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THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL STRATEGIES ON REGIME STABILITY

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"The Effects of Electoral Strategies on Regime Stability"

by

Gregory S. Thielemann

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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Abstract

"The Effects of Electoral Strategies on Regime Stability"

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This paper looks at the effects of electoral strategies on regime stability. It contends that strategies produce particular kinds of electoral coalitions and that these electoral coalitions determine the makeup of the ruling coalition or inner circle of power. The work of Axelrod (1970) establishes a theoretical base for claiming that variance in a ruling coalition determines regime stability. The paper uses social choice theory to contrast two periods in Argentine history for their relative stability. Specifically, the period of Raul Alfonsin which began in 1983 is used as an example of convergence and ambiguity as an electoral strategy, while the period of Juan Peron from 1946-1955 is used to demonstrate the technique of appealing to diverse extremes first without solidifying the center. Each case is explored for the particular type of behaviour and policy making that results. The paper concludes that the strategy of Alfonsin is potentially successful while the strategy of Peron is doomed to failure in the Latin American context.
This thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of the committee, my parents, my grandparents, Nancy Bedford and my many friends in Argentina.
INTRODUCTION

Electoral strategies are traditionally studied in the context of who wins and why. The assumption is that political scientists can learn a great deal about winning and losing elections by studying the strategies pursued by leaders who are elected. It is the contention of this paper that the electoral strategies are important for more reasons than that.

Electoral strategies continue to have consequences after the votes are counted. They contribute toward explaining why some regimes fail and others survive. Electoral strategies generate particularized support by bringing new members into the electoral coalition of the candidate. Theorists also note that the makeup of electoral coalitions has a great deal to do with the makeup of the ruling or governing coalitions. In the common setting of Argentina the type of ruling coalition that has existed has had a great deal to do with the ability of that regime to make policy and survive in the face of extra-legal challenges posed by the military.

This paper initially traces the theoretical roots of arguments that link electoral strategies to regime success. After grounding the argument theoretically, two cases with the common setting of Argentina are considered in order to evaluate the long term effectiveness of the various electoral strategies. Initially, I will consider the case of Peron in the late 1940's and early 1950's and Peron's strategy of appealing to political extremes rather than the center in order to gain an electoral majority. This approach is then contrasted with the strategy of Raul Alfonsin in 1983 that appealed to the center first and then spread out to the extremes in order to gain an electoral majority. In the end, this paper will offer a
test case of the notion of which electoral strategy is more effective with regard to policy making and regime stability.

**THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

Social choice theory makes significant contributions toward understanding the electoral behaviour of individuals by providing a framework for analysis. This analysis is concerned with the behaviour of parties both in the electoral phase and the policy making stage. Three electoral strategies will be compared for their policy ramifications. Two, convergence and ambiguity, are well rooted in the theory of social choice, while the third attempts to describe a Latin American technique of seeking the support of varied political extremes. The strategies are unique and have consequences which go beyond mere electoral success or failure. Each of these strategies produces a unique type of ruling coalition that affects the stability of the regime.

The concept of the coalition is complicated and deserves explanation. When a leader is elected to run the government, it is often a result of compromise with other leaders. And so while those who win govern, those who help them win gain favors and or influence from the victor. In this way, leaders can reward other parties or groups who commit to him and insure his election. This analysis looks at coalitions at two levels, the electoral and the ruling. Electoral coalitions are really nothing more than an accumulation of the support groups and membership in the electoral coalition is determined solely on the basis of the vote. In other words, when people vote for a candidate they become a part of the electoral coalition of that candidate. Of course, blocs of like-minded voters are more important than individuals, therefore influence is
weighted in the direction of the voters who can present themselves as an organized strong bloc.

In formal parliamentary coalitions, the ruling coalitions are the different parties that unite in order to secure a majority for the leader who heads their coalition in the parliament. Ruling coalitions in Latin America have a great deal in common with these parliamentary systems even though they use a presidential system. Support groups, or parties, offer support in exchange for positions of influence within the government. This influence that the support groups gain takes many forms and this analysis does not wish to delineate them at this point, however, the ruling coalitions' payoffs will be treated as those found in parliamentary coalitions for the moment. To the extent that the government is the ruling coalition, this means that support groups are paid off with cabinet seats or other positions of influence within the regime. From these publicly visible seats they push for the programs that suit their needs. In other words, labor unionists push for policies that benefit labor. The problem is that these different strategies produce different cabinets with different degrees of stability. It is quite easy to see that as a leader tries to keep the coalition intact, the more alike his ruling coalition is the easier his job is.

The analysis in this paper has two stages. Initially, the different electoral strategies are analyzed for their role in creating various kinds of electoral coalitions. Secondly, these electoral coalitions are explored by analyzing their implications for stable policy making. This analysis will seek to demonstrate that the first strategy of convergence allows the
policy makers the flexibility to make policies that satisfy the demands of the coalition members. The second strategy, that of ambiguity, may generate more problems in that when the leader's policies are eventually defined they may not satisfy their supporters. Finally, the third strategy presents a policymaking nightmare in which policymaking that pleases the support coalitions is impossible.

There are several assumptions of social choice theory that are held constant across all the electoral strategies discussed. This paper is concerned with the behaviour of parties. Anthony Downs' contributions are critical to this analysis in that they establish the groundwork for analyzing the behaviour of parties. Downs argues that political parties can be characterized as behaving in a rational manner. By that he means that they seek to maximize votes by taking positions on issues in order to appeal to the largest number of voters. [Downs, 1955, p. 27] Likewise, voters are assumed to respond to the policies of parties and vote for the party offering the closest array of policies. In order to demonstrate this notion, Downs offers the example of parties positioning themselves on an ideological continuum as seen in Figure 1. Under Downs' conception of rationality, parties seek to maximize votes by positioning themselves on the spectrum where the most voters are, and thus secure electoral victory.
Figure 1

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on

Ideology

mode & median

left right

Figure 1 is representative of a normal curve reflecting a distribution of voters over the single dimension of ideology. The normal curve is used throughout because it demonstrates the strategies clearly. Because the median and the mode fall at the same point, the population distribution is symmetric. This means that the same number of voters are to the left of the median as to the right. Thus, in a two party system if a party occupies the median then it is guaranteed all the votes to one side of that median. These assumptions will hold across all the strategies.

In addition to the assumptions regarding electoral strategy, several are held constant in the cases of coalition formation. As above, these assumptions hold across all three strategies. Social choice theorists have also sought to explain rational coalition formation. The study of coalitions is important to this approach in that it explains at two levels how a government makes policy. In some cases, it may be impossible for any one party to gain a majority of the vote only using like-minded voters,
and in these cases the parties must expand their base in order to win. As noted above, members who come together do so in order to extract benefits in the policy making stages. They do so with the understanding that the partners must cooperate in order to maintain a governing majority and thus extract policy benefits over time. [Browne and Friendries, 1980] The problem that has emerged for coalitions is how the resources should be divided. Gamson [1961] suggests that coalitions divide the policy values according to the amount of resources supplied by each member and there is considerable evidence to support his claim. It must, however be noted that the coalition leader’s job is made considerably easier when the members of his coalition are basically like-minded. Obviously if all the members are in basic agreement as to what policies should be pursued, the coalition partners are all kept satisfied and policymaking decisions are simple. When these partners are diverse in their opinions, policymaking becomes more difficult in that satisfying one partner may alienate another. This leads to the question of who joins a coalition.

Coalition membership is dependent upon many things, but it is apparent that coalitions which exhibit temporal stability in policymaking are made up of like-minded members. Both DeSwaan [1970] and Leiserson [1966] point to the notion of "ideological likeness" as it relates to coalition stability. In each case, the suggestion is made that the rational party will pursue like-minded coalition members so as to reduce the tension in the policymaking stages of government. In this way they provide support for Axelrod’s [1970] hypothesis that the more alike a coalition is the more stable it is. Axelrod offered two hypotheses in regard to coalition stability. Initially, he suggests that the less conflict
of interest in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will form. Secondly, the less conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will have a long duration. (p. 167) This fits nicely with the analysis of Leiserson [1966] who suggests that parties search for other parties that are ideologically close when forming coalitions. Axelrod extended his argument to suggest that coalitions that are connected will survive longer. In other words all the parties in the coalition should be connected as the following figure demonstrates.

\[ \ldots \]
\[ a \ b \ c \ d \ e \ f \ g \ h \ i \]

For example assume that coalition (efghi) is a winning coalition. All the members are connected and Axelrod suggests that this is a positive attribute for the coalition's longevity. Assume as well that coalition (defhi) is a winning coalition. Axelrod's point is that this coalition will not be as successful in terms of survival because the members are not connected. (p.170-171) There is no connectedness to the coalition and the chance of polarization and division exists.

It goes without saying that coalition members do, in fact, expect benefits. Payoffs can take many forms with many different sets of implications. The electoral coalition expects payoffs in terms of programs, while the leaders of these organizations are often paid off with influence positions in the inner circle of the executive branch of government. The important consideration to keep in mind is that the members must cooperate in order to extract benefits. If a coalition cannot agree on policy goals and falls apart, the ruling coalition collapses.
and no one receives benefits. If diverse extremes make up the ruling coalition as well as the electoral coalition for which they are de-facto representatives in the government, when the electoral coalition falls apart, the government is paralyzed. In other words, as the conflict in delivering goods causes members of the electoral coalition to leave, the members of the governing coalition that represent these groups are also obligated to leave. Thus, the leader cannot make policy decisions without destroying his electoral coalition and making such policy will result in a collapse of the ruling coalition and thus exposes the government's weakness to the society's extra-legal forces, e.g., the military in Latin America. The electoral strategies are thus important in forming electoral coalitions which are inherently linked to the distribution of power and access to the executive in the ruling coalitions that govern the society.

**ELECTORAL STRATEGY ONE**

The first electoral strategy considered is convergence. Remembering that the properties of the normal curve apply, it is not difficult to see why parties would like to move themselves toward the center of the political spectrum. On one hand, it is obvious that if a party can occupy the median in a two party system, the second party cannot win. This notion of convergence is made clear by Downs and is graphically demonstrated in Figure 2. [Downs, pp.115-118]
Figure 2

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on Ideology

The initial vote space occupied by party A is demonstrated by the vertical stripes. When party A moves to the center, it not only retains its initial supporters but it expands its influence to include those voters in the horizontally striped area. The reason is that party A will be closer to more voters positions on the ideological continuum than party B will be. By selecting a position at the center rather than on the ends, party A can appeal to more voters and thus win.

The consequences of the convergence strategy are important in that it effects the policymaking ability of the coalition and thus its stability. If a party uses the convergence strategy, its membership will show a high degree of connectedness. Consider support groups a through e as they appear in Figure 3
Figure 3

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on Ideology

In this figure, party a’s support coalition consists of a, b and c. They are connected and therefore should share a center/left philosophy. While compromise will no doubt take place, the policies pursued by the coalition leader should not diametrically oppose the wishes of the other coalition members. Because of this, policymaking should be easy in that the leader need only take center/left positions and is free of right wing demands. Because of this, it is unlikely that the coalition members will become alienated and leave over a policy making decision.

ELECTORAL STRATEGY TWO

It may be that advocating clear policies is irrational and will cost the party votes. In such situations, parties may prefer a second strategy, ambiguity. Some electorates are willing to take risks when they are uncertain of candidate’s actual positions. In these situations, parties
find themselves in the position of being able to appeal to more voters by taking general stands and avoiding specific positions. Thus, the second electoral strategy, one in which a party is deliberately ambiguous around the center of the spectrum as in Figure 4.

**Figure 4**

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on Ideology

The same logic holds as in Figure 2. As there are more voters at the center of the spectrum in this example, it is rational for the parties to move to the center, and in a case where the population is risk-acceptant, by being ambiguous the parties can appeal to a greater number of voters. The ambiguity in this case is demonstrated by the use of the brackets. Initially, party B is the same distance from the median as party A, but party A takes ambiguous stands that fall somewhere between the brackets. In this case, party A can absorb more votes than it could normally because the population is unsure of the party’s actual position. In this case party A will win all the voters that are closer to any edge of the brackets, thus winning the election. Graphically, party A’s initial vote
share is reflected by the vertical stripes and party A's share after taking ambiguous stands around the center is reflected by the horizontal stripes.

This topic has already been explored by Kenneth Shepsle [1972]. He concludes that in a setting where the population is willing to accept risk, they will take a chance on a party whose program is not 100 percent clear, the best strategy for parties is to be ambiguous around the median.

Such a strategy effects the coalition makeup as well. While the elected leader will eventually have to make policy choices, he was elected by a risk-acceptant population. This means that the population probably will give him some leeway, but his policies may still anger some supporters. Consider Figure 5. As a result, we are left with a second electoral strategy, one in which a party is deliberately ambiguous around the center of the spectrum as in Figure 4.

**Figure 5**

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on

![Diagram](image)

In this setting party A, through pursuing an ambiguous strategy has won groups a, b and c. As Browne and Frendries (1980) have stated, through
cooperation all groups eventually hope to extract benefits from the policy system. The leader can satisfy these groups by taking positions that fall under the hatched area of the curve. Because he need not worry about the right, his policy options are relatively simple. Even if his policies alienate some of the fringe voters on the right end of the hatched area, his coalition is still highly connected and thus stable.

**ELECTORAL STRATEGY THREE**

The most curious strategy is the third in that it seems to produce instability. For some reason, parties which seek to maximize votes do not always converge or take ambiguous strategies. These parties seek large majorities by appealing to everyone regardless of their position on the continuum. They promise specifics to diverse ideological sectors without regard to their relative proximity on the scale which means that they may seek the support of the polar extremes first in the hope that the center will follow. The problem is that the center is not always obedient and the results can be a majority vote without a connected coalition. While the overall policy may appear ambiguous, specific promises are made to diverse extremes, promises which are expected to be kept by the coalition members. For example, these parties could promise wage hikes to workers and wage control to business. The critical difference is that in this third strategy the party does not solidify a base at the center of the political spectrum and expand outwardly around that base, it starts out on the extremes without regard to establishing a central core of support. The results of this activity have been to produce electoral victories, but victories with costs.

The effect on policy making can be disastrous. Consider Figure 6
with our same groups of a,b,c,d and e.

**Figure 6**

Normal Distribution Curve for Preferences on Ideology

In this setting the coalition leader may gain the support of groups a,b,d and e. The result of this is a ruling coalition that reflects these diverse views and a difficult policymaking environment. When a coalition is not connected, policymaking that satisfies all members is impossible. Policies that please member a are bound to alienate member e. In this situation, the coalition leader is faced with a no-win situation. Either he cannot make any policies or he makes policies that alienate part of his coalition and thus breaks it up. Because the policy demands of the leaders support base are diverse, satisfaction of these demands can be difficult or impossible.

This theoretical background has explored the implications for policymaking under three electoral strategies. The strategies of convergence, ambiguity and promising everything to everyone each result
in different types of coalitions. These coalitions, in turn, have different ramifications for policymaking. Policymaking can be seen as simple when the coalition is connected, as it is under the strategies of convergence and ambiguity. In the third case, policymaking is theoretically impossible in that the coalition is unconnected and the policy demands upon the leader are inherently diverse and unstable. The remaining sections of this paper will explore these strategies as they relate to the common setting of Argentina. It will explore the strategy of promising everything to everyone as applied by Peron in 1946–1955 and it will explore the strategy of convergence and ambiguity as Alfonsin applied it in 1983.
THE PERONIST PERIOD OF POWER 1946–1954

The Peronist period of power is an example of the third electoral strategy, or appealing to diverse extremes at the outset, rather than first solidifying the center. Initially, this section will demonstrate that Peron's electoral strategy resembled this approach. Secondly, it will outline the electoral coalition that emerged. And third, it will explore the ruling coalition which the electoral coalition produced, which translated in this period of time to those groups with access to the inner circles of power. Once the actors have been identified, it will show how policymaking became impossible as the ruling coalition began to fight for goods and services. The section will then conclude that the electoral strategy necessarily resulted in instability in policymaking.

Before proceeding directly into the discussion of Peron's strategy, a historical prelude to the period is useful. Many scholars contend that the emergence of the Peronists was a natural phenomenon, one that was a logical progression of Argentina's history. Guillermo O'Donnell is one of these scholars. He has called this first period of Peronist rule populism. His analysis of populism is useful for understanding Peron's electoral strategy. He claims that in order for populism to take hold, a society would have to experience periods of intense economic growth as a result of industrialization. This growth would stimulate what O'Donnell called the "urban popular sector," which was the working class and segments of the lower middle class. [O'Donnell, 1973, p. 53] This newly stimulated sector would be incorporated into the political system and would support the populist regime. Argentina's history does follow a similar pattern.
The political climate of Argentina is one in which stability has generally been lacking since about 1930. The structure of the Argentine political system can, in part, explain the emergence of this so-called "populism" in the context of Argentina. The previous political establishment followed traditional Latin American norms in that the landed aristocracy dominated the political system through the liberal establishment. The emergence of a middle class forced the caudillos into a power-sharing agreement ratified in the Saenz-Pena law of 1912. This law was designed to create power sharing between the Liberal Party (the party of the landowners) and the Radical Party (the party of the middle class). As the Radical Party moved to the forefront in the 1920's, they proved themselves to be unsympathetic to the problems of the workers, which left a void in the system. The working class segments were now active and yet denied access to power. When strikes erupted in 1919, Radical President Hipolito Irigoyen put them down, giving the clear impression that he was not going to support the workers at the expense of business. [Hobsbawm, 1967, p. 45] In Jeanne Kirkpatrick's words, "According to the conventional interpretations of Argentine politics, before and after Irigoyen, domination of the oligarchy was complete." [Kirkpatrick, 1971, p. 34] The result of this exclusion was that Peron had an opening. As Peter Smith said, "The critical point is that socially mobilized groups sought participation, but were not given access to power. The inevitable result was frustration." [Smith, 1969, pp. 48-49]

When the military intervened in 1943 and replaced the Radical President Ramon S. Castillo, a colonel named Juan Peron who was involved in the coup was assigned to the Ministry of Labor. From that post he began
to mobilize the workers into trade unions and began to deliver benefits to them. The workers saw Peron as a saviour, which was not surprising as he was the first person, military or otherwise, to address their problems. He was able to use his position in the Ministry of Labor to gain a loyal following among the working class. He was an enigma, a military man who supported labor. Because he was a riddle to many, the military was badly divided on the subject of Peron. His supporters in the military were generally ultra-nationalist and centered in the Army. Members of the other branches of the military resented his popularity and felt threatened by Peron's labor connections. This sentiment climaxed when the Navy was called upon to place him in internal exile. The move came too late as the now-mobilized workers marched on Buenos Aires, winning Peron his freedom and the Argentine elections. These elections of 1946 marked the emergence of an electoral strategy that produced an electoral and governing coalition that was made up of diverse sectors of the society.

The Peronist electoral strategy was designed to bring diverse sections of the population under the common banner of Peronism. Peron's position as a military officer won him the support of the nationalistic military and his work from the Ministry of Labor earned him a loyal labor following. His background had already satisfied segments of the two diverse wings in Argentine politics. Peron drew significant support from all sectors of society, although labor was numerically the strongest electoral coalition partner. (Alexander, p.48) As a result, the Peronist coalition was marked by diverse multi-class support in 1946. With access to the wings of the political body, Peron began to solidify them before moving inward. On the left, Peron sought labor support while on the
right he sought the support of the nationalistic military, the church and the new industrialists.

The Peronist electoral strategy was to form a broad multi-class support base, and Peron used the concept of justicialism to do just that. Because Peron promised everything to everybody, the easiest way to understand his strategy is by understanding the concept that was at the center of his strategy, justicialism. The justicialists strategy allowed Peron to be flexible in his promises to the diverse wings of the Argentine electorate. Peron already had access to the outer elements of Argentine politics, now he had to satisfy them with campaign promises that would earn him their support. Peron made a point of being as ambiguous as possible. Toward this end, he invented his own ideology and hid behind its ambiguous nature. The ideology was called Justicialism and it was the tool he used to keep both labor and the military satisfied during the campaign. The most common interpretation was that it referred to a middle ground between East and West or a middle road between Capitalist imperialism and Communist excesses. In practice the ideology meant whatever Peron wanted it to. Those who studied the early campaign of Peron carefully conclude with Kalman Silvert that justicialism was "an afterthought" or "an intellectual appendage to justify the regime". [Silvert, 1967, p. 354] Peron used Justicialism to justify every position he took.

The electoral coalition that emerged was certainly multi-class. Without a doubt, the largest numbers of his supporters were the working class. Lars Schoultz has confirmed this notion through his analysis. [Schoultz, 1983, p. 29] However, Peron also sought out and received the support of the church, segments of the military and segments of the
middle class. In fact, the coalition extended into all classes. [Snow, 1979, p. 17, and Kirkpatrick, 1971, pp. 95-97] The zeal was greatest with the workers, as Peron's charisma and use of the state to deliver incentives kept him a powerful force. Peronism was, as Schoultz put it, "a working class movement with considerable middle class support." [Schoultz, 1983, p. 85] Peron also enjoyed the support of the military, or at least significant portions of it. Without this he should have never taken office in the first place. The military liked the promise to improve the domestic strength of the nation, and the workers liked the promise of jobs and wage hikes. [O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 57] In addition to the workers and the nationalistic military, he pursued the middle class as well by trying to bring the Radicals into his party. Peron even convinced a part of the Radical party to switch over and join him. They called themselves the Collaborationist Party. [Blanksten, 1953, pp. 64-65] The specifics of Peron's program were never discussed, and as long as Peron could cover the expansion of the economy, all coalition members were happy. The specific case of economic policy advocacy in the campaign is a good example of how he used justicialism to satisfy both diverse extremes. It is easy to see how the platform was able to promise everything to everybody. When Peron addressed the working class justicialism meant the creation of a workers state. When the industrialist and the military needed coaxing, the justicialist platform spoke of developing a strong domestic industry, free from foreign monopolization. The entire concept of Justicialism was linked to the intense economic nationalism Peron placed at the core of his rhetoric. The result of this strategy was to create a weapon that he could use to appeal to a multi-class coalition.
His strategy was designed to bring diverse groups into the coalition and thus secure an overwhelming mandate. As O'Donnell described it, the new populism, by encouraging domestic expansion, satisfied the diverse elements in the Peronist coalition.

While Peron placed himself at the center of his coalition, the inner circle of the Peronist government was ideologically diverse and reflected the extreme importance of two support sectors. The inner circle is operationally defined as those who were given charge of the bureaucratic agencies and those who had access to Peron directly without having to go through his underlings. The two most important members of the inner circle were the workers and the military. Their membership in the ruling coalition was a result of the way they (the ruling coalitions) are formed. Both group's membership in the ruling coalition was assured by virtue of the fact that Peron owed them payoffs for their support. The largest numerical block of electoral supporters, the workers, were rewarded with the inclusion of CGT membership in the inner circle. Labor leaders such as Cypriano Reyes were given important positions in the new regime. The military did not earn their access through numerical voting strength, but were included for a myriad of reasons. Initially, the military had always held an extra-legal veto power and had allowed Peron to come to power. It was therefore wise to include them in the regime, especially since the military had the guns necessary to end his reign. In addition, segments of the military had played an important role in his rise to power and these military men remained close to Peron until the end. While different groups supported Peron, the inner circles were not filled with all groups in the coalition. Nevertheless, those groups that were in the inner circle were of
diverse classes. The real power was divided between the labor movement and the military men. George Blanksten has written extensively on the subject and notes that the men around Peron were all either military men with loyalty to Peron or labor leaders associated with the CGT. As he put it, Peron tried to play the military off against the workers and vice versa. [Ibid, p. 327] The problem is that Peron had radical divisions from within the ranks of his government and advisors. It is true that this did reflect the nature of the electoral coalition, although it did not result in a lasting ruling coalition. Elements as diverse as the nationalistic military and the descamisados (the shirtless ones) they hated were all supporting Peron. In addition, the church, the neo-Fascists, the new industrial class and the labor movement all provided support for Peron. In the end the common support for Peron could not outweigh the dislike for each other brought about by the competition for scarce resources.

Policy decisions were simple enough as long as the treasury was large enough to keep all of the programs that made the diverse sectors of Peronism happy. Unfortunately for Peron, this period of prosperity would not last forever. In the early 1950's the Argentine economy stagnated. The analysis of Richard Mallon and Juan Sourrouille explains this in economic terms. They conclude that Argentina's strong balance-of-payments position facilitated the early development of Peron's program by allowing government expenditures to increase from 16 percent of the GDP in 1945 to almost 29 percent in 1948. They also note that in addition to the public spending, bank credits to the private sector grew more than 250 percent. [Mallon and Sourrouille, 1975, pp.9-10] The initial
programs of Peronism thus tended to satisfy the needs of the workers who demanded public spending, and those of the private sector who demanded assistance with industrialization. As Mallon puts it, "It became apparent in 1948, however, that this very expansionary policy had been based on extraordinary short term conditions that could not be expected to continue." Further, "Both imports and exports declined in 1949 by about one third and remained depressed for the next three or four years."

Such a large cut in trade compelled the government to consider ways of reducing the total claims generated by its socioeconomic policies on available resources, but the transition from "period of assault" to "period of consolidation" as Peron's policy shift has been somewhat inaccurately been described, appeared initially to be much easier to announce than to implement. [Ibid] The coalition could not be satisfied completely. Peron could not satisfy the working class supporters without hurting the industrialist and aggravating the military. True to form, he did have an answer. Mallon quotes Peron's speech to the worker delegates of the Committee for Latin American Union Solidarity to make this point. Peron said, "The justicialista economy asserts that the production of the country should first satisfy the needs of its inhabitants and only export the surplus; the surplus, nothing more. With this theory, the boys here of course, eat more each day and consume more, so that each day the surplus is smaller. But these poor guys have been submerged for fifty years; for this reason I have let them spend and waste everything they wanted to for five years.........but now we undoubtedly must begin to reorder things so as not to waste any more." [Cuzminskey, 1962, p. 135] Mallon notes that Peron had no trouble gaining support from the labor wing of his constituency for
this program. But the exports did not grow, thus the farmers and "liberal segments of the business and financial communities were not won over to support the regime." [Mallon, op.cit., p. 12] This meant that Peron's government depended on continued support of nationalistic elements in the military. When the failing economy forced Peron to drop an earlier campaign commitment to these nationalists to keep foreign industry out, he lost their support as well. This meant that by 1955, the vast Peronist coalition had been reduced to the CGT and a few personally loyal military friends. [Mallon, op.cit., p. 14]

The shortage in available government expenditures resulted in Peron having to make choices amongst his electoral coalition. These "mutually hostile forces," as Blanksten calls them, had begun to fight among themselves and Peron could not pacify them all. As long as the economy grew everyone was happy. The Argentine economy had, however exhausted the "easy stages of industrialization--i.e., the end of the period of extensive, horizontal industrial growth based on the substitution for imports of finished consumer goods." [O'Donnell, op.cit, p. 58-60] With a shortage of incoming capital, the sectors were no longer in agreement as to the public policies worthy of pursuit. Labor wanted more and the industrialists were no longer happy to share. As O'Donnell explains, "Given the strained economic situation that resulted from the exhaustion of horizontal industrial growth, the consumption and power demands of the popular sector seemed to the others to be very difficult to satisfy." [Ibid p. 70] This should not have surprised Peron. The main asset of the popular sector was its electoral clout. The natural disagreement that had arisen between the employers and the now highly organized employees was not
anticipated as a consequence of electoral strategy. The peaceful electoral coalition was gone. Peron could not give more benefits to the workers without risking a backlash from the new industrialists who were vital to the economic growth of the country, and their close allies, the military. Without the growth, there would be no benefits whatsoever. Peron was thus forced to make a choice. He could no longer satisfy the diverse sectors of his coalition.

Under these conditions, the complete coalition could not remain satisfied and intact, and when a choice had to be made between the diverse sectors of his support, Peron was pragmatic. Consider the advice of Peron to President Ibanez of Chile: "Give to the people, especially the workers, all that is possible. When it seems that you are giving too much, give them more. You will see the results."[Magnet, 1956,p.14] As the difficulty in keeping all sides happy in his diverse coalition emerged, Peron made his decisions to side with the workers. By the time the military stepped in, in 1955, the Argentine electorate was polarized over Peron, as Lars Schoultz (1983) has discussed.

As the electoral coalition began to fall apart, the representatives of the workers in the inner circle began to press for unionist concerns, while the representatives of the military urged Peron to hold the line. Marvin Goldwurt (1972), concluded that "Each of the two main pillars of the dictatorship (the CGT and the Nationalistic Military) was seeking to reconstruct it, but each wanted to alter the balance of power by increasing its own influence." (p.131) The final split began on June 16, 1955 when the Navy and the Air Force revolted. This revolt was put down by the army and the CGT, whose workers rallied with arms to protect the Peronist
regime. The defeat of the revolt put Peron in a difficult situation. The Army was divided as Peron was waging war against the church, and his regime depended on the support of this divided army. The CGT sought to exploit this weakness by forming labor militias. Peron encouraged this but it was more than the army could stand. The coalition's fragile balance of power was now tilted by the prospect of armed syndicalist militias which shifted the balance of power that had kept the coalition intact. The Army joined the Navy and the Air Force in revolt and and forced Peron to resign on September 19, 1955. It is ironic that the military's action seemed to add to the charisma and mystique of Peron in the long run.

The reality of the Peronist collapse in 1955 fits nicely into the theory offered by Robert Axelrod. The Peronists' electoral coalition was too diverse to satisfy with programs. In addition, its lack of connectedness made it vulnerable. While, electorally speaking, the strategy of seeking out diverse extremes without solidifying the center produced victory, it made satisfying the supporters impossible. When the economy faltered, the supporters were thrust in direct competition with each other over programs. The major policy decisions Peron had to make, such as whether or not to keep high levels of domestic spending, meant that someone would be hurt. This was not an enviable position, because to help the working class he would have to hurt the industrialists and vice versa. Effective policy was impossible to create, and the extreme diversity of the governing coalition made decision making impossible and paralyzed the government. Under these conditions Peronism was unable to satisfy the diverse demands of its support base making coalition maintenance impossible.
In addition, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that both antagonists in the power struggle, the workers and the military, were a part of the ruling coalition. When the military revolted, the government was divided and thus the stability was gone. The military stepped in and postponed an assumed control of the government and the responsibility for solving the countries problems. As a result, they unwittingly preserved the mystique of the movement, setting the stage for the 1970’s civil war.

The critical point of this discussion is that the strategy of bringing diverse groups into the coalition was a poor one in that it created an unstable government that did not survive. It did this by creating an electoral and governmental coalition that lacked connectedness. There was simply no way to satisfy industrialists and a strong labor movement created and sponsored by the regime at the same time. It is an unfortunate fact of life that economies move in cycles and Argentina hit a down side of the cycle during Peron’s first occupation of the Casa Rosada and hasn’t completely turned back up since. It was an unfortunate mistake for Peron that he did not anticipate the crisis that would result when expectations were raised only to be shot down again. This strategy of seeking support of the extremes is not a good one as far as stability is concerned. Peron was in fact, limited in his scope. While his movement’s electoral success depended on satisfying the workers in the popular sector and the parts of the middle class that supported him, the ability to deliver goods and services to these people depended upon the support of the new industrialists and the military. By his own electoral strategy, he was placed in the ultimate “catch 22.” Policymaking that satisfies a coalition’s membership under such conditions is very difficult in the long
run, and that is what the example of Peron indicates.
When Raúl Alfonsín ran for President in 1983 he followed a different electoral strategy. The strategy pursued by Alfonsín was one of convergence and ambiguity around the center. This section will attempt to demonstrate that Alfonsín followed that strategy. Second, it will show that it resulted in a connected electoral coalition. Third, the section will demonstrate that the electoral coalition resulted in a connected ruling coalition, which in Alfonsín's case amounts to a formal cabinet. Finally it will explore policymaking as it relates to coalition stability and compare the prospects for success under this strategy.

As in the case of Perón, Alfonsín emerges from a unique period of Argentine history. As in 1946, the situation was not one of tranquility in 1983. The CGT and the military had not stopped fighting with each other and had even engaged in a violent “civil war” in the 1970’s (for complete details see Sobel, 1975). In general, the situation had deteriorated since 1955. In 1983 the national debt exceeded $40 billion. Industrial output was down 15 percent from 1982. Argentina was suffering from a $3 billion balance-of-payments deficit, the unemployment rate was at 25 percent, and inflation was ever-increasing at 200 percent. [NACLA, July-August 1983, p.37] To be certain, this was not an economic paradise, and the military was blamed for being incompetent, as usual. In addition to the economy, the military had delegitimized itself by “disappearing” perhaps as many as 20,000 people. This was known as the “dirty war.” The military dealt with the opposition swiftly, but without the benefit of trials or other trappings of justice. The military had also proved they were not too good at their natural calling, fighting wars.
They had proceeded to bungle the Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982 and were now questioned on their ability to govern and fight. The mothers of the “disappeared” began to appear every Thursday in the Plaza de Mayo to heckle the government and they focused attention on the abuses during the “dirty war.” On April 15, 1983 approximately 12,000 people were brazen enough to march through Buenos Aires to the Government House, in open defiance of the military, to deliver a petition with 217,167 names on it demanding justice for the “disappeared.” [Clarin, Edicion Internacional, 435, 11-17 Abril, p. 1] This act only substantiated the claims that the people had had quite enough of the military. The military remained unrealistic as they attempted to halt the opposition by declaring a general amnesty. Public pressure forced the military to allow for civilian rule to return as they set the date for civilian elections in November of 1983. The next chapter in Argentine history was set to be written. La Nacion reported the gravity of the situation when it editorialized about the pending elections. It said, “The graveness of the time for the destiny of the Republic is undeniable.” [La Nacion, 55 September 1983, p. 2] The stage was set for the drama of the 1983 elections and the feeling was that this might be Argentina’s last chance at democracy.

In order to facilitate an understanding of the evidence used in this section of the paper, an explanation of the author’s methodology is offered. The author conducted interviews in Argentina during July and August of 1983. In the end, 565 interviews were conducted. The survey instrument contained 25 questions with room for additional commentary which was solicited and received. The sample was drawn from three cities, 221 interviews were taken from the Greater Buenos Aires–Federal
Capital Area, 204 were drawn from Cordoba City, Cordoba, the nation's second largest city, and 139 were taken in La Falda, a small town of approximately 25,000 in the Cordoban Interior. The design is that of a multi-stage cluster sample. This design creates different levels and assigns different quotas to each level. For example, in Buenos Aires different plazas were selected so as to reflect a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. The Plaza structure in the Federal Capital is easy to work with in that each barrio's social life centered around its public parks. The mothers would bring their children there to play, while the men played chess or talked about soccer or politics. This setting was the best one could hope for given the then current state of affairs in Argentina at that time. The sampling was done at different times of the day and early evening so as to increase the chance of different groups participating. In the end the interviews from the Greater Buenos Aires-Federal Capital area were drawn from areas as diverse as the upper class neighborhood of Barrio Norte and the slums surrounding the shipyards.

The interviewers then distributed themselves in the Plaza and asked those people who passed by if they were Argentine and if they would participate. The refusal rate was generally low, although winning the trust of the participant often required a great deal of time. The University I.D. often proved invaluable in quieting the concerns that we were CIA agents or attached to the Government of Argentina. The same procedure was followed in Cordoba. In La Falda the plaza structure was not evident, but locals familiar with the city claimed that the main street was the center of activity. In La Falda and Cordoba City, the same technique as to distributing the hour of the sampling was followed.
It goes without saying that better mechanisms exist for creating an ideal sample. Critics should bear in mind that Argentina was still under military rule at the time and that tensions and distrust were high. People were reluctant to talk about politics with strangers with the memories of the "disappeared" still fresh on their minds. If an accurate electoral registry existed, it was not evident as registration was in full swing at the time of the survey. Phone interviews were completely out of the question because ENTEL, the state-run phone system, is inoperable much of the time and trust could not be conveyed over a phone. In short we had to approach the people face-to-face.

This technique produced two consequences. Initially, while there was no conscious attempt on the part of the samplers to discriminate against one type of individual, there is no guarantee that a particular segment of the Argentine population was not more intimidated by this approach than some other. However, the results appear to be valid. The demographic variables discussed in detail later indicate that a cross section of the population was sampled. It is important to remember that military states with visible forces (police with machine guns on the corners) are hardly the ideal setting for gathering completely random data, particularly when that state has the brutal reputation of the Argentine State.

It is interesting to note, in defense of the data, that while the Argentine dailies all predicted a Peronist win, usually by as much as 10 points, this data indicated the UCR would receive 46 percent to the PJ's (1983 version of the Peronist party) 37 percent. The actual results showed the UCR with 51.8 percent to the PJ's 40.2 percent. COPFEDA.
The variation can easily be accounted for by the fact that when the survey was taken it was during the primary season when the third parties still appeared viable. As the elections drew closer, these minor parties faded.

The electoral strategy of the UCR was one of convergence and ambiguity. An analysis of the UCR platform as well as the campaign actions taken indicate this. It is important to remember that the UCR was already the traditional party of the middle class and as such was already located at the center of the political spectrum. In order to analyse the 1983 electoral strategy, it is initially important to demonstrate that the UCR was attempting to locate around the median position in the electorate.

In order to accomplish this task, the demographic variables from the author's instrument will be cross tabulated with the respondent's indication of party. As the respondents in this study gave us candidate names, the author has extrapolated party by placing all the respondents who said they were for Justicialist (1983 Peronists) candidates and called them PJ supporters. In this section, both the PJ and the UCR will be examined so as to provide evidence that over a variety of continuaums, no one party polarized itself in one sector of the electorate. In addition to the demographic variables, respondents also gave opinions on specific issues. A breakdown by party is performed in these cases as well for the same reason. In order to demonstrate the strategy of the UCR, it will be contrasted in 1983 with the strategy of its rival, the PJ. While elements of the 1983 PJ resemble those of the 1950's Peronist movement, the movements are not identical and should not be treated as such. The difference being explored in this analysis is between the UCR in 1983 and
the Peronists of the 1950's.

The initial question that comes to mind is ideology. In the 1983 election, it was never clear where the UCR and PJ would fit themselves on an ideological dimension. The past assertions of Peronists indicated that they would locate in the "third position". Respondents were asked to state whether they saw themselves as moderates, conservatives or leftists. The results are given in the table below.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>PCT LEFT</th>
<th>PCT CENTER</th>
<th>PCT RIGHT</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cross-tabulations between ideology and party offer valuable information. The significance of the relationship is tested by using a simple CHI SQUARE test which measures the deviation from a random distribution. This statistic measures the total value of the difference as a CHI SQUARE value. The result was a high 7.39 and the probability level, defined as alpha, was .027. Generally a relationship is considered significant at the .05 level and below. The vast majority of the supporters of each party saw themselves as centrist. This offers explanation as to why the parties would converge to the center of the ideology dimension, and more importantly, we see that each party's support spans all the ideologies offered in the closed scale of
left-center-right. No party had a monopoly on a side of the ideological spectrum.

The linkages between economic class and ideology have often been made clear. In the case of Peronist Argentina, the common wisdom suggests that it was a clash between varied economic backgrounds that disintegrated the governing coalition as Mallon and Goldwert have argued. Alfonsin's support, as indicated in the survey, did not reflect this fragmented base of support. The instrument provided for a clarification of relative wealth by asking for the respondent's monthly household income. Four categories were given and the respondent was asked to select the figure closest to his or her own. The results are given below by income group. These figures show us what percent of UCR and PJ supporters came from each income group.

**TABLE 2**

PARTY SUPPORT BY INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>% 700 pa</th>
<th>% 1500pa</th>
<th>% 3000pa</th>
<th>% 6000pa</th>
<th>*</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12Ω</td>
<td>259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are per family/ per month. The exchange rate at the time of the survey is ~10 pesos argentinos (pa) to u.s.$1.00
Ω The figures do not add up to 100 percent because of refusals to answer the income question.

The results here offer further support that each party received
support from all sectors of society. The CHI SQUARE test provided us with a value of 48.68 and an alpha that was less than .01. Seventy-six percent of the PJ's support came from the two lowest income groups while 50 percent of the UCR's support came from the same background. The UCR had support in the upper income ranges where the PJ did not. There was no significant bloc of upper class Argentines supporting the PJ in 1983. It is also important to note that the bulk of Argentina is poor. Most of the sample made less than U.S.$150.00 a month. The same held for education.

**TABLE 3**

**PARTY SUPPORT BY EDUCATION LEVEL COMPLETED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>% PRIMARY</th>
<th>% SECONDARY</th>
<th>% tertiary</th>
<th>% UNIVERSITY*</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO GIVE THE HIGHEST LEVEL COMPLETED.

Once again, each party demonstrated support from all education levels. The CHI SQUARE value is the lowest here at 46.18, but the alpha is less than .01 again meaning that in all three cases we have a high value and a significant alpha. In this table, party supporters are broken down by education levels. In the case of education, the cross-tabulations indicate that almost a third of the PJ supporters had only completed primary education. In contrast, only 8 percent of the UCR supporters fit
that category. If we remove the tertiary level, which in Argentina amounts to technical schools which showed up in less than 50 cases total of these two parties, a trend is noticed. The more education one has the more likely one is to be a UCR supporter. Nevertheless, this table indicates like the preceding two that this data reflects a cross section of Argentina at least as far as the dimensions of ideology, education, and income are concerned.

The strategy chosen by Alfonsin to gather support was quite different than that of Perón. Rather than trying to bring everyone into the fold initially, Alfonsin concentrated on winning the support of the rank and file members of the UCR. This translated into solidifying the middle class base of the UCR. This is the important difference in that the center of the political spectrum was in place first, before expansion took place. Halfway through the survey, the last internal challenger to Alfonsin, the Balbinist (a conservative branch of the UCR) challenger, Fernando De la Rua, dropped out to seek a Senate seat. At the time, the author's survey showed Alfonsin ahead of De la Rua by 85 percentage points, so it is safe to say that the UCR was already somewhat united. Alfonsin took every step to see that internal unity was achieved. He used his close friend and future cabinet member, Antonio Troccoli, to arrange a unity meeting between himself and De la Rua. The result was front page coverage of Alfonsin, Balbin and De la Rua joining hands. The UCR was together and Clarín (10-16 October, 1983, p.5) reported that "the internal triumph of Alfonsin hadn't been seen in Radical politics for 25 years." Alfonsin united his own party and as a result was prepared to run from a position of strength in his base of the middle class.
The Alfonsin platform was designed to show a party that was moderate in its viewpoints and ambiguous about the specific policies. On high salience issues, like what was to be done to the military for the murder of the civilians in the "dirty war", Alfonsin took specific stands. On other more difficult questions like the economy, Alfonsin was as ambiguous as possible. The platform did not appeal to all sectors of the population, nor did it make promises to all sectors as the Peronists had done in 1946. It was merely an advocacy of overall moderation, but determined to put the military in its place.

The issue of the military was highly salient in the 1983 campaign. The UCR was in line with the bulk of the survey in calling for a case by case investigation and ensuing prosecution of the military. This was the same action that 89 percent of those in the sample favored. In fact on all questions concerning the military, Alfonsin took a tough stance. He was going to be the leader, the military was going to be the follower. In contrast, the PJ’s position was away from the mainstream on this question. Initially, the PJ’s 1983 presidential candidate, Italo Argentino Luder tried to follow the UCR, but segments of the PJ, thinking that victory was already assured, moved to cut a deal with the military. As a result, by May 6, 1983 it was reported that the CGT had reached an agreement with the military that provided amnesty for the military in exchange for allowing the installation of the civilian regime. [Somos, may 6, 1983, pp. 6-9] When Alfonsin violently denounced the military-labor pact, Luder was tarnished and on this highly salient issue Alfonsin occupied the median position in the electorate while Luder was located on a far extreme of the electorate.
The UCR's treatment of the remaining issues demonstrated that ambiguity was the strategy. The variation between the two parties on the platform was really only a question of semantics in foreign affairs planks. Alfonsin urged neutrality and a commitment to the non-aligned movement, while Luder stressed the so-called third position of justicialism, which translated roughly into neutrality. Both sides favored some form of renegotiating the national debt and settling the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile over territorial waters and the Malvinas dispute through negotiations. These positions were almost indistinguishable to an expert, much less the general public. Thus, on the foreign policy issues, centrist policies were the key. [Clarín, 24-30 October, 1983, pp.6-7]

The second place that the UCR used ambiguity to its advantage took place on the most important issue cited by the population in the survey, the economy. Both sides favored helping the poorest sectors of the society and redeveloping the national industries. The difference was seen in how each side intended to do this. The traditional Radical party position was that reactivation of the agricultural and industrial bases was the key to solving the problems and that wage hikes and programs would come naturally as a result of this action. [Ibid] The PJ, however, remained closely tied to the CGT and thus labor aid became a more crucial part of their concern. The platform was easy enough to handle because justicialism was never issue specific. The campaign was another story as labor leaders such Lorenzo Miguel of the powerful Metalworkers Union and Hermanino Inglesias of the CGT talked in the old terms of violence towards the opposition and burned effigies of Alfonsin. [Clarín, International Editions #462, p. 1, #463 p. 1, Somos, June 17, 1983, p. 15}
and Buenos Aires Herald, September 4, 1983, p. 17] The PJ had always been the voice of labor and was thus tied to them. The UCR on the other hand had no such ties and thus had the freedom to be ambiguous on how much aid would go to business and how much aid would go to the workers. They remained ambiguous on this point throughout the campaign. [ibid] The critical point here is that the UCR took an ambiguous stand on the issue of the economy and thus was able to occupy a center position while the PJ was previously committed to a position that favored labor. This is in direct contrast to the economic plan of the Peronists of the 1950’s.

In addition to the ambiguity of the UCR on issues, they maintained a strategy of convergence in that they tried to assure a Radical victory without the coalition baggage Peron had dragged along in the forties and fifties. In the Argentine electoral scheme, other parties may join in coalitions at an early stage. If they do, they can not run candidates for President or pledge their votes in the electoral college to another party in order to be a part of a possible winning coalition. In 1983, the UCR flatly refused the minor parties who wished to join in the coalition. (La Nacion, 31 October, 1983 p. 1) Alfonsin was running for the UCR and the government he would put in office would be a UCR government. In other words, if you voted for the UCR, you did not do so in the hopes of getting a payoff for your party in the government.

In contrast, the PJ followed its old course of forming broad coalitions, or at least they tried to. In 1983 the PJ took on some baggage in this way. The Communist Party signed on with the PJ at an early stage in the campaign and the electors representing the PSP (Popular Socialist Party) and the FIP (Frente de Izquierda Popular) voted for the Luder-Bittel
ticket. [Ibid] The idea behind this PJ strategy was to appeal to as broad a base as possible. This is particularly true when one considers that the Luder-Bittel ticket represented the portion of the PJ that was known for its middle class professional values as opposed to the labor interest traditionally supported by the leftist fringe parties that joined the PJ. These electoral strategies led to significantly different electoral coalitions.

The emerging UCR electoral coalition is one in which it runs very strong in the upper middle and upper class sectors of the population. It runs even with the poor voters and is crushed in the lower middle class, which is the traditional stronghold of the PJ and the CGT. The classes are determined by the four representative income brackets used in the survey. In percentages, this meant that in the survey, the UCR distanced the PJ by 34 percent in the upper income group, by 68 percent in the upper middle income group, by 12 percent in the poorest group and lost by 30 percent in the lower middle income group. This lower middle income group had the largest n of the groups.

The electoral strategy produced a more homogeneous type of ruling coalition. In Argentine elections, parties have the option of forming coalitions with other parties early on. If these take place before the election, the minor parties may sign on to the slate of the major parties and thus remove their candidates for President in favor of the other parties. It was clear that Alfonsin's government would represent traditional Radical values. Other parties would not dilute the "radicalness" of the ruling coalition, as Alfonsin was cutting no deals. The end result of this activity was to create a situation in which no
payoffs were needed, the ruling coalition was homogeneous in that it was UCR exclusive.

The makeup of the UCR's electoral coalition had a profound effect on the way the ruling coalition was made. The CGT had worked diligently on behalf of the PJ and as a result had no basis on which to demand inclusion into the governing coalition. As a result, Alfonsin used his election to reward old friends from within the ranks of Radicalism. The ranks of the inner circle of power were all filled with like-minded individuals committed to the middle class moderation of Radicalism. [Somos, October 26, 1984, p.9] Even though the poor supported the UCR, they did so without the promise of payoffs. In a policymaking sense, the UCR has tried to help the sectors of the population with extreme poverty, but they did not reward them with important positions in the government. This is not really a coalition government, it is a Radical government supported by a centrist coalition, which is the logical outcome of such electoral strategies. The electoral strategy brought in the center and the right to positions of power in the government and this has its consequences.

The implications for policymaking in a government of this nature are obvious. Initially, the government's internal power brokers will all be of basically the same ideological slant, in this case centrist. In Axelrod's terms, the ruling coalition has a high degree of connectedness. In the Peron period, favors were owed to the new industrialists, the landowners and the unionists. This led to the difficulty already described in operating an effective government. The CGT was unrepresented in the Alfonsin cabinet. Because his entire cabinet was made up of members of the UCR old gaurd which had never been cordial to the unionists, the
complaints and strikes of the CGT are not from within the government coalition. [Clarín, Oct 31, 1983, p. 11] This means that while Argentine society remains highly fragmented, the ruling coalition is not. The upper income groups were satisfied by the initial appointments of Bernardo Grinspun as Minister of the Economy and Enrique García Vázquez as President of the Central Bank. Grinspun and García-Vázquez were both traditional Radical Party economists who had always stood in opposition to the PJ and their unionist supporters demands. [ibid] As a result the UCR government is offering a relatively more united front in spite of the fact that the economy and the crisis are much more severe than they were during the Peronist rule in the 1950’s. The reason behind this is that the Alfonsin inner circle is a relatively more connected group, in fact, they are practically identical.

CONCLUSIONS

The core emphasis of this paper has been that electoral strategies have ramifications that go beyond the winning or losing of elections. Theoretically, electoral strategies are linked to the electoral coalitions that are formed, and these electoral coalitions have an impact on the makeup of ruling coalitions. Stable, homogeneous ruling coalitions have a significantly easier task of policymaking than ideologically diverse ones and this is what the setting of Argentina has demonstrated. The consequences of the latter go beyond a mere paralysis of policymaking in societies where extra-legal mechanisms (the military) are in place to remove elected governments when they are failing.

This analysis has demonstrated that there are important differences
in the nature of coalitions and that these differences can be traced in part to the electoral strategy that is chosen by the leader. Highly connected coalitions allow for flexible behaviour on the part of the leadership, in that ideologically diverse partners cannot place demands upon the ruling coalition. As a result they tend to generate policies which are designed to please the median voter and thus secure themselves of a stable electoral coalition. The third strategy, demonstrated by this paper, has shown that leaders who seek out political wings before solidifying the center have different behaviour patterns all together. These regimes try to satisfy their supporters, as the connected regime does, but the diversity of opinions from within the regime itself makes policymaking very limited. The leader must try to satisfy both extremes, but will eventually have to make a choice between the groups. At this stage the coalition will naturally break up. Thus the government's ruling coalition exposes itself to intervention by the extra-legal checks in the system. This is exactly what the case studies have shown.

During Peron's rule from 1946-1955, the electoral strategy he pursued led to a particular type of coalition. Because he already had ties to both the military and the labor movement, he was already set up to form an electoral coalition of diverse ideological members. He used the concept of justicialism to do just that. He did win the election, but forced policymaking into a no-win situation. The only hope of satisfying the diverse extremes was to continue to pay them all off with programs. When the economy faltered, the coalition members began to fight amongst themselves which led to the destruction of the coalition from within and the perception of the illegitimacy of the government that allowed for the
military intervention. The point is that when electoral strategies produce "unconnected" coalitions, the regime's behaviour and policymaking are severely limited. While Peron survived for many years, this was more a result of the artificially prosperous economy brought on by the end of World War II rather than the success of Peron's leadership. The difference between coalition instability under Peron and government under Alfonsin is that the UCR government has a government coalition that is manageable.

While the Alfonsin regime has survived but two years, its policymaking options are available. This paper argues that this is a function of the makeup of the Alfonsin government. All the members of the Cabinet are Radical Party traditionalists espousing middle class values and ideology. Alfonsin's campaign, which accomplished the same thing the Peronists did in 1946 by winning the election, did not have to sell out to unstable coalition partners in order to win. In addition the 1985 congressional and municipal elections showed that the electoral coalition has remained effective as well by increasing UCR control of the government. (La Nacion, Nov 11, 1985, p. 1) The supporters of the UCR came from other traditional backgrounds, but they bought in to his particular brand of middle of the road policies. As a result when the CGT gets out of line and challenges the government, they do so from outside the ruling coalition and if anything it unites the government rather than dividing it. They are, of course, free to challenge the UCR in the next election but they cannot destroy the ruling coalition from within like the military and the CGT could in the 1950's. As a result Alfonsin has more flexibility in policymaking than unconnected coalition leaders do.
In developing societies prone to coups and undemocratic periods, parties should be well advised to realize that electoral strategies are important for more than simply winning elections and that the strategies they pursue have consequences for policymaking and regime stability. The example of Argentina has shown that ideologically diverse, "unconnected" coalitions will be very limited in their ability to act and make policy that is effective for the whole nation. On the other hand, center based connected coalitions need not worry about the ramifications of their policies to the political extremes, and by satisfying the median voter, they can assure themselves of electoral success and coalition stability.
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