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The politics of propriety: A comparative study of the New Life Movement and the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign in twentieth century China

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Rice University, 1987
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THE POLITICS OF PROPRIETY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT AND THE FIVE STRESSES AND FOUR BEAUTIFICATIONS CAMPAIGN IN TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA

by

JINYU LI

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

MASTER OF ARTS

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The Politics of Propriety: A Comparative Study of the New Life Movement and the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign in Twentieth Century China

Jinyu Li

ABSTRACT

Through an analysis of two social campaigns, the New Life Movement and the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign, this study presents two main arguments: first, although the two campaigns took place half a century apart, and were led by two antagonistic political parties, they were essentially similar, in terms of their theoretical assumptions, administrative style and main features; second, the similarities between them were the result of an outlook shared by both the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a mentality profoundly influenced by traditional Chinese culture - Confucian attitudes, values and beliefs.

Thus, despite their different attitudes toward Confucianism, both the KMT and the CCP have been molded by traditional influences. Certain distinctive characteristics of traditional Chinese culture, such as its emphasis on morality: its obsessive concern with li (propriety), are still the most notable characteristics of Chinese politics and society in the twentieth century.
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A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

The system of romanization used in this thesis is Pinyin, now slowly gaining acceptance as the standard international form for rendering written Chinese. Exceptions are made with some widely recognized names, such as Chiang kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, Manchu and Yangtze River in order to avoid confusion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Gong Chan Dang (The Chinese Communist Party)</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>The Cultural Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSFBC</td>
<td>Wu-jiang Si-mei Yun-dong (The Five Stresses and Four Beautifications campaign)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMRB</td>
<td>Guang-ming Ri-bao (The Guang-ming Daily)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuo Min Tang [Guo Min Dang] (The Nationalist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLM</td>
<td>Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong (The New Life Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLMPA</td>
<td>New Life Movement Promotion Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERM</td>
<td>The People's Economic Reconstruction Movement</td>
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<td>RMRM</td>
<td>Ren-min Ri-bao (The People's Daily)</td>
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<td>RMRM (o.e.)</td>
<td>Ren-ming Ri-bao, Hai Wai Ban, (The People's Daily, Overseas Edition)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a comparative study of two social campaigns, the New Life Movement (Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong) and the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign (Wu-jiang Si-mei Yun-dong), which were mobilized, respectively, by the Chinese Nationalist Party (the KMT) in early 1934 and the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) in early 1981. A close examination of the two campaigns - including their historical background, ideological foundations, purpose, motivation, particular features and outcome - suggests that:

1. Although the two campaigns took place almost half a century apart, and were led by two ideologically opposed political parties, they were essentially similar.

2. The similarities between them, in turn, were the result of an outlook shared by both the KMT and the CCP, a mentality profoundly influenced by traditional Chinese culture - Confucian attitudes, values and beliefs in particular.

Thus, despite their different attitudes towards particular aspects of traditional Chinese culture and Confucianism, both the KMT and the CCP have been molded by traditional influences. Certain distinctive characteristics of traditional Chinese culture, such as its emphasis on morality, spirituality and ideological orthodoxy; its obsessive concern with jī (ritual) and order; its view of government as both the teacher of its people and the guardian of their morality; its belief in and practice of ideological indoctrination; its assumption of an intimate link between external behavior and internal morality; and its stress on the value of self-cultivation, are still the most notable characteristics of Chinese politics and society in the twentieth century.

Revolution may produce rapid power changes, but a society's long-standing ideas, values and beliefs cannot be obliterated overnight. This is especially true
in the case of China. Although the Republican Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty and its two thousand year old imperial system, and politicians with modern political philosophies replaced the emperor, the traditional mentality of China’s rulers and subjects remained largely intact, and certain traditional ideas and values have been repeatedly embraced and emphasized by successive power holders. This study seeks, through an analysis of two social campaigns, to identify and analyze the enduring features of traditional China that have persisted in the modern era.
CHAPTER 1

China's Traditional World View: The Legacy of the Past

Chinese culture has been influenced by many schools of thought in the last two millennia, notably Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism and Buddhism. Although modern scholars have different opinions on the relative importance of these schools in Chinese history, the idea that Confucianism has had a profound impact on traditional Chinese culture can hardly be denied. Since Han Wu-di (reigned 140-87 B.C.) affirmed Dong Zhongshu's proposal to "respect only Confucianism and discard all the other schools of thought" (Fei-chu bai-jia, du-zun ru-shu), Confucianism had been, with a few exceptions, the dominant philosophy and political ideology of the ruling elite in traditional China. Confucian ideas, values and beliefs thus played a decisive role in the formation and development of the most basic social and political concepts of the Chinese for some two thousand years. Moreover, through the relentless effort of Confucian scholars and the state, Confucianism had become, to a significant extent, a way of life for ordinary people in traditional China.

Various opinions have been expressed concerning the question of what is the most important single concept in Confucianism. Some, such as Tang Junyi, advocate the notion of ren (variously translated as "perfect virtue," "benevolence," "goodness," and "human-heartness"; I prefer "humanity"). Some, such as Cai Shangsi, believe it is li (propriety, ritual, proper behavior or norms of social usage). Still others argue for the concepts of zheng-ming (the rectification of names), of zhong-yong (the doctrine of the mean, compromise, tolerance), or of zhong-xiao (loyalty and filial piety). Nevertheless, ren is the foundation of Confucianism. As the late Qing scholar, Liang Qichao, once pointed out, "Whenever Confucians have spoken of ethics and of government, they have always taken ren as their foundation."
Ren "comprehensively pervades all the virtues, and perfects the human character." All other Confucian virtues, including yi (duty, justice, righteousness), lian (integrity), chi (sense of shame), zhi (human wisdom), zhong (loyalty), xin (faithfulness, trust), li (fraternal submission) and so forth, are embraced by ren and expressed in it. Lacking any one of these virtues, a man would not be regarded as ren, nor be thought of as a man of li.

In the Confucian view, the man of ren cultivated first his own subjective "ren mind" (ren-xin), and then he extended his objective ren conduct from the near to the more distant, according to the limits of his own ability. This process began with filial piety and submission to the family, and ended in the "extensive dispensation of assistance to the masses" (bo-shi ji-zhong). Eventually, "everything under Heaven would revert to ren" (tian-xia gui-ren). Thus, Hsiao Kung-ch'uan states in his book, A History of Chinese Political Thought, that "in terms of personal cultivation, ren is a matter of one's individual ethics. But in terms of practice, ren is both social ethics and political principle." This is an apt conclusion.

Ren was expressed through li. Li refers to "the entire body of social institutions, rules, regulations, conventions, and norms that governed human relations in traditional China, from the etiquette of daily greetings, to solemn state ceremonies and religious sacrifices." Although it has been variously translated as standards of social usage, mores, propriety, ritual and etiquette, in day-to-day social usage, li often means simply politeness. The importance of li and its relation to ren is expressed clearly in the Confucian Analects (Lunyu). When Confucius was asked by one of his disciples about what he meant by ren, the sage replied, "To conquer the self and return to li is ren." And, when asked about how to achieve ren, he answered, "Do not look at what is contrary to li; do not listen to what is contrary to li; do not say what is contrary to li; and do not make any movement contrary to li." There can be no doubt that li was of paramount concern in traditional Chinese political and social life.

Most rulers in traditional China seem to have appreciated the truth of an old Chinese axiom which says that the empire could be conquered, but not ruled, on
horseback. Instead of relying on military power, they undertook to maintain their rule by making use of the techniques and institutions of control through the Confucian idea of *li*. In this regard, *li* may be viewed as a tool of the ruling elite. In the first place, *li* helped to create and reinforce the image of the emperor’s legitimacy and political power. Since Confucianism was embraced as the official ideology of China for some two thousand years, its assumptions were considered “orthodoxy” (*zheng* or *zheng-tong*). All other ideas and practices, that were not in tune with authority, were denounced as heterodox (*bu-zheng*, *yi-duan*, or *bu-duan*) and, hence, forbidden. Orthodoxy was thought to have the approval and support of Heaven (*Tian*). Because the emperor was regarded as the Son of Heaven, imperial orthodoxy received metaphysical sanction. State ritual, in turn - itself a form of *li* - demonstrated attunement with Heaven and the natural order (*dao*).

Another basic function of *li* was as a device for maintaining the social order. *Li* served this purpose "by encouraging submissiveness to authority and by delineating status distinctions and obligations." The "teachings of *li" (*li-liao*) were regarded as essentially the "teachings of status" (*ming-liao*); and the main concern of the "teaching of status" was the concept of the "rectification of names" (*zheng-ming*). As Confucius stressed, "If the names are not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success." The "rectification of names" was based on the Confucian doctrine of *san-gang* (the Three Bonds: ruler dominates subject, father dominates son, and husband dominates wife) and *wu-lun* (the Five Relationships, which also included the relationships of older {brother} to younger {brother} and of friend to friend).

Actions or behaviors that were not in accordance with these relationships of subordination were considered improper and could lead to punishment. Because the "rectification of names" provided the foundation for proper behavior and for the operation of Confucian society, the Confucian classics, especially the Analects and the Book of Rites (*li-jii*), devote much attention to status distinctions and obligations. The idea of "rectification of names," as Hsiao Kung-ch’uan has
pointed out, constitutes "the starting point" of Confucius' political and social thought.19

Although the virtue of the superior was stressed as the condition for power and respect, the obligation of the inferior to be loyal to the emperor, obedient to the father and submissive to the husband was much more heavily emphasized. In reality, the authority of the superior over the inferior was absolute because of their unequal status. Therefore, li, based on status distinctions, provided "both canonical and customary sanction for proper behavior" in the Confucian society. It functioned within a social hierarchy in which "every human being understands his duties and privileges and accepts them as a part of a rational and universal natural order."20 Henceforth, the emperor was expected to act like a ruler, while the subject ought to behave like the ruled. Similarly, the son must acknowledge the authority of the father, and the wife must acknowledge the authority of the husband. No wonder the rulers of traditional China all followed Confucius' advice that "to secure the ease of superiors and bring order to the people (an-shang zhi-min), nothing is better than li."21

Based on the relationship between ren and li, Confucians assumed an intimate linkage between external behavior and internal moral spirit. They believed, in other words, one's behavior reflected one's character, and that strict adherence to specific rules and standards of external behavior would help to cultivate and strengthen one's internal morality. Li (proper behavior) was not only an inner virtue, but also a means of developing it. The Book of Rites (Li-ji) states, "to cultivate one's person and fulfill one's words is called good conduct. When conduct is ordered and words are in accordance with the Tao [(Dao), the Way], we have the substance of the rules of-li [propriety]."22 Confucians emphasized that li controlled the emotions and contributed to learning, which in turn restored the goodness of man's "natural" endowment from Heaven.23

Confucius also believed that a good government rules by means of virtuous personal character and moral example via the employment of li. Hence, he emphasized the importance of the emperor's moral example in the society. This idea was clearly expressed in the Analects. The Master once said, "When a
prince's personal conduct is correct [zheng], his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed. 24 When Ji Kang (head of the Ji family, the most powerful of the Three Families of Lu, and real holder of power in the State of Lu) asked Confucius about government, the Master replied, "To govern means to rectify. ["to rectify," zheng = is the root of the word, zheng, to govern."] If you lead the people with rectitude, who would dare to be lacking in rectitude? 25 And he also once said, "If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to summit to his example. If he love good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. 26 In Confucius' view, "The character of the superior man is like that of the wind, the character of the small people is like that of the grass. When there is a wind over the grass, it cannot choose but bend." 27 In other words, the virtue and right conduct of the emperor was the key to an orderly society and to the success of his government. If the emperor possessed the perfect virtue (ren), he could "rule well without exerting himself." 28 A date could be envisaged when government would be reduced and punishments no longer used. 29

The role of government as the moral example of its people and the guardian of their morality is probably one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Confucian political tradition. Confucian government, as noted by J. K. Fairbank and others, was a "government by the best." 30 It was not a government by the people as in the democratic political tradition, but for the people. In the Confucian view, government has three responsibilities: to nourish its people; to teach its people; and to govern its people. The most effective instrument by which to carry out these functions is li while law (fa) and punishment (xing) are auxiliary. 31 The Lunyu states, "In leading them with laws and keeping them in order with punishments, the people will avoid the punishments and, furthermore, have no sense of shame. In leading them with the value of virtue (de), and keeping them in order with li, the people will not only have the sense of shame but also will correct themselves [reform]." 32 The central policy that Confucius emphasized most was that of transformation through the teaching of li. Nourishing the people was an
essential duty of the state; it was a manifestation of the Master's concept of benevolence and love (ren-si). However, it was not the state's highest policy, because the objectives of the state were not merely that the people should enjoy plenty with regard to food and clothing, but rather that they should be ethical and virtuous in character and in behavior. Therefore, when discussing the people of the State of Wei, Confucius said that when they were already enriched, they should then be taught;33 and, in reply to Zi Gong's inquiry about government, he advocated foregoing the people's food but retaining their trust [if forced to select between these alternatives].34 Morality was always of primary importance. The reason for Confucius' emphasis on transformation through the teaching of li lay in his doctrine of ren. "The man of benevolence [ren], wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others."35 Hence, transformation through teaching is not merely one of the functions of the Confucian government, but is, in fact, an important element in Confucius' political and social policy.

Throughout the last two millennia, rulers of traditional China had tried to maintain a firm hold on their subjects by both administrative and ideological control. While the former was carried out by the Bac-jia system,36 most of the rulers found Confucianism a suitable ideology and the teaching of li the most serviceable instrument to implement the ideological control.

An effective way to ensure Confucianism as the dominant ideology of the state was to maintain the Imperial Examination System, which was initiated by the Emperor Wen of the Han dynasty (reigned 197-157 B.C.); it became a nation-wide practice by the sixth-seventh century and was not abolished until the beginning of the twentieth century (1905). Under this system, Confucian classics, such as the Four Books (the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects and Mencius), were essential knowledge for the examination, and the examination became the only way to a respectable civil service career. By using this device, the rulers "sought to secure the support of the native scholars, to direct their minds and energy to the "proper channels" and to keep them out of mischief."37 At the same time, any other ideas and values were consequently
regarded as heterodox and, hence, discouraged. As Confucian classics, such as Zhou-li (Rites of the Zhou dynasty), Yi-li (The Rite) and Li-ji (the Book of Rites), became essential reading for the scholars (loosely meaning all the literate people), various popular hand-books about li also quickly appeared. Among them, some were written especially for officials, while others were for literate commoners.38 At the same time, family instructions (Jia-xun), genealogies (Jia-pu and Zu-pu) and “clan rules” (Zu-qui) also emerged, which often consisted of citations from classic and popular ritual books.39 Various li, manifesting all kinds of ethical relations and proper behavior, were described in detail in these books (for example, the proper gesture for a son to approach his mother who was ill in bed).40 The scope of such handbooks might be comprehensive or narrow, but all were deemed necessary for the proper conduct of everyday affairs in traditional China.

Ideological control of the masses was a constant concern of the Confucian government. Taking the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) as an example, in order to depict themselves as the “true heirs” of Chinese tradition, the alien Manchu rulers not only took Confucianism as their official ideology, but also took the indoctrination of the ideology, the teaching of li, as their major concern. As early as 1656, the Shunzhi emperor said, "Controlling tian-xia [all under Heaven], my first concern is to correct people's minds."41 In order to "correct" people's minds with the "right" ideology, various methods were employed: government organized public lectures; distribution of leaflets to the literate; reading exhortations to virtue to villagers; and singling out conspicuously virtuous men for public recognition.42 Amongst these methods, the most interesting was the xiang-yue (rural lecture) system, which had existed long before, but was only made into an official institution in the Qing dynasty.43 As Hsiao Kung-ch’uan’s study on rural China has suggested, the Xiang-yue lectures appeared to have been inaugurated by the Shunzhi emperor with the promulgation of his Liu Yu (Six Maxims of a Hortatory Edict).44 It was a measure taken to cope with the almost total illiteracy of the rural population and to make sure that the emperor's maxims would influence the people's minds and behavior at the grassroots level. Public lectures
on the emperor's maxims were held regularly on the first and fifteenth day of each month. The six maxims clearly reflect some basic Confucian values and the Confucian concern about proper behavior:

1. Perform filial duties to your parents.
2. Honor and respect your elders and superiors.
3. Maintain harmonious relationships with your neighbors.
4. Instruct and discipline your sons and grandsons.
5. Let each work peacefully for his livelihood.
6. Do not commit wrongful deeds.

In 1670 emperor Kangxi wrote a new set of edifying maxims and published them in the form of a special imperial edict (Sheng-yu or Sacred Edict). The content included the following sixteen maxims:

1. Perform with sincerity filial and fraternal duties in order to give due importance to social relations.
2. Behave with generosity to your kindred in order to demonstrate harmony and affection.
3. Cultivate peace and concord in your neighborhoods in order to prevent quarrels and litigations.
4. Recognize the importance of husbandry and the culture of mulberry trees in order to ensure a sufficiency of food and clothing.
5. Hold economy in estimation in order to conserve your money and goods.
6. Extend the schools of instruction in order to make correct the practices of scholars.
7. Reject false doctrines in order to honor learning.
8. Explain the laws in order to warn the ignorant and obstinate.
9. Manifest propriety and courtesy in order to make manners and customs good.
10. Work diligently at your proper calling in order to give settlement to the aims of the people.
11. Instruct your sons and younger brothers in order to guard them from evil-doing.
12. Put a stop to false accusations in order to protect the innocent and good.
13. Abstain from the concealment of fugitives in order to avoid being involved in their punishment.
14. Pay your taxes fully in order to dispense with official urging.
15. Combine in the Bao-jia in order to suppress thieves and robbers.
16. Resolve animosities in order to value your lives duly.

Although the Sheng Yu was largely an elaboration of the Liu Yu, all the
lectures were now focused on these sixteen maxims of Kangxi. About a half a century later, in 1724, the Yongzheng emperor, "apparently thinking that even the sixteen maxims of the Sacred Edict were too brief for the comprehension of 'ignorant rustics', wrote the Sheng-yu Guang-xun (The Amplified Instructions of the Sacred Edict), a lengthy document of about 10,000 words."45 Twice a month the entire population of villages and towns had to gather in groups for the "lectures." This system remained in operation in rural communities up to the revolution of 1911.46

This obsessive concern with its people's morals and behavior reflects a long-standing preoccupation of China's ruling elite with the notion of order. In Chinese politics and history, the word "order" (zhì) always denotes a positive connotation, while the word "disorder" (huán) is always linked to war and famine. Qin-mo Zhi-huan (The Disorder at the end of the Qin dynasty) brought tremendous miseries to the people. Once the Han dynasty was firmly established and order was restored under the emperor Wen and Jing (reigned from 179-157 B.C. and from 156-141 B.C. respectively), the nation revived: productivity increased remarkably and the people enjoyed a more comfortable life than they had ever had before. This period in Chinese history has been called Wen-Jing Zhi Zhi (The order of [the emperors] Wen and Jing [of the Han dynasty]). Similarly, soon following the great peasant rebellions that occurred at the end of the Sui dynasty was Zhen-quan zhi zhi (The Order of the Zhenguàn reign).47

Prosperity seems to have come along hand in hand with order. As exemplified by Chinese history, disorder not only brought misery to the people, but also often resulted in the change of dynasties. This, of course, meant the loss of power by one ruler to another. As a result, the rulers of traditional China regarded "maintaining order" as their major concern. The relentless effort on indoctrination of Confucian ideology and the teaching of jì were all aimed to maintain social order and hence to maintain their political control.

Certainly, social order is generally thought of as a necessary condition for progress and development in any society. There are, however, a number of features that make the Chinese concern distinctive. First, the Chinese concept of
order was Confucianist. It was based on the hierarchy of san-gang wu-lun, and manifested by a set of Confucian ideas and values, such as li, zhong, and xiao. According to Confucians, there was only one order existing in the world and that order was Confucian order. Any other kinds of order that were not in accordance with Confucian ideas would be considered heretical and disorderly.

Secondly, in the traditional Chinese political and social world, order was seen not merely as a necessary condition for the progress and development of a society, but as the very goal of government. The Chinese phrase "tian-xia da-zhi" (all under Heaven is in great order) was used to mean the ideal society that mankind one day would achieve. Moreover, when disorder occurred - that is, Confucian morality and ethics broke down, as in the time of peasant rebellion - the Confucian government tended to see the problem not so much in terms of economic distresses and social and political grievances, but in terms of the consequence of negligence or abandonment of Confucian morality and values (even though heavy exploitation by landowners or heavy government taxes were often the basic causes of mass unrest and rebellion; for instance, the Great Peasant Rebellion at the end of the Sui dynasty (581-618 A.D.) and the Rebellion led by Wang Xianzhi and Huang Chao (from 874 to 884 A.D.)). Although the government would take steps to remedy particular problems, it dealt harshly with those who disturbed the social and political order of the government (the government simply used force to suppress rebellions). Meanwhile, the rulers would make every effort to reinforce and restore the morality and values that they thought had been abandoned. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and the Tongzhi Restoration (1862-1874) are good examples.

The traditional fear of disorder was also due to the belief that internal disorder would invite external calamity (nei-luan wai-huan). Influenced by such an assumption, whenever external threat and internal disorder occurred at the same time, internal disorder would be taken as the main cause of external problems; and the government would regard the restoration of internal order as its priority and the necessary precondition for resisting external threat.

The preoccupation with morality and ethics and the obsessive concern with
the teaching of jī in traditional Chinese culture also reflect an idealistic world outlook of the people. This world view is highlighted by a belief in the importance and power of man's spirituality over material conditions. Contrary to Christianity, the mainstream of Confucianism had a very positive view regarding the nature of man. The starting sentence of San Zi Jing (the Three Character Classic - one of the most basic and popular books used in Confucian education) is: "The nature of man is originally good" (Ren zhi chu, xing ben shan). Mencius said, "The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none but have this tendency to good, just as all water flows downwards." Confucians believed that through self-cultivation (xiu-shen), man could be as virtuous and great as Heaven itself, and that a harmonious political and social order could be achieved as long as a high moral spirit was maintained by both the ruler and the subjects. By the same token, if a society was declining, the moral degeneration of men, as reflected in the spiritlessness of the people and disorder of the society, was taken to be a major cause. To restore moral spirit, the government ought to educate the people with jī, and urge them to cultivate their morality by adhering to specific rules and regulations. Once the people behaved themselves in a proper manner, their morality would be restored, and a high moral spirit of the people would revive the nation.

The ethical character of traditional Chinese culture and China's glorious past somehow enabled Chinese people to create a self image of being the most, if not the only, civilized nation on earth. For hundreds of years the Chinese referred to China as "the land of ritual and right behavior" (li-yi zhi-bang), regarding jī and yi as the symbol of civilization. The Chinese world outlook was based on the "essentially unchallenged idea" of China's cultural superiority to all other nation-states.

With these characteristics of traditional Chinese culture as described in this chapter in mind, we can now explore the legacy of the past to the present.
CHAPTER 2

The New Life Movement

Background

The two decades before the launching of the New Life Movement in 1934 were marked by political chaos, social unrest, widespread demoralization, and foreign imperialism. The 1911 revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty, but it could not create a stable political order to replace it. The political power of the country soon fell into the hands of Yuan Shikai, the head of the Northern Warlords (Bei-yang Jun-fa).¹ After Yuan's death in 1916, the Northern Warlords were split into three factions, led by Duan Qirui, Feng Guozhang and Zhang Zuolin, and engaged in wars against each other for the political control of the state. The country quickly turned into a state of warfare. Although the success of the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928 united the country under the Nationalist Party (KMT) led government, the influence of various warlords was strong, and open conflict broke out sporadically between Nanjing (the capital of the new Central government) and powerful warlords, such as Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan.²

Moreover, severe factional struggles within the KMT had developed since the success of the Northern Expedition. By March 1930, the left (Gai-zu Pai - the Reformist) and the right (Xi-shan Hui-yi Pai - the West Hill Group) wings of the KMT were united in an agreement to fight against Chiang Kai-shek.³ Meanwhile, the Communists were slowly regaining power after being driven away from the cities by the KMT's "White Terror" in 1927. By 1931, they had entrenched themselves in Jiangxi and set up a "soviet" independent of the Central government. In spite of the Nanjing government's most vigorous attacks (four extermination campaigns were launched against the Communists beginning in November 1930), it remained deeply rooted. The Communists steadily grew in
numbers and strength. Their influence extended to the neighboring provinces of Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong and Fujian, threatening the lower region of the Yangtze valley.4

Until the mid-30s, however, effective KMT control did not extend beyond the central and lower regions of the Yangtze valley. The central government of the KMT was merely nominal. In reality, China was torn by regional factionalism.

Moreover, the two decades after 1911 were one of the great germinal periods in the realm of Chinese thought. The collapse of the two thousand year old imperial system and the strenuous political events that occurred one after another during the five years Yuan was in power - the abortive "Second Revolution" of the KMT against Yuan Shikai in 1913, Japan's seizure of Jiaozhou from Germany in 1914 and her presentation of the Twenty-one Demands in 1915, and Yuan's final failure to become emperor in 1916 - drove Chinese intellectuals into the so-called New Culture Movement (1915-25) - an iconoclastic assault on traditional Chinese culture and a search for new values and institutions. While Confucianism was criticized and held responsible for China's backwardness in modern times, its concept of xiao and li, and the idea of the "teaching of li" (li jiao) were primary targets of attack.5 Filial piety (xiao) was criticized for being the basis of the principle of unquestioning loyalty (zhong) to the emperor and, hence, turned China "into a big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects."6 Li was denounced for encouraging submission, for preserving hierarchy, and, most of all, for being the tool of the ruler for maintaining political and social control in the society.7 The "teaching of li" was condemned as "cannibalism" (chi-ren).8 Its evil and hypocrisy were the subject of attack in many articles. Chen Duxiu (1879-1942), a leading figure in the New Culture Movement and the chief editor of the influential journal Xin Qing-nain (La Jeunesse, The New Youth), issued a "Call to Youth" (written in 1915 as the opening article for the first issue of The New Youth), in which he passionately attacked traditional Chinese conservatism and urged his readers to be independent, not servile; progressive, not conservative; aggressive, not retiring; cosmopolitan, not isolationist; utilitarian, not formalistic; and scientific, not mystical.9 He believed what China needed was
science and democracy: "We are convinced at present that only these two
gentlemen ["Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy"] can cure the dark maladies in
Chinese politics, morality, learning, and thought," he wrote in January 1919.\textsuperscript{10}

In search for new values and institutions, various political theories, which had
appeared in the last few centuries in the West, were all at once introduced to
China, mainly through the effort of Chinese intellectuals, such as Chen Duxiu and
Hu Shi, who had returned from abroad. Lively discussions of and debates over
Liberalism, Democracy, Utilitarianism, Nationalism, Anarchism, Darwinism,
Socialism and Communism accelerated the "awakening of the Chinese
intellectuals to the ideas of individualism, human rights, democracy and national
independence."\textsuperscript{11} As Chow Tse-tsung's detailed study on the movement
indicates, Chinese intellectuals, for the first time, "recognized the need for a
complete transformation of traditional Chinese civilization." What was demanded
now was, not "half hearted reform or partial renovation... but a vast and fervent
attempt to dethrone the very fundamentals of the old stagnant tradition and to
replace it with a completely new culture."\textsuperscript{12}

However, this sentiment of mainstream Chinese intellectuals was not shared
by the KMT regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. As Mary Wright pointed out, "The
accession to power of the KMT in 1927-28 marked the end of the era in which
revolutionary strains had been dominant in the Party's program and the
beginning of the most interesting and instructive of the many efforts in history to
make a revolution the heir of ancient tradition."\textsuperscript{13}

In its revolutionary days the KMT regarded itself as the heir of the great
Taiping Rebellion. Sun Yat-sen was said to have had "a lifelong admiration of
Hong Xiuquan" - the Leader of the Taiping Rebellion - and thought of himself as
Hong's successor in the struggle against the Manchus.\textsuperscript{14} The KMT's attitude
towards Confucianism was critical. It condemned Confucianism as the root cause
of China's backwardness.\textsuperscript{15} As late as 1927, "a mob had dragged a straw effigy
of Confucius through the streets of Shangsha and beat and burned it,\textsuperscript{16} and the
National Government itself had ordered on February 15 the abolition of official
Confucian rites and turned the funds over to public education on the grounds
that:

The principles of Confucius were despotic. For more than twenty centuries they have served to oppress the people and to enslave thought.... As to the cult of Confucius, it is superstitious and out of place in the modern world.... China is now a republic. These vestiges of absolutism should be effaced from the memory of citizens.17

As the new rulers of China, the attitude of the KMT leaders towards Confucius and Confucianism underwent rapid changes, while the cult of Zeng Guofan - the principal suppressor of the Taiping Rebellion, the architect of the Tongzhi Restoration and, above all, an ardent Confucian - was fast growing. Chiang Kai-shek took Zeng Guofan as his personal model.18 Identifying the KMT regime with the Imperial government, the leaders of the regime found Confucian ideas, which the Tongzhi imperial government worked hard to restore, relevant to twentieth-century problems of domestic tranquility and international security. Chiang and other leaders attributed the achievements of the Tongzhi Restoration to the stern moral character and insight into the working of the Confucian social process that characterized the heroes of the age, most notably, Zeng Guofan. Chiang praised Zeng as a man of "proper personal conduct and grand vision who renovated the old society." Zeng was regarded as the greatest man in modern Chinese history because he preserved not only the Qing house but also China.19

Public and avowed veneration of Confucius was resumed in 1928, the year the KMT succeeded in the Northern Expedition. In November of that year, Chiang Kai-shek urged his officers to spend their leisure time in the study of the Four Books: the jun-yu (The Analects), the Meng-zi (Book of Mencius), the Da-xue (Great Learning) and the Zhong-yong (Doctrine of the Mean). Two years later, Confucius' birthday was proclaimed a national holiday. National troops were ordered to give special protection to all local Confucian temples. In 1934, Confucius' birthplace, Qufu, was revived as a national shrine, and Chiang Kai-shek inaugurated the NLM to restore the basic Confucian virtues of li, yi, lian and chi.20
The tendency of the KMT to restore Confucian values deeply disappointed Chinese intellectuals who had just rejected Confucianism. Consequently, they became alienated from the KMT government and turned to sympathize with the CCP, which shared their attitude towards Confucianism. This situation was marked by the formation of a number of liberal and leftist organizations, such as the League of Leftist Writers (Zuo-yi Zuo-jia Lian-meng), the Liberal Alliance (Zi-you Da-tong-meng), the Society for the Study of Marxist Art and Literature (Ma-ke-si Zhu-yi Wen-yi Yan-jiu-hui) and the Anti-Imperialism Alliance (Fan-di Da-tong-meng); and was highlighted by the participation of such influential figures as Lu Xun and Mao Dun in an overtly leftist organization.\(^{21}\)

While the KMT faced internal political struggle and social unrest, foreign pressure also mounted as Japan became more aggressive towards China. Ever since the end of the First World War, the tension was high between Japan and China over the Shandong issue, centered around the struggle between Japan's desire to occupy the province and China's defence of its land. Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the Chinese were aware of and lived under the threat of Japan's policy of continental expansion.\(^{22}\) In 1931, Japan precipitated matters by occupying Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. This action immediately aroused wide nationalist sentiment amongst Chinese people: vigorous and nation-wide campaigns boycotting Japanese goods took place; student demonstrations were held in all the major cities, demanding that the government take firm action against the Japanese invasion. At the same time, violent actions against the KMT government also occurred.\(^{23}\) From 1930 onwards, Japan's influence in North China became more and more pronounced, and China's national independence was in real danger.

As the public's anti-Japanese sentiment grew stronger after 1931, Chiang Kai-shek's government ignored the cries from all circles of the society for the government to take firm action to resist Japanese aggression. Faced with the situation of internal disturbance and external calamity, Chiang believed that the demoralization of the people, as reflected in internal disorder, was the cause of the external invasion; and the only way to save the country was to restore
Confucian virtues and values in the society, and hence to restore internal order.24 Once the people's morality was restored and the country was in a "proper" order, resisting Japanese invasion would be "as easy as turning over your hand."25 The Communists were the most immoral people and the major problem of social disorder;26 hence, Chiang firmly pursued the policy of eradicating the Communists first and resisting the Japanese later, involving his government more and more in the battle against the Communists. In the spring of 1934, Chiang took personal charge of what was to be called the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign against the Communists. With the aid of Nazi German military advisers (as the Tongzhi regime employed the American and the English to suppress the Taipings), Chiang eventually forced the Communists to abandon Jiangxi in late 1934 and to go on the Long March.

In order to eliminate the influence of Communist ideology and to strengthen his government's political and social control of the people in Jiangxi, Chiang inaugurated the NLM.

**Ideological Foundation and Motivations of the NLM**

The New Life Movement (NLM) was inaugurated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, on February 19, 1934. It was claimed to be a "life style revolution" (sheng-huo ge-ming), aimed to overcome the "moral degeneration" and the "spiritlessness" of the people in order to rejuvenate the nation.27

In his inaugural speech, Chiang also referred to the movement as "a kind of social education." Its major purpose was to "make everyone in the society understand the value of li [ritual], yi [right behavior], lian [integrity], chi [sense of shame], and become a responsible citizen."28 To specify the movement and emphasize the significance of the four virtues, the major document of the movement, *The Outline of the New Life Movement*, states:

the New Life Movement aims at the promotion of a regular life guided by the four virtues (li, yi, lian and chi). These virtues must
be applied to ordinary matters, such as food, clothing, shelter[sic], conduct. The four virtues are the essential principle for the promotion of morality. From these rules one learns how to deal with men and matters, how to cultivate oneself, and how to adjust oneself to surroundings. Whoever violates these rules is bound to fail; and a nation which neglects them will not survive.29

Although the eight virtues - loyalty (zhong), filial piety (xiao), humanity (ren), love (ai), trustworthiness (xin), right behavior (yi), harmony (he) and peace (ping) - which Sun Yat-sen advocated during his life were mentioned in the promoters' speeches, it is the four virtues - li, yi, lian and chi - that were seen as the basic spirit of the NLM.30 This is because the goal of the NLM was to achieve a popular discipline in the society, and li, yi, lian and chi were the most useful concepts in Confucianism to maintain social order. To make Confucian virtues best suit their purpose, "new definitions" were given to the four virtues by the promoters of the NLM because of "the change in time and circumstances."

The official definitions of li, yi, lian and chi in the NLM are as follows:

Li means "law abiding attitude." All behavior that is in accordance with the rules and regulations of the country reflect the "law-abiding attitude."

Yi means "appropriate conduct." It is the visible manifestation of li - that is, the manifestation of the "law abiding attitude." All conduct that is in accordance with li is appropriate.

Lian means having a clear distinction between what is right and what is wrong. Behavior that is in accordance with li and yi is right; otherwise it is wrong. Right behavior should be advocated; and wrong behavior must be abandoned.

Chi means a clear conscience - having the sense of shame and abhorrence. One should feel ashamed when not acting in accordance with li, yi and lian; one should be abhorrent of others who are not acting in accordance with li, yi and lian.31

When explaining how the four virtues work to improve people's morality, the promoters stated, "One's morality begins with the sense of shame (chi) which prevents him from doing anything that is not in accordance with li, yi and lian. One's morality is helped by one's ability to distinguish right from wrong (lian). This ability will enable him to do all the right things in appropriate behavior (yi), which, in turn, reflects the "law-abiding attitude" (li). Hence, "the four virtues are related to and are inter-dependent upon each other, none of them can be
dispensed with.  
Among the four virtues, li was regarded as the most important value. Citing the Analects, Chiang explained that a family without li would be broken, and a nation without li would be destroyed. To stress its importance, Chiang referred to li as the only quality that distinguishes man from beasts. Although he employed the age-old Confucian ideas and values as the "basic spirit" of his NLM, Chiang himself was not "simply an old fashioned Confucian." As openly claimed by himself during one of his NLM speeches, the li he advocated in the NLM was no longer meant to be the "three kneelings and nine kowtow ritual" (san-gui jiu-ke), but referred to a wide application of "law-abiding attitude" (gui-gui ju-ju de tai-du). In other words, it meant "rational and proper behavior" in accordance with all the rules and regulations of his government. What attracted Chiang and his government about li was its social function - a device for maintaining social order - which had attracted the Confucian government, as well as the leaders of the Tongzhi Restoration. Moreover, traditional values with a nationalist overtone might win the KMT some sense of political legitimacy and help it in its struggle against all kinds of foreign ideologies, such as Marxism. For all these reasons, the regime's leadership viewed the NLM as a crucial means of attaining the nation's political, social and economic regeneration.

The fundamental assumption of the NLM was that traditional Chinese morality, as represented by the four virtues, li, yi, lian, and chi, which had made China great in remote times, could also make China powerful in modern times. In all the speeches he delivered during the NLM, Chiang maintained that morality and discipline were the essential elements that determined the success or failure of a nation. In fact, he stated assertively, that "if the classic virtues had been more assiduously cultivated in recent years, China would not have faced either domestic or foreign difficulties." By contrasting foreign strength with Chinese weakness and China's glorious past with the humiliating present, Chiang affirmed that the single greatest cause of the Chinese backwardness was, "not because that we have no fine weaponry, but that we have lost our intrinsic traditional spirit and fine morality." Hence, to overcome China's backwardness
and to become an equal to other nations, the most important and urgent task was to uplift the people's moral spirit by restoring the traditional values - li, yi, lian, and chi - which had been destroyed by the "Communist bandits" and abandoned by its people. Furthermore, he claimed that "once the people's morality was restored, it would no longer be a difficult matter to abolish the unequal treaties, to take revenge on other nations or to revive our nation." In other words, until the people's morality had been restored and the society was in order, China was not ready to resist the Japanese invasion.

With li, yi, lian, and chi as the basic spirit, the movement was said to be leading the Chinese people to a more rational life by achieving three separate but interrelated goals: militarization (jun-shi hua), productivization (sheng-chan hua), and the aestheticization (yi-shu hua). The three goals were officially defined as follows:

- **Militarization** is aimed at making every citizen pay attention to order, obedience and discipline. All actions must be quick, exact and identical.
- **Productivization** is aimed at advocating industry and thrift, reducing expenditure, preferring to use national goods, and working hard to make more of a contribution to the country.
- **Aestheticization** is aimed at educating ordinary people to uphold orderliness, to pay attention to hygiene, and to make all things naturally beautiful by keeping them clean.

To achieve the three goals, the movement was declared to be practically concerned with the people's everyday life of food, shelter, clothing, conduct together with principles of "orderliness [zheng-qii], cleanliness [qing-jie], simplicity [jian-dan], austerity [pu-su], promptness [xun-su], and exactness [que-shi]." The promoters believed that, "Rudeness and vulgar manners can be corrected by cultural and artistic training, and degeneration can be overcome by developing good personal character.... If we are determined to reform we must start with the most fundamental question - we must reform our habits first." Chiang stated explicitly in his first NLM anniversary speech, that external training of one's external conduct would help to construct his inner morality. Through issuing specific behavior codes and demanding the people to follow, the NLM would in
time change the entire outlook of the people, and the government’s will would eventually become the people’s own desire.45

By embracing traditional native values, Chiang presented himself as the legitimate leader of the Chinese nation. In his NLM speeches, he denounced the Communists for abandoning the nationalist heritage, claiming that their six-year’s rule of Jiangxi had "ruined" the place:

In the area dominated by the Communist bandits, parents cannot love their children, children have no knowledge of filial piety; brothers are not like brothers, friends cannot be friends; teachers do not know how to teach students, and the students show no respect to their teachers. In short, the superior do not act like a superior, and the inferior do not behave like an inferior. Is there any difference between them [the Communists] and beasts! The place that once was the home of sages and heroes, the land of ritual and right behavior, has now become a barbaric and horrible place. This is a shame to our sage ancestors, and to the people of Jiangxi.46

At the same time, Chiang regarded the NLM as his mission to revive traditional Chinese heritage and to restore China’s reputation as the land of ritual and right behavior (li-yi zhi-bang).47

Nationalism was the backbone of the NLM. After all, the paramount concern of the movement was, as stated clearly by Chiang in his NLM inaugural speech, to "revive our Chinese nation." Nationalism was a constant theme, which ran through all the speeches Chiang made during the NLM. For Chiang, "Confucianism was imbued with a romantic nationalism."48 The emphasis on traditional values li, yi, lian, and chi, the recital of a strong and powerful China and a respected Chinese nation in remote times, and the comparison made between advanced nations and the degenerated Chinese were all aimed to raise nationalist sentiment and inspiration.

Nationalism went hand in hand with militarism in the NLM. As Chiang testified in his inaugural speech, the purpose of the NLM was "to thoroughly militarize the lives of the citizens of the entire nation."49 On another occasion, he declared "everything must be militarized. We must teach everyone to understand militarism, [and] to learn military skills... All our political plans and policies must
be centered around militarism." A pamphlet, published by the Central NLMPA, stated that the principle of the NLM implementing plan was to "raise the spirit of militarism and patriotism; pay attention to swift and neat action; practise a simple and plain life and foster the habit of obedience." While patriotism was advocated, the military spirit of "sacrificing oneself for the nation" was strongly stressed. Militarization was one of the most advocated themes in the NLM, although it was only one of the three goals set up by the administration as the new lifestyle of the people.

A number of scholars have suggested that there was a strong element of Fascism in the NLM. Chiang's admiration for Fascism was never a secret matter. In his NLM speeches, he repeatedly cited the militaristic aspects of Japan, Italy and Germany as examples of the new lifestyle that the Chinese people ought to learn. The Fascism of Germany and Italy provided Chiang with an image of the future society. "In Fascism," Chiang once declared, "the organization, the spirit, and the activities must all be militarized... In the home, the factory, and the government office, everyone's activities must be the same as in the army... In other words, there must be obedience, sacrifice, strictness, cleanliness, accuracy, diligence, secrecy.... And everyone must firmly and bravely sacrifice for the group and for the nation." As Lloyd Eastman correctly pointed out, "this image of Fascist society was incorporated essentially unchanged into the NLM." The ideology and the rules and regulations of the NLM indicated the aims of the KMT: to achieve a society of uniformity, regularity, discipline, regimentation and obedience, and to train every individual to be willing to sacrifice self to the group, to the nation. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Fascist military organization, the "Blue Shirts" (a nation-wide secret service organization established by the KMT in 1932), played a leading role in the movement. Based on ample evidence, Eastman asserted that "the NLM was the intended vehicle for the development of Fascism in Chinese society."

Confucianism, to be sure, was not the only ideology of the NLM. Besides nationalism and militarism (and Fascism), Christianity was also a strong element in the movement. Chiang's Christian wife, Mei-ling Soong, and the missionary,
George Shepherd, played important roles in the leadership of the movement. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek himself was a Christian. Their concept of the role of the NLM must have been strongly affected by the "social cement" of Christianity in the life of Western nations. Thomson’s study reveals that Chiang had become a sincere believer by 1934, although his conversion to Christianity in 1927 seemed to be for the purpose of marrying Mei-ling. In a commencement address at Jinling College in June 1934, Chiang assured the students that "religion was essential to life," and that Jesus Christ "was a revolutionary in his conception of living and society." Moreover, he argued that "China was now in particularly dire need of the 'Christian spirit of service.'" It seems that Chiang would not mind any ideology or religion that could help him bring the kind of popular discipline and social order that he desired.

The motivations of the NLM have been suggested and interpreted variously. The views of the Chinese on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are predictably different. While the politicians and scholars under the KMT regime have asserted the necessity and importance of the movement as an educational campaign promoting traditional Chinese morals and values over Communist propaganda, and have praised Chiang for his wisdom in launching the movement, the CCP press has condemned it as a reactionary movement: the values it promoted were feudalistic and oppressive; its purpose was to eliminate the people's democratic revolution and to destroy the development of the Communist movement in China.

Among the scholars outside of China, some simply saw the movement as the consequence of Chiang and his wife's desire, arising out of personal and nationalist feelings, to clean up the place because it was "a sore point" for them to hear Westerners saying that "China was dirty." Graham Peck, an American who was in China at the time and hence witnessed the movement, suggested that it was a "cherished ornament on the government's facade of Western-style progress." Some viewed it as a government effort, aimed to modernize China and to improve China's international position. Among those, George Shepherd (who took a great interest in the movement from its start and became an adviser
to it in 1936), described it as "a large scale program to modernize China"; its aim was to "attain equality in the family of nations through making China progressive and the equal of her neighbors." Still, some believed that militarization of the entire nation was its prime motivation. Most of them, however, agreed that the NLM was a political strategy of the KMT. It was designed, first of all, to combat the "alien ideology" (Marxism) and "subversive" (Communist) elements embodied in the Communist social revolution, through the revival of Chinese traditional values. It was also an effort to overcome the public's, and especially the intellectuals', alienation from the government. Through inoculating traditional values and promoting uniformity, regularity, discipline, regimentation, obedience, its ultimate goal was to transform the people into an instrument of the government's will and to strengthen its political influence and social control in the society.

**Main Features of the NLM**

Although the most notable feature of the NLM was its hygiene related activities, the extensive propaganda campaign, the massive organizational effort, the militarization of social life, and its nationalist overtones were among the most striking characteristics.

The NLM was launched in a public meeting in Nanchang on February 19, 1934. In order to develop it rapidly into a vigorous campaign, Chiang made frequent public appearances and delivered four lengthy public speeches in the following month. Meanwhile, the government's administrative personnel actively performed their duties. Two days after the inauguration, an organization called the Association for the Promotion of the New Life Movement (Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong Cu-jin Wei-yuan-hui) was formed. It consisted mainly of Party and military personnel, and was to function as the administrative organ of the movement. At the same time, mass demonstrations were ritualistically organized to show the support of the public for the movement; lantern parades and entertainment rallies took place to welcome the beginning of the new life; on
walls and tree trunks slogans were posted, urging people to take part in the movement; mass activities concerned with cleanliness and orderliness took place. Moreover, arrests were made of anti-social characters who ignored the movement and spat recklessly.

Overall, it appeared that Chiang Kai-shek's call for a "movement for a new life" was greeted by immediate public enthusiasm. Through March and April, the NLM spread over all of Jiangxi Province, and the NLM Promotion Associations (NLMPA) were established in nine provinces, as well as three municipal centers. As the movement was rapidly expanding, the need for a headquarters arose. On July 1, the Nanchang NLMPA was officially converted into the Central NLMPA with Chiang Kai-shek as the Chairman. The body, as explicitly explained in The Complete Report of the NLM in 1934, was "to supervise and direct new life activities over the country through a hierarchical organization reaching out from the center, through the provinces, all the way to the districts." By the first anniversary of the NLM in February 1935, fifteen provinces, three municipalities, and nine railway centers had NLMPAs. At the end of 1935, organizations had reached nineteen provinces, five municipalities, twelve railway centers, and ten overseas Chinese communities.

To propagate the NLM, Chiang Kai-shek's speeches on the movement were printed and published in various forms: individual editions, special editions, collections. At the same time, many pamphlets concerned with the NLM appeared under the titles of Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong Yu Min-zu Fu-xing (New Life Movement and National Revival); Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong Yu Min-sheng Shi-quan (New Life Movement and the Historical View on People's Livelihood); Xin Sheng-huo Yu Li-yue (New Life Movement and Ritual and Music); and Xin Sheng-huo Yu Fu-nu Jie-fang (New Life Movement and Women's Liberation). These pamphlets priced at a trivial 10 fen apiece, were circulated to promote the movement, rather than to make a profit. Moreover, various propaganda teams gave lectures and talks to the public, promoting the NLM ideas at the grassroots level. In addition, a song entitled "The Song of the New Life Movement" was
composed with lyrics like NLM slogans to popularize the movement.\textsuperscript{76}

In order to help the people reform their behavior and hence to meet the basic requirements of the movement - orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, austerity, promptness and exactness, the Nanchang NLMPA issued a list of ninety-six rules to give detailed instructions under the titles of food, clothing, shelter and conduct on the individual's daily conduct.\textsuperscript{77} The people were now told to stand straight, to button their clothes, to always bring handkerchiefs, and to eat quietly.\textsuperscript{78} To "culturalize" the people, courteous language, such as morning greetings and good bye were advocated; to promote simplicity and austerity, wearing perfume and jewelry were discouraged, and dancing was frowned upon. At the same time, opium smoking was denounced as a degenerate habit. Furthermore, lavish wedding celebrations were criticized for their extravagance, and "mass weddings" (many couples were organized to get married at one ceremony) were advocated.\textsuperscript{79}

To make sure that the people observed the rules and regulations, official inspections took place. In the spring of 1934, a thousand citizens were selected in Nanchang as honorary detectives, whose duty was to remind people in the major streets and public places to act in accordance with NLM ideas.\textsuperscript{80} Regular inspections were also made at people's private homes, as well as restaurants and public bathrooms.\textsuperscript{81} The results of these inspections were put on a public display board as the means to apportion praise and blame. On a national scale, an NLM Inspection Corps, staffed by 136 graduates of the government's Central Political Institute, was organized by the Central NLMPA in 1935. It was to go to every province and major cities to examine "the efficiency of public servants" as to their observance of NLM principles and to investigate "people's organizations" and "social education.\textsuperscript{82}\textsuperscript{82} In addition to the departments of administration, promotion, and training, a Students' Department was created to arrange for "practical service" and student research "into the economic and social problems of peasants and workers."\textsuperscript{83} Moreover, local NLMPAs were instructed to hold grand scale "citizen meetings," which must be carefully organized, with various parade teams to demonstrate the nation's "united spirit" as an achievement of the
Moreover, to promote the movement, the "model technique" was also employed. Nanchang was named the model city to "establish an example for the whole country to copy." At the individual level, while urging his officials to act as examples for the masses (sheng-ti li-xing), Chiang also presented himself as the model for the people. As reflected in his NLM speeches, Chiang had no desire to hide his sense of moral superiority over the people. Indeed, he regarded himself and his government as the guardian of its people's morality. In a speech given on March 11, 1934, Chiang told his audience a story of how his parents' strict education had "brought him up to be a man of cleanliness and orderliness, and to the position of Generalissimo - a revolutionary leader." In conclusion, he asserted, "If you have the ambition to do something great for our country, to bring credit to our nation, to be a revolutionary leader of the Republic of China, you must learn from me, Chiang Kai-shek." On another occasion, Chiang stressed, "Everyone must understand that no one was born to be a revolutionary leader. If you all try hard, you can all be like me....[so] there will be more great human beings in the cause of saving our people and reviving our country." When explaining the relationship between the people and the government, The Outline of the New Life Movement stated, "People depend upon the government, especially its system of education, for a satisfactory [moral] life; the government depends upon the people to carry out its policies." The NLM was clearly viewed as a government effort to educate the people who, as Chiang described, were "filthy" (wu-sui), "lazy" (lan-duo) and "decrepit" (tui-tang). They could not discriminate "between good and evil, what is public and what is private, and what is fundamental and what is expedient." The life of most Chinese at the time, according to Chiang, was "barbaric" (ye-man) and devoid of reason (bu-he-li).

Throughout the first year, the stress of the NLM was on public health and disciplined, orderly behavior. There were regional variations on specific items, but the general emphasis was the same all over. A number of specific campaigns were also carried out as either a part of or as
an adjunct to the NLM. Among those were an anti-opium drive; campaigns to advocate the use of national goods (as a reaction against the Japanese invasion of 1931-32) and to improve public health; and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement (PERM). Several centers were set up in Jiangxi for the treatment of opium addicts. Public health was improved by large scale projects, such as anti-fly and anti-mosquito campaigns, that were carried out by various service corps.94

The PERM was inaugurated in April 1935 by Chiang Kai-shek. Its inauguration might have been a consequence of the criticism (which had begun shortly after the inauguration of the NLM) that the NLM was superficially focused on "symptoms rather than causes."95 Allegedly, the PERM was to be a long-planned adjunct to the NLM - the second of the three goals of the NLM (productivization).96 However, because the primary attention of the NLM was given to moralistic and spiritual aspects, the PERM did not receive adequate attention from its start.97 As the NLM was interrupted by the wars against Japan after 1937, the PERM was abandoned soon after it had been launched.

**Outcome and Consequences of the NLM**

Because of the personal influence of Chiang Kai-shek and the concentrated efforts of his government, the NLM achieved some success in the first year in terms of enthusiasm aroused within Jiangxi and growth outside the province. Government organized NLM activities succeeded in obtaining mass participation. City-wide clean-up campaigns that took place in Nanchang in the summer, 1934 were reported to have produced "sensational results."98 In his first year anniversary report, the chief promoter sounded pleased:

*Because of the anxious desire of the people to revive our nation, the whole country responded [once the movement was inaugurated], people everywhere followed it immediately. The development [of the movement] was so rapid that such a situation had never happened before." In praising the accomplishments of the movement, Chiang declared that "the consciousness of*
'discipline' (gui-ju) and 'cleanliness' (qing-jie) has become deeply ingrained among our people, it is becoming a trend.99 Despite its vigorous beginnings and its organizational scope, the NLM had lost much of its momentum even by its second year. By 1935 many writers were assailing the NLM both for its close party connection and its superficiality. Its lack of spontaneity was particularly apparent against "the backdrop of the extraordinarily spontaneous Student Movement in the autumn months."100 The second year of the NLM produced profound pessimism. Chiang's second anniversary speech expressed much irritation and disappointment:

Speaking from the point of results and practical conditions, we really cannot say that our expectations have been satisfied and that our original aim has been reached. On the contrary, it can almost be said that we have retreated rather than advanced. When we compare the results of this anniversary with that of the last one, they do not tally. This is very sad and shameful. I have travelled over the country a great deal within the past year. Wherever I went, I looked carefully for the actual results of our movement, to see if there is any difference in society and the life of the people, compared to the time before the movement was launched. I must say that, with very few exceptions, most places have not really accomplished the two objectives of cleanliness and orderliness.101

As Arif Dirlik has correctly pointed out, "Notwithstanding the impression of activity and success created by the movement, at least in the first year, it accomplished little that was real and lasting even in its most rudimentary goals. In fact, so far as a mass movement, its decline followed immediately upon the brief flurry of activities inspired by its inauguration."102 As internal unrest (highlighted by the Xian incident of December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by one of his powerful military marshals, Zhang Xueliang, who demanded the end of civil war and a united front against Japan) and Japanese aggression mounted in 1936 and 1937, Chiang could no longer afford to be involved personally with the NLM. His wife, Mei-ling Soong, became the Director-General of the movement. Meanwhile, the Christian church started taking an active role in the leadership of the NLM and its activities, marked by the appointment of George
W. Shepherd by Chiang as a director of the movement in 1936. As the whole country sunk into the war against Japan, and as the poverty level of the people worsened to a point where famine became a common phenomenon,\textsuperscript{103} the NLM for cleanliness, orderliness and good manners became irrelevant to the crisis at hand. As a number of scholars indicated after 1937, the NLM became an "overly government directed drive."\textsuperscript{104} Its continued existence was purely the will of its leadership, while the movement degenerated into a bureaucratic "game of words."\textsuperscript{105}

The NLM had some practical outcome in the pre-1937 years. This was mainly the results of the four campaigns (the anti-opium drive, the use of national goods, public health and civics). Through the NLM, several centers were set up for the treatment of opium addicts. Public health, in particular, had the benefit of the large-scale anti-fly and anti-mosquito campaigns. Even more important, but extremely spotty - were activities aimed at improving people's welfare, such as aid to peasants and river conservation. These, however, were largely restricted to Jiangxi province.\textsuperscript{106} The country's situation on the whole was not effected by the movement. Graham Peck, an American who travelled extensively before and during the anti-Japanese war, gave an eye witness account of the NLM in his book \textit{Two Kinds of Times}:

When I travelled in China before the war, I had seen that the movement was then cleaning up the surface of life in the big cities. Its campaigns for neat streets, hygienic habits, and orderly behavior had results among those of the small new commercial and industrial upper class who wanted to make China like the West. In the countryside and the smaller provincial towns, however, its work was irrelevant to the point of comedy and tragedy. Uplifting wall slogans were posted in villages where nobody could read, and peasants who could not afford soap were lectured on the duty to wash. On my trip up through the southern provinces in the past summer [1940], I noticed that even the superficial work was slackening off; most posters were weather-ruined and indecipherable. In Chungking, the movement was still eagerly conspicuous - fresh posters were always appearing, and there was a New Life Center for inspirational rallies - but the old spirit seemed to be gone....Behind the modern buildings on Chungking's few newly widened avenues, the steep
alleys were as filthy and turbulent as they had been in the Middle Ages. 107

Peck suggested that the NLM was not only largely an urban phenomenon, but also essentially an urban upper-class movement. His account reveals the formalistic, superficial character of the Movement and the hypocrisy of the ruling elite. The sights and incidents Peck vividly recorded in his book show situations out of control, "people demoralized to the point where self-preservation justifies the grossest inhumanity." Much humor was recorded, but Chinese life on the whole, after years of NLM, was "a cruel joke." 108

KMT officials and their supporters have, in general, sung the praises of the NLM. In a special collection of articles published to commemorate the thirteenth anniversary of the movement in 1947, the then Vice President, Li Zongren, gave credit to Chiang Kai-shek for inaugurating the movement, and to the movement for playing a positive role in the moral and spiritual reconstruction of the people and in the eventual defeat of the Japanese military invasion. 109 Yu Dawei, the Defence Minister, emphasized the "notable improvement that the NLM had made in ordinary people's daily life," but explained that the situation had not improved as much as had been expected because of the Anti-Japanese War. 110

Although giving praise to the ruler and to what he has done is a Chinese tradition (a ritualistic way to show a minister's loyalty), sentiment of disappointment was also expressed. Huang Renlin, a trusted follower of Chiang and also the General Secretary in charge of the NLM, observed with sadness that "after carrying on the NLM for 13 years, the people's daily life was getting harder and harder."111 Opinions on the outcome of the NLM were conflicting. Besides actual facts, however, it is hard to believe that after years of war the people's lives could have been remarkably improved.

Although the four campaigns (the anti-opium drive, the use of national goods, public health and civics) achieved some limited practical results in the pre-1937 years, the NLM, on the whole, was a failure. It did not bring the people a modern lifestyle or modernize China as the promoters had wished, nor did it achieve any of the specific goals that the government had desired. The means (the rules and
regulations) that had been designed to help the people to cultivate their morality - to embrace the values of li, yi, lian, and chi and to achieve eventually the revival of the nation - became the ends themselves. Once the propaganda heat was over, NLMPA's organized activities became increasingly restricted to campaigns against spitting, smoking, and "the littering of public places with watermelon seeds."112 As for its impact on the people's morality and spirit, there was no evidence to support the view that the city-wide clean-up campaigns in Nanchang (that were said to have had sensational results) had actually made the people there more moral than the people elsewhere. Moreover, the outcome of organized activities, such as street cleaning, could not be kept up for long once the pressure of the campaigns was gone.113 In addition, it is difficult to imagine that a worsened economy and a more miserable living conditions could have helped the people to build high morality and spirit. People's habits are often the product, as well as the reflection, of their external living conditions. The two seem to have a much closer relationship than the relation between habits and morality. When poverty was a widespread problem, as in the case of China in the 1930s and the 40s where people were struggling against starvation, a social campaign such as the NLM urging the people to brush their teeth and to button their shirts in the hope of arousing their moral spirit was simply absurd. It was also "ludicrous" to think that "Chiang should even conceive that China could resist the Japanese once all the people regularly plunged their faces into a bucket of cold water, or urinated in a tz'u-so [ce-suo] (toilet)."114

The NLM did not overcome the alienation of the intellectuals and the students from the KMT regime. The political image of the KMT moving from revolution to open restoration of Confucianism deeply disappointed the nation's reformist intelligentsia, who had just experienced the excitement of the New Culture Movement. Since this movement fundamentally rejected Confucianism and advocated "replacing it with a complete new culture," the NLM was "sneered and jeered" at by the intellectuals (professors, students, writers) as a "purity drive," a "return-to-the-old-life movement," and a "Return to Confucius Movement."115 In addition, they criticized its superficiality, its focus on symptoms rather than
causes. The NLM did not make much impact on the minds of the young people, who had been influenced by the New Culture Movement. As noted by George Shepherd in 1937 with dismay, "the NLM played no part whatsoever in the thinking of China's youth." It seems that without concrete plans and improvements in other aspects of the people's lives, mere Confucianist moral preaching could achieve very little, if anything.

There were a number of factors contributing to the eventual failure of the NLM. First, the movement was a sheer government effort and organization, and there was no initiative on the part of the people. The whole concept of the promotion associations, with the compulsory inclusion on every level of government officials and party heads, suggested an artificial rather than a spontaneous movement. It was a movement from above. As such, it suffered from the weakness of all spiritual movements not genuinely derived from the people. Chiang realized this weakness, and in fact, pointed it out in his third anniversary speech:

"This New Life Movement is a social movement, and cannot be accomplished with political methods - even less should one concern oneself only with writing bureaucratic essays and bureaucratic jargon [dēng - yìn fēng-chì] to deal with the problems. We should know that changing [the nation's] customs cannot be accomplished with sheets of meaningless writing. In our previous work, administration consisted of many slogans but little actual work, of many plans but little implementation; regarding the object of administration, attention was directed only to the upper strata of society, and it did not extend to the lower strata - attention was directed only to the thoroughfares and not to the sidestreets. Therefore, the result of three years of the New Life Movement has merely been a temporary and superficial renovation without attaining a fundamental reform."

Unfortunately, Chiang found it difficult to practice what he preached.

Secondly, the basic ideological assumptions that to restore traditional values and morals and hence to uplift the spirit of the people was the key to the revival of the nation - and that by reinforcing strict rules and regulations, the people's morality would be improved - were basically unsound. Just as Guan-zi (?-645 B.C.) indicated two or three thousand years ago: "When one does not have to
worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for personal honour; when the granary is full, then people learn good manners." A "new lifestyle" should have a concrete material and economic basis. Starving people would take care of their eating manners once food became available! Without taking adequate measures to improve the country's economic productivity and the people's standard of living, a mere emphasis on behavior and morality could not be fruitful. The rules and regulations that the government issued might be observed by the people under pressure, but would only become the ends themselves as the NLM has proved.

Thirdly, the NLM failed because it could not attract the interest of the two most important social groups in Chinese society, namely the intellectuals and the peasants. As I have discussed above, the whole ideology of the NLM was a departure from the mainstream of Chinese thought since the First World War. The use of Confucianism as a "viable ideology" for the nation, as James Thomson's study shows, did not bring the intellectuals any closer, but "widened the gulf between China's political leadership and its intellectuals." The NLM also had little appeal to the peasants, because it offered no effective solutions or practical remedies to relieve the economic distress that they faced every day. The People's Economic Reconstruction Movement, which was launched more than a year later after the inauguration of the NLM, was given little practical attention and had almost no influence. Consequently, the NLM had almost no impact on the life of the peasants who lived far beyond the reach of the NLM.

Of course, continuous warfare, starting with the Anti-Japanese War in 1937 and followed by the civil war, interrupted the development of the NLM. Undoubtedly, the disorder and poverty brought about by the wars contributed to the failure of the movement. However, the ideology of the NLM - especially its emphasis on moral spirit and proper behavior, and neglect of socio-economic factors - was the major reason that determined the failure of the movement even before 1937. Furthermore, the inability of the KMT to offer its intellectuals and its people a powerful political ideology, and to provide its people (especially the peasants) with attractive social and economic plans, must have helped the CCP
in its political struggle against the KMT. The victory of the CCP in 1949, not only brought the NLM to an end, but also testified to the Movement's ultimate bankruptcy: it was unable to help Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT regime to maintain political and social control of the country, which had been the real goal of the movement in the minds of its promoters.
CHAPTER 3

The Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign (FSFBC)

Background

Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained power in 1949, campaigns to promote hygiene and public morality have been a regular event, although they were interrupted in the Cultural Revolution when "class struggle" became the nation's only concern. Inaugurated in the early 1950s, the campaign to promote hygiene and to exterminate the four pests—flies, rats, bugs and mosquitoes (Chu Si-hai, Jiang Wei-sheng Yun-dong), became, in fact, a seasonal event that took place in the late spring and early summer every year. Moreover, to reinforce socialist education, the CCP created various activities and regularly practised them since the 1950s. Among these activities were: "Outstanding Red Pioneers" (You-xiu Shao-xian Dun-yuan), "Model Workers" (Mo-fan Gong-ren), "Three Good Students" (San-hao Xue-sheng - good study, good ideas and good health), and "Five Good Families" (Wu-hao Jia-ting - diligence at work and study; consideration for family members and neighbors; attention to children’s education; observation of the law and discipline; and courteous public behavior). In order to educate the Chinese peasants with socialist ideas, many "work teams" (Gong Zuo Dui - consisting of cadres and newly graduated university students) were sent to the countryside during the Socialist Educational Movement (She-hui Zhu-yi Jiang-yu Yun-dong), which started in the early 1960s. Moreover, The Campaign to Learn from Lei Feng (Xue Lei Feng Yun-dong), launched by the late Chairman Mao Zedong in 1963, was also a nation-wide, communist moral education movement. The Five Stresses (referring to an emphasis on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morality) and Four Beautifications Campaign (denoting the beautification of mind, language, behavior and the environment), which was launched in 1981 by the
CCP, has many characteristics that are similar to the previous campaigns, but the political and social background against which the FSFBC was launched was remarkably different. An examination of its background will give a better understanding of why the CCP has attached so much significance, and devoted so much effort, to the campaign.

The Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign has been a major concern of the present CCP leadership, which gained the country's political power in the late 70s after the death of Mao and the Fall of the Gang of Four (1976). Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the new government took a sharp turn in its policies, and the Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defence) became the new leadership's top priorities. But the attempt to "bring order out of chaos" (bo-luan fan-zheng) and to lead the Chinese nation to a "new era" was met with opposition and resistance within the CCP, and with little response and enthusiasm from the people who still lived in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

While the new government's policies were described by the Western press as "moving towards capitalism," a similar opinion was also held by some members of the CCP. Maoist elements (the so called Fan-shi Pai) still held important positions in the Party, in the government and especially in the military forces. Deng Xiaoping and the main figures of the so called "Second Generation" (Di-er Ti-dui) in the new government, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were challenged politically and militarily to a certain degree. Although no open conflict seemed to have occurred, strong opposition and resistance to Deng's reform obviously existed in the CCP leadership. Deng and his supporters have taken careful, yet firm actions to get rid of the Maoist elements since they gained power. A major move was the introduction of the old cadres' "retirement" policy which was declared by the Central Committee in February 1982 and came into effect in early 1985. By September 1985, some 40 aging generals had retired from the People's Liberation Army, and 131 veteran cadres retired from the three most powerful organizations - the Central Committee of the CCP, the Central Advisory Commission, and the Central Commission for Inspection Discipline. To gain
control over important leadership positions, Deng Xiaoping himself became the Chief of the General Staff of the military forces in 1977 and has been holding the position of the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP since Hua Guofeng "resigned" in June 1981. Hu Yaobang became the General Secretary of the CCP's Central Committee at the same time.6

In asserting its political legitimacy, the new leadership had taken great pains to stress that it was taking the correct socialist road; and that it firmly regarded Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology of the Party. Overall, it claimed to uphold the "Four Basic Principles" (Si-xiang Ji-ben Yuan-ze): the leadership of the CCP, the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship and Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought).7 For the new leadership, promoting the Four Basic Principles was not only the way to assert its political legitimacy against the leftist accusations, but also a necessary measure to stabilize the society, because any modifications in ideology could cause a disturbance to the great mass of the people (because the CCP's thirty years' propaganda had made Mao the God, and socialism the orthodox religion for many people, especially the peasantry, which constituted 80 per cent of the country's population).8

Besides the opposition and resistance within the CCP, the new leadership faced many other problems in the society. Among them, the most serious were the wide-spread political cynicism among its people and their alienation from the Party.

The ten-year long Cultural Revolution, characterized by constant political struggle, outrageous human-rights abuses and rampant social turmoil, had profound effects on the people personally. Disappointment with the CCP and disillusionment in the country's political system were widespread. Three generations of Chinese were affected, each in different ways.

The "adult generation," who were over 25 years old in 1966, was the primary attacking target of the Red Guards' "revolutionary actions." Massive personal attacks took place in the Cultural Revolution. Psychological torture, public humiliation and physical abuse, left many victims profoundly bitter about their
experiences, and disillusioned with the country's political system. Besides "class enemies" - those who were landlords, capitalists and members of the KMT before 1949, or those who had overseas connections, most victims were either members of the CCP or enthusiastic supporters. Many of them were amazed by the outrageous abuse of power by the top party leaders and were deeply disappointed in the Party they had worked hard to support. This sentiment was highlighted by the screenplay Ku Lian (Unrequited Love), written by a People's Liberation Army writer, Bai Hua, in 1980. It portrays a patriot artist who had given up a promising career and a comfortable life abroad and had come back to work for his motherland, but was repeatedly subjected to political purges and physical abuses in the country's political campaigns. At the end of the play, the artist openly expressed his bitterness by asking himself, "I have loved the party so much. But has the Party ever cared about me?"

The Red Guards, whose ages ranged from 14 to 25 years old in 1966, have been called the "lost generation" since the "new era" started. While those who were then university students graduated and were assigned work with graduate status, those who suffered the most were the middle and high school students, who missed much of their middle and/or high school education. They were sent to the countryside to work with the peasants for years, and are now largely being bypassed in the drive for modernization. The lack of a solid high school education and the upper age limit of 25 years old for entrance to university - both worked against their hope to obtain a tertiary education, which is considered the pathway to success. Frustrated by this situation, some were also confronted with the country's unemployment problems, which mounted when many "old red guards" came back to the cities all at once after the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976-77. The current leadership explicitly sees the major responsibility for China's modernization as passing from the generation trained before the Cultural Revolution directly to the current younger generation. Understandably, members of the "lost generation," except those who had somehow managed to get a favorable position in the society (mostly, the children of cadres), felt betrayed by their leaders and their Party. They questioned themselves; they
questioned the whole political system; in short, they suffered a "crisis of faith" (xin-yang wei-ji).

While most people in this group were simply disillusioned with Chinese politics as a whole, others expressed their grievances and resentment in various ways: big character posters (da zi baog) appeared on the walls in Beijing and other large cities; unofficial journals were circulated; demonstrations were held; and "silent sitting" (jing-zuo) also took place outside of government offices. Meanwhile, Scar Literature (Shang-hen Wen-xue) - a phrase that describes all the stories that appeared since late 1977 revealing emotional scars suffered in the Cultural Revolution - appeared and became dominant in official publications. All these actions were designed to gain public sympathy and to encourage a fairer treatment of these people. These activities were initially tolerated, and to a certain extent, encouraged, by the new CCP leadership because some publicity was useful in clearing the road for its new attitudes and policies. However, this tolerance soon disappeared as the people's criticisms became bolder and bolder, and they demanded fundamental reform in the country's political system. The famous "Democracy Wall," where numerous big character posters had been displayed and where political activists met, was dismantled; a number of activists were arrested. Consequently, as a minority became dissidents of the regime, most lived in further disillusionment.

The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the present younger generation has also been profound. A study undertaken by Beverley Hooper gives a detailed examination of the so called "youth problem" of China. These youth, who were 14 to 25 years of age in 1980, comprised roughly one quarter of China's population. Hooper's study shows that the general outlook or attitudes of the younger generation is of cynicism about politics and deviation from socialism. This situation was largely a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, as today's youth have, since their early childhood, lived in an atmosphere of political purges, social chaos, and troubled or broken families. In the meantime they were fed with ultra-leftist propaganda about all the virtues of socialist society and of Communism. They witnessed the "revolution" in action and were brought up
with horror stories of the Cultural Revolution. First, they were confused, and soon became cynical. In May 1980, Zhong-guo Qing-nian (China Youth) published a letter, written by a young factory worker. It stimulated a nation-wide discussion among the youth on the meaning of life. The following quotation from the letter may offer some clue to the cause of the "youth problem":

I used to have beautiful illusions about life. In primary school, I read the stories "How the Steel Was Tempered" and "The Diary of Lei Feng," and although I did not fully understand them, the heroic acts they described excited me.... But often, I felt a lurking pain, and it was this: the reality that my eyes saw was always sharply contradicted by what my mind had been educated to accept.... I have read the works of Balzac, Hugo, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Lu Xun, Cao Yu and Ba Jin. But reading does not free me from my problems. These masters slit open layer after layer of human nature with pens like knives, enabling me to penetrate deeply all the ugliness of this human world. I am stunned to see how closely reality resembles what these masters have described.... Gradually, I became calm, cool. Social Darwinism gave me a deep revelation: man is human!13

Having personal experience of neither the "old society" (jiu she-hui), nor the revolutionary spirit of the CCP in its early years, the younger generation formed their understanding of socialism and their image of the CCP from the situation in and around the Cultural Revolution. The harsh contrast between political rhetoric and reality made them suspicious of politics, and the image of the West led some to deviate from socialism. Because to the CCP, socialism is not only a political system, but also an all-embracing social and cultural framework, the young people who rejected socialism were described by the authorities as spiritually void, "These young people have no far-reaching ideas, no belief in their own future, and even seriously doubt the meaning of life itself."14 No specific figures were published by the government on the percentage of youth who did not believe in socialism at the time the FSFBC was launched (1981). In 1985, a special article, published in the Overseas Edition of The People's Daily, aimed obviously at praising the improved situation that had been brought about by the new CCP leadership, claimed that the majority of youth in China now had a firm belief in the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Meanwhile, the same article
revealed that a survey, that took place in Liaoning Province around 1980, had indicated that only 18 per cent of the youth believed in such an idea.15

The general disillusionment with the Party and with the political system was worsened as a consequence of the "open-door" policy, which the new leadership regarded as essential for China's economic development. The policy was aimed at Western science, technology, and even capital, but it also led to other effects. Because the people had been virtually locked out from the rest of the world for almost thirty years, the affluence and development of the Western capitalist countries, as introduced by television programs and symbolized by foreign tourists, surprised, as well as impressed, the Chinese, who had been told for so long that China had progressed dramatically since Liberation and was well on the way to becoming a modern socialist nation.

But, as impressive as the image of affluent Western countries might have been, it was the comparison of China with another Asian country, Japan, that seems to have had the greatest impact: "Japan was backward; now it's an industrial giant. And, it does not have a socialist system."16 As thirty years of CCP propaganda on the absolute superiority of socialism to capitalism confronted reality, the people's distrust of the CCP grew and their confidence in socialism was shaken. While fear prevented the experienced generations from expressing their real feelings, the youth seemed to be the most expressive. A young person who gave a decisively negative answer to a survey question, "Do you believe in Marxism?" was described by the official press as "shocking."17 But what made it shocking was the fact that he spoke out so frankly, after so many years of political purges.

While the young people's attitudes towards politics became more cynical and apathetic, their values and behavior also underwent rapid change. The opening of China to the West enhanced their desire for material goods and a more diversified lifestyle. In contrast to the model of selflessly subordinating personal interests to the endeavor of building a socialist China, "these days, the young people want everything - smart clothes, color televisions, cassette recorders. ... They are only interested in their own personal advancement instead of serving
the people.\textsuperscript{18} High school students who once unquestioningly took jobs the
government assigned to them, now sometimes refuse to take menial jobs, while
some university graduates refuse to go "where the motherland needs them."
There was a prevalent slogan among graduates waiting for government
assignment: \textit{Zhi-zai tian-nan hai-bei, bu-qu Xin-xi-lan}. This slogan superficially
means, "Having ambitions all over the world, but not in New Zealand." But, in fact,
\textit{Tian-nan Hai-bei} (all over the world) is the abbreviated form of the names of the
four big cities in China: \textit{Tian-jin, Nan-jing, Shang-hai and Bei-jing}; while
\textit{Xin-xi-lan} (New Zealand) is the abbreviated form of the names of three remote
provinces in Western China: \textit{Xin-jiang} (the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region),
\textit{Xi-zan} (Tibet) and \textit{Lan-zhou} (a poor northwest province).\textsuperscript{19} When it was risky to
express explicitly one's ideas against the Party's will, such a metaphor became a
popular form of expression. It reflected the students' rebellious state of mind.

Young people have been generally criticized by the authorities for "being
excessively materialistic and individualistic.\textsuperscript{20} The press has complained that
many young people "have luxurious hopes incompatible with the present level of
economic development.\textsuperscript{21} The state of mind of the youth is best reflected in a
"wrong idea" that has been frequently criticized by the official press: "ideals are
empty; Communism is vague; eating, drinking and being merry are the most
substantial.\textsuperscript{22}

Moreover, while Western ideas of liberalism, democracy, individual freedom
and human-rights had been cautiously advocated again by the intellectuals and
the literati, the "revolutionary spirit" of some Party cadres had also been affected.
Wealth had become an attraction, and the bourgeois lifestyle, comfortable.
Revelations of their use of power for material gain, their indulgence in decadent
lifestyles, their children's privilege and economic corruption have diminished the
prestige of the CCP.\textsuperscript{23}

This "crisis of faith" in Marxism has been candidly admitted by the Chinese
official press, although it claimed that the majority of the people, and of the youth,
still love socialism and are loyal to the Party.\textsuperscript{24} Although official explanations
hold the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four entirely responsible for
causing the "crisis of faith," many other factors have had a significant influence. At the leadership level, in particular, the frequent twists and turns of policy saw individuals, who were once praised as trusted exponents of the correct road, reviled as counter-revolutionaries (for example, the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 and the case of Peng Dehuai). The attendant ideological contortions and polemical excesses brought forward to rationalize purges must have overstrained credibility or, at least, generated scepticism, concerning political processes at the Central level.

In order to lead the people in modernizing China, the new government had to regain the people's confidence in the Party and in the country's political system. In this regard, the younger generation was considered especially important. In his speech at the Fourth Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Youth League on November 8, 1982, Vice Premier Hu Qili stressed, "The younger generation is a decisive force in our country. Whether China's modernization will succeed or not depends largely on them, [and] whether China will continue to be a socialist country or not also depends on them." In other words, the CCP leadership realizes that the younger generation is going to be the main force in the building of the country's Four Modernizations and that their adherence to the CCP's basic ideals is essential to the future of socialism in China. Hence, their disillusionment with socialism or deviation from politics causes grave concern to the CCP over the destiny of the country. This is the reason why the promoters of the FSFBC, from the start of the movement, asked all organizations to pay more attention to the younger generation.

The CCP official press called the FSFBC a "communist morality education." It was hoped that, by promoting the three spirits: the revolutionary spirit of Yan-an, the creative spirit of the 50s and the early 60s, and the Lei Feng spirit, the campaign would improve the people's "spiritual appearance" (jing-shen mian-mao), social trends (she-hui feng-qi) and human relationships (ren yu ren zhi-jian de guan-xi). The CCP wished that such a movement would create a more stable political and social situation in the society and a better relationship between the Party and its people, so that the government's policies and plans
would be carried out smoothly.

The FSFBC was first proposed in February 1981 by nine "people's organizations" - the National Federation of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, the All-China Women's Federation, Chinese Literary Alliance, the Central Committee for Patriotic Hygienic Movement, the All-China Student Association, National Society for Ethics, National Society for Languages, and Chinese Society for Aesthetics. It was an action in response to the Central Committee's call for the building of "socialist spiritual civilization" (she-hui zhu-yi jing-shen wen-ming). The campaign became an influential nation-wide event a year later when Premier, Zhao Ziyang, representing the CCP's Central Committee and the State Council, appeared on national television proposing a "National Courtesy and Decorum Month" (Wen-ming Li-mao Yue). While its activities would be focused on matters that would improve cleanliness, orderliness, courtesy and decorum, the aim of the campaign, according to its promoters, was to restore the socialist revolutionary spirit and the Chinese nation's fine tradition (zhong-hua min-zu de you-xiu chuan-tong) that had been destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. The campaign was regarded as a major effort in the CCP's determination to build up a socialist spiritual civilization, which was considered a necessary condition for the building of material civilization (Wu-zhi wen-ming) and an important measure to ensure the socialist nature of China after the Four Modernizations have been achieved, and China has become a strong and powerful nation.

Ideological Foundation and Motivations

Since the Four Modernizations were set up as its main goal in 1978, the present CCP leadership has repeatedly asserted that the building of material civilization must be accompanied by the building of socialist spiritual civilization. Since 1980, the government has given more and more emphasis to the importance of socialist spiritual civilization, though it maintains that the two civilizations must be dealt with together in order to build a "powerful socialist
motherland.\textsuperscript{33}

The significance of socialist civilization, as explained by Premier Zhao Ziyang and the General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, is twofold: first, it is a necessary condition for the building of material civilization; second, it is an important characteristic of socialism - a demonstration of the superior nature of the socialist system.\textsuperscript{34} Although the second aspect has been the more frequently emphasized since the CCP's Twelfth Conference, the first aspect is the main attraction and the concrete reason for the campaign, because of the regime's need to regain its people's confidence, loyalty and obedience in order to carry out its policies and plans. The authorities believe that, through ideological education, the campaign will help the party to regain its prestige in the society, and hence to win support from its people. Therefore, "ideological construction" was claimed to be the major part of the campaign and the principal means of building "spiritual civilization." Ideological construction possesses:

- the working class and the Marxist world view and scientific theory;
- communist ideals, faith and morality; a master's attitudes and collective thinking that is compatible with socialist public ownership; a sense of right and responsibility and the concept of organizational discipline that are compatible with the socialist political system; a sacrificing spirit in serving the people and a communist attitude towards labor; socialist patriotism and internationalism, etc. To sum up, the most important [points] are revolutionary ideals [li-xiang], morals [dao-de] and discipline [li-ju].\textsuperscript{35}

Ideological construction was hoped to be achieved through the five stresses and the four beautifications. The five stresses were viewed as the "means" while the four beautifications were regarded as the "ends" - the goal of the campaign.\textsuperscript{36} The official definitions of the four beautifications are as follows:

"Beautification of Mind" means to pay attention to the cultivation of political ideology, moral character and values; to support the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system; to be "patriotic, upright and honest"; to not do anything that would disgrace human dignity and be humiliating to the nation; to not do anything that would benefit yourself at the expense of others; and to never practise fraud.
"Beautification of Language" means to promote the practice of courteous and cultivated language; to learn to speak "kindly, gently, and modestly"; to not use rough and obscene words; to not use lame arguments and to not viciously slander.

"Beautification of Behavior" means to be a person who is of value to the people and the society; to be "diligent, friendly and obedient"; to not harm collective interests; to not damage public property; and to not disturb social order.

"Beautification of Environment" means to pay attention to hygiene of the self, the family, the sanitation of working places and public areas; to achieve "cleanliness, orderliness and having plants and trees everywhere [lu-hua]"; to not spit, litter; and to not damage trees and plants.37

Among the five stresses and the four beautifications, the stress on morality and the beautification of mind were regarded as the core of the campaign.38 Morality has always been a major concern in Chinese culture, and the People's Republic of China is no exception. As one of the CCP's propaganda books for the FSFBC, *A Collection of Discussions on Moral Questions* states, morality functions as "dynamics," a source for the inspiration of people's "fighting spirit."39

However, the CCP maintains that different societies have different views on morality, and that the morality it advocates is of two kinds - the communist morality and the "fine" (You-liang) traditional morality - which are different from that of capitalist values and feudalistic Chinese tradition.40 Similar to its political predecessors, however, the CCP is proud of the great contribution the Chinese people have made to the world's civilization and, in the FSFBC, the CCP leaders were fond of citing the phrase, "the land of ritual and right behavior" (li-yi zhi-bang), in their promotional speeches.41 Moreover, it also claimed that the high morality of the People in the 50s and early 60s was recognized world-wide.42 However, the CCP claimed that the virtues and morals that had made China glorious in the past, and revolutionary in the 50s and early 60s, have been destroyed by the Cultural Revolution. The FSFBC is an effort to restore the two traditions.43

Although the CCP's commitment to the Party's revolutionary tradition seems to be firm, its attitude towards traditional Chinese virtues and values has been inconsistent and ambivalent. On the one hand, the CCP leaders are proud of
China's cultural tradition and appreciate China's reputation as li-yi-zhi-bang; on the other hand, the very virtues of li and yi - along with the other three of the "Five Constant Virtues": ren (humanity), zhi (wisdom), xin (trustworthiness), which are the essence of traditional Chinese culture - have been objects of criticism by the CCP and are regarded as feudalist virtues.44

From a Marxist point of view, the CCP asserts that a society's moral values are determined by the country's economic system. communist morality is the most humane and progressive, and a true spiritual civilization can only be achieved in a socialist society. The CCP's explanation is simple and straightforward: the establishment of public ownership of the country's productive materials (sheng-chan zi-liap) fundamentally eliminates the possibility of class exploitation and oppression. Hence, the basic interests of the individual are identical with those of the collective and the country. Thus, the relationship between people becomes equal and friendly; the people themselves are the masters of the country. In a capitalist society by contrast, the basic economic law of private ownership predetermines the inequality of men. The core of bourgeois morality is individualism or egoism. The capitalist aim of production is to make a profit; hence, the basic nature of the economic system is exploitive, and the dominant factor in life is wealth.45 The different economic systems and political ideologies also produce different attitudes toward life. While the proletarian believes that one lives so that others may live better, the bourgeois lives for himself; while the proletarian finds satisfaction in serving the people, the bourgeois indulges in material satisfaction; consequently, while the former is pursuing a meaningful life, the latter finds "life is like a dream, and a dream is like smoke."46

Having initially extolled the industrialized West in the effort to encourage the Chinese people to work hard for the Four Modernizations, the CCP leadership is now trying to suppress the tantalizing images it had helped to create. The press regularly features articles and letters from Chinese studying, teaching or living overseas, revealing that, beneath the superficial affluence, there is wide-spread poverty, destitution and racial discrimination.47 Two students travelling overseas found a "spiritual and cultural wasteland" where "money swallowed up
everything." 48 Western youth is pictured as being immersed in a pattern of
drunken debauchery, drugs, homelessness and spiritual emptiness. 49
Furthermore, prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, and a high divorce rate
are all cited as proof of the evil and hopeless nature of capitalist society. 45 Such
propaganda in the campaign is obviously used to convince the people of the
progressive nature of socialism, to strengthen their confidence in their country's
political system, and to urge them to work hard under the CCP's leadership for
the Four Modernizations.

Meanwhile, patriotism is propagated in the campaign. It is regarded as an
important feature of the "beautification of mind" (xin ling mei). 51 In February
1983, the Three Ardent Loves (san ren ai) - love for the CCP, the motherland and
the socialist system - were added to the campaign. 52 Patriotism is viewed as "a
great spiritual force for the building of our socialist country." 53 The people were
asked to contribute all their knowledge and abilities to the great motherland with
"ardent love of sons and daughters" (er-nu shen-qing). 54 Ideas, such as "a son
should not mind his ugly mother" (er bu xian niang chou), were propagated in
order to put pressure on the people to be loyal to their country regardless of
circumstances. 55 To serve its interests, the CCP, for all its communist
propaganda, has openly used the traditional Chinese value of xiao (filial piety)
which was used by Confucian governments as the ethical basis of the principle of
unquestioning loyalty (zhong) to the emperor. Articles appeared in all kinds of
newspapers singing the praises of people who had given up promising careers
and a comfortable life in the West to come back to help build their motherland. On
the other hand, people who "have no confidence in the bright future of our
motherland," who "blindly worship the Capitalist system," who "admire the
decadent bourgeois lifestyle" of the West were all criticized. People were warned
not to be "confused by the superficial prosperity of the West," and to "understand
the fundamental problem with Capitalist society." 56

The underlying theme of such propaganda is very clear: learning the West's
science and technology, while keeping Chinese morality intact. In other words,
the material civilization may be higher in the West, but it lacks spiritual civilization
in which the Chinese have always considered themselves superior to others.\textsuperscript{57}

Hence in the FSFBC, the CCP calls for its people to support the CCP and socialism, to fight against bourgeois ideas and values, and to beautify their mind with communist morals and virtues: to put the people and the country's interests before self interest, to work single-mindedly for the country's economic development, and to be willing, if necessary, to sacrifice everything, including one's life, for the Party and the motherland.

It has to be pointed out, however, that the CCP does not acknowledge a discrepancy between theoretical socialism (or Marxist-Leninism) and socialism as currently practised in China. The current leadership invariably asserts that the CCP is a "true Marxist and Leninist" political party and is following the correct socialist road. When reformist economic policies (such as the Agricultural Responsibility System and enterprise autonomy), relinquishment of some ideological attitudes (such as its attitude towards class struggle), and some new ideas (such as "getting rich is glorious") were interpreted by the Western press as straying from socialism and taking the capitalist road, the authorities vigorously denied this interpretation. Deng Xiaoping argued that China is still firmly following socialism because "the primary means of production in the country is state-owned" and asserted that a "new bourgeoisie" will never be allowed to emerge in China.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, the CCP maintained that "Marxism is a developing science"; and that "being a true Marxist means to treat practical matters with basic Marxist principles, attitudes and methods, not to adhere rigidly to some specific words and references that were written a hundred years ago."

Hence, the CCP called for "combining theory with practice" and "seeking truth from facts."\textsuperscript{59} In addition, the CCP also stressed that the ideal society that the Chinese people aimed to achieve was a "modernized socialist country with distinctive Chinese characteristics."\textsuperscript{60}

In promoting the FSFBC, the CCP believes that "a person's morals, values and habits are not innate. They are formed by the objective environment he lives in and the education he receives."\textsuperscript{61} "Environment" and "education" are not meant to be material living conditions and education in the general academic
sense, as some critics have argued, but are meant to be an environment that puts pressure on one's personal conduct and constant ideological "education" (indoctrination). The FSFBC is to create such an environment and to provide such an "education," in order to make everyone in the country idealistic (you li-xiang), moralistic (you dao-de), cultured (you wen-hua) and disciplined (you ji-lu). Among the four "to be's" (si-you), Deng Xiaoping stresses that "to be idealistic" and "to be disciplined" are the most important:

We must educate our people, especially our youth, to have ideals... to have faith in Marxism and Communism.... Achieving Communism is our ultimate ideal. This point, I hope, would not be overlooked at any time in our propaganda.... Moreover, since ideals cannot be achieved without discipline, we must also have discipline.... The two are inseparably important to us.63

Discipline here means "observing the highest standard of the Party's discipline and the country's constitution; sincerely defending and firmly carrying out the policies of the Party and the government,"64 and holding on to the Party's Four Basic Principles. These are considered the core of socialist spiritual civilization.65

Although the FSFBC has been touted as an "ideological education" aimed at improving the people's communist morality, its activities have been focused on "overcoming dirtiness, messiness and a low standard of service" (zang. juan, cha). In fact, since March 1982, every "National Courtesy and Decorum Month" has featured hygiene related activities, such as sweeping the streets, emptying rubbish heaps and cleaning windows. These activities are important, according to the campaign organizers, because the "environment reflects people's spiritual condition" (jing-shen zhuang-tai), and a clean environment, therefore, indicates an improvement in the people's moral spirit. Furthermore, it is a demonstration of the people's determination to achieve socialist spiritual civilization: "If we could not even make the environment clean, the building of socialist spiritual civilization would be empty talk."66 Working to beautify the environment is considered part of the process of fostering one's inner morality and beautifying one's mind, because "the behavior of man is determined by his ideas, and, it also is a reflection of his
ideas." Therefore, taking part in the work of cleanliness reflects a correct attitude by being responsive and supportive to the government's call; this attitude, in turn, is a demonstration of a beautiful mind. Moreover, the environment is a direct reflection of the level of a society's civilization; hence, the beautification of the environment is the first thing that must be done to show the spiritual civilization of the Chinese people.68

Main Features of the FSFBC

The FSFBC has been given much publicity since it was launched. Top CCP leaders of the present government, notably Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, have all taken an active role in promoting the campaign.

On the same day as Premier Zhao Ziyang made his first television speech, calling for the National Courtesy and Decorum Month, massive promotional activities, involving more than two million people, representing the Party, the government, military forces, ordinary people and students, took place in the streets of Beijing. The People's Daily reported that "red flags, colorful banners, gigantic slogans were seen everywhere in the streets in Beijing." More than 200 high level CCP cadres - among them the Party's General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Vice Premier Wan Li, the First Secretary of the CCP's Beijing Committee, Duan Junyi - took part in the public activities, sweeping the streets and taking away rubbish. The official press described the organizational scale and the number of participants as being "very rarely seen."70

Promoted by all levels of the CCP branches and local governments, the FSFBC soon became an influential national movement. Meetings to "take a correct attitude" (biao-tai) were organized in which the significance of the campaign was explained and everyone was supposed to express support for the campaign. Meanwhile, many work units (dan-wei) would call off one or two ordinary working days to undertake the campaign-related activities in order to demonstrate their serious attitude towards the campaign. The first National Courtesy and Decorum Month was char
acterized by mass mobilization - one saw people working with brooms, cleaning towels and shovels almost everywhere. School children set up "traffic supervision sentries" at major streets; and stores, restaurants and hospitals established "special service windows (or tables)."\textsuperscript{71}

Although the national committee of the FSFBC was not established until March 1983, the movement was directed totally by the CCP from the start, and carefully organized by all levels of government. An editorial article dated February 28, 1981 called for "all levels of the CCP committee and its organizations at the grassroots level to take appropriate steps to support the campaign."\textsuperscript{72} A few days later, five ministries of the State Council (the Central Propaganda Ministry, the Education Ministry, the Culture Ministry, the Public Health Ministry and the Public Security Ministry) issued a joint statement, supporting the nine "people's organizations" proposal.\textsuperscript{73} At the same time, the ministries delivered the following five directions to all levels of their appropriate organizations and asked them to support the campaign actively:

1. To pay special attention to public opinion propaganda and to create a general atmosphere of courtesy and decorum in the society.
2. To pay special attention to big and middle size cities and to pay special attention to youth; members of the CCP and the Communist Youth League must respond immediately to the campaign and set up examples for the people.
3. To pay attention to the regularity and concreteness of these activities; campaign activities must be organized according to the practical situation of the particular unit.
4. To pay attention to the cooperation of the campaign activities with urban regulation, public order rectification and social discipline.
5. To pay attention to cooperation and collective spirit.\textsuperscript{74}

A number of methods were employed to promote the campaign. The most common was, of course, propaganda. In order to spark the public's enthusiasm and to create favorable opinion, the government published all kinds of books, pamphlets and propaganda sheets which had basically similar content, including quotations from CCP leaders' speeches on the campaign, the basic official stance on some ideological questions (such as the superiority of socialism over
capitalism), and the authority's criticism of "wrong ideas." Of all these propaganda materials, the *Handbook of the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign* (Handbook - hereafter) offers the most revealing look at the content of the campaign. The book consists of ten chapters, has 220 specific topics and totals 336 pages. Besides the whole text of the original proposal of the campaign and speeches by the top CCP leaders on the campaign, it contains: 1) the official definitions of the five stresses and four beautifications, together with an extensive interpretation of the relationship between, and relative importance of, these concepts; 2) explanations of political terms, such as "the communist view on life" and "bourgeois lifestyle"; 3) detailed descriptions of occupational morality (zhi-ye dao-de), of behavior codes in different circumstances (xing-wei gui-fan) and of courteous ways of dealing with different people - for example, one's parents, teachers, superiors, subordinates and comrades; 4) specific rules and regulations on personal and environmental hygiene, ranging from effective ways of killing rats and cockroaches to "not sneezing in front of people." Since these books are required reading material for "political study meetings (zheng-zhi xue-xi) in every work unit, they are all freely distributed to individuals. Hence, such propaganda materials are seen in every household. Apparently very few people take their time to read them, however, except during the group study times, which have also been taken less and less seriously.

Official newspapers - especially *The People's Daily*, the most widely distributed newspaper in the country - played a major role in the FSFBC. Beginning from the first National Courtesy and Decorum Month, a special column under the title "Let everyone be concerned with cleanliness, orderliness and courteous behavior" appeared in *The People's Daily*. The column served as a "bulletin board" for local campaign activities, the exchange of new ideas and experiences, praise for outstanding individuals or groups and criticism of "incorrect ideas."

Moreover, in order to promote the campaign, the old model, Lei Feng, has been resurrected. The Movement of "Learning from Lei Feng," which was
launched by the late Chairman Mao in 1963, has, once again, been revived: Lei Feng's life story was propagated; meetings to promote Lei Feng's selfless spirit took place; and an exhibition, entitled the "Exemplary Deeds of Lei Feng," was opened to the public in the PLA Military Museum in Beijing in March 1981.79 Meanwhile, new models have also been created to set the tone of the new era: intellectuals such as Jiang Zhuying and Luo Jianfu, who worked despite terminal illness; Zhang Hua, a medical student who died while attempting to rescue an elderly peasant from a pit of night-soil; Zhu Boru, the selfless soldier who, for years, tirelessly helped all kinds of needy people; and the determined paraplegic, Zhang Haidi, who despite personal difficulties, learned a number of foreign languages and translated volumes of foreign material, and hence made a contribution to the country's modernization. These people are called "living Lei Fings." Their pictures appeared on the cover page of the Party's official journal, The Red Flag (Hong Qi), and their heroic deeds were published in many newspapers and magazines.80 Vigorous efforts have been made to promote the selfless and patriotic spirit, which the campaign was designed to restore.

In addition, various other activities were created to promote the FSFBC: "Civilized Villages" (Wen-ming Cun) in the countryside; and "Civilized Work Units" (Wen-ming Dan-wei) in the cities; and "Five Goods Families" in local neighborhoods ("practice family planning" was added to its content).81 Moreover, at the end of 1982 just before the Chinese New Year, a movement called the "Four Advocations and Four Rejections" was promoted (Si-yao Si Bu-yao - advocate frugality and reject lavish weddings; advocate equality between sexes, respect and take care of elderly people, and reject discrimination against women and elderly; advocate science and reject superstition; advocate healthy entertainment and reject gambling).82 To promote the "beautification of language," the Beijing Student Association put forward a proposal in February 1985, calling on every youth in the country to practise the ten courtesy words in their daily speech: qing (please), nin hao (hello), dui bu qi (sorry or pardon me), xie xie (thank you) and zai jian (good-bye).83

These promotional activities varied in intensity. For example, in Beijing in
spring 1985, a massive campaign against spitting was launched. Forty thousand
people were chosen from many work units in Beijing to act as full-time
superintendents in every corner of the city, to remind the people not to spit and to
make the "law breakers" pay fines (50 fen which is about U.S. 20¢). The
financial loss of 50 fen is not much, but the embarrassment and loss of face
caused by such a fine can be overwhelming. Loudspeakers were placed in all
the major streets. Messages explaining the importance and necessity of the
anti-spitting campaign were repeatedly broadcast. The public was urged to give
its support.

In order to make sure that certain hygienic requirements were met (such as
no dust on window frames and no cobwebs hanging on roofs), as well as to give
impetus to the people, official inspections took place regularly. As a consequence
of these inspections, outstanding work units were praised and awarded with the
title "Wen-ming Dan-wei" (Civilized Unit); at the same time, the work units that
failed in the inspection were criticized. The very fact that a work unit did not have
the title "Wen-ming Dan-wei" hanging on its front gate was the source of constant
criticism - a loss of face at least to the leaders of the unit. But, opportunities for
obtaining and keeping the title were many, since once the title was obtained, it
was rarely taken away, unless the unit became really intolerably degenerated.
Consequently, many factories, hospitals, restaurants and stores had become
"Wen-ming Dan-wei." Walking in a commercial street in any of the larger size
cities, one saw the "Wen-ming Dan-wei" plate hanging on almost every storefront.

After the first National Courtesy and Decorum Month, a "evaluation" meeting
was organized in Beijing to discuss the achievements of the campaign. The
conclusions of the meeting were: 1) significant achievements were made during
the month; 2) shortcomings still existed; and 3) further hard work was needed. To set an example for all cities to follow, the government named San Ming City in
Fujian Province as the model city in 1984. It was chosen for its cleanliness and
orderliness. A national conference on the FSFBC was held in San Ming City in
the same year, and representatives from many provinces and cities took a tour of
it. A sizeable book was produced and published as the outcome of the San Ming
conference, aimed at promoting the city's accomplishments and "pushing the building of socialist spiritual civilization to a new era."87

One of the most serious, lasting efforts to promote "socialist spiritual civilization" in China has been the rectification of the CCP (zheng-dang), which has been a part of Deng Xiaoping's grand plan since the late 70s for reconstructing Party-state-society relations. "Party rectification" has been a long-standing tradition of the CCP since the 1940s when the CCP was based in Yanan. It was regarded by Mao Zedong as an important means to ensure a close relationship between the Party and its people.88 Although "Party Rectification" had been in the air since the late 70s when the present leadership assumed power, it did not become an intensive official drive until the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee, which took place in October 1983. One important outcome of the plenum was "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Rectification,"89 which was aimed at eliminating corruption, incompetence and despotism within the Party, since these problems had severely affected the prestige of the Party in the eyes of society, and put a strain on its relationship with the people. To regain the confidence and support of the people, the Party had to discipline its members. As Deng Xiaoping once said, "to correct Party style [duan-zheng dang-feng- a broad term encompassing all prescribed political relationships and activities within the Party] is the key to the correction of the social style [she-hui feng-qi]."90

Scheduled to take three years, the rectification drive aimed at: achievement of ideological unity; rectification of work style; strengthening of discipline; and purification of Party organization.91 It may be viewed as a drive for spiritual civilization within the Party. Soon after the Second Plenum, the rectification drive became a nation-wide issue, which touched upon all levels of the CCP. Since March 1985, when a few cases of economic corruption involving high level CCP officials were exposed,92 a special emphasis has been placed on "correcting the unhealthy trend" (jiu-zheng bu-zheng zhi-feng) in the Party. The specific goals were to suppress Party cadres and members who had committed economic crimes and to protect the Party's prestige.93 Although a number of middle and
high level CCP cadres have been criticized openly and punished, the rectification drive, on the whole, has been largely an ideological movement within the Party, serving as a warning to its members.

Another major event that occurred during the FSFBC was a severe crackdown on crime. As a consequence of both the Cultural Revolution and the open-door policy, a large number of people, mainly urban youths who were unemployed or holding marginal jobs, turned to crime for spiritual and material satisfaction. Although murder, rape and other violent crimes did take place, most youth crimes were of a petty nature - involving theft and gambling by young men, and "sex offences," ranging from promiscuity to prostitution, by young women. Although the crime rate was not even 2 per cent that of the United States, it caused much disturbance and anxiety in Chinese society; and its persistent rise alarmed the Chinese leadership. In July 1983, the police began a massive sweep - thousands were arrested in one night in large cities. After quick trials, some of them were executed, and others were put on trucks and taken to remote labor camps. Many were dispatched in groups. An estimated 6,000 people were executed in the second half of 1983.

The drive to eliminate spiritual pollution was also one of the efforts to build socialist spiritual civilization. It started in October 1983 after five years of unprecedented opening to the outside world and domestic reform. Reportedly, pornography was brought in from mainly Hong Kong and had become a serious problem especially in the southern provinces. Meanwhile, students, literati and philosophers, "took advantage of the CCP's discrediting and demoralization to assert their individuality and interests against Party hegemony." In the ideological and literary-art fronts, a talk on "humanism" and "socialist alienation" took place. These situations not only provided evidence for the leftists in the Party to criticize the new government's reformist policies, but also disturbed the top CCP leaders who treasured the absolute leadership of the Party as much as the leftists did. Therefore, the drive against "spiritual pollution" took place.

The first official call to "eliminate spiritual pollution" (qing-chu jing-shen wu-ran) appeared in the documents of the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central
Committee, which called for a thorough rectification of the CCP on October 11-12, 1983. The main document of the Plenum, "The Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Party Consolidation," called on all Party members, especially leading Party cadres:

to enhance their understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies based on them, raise their sense of dedication to the revolutionary cause and their sense of political responsibility, dare to combat all hostile forces disrupting socialism, to fight against decadent bourgeois ideology, against acts of creating spiritual pollution and against the abuse of power and position for personal gains so that they will set a good example for the broad masses of Party members and guide the masses to make efforts to become people with high ideals and morality, cultural knowledge and sense of discipline.

In his speech at the Plenum, Deng Xiaoping defined the substance of spiritual pollution as "disseminating all varieties of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and disseminating sentiments of distrust towards the socialist and communist cause and to the Communist Party leadership." However, the movement was soon being used by the leftists in the Party "as a vehicle to attack elements they disliked inside and outside the Party." The drive that had initially appeared to be "a criticism of pornography and certain trends in theoretical, literary and art circles," soon "expanded swiftly into an attack by elements in the CCP at all levels against a broad range of phenomena and social forces."

An attack against spiritual pollution among theoretical workers was launched on October 23 by Wang Zhen, a Politburo member and President of the Central Party School. While giving a speech at the founding of the Chinese Society of Scientific Socialism and the Fourth National Symposium on Teaching Scientific Socialism in local Party Schools in Nanjing, Wang Zhen asserted:

Some people have claimed that our country today is still not a socialist country, or that our country's socialism is agricultural socialism; and some people have persisted in propagating the so-called "alienation in socialism," asserting that in a socialist society, alienation exists not only in the ideological field but also in the
political and economic fields. Some others have gone even further by saying that "the root of alienation lies in the socialist system itself." Such viewpoints are diametrically opposed to Marxist theory regarding scientific socialism, and are in essence, sowing distrust in the cause of socialism and communism and in the Communist Party as well.\textsuperscript{102}

In conclusion, Wang Zhen urged new efforts at building Marxist theoretical contingents to counter this trend. The Red Flag, in its October issue, published Shi Youxin's article, "It Is not Permitted to Make Pollution on the Ideological Front." It asserted the CCP's firm stance on Marxism and warned all theoretical workers to fight against "spiritual pollution."\textsuperscript{103} Meanwhile, people in literary and art circles were disturbed also. The People's Daily on October 31 frontpaged a commentary, "Raise High the Socialist Banner in Literature and Art; Resolutely Prevent and Eliminate Spiritual Pollution," affirming that socialist literature and art must reflect proletarian ideology.\textsuperscript{104} The political climate resembled the Cultural Revolution so much that it pushed a number of noted figures, such as Ding Ling and Ai Qing, who had suffered in the Party's previous campaigns, to come forward to "take a stand" (\textit{biao-tai} - to express support for the movement).

As Zhou Yang, the Chairman of the All China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, made a public "self criticism" and Wang Ruoshui, the deputy editor-in-chief of The People's Daily, was forced to resign, the anti-pollution drive had pounded many aspects of the society. Besides pornography, Hong Kong style love songs and Western popular music were banned; women who permed their hair, and youths who wore stylish clothes were criticized as having been influenced by "bourgeois lifestyle."

However, as more and more people were attacked personally, (among them, high level party theoreticians, party and non-party literary and art figures); as much anxiety was developed among Chinese students and scholars who were studying and working overseas; and more importantly as the much-prized social stability was disrupted and the situation worried foreign investors, this anti-spiritual pollution drive had to be held back.\textsuperscript{105} Although it lasted only until the end of 1983, it caused much fear and disturbance within and outside of the
Outcomes of the FSFBC

After the first National Courtesy and Decorum Month, the Central Propaganda Ministry and the Central Committee of the National Youth League organized a "evaluation" meeting. It took place from April 26 to May 4. The meeting gave its assessment of the National Courtesy and Decorum Month as follows:

Based on over a year's mass participation in the Five Stresses and Four Beautification activities, the first National Courtesy and Decorum Month, for its grand scale and powerful influence, its positive effect on the society and profound impact on the masses, was, indeed, a rare achievement for many years.... Through its activities, the environmental appearances of many mid-large sized cities, and towns and the countryside have shown laudable changes, the relationship among the people has been improved to a certain extent. Especially, the movement has greatly inspired our people's revolutionary spirit and strengthened the confidence of our party members, cadres and the people in improving our party style [dang-feng], social style [she-hui feng-qi] and social order.106

The only shortcoming, pointed out by the conference, was that "some comrades have not fully appreciated the importance of these activities."

Consequently, the movement "has not reached the grassroots level in some places."107

Satisfaction was also expressed by Premier, Zhao Ziyang, in his television speech on the eve of the second National Courtesy and Decorum Month. He stated:

Since we launched the first National Courtesy and Decorum Month in March last year, a significant achievement has been made: the social style of our country has undergone a laudable change; emphasis on courtesy, hygiene, discipline and morality has become [the people's] conscious behavior; environmental hygiene in both the cities and the countryside has shown
noticeable improvement; our cadres and our people today have higher spirits and their patriotic and communist ideological awareness has been enlightened.  

Clearly, the leadership of the CCP was pleased overall with the outcome of the FSFBC in the first year. It believed that the campaign not only improved the country's and the people's hygienic level, but also heightened the people's ideological consciousness. Although the Premier mentioned no serious shortcomings, he did call for attention to the "practical results" (shi-xiao) of the campaign.  

An emphasis on "practical results" has become a repeatedly stressed theme since the second year of the campaign. At the first meeting of the "Committee on the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications and Three Ardent Loves Campaign" (Wu-jiang Si-mei San-re'ai Huo-dong Wei-yuan-hui) on March 30, 1983, its director, Wan Li, emphasized the importance of "persistence," called for "attention to practical results," and stated that the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council had decided that the FSFBC would be a long-term policy of the country, and its activities would be systemized and carried out indefinitely.  

The emphasis on "attention to practical results" suggests problems in obtaining "practical results." In other words, it revealed the leadership's concern with the superficiality of the campaign. The problem with "practical (or concrete) results" and the superficiality of the campaign appeared soon after the campaign had been launched. Because the campaign was a government initiative, it needed propaganda to mobilize and gain support from the people. Although organized ritualistic activities, such as mass demonstrations, drum-beating and sloganeering, were an integral part of the propaganda effort, they also presented to the authorities the image of mass response and enthusiasm. Consequently, the whole campaign was essentially a ritualistic performance. Since no genuine desire on the part of the masses was involved, it was impossible to produce any real, lasting results even at a superficial level. While under official observation and under pressure to be seen as supportive to the Party's call, people attempted to keep the streets clean and to behave well. However, the situation would return to its previous state once the outside pressure was gone. In some cases,
"enthusiasm" for the campaign resulted in a worsening of the situation. For example, big character slogans such as "DO NOT DUMP RUBBISH EVERYWHERE!" written on the walls of main streets are themselves obstacles to the beautification of the environment; propaganda vans with loud speakers driving around the busy streets not only worsened the traffic, but also created terrible noise pollution. Such phenomena have often been satirized by cartoonists.

In some cases, the effect of the campaign on the moral spirit and social behavior of China's youth seems to have been minimal. In July 1984, for example, China sponsored an international soccer competition called the Great Wall Soccer Championship. The final match took place between the West German team and the Chinese national team, and the Chinese team lost the match. After having won the championship, the West German team was thanking the audience and some Chinese youths in the audience greeted them with shouting, beer bottles, soft-drink cans and bread. This behavior greatly irritated and angered the foreign audience and, of course, the German players. It caused quite a disturbance in Beijing, and the Chinese left a very bad impression of themselves internationally. A few days after the incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Youth League issued a declaration to all its local branches, calling for an effort to reinforce social discipline in the three public places (san-chang ji-lu): sport centers (ti-yu chang), theaters (Ju-chang), and playgrounds (yu-le chang).

As similar incidents occurred one after another in public places, especially at sports matches - involving verbal and physical abuse of referees, shouting, swearing and fighting among players as well as among members of the audiences, and serious damage to public facilities - the National Committee for the FSFBC issued a declaration urging all local committees and governments to act together to "rectify the discipline" in the three public places (zheng-dun san-chang ji-lu).

All this occurred after four years of FSFBC education for courtesy and decorum. Likewise, its effort to eliminate public spitting and littering did not seem
to have had any impact on the behavior of the people in these cases. Patriotic propaganda may have had an effect on the young people, because the declarations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Youth League and of the National Committee of the FSFBC both hurriedly stressed the difference between patriotism and fanaticism, calling for supportive actions to protect the nation's prestige (guo-ge). At the same time, they emphasized the importance of educating the people, especially the youth, not only with patriotism, but with internationalism as well.

Meanwhile, a editorial in The People's Daily pointed out that "empty talk is not an effective way to educate our youth," an obvious criticism of the superficiality of the campaign. The superficiality of the campaign seems to have become an increasing concern of the government since 1984. Wan Li urged the people, at the third annual meeting of the Committee that, in carrying out the FSFBC, "[we] must not practice fraud (nong-xu zuo-jia), and be engaged in formalism (gao xing-shi zhu-yi)," but concentrate on "practical improvement."

Beginning in 1985, the National Committee for the FSFBC claimed in its annual plan that the methods of the FSFBC would undergo some changes. Instead of focusing effort on the NCDM, its activities would be emphasized throughout the year. This decision was obviously a measure designed to overcome the superficiality of the campaign and the "push and move" situation. In moving from "using a month to push a year" to "a year-long push," the leadership hoped that the FSFBC would be given a more sustained effort and that it would produce more "concrete results." In February, the Beijing government announced its plan to change the National Courtesy and Decorum Month to National Courtesy and Decorum Year, after an unexpected official inspection revealed that dirtiness, messiness and disorder widely existed in some residential areas, dormitories and office buildings. After five years of the campaign, the Beijing government was forced in March 1986 to remove the title "Wen-ming Dan-wei" (Civilized Work Units) from more than two hundred work units (stores, factories, hospitals, and so on) and to remove the title "Wen-ming Dan-wei Biao-bing" (Model Civilized Work Unit) from fifteen work units. Some
of the "lost title" units were said to have never met the requirement for the title, while others were said to have degenerated after they had obtained the title.123

Apparently, it has become a common practice for work units to take one or two working days off to thoroughly clean up their facilities and put some new books in the library or offices for the official inspection. Once, the inspection was over and the title "Wen-ming Dan-wei" had been awarded, the place would soon return to its previous appearance. No one would be bothered by it, unless there was to be another inspection. Moreover, a kind of bribery, such as a big banquet to the official inspection party, was often used to obtain the title.124 These practices were known to the authorities, which is the reason why Wan Li urged the people to "not play fraud," and "not to be engaged in formalism." However, for a campaign such as this, playing fraud or being engaged in formalism seems to be inevitable.

Since 1984, the FSFBC has quietened down significantly as its novelty has worn thin. The Premier's annual television speech was terminated after two years, and the leadership of the campaign has been transferred to the Central Committee for the FSFBC.

If the campaign on cleanliness, orderliness and hygiene has had very limited success, then the effort to promote communist morality and revolutionary spirit in the people has been equally unsatisfactory. Already cynical about politics, many people, old and young, are simply no longer interested in the Party's political propaganda and slogans. The preaching about communist morality and the progressive nature of socialism has become all too familiar to interest them. In 1985, after about five years' propaganda on the FSFBC and after many organized activities to promote the FSFBC, I found very few people, even in the big cities, who could recount the basic content of the five stresses and the four beautifications. The usual response was "It's about cleanliness and morality. But I can't remember what the five stresses and the four beautifications are exactly."

"Political studies" (zheng-zhi xue-xi) are held only once or twice a week. A brief reading of some political material at the start of the meeting is followed by a casual chat to pass the time. Students openly describe "Political lessons"
(zheng-zhi ke) in schools and universities as a "burden," and threaten to boycott examinations on political theory (primarily Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought). Moreover, cheating is rampant: the teachers simply turn a blind eye.\textsuperscript{125} It is safe to say that at present, the desire of Chinese students to learn foreign languages is genuine and much greater than their wish to learn Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

Surely, the crackdown on crime suppressed criminal activities for a while, and the anti-spiritual pollution drive taught the people another lesson. Furthermore, the on-going Party rectification campaign has put a certain amount of pressure on Party members and cadres. However, all of these movements, along with the FSFBC, have been unable to produce the kind of discipline that the CCP desires. The "youth problem" still exists, as does the unemployment problem.\textsuperscript{126} The wide-spread corruption associated with Party cadres, and in some cases, with high level cadres, has been an ever-present "headache" for the leadership since the start of the economic reform and the open-door policy. As a consequence of the rectification campaign, the exposure of all levels of party cadres' corruption and of their children's privileged treatment in the society has caused deeper public resentment and more damage to the Party's prestige.\textsuperscript{127} An editorial article, "The Key to the Building of Socialist Spiritual Civilization Lies in the Improvement of the 'Party Style',' describes the situation and behavior of some cadres and their children in the following terms:

\begin{quote}
as soon as they heard of the open door policy and the decision of internal economic reform, some agencies of the Party, the government and the military, some party and government cadres all went into commerce like a swarm of bees. It made the majority of our party cadres and the masses feel disgusted and disdainful.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

Deng Xiaoping's speech at the National Conference on Science and Technology indicates clearly the seriousness of the problem. He pointed out that, "there have been some crooked ways [dishonest practices; Wai-men xie-dao] in the economic reform at present," and "to correct the unhealthy tendency (jiu-zheng bu-zheng zhi-feng) has become the main task of the Party rectification,
which should be aimed at the Party cadres." 129 Yu Qiuli, a member of the CCP's Political Bureau and the Director of the General Political Department, pointed out at a meeting attended by cadres from the military on November 10, 1985 that: "At present, some people lack confidence in the correction of the Party style and the building of socialist spiritual civilization. One of the major reasons is that some cadres speak one thing and do another; and what they demand the people to do, they do not do themselves." He called on the cadres to play a leading role in the building of spiritual civilization, and to set themselves as examples to the people in order to correct Party style. 130 To demonstrate the leadership's determination to eliminate the "crooked style" within the Party, a number of corruption cases involving middle and high level cadres have been publicized, and the guilty people have been criticized and dismissed from their positions. 131 Meanwhile, children of high level cadres who have committed crimes have been tried and punished. 132 This kind of action is appreciated by the masses, and undoubtedly will help to improve the Party's image.

Since the present CCP leadership gained political power in the late 1970s, it has made remarkable improvements, especially in the economic realm. Its reformist economic policies have improved remarkably the country's economic situation. The Gross National Product increased at an annual rate of 11 per cent between 1981 and 1985. The people's standard of living also increased, despite relatively high inflation (deducting inflation, the real annual increase in the standard of living for urban people during the period 1981 to 1985 was 6.7 per cent, while for rural people, it was 13.7 per cent). 133 Consequently, the government and its major leaders have won appreciation and praise from its people. These accomplishments have also helped to stabilize the country's social and political situation. Some people praise the present government, led by Deng Xiaoping, as the best government the Chinese people have ever had. 134

However, this situation was brought about not by the FSFBC, but by economic development. Obviously, economic progress was the outcome of reformist economic policies that provided incentives for people to work harder and to find more ways to make money. In fact, the spirit inspired by the new
economic policies contradicts the basic spirit and values the campaign aimed to promote - especially selflessness, collective moral spirit, and the communist value of "serving the people." The people in China are more materialistic today than they were a decade ago: their interest in color televisions, refrigerators and better housing far exceeds their interest in socialist spiritual civilization. Moreover, crime has become more of a social problem since the reforms took place. Finally, it is obvious that neither the social behavior of the people in general nor the hygiene of the environment has improved much. In fact, one often hears people, both Chinese and foreigners, complain that the economic reform has destroyed some basic courteous behavior that the people used to possess.

Despite the limitations of the FSFBC, the CCP's stand on the importance of socialist spiritual civilization is firm. This is reflected in Zhao Ziyang's report at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth National People's Congress on the Draft of the Seventh Five-year-plan" on March 25, 1986. After a lengthy discussion on a wide range of government policies, the Premier stated in the conclusion:

I must indicate with special emphasis here, that it is the government's long-term policy that while we work hard to strengthen the construction of our country's material civilization, we must vigorously reinforce the building of socialist spiritual civilization in the whole socialist historical period.... Although economic development is the central work [in the Seventh Five-year-plan], ideological and political work is the guarantee of smooth progress and healthy development of the economy.... We must fully develop our socialist commodity economy and persist in the open-door policy; at the same time, we must resist the penetration of decadent capitalist ideas, lifestyle and liberal bourgeois ideologies.135

Although the FSFBC was not specifically mentioned in the Premier's report, all the main ideas of the campaign were stressed. The building of socialist spiritual civilization remains a very important task of the Party and the people.
CHAPTER 4

A Comparative Analysis of the Differences and Similarities Between the NLM and the FSFBC

The major difference between the NLM and the FSFBC lies in the two parties' political ideologies, which are different in nature and conflicting in their interpretation.

The basic ideology the KMT advocated in the NLM was Confucianism. The promoters of the movement obviously hoped that, by promoting traditional Chinese values, they would capture the minds and support of the people in their fight against the Communists. The basic moral values the NLM advocated were the Confucian virtues of jü, yi, lian and chi, which were regarded by Chiang Kai-shek as "the pillars of a nation." Chiang and his fellow promoters attributed China's degeneration and backwardness to the abandonment of Confucian virtues, and viewed the NLM as the KMT's crusade to revive the Chinese nation through the restoration of traditional Chinese values that had been destroyed by the Communists. The ideological assumption of the movement was that the four virtues, which had made China powerful in ancient times, were still essentially important for the survival and success of the Chinese nation in the modern era.

The ideology of the FSFBC was Marxism-Leninism. The basic values the CCP promoted in the campaign was communist morality, which was based on the Four Basic Principles: the leadership of the CCP, the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship and Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Since the founding of the CCP (1921), the party has promoted a vision of socialist revolution, based on a rejection of Confucianism and the implementation of Marxist-Leninist principles and practices. After the birth of the "new" China in 1949, the CCP, as a revolutionary government which seeks to establish a socialist order, has taken "destroying the old and establishing the
new” (pu-jiu li-xin) as one of its most pronounced revolutionary slogans.\(^2\) Confucian ideas and values have been criticized as "poisonous" and "feudalistic." The KMT's effort to restore Confucianism has been denounced as "reactionary." In the FSFBC, the Confucian virtues, li, yi, lian and chi, are criticized; at the same time, the Four Basic Principles are proclaimed the "four pillars which hold up the sky."\(^3\) The promoters of the FSFBC regard the restoration of communist morality as the necessary condition for China's Four Modernizations. They stress that, "Any words or deeds that are not in accordance with the Four Basic Principles are wrong and will not be tolerated [by the party].”\(^4\)

In promoting Confucianism, the KMT tolerated, even actively advocated, the ideas of status distinctions and social hierarchy. As reflected in Chiang's NLM speeches, he denounced the Communists for destroying traditional Chinese relationships between parents and children, teachers and students, and the old and the young.\(^5\) He also emphasized the hierarchical discipline practiced in the military.\(^6\) Moreover, the KMT's attitude towards women was traditional, despite its rhetoric of "women's liberation." In order to mobilize women to take part in the NLM, the promoters advocated the ideas that women should take part in societal affairs, and that they should demand social equality. At the same time, however, they maintained that, "women, of course, have firstly to take care of the family and housework," and after they performed their duties as women, they "can also make a contribution to society.”\(^7\) Such an attitude may have been a little more progressive than that of the Confucians', but its cry for women's liberation was, in fact, fundamentally based on an assumption of social inequality.

The notion of equality has been one of the most propagated concepts of the CCP in the People's Republic. While claiming social equality as one of its general principles, it has paid special attention to the equality between the sexes. The CCP's basic objection to Confucianism was that it preserved and advocated social hierarchy, and hence was against the basic humanistic idea of equality. One of the CCP's major criticisms of Confucianism was its attitude towards women. It criticized the teaching of li (li-jia) for legitimizing social injustice, for depriving of women's human rights and for making women appendages of men.
By denouncing the Confucian value of "li", the CCP wished to differentiate itself from the "feudalist" Chinese tradition and the "reactionary" ideology of the KMT; at the same time, it identified itself with the reformist intellectuals of the New Culture Movement, and stresses the revolutionary nature of the party.

Furthermore, although the immediate purpose of the NLM and the FSFBC was to reinforce social and political control, the ultimate goal of the KMT and the CCP, as reflected in their respective campaigns, was different. The KMT regime - which had no clear political ideology, rather a vague doctrine of the Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's livelihood) of Sun Yat-sen - embraced Confucianism as the ideology of the NLM. Its pronounced goal in the NLM was purely nationalistic: to restore traditional Chinese values so as to revive the Chinese nation. The CCP, on the other hand, is committed to communism. Its goal, as stated explicitly in the FSFBC, is to build a strong, powerful socialist China. One of the reasons for the launch of the campaign, as indicated by Hu Yaobang, was "to ensure the socialist nature of China after the Four Modernizations have been achieved and China has become a strong and powerful nation." 8

In addition, the CCP was supposed to be a political party of the "working class." Hence, its leaders have tried, at least on the surface, to identify themselves with the masses. In the FSFBC, the promoters urged the people to pay attention to hygiene and cleanliness; but no insulting words were used in their speeches. The KMT, on the other hand, never pretended to be a party of the "proletariat." Chiang Kai-shek, in his NLM speeches, clearly presented himself as morally above ordinary people. In one of his public speeches, he told his audience that "more than half of the people in the country are only partially alive, they are like working skeletons, that had no spirit but a moving body." 9 In addition, he used all kinds of insulting words, such as "wu-sui" (filthy), lan-duo (lazy), "tui-tang" (decrepit), "ye-man" (barbaric), to describe the people's living style and personal habits. 10 It is hard to imagine the CCP leaders addressing the masses in such a style. Indeed, Chiang's sense of his own moral superiority to the people was overt. While calling for the people to be clean and orderly, he did
no hesitate to present himself to the people as the model of new life, telling his audience that if they learnt from him, they could "all become the leader of the Republic of China," and "make as great a contribution to the nation" as he could.¹¹

As an intellectual system, the CCP's ideology differed fundamentally from that of the KMT. Yet, the two parties, in terms of ideological assumptions, moral values and administrative style, as reflected in the NLM and the FSFBC, resembled each other in many respects.

In the first place, both regimes regarded morality as the most important factor that determined the rise and fall of a nation. They believed that a high moral spirit would keep a society in order and harmony, and hence, bring it to success; a loss of morality would cause a nation to collapse. Whenever a society was facing serious problems, moral degeneration was thought to be the cause; to rejuvenate the society, the first and most important task was to restore the people's morality and to uplift their spirit. This view was the basic ideological assumption upon which the NLM and FSFBC were launched.

Chiang Kai-shek asserted in the NLM that the single greatest cause of Chinese backwardness was "not because we have no fine weaponry, but because we have lost our intrinsic traditional spirit and fine morality."¹² The NLM aimed to restore traditional Chinese values, and to overcome the "spirituallessness" of the people. "Once the people's morality was restored, it would no longer be a difficult matter to abolish the unequal treaties, to take revenge on other nations or to revive our nation."¹³ The NLM was viewed by its promoters as an effort to "conquer the substance with spirit" (yi jing-shen zhan-sheng wu-zhi).¹⁴

Similarly, the promoters of the FSFBC claimed that China's current social and economic problems were the consequence of the Cultural Revolution, which destroyed the people's "revolutionary spirit," "communist morality," as well as "our nation's fine traditional virtues."¹⁵ The FSFBC was designed to restore these virtues, and values and to improve the people's "spiritual appearance" in order to overcome these problems and allow China to become a modernized socialist country.¹⁶ In his first television speech to promote the FSFBC, Zhao Ziyang
stressed that "spiritual civilization is the basic and necessary condition for building China's socialist material civilization,"\textsuperscript{17} and the "source of power" for all the other possible achievements.\textsuperscript{18} For the FSFBC, morality has been regarded as "the spiritual weapon of the proletariat and the working people struggling for self-emancipation and against the system of capitalist exploitation"; "the important means to protect socialist order"; and "the spiritual power for socialist productivity."\textsuperscript{19}

The promoters of the NLM and the FSFBC not only regarded morality as the most important factor in the development of a nation, but also believed that economic conditions and other factors in the society, such as education and practical skills, would not determine the development of the people's moral values. This view brought the KMT and the CCP similar criticisms in their respective campaigns; and their arguments against these criticisms, in turn, reflected an almost identical attitude on morality and on the relationship between morality and economic and social conditions.

In the NLM, Chiang and his fellow promoters had to deal with basically two kinds of criticisms. First, some held the view that "the four virtues, li, yi, lian and, chi, were simply rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to others." Second, some people argued that "these virtues [li, yi, lian and chi] are merely refined formalities, which have nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life." Hence, they suggested that the government should focus its effort on improving social and economic problems in the society rather than on the NLM.\textsuperscript{20}

Similar criticisms of the FSFBC have been reported. It was said that some people believed that "material civilization was the foundation of spiritual civilization. Without having achieved a certain degree of material civilization, calling for spiritual civilization was groundless."\textsuperscript{21} These people suggest that the campaign is superfluous and that efforts should be focused on the building of the country's material civilization. From a similar point of view, some argued that to advocate communist morality in a socialist society was "surpassing the steps of
historical development" (chao li-shi jie-duan lun). Communist morality can be achieved only under the conditions of a communist society; it is, therefore, unrealistic to expect the people to have communist ideas and values in a socialist society. Others argued for the essential importance of the level of education and scientific development in achieving a socialist spiritual civilization and the Four Modernizations.

The critics of the NLM and the FSFBC expressed basically two ideas: first, people’s morals and values are a reflection of the material situations in which they live; a high morality requires adequate economic development and reasonable material living conditions. When arguing this point, critics of both campaigns cited the classic saying of Guan Zi: "When one does not have to worry about his food and clothing, then he cares of personal honour; when the granary is full, then people learn good manners." Second, useful knowledge and practical skills that are obtained from education and the development of science are important in the development and progress of a nation.

In their official defence against these criticisms, both the KMT and the CCP denied the suggestion that material conditions determined the people’s morals and values, and that practical knowledge and technique are more important than morality to the progress and development of a nation, despite the fact that the CCP is a "Marxist" party.

In defending their ideas, the promoters of the NLM accused the critics of the movement for "not realizing the importance of the four virtues - that is, they teach one how to be a man." "If one does not know how to be a man," they argued, "what is the use of having an abundance of food and clothing?" Moreover, they asserted that the critics' use of Guan Zi's saying was "one-sided," because when Guan Zi said this, he "did not intend to make a general statement," but "merely" referred to "a particular subject at a particular time." Furthermore, the promoters argued, "When he was making a broad statement, he said, 'li, yi, lian and chi are the four pillars of the nation.' When these virtues prevail, even if food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be produced by man-power; or if the granary is empty, it can be filled through human effort." In addition, they stressed "Social
order is based on these virtues. When there is order, then everything can be
done properly, but when everything is in confusion, very little can be
achieved. To the critics who argued for the importance of knowledge and
skills, the promoters of the NLM criticized them for not being able to "understand
the difference between matters of primary and secondary importance." The
promoters argued:

From the social and national point of view, only those who are
virtuous can best use their knowledge and techniques for the
salvation of the country. Otherwise, ability may be abused for
dishonorable purposes. Li, yi, lian, and chi are the principal rules
alike for a community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do
not observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge and
ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these virtues may
be considered as matters of primary importance upon which the
foundation of a nation can be solidly built.

It is interesting to note that Chiang Kai-shek's argument on morality and
practical skills resembled almost exactly the CCP's long-standing attitude
towards the "red versus expert" (hong yu zhi huan) question - that is, being "red"
(believing in communism) was more important, because if one was an expert but
not "red," his expertise would serve only the bourgeoisie. The present Chinese
government, in its desire to achieve the Four Modernizations, has given more
emphasis than its predecessors to the importance of being an expert. However, it
firmly maintains that communist morality is still its primary concern. Hu Yaobang
stress at the CCP's Twelfth Congress in September 1982, "We must work hard
to build a high level of socialist spiritual civilization while building a high level of
material civilization." Zhao Ziyang also stated, in his report on "the Draft of the
Seventh Five-year-plan," at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth National People's
Congress, "I must indicate with special emphasis here, that it is the government's
long-term policy that, while we work hard to strengthen the construction of our
country's material civilization, we must vigorously reinforce the building of
socialist spiritual civilization in the whole socialist historical period." Indeed,
the CCP has never failed to take a clear stand on the question of morality.

In its argument against the critics of the FSFBC, the CCP denounced these
people as "lacking a basic understanding of the dialectical relationship of the two civilizations." Since the promoters are Communists, they would not argue with any "feudalist" Chinese sages' ideas as their KMT counterparts did, but with "Marxist" principles. They claimed:

it is true that the founders of Marxism, in their struggle against the idealist conception of history, stressed that man's material life determined man's social ideology. This idea was later misinterpreted by Marxist opposition as 'the Theory of Economic Determinism' [jing-ji jue-ding lun], claiming that as man's social ideology was only the negative result of his economic position, it had no positive function. To clear this misunderstanding, Engels emphasized that neither Marx nor himself had ever believed that the economic element was the only determining factor [in historical development]; and that many kinds of elements in a society's superstructure also had their impact.30

To carry their argument further, they stressed:

From the Marxist point of view, morality is a kind of social ideology, but it is also a kind of social superstructure. It is determined by material conditions, but it also has its reaction and impact on material conditions. This is the basic principle of the Marxist view on morality; it is just because of this idea, that ethics has become a science.31

Being a "Marxist" party, the CCP had to acknowledge the importance of material (economic) conditions in the development and progress of a society; at the same time, leaders of the CCP had been strongly influenced by traditional Chinese culture and believed in the spiritual force of morality. In an effort to elaborate a sound argument, the CCP, however, came out with a compromising conclusion that "we cannot deny the fact that the people's standard of living affects their morality; in a sense, we may even say that this effect is direct, however, it is not determinative."32

In their arguments against their critics, the KMT and the CCP also used similar examples to deny the necessary connection between material conditions and the level of morality. Chiang Kai-shek argued that, "the evil behavior of traitors, communist bandits and corrupt officials was not the consequence of poverty," and that "today robbers are most numerous usually in the wealthiest
cities of the world." Similarly, the promoters of the FSFBC stressed that the Western capitalist countries have a higher standard of living, but the people are spiritually bankrupt. The low level of their social morality was indicated by their problems of a high crime rate, a high divorce rate, suicide, prostitution, drug abuse and homosexuality. At the same time, they claimed, "the high morality of the Chinese people in the 1950s and early 60s under the leadership of the CCP was well-praised by foreign friends all over the world, despite the fact that the country's economy was not yet well-developed, and hence the material conditions of the people was rather poor." Therefore, they assert that it is, indeed, possible to develop communist values and morals in a socialist society. Moreover, such a spiritual condition would reinforce and accelerate the speed of building the country's material civilization.

Influenced by such ideas, the KMT focused its effort on the activities that were assumed to be able to improve the people's morality, namely the works concerned with cleanliness and orderliness. At the same time, it gave little attention to productivity and economic development, even though it was one of the NLM's three goals (militarization, productivization and aestheticization). In fact, the economic facet was the least stressed factor in the movement. The only program that aimed to improve the country's economy was the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement. It was launched a year after the inauguration of the NLM, was never given much attention and did not achieve any results. Chiang Kai-shek promised in 1934 that the NLM would remove "beggary and robbery," make officials "honest and patriotic," terminate "corruption" and encourage the people to "pursue more productive enterprises." However, the movement relied entirely on a psychological remolding through the reform of personal habits: "For conditions of economic distress the movement prescribed purely moralistic remedies."

Unlike the NLM, there was no specific economic goal for the FSFBC to achieve, although its purpose was to accelerate the country's economic development. The CCP stressed morality and the relationship between morality and material conditions, while not giving adequate attention to material and
social conditions. One good example of this is the perennial "bus problem" in Beijing. The Chinese official press often criticizes the aggressive acts - pushing, arguing, and even fighting - that occur at bus stops and inside buses as "uncivilized behavior", and it urges the people to maintain communist morality, and to be "polite and courteous." But it gives no apology for the serious shortage of buses and makes no effort to improve the service. As millions of people in Beijing have to depend on the buses to get to work or schools on time, and as there are not enough buses (and often the buses available do not run on time), the pressure and anxiety manifested in public behavior is understandable. Moral education, in other words, may not be as effective in eliminating "uncivilized behavior" as providing more buses and a better service.

Although the KMT openly advocated Confucian virtues and stood firmly by the idea that moral spirit was the most important forces in society, the leaders of the CCP felt the need to stress that their attitudes and ideas were in tune with basic principles of Marxist ideology. In their campaign rhetoric, they asserted passionately that they were Marxist materialists; and that they rejected the idea of "moral determinism"（dao-de jue-ding lun）. They stated, "morality, the same as all the other ideologies, is the product of certain socio-economic conditions; it will also inevitably develop according to the development of material conditions."\(^{38}\) At the same time, however, they tended to give more emphasis to the influence and reaction of moral spirit on material conditions than vice versa.\(^{39}\) Despite the Party's effort to distinguish its Marxist ideology from both China's "feudalistic" tradition and the KMT's "reactionary" ideology, the CCP's attitude towards morality and its relationship to material conditions seem to be much closer to traditional Chinese ideas and the attitude of the KMT, than to Marxist materialism.

Moreover, the KMT and the CCP shared a similar view not only on the role of morality, but also on many moral values, despite the fact that they have different attitudes toward Confucianism.

In fact, although the CCP's attitude towards communist morality appears to be absolute, its attitude towards traditional Chinese values has been inconsistent and ambiguous at times. In the FSFBC, for example, the CCP calls for the
restoration of two traditions: the CCP's revolutionary tradition and the fine Chinese tradition. Although it seems that all the virtues and values it has advocated can be considered as communist morality, the CCP sees the fine traditional Chinese virtues as:

Our people's moral character of diligence, bravery, simplicity and honesty; their hatred towards exploitation, their resistance to oppression, their respect and sense of duty to family members, and their patriotic spirit to resist foreign invasion and defend the national interest.⁴⁰

These values that are defined as fine Chinese tradition are either universal human values (such as diligence and honesty) or standard socialist ideas (such as hatred towards exploitation and resistance to oppression). At the same time, the three bonds (san-gang) and the five virtues (wu-chang - ren, yi, li, zhi and xin), which constitute the core of traditional Chinese culture, have been denounced as "feudalist" values, and as the "dross" (zao-po) of Chinese traditional culture.⁴¹ Consequently, the four virtues, li, yi, lian, chi, which were promoted by the KMT in the NLM, have also been criticized as being "hypocritical and feudalistic."⁴²

However, as its propaganda books on morals and values clearly indicate, the morals and values the CCP has promoted in the FSFBC are largely similar to the "feudalist" morals and values they have criticized. One example is, Qing-nain de Mei-de (The Beautiful Virtues of Youth). This book was first published in November 1980, at a time when the CCP's emphasis on the importance of building "socialist spiritual civilization" was getting stronger. This book gives a detailed discussion of the specific virtues that the CCP demands its youth possess. It is written under such chapter headings as: 1) A Discussion on Respect of Others, 2) A Discussion on Restraint of the Self, 3) A Discussion on the Pleasure of Helping Others, 4) A Discussion on Trustworthiness, 5) A Discussion on Respecting the Old and Loving the Young, and so on. The essential ideas in, and basic content of, the discussions are clearly the traditional Confucianist values of li (courtesy and proper behavior), yi (righteousness), xin (trust and honesty), xiao (filial piety) and qi (kindness); only the terms are different. In most cases, these differences reflect merely a preference for modern
or vernacular terms over the old and classic terms. For example, the basic Confucian value of \textit{li} (cultivated behavior and proper conduct), has been promoted under the term of \textit{li-mao}. \textit{yi} has been termed \textit{zheng-yi}, \textit{xin} has been called \textit{cheng-shi}, and \textit{xiao} has been said to be \textit{xiao-shun}. Consequently, the morals and values the CCP advocated in the FSFBC were basically traditional Chinese (Confucianist) values, but subsumed under the rubric of "communist morality" or "our nation's fine traditional values."\textsuperscript{43}

Furthermore, just as \textit{li} was the paramount concern of the Confucian government, the KMT and the CCP paid great attention to the "proper behavior" of the people in their administrations. The ninety-six rules, issued by the KMT in the NLM, were all concerned with proper personal conduct. In the case of the CCP, activities, such as "Outstanding Red Pioneers," "Three Goods Students," and "Model Workers," reflect the encouragement of the moral cultivation of the people, and the promotion of "proper behavior." Indeed, slogans such as "to set strict demands on oneself with communist morality and to observe discipline carefully," have been stressed so often by the CCP, that they seem to have become mainstays in the Party's propaganda.

Ironically, although the basic ideas of \textit{li} have always been valued, embraced and promoted by the CCP, the classic term itself has often been singled out for criticism. The CCP has denounced \textit{li} as embodying all the evil elements of Confucianism. It seems, however, that when the CCP criticized the "Confucianist" \textit{li}, it was meant to be "the feudalist teaching of \textit{li}" (\textit{feng-jian li-jiao}). Its most cited evils have been hierarchy, arranged marriages and discrimination against women. In its condemnation of the evils of \textit{li}, the CCP, however, never denounced the Confucian values of "moral cultivation," "proper behavior," "discipline," "deference," and "humility," which are essential features of the "feudalist" concept of \textit{li}.

Indeed, these values have been constantly promoted by the CCP. The FSFBC is its latest promotional effort. The campaign's \textit{handbook} demonstrates to what extent the "communist morality" and "proper behavior," which the CCP have promoted, resemble traditional Confucianist virtues and values. In describing the
"proper attitude and behavior" when dealing with one's superiors, the Handbook states:

An inferior should take the attitude of respect and care to his superior. In normal times, he should greet his superior on his own initiative. He should listen with attentiveness when his superior explains work to him, if necessary he should take notes. When his superior comes to see him, if he has been sitting, he should stand up, and sit again only after his superior has sat down. When his superior rises to leave, he should open the door and see his superior off while saying, "Good bye". When disagreement occurs, the inferior must not contradict his superior to his face; he may express his opinion tactfully. If an opinion cannot be agreed upon at once, the inferior may maintain his view, but he should submit himself to his superior's decision; moreover, he must not take an antagonistic attitude.44

Such a behavior requirement fits perfectly into the Confucian notion of jin: the inferior should be attentive, respectful, deferential and submissive to his superiors.

At the same time, however, the CCP stresses that, in a socialist country, the relationship between the superior and the inferior should "be a relationship not only of the leader and the led, but also of comradeship."45 In other words, it maintains that the relationship between the superior and the inferior is somehow equal. But, the behavior that applies to the inferior in relation to his superior is not emphasized in the Handbook's discussion of "proper behavior" among comrades (the equals). When describing the "proper attitude and behavior" of dealing with a comrade, the book states:

The law of public ownership in a socialist society determines the relationship between people being equal and comradely. Therefore, among comrades there should be mutual respect, mutual care and mutual help. In informal times, they should greet each other when they meet. If they meet for the first time or if they meet again after a long separation, they may shake hands and give warm greetings to each other. [...] In a discussion among comrades, [one] must concentrate, [...] do not rashly interrupt other people's speech in order to show respect. When disagreement occurs, one should explain his opinion tactfully to avoid quarrelling.46
As the citation above indicates, the term, "mutual" or "each other" is frequently used in the description of "proper behavior" among comrades. It is clearly designed to stress the equality of this relationship. However, such terms never appear in the Handbook's description of the relationship between the superior and the inferior. It seems that the communist idea of equality appears primarily in the CCP's political rhetoric; reality is dominated by traditional Confucianist values of social hierarchy and submission to authority. This has always been true in the CCP, despite their criticisms of Confucius and Confucianism.

Since 1978, the CCP leadership has adopted a more tolerant view of Confucius and Confucianism than its predecessors. In 1984, Qifu, the Sage's birth place, which had been a largely neglected small town since 1949, was restored as an important historical site. Confucius' descendants, who were unjustly treated over the years, have been given favorable attention in the society: pictures of them enjoying their life in Qifu have been published in major magazines; one of Confucius' blood relatives has been encouraged to travel to the United States to lecture on Confucianism.\textsuperscript{47} Positive opinions on Confucius and some Confucianist ideas, for example, xiao (filial piety), have been allowed to be expressed openly;\textsuperscript{48} and books singing the praise of Confucius have been published.\textsuperscript{49} On the whole, there seems to have been a minor Confucianism resurgence. One might say that, since the CCP gained power in 1949, there has never been a more favorable time than the present for traditional Chinese ideas and values.

Furthermore, as reflected in the NLM and the FSFBC, both the KMT and the CCP assumed the role of government as the guardian of its people's morality, the supervisor of its people's behavior and the care-taker of its people's welfare. In short, government is for the people, but it is also above the people. Because the CCP seemed to be more sensitive about this idea and would vigorously deny it, Chiang Kai-shek plainly expressed it in his first NLM anniversary speech. While praising the success of the NLM in the first year, he reaffirmed the correctness of his NLM policy - "through issuing specific personal behavior codes and demanding the people to observe it, it would in time change the entire outlook of
the people, and the government's will would eventually become the people's own desire. The assumption is that the ruler knows best what the people need. Both the NLM and the FSFBC were government initiatives. They were designed, promoted, organized, and totally conducted by the government, aimed to educate the people and to lead the people to a better life. This idea was explicitly expressed by the promoters in the campaigns, despite the fact that both the KMT and the CCP emphasized the "spontaneity" and "enthusiasm" of the masses.

In addition, both the KMT and the CCP stressed the importance of moral examples of the leaders in their campaigns. Chiang Kai-shek asserted in the NLM that, if an official cannot behave in a proper order, he could not train his inferiors to act in proper manners, and hence, urged his officials to cultivate themselves and to set examples for their inferiors. Similarly, the CCP claims, "the key to the improvement of social trend [prevailing social ideas and values] lies in the improvement of the party trend [the prevailing ideas and values of the party members]." In order to discipline its cadres and members, it launched the party rectification campaign in the FSFBC, urging them to be strict with themselves and to set examples for the people.

"Moral cultivation" was one of the dominant ideas in both the NLM and the FSFBC, even though the CCP prefers the term, "reform" or "self-criticism," to that of "cultivation", for the purpose of avoiding any "feudalist" connotations. (The term "cultivation" was advocated by the late Head of the State, Liu Shaoqi. He promoted the idea that a good communist must discipline himself through self-cultivation, through "watching himself when alone," so as to become flexibly and resourcefully obedient to the Party's leadership.) Mao Zedong regarded "self-criticism" as the "most distinctive characteristic of our party," and as the "only effective method of resisting all kinds of political dust and microorganisms from corroding the ideology of our comrades and the body of our Party." "Self-criticism" is also claimed by the present CCP leadership to be the main means of the Party's on-going rectification campaign and an important method of improving their communist morality.
Furthermore, the promoters of the NLM and the FSFBC believed that a high level of morality can be obtained through ideological education (indoctrination) by the government and through the self-cultivation of the people. Both the KMT and the CCP believed that morals and virtues were manifested through proper behavior, and to demand that the people behave properly would help them to improve their moral quality; and, once the people's morality was improved, proper behavior would become a natural act, and the nation would succeed wherever course it took. To help the people cultivate their morality, both the KMT and the CCP launched propaganda campaigns to "educate" the masses. In addition to the promoters' speeches, public demonstrations, parades, meetings, and slogans, the governments published numerous articles, pamphlets and books to influence public opinion. Moreover, each government produced a special handbook with detailed descriptions of ethical virtues and proper behavior, to serve as a guide for the people in the campaigns. Although the promotion of morality was the main concern of the NLM and FSFBC, the promoters focused their practical efforts on hygiene related activities, because they believed that the environment reflected the people's moral spirit, and, by working to make the environment clean, the people's moral spirit would be improved. In the view of the promoters, compliance with the government was a sign of obedience and thus, virtuous. If everyone was as responsive and disciplined in all the other aspects of social and political life as in the act of cleaning the environment, the people's morality would be restored. From this point of view, therefore, the efforts of the KMT and the CCP to promote cleanliness and orderliness should not be seen as wasting effort on a trivial matter, but rather as an important element in the process of cultivating the people's "morality" - the kind of morality they needed. To stimulate and ensure the people's "enthusiasm," social pressure, in the forms of official inspections and the bestowing of "civilized units" awards, was also used by the promoters of both campaigns.

In addition, both the NLM and the FSFBC expressed a strong nationalist sentiment. The promoters not only were proud of China being "the land of ritual
and right behavior," but also had a strong sense of moral and spiritual superiority to all the other nations. The open-door policy of the present Chinese government is clearly aimed at Western science and technology, not Western culture and its values. The CCP's constant emphasis on the crime-ridden West and its denunciation of the "decadent bourgeois lifestyle" in the FSFBC reflects clearly its sense of moral superiority to the Western people. The FSFBC was, indeed, designed precisely to fight against Western ideas and capitalist values that had influenced the people as a consequence of the country's economic reforms, and especially, the open-door policy.

A similar attitude towards Western culture was also expressed by the KMT in the NLM. For example, the Blue Shirts, who played a major role in the organization of the NLM, thought that "the pernicious influences of Western culture were the root cause of China's moral and cultural bankruptcy." The only remedy that could save China from bankruptcy was a revival of traditional Chinese moral values.

In promoting hygiene related activities and the reform of the people's living habits, the lifestyle and social behavior of "foreign people" were praised in both the NLM and the FSFBC. However, there was no mention of the close relationship between behavior and morality while praising foreigners' good manners; and neither the KMT nor the CCP suggested that these foreigners might be morally superior to the Chinese. Indeed, it would not appeal to the Chinese to say that foreigners were morally superior to the Chinese, regardless of how the foreigners behave. Interestingly enough, while praising the good manners of foreigners, Chiang rationalized them in terms of traditional Chinese moral values, li, yi, lian and chi. In his inaugural speech, Chiang stated:

The spirit, ideas, wisdom and morals of an individual and a nation can be all reflected in their living style. How do foreigners eat, dress, live and behave? Anyone who has been to a foreign country must have seen for himself clearly. For the people who have not been to any foreign countries, they can also see the foreigners here in the foreign concessions, churches and other places. All their conduct, including eating, dressing, housekeeping and walking, are all in accordance with the standard of
modern citizens, and display the spirit of loving their countries and loyalty to their nations. In brief, [their actions] are all in accordance with li, yi, lian and chi. If a meal was not in tune with lian and chi, they would not eat it; if a dress was not in tune with lian and chi, they would not wear it. They would not do things that were not in accordance with li and yi. From getting up in the morning to going to bed at night, every act they do is regular, in accord with the principle of man, and manifests the wisdom and morals of the citizens in the modern countries.59

To be sure, nationalism has been a dominant theme in both the NLM and the FSFBC. Chiang claimed explicitly in his inaugural speech that "the mission of the NLM is to revive the Chinese nation."60 The goal of the FSFBC, as clearly indicated in the "Proposal," is "to enable our great motherland to appear in the forefront of the world with a new appearance of a high level of socialist spiritual civilization."61 Nationalism was used as a political weapon of the promoters in both campaigns to mobilize the masses. To inspire the people's nationalist sentiment and enthusiasm, both the KMT and the CCP, to different degrees, have clung to Chinese tradition. The Confucian values, zhong (loyalty) and xiao (filial piety), were advocated to promote patriotism; the phrase, li-yi zhi-bang (the land of ritual and right behavior), was cited repeatedly to inspire the people's nationalist sentiment. The KMT advocated in the NLM the military spirit of being "willing to sacrifice one's life for the country"; the CCP promoters in the FSFBC the idea that "a true communist will be willing to give up everything for his revolutionary course," and "do what the party directs and go where the motherland needs." In addition, the CCP also explicitly used traditional Chinese values of filial piety to persuade the people who were valuable to the building of the country's Four Modernizations, either out of migrating to other countries or into returning to the motherland.62 In some aspects, the NLM and the FSFBC campaigns were kinds of Westernization movements, but like their predecessors in the nineteenth century, the promoters insisted that the basic principles must be Chinese.

For all these similarities, the KMT and the CCP have remained that they are two ideologically antagonistic political parties. They seem to be more capable of
indicating the limitations of their opponent, than of themselves.

In the 1940s when the NLM was still "going on," a veteran CCP member, Deng Fa, was asked by a foreigner his opinion on the movement. He criticized the KMT regime's bureaucratic way of organizing the social movement, and its neglect of basic political and material conditions. He stated:

They [promoters of the NLM] tell the people not to spit and smoke, to be clean, healthy, and honest, to be observant of filial piety and obedient toward their superiors in society and government; [but they do not do] anything to help the people use their own initiative in bringing about that improvement of their fundamental political and economic conditions upon which all aspects of a genuine new life must depend.63

Moreover, he stressed: "We must realize that the people's economic and political problems must be solved first to enable them to be clean, healthy and honest."64 In addition, he also pointed out that the KMT's restoration of Confucian virtues and values in the NLM was aimed at three purposes: (1) To reduce the interest of China's youth in modern, progressive thought and to make young people suspicious of the basic truths of new ideas; (2) to instill in the people the idea that the teachings of the Sages about absolutism, obedience, and the classification of society into feudal groups are fundamentally as valid for the "special conditions" of China as they ever were; (3) to reinterpret Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy and his political program in a Confucian light, with the intention of making his ideas serve as a modern disguise for the continuation of the traditional political ideology by which China has been suppressed for thousands of years.65

A large part of Deng Fa's criticism and analysis of the NLM seems to be reasonable. However, it may just as well be applied to the FSFBC of the CCP - the FSFBC was as much a government bureaucratic operation as the NLM; the promoters of the FSFBC seem to have given as much emphasis to the role of morality, and as little stress to, or consideration of, the material conditions as their counterpart did in the NLM. Moreover, the Chinese Communists' attitudes toward the role of morality and of spirituality, and their concern with moral cultivation and
proper behavior, are all indications of a strong Confucian influence in their political ideology. In addition, the FSFBC is, similar to the NLM, used as a vehicle by its promoters to strengthen their political and social control over the people in the society.

In any case, the regime that organized the NLM has now undertaken the role of critic of the FSFBC with a view similar to the one Deng Fa held against the NLM more than forty years ago. In discussing the FSFBC, an article in the KMT's Weekly Material on CCP Issues (a propaganda magazine published by a government organization in Taiwan), states:

The CCP hopes that the Five Stress and Four Beautifications Campaign will create a better social trend and, hence, help its 'socialist modernization'. However, such a movement could only remain formalistic, because of ... the poor economic conditions, [and] the cultural and educational backwardness of the people on the Mainland.... All these have made it impossible for the cadres and people to develop the concept of modern civilization.66

The idea that material and educational conditions are essentially important in determining people's morals and behavior, which the KMT regime now embraces, certainly represents a departure from ideas it held prior to the 1930s and 40s on the Mainland.
Despite the differences between the KMT and the CCP in their political ideologies and in their attitudes toward particular aspects of traditional Chinese culture and Confucianism, the NLM and the FSFBC showed striking similarities in almost every practical aspect of the two campaigns. These similarities, in turn, reflected a similar outlook shared by the KMT and the CCP, a mentality profoundly influenced by traditional Chinese culture - Confucian attitudes, values and beliefs.

In the first place, the urge of the KMT and the CCP to restore morality and to promote "proper behavior" at a time of political and social instability, displayed a typical Confucianist approach to social problems.

The time Confucius lived was an age of political and social disorder just before the Warring States Period, when China was divided into a number of kingdoms engaged in bitter power struggles among themselves. Confucius saw the situation as a direct result of the disintegration of spiritual values and of the "total collapse of conventional rites and music" (li yue beng-kui) that had been established by the Sage-ancestors of the Early Zhou period. He believed that the only remedy that would save the people from such a chaotic situation was to ke-ji fu-li (to conquer the self and return to li). He believed that by promoting li (proper behavior), ren (morals and virtues) would be restored; once ren was restored, everything under Heaven would be in order (tian-xia da-zhi), and the nation would be saved. The ideological assumptions of the NLM and the FSFBC resembled almost exactly what Confucius believed and advocated well over two thousand years ago.

Moreover, the idea of "moral determination," that the promoters of the NLM and the FSFBC believed, was deeply-rooted in traditional Chinese culture. Confucius regarded li as the essential means to an ideal society. Mencius
stressed, "It was by ren, that the three dynasties gained the throne, and by not being ren, that they lost it. It is by the same means that the decaying and flourishing, the preservation and perishing, of states are determined." In his crusade to restore li, Confucius urged the kings and princes to be ren and to rule their people by moral examples (ren zheng) if they wished to obtain or maintain order and harmony in the society. In the NLM and the FSFBC, both promoters urged their officials to be strict with themselves and to set up themselves as examples for the people if they expected the people to be moralistic and disciplined. The attitude of the KMT and the CCP towards morality and their concern with "moral examples" of their officials and "proper behavior" of the people, were certainly in tune with the attitude and concern of the Confucian government. In addition, the Confucian view on the role of government was also evident in the NLM and the FSFBC - both campaigns were initiated by the government, and were openly claimed to be an "educational" movement, aimed to improve the people's morality in order to lead the people to a better life.

Furthermore, the promoters' emphasis on morality and their relative negligence of the importance of practical knowledge and techniques in the progress and development of a nation also reflected one of the most distinctive characteristics of traditional Chinese culture. The Chinese had traditionally held an idealist view on the power of man, based on his moral quality. They believed that moral learning, orderly behavior and social harmony are the important factors in the development of a nation. This view was institutionalized by the Imperial Examination System, which not only enabled Confucianism to be the most influential ideology in Chinese society, but also systematically affirmed the importance of ethics and morality over practical knowledge and skills. The KMT and the CCP's view on morality and on its relationship to other factors, such as economic conditions and educational standards, to different degrees, reflected a strong influence of traditional Chinese thought.

In the FSFBC, the CCP promoted most Confucian virtues in terms of Communist morality. In the NLM, Chiang Kai-shek also felt the need to give "more appropriate" interpretations to the Confucian concepts of li, yi, lian, and chi. However,
the essential value of Confucianism, such as stresses on proper behavior, obedience, deference, submissiveness and discipline, have been maintained and promoted. Moreover, Confucianism emphasized the moral improvability of human nature, and believed that through proper ethical instruction and exhortation, man can be made into a better moral being. In the NLM and the FSFBC, the promoters believed that through issuing rules and regulations and demanding the people to observe, the people's moral quality would be improved. Indeed, the idea of "self-cultivation" and the belief that strict observation of external behavior would improve inner morality were among the most basic ideological assumptions upon which the NLM and the FSFBC were founded.

In addition, the CCP and the KMT's views on Chinese tradition and Western culture, as expressed in their respective campaigns, also reflected the Confucian concepts of 

(ideal substance or enduring and fundamental qualities) and 

(function or practical use). This idea was highly publicized by the famous reformist slogan of the late Qing self-strengtheners, "Chinese learning [Confucian learning] for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical application" (zhong-xue wei-ti, xi-xue wei-yong). This nationalist cultural chauvinism was also well expressed by Gu Hongming an ultraconservative who stood firmly in defence of traditional Chinese culture in the New Culture Movement. He claimed that Western utilitarian culture can not develop the inner mind, and that China's spiritual civilization was so perfect that it could save China and also rescue the Western culture from its crisis. The stress on the superiority of Chinese moral tradition and the prejudice against Western culture, as expressed in the NLM and the FSFBC, indicate that both the KMT and the CCP, on this point, were strictly in line with Chinese tradition.

In short, the fact that both the KMT and the CCP, within a similar political and social situation, promoted similar Confucianist values in their campaigns is no accident. What both parties desired was popular discipline and political stability, and the key issue of concern to the leaders was the means by which to achieve their purpose. They found Confucianism, or certain Confucianist values, which began as a means of bringing social order out of the chaos, the most convenient,
effective and cheapest means for their purpose. They saw that "the Confucian order had held together because certain canons of behavior had been hammered in by precept and example so effectively that deviation from them was nearly impossible." In the view of the KMT and the CCP, the important goal was to train the people to behave in accordance with the government's rules and demands. They believed that once the people were well disciplined, the social situation would become stable and political power would be consolidated. While espousing Confucian virtues and Communist morality, the promoters of the NLM and the FSFBC were men of action rather than philosophers. While they peppered their speeches with references to the classics and to Marxist works, they failed to expound their Confucianism and Marxism in any coherent, logical way. They only took from Confucianism and Marxism those ideas they found useful to maintaining their rule. Since "to maintain existing social order" was a major concern of Confucianism, it was only natural for Chinese leaders to fall back on time-honored teachings of social and political control.

The NLM and the FSFBC were all movements of restoration - which is logical enough once the leaders have ceased to consider the party a spearhead of revolution and have come to regard it as an instrument for restoring order. When they were fighting for power, they were revolutionary and even iconoclastic, whereas once they became rulers, they desired order and discipline. To obtain them, they found that Confucian values suited their interests well.

Since 1949, the CCP has worked vigorously to eliminate traditional influence and "to educate the people with revolutionary ideas." Some changes have occurred as a consequence of the Party's administration. The most successful has been the reconstruction of China's economic system and social landscape. However, its effort to root out "poisonous feudal influences" fell far short of success and certain traditional ideas and habits continue to plague the present-day People's Republic. Even in the urban sector where changes seem to be more noticeable, traditional ideas and practices die hard. The CCP, has, in fact, displayed the familiar characteristics of traditional Chinese government - authoritarianism, state supervision of political and social and economic life,
emphasis on the importance of ideology, human will, a preoccupation with ideological, artistic and literary orthodoxy, and above all, the transformation of consciousness.

Therefore, despite the fall of the age-old imperial system and the emergence of modern political parties, the influence of the past is still strong in present-day China. Certain distinctive characteristics of traditional Chinese culture, such as its emphasis on morality, spirituality, proper behavior, and ideological orthodoxy; its view of government; its belief in and practice of ideological indoctrination; its assumption of an intimate link between external behavior and internal morality; and its stress on the value of self-cultivation, are still the most noticeable features of Chinese politics and society in twentieth century China.
NOTES

Chapter 1. China's Culture Heritage

1. For examples of some of these different opinions, see "Shen-mo shi zhong-guo de chuan-tong wen-hua?" (What Is China's Traditional Culture?), Ren-min Ri-bao (the People's Daily - RMRB hereafter) (overseas edition), July 29, 1985.

2. Dong Zhongshu (179-104 B.C.) proposed this idea to Han Wu-di in his Ju Xian-liang Dui-ce (also called Tian Ren San Ce) in 140 B.C.

3. Confucianism as the orthodox ideology had been interrupted at times in traditional China. For example, in the third to sixth century A.D. during the decline of central authority which followed the Han Dynasty, Confucianism was all but eclipsed by Buddhism.

4. Dominant Confucian assumptions (e.g. on Heaven and fate) , virtues (such as ren, li, xiao, etc.) and values (e.g. on family) have become the beliefs and values of ordinary Chinese people - ritual practices such as ancestor worship, clan and family sacrifices, birth, marriage and funeral ceremonies have all become popular practices; Confucian ethical code and the idea of li expressed in Confucian classics, such as Li-ji (the Book of Rites) and Zhou-li (The Rites of the Zhou dynasty), etc., constituted the primary content of family instructions (jia-li) and clan rules (zu-qui) and dominated the proper conduct of everyday affairs of the people in traditional China (e.g. Jia-li Zhuan-ji, Jia-li hui tong, etc.). For a detailed account, see Arthur Wright, "On Propaganda" in Robert Kapp, ed., Four Views of China, (Houston Texas) 1973.

5. Because of the complexity in meaning, it is best, I believe, to leave the term ren (and the same as li later in this chapter) untranslated.


9. Analects I/2/2 "Filial piety and fraternal submission! - are they not the
root of all benevolent action!" Translated by James Legge, pp.138-139.
10. Ibid., 6/28, p.194.
11. Ibid., 12/1, p.250.
15. Si Ma Xian, Shi-ji (Book of History), 97/6, Lu Jia's words.
Conference on Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Late Imperial China (Montecito, Calif., August 1981), revised 1984. p.9.
22. Li-jii, 1:63 (modified from Legge's translation).
24. Ibid., 13/6, (Legge, p.226).
25. Ibid., 12/17, p.258. Unfortunately, English does not convey the semantic relationships as clearly as the Chinese.
26. Ibid., 13/4, p.265.
27. Ibid., 12/19, (Legge, p.259).
29. Ibid., see 13/10-12, (Legge, p.267).
31. See Note 18.
32. Analects, 2/3/1&2 (Legge, p.146, modified).
33. Ibid., 13/9/4 (Legge, p.267).
34. Ibid., 12/7, "Zi-gong asked about government. The Master said, 'The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler.' Zi-gong said, 'If it cannot be helped, one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be forgone first?' 'The military equipment,' said the Master. Zi-gong again asked, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be forgone?'' The Master answered, 'Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state.'" (Legge, p.254).
35. Ibid., 6/28, p.194, modified.
36. An administrative system organized on the basis of households, each jia being made up 10 households, and each bao of 10 jia (numbers of households varied at different times). The head of a jia and a bao was appointed by local
government, whose responsibilities included registering the households and inhabitants in the neighborhoods and villages; watching, detecting and reporting any movements and crimes to the local authority. Through such a system, the central government was able to enforce its rule at the grass-roots level. The bao-jia system was also adopted by the KMT in 1932.


39. For example, Yan-shi Jia-xun (the Rules of the Yan Family).


43. Hsiao Kung-ch’uan (1960), Chapter 6, pp.184-258.

44. Ibid., p.185.

45. Ibid., note 8 in Chapter 6, p.616. There is an English version translated by William Milne (London,1817).

46. Ibid., pp.184-86.

47. Zhen-guan was the title of emperor Li Shi-min's reign (627-649A.D.).

48. The book is said to have been written by a Confucian in the South Song dynasty (1127-1179 A.D.).


50. Richard J. Smith, (1983) p.278, note 28. It has also been frequently used by Chinese politicians in the Twentieth Century as a source for both national pride and national inspiration (as in the cases of the New Life Movement and the Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Champaign).


Chapter 2: The New Life Movement

1. It was a warlord group formed by Yuan Shikai in 1905. Its major divisions were destroyed by the Northern Expedition in 1927, and it disappeared in 1928.


3. For details see Guo Ting-yi, Jin-dai Zhong-guo Shi-gang (An Outlined History of Modern China) (Hong Kong, 1979), pp.591-609.

4. Ibid., pp.609-622.

5. Among those who took Li and Li-jiao as the prime target of criticism, Lu Xun was undoubtedly the most influential and effective. Between 1918 and 1925, Lu Xun wrote 26 short stories and many short commentaries attacking
Confucianism. See Na-han (Cries) (Beijing, 1923) and Pang-huang (Hesitation) (Beijing, 1926).


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.


19. Ibid., p302 &305.

20. Ibid., p.304.


22. Ibid., pp.480-483.


25. Ibid.


30. Ibid., part 1, p.34.


32. Ibid.

33. Lei-bian, part 1, p.19.

34. Ibid., p.33.

35. Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under the Nationalist Rule 1927-37 (Harvard, 1974), pp.64-70; also H.S. Chi, Nationalist China at War,
36. Chiang's speech on March 24, 1934 in Lei-bian, part 1, pp.91-92.
37. The Outline of the NLM, Ji-yao, part 1, p.2; also Chiang's speech on
40. Chiang's speech on March 5, 1934, Ibid., p.38.
41. Here I adopted the translation from Chu's article (1980) p.46.
42. Lei-bian, part 1, p.92.
43. Chiang's speech on March 24, 1934, Ibid., p.91
45. Chiang's speech on Feb. 19, 1935, Ji-yao, part 1, p.86.
49. Ji-yao, part 1, p.29.
50. Ibid., part 1, p.57.
51. A pamphlet printed by the Central NLMPA, July 1, 1935.
52. Eastman and Arif Dirlik (The Ideological Foundation of the New Life
Movement: A Study of Counterrevolution, Journal of Asian Studies , Vol. 34, No.4
August, 1975) for examples.
54. Iwai Eiichi, Ranisha ni Kansuru chosa (An Investigation of the Blue
Shirts). Issued by the Research Division of the Foreign Ministry, marked "secret",
55. Ibid., p.68.
56. One of the two vice chairmen of the Central NLMPA, Deng Wenyi, was a
leading member of the Blue Shirts(see Dirlik (1975) p.951). Eastman's study on
the Blue Shirts reveals that a former high-ranking Blue Shirt had stated that
"most" of the cadres in the NLMPA were Blue Shirts (Eastman (1974) p59 & 330).
59. Ibid.
60. Zhang Qiyun, Zhong-hua Min-guo Shi-gang (3) (An Outline of the History
62. Emily Hahn, Chiang Kai-shek, An Unauthorized Biography (Doubledge &
65. Eastman (1982), p.34.
Dirlik (1975) pp. 947 & 957; Kam Louie, Critiques of Confucius in Contemporary
China (Hong Kong, 1980), p.15; also H.S. Chi (1982), p.34.
67. The four speeches were delivered respectively on March 5, 11, 19 and
26. See Ji-yao, part 1, pp32-68.
70. See Min-guo Er-shi-si Nian Quan-guo Xin Sheng-huo Yun-dong Cu-jin Zong-hui, 1936, pp.553-576.
72. Ibid., Dirlik (1975)'s translation is adopted here.
73. Ibid., p.200.
74. Xin sheng-huo cong-shu nei-rong jie-shao (An introduction on the contents of the books on NLM), in Chen Li-fu: Xin sheng-huo yun-dong yu min-sheng shi-guan (Nanjing, 1924).
78. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
82. Ji-yao, part 4, pp.3-12.
84. Ji-yao, part 4, pp.11-38.
85. Ibid., part 1, p.19.
86. Ibid., part 1, p.53.
87. Chiang's speech on March 11, 1934, Ibid., part 1, pp. 45-46.
88. Lei-bian, part 1, p.43.
89. "Outline of the NLM," Ji-yao, part 1, p.3.
90. Chiang's speech on March 19, 1934, Ibid., p.47.
92. Ji-yao, part 1, pp.47-49.
96. Ibid., Note 26 in Chapter 7, p.271.
97. No high KMT officials took part in the leadership of the movement. George Shepherd, the American missionary, was asked by Mei-ling Soong to take care of it. See Thomson (1969) p.108.
98. Ibid., p.258.
99. Ji-yao, part 1, p.87.
101. Dirlik (1975)'s translation is adopted here.
102. Ibid., p.952.
103. Thomson's study shows that China's economy was in a state of crisis in the 1930's. Population growth, domestic warfare, natural disasters (such as floods), Japanese aggression, and the world wide economic depression all combined to strike at China's economy. Famine was a common phenomenon in the country. For details, see Thomson (1969) pp.97-9.

106. See note 94 in this chapter.
108. See the Introduction by Fairbank, in Ibid., p.1.
110. Ibid., p.11.
111. Ibid., p.21.
113. Peck's observation is an example. See the quotation from his book (1967) in p.36 in this thesis.
116. See note 62 in this chapter.
119. A reformist in the State of Qi. His reformist policies made the King of Qi (reigned 685-643B.C.) the first overlord in the Spring and Autumn period (770-476B.C.).
120. Guan-tzu (Guan Zi) (Zhe-jiang shu-ju, 1877), Vol. 1, part 1, p.1.
121. See Thomson (1969), Chapter 10, pp.221-234; also George Moseley, China since 1911 (1968), p.91.

Chapter 3: The Five Stresses and Four Beautifications Campaign

1. The present leadership claimed the Four Modernizations as its prime concern at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978.

2. Hua Guofeng, the Mao Zedong appointed successor, was both the Chairman of the CCP's Central Committee and the Military Commission of the CCP's Central Committee until June 1981.

3. Opposition to Deng's reform within the CCP leadership has been widely reported by a number of journals published in Hong Kong, including Zheng Ming (The Contender), Guan Cha Jia (The Observer) and Qi-shi Nian-dai (The Severnties) since Deng's reform began. A number of editorial articles in CCP's theoretical journal, Hong Qi (The Red Flag) also indicate clearly such a situation. One of these articles, entitled "To Liberate Ideas in Order to Accelerate the
Reform," for example, states, "As a consequence of many years' influence of leftist ideology, there are some people [in the Party] who have no understanding of the reform, even resist it. [...] We must be aware that ideological resistance to reform is not lightweight." (*Hong Qi*, No. 21, 1980, p.2). For more examples, see *Hong Qi*, No. 9, 1979, p.3 and No. 11, 1979, p.11.

4. See *RMRB*, 6/29/86.


6. These changes were made at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in June, 1981. See *Hong Qi*, No.13, 1981, p.2.

7. See the editorial artical, "In Order To Achieve the Four Modernizations, [We] Must Uphold the Four Basic Principles," *Hong Qi*, No. 5, 1979, p.11-15.

8. Illiteracy and isolation have left many peasants out of touch with the current political situation of the country. I went to Jiu Hua Mountain - one of the four Buddhist mountains in China - with a few friends in the summer of 1979. The peasants we talked to there were totally shocked by the "news" that Chairman Mao had been criticized. "but Chairman Mao was our savior, how could he have faults?" They were visibly frightened and confused by "the situation in the cities." Years of the CCP's "socialist education" had had its profound influence on these people.

9. This screenplay was publically criticized in 1981 as patriotism was vigorously propagated. There had been a rumor about that the screenplay had been made into a movie, but it was prevented by the authorities from being released.

10. Between 1978-1980, the bulk of the 17 million youth who had been sent to the countryside returned to the cities. Unemployment suddenly became a grave problem. In March, 1982, Hu Yao-bang revealed in a report not intended for publication that there were some 14 million unemployed youth in urban China. See Beverley Hooper, "the Youth Problem: Deviations from the Socialist Road", in Graham Young ed. *China: Dilemmas of Modernization*, (Canberra, 1983), p.211.

11. See, for example, *Guang-ming Ri-bao*, 1/10/82.


18. Ibid., 2/14/81.

19. This "underground" slogan have been well known among students for sometime, it was cited in *RMRB* (o.e.), 5/25/86.


22. Ibid.

23. An analysis of 275 media reports from 1977 to 1980 is presented in Alan
P. L. Liu, "The politics of corruption in People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review, 77 (3), September, 1983, pp.602-623. China Daily on 23 March, 1984, p.3, discussed 45,300 cases of economic crimes from 1983 in "Inspectors find thousands of economic crimes." Moreover, cases of economic crimes may be found in the Chinese press daily, especially in local newspapers. The most recent serious case was also published on April, 15, 1986 in RMRB (o.e.), in which a middle-level cadre (who was rumored to be a daughter of a CCP top figure) was sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment.


26. Statement by Vice Premier Hu Qili to the Fourth Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, RMRB, 11/9/82.


28. The Proposal For Activities of Courtesy and Decorum by the nine organizations(Proposal hereafter), in Handbook, p.2; For promotion of the three spirits, see Handbook, p.8.

29. She-hu feng-qi is a broad term which means prevailing social values and behavior.

30. Although these structures claim to represent their people, all are under close Party control and there is normally no role for alternative organizations or publicity organs.


32. Zhao Ziyang's television speech on 2/28/82. RMRB, 3/1/82.

33. See Handbook, p.15; also Wang Li's speech in RMRB, 4/8/82; Hu Yao-bang's speech at the CCP's Twelfth Congress Ibid., 9/4/82.

34. Zhao Ziyang's television speech, Ibid., 2/28/82; also a speech by Deng Liqun (the minister for the CCP's Central Propaganda Department) published in RMRB, 5/5/82; also Hu Yaobang's speech RMRB, 9/4/82.

35. Hu Yaobang, Ibid. It is also in Handbook, p.20.


37. Ibid., pp.3-4; also RMRB, 2/28/81.

38. Ibid., p.39 and p.44.


41. Zhao Ziyang's speech, RMRB, 2/28/82; also Handbook, p.12 & p.27.


46. Wei Yingmin and Jin Kexi, p.403.
47. See, for example, articles in Qing-nian Yi-dai (Young Generation), Vol. 1, 1981, p.39; RMRB, 1/5/82; 1/6/82; 1/11/82.
52. Since February, 1983, the Campaign has been called Wu-jiang Si-mei San-reai Yun-dong (Five Stresses, Four Beautifications and Three Ardent Loves). For convenience, I shall still use the abbreviation FSFBC hereafter in this thesis.
53. RMRB (o.e.), 3/5/81.
57. While no CCP top leaders have openly expressed such an idea, this attitude is widely held and expressed by both government officials and ordinary people. Examples that are most often cited by the Chinese to denounce Western moral corruptions are homosexuality, pornography, promiscuity, high divorce rates, drug abuses, prostitution and the domination of money.
58. Deng Xiaoping's speech, RMRB, 10/2/82.
59. Two editorial articles in RMRB (o.e.), 12/7/84 and 12/21/84.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
67. Ibid., p.51.
68. Ibid., p.55.
69. RMRB, 3/1/82.
70. Ibid.
71. My talks with people in China in the summer of 1985. Also I had been to China twice during 1981-1983 and hence witnessed part of the campaign.
72. RMRB, 2/28/81.
73. Ibid., 3/3/81.
74. Ibid.
75. For interpretation of the superiority of socialism, compare Handbook,
77. The people in China are identified primarily by their work or study unit (dan-wei) which regulates a wide range of their daily activities. Many dan-wei have their own residential quarters, daycare centers, schools, hospitals and canteens.
78. My talks with people and personal observations.
79. RMRB, 3/6/81.
80. See Hong Qi, No. 8, 9, and 11, 1983. Articles promoting these people can be found in almost all Chinese newspapers and magazines in 1983.
82. RMRB, 12/23/82.
83. Ibid., 2/27/85.
84. I was in Beijing in June 1985 and hence observed the campaign in action. It was stated in the Beijing City Government's declaration (which was posted almost everywhere in Beijing) that 40,000 people had been chosen from many work units to act as superintendents in the campaign.
85. I witnessed such an incident in Beijing in June 1985. A peasant woman, obviously a visitor to Beijing, spat in the crowded Wang Fujing Street and was caught by one of the superintendents. So embarrassed by the crowds looking and laughing at her, she threw an one dollar note at the superintendent and ran away without the change with a flushed face and tears.
86. RMRB, 5/6/82.
90. RMRB (o.e.) 12/15/85.
92. see note 23 in this chapter.
93. RMRB (o.e.), 3/9/85.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., p.948.
97. Ibid., pp.960-61.
99. RMRB, 11/16/83.
100. Gold (1984), p.948
101. For example, see Ibid., p.945.
102. RMRB, 10/25/83.
104. RMRB, 12/31/83.
105. For a detailed account, see Gold's article: "Just in Time" (1984).
106. RMRB, 5/6/82.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid., 2/27/83.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., 4/1/83.
111. Ibid.
112. Fang Chengzhi, RMRB (o.e.) 11/19/85; Wang Yu RMRB (o.e.) 5/16/86.
113. RMRM, 7/29/84.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid, 8/31/84.
116. Ibid., 7/29/84.
117. Ibid., 8/31/84.
118. Ibid., 7/29/84.
119. Ibid., 1/12/85.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., 2/26/85.
122 RMRB (o.e.), 3/20/86.
123. Ibid.
124. To take one of the many cases I witnessed in the summer of 1985 as an example: two days before an inspection party came to inspect a hospital, most nurses and all the administration staff put away their routine duties and were engaged in actions to "spiffy up" the place: picking dead leaves from the hospital compound, cleaning floors, painting windows, and getting new books to display in the little library, etc. After two days work, the hospital took on an entirely new look. Consequently, the inspection party praised the people and the leadership of the hospital, and decided that it should continue to be Wen-ming dan-wei. What the situation was like between the two inspection times (it could be one or two years) was not counted. Moreover, it had been a common practice to give the inspection party a big banquet, out of the expenses of the work unit, in order to get a more favorable opinion. After the authorities issued a regulation some time in 1984 that the lunch (which was thought as necessary as the inspection often took a whole day) must not exceed four dishes and one soup (si-cai Yi-tang), the dishes and soup bowls became much larger and more substantial.
126. In March 1982, Hu Yaobang revealed in a report not intended for publication that there were some 14 million unemployed youth in urban China. See Hoop, p.211.
127. See, Deng Xiaoping's speech, RMRB, 3/9/85, Chen Yun's speech, RMRB, 7/1/85 and Yu Qiu-li's speech, RMRB, 11/11/85. Also see note 81 in this chapter.
128. RMRB (o.e.), 10/15/85.
131. The most publicized case might have been the one which involved a number of high cadres of the CCP's Hainan Committee (Fujian Province) who
committed crimes by illegally buying and selling a great number of cars. They were nationally criticized and dismissed from their positions. Also see note 23 in this chapter.

132. The most recent case involved the children of the Second Secretary of the CCP's Shanghai Committee, the former Minister of the Propaganda Ministry of the CCP's Shanghai Committee, and the Chairman of the People's Congress of Shanghai. Two people in this case received death sentence and were executed on February 19, 1986.


134. I had a long discussion with a group of graduate students (of political science and history) at Nanjing University in the summer of 1985. This idea was well expressed.


**Chapter 4: A Comparative Analysis on NLM and FSFBC**

2. *Po-jiu li-xin* was also the most pronounced slogan in the Cultural Revolution.
3. It is the title of a front-page article in *RMRB*, 10/13/83.
9. *Ji-yao*, part, 1, p.64.
10. For example, see *Ji-yao*, part, 1, p.47.
17. Ibid.
24. See note 120 in chapter 2. For the critics' use of Guan Zi's words, see note 20 and 21 in this chapter.
26. Ibid.
28. See *RMRB* (o.e.) 4/14/86.
30. Li Qi, p.13.
31. Wei Yingmin and Jin Kexi, p.162.
32. Ibid., p.163.
34. Li Qi, p.170; Zhou Yuanbing, pp.167-168.
38. Zhou Yuanbing, p.166.
39. Ibid.
42. *RMRB*, 3/11/83.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p.223.
47. For pictures of Confucius' descendants in Qufu, see China Reconstructs, No. 2, Feb. 1986. Kong Lingren, a seventy-sixth generation grand-daughter of Confucius visited America for three months in 1985. A series of articles written by her about the visit were published in *RMRB* (o.e.) from Feb. 18 -21, 1986.
49. For example, Kuan Yaming (1986). *Kong-zi Ping-zhuan* (On Confucius) (Beijing).
52. *Ji-yao*, part 1, pp.53-4.
58. It ia a loose term which was meant here to be the people of the industrialized countries. One should be aware that the "foreign people" the Chinese see in China ,or have contact with, are usually diplomats or professionals and their families.
60. Ibid., p.20.
62. See, for example, articles in Qing-nian Yi-dai (Young Generation), Vol. 1, 1981, p.39; RMRB, 1/5/82; also Liu Qilin, p.63; and Handbook, pp.90-91.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., p.246.

Conclusion

1. Analects, 12/1 (Legge, p.250).
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