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THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 1889-1910: A STUDY IN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN BRITAIN

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

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ABSTRACT

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 1889-1910: A STUDY IN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN BRITAIN

BY VICTOR FESKE

A reversal in Anglo-Russian relations occurred between 1889 and 1910. Stimulated by mounting imperial military insecurities and a sense of relative economic decline, Britain was eager to approach Tsarist Russia with offers of geopolitical accommodation. A prerequisite for the acceptability of such overtures in Britain was a favorable reappraisal by the British public of Russia, its society, and, in particular, its autocratic government. The ease with which this transformation in attitude was adopted hinged in large measure upon political ideology. The domestic political scene in Britain was polarized over the issue of rapprochement, with Conservatives and moderate Liberals favoring and Radical Liberals, Socialists, and Labourites opposing any strengthening of diplomatic ties between London and St. Petersburg. Ultimately this split within the Liberal ranks over a foreign policy issue reveals much about the malaise of the Liberal idea in late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain.
INTRODUCTION: AUGUST, 1914

"A liberal government is treasonable to its own character and violates the intimate law of its being if it is not a government for the acquisition of ever greater liberty; and even the political necessities that it has to bear in mind in its relations with the other states, and which oblige it to respect anti-liberal regimes and even at times to ally itself with them for international ends and to allow them a free hand in their conservative and reactionary internal politics, do not justify the absolute desertion of the defence of liberty in the world, which is the animating principle of its life, a defence that must persist even in occasional retreats, in temporary renunciations, ever ready to advance again and not only to profit by the course of events but to prepare it. Otherwise the policy of a government loses what is usually called its 'line', which is, in the last resort, the line of a people's history."

Benedetto Croce (1933)

On Sunday, August 2, 1914, as the nations of continental Europe mobilized for war, public meetings, hastily arranged by Socialist leaders, were held throughout Great Britain to demonstrate the opposition of the laboring classes to involvement in the coming conflict. The largest of these, a massive rally at Trafalgar Square organized by the British section of the International Socialist Bureau, adopted a resolution protesting "against any step being taken by the Government of this country to support Russia... as being not only offensive to the political traditions of the country but disastrous to Europe." This climaxed a week of feverish activity among British Radical Liberals and Socialists to prevent Britain's entry into the war. The key to the neutrality argument was Tsarist Russia. The Neutrality League, formed on July 28 by Norman Angell, J.A. Hobson, Graham Wallas, and others, distributed half a million leaflets entitled "Shall We Fight for a Russian Europe?" and issued a manifesto which warned that "the last war we fought upon the Continent was for the purpose of checking the growth of Russia. We are now asked to go to war to promote it". On August 1, the day prior to the Trafalgar Square rally, the British
section of the International Socialist Bureau chaired by Keir Hardie released *An Appeal to the British Working Class* urging British workers to "compel the governing class and their Press who are eager to commit you to cooperate with Russian despotism to keep silence and respect the decision of the overwhelming majority of the people, who will have neither part nor lot in such infamy. The success of Russia at the present day would be a curse on the world... workers stand together therefore for peace."^4

But the "governing class and their Press" would not keep silent. An article in the *Contemporary Review* explained that any of the British public who saw the war as a consequence of Russian ambitions were simply misled by the Berlin Press Bureau. Rather than for the "realisation of ambitious schemes", Russia and her armies had entered the fray to protect the "sacredness of treaties and the guaranteed rights of the small states of Europe".^5 Arthur Nicolson, writing on July 28, saw that the "crisis might be taken by the Russians as a test of our friendship and that were we to disappoint her all hope of a friendly and permanent understanding with her would disappear". He emphasized that the support of public opinion was imperative for the Government to take any policy stand on the issue of siding with Russia. Despite this he felt assured that Russia, as well as Germany and Austria, would be convinced of England's inability to remain neutral.^6 And yet, Sir Edward Grey, in his famous House of Commons speech of August 3, declined to invoke the justification of British obligations to Russia, moral or otherwise. His arguments for British involvement stressed rather treaty obligations to Belgium and moral obligations to both France and Belgium. Russia was scarcely mentioned.^7 In his efforts to enlist Parliamentary
and public backing he realized Russia had no place. Public opinion would not enthusiastically rally behind a call for support for Tsarist Russia.

The public debate in the final analysis had little bearing on the British decision to declare war on Germany as the average Englishman readily accepted the violation of Belgian neutrality as sufficient cause (although Labour leader John Burns resigned from the cabinet as the war began on the grounds that Russia, not Germany, was Britain's real enemy\textsuperscript{8}) and as the Socialist plans for an international boycott of capitalist war came to nothing.\textsuperscript{9} But the debate continued well after the beginning of hostilities. English periodical articles continued to appear through early 1915 explaining explicitly why Russia had gone to war with Germany and implicitly why England was arrayed on the side of the Tsarist autocracy.\textsuperscript{10}

There should be no surprise at such a heated debate; it had not sprung up as a consequence of the Sarajevo assassination. It was rather the final chapter in a longstanding quarrel that stretched backward into the early 1890's when British foreign policy had begun to look for new directions in response to a growing sense of military and economic insecurity.

Within this changing perspective of the capabilities and limitations of British foreign policy, rapprochement with Russia gradually assumed greater and greater consideration as a possible option. But Mother Russia, with her 'autocratic despotism', was the traditional bogeyman for British foreign policy-makers as well as for the public. Prior to 1890 English hostility toward Russia knew no political or class barriers. For a society to discard such a longstanding tradition of animosity would
require more than the mere pronouncement of a change in governmental policy. Public opinion in matters of foreign policy could not be ignored in Victorian and Edwardian England. Some kind of evolution in the British public's view of Anglo-Russian relations was essential to the development of closer ties between the two countries. In general, this could involve changing perceptions of the acceptable bases upon which foreign policy decisions should be made, as well as an awakening to Britain's increasingly precarious geopolitical situation. More specifically it could mean a gradual shift in attitudes toward Russia, her regime and the practical threat she represented to the British Empire. Such an evolution would certainly have elements of both ideology and pragmatism, with the preponderance of one or the other in any particular individual determined by a number of factors, most especially political philosophy.

But whatever alterations occurred in British attitudes toward Russia in the two decades prior to 1914, their acceptance was not complete. Dissenters remained, continuing to echo over and again the arguments of a previous age. A typical example of the older, more traditional English picture of Russia can be seen in a June, 1879 Contemporary Review article (a moderate, mainstream Liberal periodical) where the Tsar, reportedly described by his own subjects as an "unspeakable despot" and recognized as "the one great anti-human specimen of humanity", rules over a people "corrupt, venal, [and] unscrupulous" in a "culture that was rotten before it had become ripe". By contrast, in Germany "many a sweet flower [of Democratic and national spirit] has sprung up, whose bright colour and fragrance gladden a generation". Thus when E.D. Morel wrote on August 4, 1914 that English intervention meant "an intervention
on behalf of Russian despotism against a German civilization so akin to our own" 12, he was not striking a new chord. But while the rhetoric remained the same, even after the passage of thirty-five years, what is significant to note is the shift of Russophobia from a mainstream movement embracing the radical wings of both the Left and Right to one championed solely by the Radical Liberals backed by the Socialists.

The tensions exposed in the summer of 1914 and the interplay of conflicting political and ideological forces are most interesting here. The Left, invoking the specter of the unchanging, malignant nature of the Russian menace, agitated loudly for a reversal of British foreign policy away from its post-1907 links with Russia. Initially it seems to have had some success with public rallies exhibiting popular support for well-publicized Radical arguments. But as this early enthusiasm was drowned in a tidal wave of public excitement engendered by the British declaration of war, the real shallowness of Radical public support emerged. What is most surprising is that, despite the almost total collapse of the Russophobic Left, the pro-Russian Moderate Liberals and the Conservatives felt the necessity of maintaining a polemical defence in newspapers and periodicals of Britain's alliance with Russia through the early months of 1915. 13 They feared that England's new-found acceptance of Russia might prove as fragile and transient as had the old enmity.

* * * * * * *

The impotence of the Radicals in August, 1914 was the culmination of two decades of gradual change in Britain's attitudes toward foreign policy priorities. The new, harsh economic and geopolitical realities faced by fin-de-siècle Britain were to force an adjustment in what was perceived publicly as the traditional approach to foreign policy. Bri-
tain's new sense of insecurity in an increasingly hostile world was incompatible with a retention of old liberal ideas of international morality, of a foreign policy grounded on high principles. The time-worn doctrine of liberalism was now a burden that needed to be discarded, and the fragile Gladstonian Liberal coalition was to break apart under the strain. So-called Liberal Imperialists and the moderate center of the Party were to shift to the Right on the issue of foreign affairs, most significantly for our concerns, on the issue of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The Radical Left was forced to fight a drawn-out rearguard action to protect what they believed to be the old 'Gladstonian' liberal virtues in foreign affairs. Anglo-Russian relations were the focus of this domestic ideological contest after 1890. They provide a useful guide to one aspect of the crisis of Edwardian liberalism.
THE DEEP ROOTS OF RUSSOPHOBIA

Old animosities die slowly—particularly when the underlying causes remain unchanged—and the late-Victorian adversarial posture of Great Britain toward Russia had a long and complicated ancestry, eventually becoming "the most pronounced and enduring element in the national outlook on the world abroad". However prior to 1815 there was little to suggest such a development. England first came into contact with the court of the Tsars in 1553 through the efforts of the explorer John Cabot. A profitable trade in furs, marine stores, grain, and caviar developed. Through the next two-hundred and fifty years the Powers maintained friendly relations based upon complementarity of commercial and political interests. In 1791 public opinion, or at least media opinion, was sufficiently well-disposed (no doubt partially through ignorance) toward Russia to successfully oppose in combination with Whig backing in the Commons, the younger Pitt in his attempt to force Russia to restore the recently captured fortress of Ochakov to the Ottoman Empire. The argument was advanced that Russian trade was of great value and that it was inconceivable to imagine a Russia powerful enough ever to threaten England.

The Napoleonic years brought many swings in Anglo-Russian relations, while always steadily increasing English knowledge of Russia, her people, and government. Tsar Alexander's flirtation with the French Emperor and temporary adherence to the Continental System, and the anxiety and indignation produced by both in London, was succeeded by the British image of Russia as the heroic conqueror of Napoleon. This admiration of Russia's martial successes was tempered by the knowledge that there was precious little else about her which could evoke English
approval. However, as of 1815 Russia was still in no way perceived as a real threat to British security and interests.

But during the post-Vienna era there emerged areas of conflict between the two nations that had been presaged by the Ochakov controversy. The introduction of the Corn Laws of 1815 effectively ended the longstanding, large-scale importation of grain from Russian Poland and the Ukraine. This was followed by the imposition of a tariff on Baltic timber (a measure strongly favored by merchants with interests in North America). Russia answered with tariffs on imports designed to foster the growth of her domestic industries. The importance of these measures lay not so much in that they significantly reduced Anglo-Russian trade—so important to both countries\(^4\)—but rather in the severe strain on the cordiality of Anglo-Russian relations which resulted from the harsh, corrupt, inefficient, and discriminatory methods with which the Russian bureaucracy appeared to enforce the tariffs against English merchants dealing with their country.\(^5\)

Britain's slow withdrawal from the Quadruple Alliance, constructed by Castlereagh at Vienna, led to her eventual continental isolation from the so-called Eastern Powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Meeting at Troppau in November, 1820, these three nations formally adopted a policy of reaction to answer the challenges offered by the dynamic new forces of nationalism and liberalism. That same year Castlereagh, fearful over the possibility of Russian intervention to crush the revolt in Spain, gave eloquent expression to this new recognition of a serious ideological chasm between his country and Russia\(^6\):

"For instance the Emperor of Russia, from the nature of his authority, can have nothing to weigh, but physical or moral difficulties external to His own Government and Dominions which are in the way of giving effect to His designs;
His action is free and His means are in His own hands.— The King of Great Britain, from the nature of our Constitution, has on the contrary, all His means to acquire from Parliament... In Russia there is but little Public Sentiment with regard to Spain which can embarrass the decision of the Sovereign;— In Great Britain there is a great deal, and the Current of that Sentiment runs strongly against the late Policy of the King of Spain... [I]ntervention... has more or less the air of dictation and of menace... Our Position, our Institutions, the habits of thinking and the prejudices of our People, render us essentially different... The Principle of one State interfering by force in the internal affairs of another, in order to enforce obedience to the governing authority is always a question of the greatest moral as well as physical delicacy... [T]here is the moral impracticability arising from the inaptitude of particular States to recognize or act upon it— No country having a Representative System of Government, could act upon it,— and the sooner such a doctrine shall be distinctly abjured, as forming in any Degree the Basis of our Alliance, the better."

A latent Near Eastern rivalry between Britain and Russia was finally laid open by the uprising in Greece in 1821. British interests in the Near East were directed primarily toward maintaining Ottoman control of Constantinople and the Straits, preventing Russian naval interference in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ultimately this would preserve communications with India and allow England to retain economic predominance in the Near East as well. However Britain's strategic interest in the preservation of Turkish integrity conflicted at home with the rapid growth of popular philhellenism and the sympathy for a people in revolt against 'ungodly despotism'. Strategic and ideological considerations were at odds.

For Russia much the same was true. Although unsympathetic to the Greek cause as merely a further extension of Jacobin revolution, the Russians were certainly materially interested in territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. In the confused situation Russia and Great Britain found themselves opposed on both strategic and ideological grounds, with strategic considerations finally weighing most heavily in each case.8
Radicals became confused over whether the Ottomans or the Russians offered the most despicable example of despotism. Many, most famously William Cobbett, resolved their dilemma by adopting a stance that supported the national interests of England. Writing in 1822 and again in 1829, he argued:

"Ministers ought to send as many ships as they can muster, to carry a message to the Autocrat, requesting him in civil language, to march his Cossacks back from the confines of the dominion of the Turk, and, in case of non-compliance, to take, burn, sink, or batter down all that they could possibly belonging to the Autocrat." (1822)

"It is not our business to run about the world to look after people to set free; it is our business to look after ourselves and to take care of our country and Sovereign; and if we descend to particulars, it is our first duty to take care that England shall have dominion of the sea." (1829)

While the situation in Greece eventually proved amenable to careful and patient diplomacy, the rift in Anglo-Russian relations resulting from the Polish revolution of 1830 "soon proved incapable of harmonious adjustment". Public opinion in England was vocal in its support for the Polish rebels. With the single exception of the ultra-Tory Morning Post, the entire London Press lined up to attack Russia and her treatment of Poland. The Literary Association of the Friends of Poland was formed in 1832 in London with branch societies in at least six other cities; collections were made to succor Polish refugees; public meetings were organized to exhibit sympathy for the Poles. The simultaneous domestic agitation for a Parliamentary Reform Bill forged links between the two causes:

"Give us Poland, our sufferings began with Poland, and with Poland they shall end. The beggar in the streets,— the man who is to be hanged for rick-burning,— is son and heir to the spoilation of Poland... If the Russians are driven over the Niemen, we shall have the Ballot; if they cross the Dnieper, we shall be rid of the Corn Laws; and if the Poles get Smolensko, we too in our taxes shall get back to the ground of 1686... Poland has its
liberation to win, and so have we. We have both of us fallen among thieves, and we cannot do better than carry on the contest in concert."  

In the words of A.J.P. Taylor, "What the Radicals learnt from the Poles was hostility to Russia".  

Thus by the early 1830's Anglo-Russian antipathy could be observed from at least three different angles: commercial, strategic, and ideological. Strategic difficulties were multiplied by the Russian victories over Persia in 1826-8 and Turkey in 1828-9, each of which appeared to the Foreign Office and to Lord Palmerston to increase the Russian threat to India directly through Central Asia and indirectly to Indian communications with the Mediterranean. As Lord Aberdeen observed in October, 1829, "Russia holds the keys both of the Persian and Turkish provinces; and whether she may be disposed to extend her conquests to the East or to the West, to Tehran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacles can arrest her progress."  

Aberdeen's lamentation followed on the heels of the publication in the same month of Colonel deLacy Evans' Practicability of an Invasion of British India which focussed on the exposed position of the Northwest Frontier to Russian incursions. The subsequent Near Eastern Crisis of 1833, difficulties over Afghanistan in the late 1830's, and the Near Eastern Crisis of 1839-41 did little to calm British anxieties over the Russian threat to the Straits, Constantinople, and India. The anonymous author of the pamphlet India, Great Britain, and Russia summed up the situation in 1838:

"It would be the height of folly to go on believing that all is safe, while the Russians were deliberating at which part they should enter the British frontiers: it would be the height of wickedness as well as folly to attempt to palm such a delusion on the public mind. The truth must not be concealed that the British and Russian nations are rivals for the possession of India."
There arose to fuel the fires at this time of rising antagonism between the two countries the most implacable English foe of Russia of the nineteenth century, David Urquhart. Strongly pro-Turkish (he introduced Turkish baths into England as a medical panacea and regarded Turkey as the ideal community¹⁸), Urquhart was outraged by the settlement of the 1839–41 Near Eastern Question hammered out by Palmerston and Tsar Nicholas I. But even before this as an official in the Foreign Office he had begun what was to be a lifelong polemical attack on Russia and her policies stemming from his obsession with Russia as a force of uncompromising evil. He wrote in 1835:

"Russia chooses her own time; she prepares the events, she has them all under her own control. She sees on all sides at once... She will be perfectly certain of success before she makes the move; and there is no reason whatever for her making the move before she is certain. Match with her knowledge, decision, secrecy, rapidity, and proximity our ignorance, uncertainty, changeableness, absence of disposable force, and distance, and then say if Russia has anything to apprehend from the awakened interests or aroused indignation of England."¹⁹

Urquhart even carried his anti-Russian campaign to the point of accusing Lord Palmerston of the crime of high-treason. He could see no other explanation for the continued failures of the Foreign Secretary to check Russian ambitions than that he was an agent in the pay of St. Petersburg. The actual influence of Urquhart is difficult to assess, but "that by the end of 1837 Russophobia was a major element in English opinion is not open to doubt", and "that Urquhart and his collaborators were in large measure responsible for this situation is equally transparent".²⁰

The intervention of the Russian armies of Tsar Nicholas in Hungary in 1849 met with a wave of indignation in England equal to that aroused in 1830 during the suppression of the Polish revolt. A new group of refugees, this time Hungarian, descended on London to reinforce the
rising tide of anti-Russian sentiment with their writings and speeches. Following in the footsteps of Urquhart, Louis Kossuth, during his 1851 visit to England, railed against the Russian menace:

"The principle of all evil on the continent is the despotic and encroaching spirit of the Russian power. There is the pillar which supports everyone who wishes to establish his ambitious sway on the sufferings of nations, raising himself on the ruins of their liberty. Russia is the rock which breaks every sigh for freedom, and this Russian power is the same which England encounters in her way, on every point— in Pekin and in Herat, at the Bosphorus and on the Squand, on the Nile and on the Danube, and all over the continent of Europe."**

"What is it that humanity expects... from Britannia?... Should the Czar once more threaten oppressed humanity, should he once more be willing to violate the sovereign independence of nations— should he once more be willing to take any pretence to put his foot on whatever people in the world he chooses and drown Europe's liberty in blood— humanity expects from the people of England that it will shake its mighty trident, and shout out a powerful 'Stop!'"**

In the speeches of Kossuth can be seen the congruence of moral statement of purpose and national interest that was to characterize so much of subsequent English policy toward Russia. A notable example came in 1849 when, unlike in Greece three decades earlier, ideological leanings dovetailed nicely with British strategic interests over the Russian and Austrian demand that Turkey surrender the Hungarian revolutionaries who had taken refuge there following the crushing of the uprising. Pursuing the now traditional British policy of backing Turkey in its conflicts with Russia, Palmerston was able to stiffen the Ottomans sufficiently to prompt a refusal of the Russian demands and allow the evacuation of the refugees under the aegis of the United States Navy.**

He justified his actions to Lord John Russell (and through him to the Queen) not in the language of rational calculation and power politics, but rather in the language of high moral purpose:

"... the Hungarian leaders may certainly be called revolutionists, but they are revolutionists in the same sense as the men whose measures and acts at the close of the seventeenth century it is owing that the present Royal Family
of England, happily for the nation, are seated on the throne of these realms..."24

Once again, as in 1831, the maintenance and progress of Britain's liberal institutions were linked to defiance of Russia.

This alliance between strategic necessity and Russophobic public opinion swung the balance in a divided cabinet in March, 1854 in favor of war against Russia on the side of Turkey and France.25 The English Press had prepared the ground for such a decision by reminding their readers of the horrors of the Siberian prison system, the Russian atrocities committed in Poland and Hungary, and their attempt to bully the Ottomans into surrendering the refugees in 1849.26 Thus public opinion in most quarters and particularly among the Radicals, strongly backed the Crimean War, at least at the outset.27 And the Foreign Office attempted to extract the maximum strategic advantage from the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The Turkish Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of Europe and Russia was allowed neither warships nor naval bases in the Black Sea.28 Adherence to principle had proven to be geopolitically profitable.

During the forty years between the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris British opposition to Russia had acquired a pattern, constructed from more than purely conflict of interests. And for the subsequent thirty-five years this same formula was to be pursued with little or no questioning from any quarter.29 The events involving both countries during these years read like a repetition of the period from 1815 to 1850. The Polish rising of 1863 again aroused vocal English support and a denunciation of the Tsarist despotism.30 As there had been confusion and conflict between ideological and geopolitical goals in Greece
in 1820, so there were also in 1876 in the aftermath of the 'Bulgarian Atrocities'. Once again there was uncertainty in the Radical camp between the unpalatable choices offered by both Turkey and Russia. In Liberal circles there was some support generated for an alliance with Russia to punish the Ottomans. In the confusion even a conservative like Thomas Carlyle, whose Russophobia, unlike the Radicals, was grounded upon the more secure foundation of purely strategic interest, while fulminating against the "unspeakable Turk", could voice his approval of the Russians:

"In our own time they have done signal service to God and man in drilling into order and peace anarchic populations all over their side of the world ... They have a clearer hold of the great truth that obedience to the rightful authority is a sacred duty." 

But in the end, as previously with Greece, strategic interest overcame the temporary affinity of moral purpose between the two countries. England did not join Russia in her war with Turkey and Disraeli used the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to pare away many of the advantages gained by Russia at Turkey's expense in the Treaty of San Stefano.

To English eyes Russian membership in the Dreikaiserbund in the 1870's with Austria and Prussia bore a marked resemblance to the reactionary Triple Alliance formed in 1820 and did nothing but reinforce Britain's notion of Russia as the leading reactionary Power on the continent. The Anglo-Russian frictions in Central Asia, essentially quiescent since the 1830's, heated up rapidly during this period with disputes arising over Afghanistan, Persia and the Persian Gulf. The Penjdeh Crisis of 1885, an Afghanistan border dispute, spurred even so fervent a supporter of the Concert of Europe as Gladstone to react with almost instinctive Russophobia and call up the army reserves. In the end an agreement was patched together, but "the Russians had once again
clearly emerged as England's principal enemy.\textsuperscript{35}

What can be unmistakeably recognized from this brief recital of Anglo-Russian relations in the nineteenth century is that by 1890, the acceptance by Englishmen of all classes and political persuasions of Russia as 'the enemy' was commonplace and natural. Differences of ideology and political philosophy had initiated the animosity in the immediate post-Napoleonic period, but strategic interest and power politics had soon reinforced and later, in many cases, superceded such considerations. There had been isolated moments of wavering (as over the Greek Revolution and later following the massacres in Bulgaria), when Russia had assumed a more complex appearance in English eyes— as a nation that could, on occasion, champion a righteous cause. But such wavering were invariably overtaken by considerations of national interest and political and ideological incompatibility and quickly forgotten. As the final decade of the nineteenth century approached there was little to suggest that the traditional Anglo-Russian enmity was in any danger of abating; that any voices would rise to challenge assertions by Richard Congreve and Frederic Harrison in 1866 that Tsarist Russia should be excluded from the civilization of Western Europe because she was "extra-European and semi-Oriental" (Harrison) and "alien to the movement of later European thought". (Congreve)\textsuperscript{36}
BRITAIN IN A HOSTILE WORLD: A REASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS

Britain emerged from the optimism of the mid-Victorian years into a long period of slowly deepening doubt and insecurity. The replacement of optimism with pessimism was occasioned by a multiplicity of factors: economic erosion, mounting social and political instability, and perhaps most importantly, strategic vulnerability. This darkening of Britain's horizons, beginning in the 1870's, accelerating in the 1880's, and ushering in a general sense of crisis by the 1890's, was to have a profound effect upon Anglo-Russian relations. Britain's posture toward Tsarist Russia, formerly a product of moral distaste and practical incompetence, faced a readjustment based upon pressing, new considerations of a very tangible nature. National and Imperial insecurity required that Russia be viewed from a fresh, less harsh perspective.

To understand why such a reorientation became acceptable we must first develop a sense of the desperate anxiety that propelled Englishmen down this new and unfamiliar road.

* * * * * * *

For Great Britain, the mid-Victorian years could be called the 'years of confidence'. Post-1851 England, basking in the reflection of the assured, self-congratulatory rhetoric of the Great Exhibition, looked forward to a future of continuing economic, social, and political advancement as the vanguard of the progress of western civilization. Prince Albert, in his Guildhall Speech of 1849, had stressed this belief in a bright future, when man would harness Nature for his own purposes, and "the moving power of civilization" would be "extended to all branches of science, industry, and art". Man, "created after the image of God", was fast "approaching a more complete fulfillment of that great and sacred mission which he has to perform in this world".1

(17)
Most Britons took for granted, as did H.T. Buckle in his 1857 *History of the Civilization in England*, "the progress from barbarianism to civilization". The superiority and pre-eminence of England in this movement was obvious to all, and a necessary accompaniment of this realization was some means of determining how Britain had attained such a lofty position and how to ensure its continuance. In 1851 G.R. Porter, in his *Progress of the Nation*, a title that captured the mood of the age, raised this issue:

"It must at all times be a matter of great interest and utility to ascertain the means by which any community has attained to eminence among nations. To inquire into the progress of circumstances which has given pre-eminence to one's own nation would almost seem to be a duty."

In these years it was an easy matter for the British nation to present optimistic answers to any such self-examination. These were the decades when Britain dominated international trade, enjoying an almost monopolistic position derived from the benefits of her early start. Using her advantages to the fullest, British foreign trade comprised, in the quarter century between 1850 and 1875, consistently from one-fourth to one-fifth of all international commerce. Alongside this there was dramatic progress in domestic industry and transportation. Between 1850 and 1880 pig iron production had increased from 2250 thousand tons to 7750; steel from 49 thousand tons to 1440; while coal production had jumped from 49,000 thousand tons to 147,000. Eleven thousand miles of railway were opened during this period, and the net tonnage of iron ships built in British shipyards ballooned from 13,000 in 1850 to 250,000 by 1870. Great Britain was both a growing industrial giant and the center of a vast network of global commercial exchange. It was with good reason that economist W.S. Jevons could boast in 1865, "The several quarters of the globe [are] our willing tributaries."
Despite the disaster predicted by some with the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, British agriculture flourished as the Industrial Revolution fueled an evergrowing demand for foodstuffs by the newly urbanized, industrialized areas. The boom allowed the British farmer for the first time to pay higher wages to agricultural labor and to introduce new scientific fertilizing techniques and labor-saving devices. There was also cause for optimism in the area of social welfare. The gloomy prophecies of Malthus and the 'dismal science' of political economy had proven empty. The population of England and Wales had doubled in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, and yet, still the absolute standard of living was rising.

The mid-Victorians were as well satisfied with their political system as with their economic position. The year 1867 had witnessed the passage of the Second Reform Act. Despite warnings from many sides that it would transfer power to the ignorant, disrupt the delicate political balance, and undermine national unity and prosperity, Walter Bagehot saw no reason, in bringing out a new edition of his The English Constitution in 1872, to substantially rewrite his well known analysis of the political system of England. In spite of legislative tampering, the elemental structure of the Constitution, he observed, had remained unshaken. And, suited to Britain's international status, that structure was a superior one, to which only America could claim any comparable degree of perfection:

"The practical choice of first-rate nations is between the presidential government and the parliamentary; no state can be first-rate which has not a government by discussion, and those [Great Britain and the United States] are the only two existing species of that government."

To this assured mid-Victorian self-image was added a new public enthusiasm for the Empire and for Imperial expansion. Disraeli, who
had once referred to the colonies as a "millstone round our necks"\textsuperscript{14}, sensed this new mood, while simultaneously fostering and exploiting it. In his famous June 24, 1872 Crystal Palace Speech he intertwined the supremacy of Britain with her Empire, cleverly linking both with her traditional domestic institutions. Disraeli affirmed that it was natural that English pride and confidence should extend beyond her shores because Englishmen

"... are proud of belonging to a great country, and wish to maintain its greatness in that they are proud of belonging to an Imperi-\textsuperscript{1} country, and are resolved to maintain, if they can, their empire— that may believe on the whole that the greatness and the empire of England are to be attributed to the ancient institutions of the land."\textsuperscript{15}

Even for W.E. Gladstone, always lukewarm in his enthusiasm for colonies, the "sentiment of empire" was "innate in every Briton".\textsuperscript{16} He even went so far as to suggest that British Imperial policy might be identified with the progress of civilization. The "perhaps, irrepressible tendency ... of British enterprise to carry our commerce and the range and area of our settlements beyond the limits of our sovereignty in those countries where civilization does not exist..." had resulted "on the whole [in] a balance of good... for the happiness of mankind".\textsuperscript{17}

The Foreign Office was less idealistic in its Imperial considerations. Britain's policy-makers of this era have been dubbed "the reluctant imperialists" because of their hesitancy in assuming control over any area not presumed to be strategically sensitive. They were willing to promote annexation, however, if a number of conditions were met, if those private interests most desirous of annexation could make a good case for it. Considerations which would win Foreign Office support included a demonstrable threat— "commercial, financial, spiritual or strategic"— to British interests, a potential interest which Britain might
wish to explore before the attention of rival nations was attracted, and the cheapness with which any particular annexation could be carried out.18

Complementing the new-found interest in the Empire on the part of the public was a further increase in Britain's traditional reluctance to become involved on the European continent. In part this was an outgrowth of the British sense of superiority. Foreigners were regarded with a mixture of condescension and contempt. Queen Victoria, despite her host of aristocratic continental relatives, shared this attitude, remarking, "We are the only honest people and therefore our task of dealing with others who are not so is dreadful."19 Edward Dicey was more explicit, if less colorful, in expressing the same sentiment. "No Englishman is, I think, ever quite able to divest himself of the innate belief that foreigners, as compared with himself, belong to an inferior order of creation."20

Mingling with this feeling of disdain for Europeans and their affairs was a sense of isolation bred by Britain's island status and her acknowledged, overwhelming naval superiority. The myth and the reality were that Britain could remain aloof from petty Continental squabbles, protected by her fleet. Britain's industrial strength and her dominating financial and commercial position with both her formal and informal empires encouraged the belief that Britain could withdraw from or intervene on the Continent at will with relative impunity.21 More practical observers would have noted some of the less positive motives for Britain's self-absorption. British military power beyond the Royal Navy was negligible. Often the exercise of British power and influence stopped at the water's edge. The lack of a credible army automatically ruled out
many courses of action, severely limiting policy choices in Europe. In addition, even during this period of profound confidence and enthusiasm, there was an awareness among policy-makers of the finite nature of British power. These limits were made apparent time and again, as for example in 1864 during the Schleswig-Holstein affair. At the outset of the crisis Lord Palmerston stated publicly that "if any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights and interfere with [the] independence [of Denmark] those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend." 22 But seven months later he disclosed to Lord Russell privately:

"I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet prepared for active interference. The truth is that to enter into a military conflict with all Germany on continental ground would be a serious undertaking." 23

Whether through strength or weakness, the mid-Victorians chose to pursue a policy of what came to be known as 'splendid isolation' in their European relations. 24 In the popular mind of Britain, she was not a continental power; despite the legacy of Marlborough and Wellington, there was a general acceptance that both her traditions and material interests pointed her in the direction of her colonial possessions and the maintenance of the naval superiority which had made the acquisition of those territories possible. 25 Perhaps this was a selective interpretation of British history stemming from the relative impotence of the British army in the mid-nineteenth century. But for whatever reason, it dovetailed nicely with the arguments touted by Imperial propagandists that Britain was a nation whose power and influence was a product of her Imperial nature. Although overstated, every Briton could recognize a ring of truth to Sir John Seeley's assertion in 1883 that "England has left Europe altogether behind it and become a world-state." 26
With her gaze concentrated elsewhere, Great Britain wanted peace in Europe for a variety of reasons. She had no territorial ambitions there. She was a satisfied power, as we have seen, reluctant even to undertake any further Imperial obligations. As such it was easy for her to assume a moral stance when faced with continental geopolitical issues. Her interests in European disputes, as she saw them, were only peripheral. But behind this moral, disinterested posture lay more practical interests. War disrupted the free exercise of trade—and trade was the cornerstone of British strength.

With this always in view, the Foreign Office pursued a policy concentrating on the maintenance of a European balance of power which would forestall the necessity of such an intervention as had been required to meet the challenge of the hubris of Napoleonic France. What was aimed at by most of the Foreign Secretaries of the mid-Victorian period was a careful application of British power in a reserved, flexible, non-partisan manner to ensure a precarious continental balance that was identified, in the British mind, with peace. There was a brief departure from this line with Gladstone's advocacy of a renewal of the old, high-minded idea of a Concert of Europe. But this noble (or naive) attempt foundered on the complexities of the Egyptian situation and the machinations of Bismarck, and the course of policy soon reverted to the old, cautious maneuvering with Britain in her accustomed role as the disinterested power-broker. Disraeli summed up this approach to foreign policy in his Manchester Free Trade Hall Speech of April 3, 1872:

"Don't suppose, because I counsel firmness and decision at the right moment, that I am of that school of statesmen who are favourable to a turbulent and aggressive diplomacy. I have resisted it during the greater part of my life. I am not unaware that the relations of England to Europe have undergone a vast change during the century that has just elapsed. The relations of England to Europe are not the same as they were in the days of Lord Chatham or Frederick the Great. The Queen of England has become the Sovereign of the most powerful
of Oriental States. On the other side of the globe there are new establish-
ments belonging to her, teeming with wealth and population, which will, in due
time exercise their influence over the distribution of power... These are vast
and novel elements in the distribution of power. I acknowledge that the policy
of England with respect to Europe should be a policy of reserve, but proud
reserve..."  

But by the beginning of the century's last decade, and even before,
the old assumptions of stability, power, security, progress, and even reserve, were being called into question by an ever larger and more vocal
group of Cassandras. The warnings they issued originated from prob-
lems which had arisen in every sphere. The political consensus of the
1860's and 1870's, the 'age of equipoise', had, by the late 1880's, been
superseded by fears of instability arising from the broad extension of
the franchise, the establishment of working class parties, the upsurge
in union strength and militancy, and the encroachment of Socialism into
the political arena (a fear confirmed in the minds of many by the Lib-
eral Newcastle Programme of 1891).  

Heightening the sense of domestic political uncertainty was the
additional strain of economic decline. Walter Bagehot had foreseen the
likelihood of just such a downward turn in January, 1873. He warned
that the past, when Britain's economy had advanced "not by steps, but by
'leaps and bounds'" was to be supplanted by a period in which prospects
"would not be happy, but very dismal". Britain, the first industrial
nation, was finding her supremacy challenged. Industrial production,
which had maintained an annual growth rate of about 3 per cent between
1840 and 1870, dropped to a sluggish 2.1 per cent in the years 1870 to
1913. Britain's percentage of the world's manufacturing capacity
shrank from 31.8 per cent in 1870 to 14.7 per cent by 1906, while its
two leading rivals, Germany and the United States were greatly increasing
their shares. By the mid to late 1880's the alarming notion that Bri-
tain's industrial and financial ascendency was rapidly eroding away had reached public consciousness.\textsuperscript{37}

A Royal Commission of the Depression of Trade and Industry, appointed in 1885, stressed foreign causes: competition, restrictive trade practices, etc., as the origin of many of Britain's economic ills.\textsuperscript{38} Here was reflected another new focus of British anxiety. Britain had always been impatient to regard the whole world as her market, having generally pursued in the past, not economic concessions, but instead agreements to keep markets open for Free Trade (which, with her dominant position, redounded to her advantage).\textsuperscript{39} Preferring the advantages of economic manipulation to the obvious difficulties of more formal Imperial annexation, Britain's Empire up to the 1880's was largely an informal one.\textsuperscript{40} But in the more threatening atmosphere of the late 1880's, Britain found its old markets threatened by new rivals. France and Germany, among others, had entered the imperial contest and were setting aside large areas in which British trade would be severely restricted or even eliminated altogether. It had long been understood by Britons that trade was the source of their island's power and greatness. "If we cannot keep our trade we cannot keep our Empire."\textsuperscript{41} The reverse of that was equally true. The\textit{ Pall Mall Gazette} recognized the danger as early as 1885 during the height of the scramble for colonies:

"In times past... we did what we pleased, where we pleased, and as we pleased. The whole of heathendom, to use a comprehensive term, was our inheritance, and the salt sea our peculiar possession. All that has changed. Europe has overflowed into Africa, Asia, America, Australasia and the Pacific. At every turn we are confronted with the gunboats, the sea lairs, or the colonies of jealous and eager rivals... The world is filling up around us... Europe, no longer distracted by intestine feuds, throws off ever increasing swarms to settle in other continents, and whereas, since Trafalgar, the Englishman has never found himself confronted by any other opponent but the savage with his spear, or the pirate in his prah, we now find every ocean highway furrowed by European ironclads, while over many a colonial frontier frowns the cannon of Continental rivals."\textsuperscript{42}
To meet the challenge of the new imperial powers Britain felt compelled to answer with Imperial acquisitions of her own. Economic control was replaced by political control. During the last three decades of the century Britain annexed 4.25 million square miles with 66 million inhabitants.

The works of Sir Charles Dilke (*Greater Britain*, 1870), Sir John Seeley (*The Expansion of England*, 1883), and J.A. Froude (*Oceania*, 1885) all contributed to a new interest and pride in this more formal Empire. Seeley, although arguing that it was a combination of ambition and philanthropy that accounted for the conquest of the Empire, saw the global spread of English power as a purely natural and unavoidable occurrence. England seemed "to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind". Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, continuing in the tradition of Disraeli, voiced the connection between British power and formal Empire. "We believe in the greatness of the Empire. We are not afraid of its expansion. We think that a nation like an individual, is better for having great responsibilities."

But others were not so sure. Although Seeley agreed that colonial possessions heightened the power and prestige of Britain, they likewise greatly increased the threat to her security as he stressed in Chapter Seven of his book, entitled "Internal and External Dangers". Britain's geopolitical position in the last two decades of the nineteenth century was more precarious for many reasons. The sheer physical size of the Empire made for a multiplication of difficulties involved in military defence. Dilke devoted 75 pages to a discussion of the subject in his 1890 publication *Problems of Greater Britain*. Each of the colonies, with its particular vulnerabilities to attack, was considered. Dilke's appre-
hension over the prospect of a war fought over colonies was apparent:

"We wish only to be safe from the ambitions of others... That it is most detri-
mental and dangerous to the interests of the country that our defences should
not be at all times in such a state as to place the Empire in security from
sudden attack." 48

Major H. d'Arch Breton, writing in Blackwood's in 1895, agreed that the
danger was a real one. "As time goes on, it becomes more and more ap-
parent that the policy of future war will not be so much the expansion
of empire as its retention." 50

The most basic assumption of Victorian foreign policy was command of
the seas. A June, 1901 Nineteenth Century and After article entitled
"The Standard of Strength for Our Army", started from this position:

"The condition of the British Empire without command of the sea is hardly con-
ceivable. We should then be at the mercy of any Power which had such command.
Our communications could not be maintained. We should be liable to blockade at
home and to ruin of our foreign commerce, nor could we keep India or any other
dependency by force." 51

Britain, as an island nation and Imperial power, translated its new-
found worries about defence into fears of naval weakness. The trad-
tional devotion of Britain to naval superiority was intensified by the
tremendous impact of two volumes on strategic naval thought by American
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan published in the early 1890's (The Influence of
Sea Power on History 1660-1783 in 1890 and The Influence of Sea Power upon
the French Revolution and the Empire in 1892). 52

The growing perception of defensive vulnerability of both the Home
Islands and the expanding Empire represented to the British reason enough
— even without Mahan's thesis that naval power was, in the end, stra-
tegically decisive— for the maintenance of the supremacy of the Royal
Navy on the world's oceans at any cost. The Navy was seen as an indis-
pensible defensive force. Its mission was the protection of "trade,
empire, and national security". 53 Any reduction in strength leading to
a naval defeat for Britain would be catastrophic. By contrast, as the First Lord of the Admiralty remarked in 1903, "To any continental power a naval defeat is nothing more than a very lamentable incident in their national history... to all other nations a navy is a mere luxury."\textsuperscript{54} But to Britain it was deemed vital. The scramble for tropical colonies by other European powers and the various accompanying naval expansions presented a challenge, unprecedented since the days of Nelson, to British command of the seas. Prior to 1900 the combined strength of the Russian and French fleets (particularly following the signing of the Franco-Russian Entente of 1894) posed the major threat. Tensions between Britain and those two powers sparked the Navy Scare of 1884 when the \textit{Pall Mall Gazette} published a series of alarmist articles on "The Truth about the Navy".\textsuperscript{55} A succession of naval scares of diverse origin followed in 1888, 1900, and again in 1903. The Admiralty's answer to the uproar was the adoption in 1889 of the Two-Power Standard (the "two-powers" at that point being Russia and France) to be maintained by instituting a series of massive naval expansion programmes which increased the Naval Budget three-hundred per cent between 1880 and 1900-1 (10.2 million pounds to 29.5 million pounds).\textsuperscript{56} A significant new burden was added to the British economy.\textsuperscript{57}

The last decade of the nineteenth century saw the upsurge in British insecurity translated into the appearance of a whole spate of books discussing the problems of defence.\textsuperscript{58} Among the most famous and influential of these works concerned with the strategic vulnerability of the Empire were George Curzon's \textit{Russia in Central Asia} (1889) and Archibald R. Colquhoun's \textit{Russia Against India} (1901), both warning that Russia posed an almost irresistible threat to India, that most precious of Imper-
ial possessions. As a group these books served to focus attention on Britain's isolated and exposed position in a world of enemies. George Peel's *The Enemies of England* (1902) stressed the theme of Europe's "great prejudice against England", quoting Lord Rosebery's comment that "there is no parallel to the hatred and ill-will with which we are regarded almost unanimously by the peoples of Europe".  

The rise of Bismarckian Germany to a position of continental military, economic, and diplomatic preponderance also increased British anxieties. No longer could Europe be ignored with impunity. Germany appeared eager to exercise a global influence commensurate with its European position. France, too weak after 1870-1 to directly challenge German power, had to turn to other fields to expend her aggressive energies. Russia continued in her traditional pursuit of a policy of border expansion both in the Balkans and in Asia. By 1895, it seemed conceivable to Britain that these powerful, aggressive states would combine to oppose her at every point:

"This universal jealousy of England's neutrality, and of the gain likely to accrue to her in consequence serves as a bond of union to draw the Continental Powers together in opposition to her policy all over the world. The advantages of this combination are obvious to the dullest apprehension: if possible to force England to descend from her lofty pedestal and enter the arena, meanwhile to further their own several ends at the expense of the wealthy egotist ... Now this opposition constitutes a danger to England, the gravity of which it would be unwise to underrate."  

In the popular imagination this opposition could even take the form of an invasion of the Home Islands of Great Britain. G.T. Chesney's *The Battle of Dorking* published in 1871, was the first of the wave of invasion novels that was to become a flood by the late 1880's. No less than twenty-eight such fictional accounts were published between 1880 and 1902.  

Invaders as exotic as the Chinese [*The Decline and Fall of the British Empire* by Lang-Tung (pseud.), 1881] were described, but more
commonly, some combination of continental powers was cast as the villain. Although later ridiculed by some [most famously by P.G. Wodehouse with his *The Swoop! or How Clarence Saved England* (1909) in which Germany, Russia, China, Switzerland, Monaco, Morocco, Bollygolla and the Mad Mullah coordinated an invasion], these pieces of fiction did have their serious counterparts. In his *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890), Charles Dilke devoted twenty-six pages to a discussion of the defence of England itself. The National Service League published in 1909 The *Problem of Invasion and How to Meet It*, while The *Nineteenth Century and After* asked in 1909, "Is Not Invasion Possible?" But perhaps most illustrative of the genuine fear of invasion was the furor over the proposed construction of a Channel Tunnel beginning in the 1880's. Between 1876 and 1901 no less than seven novels suggested that the Channel Tunnel would become a route for successful invasion. Hussey Vivian voiced his and the nation's fears in the Commons debate over the Channel Tunnel [Experimental Works] Bill on June 27, 1888:

"But if the House sanctioned a Tunnel passing 150 feet beneath the Channel, our fleets might sail uselessly over the Tunnel while thousands and tens of thousands of men were passing through to invade and occupy our country, and the vessels would be perfectly powerless to keep the enemy back. At present we [have] the grand barrier which Nature [has] interposed between us and France; but the case would be different if we constructed such a communication as the Channel Tunnel would afford." Why this country should voluntarily incur risks [I] altogether fail to see."

The proposal was defeated by a majority of 142.

Nothing expressed the confusion in the minds of the British public as clearly as the violent opposition to the proposal for the construction of a Channel Tunnel. It reflected at once, both the old idea of Britain as separate from Europe, seeking to preserve her 'splendid isolation', and the newer notion of British military insecurity and diplomatic and strategic isolation.
It was just this sense of vulnerable solitude that Edward Dicey made the subject of a *Fortnightly Review* article entitled "The Isolation of England" published in the February, 1896 issue. In it he reviewed one by one the continental powers, the level of animosity each held for Britain, and the reasons for such unanimity of resentment. Wilfrid Blunt recorded in his diary in January of the same year, "We have now managed in the last six months to quarrel violently with China, Turkey, Belgium, Ashanti, France, Venezuela, America and Germany. This is a record performance and if it does not break up the British Empire nothing will." Peel's recapitulation of this theme six years later in his *Enemies of England* underscored the point of the vulnerability of a solitary Great Britain. The pervasive sense of unease testified to the lengths she had come from the confidence which had dominated the decades after the 1851 Great Exhibition. Lord Rosebery was one statesman who acknowledged the profound change, seeing in the Britain of 1899 a "little island... so lonely in these northern seas, viewed with such jealously, and with such hostility, with such jarred ambitions by the great empires of the world, so friendless among nations which count their armies by embattled millions".

Two years later Calchas (pseudonym of J.L. Garvin, at this time leader writer for the *Daily Telegraph*) tied all the loose ends of the fears of decline together under the heading "Will England Last the Century?", examining in brief, among other things, industry and commerce, foreign policy, education, taxes, political conditions and social conditions including slums and alcoholism. Significantly, under the section on "Policy" he commented:

"It has been obvious to every political thinker for many years that our aim should be to prevent the 'splendid isolation' which could only end in a Continental coalition."
The pessimistic appraisal of Britain's prospects on the international scene led to a call for a more 'realistic' approach to foreign policy. Successive Foreign Secretaries of both parties in the 1890's, Lord Salisbury, Lord Kimberley, and Lord Rosebery, saw that some measure of accommodation would be required to deal with Britain's isolation in a hostile world. All three of these men are, to a certain extent, identified with a deliberate continuation of the policy of 'splendid isolation'. After all, Lord Rosebery had declared in a speech to the Eighty Club in March, 1896, "It is not possible in our conditions, and still less is it desirable to enter into a system of alliances"; Kimberley later pointed out that even a defensive alliance was necessarily directed against some other power; while Salisbury emphasized the advantage of Britain's "insular position which makes the burdensome conditions of an alliance unnecessary". An yet, despite such declarations, their policies were not nearly so single-minded or dogmatic. Rosebery, recognizing the realities of the new global power structure and Britain's need to carve out her niche in it, was willing to accommodate his avowed adherence to Britain's free-hand and independence of action to the requisites of British security. During the decade's three years of Liberal Government, with Rosebery first as Foreign Secretary then as Prime Minister, he vigorously pursued a policy of rapprochement, if not actual alliance, with all the European powers in turn.

Salisbury is more difficult to assess. His alleged devotion to a rigid policy of isolation would allow for an exception when required by Britain's national interests. He was clearly willing to enter into bilateral agreements, as witnessed by his overtures to Russia regarding China in January, 1898. And yet, Salisbury was certainly seen by many
of his colleagues as the last, determined defender of 'splendid isolation'. The vagueness and ambiguity of the Salisbury approach to foreign policy is conveyed in a speech he delivered at Caernarvon on April 10, 1888:

"We belong to a great community of nations, and we have no right to shrink from the duties which the interests of the community impose upon us. There is all the difference in the world between good-natured, good-humoured effort to keep well with your neighbours, and that spirit of haughty and sullen isolation which has been dignified by the name of 'non-intervention'. We are part of the community of Europe, and we must do our duty as such."

Salisbury's hesitancy to commit himself was a frustration to many. Joseph Chamberlain clearly was among the most dissatisfied with Salisbury's methods of addressing the unprecedented threats that seemed to surround Britain as never before. He voiced his frustration as well as that of many others, when he spoke in a Commons debate of June, 1898:

"We are the most powerful Empire in the world; but not all powerful... Nobody ever talked of a permanent alliance. All I said was that the policy of this country, hitherto well known to all nations of the world and declared again and again, was that we would not accept any alliance... but once it became known that we are willing to consider alliances, I do not think we shall find the difficulty right Honourable Gentlemen suggest in getting offers well worth our consideration."

In the end, under heavy pressure from a Cabinet anxious to introduce new directions in British foreign policy, Salisbury relinquished his post as Foreign Secretary in the Unionist Government to Lord Lansdowne in November, 1900. Lansdowne, much like Chamberlain, saw the very real dangers of England's global position and the very finite limits to British power (particularly as at the time of his move to the Foreign Office, Britain was bogged down in the surprisingly costly Boer War) and, as such, was not averse to an outright abandonment of isolation if it would prove of practical benefit. But his new perspective was perhaps not so radical a departure after all, for as we have seen, the tenures of Rosebery and Salisbury as Foreign Secretary had been punc-
uated with both successful and abortive approaches to other powers with offers of 'an arrangement'. This history of frantic, if often unrewarded, diplomatic activity points up the fact that Salisbury and Rosebery were as uncomfortable with Britain's situation as many of their colleagues. The dizzying succession of bilateral agreements betrayed their insecurity. But somehow they always found themselves unable to take the final step and conclude a binding alliance which the public had indicated it might be willing to countenance.

The question that had to be answered, once the necessity of some sort of alliance was finally accepted, was what options were available. The astonishing variety of diplomatic activity of the 1890's argued persuasively that, at least as far as practical considerations were concerned, British alliance options were equally varied. Chamberlain was speaking with the knowledge of an insider when he predicted that it would be an easy matter to obtain "offers well worth our consideration". But of course the options open to the Foreign Office were constrained by limitations other than geopolitical practicality alone. Economic realities, tradition, public sentiment, cultural affinity and that old Gladstonian yoke, international morality, all fitted into the equation.

Russia, along with Germany and France, presented interesting alliance possibilities, at least from the standpoint of expediency. She was traditionally a land power and as such, at least without the aid of maritime allies, presented no serious challenge to the Royal Navy's command of the sea lanes. The Russian army offered an attractive counterpoise, along Germany's eastern frontier, to the continental dominance of the German military machine. Her aid would prove invaluable in any future Anglo-German conflict. Russia, as a relatively underdeveloped
country, offered little industrial or commercial competition to Britain, unlike Germany. On the contrary, Russia represented a potential market for British goods and investment funds. But most importantly, Russia bordered on a large number of areas of vital, or at least significant, British interest: the Near East, Central Asia with its invasion routes to India, and China and the Far East. By 1890 British foreign policymakers were aware that all regions of Imperial interest could not be successfully defended while Britain remained non-aligned. Agreements would have to be made in some areas so that finite military resources could be better allocated and utilized. Since the entire Empire could not be protected militarily, some parts of it would have to be protected by treaty. The idea of an agreement with Russia was an attractive consideration to the men at the Foreign Office and the War Office because it guaranteed the security of the most valuable and most vulnerable jewel in the Imperial Crown, India. Even though India may have been more of an economic liability than the asset she was generally thought to be, "she did serve to conceal basic weaknesses in the home economy." And her value in psychological terms was immeasurable. Most Britons would have agreed with Lord Curzon's assessment that "as long as we rule India, we are the greatest power in the world. If we lose it, we shall drop straight away to a third-rate power." 

Accommodation with Russia was required in order to ensure the safety of the Indian subcontinent. But more than either Germany or France, any serious approach to Tsarist Russia on the part of Britain would be burdened with the baggage of a century-old tradition of animosity, distrust, and fear. The Foreign Office had seen fit to conclude a restricted agreement with her in 1899 in the Far East and had approached her for limited
understandings concerning other matters on several occasions during the decade. But Lord Lansdowne had to ask himself in 1900 whether it was politically feasible to submit to Russia a proposal for a more formal, comprehensive, and binding agreement. Lansdowne wrote to Sir Charles Scott, British ambassador in St. Petersburg, in April, 1901, "[w]e shall certainly not reject an overture [from the Russian Government], if one is made to us; and you cannot do wrong in repeating that we wish to be friends." The foundations for such sentiments had been laid in the anxieties of the 1890's. It remained to be seen if they would lead to anything further.
FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS PLACE IN EDWARDIAN SOCIETY: THE FOREIGN OFFICE, THE PUBLIC AND THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Because of the burden of so many longstanding emotional and ideological barriers separating Great Britain and Tsarist Russia, before beginning an examination of the evolution of Anglo-Russian relations in the late-Victorian era it is necessary first that we briefly consider what individuals, groups and institutions would participate in a reorientation in British foreign policy toward Russia as a reaction to the growing pessimism regarding Britain's international position. As a pluralistic society Britain might have been expected to base at least the general tenor of its international policies upon a compromise arrangement hammered out in the domestic political arena between competing repositories of power within the social system; political parties, classes, labor unions, the Press, special interest groups, economic circles, etc. However, the formulation of British foreign policy in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods did not completely fulfill such grandiose expectations. Certain portions of the equation were excluded from any but the most peripheral impact on the decision-making process, and the contributions of most of the other groups were seriously constrained.

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In the wave of post-Crimean War government reforms the Foreign Office had not remained untouched. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853 had prodded Lord Clarendon (Foreign Secretary 1853-8) to introduce the use of entrance examinations for the Foreign Office and a 'qualifying' exam for the Diplomatic Service.¹ The latter consisted of the ability to translate written English into French, as well as Latin, German, Spanish, or Italian into English, speak fluent French, have some knowledge of geo-
graphy and post-1789 European history in combination with some familiarity with the politics and foreign affairs of the country to which the diplomat was to be assigned.\(^2\) The entrance examination standards, by contrast, were much less stringent, leading Charles Spring-Rice to remark before an 1861 Select Committee that the "test is not much more than an ordinary boy of fourteen, with a poor education, ought to be able to answer."\(^3\)

Spring-Rice certainly exaggerated the ease of the exam. It, along with the diplomatic qualifying test, was designed to reflect knowledge gleaned from a typical upper-class public school education. As such, there was not even the semblance of open competition for positions. To receive permission to sit for the exam, nomination was required from the Foreign Secretary. Even by the 1880's and the Ministry of Lord Salisbury, applicants from families unfamiliar to him or to his private secretary were a great rarity.\(^4\) In addition, those recruited to the Diplomatic Service were expected to have a private source of income—another stumbling block for those with more humble origins.\(^5\)

In short, the Foreign Service remained a bastion of privilege, "the last choice reserve of administration practised as a sport."\(^6\) And the Service was confirmed in its defence of such an inegalitarian system. When nominations were transferred from the province of the Foreign Office to a Board of Selection in 1907 no real changes were anticipated, it being assumed that the

"Board of Selection will generally take what we may call perhaps one type of man, because he is the type of man who is fit for this international career called diplomacy. All... speaking metaphorically, speak the same language; they have the same habits of thought, and more or less the same points of view, and if anybody with a different language came in... he would be treated by the whole diplomatic service more or less with suspicion."\(^7\)

The fact that every Foreign Secretary before 1905 occupied a seat in the
House of Lords served only to highlight the Foreign Office as a special preserve of aristocratic privilege.

As aristocrats, the policy-makers of the Foreign Office saw themselves as removed from the prosaic world of everyday commerce and industry, often regarding it with condescension and contempt. It was only over the strenuous objections of Permanent Under-Secretary Edmund Hamilton that a Commercial Department was established within the Foreign Office in 1865. Despite their inexperience in finance and trade, the permanent officials were forced to concern themselves with these matters in the interest of the maintenance of British international power and prestige. But this belated concern manifested itself in a policy of general assistance for British commerce. Individual traders found their pleas for intervention of a more particular nature largely ignored. The same was true for international financiers (J.A. Hobson's arguments notwithstanding). As D.C.M. Platt remarks:

"There can be no doubt of the importance which British statesmen and officials were accustomed to attach to the security and maintenance of overseas trade. But the action they were prepared to take was limited by both their aristocratic tastes and prejudices and by the laissez-faire, Free Trade tradition of classical political economy."

Therefore British foreign policy-makers, although not immune to economic considerations, were rarely during this period, unduly influenced or pressured into action by self-interested groups of industrialists or financiers concerned with overseas events solely affecting their particular business affairs.

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The role of the working-class in the making of foreign policy was marginal at best. The serious public discussions of foreign policy carried on in newspapers and periodicals were, for the most part, at a level
of abstraction far beyond the understanding of the majority of the lower classes. What little was read among the masses about the subject was presented in a more simplified and popularized form. But even the Daily Mail, with its large leaders and streamlined stories, was read mainly by the lower middle-class and not the average manual laborer.\textsuperscript{11} The one advantage of the working-class, its numerical superiority, translated into votes at election time could certainly have influenced the decisions of the foreign policy-makers. However, elections were fought almost exclusively over domestic issues. Even the famous exception, the 'Khaki' election of 1900, is only an equivocal example of an election decided by non-domestic issues, and its effects were very short-lived.\textsuperscript{12}

The working-class was also handicapped by a franchise system which encompassed only a little over one-half of adult British males in 1899.\textsuperscript{13} The system of electoral restriction, combined with the traditional support of many radical working-class voters for Liberal candidates, and the exclusion of working-class candidates by local Liberal Committees\textsuperscript{14}, conspired to minimize parliamentary representation for the working-classes inside the Commons. In 1899 there were twelve trade-union leaders in Parliament, and all were Liberals. After the 1900 elections even this small number had fallen by one-quarter.\textsuperscript{15} At the same time the Independent Labour Party had only 51 branches with about 4000 members. The Labour Representation Committee did manage to get two of its own, Keir Hardie and Richard Bell, elected in the 1900 election. But Bell soon reclaimed his former affiliation with the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{16} The working-classes, faced with these obstacles, were in no position to decisively affect the framing of late-Victorian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{17}

Although it could to a certain extent ignore the working-classes
and exclusive economic interests, the Foreign Office found more formid-
able opponents in Parliament and the Press, and among what might be
termed the non-policy-making elite. These were the literate, respectable
middle-classes concerned with gaining a voice in the exercise of British
power overseas. One channel through which they could exert their influ-
ence was the periodical. Several hundred reviews, magazines, and week-
lies that could lay a claim to the title of 'literature' were printed
in Britain during the nineteenth century, and they commanded a large
amount of prestige and influence. Their readership was "the articulate
classes, whose writing and conversation made opinion." Periodicals
presented an extra-official avenue for the expression of considered pub-
lic opinion on foreign policy, which, it was hoped by readers, authors,
and publishers alike, might lead to the translation of that opinion into
policy. The periodical was also to act as a conduit in the reverse dire-
tection as Walter Bagehot noted in the National Review for October, 1855:

"On politics, on religion, on all less important topics still more, every one
thinks himself competent to think,— in some casual manner does think, to the
best of our means must be taught to think— rightly. Even if we had a profound
and far-seeing statesman, his deep ideas and long reaching vision would be use-
less to us, unless we impart confidence in them to the mass of influential per-
sons, to the unelected Commons, the unchosen Council, who assist in the deli-
beration of the nation... We must speak to the many so that they will listen
... that they will understand."

And Bagehot well understood that confidence in the "far-seeing states-
man" could be undermined as easily as bolstered by periodical commentary.

Zara Steiner writes that "the 'third estate' could be a formidable
critic but no foreign secretary changed his stand as a result of a lea-
der-writer." Perhaps for any individual decision set in isolation that
statement is accurate. But in a more general sense the issue is cer-
tainly of much greater complexity. Lord Clarendon had written in 1869
that "Governments no more than individuals can afford nowadays to despise
public opinion." This assertion was possibly even more true thirty years later, but its ill-defined nature remained. Perhaps public opinion was indeed so important that it could not be ignored, but what was its actual contribution to foreign policy? Of course it did not dictate the day-to-day moves of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Corps. Harold Spender in a September, 1905 Contemporary Review article entitled "Is Public Opinion Supreme?", did not even mention foreign affairs, in all likelihood indicating his uncertainty in the matter. Statements by different Foreign Secretaries (all of course made in a specific context) are disparate and confusing with regard to the power of public opinion to shape policy, but all seem to agree that it had a significant role to play. The Spectator accused Lord Salisbury of regarding public opinion as "a kind of blind external force" which he was forced to "partly obey and partly get round by oblique methods." Lord Lansdowne went so far as to warn the German ambassador in 1905 that "if Germany lightheartedly were to provoke a war against France, it was impossible to foresee how far public opinion in England would push the Government to support France", implying that not only could public opinion endorse or condemn Government foreign policy decisions, it could actually seize the initiative and direct policy itself. This of course assumed an unambiguous, united front of opinion exercised over a well-defined issue. And such singleness of purpose was certainly a rare, if not unknown occurrence in British international affairs during the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods.

This sort of clear public statement on foreign policy was lacking because in the opinion of The Spectator:

"[I]n truth public opinion is perfectly fluid. The ordinary Englishman, though he reads many foreign telegrams, is in reality singularly ignorant about international matters. He does not in the least understand the play of forces abroad,
and he is puzzled by the varying complications of the diplomatic kaleidoscope.

... That being so, when any incident takes place or any new-movement is developed, he looks for guidance as to which view he should take and which side he should support."

The remedy proposed being:

"If... the men who know could take the trouble and have the courage to keep the country properly guided and informed on the main issues of foreign affairs, a very different state of public opinion would grow up from that which at present exists."  

The Spectator meant the officials of the Foreign Office when it referred to "the men who know". But as is clear from Bagehot's statement quoted earlier, there were others who saw themselves in the role of educators and shapers of public opinion on foreign policy. And the Foreign Office seemed to be satisfied with just such an arrangement. There was little interest among its permanent officials in supplying the public with any detailed information in an effort to instruct as well as manipulate the weight of opinion behind any chosen course of action. Interested and knowledgeable laymen had little or no access to the Foreign Secretary or other Foreign Office policy-makers. Certainly no forum for public discussion between the two parties existed.  

Consistent with its aristocratic nature the Foreign Office was content, for the most part, to allow public opinion to pursue its own path. Only a very limited amount of information was made available to interested parties. In fact it is true to say that as the political arena in Britain underwent a gradual democratization in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was paralleled by increasing restrictions on foreign affairs publications.  

"The attitude which has been adopted by those who represent the British Empire in the diplomatic arena may be entirely defensible; and it is possible that if the nation were behind the scenes of the drama, the acts done in its name would receive its entire approval. But it is not behind the scenes; it is not even a spectator of the play; and it has no opportunity either of approving or condemning until it is far too late for either approval or condemnation to be of the smallest practical avail. For years past, it has abandoned its supervision over the management of its external affairs."
The Fortnightly Review mourned this apparent lack of interest, but actually the public had not abandoned the management of its international affairs. As each Foreign Secretary clearly realized, the public could bring to bear a certain degree of control over foreign policy which could never be completely discounted. Keeping this in mind, the seeming unconcern exhibited by the Foreign Office in exercising some control over the formation of public opinion is puzzling. The perception of autonomy within the Foreign Office in the formulation and execution of policy decisions was true in a very real, but also very limited sense. Weekly or monthly alterations in public sentiment did not shake such decisions. But on a broader scale, deep currents in public opinion developing over years, or even decades, were certain to exert an influence which could, in the end, prove decisive in molding the general directions of policy. Even Lord Salisbury, accused of attempting to sidestep public opinion "by oblique methods", acknowledged the power ultimately wielded by it:

"If the Government promised to declare war for an object which did not commend itself to public opinion, the promise would be repudiated, and the Government would be turned out... We have no means whatever of knowing what might be the humour of our people in circumstances which cannot be foreseen... The course of the English Government... must depend on the view taken by public opinion of this country..."

But even if it truly was the final arbiter of British foreign policy, a large segment of the literate, well-informed public was not satisfied with its passive, silent-partner role. The Foreign Office found itself under attack from both sides of the political spectrum in the years between 1890 and the Great War, not only in regard to particular policy decisions, but in a much more fundamental way. The very manner in which international affairs were conducted was called into question as was the competence of the men orchestrating policy. The Conservative Press accused them of unnecessary secrecy, inefficiency, and ineptitude:
"No other executive department is carried on under such conditions of mystery as that of our foreign affairs; none are so impenetrable to the light of day... By their very constitution our diplomatic departments escape those conditions of friction, competition, and accountability which are essential to all efficiency, and they are protected in the special vices which tend to degeneration. The Foreign Office to-day is more than inefficient, it is almost worse than useless."

Drastic changes were called for to alleviate this deficiency:

"[A]'s regards the Foreign Office no measure would be efficacious that stopped short of reforming it altogether. Nothing less than the reconstitution of our whole external service will suffice for the growing needs of the empire."

The voices of Moderate Liberal opinion echoed these sentiments. They were as convinced as their political rivals of the incompetence of the Foreign Office. And they were equally dissatisfied with their own apparent exclusion from the policy-making process. But Liberal criticism originated from more abstract concerns than efficiency and "the growing needs of the empire":

"People are asking themselves not merely whether our policy is satisfactory, but how is it being shaped, who is really responsible for it, and how are we to ensure that in this department of government, affecting us so closely in trade, honour, in reputation and in every aspect of our national life, the interests and wishes of the nation as a whole shall be expressed. Here, at least, it is evident that democracy, as at present understood, has utterly failed to make itself felt. Neither in our own country, nor in any country of Europe, do the people exercise any direct control over international relations."

Direct control over foreign affairs was interpreted as a natural concomitant of political democratization. But such an evolution was blocked by an elitist clique, "autocrats" composed of "a little group of statesmen and Ministers settling the whole matter in secret conclave and by exchange of secret dispatches."

Radical Liberal and Socialist positions were inconsistent. At times the Socialists regarded foreign policy as a "conspiracy conducted behind the backs of 'the people'." The principal aim of this conspiracy was to buttress the power of the ruling-classes by keeping foreign affairs free from the interference of democracy:
"Ever since 1832, the upper classes in England have been faced with the problem of retaining as much as possible of the substance of power while abandoning the forms to the clamours of democrats... In foreign affairs, their ascendency, threatened by the Manchester School and Gladstone... recovered... and survived even the collapse of 1906."

At other times they ignored foreign affairs almost entirely as an inconsequential sideshow that would squander energy better applied toward agitation for domestic social reform. Keir Hardie reportedly told Charles Dilke that he chose not to vote on any division on foreign affairs during the Parliament of 1892-3 for just this reason.

But most commonly their criticisms of foreign affairs followed the lead of mainstream Liberalism. Even so ardent a Socialist as Robert Blatchford, editor for The Clarion, who wrote in 1909, "I have never been a comrade of the Liberals. I have never marched under the Liberal banner. I have always opposed the Liberals", could follow the Liberal lead in attacking the secretiveness of the Foreign Office. "One of the things the public should insist upon is that, save in cases where publicity would be dangerous, the whole of the facts in all foreign negotiations and operations should be made known."

In a representative democracy Parliament would appear to have been the logical institution through which a redress of grievances could be obtained. But constitutional constraints made this difficult at best. Parliament depended upon the Government for all of its information on foreign affairs. It could not initiate policy, but rather only seek clarification and question what had already been done. Formal obligations, including secret treaties, could be assumed with no Parliamentary discussion or even knowledge. Parliament had only a limited, indirect effect on the entire process. Debates on foreign policy were infrequent and poorly attended. Daily Question Time provided the most common form
of Parliamentary discussion on international affairs. The growing dissatisfaction with the entire apparatus is indicated by the increase in the annual number of questions from 129 at mid-century to 6448 by 1901.\textsuperscript{45} The frustrations arising from Parliament's impotence fueled a sustained movement for the creation of a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee beginning in the 1890's, a movement that invariably encountered resistance from both front benches.\textsuperscript{46}

With Parliamentary avenues closed to them it is not surprising to find that parties interested in exerting some measure of influence in the formulation and direction of foreign policy turned to extra-Parliamentary committees and pressure groups. Traditionally such organizations had been mainly concerned with 'progressive' aims. However, in response to the newly found anxiety over a possible decline in British power, groups were now formed around conservative consolidationist and protectionist concerns.\textsuperscript{47} Examples of this type include the Navy League (1895)\textsuperscript{48} which claimed 15,000 members by 1901; the National Service League (1901), arising as an answer to the military humiliation of the Boer War and claiming 35,000 members by 1909\textsuperscript{49}; the Imperial Federation League (1884), reacting to increasing anxieties about the loss of Britain's preeminent position in world commerce by calling for a strengthening of Imperial ties; the British Empire League (1894), first-cousin to the IFL\textsuperscript{50}; the Tariff Reform League (1903), supporting Chamberlain's answer to economic decline; and the remarkably named Committee to Promote a Policy of Resistance to the Ascendancy of Russia and other Foreign Powers in China (1898).\textsuperscript{51} And alongside these new organizations the older tradition of progressive groups flourished through the efforts of such foundations as the National Peace Council, the Anglo-German Friendship Society, the Society of Friends
of Russian Freedom, and the Anglo-Russian Committee, to name only a few among many.\footnote{52}

The actual effectiveness of all this organization and activity is difficult to assess. The leagues, committees, and societies were composed of intelligent, literate members (journalists, scholars, politicians, clergymen\footnote{53}, or even a former Foreign Office official\footnote{54}) of the middle, and sometimes even the upper-classes\footnote{55}, all eager as we have seen, to voice their opinions about the directions British foreign policy should take. But the activities of the groups, even when their sympathies coincided, were uncoordinated and in varying stages of disagreement about precise objectives.\footnote{56} And the means to be undertaken to achieve these ends were likewise, a constant source of dissension, even within individual committees.\footnote{57}

With the uncertain and limited effectiveness of Parliament and pressure groups as avenues for the expression of literate public opinion on foreign policy issues, the Press, both daily newspapers and periodicals, represented the most likely alternative. In 1901 over twenty-five hundred newspapers, including 510 in London alone, were published in Great Britain. Added to that were more than 1000 magazine publications.\footnote{58} Every shade of political opinion was represented within these impressive numbers. There was no doubt among some contemporaries that this immense volume was readily translated into influence. Lord Salisbury, in a bit of ironic exaggeration, wrote to Canon MacColl in 1901:

"The diplomacy of nations is now conducted quite as much in the letters of special correspondents, as in the despatches of the Foreign Office."\footnote{59}

That this interference into areas beyond its competency was pernicious was argued even by newspapers (The Spectator):

"There can be no doubt that the Foreign Office and some of its more important
agents abroad are terribly hampered and embarrassed by the British [Press] methods of securing information."

and newspaper editors (William T. Stead):

"If there is one thing more than another upon which I found that every one was agreed in my tour around Europe, it was that much of our modern journalism is the most potent weapon yet invented by the devil for banishing peace and goodwill from the world."61

But perhaps such rarified rhetoric hides more than it reveals. This was the era of the 'new journalism', launched by Alfred Harmsworth and his Daily Mail. (Ironically enough, W.T. Stead, quoted above as a critic of the influence of the new journalism on foreign affairs, was the innovator who had introduced into English journalism many of the techniques later refined by Harmsworth.62) Circulation of the Daily Mail averaged over 750,000 during the Edwardian years.63 But the papers and periodicals which were read by the policy-making elite were those with the real influence. A paper like the Daily Mail could boast of its readership approaching one million, but as regards the formulation of foreign policy, it was essentially a cipher.64 The effects of "modern journalism" execrated by Stead were actually of only marginal consequence in the still restricted preserve of international affairs.

There were no official links between the Foreign Office and Fleet Street.65 No Press Bureau then existed. The Foreign Secretary had almost no dealings with the Press directly. This task was reserved for his private secretary or one of the senior permanent-officials. One journalist described the cold and indifferent reception he might expect from the Foreign Office:

"Here he was ushered into a chilly waiting room by a still more chilly attendant, and after having declared his business was left to his own reflections for an indefinite time. Then the attendant would return, probably munching toast if it was tea-time... and with a lofty air would announce: 'The Foreign Office has no communication to make, but it may issue a statement later'."66
But while no formal contacts existed, there was a rather Byzantine, unofficial interchange between the two institutions. Lord Palmerston had written in 1831:

"The fact is that the only influence that my office possesses over the Courier or any other paper is positive not negative. I could get him [the editor] to insert any article I wished today but I have no means or power of preventing him from inserting any other of quite a different kind tomorrow. I can compel but I cannot control."68

Eighty years later Grey, in a speech to the Commons, would not even go as far as that:

"Certain representative newspapers and Press agencies receive any communication with regard to foreign affairs which are suitable for publication. Such information is, for the most part, confined to appointments and changes in His Majesty's Diplomatic Service. If inquiries are made at the Foreign Office with regard to specific facts they are answered when it is possible to do so without prejudice to public or private interests... There is no regular organization in connection with the Foreign Office for inspiring any Press agency or newspaper in order to put forward, either officially or semi-officially, the news of His Majesty's Government with regard to Foreign Affairs."69

Palmerston was certainly closer to the mark than Grey. The Foreign Office had over the years carried on an unofficial, symbiotic relationship with The Times which, independent of party affiliation, would usually strongly support the Government's policies. (Of course, there were many exceptions to this.70) Valentine Chirol, foreign editor of The Times from 1896-1912, was an old Foreign Office hand and retained many of his contacts with strategically-placed permanent-officials. He was a frequent visitor to Pembroke and Malmesbury Houses.71 Combined with its non-partisan stance and the great admiration and respect its quality of journalism engendered in the higher echelons of Government, this backstairs connection allowed The Times to exercise an amount of influence over foreign policy that was out of all proportion to its circulation figures. Abroad The Times was read and regarded as a semi-official Government paper.72 Herbert Bismarck and his father were certainly con-
vinced of the importance and influence of The Times and its Government connections, requesting of the British Cabinet in 1885 "to do everything possible to influence The Times in the future to discontinue opening its columns to its correspondents uncritically." 73

The Times was not alone in making its presence felt. While the mass circulation newspapers were generally ignored, warranting attention only as potential troublemakers 74, the more serious papers and periodicals, as important sources of literate opinion, were read regularly and carefully by the Foreign Secretary and permanent officials. 75 These policy-makers were sensitive to the barbs launched by the Press. Harold Spender noted that, "If a newspaper criticized a Foreign Secretary too severely he had a very simple means of punishment— he closed the door of the Foreign Office to that paper..." 76

Chirol was not unique among editors in possessing intimate Foreign Office contacts. 77 Informal links between influential Press organs and the Foreign Office were quite extensive and considered important by both parties. The Diplomatic Service also considered contacts with foreign-based British correspondents as essential to the efficient performance of their duties. A correspondent's information was usually earlier and frequently more accurate than that of the diplomat. 78 Because of their "intelligent anticipation of facts before they occur" ambassadors and other overseas functionaries, as well as those in the Foreign Office back in London, kept a watchful eye on the published reports of these foreign correspondents. 79

Merely because high-level politicians were attentive to the more literate publications gives no quantitative confirmation of influence. But the intricate web of contacts and the protestations by all the For-
eign Secretaries of the final, indisputable supremacy of public opinion indicates that in some way, the newspapers and journals were taken seriously by the Government. W.T. Stead saw the power of the Press originating in its unique role as the one true gauge in British society of public opinion. For him the Press conducted "an exhaustive interrogation of public opinion" presenting to the Government at any point in time "an unmistakable demonstration of what the opinion of the people really is." Sidney Low was less assured:

"How can any Minister know? He reads (if he is industrious) half a dozen newspapers daily. He gains from them the views of half a dozen or a dozen men, perhaps penetrating and judicious, perhaps not, who have small opportunity of ascertaining the views of more than a very limited number of their fellow-countrymen."  

Low's lamentation confirms again the relative isolation of the Foreign Office from the vicissitudes of public opinion. But the situation that did obtain might have satisfied Bagehot quite well. A handful of respected and literate publications, containing perhaps only a skewed sample of mass sentiment, acted as the intermediary between the masses and the policy-makers. They composed Bagehot's "unchosen Council", instructing the Government and people alike.

* * * * * *

When the Conservatives were in power during the 1890's it meant, for practical purposes, a foreign policy formulated by Lord Salisbury. Conservative propaganda urged a strong external policy grounded upon practical considerations. Unhindered by the constraints of principle, the Conservatives were able to exhibit a flexibility in foreign policy that satisfied the dictates of Realpolitik. Convinced of the ineffectiveness of Gladstonian-style moralizing in the international arena, in 1885 Salisbury offered his sarcastic congratulations to his Liberal pre-
decessors. They had "at last achieved their long desired 'Concert of Europe'. They have succeeded in uniting the Continent of Europe— against England." Salisbury's policy for the next fifteen years was a consistent advance of British global claims while maintaining a flexibility derived from a stress laid on method over principle. Of course there were several unspoken tenets from which he would not deviate. War and diplomatic success so conspicuous as to excite envy were to be avoided. Cultivation of cordial relations with all powers but obligations to none would allow the best chance of success in the calculated pursuit of Britain's national interests. We have already seen that Salisbury was accused of regarding public opinion as a nuisance. Certainly his aristocratic bearing and the ironic and sarcastic style of his correspondence would support that conclusion.

Some might even consider that approach an advantage:

"Lord Salisbury has several qualifications that justify his claim to the Premiership. In one respect he stands unique among British statesmen. He is absolutely indifferent to the opinion or vagaries of the man in the street ... Lord Salisbury unfettered by House of Commons ties, is able to go the full length of his natural tendency. So far from timidly waiting to serve the caprices of the Man in the Street nothing gives him keener delight than to tweak him by the nose." But his attitude was more complicated. Salisbury always maintained that the English people were the final arbiters of foreign policy. In a letter of 18 August, 1892 to the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office Salisbury could write, "The action of an English ministry must depend on the national feeling at the moment..." Perhaps much of this concern was posturing to gain leverage in diplomatic negotiations. He was particularly adept at using arguments based upon the peculiarities of Britain's constitution to avoid making concessions or entering into obligations.
But Salisbury's invocation of these checks on his power was not solely a cynical strategem. Very conscious of the limits under which he labored, at times he might even have exaggerated them. His uncertainty and inconsistency in this regard contrasted noticeably with the calm, calculating assurance he exhibited when faced with more familiar variables in the arithmetic of international diplomacy. Uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the changes wrought by the expanded electorate and the 'new journalism', he sometimes might have overestimated their influence. Salisbury was unconvinced of his ability to lead public opinion and made little or no attempt in that direction. And yet, despite this reluctance, anxiety over a perceived lack of public support could affect his policies. In the Near Eastern Crisis of 1895-6 he hesitated to provide the Ottoman Sultan with guarantees of British aid against Russia, a move he saw as consistent with Britain's material interests, because of his concern that the public would refuse to go to war on behalf of a ruler guilty of atrocities.

Lord Lansdowne, regarded by some as less sensitive than his predecessor to the constraint of public opinion on foreign policy, nevertheless retained a healthy respect for the power of national sentiment. When considering a defensive alliance with Germany in 1901 he wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin:

"His Excellency [Count Metternich, the new German Ambassador to St. James], who is familiar with public life in this country, must be well aware of the suspicion with which any entanglement in foreign alliances was regarded by a large part of the British public... This would be represented as a new and onerous obligation, and we should have considerable difficulty in defending ourselves for wishing to incur it... it was undoubtedly... a very stiff fence to ride at."

Lansdowne did not feel therefore, "that for the moment we could afford to take it up."
Liberal foreign policy did not present such a united front as their Conservative counterpart. The traditional origins of Liberal theories of foreign relations were varied and, to a certain extent, contradictory. Contributions came from a wide range of sources; Richard Cobden, T.H. Green, J.S. Mill, W.E. Gladstone, and John Morley among others.93 Much of the post-1865 period was spent trying to shake the incubus of the Palmerstonian brand of Realpolitik. During his years as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Palmerston had adopted a policy of nominal support for liberal ideals in international relations while in reality maneuvering always to defend and forward British national interests.94 What made his Liberal bedfellows uncomfortable was the apparent transparency of his moral pronouncements and his methods, often involving intervention, war, and the threat of war.

The alternative to Palmerston was an amalgam of ideas. The Manchester School contributed an allegiance to pacifism and non-intervention "except in so far as it affects the honour and interest of England", as phrased by John Bright.95 Mill and the Utilitarians added the idea of the state as the instrument for the protection of individual natural rights and liberties. T.H. Green, adapting the notion of Kantian moral freedom to British liberalism, insisted upon the duty and obligation of the application of morality to foreign policy.96 Gladstone, oftentimes a critic of Palmerston, was in agreement with Green. In his third Midlothian Campaign speech he enumerated his six principles of foreign policy: to foster domestic strength through just legislation and economy, to preserve to the nations of the world the blessings of peace, to maintain the Concert of Europe, to avoid needless entanglements, to acknowledge the equal rights of all nations, and finally, that the foreign pol-
The compatibility of Gladstone and the Cobdenite Radicals was never secure. He agreed with them that free trade would promote world unity and international peace. But Gladstone was more concerned with the maintenance of public law in Europe. The implications of this priority were that intervention was not ruled out on moral grounds. Force applied under the aegis of the Concert of Europe and in the name of morality was acceptable to Gladstone. The latent conflict emerged in 1876 during the Bulgarian Agitation. With Gladstone and his supporters clamoring for some action against the 'unspeakable Turk', even if it meant alliance with Russia, the Cobdenite faction dissented. H.M. Hyndman, not yet a Socialist, "could not see that the desire to emancipate Christian... populations... was sufficient justification for supporting Russia."

Gladstone's patronage of a Concert of Europe, morality, and liberal principles in international relations, however shortlived, captured the imagination and allegiance of a large segment of the Radical Liberals (despite his Egyptian policy which left them feeling confused and betrayed). The depth of the Radical fidelity to this ideal comes across in the following excerpt from *The Speaker* which appeared in July, 1892:

"The principles that guided the external action of the Gladstone Ministry of 1880-85, and which, in spite of all difficulties, were steadily adhered to from first to last, were mainly these:— that the rights and interests of the British Empire could best be upheld and defended by scrupulously respecting the rights and interests of other Powers, and that this country was bound, not only by her past traditions, but also by her faith in the great cause of human freedom, to extend a generous sympathy to the efforts of oppressed and struggling nationalities."

The breakup of the Liberal consensus in the 1890's, catalyzed by Gladstone's uncompromising advocacy of Irish Home Rule, left the Party divided in foreign policy as on other issues. The Radicals retained their support for some sort of close cooperation between nations within a Concert
of Europe. While vigorously opposed to alliances, they were very much in favor of cordial relations with other 'appropriate' Powers. The measuring stick for such friendship was the political complexion of the other country.\textsuperscript{102} Progressive, democratic, liberal regimes were to be favored by Britain's friendship; autocratic, repressive regimes were not. In the midst of all this, Britain was still somehow to retain a level of detachment which would allow her to exercise what was perceived by the Radicals as her traditional role of international mediator.\textsuperscript{103} The label Radical was used to encompass a range of differing opinion. Therefore it is not surprising that seldom did an unbroken consensus on foreign policy issues emerge from their ranks.

Herbert Samuel wrote in 1902:

"Two doctrines compete for the general guidance of international affairs... The ideal of one is cosmopolitanism; of the other it is strictly national. One holds that the State has duties to all mankind; the other that the State's duties are limited to its own subjects. One is inspired in its dealings with foreign op- tions by a spirit of goodwill, the other by a spirit of latent hostility."

He was referring to the contrast between Bismarckianism and liberalism, but he could just as easily have been describing the fin-de-siècle split in the Liberal Party's outlook on foreign policy. A small but influential group known as the Liberal Imperialists emerged within the Party in the 1890's to challenge the Radicals and their allegiance to Gladstonian principles. Led by such men as Lord Rosebery, Edward Grey, R.B. Haldane, and H.H. Asquith, this faction adhered to the view that the basis of Conservative foreign policy was sound and should be supported by the Liberals in opposition and continued by them when in office. For the Liberal Imperialists the most reliable criteria for judging policy were the dictates of realism, not morality. Efficiency was to be stressed through the application of business principles. The Liberal Imperialists:
"looked at foreign relations as matters not for copy book maxims but for business men— that while desiring peaceful or pleasant relations with everybody, as all sensible people must, they were of the opinion that those could only be maintained by conducting affairs on a business-like footing."  

Their opposition to the traditions of Liberal foreign policy arose in large measure over a concern with the deterioration of Britain's world position.  

Gladstonian methods were unrealistic in the face of the new, less-promising situation. Britain no longer had the luxury of expending her resources in the service of humanitarian causes. She must husband these resources for her own survival. They were:

"Not prepared to gratify the noblest and most philanthropic sentiment... wherever some of our critics in the world may say, ... the heart of England and Scotland is still as sensitive as it always has been to the spectacle of unmerited suffering and triumphant oppression— [but] we cannot forget that we are trustees of a Great Empire, inhabited by men and women of our own flesh and blood, that our first duty, as well as our first interest, is to do nothing which will imperil the security of that priceless possession."  

Situated between the Radical and Liberal Imperialist extremes it is not surprising to find a third, more moderate group devoted to "peace, retrenchment, and reform."  

The sympathy of these Liberals lay with the traditions of Gladstone, but they found themselves unable to deny the force of many of the arguments of the Liberal Imperialists. The ideological splits within the Party were laid open by the furor over the Boer War. The Radicals, opposed to an immoral war which disgraced England in the eyes of the world, ranged themselves on the side of the so-called 'Pro-Boers'. The Liberal Imperialists supported the Unionist Government's vigorous pursuit of the conflict, while the Moderate Liberals, led now by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, attempted to find some issue that would keep the Party intact. In 1900 the Annual Register estimated that within Parliament there were 68 Radical Liberals, 62 Liberal Imperialists, and 30 members of the Campbell-Bannerman group. Amid the confusion of this factionalism the Liberal Imperialists were anxious to make
their beliefs orthodoxy, to capture the leadership of the Party. 112 But outmaneuvered politically by Campbell-Bannerman, by 1902 they were forced to admit, at least privately, that they constituted only a minority opinion in the Party. 113 Despite this acknowledgement however, the influence of the Liberal Imperialists remained pre-eminent in foreign affairs, if not in other areas of Party philosophy, allowing them to insist upon Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary in the negotiations with Campbell-Bannerman preceding the Liberal return to office in 1905. 114

Gladstone had made direct appeal to the public on foreign policy issues one of the main supports of his application of morality to the field of international relations. It was only natural that the Radicals and Moderate Liberals should continue to see a direct link between public opinion and foreign policy decisions. Noel Buxton, one of the most vocal of Radical critics on foreign policy issues, declared in 1912 that the Foreign Secretary:

"is a trustee for views with which he many not agree. We are concerned to emphasize that principle, but to insist that in acting as a trustee of public opinion it is essential that public opinion should be rightly and justly interpreted." 115

It also was the Radical wing of the Party which was the driving force behind the demand for a closer Parliamentary scrutiny of the Foreign Office. 116

The Liberal Imperialists, unlike their rivals for Party hegemony, exhibited much of the enigmatic Conservative posture toward the role of outsiders in the control of foreign affairs. The London Observer could write that Lord Rosebery "frequently shows himself... [as an] interpreter of that instinct of common sense and broad humanity which has come to be typified as the Man in the Street." 117 Sir William Harcourt, Rosebery's chief rival for leadership of the Liberal Party after Gladstone's resig-
nation, gives this record of a conversation with Rosebery. "I said that I was of the opinion that the Foreign Secretary should communicate as fully and freely with the Leader of the House of Commons as he did with the Prime Minister. To this Lord Rosebery agreed..." But later Harcourt, having assumed leadership of the Commons under Rosebery's premiership, complained:

"The House of Commons has a right to expect that I shall answer to them for the Foreign Policy of the Government. The only answer that I can now return is that the Foreign Policy of the Government is transacted by the First Lord of the Treasury and the Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords, and that they take particular care that I shall know nothing of these Foreign Affairs." Rosebery's protean nature allowed him to be seen alternatively as the careful interpreter of the "Man in the Street" or as the stubborn defender of the Foreign Office aristocratic privilege and secretiveness.

Edward Grey is as difficult to pin down on the question as Salisbury and Rosebery. At times he appeared firm in his support of the supremacy of public opinion in foreign affairs. He could write to Sir Arthur Nicolson in October, 1908:

"I told him [M. Isvolsky] frankly that the opinion of the Cabinet was that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to get public opinion here to accept." And still later in an unpublished memorandum he argued that:

"The idea that one individual, sitting in a room in the Foreign Office, could pledge a great democracy definitely by his word, in advance, either to take part in a great war or to abstain from taking part in it, is absurd." But he could as easily say that although the direction of foreign policy by public opinion was an attractive theory, "many of the shortcomings of democratic government are due to the fact that public opinion is not necessarily a great statesman at all." In this vein he was to approve the fateful Anglo-French military conversations in January, 1906, of which even the Cabinet was to remain ignorant for more than five
years. The Nation complained in 1907:

"It was thought, when the Foreign Office was entrusted to a commoner, that some advance was being made towards a more open and democratic conduct of our external policy."

But, much to the chagrin of the Radical wing of the Party, it had found Grey to be "the most autocratic Foreign Minister of our time." The public's acquisition of information was carefully monitored through limited access granted to the Press and Parliament on Foreign Office terms and through selective document publication. The public, literate and otherwise, was to varying degrees dissatisfied with the arrangement but had very little means at its disposal to alter the imbalance. Voicing their grievances in the Commons, the Press, and at the polls while organizing into pressure groups for the advocacy of specific causes, the public could see its opinions aired but was uncertain if they were ever translated into action.

The Foreign Office's central concern always remained the forwarding of the national interests of Great Britain. Their approach was both pragmatic and flexible. The permanent-officials had never been entirely comfortable with the Gladstonian interlude when high moral purpose and practicality clashed. The cautious, rational calculation of a Lord Salisbury was more suited to their tastes. Using moral exhortation, Gladstone had on occasion roused the people of Great Britain to take an active interest in international affairs. That interest was to flow from ideological considerations, not pragmatism. In the intervening periods public attention to foreign affairs was only fitful (much as was Gladstone's), but the gradual democratization and liberalization of the
British social and political landscape, the growth of working-class voting power, the new unionism, the rise of the mass Press, had all combined to make the conduct of British foreign policy an anachronism by the 1890's. Conservative Governments after Gladstone attempted to return to the way things had been before. But they were less sure of their ground domestically. As a result, Conservative and Liberal Imperialist Foreign Secretaries alike kept one foot in each camp, declaring the ultimate power of public opinion to control foreign affairs and often completely disregarding that declaration in action.

Dissent in the area of foreign affairs was not a new phenomenon, but previously had been ignored with impunity as an inconsequential nuisance. Now for the first time the policy-making elite were forced to come to terms with their critics. As we have seen, Salisbury, Lansdowne, Rosebery, and Grey all realized that too large a discontinuity between the official mind and public opinion would mean disaster for the Government. But no real mechanism for an integration of the two existed. The Foreign Office somehow had to make its decisions, based upon practicality and the realities of power politics, palatable to a public that was as concerned with ideology as it was with material and strategic advantages. Yet the Foreign Office rarely paid any attention to the shaping of public opinion. In the diplomatic atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity that prevailed in the 1890's there was no initiative taken by the Government to educate the populace about what the relative decline in British power would do to foreign policy options. The lead in this area was taken instead by the Press, the periodical Press in particular. They emerged as the mediating instrument between expectation and reality. Any integration that resulted would be a product of their efforts.
British relations with Tsarist Russia must be studied with this complex interrelation of forces always in mind. Any change in the public's perception of Russia or willingness to accept her as a friend of England, along with any adjustment in the official mind's appreciation of Russia as a strategic threat versus Russia as a potential ally, can be seen as part of a two-way process. The views of the public, both reflected and shaped by the Press, mingled with the Foreign Office's consciousness of the realities of power. The policy that emerged from this conjuncture was a resolution of many ingredients. Therefore not all parties could be completely satisfied. Criticism over any decision was certain to remain, but the efficacy of the machinery of integration would finally be measured by the depth of support that existed beneath the voices upraised in protest.
THE ENGLISH PUBLIC AND TSARIST RUSSIA: THE POLARIZATION OF OPINION

A random sampling of any of the most respected British magazines and journals would lend support to the notion that the image of Russia, her people, and her ruler was being subjected to a careful and exhaustive scrutiny beginning in the years immediately prior to 1890. The surge in interest in this backward, half-European, half-Oriental, traditionally hostile nation was, in the main, unprecedented.¹ And where before, the few articles which had appeared in print concerned almost exclusively Russia's place vis-à-vis Great Britain in the global game of diplomacy, now these were interspersed with essays on any number of subjects: internal Russian politics, the structure of Russian government, Russia's music and literature, her criminal code, her religion, her Jewish policy, the psychology of the typical Russian peasant. All of these topics and more suddenly found an eager and attentive audience. As the amount of published material multiplied, the literate, reading public found that old notions of Russia, ideas simple and prejudicial and based upon scanty evidence, required extensive revision. The old monolithic Russia of the past gradually gave way in the mind of Britain to a more diverse and complicated nation, filled with subtleties and contradictions not previously recognized. Inevitably the reconstruction of a different Russia to occupy the consciousness of the average Englishman was accompanied by some change in sympathies as well. Ambivalence and uncertainty would now reign where hatred, fear, and distrust had once held unrivaled sway. By 1901 the Fortnightly Review would observe that:

"English opinion is perceptibly in a more indefinite and contradictory frame of mind towards Russia than at any previous period. It is at once pacific, irritable, and perplexed."²

Eventually this "indefinite and contradictory frame of mind" was to
be resolved in a radical polarization of British attitudes toward Russia and her Government. Moderate Liberals were to make common cause with Conservatives in opposing long-held Radical Liberal notions of Tsarist Russia, notions which conformed so well to their Manichaean understanding of international politics.

* * * * * *

The Tsar, in the eyes of the English public the archetypal symbol of tyrannical despotism, had always provided a focus for the animosity directed towards Russia. Alexander III, Tsar since the assassination of his father in 1881, was an invitingly easy target for invective. Liberals and Conservatives alike saw in him proof of all the habituated prejudices regarding the Russian Autocracy. Surveying six generations of Russian Tsars the Nineteenth Century concluded that, as might be expected, time had stood still under Alexander. Corruption, ignorance, and repression continued unaltered since the days of Peter the Great. The Contemporary Review went back even farther, linking the severity of Alexander’s rule with the uncivilized, barbarous, medieval Russian past:

"[Alexander’s rule] is by far the most despotic experienced by the Russian people since the days of Ivan the Terrible... all the legal formalities... have been completely swept away, and flogging, imprisonment, and life-long torture in Siberian mines can be, and frequently are, meted out."

The equally intense Conservative dislike of Alexander arose from a second and more influential source. Showing less concern than the Liberals with any injustices that might befall his Russian subjects, the Conservatives viewed the Tsar as a man who saw himself as an instrument in the hand of Providence. This sense of divine commission and the fanaticism that accompanied it might one day lead Alexander to abandon his prudent foreign policy and, throwing caution to the wind, use the awesome military power at his disposal to upset the equilibrium of Europe.
they disliked most about him was not that "he is a tyrant almost of the ancient type", but rather that he had the power to threaten the British Empire at its weakest points.

The death of Alexander in November, 1894 and the accession of his son Nicholas II presented the British public with an opportunity to reassess their blanket, unthinking condemnation of the Autocracy. The appearance of a great variety of early appraisals of the new Emperor of All the Russians argues persuasively that the English public was anxious to find the new monarch acceptable. Hopes, often based upon the flimsiest and most insubstantial of evidence, were high that the change in rule would mean a moderation of the unlimited Russian autocratic system. That a succession of frustrations to such expectations did not precipitate a return to the anti-Tsarist rhetoric of old, points to more than just a period in which Britain was willing to give the untried Nicholas the benefit of the doubt. It provides proof of a deeper change in British public opinion, at once both less idealistic and less realistic.  

From the outset the British Press began to soften the image of Nicholas, to allow him human characteristics, to make the Tsar less a purely symbolic representation of despotism and evil. It seemed to many:

"to be a probability that with the new Czar a better, or at least more humane, régime may commence in Russia. Nicholas II intends to be autocrat, but he also intends, if we may trust rumours that appear to be well founded, to use his autocratic power with sense and moderation."

The new Tsar was often referred to as a loving father and devoted husband. Even an unflattering physical description could be used to make him appear less imperious and autocratic:

"It is not the fault of Nicholas II that he is not the tallest soldier in Russia, and of such majestic and Olympian mien and such savage wilfulness of temper and resolve that people quail before his glance, and speculate in and
upon his freaks and whims.⁹

In the first few months of his reign Nicholas's actions could only lend encouragement to his hesitant admirers in Britain. Censorship of the Press was relaxed, amnesty was granted to various categories of Siberian exiles, a deputation from Poland was allowed to present to Nicholas a list of grievances against its Russian governor, and certain peasant debts and tax arrears were cancelled.¹⁰ What seemed to offer the most hope to the British public was that the new Tsar had "received his education in chief part from a highly educated, large-minded Englishman".¹¹ His sympathy with ideas of English origin and his natural "gentleness of disposition" seemed sure to combine to introduce a liberal spirit into the conduct of Russian internal affairs.

The dynastic ties between the new Tsar and Tsarina and the British royal family appeared also to favor improved relations between the two countries and to possibly indicate a larger degree of English influence than had been previously exercised in Russia. The Prince of Wales had attended both the funeral of Alexander III, and a week later, the wedding of Nicholas to Princess Alix of Hesse, a niece of Edward. The Prince's Russian visit had, according to Sir William Harcourt, established "not only in fact but (what is not less important) in public opinion and sentiment, the most intimate and friendly relations with Russia".¹²

But as the years passed and the hoped-for liberalization and moderation of Tsarist rule did not materialize¹³ there was not a uniform reversion to the older, standardized, single-note characterizations so common to the British Press before 1893. The desire to see Nicholas II as somehow different from his predecessors persisted, although now in a slightly altered form. He continued to be "a kind moral family man,
who as an English squire would be much respected in his parish". But if he could not be the great reformer that the British public demanded, at least his failure would be one of weakness and ingenuity, not one of spite, backward-looking ignorance, and mule-headed intransigence.

The Speaker had written during the reign of Alexander III that "nobody in this country knows exactly how far the Czar is aware of what is done in his name, how far he is the master or the victim of the views of his advisers". This theme was taken up and eventually became the keynote of the British assessment of Nicholas for more than two decades. He was seen as physically weak with a will easily deflected from its purpose. His character was assumed to possess few of the ingredients essential to a strong ruler, and while some might have felt that this vacillating weakness prevented him from instituting necessary reforms opposed by well-entrenched, aristocratic interest groups, it also made Nicholas difficult to hate. At different times during his reign the whole spectrum of the political Press in Britain could agree that Nicholas was ineffectual as a ruler; the Conservative Saturday Review (during the Tsar's 1896 visit to Balmoral):

"It is not the autocratic master of millions of lives and minds and souls whom we think of as the guest at Balmoral, but the sad and anxious figure head of a vast aggregation of forces, which are as little subject to his personal will as are the tides themselves."

the Moderate Liberal Fortnightly Review (March, 1904):

"He is amiable when iron-handedness is essential. He is dependent when a strong individuality is required. He is constantly in subjection first to one influence and then to another."

the Radical Liberal The Nation (June, 1909):

"It [the world] knew him to be vacillating, of mediocre talents, and without physical courage or the gift of leadership."

and the Socialist The New Age (December, 1905):
"It is evident that Nicholas II is in no sense a great man, much less a great ruler. He is said to have remarked that he was curious to see how it [the 1905 revolution] will end. Never was so unautocratic a remark made by an autocrat. An autocrat does not wait to see how a situation will end. He ends it, or fails in the attempt..."[20]

In the excerpt from *The New Age* there is almost an edge of irritation that the Tsar is not so tempting a target as before.

Nicholas muddied the waters further when in 1898 he assumed the role of the 'Great Peacemaker' with his Hague proposals for a conference to discuss binding arbitration for international disputes accompanied by disarmament. There was little public doubt expressed in England regarding the sincerity of the Tsar's motives. [21] Even private Foreign Office diplomatic correspondence hesitated to view the offer with cynicism. [22] Despite this however, except for a handful of Radical Liberals, some prominent churchmen, the Trades Union Congress and the maverick W.T. Stead [23], there was little enthusiasm in Britain among the majority of the Press, private organizations, or in Government circles to support the conference. [24] Its proposals seemed too unrealistic and weighted too much to Britain's practical disadvantage. Although the Hague Conference of 1899 (and its subsequent offspring in 1907) failed in its original purpose (sincere or otherwise), the Tsar still managed to retain a degree of respect and admiration in Britain as the man who had attempted to reintroduce sanity into European relations. The Liberal Imperialist Henry Norman could write in 1903:

"... from all I learned in Russia I believe the Tsar would be more likely to draw the sword to compel some international dispute to be settled by arbitration instead of by war, than for any other object." [25]

But Nicholas did not escape the most extreme criticism through an appearance of weakness and high moral purpose. Many on the Left refused to absolve him from responsibility for what took place in his name.
Carl Joubert underlined this in 1904:

"The Tsar is Russia. The very titles he has assumed condemn him. For so long as he is 'Autocrat of all the Russias', for so long must he bear the burden of his high calling. It is useless for him to shrug and wriggle his narrow shoulders, he cannot shift the load or abate one tittle of his responsibility. Let the 'God on Earth' bear it—like a man!"

Because Nicholas continued to demand the prerogatives of an Autocrat, British Radicals and Socialists saw no alternative but to affix to him responsibility for all the villainies of Russian society and administration:

"It is useless to say, on behalf the Czar, that he is personally powerless; that Russia is ruled by a bureaucracy; and that the course of... life cannot be controlled by his fiat."

Despite a deeper knowledge of the man and his human failings, what the Left attempted, albeit at times inconsistently, was some perpetuation of the older, more extreme pre-1890 anti-Tsarist rhetoric. It is one illustration of their adamant refusal to accept any alteration in Anglo-Russian relations, whether in the realm of ideas or in the more prosaic and immediate field of diplomacy.

Conservative opinion remained ambivalent about the young Tsar for more practical reasons that were a carry-over from an earlier period. His autocratic position gave him almost unlimited power to disrupt the tranquility of Europe and threaten the interests of Britain. Because the Tsar wielded such absolute sway over his people and his army he remained the single most important reason why Europe found itself an armed camp:

"He [the Tsar] is the legitimate heir of a dynasty which for two hundred years has pursued or suffered to be pursued, a steady policy of territorial aggrandizement."

Only the assurance that Nicholas harbored no such ambitions in regard to Imperial British possessions or lacked the necessary resources to
make good such ambitions would completely reconcile British Conservatives to adopt a more generous attitude toward the occupant of the Russian throne.

If the Tsar was no longer seen as the source of all of Russia's evil, a new scapegoat was needed for the British Press and public. As a 1905 Spectator article noted, the British hated the Russian Government, not the Russian people. The Government as a whole, or what came to be commonly referred to as 'the Russian bureaucracy', gradually assumed the role of arch-villain in the morality play enacted daily on the pages of the British Press. The bureaucracy was seen more and more as the real force in Russian politics, manipulating the unwitting, weak-willed Tsar through the use of guile and the application of direct pressure.

As the transition of responsibility from Tsar to bureaucracy only slowly permeated the British image of Russia, it is not surprising at first that a figurehead to replace the Tsar as the lightning rod for criticism should be needed. In 1893 that function was fulfilled by Constantine Pobedonostseff, the most influential member of the Imperial Council:

"He is now regarded throughout Europe as the personification of all that is distinctly odious in the policy of the Tsar... for the Government is M. Pobedonostseff, and M. Pobedonostseff is the Government."

By the turn of the century the need for such a focus was less apparent but vestiges remained. In 1903 Finance Minister Count Sergei Witte found himself in for rough treatment at the hands of the British Press as the surrogate Tsar:

"Where Liberalism and finance diverge there is no worse retrograde in the Tsar's Empire. Thus we find the Liberal minister [Witte], in pursuit as usual of centralization, declaring that free local government is incompatible with autocracy, limiting the fiscal independence of the Zemstvos, regulating the labour question with secret circulars, and using censure and exile with as
little scruple as the Procurator of the Holy Synod. It is no wonder, therefore, that the wise and politic reactionaries adore their chosen Minister, and cry, 'Better a year of Witte than a cycle of Pobedonostseffs'.

Later that year the *Spectator* was to mourn the fact that the Tsar had been unable "to find in his dominions a really great Minister, a man of the Cavour type, whom he might trust".\(^3^4\)

But the trend was away from individual responsibility, moving toward a more collective apportioning of blame. In 1893 the principal villain had been Pobedonostseff, but by 1903 it had become commonplace to hear that "a silent struggle is going on in St. Petersburg between the Palace and the bureaucracy".\(^3^5\) The Tsar was often pictured as the sincere, well-intentioned, benevolent but weak adversary of a faceless, selfish, powerful administration whose aim was always the retention of its "pleasant prerogatives of power".\(^3^6\) And the privileges so jealously guarded were those of a backward, semi-feudal society. The Radical Liberals in particular were eager to depict the upper levels of the bureaucracy, filled by the sons of aristocrats, as the real enemy of Russian liberalization with the Tsar becoming merely an unwitting accomplice. Political liberalization in the English mind was a concomitant of economic and industrial progress, and it was supposed that the Russian upper-classes, who filled the policy-making positions in the bureaucracy, wanted none of either:

"You will never find sons of the aristocracy employed in engineering works or any other craft; and, of course, trade of any kind is out of the question for them."\(^3^7\)

The English estimate of bureaucrats of more humble origins and lowly status was equally disheartening. They were pictured as products of a system that encouraged fiscal corruption, absence of ideals, bullying of inferiors, and obsequiousness in the face of authority. It seemed
clear to English Liberals that in such a system, officialdom would always blindly back absolutism as the underlying support for the entire edifice of Russian society. Opposition to authority would only endanger job security and potential advancement opportunities. The bureaucracy appeared as a unified bloc, resolute against any and all reform.

Many Britons were anxious to join in the chorus accusing the Russian bureaucracy of doing all in its power to hinder the social and political advancement of their charge. But there was no universal agreement on this issue any more than there was on the complicity of the Tsar. Some dissenters were ready to argue in defence of the Russian bureaucrats. Bernard Pares, who was to become the first professor of Russian history in the English-speaking world at the University of Liverpool in 1908, in his 1907 book *Russia and Reform* enabled his fellow countrymen to meet some Russian bureaucrats face to face. In some detail he described a town policeman, a police corporal, a police captain, a police colonel, and a governor, even giving short transcriptions of conversations with them. The effect was to humanize and demythologize the officials of the Russian bureaucracy whom he could describe as "good-hearted ... at least fairly quick-witted" and "usually pleasant gentlemen". Although Pares went on in his book to condemn the Russian bureaucratic system, his portraits could not help but make the average Englishman more sympathetic to and understanding of the viewpoint of Russian officialdom.

Some Moderate Liberals and Conservatives were willing to take the case in favor of the Russian bureaucracy even further. Although admitting that Russia was "groaning and panting under the oppressive burden of bureaucracy" the Fortnightly Review saw little to recommend
the abolition of government by bureaucracy:

"What is to take its place? The hypothesis of a self-governing vox populi constitution so freely mooted and glibly discussed by the Press of this country ... is obviously untenable to any one who knows Russia and her people with any degree of accuracy. The English Republic with its hereditary royal president cannot be made to fit into the Russian conception of orthodox Tsardom... The complex elements at work in her polity are altogether too heterogenous to apply any Western ideas of reform."41

The Conservative Spectator was even willing to argue that the bureaucracy should be retained, not for lack of an adequate, ready replacement, but because it was the best possible arrangement for Russia, given her social and political traditions.42 Whatever reform was to be carried out, according to the Conservative Saturday Review, should be within the existing system:

"We are entitled to attach great importance to his [Witte's] readiness to believe sufficient the instruments he finds ready to his hands— that is to say the benevolent will of the Tsar and the loyalty and ability of the officials."43

It was of no value to label the Russian administration as reactionary when it was the "only form of government under which Russians have ever lived". Reform would come about "if the Tsar's Government were given a fair chance".44

By contrast, as with the Tsar, the political Left in Britain found itself unable to compromise in their judgement of the system of government in place in Russia. Carl Joubert's Russia as It Really Is (1904) used sarcasm and overstatement to ridicule the complete structure of administration from the Tsar to the lowliest customs official. The Radicals accused the Tsar of entrusting:

"the liberties of his subjects to a succession of police officials, trained in a school which uses torture and the agent provocateur... it is the manipulators of this police terrorism, who are... the real rulers of Russia, and the absolute masters of the liberties of its citizens... one frames the picture of a society, singularly sensitive and thoughtful, whose governors would have it race backwards under a régime of coercion, into barbarism."45
The Tsar and his bureaucracy were "at war with [their] own people"\textsuperscript{46}, and the Left, loud in its affirmation of solidarity with and sympathy for the Russian 'people', could not cease condemning what it perceived as a gross injustice.

Even two such clearly recognized pillars of the old order, the Orthodox Church and the military, were not immune to the more congenial atmosphere of opinion toward Russians and their institutions sweeping through the English public. Traditionally the Russian Orthodox Church had been seen in Britain as a perpetrator of ignorance and superstition among the people of Russia. As one of the principal underpinnings of the Tsarist Autocracy its function was to divert the minds of the 'people' from "unprofitable speculations and dreams" into "harmless channels" that posed no threat to recognized authority.\textsuperscript{47} With the Tsar simultaneously occupying the role of pope and emperor of his country, Britain quite naturally saw the Russian Church and State as indivisibly bound.\textsuperscript{48} This was carried to the point of referring to Russia as a "theocracy". It was even argued on occasion that "the Russian clergy, not the Russian bureaucracy, governs the country and directs its policy".\textsuperscript{49} State repression came to be equated with Church-inspired repression.\textsuperscript{50} The hand of the Orthodox Church was seen in the Russification schemes ruthlessly enforced in Finland, Poland, and the Baltic States.\textsuperscript{51} The Russian Church was variously accused of instigating Jewish pogroms\textsuperscript{52}, and directing the persecutions of Armenians\textsuperscript{53}, Livonian and Estonian Lutherans\textsuperscript{54}, Polish Catholics\textsuperscript{55}, and Georgian Dukhobori.\textsuperscript{56}

But in the late 1890's and after the turn of the century there was a parallel current in which the Orthodox Church came in for much milder treatment at the hands of British observers. It was now possible for
some to see a distinction between Church and State in Russia. The
Contemporary Review suggested in 1905 that a portion of the higher clergy
of the Church was attempting "to shake off the bonds of officialdom". 57
The Church was seen by some as reforming itself from within 58 , while
others were equally satisfied to see the reform originating from outside
the Church hierarchy. 59 Liberal English hatred of the Orthodox Church
as an instrument of social control in the hands of the upper-classes
was diluted by the realization that it fulfilled a necessary spiritual
function for the Russian people. Liberal Imperialist M.P. Henry Norman
noted, "It had become part of the very nature of the masses of the peo-
ple". 60 Conservatives pointed out the common bonds between any two
branches of Christianity. Favoring ecumenical understanding on practi-
cal grounds, the Spectator advocated during the Archbishop of York's
Russian visit of 1897, that ties between the Orthodox and Anglican Chur-
ches should be fostered. The Russian Church, with its "Oriental" nature
seemed likely to be the form of Christianity most welcome in China,
Japan, and India. "Influence over such a Church must be worth having."

The Russian army was a traditional bogeyman for Britain as well as
for the rest of Europe. Since its use by Nicholas I in Hungary in 1849
and even before, it was recognized as the most powerful force for reac-
tion on the continent. It massive size was legendary. 62 And the power
represented by its seemingly limitless numbers allowed it to threaten
the interests of Britain at any number of strategic points simultaneously.
While most of the Russian armies were concentrated on the western border
with Austria-Hungary and Germany, sizeable contingents were stationed
in Russian border areas more directly alarming to Britain. 63 British
strategic planning was always aware of Russia's proximity to Constan-
tinople and the Middle East; Central Asia and the Persian Gulf; Afghanistan, Tibet, and the approaches to India; and China and the Far East, all areas considered of vital importance to Britain militarily and economically. The marked increase in railroad building in the late 1890's heightened the Russian menace by enhancing the mobility of her troops.64

A new threat was added as Russia began an expansion of her relatively modest navy in the early 1890's.65 Naturally Britain watched the Russian building programme with interest and concern. The danger to Britain's command of the seas was further increased after the Franco-Russian military agreements of 1893-4. With her adherence to the so-called Two-Power Standard, Britain found herself measuring her strength with the combined French and Russian fleets.66 Blackwood's, listing figures of relative naval strengths in 1894 that showed England at a slight disadvantage, warned that:

"France and Russia are... preparing to spend immense sums in the next few years upon their navy, and if we do not keep pace with them we will fall hopelessly behind."67

The British preoccupation with Russia's military strength was only an old manifestation of a new and growing tendency at the close of the century to see Russia as up-and-coming, as the nation of the future, fated to surpass England not only strategically but also economically as well. English doomsayers were quick to equate Russia with Britain's most powerful new economic rival, the United States:

"Russia is in reality at this moment almost exactly in the position in which America found herself in the early fifties. Just as America had then got a rich and vast undeveloped territory... so Russia has now a rich and undeveloped territory to the east of her... America threw herself upon the task of development with characteristic energy, and during the last fifty years attracted the capital of the world... Russia cannot hope to do her work so rapidly, but she is anxious to perform a similar task."68

It seemed only a matter of time before Russia's vast material resources
and huge population were mobilized to turn her potential into reality. England's eventual inferiority to Russia appeared assured. Social Darwinism had a place in the overall picture. Russia's growth of power and influence seemed to comply with the natural order of things. She was described as an "organism" whose history of expansion was the product of the "rhythmic movement" of Nature. George Washburn in the Contemporary Review argued that, having failed in their respective opportunities "to establish a truly Christian civilization", the "Latin and Teutonic races" were to lose their pre-eminence as the untapped energy of the Slav regenerated Europe. Not only was England as a nation threatened, but also the acknowledged supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race.

But as we have seen before, the picture was not totally one-sided. At the same time articles appeared warning of the increasing strength of Russia's army and navy, other writers, some of them military experts, minimized the risks posed by the Russian war machine. In 1900 military analyst and historian Spenser Wilkinson dismissed the threat posed by Russian land forces to British interests in the Near and Far East as inconsequential:

"At the present moment... the military strength of Russia consists in her being ready for war on her eastern frontier. In any other direction she is hardly prepared for a great effort." Even the Russian naval expansion programme could be viewed with equanimity by some experts. Fred T. Jane contended that the enlarged Russian fleet in no way was a menace to Britain, but rather merely a proper and fair increase to meet the needs of her growing empire. And the huge figures quoted so often in relation to the Russian military concealed the inefficiency of organization, obsolescence of equipment, and discontent within the rank and file. The New Age was jubilant in 1902 with
a demonstration of the unreliability of the Russian troops:

"The most gratifying piece of intelligence we have had of many a day is that on a recent occasion Russian troops refused to fire on people. Tyranny is based on physical force, and the tyrant's occupation will be gone when he can no longer rely on his troops."\(^\text{75}\)

Other factors such as the precarious financial position of Russia\(^{76}\) and her underlying social unrest always threatening revolution\(^{77}\), combined to undercut the picture of monolithic Russian invincibility that many journalists so carefully cultivated. Even biology was against her:

"Nor can Russia be regarded as an immediate rival of England. It is a huge, amorphous, protoplasmic mass, ready indeed to engulf any intruding foreign body, but not informed with the higher organization necessary for movements of external aggression... Russia will spend centuries in the slow process of domestic integration, and wars of aggression... are not to be feared from it."\(^{78}\)

With her attentions absorbed by her own internal difficulties it could be predicted that "the indefinite and automatic period of Russian expansion [was] at an end".\(^{79}\)

Britain's conclusion of a defensive alliance in the Far East with Japan in 1902\(^{80}\), the defeat of Russia by the Japanese in 1904-5, and the upheaval of the subsequent 1905 revolution gave credence to those who had all along argued for the chimerical quality of the Russian threat. Russian naval strength had evaporated after the crushing defeats at Port Arthur and Tsushima\(^{81}\), and her army had been roughly handled as well:

"Russia in Europe had lost her former position, and her voice has now hardly any weight with other nations... Even the Asiatic tribes and pseudo-nations\(^{82}\) which border upon Russia begin to look upon her with undisguised contempt."

But the recovery of Russia in the years immediately following the revolution was surprisingly swift, rekindling the debate over the strength of Russia and her military and the potential threat posed to the British Empire.\(^{83}\) The Foreign Office privately assessed the reconstruction of the Russian army and navy while articles again began to appear warning of the Russian danger to peace. As before this debate was carried on
almost exclusively in Moderate Liberal and Conservative Press organs. The Left had never exhibited much interest in Russia as a strategic threat to an Empire for which it harbored little enthusiasm. Whether or not Russia's military was recovered enough to once more worry those guarding the Northwest Frontier of India was of minor importance when compared to what Radicals felt was the real issue at stake in Russia's rapid recovery, the restabilization of her internal political situation using the army to maintain the Autocracy's hold over an unwilling populace.

If this was to become the central issue in measuring Russian acceptability to British standards, then a sympathetic appraisal of the Russian 'people', as opposed to its ruling-class, was in order. Traditionally, the typical Russian had been caricatured in Britain as cruel, barbaric, drunken, uneducated, dirty, riotous, blindly loyal to the Tsar and Orthodox Church, and in the face of hardship, possessed of an infinite patience born of ignorance and superstition. This image of Slavic ethnic inferiority was not completely overthrown in the 1890's. Deletions were made, but portions of the old stereotype cropped up throughout the decade and on into the twentieth century. In 1905, the Monthly Review could still write:

"Psychologically, the Russian has all the characteristics of the woman... he is inert, indolent, indifferent, insensible, and submissive. Fatalism and gregariousness, absence of individualism and personality, of initiative and individual genius, a lack of originality, of a sense of personal responsibility and independence of judgement, constitute the fundamental psychological traits of the Russian."

But in conjunction with this older, more conventional picture there arose a more generous rendering of the 'typical' Russian. Descriptions of Russians in British publications began to include terms such as "kindly, earnest, loyal"; "earnest helpfulness" and "gentleness"; "adaptability"; "brotherliness" and "sweet and wholesome spirit".
Russians could even be favorably compared with Germans:

"The word which I should use to represent the main impression made on me by the average Russian, the soldier, the railway-porter, the labourer, is uprightness, and it seems to me to contrast very favourably with a quality [duty] perhaps equally strong which is seen in the faces and bearing of the average German."91

Mainstream Liberals, Liberal Imperialists, and Conservatives were content for the most part, to view the Russian people in as ambiguous a manner as they viewed the Tsar, the Orthodox Church, and the bureaucracy.92 Radicals however seemed determined to recast the image of the Russian populace in the mind of Britain so that all old perjorative connotations fell away. The difficult task faced by the Radicals was to make the people of Russia appear as sympathetic victims of decades of tyrannical oppression, who yet managed to retain the courage, initiative and spirit to desire and merit reform. If made to appear too downtrodden and pathetic the Russian people would be unable to inspire confidence that their chains could be broken with the aid tendered by English sympathizers.93 But equally, to depict them as rebellious, defiant, completely autonomous and self-reliant would erode away the idea of the importance of the role British Liberals saw themselves as playing in the reform and liberalization of the Russian Empire. Bernard Pares came close to the second extreme in his description of a 1905 Peasant Reform Meeting:

"A young peasant now takes charge of the meeting; he reads out a list of demands, for each of which a reason is stated in moderate language. The peasants 'have resolved to declare to all those who love their country, who value the interests of the people, and who genuinely want to amend the existing Imperial order of things, that to go on with our former life is impossible' [nine demands are listed]... It was not possible before 1905 to know of how much the peasant mind was capable when directly applied to public affairs."94

But there were many Radical columnists who successfully walked the tightrope with their depictions of terribly oppressed Russians who man-
aged somehow to retain, hidden deep inside, a spark that yearned for freedom:

"To live in common peril is of itself the surest equalizer. Whether the danger be poverty, famine, war, imprisonment, or execution, does not much matter... It is in the school of danger that the ... Russians have learned the politeness of equality, and a freedom of social intercourse that English society has no conception of. Thus out of the eater cometh forth meat, and in the land of despotism alone is liberty to be found. 'You talk a great deal about freedom', said the eighteenth-century Frenchman to a lady; 'but where have you found it?' 'Only in the Bastille', she replied."

Once again the political Left in Britain took a more simplified view and clearcut stand in relation to Russia than did their less doctrinaire domestic political adversaries. The Russian 'people' were seen as unreservedly good, innocent victims of their rulers in the eyes of the Radicals and Socialists. Historian Max Beloff has commented on this creative Left-wing picture of the Russian 'people' regarding Jewish pogroms:

"[I]t was important to convince the [British] public... that the real instigators of the pogroms were to be found in the Russian government itself, and that the popular masses were merely their dupes, being encouraged to treat the Jews as scapegoats for their wrongs."

This partisan, one-sided definition fitted more easily into the requirements of Radical ideology. However at times their model proved painfully inconsistent with reality. Bernard Pares remembered just such an episode in his memoirs. The Russian émigré and English branches of the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom came to Robert Spence Watson, as Society president, to settle any important question that divided them.

On one such occasion of disagreement:

"The question turned out to be whether a certain Russian Minister was to be assassinated. All the John Bull rose in Spence Watson: 'No! not no!' he cried. 'Impossible!' And he did not fail to take note what curious friends he was working with."

The more well-rounded and elusive picture of the Russians, glimpsed fleetingly in this instance by Spence Watson, formed by adding and subtracting from the old stereotypes, well satisfied the evolving nature of
Moderate Liberal and Conservative attitudes toward the subjects of the Tsar, attitudes based less on ideology than on the dictates of pragmatism.

Both the Radical and Moderate Liberal/Conservative representations of Russia had to be accommodated to the most persistent, if perhaps not the most important issue in Anglo-Russian relations, the Russian treatment of their Jewish population. English attention to this problem had grown steadily since 1881. The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in April of that year had touched off anti-Jewish rioting in a number of provinces and this was followed in 1882 by the anti-Semitic, economically restrictive 'May Laws'. This marked the beginning of a sharp increase in Russian Jewish immigration into Great Britain. The general trend of this movement was to continue until the First World War. Between 1881 and 1905 it is estimated that 100,000 Jews settled in England, principally in the London area. Such a large influx into the British Isles could not occur without arousing interest into the causes behind the mass exodus of Jews from Russia.

In the 1880's and particularly in the early 1890's there was a flood of articles in the British Press condemning unequivocally Russian Jewish policy. The tone of these commentaries was virtually identical whether the political complexion of the journal or newspaper was Conservative (the Spectator):

"The Jews, in fact, are treated as criminals, and all over the Russian Empire are being harried, oppressed, and so far as blows go, even tortured, in a way which man had begun to believe in Europe, and under any Christian Government in 'the enlightenment and philanthropy of the age', had become impossible."

Moderate Liberal (The Nineteenth Century):

"In the name of civilization and justice I claim the right—a right shared by all honest men and women—to appeal to public opinion on behalf of the victims of a relentless persecution, alien alike to Christian precept and modern morality."
or Radical (The Speaker):

"[I]t is impossible to believe that public opinion in England will remain indifferent, whilst an iniquity like this is carried out in all its enormity by a Government which calls itself Christian and civilized."  

But Harold Frederic noted in 1892 that "the indignant interest with which Christendom has followed Russia's career of internal persecution and inhumanity is, at its best, of a sentimental character." Britain was becoming exceedingly uncomfortable with the "sustained Semitic invasion". Frederic warned that the outrage of the British Press at the Russian persecution of the Jews was soon to be drowned in a wave of anti-Semitic xenophobia. But what seems certain, and what remained unnoticed or at least unspoken at the time, was that the gradual disappearance during the late 1890's of literature denouncing Russia's Jewish policies shadowed the general movement toward a more favorable assessment of Russia by the Moderates and the Right in Britain.

Frederic was of course partially correct. A slipper-maker of Leeds could complain in 1907:

"We had always plenty of work until the Russian Jew appeared on the scene, and then a rapid change set in. The reason of the great change is the unfair competition of the Jew."  

There was a mass of popular interest in the so-called 'Alien Question' during this period, finally culminating in the appointment of a Royal Commission on Alien Immigration in 1902 and the passage of the Aliens Bill of 1905. Attention was drawn in the British Press to the threat posed to the working classes by Jews, "the wild, hunted-looking creatures, with fur caps and baggy, greasy clothes who may be seen gaping about them most days at the London Docks". Public outcry against the detrimental effects of immigration required that remedial steps to limit Jewish entrance into Great Britain be taken.
But the Press did not stop there. It went beyond denouncing Jews based solely upon the immigrant and labor questions in England. Suggestions were made with increasing frequency between 1890 and 1910 that the British condemnation of Russian Jewish policy should be reconsidered. Perhaps its harshness had been judged a bit prematurely, perhaps it had a certain justification. Robert H. Sherard, drifting into overt anti-Semitism in a series of articles for the *Standard* in 1905, claimed that the Russian pogroms were "mild reprisals" for the sins of the Jews in Russia.

The change in tone is even apparent in a comparison of the non-partisan *Annual Register*’s description of Russian Jewish persecution in 1891 and in 1900:

"The persecution of the Jews, initiated in the previous year, grew to such alarming proportions as to excite the indignation and sympathy of the whole civilized world." (1891)

"At Odessa the [rioting] began with a quarrel between a soldier... and a Jewish huckster... vigorous measures taken by the authorities resulted in the restoration of order." (1900)

By 1900 the Russian Government was forced to assume the task of defending "Jewish hucksters" against the ire of legitimately aggrieved citizens.

In reviewing the literature of the period the gradual change in tone is striking. But it is restricted exclusively to the Moderate Liberal and Conservative Press. The Radicals and Socialists in no way participated. In June of 1909 *The Nation* was still accusing the Tsar of sanctioning a policy of open, organized "massacre of Jews". The Labour Party’s sympathy for the plight of the Russian Jew, either as a victim of Tsarist persecution or of British xenophobia, remained undiluted. Keir Hardie wondered aloud on the Commons floor in 1905 whether:

"these poor creatures who have been shot down in the streets of Warsaw and other..."
parts of Russia, those poor, poverty-stricken human beings who have been hunted down as beasts of prey are to be condemned by this [Aliens] Bill to remain in a country that does not know how to treat them.\textsuperscript{116}

The Left had no trouble accommodating its stand against Jewish persecution in Russia to its uncompromisingly anti-Russian position in every other area.\textsuperscript{117} The evolution of the journalistic handling of the issue by the Moderate and Conservative Press suggests that extensive efforts were being made to establish some consistency in their overall picture of Russia and her Government. A Russia actively pursuing a policy of brutal, unwarranted persecution of an ethnic minority was not acceptable in the atmosphere of reconciliation of the late 1890's and early 1900's. If Britain's attitude toward Russia was to be more favorable it must extend to all areas.

A more appealing topic to those subjecting Russia to a reevaluation during these years, was Russian culture. Russian literature, drama, opera, ballet, and symphonic music were all discovered in the late Victorian period. There was a "fashionable craze" for a "fresh and unsophisticated" literature that would "regenerate" Europe.\textsuperscript{118} (These terms sound remarkably similar to those used to describe the young and vital Slav who was rising to regenerate a politically decadent Europe.\textsuperscript{119}) Rupert Brooke was to say admiringly of the visiting Russian Ballet, "They, if anything can, redeem our civilization".\textsuperscript{120} Russian novelists captured the imaginations of British readers. In the 1890's Tolstoy and Turgenev received the majority of attention, with special praise and adulation being reserved for the former. Tolstoy's opinions were valued on every subject: artistic, religious, or political.\textsuperscript{121} He became a true celebrity in Britain through his writings alone. As an acknowledged celebrity and sage he was not without his British disciples. Harold
Williams, the Manchester Guardian's resident correspondent in St. Petersburg after 1904, has been described as a "passionate Tolstoyan" despite the vagueness of such an appellation. By the beginning of Edward's reign Tolstoy had been joined in the spotlight by a succession of new discoveries to the English-speaking world including Pushkin, Gogol, Gorky, Chekhov, and most particularly, Dostoevsky.

Russian music was likewise being assimilated by English intellectuals during the same period at an equally rapid pace. There were performances of music by Glinka, Rimsky-Korsakov, and Tschaikovsky, as well as a spate of articles analyzing their styles and praising their artistry. The climax to the Edwardian love affair with Russian music was the opening in June, 1911 of Diaghilev's Russian Ballet at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. This event seemed to concentrate all of the cultural Russophilia that had been building in England for two decades. "Admiration for Russian art had reached such a pitch that Russianness alone sometimes seemed a measure of value, as when a reviewer of Petrouchka rejoiced that 'the whole thing is refreshingly new and refreshingly Russian; more Russian, in fact, than any ballet we have seen.'"

This celebration of Russian culture reveals again what has now become the familiar dichotomy of the Radical and Socialist Press and the Moderate Liberal and Conservative Press. The attention by the Left to the whole phenomenon was scanty at best, except for the admiration of individual Left-wing artists and intellectuals. When broader comment was forthcoming, as often as not, it attempted to score a political point, as when The New Age, reviewing Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard, described it as "one of the most savage and convincing satires on a whole society that was ever seen in a theatre." G.B. Shaw called Heartbreak House, his pre-
war denunciation of British society, "A Fantasia in the Russian manner on English scenes". He made it clear that at the center of his admiration for Chekhovian artistry was its incisive social commentary. Shaw wrote:

"Chekhov's plays, being less lucrative than swings and roundabouts, got no further in England, where theatres are only ordinary commercial affairs, than a couple of performances by the Stage Society. We stared and said, 'How Russian!' They did not strike me in that way. Just as Ibsen's intensely Norwegian plays exactly fitted every middle and professional class suburb in Europe, these intensely Russian plays fitted all the country houses in Europe in which the pleasures of music, art, literature, and the theatre had supplanted hunting, shooting, fishing, flirting, eating, and drinking. The same nice people, the same utter futility." 128

As might be expected, the Moderates and Tories were quite content to accept the impetus cultural Russophobia provided for a political rapprochement between Britain and Russia. In one of the rare instances when this connection was made explicit, the Contemporary Review observed that:

"The future of the world must largely turn on the relationship of England and Russia, and yet there can be no sympathy between these great peoples unless they have read each other's hearts in their respective literatures." 129

One thing that united all those who wrote about Russia whether on the Left, the Right, or in the center, was the assurance that their expression of opinion was important, not only in shaping opinion in Britain, but in shaping events in Russia. Sergei Stepiak, a Leftist Russian émigré living in London and a member of the Society of the Friends of Russian Freedom, assured the British Radicals that their efforts had a decisive influence on the struggle for reform in Russia. He wrote to the wife of Robert Spence Watson that:

"in Russia, as everywhere else, freedom will be won by fighting and not otherwise. The foreign friends and sympathizers can help the cause of our freedom by strengthening the fighting body, or more exactly the opposition— as far as it is morally possible to do to foreigners... The history of the emancipation of the serfs shows us that such an influence has been exercised in all senses by foreign public opinion; upon the Russian governing class in general and upon the Tsar... If some Englishman or English woman whose position would secure a free access to the Tsar would take our cause so much to heart as to become a good
authority on the matter— in a moment of crisis they might perhaps step forward as mediators and exercise a certain amount of influence upon our Tsar directly or through some of his immediate surrounding.  

Bernard Pares wrote of the "imitative character of Russian culture". The British felt certain that after 1890 it was their culture, not that of Germany or France, to which Russia looked for inspiration and leadership. They had no doubt that everything British was much admired in Russia. Noting that the popularity of German and French ideas and opinions in Russian circles fluctuated almost seasonally, the Contemporary Review in 1895 went on to boast:

"Nothing of this kind is to be observed in the relations of Russian liberal society with England: no fluctuation of opinions, no contrasts of sympathy and hostility, no periods of indifference or decline. On the contrary, we see a continual and progressive growth in all directions... Great Britain, its political and social condition; its customs of private and public life; its philosophy, science, and literature, economical welfare, have always been, and are at the present moment, the object of most serious interest among the cultivated classes of Russia."

The English were quick to compare and contrast with their own versions a wide variety of Russian public and private institutions including old age homes, temperance committees, educational systems, and poor relief, as well as some other, more exotic subjects such as sexual morality. The general conclusion was always that Russia needed only to Anglicize her institutions to ensure progress. And nowhere was that more true than in the field of politics. Despite the historical and cultural dissimilarities between England and Russia, a majority of liberal Englishmen were well-satisfied that their own brand of liberal democracy was an acceptable blueprint for Russia's future. Bernard Pares noted during a 1905 visit to Russia that the entire political spectrum, classified by him as "Liberals", "Conservatives", and "reactionaries", harbored a great respect for English political institutions and ideas. Pares found that he:
"could rely on a certain kind of political arithmetic: in so far as any Russian desired constitutional liberties for his own country, he was certain to have a friendly feeling for ours. Half-hearted or whole-hearted, his attitude on the two questions of Russian liberties and friendship with England were almost invariably identical."

Conservatives had very little to say on the matter of the reform of Russian institutions. Their main concern lay with the effects of English influences upon Russia's external policy, not her internal affairs. But on the odd occasion when Tory writers turned their attentions to Russia's domestic political scene they could exhibit a surprising degree of cultural relativity absent from the Liberal Press.

"It is not easy for Englishmen to gauge the needs of Russia... We [Britain] still argue from the standpoint of the mid-Victorian era though events have mitigated the theory which was fifty years ago an accepted convention, that parliamentary government was the universal panacea."

Moderate Liberal writers were less willing to accept the idea that political reform in Russia should not take its cue from the English political tradition. But after 1895 they began to sound more and more like their Tory counterparts with a Liberal twist. While continuing to stress the absolute necessity of constitutional changes on the British model in Russia, the Moderates called for a strengthening of ties between the two countries based as much on the practical strategic advantages offered to Britain as on any hope that closer ties would bring greater liberal pressure to bear on Russian internal affairs. This increased emphasis on the expedient was made more ideologically palatable by linking it to the argument that for the great liberal powers of Europe to ostracize Russia would only discourage and weaken the forces within the country fighting for reform. Besides, Russia was no longer judged to be the distillation of evil that she had been in the past:

"Perhaps one of the most outstanding misconceptions under which we labour is, that in coming to Russia we should grapple to us a people whose modes of government are repellant to our ideas of justice and humanity. Possibly Siberia, years ago, was a terrible country, but nowadays..."
Conversely Radicals denounced any intercourse between the two nations as detrimental to the cause of political and social reform in Russia. Cultural, political, and economic ties merely bolstered the legitimacy of the Tsarist despotism. Radicals envisioned England exerting not inconsiderable influence (as they saw it) through the threat of a severance of formal relations with the Russian Government while lending moral support to the forces of liberalism within Russia, who, using England as their polestar, were engaged in a struggle to bring about much-needed internal change. Just two months prior to the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 The Nation, using this argument, pleaded for Anglo-Russian diplomatic estrangement:

"If [Russia] thought that a close association with England would turn the scales against the internal reaction, we may be sure that it would not argue for an immediate understanding... After its signature, the possibility either of bargaining or of moral influence would be diminished. We might advise, we might even plead, but if the Russian Government had once become an integral factor in the combinations of our world-policy, our Imperial interests would compel us to uphold its credit and its authority."

The true way to ensure change in Russia was to remain aloof and morally unsoiled. To the Radicals the course followed by the Moderates was an unacceptable ideological compromise. The talk of peace and of the fostering of internal Russian reform through a political rapprochement appeared as little more than an elaborate rationalization framed to justify a calculated, cynical decision of power politics.

It was well recognized by contemporaries that the old unquestioning hatred of Russia had disappeared after 1890. Even The New Age would grudgingly admit in 1897 that "the old 'anti-Russian' feeling, if it exists at all now, is an altogether negligible quantity." That traditional "anti-Russian feeling" had found Liberals and Tories in agreement, but for different reasons. Liberal antipathy for Tsarist Russia
had stemmed from fundamental ideological differences. Conservative fear and distrust of Russia had an equally firm foundation, the threat to British interests posed by Russian power and ambition. The emergence of an image of a more acceptable and less threatening Russia can be interpreted as, in part, a natural reaction to the increase in available information on that distant and mysterious land in the last decade of Victoria's rule. But greater weight should be given to the new British sense of insecurity which kindled a need to find in Russia a potential friend and ally. Despite a paucity of real political change in Russia between 1890 and 1904, a large portion of the literate British public was conspicuously eager to effect a real evolution in their assessment of that country. The old united front of hatred and mistrust of Russia (severely tested in the past on a number of occasions—e.g. the Bulgarian Atrocities of 1876\textsuperscript{151}) was broken up, but the fissure line came at an unexpected point.

Conservatives and Moderate Liberals more often than not agreed on the yardstick that should be applied to Russia and the path that Anglo-Russian relations should take. The Conservatives, less concerned with ideology in the past, had to make fewer adjustments in the new atmosphere. Pragmatic considerations still defined the limits of their posture toward Russia. But the Moderates found themselves frantically adjusting their old ideological positions to conform to the new dictates of their appraisal of Russia. The harmonization of power politics and morality was essential to satisfy the Liberal conscience.

Rejecting this new course was the Radical wing of the Liberal Party. The Radicals refused to acknowledge that the realities of \textit{fin-de-siècle} global power politics necessitated any alteration in the relations of
Great Britain to Tsarist Russia. Ideology took precedence over raison d'État. The Radical position vis-à-vis Russia remained virtually unaltered between 1889 and 1907. If, in the face of the mass of newly available information on Russia that tended to turn black and white into shadings of gray, the Radicals still insisted on retaining older, simplistic notions of Russia, at least they could preserve a semblance of ideological consistency. The sacrifice of such consistency by Liberals less doctrinaire than the Radicals was to split the Party over Russia just as it had over the Boer War.
CONSERVATIVE POLICY-MAKERS AND THE APPROACHES TO RUSSIA

In November, 1894 the Spectator felt secure in the knowledge that, for reasons of practicality, some type of agreement between Russia and Great Britain should be sought by the Foreign Office:

"No one who really understands the politics of Asia can doubt for a moment the advantages which would follow to both Powers, and especially to this country, from an Anglo-Russian understanding."

As that Conservative journal saw it, the main obstacle in the way of such a coveted prize was the "confidence of the British people." It would be impossible to guarantee any treaty with Russia because of the ever present possibility of "an outburst in Britain of angry suspicion and resentment."

The author of the article was, as yet, unable to sense the swing in the mood of the British public toward Russia that was gathering momentum in the early 1890's. He more accurately gauged the prevailing attitudes of the men in power. Those in the Government who studied and directed foreign policy were well aware of "the advantages which would follow" from an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. With their growing sense of insecurity, Britain's leaders were eager to entertain the widest possible variety of diplomatic arrangements in an effort to diminish to some extent the taxing obligations of Imperial defence. The advent of the 'New Imperialism' with its scramble for African colonies and Far Eastern concessions by a growing number of European continental Powers, meant that Great Britain, with her far-flung Imperial holdings, was constantly embroiled in any number of disagreements that excited tensions and bred rumors of war. In this atmosphere, 'splendid isolation' lost much of its luster, and Britain began to look for friends to strengthen its international position.

(94)
Germany felt certain that the Anglo-Russian rivalry, which had for so long prevailed in international relations, was in no danger of disappearing and could be counted on as a given in formulating future German policy. But the Conservatives, who governed Britain for all but three of the years from 1886-1905, were of another mind. New situations called for new solutions. Old prejudices, whatever their origins, had to undergo a reassessment in light of Britain's precarious situation.

As we have seen, Conservative antipathy for Russia could be traced to a concern with matters of practicality. During the nineteenth century there were two main areas of conflict between Russian and British policies. The most longstanding was the Russian fixation on the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the lure of a warm-water port at Constantinople. This, combined with the 'historic mission' of Russia to rescue the Christian population of the Balkans from the Mohammedan yoke, had directed Russian efforts for decades toward either the destruction or cooption of the Turkish Empire. In response to this persistent Russian pressure in the Near East, Britain pursued a traditional policy of resistance, most overtly manifested in the Crimean War, aimed at preserving the weak Empire of the Osmanlis as a pliable bulwark to protect British communications with India. After the purchase of the Suez Canal and the eventual occupation of Egypt the old pro-Turkish policy of Britain appeared outmoded to many. But its very longevity had bestowed upon it a life of its own and for that reason it proved difficult to abandon.  
Salisbury explained this to Goschen in December, 1895:

"I am not at all a bigot to the policy of keeping Russia out of Constantinople ... But the keeping of Constantinople out of Russian hands has now for near half a century, if not more, been made a vital article of our political creed: it has been proclaimed as such by all statesmen of all parties, at home and in the East: our fame and prestige are tied up with it: that when it falls the blow will be tremendous."
A succession of frustrations to her Near Eastern ambitions led Russia to turn her attentions to Central Asia. Territorial expansion into the Turkestan steppes and the Mohammedan Khanates and the infiltration of her influence into Afghanistan and Persia in the 1870's and 1880's excited British opposition at least as much as Russian machinations against Turkey. Russia, interested primarily in the economic exploitation of Persia and a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf, once again menaced British India. This time the threat was more direct, from the southwest through Persia and from the northwest through Afghanistan. By the mid-1880's the Russian forward policy in Central Asia had become the point of greatest friction between the two Powers. The furor aroused in Britain over such a small affair as the Penjdeh border dispute of 1885 demonstrates the potentially explosive situation that existed in Central Asia by 1890.6

Added to these older disputes was a new Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East. As early as 1886 the War Office in London was considering the necessary steps to take in preparation for a war with Russia in the Pacific.7 The preceding year Britain had occupied Port Hamilton, an island off the coast of Korea, to forestall any Russian attempt to gain a foothold on the peninsula.8 The competition for political influence and commercial concessions in China continued into the 1890's, intensifying after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 vividly demonstrated to all Europeans the weakness of the victim.9

After 1895 this competition centered around the grant of foreign loans to China, required by her to finance the post-war indemnity due Japan as specified by the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 and necessary as well for new railroad construction in China and Manchuria.10 After the
German seizure of the port of Kiaochow in November, 1897, Russia followed suit with her own occupation of Port Arthur on December 4. Britain, heretofore at least nominally respectful of China's territorial sovereignty, felt compelled to answer this by obtaining a lease of Wei-Hai-Wei to be held as long as Russia occupied Port Arthur. Having placed themselves opposite the Russians at Port Arthur, the British had taken the lead in opposing Russia's Far Eastern policy. Even worse, Britain had abandoned her traditional respect for the technical integrity of the Chinese Empire. "If Germany, Russia and France were following a criminal policy, Britain, having protested, now decided to join the criminals." A consistent hardliner in urging a policy of firmness in response to Russian ambitions was the British Government in India. Lord Lansdowne (Viceroy 1888-94), finding large amounts of his time and energy devoted to dealing with hostile Russian intrigues in Persia and Afghanistan, advocated extending out from the Indian frontier a belt of territory forming a "sphere of influence, within which we shall not attempt to administer the country ourselves, but within which we shall not allow any aggression from without." An even more implacable proponent of a 'forward policy' in Central Asia, Lord Curzon (Viceroy 1898-1905) was so convinced of the very real military threat posed by the Russian army to the Indian frontier that in 1889 he published a booklength warning entitled Russia in Central Asia. Although Curzon maintained that the likelihood of a Russian conquest of the subcontinent was remote, he was equally certain that Russian statesmen and generals did: "most seriously contemplate the invasion of India; and that with a very definite purpose which many of them are candid enough to avow... [The Russian] object is not Calcutta, but Constantinople; not the Ganges but the Golden Horn... To keep England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia, that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy."
The India Office in London could usually be counted on to disagree with the Government in Calcutta\textsuperscript{16}, but when it came to the subject of the Russian presence in Afghanistan and Persia they often clamored just as loudly for a British policy both resolute and aggressive. Lord George Hamilton (Secretary of State for India 1895-1903) was fearful to the point of despair regarding the possibility of Russian encroachment into Central Asia and the approaches to India:

"Every year in spite of what we can do, she will advance slowly but continuously toward the Persian Gulf."\textsuperscript{17}

These warnings by the Indian Government and the India Office found a sympathetic echo in the Conservative Press.\textsuperscript{18} There was no shortage of writers to advertise the need for a vigilant and forward policy in Central Asia to counter the Russian menace.

Finding itself at odds with the Cabinet in London all too frequently over policy issues concerning Russia\textsuperscript{19}, the foreign policy of the Calcutta Government began to assume an air of near autonomy that was ultimately bound to clash with London. One example of many is the difficulties over Tibet in 1901-5. Lord Curzon, then serving as Viceroy, was suspicious of possible Russian influence in the court of the Dalai Lama. He requested from London that he be allowed to despatch a military expedition to Lhasa to underline the unacceptability to Britain of such a situation. The Cabinet in London, worried lest armed intervention in Tibet might lead to a permanent British protectorate that would undoubtedly antagonize Russia, refused to sanction Curzon's proposals.\textsuperscript{20} But the Viceroy, acting without Cabinet approval, presented the London Government with a series of fait accomplis as Colonel Younghusband and his party of two hundred slowly advanced toward Lhasa. At each stage of the expedition's march into Tibet the Cabinet was maneuvered into granting
retroactive approval. London did not repudiate the Tibetan treaty eventually signed on September 7, 1905, but made no attempt to hide its displeasure with the disregard shown in Calcutta for the final authority of the Cabinet in all matters of foreign relations. St. John Bodrick, Secretary of State for India, voiced the frustrations of his colleagues when he said, "We cannot accept the situation created for us by our Representatives disobedience to orders."22

The concern exhibited by London that Russia be mollified is understandable in view of the expected military requirements for an adequate defence of the Indian subcontinent. Charles Dilke estimated in 1890 that in the event of war with Russia in Central Asia, twenty to thirty thousand reinforcements from England would be required in the first month alone.23 In ten years that estimate had ballooned to 100,000 men, and the expansion of the Russian railway system raised the figure to 143,000 by 1905.24 To meet these manpower demands, declared the General Staff, would decimate the Home Army necessitating "a sacrifice of the whole of our organization, as well as our troops."25 Arthur Balfour summarized England's predicament in 1903 when he noted that "the most fundamental fact is that the troops at our disposal are relatively few, the troops of Russia practically unlimited."26

British Conservatives, no matter how ideologically distasteful the facts of a situation, were ready to assess them from what they felt to be a rational and realistic perspective.27 It is natural, therefore, to assume that they would eventually acknowledge the need for some type of Anglo-Russian accord, particularly in Asia. And this is precisely what happened. The first prominent Tory politician to undertake the task of leading his nation kicking and screaming to the Russian altar was Lord
Randolph Churchill. Although warned by the Foreign Office prior to his
departure not to discuss international relations while in Russia, Lord
Randolph characteristically disregarded all such advice on his 1887-8
visit to St. Petersburg. In his account of his audience with the Tsar
he wrote that he told Alexander, "I had formed a strong opinion that a
thorough understanding between England and Russia was possible and would
be of the greatest advantage to both." Lord Randolph's indiscretions
were denounced by British foreign embassies, the Foreign Office in London,
and even by the Queen herself.

But the Prince of Wales was not displeased by Lord Randolph's bold
pronouncements. A covert supporter of Anglo-Russian rapprochement,
Edward encouraged Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, British Ambassador to Tehran,
to present his ideas for an economic partition of Persia between Russia
and Britain to the Tsar. Wolff and Alexander were both to be in Berlin
in the fall of 1889, and the Prince went so far as to furnish a letter
of introduction to insure that Wolff's proposals, more substantial than
Lord Randolph's vague declarations of common interest, would reach the
Tsar's ears. Although nothing came of this affair, it did not go un-
noticed by Lord Salisbury and the Foreign Office that attempts were
being made to carry on diplomacy through extra-official channels.

Although Lord Salisbury might resent interference into his area of
responsibility, he did not find fault with the general principles of
Drummond Wolff's proposals. As we have seen, Salisbury was not a
"bigot" when it came to Anglo-Russian relations. He even wrote "that
the English statesmen who brought on the Crimean War made a mistake."33
His eagerness to woo Russia was spurred by the visit of the French fleet
to Kronstadt in July, 1891, heralding the first in a series of agreements
between France and Russia which collectively came to be known as the Franco-Russian Entente. Fearing an alliance that appeared to be aimed directly at England, Salisbury went to great lengths that month in a Mansion House address to distance England from the Triple Alliance, in the hope of reassuring the Government of the Tsar that England would refrain from joining any combination hostile to Russia.34 Always reluctant to undertake excessive obligations,35 nevertheless Salisbury recognized the advantage to Britain of cooperation with Russia in clearly-defined, strictly limited areas. Within these constraints he was to consistently pursue a series of understandings with Russia after 1894. The first of these overtures in the fall of 1895 originated in an effort to force reform upon the Sultan in Constantinople in the wake of the Armenian Massacres of July, 1894.36 Salisbury's hopes founded on Russia's refusal to countenance a show of force by the British navy in the Straits to coerce the Sultan into compliance with Western demands.37

Salisbury, a patient and methodical diplomat, was not discouraged. During the visit of the Tsar and Tsarina to Balmoral in September, 1896, the Prime Minister had two private conversations with Nicholas. Taking advantage of the occasion Salisbury proposed a revival of the Concert of Europe to draft a reform programme that could then be forced on the Sultan. But although the Tsar affirmed a general wish to cooperate with England, he refused to agree point-blank to Salisbury's offer. Any such arrangement would threaten the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, and Russia had no interest in that unless she was assured of control over the Straits. Salisbury pointed out the difficulties with the other Great Powers of any partition of Turkey to Russia's advantage, while refusing to commit Britain to an opposition to Russian aims on this important
question. Moreover, he cautioned that until the Ottoman Empire had disappeared, an arrangement which placed Russian troops on the Bosphorus was beyond consideration. Since Nicholas saw little of substance in Salisbury's offer, the possibility of reciprocal arrangements to the advantage of Great Britain in Egypt or Central Asia did not come up for discussion.

The Near Eastern Question, however, would not go away. A repetition of the massacre of Armenians by Ottoman troops in the autumn of 1896 created a furor in the British Press, prompting a rash of meetings around the country demanding extreme measures to deal with the Turk. W.T. Stead's *Review of Reviews* described a St. James Hall meeting in November attended by more than one hundred mayors:

"The roof would have gone off with the roar of exultation which would have greeted an announcement by the Chairman that a declaration of war against Turkey had been launched by Lord Salisbury."

Salisbury, rebuffed on two previous occasions, was resolved at this propitious moment to try again. His desire for some sort of settlement with Russia stemmed, of course, from more than an interest in the protection of Armenians and the desire for political reform in the Ottoman Empire:

"[Palmerston] made war with Russia... In order to baulk and baffle Russia he, and his school, set up as a political faith the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire... and look at the results... the feud with Russia remains... It is much easier to lament than to repair. It may not be possible for England and Russia to return to their old relations. But it is an object to be wished for and approached as opportunity offers. At all events efforts should be made to avoid needless aggravation of the feud between them which Governments and not the nations have made. The French and German people both hate us; the Russian people do not... All we can do is try to narrow the chasm that separates us. It is the best chance for something like an equilibrium in Europe."

Friendship with Russia was to be cultivated because friends of England were very rare indeed. If an Anglo-Russian accommodation required the
abandonment of traditional British Near Eastern policy, the cost/benefit ratio supported that course. Although generally a firm supporter of the status quo, Salisbury was willing to acknowledge what he deemed inevitable, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. He wanted to cooperate with Russia in the Near East even if it meant a Russian occupation of the Straits. Never formally proposing a partition of the Ottoman territories, Salisbury certainly knew that a European imposition of reform on the Sultan through coercion might easily lead to the disintegration of the 'Sick Man of Europe.' By 1896 he was willing to accept Russia on the Bosphorus.42

Salisbury's solution for the new Armenian crisis was to table a proposal for an Ambassadorial Conference of the six Great Powers in Constantinople to decide upon a programme of reform for Turkey. This plan envisioned enforcement of the European pronouncements by "the measure of such force as the Powers have at their command."43 Once again the proposal was nearly scuttled by Russia's reluctance to sanction the use of military force for fear that the Straits would be seized by the Royal Navy on some pretext.44 But the conference did finally take place, a detailed plan of reform being agreed upon between the six interested European states. There was still the thorny question of how to enforce their will upon the Sultan, and this, added to the distraction of the Graeco-Turkish War of 1897, led to an eventual shelving of the programme to the undisguised relief of all.45

Meanwhile Salisbury's succession of overtures was enlisting support from other influential Government figures. By 1898 Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and even the Germanophile Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain were both advocating a continuation of the
wooning of Russia as the only sane policy for Britain to follow. No doubt Chamberlain would have preferred an Anglo-German understanding in 1898, but if that was not forthcoming, he was agreeable to Britain making the requisite overtures in other directions. Hatzfeldt (German Ambassador to London 1885-1901) wrote of an April, 1898 meeting with the Colonial Secretary:

"Mr. Chamberlain in reply developed in detail the view that if his idea of a natural alliance with Germany must be renounced, it would be no impossibility for England to arrive at an understanding with Russia and France... I could have no doubt that Mr. Chamberlain in these utterances meant very deliberately to indicate that in case of a definite rejection on our side, England so far as he has to do with it, will work for an understanding with Russia or France."  

Chamberlain was not alone in his resolve. The Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary Thomas Sanderson welcomed the prospect of an agreement with Russia and to that end on several occasions intervened with The Times to moderate its anti-Russian rhetoric. The Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, was sanguine about the possibility of finally ironing out some sort of accord in the early months of 1898, remarking on "the favourable current to Russia now existing in England."

The eagerness of the Foreign Office to take advantage of this "favourable current" in promoting an Anglo-Russian agreement by 1897-8 is well illustrated by the case of Vladimir Burtsev. Burtsev, a Russian émigré residing in London where he was publisher of the terrorist journal Narodovolets, came to the attention of the British Foreign Office in April, 1897 after his publication threatened the Tsar with assassination if constitutional reforms were not soon facilitated in Russia. The Russian embassy filed a formal protest with the British Government, and the Foreign Office, solicitous of Russian favor, pressed the Home Office to prosecute Burtsev. The Home Office, less than enthusiastic, indicated that there was insufficient evidence to warrant criminal proceed-
ings. But the Foreign Office and Lord Salisbury, who had taken an interest in the matter at the outset, continued to press Home Secretary Sir Matthew Ridley. The Home Office was willing to act only at the insistence of the Foreign Office, acting, in turn, at the behest of the Russian Government. The Foreign Office was anxious to render a "service to the Russian government", subordinating the legal questions of the Burtsev affair to "considerations of policy." On November 10 Lord Salisbury notified the British Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg, W. E. Goshen, that the Russian Ambassador had been informed that, should the Russian Government request it, the prosecution of Burtsev would be initiated. Goshen replied on December 2:

"[T]he mere fact of a prosecution having been undertaken would have an excellent effect upon public opinion in Russia."

Burtsev was arrested and his case tried before Mr. Justice Lawrence who reminded the court that neither the justice of Mr. Burtsev's cause nor the injustice of the Russian autocracy was on trial. The sole issue was whether Burtsev was guilty of inciting readers of Narodnaya Volya to commit regicide. Burtsev was convicted under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act and sentenced to eighteen months hard labor. Free Russia, the publication of the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, lamented that the protection afforded to émigrés by the liberal guarantees of English law could so easily be circumvented. A Russian commentator noted with cynical satisfaction that in England, as everyone knew, a law could be found for every contingency. 50

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Salisbury was now finally ready to dispense with his previous restriction of Anglo-Russian conversations to Near Eastern affairs alone. The German seizure of K'ianchow in November, 1897 and the Russian res-
ponse at Port Arthur turned attentions to the Far East. In a letter to O'Connor, Salisbury, for the first time, broached the topic of a reciprocal Anglo-Russian understanding:

"We aim at no partition of territory, but only a partition of preponderance. It is evident that both in respect to Turkey and China there are large portions which interest Russia more than England and vice versa... Would it be possible to arrange that where, in regard to these territories our counsellors differ, the Power least interested should give way to and assist the other?"[3]

The Russians were suspicious of the unprecedented scope and uncharacteristic directness of the British proposals. Nicholas wrote of his interpretation of this change to his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm:

"Never before had England made such an offer to Russia. That showed us clearly that England needed our friendship at that time to be able to check our development in a masked way in the Far East."[4]

Nicholas, obviously still wary of English intentions, was unwilling to consider any widening of the boundaries of negotiation to include India and the Near East.[5] Discussions of a more limited nature were ultimately to run afoul of the Russian insistence on obtaining a long-term lease of Port Arthur and the conclusion of a joint Anglo-German loan to the Chinese Government to which Russia had strenuously objected.[6]

It seemed as though once again Salisbury's Russian policy would come up empty-handed. But despite irritation on both sides, diplomatic channels remained open and "bargaining over trifles" continued.[5] Britain, after her failure to come to an agreement with Russia had turned to Germany in search of a defensive alliance. The failure of these negotiations by the late summer of 1898 led Salisbury to consider a further formal approach to Russia.[5] Chamberlain, who had taken the lead in conducting the ill-fated Anglo-German discussions lent his support with a call for a resumption of negotiations with Russia. In a December 8, 1898 speech he maintained that it was quite possible:
"to conciliate what we may call the reasonable ambition of Russia with the fixed and settled policy of this country to maintain equal opportunities in trade for all nations."

The draft of an agreement to regulate railroad concessions in China was prepared by the Foreign Office and presented to the Russians in September, 1898. Besides the stated division of railway concessions, implicit in the document was the designation of the Yangtse basin as an area restricted to British commercial influence while Russia was to predominate unopposed in all matters "north of the Great Wall." Salisbury and the Foreign Office had hoped to expand this into a more far-reaching agreement, but Russia stubbornly refused to consider anything more than the original offer. Faced with the prospect of war in South Africa, Salisbury had to be content with this small but important first step, and a final draft was signed on April 28, 1899.58

The friendly overtures to Russia that began with Randolph Churchill's 1887 visit to St. Petersburg suffered no shortage of support in the Conservative Press. There was the occasional dissenting voice as when the Saturday Review predicted disaster in January, 1897 as a result of such a conciliatory policy:

"Those who, like Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour, appear to think that all possible differences with Russia can be composed, and that it can be safe for the British Empire... to lie side by side with a Power already possessing a peace army of a million men, must be prepared to look forward to the gradual extinction under a protective system of our China trade. They must be prepared to look forward to the eventual fortification of the strongest position in the world— that of the Dardanelles... to the dominance of Russia in the Baltic, and to the consolidation of a military Power... in the North Pacific, in Persia, in Asia Minor, and other countries where we have an enormous trade."59

But more commonly the Press was several steps out in front, anticipating and even leading the Government toward an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Conservative writers were quick to criticize insignificant "bickerings over rubbishy details."60 Impatient with Salisbury's seeming reluc-
tance to countenance an offer to Russia that included anything beyond an arrangement in the Near East (a reluctance attributed to Salisbury's lack of confidence in the support of "English public opinion"71), Conservative journalists urged an extension of any understanding "beyond the Eastern question... to include China and India."62 Joseph Chamberlain, veering far from his earlier advocacy of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement (a position he was to return to by the autumn as we have already seen), was blasted by the Press for his hostility toward Russia during his unsuccessful approach to Germany in the summer of 1898. Speaking at the Birmingham Town Hall on May 13, only two months after the breakdown of negotiations for a Far Eastern Agreement with Russia, he warned of the danger of any dealings with the duplicitous Tsarist Government. "Who sups with the Devil must have a very long spoon."63 Conservative commentators wasted no time attacking the Russophobic sentiment of Chamberlain's speech. They took particular exception to the notion that Russia should still be identified as "the enemy":

"We cannot disguise our disgust at the prospect of drifting back into the position of treating Russia as our deadly enemy merely in order to maintain the integrity and independence of a derelict [Chinese] Empire."64

The following year, at the same time the limited Anglo-Russian Far Eastern agreement was being signed in St. Petersburg, the Spectator was recommending a commercial treaty as "just the instrument needed to bring about the desired understanding."65 The Press did not hesitate to proclaim its endorsement of any equitable comprehensive agreement with Russia. By the close of the decade the obvious advantages of such an entente were almost taken for granted by every prominent Conservative newspaper and periodical since it was realized that Russia was "the great land-Power, while we are the great sea-Power, and our political aspira-
tions do not really clash." Even a Blackwood's article of April, 1899 entitled "The Why-not of Agreement with Russia" did not criticize the intent of Salisbury's offers to Russia. The author merely noted that the suggestion for any wide-ranging Anglo-Russian treaty must originate in St. Petersburg if it was to last.67

Foreign Office sentiment was less consistently supportive of Salisbury's initiatives. Francis Bertie (Assistant Under-Secretary 1894-1903) was actively lobbying for a treaty with Japan to keep the Russian danger in the Far East in check.68 Eyre Crowe (very influential in the formulation of policy although only a junior clerk until 1906), most famous for his Germanophobia, was equally hostile toward Russia.69 But attitudes such as these were balanced by others more sympathetic to the need for an Anglo-Russian accommodation. As we have seen, Permanent Under-Secretary Sanderson (1894-1906) was receptive to the notion.70 Charles Hardinge, assigned to St. Petersburg as First Secretary (1895-1903) and then as Ambassador (1904-6), was enthusiastic for an understanding which he regarded as the primary goal of his Russian assignment.71 And in the final analysis the permanent officials of the Foreign Office were willing, for the most part, to submerge any residual anti-Russian feelings and carry out the policies judged favorable to British interests by the Foreign Secretary. The diligence of the Foreign Office in the prosecution of Vladimir Burtsev clearly demonstrated their commitment to Lord Salisbury's estimation of the exigencies of Imperial policy. Most, like Eyre Crowe, were civil servants through and through, willing to follow instructions even when they ran counter to their own inclinations.72

Lord Lansdowne replaced Salisbury at the Foreign Office in November, 1900.73 Less wedded to the idea of 'splendid isolation' than his
predecessor, Lansdowne was more than eager to follow in the wake of Salisbury with further overtures to Russia. But Salisbury, still Lansdowne's Cabinet superior as Prime Minister, by this time, having been rebuffed for five years, was not sanguine about the prospects for any such offer:

"I am not in favour of making any offer to Russia. She will pretend to consider it—will waste time in colourable negotiations—and when she has arranged matters to her liking will decline any cooperation with us."74

But Lansdowne was evidently convinced that the possible gain to British interests warranted another potential disappointment. The consternation over Russian military maneuvers near Afghanistan and the extension of their railroad construction to within 100 miles of Herat while Britain's attentions were absorbed in fighting the Boers, underlined the urgency felt by the Foreign Secretary that some type of understanding was needed.7 He communicated his receptive mood to Charles Scott in April, 1901:

"[W]e shall certainly not reject an overture, if one is made to us, and you cannot go wrong in repeating that we wish to be friends, and that we recognize the special interests which Russia possesses in Manchuria."76

The Foreign Office was optimistic that any new proposal to Russia would be well received:

"They [the Russians] are very friendly at the moment... I fancy the Czar is all in favour of working on a good understanding with us."77

The enthusiasm and high expectations within the corridors of power were abetted by an escalation of the agitation in the Press for an Anglo-Russian entente. The Tory National Review published in November, 1901 an influential article renewing the call for a comprehensive settlement of Anglo-Russian differences in the Near and Far East and in Central Asia:

"We venture to sketch in outline some suggestions for a comprehensive settlement between the two Powers with the object of demonstrating to the sceptics that at any rate the raw material for an Anglo-Russian agreement abounds."78

The explicit recommendations of the article caused a sensation and eli-
cited a flurry of support from like-minded journalists. The Times was warm in its praise for the proposals as was the Spectator. The National Review responded to the enthusiastic reception by publishing follow-up articles in December and January to underscore the desperate need for agreement. As in the first article, interest in an accord between Britain and Russia was linked to the fear of German strength and hostility. A novel and powerful incentive was thus added to the old arguments.

A more light-hearted accompaniment to the continuing drift in the Foreign Office and the Press toward an Anglo-Russian understanding was the changing nature of British invasion fiction. Russia had always shared, along with France, the dubious honor of being cast as the primary aggressor in these works. The years 1890-3 had seen a short hiatus in that custom, but after the 1893-4 Franco-Russian Entente a resurgence of the fear of Russia led to the appearance of more books in the old tradition. This fear gradually played itself out and 1903 and 1904 were to see the last two English invasion novels with Russian villains. The new fear of Germany had eroded away the former Franco-Russian monopoly. The naval policy of Tirpitz led to a German acquisition of the role of 'the enemy' in fiction as well as in reality. As is so often the case, 'art' and politics reflected one another, and which was leading and which was following is too complicated to unravel.

Persian financial difficulties presented Lansdowne with the opportunity he needed. The Shah required large sums of money and Russia and Great Britain were both anxious to strengthen their influence in the region by tendering a loan. Hardinge and Bertie recommended to Lansdowne a joint Anglo-Russian loan as the answer to this rivalry for economic
considerations. It would solve the dilemma and take the first step toward rapprochement with Russia. Lansdowne saw advantages to the suggestion even if Russia should refuse:

"It is, I am afraid, more than likely that our overture will be declined by Russia but it may be of assistance to us hereafter to be able to appeal to the fact that we made it, and the refusal by Russia would leave us with a comparatively free hand to make an arrangement of our own with the Persian Government." 83

In addition, if Russia refused to bargain any criticism of a Far Eastern alliance with Japan, then under consideration, would be blunted. 84

Lansdowne's expectations proved accurate with a Russian veto of the British joint loan offer in late November. This rejection finally confirmed for the Foreign Secretary the necessity for an Anglo-Japanese alliance to protect English interests in the Far East. Hints of a possible Russo-Japanese agreement, which would remove Japan's requirement of British support, made Lansdowne more anxious to expedite this course of action 85 and a treaty was eventually signed on January 30, 1902.

Reaction in the Press, so recently active in agitating for an Anglo-Russian alliance, was surprisingly positive. 86 The Times argued that Britain's new commitments presented no obstacles to the further pursuit of an arrangement with Russia:

"The Anglo-Japanese Agreement removes all possibility of any misconception as to what our policy really is, and it shows at the same time that there is nothing in our policy to which Russia... can reasonably take exception." 87

The effect of the new alliance was debated in the Commons with particular attention devoted to its potential effects on Anglo-Russian relations. 88 To Henry Norman's accusation that it was "quite useless to deny that the treaty is aimed at Russia" 89, Arthur Balfour, answering for the Government, protested that the alliance merely guarded against the "dangers of an adventurous policy" which "schools of thought on the Continent
[not necessarily including Russia]... would like to see... carried out." He went on to stress that there was "no dearer wish of His Majesty's Government" than that Britain "should be on friendly and cordial terms with Russia." At the same time the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Scott, was informing Count Lamsdorff that "the Agreement did not diminish the hope H.M. Government had never ceased to entertain for a frank and friendly understanding with Russia." Even though the alliance had obviously been negotiated with the threat of Russia in mind, the Foreign Office and organs of opinion in England were intent on denying that it contained any articles that precluded a harmonization of interests between the two Powers.

Privately Lansdowne was less certain that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and an Anglo-Russian settlement were compatible. He wrote of his doubts to the always Russophobic Curzon in April, 1902:

"I wish I could disagree with you in your conclusion as to the impossibility of an agreement with Russia over Asiatic questions. I fear however that it is irresistible." This pessimism, however, did not discourage him from resuming his former policy. Approaches were made to Russia in August and again in October, 1903 regarding the settlement of the question of Russian influence in Manchuria. In the meantime a new advocate of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement had appeared. France, in the person of her Foreign Minister M. Delcassé, had long cherished the idea of "a cordial understanding between England, France, and Russia." As a by-product of the warming trend in Anglo-French relations, Delcassé was enlisted to plead Britain's case to Count Lamsdorff.

Certainly one of the most alluring arguments for an Anglo-French entente for the policy-makers in the British Foreign Office was the good
effect it would have on Anglo-Russian relations.\textsuperscript{95} Lansdowne wrote of this in September of 1903:

"A good understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia, and I need not insist upon the improvement which would result in our international position.\textsuperscript{96}"

Balfour, now Prime Minister, was in agreement, "regarding an understanding upon all pending questions with France as possibly a stepping-stone to a general understanding with Russia.\textsuperscript{97}

As anticipated, France, even prior to the signing of the Entente with Great Britain, proved most generous in the assistance provided in promoting Anglo-Russian cooperation. Because of French influence Hardinge was able to express a new sense of optimism to Bertie in December, 1903. "I for the first time believe that it might be possible to come to an agreement.\textsuperscript{98} But the brewing troubles in the Far East between Japan and Russia dashed these high hopes. Conversations between Britain and Russia could not continue in the hostile atmosphere bred by the outbreak of war. Russia saw in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the provision of security necessary for the Japanese to resort to armed confrontation. And Lansdowne, despite all his earlier public protestations, agreed.\textsuperscript{99}

But in spite of this new barrier there was no abandonment within the Government of the idea of an eventual agreement with Russia. Lansdowne wrote to Sir Cecil Spring Rice (the new Ambassador to Russia):

"The war with Japan rendered the present moment unfavourable for entering upon negotiations, but the Russian Government had never shown themselves averse to a sincere understanding."\textsuperscript{100}

King Edward, anxious as always to promote friendship with Russia, met with a Russian representative, M. Isvolsky, in Copenhagen in April, 1904 in an effort to render harmless the effects of the war on Anglo-Russian relations. He assured Isvolsky of his fervent hopes for an entente
between England and Russia to match the Anglo-French Entente. Meanwhile polite diplomatic communications continued in both directions. It should be remembered that the amicable solution to the troubles in Tibet was worked out during this period of uncertainty. The Anglo-phobia inspired by the Japanese Alliance apparently did not run very deep in the circles of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Even when circumstances conspired to disrupt the mood of cordiality, Lansdowne refused to lose sight of his ultimate objectives. On the night of October 21, 1904 the Russian Baltic Fleet, on its way to the Pacific, opened fire on the Hull fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank. Under the ludicrous pretext of fending off an attack by Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea, the Russian fleet sank one trawler, killed two fishermen, and wounded several others. They then compounded the crime by steaming away without offering assistance to survivors. The British public, already seething over Russian seizures of neutral ships carrying 'contraband', was outraged. And public anger was fueled by an equally indignant Press demanding satisfaction. King Edward worried lest the outcry force England to take rash and unwarranted retaliatory action:

"Public opinion, egged on with unnecessary violence by the Press, is very strong against Russia, but are we prepared to go to war with her? It would, I think, be a dire calamity for this country, as nobody knows what it would involve, and after all for the sake of the heirs of two harmless fishermen."

Lansdowne was faced with a rebellious and belligerent Cabinet as well. They had backed his search for an agreement with Russia, but for many of them this incident was too unspeakable to be ignored. Lansdowne, though angered as well, refused to be provoked into advocating retaliation. His stand against those of his colleagues calling for war was backed by the Prime Minister. Balfour moderated the language of a potentially inflammatory speech at Southampton on October 28 when a
"satisfactory" reply to a formal protest from His Majesty's Government was received from Russia. A flurry of negotiations ensued between London and St. Petersburg in search of a peaceful solution. Very quickly, after the initial shock and anger had subsided, Press articles began to appear in support of the Government's policy of moderation. One writer on foreign affairs even went so far as to suggest that the incident had been engineered by Germany. The eventual triumph of those counseling conciliation was complete. Cooler heads prevailed, and the settlement of the incident was placed in the hands of an International Commission of Inquiry. Lansdowne, obviously relieved with the outcome, wrote to Hardinge:

"We have got the Russians out of the scrape this time— but nothing that you or I, or Lansdorff or Benckendorff [Russian Ambassador in London], can do will get them out of a second scrape."

Although the Dogger Bank Affair had, at least temporarily, made the thought of any agreement between Russia and Great Britain impossible, neither Power harbored sufficient residual animosity to permanently damage relations between them. Although Russia was to flirt with Germany at Björkö in 1905, she remained very receptive to English overtures. The break that could have resulted from the strains of the war with Japan did not materialize and the irritation over Tibet soon subsided. Even the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on August 12, 1905 did not cause undue friction between St. Petersburg and London. Despite Britain's continued alignment with Russia's recent adversary and Far Eastern rival, while discussing the Alliance's renewal with Charles Hardinge, Count Lansdorff was eager to assure England of "his friendly sentiments and of his desire for good relations between our countries."

This is where relations between Great Britain and Russia stood at
the moment of the Liberal assumption of power at the end of 1905. The legacy bequeathed to the new Government by the Conservatives was considerable. There was little enough in the way of substantive agreements, but a foundation of amicability and hopefulness between the Lion and the Bear had been established. The Tories had demonstrated an ability rare in democratic governments. They were able to decide upon long-term objectives based entirely on considerations of practical advantage and to pursue a policy aimed at the realization of those same objectives. On this occasion British diplomacy had lived up to its reputation for masterful skill and resourcefulness. The approach to Russia was a gradual and always purposeful movement. Conservative doggedness had overcome a succession of Russian snubs, with each failure seeming always to lead to a new round of discussions. The continuous dialogue, even when it fell short of a formal treaty, was not diplomatically fruitless. By the close of the Secretarship of Lord Lansdowne, Anglo-Russian relations had progressed far enough that the Russo-Japanese War, the Dogger Bank incident, the troubles in Tibet, and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved insufficient to drive a permanent wedge between the two Powers. The growth of this spirit of cordiality between Russia and Great Britain had found a generous measure of support on Fleet Street. Conservative Press organs had been almost uniform in their praise of any overture to Russia, and as we shall see, a large segment of the Moderate Liberal Press was equally well disposed. The groundwork had been laid for the long-awaited Anglo-Russian entente. This was the inheritance of Campbell-Bannerman and Sir Edward Grey in 1905. Charles Hardinge summed up the diplomatic situation in October in a dispatch to Lansdowne:
"I endeavoured to impress upon the Emperor [Nicholas] the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and I pointed out that complete unanimity prevailed in England on this subject, since it constitutes part of the policy not only of the Government but also of the opposition, while the press without exception was favourably disposed toward the idea... The points of difference between the two countries [are] after all few in number and not of a nature to render agreement impossible." 118

It remains to be seen what basis Hardinge's use of the terms "complete unanimity" and "without exception" had in reality.
THE LIBERALS AND RUSSIA

The Liberal consensus of the mid-Victorian years was severely tested as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The disparate Gladstonian coalition was drifting in a number of directions simultaneously on political, economic, and social questions. The gradual polarization of the Party on issues domestic was mimicked by a divergence on issues of foreign policy. Anglo-Russian relations occupied a crucial position in this process of polarization. There already had been hints of Russia's disruptive potential.

The long-held Liberal image of Tsarist Russia as the primary repository of tyrannical despotism was first seriously called into question during the Bulgarian Agitation of 1876. The massacre of twelve thousand Bulgarians by the Turks in May presented the Liberals with a new villain against whom Russia might favourably be compared. Gladstone's famous pamphlet *The Bulgarian Horrors*, written with the encouragement of that life-long Russophile W.T. Stead¹, mobilized a large body of support for a reversal of Disraeli's supposedly pro-Ottoman policy. But to oppose Turkey meant abetting Russian designs on the Balkan peninsula, a dilemma that caused no end of problems to Liberal sensibilities.

The Liberal Henry Nettleship, later to become Corpus Professor of Latin at Oxford, made an attempt to balance moral and material considerations. Reacting instinctively he was initially unsympathetic to the "superficial Liberalism" which urged support for a Russian punishment of the Turks. Ultimately however, he came to see that any intervention by England on the side of Turkey in opposition to Russia "must lower us morally, for what should we be fighting for but the most obvious material advantage?" Reluctantly Nettleship had to admit that Russia was

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more "progressive" than the Ottoman Empire because of the emancipation of her serfs.\(^2\) James Bryce supported Russia on religious grounds as he "longed for Russia to drive out these unbelievers [from St. Sophia]."\(^3\) Liberal historian Edward A. Freeman saw Russia as the eventual emancipator of the South Slavs from the yoke of the Turkish infidel, just as Alexander II had been the emancipator of the Russian serfs:

"Here is a nation [Russia] in the freshness of a new life, burning to go on the noblest of crusades and our loathsome jew (sic) [Disraeli] wants to stop them."\(^4\)

Under the circumstances English opposition to Russia was misguided:

"Perish the interests of England, perish our dominion in India, rather than that we should strike one blow or speak one word on behalf of the wrong against the right."

But many Liberals were not so ready to acknowledge that "right" and Russia were one and the same. Lord Granville, nominal leader of the Party following Gladstone's resignation\(^6\), felt that those clamoring for action against Turkey made "too light" of giving Russia material advantage in European Turkey, and he was not at all convinced anti-Turkish feeling resulting from the recent agitation outweighed the more traditional and deep-seated anti-Russian sentiment of the British public.\(^7\) Charles Dilke was astounded and distressed by the eagerness of many Radical newspapers "which for years had been the enemies of Russian autocracy" to express "their confidence in the disinterestedness of Russia."\(^8\) Despite a genuine sympathy for the suffering of the Bulgarians, Russophobic parliamentary Radical Joseph Cowan could not bring himself to lend vigorous support to "the Muscovites".\(^9\) Likewise the Positivists stood firmly against Russia with Richard Congreve and Frederic Harrison both attacking Gladstone's initiative in *Fortnightly Review* articles.\(^10\)

But Gladstone was already drawing back. He saw himself at the head of a movement whose ultimate objectives he found distasteful. E.A.
Freeman summarized the possible unappealing consequences of the Pandora's box opened by Gladstone's The Bulgarian Horrors:

"If the fault of our Government leaves us no choice between the aggrandisement of Russia and the bondage of Bulgaria, and other revolted lands, then we must choose the aggrandisement of Russia."¹¹

The Russian successes at the siege of Plevna¹² had already blunted British sympathy by the spring of 1877. Anti-Turkish agitation had crested and was now in rapid decline, giving way to a resurgence of more traditional Russophobia. Gladstone tabled five resolutions in the House of Commons debate on the Eastern Question in May, 1877. The first two, merely condemning the brutal actions of the Ottomans in Bulgaria, were agreeable to both sides of the House. The other three resolutions contained language in support of coercion, in conjunction with the Concert of Europe, to effect reform in the Ottoman territories, and implicitly sympathized with Russian military action in the Balkans.¹³ Gladstone, sensing the reversal in public opinion and the mounting disunity among Liberal Whigs and Radical Russophobes, moved only the first two, non-controversial resolutions¹⁴, thus preserving Party unity and withdrawing himself from the acknowledged leadership of the pro-Russian movement, a role in which he had experienced no end of discomfort.¹⁵ His desertion, abetted by Russian military successes in European Turkey, was quickly followed by the total collapse of the agitation.

The dramatic disintegration of the movement was to be expected. The lapse in Liberal antipathy for Russia stemmed from grounds too shallow to be more than a fleeting phenomenon. The new admiration for Russia was based upon a relativistic assessment in comparison with the tyranny of the Sultan in Constantinople, certainly not the foundation for a long-lived reconciliation as recognized by Frederic Harrison:
"Perhaps... the roll of Turkish atrocity is somewhat more red, more revolting, more enormous, than the roll of Russian atrocity; but the difference is one of degree."¹⁶

The pro-Russian reaction was an instinctive response to a moral outrage. There had been no long period of preparation for such a reversal. Basic attitudes of the public, the Press, and the power-elite had remained fundamentally unaltered. The call for cooperation with Russia was a seed sown on rocky soil, destined to soon wither and die. But the brief interruption of Russophobia was an omen of things to come. There was a tone of regret at a missed opportunity in the Daily News commentary of April 25, 1877:

"The fanatics who believe in a Holy Russia of pure disinterestedness and the fanatics who believe in a devilish Russia of unmixed malignity are alike incapable of being argued with. We have to deal with a Russia in whose policy better and worse motives mingle. Unfortunately, the action of our Government has been such as to drive back the nobler impulses, and to foster the more ignoble and self-seeking ones."¹⁷

The Daily News chose to interpret the outcome of the Bulgarian Agitation as a victory for national interest over international morality. But that is an oversimplification. Certainly Tory identification with pro-Turkish policies stemmed from purely practical considerations, but the eventual Liberal support for these policies did not signify a readiness on their part to jettison morality from foreign affairs. The moral issue had been too confused; no clear-cut choices were offered. The best that could be hoped for was a "transference from Turkish to Russian despotism."¹⁸ In such circumstances to side with the Government was at least as morally defensible as any other posture. By 1879 Gladstone, still the spokesman for the broad range of Liberals although no longer the official leader of the Party, was answering charges leveled against Liberal "sympathy with Russia, with the despotism of Russia, with the bad faith of Russia, with the cruelty of Russia."¹⁹ His answer stressed
the "evil tradition" of Russia's antagonism to freedom which placed "an insurmountable barrier between the sympathy of British Liberalism and the European policy of the Czars."^20

* * * * * * *

Gladstone's principles of foreign affairs tantalized the Radical wing of his Party. In him, at last they seemed to have found a Party leader and Prime Minister who took seriously the time-worn ideals of Radical foreign policy: economy, peace, equal rights of all nations, non-intervention, and a love of freedom and liberal government. However, the occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the creation of a British protectorate in Uganda in 1893-4 to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the British East Africa Company, had been "bitter pills to swallow." The Radicals were left angry and befuddled, unsure what had become of their high hopes for Gladstone and his noble policies. But Radical disenchantment was only intermittent. The reality of the policies of the Grand Old Man could sometimes be forgotten amid all the comforting rhetoric. The legacy of Gladstonian foreign policy was more a product of expectations than of actual events:

"The principles that guided the external action of the Gladstone Ministry of 1880-85, and which, in spite of all difficulties, were steadily adhered to from first to last, were mainly these:— that the rights and interests of the British Empire could best be upheld and defended by scrupulously respecting the rights and interests of other Powers, and that this country was bound, not only by her past traditions, but also by her faith in the great cause of human freedom, to extend a generous sympathy to the efforts of oppressed and struggling nationalities."^21

The Radicals embraced that rhetoric, always harking back to it in their never ending battle against "the increasing powerlessness of idealism in foreign policy."^24 As we have already seen, the application of idealism to foreign affairs meant that the domestic politics of any potential international friend carried more weight than any considerations of prac-
tically or expediency. And Russia, with her oppressive autocracy, corrupt bureaucracy, and suffocating Orthodoxy, was the best example of a government deserving of hostility despite any strategic advantages which might ensue from an Anglo-Russian reconciliation.

The rise to prominence of the Liberal Imperialist section of the Party offered a direct challenge to the Radical vision of the proper manner of conducting foreign affairs. The shibboleths of Liberal Imperialist foreign policy were 'continuity' and 'realism.' Led by Lord Rosebery, they were great admirers of Conservative pragmatic policies. They saw eye-to-eye with their parliamentary opponents on virtually all questions of international affairs, national defence, and the Empire. Inevitably, this led to friction within the Liberal Party between the Radicals and the Rosebery faction. The concept of continuity suggested to the Radicals that those who professed it were not looking for a specifically 'Liberal' foreign policy. The Liberal Imperialists denied that such an ideologically pure program was either possible or desirable, a position which particularly annoyed the Radical wing of the Party which saw what the Liberal Imperialists regarded as a lack of options as a conspiracy by the 'governing class.' A representative sample of the discord is this exchange between R.B. Haldane and the Radical Henry Labouchere during the Commons debate on the Cretan Question in 1897:

"Mr. Labouchere said... His hon. and learned Friend [Haldane] was so zealous against the present policy of the Liberal Party that he positively went out of his way to attack a speech made by his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition [Sir William Harcourt].

Mr. Haldane said he had entirely agreed with the speech of the Leader of the Opposition as to what they would like to do, but he was in agreement with the Government, inasmuch as they were doing the only thing that could be done. [Ministerial cheers."

Although continually frustrated in their attempts to make their brand of Liberalism orthodoxy in the Party's inner councils, because
of the intellectual pre-eminence of the leaders of Liberal Imperialism they did exercise influence out of proportion to their parliamentary strength. This was particularly true in regard to the formulation of policies affecting Imperial and foreign affairs, which is readily understandable as those were the principal areas of Liberal Imperialist concern.

Their embrace of Tory pragmatism enabled the Liberal Imperialists to appreciate Tsarist Russia in an entirely different light from the rest of their Party. The picture was not cluttered with doubts about Russia's domestic political arrangements. One of their number, Henry Norman, preferred to accentuate the positive in his book All the Russias:

"I have naturally been led to give prominence to facts favourable to her [Russia] and attractive to others." 52

Praising Salisbury's attempts to initiate a reconciliation, Norman was certain that the "mutual enmity rooted in the hearts of both peoples" was only an illusion:

"I am profoundly convinced that a good and lasting understanding between the two nations is not only desirable above all things, but also well within the range of possibility." 53

Norman's thirty-six page explanation (pp. 413-48) of the "desirability" of such an understanding was devoted entirely to strategic considerations. Gladstonian scruples were not in evidence.

Edward Grey's eagerness to promote friendship between Britain and Russia stemmed from concerns identical to those of Norman. He wrote in December of 1895, soon after the Liberals had left office:

"I think a bold & skillful Foreign Secretary might detach Russia from the number of our active enemies without sacrificing any very material British interests... Unless Russia is bent on annexing Persia, room could easily be found for her wants and ours in both Asia and Europe." 54

Norman thought that Rosebery was the man for the job, lamenting that
when his Government stepped down in 1895 the much desired Anglo-Russian
"entente was virtually in sight."  

Rosebery had shown every evidence of an enthusiasm for some type of
agreement between the two Powers. Anticipating the selective efforts of
Lord Salisbury, he was content to pursue only carefully limited arrange-
ments which if attained might lead to a more general rapprochement:

"Ever since the Government has been in power our relations with Russia have
been more cordial than I ever remember them to have been. We have, as nearly
as possible, I hope and believe, terminated the longstanding difficulty with
regard to the limitation of our sphere in Central Asia, which removes in Asia,
I hope, almost the last dangerous question that arises between the two Powers
... If Russia and England can march with cordiality and without suspicion in
Asiatic affairs, one great step towards the peace of the world will have been
taken forever."  

Rosebery's reference to Central Asia concerned the Anglo-Russian dispute
over the control of the passes through the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush (with
concomitant control of the northwestern invasion routes of India.) A
line of demarcation had been agreed upon after a series of laborious
negotiations. It was during these discussions that the Prince of Wales
attended the funeral of Tsar Alexander 37, rendering, according to Rose-
bery, "a signal service to your country as well as to Russia and the
peace of the world." 38 The pacific manner of the resolution of the Cen-
tral Asian dispute raised Rosebery's hopes that Britain was entering a
new stage of more general cooperation with Russia. But the frustrations
of Rosebery which followed foreshadowed those through which Salisbury
was later to suffer.

Russian and British aims were too sharply divergent in both the Near
and Far East. The Armenian problem could not be addressed jointly be-
cause of Russia's preference for inactivity 39, and the aftermath of the
Sino-Japanese War demonstrated the incompatibility of British and Russian
interests in the Pacific. 40 But as witnessed from Grey's letter of Dec-
ember, 1895 (see above p. 125), the Liberal Imperialists were not discourage
d by their failures. Since ideological compatibility did not enter into the equation, they were optimistic that in the shifting sands of *fin-de-siècle* European diplomatic alignments enough common ground would eventually emerge to allow for a complete Anglo-Russian rapproche-
ment.

The readiness, indeed even eagerness, of the Liberal Imperialists to countenance a Conservative-style approach to foreign policy was unthinkable to the Radicals. And this contemplation of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement was the most powerful of incentives to oppose any extension of Liberal Imperialist influence over the large Moderate segment separa-
ting the two more extreme wings of the Party. Unfortunately for the Radicals, they were swimming against the current. Not only were they in the midst of the previously examined transformation in British attitudes toward Russia, allowing her and her institutions to be judged in a more favorable light, they also had to contend with the long British tradition of continuity in foreign policy so faithfully adhered to by the Liberal Imperialists. Under the circumstances it is not surprising to find a gradual conversion of Moderate Liberal opinion to an acceptance and even approval of Liberal Imperialist, and by extension Tory, policy toward Tsarist Russia.

As early as January, 1895 Malcolm MacColl was already arguing in *Contemporary Review* that:

"The friendship of Russia would be most valuable to us, for it is on our mutual antagonism that the adversaries of England, in Egypt and elsewhere, rely."

MacColl's conclusion was based upon the reasoning that India and the Straits were not really under the threat of Russian aggression. But if
Russia no longer represented a danger to British interests in the Near East, "Germany and Austria and the nascent Principalities which are arising over the ruins of the Ottoman domination in Europe" most certainly did. 43 In June of the same year another Contemporary Review article, offering a critique of a recently published Henry Norman book on the Far East, agreed that Britain should not become entangled in opposing the Russian acquisition of a temperate-zone port in Asia, as such a policy in the Near East had led to long-term, dire consequences for Anglo-Russian relations. 44 The balance of the decade and beyond was awash in articles in the Moderate Liberal Press praising Salisbury's successive overtures to Russia and predicting the inevitability of an eventual Anglo-Russian rapprochement. 45 A reciprocal agreement of any sort seemed welcome:

"Though the unconditional presence of Russia at Constantinople or in Corea might threaten our commercial interest, there is no reason why a fair arrangement should not be come to, under which all Powers concerned many share proportionately in the settlement." 46

There were of course counterarguments such as Frederick Greenwood's observation in February, 1896 that "about the most unlikely thing in all political speculation is an English-French-Russian alliance." 47 But the frequency of analogous opinions was diminishing as the new century drew near. And what is most significant is the way in which the issue of the future of Anglo-Russian relations was argued from either side of the question. The debate carried on in mainstream Liberal journals and newspapers was slowly but surely restricted to one of tangible advantages and commercial and strategic objectives. High principle had quietly been eased out. The Liberal Imperialist vision had triumphed. Expressions of distaste for diplomatic association with Russia because of moral squeamishness were banished to the pages of more Radical publications.
The author of "Shall We Invite the Russians to Constantinople?" which appeared in the February, 1897 Contemporary Review, could answer his own inquiry with an emphatic 'yes' because of the exigencies of international power politics. The justification advanced for using practical considerations as the sole criterion for reaching that conclusion can be taken as a general expression of Moderate Liberal opinion by the end of the 1890's:

"[T]here is an impression in the minds of most Englishmen that Russian methods of government are (as Lord Rosebery delicately expressed it) open to criticism. For my own part, I believe a good deal of what I read about the horrors of Siberian prisons, about the persecutions of Jews and heretics under the late Emperor [Alexander III], and about the severities which broke the Polish national spirit under his two predecessors. I also very decidedly prefer democracy, wherever practicable, to autocracy. But surely some sense of proportion is desirable in these matters."

A "sense of proportion" meant, of course, that in 1897 raison d'état outweighed considerations of morality. Faced with Britain's weakened and vulnerable position Liberals could not afford the luxury of a strict adherence to the old Gladstonian principles with their unsuitability for addressing modern problems. Presented with a somewhat rehabilitated picture of Russia and more than willing to ignore obvious residual imperfections, Moderates became ever more avid supporters of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The pervasiveness of the new mood is conveyed in the titles of periodical articles that began to appear in 1900: "A Plea for Peace— An Anglo-Russian Alliance" (Fortnightly Review, 1900); "Why Not a Treaty with Russia?" (Fortnightly Review, 1900); "The Proposed Anglo-Russian Convention" (Contemporary Review, 1904); "Obstacles to an Anglo-Russian Convention" (Contemporary Review, 1904).

The Liberal Imperialists were confident of the ascendancy of their influence over foreign affairs in the Commons as well as in the Press. After the meeting at Wellesley in September, 1905 Haldane wrote:
"During the South African War he [Campbell-Bannerman] took the line that the group represented by Rosebery outside the House of Commons and by Asquith and Grey inside did not represent the mind of the party, and that he must look to his majority as thinking differently. Now we have never admitted that this was a sound judgement. The majority of the Liberals in the House of Commons are sensible enough though they have often been weak and acquiescent. And, as far as we can estimate the situation, if... the Liberal Party has a majority in the next election a very large part of that majority will be in heart with us..."

The accuracy of Haldane's analysis is evidenced by the Liberal reaction to the Russian Revolution of 1905-6. The British Press had long predicted a cataclysmic upheaval against the Tsarist regime. When it finally came in the wake of the Russian defeats at the hands of the Japanese, Liberal reaction was confused. There was most certainly among all elements of the Liberal Party, as well as among the Conservatives, great sympathy for the liberals within Russia agitating for constitutional reform. But the Radicals and their Socialist allies were ready to let this sympathy dictate British foreign policy:

"Our Government is clearly entitled to offer counsel... if Russia would have us maintain diplomatic relations with her. We are always entitled to expect our personal friends to conduct themselves decently; as a nation we are surely no less entitled to expect our national friends to conduct themselves decently too. Of course, there are limits to the extent to which we are entitled to 'interfere' in the domestic affairs of other people, but if our next door neighbour constitutes himself a nuisance or starts shooting the members of his household we interfere promptly enough... It ought not to be beyond the wit of man to discover some method by which, without giving undue offence, our Government may make friendly representations to Russia, with a view to putting an end to the criminality of the Russian Autocracy."

In the eyes of the Radicals the English response to events inside Russia should be based solely upon considerations of morality. In the name of morality the Manchester Guardian was even willing to sanction political assassination:

"The murder [of Grand Duke Sergius, Governor-General of Moscow] is the people's answer to the murder of their fellows in St. Petersburg... after what happened surprise or even deep indignation would be affectation. Whether any provocation is sufficient to justify such horrible reprisals is a very debatable moral question, but if assassination could be justified on moral grounds it would be the case of Grand Duke Sergius."
In contrast to the Radicals, among Moderate Liberals there was little or no suggestion that the course of British foreign policy should be radically shifted or even minimally adjusted because of domestic political events in Russia. This was true despite the lavishly detailed reporting of the upheaval in Russia that appeared in the pages of such traditional sources of Moderate Liberal opinion as The Nineteenth Century, Fortnightly Review, and Contemporary Review. Discussing the situation in Russia with an air of lofty detachment, these periodicals expressed satisfaction at any small victory for the Russian 'constitutional' faction and dismay at the excesses of the forces of reaction. But while they did not hesitate to pass judgment upon the confusion of events in Russia, there was never any attempt to link those events with the formulation of British foreign policy. Analyses of the connection between the Russian Revolution and British foreign policy were restricted to examinations of what the decrease in Russian military power as a result of her domestic chaos would mean to Britain's strategic position. E.J. Dillon in the June, 1906 Contemporary Review could discourse for twenty pages (876-96) on the social and political turmoil inside Russia, but then in the article's last section entitled "An Anglo-Russian Understanding: Still a Pium Desiderium" he managed to discuss the possibilities of rapprochement without ever once referring to any of his previous observations. Journalist Mackenzie Wallace summed up this complacent attitude quite succinctly, arguing that "Englishmen have no right to interfere obtrusively in Russian party politics."

Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the Moderates, was no more anxious than his followers to damage Anglo-Russian relations with lofty pronouncements in support of reform within Russia. On July 23, 1906 he was to
address the opening session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a gathering of representatives of all European parliaments. Included among them was a delegation from the Russian Duma. Immediately prior to his speech the Prime Minister learned that the Tsar had dissolved the Duma on the 21st. Because the news was of such moment that it could not be ignored, Campbell-Bannerman quickly inserted a few extra sentences into his address which seemed appropriate. The original text had been approved by the Foreign Office; however there was not enough time to submit the amendments for a similar treatment. Five-hundred members of twenty-two different parliaments heard Campbell-Bannerman's instinctive, unedited reaction to the news:

"I make no comment on the news which has reached us this morning; this is neither the place nor the moment for that. We have not a sufficient acquaintance with the facts to be in a position to justify or criticise. But this at least we can say, we who base our confidence and our hopes on the parliamentary system—new institutions have often a disturbed, if not a stormy, youth. The Duma will revive in one form or another. We can say with all sincerity, 'The Duma is dead; long live the Duma!'"62

The Radicals sensed that the dramatic speech might ignite a wave of activity and protest reminiscent of the Bulgarian Agitation of 1876. H.W. Massingham, writer for the Daily News and the Speaker and soon to become editor of The Nation, rejoiced:

"The Prime Minister's speech is the sensation of the hour. Nothing else is spoken of... everyone feels that it will ring around Europe... It has awakened a most enthusiastic feeling in the Party here..."63

The Daily News, which had called the October, 1905 Manifesto by the Tsar enlarging the Duma's powers "a great day in the history of mankind," now predicted a "Götterdämmerung" with the Russian people rising up to avenge this usurpation of their newly won constitutional rights. "The result will be not so much a revolution as a kind of cosmic anarchy."64 Henry Nevinson, one of the most ardent and outspoken Radical opponents of Tsar-
dom, recorded that Campbell-Bannerman "had exactly and courageously expressed the mind, not only of that assembly, but of the country... it seemed as though the applause would never end." 65

But the Prime Minister had no desire to stir his Party into a fever-pitch of righteous indignation. Like Edward Grey, he believed that any overt demonstration against the Tsarist regime would injure the cause of Liberalism in Russia by playing into the hands of the reactionaries. 66 Delicate negotiations between England and Russia were in progress, and Campbell-Bannerman declared himself "desolated" that his words might be interpreted as a rebuke to the Tsar and as interference in Russian internal affairs. 67 The Liberal Imperialist/Tory approach to foreign policy, so favored by the Foreign Office, had indeed captured the Party. Hartinge wrote to Knollys, the King's private secretary, on July 24:

"C.B.'s remarks were most injudicious. Benckendorff spoke to me about them this afternoon. All I was able to say was that his final remark must not be taken too seriously or tragically." 68

The same day, Campbell-Bannerman, backpedaling as fast as possible, wrote to his Foreign Secretary:

"My difficulty was the Duma business, which was sprung on me only yesterday morning. I had to say something and to write it out in French and English—and mere platitudes would not do. I think what I said was free from offence, yet was, I think, effective for good. My only fear was (and is) that detached words might be telegraphed which, away from context, might seem imprudent or mischievous. I hope that has not occurred." 69

Meanwhile Grey was busy explaining to an irate Benckendorff that Campbell-Bannerman's last line was no more than an adaptation of the traditional "Le Roi est mort; vive le Roi!" As the Tsar had already announced his intention to summon a new Duma, the phrase should give no offence. 70 Mackenzie Wallace, journalist and Russian expert sent to St. Petersburg by Edward to report directly back to the King on the true situation there, brought the British reaction to the dissolution of the Duma full circle
by praising the Tsar's action not only on grounds of expediency, but also, because it precluded the disintegration of Russian politics into a state of anarchy, as an act of political wisdom carried out with the best interests of his subjects at heart:

"If I [Wallace] understand the situation a right it would be, to say the least, extremely hazardous to entrust the legislature and executive power to the Cadets or any other of the Duma groups at a moment like this, when the country is on the brink of anarchy. In several of these groups are men of great intelligence, wide culture, and good intentions, but they are all theorists and doctrinaires without political experience of administration, and they are all committed to a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Extremists."

Thus, given the opportunity to reject Liberal Imperialist pragmatism for Gladstonian morality still held sacred by the Radicals, the Moderates and their parliamentary leader had turned away and not looked back. This clearly demonstrated their distance from the Left wing of the Party. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if Campbell-Bannerman had exploited the opportunity that he had inadvertently created. Would he have been able to carry the center of the Liberal Party with him? Or had the climate of opinion so altered since 1876 that his idiosyncratic foray into idealism would have been met with indifference mixed with hostility?

Trying to bridge the gap between Radicals and Liberal Imperialists was the eccentric and erratic W.T. Stead. He represented an anomaly; a Radical editor interested in social reform, Imperialism, and an 'entente cordiale' with Russia. He had often been written off by other Radicals as no better than a publicist for the Tsarist regime. The left-wing Russian émigré Sergei Stepniak disparaged the editor of Review of Reviews as "an upholder of autocracy unconditionally." But Stead could not be pigeonholed so easily. He was certainly not an uncritical apologist for the Russian Government. He had not hesitated in the past to denounce
Pobedonostseff, Ministry of the Interior V.K. von Plehve or the reactionary Governor-General of Finland N.I. Bobrikov. Although always ready to defend the Tsar as "a man full of sympathy with modern ideas," Stead felt that too often Nicholas had to defer to "other forces than his personal convictions." As the war in Manchuria turned against Russia in 1904 Stead scolded the Tsar for failing to address serious unrest at home, for amnestying criminals while withholding liberty from "a nation... innocent of crime."

After Bloody Sunday on January 9, 1905 Stead showed his Radical stripes by drawing parallels between this sad affair and British Toryism. He reasoned in the February, 1905 Review of Reviews that hunger had prompted the march on the Winter Palace by 60,000 striking workers. And what was the cause of this hunger?— protectionism à la Joseph Chamberlain, war and all the other accompaniments of Tory policies.

But he was also quick to defend the Russian Government's resort to force. "The Tsar's troops had not fired until other means of stopping the crowd had failed." Impatient with Nicholas to act to introduce liberal reform, while at the same time understanding the Tsar's "almost impossible position," Stead decided to journey to St. Petersburg in August, 1905 to reconcile the Tsar and his people.

Like many Radicals and other Liberals, Stead invested the Duma with a mystical significance that it never merited in terms of practical politics. The Dowager Empress Marie Fedorovna assured Stead in an interview on August 28 that her son would fulfill his promise to establish a Duma:

Stead: "... And I do implore you that if you can in any way use the great influence of your position to prevent any falling away from the position taken upon the Duma, use it for the sake of Russia and for the sake of the dynasty."
Meanwhile Stead pleaded for "all lovers of liberty [in Russia]... to unite in making the... best of an institution [the Duma] which however imperfect... will achieve... the emancipation of autocracy and... the nation." He wrote to his confidante Mrs. M.J. Waring, "It may be that I am His [the Tsar's] last chance!" Reactions to Stead's mission back in England were mixed. His good intentions and sincerity were admired, but the unreality of his expectations provoked cynical commentary from many journalists. According to E.J. Dillon, despite Stead's ethical ideals, he "overlooked many of the realities of the Slavic world." The Socialist The New Age praised his efforts while calling into question the soundness of his methods:

"His sincerity is obvious as his courage; and only a 'double-dose' of both could have led an Englishman to go to Russia as he has done on the mission of reconciling the people of Russia with their Tsar... When all is said, the Russian reformers are better entitled than Mr. Stead to form an opinion as to the Tsar's trustworthiness... Indeed, his [the Tsar's] acceptance of Mr. Stead's mediation is as characteristically weak as Mr. Stead's action is characteristically courageous, not to say Quixotic."

The "Russian reformers" agreed with The New Age, refusing to listen to Stead. They rejected his plea for "an English but most un-Russian accommodation" with their Tsar. Stead left St. Petersburg on November 3rd sorely disappointed, convinced of the basic weakness of Russian liberalism which would prevent it from successfully combating the real danger to Russian freedom, the extreme Left.

Just one month after Stead's return to London there was a change in Government. Russophiles such as Stead, perhaps concerned that Lord Lansdowne's pursuit of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement might now be abandoned, need not have worried. The Liberal Cabinet made it clear early on that they welcomed a friendly arrangement with Russia.
ber 20th Grey, the new Foreign Secretary, had said:

"The estrangement between us and Russia has, in my opinion, its roots not in the present, but solely in the past. It may be, perhaps it must be, that confidence between the two countries must be a plant of slow growth; but the condition should be favourable to its growth, and it should be the business of both Governments to foster and encourage those conditions."90

Contained in that declaration was approbation of the policies of Salisbury and Lansdowne and a hint of things to come.

On December 13th, almost the earliest possible moment, Grey assured Benckendorff of his willingness to work for an Anglo-Russian accord.91

On April 24th, 1906, at a dinner at Grey's home, Asquith (Exchequer), Haldane (War Office), John Morley (India Office), Arthur Nicolson (soon to leave for St. Petersburg as the new British Ambassador), and Grey met and "talked entente in and out, up and down."92 The prime motive behind the support of Grey and his Liberal Imperialist colleagues for a Russian agreement was what might be expected. At the height of the Algeciras crisis Grey wrote:

"The door is being kept open by us for a rapprochement with Russia, there is at least the prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with her. An entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done."93

For the new Foreign Secretary the Russian domestic political scene had no place in considerations of diplomatic necessity. "Our attitudes towards her [Russia's] internal affairs should be one of benevolent neutrality and hope."94

But Morley, who considered himself the last bastion of the true Gladstonian tradition, was not a Liberal Imperialist. Yet, in March he was already writing to Lord Minto, Viceroy of India, urging him to consider what terms would be acceptable to Calcutta should negotiations for an Anglo-Russian agreement be undertaken.95 Grey recognized that the
support of Morley was the key to Cabinet harmony, as the patronage of the biographer of Gladstone would demonstrate the broad base of support for an entente. Without Morley, Grey's principal Cabinet allies were confined to his fellow Liberal Imperialists. Morley was also needed to keep the rebellious Government in India in line. Grey was later to write to Campbell-Bannerman, "Without Morley we should have made no progress at all."96 Grey wrote to Morley himself expressing his sense of gratitude:

"If you had not taken the strong and clear line which you did, we should have had to go to the Cabinet time after time to get authority to overrule the objections of the Indian Government to point after point in the course of the negotiations. The result would have been that progress would have been slow and difficult and the whole thing might have come to nought."97

Morley certainly had his problems with India. Only five months prior to Grey becoming Foreign Secretary, Lord Kitchener had proposed increased preparations to combat "the menacing advance of Russia towards our frontiers."98 Minto raised a number of objections to any approach to Russia, pointing out that an Anglo-Russian agreement would weaken the alliance with Japan and suggesting that the Indian Government be fully consulted before anything that could not be retrieved was conceded to Russia.99 Morley's reply reminded Minto in no uncertain terms that:

"Be they good or bad, be we right or wrong that is our policy... H.M.'s Government have determined upon their course and it is for their agents and officers all over the world to accept it... The plain truth is... this country cannot have two foreign policies... You have set out your views with signal force. They do not convert us— and so, like other ministers who cannot carry their colleagues, you will make the best of it."100

It is unclear, given his political background, why Morley joined in with the Liberal Imperialists to work for an Anglo-Russian treaty with such relish and enthusiasm. Certainly a major factor was his anxiety about the vast military organization and expenditure required to defend India against a Russian invasion.101 His Chairmanship of a sub-committee
of the Committee of Imperial Defence charged with considering the "military needs of the Empire" had driven that point home. He warned Minto of the "tremendous load of military charge and responsibility you carry if you won't come to terms diplomatically with Russia" (as if Minto had any choice in the matter). Although the vulnerability of India was the main reason for Morley's support of Grey and his policy toward Russia, there were others. Like much of the country he was increasingly suspicious of German ambitions, sounding much like the Liberal Imperialists when he wrote to Minto, "the key to German diplomacy is to prevent anything like a triple entente of England, France and Russia." Morley was convinced of the "almost universal support in public opinion" for a rapprochement with Russia. And then of course, there is that intangible, the long-term change in British attitudes toward Russia. It is impossible to say how much this affected Morley's decision to add his influence to those working for an Anglo-Russian treaty. But we can see that it was at least a contributing factor from a letter he wrote to Lord Lamington, Governor of Bombay, in April of 1906 in which he deprecated the fact that:

"... so many Anglo-Indians [are] unable to think of any other single thing beyond the check-mating of Russia. I am no Russian, heaven knows, but I won't put on great blinkers to prevent me from seeing anything else but Russian intrigue, mendacity, etc., etc., in the whole field of international policy." Outside of the Cabinet, encouragement came from the Foreign Office and the King. Charles Hardinge returned from St. Petersburg in 1906 to become Permanent Under-Secretary. Advocates of an entente with Russia thereby gained an influential and enthusiastic ally:

"I have been so imbued with the importance of an agreement with Russia that it was one of the reasons which induced me to give up the Embassy at St. P[etersburg] since I felt that I could do more by impressing my views on people at home, and I promised both Lamsdorff and the Emperor that I would do my level best to bring it about."
A confirmed believer in Anglo-Russian friendship, Arthur Nicolson, was selected to replace Hardinge at the key post in St. Petersburg. He had been one of those in attendance at the April 24 meeting at Grey's home. He later recorded his reactions to his new assignment:

"Personally I was most anxious to see removed all causes of difficulties between us and Russia. I considered that many of these differences were caused by simple misunderstandings." 109

But Nicolson was worried lest the "flourishing vigour" of the old British "antipathy to Russia" should hamper the successful completion of his mission. Wary of public opinion at home and uncertain in the unfamiliar, volatile climate of Russian politics, Nicolson, shortly after his arrival in St. Petersburg in May, 1906, eagerly consulted two of the most accessible British experts on Russia, journalists Bernard Pares and Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace. Presumably the new ambassador's intention was as much to test the waters of British public opinion as to obtain information on and analyses of Russian affairs. 110 He needed reassurance because he feared that in Britain:

"... in large sections, Russia was regarded as a ruthless and barbarous autocratic State, denying all liberties to her subjects and employing the most cruel methods in the suppression of freedom of speech and indeed of thought ... during the course of the negotiations it would be possible that some event might arouse public opinion in England against the continuance of any discussions." 111

The catalytic "event" that so worried Nicolson could have been the Tsar's dissolution of the Duma. Spring Rice was convinced of the symbolic importance of the Duma in any furtherance of the friendship between Russia and Britain, writing to Grey in March, 1906, "Our relations will very much improve as soon as the Duma is a working institution." 112 Grey agreed with Spring Rice that Russia's handling of her internal troubles had great bearing on the British public's acceptance of entente negotiations. 113 But the absence of a sustained response to Campbell-Bannerman's
"La Douma est Morte; Vive la Douma!", except among the Radicals, indicates that Grey's concern was perhaps misplaced. The Times in April, 1906, viewing the approaching Algeciras conference, optimistically noted that:

"Not a few Englishmen will hope that the Algeciras conference will give a further stimulus to the policy already initiated by Lord Lansdowne and Sir Charles Hardinge, the policy of supplementing the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Anglo-French entente by their natural complement, a cordial understanding between Great Britain and Russia."

The expression of such sentiments in The Times does not mean however that the Radicals, Socialists, and Labourites were not a constant thorn in the side of the Foreign Secretary. The January, 1906 anniversary of Bloody Sunday was observed by a number of meetings organized by H.H. Hyndman's S.D.F., the I.L.P., and the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom. A similar gathering sympathetic to the Russian reform movement was organized in Manchester by Mrs. Pankhurst. Beyond such isolated displays the Labour Representation Committee was a incessant irritant, reminding Grey each day in the Commons at Question Time of the atrocities of the Tsarist regime. For Sir Edward the Labour leaders were no better than "dram-drinkers":

"The Russian revolutionaries, who wish to embroil their country with any foreign country in order to overthrow the Russian Government, come here and it is easy to play upon the emotions of our dram-drinkers, in fact supply them with the stimulant they crave for."

But there was no need of "Russian revolutionaries." Grey was providing stimulation enough of his own. As a demonstration of friendship, Spring Rice had proposed a visit by the King to Russia for the spring of 1906. Edward, anxious to avoid sabotaging negotiations, wisely declined, citing as his reason public disapproval concerning the Tsar's heavy-handed responses to initiatives for liberal reform in Russia. "I hardly think that the country at home would much approve of my going there for
a while.” The Foreign Office suggested that a visit by the Royal Navy to Kronstadt might be substituted. This alternative evoked a frenzy of Radical criticism. The Speaker denounced the proposed visit with a melodramatic flair:

"[I]t would be unfortunate if we should contemplate sending our fleet to Kronstadt to be fêted as the guests of the Tsar... The hand which we proffered to the Russian nation would be seized as a prop by the tottering Russian despotism... still red with the fresh blood of Bielostok."

Grey lamely defended the proposed visit in the Commons debate of July 5 on the grounds that it would "seem that there was a taking of sides if the fleet did not visit the Russian ports." The Russian Foreign Ministry finally resolved the embarrassing situation by tactfully requesting the abandonment of the visit.

With this minor victory as a spur, the Radicals continued to hamper Grey's efforts to maintain the compartmentalization of British foreign policy and Russian internal affairs. In the summer of 1906 the Commons had decided to send a congratulatory address to the newly-formed Duma as "a sort of greeting from the oldest to the youngest Parliament." After the dissolution of the Duma the Radicals proposed that, in lieu of the original address, a delegation be dispatched to deliver a message of sympathy and encouragement to the late Duma's President Muromtsev. The idea was the brainchild of a hastily formed Anglo-Russian Friendship Committee for the Promotion of Rapprochement between the Peoples of Great Britain and Russia. The message to Muromtsev was signed by, among others, George Meredith, Thomas Hardy, Rider Haggard, officials of more than one hundred and fifty trade unions and nearly half the House of Commons. The delegation to Russia was to include such prominent spokesmen of the Left as J.L. le Breton Hammond of The Speaker, C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, H.N. Brailsford, and H.W. Nevinson. Grey, horrified at the thought
of the potential adverse consequences, blocked the idea as an interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Instead of a deputation, the message was finally taken to St. Petersburg in secret by Nevinson alone.

Undiscouraged, the Left continued its efforts to reclaim the attention and sympathies of the British public for the Russian reformers. Paul Milyukov, one of the leaders of the Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, visited England addressing meetings organized to rekindle flagging interest. The S.D.F. redoubled its efforts to raise much needed funds for the Russian reform cause. The T.U.C. sent out a circular in September, 1906 asking affiliated unions to provide financial assistance to aid the noble struggle of the Russian people. As negotiations for an entente continued under the direction of Grey and Nicolson a letter appeared in The Times on June 11, 1907 signed by an unsettled group of intellectuals including G.B. Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald, John Galsworthy, Robert Spence Watson, and J.A. Hobson and expressing:

"Apprehension at a report that an agreement [was] being arranged with... the Government of St. Petersburg... We protest against maintaining any but the most distant diplomatic relations with a Government which is, with good reason, suspected of connivance at the recent massacre of Jews, the devastation of the Caucasus and Baltic provinces, and the prison tortures in Riga."

On Bastille Day a large joint demonstration was organized at Trafalgar Square by the I.L.P., S.D.F., and the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom to protest against an alliance with Russia. Commenting on the opinions presented by the assembly's speakers, The Nation insisted that they were "shared by a very large number of Englishmen of all parties."

But very few other Radical publications agreed with the optimism of The Nation. The previous month The New Age had bemoaned the sorry state
of public opinion on the issue of a Russian entente (note the acknowledgment of the inspiration of Gladstone, even a Socialist publication):

"Not a single mass meeting has been held independent of party: not a single statesman has made a Midlothian campaign: not one great newspaper has taken up the cause of Russian freedom... Where is the quick response which England felt when France was struggling to be free?"\(^\text{(130)}\)

A visit by a Russian squadron to Portsmouth in March of 1907, less than one year after the scheduled visit by the Royal Navy to Kronstadt had been cancelled amid a flurry of Radical protest\(^\text{(131)}\), indicated the new mood of the British public. Eighteen officers and one hundred crewmen were taken to London where, according the The Times of March 27th, they received an enthusiastic reception at a gala performance at the Alhambra attended by both Grey and Admiral Sir John Fisher. The same day the Daily Express pronounced the eulogy for the cause of the anti-Tsarist Radicals:

"The hearty cheers which greeted the men of the Russian fleet in the streets of London yesterday prove, at least, that Russophobia is dead."\(^\text{(132)}\)

Grey and the Liberal Imperialists appeared to have won. The country seemed to agree with the Foreign Secretary when he recommended that:

"The less comment on Russian affairs the better... There is one safe rule to follow, and that is as far as we can to avoid comment and all interference... the best help in these matters is the least interference... the best sympathy is silence."\(^\text{(133)}\)

And it was upon the approbation of the country that Grey was relying as he stated openly during Question Time in the Commons on August 1st:

"Our object is to hold that all possible causes of quarrel [between England and Russia], if possible, should be removed. That is an object, surely, to be pursued without reference to the internal affairs of a country. If the removal of possible causes of quarrel results in the development of friendship, the degree of that friendship must depend on public opinion. It may be in the power of the Foreign Office to remove possible causes of quarrel, but to say how far that removal strengthens friendship is not in the power of the Foreign Office; it rests with the people and with public influence in the countries."\(^\text{(134)}\)

Exactly four weeks prior to the signing of an Anglo-Russian conven-
The Nation made a final plea:

"It is not too much to ask Sir Edward Grey to be faithful to the moral idea of Liberalism as well as to the material interests of the Empire." 135

But it was a mere gesture, as by then the Radicals knew the hopelessness of the situation. It was only a matter of time. On August 31, 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed at the Russian Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg. 136 The agreement was not comprehensive. It was confined to the most pressing area of contention, Central Asia, specifically addressing the disputed regions of Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, outlining spheres of influence in each. 137 Although the Far East and the Straits Question were omitted, Grey was pleased with the results of his efforts. He felt he had realized his goal "to begin an understanding with Russia which may gradually lead to good relations in European questions as well." 138 Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Ripon were quick to send congratulations on "a great achievement... secured... by your tact, patience and firmness." 139
THE RECEPTION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

The Times, the voice of 'respectable', non-partisan British public opinion, confidently assured its readers on September 2, 1907 that the Anglo-Russian Agreement would "be received, we believe, with deep satisfaction by all reasonable Englishmen."¹ After a discussion of the conspicuous practical advantages to the British Empire of such an arrangement, The Times article went on to praise Sir Edward Grey for his foresight and determination, citing his "plant of slow growth" speech of October, 1905², calling it a "remarkable utterance" of a "statesmanlike programme" which had done "much to win confidence for the Liberals so far as foreign policy was concerned."³ Grey had followed through on his declared intentions toward Russia and could now rely on bipartisan support for the results of that policy. But only four days later The Times admitted that perhaps it had overestimated the general appeal of the Convention:

"The satisfaction which has been widely and loudly expressed at the conclusion of the arrangement... is not, however, universal."⁴

This delayed qualification by The Times of its original optimistic expectations was quickly justified. Instead of unanimous approbation, a lively debate emerged, complicated by ideological and political factions arguing past each other, from different frames of reference, using different value systems and vocabularies. The debate between the Lord Curzon-led Conservatives and Government-supporting Moderate Liberals and Conservatives (with a sprinkling of Radical statesmen added— e.g. Lord Loreburn and Lord Courtney⁵) was restricted to one of details, both parties employing the same language while arguing different sides of points mutually recognized as essential. But the more heated debate, with Radicals and Socialists squaring off against everyone else to the political
Right, was pursued at two levels. Ostensibly the battle was over the acceptability of this particular Agreement with Russia. But the arguments, carefully worked out and presented by each side, rarely met head on. The point of departure for each of the antagonists was different, thus the milieu in which each argument was developed was incompatible with the prior assumptions of its opponents. The Government and its supporters were arguing past their Radical critics and vice versa. The real issue was whose values would ultimately prevail. Success in generating acceptance of a definition of the limits of debate would dictate the eventual outcome of the more visible surface controversy. The result was a concentration of the conflict that had been waged in less direct, more sublimated forms since the early 1890's; that is, how was Tsarist Russia to be judged by the average Englishman; what criteria were permissible in the rendering of that judgement. The task of the feuding factions was to ensure that the question was phrased in language that fitted the ideological pre-suppositions of each and ensured a conclusion congruent with those pre-suppositions.

The initial Conservative reactions to the Treaty were a curious mixture. As already noted, The Times looked with favor upon Grey's diplomatic coup, as did the Tory Morning Post, welcoming the Agreement as an inevitable and eminently sensible reaction to British insecurities:

"The Agreement with Russia, following at no great interval of time the Agreement with France and the Treaty of Alliance with Japan, marks an advanced stage in the development of a new order of ideas... The prejudice against Treaty obligations which dominated British foreign policy during the Gladstonian epoch has been succeeded by... a re-action in favour of Agreements... It is the modern growth of Germany in population, in territory, in trade, in industry, in organisation for peace and war alike, that has brought about the change above noted in British sentiment. There is a vague feeling that Germany may in the twentieth century play the role that Spain played in the sixteenth and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and this apprehension has made us more ready to welcome any negotiations by which co-operation with other Powers for a common defense in case of need might be facilitated."
It is interesting that the Morning Post editorial limited the discredited policy of 'splendid isolation' to the Liberals by assigning it chronologically to the "Gladstonian epoch", conspicuously ignoring Lord Salisbury's years as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. The less than subtle implication of this omission was, of course, that those who espoused the foreign policy tenets of Gladstone, i.e. the Radical Liberals, advocated weakness and insecurity, while the way of strength and progress lay with the Conservatives and their "new order of ideas."

The Saturday Review was acquiescent but unenthusiastic:

"We cannot affect to relish the result of the bargain as to Tibet and Persia; still, by making a definite agreement as to the demarcation lines of their respective spheres of influence in Asia they [Britain and Russia] ought to have removed... the chief cause of their long antagonism and suspicion."

Although the Convention represented a "temporary gain" for the world at large in its quest for the maintenance of global peace, Blackwood's made no effort to camouflage its irritation. 9 This organ of high-Tory opinion could "find nothing but loss for England" in the Asian arrangements with Russia. Although Blackwood's averred from the outset that its condemnation of the Treaty was based "on broad principles" both "moral and material", a careful reading of its commentary shows that these moral objections were barely distinguishable from material ones. Appended to a highly critical January, 1908 discussion of the disadvantages offered by the new Agreement to the commercial and strategic position of Britain in Central Asia, was brief summary of what Blackwood's meant by "moral" objections. These had no connection with the characteristics of the Russian polity; they voiced no criticism of the harshness of the Tsarist regime. Rather Blackwood's expressed its displeasure at Britain's "inconsistent and disloyal" conduct toward its Persian, Afghan, and "Tibetan" friends, "arranging behind their backs"
a treaty with their "most dreaded enemy" while treating their rulers as political ciphers. More strenuously than any other Conservative newspaper or journal Blackwood's attacked Grey and his Russian Convention, accusing the Foreign Secretary of having "surrendered every political and commercial advantage we enjoyed. And for what purpose?"

The Spectator experienced less anxiety with Grey's accomplishment, extending its "heartfelt congratulations" for the negotiation of an Agreement "so desirable, not only in our own interests, but in those of the peace of the world."10 Noting that the Convention was restricted to Asia alone11, the Spectator expressed its satisfaction with the "prospect of a less exhausting military expenditure in India" combined with a "new and most welcome sense of security in the Persian Gulf." But attention was just as clearly directed to the "sacrifices" that had been required to obtain these not insubstantial material advantages. Far too much of Persia had been relinquished to Russian control. The Russian sphere included "nearly all the large towns including the capital." Trade interests in Persia, rightfully English, had been forfeited "through lethargy."

What the Spectator offered its readers was an appraisal of the Treaty that read like a business balance sheet; profits and losses were totaled up and compared. Under those conditions the Convention was a fair bargain:

"[W]e gain in security elsewhere as much as we have lost in material interests in the Russian sphere in Persia."

But some prominent Tories were unwilling to concede that an equitable bargain had been struck, much less that Britain had taken advantage of Russia. Lord Curzon, recently returned to public life and in the estimation of Arthur Nicolson "an effective critic"12, was unrestrained in his criticism of the terms of the Convention:

"The Russian Convention is in my view deplorable. It gives up all that we
have been fighting for for years, and it gives it up with a wholesale abandon that is truly cynical in its recklessness. Ah, me, it makes one despair of public life. The efforts of a century sacrificed and nothing or next to nothing in return. When parliament meets there ought to be, but I suppose will not be, a demonstration in force."

Curzon's "nothing or next to nothing in return" is difficult to reconcile with Edward Grey's statements expressing his complete satisfaction with his handiwork. While agreeing with the former Viceroy of India that the Agreement appeared "one-sided", for Grey the obvious advantages rested with Britain:

"Russia gained nothing as regards the Gulf by the Agreement, but her position was not made worse. Even so, the Agreement seemed to me one-sided. What we gained by it was not apparent."

The range of opinion within the Tory Press meshed harmoniously with that found in the mainstream Moderate Liberal Press. There was a vocal and erudite minority opinion critical of Grey's "sacrifice of our interests." Angus Hamilton, in the November, 1907 Fortnightly Review, judged the "main value of the new Convention" to lie in its usefulness in creating "good feelings" between London and St. Petersburg. But such ephemeral, "tempermental considerations" were insufficient to justify this particular arrangement. What really mattered were "various political, commercial, and strategic matters." According to Hamilton, in those vital areas, British interests had been betrayed by Grey.

In the journal's same issue, Perceval Landon did not even acknowledge the intangible gain of more cordial relations with Russia. The title of his piece, "Views on the Anglo-Russian Agreement: Relative Loss and Gain", left no doubt by what criteria he would judge the Convention. Landon's main concerns centered around the price exacted from Britain for "immunity" from Russian attack. He could only conclude that in all the provisions, without exception, Britain had been diplomati-
cally outmaneuvered, placing herself at great risk in Central Asia:

"It has long been a saying that if we ever lose India it will be lost on
the floor of the House of Commons. From today that much abused institution
may at least rejoin that our authority in India is less likely to be imper-
illed by the interference of private Members of Parliament, than by the
gross ignorance of chiefs and clerks alike at the Foreign Office."

But within the Moderate Press a large consensus spoke favorably of
the Convention, far outnumbering those with more negative opinions.
And often these more sympathetic articles were penned by journalists
with considerable prestige and influence such as the foreign editor of
the Contemporary Review, E.J. Dillon and J.L. Garvin 17 (using the pseudo-
nym 'Calchas') in Fortnightly Review.

Calchas accused the Liberals who assailed Grey's great accomplish-
ment of being "superficially acquainted with the state of Europe." 18
The strengths of the new treaty seemed obvious to him. "British dominion
in India [was] now guaranteed for all practical purposes", Tibet was
effectively neutralized, "Afghanistan [was] expressly recognised as
lying within the exclusive sphere of British influence", and an unequi-
volatile line of demarcation had been drawn through Persia. But whether
or not Britain had made real or imagined sacrifices in these regions was
really immaterial in contrast to the real gain from the Treaty, a power-
ful check administered to the ambitious German Weltpolitik:

"That is why we have been brought in the last seven years to view in a totally
altered light our relations with... the Empire of the Tsars. That is why we
have made the real but sensible sacrifice of minor interests to major inter-
ests."

Calchas was satisfied "that the Anglo-Russian agreement [had] sealed
for a long interval a truce of God."

Dillon, like Landon, talked in terms of "Profit and Loss". 20 He
was inclined to place the Persian and Afghan settlements in the profit
column of Britain, with the Tibetan clauses adjudged equally advan-
tageous to Russia and Britain. All in all, Britain had fared quite well in his estimation. Echoing Calchas, Dillon, in a statement obviously directed toward Germany, noted that the Convention had "deprived other states of the power of causing a sudden panic among ourselves, or precipitating a sanguinary war between the British and Russian peoples." By July, 1908 the Nineteenth Century and After could be found praising the Anglo-Russian entente as a "business arrangement between two governments" that had "already borne fruit", referring to the unprecedented absence of Anglo-Russian friction in Central Asia.

Form as well as content was similar in all of these editorials. What they shared, both pro- and con-, with their Tory counterparts was a common set of assumptions. The journalistic discourse was limited almost exclusively to one of business interests, strategic advantages, and practical diplomacy. The language employed by opponents and supporters alike of Grey's initiative was identical. Logical argument was met with logical counter-argument, all within the framework of unspoken, but nevertheless, clearly delineated boundaries.

Only one lone article appeared in the mainstream Liberal Press which dared to step beyond these boundaries and judge the Agreement by a completely different and potentially subversive set of criteria. However, that article was not even the work of an Englishman, being instead a foreign contribution to the Nineteenth Century from an Asian expert at Budapest University, Arminius Vambéry. The seventy-five year old Hungarian scholar had written far back in 1864 in his Travels in Central Asia that "the continued progress of the Russian's designs in Central Asia is... beyond all doubt." In his book Western Culture in Eastern Lands: A Comparison of the Methods Adopted by England and
Russia in the Middle East (1906) he made no effort to conceal his sympathies:

"The view that Russia will be better qualified than England to civilise Asia is... altogether false. A politically free nation, occupying a higher cultural level, has more active measures at its disposal, had more strength and perseverance, and has nobler ends in view, than a nation... held fast by the bonds of despotic, absolute monarchy."24

By 1907, after having studied "for more than fifty years... the Anglo-Russian rivalry question in the East", Vambéry had little or nothing good to say about the new Agreement. As perhaps, a more objective, foreign observer, he was convinced "that the stipulations [did] more harm than good to British interests."25 But he took his criticisms beyond a simple listing of the dangerous concessions made by Grey in Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. Citing "comments of the Mohammedan Press", he decried the abdication of Britain's "dearly-bought" moral position in Asia. The "Asiatics" had always looked upon "Great Britain... as superior to Russia... whose liberal comedies are disregarded by Orientals and taken for what they are worth." But now, as a result of the provisions of the Anglo-Russian Convention, the ideals of British liberalism, so genuinely admired in the East, had been cynically cast aside and as a consequence, Britain had lost its exalted and pre-eminent rank among its Asian admirers. Vambéry mourned the fact "that the halo of Great Britain should be eclipsed by Czardom."

But Vambéry could not look to the Moderates or Conservatives for support. His Nineteenth Century article was virtually alone among the Press organs of the Right and Center in protesting against the Treaty on grounds of morality and idealism. Testimony to his isolation is the complete absence of any rebuttal of his views. Apparently none was felt to be necessary. The debate, initiated in the Press according to the
dictates of Liberal Imperialism and undisturbed by the scruples of Vambéry, was transferred directly to Parliament.

This transfer had been long delayed as Parliament had risen just prior to the signing of the Convention. Lord Curzon was forced to wait until February 6, 1908 to open his attack on the Agreement in the Lords.\textsuperscript{26} Noting the debt the Convention owed to the work of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne, Curzon denied that there was anything at all in a policy of rapprochement with Russia to which he was likely to have a priori objections. He maintained that his experience in India had convinced him that "no inherent or ineradicable antipathy or antipathy" separated Russia and England.\textsuperscript{27} He would not hesitate to congratulate the Government on an arrangement of a "satisfactory nature"\textsuperscript{28}:

"But no body of men can be more familiar than your Lordships with the fact that a business transaction must be regarded... in the light of the terms in which it is concluded... I wish that my own impressions of the treaty, point by point, could have been more favourable than they have been; but I cannot honestly say to your Lordships that that is a fair bargain which I hold to be unequal and unfair."\textsuperscript{29}

Curzon analyzed the meaning of the Treaty article by article, exposing as he understood it, the newly precarious state of Britain's Central Asian position. Needless sacrifices had been made in Persia, nothing had been gained in Afghanistan, and the clauses concerning Tibet amounted to "absolute surrender" and "humiliation."\textsuperscript{30}

When the debate resumed on February 10th Lord Lansdowne, like Curzon an ex-Viceroy, muted his own criticisms.\textsuperscript{31} Carefully restricting his comments to a discussion of the Convention's details, he hesitated to venture "beyond the limit of reasonable criticism."\textsuperscript{32} Although some points seemed "to incline in a marked manner against this country"\textsuperscript{33}, others he regarded of "utmost value." In his estimation, the true value of the Treaty would depend upon Russia's conduct, and Lansdowne was con-
fident "that this Agreement will be loyally and honourably interpreted by the Russian Government." 34

The official reply came from Lord Fitzmaurice, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and also Lord Lansdowne's brother. He answered Curzon's objections one by one, dwelling at length upon the issue of the partition of Persia. 35 Fitzmaurice was ably seconded by Lord Reay 36, the Earl of Crewe 37, and Lord Cromer. 38 The most telling defense of all however, came from Lord Sanderson, whose former position as Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office added weight to his observations. Admitting that exception might be taken to some of the Treaty's finer points, Sanderson reminded his colleagues of other, overriding considerations:

"We are however, I think, agreed that the Agreement should be judged as a whole, and viewed in that light it has great claims to be regarded with favour. It is an endeavour on the part of two Great Western Powers most interested in Asia to put aside small jealousies and suspicions, to come to an agreement on points on which there is danger of conflicting policies, and to work together in the cause of progress and civilisation... For such objects it is worth while to make considerable sacrifices..." 39

The Lords debate was a replay of the one carried on for five months in the Press. Both could be summarized in the words of Lord Lamington:

"My Lords, I do not think that any Member of your Lordships' House objects to the Convention in principle. The only criticism that has been directed against it is in regard to details."

The Commons debate on the Convention on February 17th closely followed the lines of the Lords' arguments. Earl Percy, former Foreign Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary, attacked the Agreement with a Curzon-esque vigor. 40 British interests had been sacrificed without solid Russian assurances having been received. Arthur Balfour joined in the criticism 41, but with a more moderate, equivocating tone reminiscent of Lansdowne and described by John Morley as "a lot of skimble-
skamble stuff." Uncharacteristically, considering his training in philosophy, Balfour's concluding remarks undercut much of his previous argument:

"I cannot regard the Agreement for which the Government are responsible as one in which they have scored a great diplomatic success, although it carries with it substantial advantages, which may, and I hope will, carry in addition some augmentation of that friendly feeling which is the great security of peace and goodwill among those who lead the civilised nations in Western Europe."  

Sir Edward Grey, in a lengthy and detailed speech, eloquently presented his own answers to critics of his policy. Admitting that some concessions had been made, he was convinced that what had been sacrificed to Russia in Central Asia would be shown not to be "those things... which in any reasonable prospect British policy could have attained." Commercial opportunities might possibly have suffered, but the real test of the Treaty was "the strategical importance of it. It [was] the strategical-position which makes the Agreement desirable and essential."  

John Morley joined with Grey in proclaiming the Convention an Agreement that Britain "may not only be contented with, but proud of... I think His Majesty's Government and the country have reason to congratulate themselves on this arrangement being made."  

Reading through the clearly reasoned, verbose arguments of the Lords and Commons debates gives the impression that the question of the Treaty was considered from every possible angle. That is, of course, an illusion created by the careful restriction of the debates to matters commercial and strategic, matters of pragmatic, down-to-earth diplomacy. It is significant that no Radical or Labour M.P. spoke in the February debates. This negligence permitted the Government spokesmen to concentrate their defence of the Convention against objections stemming from the dictates of practicality and national interest.
Discussions of international justice and Britain's duty to humanity were conspicuous by their absence, the implication being that they were not germane to the question at hand. And in the end it was not the Radicals but both the defenders and opponents of the Convention as a practical arrangement, who touched upon those issues, however briefly and tangentially.

Lord Curzon, leader of the anti-Russian faction, was unwilling to make common cause with allies of just any ideological stamp. He was careful to dissociate himself from criticisms of the Agreement based on moral grounds:

"That is the view that no arrangement ought to have been concluded with Russia because it might have prejudiced the cause of constitutional reform in that country. I see no validity whatever in this plea. Indeed, I see no relevancy between the two propositions. His Majesty's Government could only deal as they did deal, with the accredited and established Government of the Russian Empire. There is no prospect of that Government being dislodged; and it would appear to me to be not only false policy, but an almost gratuitous impertinence to decline to negotiate with that Government because a constitutional movement is proceeding in Russia with which a large number of people in this country find themselves in sympathy."

That was the first and last time such an objection was mentioned in the Lords debate. The Commons followed suit with Grey addressing that angle of the issue simply to discredit it:

"There is one more point which has not been raised in the debate, but about which I have been much criticized elsewhere, and about which from time to time I have received many resolutions, and most of them very uncomplimentary ones. I have been told that at a time when Russia was passing through a constitutional crisis, at a time when events were happening internally in Russia which did not meet with the approval of those who addressed me on the subject, that was not the time to enter into diplomatic negotiations or to make an Agreement with Russia. I should like to say generally that when you are dealing with a great homogenous nation, foreign interference—an attempt by your foreign policy to exercise pressure on the internal constitutional problem—does nothing but inflame and irritate. It is of no benefit, no help; and sooner or later, generally sooner, it produces a united national resentment against you."

The devotion of such a tiny fraction of its energies to the formulation of an answer to the Radical position was not a new stratagem
adopted by the defenders of the Convention at the time of the Parliamentary debate. The precedent had been set in the Tory and Moderate Liberal Press during the intervening five months since the signing of the Convention. Even in the Vambéry article mentioned previously, the custom had been to mention the issue of morality merely as an aside within the context of a discussion of the strategic advantages or disadvantages offered by the Treaty. And when the claims of the Radicals had been deliberated, it was in a less than complimentary manner. The Times accused the Radicals of entertaining a willingness to endanger Britain's security for the will-o-the-wisp of Russian internal reform:

"Not a few amongst the organs of that curious school of advanced Radicalism which habitually seeks peace and ensures it by proclaiming its readiness to sacrifice any British interest on demand, have murmured loudly at the signature of an instrument which should be one of the greatest bulwarks of peace. The reasons on which they found their objections would lead to some remarkable results, were they followed to a logical conclusion. They do not approve of the domestic policy of the Russian Government, which they justly conceive to be based on principles incompatible with their own. They say that it is monstrous for a Liberal Ministry to make a treaty—though, of course it relates exclusively to foreign affairs— with a Government which dissolves Dumas, manipulates electoral laws, and even shoots dynamiters when it can. There have been times, and there may be times again, when the rigid application of the doctrine would condemn us to a very perilous isolation."

For the Spectator "there [were] bargains and bargains." The "extreme Liberals" had missed the point of the Treaty, it was "a mere matter of cold business." The Conservative weekly was willing to concede that if a truly intimate alliance had been reached it might indeed imply British sanction for the excesses of Russian internal political repression. But instead a simple bargain had been struck to "end a dangerous dispute." Did not the extreme Liberals agree that such a dispute existed? Was it not worth ending? If so then the Spectator agreed that the logic of the Westminster Gazette's assessment of the Radicals' complaints seemed inescapable. That illogical and unreasonable faction
had indicated a willingness "to sacrifice the greater morality to the
less."

E.J. Dillon in the *Contemporary Review* concurred. In his judg-
ment an Anglo-Russian Agreement was the *sine qua non* of a lasting
European peace. Since British foreign policy could not

"improve relations between the Russian rulers and ruled, it does not follow
that we should abstain from improving our own relations with Russia and...
increasing the chances of permanent peace... Because Russia's rulers dis-
agree with Russia's would be reformers, should Great Britain run the risk of
having to wage war with the Tsardom in Persia or Afghanistan next year or the
year after?" 54

J. Ellis Barker in the *Nineteenth Century* reminded those Radicals
demanding a diplomatic quarantine of the Tsar's Government that the
Anglo-Russian entente was "not a sentimental union but merely a busi-
ness arrangement between two governments." 55

Calchas, in probably the most well-considered answer to the
Radicals, asked whether Great Britain should "jeopardise peace rather
than traffic in autocracy." 56 Using examples from nineteenth century
British diplomatic history, this frequent contributor of foreign
affairs articles to the *Fortnightly Review* criticized Britain's long-
standing tendency to "strengthen our various attitudes towards Russia
in foreign policy by utterly irrelevant arguments founded upon the real
or imagined facts about the internal conditions of Tsardom." The prac-
tical pursuit of national interest was Britain's "necessary business"
and available energy should not be expended uselessly on "a purely
verbal zeal for human rights at large." Calchas could only hope that
at long last Anglo-Russian relations had risen above the "wash of
sentimentalism."

The examples cited above are not the tip of a great iceberg,
representative samples of a vast collection of retorts to Radical cri-
tics. Instead, they are isolated cases. The rarity of this type of article argues very persuasively for a lack of concern among Moderates and Conservatives with the objections raised by "extreme Liberals", a common understanding as to the irrelevancy of the question of morality. The reasons behind the paucity of such articles is underscored by the style and tone of these examples. Their writers convey no sense of anxiety to the reader regarding pressure from the Left. The answers to the Radicals' pleadings are not impassioned polemics. Rather they read like the obligatory listing of known, well-worn arguments, arguments not requiring excessive elaboration as they have already been assimilated and assented to by the general readership. The authors exhibited a firm confidence that the foreign policy assumptions of themselves and their readers were congruent.

The Liberal ministers were no less certain that they would easily succeed in restricting what public debate there was to the parameters considered appropriate. Morley wrote to Nicolson one week after the signing of the Convention:

"I fancy that the fight in England... will all turn on geographic details that will not much stir the Man in the Street... And on the general issue, public opinion will cordially approve.""57

After the Parliamentary debate Grey admitted that many people did not think that the Convention, as an isolated bargain, was a good one. However, he felt sure that these critics would "be pleased if it leads to a generally friendly attitude of Russia towards us."58 Morley summed up the Government's confidence and satisfaction in a letter to Minto on February 19, 1908:

"The Anglo-Russian Agreement is now well over the bar in Parliament, the Press, and the country. I certainly don't mean that all the politicians and journalists who approve have a right to any opinion at all, whether in the way of approval of disapproval. But there it is. Public opinion, much
or little as it may be worth, runs strongly for the Convention.\(^{59}\)

* * * * * * *

Throughout the fall and winter of 1907-8 Morley had watched the flow of events and was secure in his confidence that the Radicals posed no threat to Grey's foreign policy initiatives toward Russia. One of the attributes that had made the Secretary of State for India's recruitment so attractive to Grey was Morley's clear understanding of the sources of Radical weakness and vulnerability.\(^{60}\) Better than the Foreign Secretary, he saw that Radical disunity would undermine their effectiveness. As Morley remarked to Lord Minto, "They [the Radicals] are of all sorts of political temperament...they don't agree on anything, and have no leading mind among them." Under the circumstances a single-minded and determined Minister exercising a "moderate commonsense" had "no serious difficulties to fear."\(^{61}\)

Perhaps Morley was aware as well, of another failing of the Radicals, an inflated estimation of their power and influence. Wilfrid Blunt, on hearing of the signing of the Convention, complained in his diary:

"The whole thing is, of course, abominable, but what fools the Radical members are to have put up with Grey these two years since the General Election."\(^{62}\)

Blunt makes no suggestion as to just how the Parliamentary Radicals were to have disposed of the Liberal Imperialist Foreign Secretary, but there is an assumption that the Radicals possessed untapped reserves of power which could be unleashed at any time to bend government policy to their will.

Morley proved the better prophet. There was a crack in the ranks of the Radical Press from the outset. The Manchester Guardian hesitated to condemn the Agreement, and even more damaging, discussed it in a manner little removed from the Tory or Moderate Press:
"A Liberal cannot grow lyrical over the Convention, but he can reasonably say that in so far as it promises relief to Indian finances, secures our honour in relation to Tibet, and checks the pace of actual European attack upon Persia while protecting legitimate British interests there, it serves some substantial ends with the least possible discredit." 

C.P. Buxton's Albany Review limited itself to a very lukewarm and cautious criticism of the Treaty, reserving the hope that it might, over the years, be developed into the old Liberal policy of bringing pressure to bear on Turkey in the Balkans. Veteran Radical statesmen such as Lord Loreburn and Lord Courtney provided Parliamentary support for the new diplomatic connection, despite accusations of betrayal by their more extreme colleagues.

But a larger segment of Radicals reacted with the dismay and outrage that would more properly be expected. H.N. Brailsford was alert to the global implications of the Convention as demonstrated in his letter to The Times of September 5th:

"If the Agreement was, in fact as it is in form, merely a local Asiatic arrangement, which left our hands free, it might not be relevant to consider the character of the Russian Government..."

However, since Britain was undoubtedly relying on Russian "co-operation" throughout the Middle East and Europe, this qualification did not hold:

"In public as in private life one may make any isolated business arrangement with a person, but when one contemplates co-operation and common action, it is relevant to consider the character of the other party."

Brailsford joined with other disgruntled Radicals in forming the Anglo-Russian Committee. Included among its members were M.P.'s J. Ramsey MacDonald and J. O'Grady, along with journalists H.W. Nevinson, G.H. Perri, C.P. Scott, and Lucien Wolf. The avowed intention of this organization was "to watch the development of Anglo-Russian relations in the interests of the liberties of the Russian people... whose destinies may be affected by any policy which Russia and Great Britain may pursue..."
Lucien Wolf's Russophobia stemmed, in the main, from his Jewish heritage. In 1899, as foreign editor of The Illustrated Graphic (1890-1909), he came "reluctantly to the conclusion that the theory of the incurable bad faith of the Russian Government was no mere superstition."\(^{69}\) This was quite an about-face from his position in 1896, when Russia seemed, of all the European Powers, "the one which competes with us the least and with whom we have most in common."\(^{70}\) His change in attitude was a direct consequence of the "implacable nature of Russia's official anti-Semitism"\(^{71}\), which was laid bare before him in an interview in 1903 with the ultra-reactory Minister of the Interior Plehve. By October, 1905 Wolf had begun publication of a weekly news sheet called The Russian Correspondent. "issued by sympathizers with the Russian struggle for freedom."\(^{72}\) Given his past concerns, naturally Wolf expressed immediate and uncompromising opposition to the Convention. He refused to accept Grey's thesis that there was no relation between Russian internal affairs and British foreign policy:

"He [Grey] says we have no concern with the domestic politics of Russia. He might just as well say that we have no concern with the private lives of the people we place on our visiting lists."

The Anglo-Russian Agreement was:

"the most notable example of the unextenuated adoption of the raison d'état in Liberal foreign policy of which we have any record. For at least a century the Liberal Party has been faithful to a politique de pricipes... From the time of Earl Grey it has never hitherto entered the mind of a Liberal statesman to negotiate an entente with a despotic Government, especially one at war with its own subjects."\(^{73}\)

Along with Wolf in The Graphic, the most uncompromising critic of the new accord with Russia was The Nation. Its September 7th issue admitted that there was some reason for complaint on the part of " Asiatic merchants and experts" who decried the sacrifice of British prestige
and trade opportunities in Central Asia. But the concerns of the editor, H.W. Massingham, lay elsewhere, with the consequences of the new Agreement for Russian liberalism and Persian nationalism:

"We retain our fear that any rehabilitation of the Russian Government abroad must to some extent improve the prospects of the autocracy at home. It was its pitiable weakness abroad during the war, which rendered the reform movement possible at home. We have chosen the interests of our Welt-Politik to cover up this weakness and to restore Russia to her old position of influence... the policy of strengthening the Russian Government may have graver consequences for human liberty than the menace which it involves to Persian nationalism."  

After the publication of the text of the Convention The Nation still suspected hidden beneath the "local Asiatic arrangement" was an attempt to "inaugurate a general entente cordiale with the Russian Government."  

The contemplation of such a "premature rapprochement" surely endangered the establishment of a truly constitutional Government in Russia and "might compromise the ultimate friendship between the two peoples." The extension of the Convention to a general entente would be disastrous:

"It would tie the hands of our statesmen and our Press in criticising any sort of Russian governmental excess, from pogroms to coups d'état. It would enhance the prestige of a régime which has often seemed to live upon its credit... Finally... it is not desirable to enlist among the associates of English diplomacy in many European questions, a partner who would share neither our scruples nor our ideals."

The editorial stand of The Nation, derived from solid Gladstonian principles of liberalism, morality, and international responsibility, was seconded by The New Age:

"Nothing will prevent the agreement being used by the Tsar to prop the tottering fabric of his Tyranny. On the strength of our friendship he will raise money; by our aid he will buy arms; of every Russian woman tortured and outraged by the agents of despotism, will be required at our hands."  

Lucien Wolf had predicted that a Government defence of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in the Press would not be easy as "only one evening paper bowed to the uncompromising championship of Downing Street." He had praised the "admirable presentation of the case of the so-called
'idealistic' position' found in H.N. Brailsford's letter of September 5, 1907 in The Times\textsuperscript{77}, noting that "the cogency and moderation of his arguments ought to impress the public mind."\textsuperscript{78} But the attempt to locate the debate over the Anglo-Russian Convention in an environment more congenial to Radical sensibilities was a dismal failure. The arguments of Brailsford, Wolf, The Nation, and The New Age fell short in eliciting the desired response, a response similar to that of the Bulgarian Agitation of 1876. Even more alarming, their arguments failed to elicit almost any response at all. Those with a hand in foreign policy formulation, the power-elite, the Press, and the literate, reading public, were quite willing to restrict the debate to one of practical politics, to a critique of diplomatic debits and credits. The Radicals were acutely aware of their ineffectiveness. There were no mass protest meetings.

Their idealistic zeal did not carry even a small fraction of the Moderate Press along with it. As we have seen, their efforts were so ineffectual that practically no rebuttals of their arguments appeared in opposition journals and newspapers. The Liberal Imperialist/Tory vision of foreign policy had triumphed by redefining the rules of the game. Within the new foreign policy value system the old Gladstonian principles were mere irrelevancies.

With their more familiar avenues of debate closed, Radicals, in frustration, were forced by circumstances to enter the arena on the Government's terms. The Nation was prompted to append to its assertion that the Anglo-Russian Convention was immoral, a long discourse on the Treaty's strategic drawbacks. But this was for them a very unfertile line, because although the Treaty seemed to damage British commercial and strategic interests in Persia it did offer the recognition of
Afghanistan and Tibet as "two buffer States" for India "in which the intrigues and rivalries of the two Empires will henceforth cease." The Radical hatred of armaments and advocacy of peace made this consequence irresistible. As can be seen, this line of reasoning had many unforeseen and unpleasant traps for the Radicals.

Adding to the Radical woes was the reluctance of many of their usual supporters to speak out on this issue. The Manchester Guardian and Albany Review criticisms had been lukewarm at best. The New Age found it impossible to "acquit the Labour members [of Parliament] of blame for not having made their indignation visible and audible as soon as they knew that such a project was in the air." The hesitancy to speak out against Grey's policy was highlighted by the silence of all Radical and Socialist M.P.'s during the Commons debate of February 17, 1908. (The sole exception was Charles Dilke, and he restricted himself to comments pertaining to commercial and strategic interests alone.)

After their rout in the six-month debate following the Convention's signature the Radicals and their Socialist allies had lost any real prospect of altering the course of pre-War Anglo-Russian relations. The best they could do was to continue to make a nuisance of themselves on foreign policy issues, while consistently pricking the 'Gladstonian conscience' of England. There were certainly abundant opportunities for symbolic gestures.

At the I.L.P. Huddersfield Conference in 1908, Keir Hardie complained bitterly that Britain's signature on the Anglo-Russian Convention was equivalent to "giving an informal sanction to the course of infamous tyranny which has suppressed every semblance of representation and has condemned great numbers of our Russian comrades to imprisonment, torture
Grey's announcement in the Commons on May 27th that King Edward had accepted an invitation to visit the Tsar at Reval in June presented Hardie and the other Labour M.P.'s, now apparently recovered from their earlier bout of reticence, with an opportunity for a more tangible display of their dissatisfaction, a display that had been conspicuously absent in the February Commons debate. Ramsay MacDonald and Hardie contributed powerfully worded articles to the Labour Leader attacking the proposed visit. MacDonald's piece, entitled "An Insult to Our Country", described the Tsar as a "common murderer" and objected to the King, as the head of a state which prided itself on its constitutional freedoms, "hobnobbing with a blood-stained creature" like Nicholas II. Hardie's article, "Consorting with Murderers", maintained that "The Czar and his Government have been singled out for honour by a Liberal Government. What is the explanation?"  

The matter was raised in Parliament by James O'Grady and Hardie. In the debate of June 4th Hardie's use of the term "atrocities" in reference to a "friendly Power" incurred the censure of the Chairman, who demanded its retraction. Reluctantly, under the threat of suspension, Hardie complied. The O'Grady amendment, put to a division, received only fifty-nine assenting votes, described by P.W. Wilson, Parliamentary correspondent for the Daily News, as the "revolt of the fifty-nine." But included among that number were only twelve Radical members. In this case Labour had taken the lead in opposing the Government's foreign policy.

Perhaps concerned lest Radical ammunition be frittered away on a matter of no ultimate consequence, Lucien Wolf, an inveterate anti-Russian, would not speak out against the visit. He insisted that the King's trip
to Reval would have no real influence on British public opinion in extending the Treaty into an "entente cordiale". That was the best that could be hoped for under the circumstances:

"As long as no exaggerated significance is attached to the King's visit to the Tsar it would be ungracious, and perhaps even not a little mischievous, to criticise it. My own views on the subject of an entente with Russia are on record, and I see no reason to modify them. I am, however, disposed to accept Sir Edward Grey's formula, that while statesmen can make treaties, it is only public opinion that can make ententes cordiales, and I have sufficient confidence in the political idealism and wholesome instincts of my countrymen to feel certain that in the case of Russia they will not confuse the two... between the British democracy and the Russian autocracy there can be no sense of affinity, and consequently no bond of enthusiastic cordiality."

Perhaps Wolf and the Radicals were discouraged after their poor showing in the months following the signing of the Convention. Or perhaps their reluctance to join the Labour revolt could be traced to a message to the British people from the President of the Third Duma (a legislative body described by Bernard Pares as a "parody of representation") declaring the visit by the British sovereign to be "both opportune and natural now that representative government in Russia was set on a firm and permanent basis." However, no matter what the reason, The New Age deplored the reticence of the Radicals, suggesting that the mantle of old liberalism had passed to the Labour Party:

"It is significant that more than half of the Liberal Party had the cowardice of their principles, and abstained from sharing in the honour of voting with Mr. O'Grady against the visit of King Edward of England to the Tsar of Russia ... Not a man in England worthy the name but will have a word of praise and thanks to the Labour Party for raising the discussion. Twice last week the only notes of ancient Liberalism were struck by the Labour Party."

There was a re-enactment on a smaller scale of this dissent prior to the Tsar's visit to England in the summer of 1909. On June 25th the Labour Party issued a declaration labeling the projected reception of Nicholas as an insult to the English people when "his personal approval of the criminal agents [of repression inside Russia] had been placed
The Nation warned that, "A welcome offered to him is a misprint in the history of Liberalism, and an infidelity to the cause of freedom." At a Trafalgar Square demonstration on July 25th H.M. Hyndman urged his enthusiastic audience to spit in the Tsar's face. The Radical campaign was carried through to August 2nd, the day of the Tsar's arrival, when an open letter was published protesting against the official welcome accorded the Russian Autocrat. Signed by seventy Liberal and Labour M.P.'s, many Free Church ministers, and three peers of the realm (Lord Courtney and the Bishops of Hereford and Birmingham), the letter was essentially ignored and served only to emphasize the genuinely popular welcome showered on Nicholas and his family.

Russian activities in Persia after 1908 were a further incitement to British Radicals. In their minds the bright hopes for Persian constitutionalism had been abandoned in the pursuit of continued Anglo-Russian cooperation at any price. By the second half of 1911 dissatisfaction with Grey's Persian policy had acted as a rallying point for all the opponents of the Foreign Secretary and his methods. Lord Curzon, speaking to the members of the Persian Society at their inaugural banquet on November 15th, declared that it must be admitted by all friends of an independent Persia that Anglo-Russian diplomacy had been ill-conceived. The Conservative Press, for the most part, ignored Curzon's speech, but his statements received generous coverage and earnest support from the Manchester Guardian, The Nation, the Daily News, and the Labour Leader. Within another week the anti-Grey movement had gained the backing of the Conservative Daily Telegraph. Lucien Wolf, in a series of articles in The Graphic, pointed out that Grey had consistently been outmaneuvered by the Russians in Persia. The scope
of criticism gradually became more generalized, eventually encompassing the whole history of the Liberal Government's handling of Anglo-Russian relations. Ramsay MacDonald's speech in the House of Commons debate on foreign affairs of November 27, 1911 reintroduced the issue of Russia's internal conditions as a factor in the formulation of British foreign policy:

"The whole justification for our friendship with Russia lies in the liberalizing of Russian institutions—and that has not happened. As a matter of fact one of the results of our pro-Russian policy has been to encourage the Russian bureaucracy to stamp out Parliamentary institutions as much as they possibly can in Russia." 103

Taken to its logical conclusion, the outcry was nothing less than a complete calling into question of the principles of the foreign policy of the present Liberal Government. 104 Dissent was vocal enough to warrant a Parliamentary debate on February 21, 1912. However, once again Radical pressure proved more apparent than real. The debate was a lifeless, anti-climax to the buildup generated by the Press, with criticism originating solely from the back benches. 105 For the last time before August, 1914 the impotence of the Radicals in the area of foreign affairs was laid bare, and none were more aware of it than they themselves, as H.N. Brailsford did not hesitate to point out:

"The ability of the Liberal press to influence the Foreign Office has been tested during Sir Edward Grey's long term of office. The Nation, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News have been steadily critical of the whole trend of his policy, and incidents have some times moved them to outspoken indignation. Yet it is only within modest limits, and then only when a section of Conservative opinion was with them... that they have seemed to deflect his course of action." 106

This was truly a Radical admission of defeat.
SOME CONCLUSIONS

In the broad context of the history of Great Britain prior to the Great War, Anglo-Russian relations and their evolution provide a portal through which the astute and diligent observer can witness more than simply diplomatic machinations. Conclusions, some perhaps tentative, about economic well-being, social stability and cohesion, as well as military and strategic security are certainly possible with the data available. The flux of the British political process is reflected with particular clarity, as new, fairly distinct political alignments emerge around the issue of Anglo-Russian rapprochement. On a more abstract level, changes in attitudes toward Russia can be taken as a microcosm of Britain's fin-de-siècle ideological and philosophical evolution. The decline of the consensus of Victorian liberalism, the growing sterility of the liberal ideal and the passing of the torch to the Labour Party are all mirrored in the two decades of negotiations culminating in the Convention of 1907.

The reasons behind the Anglo-Russian rapprochement which seem obvious to the historian of today were no less obvious to its Edwardian contemporaries. The generally recognized economic decline (though relative, not absolute) as well as mounting military insecurity, a product of the new competition for Empire, had forced Britain by 1890 to alter her perception of her strategic position. What once had been praised as a judicious policy of 'splendid isolation' was now criticized as detrimental to national interests. There was a grudging but unmistakable agreement that the traditional freedom of British foreign policy, perhaps more apparent than real, must be abandoned to the exigencies of Imperial security. The meteoric rise of Wilhelmine Germany
made an approach to Russia a logical step in a world where an excess of powerful enemies was becoming increasingly dangerous.

Certainly there is much to this argument. The progression of cause and effect is simple, tidy and eminently logical. But it is a bare outline to which much detail must be added before any real understanding can be achieved.

First we must wonder about the marked change in the ideology of British foreign policy. Had Britain jettisoned any semblance of morality in foreign affairs by approaching Russia with the offer of an agreement? Or perhaps only an ideological veneer had been discarded to reveal a policy of pragmatism that had changed little since the days of Palmerston? Certainly both Liberals and Conservatives were in agreement that British foreign policy had always taken some broad interpretation of liberalism as its guiding principle in the past. The Tory Spectator would admit of no break in continuity even as late as August, 1908, a full year after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention:

"Canning's Liberalism was best shown in his Continental dealings... It has gradually been discovered that while maintaining the traditions of foreign policy which he inherited, he [Sir Edward Grey] has been able to carry the nation with him in broadening and emphasizing its liberal basis."

Just as certainly Radical Liberals were convinced of the distinguished ideological lineage of British foreign policy, a policy that in the past had used "faith in the great cause of human freedom" and "generous sympathy [for] the efforts of oppressed and struggling nationalities" as its polestar.3

The accuracy of these partisan readings of history is for the most part irrelevant to our purposes. What is more important is the fact of the internalization of these ideas by the British public and the
policy-making elite. The intimate and irrevocable association between liberalism and international morality and British foreign policy had been incorporated as myth into the British consciousness. The identification with the myth was, not surprisingly, especially strong among the Radical Left.

The task of the British public, and its leaders, during the two decades prior to the Great War was to reconcile myth with reality. Global economic and strategic realities required concessions to the dictates of practicality. For Conservatives and Moderate Liberals alike, friendship with Russia was a pill that had to be swallowed with the best possible equanimity. This necessitated a drastic alteration in attitudes and priorities. The Bulgarian Agitation debate of 1876-7 had been, in large measure, one conducted on the basis of the morality of the situation. There had been important issues of material interest at stake then (and in the end they perhaps weighed most heavily in the balance), and yet the public discussion had been carried on at a more elevated and abstract level than that of the crude calculation of material profit and loss.

The development of the debate over a possible British rapprochement with Tsarist Russia in the 1890's and early 1900's gradually shed much of the old ideological rhetoric. Britain's fears were now more tangible and the language of debate reflected this. Journalistic analyses of the practical advantages offered Britain by Russian friendship became much more common than vague pronouncements of Anglo-Russian philosophical and political incompatibility. For the average Edwardian Englishmen raison d'etat lost many of its ideological trappings.
But this was not the whole story. In conjunction with this new tendency to judge foreign policy on a more strictly pragmatic basis was an unconscious effort to maintain the myth of the close association between Britain and 'right'. We have seen how the Tsar, his government, and the Russian nation as a whole were rehabilitated in the Moderate Liberal and Tory Press in the 1890's. This allowed for a harmonization, albeit in many cases a procrustean one, of raison d'etat and ideology so important to the Liberal conscience. If strategic considerations necessitated friendship with Russia, then Tsardom must be divested of many of its most unappealing characteristics, otherwise the resultant ideological tension would undermine the integrity of British liberalism.

And therein lies the crux of the dispute between Radicals and their more moderate colleagues. To the Radicals the approaches to Russia betrayed long-held Liberal British foreign policy tenets that had been brought to their highest state of perfection during the Gladstonian administrations:

"In his conduct of affairs Gladstone may have made, did make, concessions to imperious colleagues, and committed himself to a share in some acts of territorial aggrandisement upon which he would not have entered of his own will. But, when all limitations are allowed for, he left his country a name in international dealings such as no nation has enjoyed before... It was recognised that in Gladstone a great country had for once at the head of affairs a man who had a place for other considerations than those of national pride or material interests."^4

The Nation, in a rare burst of bipartisanship (however carefully qualified) noted that although "the Gladstonian tradition was never lost by Lord Salisbury", its potency had gradually been sapped during his years at the Foreign Office:

"More and more the belief grew that German 'Real-politics' contained the last word of wisdom in international affairs... Non-intervention was the word so far as mere justice, mere liberty, mere humanity, were concerned."^5

Sir Edward Grey's tenure as Foreign Secretary had confirmed this omi-
nous drift in foreign principles:

"Liberal readers of Sir Edward Grey's speeches on foreign affairs must be sensible of a sharp moral differentiation from the doctrine in which they were brought up, and to which their instinctive affections are given... We seem to have definitely left the several spheres where the spirits of Canning and Palmerston and Russell and Gladstone have necessarily held sway, and to have entered a territory in which the only recognised object is the pursuit of Imperial interests."  

The Agreement with Russia had been only the most flagrant and conspicuous acknowledgement of the sorry new state of affairs. Lucien Wolf expressed his fears for the fate of Britain's tradition of Liberal foreign policy as a consequence of the Anglo-Russian Convention:

"On the ethical side I persist in believing that it is deplorable. It is a reverse of all the ideas which have inspired British foreign policy since the time of Pitt. For the Liberal Party, which boasts its descent from Puritans, to conclude such an Agreement, especially under present conditions, seems like a freak of topsy-turvydom. I am not altogether a believer in the quixotry of Puritanism, but Liberalism has travelled very far from its ideas in foreign policy as they were once expounded by Harrington: 'The duty of a free Commonwealth is to relieve oppressed peoples and to spread liberty in other lands; to the intent that the whole world may be governed with righteousness.' I venture to commend this dictum to the Nonconformist conscience.'

Numerous examples have been given of the Radical claim that the Convention was a betrayal not only of the traditions of British foreign policy, but also of a responsibility owed by Britain, as the world's foremost liberal power, to the people of Russia. This responsibility to Russia was part of a larger British responsibility to Europe as a whole. Britain's adherence to liberal principles and international morality provided Europe with its only hope to avert eventual disaster. The European Powers "by a strange moral blindness" were pressing each other to "the gulf of common ruin" and greeting "every advance to the precipice as a victory of peace." Under these dire circumstances:

"Two organised political forces only seem to exist to combat these tendencies. They are the British Liberal and Labour Parties and Continental Socialism. Liberalism is, for the moment, the most important of these instruments for redeeming modern society from its craze for violence."
The Anglo-Russian Convention as well as the Anglo-French Entente had betrayed Britain's trust to Europe:

"Nowhere has the Triple Entente served a Liberal thought, and at no time in the long rivalry has this battle over the balance of power turned on an intelligible principle, or a purpose which promised anything to the common good of Europe."

To the Radicals these were high stakes indeed for a retention of Liberal ideological purity in foreign policy, important motives to resist a dilution of traditional orthodoxy:

"If the Liberal Party now abandons or qualifies its central doctrine, it will not only destroy itself, but will open the way to a worse Europe than that of 1815."

In fact, the very basis of Liberalism itself was under attack by those who chose to redefine Liberal ideals and compromise Britain's integrity in the frantic search for a transient material security.

J.A. Hobson, in his Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy (1909), discussed Anglo-Russian relations and their intimate connection with his central theme, the grave dangers faced by Liberalism unless it discovered the strength of character to reaffirm its old doctrines. Noting that the majority of Englishmen sympathized with the Russian people in "their struggle for self-government", Hobson accused the State of abandoning liberal principles in its pursuit of a policy of non-intervention in Russia. The problem was that a nation was held accountable to a lower level of moral responsibility than the individual. Liberalism demanded that equivalent standards of judgement be applied to the abstract State as well as the individual. As Britain fell farther and farther from this paradigmatic ideal of conduct there was a "decay of faith" demanding "new principles and a new policy." The Socialists were to provide both, accepting the old, soiled mantle of liberalism, "exposing the falsehood of the ancient
party watchwords and cleavages" while pursuing "intelligible and mentally satisfactory principles."¹³

The Nation was equally distressed at the crisis of Liberalism writ small in the abandonment of ideals to practicality in foreign policy:

"Do Liberals quite realise the full loss to the party of the submergence of their ideals? Do they not forget sometimes that faith and enthusiasm are, even in a faithless generation, the sole trustworthy sources of vitality in a party which has permanently against it the great forces of inertia, as well as the ill-will of a society whose timidity grows with its ever-growing wealth?"¹⁴

For The New Age the loss of a moral ideology meant the end of everything:

"Rome lost her ideals, and set up materialist gods. The inevitable reaction came, and Rome fell. Has Britain lost her ideals? We Socialists say not. We will not bow the knee to the gods of a selfish Materialism. But unless we can carry the nation with us, Britain is doomed as surely as Greece, Macedonia, Assyria, and Rome."¹⁵

Here was a clear expression of the predicament of Radical Liberalism. They were ready and willing to lead a revival of Liberalism, purging in the process, all of the Liberal Imperialist's impurities acquired in the preceding two decades. The Radicals felt morally qualified to "carry the nation" with them, but, at least in the area of international relations, their overtures were rejected or ignored. Despite a host of opportunities: innumerable Jewish pogroms, the controversy over Tibet in 1905, the Dogger Bank affair, Bloody Sunday, the dissolution of the First Duma, post-Convention excesses by Russia in Persia, the visit of the King to Reval, etc., it proved beyond the capability of the Radicals to create and sustain a broadly-based, politically influential anti-Russian movement. In each case there was either a quickly extinguished and forgotten flare-up of Russophobic sentiment (as in the immediate aftermath of the Dogger Bank affair),
or an embarrassing lack of any public response at all (as followed Campbell-Bannerman's "La Douma est morte, Vive la Douma!" speech).

What did this lack of Radical support signify? The concentration of Radical attacks upon the head of Sir Edward Grey tells us something. The Radicals felt that the public suffered from a lack of education about the true situation in foreign policy. They had been misled by Grey and his cronies at the Foreign Office. If only the issues at stake were accurately represented to them, then they would reject the policies of the Liberal Imperialists and marshal themselves against Tsarist despotism.

But of course this never came to pass. There is no reason to believe that Grey and other policy-makers were cynically manipulating the British public to gain support for a policy of Anglo-Russian rapprochement. Certainly at crucial points doubts were raised about the popular reaction to specific diplomatic maneuvers, but on the whole Grey and his predecessors, Salisbury, Rosebery and Lansdowne, expended little time or energy on considerations of public opinion as regarded their approaches to Russia. Indeed we saw previously that quite often the public's new found acceptance of Russia over a wide range of areas had leap-frogged ahead of government policy initiatives. British public opinion was ready, perhaps even impatient is not too strong a term to use here, for each successive friendly overture by His Majesty's Government toward Tsarist Russia. Therefore, although to the Radicals British foreign policy may have appeared aristocratic, high-handed, and out of touch with a popular base, there is little to support such a contention in the history of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement of 1889-1907.
Instead, British public opinion clearly paralleled its leadership during these years. If, as the Radicals accused, the primacy of ideology in foreign affairs had been cynically surrendered by the policy-makers, the British public had given its silent approval. Although some efforts had been made to retain it, the one-to-one correspondence between ideology and practicality had been allowed to lapse without significant protest. Faced with new external pressures, the English public appeared willing to sacrifice the myth of their own righteousness in the realm of foreign affairs to the more pressing, tangible needs of national security. A liberal conscience proved to be an expensive luxury which Great Britain could no longer afford.

The readiness with which this myth was jettisoned tells us much about the state of the liberal idea in Edwardian Britain. Moderate Liberals had been as eager as Liberal Imperialists and Conservatives to accept an Anglo-Russian Agreement as a pragmatic necessity. As G.M. Trevelyan remarks, "If in making friends with our two ancient rivals [France and Russia] Grey betrayed Liberal principles, Campbell-Bannerman, Ripon and Morley were his allies in the betrayal." The outpouring of justificatory rhetoric could not disguise the fact that Liberalism, and liberalism, had indeed been betrayed. If, in the past, ideals had been compromised to necessity, at least the appearance of morality had been carefully retained and nurtured. Now, despite the industrious rationalizations of the Moderate Liberals, the appearance as well as the reality was cast aside with a certain cynical bluntness. And it is the complacence with which this was borne by the vast majority which is the most telling of all.

Kenneth O. Morgan, in his The Age of Lloyd George (1971), makes
a case for the vitality of the Liberal Party in pre-War Britain. In his estimation the traditions of 'Old Liberalism' combined with the potency of 'New Liberalism' to produce, by 1906, a Liberal Party that "was undeniably in full and vigorous health." There is much of merit in Morgan's argument. But whatever the immediate domestic prospects of the Liberal Party apparatus, Liberalism had lost something crucial by the first decade of the twentieth century. It had lost faith in its own mythology. The sterility of the traditional Liberal idea was, to a certain extent unconsciously, acknowledged by the public and by the Party elite. The Party of 1906 that appears so alive and vigorous to Morgan would have deeply troubled Gladstone. It was busy forging a new ideology on the international and domestic scenes that would leave the precepts of 'Old Liberalism' behind. Hobson was correct in concluding that from "the crisis of liberalism" would emerge Socialist progeny. British Liberalism had deserted "the defence of liberty in world" for the Golden Calf of self-interest, and for that the penalty was oblivion.
Notes for pages 1-6:

1 Croce, Benedetto; History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century: Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York (1933); p. 136.


3 Ibid; p. 412.

4 Ibid; p. 414.


7 Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. LXV; 1810-27; Aug. 3, 1914. Grey's only reference to the Anglo-Russian Convention was an oblique one that went as follows:

"They [France] are involved in it [the Austro-Serbian dispute] because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation."

[1814-5]

8 Stromberg, Roland N.; Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914: Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence (1982); p. 135.

9 This topic is discussed fully in Stromberg; Redemption by War; pp. 107-36; see particularly pp. 135-6 in regard to England.

10 For example, the Contemporary Review alone had three such articles between September and December, 1914.

11 Blind, Karl, "Conspiracies in Russia"; Contemporary Review: Vol. XXXV; June, 1879; pp. 422-4. Percy William Bunting became editor of the Contemporary Review in 1882, and under his guidance the periodical assumed a more "activist" and internationalist flavor. Bunting was an ardent promoter of social reform and political liberalism and earned his journal a reputation for, in the words of the Review of Reviews (1891), "broad, evangelical, semi-socialistic Liberalism". Initially Bunting maintained an 'open platform' for a wide variety of contributors (the policy of an 'open platform' was first formulated in 1877 by Bunting's editorial predecessor, James Thomas Knowles). But this policy gradually fell into disuse with the magazine being conducted "along more strictly liberal lines" and with the development of an intimate association between the Contemporary Review and the Liberal Party. See Walter E. Houghton (ed.); The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900, Vol. One: University of Toronto Press, Toronto (1966); pp. 216-3.


13 Refer to p. 2 and 3 above as well as fn. 10.
Notes for pages 7-16:

1 Gleason, J.H.; *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*: Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1950); p. 1. This work gives an authoritative account of the growth of hostility between Great Britain and Russia from the immediate post-Napoleonic era to the end of the 1840's, with particular emphasis on the role played by David Urquhart.


3 Gleason; *Russophobia*; pp. 9-12.

4 Between 1827 and 1831, forty per cent of Russia's imports came from England and forty-eight per cent of her exports were shipped there; while between 1820 and 1831, British trade with Russia comprised a not inconsiderable seven per cent of her total foreign commerce. See Gleason; *Russophobia*; p. 27.

5 Ibid; pp. 25-32.

6 Webster, Charles; *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822*: G. Bell and Sons, London (1963); pp. 234-42.

7 "The State Paper of 5 May, 1820"; Harold Temperley and Lillian W. Penson; *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*: University Press, Cambridge (1938); pp. 53-6, 58, 61.

8 Webster; *Castlereagh*; p. 361.

9 Quoted in Taylor; *Troublemakers*; pp. 38-9.

10 Gleason; *Russophobia*; p. 110.

11 Ibid; p. 117.

12 Ibid; pp. 118-23.


14 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 45.


16 Ibid; p. 35. See also Gleason; *Russophobia*; pp. 101-4.

17 Anonymous; *India, Great Britain, and Russia*: London (1838); pp. iii-iv; quoted in Gleason; *Russophobia*; p. 214.

18 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 46. After fighting for Greek independence in the 1820's, Urquhart had toured extensively in the Ottoman Empire, finding many Turkish virtues which he had not anticipated. He came to appreciate the Islamic way of life and found himself welcomed in many Turkish circles where Christians were usually excluded. On returning to England in 1832 he published *Turkey and its Resources*, analyzing the Ottoman Empire's commercial and administrative systems and arguing forcefully for the basic soundness of the Porte. Urquhart emphasized the freedom of trade, direct taxation, and local administrative independence of the Turkish Empire as its true sources of strength.
Notes for pages 7-16 (cont'd.):

These characteristics had allowed the Porte to survive a multitude of catastrophes and would be the germ of an eventual regeneration. He concluded that England could benefit enormously by adopting the Turkish principles which he admired most. See Gleason; Russophobia; pp. 153-6.

Urquhart, David; Russia and England: London (1835); p. vii; quoted in Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 47 and in Gleason; Russophobia; p. 174.

Gleason; Russophobia; p. 204.

"Speech in Southampton"; P.C. Headley; The Life of Louis Kossuth with an appendix containing his principal speeches; Derby and Miller Press, Auburn, New York (1852); p. 346.

"Speech at Birmingham"; Headley; Kossuth; p. 394.


Bourne; F.P. of Victorian Britain; pp. 75-7.

Ridley; Palmerston; p. 416.

Although, strangely enough, David Urquhart opposed the Crimean War as he relit it was somehow being run for the advantage of Russia by that abject servitor of St. Petersburg, Palmerston.

Bourne; F.P. of Victorian Britain; p. 79.

A notable exception is W.T. Stead, who significantly co-authored a book with Mme. Novikov entitled M.P. for Russia. See below p. 134 for a more complete discussion of Stead's pro-Russian affinities.

Mosse, W.E., "England and the Polish Insurrection of 1863"; English Historical Review; Vol. LXI; (1956); pp. 28-55.

A more complete treatment of the Liberal dilemma and the Bulgarian Agitation see below p. 119. See also R.T. Shannon; Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876; Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London (1963).

Quoted in Taylor; Troublemakers; pp. 76-7.

Marriott; Anglo-Russian Relations 1689-1943: pp. 127-8, 140-2.


Bourne; F.P. of Victorian Britain; p. 145.

Quoted in Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 68; taken from the 1866 Positivist publication International Policy in which a number of contributors presented their ideas of an ideal foreign policy. Within that construction there was no place for friendship between Great Britain and Tsarist Russia.
Notes for pages 17-36:

1 Martin, Theodore; The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort Volume Two; Smith, Elder & Co., London (1880); p. 248.
2 Quoted in A.A. Briggs; The Age of Improvement; Longman’s, Green & Co., London (1959); p. 400.
3 Ibid; quoted on p. 394.
5 Hobsbawm, E.J.; Industry and Empire; An Economic History of Britain Since 1750; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London (1968); p. 94.
6 Ibid; p. 93.
7 Briggs; Age of Improvement; p. 395.
8 Quoted in Paul Kennedy; The Realities Behind Diplomacy; Allen & Unwin, London (1981); p. 20.
9 Hobsbawm; Industry and Empire; pp. 164-7.
10 Briggs; Age of Improvement; p. 394.
14 Montgomerie, William F. and George E. Buckle; The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield; Macmillan, New York (1914); p. 1201.
15 Quoted in Robert Blake; Disraeli; Eyre & Spottiswoode, London (1966); p. 523.
17 Hambidge; 3rd Series; Vol. CCLXVII; 1911-2. An excellent discussion of the many reasons underlying Britain's renewed interest in Empire is presented in C.A. Bodelsen; Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism; Heinemann, London (1960); pp. 79-132. Bodelsen discusses both the "intangible" forces "transforming public opinion" [pp. 79-87] and the more immediate causes. See also Bernard Semmel; Imperialism and Social Reform; Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1960).
18 For a more complete discussion of this topic see Bernard Porter; The Lion's Share; A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1970; Longman, London (1975); pp. 113-4.
19 Quoted in Donald Read; England 1868-1914; Longman, London (1979); p. 200.
Notes for pages 17-36 (cont'd.):

21 See Arthur J. Marder; The Anatomy of British Sea Power: Alfred A. Knopf, New York (1940); pp. 10-23. See also Kennedy; Realities Behind Diplomacy and Porter; The Lion's Share.

22 Hansard; 3rd Series; Vol. CLXXII; 1252; July 23, 1863.

23 Palmerston to Russell, Feb. 13, 1864; quoted in Evelyn Ashley; The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston 1846-1865 Volume Two; Richard Bentley & Son, London (1876); p. 247. For a brief discussion of Britain's recognition of her limitations in the exercise of her power see C.J. Lowe; The Reluctant Imperialists; British Foreign Policy 1878-1902 Volume One; Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1967); pp. 1-18 and Kennedy; The Realities Behind Diplomacy; pp. 74-81.

24 The term first gained wide acceptance in England when The Times of Feb. 27, 1896 quoted First Lord of the Admiralty C.J. Goschen in praise of isolation as splendid. For a general discussion of 'splendid isolation' see Christopher Howard; Splendid Isolation; Macmillan, London (1967); esp. p. 22. See also Read; England 1868-1914; p. 374.

25 Marder; Anatomy of British Sea Power; pp. 10-23.


27 This subject is covered thoroughly in D.C.M. Platt; Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914; Clarendon Press, Oxford (1968). See also Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists.

28 Read; England 1868-1914; p. 201.

29 Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 111, pp. 420-2.

30 The demise of a Gladstonian 'Concert of Europe' at the hands of Bismarckian Realepolitik is the subject of W.N. Medlicott; Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe; Athlone Press, London (1956).

31 Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 96, p. 403.

32 For a representative example see Andrew Carnegie, "British Pessimism"; Nineteenth Century and After; Vol. XLIX, No. CCXII; June, 1901; pp. 907-12.

33 Generally see Elie Halévy; A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century Volume Five; Imperialism and the Rise of Labour; Ernest Benn, Ltd., London (1929). More specifically see Chushichi Tsuzuki; H.M. Hyndman and British Socialism; University Press, Oxford (1970) and A.E.P. Duffy; "New Unionism in Britain 1889-1890: A Reappraisal"; Economic History Review; Second Series, Vol. XIV, No. 2; Dec., 1961; pp. 306-19. See also Philip Magnus; Gladstone: A Biography; John Murray, London (1954); p. 396 in which the author makes the point of discussing what a radical departure away from previous policy this was for the Liberal Party. He also remarks on Gladstone's personal distaste for the entire Programme and his lack of effort in attempting to digest its true meanings. Magnus describes it finally as methods employed by an old man become negligent in his old age about the means used to achieve an end. His unconformability with it is stressed.
Notes for pages 17-36 (cont'd):


35. Aldcroft, Derek H., "British Industry and Foreign Competition 1875-1914"; D.H. Aldcroft (ed.); The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition 1875-1914: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London (1968); p. 13. Industrial production growth rates over the same period for the United States and Germany were 4.7 and 4.1 respectively.


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38. Among the causes of economic ills is the Royal Commission listed: "... (3) the effects of foreign tariffs and boundaries, and the restrictive commercial policy of foreign countries in limiting our markets; (4) foreign competition, which we are beginning to feel both in our own and in neutral markets... (6) cheaper rates of carriage enjoyed by our foreign competitors... (8) superior technical education of workmen in foreign countries."

Quoted from B.W. Clapp (ed.); Documents in English Economic History; England Since 1760 Volume One: G. Bell & Son, Ltd., London (1976); pp. 41-2.
Notes for pages 17-36 (cont'd.):

39 See Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics for a discussion of this, especially Appendix V which is the Bryce Memorandum of 17 July, 1886, the clearest exposition of British policy in this area.

40 The Manchester Guardian of April 7, 1884 explained:
"It is not the habit of the English people to set out with their eyes open on a career of conquest and annexation. The conquests which we make are forced upon us."
Quoted in Porter, The Lion's Share; p. 111.

41 Calchas, "Will England Last the Century"; Fortnightly Review: Vol. LXIX, No. CCCCIX; Jan., 1901; p. 34. The John Masefield poem "Cargoes" (1903) underlined the connection between Empire, trade, and British power:
"Quinquireme of Nineveh from distant Ophir
Rowling home to haven in sunny Palestine
With a cargo of ivory
And apes and peacocks,
Sandalwood, cedarwood, and sweet white wine.
Stately Spanish galleon coming from the Isthmus,
Dipping through the Tropics by the palm-green shores,
With a cargo of diamonds,
Emeralds, amethysts,
Topazes, and cinnamon, and gold moidores.
Dirty British coaster with a salt-caked smoke stack
Butting through the Channel in the mad March days
With a cargo of Tyne coal,
Road-rail, pig-lead,
Firewood, iron-ware, and cheap tin trays."

42 Pall Mall Gazette; Feb. 10, 1885; quoted in Porter, The Lion's Share; pp. 117-8.

43 Langer, William; The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902: Alfred A. Knopf, New York (1951); p. 75.


45 Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 71.

46 Seeley; Expansion of England; p. 353.

47 Ibid; p. 10.

48 Quoted in Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power; p. 11.

49 Dike, Sir Charles; The Problems of Greater Britain Volume Two: Macmillan, London (1890); p. 575.

50 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine; Vol. CLVII; May, 1895; p. 665.


52 See Marder; Anatomy of British Sea Power; pp. 44-8 for a discussion of the impact of Mahan's books and its repercussions.
Notes for pages 17-36 (cont'd.):

53Ibid; p. 13.
54Ibid; quoted on p. 13.
55Ibid; p. 121.
56Kennedy; The Realities Behind Diplomacy; p. 35.
57The introduction of new technology in the form of the Dreadnought-class battleship, was to further complicate the issue after 1905. The overnight loss of Britain's overwhelming naval numerical superiority led to a further steep escalation in the naval estimates—40.3 million pounds by 1910-1. Marder; The Anatomy of British Sea Power gives a full discussion of the impact of the Dreadnought design upon British domestic and international policy, see especially pp. 515-45.
58A partial list includes George Curzon, Russia in Central Asia (1889); Sir Edward Hamley, National Defence (1889); Maj. Gen. Maurice, National Defences (1897); Charles Dilke, Imperial Defence (1897); Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy (1900); Archibald R. Colquhoun, Russia Against India (1901); George Shee, The Briton's First Duty: The Case for Universal Military Training (1901); George Peel, The Enemies of England (1902); Edward S. May, Principles and Problems of Imperial Defence (1903); Philbic (pseud.), A Review of Our National Military Needs (1904); and Viscount Esher, National Strategy (1904).
59Peel, George; The Enemies of England; Edward Arnold; London (1902); p. 1.
60Dillon, E.J., "Our Foreign Policy"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXIX; Nov., 1895; p. 615.
61It first appeared in the May, 1871 issue of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. Over 80,000 copies in 6-penny pamphlet form sold in a month. See Read; England 1868-1914; p. 199.
62See I.F. Clarke; Tales of the Future; The Library Association, London (1978); pp. 9-31 for a bibliography of these works, and Samuel Hynes; The Edwardian Turn of Mind; University Press, Princeton (1968); pp. 33-53 for an interesting discussion of their significance.
64"Is Not Invasion Possible?"; Nineteenth Century and After; Vol. LXVII, No. CCCXXXVIII; Apr., 1903; pp. 725-33.
65Cassandra (pseud.), The Channel Tunnel, or England's Ruin (1876); The Demure One (pseud.), The Battle of Boulogne; or How Calais Became English Again (1882); Grip (pseud.), How John Bull Lost London; or the Capture of the Channel Tunnel (1882); Vindex (pseud.), England Crushed: the Secret of the Channel Tunnel Revealed (1882); C. Forth, The Surprise of the Channel Tunnel (1883); F.M. Allen (E. Downing), London's Peril (1900); M. Pemberton, Pro Patria (1901); all are listed in Clarke; Tales of the Future; pp. 8-27.
Notes for pages 17-36 (cont'd.):

70. See below p. 151 and footnote no. 17 for pp. 146-70.
72. The Times; Mar. 4, 1896; quoted in Howard; *Splendid Isolation*; p. 35.
73. *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. LVII; 1512; May 17, 1898. See Howard; *Splendid Isolation*; p. 36.
74. Quoted in Howard; *Splendid Isolation*; p. 36.
75. Bourne; *Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain*; p. 155.
76. Discussed at length in Howard; *Splendid Isolation*.
77. B.O. Vol. One; Document 118, p. 93. This is the text of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty to deprive the South African Republic of arms shipments.
79. The Times; Apr. 11, 1888.
80. See Langer; *Diplomacy of Imperialism*; pp. 503-11 as well as George Monger; *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907*: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London (1963); pp. 13-6.
81. *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. LVIII; 1431-3; June 10, 1898; quoted in Langer; *Diplomacy of Imperialism*; p. 509. Chamberlain had written to Arthur Balfour on Feb. 3, 1898:
   "I think you would agree with me that grave trouble is impending upon the Government if we do not adopt a more decided attitude in regard to China... If only Lord Salisbury sees the peril and is prepared to meet it, I would rather leave to him the method than rush in with what may be impossible suggestions. But as the matter now appears to me I should propose..."
83. Langer; *Diplomacy of Imperialism*; pp. 741-2.
84. To name only a few: the two Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1891 regarding North African spheres of influence (see Langer; *Diplomacy of Imperialism*; pp. 109-12); the Anglo-German Agreement of 1891
regarding Uganda and Heligoland (see Langer; pp. 6-7, 119); the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of 1894 (see Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; p. 153); the Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration of 1899 (see B.D. Vol. One; pp. 88-99); the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 for the eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies (see Langer; pp. 422-30); the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1899 concerning the Far East (see Langer; pp. 681-3); as well as unsuccessful negotiations with Russia (1894-7), France (1894), and Germany (1898).

Langer comes to this conclusion in Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 55, 250-4, 725-7. A cross-section of contemporary examples include Calchas, "Will England Last the Century?"; Forthnightly Review; Jan., 1901; "Our True Foreign Policy"; Saturday Review; Apr., 1895; "The Quadruple Alliance"; Contemporary Review; May, 1896. But as late as Feb. 13, 1902 the Daily News could still write: "We desire to be friends with all the world; but do we desire to be chained to anyone? The traditional policy of England...has been... 'splendid isolation.' There is much to be said for that policy."

See above footnote no. 84.

The Board of Trade Journal consistently lauded Russia as the most fertile new field for British overseas enterprise and investment. See W. Harrison, "The British Press and the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907"; Oxford Slavonic Papers; New Series, Vol. VII (1974); p. 81, Footnote no. 39. See also an article entitled "British Capital and Russian Industries" in The Times; Sept. 4, 1897; p. 4. Commenting on the absence of British capital in the "many developments of Russian enterprise," the article exhibits a concern that "the metallurgical industry of Southern Russia may be said to be entirely in the hands of French and Belgian capitalists." Since it was no secret that the Russian Minister of Finance was "most desirous to draw foreign capital into Russia," it seemed "somewhat singular that the capitalists of Great Britain are practically unknown in the land." The opinion of the British consul at Kiev was that "the Belgian and French capitalists are wise...their investments are far from being classed under those known as 'risky.'"

For one of the most thorough contemporary presentations of this argument see Chapter xxv, "Russia and England" in Henry Norman; All the Russians; Charles Scribner's Sons, New York (1903); pp. 413-448. For other versions of this argument see "Lord Rosebery's Guildhall Speech of Nov. 9, 1894"; The Times; Nov. 10, 1894; p. 6; Malcolm MacColl, "Russia and England"; Contemporary Review: Vol. LXVII; Jan., 1895; pp. 1-16; and "Sir Edward Grey in the City: Foreign Policy and Fiscal Reform"; The Times; Oct. 21, 1905; p. 5.


See below pp. 100-8.

Quoted in Newton; Lansdowne; p. 215
Notes for pages 37-63:


3. Quoted in Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 16 from The Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service.

4. Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 17.

5. Ibid; p. 17.

6. Ibid; p. 18.


8. Platt; Finance, Trade, and Politics; p. xxiii.

9. Ibid; pp. 373-5. The creation of this Commercial Department was only partially successful in altering Foreign Office attitudes toward trade and commerce. It left an uncertain relationship between the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office regarding overseas trade functions; in many respects the Foreign Office Commercial Department became merely a transmitter of information to and from the Board of Trade.

10. Ibid; pp. xxxix-xli. This theme is discussed at great length by Platt pp. 3-148.


12. Ibid; pp. 91-5.

13. W.C. Steadman emphasized this inadequacy at the 1899 Trades Union Congress, "With our present electoral system not one-half of the million and a quarter workers whom the Congress represents would have a vote if an election took place on the morrow"; quoted in Pelling; Popular Politics and Society; p. 85 from the T.U.C. Report 1899. Britain had entered the Boer War ostensibly to redress the grievances of British immigrants to the Transvaal Republic denied the franchise, and the irony was not lost on working-class leaders. W.M. Thompson, editor of the popular weekly Reynolds's Newspaper, wrote in October, 1899, "If the war... has no other use it will at least have taught people this great lesson—that where in any country the franchise is denied, even to foreigners, it is not only just, but it is an absolute duty to use force to acquire it." Quoted from Pelling; p. 83.


15. Pelling; Popular Politics and Society; pp. 82-3.


17. However, by 1906, through cooperation between Herbert Gladstone and Ramsay MacDonald, the L.R.C. was able to increase its Parlia-
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

mentary strength to 29 members. By the January, 1910 election it had risen to 40, and to 42 by December, 1910 (the last general election prior to 1918). See Miller; *Socialism and Foreign Policy*; p. 40.


19 Ibid; quoted on p. 5.

20 Steiner; *Foreign Office*; p. 212.

21 Clarendon to Loftus, Feb. 10, 1869; quoted in Kennedy; *The Realities Behind Diplomacy*; p. 51.


24 "The Place of Public Opinion in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs"; *The Spectator*; Vol. LXXXVI; Apr. 6, 1901; p. 487.


26 "The Place of Public Opinion in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs"; *The Spectator*; Apr. 6, 1901; p. 487. See Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; *Foreign Policy under Grey*; p. 72 for similar sentiment.

27 Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; *Foreign Policy under Grey*; pp. 72-3.

28 Temperley, Harold and Lillian M. Pensone; *A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books 1814-1914*; Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York (1966); p. ix. According to their assessment, the restriction on foreign affairs information made public through the Blue Books is evident beginning with the second Gladstone administration, becomes more marked during the long Salisbury period, and is most accelerated during the tenure of Sir Edward Grey. Temperley and Pensone note that the reduced degree to which Grey takes the public into his confidence as compared to Palmerston is a very significant constitutional development. They speculate only that some of the increased secrecy may be the result of the disappearance of pressure for information by independent members of Parliament. This seems dubious in view of the marked increase in the number of annual questions on the Commons floor regarding foreign affairs between 1850 and 1901 (129 to 6448; see below fn. no. 45).
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):


30 For a representative example see the anxiety encountered by Herbert Bismarck in London in March, 1899 to discuss East African affairs:

"Consistently I met with anxiety lest East African affairs might take a turn likely to excite public opinion here and threaten the existence of the Government. The other questions, some of them far more important, were made less of, but I was obliged to discuss Zanzibar in detail with Chamberlain, Goschen, Rosebery and Lord Salisbury's two Under-Secretaries of State, each for a good hour."

Quoted from Lowe; The Reluctant Imperialists Volume One; p. 128. Of course, much of the British anxiety was certainly feigned in an attempt to gain diplomatic leverage with Germany by bemoaning the impotence of the Government in the face of adverse public opinion. But it can not all be dismissed on such grounds.

31 Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 200.

34 Liberal Unionist opinion mirrored that of Conservatives and Moderate Liberals on this particular issue. The London Observer, a former Gladstonian organ, could write on July 14, 1901:

"The fact is that the mechanism and organization of British [Foreign Office] administration have become entirely obsolete. The method of recruiting the personnel of many office establishments in this country debars the members thereof from the practical training which gives real interest to their work, and which imparts that true sense of proportion so invaluable to a public servant."

36 "Our Foreign Policy and Its Reform"; Contemporary Review: Vol. CI; Apr., 1912; pp. 466-74.


38 Low, "Foreign Office Autocracy"; Fortnightly Review: Jan. 1, 1912; p. 2. Arthur Ponsonby M.P. complained that the problem was:

"... how the pacific, progressive and moderating opinion of the democracy may be introduced into international as well as national affairs, and as to how a democratic state can discover the proper means of expressing itself in the council of nations... In the realm of foreign affairs... the concentration of power in the executive, or, rather in the hands of one individual has now begun to present itself in the light of a serious danger."

Quoted from Arthur Ponsonby; Democracy and the Control of Foreign Affairs; A.C. Fifield, London (1912); pp. 5-7.

39 Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 97.
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

40 Quoted in Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 98 from Bertrand Russell; *The Foreign Policy of the Entente*. Russell's hatred of the Foreign Office, bordering on the irrational, extended far into the First World War. Writing about a prospective book attacking the Foreign Office he said:

"I can make a terrific piece of invective in the book I want to write. One might head each chapter with a quotation from Asquith's speeches since the war—'We are fighting in defence of small nationalities'—Boer War; 'for democracy'—how we paid the Tzar to suppress the Duma and sent its members to Siberia; 'in defence of the sacredness of treaties'—Algeciras and Persia; and so on through the whole chapter of our crime. I cannot discover an infamy in the whole wide world which the Foreign Office has not done its best to support—It is beyond belief."

Quoted in Ronald W. Clark; *The Life of Bertrand Russell*: Alfred A. Knopf, New York (1976); p. 255.

41 Morris; *Radicalism Against War*; pp. 27-8.

42 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 92.


44 Quoted in Miller; *Socialism and Foreign Policy*; p. 28. See also the example of Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in the Commons debate of Dec. 14, 1911 criticizing the Foreign Office along the same lines as the Moderate Liberals, *Hansard*; 5th Series; Vol. XXXII; 2613-20. In 1911, after the Agadir Crisis, Ponsonby and Noel Buxton formed a Liberal backbenchers Foreign Affairs Committee, with more than eighty members, to protest the dictatorial and arbitrary policies of the Foreign Office. See Zara Steiner; *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*: St. Martin's Press, New York (1977); p. 141.

45 Steiner; *Foreign Office*; p. 194.

46 The Liberals had a prescription for this constitutional malady. They proposed the creation of a standing Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee with the power to examine the policy pursued by the Foreign Office and even meet with the Foreign Secretary in secret session if necessary. See K.G. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties"; Hinsley; *Foreign Policy under Grey*; p. 17. As early as 1895, an article appeared in *The Nineteenth Century* arguing the advantages of such reform:

"Most important would be the fact that Parliament and, through Parliament, the nation would regain a portion of that control over the Executive which it has almost lost... It is necessary that Ministers should take the helm of the ship and keep their hands upon the levers of the machinery. But Parliament, through its committees, might at least be in a position to consult the compass from time to time."

Sidney Low, "A Foreign Affairs Committee"; *Nineteenth Century*: Vol. XXXVIII, No. CCXXXIII; Sept., 1895; pp. 517-8. Philip Morrell was to go even further in 1912, suggesting that:

"No treaty with another Sovereign State can be valid until it has been
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

confirmed by Parliament. That such a rule is in itself both important and desirable every Liberal who realizes the dangers of our present system will be inclined to agree.”
Marrell, "The Control of Foreign Affairs: The Need for a Parliamentary Committee"; Contemporary Review; Nov., 1912; p. 667. Of course, invariably the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were unenthusiastic about any such ideas, and their resistance, joined with the general opposition of both front benches, saw to it that the matter was not seriously discussed in the House until 1914. They were quite content that things should remain as the Radical weekly The Nation described in December, 1911: "So far as foreign affairs are concerned, this House of Commons and its two predecessors might never have met."

47 Kennedy; The Realities Behind Diplomacy; p. 57.
48 See Marder; Anatomy of British Sea Power; pp. 48-55 for a more complete discussion of the Navy League.
49 Read; England 1868-1914; p. 488.
50 Porter; The Lion's Share; p. 133.
51 See Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 493.
52 See Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; pp. 83-7; S. MacCoby; English Radicalism Volume Five 1866-1914; George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London (1953); p. 497 including footnote no. 2; Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 118-9.
53 Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 82.
54 Sir FrankLascelles, British Ambassador to Berlin until 1908, after leaving the Foreign Service eventually became the Chairman of the Anglo-German Friendship Society. See Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 262.
55 For example, Lord Courtney of Penwith served as President of the Foreign Policy Committee.
57 See the discussion of the difficulties within the Balkan Committee in Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 85.
59 Quoted in Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 85.
60 "The Foreign Office and the Newspapers"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXX; Feb. 5, 1898; p. 189.
61 Quoted in Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 85.
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

62 Read; England 1868-1914; pp. 280-1.
63 Ibid; p. 431.
64 Hale, Oron James; Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany 1890-1914: Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass. (1964); p. 19.
65 Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 186. See also Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 81.
66 Jones, Kennedy; Fleet Street Downing Street; London (1920); p. 95; quoted in Hale; Publicity and Diplomacy; pp. 36-7.
67 Francis Bertie recommended a reorganization of this haphazard and inefficient arrangement in 1898. See Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 186.
68 Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 11, p. 221.
69 Hansard; 5th Series; Vol. XXXII; 564.
70 See Steiner; Foreign Office; pp. 186-7 for examples.
71 Ibid; p. 189. See also Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 82.
72 Ibid; p. 186. See also Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 82.
73 Die Grosse Politik; Vol. IV, No. 760; p. 107: "... ihr möglichst zu tun, um auf die "Times" in dem Sinne einz wirken, das sie ihre Spalten den Korrespondenten Künftig nicht mehr kritiklos öffne."

The Times, despite its special relationship was reluctant to take advantage of its position. D.M. Wallace, the holder of Chirol's post prior to 1896, wrote to The Times Rome correspondent in 1894: "Our Foreign Office has a strong objection to unofficial diplomacy. Though I know Rosebery pretty intimately, I am always most careful in avoiding like interference."

Wallace to Stillman, Jan. 29, 1894; quoted in (Anon.); The History of The Times Volume Three; The Twentieth Century Test 1884-1912; Macmillan, New York (1947); p. 134.
74 Hale; Publicity and Diplomacy; p. 39.
76 Quoted in Hale; Publicity and Diplomacy; p. 37.
77 Ibid; pp. 37-8. See also Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 189.
78 The History of the Times Volume Three; p. 134.
79 Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 188.
80 Koss, Stephen; The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain Volume One: The Nineteenth Century; University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill (1981); p. 417.
81 Ibid; p. 417.
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):


84 See J.A.S. Granville; *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy*: Athlone Press, London (1964) for a discussion of Salisbury's approach to foreign policy, especially pp. 3-23.


87 Cecil; *Salisbury Volume Four*; p. 404.

88 Howard; *Splendid Isolation*; pp. 75-83. Foreign representatives frequently commented upon this tactic. See Lillian M. Penson, "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy"; *Cambridge Historical Journal*: Vol. V, No. I (1935); p. 91.

89 Penson, "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy"; *Cambridge Historical Journal*; (1935); p. 104. *The Speaker* of July 9, 1892 said of Salisbury: "His political history is one long record of failure to comprehend the scope of tendency of the new social and political forces that are continually being evolved in a great and growing community." (p. 36)

90 Granville; *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy*; p. 17.

91 Steiner; *Foreign Office*; p. 48.


94 For example see *Hansard*; 3rd Series; Vol. XCVII; 121-3.

95 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 72.


97 Bourne; *Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain*; Document 111, p. 420-2.

98 Knapplund, Paul; *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*: Harper & Brothers, New York (1935); p. 12.

99 Quoted in Taylor; *Troublemakers*; p. 75.

100 Ibid; p. 92. See below p. 123.

101 "Our Great Foreign Minister"; *The Speaker*; Vol. VI; July 9, 1892; p. 36.

102 "The Liberal Party and Foreign Policy"; *The Nation*; Vol. XI, No. XXVI; Sept. 25, 1912; p. 924.

Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

104 Samuel, Herbert; *Liberalism*: London (1902); p. 347.
105 Haldane to Rosebery; quoted in H.C.G. Matthew; *The Liberal Imperialists*; University Press, Oxford (1973); pp. 197-8.
108 Kennedy; *Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*; p. 333. See also Pelling; *Popular Politics and Society*; pp. 8-12.
109 For an excellent short discussion of the ideological splits within the Liberal Party resulting from the Boer War see Halévy; *Imperialism and the Rise of Labour*; pp. 93-110.
110 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; pp. 109-110.
111 Annual Register 1900; p. 165.
112 Matthew; *Liberal Imperialists*; pp. 37-78, esp. p. 65.
113 Ibid; p. 78.
114 Wilson, John; *A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*: Constable, London (1973); pp. 332-42.
115 Hansard: 5th Series; Vol. XC; 2010; July 10, 1912.
116 See above pp. 46-7. See also footnote no. 46.
117 London Observer; Mar. 17, 1901; p. 4.
118 James; *Rosebery*; pp. 331-2.
119 Ibid; p. 349.
120 Grey to Nicolson; Oct. 12, 1908; quoted from Viscount Grey of Fallodon; *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916: Volume One*: Frederick A. Stokes, Co., New York (1925); p. 174.
122 Quoted in Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; *Foreign Policy under Grey*; p. 88.
123 Robbins, Keith; *Sir Edward Grey*: Cassell, London (1971); pp. 142-50. See also Grey; *Twenty-Five Years*; pp. 79-96.
124 "The Control of Foreign Affairs"; *The Nation*; Nov. 23, 1907; p. 263.
125 However, even the permanent officials recognized the limitations imposed by public opinion. See for example B.D. Vol. II; Doc. 84, p.
126 Ward and Gooch; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy Volume Three*; p. 600.
127 Taylor; *Troublemakers*; pp. 11-66.
128 However, Lord Salisbury was not so certain of the essential nature of the role of the Press in the opinion of an Austrian diplomat as relayed to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Gustav Kálnoky:
Notes for pages 37-63 (cont'd.):

"Lord Salisbury told me that the general belief that public opinion in England was influenced by the Press was mistaken since the great majority of the people do not read newspapers." Deyn to Kálnoky; Dec. 4, 1888; quoted in Lowe; The Reluctant Imperialists Volume One; p. 11, footnote no. 13.
Notes for pages 64-93:

1 For example, in the ten years between 1881 and 1890 the Contemporary Review contained only some fourteen articles pertaining to Russia. The decade of 1891-1900 saw more than a three-fold increase in that number to forty-seven.

2 Calches, "Russia and Her Problem I.-- Internal"; Fortnightly Review: Vol. LXIX, No. CCCXIV; June, 1901; p. 1031.


6 Less idealistic because the British public appeared willing to shrug off many examples of hostility to liberal principles by Nicholas; less realistic because often the public failed to correctly interpret Nicholas's support for acts of repression within Russia, i.e. the myth of 'the good Tsar'. The two attitudes were obviously complementary.


9 "Nicholas I and II"; Saturday Review: Vol. LXXXII, No. 2135; Sept. 26, 1896; p. 333.


11 "A Change of Tsars"; Blackwood's; Feb., 1895; p. 330.


"When he [Edward] attended the funeral of Alexander III, it is said that he noticed that the windows along the road of the cortège had been blocked up and that he innocently asked: 'Where are the people?' Whereupon, it is said, police officials were sent in various directions to collect some 'people'."

13 Only one month after Edward's Russian visit Nicholas shocked English political sentiment with a speech denouncing in emphatic tones as "senseless dreams" all schemes of popular government, and declaring his firm resolve "to maintain for the good of the whole nation the principle of absolute autocracy as firmly and as strongly as did my lamented father". See Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; p. 693, fn. 1.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

14 Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 84.
15 "The Czar as a Force in Politics"; The Speaker; Aug. 23, 1890; p. 203.
16 See for example Sir Arthur Nicolson’s assessment of the Tsar in H. Nicolson; Portrait of a Diplomatist; Houghton Mifflin, Boston (1930); p. 156. See also the assessment of his character in Lord Frederick Hamilton; My Yesterdays II. The Vanished Pomp of Yesterday; Hodder and Stoughton, London (1924); pp. 307-8.
17 "Nicholas I and II"; Saturday Review; Sept. 26, 1896; p. 333. A second example can be found in the Conservative Spectator; "The Real Czar"; Vol. XCIV; Feb. 4, 1905; p. 166: "Probably the Czar, besides being weak and well-meaning, helpless and irresolute, has, like most men of such a type, a strain of vanity and self-delusion."
18 "The Tsar: A Character Sketch"; Fortnightly Review; Mar. 1, 1904; p. 370.
20 The New Age; Dec. 7, 1905.
25 Norman, Henry; All the Russias; Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York (1903); p. 390.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

26 Joubert, Carl; Russia as It Really Is: Eaveleigh Nash, London (1904) p. 6.


30 Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press, and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 84.


32 Witte proved a chameleon as far as British observers were concerned. He could be praised to the skies as a liberal or denounced as the worst of reactionaries. See for example Calchas, "Russia and Her Problem I. — Internal"; Fortnightly Review; June, 1901; pp. 1031-44; E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs: Religious Toleration Carried Out by Witte"; Contemporary Review: Vol. LXXXVII; June, 1905; pp. 895-7; Dillon, "Church Reforms in Russia?: Witte versus Pobedonostseff"; Contemporary Review: Vol. LXXXVII; May, 1905; pp. 712-26; W. Harrison, "Mackenzie Wallace's View of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907"; Oxford Slavonic Papers: New Series, Vol. IV (1971); p. 78. British assessments of Witte were also made on considerations removed from ideology. Bernard Pares warned that Witte's ambition was to create an economic association of France, Germany, and Russia "to counter the economic predominance of Great Britain". See Bernard Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 61, fn. no. 1.

33 Long, R. E. C., "M. Witte: Atlas of the Aristocracy"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. LXXXII; No. CCCXXXIII; Jan., 1903; pp. 109-26. Long, a journalist, had a long history of experience in Russia. While on the editorial staff of Review of Reviews in 1898 he was dispatched to Russia to interview Leo Tolstoy on the Tsar's proposed peace and disarmament conference. The following year he worked as a special correspondent for the Daily Chronicle covering the famine in eastern Russia. He also served as a correspondent in Russia in 1904-5 and again in 1906-7. He was a frequent contributor to the Fortnightly Review of articles chiefly concerned with Russian politics and literature.


36 Ibid; p. 886.

37 Joubert; Russia as It Really Is; p. 39.

38 Pares Bernard; Russia and Reform: Constable, London (1907); pp. 176-8.

Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):


41. Ibid; p. 423.

42. This theme is echoed in a great number of places. See for example R.F. Quinton; Crime and Criminals 1876-1910: Longmans, Green, London (1910); pp. 201-2. Quinton concludes that Russia's judicial system is "in accordance with the national sentiment of the people who live under [it]."


46. Ibid; p. 374.

47. See Joubert; Russia as It Really Is; pp. 7-13 for a particularly malignant presentation of the British ideas of the Russian Orthodox Church's traditionally repressive role.


50. Ibid; p. 147-59.


52. Joubert; Russia as It Really Is; pp. 130-7.


56. Tolstoy, Leo, "The Persecution of Christians in Russia"; Contemporary Review: Vol. LXVIII; Nov., 1895; pp. 645-50. See also The Times; Oct. 23, 1895. The Dukhobori (also known as the Macedonian heretics, followers of Macedonius, a fourth-century Bishop of Constantinople) denied the uncreated nature of the Holy Spirit.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

57."Church Reforms in Russia?: Witte versus Pobedonostseff"; Contemporary Review; May, 1905; p. 712.
60.Worman, All the Russians; p. 61.
61."The Archbishop of York in Russia"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXVIII; Apr. 24, 1897; p. 588.
64.The Trans-Siberian Railroad as well as several new lines in Central Asia and Manchuria were constructed during these years.
65.See Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power; pp. 162-5. See also Col. G. S. Clarke, Russia's Sea Power, Past and Present; John Murray, London (1898).
68."Russia and England"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXII; Apr. 29, 1899; pp. 596-7. For another comparison of Russia with the United States see "The Russian Menace"; Saturday Review; Vol. XCIII; May 10, 1902; pp. 590-1. Havelock Ellis was to write prophetically in 1901, "The only rival of Russia as a great world-power is the United States". Havelock Ellis, "The Genius of Russia"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXXX; Sept., 1901; p. 437.
69."Russia and Britain in Amity and Conflict"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXI; Nov., 1898; p. 627.
70.For a discussion of this theme see Skrine, The Expansion of Russia; pp. 1-7.
72.Wilkinson, Spencer; War and Policy; Dodd, Mead & Co., New York (1900); p. 221. Wilkinson, a very well-known and widely published military expert and leader-writer for the Morning Post, was to become in 1909 the first professor of military history at Oxford University. He was also the brother-in-law of Eyre Crowe, the influential Foreign Office junior clerk.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):


75 The New Age; May 8, 1902; pp. 287-8.


78 A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy; Saturday Review; Vol. LXXXII; Feb., 1896; p. 119.

79 Calchas, "Russia and Her Problem II.— External Policy"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. LXX, No. CCCCV; July, 1901; p. 127.

80 Russia and France and the Japanese Alliance; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXVIII; Mar. 22, 1902; p. 428.

81 See the memorandum of November, 1905 by Admiral Sir John Fisher prepared for the Committee on Estimates:

"How profoundly the situation as regards battleships has been modified in our favour by the great Japanese victory may be gathered from the fact that whereas before it, we should have been in a position of serious numerical inferiority if called upon to face a coalition of the three Powers, France, Russia, and Germany, we dispose at the moment of a force of battleships considerably superior to the combined battleship strength of these three Powers. Remember it is the battleship that determines victory."

Quoted in Monger; The End of Isolation; p. 200. See as well Robert Macrury, "The Collapse of Russia V. Great Britain, Germany, and Sea Power"; The Nineteenth Century; Vol. LVIII, No. CCCXI; July, 1905; pp. 51-61.


Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

84 The Radical Press argued after 1905 that the estimate of Russia's recovery was overstated. This allowed it to deny the necessity of a rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain based on strategic considerations, stating that Russia posed no danger to the Empire. This made the ideological sell-out of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 seem that much more calculated and cynical in their eyes. See for example "The Price of the Russian Agreement"; The Nation: Vol. XXVIII; Sept. 7, 1907; pp. 980-1.

85 Some examples include Arthur Symons, "Some Russian Impressions"; Saturday Review: Vol. XC; July 21, 1900; pp. 76-7; "The Peasant Life of South Russia"; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine; Vol. CLVIII, No. DCCCLXII; Dec., 1895; pp. 805-18; Norman; All the Russians; pp. 35-46; Joubert; Russia as It Really Is; pp. 52-7.


88 Symons, "Some Russian Impressions"; Saturday Review: July 21, 1900; p. 76.

89 Baring, Maurice; A Year in Russia; Methuen & Co., London (1907); p. 181.

90 Stading and Reason; In the Land of Tolstoi; p. 261.


92 A good example is Ellis, "The Genius of Russia"; Contemporary Review; Sept., 1901; pp. 419-38.

93 Carl Joubert bordered on this extreme in Russia as It Really Is; pp. 52-7.

94 Pares; Russia and Reform; pp. 46-8.

95 "The Character of the Russian People"; The Nation: Vol. IV, No. 5; Oct. 31, 1908; p. 180. For the same idea see "A Dark Picture of Russian Life"; The Speaker; June 11, 1892; pp. 700-1.


97 Pares; My Russian Memoirs; pp. 50-1.

98 The 'May Laws' or 'Temporary Orders Concerning the Jews' prohibited Jews from engaging in any type of business activity on Sundays and Christian holidays. They also contained provisions to limit Jewish ownership and cultivation of rural land and to prevent Jewish residence in agricultural areas. See V.D. Lipman; Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1950; Watts & Co., London (1950); pp. 63-93 for a discussion of this legislation and the emigration it sparked.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

99 There were of course peaks and valleys. For example, immigration totals rose sharply in 1890-2 following the expulsion of Jews from Moscow and from other population centers outside the officially designated 'Pale of Settlement'. There was another peak in 1896 when a liquor monopoly was created excluding thousands of Jews from the liquor retail trade. After 1899 there were a number of fluctuations relating to pogroms, famine, and economic depression. See Lipman; Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1930; pp. 85-8 and also Lloyd P. Gartner; The Jewish Immigration in England 1870-1914: Wayne St. Univ. Press, Detroit (1960); pp. 47-7.

100 This estimate also includes a small percentage of East European Jews not of Russian origin; i.e. Poles, Austrians, Roumanians, see Lipman; Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1930; p. 90. As early as 1891, 21,991 aliens, most presumably East European Jews, were living in a two-square mile area of the East End of London, and in 1901 31.8 per cent of the total Whitechapel population was made up of aliens. See John A. Garrard; The English and Immigration 1880-1910: Oxford University Press, London (1971); p. 271.


103 "The Russian Horror"; The Speaker: Aug. 2, 1890; p. 120.

104 Frederic, Harold; The New Exodus: A Study of Israel in Russia: W. Heinemann, London (1892); p. 266.


"So far, therefore, from having displaced native labour, the foreign Jew has positively created new trade... From an industrial point of view, therefore it is impossible to regard the advent of the Russian Jew as an unmixed evil."

Geoffrey Drage, "Alien Immigration"; Fortnightly Review: Vol. LVII, No. CCCXXXVII; Jan., 1895; pp. 41-2. But this type of piece was fast disappearing and is the exception that proves the rule.
Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

108"Foreign Undesirables"; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine; Feb., 1901; p. 283.

109Certainly Liberal Imperialist M.P.'s like Sydney Buxton and Henry Norman felt compelled by their working-class constituents to side with the 'anti-aliens'. Norman, addressing the anti-immigrant British Brothers League in January, 1902, employed very harsh rhetoric:

"Let the nations burn their own smoke [Cheers]. Let them disinfect their own sewage. Englishmen...[will] not have this country made into the dumping ground for the scum of Europe."

Quoted in Garrard; The English and Immigration 1880-1910; p. 137. See Raphael Samuel; East End Underworld: The Life of Arthur Harding; Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (1981); esp. pp. 125-45 for an oral history account that takes issue with the idea that there was a great deal of friction between the Jewish immigrants and the British working-classes in London's East End.

110See for example "The Tsar and the Jews", by an Anglo-Russian; Contemporary Review; Vol. LIX; Mar., 1891; pp. 309-26, esp. p. 323:

"The Russian Government are not only not guilty of the charge brought them of objectless persecution, but to some extent are justified in the policy which they have adopted."

M.D. Menchikoff, "The Jewish Peril in Russia"; Monthly Review; Vol. XIV; Feb., 1904; pp. 91-5, esp. p. 94:

"Hostile both to Christianity and to the Russian independence they [the Jews] are a dissolvent in the national culture and organism."

Arnold Haultain (ed.); Goldwin Smith's Correspondence; Duffield & Co., New York (1913); p. 483, G.S. to Robert Collins: Mar. 24, 1907:

"The Russian fire spreads, as it is sure to do. The rising in Roumania and Moldavia is not anti-Jewish in a religious sense, but it is in the sense of resistance to Jewish intrusion and oppression."

By 1904 there were even suggestions that England, at least in dealing with Jews in the Transvaal, might be coming around to Russia's way of thinking on the 'Jewish Question'. See Colon- lensis, "Can We Trust Russia?"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. LXXV, No. CCCXLIX; May, 1904; pp. 162-3.


112Annual Register 1891; p. 307.

113Annual Register 1900; pp. 325-6.

114Although the Radicals did not participate in condoning Russian persecution of its Jewish population, some did succumb to the pressures of working-class opinion and lend their support to the Aliens Bill of 1905, most notably Henry Labouchere. In the words of historian John Garrard, all Liberals found "the pro-foreigner a difficult burden to bear". William Pearce, Liberal candidate for Limehouse in 1906 demonstrated the ambiguity of attitudes clearly in May, 1905:

"The invasion of DESTITUTE FOREIGN JEWS has rendered the Aliens question a special trouble in this district. In April last, I joined in a successful appeal by East End members and candidates to the Liberal
Leaders to prevent party opposition to the Aliens Exclusion Bill... The progress of the Bill was greatly facilitated in consequence."

East London Observer, Jan. 16, 1906; p. 5; quoted in Garrard; England and Immigration 1880-1910; pp. 138-9. Despite this, Radicals Liberals were still the most conspicuous group in the pro-Alien camp, (see Garrard, pp. 149-53), while with very few exceptions Socialists condemned any hostile alien legislation (see Garrard, pp. 183-202).

115 "The Tsar's Visit to England"; The Nation; June 12, 1909; p. 374.
116 Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CXLV; 780, May 2, 1905; quoted in Garrard; England and Immigration 1880-1910; p. 187.
117 The Left in Britain seemed satisfied to fault the Russian Government with initiating all of the Jewish pogroms and announcing anti-Semitic legislation without popular support. They refused to acknowledge that anti-Semitism was very popular among the Russian 'people' with whom they so strongly identified. Their method of resolving this inconsistency was ignoring it.

118 "Lectures on Russian Literature"; Saturday Review; Vol. LXIX; Mar., 1890; p. 298.
119 See above p. 70.
120 Quoted in George Dangerfield; The Strange Death of Liberal England: G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York (1935); p. 428.
121 For some examples of this interest in Tolstoy's views see Alymer Maude, "Tolstoy's Theory of Art"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXXVIII; Aug., 1900; pp. 241-54; Leo Tolstoy, "The Persecution of Christians in Russia"; Contemporary Review; Nov., 1895; pp. 645-50; Stadling and Reason; In the Land of Tolstoi; pp. 1-74. At least one person did not join in the general British admiration of Tolstoy and his work. Bernard Pares's reaction on a journey to Russia in 1898 was outspokenly critical: "In a way they [the great Russian novelists] used to make me extremely angry—especially Tolstoy. Reading him... one had forced in on one every ounce of his native cynicism and, I would dare to add, his innate savagery. Horace could write a delightfully graceful poem even on a repulsive subject. Tolstoy could make a suggestion of nastiness even in his description of the furniture in a room. I was bored with his unreasoning pessimism."

Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 38.
122 See Ayerst; The Manchester Guardian; Biography of a Newspaper; pp. 356-8.
The path for Diaghilev's troupe was smoothed the previous year by Anna Pavlova and a small group of dancers from the Russian Imperial Ballet, who had a triumphant tour of Britain, performing in London at the Palace Theatre. See Hynes; The Edwardian Turn of Mind; pp. 339-49.

Hynes; The Edwardian Turn of Mind; p. 345. Hynes attributes this burst of Russophilia to a general increase in British awareness of the European continent during these years.

The New Age; June 8, 1911. Also see The New Age; Mar. 3, 1905 where comment is made upon Russia's harassment of her literary intellectuals.

Quoted in Hynes; The Edwardian Turn of Mind; p. 339.


Pares; Russia and Reform; p. x as well as pp. 186-7.


Milyukov, Paul, "The Influence of English Political Thought in Russia"; Slavonic Review; Vol. V, No. XIV; Dec., 1926; pp. 258-70. Bernard Pares praised Milyukov in 1931 as a man who "has all his life stood for English principles of government". See Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 91. For a very different appraisal of the value of English opinions and the influence of English ideas see Alan Kimball, "The Harassment of Russian Revolutionaries Abroad: The London Trial of Vladimir Burtsiev in 1898"; Oxford Slavonic Papers: New Series, Vol. VI (1973); pp. 62-3. After his arrest (see below p. 104) Burtsiev quoted the Russian proverb, "The well-fed cannot understand the hungry". The politics of accommodation advocated by English liberalism were inadequate to deal with the problems of Tsarist Russia. Burtsiev was a terrorist because "we are denied every legal means of struggle for our ideas... we have no choice... We must either remain silent or struggle in the manner indicated by Narodnaya volya".

"English Influences in Russia"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXVII; July, 1895; pp. 55, 57.

Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):


Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 85.

"Russia—Progress by Reaction"; Saturday Review: Vol. CIII; June 22, 1907; p. 768.


Beloff; Lucien Wolf and Anglo-Russian Entente 1907-1914; p. 6.

Gambier, "A Plea for Peace—An Anglo-Russian Alliance"; Fortnightly Review; Dec., 1900; p. 1003.

H.N. Brailsford certainly was firmly convinced of the intimate connection of English public opinion with the magnitude of economic ties between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain: "Russia depends as absolutely as any Latin American Republic upon its repute in Western money markets... we shall be able to realise dimly why and how much the good opinion of the English people matters to the Russian Government. Credit is a delicate possession... So long as these people [the English public] thought of Russia either as a hostile Empire dangerous to ourselves, or as an unstable autocracy menaced by revolution, it was in vain that the Russian financiers brought his proposals to the City."

Notes for pages 64-93 (cont'd.):

147 The Socialists, echoing the Radicals, rammed this point home time and again:
"There is but one thing we can do. The Government should withdraw the British Ambassador. We ought not to be associated in any way with such a ruthless villainy as the present Russian Government. If our Government hesitates to take this course, at all events a motion to that effect might be made in the House of Commons. It would, we believe, command considerable support, and it would have a strictly moral effect, we are convinced."
The New Age; Sept. 13, 1906.

148 "Our Relations with Russia"; The Nation: Vol. I, No. XV; June 8, 1907; p. 553. For the same sentiment see Howard Weinroth, "The British Radicals and the Balance of Power 1902-1914"; Historical Journal; (1970); p.665.


150 The New Age; Feb. 18, 1897. The article went on to say:
"The new feeling which desires only to see the Russian people freed from a selfish and stupid despotism... is a factor with which the hucksters of the political market must count."

151 See below pp. 119-23.
Notes for pages 94-118:

1 "Great Britain and Russia"; The Speaker: Vol. LXXIII; Nov. 24, 1894; p. 717.
3 See for example Die Grosse Politik: Vol. XIV, part 2, No. 4016; Apr. 17, 1899; p. 336.
5 Quoted in Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy: p. 28.
6 For a fuller discussion of the long history of this rivalry in Central Asia see Morgan; Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia; pp. 118-99. See also Rogers Platt Churchill; The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907: Books for Libraries Press, Freeport, New York (1939); pp. 5-10.
8 Ward and Gooch; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy Volume Three; p. 230. See also Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; p. 144. The Gladstone Government resigned soon after the seizure of Port Hamilton. It was on re-assuming office in 1895 that Lord Salisbury commented, while contemplating among other things the bitterness between Britain and Russia stemming from the Port Hamilton affair, "They have at least achieved the long-desired 'Concert of Europe.' They have succeeded in uniting the Continent of Europe— against England." See Cecil; Salisbury Volume Three; p. 136.
9 Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 769-90.
11 Ward and Gooch; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy Volume Three; pp. 231-3. See also Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 450-79.
12 Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 479.
13 Newton; Lansdowne; pp. 56-126.
14 Quoted in P.E. Roberts; History of British India: Oxford University Press, London (1930); p. 487.
15 Curzon, George N.; Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question; Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd, London (1889); p. 321. Curzon's book was actually published nine years prior to his Viceroyalty and was based upon an 1887-8 journey to India and Central Asia. Lord Salisbury, impressed with his knowledge, appointed him Under-Secretary for India in 1891. Curzon's views
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

on the Russian threat to India were to change very little over
the years until 1907. His book of 1889 is an apt description
of his view of the situation in 1898. See Earl of Ronaldshay;
The Life of Lord Curzon Volume One: Ernest Benn, Ltd., London
(1928); pp. 70-1, 126-33, 143-5, 147-57.

16Dilke; Problems of Greater Britain Volume Two: pp. 65-6.

17Hamilton to Curzon, Feb. 4, 1902; quoted in Monger; End of Isolation;
p. 87.

18See among other examples Maj. Gen. Sir George B. Wolseley, "Our Indian
Frontier"; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine; Vol. CLVII, No.
DCCCLXIV; Apr., 1895; pp. 537-44; "Russia and the Pamirs";
The Spectator; Vol. LXIX; Sept. 3, 1892; pp. 311-2; "Russia's
March toward India"; Saturday Review; Vol. LXXVII; Mar. 24,
1894; pp. 315-6.

19See R.L. Greaves; Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892: Athlone
Press, London (1939) for a complete discussion of the influence
of Indian defence on British foreign policy and the disagreements
that developed between Calcutta and London. See also Ronaldshay;

20The Cabinet was also worried about being drawn into the approaching
Russo-Japanese War:
"If [Russo-Japanese negotiations] break down, and if Japan goes to
war, who is going to lay long odds that we are not at loggerheads
with Russia within six months? In that event, I should have supposed
that any complications in Tibet, even on the small scale suggested by
the Viceroy, might prove exceedingly embarrassing."
Balfour to Bodrick, Oct. 28, 1903; quoted in Monger; End of Isola-
tion; p. 141.

21For a full discussion of the Tibetan difficulties see Ward and Gooch;
Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy Volume Three; pp.
321-8; Ronaldshay; Curzon Volume One; pp. 272-80, 340-8; Churchill;
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 69-70.

22Quoted in Ward and Gooch; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy
Volume Three; p. 328. London did not completely accept the sit-
uation. Before ratification of the treaty certain amendments
insisted upon by the Cabinet were inserted. Lord Curzon was
eventually to tender his resignation as Viceroy in August, 1905
because of the disputes between Calcutta and London. The Cabinet
eagerly accepted his sacrifice. See Monger; End of Isolation;

23Dilke; Problems of Greater Britain Volume Two; p. 46.

24Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 95-6.

25Ibid; p. 96.

26Ibid; p. 97. See also Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; pp.
92-6 and "The Creation of an Imperial Militia Service and the
Reinforcement of India in Time of War"; Blackwood's Edinburgh
Magazine; Vol. CLXXVII, No. MLXXV; May, 1905; pp. 731-6.
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

27 See for example A.B.C., "British Foreign Policy"; National Review: Vol. XXXVIII, No. 225; Nov., 1901; p. 357: "We may, perhaps, be allowed to interject in passing that the different methods and systems of government and political institutions in the two empires [British and Russian] need not interfere with their cordial relations."


29 Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; pp. 682-5. Queen Victoria had stated only seven years earlier, "She [Russia] is our real enemy & Rival — the only one perhaps (& she believes it) we Have." Quoted in Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists, Volume One; p. 93; The Queen to W.E. Gladstone, June 20, 1880.

30 The Prince of Wales was kept well-informed by Lord Randolph through frequent letters — all of which Edward communicated to his Mother and to Lord Salisbury. Despite this he was not free from their suspicions that he was behind this outrageous behavior on the part of Lord Randolph. Their suspicions were perhaps not unjustified. See 'Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; pp. 682-3.

31 See Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 11-2 and Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; pp. 685-8.

32 Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; p. 687.

33 Salisbury to Goshen, Dec. 3, 1895. Quoted in Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; p. 28.

34 Langer; Franco-Russian Alliance; pp. 189 and 199.

35 See above pp. 32-4.

36 See Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 145-61. An organized rising of Armenians in the Sassun and Zeitun regions of Turkey in the summer and autumn of 1894 was suppressed by the Ottoman army with the destruction of 25 villages and the massacre of ten to twenty thousand Armenians. These atrocities caused an uproar in the Western Press.

37 Ibid; pp. 195-205 and Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; p. 29. Langer contends that Salisbury was willing to consider at this juncture the offer of a free hand to Russia for the seizure of the Straits and Constantinople in return for reciprocal concessions. Granville, with access to documents not available to Langer in the 1950's, disagrees. He rejects the notion that Salisbury ever considered acquiescence to a Russian occupation of Constantinople. He insists that Salisbury only wanted Russian cooperation to force reforms upon the Sultan in response to pressure from an indignant British public and Press. Although Granville has access to more information, his argument is no more compelling than Langer's. Salisbury's talent for making contradictory statements keeps this an open question.

38 Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists Volume Two; pp. 105-6, "Salisbury's
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):


39 See Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; pp. 78-83 and Lee; King Edward VII, Volume One; pp. 696-7. See also Robert Taylor; Lord Salisbury: Allen Lane, London (1975); pp. 170-1. Even without the rebuff from Nicholas, Salisbury's direct overture to the Tsar may have been a waste of time and effort. The real worth of such agreements was to be demonstrated in 1905 at Björkö. See Sidney Bradshaw Fay; The Origins of the World War Volume One: Macmillan, New York (1930); pp. 171-7.

40 Review of Reviews; Nov. 15, 1896; p. 391. See Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 327.


42 See Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; pp. 94-6; Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 342; Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists Volume One; pp. 196-203.

43 Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 125, "Extract from Salisbury's confidential circular dispatch on Turkish Reform", Oct. 20, 1896; p. 446.

44 The so-called Nelidov Plan (calling for a Russian coup de main on the Bosphorus) was considered for a time in December, 1896 by the Tsar and his advisors. But the insistence of France that Russia stand by her promise to uphold the status quo in Turkey combined with the opposition of M. Witte and the peace party in St. Petersburg led to the abandonment of the bold scheme. See Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 335-50 and Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; pp. 86-8.

45 Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; p. 89; Ward and Gooch; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy Volume Three; p. 237. See also Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 349-50.

46 Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; p. 143; Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 460-1; and Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 16-7.

47 Quoted from Die Grosse Politik: Vol. XIV, part one, No. 3793, p. 225 in J.L. Garvin; Joseph Chamberlain, Volume Three; 1895-1900 Empire and World Policy; p. 279. The Kaiser's marginal comments on Hatzfeldt's memorandum reaffirm the total German failure to comprehend the British position. "The further the Russians engage themselves in Asia, the quieter they sit in Europe." Any thought of an Anglo-Russian settlement was, "unmöglich!" (p. 226)

48 Steiner; Foreign Office; pp. 36-7, 187.


50 The entire Burtsev affair is discussed in great detail in Alan Kimball, "The Harassment of Russian Revolutionaries Abroad: The London Trial of Vladimir Burtsev in 1898"; Oxford Slavonic Papers: New Series, Vol. VI (1973); pp. 48-65. Kimball also describes another case of a conspicuously agreeable British Government res-
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

response to a request of the Russian Government. A complaint was submitted from the Russian Embassy to the Home Office on September 1, 1897 against one Hilda Czarina, a 'Speciality Dancer' of Brighton. The Russians desired Hilda to change her last name, and once again, Lord Salisbury intervened on their behalf. He authorized the British Government to pay the ten guineas legal fee required, and Hilda Czarina's name was changed to Hilda Corelli. Salisbury was careful to insist on strict confidentiality, well aware that publicity about the incident would cause a "bother." See page 65, footnote no. 54.

O'Connor was just as eager as Salisbury to have a comprehensive agreement. He had told Count Muraviev (the Russian Foreign Minister) five days earlier:

"I thought any understanding, to be really effective and lasting, ought to extend to the general area of our respective interests, and not to be confined to the important questions affecting the Far East."


52 Die Grosse Politik; Vol. XIV, No. 3803. Quoted in Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 470.

53 Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; p. 21.


55 For example see Watt and Bourne (eds.); British Documents on Foreign Affairs; Series A Russia 1859-1914 Volume Two; Document 81: "Foreign Office Memorandum as to the Assurances given by the Russian Government respecting Port Arthur and Tientsin", Mar. 31, 1898; pp. 311-4.

56 For a discussion of the Anglo-German negotiations see Fay; The Origins of the World War Volume One; pp. 129-41; Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 492-517; Garvin; Joseph Chamberlain Volume Three; pp. 294-95; Kennedy; Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism; pp. 223-36.

57 Quoted in Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 682.

58 B.D. Vol. One; Documents 59 & 61, pp. 38-41. See also Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 28-31; Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 682-3; Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists Volume One; p. 236; Granville; Salisbury and Foreign Policy; pp. 146-7.


60 "Great Britain and Russia"; The Spectator; Nov. 24, 1894; p. 717.

61 "England and Russia"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXVII; Aug. 15, 1896; p. 197.
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

62 Ibid; p. 197.

63 The Times; May 14, 1898; p. 12. Chamberlain's ready transfer of enthusiastic support for alliance with Russia to alliance with Germany is an individual confirmation of the overarching Conservative concern with political expediency.

64 "Mr. Chamberlain and Russia"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXX; May 21, 1898; p. 717.

65 "Russia and England"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXII; Apr. 29, 1899; p. 596.

66 "An Understanding with Russia"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXII; Mar. 18, 1899; p. 369. For other examples of Conservative, pro-Anglo-Russian treaty arguments see "Our True Foreign Policy"; Saturday Review; Vol. LXX; Aug. 24, 1898; p. 228 and "Russia, England, and Persia"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXVII; Sept. 7, 1901; pp. 306-9.


68 B.D. Vol. Two; Document 54, p. 43.

69 Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 66. By January, 1907 Crowe's Germanophobia had gotten the upper hand. In his now famous "Memorandum on the Present State of Relations with France and Germany" he wrote: "The Anglo-French entente had a very material basis and tangible object — namely, the adjustment of a number of actually-existing serious difficulties. The efforts now being made by England to arrive at an understanding with Russia are justified by a very similar situation. But for an Anglo-German understanding on the same lines there is no room, since none could be built up on the same foundation."

B.D. Vol. Three; Appendix A, p. 418.

70 See above p. 104.

71 See Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 100 and 165.

72 See Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 140.

73 See above p. 33.

74 Salisbury to Lansdowne, Oct. 18, 1901. Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 53.

75 B.D. Vol. Two; Documents 302, pp. 243-4; 310, p. 249; 321, p. 258. There was great apprehension and much discussion regarding Russia's preparedness to take advantage in Asia of Britain's preoccupation with South Africa.

76 Newton; Lansdowne; p. 215.

77 B.D. Vol. Two; Document 73, p. 55.

78 A.B.C., "British Foreign Policy"; National Review; Nov., 1901; p. 354. A.B.C. turned out to be Leo Maxse, editor of the National Review, and his article was based upon information received from his friend Charles Harding. See Steiner; Foreign Office; p. 189.
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

79 The Times; Oct. 29, 1901; p. 7:
"Whether such an arrangement [an Anglo-Russian understanding] is possible we do not undertake to say—still less do we assume that it could be carried out on the lines traced, with evident caution and knowledge, in the National Review. We can only repeat that it is a question eminently worthy of the attention of thoughtful citizens as well as of farseeing statesmen."

80 "British Foreign Policy"; The Spectator; Vol. LXXXVII; Nov. 2, 1901; pp. 648-9:
"The writers in the National Review suggest the outlines of a foreign policy which would put an end to our antagonism with Russia... They propose, in fact, that understanding with Russia which we have so consistently advocated in these columns."
Support came from Moderate Liberal as well as Conservative journals. See for example Calchas, "The Crisis with Germany— and Its Results"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. CCCCXX, No. LXX; Dec., 1901; pp. 934-40.


82 See Clarke; Tales of the Future for a complete bibliography of all fictional accounts of an invasion of the British Isles during these years.

83 Memo by Lansdowne, Oct. 25, 1901. Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 54.

84 For a discussion of this approach to Russia see Newton; Lansdowne; pp. 234-5; Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 46-56; and Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 758-9.

85 Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 49-50. See also Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 56-8.

"[T]he new treaty may tend rather to draw Russia and England together than to bring trouble between them." (p. 443)

87 The Times; Feb. 12, 1900; p. 9.
88 Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CII, 1272-1313.
89 Ibid; 1278.
90 Ibid; 1296-7.
91 B.D. Vol. Two; Document 140, p. 130.
92 Lansdowne to Curzon, Apr. 10, 1902. Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 72.
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):

94 B.D. Vol. Two; Document 242, p. 212; Document 250, pp. 217-8. See also Monger; End of Isolation; p. 143.

95 Gwynn, Stephen (ed.); The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice Volume One; Houghton Mifflin, Boston (1929):
"England as the corollary of the French agreement, wished to settle all outstanding difficulties with Russia."
Spring Rice to John Hay, June, 1904; p. 415.

96 Memo by Lansdowne, Sept. 10, 1903. Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 133.

97 Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 137.

98 Hardinge to Bertie, Dec. 4, 1903. Quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 143.

99 Newton; Lansdowne; p. 309:
"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although not intended to encourage the Japanese Government to resort to extremities, had, and was sure to have, the effect of making Japan feel that she might try conclusions with her great rival in the Far East—free from all risk of a European condition such as that which had on previous occasion deprived her of the fruits of victory."
Lansdowne to King Edward VII, Apr. 18, 1904.

100 B.D. Vol. Four; Document 184, p. 189.


102 See for example B.D. Vol. Four; Documents 184, pp. 189-90; 185, pp. 190-2; 186, p. 193; 187, pp. 193-4; 188, pp. 194-5.

103 See above pp. 98-9.


105 See for example The Times articles headed "The Outrage by the Baltic Fleet"; October 25-8, 1904.

106 King Edward to Lansdowne; Lee; King Edward VII Volume Two; p. 303.

107 Steiner; Foreign Office; pp. 74-5 and Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 172-3.

108 See Blanche E.C. Dugdale; Arthur James Balfour; Putnam's, New York (1937); pp. 286-8. For a transcript of Mr. Balfour's Southampton speech see The Times; Oct. 29, 1904; pp. 11-2. King Edward indicated the importance of this speech on public opinion when he wrote:
"The Government have a heavy responsibility, and Mr. Balfour's words at Southampton will be awaited with serious interest."
King Edward to Lansdowne, Lee; King Edward VII Volume Two; p. 303.

109 B.D. Vol. Four; Documents 5-31, pp. 5-41.

110 See for example "The Bolt from the North Sea"; Saturday Review; Vol. XCVIII, No. 2357; Oct. 29, 1904.
Notes for pages 94-118 (cont'd.):


112The International Commission of Inquiry, meeting in Paris, consisted of admirals from England and Russia, together with naval representatives from France, the United States, and Austria. On February 25, 1905 it handed down its decision, declaring for Great Britain and requiring a sixty-five thousand pound compensation payment from Russia. See Lee; King Edward VII Volume Two; p. 304.

113Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 29, 1904. Quoted in Newton; Lansdowne; p. 317.


116See for example Lord Newton's assessment that by the end of 1905 "Russia and England were on more amicable terms than they had been for a century." Newton; Lansdowne; p. 339.

117See below pp. 127-9. See also p. 107, footnote no. 78.

Notes for pages 119-145:

1 See R.T. Shannon; Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London (1963); pp. 103-5 and Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 80.

2 Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; p. 205.


4 Freeman to Bryce, Nov. 23, 1876, quoted in Shannon; Bulgaria Agitation; pp. 224-5.

5 Quoted in Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 76.

6 Gladstone resigned in January, 1875 because of his Party's election defeat in 1874. Lord Granville had little faith in the permanancy of Gladstone's retirement. Therefore the Party was managed by the 'collective' leadership of Gladstone, Granville, and Hartington. See Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; pp. 1-3.

7 Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; p. 124.

8 The Times; Jan. 10, 1877; p. 10. See also Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; p. 228.

9 Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; p. 230.

10 See Richard Congreve, "England and Turkey"; Fortnightly Review; vol. XXVI, No. CXVIII; Oct., 1876; pp. 517-36: "I have already said that from the school which gravitates toward Russia I wholly dissent; and I have dwelt on the peculiar inappropriateness of calling her in in the treatment of Turkey. What is there in the past history or present condition of Russia that should make her an object of our political preferences?" (p. 525) See also Frederic Harrison, "Cross and Crescent"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. XXVI, No. CXX; Dec., 1876; pp. 709-30.

11 Daily News; Oct. 24, 1876. See Taylor; Troublemakers; pp. 82-3.

12 It was not to fall until Dec. 10, 1877.

13 Hansard; 3rd Series; Vol. CXXXIV; index under "Turkey—The Eastern Question—Mr. Gladstone's Resolutions" which gives the full text of all five resolutions.

14 See Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation; pp. 268-9 as well as Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 83. Taylor interprets Gladstone's parliamentary tactics as a rather bald-faced attempt by Gladstone to unencumber himself from association with a policy that would lead to Russian aggrandisement. Shannon sees Gladstone's maneuvers more as resignation in the face of Party disunity—a sacrifice of principle to practicality in politics.

15 See Shannon; Bulgarian Agitation where at this point the author notes that Gladstone deserved no credit for what initiative remained with the Agitation movement. Through circumstances he became responsible for a situation "created by the initiative of others." (p. 258) In October, 1876 he positively discouraged the staging of a rally by the Agitation supporters (p. 248), and by January, 1877 he was complaining that his Homeric studies were being "hamstrung" by the Eastern Question. (p. 267) In June he wrote to Granville:
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

"My earnest hope is that this Eastern Question is to reach a close or a resting place during the summer & that then I shall be a free man again." (p. 267)

16 Harrison, "Cross and Crescent"; Fortnightly Review; Dec., 1876; p. 718.


18 Ibid; p. 167.


20 Ibid; p. 172.

21 See "Extract from Gladstone's Third Midlothian Campaign Speech", Nov. 27, 1879; Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 111, pp. 420-2.


23 "Our Great Foreign Minister"; The Speaker; Vol. VI; July 9, 1892; p. 36.


25 See above pp. 56-7.

26 See Grey; Twenty-Five Years Volume One; p. 32:
"Mr. Gladstone's Government [with Lord Rosebery as Foreign Secretary] continued the policy of Lord Salisbury as they found it; when Lord Salisbury returned to the Foreign Office in 1895 he saw no more reason to change that policy than Lord Rosebery or Lord Kimberley had done."

See also "Sir E. Grey in the City: Foreign Policy and Fiscal Reform"; The Times; Oct. 21, 1905; p. 5:
"At the present time it is not only possible, but it is most important, to adhere to the principle of continuity."

27 See above pp. 57-8.

28 See Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 790-1.

29 See Taylor; Troublemakers; pp. 95-104. See also The New Age; Vol. XIV, No. 388; Mar. 6, 1902; p. 146:
"[W]e must take care that the Rosebery element shall not dominate our councils... Liberals, Radicals, Democrats must capture the machine, and see to it that the mechanics are of the right sort."

30 Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. XLVI; 1484, Mar. 2, 1897.

31 See Matthew, Liberal Imperialists; pp. 3-78.

32 Norman; All the Russias; p. 384.

33 Ibid; p. 413.
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

34. Grey to Sydney Buxton, Dec. 31, 1895; quoted in Matthew; Liberal Imperialists; pp. 204-5.

35. Norman; All the Russians; p. 413.

36. "Lord Rosebery's Guildhall Speech of Nov. 9, 1894"; The Times; Nov. 10, 1894; p. 6.

37. See above p. 67.

38. Rosebery to Edward, Dec. 6, 1894; quoted in Lee; King Edward VII Volume One; p. 691.

39. The British public was aroused by the atrocities committed during the Turkish suppression of the Armenian Sassun uprising in the autumn of 1894. Rosebery attempted to form an 'Armenian Triplce' of France, Russia, and Britain for common action against the Sultan. But Russia, fearful of the repercussions in its own Armenian provinces from a successful Armenian revolt in Turkey, was less than cooperative. As W.L. Langer remarks, "The Tsar had as much interest as the Sultan in checking the Armenian revolutionary movement." [Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; p. 162] As might be expected, Russia proved a hindrance to British initiatives for reforms favorable to the Armenian minority. See Langer; pp. 145-64 for an excellent discussion of this subject.

40. After the defeat of China by Japan in 1894-5 British public opinion was initially pro-Japanese. Since the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, although altering the Far Eastern status quo, did not conflict with British interests, the Government in London saw no reason to voice any opposition. Lord Kimberley explained that "we should have much preferred the status quo before the war, but our interests [now] are not so much concerned." [Quoted in Lowe; Reluctant Imperialists Volume One; pp. 192-3] Russia, worried about the Japanese threat to her influence in Manchuria, favored forcing a moderation of the terms of the Treaty to steal away Japan's victory. Britain could not provide support for that line of policy. Lord Kimberley wrote: "Our separation from Russia in this matter may have a prejudicial effect on the understanding which had been established between the two countries. He [Lord Kimberley] greatly regrets this, but he is convinced that it would be a fatal mistake to deprive Japan of the fruit of her victories."

"Kimberley's Cabinet Report to the Queen, Apr. 23, 1895"; Bourne; Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain; Document 122, p. 435. For a discussion of this whole affair see Bourne, pp. 153-5; Lowe, pp. 191-3; and Langer; Diplomacy of Imperialism; pp. 167-91.

41. See Matthew; Liberal Imperialists; pp. 195-8.


43. Ibid; p. 2.


45. For example see Calchas, "Russia and Her Problem I.— Internal";
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

Fortnightly Review; June, 1901; pp. 1031-44:
"England is the one strong power adjacent to her [Russia's] frontiers which does not threaten her existing or desired outlets by aggressive action. It may be shown in another paper that if the Persian Question can be solved an Anglo-Russian settlement is assured." (p. 1044)
See also A. Rustam Bey deBilinski, "Great Britain and Russia"; Nineteenth Century and After: Vol. L, No. CCXCVII; Nov., 1901; pp. 723-36:
"Whether British statesmen, as opposed to the British public, realise that Russian ambitions, except in one instance, are not detrimental to their country, I have no means of knowing. What is manifest, however, is that they recognise the impossibility of arresting the course of the Muscovite." (p. 739)

47 Greenwood, Frederick, "The Question of Alliances"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LIX; Feb., 1896; p. 165. It is not surprising that Greenwood should adopt the more Radical position. He had been, during the 1880's and 1890's, one of the leading critics of the aristocratically controlled foreign policy of Great Britain. See Frederick Greenwood, "The Mystery of Our Foreign Policy"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LV; June, 1889; pp. 815-27.

48 Wilson, Roland K., "Shall We Invite the Russians to Constantinople?"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXI; Feb., 1897; p. 271.
49 Gambier, Capt. J.W., "A Plea for Peace— An Anglo-Russian Alliance"; Fortnightly Review; Vol. LXVIII, No. CCCCVII; Dec., 1900; pp. 998-1008:
"The closer and more seriously this question of an Anglo-Russian friendship is studied, the more clearly does it stand out as the only possible guarantee of the peace of the world." (p. 1008)

51 Dillon, E.J., "Our Friends, Our Ally, and Our Rivals: The Proposed Anglo-Russian Convention"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXXXV; May, 1904; pp. 612-6:
"Nothing could be more acceptable to our people of every political shade of thought than such a satisfactory agreement with Russia as we have concluded with France." (p. 613)

52 Dillon, E.J., "The Obstacles to an Anglo-Russian Convention"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXXXVI; July, 1904; pp. 41-69:
"Russia, after the present campaign [the Russo-Japanese War], will be in a suitable mood to come to an all-round friendly settlement of her differences with Great Britain." (p. 69)

53 In September, 1905 a meeting was held at Grey's Highlands fishing lodge where Asquith, Grey, and Haldane agreed to a pact calling for, in the event of the formation of a Liberal Government, Campbell-Bannerman to accept a peerage and allow Asquith to assume leadership in the Commons. All three agreed to refuse to serve in the Government if these conditions were not met. See Matthew; Liberal Imperialists; pp. 112-21.
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

54. Haldane to Knollys [King Edward's Private Secretary], Sept. 12, 1905; quoted in Dudley Sommer; Haldane of Clan: His Life and Times 1856-1928; George Allen & Unwin, London (1960); p. 145.


56. The New Age; Feb. 23, 1905.

57. Manchester Guardian, Nov. 18, 1905; quoted in Ayerst; Manchester Guardian; Biography of a Newspaper; p. 359.

58. This was especially true of E.J. Dillon and the Contemporary Review, averaging twenty pages per issue from December, 1905 to February, 1906 devoted exclusively to the coverage of the events in Russia; That was about fifteen percent of each issue.


60. Dillon, E.J., "Foreign Affairs"; Contemporary Review; Vol. LXXXIX; June, 1906; pp. 876-98. Bernard Pares felt that in 1906: "Dr. Dillon... knew Russia better than any of us [other British journalists], but had lost the sympathy of the Liberals, because he was now regarded as the spokesman of Witte."

Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 114, see also p. 183.

61. Harrison, W., "MacKenzie Wallace's View of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907"; Oxford Slavonic Papers; New Series, Vol. IV (1971); p. 75. Apparently Wallace was urging his contacts at The Times to moderate any criticisms toward Russia. See B.D. Vol. Four; p. 247. Harrison in another article notes the rapidly flagging interest of Britons in the situation in Russia recorded by their donations in answer to appeals for monetary support. Early in 1905 the L.R.C. had raised almost one thousand pounds on behalf of Russian strikers. A similar appeal in July from the S.D.F. provided less than sixty pounds by December, while in stark contrast, eight thousand pounds were raised to support the German Social Democrats in answer to a fund-raising campaign in Justice. See W. Harrison, "The British Press and the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907"; Oxford Slavonic Papers; New Series, Vol. VII (1974); p. 80. For further evidence of Britain's declining interest in the Russian Revolution see Pares; Russia and Reform; p. 566.
The speech was written and delivered in Campbell-Bannerman's excellent French. The text contains the official translation. His original version in French follows:

"Je ne fais pas de commentaire sur les nouvelles qui ont éclaté ce matin: ce n'en est ni le lieu le moment. Nous n'avons pas une assez grande connaissance des faits pour pouvoir blâmer ou louer. Mais ce qui du moins nous pouvons dire— nous qui fondons notre confiance et nos espoirs sur le régime parlementaire. Les nouvelles institutions ont souvent une jeunesse accidentée sinon orageuse. La Douma reviendra d'une forme ou d'autre. Nous pouvons dire avec toute sincérité: La Douma est morte, Vive la Douma!"


Nevinson, Henry; The Dawn in Russia; Or Scenes in the Russian Revolution: Harper's and Bros., London (1906); p. 361.

See Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 60. Much of Grey's protestation along this line might have been nothing more than rationalizations to support a policy of non-interference which dovetailed nicely with his eagerness for a negotiated settlement.

Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; p. 132.

Wilson; Campbell-Bannerman; p. 536.

C.B. to Grey, July 24, 1906; quoted in Spender; Campbell-Bannerman Volume Two; p. 264.

Grey; Twenty-Five Years Volume One; p. 150.


See Joseph O. Baylen; The Tsar's 'Lecturer-General': W.T. Stead and the Russian Revolution of 1905: School of Arts and Sciences Research Papers; Georgia State Univ., Atlanta (July, 1969); p. 2. See also Taylor; Troublemakers; p. 110 and Bernard S. Semmel; Imperialism and Social Reform: Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge (1960); pp. 57 and 178.


See Frederic Whyte; The Life of W.T. Stead Volume Two; Garland, New York (1977); pp. 273 and 277. See also Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 3.

Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 5.

Whyte; W.T. Stead; p. 273.
Notes for pages 119-145 (con'd.):

77 Stead, W.T., "The Tsar Nicholas II. A Cruel Caricature..."; Review of Reviews; Vol. XXX; Aug., 1904; pp. 158-9; quoted in Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 3.

78 Whyte; W.T. Stead; p. 272.


80 Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 5.

81 Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 60. See above pp. 131-4 for a discussion of Campbell-Bannerman's speech concerning the dissolution of the Duma.

82 "Transcript of Interview with the Dowager Empress Marie Fedorovna, Aug. 28, 1905"; from Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 43.

83 Quoted in Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 9.

84 Stead to Mrs. Wareing, Sept. 10, 1905; quoted in Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 9.

85 Dillon, E.J., "W.T. Stead as He Appeared to One Who Was Often His Antagonist"; Review of Reviews; Vol. XLV; May, 1912; p. 484; quoted in Whyte; W.T. Stead; p. 277. This article was written by Dillon after Stead's death aboard the Titanic.

86 The New Age; Oct. 5, 1905.

87 Tompkins, Stuart Ramsay; The Russian Intelligentsia: Makers of the Revolutionary State; Oklahoma Univ. Press, Norman (1957); p. 190. See also Whyte; W.T. Stead; p. 277 and Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 20.

88 See Baylen; Tsar's 'Lecturer-General'; p. 20.

89 Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, Ripon, Haldane, Morley, and of course, Grey seem to have been the only Cabinet members involved in discussions about the proposed Russian entente. See Trevelyan; Grey of Falloch; pp. 209-10. See also Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; p. 108 and Monger; End of Isolation; pp. 283-4.

90 "Sir E. Grey in the City: Foreign Policy and Fiscal Reform—Speech at Cannon Street Hotel, Oct. 20, 1905", The Times report; Oct. 21, 1905; p. 5.


92 Morley to Minto, Mar. 23, 1906; quoted in Monger; End of Isolation; p. 281. See also Harold Nicolson; Portrait of a Diplomatist; p. 151.


94 Grey to Katherine Lytton, June 28, 1909; quoted in Trevelyan; Grey of Falloch; p. 215

95 Morley to Minto, Mar. 23, 1906; quoted in John Morley; Recollections Volume Two; Macmillan, New York (1917); p. 167.

96 Grey to C.B., Aug. 31, 1907; quoted in Grey; Twenty-Five Years Volume One; p. 160.
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

97 Quoted in Trevelyan; *Grey of Fallodon*; pp. 209-10.

98 Williams, Beryl, "Great Britain and Russia, 1905 to the 1907 Convention"; Hinsley; *Foreign Policy under Grey*; p. 135.

99 Morris; *Radicalism Against War*; p. 57. See also Morley; *Recollections Volume Two*; pp. 160-80.

100 Morley; *Recollections Volume Two*; pp. 178-9.


102 This sub-committee, chaired by Morley, also included Grey, Asquith, and Haldane. It reported in May, 1907 strongly in favor of "the school who look to diplomacy rather than to arms, and hold that the foundation of our rule in India would be more securely strengthened by peace with Russia than by any success in war with Russia." Quoted in Keith Wilson; *The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-1914*; University Press, Cambridge (1985); p. 76. See also Morris; *Radicalism Against War*; pp. 57-8 and Monger; *End of Isolation*; pp. 284-6.

103 Morley to Minto, May 31, 1907; quoted in Monger; *End of Isolation*; p. 285. Morley was already worried lest any major increase in the proportions of the Indian military establishment (a strengthening of Indian security would mean an enlargement of the number of native Indian troops) would excite smoldering Indian nationalist feelings. See Stephen E. Koss; *John Morley at the India Office 1905-1910*; Yale University Press, New Haven (1969); p. 112.

104 Morley to Minto, Aug. 29, 1906; quoted in Monger; *End of Isolation*; p. 286.

105 Morley to Minto, July 6, 1906; quoted in Morley; *Recollections Volume Two*; p. 177.

106 Morley to Lamington, Apr. 12, 1906; quoted in Koss; *Morley at the India Office*; p. 114, footnote no. 12.

107 B.O. Vol. Four; Document 520, p. 580. See also Steiner; *Foreign Office*; pp. 90-7 and Morris; *Radicalism Against War*; p. 58.

108 See Churchill; *Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907*; pp. 109 and 125. See also H. Nicolson; *Portrait of a Diplomatist*; pp. 149-69.

109 Quoted in H. Nicolson; *Portrait of a Diplomatist*; p. 152.

110 Wallace was a particularly ill-advised choice for Nicolson to select to obtain accurate, objective information on either Russian affairs or the state of British public opinion. Wallace's classic two-volume *Russia* had been published in 1877, and he was, by 1906, totally out of touch with the real situation in Russia. He himself admitted to Moberly Bell of *The Times* that he had made a serious mistake "in underestimating the force and velocity of the revolutionary current." He had been dispatched to St. Petersburg by King Edward to report back on the true nature of the Russian political scene and the stability of the Tsarist regime, and to advise Nicolson. He also was to aid in any way possible the furtherance of an Anglo-Russian understanding. Thus
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont’d.):

the objectivity of his advice to Nicolson is suspect. See Har- 
son, "Mackenzie Wallace’s View of the Russian Revolution of 
1905-1907”; Oxford Slavonic Papers; (1971); pp. 73-4. See also 
Lee; King Edward VII Volume Two; pp. 305-7; H. Nicolson; Portrait 
of a Diplomatist; pp. 224-5; and Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 
125.

Nicolson, H.; Portrait of a Diplomatist; p. 152.


Grey; Twenty-Five Years Volume One; pp. 147-50. See also Morris; 
Radicalism Against War; pp. 59-62. Harding and Grey considered 
suspending negotiations with Russia in July of 1906 because of 
worries about the readiness of the British public for such a mo- 
mentous step. See Harrison, "Mackenzie Wallace’s View of the 
Russian Revolution of 1905-1907”; Oxford Slavonic Papers; (1971); 
p. 78.

Quoted in Harrison, "The British Press and the Russian Revolution of 
1905-1907”; Oxford Slavonic Papers; (1974); p. 82.

Ibid; p. 80. Harrison notes that although there were a number of 
these meetings organized by the Left, they elicited none of the 
"spontaneous and widespread indignation" that had been charac- 
teristic of such gatherings immediately after Bloody Sunday. He 
contends that the British loss of sympathy for the Russian re- 
formers was occasioned by the use of terror tactics in Russia 
by the extreme Left and because Britons had gradually realized 
that the alternative to Tsarism might be something very differ- 
ent from British-style constitutional government. The average 
Briton now [late 1906] suspended moral judgement.” This notion 
seems an oversimplification, ignoring a long process of disen- 
chantment with Russian reform and reformers beginning in the 
1890’s.

Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 61.

Grey to Katherine Lyttelton, June 28, 1909; quoted in Trevelyan; Grey 
of Pallodon; p. 215.

Quoted in Lee; King Edward VII Volume Two; p. 565.

The Speaker: Vol. XXIII; June 23, 1906; quoted in Morris; Radicalism 
Against War; p. 61.

Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CLX; 327-30, July 5, 1906.

Grey; Twenty-Five Years Volume One; p. 150.

Grey to Nicolson, Oct. 3, 1906; quoted in Grey; Twenty-Five Years 
Volume One; p. 151.

Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 62.

Harrison, "The British Press and the Russian Revolution of 1905- 
1907”; Oxford Slavonic Papers; (1974); pp. 89-90. The Labour 
Leader at least was relieved at the decision by the delegation 
to comply with Grey’s wishes, noting: 
"We frankly confess that from the outset we felt dubious as to the 
wisdom of a British political demonstration on Russian ground in favour 
of the Russian revolution.”
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

125. See above footnote no. 61.


127. The Times; June 11, 1907; p. 5. See also Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 64.

128. The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom was formed in March, 1890, in an effort to awaken public sympathy for the cause of Russian reform. Organized and led primarily by Robert Spence Watson and Stepanak, the initial committee consisted of twenty-eight English men and women including clergymen, university professors, and nine M.P.'s. Articles from the Committee's journal Free Russia were frequently excerpted by British and continental newspapers. The SPRF gradually built up a network of local branches by the mid-1890's. The SPRF was energetic in arranging protests against Russian persecution of Jews and Tsarist repression of university student demonstrations. It was prominent among the opposition to the Aliens Bill of 1905. With the coming of the revolution of 1905 the SPRF expanded its activities to include organizing mass meetings in support of Russian reformers, providing financial backing to these same groups and aiding Russian refugees in England. It was later to turn its efforts to resisting the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The SPRF was greatly weakened by the death of Spence Watson in 1911, and its activities came to an end in the confusion at the outbreak of the First World War. See Barry Hollingsworth, "The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom: British Liberals and Russian Socialists, 1890-1917"; Oxford Slavonic Papers: New Series, Vol. III (1970); pp. 45-64.


130. The New Age; June 20, 1907; quoted in Morris; Radicalism Against War; pp. 63-4.

131. See above pp. 141-2.


133. Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CLX; 327-30; quoted in Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 61.

134. Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CLXXIX; 1319; Aug. 1, 1907.


136. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations of the Convention see Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 107-76; Monger;
Notes for pages 119-145 (cont'd.):

End of Isolation; pp. 281-95; and Williams, "Great Britain and Russia, 1905 to the 1907 Convention"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; pp. 133-47.

137 For a transcript of the Convention see B.D. Vol. Four; Appendix I, pp. 618-20. For a detailed discussion of the particulars of the treaty as relating to Tibet, Persia, and Afghanistan see Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; chapters iv, v, and vi respectively, pp. 177-308.

138 Quoted in Williams, "Great Britain and Russia, 1905 to the 1907 Convention"; Hinsley; Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 147.

139 C.B. to Grey, Sept. 3, 1907; quoted in Trevelyan; Grey of Fallodon; p. 214.
Notes for pages 146-70:

1 The Times; Sept. 2, 1907; p. 7.
2 See above p. 137.
3 The Times; Sept. 2, 1907; p. 7.
4 The Times; Sept. 6, 1907; p. 7.
6 See above p. 146.
7 Morning Post; Sept. 2, 1907; quoted in Postgate and Vailance; Those Foreigners; p. 211.
8 "Russia and England"; Saturday Review; Vol. CIV; Sept. 28, 1907; p. 384.
9 "Britain and Russia in the Middle East"; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine; Vol. CLXXXIII, No. MCVII; Jan., 1908; pp. 152-52.
11 The Spectator blindly refused to acknowledge the influence that the Convention would undoubtedly have on European politics. "[D]n the whole, we do not think that the Convention will have any directly recognisable influence upon what we call the balance of power in Europe." ("The Anglo-Russian Convention"; The Spectator; Vol. XCIX; Sept. 28, 1907; p. 420.) The Westminster Gazette agreed that the Agreement had "no European motive." (See Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 69), but the Saturday Review was less certain of the restrictive nature of the Treaty, predicting that "though it does not touch them, we think it should influence the peaceful development of European international relations." ("Russia and England"; Saturday Review; Vol. CIV; Sept. 28, 1907; p. 384).
12 Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; p. 325.
13 Curzon to Lord Percy, Sept. 25, 1907; quoted in Ronaldshay; Life of Lord Curzon, Volume Three; p. 38. See also Nicolson; Portrait of a Diplomatist; p. 251.
14 Grey; Twenty-Five Years, Volume One; p. 155. See also "Grey's Speech at the Corn Exchange, Berwick-on-Tweed; December 19, 1907" in Paul Knaplund (ed.); Speeches on Foreign Affairs 1904-1914 by Sir Edward Grey; George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London (1931); pp. 40-1. If this speech is taken at face value, then Grey saw the Agreement as more than a mere advantageous business deal and was willing to make his hopeful expectations public:
"If it is worked as it is intended, in a faithful and friendly spirit on each side, it will dissipate jealousy and suspicion, it will relieve both nations from the strain of anxiety, and, by removing one constant cause of friction, it will enable the two nations to treat all other matters which may arise between them in the future in a friendly spirit; and if peace between England and Russia is assured, depend on it, it is in the interest of social reform and internal development in both countries, and it is a valuable contribution to and an important element in securing the peace of the whole world."
Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd):


17 J.L. Garvin, prior to 1899, had been an enthusiastic Liberal, using his journalistic position to promote Home Rule and Irish nationalism. Trained in the journalistic craft while working for the Newcastle Chronicle, owned by Radical politician and publicist Joseph Cowan, in 1896 Garvin actually applied for a position with the Irish Daily Independent, an Irish nationalist organ controlled by John Redmond. Garvin's conversion to Chamberlainism and Liberal Unionism during the Boer War period was a consequence of his concern for the safety of England and the Empire. His rapid conversion to the Tory cause can be seen as an extreme case in the overall shift of Liberal foreign policy to the Right, best demonstrated by looking at the Liberal Imperialist movement. The Fortnightly Review began accepting articles by Garvin in 1895, and continued to publish his pieces even after he joined in the campaign for Tariff Reform. His articles on foreign affairs were usually signed with the pseudonym 'Calchas', although 'X' and 'Ignatus' were occasionally substituted. Because the true identity of 'Calchas' was never published (the Germans thought Wessellitzky, London correspondent of the Russian paper Novoye Vremya, was 'Calchas') it must be assumed that the views expressed in Garvin's articles were acceptable to the editors of the Fortnightly Review. See Alfred M. Gallin; The Observer and J.L. Garvin 1908-1914: Oxford University Press, London (1960); pp. 10-14. Garvin was actually commissioned in October, 1899 by Edward Lawson of the Daily Telegraph to write a letter "From a Liberal... to show that the obvious duty of Lord Rosebery and Sir Edward Grey ought, in the opinion of the great bulk of their party, to be no longer shirked." Stephen Koss opines that it was "absurd" for Garvin "to ventriloquize" as a Liberal. But given Garvin's background, was this such an absurdity? See Stephen Koss; The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century: Univ. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill (1981); p. 393.


19 Ibid; p. 545.


Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd.):

23 Vambéry, Arminius; *Travels in Central Asia*: John Murray, London (1864); p. 442.


26 *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIII; 999-1024, Feb. 6, 1908. For a discussion of the Lords and Commons debates on the Anglo-Russian Convention see Ward and Gooch; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1866-1919 Volume Three; pp. 361-6 and Churchill; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; pp. 325-32.

27 Ibid; 1001.
28 Ibid; 1001.
29 Ibid; 1003, 1023.
30 Ibid; 1022.
32 Ibid; 1334.
33 Ibid; 1334.
34 Ibid; 1334.
35 Ibid; 1028-44.
36 Ibid; 1318-23.
37 Ibid; 1339-44.
38 Ibid; 1024-8.
39 Ibid; 1310-1.
40 Ibid; 1043.
41 *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIV; 460-76, Feb. 17, 1908.
43 Morley; Recollections Volume Two; p. 245.
44 *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIV; 559, Feb. 17, 1908.
46 Ibid; 496.
47 Ibid; 481.
48 Ibid; 563-4. See 559-64 for Morley’s entire speech.
49 Charles Dilke was the sole exception, and his comments were limited to inquiries regarding specific Treaty details.
50 *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIII; 1002, Feb. 6, 1908.
51 *Hansard*: 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIV; 493, Feb. 17, 1908.
Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd.):

52 The Times; Sept. 6, 1907; p. 7.
55 Barker, "The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance"; The Nineteenth Century and After; July, 1908; p. 9.
59 Morley to Minto, Feb. 19, 1908; Morley; Recollections Volume Two; pp. 244-5.
60 See Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 67. Grey was also greatly appreciative of Morley's efforts to secure the Convention, particularly his neutralization of the objections of the Indian Government in Calcutta. Morley wrote in early 1908: "The Anglo-Russian Agreement needed much care and vigilance... The Government of India is always Jingo, and Grey's work, as he often over-generously says, would have been impossible if there had not happened to be over the Government of India a Secretary of State whom the Jingo is the devil incarnate."
61 Morley to Minto, June 23, 1906; Morley; Recollections Volume Two; p. 175.
62 Blunt; My Diaries 1888-1914; p. 598.
63 Manchester Guardian, Sept. 2, 1907; quoted in Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 68.
64 Morris; Radicalism Against War; p. 68.
66 The Times; Sept. 10, 1907; p. 5.
67 The membership of C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, on the Committee makes that paper's editorial position in regard to the Anglo-Russian Convention difficult to under-stand.
68 Brailsford, H.N.; The Fruits of Our Russian Alliance; The Anglo-Russian Committee, London (1912); backcover.
69 The Illustrated Graphic; Jan. 12, 1907; quoted in Max Beloff; Lucien Wolf and the Anglo-Russian Entente 1907-1914; The Jewish Historical Society of England, London (1951); p. 15.
Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd.):

See also K.G. Robbins, "Public Opinion, the Press and Pressure Groups"; Hinsley; British Foreign Policy under Grey; p. 84.


71Beloff; Lucien Wolf and the Anglo-Russian Entente 1907-1914; p. 16.

72Ibid; p. 17.

73"The F.O. Bag"; The Illustrated Graphic; Vol. LXXVI, No. 1,971; Sept. 7, 1907; p. 374.


76The New Age; Vol. I (New Series), No. 19; Sept. 5, 1907.

77See above p. 162.

78Wolf, Lucien, "The F.O. Bag"; The Illustrated Graphic; Vol. LXXVI, No. 1,972; Sept. 14, 1907; p. 350.

79"The Anglo-Russian Convention"; The Nation; Sept. 28, 1907; p. 1079.

80See above pp. 161-2.

81The New Age; Vol. I (New Series), No. 19; Sept. 5, 1907. As noted previously, the Socialists and Labourites, particularly Keir Hardie, were loathe to squander energy and credibility on hopeless foreign policy agitations when it might better be expended on issues of domestic social reform. See above pp. 45-6.

82Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CLXXXIV; 508-13, 537, 551, 563; Feb. 17, 1908.


84Lee; King Edward VII, Volume Two; p. 587.

85Stewart; J. Keir Hardie; p. 264.

86Member for East Leeds (1906-18) and for S.E. Leeds (1918-24).

87Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CXC; 252-8; June 4, 1908.

88Quoted in Weintroth, "The British Radicals and the Balance of Power, 1902-1914"; The Historical Journal; (1970); p. 668 from the Daily News; July 5, 1908. Weinroth states that there were 13 Radicals while Lee; King Edward VII, Volume Two gives the figures as 12 Liberals, 25 Labour members, and 22 Irish Nationalists voting with the minority.

89The whole affair had an interesting sequel. The King resented the suggestion that by visiting his royal cousin he was "condoning atrocities." As a punishment, the names of three M.P.'s who had voted in the minority on June 4th were withheld from the invitation list to a royal garden party on June 20th. Radical
Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd.):

Arthur Ponsonby, and Labourites Victor Grayson and Keir Hardie at first thought that there had merely been an oversight. But disabused of that notion, and taking the position that their exclusion cast an official aspersion on their constituencies, they protested. The Press took up the matter eagerly. The names of Hardie and Grayson were quickly restored to the list by an embarrassed Edward. He was more reluctant to forgive Ponsonby, as he had been "born and bred in the purple", but eventually, after an exchange of very cordial correspondence the ban against him was also withdrawn. See Stewart; J. Keir Hardie; pp. 267-71 and Lee, King Edward VII, Volume Two; pp. 588-90.

Wolf, Lucien, "The F.O. Bag"; The Illustrated Graphic: Vol. LXXVII, No. 2,010; June 6, 1908; p. 776.

Pares; My Russian Memoirs; p. 171.

Lee; King Edward VII, Volume Two; p. 587. Sir Edward Grey quoted Cadet leader Millukov in the debate as favoring the Royal visit. See Hansard; 4th Series; Vol. CXC; 240; June 4, 1908.

The New Age; June 13, 1908.

Lee; King Edward VII, Volume Two; p. 690.


See The Times; Aug. 2, 1909; p. 7 for comments critical of this letter.


See D.W. Sweet and R.T.B. Langhorne, "Great Britain and Russia, 1907-1914"; Hinsley; British Foreign Policy under Grey; pp. 236-55.


Ibid; p. 148.

Hansard; 5th Series; Vol. XXXII; 76; Nov. 27, 1911.

See for example "The Principles of Our Foreign Policy"; The Nation: Vol. VII, No. 12; June 18, 1910; pp. 410-2. This article appeared eighteen months before the agitation against Grey crested. But it is a complete representation of The Nation's stand on the issue, a stand which was consistently adhered to until after the beginning of the First World War: "[T]he nation's memories of British policy... we [cannot] recall such sterility on the humanitarian side, combined with such a stiff pre-
Notes for pages 146-70 (cont'd.):

sentiment of materialist doctrines of State policy... As greatly as we admire Sir Edward Grey, we doubt whether he realises by what wide continents such sentiment divides him from the central force of Liberalism." (p. 411)

105 Murray, "Foreign Policy Debated: Sir Edward Grey and His Critics, 1911-1912"; Wallace and Askew (eds.); Power, Public Opinion, and Diplomacy; p. 169. See Hansard; 5th Series; Vol. XXXIV; 628-95; Feb. 21, 1912.

Notes for pages 171-80:

1 See above p. 123.
2 "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs"; The Spectator: Vol. CI; Aug. 22, 1908; p. 252.
3 "Our Great Foreign Minister"; The Speaker: Vol. VI; July 9, 1892; p. 36; see above p. 123.
5 Ibid; p. 748.
7 Wolf, Lucien, "The F.O. Bag"; The Illustrated Graphic; Sept. 28, 1907; quoted in Beloff; Lucien Wolf and the Anglo-Russian Entente; p. 7.
8 "The Liberal Responsibility to Europe"; The Nation: Vol. IV, No. XXIII; Mar. 6, 1909; p. 845.
9 Brailsford; The War of Steel and Gold; p. 46.
10 "The Liberal Responsibility to Europe"; The Nation; Mar. 6, 1909; p. 845.
12 Ibid; p. 254.
13 Ibid; p. 271.
14 "The Spirit of Our Foreign Policy"; The Nation; Feb. 22, 1908; p. 749.
15 Lee, Thorpe, "Why Empires Fall"; The New Age; Feb. 29, 1908.
16 For example see above pp. 115-6 for concerns over public opinion during the Dogger Bank affair. See also pp. 160-1 for the concern of John Morley over the public reception of the newly negotiated Anglo-Russian Convention.
17 The Foreign Office was to continue to pursue a laissez-faire policy in the manipulation of public opinion up to the outbreak of war in August, 1914. There were inside questioners of the ultimate wisdom of this hands-off policy. A retired Sanderson suggested in 1911 that more Blue Books should be produced in an effort to enlist public support, and Hardinge apparently agreed. But these sentiments were never translated into action. See Keith Wilson, "The Foreign Office and the 'Education' of Public Opinion Before the First World War"; The Historical Journal: Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (1983); pp. 403-11. Compare this to the editorial recommendations of The Spectator in 1901; see above pp. 42-3.
18 Trevelyan; Grey of Falloond; p. 140.
20 Croce; History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century; p. 158; taken from a longer quote cited earlier on p. 7.
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