometimes warranted or justifiable, but simply that the violence is not being carried out by the state authority. In fact, many regimes which we now accept, often justify and sometimes admire, started out in the category of groups I qualify as illegitimate, including the American revolutionaries, Nehru and the Indian nationalists, and many regimes in the communist bloc including the Soviets, the Chinese, and the Cubans.

Further, the groups which I wish to consider are those usually categorized under the rubric of terrorist. To be more completely defined later, terrorist in this sense simply implies two things; first, violence is used by these groups against governmental and non-governmental actors alike, regardless of their 'guilt' or 'innocence' or even their involvement in conflictual situations; second, these groups have little if any chance of 'winning' a battle and usually resort to violence more for its secondary effects on the government and the community than they do on the hopes they will overthrow the government. Also, it must be noted that separatist groups are not the only groups which would fit under this heading. For purposes of analysis, however, other types of terrorist groups will be omitted and concentration will remain on separatist movements, defined simply as any nationalist movement of substantial size within a state, usually comprising a geographical region within that state, wishing independence for their region. By creating such a distinction, terrorist groups can be divided roughly into those wishing a separation from a government which they,
under most other circumstances, would consider legitimate, and those who consider the entire structure of authority throughout the state, and perhaps throughout the international system, as illegitimate. Within this framework the main question to be examined is: what are the variables which influence a particular separatist group's recourse to violence? In general, these variables can be broken down into variables independent of the group, including governmental factors, economic conditions, social structures and historical considerations, and group variables based on long term and short term group goals. By group is meant the terrorist organization claiming to represent a community which has a national consciousness.

With this in mind, what this paper will attempt to do is look at various social and historical trends within Northern Ireland and Quebec and view them as they have changed over time and observe how they have affected the output of violence by terrorists within these provinces. Specifically, this paper will look at past uses of violence in these provinces; the structure of the political systems in terms of representativeness, effectiveness of representation, and variations in the level of violence with regime changes; economic factors in terms of community demands for fair economic treatment and complaints of discrimination; plus other social considerations including the effects other groups representing the communities have on the use of violence. This will be accomplished, for the most part, by analyzing the wealth of literature on these two provinces along with statistical abstracts on economic conditions and violence, and electoral returns, both historically and, more importantly, for the periods in question; starting around 1969 for Northern Ireland and the early 1960s for
Quebec. Further, it must be realized that environmental conditions are not the only factors leading to violence. Thus, the groups themselves will be analyzed, to the extent possible, in order to determine what their goals may be, both in the long term and short term, and how they have changed over time. This part of the analysis will be the most difficult, for it is not usually in these groups' best interests to broadly advertise their thoughts and intents. However, there have been interviews done with some group members, both former and current, as well as autobiographies and biographies and the threats and claims of responsibility in various newspapers.

CASES: THE IRA AND THE FLO

Any analysis of violence among terrorist separatist groups is severely restricted by the general lack of information available from the groups themselves owing to their need for secrecy. Still, there are groups which have had members and ex-members disclose some of the inner workings of the group and which have been extensively analyzed by specialists in the field. My original interests in this area revolved around one of these groups: the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The problem arises here, as in most comparative analyses, as to whether the comparison should look at cases which are most similar, then accounting for differences by holding similar variables constant, or cases most different, and observing those common variables which seem critical in leading to a common result. Within the context of this paper these problems are exacerbated by the fact that
terrorist separatist organizations exist throughout a wide diversity of states, ranging from Marxist/communist states through democracies. For these reasons, and in order to have access to as much information as possible, this paper shall be limited to an analysis of groups in what are commonly termed liberal democracies (defined by Schumpeter as those countries in which there is an "... institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes."\(^1\)). Of the cases which fit this somewhat restricted universe, the Quebec nationalists, and specifically the *Front de Liberation du Quebec* (FLQ), in Canada seemed to offer the best basis for comparison keeping in mind the above-mentioned problems.

In the cases of both Northern Ireland and Canada what we see is an ethnic group constituting a statewide minority wishing to at least increase its autonomy vis-a-vis the central government and in some cases to separate entirely from it. In both cases the minorities are dealing with a basically Anglo population having majority control of the central government, and in both cases the minority populations claim they are discriminated against in many areas of both economic and political life. Further, both minority populations are staunchly Roman Catholic, a fact which only reinforces discrimination most noticeably through the separate school system which accompanies many Catholic populations.

There the similarities end. One of the most drastic differences between these two cases is the fact that a large portion of the French Canadians' complaints rests solely on the differences in language between the majority
and minority populations, whereas there is no longer a major linguistic difference between the Northern Irish populations. However, the bond an ethnically distinct language provides would seem, on the surface, to create stronger community ties leading to a more united separatist effort than one might expect to find where no difference exists. While this makes intuitive sense, in comparing these two situations it seems to be less of an influence in the use of violence than might be theorized. Another major difference between these two situations is the entire structure of government within the two nations. Canada has a federal system divided into ten provinces and two territories each province with its own parliament and premier. In this system, the French Canadian population, while being a minority nationwide, actually constitutes the vast majority (approximately 60%) in the province of Quebec. The situation in Northern Ireland is very different. Although having a form of devolved government from 1921 until 1972 in which many decisions on the internal affairs of the province were decided in Stormont, the Northern Irish Parliament, the Catholics never came near a majority situation, maintaining roughly a 1/2 ratio with the Protestant population. With the suspension of the Stormont government amidst a rapidly deteriorating social climate in 1972 and the return of direct rule to the parliament at Westminster, the representation of the Northern Irish Catholics only decreased. This difference, unlike that of the language situation, does seem to play a very important part in the comparison of violence in these two communities and will be returned to later in the analysis. In order to maintain a clearer perspective of the cases, a brief review of the recent histories of these two terrorist organizations and
their communities may be in order.

BACKGROUND: NORTHERN IRELAND

To understand the history of the IRA one literally must cover centuries of Irish/English relations, a project well beyond the scope of this paper. However, an understanding of a strictly Northern Irish problem, hence an understanding of the acts of present IRA, can be accomplished by viewing the Irish question from the relatively recent history starting just after the turn of the century. Since the mid-19th century, Ireland's only form of representation within the United Kingdom was the seats it was allowed to occupy at the Parliament at Westminster in London. But with an aborted revolution attempt in 1916 and the summary execution of its perpetrators as traitors to the crown of England, political and popular opinion in Ireland began to coalesce around the idea that a resolution of their problems with England in the form of independence was mandated. With this growing support among their countrymen, the Sinn Fein party Irish representatives in the London Parliament (many of whom were still in jail for IRA activities) abstained from sitting after the 1918 post-war elections for the British Parliament and formed a provisional government, the Dail Eireann, in Dublin in 1919. England, too, by this time, realized that Ireland was becoming too much of a problem and tried to resolve the issue by passing the Government of Ireland Act in 1920. This act tried to please the majority Irish Catholic population on the island less than it attempted to placate the minority Protestant population in the north by creating two devolved governments:
one in Dublin with authority over the three southern provinces of the four on the island along with three counties severed from the northern province of Ulster, the second in Belfast with authority over the remaining six counties of the province of Ulster.4

This Government of Ireland Act (1920) was important for two major reasons. First, it was the first official recognition of Northern Ireland as a legitimate territorial entity. Second, despite the fact that two governments were created for Ireland, they were both supposed to remain under the general rule of Great Britain. Yet, because the Irish Catholic representatives were already refusing to sit, they saw the English legitimation of an Irish government as an admission of Irish rights to independence and took the opportunity to retain their independent provisional government in the guise of the Dublin Parliament. Further, because of the division of the island, the representatives in Dublin did not view the Act or its effects as legitimate. This, along with the fact the representatives in the south claimed to be independent, caused problems with the English government which would have preferred a more stable situation on their western flank. For this reason, the government in London began negotiations with the provisional Irish government in Dublin in an attempt to secure peaceful relations with Ireland and legitimize the border. This was accomplished through the creation of the Irish Free State which was negotiated by Michael Collins, a leader in the IRA, and approved by the Dail Eireann in 1922 by the margin 64 to 57.5 This narrow margin represented a more fundamental rift within the IRA; the Free Staters, those who would eventually become the government in the south and who accepted the border and hoped for its eventual
dissolution, and the more emphatic and defiant side of the organization which would remain as the illegitimate IRA and would settle only for a united independent Ireland.

In the north, of course, this basic rift was nonexistent. All IRA members there, regardless of ideological persuasion, thought the border illegitimate. To do otherwise would be admitting defeat. Thus, while a civil war raged in the south between the Free Staters and the IRA, the IRA in the north while weak, due to loss of supply caused by the war, remained unified.\(^6\) After the civil war the islandwide IRA, the eventual losers in the civil war in the south, remained a fairly unified group through the common abhorrence of the border felt by all members despite the increasingly Marxist bent of the group and its maintenance as an outlawed group in the south.\(^7\)

This remained the state of affairs until, amidst Catholic civil rights agitation in late 1960s, increased Protestant attacks on Catholics invited an IRA response. Yet the leader of the IRA at this time, Cathel Goulding, maintained the socialist platform and did not respond arguing that it was not the Protestants and Catholics who were the true antagonistic groups, but the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Sectarian conflict, therefore, only exacerbated and disguised the real conflict between the classes.\(^8\) Others in the group disagreed and argued the community must be defended. A further rift in the group came when the 20 member IRA army council voted to end abstentionism in October of 1969.\(^9\) This was followed by the narrow passage of a similar vote in the political forum of the IRA, the Sinn Fein party, in January 1970.\(^{10}\) These votes caused the IRA to literally break in two groups: the Official IRA (OIRA) who believe in a Marxist, stages
approach to a united Ireland allowing for the participation of the group in the governments in London, Dublin, and Belfast, in the hope of establishing a communist workers state; and the Provisional IRA (PIRA) who believe that any participation in the presently constituted governments legitimizes an illegitimate situation. The PIRA are less Marxist than the OIRA and look to the future of the island as a republic, but they too maintain a socialist orientation.

It will be the PIRA, the group which came out for the more violent approach to resolving the question of Northern Ireland, which will be the main target of this study. Because of the violent response taken by the PIRA after its establishment in 1970, the situation in Northern Ireland became unmanageable for the government in Belfast as set up by the Government of Ireland Act in 1920. Rule of the province reverted back to London in 1972. Since then it has been the PIRA, the ideological followers of those revolutionaries who fought for a united and independent Ireland in 1916, who have been the main instigators of terrorist violence from 1972 until the present.

**BACKGROUND: CANADA**

On the other side of the Atlantic, the position of the French in Canada has always been rather questionable. With every outbreak of hostilities either between England and France or in France alone, the French Canadian population has had its allegiance questioned. However, for the most part the French have acquiesced to the British rule of Canada. A major exception to
this rule occurred in the French rebellion in 1837-1838. By 1791, all
Canadian colonies had been granted the right of assembly, a system
similar to that in the pre-revolution United States whereby the colonies had
the right to have a government, but real power remained in the hands of the
colonial governors who were appointed by England. A history of
semi-tyrannical governors during this time, proroguing the Quebec Assembly
mainly over questions of fiscal control, lead to violent attacks against
British rule by a group of French nationalists called the Patriotes. It
was not so much the effects of the rebellion which are important here as is
the fact that the Patriotes...[cast] every claim and every confrontation in
ideological and ethnic terms. This intransigence is a continuing, if
sporadic, theme throughout the history of French nationalism in Quebec.

Further outbursts of French nationalism in Quebec have been neither so
violent nor so organized until the emergence of the FLQ in the early 1960s.
This is not to imply that this nationalism was non-existent. From the
creation of Canada by the British North America Act in 1867, which
established a unified federal system under the auspices of an English
mother tongue, through La Revolution Tranquille, the Quiet Revolution,
which is the name given to a massive resurgence in French nationalism at
the start of the 1960s, there has been constant French criticism of
British/English rule. But it was the FLQ with their bombing campaign
starting in 1963 which most starkly displays French nationalism since the
rebellion in 1837. The actual FLQ campaign had five different waves lasting
from early 1963 until the end of 1969. Each wave was relatively
independent from its predecessor in terms of both tactics used and
personnel carrying out those tactics. Yet while the tactics and personnel changed, the main goal of the group, that to "...awaken the population against the domination of the Anglo-Saxons...", remained the same.
CHAPTER 2

DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

Political scientists, unlike practitioners in many other academic fields, work from the handicap of not having an agreed upon vocabulary to guide each writer's work. Because of this, many studies undertaken to explain various political events suffer simply because the reader must also act as interpreter of the authors' words. While this is not necessarily bad, it may lead to conclusions about various studies which differ significantly from the author's findings. This may occur, not because of shortcomings in the authors' methodology, but because the author did not clarify or define the variables and cases being studied succinctly enough to exclude those outside the universe of the author's study. Further, even with clear definitions by the author, there is no guarantee others in the field will agree with them. This becomes even more of a problem when the research involves comparisons across countries. Here, language and translational problems arise along with bias based on the governmental system and its traits. Because this paper deals with conflict, one of the more difficult areas to agree on definitionally, it is necessary to delineate some of the definitional problems which may arise.
This paper, above all, is concerned with what is generally regarded as terrorism. Yet not only is there no agreed upon definition of terrorism, but the definitions given in the past are sometimes contradictory. Many authors, such as O'Brien stress the type of governmental system in their use of the word terrorist:

I would restrict the application of the word 'terrorist' to one who, under these conditions [those of democracy, rule of law and freedom of expression, emphasizing the consent of the governed], uses lethal violence to bring about political change. 16

While this is the most obvious type of terrorism and perhaps the most effective in producing terror due to the openness of these societies, one should not assume that these are the only conditions under which terrorist violence exists. In fact, a review of past terrorist attacks would show that many have taken place in authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. Other authors stress this point better by widening the area of definition to include state terror, something less of a problem in an open democratic system. Edward Mickolus, for example, defines terrorism as:

The use, or threat of use, of anxiety inducing extranormal
violence for political purposes by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims... 17 (emphasis mine)

Others, such as Robert Moss, sidestep this problem by reclassifying terrorism into repressive terror in which the government controls the population, defensive terror in which nongovernmental actors attempt to uphold the status quo, and offensive terror which is directed against the government. 18 Others see terrorism as transcending politics and political systems: "Terrorism is the use or threat of violence to instill fear." 19 Obviously, this definition is more concerned with effects than with causes and, thus removing terrorism from strictly political analyses.

The one thing that almost every writer on terrorism agrees upon is that its main purpose is fear:

Brian M. Jenkins: Terrorism is violence for effect, not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victims may be totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of terrorism. 20 (emphasis mine)

David Fromkin: Terrorism is violence used in order to create fear;
but it is aimed at creating fear in order that fear, in turn, will lead somebody else—not the terrorist—to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires.²¹ (emphasis mine)

Yet the main definitional problem with the terms terrorism and terrorist is that they carry with them a connotation of "the bad guys." No one is seriously going to defend all terrorists, but to use these words in a warlike situation denies the fact that there are often two sides of the story, and more often, double standards. The often cited examples of the allied bombers setting Dresden afire and the U.S. attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as fitting within the heading of terrorist are perfect illustrations of how analyses may be definitionally correct, yet miss the larger picture. Two of the main analysts on this subject point this problem out quite clearly.

Conor Cruise O'Brien: The words "terrorism" and "terrorist" are not terms of scientific classification. They are imprecise and emotive... We reserve their use, in practice, for politically motivated violence of which we disapprove.²² (emphasis mine)

Brian M. Jenkins: Use of the term terrorism implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the
label "terrorist" to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.23

This problem with terrorism, the fact that one man’s freedom fighter can be another man’s terrorist, is quite noticeable when one talks about the IRA in Northern Ireland. This is true because the IRA have, if not the support, then at least the sympathy of many Irish and many Catholics throughout the world. Here in the U.S., while our chief politicians recognize the IRA as a terrorist organization, some of the population, particularly those of Irish-Catholic descent, sees them as heroes fighting for Ireland. In this situation, as in many others, it comes down to a question of the ends justifying the means. However, in the case of the IRA it seems that many of the means used are not justifiable in terms of the results produced because independence has not been gained. If we accept that the purpose of violent action taken by a terrorist group is to effect, through secondary effect of fear, a population larger than the immediate victims who may be unrelated to the immediate conflict so that they in turn will carry out the terrorists objectives, then the IRA would have to be considered a terrorist group.24

In the scenario of Northern Ireland, the professed goal of the IRA is to remove themselves from British rule. Clearly, the IRA alone has too little power to accomplish this so they want the British to want to leave. To do this they have tried to create a situation in which the British government must either accept indiscriminant communal violence or deny democratic rights, particularly that of habeas corpus. Neither of these choices conform
to what the British want. Therefore, the argument goes, the British will have to leave in order to avoid these other two situations. The case of the FLQ in Canada is more obvious for they are a much smaller group within the French population. Since Quebec does have some autonomy, the goal of the FLQ would seem to be that of convincing the rest of the province, by way of attacks on Anglo domination, to secede. Thus, despite the ambiguity of the term 'terrorism' I believe there is justification for its use in these two cases.

NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

A second definitional problem arises when one starts talking about distinctions among terrorist groups based on the goals and aspirations of that group. In the introduction a distinction was made between separatist terrorist groups wishing independence for an communal group and other terrorist groups with less concrete goals such as anarchists and Marxists. The problem is how do we actually distinguish a separatist organization from other terrorist groups. Smith has stated:

Any separatist movement must, by definition, desire the de jure independence and sovereignty of the unit on whose behalf it operates. In that formal sense alone, therefore, separatism is a species of nationalism.25

In this sense, a separatist group can be recognized by the "unit" it
represents: the nation. The question then becomes, what is the nation. One way to look at a nation is as:

... a large vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict.²⁶

The key term here is collective sentiment which is usually strengthened by the number of "common characteristics" the people share. This point is reinforced by Achar Ha'am: "... the definition of a nation is a subjective feeling. A nation is what individuals feel in their hearts is the nation."²⁷ The point is that a nation, unlike an ethnic group, is bounded less by its common characteristics than by the feeling among its members that the commonalities are important. An ethnic group on the other hand is marked by characteristics more so than its own feelings of commonality among its members. Thus we can talk about the ethnic Italians in a Swiss nation. The ethnic ties of the Italian people, their language and their religion among others, are what make them discernable from the French and the Germans within Switzerland, but their loyalties and their "collective sentiment" are with the Swiss be they of Italian, German or French ethnicity. Tiryakian and Nevitte point out this nonreducibility of a nation:
A nation is a social phenomenon of collective life, marked by a level of *intersubjective consciousness* reducible neither to "objective conditions" such as territory, kinship, class (economically understood), and language, nor to other levels of intersubjective consciousness such as class ("for itself"), generation, and so forth.28

An ethnic or communal group not already in control of a region can only constitute a nation if it has developed this "intersubjective consciousness." Therefore, when we talk about separatists what we are actually referring to is a section of a society or a region of a country with the common bonds of a feeling of "nation." If we are able to reduce a groups consciousness to "objective conditions" or to class, then what we are looking at is not a nationalist group. To elaborate, Marxist terrorists can have their bonds as a group reduced to class conflict. Shi'ite terrorists groups can have their unity reduced to their religion, not necessarily to a sense of collective characteristics.

Thus, when one talks about the IRA or the FLQ as being separatist what is being implied is that they are part of a community which considers itself different from other communities for quite subjective reasons. In any analysis of this type the actual proof lies less in something one can point to, such as religion, race, language, etc., than it does on the claims being made by the groups being studied. One can not prove a nation exists. A nation exists if a group of people (usually a fairly large group) believes it does or sometimes only if it believes it should (as in the case of the Palestinians).
A terrorist group in such a situation may, or may not, represent the rest of the 'nation.' The most that can be said prior to a complete analysis is that the terrorist group is at least a subset of the larger nation group in that the members within the separatist organization believe in a commonality among themselves and at least part of the population in which they live. What does distinguish a separatist terrorist group (STG) from its respective nation is the intensity with which they feel their nation is special among the wider community of nations. Given this shared sense of community, there are basically three options open to a member of that community wishing to better its position vis-a-vis the state: first, there is communalism in which the community interest is aided and or advanced by means of the governmental system; another option might be a push toward partial autonomy, most clearly seen in federal systems; finally, there is the separatists option with separation through violent action as an endpoint on this rather sketchy continuum.  

The point is that this paper does not deal with why some nationalists choose the communal option while others turn to violence; Gurr, Davies and others have theorized on the variables within society which might result in political violence. These can roughly be reduced to the notion of relative deprivation or man’s perception of himself in relation to others within his national group and his group in relation to other groups both within the state and internationally.  

Gurr realized however that more was required in order for political violence to occur; namely the violence must be justifiable and a belief that it could, in fact, bring about some desired goal.  

This paper will approach these two facets of violence: how STGs justify their use of violence and what they assume it
THEORIES ON THE USES OF TERRORISTIC VIOLENCE

Despite the vast amount of literature on violence, relatively little has been written on its usefulness as a strategy. Gurr's analysis of relative deprivation and additional pieces by Birrell, among others, have focused on the usefulness of relative deprivation in analyzing community violence and rioting, but fail to deal with violence in protracted group situations in which violence is one of many ongoing strategic options and not simply a reaction to concurrent conditions as they are perceived. However other theories do deal, if indirectly, with various aspects of violence. These include psychological theory, revolution theory, theories on fragmentation and elites, the rational actor model, and game theory and bargaining.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

"In Britain, as well as in Ulster, we face in the IRA not a nationalist movement, not a league of patriots, not 'guerrillas' or 'freedom fighters', or anything which can be dignified with a political name, but an organization of psychopathic murderers who delight in maiming and slaughtering the innocent, and
whose sole object and satisfaction in life is the destruction
of human flesh. 33

The above stated belief is commonly held when it comes to terrorists
and terrorism. Indeed, for most of us the ability of these terrorists to
commit murder as frequently as they do is totally abhorrent. And yet, it is
not unusual for people to resort to violence. In fact, the point is often made
that man is one of the few species on earth which frequently kills its own
kind. Even in the animal world, violent attacks are not uncommon when
matters of territory and mating are concerned. Further, if the previous
reference to WWII is reexamined, it can be seen that anyone is capable of
large scale violence given the proper circumstances. Obviously, however,
what the above author is referring to is the use of violence without regard
to whom the violence is being used against. In situations of war the
“indiscriminant” use of violence is justified in many cases because the
populations being attacked are symbolic of the regime against whom the
war is being fought. Yet, even in cases of war, the use of violence is to some
degree restricted depending on the situation. In Vietnam, for example, many
atrocities were recorded by U.S. troops. However, even in that situation few
would have accused those men of being psychopathic. Further, the act of
being at war may be entirely dependent on the perceptions of the groups
involved. Perhaps, the criteria being used above is the ruthlessness of the
violent acts being performed. Yet Milgram, in his famous controlled
experiments, showed that almost anyone would resort to the most outrageous and cruel behavior given the proper impetus.\textsuperscript{34}

Given this definitional problem, how are we to distinguish between groups composed mainly of psychopaths and those that do not act on psychopathic tendencies? Further, where do the PIRA and the FLQ fit into this discussion? First, one must be sure of what is actually indicated by the term psychopath. Alfred Hitchcock perhaps forever tainted the term by its use as the title for his film \textit{Psycho}. We commonly use the term now as a form of derision and an indication of somehow abnormal behavior, usually indicating that a person is capable of murder. However, clinical psychologists have refined their conceptions of psychopaths so that they can point to a checklist of psychopathic behavior. As cited by Ken Heskin in \textit{Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis}, Cleckley (1964) has delineated many of these traits. They include: superficial charm, good intelligence, an absence of delusions, an absence of nervousness, untruthfulness and insincerity, a lack of remorse or shame, being antisocial without compunction, showing poor judgement and failing to learn from experience, egocentricity, an incapacity to love, a general poverty of emotion, a loss of insight, unresponsiveness to interpersonal relations, frequent threats of suicide, an impersonal sex life, and not having a life plan among others.\textsuperscript{35}

Using these psychological traits as guideposts, the above quote, by calling the IRA an 'organization of psychopathic murderers' seems to be claiming that a significant number of the PIRA members exhibited all or
most of these psychotic symptoms. Yet some of these traits, particularly the lack of truthfulness, the antisocial behavior and an unresponsiveness to relations, would be completely out of place in an organization which places a great deal of emphasis on secrecy, community, and coordination of action. Granted, not all terrorist organizations place equal emphasis on these three facets of action, but most separatist organizations must in order to be perceived as part of the community and in order to continue operations within that community. It must be admitted though that simply by their nature,

[conflict oriented groups... will attract [these] types of individuals... in the long term however their egocentricity and unreliability would make them a dangerous liability to such an organization.]

Thus, we can probably assume that, on average, these two terrorist organizations do have a larger share of people with psychopathic tendencies than most other groups. If a psychopath wishes to commit a crime, what better way to have it sanctioned than by committing it for a violent group? However, Heskin notes:

Of the leadership of terrorist organizations as portrayed in these various accounts, it is fair to say that none
even remotely resemble either the popular image of the psychopath or the more precise and detailed clinical descriptions given by the clinicians above (i.e. Cleckley et al.).

Also, if anything can be made of the recent H-Block starvation diets, these terrorists can only be seen as being dedicated to the cause, something a psychopath would never be. Also, Heskin notes that, at least among the PIRA, many of the leaders share a belief in authoritarianism, while feelings of depression, self doubt and guilt were common among most of the members. All of this points not to psychopaths, but to men believing in a cause, a belief so strong among some of them that they have willingly given their lives for it. These are hardly psychopathic tendencies.

Even leading British army authorities have testified to the nonpsychopathic nature of the PIRA. In a controversial leak of army intelligence in 1979, Brigadier General James Glover stated:

The Provisional leadership is deeply committed to a long campaign of attrition. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) has the dedication and sinews of war to raise violence intermittently...for the foreseeable future.

Obviously, commitment and dedication are incompatible with the erratic
and irrational behavior of a psychopath. Further, the phrase "sinews of war," indicates that the group as a whole has learned from their experiences with the British army and the police forces in Northern Ireland and learning from past experiences is not something the clinicians would associate with psychopathology. Glover, in the above statement, is commenting specifically on the leadership of the PIRA, but he goes on to comment on the average member of the organization:

Our evidence of the caliber of the rank - and - file terrorists does not support the view that they are merely mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and the unemployable.41

This is certainly no absolute statement on the nature of these terrorists, but he goes on to mention their years of experience, their training, their recognition of the need to avoid alienating the Catholic population, and their ability to select targets based on rational choices. None of these traits would be expected from someone with psychopathic tendencies. It could be argued that what Glover has seen as a rational selection of targets is simply the erratic functioning of the terrorist organization in a haphazard and irrational manner. Yet any group in the no win situation faced by the PIRA in their campaign against a much more heavily armed British army would be wise to vary their targets of attack; to do otherwise would be
inviting defeat and infiltration.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, it would appear that the seeming irrationality of the PIRA is in fact a fairly well designed plan by calculating, if highly emotional, individuals.

A similar case can be made for the various functionaries of the FLQ, although the evidence is much less complete due to a lack of continuity within the group and the fewer number of events which have occurred over the years. While the FLQ carried out its activities from the years 1963 to 1970, it relied primarily on bombing campaigns designed to affect property more than population targets. Because of this, the toll in human lives was far less than that witnessed in Northern Ireland since 1969. Even so, the psychological evidence seems to point more toward the FLQ as consisting of people interested in various ideals of nationalism and socialism, rather than 'hoodlums drawn from the unemployed and the unemployable.' Gustave Morf in his psychological case studies of various FLQ members, while finding some of them to be malcontents and extremists, generally finds many of their personality traits as being relatively normal, some being at worst romantics and dreamers and most with strong relations and feelings towards family and friends.\textsuperscript{43}

In general then, the available evidence on these STGs does not support the view that they consist wholly or in majority of psychopaths. As Padraig O'Malley states: "...condemnation [of these groups] is easy, even comforting. It bestows an aura of moral righteousness..."\textsuperscript{44} Thus, as in the case of the use of the word terrorist, there is more to the word than its simple
definition. By calling these people psychopaths the above author is making more of an emotive statement than a justifiable criticism of these groups. If from this discussion we can reject the interpretation that by using violence, these groups are simply acting irrationally, then the use of violence must be serving some purpose, if not for the community, then at least for the group.

REPUBLICAN THEORIES

The goal of separatist terrorism, at least in part, is to create a new governmental order for a fragment of the state. In this respect it can roughly be compared to guerrilla warfare which attempts to overthrow the government in its entirety. It is not my purpose here to attempt to differentiate between these two rather vague titles. Both situations are based on the perception that the governmental order, as it presently stands, is corrupt, discriminatory, or in some way unresponsive to a fairly large group of citizens. There may be differences, to be sure, between the two groups depending on one's viewpoint. These differences might be in amount of support for the group, territory held by the group, the environment (rural v. urban) in which the group is working, the type of violence being used, the group's goals, etc. Still, despite the disagreements on the distinction
between these two types of forces (if indeed they are even distinct types), much of the theory concerning one group is applicable to the other. If we then consider the role of violence in either of these situations the rationale should be similar.

If the government then is somehow alien to a reasonably large part of the population, it is in the guerrillas' or terrorists' best interests to both make this fact obvious to the masses and to get the masses behind the revolutionary cause the guerrillas advocate. Mao realized this fundamental aspect of revolution and used it to his advantage in China. Stated succinctly by Friedland:

In contrast to other forms of warfare, revolutionary warfare is always directed not only at defeating the enemy by military means, but at the mass involvement of the people as a crucial part of the process.\textsuperscript{45}

Further, as displayed by Mao and the Viet Cong, crucial aspects of this use of mass involvement are the ability for the insurgents to maintain the secrecy of their actions, to be able to lose themselves among the population thereby avoiding detection, and to maintain their supply of recruits from within the population.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, the active involvement of the masses is not mandated, but their passive support is absolutely necessary. If, as in the
case of most West European countries, the terrorists have to face the dual antagonists of the government and the population, they will surely fail in the long run. As Chalmers Johnson points out: "...the mounting of a guerrilla movement as well as the possibility of guerrilla victory depends upon the loyalties of civilians in the area of operations."

Obviously, we should make a distinction here between guerrillas and separatist terrorists. If the vast majority of the population continue to believe in the government, particularly one based on democratic principles, the insurgents have little, if any, chance of winning as long as we continue to define victory as the accession of the insurgents to power. In most separatist situations, the terrorists usually do not receive anywhere near majority support from the population at large due to the fragmented nature of the society, thus a victory for them should not be defined in the same way as it would for guerrillas who can garnish support from all or most of the population with the proper strategy. The actual question of how to define success for STGs is not an easy one and will be tackled in a later section. For now, let success simply imply continued support, passive or active, from the ethnic community on whose behalf they claim to act along with the continued existence of the group, of course.

Given, then, that some popular support is necessary, how can the guerrillas ensure this support? One way is that taken by Mao in China. Mao, though not classifiable as a terrorist, faced the underdog situation in his early years, which many guerrilla and separatist/terrorist groups face.
Among other things, Mao created a code of ethics among his troops which led them to treat the population as brothers in the effort; a 'you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours' atmosphere, wherein popular support was rewarded with assistance and honesty by the troops. Of course, this was even more effective in light of the treatment these peasants received from the nationalist troops. While it is generally agreed upon in the literature of the revolutionary that this is the most effective way to obtain support, it is not necessarily the only way. The French in Algeria interpreted the movement there as being more coercive towards the population than simply trying to garnish their support through proper action of the insurgents:

"Revolutionary or insurrectional war has for its aim the take over of power in the state - that is, internal conquest - made possible through the active help of a population that the insurgents have physically and morally conquered." Military power plays a secondary role in such a contest; the decisive factor is the population, which is both the strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary objective.45 (emphasis mine)

This interpretation seems to be seconded by the U.S. experience in the Philippines during WWII:
No resistance movement can flourish for long without mass civilian support. This support may be voluntary, induced or imposed, but it is absolutely essential to the maintenance of large guerrilla forces for a prolonged period of time in a country overrun by the enemy.\textsuperscript{49}

(emphasis mine)

Despite these opinions on the ability for the guerrillas to coerce the population into supporting them, there appears to be an inconsistency here. Stated succinctly, the population cannot be too convinced in the revolution if they have to be coerced into support and one would have to question how long they would be willing to be loyal to the cause. Two important aspects of loyalty must be observed here in order to judge the ability of coercive force to garnish support from the population. First, it is necessary to realize that the guerrilla forces are not acting in a vacuum. Not only does the population have to judge the insurgents, but that judgement must then be compared to the government in power: "The condition upon which guerrilla warfare is predicated is that the civilian population is regarded by the defending force as neutral but is, in fact, hostile to the defending force."\textsuperscript{50}

It would seem, therefore, that the guerrillas can attempt to garnish popular support, even through coercion, as long as a situation is maintained in which the civilian population is more antagonistic to the government than they are to the guerrillas. Further, there is a circularity working here, for if the
guerrillas can maintain governmental retributions against the population, they can ensure that the population will continue to be more antagonistic against the authorities. It would seem that as long as the insurgents raised the levels of violence against both the authorities and the population on an equal scale then coercion of the civilian population could be successful.

A second and perhaps more important aspect of the use of coercion to garnish support is the atmosphere in which the insurgents are working. In most guerrilla situations, the population is motivated by grievances of a mainly personal nature. In these situations we can talk about class politics and class mobilization. Each group in society will then be alienated by what tend to be relatively limited grievances: the elites by their loss of a power base, the business class by taxation and lack of representation, the workers by low wages and limited access to material goods, peasants by land reform, etc. This is a simplified scenario, but one which seems to be important to many revolutionary situations. However, when we start talking about separatist situations, loyalties tend to become more communal. Granted, various groups within the civilian population still have their personal grievances. Yet there is introduced the matter of a 'collective sentiment', an 'intersubjective consciousness', which tends to unite the community in question. In these situations coercion can take on the aura of nationalism. Thus, if the STGs are portrayed, or portray themselves, as the protectors of the community and the nation, their acts of coercive terror might be seen as a punishment against those who were disloyal to the
community. In a more limited realm, support can be ensured within the group by this use of coercion. Group members will be less likely to abandon the cause or to turn informer if they know that retribution will be forthcoming. Returning to the aspect of the STG which makes recruitment from the community an important aspect of its survival, a loyalty to the group, stemming from its very foundations up through the entire community, can be maintained in the very difficult balance of terror and nationalism.

FRAGMENTATION AND THE ROLE OF THE ELITES

As noted earlier, there are a number of theories which deal with the possible outbreak of violence but only approach the actual use of violence indirectly. One of these areas is that of the fragmented society. If we accept Almond's definition of a fragmented society as one that has self contained, mutually exclusive subcultures each with its own subsystem of roles, then the inclusion of Northern Ireland and Quebec within this umbrella is relatively simple.51 Largely dependent on the different cultures, both communities in the two societies have basically separate school systems: a state run system and a parallel system run by the Catholic church. Each community in the two societies also has its own political parties with little overlap. Further, the press in the two societies is relatively divided down community lines. However this is most pronounced in Quebec where the language difference divides the two communities more noticeably. Yet it
is not necessarily the simple existence of fragmentation which leads to violence, but its reinforcing nature over time. With the limited overlap between the communities in these two societies, bias and hostility become harder to break over time. The literature on overlapping memberships and its opposite, cumulative memberships, is reviewed extensively by Aunger (1981). In his book he summarizes the dynamics of cumulative memberships found in fragmented communities:

1. All individuals are members of interconnected cumulative groups.
2. Cumulative memberships create reinforcing allegiances and solidarities within groups.
3. Reinforcing allegiances strengthen the cohesion of each group.
4. Strengthened cohesion results in an increase in each group's demands on the socio-political system.
5. Increased group demands intensify conflict between the groups.\textsuperscript{52}

While violence is not an immediately apparent outcome of this theory, it is obvious that once it enters into the process it could become more and more engrained and accepted as part of the groups' conflict. Further, over time, not only will violence become accepted by the groups but it may well
become more intense as suggested by '5' above. Yet it is also argued by Aunger that this problem of group conflict, even in fragmented societies with cumulative memberships, can be overcome by proper, knowledgable responses by the leadership within the groups.\textsuperscript{53} This is most obvious when one observes the political interaction taking place in societies such as those in Switzerland and the Netherlands. Here, despite the fact that these societies have self contained, mutually exclusive subcultures, the leaders within the two subcultures actively work to assuage intercommunity conflict. If this is the case, however, these same leadership roles can be used to heighten the conflict depending on the interests of the leaders:

\textldots\text{the failure on the part of the ruling establishments to look beyond their narrow, if understandable, commitment to preserving the status quo, to protecting their own political hegemony, irrespective of the legitimate aspirations, felt needs, and demands of others encourages a climate of violence and contributes substantially to its escalation.}\textsuperscript{54}

While the above observation (made in reference specifically to Northern Ireland, Italy and Cyprus) refers to the groups in actual governmental power, the same conclusion can be made regarding the goals of the leaders in the minority communities when they place their goals beyond the interests of
their communities. Thus, depending on the actual situations present in Northern Ireland and Quebec, both the existence of fragmented communities and intransigence on the part of the communities' leadership can lead to the need to resort to violence.

**RATIONALISM, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND BARGAINING**

If we are to conclude from the above discussions that there is some rationality behind the terrorists' choice of violence as a strategy in order to obtain their goals, even if that strategy is not immediately evident, then some logical path must have been followed which limited and defined their choices. The basis of rational decision making, as summarised by Allison (1971), includes the relative ranking of objectives, the listing of possible alternatives in order to accomplish those objectives, the realistic conclusion about the consequences of each alternative, and the final choice of which alternative will be chosen. All of these calculations in the end lead to a situation in which the terrorists are attempting to value maximize. If violence is used only after such calculations, then logically the terrorists have concluded that among all of the possible choices open to them, ranging from dissolution of the group through support of other, more legitimate groups, to the use of the electoral process in these democratic countries, only violence will help them achieve their goal of separation. However, we would also expect that violence might also accomplish other
goals if in fact the terrorists are attempting to get as much utility from each act of violence as possible.

In any situation, however, perfect rationality can only be accomplished if one is working in an atmosphere of perfect information, for only then can one be assured of the outcomes of various scenarios. It can hardly be assumed that terrorists have such perfect lines of information. Even so, some rationality must be at work if we are to assume that the terrorists in these situations are not psychotic. If this is the case, then they are probably working with a somewhat accurate account of both their self interest and the social reality. The important point to notice here is that, as is often the case, the terrorists' self interest and the communities' self interest may not be the same. Thus, while the leaders of the terrorist organizations may be value maximizing for themselves, they may actually be acting irrationally in terms of the community. Further, if we assume rationality on the part of the terrorists, then we should also assume some rationality on the part of the community at large. This would probably be most apparent in the support given the terrorists. In order to garner this support from the community, one of the objectives the STGs must accomplish is to convince the community that there is some benefit, either physically or socially, which the terrorist group can deliver which would be otherwise unavailable to the community.

Conversely, the community will only support the STG if they can rule out all other forms of access and benefits available from the the government or
society. In this type of a situation we are disregarding the community's desire for simple state sovereignty in the assumption that given the simple choice of self government or government by others, any community would choose the former. However, more to the point, we must realize that state sovereignty would also entail some form of economic sovereignty. In this situation the community must attempt, at least on an individual to individual basis, a cost benefit analysis based on the usually favorable terms of provincial trade with the 'mother' country, the ability for the province to easily transfer labor and capital within the regions, the possibility for the province to set its own economic policies, and an analysis of the cost of losing transfer payment, or the benefit of the province to stop paying for the poor sectors outside of the immediate region.58

Besides the strategy of maintaining community support, or rather in addition to it and in promotion of it, the STGs must also attempt to gain concessions from the government. In a no win military situation, the terrorists have the upper hand, for in their decision to resort to violence, they are simply upping the ante for the government through their willingness to sacrifice themselves. If they see their situation as one of having nothing to lose, any increase in the level of violence gives them more with which to bargain. Recent work in the area of bargaining strategies (Axelrod 1984, Jensen 1984, Stoll and McAndrew 1986) tends to indicate that a tit-for-tat reciprocating strategy, in which concessions by one side
are followed up by concessions from the opposing side, seems to be the most beneficial from the viewpoint of reducing tensions and coming to an agreement in an atmosphere of negotiations.

While it is true the violent situations confronted in terroristic antagonism are not directly comparable to discussions at the negotiating table, they still have the general goal of reducing complaints one side may have against the other. In this situation, the terrorists may be seen to have two options: first, as noted above, by increasing the level of conflict over time, the terrorists are actually building on the number of concessions they may be able to give in the future, thereby making the government respond while still maintaining the option of violence. On the other hand, and this at first glance may be the more obvious strategy, the terrorists may simply be playing a bully game in which no matter what the government officials do, the terrorists continue to increase the level of conflict over time. This may be the more likely, simply because of the illegitimate status of the terrorists in the eyes of the government along with the government’s perceived illegitimacy in the eyes of the nationalists. Further, because violence may be intended to accomplish varying goals at the same time, and depending on the targets of the violence, both of these strategies may be occurring concomitantly. The problem, of course, is whether or not either of these possibilities will be observable due to the inability to discover the inner machinations of the terrorist organization.

Thus, by ruling out total irrationality on the part of the terrorists, we
are left with the conclusion that there must be some logic or rationale to their use of violence in separatist situations. There are several possibilities for its use. As noted, violence could be used in the attempt to influence the terrorists' community, either in a positive or a negative fashion, directly or through the antagonism of the opposing community; it could be used to further the terrorists' own interests; it might be used in order to play power games with the government; or it could be used because that is the way things have been done in the past, its use thus being reinforced over time with continued division within the society. By observing the two groups in question here, the PIRA and the FLQ, it should be possible to discover just which of these uses is the predominant factor in the terrorists' strategies and what factors accentuate or detract from the ability of the terrorists to accomplish their goals through the use of violence.
CHAPTER 3

DETERMINANTS IN THE USE OF TERRORISTIC VIOLENCE

The main question this paper attempts to analyze is why separatist groups resort to violence. While there can be many influences in this matter, there seem to be some obvious societal variables which tend to influence the nationalists in their decision to resort to armed struggle against what they see as an oppressive government and an oppressive society. This chapter looks at some of the secondary influences on the STGs, particularly those in Northern Ireland and Quebec, in order to determine how differences in the particular societies affect the choice to resort to violence.

HISTORY - A TRADITION OF VIOLENCE?

Thomas Spira has noted: "Western nationalism...is undoubtably grounded in traditionalism. It tries to revivify or recreate the national past and its glories, both imaginary and real."59 Part of the appeal of nationalism, and thus of separatism, then, is the link of a common history which relates all of the national community. How then does this relate to violence? It would seem likely that if this common past, this heritage of past glories, has affected the entire community through violence and violent discrimination then part of the revivification mentioned above would be carried on through
the acceptance of violence as a tool for independence within the community. Although mentioned in passing earlier, the histories of the two provinces are of main concern here.

Ireland, like most kingdoms during the middle ages, was rent with various factions all vying for territory and control on the island. It was not until the Stewart reign in England however that this violence became channeled into a common goal: the expulsion of the English. During the reign of Oliver Cromwell in the mid 1600s, the first organized Irish rebellion took place with ensuing bloodbaths recorded by both sides. Following these episodes, the tradition of Catholic/Protestant conflict was further engrained during the Battle of the Boyne in which the Catholics, in support of James II, were soundly defeated by the Protestants and William of Orange. This, in and of itself, might not have contributed to long lasting antagonism between the communities had it not been for the relish the Protestants took in their dominant position. This was visible both in their subjugation of the Catholic population and in the embellishment of the anniversary of the battle, celebrated by the Protestant community to this day. Since that time the Irish have resorted time and again to violence in order to correct the inequity created by English domination on the island.

The actual dates of these violent uprisings are relatively unimportant. They were led by both Protestant and Catholic Irishmen and they occurred about twice a century from the 1600s until the eventual independence of the Republic in the 1920s (actually called the Irish Free State from 1921 until 1937 when it declared itself Eire and then the Republic of Ireland in 1949). What is important however is the fact that in each of these rebellions there
were men who were perceived by the community as representing the interest of the Irish people. Irish nationalists from both the North and the South look on them as heroes. Further, on almost every one of these occasions, those Irishmen in rebellion were always on the losing side of the fight. These failures have had several effects. First of all, with each defeat the Irish, justly or unjustly, may have tended to feel ever more subjugated.

For not only did the rebels fail to accomplish their major goal of separation, but also, through their antagonism of the government in England, they often brought upon themselves and their community the retribution and punishment of the rulers in London. Thus, added to those previous grievances were the new ones based on the punishment meted out to the rebels, their accomplices, and the community in general. Also, because these rebels were ostensibly fighting for the good of all Ireland, their subsequent punishments, often their deaths, created heroes and martyrs for their fellow countrymen to emulate. This martyrdom created a legitimacy for their tactics and exonerated them from what might normally be considered reprehensible acts.

Perhaps the most effective martyr of all was James Connelly, a labor leader and head of one wing of Irish militants during the unsuccessful uprising in 1916. The fact that the rebellion took place at all is amazing considering that not even the rebels were agreed upon its timing and were nowhere near united in the decision to attack. More amazing still was the fact that these vastly outnumbered men had the audacity to proclaim their independence and confront what was probably the most powerful country in the world at the time in a military campaign. In fact, these aspects were so
obvious that even the participants knew their fate before they embarked on this revolt.\textsuperscript{50} It took the British only a week to quell the rebellion and, through secret trials, sentence the leaders to death. Yet it was through their deaths that the rebels gained their greatest success, with Connelly emerging as the most 'successful' of all. As was the custom, the leaders were sentenced to be shot in the traditional fashion of standing before a wall and facing a firing squad. Connelly, however, had been severely injured in the fighting so instead of standing to face the firing squad he was tied, bleeding, to a chair then shot. When the population found out about the executions, and Connelly's in particular, they were horrified and became greatly united behind the rebels’ cause. From that point on, if it had not existed before, the resorting to violent insurrection became glorified as a tribute to, and in the tradition of, the 'Men of 1916.' Thus: "... the Irish revolts, so bold in courage and so futile in execution, had by their very numbers fashioned a revolutionary tradition."\textsuperscript{51}

Yet, there is a greater impact which these rebellions have on the PIRA of today:

This widespread use of violence has left a legacy, and we have the residue today, principally for two reasons. Firstly, its effectiveness in bringing about revolutionary change has been demonstrated positively, and secondly, ... the original objective of its advocates have not been fully achieved ...\textsuperscript{62}

The first aspect of this statement can be debated on deductive and
definitional grounds. It was not violence which directly resulted in changes in the constitutional status of Ireland, although its important indirect effect has been noted. Nor can we necessarily claim that the changes which occurred were revolutionary in the classical sense of the word. As defined by Huntington, a revolution is:

... a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.63

The eventual independence received by the Republic of Ireland would more properly be classified as the result of a rebellion or insurrection in which we notice political change but not necessarily social change or change in the dominant myths of society or its values.64 Yet, importantly, the legacy mentioned above deals, not with the semantics of definitions or the logic of conclusions, but with the perception of previous success on the part of those taking part in the campaigns of rebellion. This, along with the fact that major nationalist objectives have been left unfinished, are of primary importance for the PIRA today. For even with the martyrs and the tradition of violence in Ireland, there would be no justification for terroristic violence in Northern Ireland today if it were not for the fact that the original objective of the rebels of the past, a free Ireland encompassing the entire island, has not been accomplished. With the background of an unfinished 'revolution', the PIRA is bolstered by past martyrs and traditions.
Without it, they would be hard pressed to justify their actions to the community they claim to represent. As long as the PIRA claim to have an unfinished task, as long as they can be seen in the light of continuing a just cause or trying to redress grievances, both past and present, they will have ample material with which to justify their violent struggle.

As noted in the introduction, the violent preludes to the FLQ are considerably fewer than those of the PIRA. The rebellion of the *Patriotes* in 1837-38 offers one of the few shows of violence by the French Canadians. In fact, it could be argued the opposite tendency, one of actuating change through constitutional means and parliamentary organization, forms the tradition of French nationalism in Quebec. The reasons for this may be many, but one of them is most assuredly the British treatment of the French Canadians since the very beginning of Canada. This treatment can be seen most notably in the light of the revolutionary atmosphere of the late 1700s and early 1800s in the United States and France:

...an alliance of Revolutionary France, America and a Fifth Column of French Canadians could have seriously threatened all British power on the American continent and around the Caribbean.

As a result, the British government continually reverted to a course of compromise and moderation. London usually decided in favour of Quebec's demands, and was often unwilling to back the English settlers in the area.65
The beginning of this policy of moderation can be traced to the Quebec Act of 1774 in which a broad range of concessions were given to the French Canadians covering areas of territory, religion, the economic system, judicial rights, and political representation. Considering the actual style of monarchical government practiced in Britain and Canada at the time, these concessions came nowhere near total democratic rights for the French, but they obviously were a show of good faith and went a long way in placating French fears of domination and subjugation. Further, while there was conflict within Canada at the time, and particularly within Quebec, the areas of conflict were limited to questions of provincial expenditure, religion and education. These were definitely issues which had great emotive possibilities, but the battles were confined mostly to the political realm, usually between the British appointed governor and the provincial legislature, and were seldom so strongly contested as to erupt into violence.

Another possible explanation for the absence of a violent nationalist movement in Quebec could be attributed to the relative homogeneity of the population in the province. This may have effected the situation in two ways. First, in order to lash out at injustice, the battle would have to be taken from the agrarian countryside, to which the majority of the population was tied, to the underpopulated cities of the 1800s. For it was in the cities, and particularly in the cities of Quebec and Montreal, that the main instruments of British domination and control were to be found. Attempts at conflict in other areas would only antagonize the otherwise sympathetic population. The British North America Act of 1867 provides the reasoning behind the second argument based on the homogeneous population. As noted
earlier, this act provided the foundation for federalism in Canada and, therefore, a degree of autonomy for Quebec. Thus, when faced with provincial problems Quebec could basically attempt to solve its own problems with relatively little internal antinationalist/antifrench dissent. This, in fact was the case in the latter half of the 19th century when Quebec became isolated from the rest of Canada and concerned itself almost entirely with its own internal affairs.66

Finally, in the 20th century, French nationalism has steadily become an influential force in both the political and social realms in Quebec. Perhaps best seen through international questions such as the two world wars, this nationalism has separated Quebec from the rest of Canada on many issues. Throughout both wars, for example, the French Canadians were strongly against conscription. This led to some large scale rioting in WWI and to a referendum in WWII in which 80% of the English Canadians voted for conscription and 78% of the French Canadians voted against it.69 The rioting was unorganized and short lived and thus did not set precedent for further violent acts. The debate against conscription simply lead to fewer French Canadians serving overseas.

Another area in which this growing nationalism can be seen is in the political realm where French Canadian politicians have become important in both provincial politics and nationwide. Men such as Henri Bourassa, Duplessis, Lesage, Levesque, and perhaps most importantly Trudeau have been very influential in highlighting various aspects of French Canadian nationalism, autonomy, and independence. Yet all of these men have one thing in common. True, they have all worked for French nationalism, in
varying degrees and with various goals, but from within the system. They had the ability (or luxury?) of letting the democratic system work for them. Although, for the most part, the most radical programs of these men were not enacted or long lasting, it was under this increased national ideology which they represented that violent separatism was born.

Thus, we see that for various reasons the French nationalists, unlike the Irish nationalists, have been unable to either utilize a violent tradition or to indoctrinate their community into the acceptance of violence for separatist goals. Because the Quebecois do not have the history of growing antagonisms as the Northern Irish Catholics have, or the psychology of an unfinished revolution working for them due to the accommodating nature of past British treatment, the violence they use is viewed by the French population in an atmosphere of relatively stable and peaceful community relations. In such a situation, violence is seen for what it is and can not be glorified or excused based on historical precedent. A history of violent conflict, recognized by STGs, can be used by them to help accomplish their goals. Without this history, violence must be looked at in an entirely different light, and its use must be circumscribed by possible antagonism to the community. Further, because the main fighters for Quebec’s French were parliamentarians, and not guerrillas or terrorists, there is no tradition of martyrdom for the French nationalists to follow. Thus, the socialization of violence over time and an acceptance by the respective community seems to be a vital cog in the strategy of violent separatism.
POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND REPRESENTATION

As noted earlier, there are two factors at work in the separatist situations being analyzed here. First, there is a sense of nationalism which unites a particular group of people who subjectively consider themselves a unified and distinct community. Second, this community often sees itself being discriminated against by a larger population in many if not most areas of social, political and economic life. To quote Coyle:

...aspirations, deprivations, and demands [create] strain components, which [may develop] eventually into what sociologists call "value-oriented movements." Such movements can best be diffused when the agencies of social control - preeminently the responsible government and the political parties... behave intelligently, and with flexibility. 70

If one agrees with the logic of this statement, it follows that community grievances, in large part, could be redressed if the feeling of discrimination were to be removed. The problem here is who is actually in control of these governmental positions to resolve the situation. Ideally, at least for the separatists and their 'nation' in general, resolution of problems of discrimination would best be handled by the community itself or its
representatives, for they would best know of the problems and best be able
to gauge reaction to the solutions put forth. Barring complete control over
the government, it would be expected, or at least hoped, that the nationalist
community would have a form of representation in governmental bodies in
some proportion to its population and with access to actual decision making
in the government. The reason for this, particularly in the cases represented
here, is based on the Westminster model of parliamentary government which
these two systems have inherited from Great Britain. As Lijphart points out:

In theory, because the House of Commons can vote a cabinet
out of office, it "controls" the cabinet. In reality, however,
the relationship is reversed. Because the cabinet is composed
of the leaders of a cohesive majority party in the House of
Commons, it is normally backed by the majority in the House
of Commons, and it can confidently count on staying in office
and getting its legislative proposals approved. 71 (emphasis mine)

Access to power is not assured in this type of system.

In this analysis, then, two aspects of access to the governmental system
will be examined. First, do the communities in question have fair
representational opportunities; and second, does this representation
translate into actual power and control, if only in a limited amount, over
community affairs and grievances? Ideally, one would like to conduct a
thorough examination of voting statistics for these communities and
compare the numbers observed with actual conditions. However, such an
analysis, while possible, is very superficial in these cases and particularly that of Northern Ireland. As noted earlier, Northern Ireland had a devolved government in its parliament at Stormont until 1972 when rule diverted back to the parliament at Westminster in London. It might be assumed therefore, based on the timing of the most recent troubles, that the grievances of the nationalists in Northern Ireland stem partly from this period of governance. Yet a simple analysis of the representation in Stormont at this time is anything but conclusive:

**Table 1**

**NATIONALIST VOTING STATISTICS IN STORMONT ELECTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>N/R* VOTES</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTES</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N/R</th>
<th>%¹</th>
<th>N/R SEATS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ELECTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>165,293</td>
<td>510,916</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>112,067</td>
<td>384,745</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>37,763</td>
<td>290,097</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>44,990</td>
<td>167,333</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>16,167</td>
<td>329,304</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>32,546</td>
<td>354,874</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>101,445</td>
<td>373,221</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>39,936</td>
<td>256,750</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>41,181</td>
<td>235,702</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>45,680</td>
<td>295,874</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>27,430</td>
<td>324,589</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>42,315</td>
<td>559,087</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates those candidates running on the nationalist or republican tickets, i.e. those whose platforms were based on anti-partition.

¹ indicates the N/R candidates as a percentage of all candidates contesting seats.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>CATH.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>PROT/PRESB/METH</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,482,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>768,000</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,280,000</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>791,000</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,371,000</td>
<td>471,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,425,000</td>
<td>496,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>830,000</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,536,000</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>811,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,482,000</td>
<td>415,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>663,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Realizing that the total vote for a party is at most a rough estimate of community preferences, there are several points which can be made here. First, in general, while the total percentage of seats occupied by the Irish nationalist community's representatives is lower than the total percentage of Catholics in the north, the figure is not so low as to be totally out of step with fair proportional representation even given the high 35% Catholic population in 1961. Further, a simple sight analysis of the percent total vote v. percent seats won shows some anomalies. First, for the years '25, '33, '53, '58, and '62 the ratio, % of seats to % of vote, varies by less than .2 from the ideal proportionality of 1% of the votes resulting in 1 % of the seats occupied, not necessarily what one would expect in the case of a group claiming discrimination. Second, in elections where the nationalists' vote percentage dropped drastically, specifically '25-'29, '33-'38, '49-'53, '62-'65, the loss in percentage of vote came nowhere near a corresponding loss in percentage of seats. On the other hand, from the elections in '65-'69
a small gain in percentage vote was met with an amazing loss in seats. A similar inconsistency is seen in the elections spanning '53-'56-'62, in which a 2% gain in total vote from '53-'56 was met with a 2% loss in seats while a 2% loss in votes from '56-'62 was met with a 2% gain in seats. All of this actually means very little except that in a straightforward analysis there is little proof that the nationalist Catholic community of Northern Ireland was being discriminated against in the legislature at Stormont.

What the numbers do not show are the more elusive facts of Northern Ireland's political situation. First, despite the seats/vote ratios, because the Protestants always had a majority in Stormont, the Catholic community never had any input at the ministerial level or any chance of obtaining a majority vote on issues key to the communities. Further, because the Protestants always had a clear majority, they were able to change the districts and the voting procedures in order to allow themselves a large number of safe seats. This is perhaps best seen in the trimming of the predominantly Catholic counties of Donegal, Monaghan and Cavan upon partition in order to increase the Protestant majority in Stormont. Further, it was claimed that the Protestants, by concentrating the Catholic vote in the remaining counties of the North into several districts, ensured they had a disproportionate number of safe seats in the Stormont parliament. This latter point evidences some ambiguity however. While there is no doubt about the fact that the Stormont election procedures were altered by the Protestants, there is a question as to whether this constituted a gerrymander as the nationalists claimed.

Initially, Stormont elections were held under the auspices of the Local
Government (Ireland) Act of 1919 which established the single transferrable vote system of proportional representation (PR) which, with the 2/3 majority held by the Protestants, ensured their dominance in the parliament.\textsuperscript{74} This, however, was changed, prior to the 1929 elections, to one of single member districts. As pointed out by Whyte, the alteration of the district lines, while having questionable results for some counties, namely Fermanagh where nationalists obviously were discriminated against, did not result in an overall loss to the nationalist community, nor was it meant to.\textsuperscript{75} Further, as would be expected, the shift from PR to the single member district did hurt some parties.\textsuperscript{76} Yet, rather than greatly affecting nationalist representation, this change in the electoral system hurt the more centrist parties in the North which tried to bridge the sectarian divide between unionist and nationalist communities.\textsuperscript{77} As can be seen in Table 1, the changed electoral situation in 1929 resulted in the loss of only one seat to the nationalist parties.

This, in and of itself may not have been of great importance because, firstly, even with full turnout of the Catholic vote, chances were, depending on Protestant turnout, there would still be a 2 to 1 ratio favoring the Protestants. More important was the republican policy of abstentionism. Although not of primary importance in the first several elections, the policy of showing non-acceptance of the border, by not recognizing and not sitting in any of the governments directly affected by it may have had the effect of slowly reducing most Catholic participation in politics in the North. Further, elections in Northern Ireland were unusual in the fact that they had a traditionally high proportion of uncontested seats, averaging about 43%
from 1929 to 1969. This may indicate the republican and unionist recognition of the imbalances created by the district boundaries; republicans would win their districts safely as would the unionists. To try to swing a district would simply not have been possible in many areas.

However, republicans did see the need to contest and occupy local seats in Northern Ireland because of the direct effect they had on the Catholic communities. It is here that we see the real ability of the Protestant majority to control Northern Irish politics. Despite being originally set up to be based on PR, the local government election rules were soon amended in order to block Catholic representation. This was done by means of the Local Government (Ireland) Act of 1922 which effectively ended PR at the local level and mandated an oath of allegiance to the English crown by elected officials. The effects such an oath would have on a population hoping to unite with the government to the South, and who did not see the border as legitimate to begin with, is obvious. To take the oath would mean accepting defeat. Further, the effects of ending PR, along with the Unionists' ability to determine district boundaries, population size, residence (initially 3, but later changed to 7 years) and property qualifications (based on the categories of 'resident occupiers', limiting the vote to two persons in a household, and 'general occupiers', allowing those with property values of £10 or more to nominate other voters for each additional £10 valuation), are best seen by viewing one of the most extreme cases: Londonderry.
TABLE 3

LONDONDERRY LOCAL AUTHORITY RETURNS 1967*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>CATHOLIC VOTERS</th>
<th>OTHER VOTERS</th>
<th>RETURNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>8 Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>3,697</td>
<td>4 Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>10,047</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>6 Non-Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,429</td>
<td>8,781</td>
<td>12 Unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Non-Unionists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Local electoral systems, while usually based on ward districting, were left up to the various authorities to determine. In Londonderry, the three ward system was introduced allowing voters in each ward to vote at large for the delegated number of members.

Similar trends in disproportionate Unionist representation on Local Authorities can be seen province-wide. Obviously, the democratic ideal of 'one man, one vote' does not apply to this situation. Nor was this situation (reorganized in 1973 to fall under more direct control of the government in London) one that was covered up or ignored by the relevant parties concerned. It was a major hub of the civil rights movement in the late 1960's and became a focus in the Cameron Reports which analyzed the rioting at the turn of that decade:

...the arrangement of ward boundaries for local government purposes has produced in the local authority a permanent unionist majority which bears little or no resemblance to the relative strength of unionists and non-unionists in the
area. 83

Therefore, what we see in the political situation in Northern Ireland is a community severely restricted in its ability to provide for its own welfare. On the most basic level, at least historically, the Catholic/republican community has been discriminated against in the area of the most direct governmental contact: the Local Authority which had a great deal of control over both housing and jobs in any one particular area or city. Some of the more discriminatory aspects of this Local Authority problem were ended with the transfer of responsibility for things such as housing to British authority. Yet these problems, being as central as they were at the beginning of the current troubles, were not forgotten.

Where the Catholic community does not seem to be as obviously discriminated against, namely in past Northern Irish Parliamentary elections, simple population ratios deny them any control over their situation. Further, because the Catholic/republican population (although not necessarily always the same) may see itself as a branch of a larger community, that of the islandwide Irish community, it is possible that they might perceive what little representation they would be allowed, given a united population, as being insignificant. In a situation of islandwide government, the Northern Catholics would be in the majority and would probably be able to exercise their rights as they wished. In the absence of such a situation the Catholic population of the North might view itself as being unfairly relegated to second class citizenship.
Finally, based on the possibility that this larger national view may exist, the Northern Catholic community would probably not recognize the border between North and South and thus support political groups who represent this view. Unfortunately, while research has been done on both legitimate and illegitimate parties representing the major sectarian divides in the two communities and their attempts at attracting voters to their platforms, information on the actual alignment of the voting patterns in the North is relatively sparse. Obvious trends have been noted:

In most liberal democracies, politics is a battle for control of the floating centre vote...This situation is reversed in Northern Ireland. Every election since the formation of the state has demonstrated that the political centre is electorally irrelevant...The main problem for both the Unionist and Nationalist parties was not the winning of such support; it was ensuring the allegiance of the extremist wings. The policies which were rewarded by success at the polls were those which emphasised basic loyalties and the need for sectarian solidarity.84

Yet, while this may be a fine analysis of party politics in Northern Ireland, it indicates very little about the attitudes of the communities as a whole towards fairness of the system, discrimination, or even if concern was given on an individual basis to these problems. Thus, while it might be
logical to conclude that the two communities never vote for a party representing the opposing views based on a recognition of allegiance to either the nationalist or unionist constitutional desires, the automatic assumption of complete sectarian community support for one position or the other can not be made.

Whether or not the situation exists in which the Catholic community, as a whole, perceives massive discrimination by the Protestant community, thus leading them to accept violence, is not clear. What does seem to be more clear is that many of the leaders of the Catholic communities in the North, or at least the would be leaders, have resorted to violence as the means for personal political expression. While it is not completely obvious that this is their only logical option, it does appear that through the maintenance of a violent confrontational situation in the province the terrorists are able to, or at least attempt to exhibit themselves as suppliers of a good to the community. Once again, one would ideally look towards elected representatives to address problems in the community. Yet by claiming that representation is, for the most part, unsuccessful, they are able to resort to nonconstitutional methods in the attempt to ensure community perceptions of safety and well being. Granted, the display presented by the civil rights marchers went a long way towards forcing reform in the North and showing that other options could succeed. Still, it is argued, the advantages gained were not come by through sympathetic responses from the Northern government, but rather through a reliance on international sympathy and outrage. Thus, because the pressure for reform came mostly from third
parties, it would not be a situation on which to rely in the future. In order to ensure that the community would look towards its own survival in the future, therefore, the leaders of the separatist group found it necessary to be perceived as supplying a good which the community could not receive elsewhere: defense.

The situation for Quebec in Canadian politics is not nearly as complicated nor as conflictual simply due to the federal nature of the system. The national assembly of Canada is the House of Commons with 282 members elected by district based on population. As Quebec is the second largest province in the country (behind Ontario) it has the second highest number of representatives in the House with 75 seats compared to Ontario's 95. Further, there have been only two major parties consistently vying for control of the House since at least the mid 1940s; the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Conservatives for the most part are based in Ontario and represent the mainly Protestant Anglo population, although by no means is it a party based solely on ethnic/national support from that group. Rather it is more of an ideological party of the near right. The Liberals, on the other hand represent politics on the near left if not the middle of the road. Traditionally, the Liberal leadership has swung back and forth between French and English Canadians and has almost always been the favored party in Quebec elections. Thus, Quebec has always had input into national politics. Of course, the province does not always get its way due to the national scope of the Liberal Party, and much of the recent push in Quebec for separation has come in response to Liberal impetus towards greater
Canadian nationalism and less provincial concentration. The fact that this emphasis on national rather than provincial unity was the design of Pierre Trudeau, a French Canadian in charge of the Liberal Party, reinforces the idea that the French Canadians have the ability to work both with and through the parliament in Ottawa.

In the Quebec government, the situation is even less ambiguous from the French Canadians point of view. As the French speakers constitute about 60% of the Quebec population they have always held the reigns of power in the province. This is relatively important as the provinces are responsible for a number of areas in the social and economic spheres. These include education, social services and civil justice along with some control over their own natural resources. Thus, the French Canadians have consistently held power in the province. This, as noted earlier, has allowed the French in the province to maintain a great deal of isolation and independence when faced with problems within the community. Further, the ability of the French leadership to make its and the community's wishes known through legitimate political means by way of the two assemblies has diverted any major non-legislative movements through the realization that the population can express itself through its majority standing and its ability to block, if not control, the national legislature due to the proportion of seats it is allowed.

This ability to control, particularly in the Quebec legislature, is best exemplified by the emergence of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1968. The PQ, under the leadership of Rene Levesque, was formed under the auspices of the
French separatist movement and maintains that goal, at least in part, in its current party platform. Because of the federal nature of the Canadian system, and due to the obvious attraction the party had among French voters, the PQ was able, in its first contested elections in 1970 and 1973, to win enough support to set it as the second ranking party in Quebec behind the Quebec branch of the Liberal Party (PLQ).\textsuperscript{85} Further, by the third election the PQ had entered, that of 1976, it was able to gain the majority of seats in the Quebec legislature and maintained that position until 1985.\textsuperscript{86} Yet despite the favorable results in these elections, the PQ has not been able to win the votes needed in referendum to accomplish its goal of separation-association (a scheme whereby political separation would be accompanied by economic association with the rest of Canada). Clearly, by working within the legitimate political system the PQ is not only able to share control of Quebec politics and thus important aspects of Quebec’s social and economic system, but is also able to gauge French demands and therefore act and react to variations in the community’s will.

A final interesting aspect of the French Canadian leadership’s choice to play politics from within the system is the story of Pierre Vallieres. Vallieres was a member of the terrorist FLQ from 1965 to 1966. In this time he seems to have been the spiritual and ideological leader of the group and the greatest supporter of revolutionary separatism for Quebec.\textsuperscript{87} He was arrested in 1966 for these terrorist activities and imprisoned in Montreal where he wrote his autobiography \textit{White Niggers of America} chronicling what he saw as the injustices in Canada and how revolutionaries
should attempt to rectify them. He was released from prison in 1969 and subsequently joined Levesque’s Parti Quebecois, a drastic shift in terms of his previous revolutionary action. It appears obvious therefore that in situations where legitimate political action is open to community leaders, along with the ability of those leaders in such situations to actually be able to offer concrete rewards and benefits to the community, there is little advantage gained in opting for the violent approach to separatism. However, in the absence of this ability to provide benefits through the system there is the possibility that community leaders can provide benefits in extra-legal ways in order to maintain community support. On the other hand, if there is an attempt to gain community support through violence while the option of legitimate political power still exists, there is little inducement for that community to follow the lead of the terrorists. Their continued support of the government offers more in the way of assured and probably longer lasting concrete benefits than if they were to turn to revolutionary violence.

Thus, as Levi and Hechter have pointed out, the factors influencing who the community supports can be broken down to; 1) the demands for benefits available from the party, and 2) the supply of benefits which exist elsewhere. In the case of Northern Ireland, the legitimate parties representing the Catholic community have little to offer in the way of benefits to the community. Thus it is in the community’s best interests to go elsewhere, outside of party politics, for some of their daily wants and needs which, importantly, seem to be supplied by the PIRA to a great degree.
Conversely, in Quebec, groups outside of party politics have little to offer in the way of benefits for the community. Further, there is a great deal to be gained by supporting politics for those interested in French nationalism. To go against the system might simply antagonize the government and actually reduce the benefits which the community already enjoys. This analysis would tend to support the theory presented earlier which places importance on the leadership and its ability to either assuage community differences or reinforce them, but based on the system the leadership is working in.

Another measure of the effects the structure of government might have on terrorist incidents is the possible increase or decrease in the level of violence as those who hold governmental power are brought into or depart from office. The main question to be asked here is: As control of the government moves from party to party, or from leader to leader within a single party, does the level of nationalist terror change?

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Governments and Terroristic Violence 1969-1984}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{YEAR} & \textbf{STORMONT \ PAR\ T\ Y} & \textbf{WESTMINSTER \ PAR\ T\ Y} & \textbf{DEFENSE*} & \textbf{CIVILIANS} & \textbf{TOTAL} \\
\hline
1971 & Faulkner & & 59 & 705 & 115 & 1838 & 174 & 2543 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>STORMONT PARTY</th>
<th>WESTMINSTER PARTY</th>
<th>DEFENSE* K</th>
<th>DEFENSE* I</th>
<th>CIVILIANS K</th>
<th>CIVILIANS I</th>
<th>TOTAL K</th>
<th>TOTAL I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972 (to Mch '72)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>3813</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>4876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>639</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2651</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Labour (Feb-Oct. 1974)</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2398</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Labour (Oct.1974)</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2044</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2474</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>2729</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1398</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Conservatives (1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
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<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>525</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the British Army, and the Ulster Defense Regiment.
K = number of persons killed
I = number of persons injured

As can be seen from the above table and as might be expected considering the circumstances there is little significant relationship between violence and the government at Stormont. Up until rule of Northern Ireland reverted back to Westminster in 1972 violent acts on the part of the nationalists steadily increased. Obviously, the terrorists were less inclined to cooperate with Faulkner at the end of the Stormont government than they were with O'Neill at the beginning of the current troubles in 1969 simply because of the continuing and aggregating grievances to both the community and the group. Further, although there are variations among the levels of violence
from regime to regime the overall trend seems to be a gradual reduction over time starting in 1972. If we disregard the election years where the elections fell in the middle of the year (6/70 and 5/79) as years of transition in the chart, and thus not necessarily identifiable with either party, we see that violence, in terms of the sums of those killed and injured, is highest during a Conservative government (averaging 3654 for the years '71–'73) and lowest during a Conservative government (averaging 893 for the years '80–'84). It is probable that the initial response of both Labour and Conservative governments was one of getting tough with the terrorists, possibly resulting in a more violent backlash from them. Also, it must be realized that while continuing a tough stance in word if not in deed, the Thatcher government has made overtures to the Republic of Ireland in terms of its rights to be involved in negotiations concerning the North. Despite their outward reaction, stating Britain had not gone far enough in this direction, the PIRA must be somewhat satisfied with the turn these events have taken. Thus, a rational argument can be made for the variations in violence depending on the government in power. Yet the figures are not plentiful enough to make a totally convincing argument for this stand. It might just as easily be the case that violence in general is simply used less by the terrorists over time and that the next government to take power will see a further reduction in the totals despite its view on the legitimacy of the nationalists claims, or its actions toward the community.

When analyzed statistically there initially appears to be a relatively strong relationship between defense deaths and the party in power in
Westminster (coefficient=22.8, standard error=16.8, t-statistic=1.4, probability>t=.197). However, when the year 1972 is corrected for, on the grounds that it appears to be an outlier, it becomes the most important variable and the party seems to be unrelated (Party: coefficient=9.1, standard error=10.8, t-statistic=.8, probability>t=.417; 1972: coefficient=111.5, standard error=24.4, t-statistic=4.6, probability>t=.001). This being the case one would have to assume that there was something distinct about 1972 which caused all casualty figures to jump, including defense injuries, civilian deaths, and civilian injuries in addition to military deaths. There are several explanations for this. One explanation is that the PIRA at this time finally began using the weapons at their disposal more efficiently enabling them to be more self assured in their use of such weapons as landmines and boobytraps. Also, in January, British troops opened fire on a large group of Catholics, most if not all of whom were civilians, killing 13 of them and earning the title of 'Bloody Sunday' for the massacre, a situation which went a long way in antagonizing the Catholic community and the PIRA. Further, with the onset of direct rule the government in London attempted to arrange a ceasefire with the PIRA. While the ceasefire accomplished reduced terrorist attacks against British officers, it failed to curb intercommunal violence. Finally, with the intercommunal violence continuing apace, the PIRA ended the truce with Britain in the knowledge that they were the only ones who would be able to protect the Catholic community from the Protestant gangs. With the ending of the ceasefire, the PIRA embarked upon, or rather renewed and intensified its bombing
campaign against both British and Protestant targets. A further argument can be made that the level of violence in Northern Ireland is more closely dependent on the military response which the Westminster government makes in regard of the terrorists. During the time Westminster was trying to bolster the parliament at Stormont, except for a period towards the end of 1970, the troop levels were continually rising, and from 1972 on have been in a noticeable decline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troop Level 1</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troop Level 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>14,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparing the level of violence to troop levels it seems to be a safe assumption that the PIRA was simply responding in kind to action taken against it: more troops, more violence. Thus, when the British began reducing the level of its troops in the Province the violence directed by the terrorists also dropped. But once again the facts are not clear enough to distinguish among the causes for the level of violence. In a statistical analysis the year 1972, as with the party analysis above, seems to be the main independent variable influencing the situation, but the variations are
so small that no firm conclusions can be drawn (coefficient=10.0, standard error=3.0, t-statistic=3.3, probability>t=.007). Nor are the facts definitive enough to decide which came first; troop increases and withdrawals or surges and relaxations in violence. From the evidence therefore, it does not seem to be the case that violence is a reaction to specific governmental situations. Variations in the party in power in London is not a cause for the PIRA to vary their attacks in Northern Ireland. Rather, it would appear that the use of violence is relatively independent of policy shifts from Britain and depends more on immediate situational variables and group strategies.

A similar analysis of Quebec violence leads to similar conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>INCIDENTS</th>
<th>DEATHS/INJURED</th>
<th>PARTY QUEBEC</th>
<th>PARTY CANADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>Interim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966†</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>Interim</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>UNION NAT'L</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0/34</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970†</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2/0</td>
<td>Interim</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* indicates election years for Canada
' indicates election years for Quebec
INCIDENTS includes all recorded criminal
offences by the terrorist group
Interim indicates elections took place
mid-year

Through simple observation, reinforced by statistical analysis, there is
no strong dependent relationship between terrorist violence and those
parties in power either in Quebec or in Ontario. Yet, while there is no
consistent pattern developed here, in several cases the FLQ are directly
influenced by party politics. Specifically, some attacks were directed
against particular parties as listed below:

1. 10/23/63; burglary at the offices of the New Democratic Party.
2. 6/6/66; bombing at a Liberal Party rally.
3. 9/8/66; bomb discovered at the Quebec Liquor Commission.*
4. 10/13/66; bomb discovered at the provincial building of the
   Ministry of Labor.*
5. 10/14/68; bomb discovered at the Renaissance Club of the Union
   Nationale.
6. 10/14/68; bombing of the Reform Club of the Liberal Party.
7. 12/31/68; 2 bombings (1 unsuccessful) at the Montreal City Hall.*
6. 2/8/69; bomb discovered at the Ministry of Labor.*
9. 2/22/69; bombing of the Reform Club of the Liberal Party.
10. 9/28/69; bombing of the mayor of Montreal's house.*
11. 6/24/70; bombing of the Ministry of Defense, Ottawa.*
12. 10/5/70; British Trade Commissioner kidnapped.*
13. 10/10/70; Minister of Labor kidnapped and killed.*

Although there was no consistent pattern to the FLQ terror over the years, a relatively high percentage of their attacks (about 11%) were directed either at specific parties or at various governmental installations. Yet these attacks also point to the fact that the FLQ did not necessarily play favorites according to the party in power. Based simply on their goals of separation one would expect a high percentage of their attacks to be directed against government installations. In such a situation (indicated by * above) it is difficult to tell if the attack was directed against the party holding power or the role an institution plays regardless of party control. Further, during the course of the FLQ campaigns, the Conservative Party was not in power except for a short while at the beginning of 1963, thus almost entirely excluding them from possible attack. The rest of the attacks against party targets, though few in number, are split fairly equally between the Liberals and the Union Nationale. Further, because of the infrequency of attacks over the years, it is almost impossible to discern an easing of attacks with party changes. Thus, the facts overall are inconclusive except that the FLQ often directed its attacks against
governmental representatives whether in or out of power.

An interesting note however is the fact that as an organization the FLQ ceased to exist about the same time the Parti Quebecois entered the political scene in Quebec. Though not necessarily directly related, it seems that if the option for legitimate separatist participation is open, violence takes a second seat, a fact reinforced by the realignment of Pierre Vallierais from the FLQ to the PQ upon his release from jail.96 No doubt much of the reason the FLQ ceased to exist was the fact that security measures all through these years were quite successful. However, the fact that there has been no major resurgence in recent years seem to indicate that the French leadership is satisfied that separatism is receiving proper attention in the governmental bodies.

Thus, it would seem that both of these cases support the theory that governmental structure plays an important role in determining the ability for STGs to both mount and maintain successful campaigns of violence. In situations where major parts of the population have little or no ability to hold the reins of power at any level, violent reaction, particularly when that violence seems to supply a needed commodity, becomes possible on a major scale when the community expresses a desire for that commodity thereby supporting groups able to deliver it. When there are other avenues open for the representation of the community in question, and the receipt of necessary goods is assured through overall community control of important aspects of its social and economic life, violence, while still an option, ceases to receive full support due to the benefits offered through peaceful
management of conflict and discrimination.

Although less conclusive, it also appears that the determinants in these situations are the overall structures of the governments in question and not the variations which occur over time within them. However, given the time frame being analyzed here, this inconclusiveness must be stressed. Only longer trends will supply the much needed information to assure that the party in power really does not matter. Thus, it will be important to observe future variations in both Northern Ireland and Canada. Two particular scenarios will prove most interesting. First, what will be the PIRA's reaction to possible moves towards more autonomy, as begun by the Thatcher government, by the next ruling party in Great Britain? Will anything short of complete independence and unification help quell PIRA violence? Also, in light of the recent PQ losses in Quebec, will continued losses by this legitimate separatist group lead to a resurgence of illegitimate separatist violence? While only long term analyses will answer these questions, there is little doubt that the ability of either group to continue or revive its strategy of violence is based in part on the ability of the community to enjoy basic representation and assurances of basic rights through control of at least community-specific needs and benefits.

VIOLENCE AND THE ECONOMY

Another factor often pointed to in situations of violence is the economic standing of the group in question. Yet, as pointed out earlier, the belief that
economic discrimination of one form or another tends to lead to violence does not address how the group is specifically affected by discrimination or how violence is supposed to redress the grievances of the group and the community. Again, on an individual basis, the use of violence during a time of economic hardship might be expected. Frustration and relative deprivation have been shown to be associated with aggression when there are limited alternatives. But to argue that in a minority group situation, violence might be turned to in order to somehow address overall economic problems within the community does not make much sense.

There obviously are examples of groups being able to use violence in order to secure economic benefits. The British desire for opium among other things during the opening of China may be the best example and it is claimed by many that the entire idea of colonialism stems from the use of force in order to continue favorable economic exchange. Yet the use of force in order to manipulate economic conditions is greatly dependent on whether those using the force are more powerful or less powerful than those from whom they are trying to obtain economic gains. In separatist situations, the separatist group, almost by definition, has less power than the government which controls the economic resources. Thus, an attempt to gain economic reward through the use of violence would probably be self-defeating. What is more likely in such situations, and what seems to be the case in both of the situations at hand, is that violence is being used to manipulate the political positions of the groups involved in the attempt to affect the economic situation in a secondary manner.
The question of whether discrimination applies to the cases being examined here remains to be answered fully. For Northern Ireland, while accusations of discrimination have been abundant, proof of actual discrimination on the part of the Protestant majority against the Catholic minority has not been conclusive. In an excellent analysis of existing data, John Whyte has surveyed the existing literature and facts from the beginning of the Stormont government up until the civil rights activities in the late 1960s as fully as can be expected.\textsuperscript{98} His conclusions do indicate that the Catholics, in some areas of the economy, were discriminated against, but often not to the extent they claimed. In the six areas he examines from which past cries of discrimination have emanated, he found discrimination most abundant in the areas of electoral practices, public employment, and policing and least evident (or least proven) in the areas of private employment, public housing and regional policy.\textsuperscript{99} Particularly interesting in his analysis is the area of public housing, a main area of complaint by the civil rights activists in the late 1960s:

The civil rights agitation of 1968 was sparked by the allocation of a house at Caledon, in Dungannon Rural District [a Catholic majority area], to an unmarried Protestant girl ... when there were Catholic families in the area badly in need of housing. It is no consolation to such victims to tell them that in many parts of Northern Ireland they would have received fair treatment. This does, however, seem to be the truth.\textsuperscript{100}
Given then that at least part of the time some discrimination was evident in Northern Ireland (although, importantly, the most severe cases were to be found in the political sphere not the economic), what would be the most logical strategy to end these practices. It was definitely not the IRA and the gun. The people of the Catholic community instead, following the lead of black activists in the U.S.A., took to non-violent protest in the form of popular marches. These marches were organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) which based the protests on 7 demands which covered fairness in voting qualifications, electoral districting, public employment, housing, and policing among others.¹⁰¹ Thus:

... by August [1970] ... the Faulkner government [at Stormont] was able to publish and present to Parliament a booklet setting out a number of legislative and administrative changes which, on paper at least, met almost all of the original demands of the civil rights movement ... The enactment of these measures, under pressure from the civil rights campaign and the increasing concern of the British government, did not bring about instant change, but it did represent an end to the most blatant form of discrimination in Ulster. Yet by then the militants were not interested in civil rights demands.¹⁰²

In this situation, it seems obvious that the violence the PIRA used was
not meant to deliver economic equality to Northern Catholics, but was justified as such, seemingly as an afterthought particularly after its introduction in defense of the community. Further, while the PIRA campaign dragged on, economic targets were attacked in the attempt to make British control and authority over the North impossible. They were not attacked in the hope of obtaining economic benefits.

The situation in Quebec, while different in the circumstances, has similar outcomes for the rationale of violence. Rather than any concrete complaints of discrimination, the situation in the province of Quebec was one of a feeling of loss of control:

The movement in favour of the political independence [not violent separation] of Quebec is a social coalition of several groups in the francophone community - portions of the working class, those in the middle classes who work outside the private sector, and the intelligentsia. These three groups, despite different interests, have come together in a single political movement because each perceives a need for the francophone community to have greater control over its own affairs [both economic and social].

Particularly, it was the working class which placed the greatest emphasis on the economic aspects of this loss of control. The private sector of the middle class and the "capitalist class" saw that the economy of Quebec, despite all intentions, past, present and future, was inexorably tied
to the economies of both anglophone Canada and the United States. Attempts at separatism would give the Quebecois more control over their resources and expenditures, but it would not break the dependency on these two other major economies. Violent separation, in fact, could even increase the economic problems of Quebec particularly in the form of dwindling capital investment from the United States which otherwise could help the depressed economy get rolling again, but which would probably not be forthcoming in the face of political instability.

Thus, while economic concerns are important to separatist situations, the problems the economy poses are not subject to violent resolution. The economy may indeed play a secondary role in the use of violence, particularly when it is disrupted in order to create a more chaotic situation. Yet, based on these two cases it seems reasonable that violence will be used by these groups, not to affect the economy directly, but in an attempt to gain political control of a region and thus its economic policies and resources.

**COMMUNITY DETERMINANTS**

A final aspect in the determination of violence in separatist situations are the influences of various community actors not directly involved with the groups in question. As the histories of these two provinces might suggest, the Roman Catholic Church may be expected to be one of the prime movers in the argument against the use of violence. Yet, in searching the
literature there are very few references to the role the Catholic Church plays in these crises. In Canada this absence is more notable than it is in Northern Ireland. The reason for this is not entirely clear, but it appears that as Quebec was undergoing its Quiet Revolution, in which attempts were made at increasing Quebec's modernization, the need for secularization in order to control various aspects of the welfare state, particularly its funding, was acknowledged by the Church:

The advent of the welfare state [around 1960] meant that hospitals [and later schools, social aid agencies, credit unions and the labor movement the latter two having been initiated and organized by the clergy] had to be incorporated independently of the religious orders that ran them... But the Church had no desire to make a stand against the secularization resulting from increasing reliance on public funds. It was generally accepted that the days of clerical paternalism had finally come to an end. 106

Thus, it appears that at the same time Quebec was realizing that it had to fight to maintain its culture, the Catholic Church was beginning to fade as one of the main influences within the society. Further, considering the Marxist leanings of many in the FLQ, it is doubtful that, even had the Church attempted to mediate in the conflict, their efforts would have been successful.
Another aspect of the community which has important implications in the use of separatist terrorist violence is the community at large. It has been stressed and will continue to be stressed that in order for "guerrilla" groups to survive they need to be able to make themselves invisible when fighting from a condition of relative weakness. The best way to do this would be to have a large population in which to hide, thereby becoming indistinguishable from the average man on the street. Public support, however, is relatively difficult to measure in conflictual situations. One can not simply take a questionnaire into the streets and ask people if they favor terrorism or outlawed separatist groups. Thus, one is forced into using more general measures, as was done earlier in terms of political parties and their relative support.

In this sense, polls can be taken which measure relative support on key issues, namely the will to separate in this instance. In their work on Quebec independence, Hamilton and Pinard have included such polling data from 1962 until 1980 for adult French Canadians. The results of their efforts need not be reproduced here. But the main point which comes out of their work is that from the time the FLQ was formed until disbanded in 1970, the French population favoring independence never exceeded 16%. Thus, not only was there little evidence of popular support for separation, but one must assume that even among those who favored separation, only a small percent would have favored violence leading to that end.

In Northern Ireland, the situation is reversed. The Catholic Church has often attempted to play a part in the troubles. However its effects can not
be easily discerned. In the 1920s, the Church was adamant in its opposition to the IRA. However, the population at this time did not see the IRA battle as a religious matter, but rather saw the group as a political actor and was therefore separated from Church influences in this matter. Since the beginning of the present troubles, the Church has continually maintained two streams of thought; the abhorrence of the use of violence despite the ends obtained, and a condemnation of the oppression by which a large section of the population was afflicted. Despite this stance, the Church has had seemingly little influence on the use of violence by the PIRA. Minor gains have been made, such as the reported turning of popular opinion temporarily against the PIRA after they reprimanded the clergy for supporting the end of the hunger strike in 1981; yet the Church's effect has been limited.

On the other hand, the support by the Catholic population for the dissolution of the border and a reuniting with the Republic (not support for the PIRA) has been much greater than that in Quebec. While continuous data are less available, opinions from the start of the troubles and from recent polls are interesting. In his poll taken in 1968, Rose records that 56% of the Catholic population interviewed favored dissolution of the border. In 1984, Market and Opinion Research International conducted a poll in which 75% of the Catholics interviewed in the North favored a united Ireland (up from 58% reported in 1981). Thus, while there is evidence of great variation, it appears that a majority of the Catholic population has supported a united Ireland since the beginning of the present troubles.
this is no sure indication of support for the PIRA, it is probable that the PIRA would find it easier to maneuver and operate within their province than the FLQ in Quebec.

Finally, some mention must be made of the role other groups desiring the same general goals play in effecting violence used by the groups in question. In Quebec, as noted earlier, political parties had little impact on limiting FLQ violence. But to reemphasize, the Parti Quebecois did not appear on the scene until the decline of the FLQ. Thus, it may appear that due to the legitimacy given the electoral procedures and the French majority in Quebec those willing to carry out violent separation can be appeased in the short term through the election of likeminded parties. In Northern Ireland, conversely, the PIRA assumes that any party representing the nationalist/Catholic population will refuse to sit in any major governmental forum, since participation would tend to legitimize the partition now in place. Parties which do take their seats, on the other hand, are obviously, according to the PIRA, supporting the divide and the dominance of Great Britain in Irish affairs. Thus, while there are other parties which claim to have the wellbeing of the nationalist population at heart, they have no major effect on PIRA strategies. Further, as will be noted later, groups who tentatively agree with the PIRA's methods of violence but not their view of how a united Ireland should be governed tend to lead the PIRA into the use of more violence. Unfortunately for these other groups, the increase in the use of violence is usually directed towards communal infighting aimed specifically at those other groups instead of against their common enemy:
the British.
CHAPTER 4

GROUP DETERMINANTS OF VIOLENCE

Despite the fact that many events and factors within society may lead people and groups to violence, by far the most important determinant in the use of terroristic violence is the perception of the group actually using it. The main questions to be examined here are the following. What reasons do separatist terrorist groups offer for the use of violence? Is the use of violence successful in achieving those ends in the long term? The obvious problem here lies in the reluctance of these groups to admit their major strategies for reasons of secrecy and survival. Further, while some justification may be given in official claims of responsibility, the reasoning behind the violence may lie on more than a single level. For both of these reasons, this section will put forth possible uses of violence and attempt to discover whether or not the groups in question have discovered any benefits in using violence aimed at designated goals.

Another problem which will have to be dealt with as this analysis progresses is the way in which 'success' is defined. This once again leads to the problem of the level of justification and the ends to which various strategies are directed. STGs, perhaps more than any other group, have the need to justify their actions to a population much larger than their immediate members. Because separatists claim allegiance to a nationalist community, they must attempt to explain their actions in the context of this
larger community in order to maintain support. They need both active support, in terms of recruits, monetary contributions and other outward displays; and passive support, in terms of supplying safehouses and refraining from disclosing the terrorists' whereabouts or plans to official (or unofficial) governmental representatives. Since the nature of these groups necessitates that they at least profess an interest in the protection of the well being of a population larger than their active roster, it is possible that the violence they use may have varying effects on the four different levels with which the group is concerned: the terrorist group itself, the community it purports to represent, the society in which the group and its community must exist and the nation and government from which the group wishes independence.

Thus, because violence may effect these four levels differently, it is conceivable that the STGs maintain both long term and short term goals for each level. Further, because these goals may be different for each level, the effects of successfully accomplishing a goal on one level may reinforce the ability to achieve a goal on another level, make the accomplishment of other goals impossible, or have absolutely no effect on the other levels of concern.

**LONG TERM GOALS**

In considering long term goals for these groups, success is usually measured in the accomplishment of separation or independence. Other goals
are viewed as secondary concerns. It is obvious from the evidence of past revolutions and rebellions, that, under the proper circumstances, violence can succeed in bringing about a change in government. Yet, while violence may succeed on a national or governmental level, it may have debilitating effects on other long term goals of a political movement.

In the case of the PIRA, the obvious advantage of independence from Great Britain would be the ability for the province to be reunited with the Republic of Ireland. Therefore, if what the PIRA is desires is to simply reassert Catholic control on an islandwide basis regardless of minority groups, then violent acts aimed at antagonizing what would be a future Protestant minority will be of little interest to the group. Further, in reference to the group’s national community, the only practical use of violence against that community would be if the STG planned on (or was powerful enough to bring about) an authoritarian or dictatorial system with the terrorist organization in control. If we use this situation as one endpoint on a continuum, it is apparent that violence can be used against any target without fear of detracting from the group’s goals; violence could only help bring about the group’s desired ends and rational choices of targets would be unnecessary.

Despite the utility of violence in the extreme situation described above, sectarian dominance is not necessarily the prime long term objective of the PIRA (nor do they have the power to run roughshod over their sympathetic community). Ostensibly, the PIRA, as stated in their manifesto ‘Eire Nua’ (‘New Ireland’), would like to see a federal system governing a united
Ireland. Within such a system, the central government in Dublin would be complemented by a provincial government in each of the four historical provinces on the island. In this way the Protestant majority in Ulster would be assured of fair treatment through the control of their provincial government in Ulster, while Catholic rights in this area would be assured through the checks and control provided by the central government:

The provincial parliament scheme was meant to allay
Protestants' fears about being forcibly integrated into
a narrow-mindedly Catholic state that would not respect
their religious and cultural identity.113

Given this stance, and granting that it may be no more than an attempt at legitimizing their group, the PIRA would only hurt itself and its possible success with a long term attack on a Protestant community with which they eventually hope to share governmental power. Attacks against their own community with such democratic institutions envisioned would be completely self defeating when incorporated into long term strategy. Granted, in order to have their way within the governmental system they must do more than simply defeat the British. Other groups and parties both legitimate and illegitimate of both Catholic and Protestant persuasion and ranging from the far right to the far left in political positions must be convinced of the logic of the 'New Ireland'. Democratically speaking, one would like to see the people choose their preferred system through the vote.
Yet, even with the PIRA's stated desire for a federal democratic system, one cannot rule out a battle for primacy in an already violent confrontational situation. Such battles, particularly between the Official and the Provisional IRAs, have been waged, but these battles have seemingly been over short term intergroup problems, not long term policy. Further, given the nature of ST6s, which usually work from a position of weakness against a stronger governmental power, any action which offends its nationalist community weakens its power base even more. Referring to Mao's observations, the fish need water in which to swim. Alienating the population would only reduce the group's resources and ability to act.

The FLQ has had to deal with a similar situation in Quebec although from a much less secure starting position. It seems obvious that the French nationalists do not want a federal solution to their problem as they are already incorporated federally into Canada. However, not only did the FLQ not accept Quebec's role in the Canadian federal system, but they had no alternative plan for governance outside of vague references to a socialist state. Thus, the FLQ probably did not have to worry about the long term effects of violent attacks on the non-French population within the province and might even have been able to improve their position through attacks on Anglophile population outside of their province through the rising costs for the rest of Canada in maintaining ties with Quebec. With this in mind, it seems all the FLQ had to do was garnish support from its own community. Yet, because the population in the province is 80% French, almost any attack within the province would have a fairly high probability of affecting the
French community, either directly or indirectly. As it turns out, many of their attacks did have this result. And, as might be suspected, these attacks had the affect of reducing the support of the French Canadians in the province for the FLQ.

Thus, given the de facto acceptance by these groups that violence can help them achieve their long term goal of separation, it seems apparent that attacks without regard for the communities involved could result in the inability to achieve other STG goals for the group itself, the community and society in general. It appears that if the goal is simply separation, the terrorist organization may have a little more leeway in its choice of violent strategies. If the group has distinct ideas on the future regime, however, notice must be taken on possible secondary effects violence might have in these other areas. Because of this, antagonism of their own community could be avoided by isolating their communities from direct attacks.

**SHORT TERM GOALS**

Despite the logic of the above argument, STGs seldom concentrate solely on long term goals outside of their repeated emphasis on the main goal of separation. More often, it appears that day-to-day existence takes up the majority of the groups' strategic thinking. While long term aspects of violence often dominate outward justification of separatist violence, there are often more subtle reasons why particular violent acts are carried out. Von der Mehden, in his analysis *Comparative Political Violence*, classifies
violent movements under the five headings of primordial, coup-oriented, issue or personality oriented, separatist and secessionist, and revolutionary/counter-revolutionary. Within these political movements, he lists five general types of justification for violence in achieving political goals: defense, vengeance, necessity, immorality, and destruction of the system. This categorization of justifications proves to be very useful both in a comparison of violence across the typology which von der Menden introduces and as a basis for individual analyses of particular cases. Still, when one attempts to analyze in a comparative manner a particular category within the typology, such as separatism, some justifications become redundant while others may not pertain to specific situations.

In the above example, defense, vengeance, and destruction of the system are self-explanatory and will be returned to later in this chapter. However, for the purposes of this paper, the 'necessity' justification is roughly equivalent to that of destruction of the system. As von der Menden explains, arguing that violence is necessary indicates that it "... is seen as the only means available for achieving desired goals." And, as the desired goal of the STG is the violent destruction of the system, at least in political terms, then in fact the necessity and the destruction of the system arguments are basically the same and thus redundant in most separatist situations.

Further, the fourth category, that of immorality, does not appear to be directly applicable in purely separatist situations. In these cases it is not usually argued that the government in power is immoral, simply discriminatory. And while questions of morality may arise, and accusations
of immorality may be exchanged, they usually refer to specific incidents and actions, not the entire foundation of the groups involved. Also, it appears that in many situations where questions of morality do arise and which do involve separatism, such as in the case of the Palestinians, the situation cannot be neatly classified under one type of political violence or another, but a combination of types: PLO violence can be labeled both separatist and religious. For these reasons, by limiting the discussion to movements based solely on separatism the question of morality becomes relatively unimportant.

Further, because this analysis deals with terrorist organizations, many of the actions taken may not directly affect governmental organizations. Because the above typology generally concerns itself with political violence, it is focused on group/government interaction. Separatist violence is designed on the whole to affect the actions of the government, yet minor violent occurrences may be directed at nongovernmental targets. Thus, while these actions are not necessarily classifiable as 'political', their inclusion in an analysis of terroristic violence is necessary because they contribute to the overall political climate. For this reason, and based on the above discussion of the separatists possible involvement in the group, the community, the society, and the government, the following analysis will examine various justifications of violence as they apply to these different levels of interaction.
THE GROUP

Given that the majority of violence in separatist situations is not based on personal whim, but on group strategy, the goals of the group, and not individual aspirations, are what should be taken into account. On the most basic level, therefore, the group may use violence to control its own organization. Conceivably, violence in the group situation could be used for two purposes: indoctrination and control. While indoctrinating recruits through their involvement in violent acts and thereby ensuring their silence or their guilt makes intuitive sense, there is little or no evidence that this played a major role for either of these groups. There might be several reasons for this. First, in situations of nationalist violence, to betray a group purporting to represent 'the nation' would be tantamount to betraying the nation itself. Thus the group may assume that loyalties do not need to be taught. Yet there are other more situation-specific reasons behind the absence of indoctrination through violence.

In the case of the IRA, security measures since the early 1970s have been fairly stringent. Both Sean MacStoifain and Maria McGuire discuss at length the precautions taken by the IRA and the extensive background investigations it puts recruits through. This was as true for MacStoifain when he joined in the 1950s as it was for McGuire in the 1970s. Further, England, toward the end of the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, embarked upon their supergrass campaign. Simply put, this strategy offered
clemency to IRA informers. With such stakes, the IRA seems to have been extremely careful in who it places in positions of knowledge, particularly when it comes to cases of murder and terror. A final reason why violence might not be used to indoctrinate recruits is the extensive powers of control which the PIRA exerts on its members, a point which will be taken up later.

In the case of the FLQ, apart from the fact that its use of violence was on a smaller scale than that of the IRA, the reason for the absence of violence for indoctrination seems to be that the various groups of the various waves were so small and so unorganized that anyone who wanted to join could:

The structure of the FLQ was such that one or two individuals who were interested in undertaking revolutionary activity would form a cell having little or no contact with other cells and then seek to attract others to it. 119

In such a situation it would be difficult to know very much about other cells. The freelance nature of the group would allow reconstruction almost immediately even if informers did attempt to destroy the group.

The second reason why violence may be used within the group situation is for internal security. This type of violence is well documented in the case of the PIRA:

... the Provisionals seem to prefer their own mixture of bomb
and bullet... [T]he successive IRAs of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1950s and the Provisionals after them, directed this weapon of intimidation against all officers of the British administration, the Anglo Irish Establishment, Protestants, and reluctant patriots. In each case the terror has also served as an internal coercive sanction. The traitors, spies, informers and blackmailers who had bedeviled previous Irish insurrections were thus removed. 120 (emphasis mine)

Further, as mentioned before, with the possibility of being shot by one's own side hanging continually over the heads of the new recruit and the seasoned veteran alike, one would have to have some serious reservations before informing on the group. These matters were taken seriously by the recruits and officers. In the mid 1970s spies and informers became a prime focus for the PIRA:

TABLE 7

IRA DISCIPLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kneecappings</th>
<th>Tarring and Feathering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Kneecappings</td>
<td>Tarring and Feathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further aspect of the group's multiple goal of loyalty, necessary to the health of such a secretive and underground operation, is the need to control the units within the organization. A bothersome problem which has caused the group hardship in the past, independent operations can often lead to negative repercussions on other goals. To take part in an activity not sanctioned by the group may lead to that group being blamed for something which it in no way was associated with. Yet, despite the fact that complete control of all units is impossible, examples have been made of those going against the group's wishes. In one instance a PIRA man was shot to death for 'misusing' IRA weapons. Thus force is seen to be a legitimate weapon in policing terrorist groups.

Once again, however, the FLQ failed to exhibit this type of intragroup violence. The reason for this seems pretty clear. Each wave ended in either the arrest of all the terrorists in the group, or at least the brain trust of leaders, leaving the group decimated after each successive round. Thus, because of the fluidity of organization of the FLQ, it may well be that the group really did not have goals for itself outside of its existence in the short term.

Despite the necessity of internal policing, any STG must be aware that
those executed or kneecapped are also members of the community. Granted, after informing on the particular group, a spy may not receive much respect from his neighbors. Still, consideration must be given to the family and friends who would be turned off by nationalistic violence directed inward against the nationalist community itself. Thus, if one of the goals of the STG is to maintain community support, the manner in which it carries out these punishments must be carefully balanced against the popularity of those punished and the number of people within the group to whom the punishments are meted out. The PIRA, despite the fact that it professes to maintain rules governing the punishment of accused spies,\textsuperscript{123} has often lost support from sections of the community following the application of such punishment.\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY}

Outside of its own security, the next level of concern for the group is the community it claims to represent. The most likely use of violence in the group's relations with its community is the protection of that community. A prime actor in separatist situations, the community often receives the brunt of the government's attacks due to the already conflictual nature of the its interaction with the authorities. For the PIRA this is perhaps the reason they came into existence. When the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association began demonstrating for equality for the Catholic population through organized marches, they were attacked, seemingly without violent
provocation by groups of Protestant loyalists. At this time, from 1968 to 1970 or so, the IRA (then a single united group) was, for the most part, abstaining from terrorist action. Thus, when attacks came against the community they were caught unprepared and were forced into quickly acquiring as much defensive power as possible: "It [the Provisional Army Council] was not in a position to force the pace of events [in early 1970]. At least to begin with, the best strategy would be one of response."¹²⁵ The importance of defense in the summer of 1970 was further emphasized by Sean MacStiofain, Chief of Staff of the PIRA in the early 1970s:

All our energies would be devoted to providing material, financial and training assistance for the Northern units. The objective was to ensure that if any area where such a unit existed came under attack, whether from Loyalist extremists or British forces, that unit would now be capable of adequate defensive action.¹²⁶

Later, after the PIRA went from a defensive stance to an offensive one, the defense of nationalist areas still played an important role. Targets were selected away from nationalist areas in order to force British troop concentration both away from the area and to spread them out more thinly.¹²⁷ At least early on, then, the PIRA was involved in the active defense of the community. This never became an option for the FLQ because the French Canadians were never in an open violent confrontation with the
central government. Since a strategy for violence based on defense of the community never existed, the justification for such use was removed from the FLO's rationale allowing violence to be seen by the community as being separate from its immediate interests.

Despite the logic of using defense as a justification for violence, there are still problems associated with such a tactic. One of these is the possibility that the community may see through the justification to the real problem of violence:

The Provos are, in the same way [as the British army], thought of as protecting the people from destruction. This is an age old method of taking control - you make the people feel defenseless, then you say we'll protect you, and thereby establish dependency...I think if you took away the feeling of dependency the support would go.128

Fr. Desmond Wilson, the author of the above comment, as a Catholic priest in Northern Ireland, quite naturally has great interest in the cessation of violence in his community. Yet the point he brings up, that community dependency on the PIRA may be more perceived than real and can be removed, is insightful. This feeling of dependency has not, as of yet, been lost, nor does the population seem convinced of its illusory nature. But the fact that at least one person views the PIRA in this manner gives the impression that more may follow given time, particularly if attacks against the community
were to cease and with them the need for defense.

The claim of community defense may backfire if that defense does not come forward. On the day that has come to be called 'Bloody Sunday', Jan. 30, 1972, the British army opened fire on a Catholic march which was taking place in Londonderry. Whether they were provoked or not is not the question here. What is clear is the lack of a PIRA defense in the face of an attack on the community which the PIRA knew was going to take place. It is obvious that in terms of group goals and concerns the PIRA was justified in not confronting the British troops. But by not confronting them they left the community open for attack, resulting in 13 deaths at the final tally. While the immediate effects of the PIRA lack of response are obvious, the long term consequences continue to face the group. After 'Bloody Sunday', the Catholic community began refraining from the tool of demonstration for fear that they would be attacked and that there would be no PIRA defense in the face of superior British forces. Thus, group survival seems to be a more important short term goal than community protection and while violence seems to dissuade small scale attacks on the community, major attacks cannot be handled so easily. Therefore, while the PIRA enjoys short term success in defense of the community, the group's ability to use this as a justification for violence over the long term is precarious at best.

Considering the consequences of the above argument, the terrorists can use violence to effect the community in another way. If there is evidence that the community is losing faith in the group as its protector, all the terrorists have to do, as Fr. Wilson pointed out, is make the community
believe that protection is still necessary. Clutterbuck implies this strategy in his analysis:

The Provisionals also calculated that violence and terror would induce clamour for repressive counter-measures which would bear hardest on the Catholic ghettos on which they were based; so that amongst the people in these ghettos, the fear of the IRA gunman would be mingled with respect for him as their protector and a growing hostility towards the soldiers and the police who would act as the cutting edge of repression. 131

Despite the lack of hard evidence supporting this tactic (one really would not expect the PIRA to admit to this even if it was part of their strategy), and the claims that this was not part of the policy of the PIRA made by MacStofain ("The only Protestants we've deliberately killed have been members of the UVF who attacked Roman Catholic areas.";132), the effects of violence used for this purpose would appear to be too tempting for the terrorists to pass up. In fact, this type of a strategy does not even have to be paramount in the PIRA attacks. In the choice of a target, all the terrorists have to do is pick one that might demand response from the other community. The choice could be politically or economically motivated and as long as there were other justifications given for the attack no one would be the wiser. Yet again, over the long run, such a strategy is bound to be recognized for what it is. If PIRA attacks are continually met with
reprisals, it should not take the community too long to put two and two together and realize that if the PIRA would stop, so would the reprisals.

Another possible benefit which seems to stem from the terrorist strategy of inviting reprisals is the unification of the community. In creating and continuing an adversarial atmosphere, the PIRA is able to create a we/Them situation in which continued community cooperation and tightness will hopefully rally support around the terrorist group. The need for the terrorists to maintain community allegiances has been noted. Without a background into which it can disappear, the terrorist organization would be in an extremely vulnerable situation. However, the unity stemming from Protestant reprisal is only secondary in nature and really beyond the direct control of the terrorist organization. Thus, in order to be more sure of continued community support, the PIRA appears to fall back on another strategy of violence: coercion. As Hechter points out:

Regardless of an individual's dependence on a group, compliance can only be assured when the group's other members or leaders have the capacity to monitor his behavior in order to discover when he is being compliant and when he is not. For only when selective incentives are provided exclusively to reward the compliant and to punish the noncompliant can free riding be precluded.\(^{133}\)(emphasis mine)

Compliance here can mean as little as keeping one's mouth shut about
terrorist operations. Thus, if the entire community is going to receive the rewards of the terrorists' actions, be they simple defense or eventual independence, the entire community, ideally, has to be compliant with the terrorists' wishes. Clutterbuck translates this idea into the Irish perspective:

The IRA Provisionals had spent one and a half years in planning, preparation and stocking up with arms and explosives, and during this time they had been studying the urban guerrilla classics - Carlos Marighella and Grivas. They knew that the urban guerrilla is most vulnerable to betrayal by the public amongst whom he lives and fights, and this can best be discouraged by fear - or terror.134

Thus, through the intimidation of the community, the terrorists may be able to ensure that that community does not betray them. On a previous table (see Table 7, p. 94) disciplinary measures were recorded. That table included kneecappings and tarrings and featherings. Kneecappings, as noted, were punishments most often handed out to PIRA members, especially men. Tarring and feathering, on the other hand, is usually reserved for non-compliant community behavior particularly on the part of women, sometimes for simply dating a Protestant or a member of the security forces.135 Another example of forced compliance was the execution of William Best. Best was a Roman Catholic from Northern Ireland serving in
the British army, but not in those forces retained in the province. While home on leave, he was killed for being a member of the enemy's forces, despite his nationalist leanings.\(^\text{136}\) The fact that this murder was carried out by the Official IRA and not the PIRA is not overly important here. The messages were clear: First, all British troops are open targets; second, Catholic complicity with the enemy is unacceptable.

The FLQ also attempted to ensure community compliance with nationalist aims while at the same time promoting their fight through displays of violence. By attacking the Quebec/Canadian connection in general, the FLQ also attempted to show that French cooperation with the national government would be punished. They attacked the French Canadian elite as much as the Angio population: "... because the French-Canadian ruling class is absolutely incapable of opposing the imperialism and capitalism on which its privileges and institutions rest."\(^\text{137}\) In fact, Trudeau, a French-Canadian, was seen by the FLQ as a traitor to the people of Quebec.\(^\text{138}\) This can be interpreted as a two pronged attack; one of nationalism and one of socialism. Yet the FLQ never exacted community support due to their limited resources, lack of personnel, and their inability to convince the rest of their community to support them. The PIRA, on the other hand, had the defense of the community to fall back on. Without it they too would have probably antagonized the community.

A final use for violence in terms of goals within the community is that of maintaining group supremacy within the community. Despite the desire to be the group in control, and regardless of who starts intracommunal clashes,
this strategy always detracts from the groups involved. Perhaps the worst example of this type of violence was evidenced in 1975:

After what the Belfast Brigade [of the Provisionals] felt was a series of provocations by the Officials, on October 29 the Provos struck back violently killing one man and wounding at least fifteen others.139

The problems with this form of attack are obvious. While it makes sense on the level of group goals to maintain one's group as the leader of the community, the overall effect is one of increased community bitterness and diminishing access to valuable commodities as well as the probable loss of members through death. In Canada, the problems for the FLQ when using violence in this way are increased significantly. While there have been no clashes between the FLQ and other terrorist organizations, the FLQ, as noted, has often attacked political parties. While these attacks were not necessarily attempts to gain power within the community, they were attempts at either getting the parties to discontinue certain policies or at showing the community there was an alternative group which was fighting for the nationalist community. With the little support the FLQ started with, the likelihood that such attacks would obtain new adherents from within the community was slight.

Thus we see that violence directed at the nationalist community can be both helpful in the long run or harmful. The key is to maintain the support
given by the community. This can be done in a number of ways, but voluntary support appears to be the most beneficial. As long as the community is not coerced into support, or that coercion is secondary to other matters such as defense, the STG can continue towards its ultimate goal of separation. If, however, the community does not freely offer support, the STG must attempt to accomplish two goals at once which often seem to demand opposite strategies. This may be one of the most important determinants in the failure of the FLQ. While they had some support from the community for the major goal of separation, they were never able to obtain support for their tactics. Without such support, they were unable to successfully fade into the background and thus ended up in jail more often than they would have probably liked. Conversely, attempts at garnering community support only served to further community antagonism towards the group. The PIRA, on the other hand, by starting with general community support for them as defenders, were able to both work on increasing that support through direct and indirect threats on the community and attack its ultimate goal with little fear of a drop in that support. However, the use of violence in order to ensure community compliance may easily be a long term handicap. Continued violence may breed apathy and an 'anything is better than this' mindset within the community: a pendulum response which has caused short-lived problems in the past, and may well be more of a problem as the violence drags on.\textsuperscript{140}
THE SOCIETY

Of all the aspects of the current troubles in Northern Ireland few attract as much worldwide attention as the outwardly sectarian nature of the conflict. The actual reason for this is entangled in the history of Irish/English relations, but basically relies on the fact that the Catholic population feels closer ties to the Republic of Ireland while the Protestant population feels closer to Great Britain. Yet despite this relatively clean divide, the nature of the battle in Northern Ireland is not primarily over religious rights and freedoms, but over the constitutional question of the status of the province. Unfortunately, because there is this dual nature of religious and constitutional conflict, antagonists and protagonists are relatively easy to identify depending on which side you are on. Thus, when attempts were being made to end Stormont, the British troops could be relatively sure that it was not the Protestant community who was at fault, but the Catholic one. From the Catholic viewpoint this was unfair for they were being attacked by Protestant gangs as much as they were attacking the Protestants, yet punishment was being meted out one-sidedly. It is easy to see both how this situation can spiral out of hand and that there is really no possibility of a 'winner' in such a situation.

Despite this problematic community divide, the assumption that the situation in Northern Ireland is one of two communities in an all out war with each other is too simplistic. As noted previously, the PIRA ostensibly
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Despite this problematic community divide, the assumption that the situation in Northern Ireland is one of two communities in an all out war with each other is too simplistic. As noted previously, the PIRA ostensibly
sees a future united Ireland based on a federal system in which the Protestants, as in the past, would maintain control over key aspects of the province of Ulster assuming they continue to enjoy majority support in that region. After initial intercommunal fighting stemming from Protestant attacks on the civil rights marchers and the PIRA response against Protestant civilians as an answer to those attacks, the situation settled down quite a bit. As noted by MacStoifain earlier, and as official PIRA policy through at least 1975: "The IRA... did not officially sanction or claim retaliation for sectarian murders except in unusual circumstances."\textsuperscript{141} Further, at least into 1976: "... the Army Council wanted a military campaign, not the massacre of the innocent."\textsuperscript{142} Thus, it would appear that one use of violence, revenge, is not one of the justifications the PIRA uses in obtaining its goals within the society.

If from this we are to deduce that the goal the PIRA is attempting to reach is a united effort by both communities in getting Britain to remove itself as an interested party from Northern Ireland, what are we to make from continued PIRA attacks the Protestant community? Granted, a small minority of the attacks are directed at the Catholic community as noted above, but this leaves the vast majority of these attacks directed at the police and army forces and the Protestant community. Logically, one must assume there are other forces at work here. Despite stated Provisional policy, tit-for-tat murders do take place in which PIRA men, even without official orders, attack Protestant civilians. Particularly in the early 1970s, but continuing through the present situation, random shootings were and are
commonplace and Protestant attacks were often reprisals for such IRA attacks. More obvious, however, are the assassinations the PIRA has performed over the years. Despite MacStoifain's statement that only Protestant members of the UVF were subject to attack, the last ten years have seen the deaths of Robert Bradford, a Member of Parliament at Westminster from Ulster, and Jeffrey Agate the director of the Dupont plant in Ulster in 1977 among other noncombatants. The goals here were not simply anti-British, they were obviously designed to specifically affect the Protestant community:

Bradford's death did not fit into a similar context [of reprisal killings], and it seemed to some observers that the IRA had targeted him in an attempt to heighten tensions in the North and perhaps trigger an all out clash with the loyalists. In addition, one of the ways in which the IRA tries to create an ungovernable situation for the British has recently been to expand their attacks from strictly military targets to administrative and economic ones such as telephone exchanges, town halls, rent and rate offices, and general economic centers such as restaurants, hotels and other service industries. The point here is that although it is true such attacks will make it more difficult for the British to maintain control, the obvious targets of these expanded campaigns are the Protestant businessmen and community. So although this may well make the province ungovernable by
scaring those involved with such businesses, particularly in the sphere of governmental authority, the possibility of antagonizing the Protestant community is further increased.

A more likely goal of the PIRA's use of violence in the setting of the society is to create disorder and rule out any kind of stable situation. If one is willing to use violence in this manner, the strategy with the highest gain and least cost is terror. Not only does terror destroy the immediate victim (particularly important for security forces), but it also affects those associated with the victim (as in the case of economic targets): "You're bound to have fellows who'll place a bomb anywhere, just to keep the count up for the night - ten tonight, twenty tomorrow." With the atmosphere such a campaign would produce it would be difficult to feel secure. While the situation may indeed make the province ungovernable, the cost is obviously the loss of whatever cooperation the PIRA hoped for on a society-wide basis.

There is perhaps a greater problem with broadening the violence beyond the military level than the simple alienation of the Protestants. Economic centers are not all divided along sectarian lines. The threat, therefore, is to the whole society including the Catholic community. Disrupting all economic life means disrupting economic life for the Catholic sympathizers as well, which in turn may easily lead to a loss of support for the group. Further, Protestants might not view the attacks as simply economic, even if they were meant to be. More than likely, the Protestants would see such an attack as one aimed at their community thus inviting a response violent.
response means violence against Catholics who then see the broadening
campaign as increasing their costs again leading to a probable drop in
support for the terrorists.

All of these problems are multiplied for the FLQ in Quebec. As long as the
FLQ was satisfied with such acts as planting bombs in military areas,
toppling statues, and occasionally attacking English language radio stations,
they were in little fear of antagonizing Quebec society. Yet with the
expansion of efforts to economic and political targets, the FLQ seemed to
begin to lose what support it had. The problem here, as stated before, was
that the French comprised 80% of Quebec society. Where the IRA could
disrupt society antagonizing mostly 'the enemy', FLQ attacks could only have
reverberations within the French community. A situation of terror was
created, but its only result was to push popular opinion away from
extraconstitutional means of remedying the situation.¹⁴⁷

The conclusions appear to be straight forward. If a group wishes to use
violence in order to separate a community from a government which appears
repressive in some way, recognition must be given to those who the violence
will effect. In a divided community in which two groups are fairly evenly
represented, violence can be targeted strategically enough so as to
minimize community casualties. In a situation where the nationalist
community comprises the great majority of the provincial population,
attacks must be either planned so exactly that the community is not
affected, or the battle must be taken elsewhere. To do otherwise would mean
sacrificing support from one's own community and turning it into actual
antagonism against the STG.

THE GOVERNMENT

However many goals the separatist terrorist group has, its overall goal, its raison d'être, is separation from and independence of the government under which the nationalist community presently exists. To lose this as the main goal would necessitate redefinition of the group and it would cease being officially separatist and become simply terrorist. In the long term, the title of separatist is easily maintained even if the group ceases its use of violence and terror. In the short term however, in order to maintain its position, the justification for all or most of its violent acts has to be based on the fight for freedom whether or not this is actually the case. To admit otherwise would mean the possible loss of support from both within the community and from those outside of the community who sympathize with the STG's cause.

Given this situation, the most obvious use of violence would be against the primary agents of the government, particularly those involved in the 'coercion' of the community: the police and army. Attacks therefore by the STGs against persons able to defend themselves or against those who have been involved in attacks against the community would probably be the most justifiable, simply based on the recognition of these forces as the direct representatives of the 'repressive' government. While this strategy makes the most sense, and the purported aim of the PIRA is to attack only military
and police personnel of the British or the former government at Stormont, the facts indicate that these are not the only targets chosen.

Given this, the short term objective of the PIRA must have been more than simply attacking direct British authority. The assumption that a direct military engagement would end in a rather quick defeat of the PIRA is the probable reason behind their choice of alternative targets. The fallback strategy from direct military engagement has been to make the province ungovernable: "The Provo leadership's stated objective for such terrorist activity is to secure Irish sovereignty and weary the British of Ireland." Initially, however, the most obvious target for destruction was Stormont. Although it may not have necessarily been the PIRA which brought its downfall about, its activity in the situation certainly did not help the Ulster government. Even though the PIRA did not directly bring about the Stormont downfall, that was their original goal in the present troubles its fall thus necessitated some serious rethinking of policy among the PIRA leadership:

The coming of direct rule presented the Provisional IRA with a serious dilemma. The Provisionals had put the destruction of Stormont at the top of their list of military and political aims ever since their formation.

Yet, with direct rule the PIRA had an even better choice of targets. Now it could more easily be claimed that these attacks were not sectarian in nature for there was no longer an Irish Protestant hierarchy in control of
the government. Further, the Protestant hierarchy wanted direct British rule almost as little as the PIRA did, but for diametrically opposite reasons. Still, this should have played into the terrorists hands, for now there were two antagonistic groups facing the British troops where once there was only one. 150

Another aspect of violence, apart from making the province ungovernable, was introduced in 1972:

The car bomb was also introduced in 1972, both for strategic and tactical reasons. The strategic aim was to make the government and administration of the occupied North as difficult as possible, simultaneously striking at its colonial economic structure. 151

This venture into economic attacks and its possible consequences on the population has already been commented on. Yet, while the PIRA was claiming the attacks were on the colonial nature of the economy, they inflicted much less damage on the colonial power, Great Britain, than they did on the communities who made their living off of that structure. Further, with attacks coming in less regulated areas, the British are forced to defend a larger territory making their defenses thinner and therefore less effective, or mandating increased troop strength which in turn would supply the terrorists with more targets. 152

Finally, another less used strategy for violence is to embarrass the
British and, formerly, Stormont governments. Time and again, in order to appear in control of the situation, these governments have issued statements to the effect that the PIRA was on its last legs, that the leaders of the group were all in jail, or that a situation of normalcy was about to unfold itself. In answer to these statements, the PIRA has engaged in massive displays of terror in order to show the community, the society, the government, and the world how wrong these interpretations of the situation were. Of course, they were often completely accurate. Yet, the PIRA no matter how weak would answer back just to embarrass the authorities. 153

For the FLQ, the justification for their terrorist attacks have covered two areas. Similar to the IRA, the terrorists have attempted to create a province-wide feeling of insecurity leading to the inability of the authorities to effectively control the province. Yet neither their choice of targets, nor the level of attack seemed suitable to such a strategy. 154

Further, even if the government in Ottawa were to tire of the situation in the province, the thought that they would disintegrate ties with Quebec without popular support from within the province is ludicrous. Thus, the only logical explanation is that the FLQ was attempting to convince the population of the inequity of the situation, which, as already mentioned, makes little sense when one recognizes that the community in fact will be negatively effected by such a campaign.

The point of this discussion is that terrorist violence, when used in a separatist situation, will almost always be subsumed under the heading as "separatist" when in actuality, violence used in different situations may
have goals other than separatism as their justification. Horowitz maintains that: "As a tactic terrorism has failed to reach its primary objective, changing the foundations of state power..." Yet, based on the above argument that terrorism has different primary objectives at different times, the question of 'success' or 'failure' depends on what was being attempted at the time. Thus, it could be argued that the FLQ indeed failed in that they no longer exist as a group. Or they failed in receiving community support. Or, as Horowitz maintains, they failed because they did not reach their ideal of separation. Yet, while the IRA has failed in accomplishing separation, for a large part of its existence it succeeded in that it has maintained, or seem to have maintained, overall support from the community for whom it is reportedly fighting. If some terrorist act is not meant to further a cause, in this case separation, one should not assume it has failed based on the long term strategy of the group.
CONCLUSION

In any conflictual situation, the outcome is determined by the interaction of decisions made by those involved. Because of this, the strategies chosen by one side in the conflict will affect the reactions by the other side and have greater implications for both sides’ long term and short term goals. As a strategy, then, violence, the form it takes, and its targets, will, as other choices in the conflict, affect the eventual outcome in one way or another.

This will be as true in separatist situations as in any other. The choice of terroristic violence, therefore, should be looked at as one strategy among many which could be opted for by any group in obtaining the long term objective of independence. If one accepts this view, then the idea that terrorism, specifically in separatist situations, is mindless or irrational must be rejected. Further, while this view may be applicable to all violent situations, separatism is singled out here because it is a goal which is often desired by a community larger than the group which chooses violence to obtain it.

Yet, it is also obvious that violence in varying separatist situations will achieve different outcomes based on the context of the situation. This context will not only include the environment and the interaction of the groups involved, but also the groups’ perceptions of the facts as they exist. Thus, if one is analyzing the use of violence in these situations, both environmental variables which may lead to the use of violence, and the groups’ interpretations of and goals towards those variables must be
observed in deciding which determinants play the key roles in the groups' choice of violence as a strategy.

In this analysis, key environmental determinants and group goals were examined using the cases of the Provisional IRA in the situation in Northern Ireland and the FLQ in Quebec. Within these contexts, several environmental factors appeared to be more important than others in determining the use of violence and its acceptability to the nationalist communities as a factor for the acquisition of their goals.

Particularly interesting, yet analytically elusive, was the role history plays in these situations. It would appear that violence, when used as a political tool, could be legitimated over time. With continued use, the community seems to recognize violence as acceptable given a situation of continuity. When violence is interpreted by the community as being glorious or successful based on past usage, it becomes a tool which groups can wield without excessive fear of communal retribution. The success of violence measured simply in terms of continued use appears to be at least indirectly related to its past uses. In Ireland, where there is a long and nearly continuous history of violence used against the British, violence is still used to a fairly frequently. In Quebec, no such history exists and violence used for political gains seems to be unacceptable.

Another environmental condition which appears to lead to the use of violence is the degree of fragmentation in society and the resultant effects on the ability of the minority groups to have political input and control. In situations where minority groups are refused fair representation, thus
restraining the elites of those minorities from obtaining positions of practical importance to the community, the groups representing the communities appear to have a freer hand in their use of violence. The inability for legitimate political action to affect or secure minority rights leads the group and its leaders to the use of illegitimate means in order to ensure those rights.

The Catholics in Northern Ireland see themselves as having been without meaningful representation since the partition of the island. For this reason, when the governments at Stormont and Westminster seemed unwilling to assist in maintaining the Catholic community's rights, that community turned to help from within its borders particularly in the area of defense. In Quebec, the French community, apart from having majority control of its provincial government, is fairly represented in the central government. Therefore, the wishes of the community and its leaders have forums in which to be heard and have extensive control over their situation. Because of this, they are able to secure greater benefits from working legitimately from within the system than they could ever hope for by turning to illegitimate violence.

A final environmental factor which seems to bear greatly on the use of violence over the long term is community support. Yet, because of the nature of the groups in question, direct support is difficult to gauge. Still, it generally appears that the more the nationalist community desires the goal for which the STG is fighting, the more likely that group will obtain support regardless of the use violence. Unfortunately, community attitudes on
violence and its use are not easily gauged.

Other aspects of the environment such as the economic situation of the community, the existence of other groups competing for community support, and the specific party in power, seem to have less of a bearing on the use of violence by the groups in question here, than history, representativeness, or community support.

In terms of the group, its long term and short term goals towards itself, the community it claims to represent, the society in which it exists, and the government from which it wishes to separate, are important in determining how that group will use violence. Yet a more important point seems to be that the effects of violence are often contradictory in terms of the various ends desired for the various levels of group interaction. Because of this, the way in which groups use violence will only have the desired effects if the group rationally and fully investigates the possible outcomes. Judging from the experience the two groups in question here, such intricate investigation often take place. Thus, while goals are set and tactics chosen to accomplish those goals, the results often are less than the group hopes for.

Thus, while rationality appears to be a part of the terrorist's decision to resort to violence in separatist situations, this rationality seems to be limited by a failure to justify all of the group's goals in terms of each other. Further, any generalization of rationality to the larger universe of terrorist and separatist/terrorist groups must be circumspect. It is conceivable that other groups could display tendencies of both greater and less rationality. However, without the luxury of a more expanded comparison, the results
obtained from these two cases seem to indicate several of the more important concerns of separatist organizations attempting to violently alter their constitutional if not their societal situation.
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid. p.37.

5. Ibid. pp. 43-44.


7. Ibid. p. 56.

8. Ibid. p. 125.

9. Ibid. p. 126.

10. Ibid. p. 127.


15. Ibid. p. 191.


20. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," in


22. O'Brien, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, p. 91

23. Brian M. Jenkins, "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems," in Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives, p. 3.


29. Smith in National Separatism, p. 32.


34. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, (London: Tavistock, 1974).


36. Ibid., p. 83

38. Heskin, p. 80.

39. Ibid., pp. 81 – 83.


41. Ibid., p. 263.


43. Gustave Morf, Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1970). Note particularly the individual analyses of the FLQ members.

44. O’Malley, p. 260.


52. Ibid., p. 6.

53. Ibid., p. 11.
61. Smith in *National Separatism*, p. 25.
64. Ibid., p. 264.
66. Ibid., p. 13.
68. Ibid., p. 23.
69. Ibid., pp. 28 - 30.
76. Lijphart, p. 157.
77. Whyte, pp. 3-4. For a good analysis of political affiliations in Northern Ireland see Ian McAllister, "Political Parties: Traditional and Modern," in Contemporary Irish Studies.
79. Harkness, p. 28.
81. Darby, Conflict, p. 50.
82. Ibid., p. 51.
84. Darby, Conflict, pp. 110-111
85. Fitzmaurice, p. 188.
86. Ibid., p. 197.
88. Levi and Hechter, p. 133.
92. Ibid. p. 266.
93. Ibid. p. 271.

95. Table 6 compiled from Morf *passim*; Mackie and Rose, p. 82; and Fitzmaurice *passim*.

96. Fitzmaurice, pp. 41-2

97. See page 25 and reference in footnote #58.


100. Ibid., p. 21.

101. Coyle, p. 50.

102. Ibid., p. 69.


104. Ibid., p. 225.


116. Ibid., p. 34.

117. Ibid., p. 34.

118. For their accounts of their introduction to the IRA see MacStoifain (1975) *passim*, and McGuire (1973), *passim*. 
123. MacStoifain, p. 306.
125. MacStoifain, p. 145.
126. Ibid., pp. 145-6.
127. Ibid., p. 206.
129. Kelley, p. 162.
130. Ibid., p. 200.
132. Sweetman, p. 156.
134. Clutterbuck, p. 98.
135. Janke, p. 15.
138. Ibid., p. 204.
140. Kelley, p. 199.
141. Ibid., p. 236.
143. Kelley, p. 185.
144. Ibid., p. 346.
145. Reports on IRA attacks abound, particularly in news reports. See

146. Sweetman, p. 209.
147. Morf, p. 6.
152. Ibid., p. 249.
154. Morf, passim.
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