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MILITARY CONTROL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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Rice University

Military Control in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study

by

Suphapong Boonyapratuang

A Thesis Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

Approved, Thesis Committee:

Fred R. von der Mehden, Albert
Thomas Professor of Political
Science
Chairman

Robert H. Dix, Professor of
Political Science

Richard J. Stoll, Associate
Professor of Political Science

Houston, Texas

November, 1984
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ABSTRACT

MILITARY CONTROL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Supapong Boonyapratuang

The theme of the study is to characterize military control in the politics of four Southeast Asian countries. Five categories were set to examine the diversity of military influence within the political sphere. These categories examined include a confined-type, an unconfined-type, a cooperative-type, a corrective-type, and a veto-type.

The thesis also provides explanatory examples over the question of "what" types of control patterns did exist and how they can be recognized. Although no two military institutions possess exactly the same condition in response to the political development and hierarchical control, it is
assumed that the aim and the surrounding problems have
sufficient universality so that cross-national study can be
applied with enough validity.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On the way to the development of a "well-defined" analytical and conceptual scheme, comparative political researchers face various types of problems. These vary from the specific problems of interpreting and indexing, to the complex problems of developing cross-national categories and criteria for acceptable explanation. Even though comparative politics has yet to achieve a general theory, we still can contribute to the cumulative development of the field by helping formulate new ideas, either from the existing context of a conceptual scheme or from direct observation of problems. It is based on this perception that the study is going to proceed.

This study aims at the development of an analytical
framework for classifying political behavior of the military in four countries of Southeast Asia: Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The study presents a new approach to the theory of military politics. Up to the present time, most studies have mainly been divided into two criteria for analytical comparison. The first analytical approach focuses on the question of why the military crosses into the political arena. The work is, basically, to reveal what types of civilian control and what kind of failure lead to the military intervention and what are the various sociocultural and political system characteristics suitable for military takeover. This approach could be found in the works of Morris Janowitz, Amos Perlmutter, and Eric Nordlinger.(1)

The second approach deals with the question as to whether the military is an adequate organization for the development of the economy, the modernization of the
society, and the stability of political system.

Theoretical Scope of the Study

Based on the second approach, a distinction has emerged between two schools of thought. The first one is based on the characteristics of the military organization. In this light, it is argued that the military is the organization which can most efficiently combine a maximum rate of modernization with a maximum level of stability. (2) Close to this argument is the explanation by Lucian Pye that it is the shame of their countries' backwardness in technological and socioeconomic development which leads many of the world's military establishments into politics with the aim of changing their own societies. The related explanation is made by Guy Pauker, who views the military as the progressive force that stood against feudalism while
inducing modernization. (3)

Those adhering to the second school of thought, known as the revisionists, base their views on the structure of the military organization. They see that even though the military organization represents disciplined organization, the appropriateness of its skill to modernize is doubtful. Instead, the military is more concerned with protecting its own interests and with preserving social order than with social change or development. To this second question of whether the military can develop the country, Samuel Huntington explains that both of these views are correct, but the specific outcome of the military rule depends on the specific type of society under concern. In other words, as society changes so does the role of the military. The more backward a society is, the more progressive role the military plays; and thus the more advanced a society is the more conservative the military is. (4)
Theoretically, Huntington has formulated his own typology of civil-military relations focusing on civilian control over the military. His thesis was drawn from two basic concepts of control: "subjective" and "objective" civilian controls. Subjective control implies an effort by the civilian sector to reduce military influence by civilianizing the military, while objective control involves the political neutralization of the military by maximizing attitudes and behavior of military professionalism, thus achieving its goal by fully militarizing the military, making it the tool of the state(5).

In following Huntington typology, we come to the point of this thesis; namely, that there is a possibility of a significant addition to previous literature, since Huntington's thesis only focuses on the ways in which the civilian commands the military. One may reflect that there are times when civilian institutions or groups cannot have a
sufficient control over the military. Indeed, in many
developing societies, it is the military that commands the
civilian or at least, it is the military that plays a
crucial role in helping regimes maintain their control over
these societies. And for most of the time, real civilian
control without military support is usually short-lived.
Instead, it was the military control that played a
deterministic role both from the political standpoint and
socioeconomic standpoint. The importance of the military
association within the political arena has given me a strong
interest in analyzing the existence of different types of
military influence and control over civilian populace.
Thus, this study will not follow the unending debates over
why the civilian loses control and whether the military will
succeed in development, but points to the different types of
control used by the military to support their regimes
against opposition forces. The thesis is theoretical in the
sense that it provides descriptive typologies and explanatory generalizations that might be applicable to regions other than Southeast Asia.

Specifically, the author is not after the theoretical questions such as "why", "when", and "by whom", but focuses instead over the question of "what" kinds of control patterns did exist and how they can be recognized. It could be stipulated that the following thesis is a reflection of Huntington’s contrasting concepts of civilian control over the military since it focuses upon the situation that once the military has been involved, what types of manipulative control have they used against the society and whether categorization of the military involvement is feasible.

Two Ways of Categorizing

In this thesis, the two general categorizations that
will follow are related in the sense that they are complementary to one another. Both are parts of the military control definition and contribute to the generalization of military control. One of these general categorizations alone is not sufficient to characterize the varied nature of military involvement. Hence, they are related because both reflected the use of military control as the key to political dominance, regardless of how strong the levels of military intervention may be. These two general categorizations, then, differ from each other most fundamentally with regard to the level of control; that is, the extent of the governmental power which is exercised by the military establishment and the objective of this political control. These two general categorizations generally vary together, as the method and policy of the government's political goals reflect the specific type of control used by the government.
In explaining how these categories should be used, it must be clarified what may yet be constituted as an oversimplified picture. Although the study focuses on military control, the military control categories apply to both military and civilian governments since various military factions and cliques frequently possess considerable power in regimes no matter if it is civilians or military who occupies the majority of governmental seats.

To distinguish between the usage of these categories is therefore not to suggest that one type involves exclusively control by military officers and no civilians, and vice versa. Instead, the categories cover and can be used in examining a wide range of governments; from a mainly military regime to a mixture of military and civilian, to a largely civilian dominated regime. Thus, the crucial thing is that the military is used by the regimes as a means to control the opposition elements. Lastly, it is necessary to
state that there are also situations in which civilian leaders extensively use the military as a tool for controlling the civilian populace. These situations can be distinguished between traditional control of the military at national level and insurgency control of the military at local level. The traditional control consists of using the military to influence national politics, while the insurgency control refers to the extended use of the military at the local level against the insurgents. Hence, it can be divided in the following way:

(A). Civilian control of the military.

1. Military is used as a tool by civilian politicians for national needs.

2. Insurgency situations where the military carries on certain civilian administrative duties in security zones but is still under civilian control ultimately.

(B). Five categories of military control.
(A). Civilian control of the military.

1). Military as a civilian tool.

In this situation of civilian supremacy, the military helps civilian leaders to subdue or stabilize national politics. The military leaders prefer not to view themselves as politicians even when they serve as governors. For example, in the case of the Philippines where the military under President Marcos attributes a great deal of importance to the protection of the military professional's responsibility and corporate's expertise. Hence, the Philippine military is more willing to take orders and stay free from being responsible for the side-effect of politics than to venture itself as a visible leading force in any political issues beyond the national security sphere.
2). Insurgency situations.

In this second type of situation, the civilian leaders do not explicitly use the military for any political advantage but will use the military only in certain civilian administrative duties in security zones. To continue with the Philippine example, President Magsaysay had used the military primarily in handling the insurgency problems but still ensured his civilian control by constantly assessing the uses and abuses of administrative duties by the military in insurgency areas.

(B). Five categories of military control.

Table A. Five Categories of Military Control.

MILITARY CONTROL

(Five Categories)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level(1)</th>
<th>CON1</th>
<th>UNC1</th>
<th>COO1</th>
<th>COR1</th>
<th>VET1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals(2)</td>
<td>CON2</td>
<td>UNC2</td>
<td>COO2</td>
<td>COR2</td>
<td>VET2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charc(3)</td>
<td>CON3</td>
<td>UNC3</td>
<td>COO3</td>
<td>COR3</td>
<td>VET3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes to Table A:

(Vertical: CON=confined; UNC=unconfined; COO=cooperative;
COR=corrective; and VET=Veto).

(Horizontal: Level(1)=level of control; Goals(2)=objectives
of military control; and Charc(3)=Characteristics of
military control).

CON1: Governmental control with highest degree of
restriction and punishment for objecting or opposing to
rule.

CON2: The objective is to keep opposition forces at minimum.
Hence, ensuring the stability of the regime.

CON3: High level of centralism in the military institution.

UNC1: Governmental control by balancing various political
groups.

UNC2: A control where the optimum objective is to maintain a
stage of unemotional response of the opposition.

UNC3: Oppositions are neutralized and isolated.

CO01: Political control with the explicit drive by the
ruling military faction to control the civil-military
relationship through some civilian supports.

CO02: Control of civilian groups in return for their
cooperation and support.

CO03: Military regime directs its own military faction to
cooperate with civilians.
COR1: Political control with the drive to modify the political process.

COR2: Restoring the ill-bred politics caused by civilians.

COR3: Previous administrative and developmental processes are explicitly corrected by the military.

VET1: Political influence which does not require actual military government running the government.

VET2: The military has the power to stop any policy that could damage the stability and security of the state.

VET3: The military usually has the final decision on national security matters.

I) "Confined" and "Unconfined" Military Controls:

The first way of categorizing is an extension of Huntington's "subjective" and "objective" civilian controls.

In retrospect, Huntington's thesis is concerned with the types of civilian control over the military which is
different from the approach to the causes of military intervention. Hence, "confined" and "unconfined" military controls extend the focus to the other side of control.

Confined Military Control

"Confined" military control is related to the "subjective" civilian control in the sense that both focus on the restriction of the opposition as the means for preserving its power. Hence, both of these controls are characterized by the restraining of opposition influence in the political process such as governmental official appointment to key positions and blacklisting anti-regime opposition.

The differences between confined military control and subjective civilian control are in the level of restriction and punishment for objecting or opposing to rule. Confined
military control possesses a higher degree of both
submission of the opposition and penalties for
insubordination. These differences can be attributed to the
higher level in centralism of the military institution.

Unconfined Military Control

The "unconfined" military control resembles the
"objective" civilian control on the ground that both aim at
getting the other groups free from political pressures which
may arise as a result of the struggle of power. It is
represented by a situation that symbolizes or renders
minimal emotion to the people. Thus, it is characterized as
a control that tries to maintain a stage of unemotional
response from the opposition. This can be achieved by
neutralizing the opposition. Actually, the government tries
to neutralize or isolate not only the various civilian
groups, but also the prominent military figures that could eventually form a strong opposition group. It avoids, therefore, the specter of antagonistic factions fighting for power and creating societal tensions that could lead to anti-government activity or even to the overthrow of the military rule. In this way, the general populace will not be able to substantially channel its support in an anti-military direction since the ruling military faction is isolating and balancing the other groups which could have become united into a collision or could have raised public tension and support against the ruling faction.

The difference between unconfined military control and objective civilian control is that unconfined military control does not, ordinarily, seek only to neutralize the opposition, but also tries to decentralize its own group in order to be the sole authority and to ensure a lasting control by playing various opposition groups against each
other. By decentralizing its own group, the control is spread out to various parts of the group. Thus, it decreases the chance of an intra-group split or insubordination which would be made likely to occur if a fraction of the ruling military group were powerful enough to challenge the group leaders. Possibly, the reason behind unconfined military control lies in the fact that harsh military coercion used as the means for preserving power is most likely to result in response to only a limited number of situations, such as the suppression of open revolt, widespread rioting and attempts to control areas that have been antigovernment and semiautonomous.

The Second Way of Categorizing: Three Types of Military Control.

In contrast to the first two categories, the next three
categories deal with a lesser degree of restraint which regimes use against their societies. These three types differ according to the specific context of various situations. Here, as in the first two categories, civilians may govern, but their power is enforced by a military group which controls as would any military group if it was formally in charge. Thus, civilian regimes that use the military as a means of control and maintain their rule over civilian populace fall into the same treatment as military governments.

Cooperative Military Control

This type of control deals with the manipulation of power by allowing civilian influence in return for civilian cooperation and support. Here, even though the military is controlling the country, military rule is not necessarily
met with universal civilian disapproval. In fact, it does not depend on how many civilians have to be involved in the government. Hence, some groups, such as the urban middle class, may perceive military rule as positive to their wellbeing: most labor strikes decline in frequency; violent crime rates also decrease on average since the military is usually exercising stricter control than a civilian government would. And, unexpectedly, the urban middle class and other groups may support and cooperate with a military government, at least as long as control does not directly and negatively effect their status quo. Hence, cooperative military control can exist if the control does not directly effect the supporting civilian groups in a negative way. It may, by then, be too late to become politically active in opposing to the military government and civilian groups may find themselves impotent against the ruling military group. In fact, the use of coercive force is only one technique of
control and it is indeed quite limited in its long-term effectiveness. In actual cases, it is sometimes sufficient for the military to provide just symbolic or rhetorical cooperation with the civilian. The main difference between cooperative control and other types of control is that the military goal is to actually work with the civilians. The reason may be that the military lacks sufficient power to run the country or it may be perceived by the regimes' leaders that even though the locus of power is in their hands, only through cooperation with other groups will ensure a longlasting rule. Basically, a system is cooperative when the regime directs its own military faction to cooperate with civilians. The goals and policies must indicate that a drive has been set to work with civilians and to win civilian support, even if these regimes are still directing their policies according to their own perceptions. Thus, it is not crucial whether civilians actually influence
the decision-making or not. Lastly, as long as there is a
drive for cooperation, the actual use of civilian
bureaucracy is not as important since in most of the cases
we can not escape the fact that, for most of the times,
civilian bureaucracies pursue their decisions under the
direction of the regime's leaders and are frequently under
the supervision of these regimes, if not already part of
them. When either military government or civilian
government uses military control, cooperation according to
the regime's leaders seems to imply policies that amount to
sharing and coordinating with various civilian groups for
advices while assessing the demands of the general populace.
Hence, the cooperative method under these regimes results in
policies that use civilian groups by allowing for their
influence in terms of advice, ideas, or demands, in return
for their support and cooperation as long as it is
permissible. In turn, this helps to inform the leaders of
various civilian preferences in order to set their general policies in the directions toward which civilian groups can express their preferences more clearly. Thus, it helps these regimes to maintain control since more groups would be able to find a means of indirectly influencing the government. In all, it is likely to reduce the possibility of a civilian outbreak since this type of control allows more messages across the civil-military antagonistic barrier.

Corrective Military Control

The corrective military control involves the kind of political manipulation which, while allowing limited civilian influence, keeps its political challenge to a minimum. In this situation, the military perceives that national security is at stake because the civilian is incapable of solving the growing problems of the country.
Hence, the military may conciously or unconsciously be led into the role of the sole institution capable of controlling widespread turmoil. Here, military leaders are not only the referees and the peacekeepers, but at the same time play the role of correcting whatever they perceive as unhealthy to the society. The military, by all means, does not have the ability to effectively correct all perceived civil and economic turmoil. But the military still has two major advantages in playing this role. First, the military is most likely to be the only group capable of making concrete policies and getting those policies accepted over most competing groups, since as an hierarchical institution the military possesses greater control of its members and the capability to enforce its policies with actual coercive force. Second, in terms of implementing policies to reality, the military represents a source of administrative and technological personnel. Furthermore, the development
processes require a large demand for their expertise and places them in key administrative positions, thus easing their corrective process in controlling the administration of the socioeconomic and political conditions of the country. In corrective control, the military does not require civilian cooperation to change whatever seems unfit. In practice, corrective control could normally be seen as a control that allows the military to be involved in the political scene under the pretext of changing or restoring the ill-bred politics. The goal of the corrective control is clearly to modify the politics which differs from the goal of the cooperative control. Corrective control also differs from cooperative control in the sense that it does not require actual civilian groups to participate in the political courses of the country. Lastly, corrective control is usually accompanied by coercive use of force; although not as extensively as in confined control, but
substantially more than with cooperative control.

Veto Military Control

Veto control could be implied in a situation where the military is not officially in power but still draws the line as to what is allowed with regard to issues of paramount interest to it. In other words, the military holds the veto power over what it views as critical to the stability and security of the state.

Furthermore, the military expects that military matters should be directed by the military institutions and will seldom let the civilian interfere with its own affairs.
CHAPTER TWO

BURMA: THE MILITARY ACCORDING TO NE WIN

Burma became an independent republic with a bicameral legislature based on the European pattern in January 1948. Independence had been won by nationalist, anti-colonial, anti-Western, and anti-capitalist movements, involving both military and political support. These various groups were united in a political party, the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League), which dominated the government from 1948 until 1958 when the first military control took place. (1) In 1948, Burma was beset by rebellion, insurrection, and disorder. The government at that time and thereafter has always been associated with the traditions of division and revolt. Very seldom and then for short periods has any Burmese government been in control of the entire
country. In the decade following independence, it was difficult for the government to hold the unstable Union of Burma together.

During the period from 1948 to 1958, the Burmese military tended to play an apolitical role at the decision-making level. The influence that the military possessed tended to be restricted to matters concerning domestic security and the defence budget. However, military influence began to grow with the outbreak of the civil war. Revolts by ethnic groups and pro-Communist factions drew the military into local government affairs of troubled rural areas.(2) In the general election in 1956, there were more complaints of bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of technical skills among civilian administrators, and the continued resistance of the minority groups.(3) Although the ruling party, the AFPFL, won the election by a wide margin, the opposition had increased its strength significantly from the
previous election. The growing vote of the opposition worried Prime Minister U Nu, then the AFPFL leader, who resigned from leadership position to "clean up the AFPFL". Upon his return in 1958, U Nu announced the abandonment of socialism, and the AFPFL split into two factions. Socialism has had little significance in Burma in terms of a "Left-Right" spectrum, since all parties claim to be socialist. The party was now spilt into two factions: the clean AFPFL under U Nu and the "stable" AFPFL. The military had remained neutral in the AFPFL split, but had warned against the danger of letting the situation deteriorate. In particular they warned the AFPFL against accepting the parliamentary support of the Communists. U Nu also liberalized the policy of releasing political rebels in order to gain more votes. It was claimed that over 4,000 rebels came out of the hills, and 2,000 of the Communists formed a legal party known as the
People's Comrades Party. (10) The military had disapproved of the amnesty, proposing instead that it be allowed to destroy the rebels, but the proposal was rejected. (11) In the meantime, the conflict between the two AFPFLs started to become extremely tense. (12) Hence, the neutralization of the party power in order to lead the country in times of trouble was perceived as necessary. (13) The amnesty did not seem to do much to improve the situation, and the insurgency and civil war had shown signs of deteriorating. In October of 1958, General Ne Win, head of the army, was asked to take control of the government. (14)

The First Military Control: 1958-1960

The request to take over the government was a turning point and also a starting point of military in modern Burmese politics. In 1958, the military under Ne Win took
control as a "caretaker" government under the approval of the Parliament. (15) Ne Win had promised to stabilize the volatile political situation, to maintain law and order, to establish conditions for free elections, and to continue Burma's nonaligned foreign policy. The military also promised to return control to the civilians after the situation had settled down. (16)

Upon assuming power after his election by Parliament, Ne Win made several changes. (17) He appointed a largely civilian Cabinet, but placed military leaders at all the key Cabinet positions. (18) He dismissed thirty-eight politically appointed parliamentary secretaries and reassigned eighteen top civil service officers who were in charge of the ministries and departments of government. (19) At the top level, the government assumed more military control. Six of the most important ministries were controlled by military men. (20) Twenty key economic boards,
and government enterprises came under military leadership.

The effective decision making center of government shifted from the cabinet to the Military Staff Council controlled by military officers in clear chains of command and discipline. (21) The military government also amended the constitution to prevent the feudal chiefs in the Shan and Karen states from occupying their seats automatically in the parliament's Chamber of Nationalities and it also paid them a large sum of money to give up their hereditary political rights in their states. The caretaker government remained in office for close to two years, longer than expected. (22)

Corrective Military Control

The methods of the caretaker government were direct and many times severe. The military leaders viewed that the inefficiency and corruption of the civilian government were
something that had to be stopped and corrected.(23)

However, the general Burmese populace did not strongly
condemn these corrupted practices. Instead, to the people
it was proper that the government's primary concern should
be the care of Buddhism, while corruption and inefficiency
had become a way of life.(24) These attitudes were not
supported by the military, but the most unacceptable
condition was the view that the civilian governments had
betrayed the expectations of the revolution.(25)

According to the typologies set in this study, the
experience of the Burmese military in 1958 fits that of
corrective military control. The criteria for the
corrective control are that the military intervenes to
correct the civilian government wrongdoing. In the 1958
case the military leaders saw that the national security is
at stake because the civilian government was incapable of
solving the growing problems and also deviated from the
independence expectations. The Burmese military also followed one of the corrective control criteria by acting as only the peacekeeper or the caretaker of the country. The fact is that for the eighteen month period of military control, the formal government institutions remained and was not destroyed as would had been in a case of a revolution, even though the military played the primary policy-makers and ran all important matters, while the civilian maintained the role of critics.(26)

Actually, the corrective role played by the military was not a total success. Prior to control, the military saw the spirit and ethos of the civilians as little more than uncontrolled and undisplined cravings for corruption. As military men they believed most problem could be corrected through the purifying influences of action and honor. However, within six months the military leaders were beginning to learn that government was an extremely
complicated and intractable matter. (27) The solution was not quite as easy as they had planned. After a year in power military officers had to compromise what could not be corrected according to their original standards. Close to the end of their eighteen months' control, the military started to see themselves losing the status of military men and taking on some of the aspects of the civilian. (28) In sum, the military control in 1958 to 1960 had partly achieved their major goal which was to restore the independence spirit and to reform the administration's efficiency and effectiveness. (29) The reason was that in reaching for what they set out to do, the leaders of the military realized that they were not immune to the problems that plague politicians and administrators. Gradually, the military leaders were convinced that if they continued to control the country within these environments, there was a clear possibility that the military itself would split—the
same way as the civilians had divided in 1958—with the plausible outcome that people might become united, but only in opposition to the military control. Thus, it sought to withdraw from power while it was still possible to have something of its claims to integrity.

The most significant element in this corrective control is that the military could claim for an ultimate success, for the Burmese military would be the first military control in the developing countries to keep its promise of seeking only temporary control. In doing so the military was able to create a trusting image of its aims, while showing that they were seeking to use only a corrective stand and not to fully dominate the civilian.

The Civil Rule: 1960-1962

Veto Military Control
The period after the first military control could be termed as veto military control since in those two years, even though U Nu led a civilian government over the country, the military was holding a close watch on how well the civilian government had followed the path restored by them. The return of the civilian government revived the problems that plagued Burma prior to the military control. (30) Inefficiency and corruption again characterized the civilian administration of U Nu. (31) Again the AFPFL split, creating a parliamentary deadlock. U Nu's conciliatory gestures to the tribal minorities brought new demands for more autonomy and even separation of the Shans, Karens, and Chins from the Union. Insurrectionary activity among the Karens, Shans, and former Kuomington soldiers increased. (32) U Nu again played a weak stance toward communist insurgents, and criticized the military for its firm control of Shan chiefs during its corrective action on Shan area. Worst, U Nu
opposed to a number of policies imposed by the military during its control. (33)

In retrospect, the military leaders, even though no longer in control, expected their policies to be followed and especially that military affairs should not be tampered with by civilian decision-makers. In the 1960 to 1962 period, U Nu promised the Mons and Arakanese their own states. Moreover, he obtained a constitutional amendment turning Burma into a Buddhist state, these actions had brought warnings from the military that the antagonism of religious minorities might break unity throughout the Union. (34) Hence, the situation in 1962 seems to show that the military veto control was violated without careful consideration by the civilians. Political matters became as antagonistic as they had been previously, when the military leaders had clearly stated in their veto stance that the country could not afford to be broken up into small pieces
like Laos and Vietnam. The underlying policy by the military was that Burma could not return to 1948 period.

The Military Control of 1962-1964

Confined Military Control

The type of military control which began in 1962 appeared to be a corrective control, especially, during the first few weeks. However, when the real objective of the military government was known, it went beyond the political role of officers, encompassing a large number of other issues. (35) The control was drastic and it was clear that this time it was not a corrective control like the previous one. It had some aspects consistent with a confined military control. In retrospect, the confined control consists of restricting the opposition in order to preserve its rule. In 1962, it was clear that control was set to
stay and the constraint of any deviation from the military's policy would be strictly met. This time the military was swift and strict in controlling government institutions, in sharp contrast to the corrective control of four years earlier. The constitution was abolished and Parliament dissolved. U Nu, his cabinet ministers, the chief justice of the supreme court, and many Shan state leaders were imprisoned without trial. All political parties were also later banned and their leaders placed under arrest for varying lengths of time. In all, over 4,600 leaders of political parties, students, Buddhists, minorities, and "economic criminals" were confined, of whom more than half remained in jail until mid-1965. In cementing his confined control, Ne Win in the place of the constitutional and political institutions created the Revolution Council, consisted of seventeen high-ranking officers, all but two of whom were in the army. Ne Win, then chairman of the
council, announced that he would exercise all executive, legislative, and judicial powers. At that time there was no mention that the Revolutionary Council was to be a "caretaker" government, that the military control was aimed at correcting some deviancies, no hint of an eventual return to parliamentary government, no plan for elections in the near future. As Ne Win explained, parliamentary democracy was not appropriate in Burma because of "the absence of a mature public opinion".

As for the economic sector, the new economic program was created and known as: "the Burmese Way to Socialism". This involved nationalization of most remaining sectors of private enterprise, especially those owned by foreigners. Military officers returned to their former administrative posts as in 1958. By 1964, few things remained in private hands except agriculture, small industries, and service activities. Overall economic decision making was
mainly directed by the Revolutionary Council's Socialist Economy Construction Committee which was composed of twenty-five military officers and four civilians.(37)

In the internal security sector, the military gained control of the national police and set up Security and Administrative Committees in the rural areas. These committees were led by a local military commander and their functions were to create a popular support for crime control activities and counterinsurgency, to have a channel for military intelligence and peasant attitudes and demands, and more importantly, to enlist the rural population's support of the government.(38)

Military control seemed best suited in terms of restoring law and order. The most successful years since the re-establishment of control were 1963-1964 when Ne Win sought peace with the different groups, even though he succeeded only with the main body of the Karens.(39)
Insurgency since 1964 has remained a chronic problem of the military government, partly due to the lack of mobility and the logistic weaknesses of the military, and partly due to the fact that too many officers were dispersed into the administrative key positions. The inability of the military to end insurgency might, however, have a deeper meaning for the military. The continued existence of the guerrilla threat offers undisputed authority and unrivaled opportunity for continuing confined control throughout the country. If insurgencies were to be stopped, the military might lose something of its importance and much of its necessity role in controlling the country. Moreover, the fluidity of a chronic civil war offers hard-to-find chances for smuggling and other illicit ways of supplementing military financial needs. Thus, there was no incentive for the military to bring the insurgency directly to an end. All that is needed was to contain the insurgency at a safe
level while maintaining the control.(41)

To sum up, the facts of Burmese military control in 1962 fit the major classification of the confined military control since a centralized form of decision-making body, the Revolutionary Council, was formed with authority covering key sectors of the country; next a single political party created along lines of democratic centralism; and a series of functional councils, all dominated by members of the military.(42)

The Cooperative Military Control: 1964-1973

The confined military control stayed with the country until the beginning of 1965. During the period from 1964 to 1973, the military was looking for ways to unite the various factions of the country. Beginning on Union Day 1964, Ne Win issued a new policy statement entitled a "Declaration of
the Conviction of the Revolutionary Council on the Question of Union Nationalities." The new declaration identified the areas of activity in which all nationalities together would share responsibility in the development of national unity. There was also a clear message that no independent actions should be taken if they proved to be politically and socially divisive or if they affected the welfare of other ethnic groups. Clearly, this new policy restricted the actions that could have been taken by the various factions. It was a new stance taken by the military leaders since this time Ne Win wanted to achieve a sense of unity and cooperation, a goal, that if successful, would bring great benefit to his government and to the people. In 1966, the theme of the Union Day celebration was the continued existence of racial prejudice and the efforts by this government to overcome the barrier to national unity and cooperation. However, a year later Ne Win complained,"In
spite of the obvious need for united action, certain
dissident elements are holding fast to narrow racial
outlooks with misguided extremist policies, carrying on
their disruptive work, hindering progress of development
projects and imperiling national unity". (44) In 1968,
Colonel Hla Han, a member of the Revolutionary Council,
repeated the earlier policy made by Ne Win and went a step
further. He linked the failure of the various groups to
cooperate with the government as due to foreign influence.
His remark must be viewed against the fact that Burma-China
relations were at a low point resulting to China's open
appeal to the Burmese to overthrow the military control. (45)

Also during 1968, Ne Win started to emphasize collective
leadership for better cooperation and condemned the granting
of too much power in a single faction for this would lead to
totalitarian rule, something that was never mentioned in the
1962 confined control. Cooperative control also came in as
the theme for the right to participate. Ne Win gave a
special appeal to the nation in September: "we (meaning the
military leaders) cannot monopolize politics. Politicians,
army personnel, civil servants, the intelligentsia, peasants
and workers—all must participate in the practice of
politics". (46) Admitting the military men might have erred
"in certain fields", he said: "The anti-Military prejudices
are as undesirable as anti-politician bias. Our military is
now a responsible one. Soldiers should participate in
politics. Freedom to express one's opinion must be allowed.
In the past, politics was the monopoly of the politicians
only, and when this monopoly was misused, strong reactions
set in on all sides". (47) Presumably, only through
cooperation of all sides will ensure maximum benefit to the
country.

Also in 1968, as part of his cooperative policy, Ne Win
selected thirty-three former political and ethnic leaders,
many of whom had been his prisoners for several years, to work in a new committee, the Internal Unity Advisory Body. This group was asked to "submit on means of establishing internal unity that would effectively and directly benefit the working people of the Union of Burma politically, economically, socially, and ethnically". (48) Given the diversity of the committee members, it was not unexpected that it could not agree on a single report. (49) A majority of eighteen favored a return to the traditional constitution with amendments as necessary to make it accommodate the need of the people. A minority of eleven rejected the idea and proposed instead for the creation of a national unity congress, the traditional retention of a federal structure, the creation of an all-inclusive single political party, and the adoption of socialist democracy as its ideology.

On national cooperation issue the majority group called for a return to the old federal system with the possibility
of creating new states where they would be suitable. Three members of the majority group disagreed with this proposal and called instead for the establishment of a unitary state with cabinet representation for all ethnic groups. The minority suggested that a new federal system be created with autonomous territories for the smaller ethnic group. With no accord among the former leaders, Ne Win felt free to continue along his own path, a path that led to the writing of a new constitution, but would not be implemented until 1974. (50) With this new path to unity, the military was able to have more cooperative control over the minority groups in areas where insurgents held little or no power over the people. Moreover, with no factional leaders who opposed the military in positions of authority, the hierarchy of council was able to extend its control and cooperation from the various groups more effectively than any previous government had been able to get. While the
military leaders, like their civilian predecessors, acted in ways that seemed to lend support to the ideal of unity, they pursued policies that would lead to the assimilation of people into common loyalty and common unity. Thus, they frequently emphasized the nationalization of the society as a whole and the Burmanization of its culture.(51)

Furthermore, as a gesture of his willingness to win support and cooperation, Ne Win allowed his long term adversary U Nu to embark upon a world tour in search of support for his campaign to remove the military control. U Nu was also allowed to offer advice in reports to the military government. The first one called for a return to parliamentary democracy. A second report suggested a democratic socialist government with a multi-party system and a third a socialist state based on the power of the workers. U Nu's reports were given prominence in the national media, apparently showing Ne Win's willingness to
cooperate with civilian leaders. To the press, U Nu criticized that problems afflicting Burma were getting it towards total disruption. But U Nu also showed signs of desiring to work with the military when he suggested that Ne Win should remain leader of Burma. In any event, Ne Win rejected his proposals.(52)

From 1969 on to 1974, the military's main political development had centered on the conversion of the BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party)--Burma's sole legal political party--into "people's party". As a means to prolonging his control Ne Win explained this move as "handing power back to the people." This took the form of a process of electing party members at all levels. By 1971 there were 73,000 party members. These members cooperated among themselves and with the party leaders in conferences at which party members exercised "inner-party democracy" and discussed draft party directives on the 20-year economic
development plan. Many outspoken comments were made that
party members had come to regard themselves as a "new elite"
class.(53) Certainly without realizing it, they were
selected to play the game of Ne Win's politics and to act as
a support group cooperating with the military government.

While Ne Win kept on declaring that: "(although) we are not
yet able to hand back power to the people's representatives,
we are now able to transfer it as from today to our party,
which represents at least a good part of the people of
Burma".(54) This "transfer of power to the party" was
publicized widely through the press and radio. Furthermore,
the central committee also appointed a 30-man all-civilian
consultative committee to advise the Revolutionary Council
on legislative, economic, and foreign affairs proposals
proposed by the military government.(55)

The outcome of the cooperative drive was to some extent
successful. The period 1970-1971 saw a general weakening of
insurgency in Burma, although isolated acts of violence continued in the rural area. The Stalinist "Red Flag"
Communists disappeared from the political scene and a large number of insurgents were killed or forced to surrender by the government troops with the help of the local people's militia. In terms of the cooperation between the military and the civilian, the policy had been quite a success except that it is still doubtful how the policy would work without the military force backing it.

The Elected Government of 1974

Unconfined Military Control

Twelve years after it had been in control of the country, Burma's 15-man Revolutionary Council, led by Ne Win, gave the country a new constitution and stepped out on March 1974. However, Ne Win promptly returned to office as
head of an elected government, marking the completion of the revolutionary government and its mission "to return power to the people". (56) Although the military government had stepped out of power, the move was just a symbolic one designed to create a legitimate political system. In this new government, it was nothing more than a new arrangement of the old Council members. Ne Win, then chairman of the Revolutionary Council, was now the president of the nation; General San Yu, Armed Forces Chief of Staff, became Council Secretary; U Sein Win, a retired Brigadier of the Army and former Revolutionary Council member, as Prime Minister. The Council now included 2 serving and 13 retired army officers. (57)

There are basically three reasons to classify the 1974 rule as unconfined control and not veto control or confined control. Firstly, most military leaders were still in power even though they claimed to have been elected by the
national congress. Secondly, only a year after the newly elected government took control, there were huge anti-Government demonstrations by students, monks, and workers in Rangoon, attacking Burma's rigid one-party rule, and the burdensome and corrupt economic system which that rule had imposed upon the country. Rioters walked through the streets, attacking every symbol of status and authority. This kind of violence was never allowed under the confined control where the strict restraint of the people is necessary in order to survive. Furthermore, many rioters were arrested but about half were released after interrogation. This pointed out the difference with the 1962 period where most political dissenters were jailed for years. Thirdly, the most different stance the government took this time was that it did not blame the riots on the demonstrators, as would certainly have been done in the confined control, but instead the government started a determined drive against
slack and corrupted officials in the public service and
state-run industrial and economic concerns. The first group
to get the axe consisted of 15 senior railway, road, and air
transport officials. Soon afterwards, 480 agriculture and
forestry officials, 20 management level employees of five
State-owned trade and industrial corporations; and 42
officers of the Rangoon Police Force were discharged or
pensioned off. (58) The drive could be seen as shifting the
target of dissension and complaint away from the new
government to various groups of people, hence neutralizing
the coherence of the dissenters. (59)

As a test to the unconfined control, the student
trouble flared up again in the capital in 1977. About 2,000
students demonstrated peacefully and called upon all
students to join them. The flare-up was a flop, unable to
receive support from the mass of students. This may have
been due to the government's strategy of neutralizing the
student body by spreading the target of attack into various parts, hence minimizing the ability of the dissenters to organize and create coherent forces.

From 1977 on, no stirring event ruffled the Burmese political scene as in 1975 and 1976. President Ne Win was firmly in control, directing national affairs with the power of the head of state and chairman of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the vanguard of the one-party state. The BSPP itself showed no sign of internal trouble, as it previously did. The insurgency started its fourth decade, but the various groups—communist, and ethnic—seemed less active than in previous years.

The military officers are still in control as before. According to the reports of the State Council (60), both serving and retired military officers were recruited in 1979 to fill 17 of the 31 top civilian posts. This continuing trend towards putting military men in civilian
establishments has prompted some observers to comment that a
"green revolution" in Burma is an ongoing process that does
not seem to have an end. (61)
CHAPTER THREE

INDONESIA: THE RESPECTED MILITARY

Until it became a Dutch colony, Indonesia was a collection of variegated islands and peoples.(1) A succession of warring kingdoms, including Srivijaya, Mataram, Majapahit, and the Malacca Sultanate, had controlled but were never able to unify the country.(2) In view of the diversity of the Indonesian people it is no surprise that the independence movement that developed against the Dutch political and economic policies was divided into several groups.(3) First, beginning in 1912 a group of Islamic merchants and lower-class but moderately Westernized Javanese and Sumatrans formed the "Sarekat Islam".(4) Out of it grew the modernist Muhammadijah movement and the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama.(5) Second,
in 1920 the Indonesian Communist Party was created.(6)

Finally, a group of Western-educated, middle-class students

from Bandung, led by Sukarno, founded the Indonesian

Nationalist Party in 1927.(7)

None of these nationalist groups, however, could match

the strict Dutch control that led eventually to the jailing

or exiling of most major nationalist leaders.(8) By 1942,

the Japanese occupation turned this situation around.(9)

The Nationalist leaders were freed and were encouraged by

the Japanese to revitalize their nationalist movement while

generating support for Japanese policies.(10) All three

groups were to help in the following ways: the Sarekat

Islam to establish a single Islamic mass organization; the

Masjumi, to link the central occupation government with the

rural masses; and Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta were aided in

setting up secular organizations to communicate Japanese

policies to the public.(11) It needs to be mentioned here
that by all means, the Japanese did not aim at unification of these three Indonesian mass organizations. (12) They wanted to keep each group separately dependent on Japanese support and too weak to singly challenge Japanese hegemony. (13) As a result, each group had its own leaders, views, and bases of social support. (14) This fragmentation was deeply rooted and carried over beyond the Japanese occupation into the postwar period where it was manifested in multiple political parties and factional disputes. (15)

Near the end of the war, only Sukarno, however, was able to mediate between the groups and receive the consensus necessary for national decisions. (16) With the end of the war, an independence preparation committee was created and a few days following Japan's surrender. Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia's independence. (17) It was the threat of immediate reoccupation by Dutch and British that temporarily unified the various factions. (18) Within weeks they had
drafted a constitution, formed an interim legislative committee of 135 men, and Sukarno was elected President of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. (19) Since the most crucial task of the new government was to secure national independence from the Dutch, the Indonesian military quickly emerged as one of the primary elements of the State to ensure freedom against the Dutch in a four-year Indonesian Revolutionary War. (20) The main fighting force of the Indonesian military was the soldiers of the Corps for the Defense of the Fatherland (PETA). (21) By 1948, the last Dutch offensive drive to reoccupy Indonesia by force had failed against the Indonesia military. (22) This failure, plus the United States and United Nations pressure on Holland, brought the Dutch to the Conference at The Hague. (23) The Conference resulted in Holland's acceptance of the independence of all the former colony save the territory of West New Guinea. (24)
By 1950, Indonesia had assumed its present constitutional form as a unitary republic. (25) Some 30,000 Indonesian officers and men from the disbanded Dutch Colonial Army were incorporated into the military of the new republic. (26) However, the fundamental differences between the two armies led to the emergence of serious political, administrative, and social problems. (27) Regular army men tended to regard the former Dutch Colonial Army as Dutch collaborators who had been trained in a Western-style army. (28) By contrast the original PETA had been trained by the Japanese during their occupation in an anti-Western style in which fighting spirit and political loyalty were emphasized as opposed to the emphasis on discipline and technical efficiency of the West. (29)

As a result, the military high command started to separate itself into two factions: the PETA and the "administrator" (Dutch Colonial Army) groups. (30) The PETA
was linked with the Indonesian Nationalist Party. (31) It opposed army reorganization and centralization. (32) On the other hand, the administrator group was led by Generals Nasution and Simatupang. (33) They supported the cabinet's rationalization program and its consequent reforms. (34) They were politically supported by the leaders of the Modernist Muslim Party (Masjumi). (35) In 1952, President Sukarno, perceiving that his control over the military depended on the strength of the PETA group of officers, put his influence behind a parliamentary motion which publicly censured the administrator group of officers. (36) The administrator group quickly organized demonstrations against the Parliament and all politicians who attempted to interfere with internal military affairs. (37) Sukarno, however, took a firm stance, refusing to dissolve Parliament and within the weeks that followed, many command officers sympathetic to the administrator group were replaced by
their PETA group subordinates. (38) Moreover, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Simatupang and Army Chief of Staff Nasution were replaced by senior PETA group officers. (39) By 1955, the military officers who had remained neutral between the PETA and the administrator started to isolate the PETA group for the favoritism that the cabinet had shown to PETA officers. (40) As a result, the military as a whole reacted by refusing to accept the appointment of a PETA group leader to the post of Chief-of-Staff. (41) This move caused Ali Sastroamijoyo, then Prime Minister, and his cabinet to resign. (42)

The new Cabinet tended to reflect the newly unified military's political preferences. Since the new Cabinet was formed by a modernist Muslim, the old Nationalist Party leaders found themselves excluded. (43) Thus, the year 1955 marked the beginning of the military role in cabinet politics.
Military Influence of 1955-1967

Veto Military Control

By 1959, the principle actors in Indonesian politics were narrowed down to two: President Sukarno and General Nasution.(44) Sukarno had his power base in the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) and PNI while the military supported Nasution.(45) It was clear that even though the military was not officially in control of the country, General Nasution possessed sufficient power to block the civilian politics or to generate significant military influence in the political arena, and it was also clear that the civilian government and the military did not move in the cooperative direction. For example, in searching for support to counterbalance the army, Sukarno attempted to place the Air Force directly under presidential command.
However, General Nasution, then Minister of Defense and Army Chief-of-Staff, was able to block the transfer. (46) Sukarno retaliated by initiating an investigation of corruption among members of Nasution's staff. (47) Nasution promptly arrested the investigating official and the investigation collapsed. (48) Another example concerns the instance in which the army carried out the appropriation of Chinese enterprises in 1959 and 1960. Sukarno used his diplomatic skills to smooth relations with Peking, and he also encouraged the PKI to criticize the army for excessive anti-Chinese action. (49) Still another example shows that when Sukarno in 1961 attempted to bring two PKI leaders into the Cabinet, Nasution insisted on making some appointments of his own, with the result that the Cabinet became even more militarily influenced than before. (50) The tug-of-war between these two leaders went on until in 1965, when two army officers, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, two
Java Army Battalions, and groups of PKI, carried out a coup against the Army's High Command. (51) Six leading Generals, including the Army Chief-of-Staff and the Chief-of-Army intelligence, were executed in the coup. (52) Nasution was able to escape by going over a wall into his neighbor's yard. (53) The coup leaders, backed by the president's palace guards and two battalions, proclaimed a Provisional Revolutionary Government and asserted that the coup was an internal military affair aimed to forestall an American CIA-directed coup which was to be carried out by a "Council of Generals" against President Sukarno. (54)

In a counter-coup move, the military leaders, led by General Suharto, then Commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve in Djakarta, took command and declared martial law. (55) He was able to put down the disloyal army units and executed the coup leaders including the Communist Party Chairman Aidit. (56) The next move, the military banned all
communist activities and set about systematically to arrest, try, or execute PKI leaders, members, and their families. (57) An estimate of the purge was over 150,000 executed and 200,000 jailed. (58) In March 1966, following massive demonstrations and military pressure, Sukarno resigned and Suharto took over. (59) Sukarno was then confined to Bogor Palace and his cabinet members were arrested. (60)

The Military Control of 1967-1973

Unconfined Military Control

Suharto's presidency could be best characterized as a military leadership that maintained a middle-of-the-road course which differed from his civilian predecessor, Sukarno. (61) In fact, Suharto could be accused by modernists of being too reluctant to carry out drastic
changes. At the same time, the conservative groups, which concealed Old Order forces, could suspect Suharto of preparing a military dictatorship. Actually, Suharto's rule brought very few changes in the structure of the Indonesian government. (62) There was no drastic move to change the national political structure that could be classified as corrective, nor was there any sign that the military was willing to cooperate with major civilian groups. The constitution of 1945 remained in force: Parliament, the Provisional People's Consultative Congress, and state Advisory Councils retained their basic forms and functions, although they were strictly controlled for communist activity and for Sukarno's support. (63)

However, the most visible changes were reflected in foreign relations and not in internal structure. Even though the country was under military control, anti-Foreign and anti-Colonial sentiment declined. Foreign entreprises
were invited to invest in natural resource exploitation, agriculture development, and light manufacturing facilities. (64) Tourism was encouraged and Indonesia rejoined the United Nations. (65) The irony was that prior to his control of the government, Suharto was very strict in confining the opposition. But, when he took control of the government, he stood between a liberal, Western-style democracy and a military dictatorship. (66) Musjawarah (decision by discussion) and "soft power" became the stances of his control. (67) He continued to try to defuse political emotions—mainly caused by extreme nationalists and Moslem forces. (68) From this standpoint, Suharto was playing the role of compromising and neutralizing the various groups. Intellectual groups complained about the apathy of the masses; party leaders continued to be suspicious of the predominance of military authorities. (69) At the same time, military leaders were afraid of a reduction of their power
in non-military affairs. (70) The President had to listen to objections from all sides, yet his most serious concern was from a group of frustrated old colleagues. (71) On the other hand, he was able to maneuver friend and foe in agreeing with him that there was no other reasonable alternative for the foreseeable future. (72) Hence, Suharto seemed to be ruling the country with the consent of most Indonesians. (73)

Under Suharto, the Indonesia Armed Forces, although still divided into factions and cliques, agreed to maintain their Suharto-style role as a stabilizing and unifying factor. (74) In terms of actually controlling the country, two-thirds of the governors of all the provinces were military officers, the administration from capital to village level was almost entirely under military control personnel. (75) As well, out of 23 Cabinet Ministers, only six were from the Armed Forces. (76) "Arch-civilians" such as Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and technocrats such as Dr.
Sumitro, worked closely with Suharto who apparently was determined to "de-militarize" the government. (77)

Furthermore, the "Police Force of the Republic of Indonesia" became the "Police of the Republic of Indonesia", indicating the intention to bring the Police closer to their non-military task. (78) Nevertheless, the police still remained under the control of the Ministry of Defence and Security. (79)

As one characteristic of the unconfined control, Suharto made several changes in the military hierarchy itself. The policy could be viewed as a means to prevent the formation of a military pressure group, if not a junta, with the power to counterbalance Suharto's control—recalling that under an unconfined control, the optimum goal of military ruling group is to neutralize opposition groups and maintain any possible sources of pressure at minimum. The reorganization and integration of
military resumed with Suharto having retitled the heads of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force from "Commander-in-Chief" to
"Chief of Staff", but having allowed regional commanders to
keep their titles of "Commander". (80) He appointed a Deputy
Minister and three Chiefs of Staff to assist the Minister of
Defence and Security. (81) He also announced that Indonesia
would be divided into six Territorial Defence Commands, an
approach that would decentralize the military corps. (82)

Military Control since 1973

Cooperative Military Control

In March 1973, Suharto was re-elected President for
another term of five years, while Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX
was elected Vice-President. (83) They were, however, the
only candidates. (84) Soon Suharto announced the formation
of a new Cabinet, in which the number of military
representatives was further reduced to four--the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Industry, Defence/Security, and the State Minister for non-Ministerial Bodies/State Secretary--thus, showing the tendency to use more civilians in his cooperative control.\(^{(85)}\) Suharto resigned from his post as Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.\(^{(86)}\) The civilian technocrats increased in number and influence in the hierarchy, while representatives of the political parties lost ground, showing that Suharto's cooperative control maintains a sort of balance in the political arena by limiting the role of each group. The military, though gradually being reduced in size and visibility, still represented the strongest group in decision-making.\(^{(87)}\) Nevertheless, its role under the cooperative control was limited constitutionally by other forces such as the mass media, and other State institutions.\(^{(88)}\) According to the Constitution, Indonesia
had six high State institutions: 1) the People's
Consultative Assembly; 2) the President; 3) the House of
People's Representative; 4) the Supreme Court; 5) the
Supreme Advisory Council; and 6) the State Comptrolling
Body. By 1975, the broad military policy of the unconfined
drive to de-politicize and de-pressurize the Indonesian
civilian establishment seemed to be working.(89) Whether
this meant that the cooperative control was effective or
not, for those observing the political scene it was quiet;
particularly since hardly a word was heard from the people
who were being de-politicized.(90) The Generals were in
full command, but tensions were seldom felt. This implies
that if this was to be an confined control, the tensions
between the civilian and the military would have emerged or
at least been heard of. Clearly, Suharto's cooperative
control showed that at least the vast majority of
Indonesians seemed to be satisfied with his rule. However
this does not mean that the people were strictly suppressed so that there were no major opposition forces. Instead, it is interesting to note that the silent opposition which Suharto received when tackling problems during the years represented a level of acceptance of the military rule by the civilian. (91) Actually, the support that Suharto received from the civilians is greater than any other mentioned military leaders had ever received, e.g. Ne Win's confined control in 1962 and Sarit's confined control in 1957, using the strictest means of confined control. Hence, the nature of Suharto's government, which is a combination of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism, is without question supported by a wide majority of the people. After a decade of his rule, Suharto was now holding a firm and stable control while enjoying the broad support of the military and civilians, despite a growing number of critics that came out by 1977 against corruption in his
government. The government was often criticized for seeking out only the small-time corruptors and not a number of big corrupters. Although students and civilian protest began to be heard, there was no prospect of successful demand for removing the military from the control of the government. The institutionalization of military control had proceeded over more than two decades now, while alternative political organizations had been severely weakened. Furthermore, the prospect of the emergence of revolutionary opposition to the military government seemed slight, not only because of the government's ability to work with all factions but also because of the weakness of revolutionary tradition.

In 1978, Suharto was elected for the third time despite prior student criticisms of his presidency. There were some modifications in his Cabinet. One was a considerable change in the military representation—
five out of twenty-two seats in the old Cabinet to eleven out of thirty seats in the new, expanded Cabinet. The second modification is that the new technocrats tended to have a somewhat higher level of technical competence than their predecessors. Also for the first time, the Cabinet did not include any representatives of the non-government political parties. All these could lead to the belief that the military cooperative drive had already reached its peak and the reverse trend was appearing after the 1978 election. None of this, however, is likely to amount to very much so that the so-called pendulum might swing back towards a strict confined control or a corrective control which would result in the correction of the present political trend.

In 1983, Suharto was re-elected for the fourth time and Adam Malik, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, became his Vice-President. Fighting corruption has been one
of the early promises of the new enlarged Cabinet in order to maintain a good relationship with the civilian. (103) It can be easily speculated that the cooperative control will remain as the characteristic of Suharto's new government for the coming five years. One explanation for the success of the cooperative control over the past decade is that the Indonesian military, unlike its counterparts in some other countries, did actually help Suharto in maintaining this type of control. One reason is that, on the one hand, the old Indonesian military leaders are worried about their juniors becoming too tough with the general populace; on the other hand, the opposite concern, that the young generation may become too liberal, is also heard. (104) At any rate, behind this characteristic of the military perspective is the basic assumption that the military must continue to play a central role in unifying and working with civilians. (105) Thus, the 1945 military generation has consistently
maintained that younger officers must broaden their views
toward the civilian and gain a deeper understanding of
political and social affairs in order to avoid the advent of
militarism, authoritarianism, and widespread discontentment
of the general populace.(106) This unique characteristic of
the Indonesian military has resulted in the lengthy
cooperative control that not only reflects Suharto's will,
but also the military traditions.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PHILIPPINES: MILITARY CONTROL UNDER CIVILIAN RULE

The Philippines falls under the case where civilian leaders use military control to support their rule. The Philippine military differs from other Southeast Asian nations precisely because of its unique relationship with the civilians. The Philippine military has never been an effective organ of national independence. (1) Hence, the military has never considered itself as the national symbol of independence like the Burmese and the Indonesian militaries do. From the time of Spanish domination to that of Japanese, the Philippine military was not the major element in establishing any significant opposition force against the colonializers. (2) Even during World War II, the Philippine military under the Japanese occupation failed to
maintain effective control of the country against underground guerrilla activities.(3) Still, an attempt had been made by the Japanese to back the local military in maintaining control through formation of the Philippine Constabulary, charged with maintaining peace and order and in particular with coping with the guerrilla problem.(4) The Japanese pressed the Philippine Secretary-General, Jose Laurel, to increase the size of the military constabulary force and to establish regional training schools to improve the quality of members.(5) Former officers of the Philippine Army were given automatic commissions to expedite the program.(6) Despite numerous awards and incentives issued by the Secretary-General, the military force was never effective from the Japanese viewpoint.(7) During the Post War period, the presence of the United States Air and Naval stations on Philippine soil made it further unnecessary for the new Republic to maintain a large
military force of its own. (8)

The Military Control in Post War Period

Insurgency Control of the Military

It should be noted that during the late 1940s, the Philippine military and constabulary were basically clustered in urban areas. (9) The civil-military relationship was riddled with favoritism and graft among the military officers. (10) Clearly, the military could not make headway against the main problem of national security which was the widespread insurgency in the southern part of the country. (11) Methods of suppression only added to civilian bitterness against the military. During the period from 1947 to 1950, the Philippine government's main problem was its relationship with the people. The use of military force as a means of controlling the general populace did not seem
to work. Instead, the rural masses in the Philippines became alienated from the government. (12) The military units could not contain the growth of the revolutionary movement, especially of the Huk—an Anti-Japanese Resistance Army that now turned against the Philippine government—due to the lack of mass support (5).

The Military Influence of 1950–1965

In 1950, President Elpidio Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay to the Secretary of National Defence. (14) Magsaysay fought with the American-led guerrillas during the Japanese occupation. (15) After the war, the American authority appointed him as military governor of west-central Luzon, and he was returned to the House of Representatives from that district in 1949. (16) When Magsaysay took office as Defence Secretary, his main tasks were to maintain the
military control over the country and gradually to revive
the decline of national morale in the face of the growing
insurgency. (17) To this end, the plan by Magsaysay was
divided into three major steps. (18) First, it had to
contain the military threat of the Huk. (19) This could be
done by reforming the armed forces and developing units
which would be capable of defeating guerrillas in the
field. (20) The most crucial key to the success of restoring
the military control was in the cooperative relationship
between the military forces and the civilian populace. This
relationship had to be improved if crucial intelligence
support about insurgent movements was to be obtained from
the people. (21) Second, in order to restore the image of
both civilian and military authorities toward the public,
government authorities at all levels had to be freed from
persistent abuses of power, so that the government's
effectiveness in the public interest could be clearly
demonstrated. (22) Politically, it was considered of first
importance in the civil-military relationship that the
widespread charges of electoral fraud and of military
interference with elections be repudiated, and general
confidence in the military institution be sustained
throughout the Philippines. Third, it was necessary not
only to contain the insurgency but also to weaken it; to
carry an assault with the help of the civilian populace in
cooperation with the military against the rural base of the
Huk movement. (23)

The policy when Magsaysay became Secretary of National
Defence was to carry through a reorganization of the
Philippine armed forces. (24) Efforts were made to establish
a better relationship between military officers and the
civilians. The army was purged of unreliable and
incompetent officers, including an Army Chief-of-Staff. (25)
Furthermore, in order to avoid nepotism in the military—-a
situation that tarnished the military image among the
civilians—the system of promotion within the armed services
was now based upon accomplishments.(26) Moreover, the
reorganized military replaced the constabulary as the
principal counter force.(27) In 1951, in an extended effort
to improve the relation between military personnel and
civilian populace, the military carried out programs of
economic reform and civic welfare.(28) Economic reforms at
the village level were given high priority to witness the
government's concern for cooperation with all levels of the
community.(29) Also, a special organization, the Civil
Affairs Office of the Secretary of National Defence, was
established to coordinate these efforts.(30) Civil Affairs
officers were assigned to each echelon of military command
down to the lowest level.(31) Their duty was to maintain
liaison with military leaders in the rural areas, and
consult with them to make on-the-spot plans for necessary
improvements in civil-military cooperation. (32)

Furthermore, there was also a special unit of the army engineers who constructed thousands of schools, dug wells, built roads and repaired them. (33) Military personnel also escorted civilian officers into rural areas to instruct the peasants of modern agricultural methods. (34) An attempt was also made to stop the unpopular military practice of foraging the civilian populace by reorganizing the supply of field rations to the military troops. (35) Another effort reflecting the new system of education was designed to remove the mutual antagonism between the military and the general populace: military personnel were taught that their mission was to protect and cooperate with the civilian, that they were ambassadors of the government as well as Huk killers, and the rural populace were persuaded that the military was "friend". (36) The Defence Secretary, Magsaysay called this policy his "Attraction Programme". (37) As it
turned out, Magsaysay invited the populace to report
directly to him, or to his personal staff, any grievances
against military personnel or officials. (38) He arranged
that telegrams for this purpose could be sent inexpensively
and made good his promise that each complaint would be acted
upon within a twenty-four hour period during which an
investigation would start. (39)

As a move to prevent the discontentment of voters and
fraud at the polls, the government, in 1951, used teachers
as poll clerks, officer cadets to guard the polling booths
and military personnel to protect ballot boxes and polls
from possible interference. (40) These precautions might not
in themselves have been sufficient to restore confidence in
the integrity of the elections as the military was widely
thought to have been a major source of the electoral
corruptions of 1949. (41) To remedy the situation, further
evidence was therefore needed to show that the military did
not influence the result of the elections in 1951. (42) This evidence was given by Philippine veterans of the struggle against the Japanese. (43) The veterans organized a movement known as the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which inspired confidence and received support throughout the Philippines. (44) The NAMFREL was to act as an independent third force to ensure the honesty of the elections. (45) As a result, the 1951 elections were free of military interference, and were largely seen to be free in the results of the elections: most of those elected were opponents of the existing administration. (46) Hence, the civilian populace was convinced that the government was indeed its government, and the antagonism between military and civilian decreased.

Many of these activities of the Attraction Programme were measures to restore faith in and to win the cooperation of the masses for their government and the military corps.
But one programme was particularly successful in carrying out the counterinsurgency.\(\text{(47)}\) This involved the work of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), which was initiated in 1950 and became perhaps the greatest civic effort of the military on the behalf of the government.\(\text{(48)}\) The EDCOR had originally been approved by the Philippine Congress as a means to supply food for the armed forces, by providing farms for discharged and other soldiers.\(\text{(49)}\) Magsaysay transformed it into a programme for the rehabilitation of Huk prisoners and their dependents, and for inducing other rebels to desert the movement.\(\text{(50)}\) He viewed land hunger as one of the basic causes of anti-Military and pro-Insurgency activities in the Philippines.\(\text{(51)}\) By the terms of the programme, each insurgent who surrendered received about fifteen acres of land, and was transported with his family to the site.\(\text{(52)}\) At the same time, military units built roads and houses before the settlers arrived, and also
helped members of the new communities to build village centres, schools, chapels, markets and other facilities. (53) Besides, military units also provided legal assistance in connection with land titles. (54) The psychological results of these programs were profoundly important in the way in which they asserted the good intentions of the government and the military. (55) It created a new respect for the military and enhanced the future of civil-military cooperation.

In view of these facts, the economic and political reforms improved the life of the civilian populace and cut off the insurgent zealots from their base of support, thereby driving them to employ terrorism against the population which only helped to cement the civil-military relationship. (56) The policy of resettlement and the re-education of surrendered insurgents went even further toward solving what had seemed to be an almost endemic
military problem. (57)

Magsaysay and his vice-presidential running mate, Carlos Garcia, were inaugurated in 1953 as President and vice-President respectively. (58) Magsaysay continued to strengthen the civil-military cooperation programme until his death in a plane crash in 1957. Eight months later, vice-President Garcia was elected as President and Diosdado Macapagal as vice-President. (59) President Garcia continued the programs launched by his predecessor and gave new attention to industrialization, while vice-President Macapagal and his associates quietly toured most Islands, expounding their views on the rights of the people and the need for new leadership. (60) In 1961, Macapagal was chosen the fifth president of the Republic. (61) Not only had the country managed its second peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another, but the general populace had shown that they could be independent-minded in their choice
of leaders when they were free of military manipulation.

The Military Influence of 1965-1972

Ferdinand Marcos, who won renown as a guerrilla fighter during the Japanese occupation and a member of the Nacionalista Party, was elected President in November 1965, defeating the incumbent Macapagal. (62) At first, the Philippine politics appeared rather stable as Marcos' presidency followed the patterns of his predecessors. (63) However, in 1970, the year began disastrously for President Marcos. In the very first month of his second term in office, Manila was faced by the most violent student demonstrations in the country's history. (64) The demands of the students were a non-partisan constitutional convention in 1971, clean elections, and less party politics in government. (65) A more violent demonstration took place a
few days later at the Presidential Residence.(66) As students attempted to seize the palace, military guards opened fire and five students were killed.(67) This marked the first time in the Philippines history that students had died in a political demonstration.(68) At one time there were fears that the administration would declare martial law.(69) Marcos quickly blamed the riots on Maoist insurgents.(70) With respect to this study, the démonstration had drawn the political role of the military into the open. For a long time, the Philippine armed forces had been playing a low-key role in relationship to political matters. A few weeks after these violent demonstrations, the Chief of the Armed Forces announced that a Maoist insurgent group had drawn up a blueprint for a civil war of national liberation in the country.(71) In June, spokesmen of the army claimed they had discovered evidence that the most militant student organization, the Kabatang Makabayan,
was linked with a communist plot to overthrow the government. (72) In conjunction with the military's moves, Marcos announced major cabinet changes in an attempt to win popular support. (73) The Cabinet size was reduced from thirty to twelve members and some new politicians and technocrats were included. (74) However, in course of time, Marcos's moves began to be interpreted as an attempt to put his own men in key positions. (75) There also were reports that four key posts were filled under pressure from the military. (76)

Meanwhile, the military was concentrating on cleaning up the Huk insurgency. (77) In September, Faustino Del Mundo, a Huk Commander, surrendered to military forces without a fight. (78) Del Mundo was taken to Marcos and later gave a public statement that the government was doing a good job in all aspects and that all Huks should surrender to the military and cooperate with the government. (79) In
conjunction with the military move to subdue the insurgency and create a stable atmosphere in the rural area, Marcos offered a "selective amnesty" to the Huk in Central Luzon. Military official sources announced later on that armed Huk strength had been reduced to less than 500 men. (80)

Although, the military leaders were not in control of the presidential post, they nevertheless, possessed a significant influence and substantial power in dealing with the civilian and helping the government maintain its control. Actually, the military relationship with the civilian had been fairly stable in those years. (81) No revolution had been fought, and there had been no widespread intramilitary purges. (82) As a result, the relationship created a unique characteristic: the Philippine military officers, unlike many other military corps in the less developed countries, are careful to point out that a good working relationship with the civilian populace should not
be taken to mean that military leaders are becoming the modern-day politicians, which is almost the opposite of the military perception under Ne Win or Suharto. Furthermore, the Philippine military officers are focusing on the ability to get along with others and it is as "makisama and makimasa," to love the people and to be good companions to the civilian populace. (83) Unlike military officers in Burma and Indonesia, members of the Philippine military elite admire "professionalism" in their peers. (84) To many military officers, this means simply carrying out the instructions of a civilian President and Minister of Defence. To others, it means discipline, attitude, effectiveness, loyalty, and integrity. (85) The underlying theme in all definitions of professionalism appears to be "self-discipline," a watchword that Marcos always emphasizes in his development of the "new" society. (86)
The Military Influence from 1972 onward

Veto Military Control

In 1971, tensions rose dangerously as the campaign for senatorial elections gathered momentum. (87) Two bombs exploded at a Liberal Party political rally in Miranda Plaza. (88) Ten people died and virtually every top leader of the opposition party was seriously wounded. (89) Marcos blamed the communists for the mass assassination attempt. (90) But the government's inability, even by the year's end, to arrest any suspects appeared to confirm widespread suspicion that Nacionalista enthusiasts had had a hand in the tragedy. (91) In consequence, charging that an armed rebellion was under way in the country, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus. (92) Scores of people were quickly arrested and detained without charge or bail by the military under the administration's order. (93) As a
response to Marcos's move, only two Nacionalista candidates
won the senatorial race and by and large the Nacionalista
Party maintained its hold only on the provinces where
military authority was strong, but with reduced
majorities.(94) As the political situation deterioTed in
the face of a strict control by Marcos and the military, by
1972 it became clear that martial law was on the way.(95)
In a public disclosure by Senator Benigno Aquino, President
Marcos had prepared Operation Plan Sagittarius which would
put key parts of the Philippines under strict military
control.(96) Marcos accused Aquino of conspiring with the
communists and started to meet in a prolonged conference
with a military group, led by Defence Secretary Enrile.(97)
In the evening of September 21th, unknown to his own
Cabinet, Marcos signed the martial law proclamation which
was for the first time in the Philippines's independent
history.(98) Martial law was implemented by the military
with remarkable efficiency. (99) Within seconds of the signing, military units seized and sealed all mass media, and most of the prominent citizens on the blacklist had been arrested. (100) Aquino was "invited" to go to the military prison while attending a congressional committee. (101) Critics say that the military had a list of about 300 names that were going to be arrested. (102) The general populace knew of development that the military was in control of the city only on the next day, when Marcos went on the air to personally proclaim the imposition of martial law. (103)

In his speech, there was a clear line which differed from typical military control that has been noted in this thesis. Marcos proclaimed that "This is martial law as conceived by a constitution—as a principle of self-defence. It is not the offensive type of martial law. From the very beginning it was understood that the military would do the bidding of the civil authority. That is why we allowed the
arrested persons to be brought before the Supreme Court.

Under martial law I (Marcos) could sweep aside such ceremonial. But it is important that everybody in whom I now repose confidence (not just the military) knows that what I am doing is within the Constitution. Some may call it a mere facade of legality. Just the same, we must maintain it. From any point of view this is just as necessary as reform. Anything illegal would be anathema...contrary to everything we are fighting for."(104)

Later on a question was asked to Marcos: "could a situation arise in which a military set-up will have to be superimposed on the civilian bureaucracy?", Marcos replied:

"Never. We must never allow this to happen."(105) In fact, Marcos did not allow military supremacy to happen, but he did not also dare to touch the military as he did in the civilian case. Two weeks after the implementation of martial law, Marcos issued orders that almost half a million
civil officials were to resign so that he could reconstitute the bureaucracy on a more efficient basis. (106). Steps were taken to revitalize the judiciary and modernize education. (107) As the veto military control started to spread out, a special order was given by Marcos to allow military tribunals to try civilians in certain important cases. (108) The order could only be interpreted as to enhance the established military rule that Marcos had previously declared as the need to instill national discipline. (109) Although the government claimed to have the dissident problem under control of dissident problem, it still emphasized on the need for increasing the military's role in dealing with subversives. (110) Recall that under a veto control, the military will allow for struggle or cooperation of various groups as long as what it views as critical to the stability and security of the country is not at stake. Thus, the military became a means of maintaining
national unity and guarding against the insurgents' plot to bring the struggle from the countryside to the towns. (111)

With the imposition of martial law, the insurgents were active in a secessionist movement. (112) Marcos admitted that the insurgent problem would not be solved through military control alone. (113) He planned to combine military action with his policy of attraction—recalling that the policy of attraction was originated from the late President Magsaysay. (114) In terms of the civil-military relationship, the outcome of the mixture between military control and policy of attraction has been an extension of "makimasa and makisama" concept. Obviously, this concept has now become increasingly important with the introduction of martial law. (115) Traditional patron-client relationships are now seen daily in the offices of senior military officers. (116) Congressmen have been replaced by military officers in dispensing favors. (117) Civilians now
regularly call upon senior military officers to plead for assistance in getting jobs, solving problems, processing applications, securing community development projects, or replacing inept local government officials. (118) Military officers are sought out to help solve various problems since they are now challenging the country. It is necessary to note that civilians did not tremendously suffered under the military control, due to the traditional role of the military.

In January 1981, martial law finally came to an end, after eight years of strict control, but Marcos’s one-man rule continues. (119) The decision to end martial rule was a political move that Marcos took despite strong opposition by high-ranking military leaders. (120) The decision was made not so much to appease his belligerent political opponents as to take political advantage of two important events—the visit to the Philippines in February of Pope John Paul II
and the election of United States President Ronald
Reagan. (121) Actually, all Marcos did was to put an end to
the legal status of martial law and to dismantle the
military tribunals. (122) His powers to legislate and the
military power to arrest and to detain of anyone remain
unchanged. (123) Despite the move to ease tensions, Marcos's
popularity has deteriorated in the face of prolonged
political and economic problems, such as corruption of the
government, military abuses of power in the name of national
security, and economic inequalities. (124) By the early
1980s, the military has been mainly viewed as nothing more
than a means of the administration to prolong Marcos's
control. For example, an organization called the National
Coalition for the Protection of Workers' Rights planned a
one-day nationwide protest which did not materialize because
of the military restraint on the movement and arrest of
several union leaders. (125) It was not only in the labor
sector that military control was used. Even in the church
sector, the government managed to use military crackdown and
infiltration in the Catholic Bishop Conference of the
Philippines—the highest ruling body of the institutional
church.(126) A major public discontentment against Marcos
and the military came in 1983 when opposition leader,
Benigno Aquino, returning from political exile in the United
States, was shot dead as he left his aircraft.(127) The
military linked the assassin to the communist New People's
Army (NPA).(128) However, the general populace disbelieved
the story.(129) The assassin had military friends, one of
whom identified his body.(130) The widespread belief was
that the military "hit" Aquino, probably on behalf of some
powerful official.(131) Whether true or not, this belief
only helped severely weaken the credibility of Marcos and
the military.(132)

A question may be asked how Marcos was able to maintain
the military veto control for over a decade now? Actually, he has always been able to come up with a list of military personnel that were involved with the abuses of power. (133)

For instance, in 1976, Marcos was quoted as saying 2,700 military personnel were discharged for abuses against civilians. (134) In 1978, Marcos wrote that 2,083 members of the armed forces had been dismissed and penalized for various abuses, including torture, and 322 had been disciplined. (135) To some extent, this purge of the military helps ease tensions in the civil-military relationship and enhances the longevity of the control without the actual drive for an uprising by the civilians.

As well, Marcos's ability to maintain his military control should be attributed to beliefs of the senior military officers concerning the role that military has to play with civilian leaders: the military role is only supporting, assisting, collaborating, and complementing the roles
performed by the civilian leaders. (136) All serve at the
direction of the President. (137) They repeatedly stress
that the military is subordinate to the President, the man
who plays the role as that of Commander-in-Chief.
CHAPTER FIVE

THAILAND: THE ROYAL MILITARY

The fact that the Thai military have played a dominant role in the politics of the country is well known to the world. Military officers have led the ruling group, controlled the institutions of government, and set the style of Thai politics.(1) A characteristic of the Thai politics has shown that regardless of which leader is in control, military or civilian, the government continues to function in much the same way.(2) The fact that the ruling class is small and largely overlaps the bureaucracy explains the root of this situation.(3) Ruling-class political concerns have been narrow, where not actually personal, and problems have revolved largely around the basic question of political status—how shall the rewards of goods, prestige, and power
be distributed within the ruling class? (4)

This condition can be attributed to the fact that other institutions which might help balance the power of the ruling class, e.g., the National Assembly and the private press, are actually weak if not already under the control of the ruling class. Hence, the social structure has obstructed the development of effective political parties or social organization. Moreover, the leaders of the ruling class were soldiers in some sense of the word; all were necessarily prepared and able to organize and lead armies. (5) However, the military has not formed a class of its own. Actually, the ruling group is bureaucratic and official, and all its members—civil and military—are equally subordinate to the throne. (6)

The First Military Intervention in 1932

Corrective Military Control
Military intervention in the Thai politics started in 1932, when a coup ended the Thai monarchy's absolute power.(7) This first intervention was the combined effort of both the military officers and civil servants.(8) However, the intervention was neither a military rebellion nor a popular revolution, but actually reveals that the aim was mainly to change the political system from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. There was no major bloodshed by the military intervention nor an explosion from below, just a rearrangement of the political system. The corrective move was led by a small group of civil servants and military officers, most of whom were educated in France and Germany.(9) They simply took control from the High Princes, while the general public were only spectators. The leaders of the 1932 coup consisted of three elite groups.(10) The first group included senior military
officers led by Colonel Phahon Phonphayuhasena, who later became General and Prime Minister of the military government. (11) Phahon, a competent officer who received military training in Germany, had risen to the highest level attainable by a commoner in the Royal Thai Army. (12) Those above him were members of the royal family, whom, Phahon felt, were much less able than he as far as military science was concerned and who tended to slight his advice. (13) For Phahon and his military colleagues, the dynasty had offended both their professional pride and their personal ambitions. (14) The second group consisted of civilian officials led by Pridi Phanomyong, who had received the degree of Doctor of Law from Sorbonne University in Paris. Members of this group, like those in the first group, felt professional frustrations under the royal family monopoly control of politics, but they their goal of establishing a system of state socialism differed from that of Phahon's
The coup had been in the planning for years among the Thai students in Paris, but these students saw no serious conflicts in cooperating with the military to overthrow the monarchy. The third group was made out of younger military officials who shared the ideological conviction of their civilian allies, but also shared with their senior military colleagues a deep concern for the growth of the military as an institution. The most prominent among them was Phibun Songkhram, who received his advanced education in Paris, and was among the Paris group who were the ideological progenitors of the 1932 coup.

These three groups, known as the "coup group", formed the base that overcame royalist opposition during the post-coup months of 1932-1933. Overall, the coup group was made of thirty-seven military men and twenty-four civil servants. The coup group was able to create the first government under the hastily drafted provisional constitutional of 1932.
The event of 1932 could be marked as the beginning from which the military crossed into the political sector and has never quite retreated from that arena. At first, circumstances had led to the belief that the civilians might emerge as the leading force in the government although the four senior leaders of the coup had been colonels. (18) However, a serious division developed between the younger civilians, who had promoted the coup, and the older, more conservative bureaucrats who had been invited into the government after the coup to lend respectability and solidity to the new government. (19) The dispute, which involved an economic plan, developed into a countercoup, in which Phraya Mano, the conservative leaders, closed the National Assembly. (20) This was a blow for the coup group as a whole and particularly to the military leaders. (21) The military coup was aimed mainly at correcting the absolute monarchy to the constitutional form of government.
Hence, when Mano dissolved the National Assembly, it became clear that the conservative civilians had acted against the military will.

The Second Military Control: 1933-1938

Unconfined Military Control

Within the sixteen-month period of the constitutional government, the coup group broke up into three factions: the conservative civil servant group, accused of leaning toward the royalists; the younger civilian group led by Pridi; and the military group, led by both Phahon and Phibun. The civilian groups were soon replaced in 1933 by a military coup, led by the military group of both Phahon and Phibun. A military government was established with Phahon as the Prime Minister. This time, military control could be classified under the typology of unconfined control. The
government tried to neutralize not only the various civilian groups, but also the prominent military figures that could eventually form a strong opposition faction. The military leader that Phahon wanted to neutralize was no one else but Phibun. The reason was that Phibun, because of his role in the seizure of power from Mano and in the suppression of the civilian in October 1933, had emerged as the most prominent of the young army officers. (22) Actually, Phahon's government depended on a balance between the military and civilian groups, since there was not a solidified support from the officer corps to his government. Worse yet, control over the military itself started to shift from the hands of Phahon and his supporters to those of the Phibun group. By 1938, Phibun glorified the image of the military, showing them as the chief symbol of national honor and the indispensable protectors of the nation. (23)

In terms of settling the military into the domain of
Thai politics, the Phahon's unconfined control was much more successful than in the military sector. The military did move to strengthen its position in the bureaucracy. Military officers were posted at first to the Custom Department, then to other departments. Their intervention was explained to the public on the basis of helping the economy. They were "on loan" to provide extra administrator at no additional cost to the departments involved. (24) By 1935, seven out of eight top appointments to civil service positions were given to military officers. (25) In national politics military control became increasingly tight. In addition to the prime ministership, eleven out of twenty-one seats in the State Council of 1938 were now occupied by military leaders. In the National Assembly, fifty-three appointed members out of seventy-eight were military officers, and an additional eight of the seventy-seven elected members had military career backgrounds before
The Military Government of 1938-1944

Confined Military Control

In 1938, General Phibun succeeded Phahon as Premier. From that time on to 1944, Phibun and his military colleagues were firmly in control of the country. Phibun adopted a nationalist policy directed against the Chinese minority in the country. By 1941, Phibun led Thailand into the Japanese camp and subsequently increasing wartime conditions created greater need for military control in the government. At first civilians tried to continue their cooperation under strict control by the military, although with less and less enthusiasm. But, as control continued to expand, one by one the important civilians withdrew or were ousted from the government. Hence the
military succeeded to established their role of firm
political dominance and strict control. In 1944, however,
military control came to an abrupt end.(30) The Phibun
government was overthrown by the civilian. Clearly,
Phibun's major problems were at coping with Japanese
ambitions for empire in Southeast Asia. His government
accepted Japanese occupation of Thailand and later declared
war on the Allies. However, despite the presence of
Japanese forces, Phibun managed to preserve a wide latitude
of control over domestic affairs.(31) But, by 1944, when it
was clear that Japan would lose the war and that Thailand
would be forced to placate a different set of foreign
powers, civilians and dissident military elements took
courage and moved against Phibun and his military group.
The confined military control had come to an end, along with
world war II. It has to be assumed that the control lost
much of its support among the officer corps since there was
little military opposition when the civilian, led by Pridi, replaced the military leader. Phibun was replaced by Kuang Aphaiwong, a politically uncommitted civilian. (32) In terms of control, the war left the civilians in apparent political control, but despite that, the military was still in strength and the officer corps intact. With the termination of confined military control, postwar politics developed as a struggle for power and dominance among three principal groups: first, a civilian faction under the leadership of Pridi, based primarily in the civil service and the parliament; second, a less powerful civilian faction, but highly prestigious, composed largely of supporters of the monarchy and led by Kuang Aphaiwong; and third, the military faction, in which Field Marshal Phibun still possessed considerable personal influence, but was clearly out of official control. (33)
The Military Control of 1944-1947

Veto Military Control

During the period of civilian rule from 1944 to 1947, the military was out of political control. There was actual evidence of veto control that the military had over the civilian during this period, since the military was still in strength and possessed considerable political influence. However, in 1946, new parliamentary elections were held under a revised constitution, a provision of which prohibited permanent government officials (including military officers) from holding political office. (34) This was obviously an attempt to establish civilian political dominance over the military by legal means. However, it was not applied through adequate political sanctions, and was, therefore quite ineffective, though it remained in the constitution during the 1946-1951 period. (35)
Military Control in 1948-1948

Veto Military Control

In November 1947, military leaders moved to regain control over the government. The coup was led by Field Marshal Phin, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but the military supporters of the coup found it wise to bring in Marshal Phibun in order to have military unity.(36) The civilian government was easily ousted. But perhaps in fear of international reactions to the coup, the military leaders did not establish outright a military government.(37) The royalist group of Khuang Aphaiwong agreed to form an interim government pending new elections.(38) The reasons behind the coup were that the officers possessed veto control established with the civilian government, but the civilians did not respect it and even tried to neglect it. The
military also expected a few "rights" that should not be tampered with. These rights were claimed upon the basis that: first, the officers deeply resented Pridi's drives to assert civilian control over the military; second, Pridi's constitutional provisions to prevent renewed political participation by officers could be circumvented, but his efforts to dismantle Marshall Phibun faction with the military constituted a fundamental threat to the military's internal autonomy. (39) Political influence was during this time considered a "right" of the military. Civilian interference in military internal affairs, on the other hand, was viewed as intolerable. (40)

The Military Control of 1948

Confined Military Control

Just before the new civilian government of Khuang
Aphaiwong could establish itself, Phibun and his military supporters organized a coup of their own in April 1948, and Phibun himself returned to power as prime minister, the move can be attributed to Khuang's move to restore civilian supremacy over the military. (41) His rule was clearly a confined control, although he did not enjoy an unchallenged confined control as Ne Win did in the 1962. In comparison to the Burmese military, the Thai military establishment remained highly fragmented. Phibun, even though in strict control, was opposed by a substantial number of army, navy and marines corps officers. The major reason behind this opposition was that the Phibun group had been discredited by its wartime policies. (42) The naval and marine officers were closely aligned with the civilian faction led by Dr. Pridi. (43) These rivalries prevented Phibun from solidifying his power within the military, which was necessary in order to restrain the civilian opponents. The
three-year period that followed was a challenge to his confined control, and Phibun had to fight a number of open revolts by the opposition forces one by one. In October 1948, only six months from the time he took control, several officers of the army general staff were arrested by Phibun's security forces and convicted of fomenting a rebellion.\(^{(44)}\) Four months later, there was an open revolt in Bangkok by marines in an attempt to restore Pridi to power, but the attempt was met by Phibun's forces.\(^{(45)}\) Two years later, a group of navy and marine officers did succeed in kidnapping Phibun, creating three days of serious interservice fighting. However, Phibun managed to escape and the army's superior forces were able to suppress the revolt.\(^{(46)}\)

Actually, Phibun's ability to control the country was not solely on his own, which was different from the era of 1938 to 1946 prior to the end of World War II when he possessed adequate power to control the way he wished.
Instead, he found himself gradually dependent on two younger leaders, General Phao Siyanon and General Sarit Thanarat, for keeping effective control. Phao was also the son-in-law of Field Marshal Phin, the army commander, and thus was linked to a group with substantial army support as well as power in the commercial and business sectors.

Furthermore, as commanders respectively of the police and of the Bangkok army garrison, Phao and Sarit together controlled the forces most strategically vital to Phibun's confined control. With the support of Phao and Sarit, Phibun gradually gained control of the military establishment. By late 1951 Phibun's military support was sufficiently solidified to let him move decisively against his civilian opposition in parliament. The reason was because in 1949 the royalists were able to revise the constitution to limit the direct control of the Prime Minister. The lower House was elected by universal
suffrage, rather than appointed by the prime minister, while the upper House was appointed by the King. Thus, this new arrangement was aimed at making the Phibun government dependent on the parliament. Although, the civilian Democrat Party moved cautiously under the military confined control, it still dared, for example, to vote down the government's budgetary legislation for 1950 and 1951. (52) Hence, Phibun perceived the authority of parliament as an irritating constraint to his control. In November 1951, he employed his confined control to announce the suspension of the revised constitution and the restoration of the constitution of 1932. (53) The parliament was dissolved and a new unicameral House of People's Representatives was appointed with an overwhelming majority of military officers. (54) In comparison to the Burmese case, this move reflected exactly what Ne Win did in the 1962 control. From this point on through the end of Phibun control in
1957, parliamentary democracy was just a facade covering the confined rule of the military.

Like Ne Win in his move against the Burmese parliament in the face of widespread insurgency, Phibun justified his move against parliament by asserting the need for stronger powers in the face of a communist threat. In 1950 Phibun had adopted anti-Communism as the platform for his policies.\(^{(55)}\) Phibun's use of the anti-Communism policy as a pretext to cover his strict repression of all opposition was clearly a success, especially against the civilians since he was able to repress any civilian opposition forces as pro-Communism. However, around 1954, Phibun's power in the military institution started to decline as his two subordinates, Phao and Sarit, gradually increased their own power bases.\(^{(56)}\) General Phao, as director of police and leader of the government party's parliament organization, became the head of a complex political faction with close
ties to the business sector. Field Marshal Sarit, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had won his personal following within the military that was then also second to no one.

As Phibun's power continued to decline, he became increasingly dependent on the support of the United States to maintain his authority. But, when Phibun, in order to improve his political support, attempted to return to the traditional "Siamese" policy of accommodation toward China, his support from the United States began to deteriorate.

Hence, Sarit did not waste this opportunity to launch a coup d'état in 1957. He succeeded in ousting both Phibun and his adversary Phao into exile.

The Military Government of 1957

Confined Military Control
In order to cement his rule, Sarit held elections to have his legitimate parliamentary faction, which consisted mostly of military officers. (61) However, Sarit's poor health forced him to temporarily leave the country for medical care abroad. His Deputy-Commander of the Army, General Thanom Kittikachorn, took over control for a year but he soon proved ineffective, as the economic conditions worsened and the military officers started to split. (62) Finally, in October 1958, Sarit returned to resume control. General Thanom stepped aside, while Sarit assumed strict control over the country, in which shortly after he returned, the constitution was suspended. (63)

A year later, Sarit appointed a new parliament assembly and directed it with drafting a new constitution, a task that took ten years to finish (recall that it took nine years in the Burmese case). (64) As chief executive, Sarit ruled with the broadest discretionary powers of any ruler.
since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. (65) Political opposition was severely repressed. (66) Military officers controlled not only the parliament but also the middle and upper-middle levels of the government bureaucracy. (67) Sarit justified his confined control by pointing to the growing instability in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, and to the danger of Communism. (68) A few years later, Sarit addressed the parliament stating that through a broadening of educational opportunities and the growth and diversification of the economy, his government would establish the necessary foundations for a future democratic system. (69) He then started to overhaul the whole administrative structure of the government, pushed projects to develop Thailand's industrial infrastructure, and cracked down on criminals and prostitutes. (70) Despite these drives, there was no real move toward Sarit's democratic system. Civilian institutions remained the same and the
social inequality had actually increased.(71)

The Military Control of 1963

Confined Military Control

Field Marshal Sarit died in 1963 and Thanom Kittikachorn succeeded his post.(72) Control of the government remained firmly in the hands of the military and the fundamental policy directions established by Sarit were maintained without question. A new constitution was promulgated in 1968 (Thailand's eighth since 1932).(73) An election was held in 1969, and as expected, the Thanom group's United Thai People's Party (UTPP) won 35 percent of the seats and another 33 percent was won by independents, many of whom sympathized with Thanom.(74) Hence, Thanom retained the premiership. His government awarded six cabinet posts to civilians, but the other six more powerful
cabinet posts in controlling the country went to military
and police officers. (75) Furthermore, even though the new
constitution limited on Thanom's discretionary powers,
little of substance was implemented to his power. It was
clear that the military still continued to control the
country as before.

In 1971, Thanom discovered that the opposition parties
were going to forge a united front against his rule and
ousted his government in a no-confidence vote. (76) So, a
few days before the parliament met, Thanom moved to dissolve
his own Cabinet, to abolish the Parliament, and to suspend
the constitution. (77) A Revolutionary Council headed by
Thanom and consisting of personnel from the military and
police was now in strict control. (78) Tough orders
followed—summary executions for violent crimes, and a ban
on reports of any disturbances. (79) The next setting
witnessed the continuation of the top military leaders in
power. (80) Apart from Thanom, who became Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Praphat Charusathiara was named Director of Military Affairs, and Air Marshal Thawee Chullasaphya became Deputy Director of Military Affairs. (81)

Thanom declared that this new setting would be in control for the next five years, during which a new constitution would be drafted. (82)

After thirteen months of strict control, the military leaders felt secure enough in its power to allow a return to constitutional forms. (83) In 1972, the king promulgated an interim Constitution (Thailand's ninth Constitution) establishing wide-range executive powers and also a 299 member National Assembly that replaced the Revolutionary Council. (84) The Assembly's appointed membership included 187 military officers, 99 civilians, and 13 police officers. (85) The political significance of the new Constitution and legislative rested their importance only as
legitimizing devices.(86) The facade of a limited constitutional monarchy once again covered the reality of the confined military rule.

On October 14, 1973, the military control of Field Marshal Thanom collapsed following massive student demonstrations in Bangkok, in which over 70 people died.(87) Thanom and Praphat fled the country along with Colonel Narong Kittikakorn, Thanom's son.(88) King Bhumibol appointed the Rector of Thammasat University Sanya Dharmasakti as new Prime Minister. Thus ended the military control that had lasted for many decades.

The Military Control of 1973-1976

Veto Military Control

From 1973 to 1976, three civilians were chosen as Thai Prime Ministers.(89) However, all three civilian
governments seemed unable to solve the many pressing social and economic problems. (90) Most of the senior officials who served under the previous government remained in office and the vast government bureaucracy continued to function largely on the basis of patronage and corruption. (91)

During this period, the military took a veto stance. For the first time in many years, there were very few military officers serving in the Cabinet, but this did not mean that the military had lost its power. It meant, merely, that the military was less conspicuous. Nevertheless, 1976, major demonstrations by students revived the atmosphere of crisis and opened opportunity for the military to step in under the claim that national security was at stake.

The Military Control of 1976-1977

Cooperative Military Control
New elections were held in April 1976, and a coalition government headed by Seni Pramoj was formed only to be overthrown by a military coup in October of the same year. (92) The military seized power from the elected government under the pretext of defending the monarchy against communist conspiracy. (93) Thanin Kraivixien, a Supreme Court Judge, was installed as Premier. (94) But, it was clear that the Thanin government, different from the previous three civilian governments, was supposed to play a cooperative role with the military. The military was directing what and what not to do. In spite of this military control, a year later, the same generals who put Thanin in power removed him in the name of liberalism at home and detente with neighboring communist powers. (95)

The Military Control of 1977-1980

Unconfined Military Control
General Kriangsak Chamanand became the new leader when he assumed control of three key positions: Prime Minister, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Interior. (96) However, even though Kriangsak was in charge of these three posts, he did not rule in a confined manner. (97) Since, from the beginning of his rule, his power was never sufficient to stand and fight the various faction, one by one like Phibun and Sarit did. Instead, Kriangsak's stance was one of compromising or neutralizing a fractious military which was composed of three major groups. (98) The first group was led by General Serm Na Nakorn, who was the Army Commander-in-Chief. (99) The second faction was led by Admiral Sangaad Chaloryu, who had been Chairman of the National Administrative Reform Council. (100)

The third group was known as the "Young Turks" who were the battalion commanders, a group of some 40 field grade
military officers.(101)

When Kriangsak took power, he had to play a role of compromising and neutralizing these three essentially independent sources of power.(102) Kriangsak, as Prime Minister, appointed the cabinet and essentially controlled the government in an unconfined way. However, Sangaad remained Chairman of the Revolutionary Party with powers to dismiss the Prime Minister under the approval of the King.(103) Moreover, the Admiral had a large hand in appointing the 360-member National Assembly (over half of which was military) whose main task was to adopt a permanent constitution leading to national elections by April 1979 at the latest.(104) Throughout 1979, Serm, the Army Commander, remained an independent figure whose personal loyalty to Kriangsak was limited, and who was always capable of changing sides given the right circumstances.(105) These uncertain alignments underscored Kriangsak's dilemma at the
outset of his tenure. (106) In this regard, most of his policies were designed to isolate or neutralize his opponents and consolidate the power of his own government. (107) Under his unconfined rule, the fragmentation of his rule made military patronage less attractive to businessmen than it was during the Sarit-Thanom era when alliances were long lasting. (108) As a result, few lucrative alliances between businessmen and generals seem to have occurred during his government. (109)

The Military Control of 1980

Cooperative Military Control

Kriangsak was replaced as Prime Minister by General Prem Tinsulanond in a peaceful transition of power that brought royalist Prime Minister and Army Commander-in-Chief to power on a clear monarchy endorsement. (110) In terms of
control, the Prem government played a cooperative control, certainly, with the backing of the royalists.\(111\)

Cooperation with the civilians was mainly aimed at uniting the country and prolonging the control itself since the use of coercive force is indeed quite limited both in its long-term effectiveness and its ability to create a long and stable rule. In 1983, Prem was elected as premier for the next four years, thus legitimizing his control as a democratic one.\(112\) Clearly, in the context of cooperative rule, it should have triggered in many Thai leaders' minds--civilian and military alike--the crucial problem of how could they change the direction or whether they should merely continue this familiar cycle which has always ended with a military seizure of power. Certainly, without noticing that they were acting in such a way that fits the criteria of a cooperative rule, it was interesting to note that politicians have been talking for the first time about
the possible emergence of a dominant political grouping, legitimized and underpinned by the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy—something not out of place in an area largely governed within the framework of one-party system, or something of a cooperative nature that could lead closer to democracy perhaps. Or would it be just a united front that would resemble the Me Win party before it tumbled down into the military control again?
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The framework of analysis, set out in the first chapter, classifies five types of military control. These, restated briefly, are as follows: first, a confined-type where a government uses a strict military control as a means of ruling; second, an unconfined-type which represents the neutralizing or isolation of prominent opposition groups; third, a cooperative-type where the military's method involves winning civilian cooperation which is a major factor in maintaining its control; fourth, a corrective-type where the military along with civilian groups see that the government is heading in a perilous direction in which only through military control will the deviancy be stopped and corrected; fifth, a veto-type which applies to the situation
in which military is indirectly in control, but still draws the line of what and what not to do.

The progression so presented does not, of course, describe any single type of control in an exact manner. Hence, in this concluding chapter, I shall be considering the overlapping issues. In offering criteria for classification of military control, an assessment of each type of military control in the four countries is useful as a concluding remark.

Five Categories of Military Control: An Evaluation

To begin with, in each country that I have prescribed, the five types of control apply rather adequately to Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and to some extent to the Philippines. It is more abstract for the Philippines, where military officers usually play a role subordinate to civilian
leaders. It is helpful, therefore, to review briefly the
nature of different types of control used by these
countries, as shown in the preceding chapters.

Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand faced a situation where
military institutions have remained strong and have
represented the symbol of national honor. Coupled with
strong military leaders—such as Ne Win, Suharto, and
Sarit—the power of these military leaders to control in
their countries has increased and been enhanced to the
extent that military controls are now cemented in the
national politics and institutions of these countries. In
addition, it is now almost entirely up to each military
leader of these three countries to establish his own
criteria for control that are perceived as most suitable and
beneficial for military control.

Burma
In Burma, civilian divisions are spread in so many different directions that they never seem to be able to regroup. Furthermore, close to half of the senior military officers who took control in 1962 continue to be in power, demonstrating a military-control solidarity probably un-matched in Southeast Asia. (1) Despite the retirement from active military service of over 250 senior officers in party or administrative positions and the creation of the nominally civilian Socialist Republic in 1974, military control remains much of an on-going process. (2) Military control from the beginning, even though changed in style from corrective control in 1958 to unconfined control in 1974, has been maintained by a kind of double-image role. On the one hand, military leaders have created military governments and they continue to be the power behind them. On the other hand, the first military government since its
inception frequently maintained that this military control was but a transitory condition and has let civilians be aware that the Burmese People's Army could also be viewed as the people's oppressor, regardless of its symbolic image.(3)

In terms of controlling the civilians, the problem as perceived by military leaders is not in Ne Win's words: "How to let go of the tiger's tail once you have seized it", but more appropriately how to come up with new, more effective, and safer types of control in order to prolong the control.(4) In retrospect, we have seen that military control in Burma fit all of the five-classifications at one time or another. It began with a "corrective" control in which Burmese military leaders had stepped down after having restored crucial political issues. A "veto" control followed the corrective-type, offering, up to now, the last period where civilian leaders were in control of the country.

Turning to the next three periods of military control, the
most important assessment seems to be whether there has been
any real change in the method of control during these
twenty-two years or only a facade of civilianization? From
the period after veto control in 1962, Burmese military
government began to strictly control the country by using
swift control methods. The confined method was effective in
terms of cementing military authority over civilians.

However in 1964, after two years of strict confined control,
military leaders started to search for ways to unite and
cooperate the various factions of Burma, since, internally
or externally, confined military control only tarnished the
symbolic image of the Burmese military institution as a
whole. Cooperation according to Burmese military leaders
seems to imply, implicitly or explicitly, policies that
would only lead to military control in a cooperative-type.

The policies came as sharing and coordinating with civilians
while assessing the reaction of the general populace. It
was a cooperative military control despite military autonomy at the decision-making level since under the definition of military control there is rarely an equal-sharing of political power in any civil-military relationships. In Burma, the final decision is still Ne Win's and his military group while cooperative control aims at assessing civilian demands or reactions that would help implement and coordinate the policies. Thus, the cooperative method under Ne Win has resulted in policies that manipulate civilians by allowing for their influences in terms of advices, ideas, or demands, in return for their support and cooperation as long as it is permissible. The reason may certainly be that the use of coercive force is clearly quite limited in its long-term effectiveness and, hence, only through cooperation with civilians would military leaders be able to assess the civilian demands in order to accommodate their general policies in those directions. In turn, this would help
maintain military control since more civilians would be able to find a means of indirectly influencing the government, hence lessening the likeliness of civilian outbreak.

The unconfined period began in 1974 when Ne Win returned to office as head of an elected government. The main reasons to classify this period as unconfined-type and not cooperative-type or confined-type are that there was almost no drive to cooperate with civilian elements, and when civilian demonstration broke out, there was also no step taken by the military to use strict confined method against rioters. Instead, the government undertook a determined action against slack and corrupt officials in various public sectors. The drive could only be seen as shifting the target of dissension away from the ruling military faction to other groups of both civilian and military. Hence, it neutralizes the dissenters reflecting a method of control that does not need to use strong coercive
force, but does weaken opposition forces by ruining their own linkages.

Indonesia

In this study, Indonesia has been classified into two types of control: "veto" and "unconfined". Indeed, Indonesia represented rather a stable military control style when compared with other Southeast Asian countries. At the time, in 1955 military leaders possessed a significant veto control in the civilian government of President Sukarno, especially in the military sector. By 1959, however, military veto control was challenged by Sukarno and, hence, the military started to increase its role subsequently as its leaders openly supported General Nasution in blocking civilian policies and in generating significant military influence in the political arena. The tug-of-war between
civilians and military went on until 1965, when General Suharto in a countercoup-move took command of the country.

The role of the military increased tremendously as Suharto fought his way up until he became President and carried on an unconfined method of control that remains to the present time. Suharto's most successful method was not to strictly control the civilians nor loosely ask for civilian cooperative support and needs. Instead, it was characterized by a President who is continuously trying to defuse political emotions—mainly caused by extreme nationalists and Moslem forces. Actually, what Suharto did was play the role of compromising and neutralizing the various groups. Moreover, without having to ask for cooperation from civilians, Suharto was able to make them dependent on his power. Furthermore, Suharto was also able to use the Indonesian Armed Forces, although divided into factions and cliques, to agree in maintaining its role as a
stabilizing factor. As a means of unconfined method, Suharto made several changes in the military hierarchy itself. The move could be viewed as a preventive approach to the formation of a military pressure group, if not a junta, with the power to counterbalance his control—recall that under an unconfined control, the optimum goal of military ruling group is to be able to neutralize opposition groups and maintain any possible source of pressure to minimum. Clearly, it can be speculated that unconfined-type of control will remain as the characteristic of Suharto's government in the future since it has proven successful in keeping problems at bay. One explanation for the success of unconfined control in Indonesia could be related to the fact that, unlike cooperative control, the military as a whole is satisfied with this type of control since it gives political control without having to extensively share or carefully consider civilian preferences. On the other side, the
Indonesian civilians were quite satisfied with this type of control since, even though they do not participate substantially in the political process or lend support to governmental decision making, they are still free from extensive control that would have been the case under the political scheme of the Communist Party under Sukarto and his civilian groups if the military had not taken over.

The Philippines

The Philippines from 1950 onward constitutes a case in which the overall civil-military relationship was marked neither by bitterness nor affection. Instead, it was represented by a common understanding of the role that each side has to play in the national politics. In the 1940s, the civil-military relationship could be characterized by an antagonism against methods of suppression used by the
military. By 1950, however, the civil-military relationship had improved significantly under the efforts of Magsaysay.

Reforms had been made to improve military perceptions of the civilians and to promote armed services cooperation with the civilian populace. The period from 1950 to 1965 was indeed one of the most incisive case of improvement in civil-military relationships.

In 1965, under Marcos' presidency, winning civilian support by the use of a cooperative method that Magsaysay had set out in the early 1950s was no longer the leading policy of the administration. During this period, the military had a significant political influence and substantial power in dealing with the government, in spite of the limited power. The reason behind was that Marcos, as Commander-in-Chief, had gradually increased his control over the military by purging military officers who could be considered as a threat to his presidency.
The military role began to increase again in 1972 when Marcos declared martial law in the country. The important consequence of the new type of control, in terms of civil-military relationship was that military factions that were loyal to the President started to play a veto role against civilians, forgetting its "makisama and makimasa" role of working with the civilians and being good companions to the general populace. However, the leading military groups did not altogether abandon the "makisama and makimasa" concept. The result of veto control was instead a mixture between military control and an extension of "makisama and makimasa" concept. Actually, military officers now possess power to control and accord favors to civilians, replacing congressmen and other civilian representatives. It is also important to note that civilian leaders, even though they were not allowed to participate in a traditional manner, did not tremendously suffer under
military veto control. Instead, they now sought
authorizations by military leaders who were acting as the
main pillar of power under the president.

Thailand

Thailand represents a case in which military control is
the most changeable of the four Southeast Asian states. The
case of Thailand began in 1932 with a corrective-type
seeking to change the absolute monarchy to a constitutional
monarchy. From then on, the military role started to
increase as a second pattern of military control immediately
followed in 1933. That control could be characterized as an
unconfined type because the military government depended on
both military and civilian groups, since antagonistic
military and civilian factions fighting for power and
creating societal tensions could lead to anti-government
activity or even to the overthrow of the military rule. By 1938, General Phibun came to power as a new Premier who possessed more solidified support from the officer corps than had the previous Prime Minister. During this first confined period, Phibun and his military group did not make any move to compromise with civilian leaders or with other military factions. Phibun seemed to believe that the glorification of the military image that he helped to establish from 1938 onward would be sufficient to let him and his military faction rule with a confined-type of control. In fact, Phibun was correct: up to that time the military image was which of national honor and the indispensable protector of the nation. However, the outcome of World War II had critically tarnished this image, putting Phubun and his group into isolation. Actually, the veto control that followed represented a change of direction in Thai military control. The confined method had come to a
sudden end, and it has to be assumed that the confined control lost much of its support among the officer corps since there was little military opposition when the civilians replaced the military. Certainly, to both civilians and military corps, Phibun and his confined control were responsible for leading the country to the wrong side during World War II and, especially to the officer corps, for tarnishing the long-preserved glory of the military image. Hence, the periods that followed were veto-type of controls where the military plays a safe and low-key roles, suitable for the situation since the military was then still trying to recuperate from its tarnished image.

From 1944 to 1947, despite the knowledge that military corps was still in strength and intact, the civilian government openly challenged the veto control that military leaders had installed by revising the constitution to
exclude military leaders from politics.

In this light, a characteristic of Thai military control reflects that even though the country is in strict control, there was rarely a period when the ruling military group was not openly opposed by substantial numbers of both civilian and military officers. Thus, this trend of opposition always reduced the longevity of any military faction that controlled the country. Nevertheless, the four longest periods during which any single military faction controlled the country ranged from six to ten years (1938-1944, 1948-1957, 1957-1963, 1963-1973), and were all of the confined-types. These chronic rivalries between civilian and military groups or between military cliques themselves have not only prevented a single military group from maintaining a longlasting control but have also opened, from time to time, chances for civilians to challenge military control, something that is seldom seen in Burma or
Indonesia.

Thai politics moved into three periods of confined military control from 1948 to 1973. Clearly, these periods were represented by the widespread use of coercive forces in three strong military groups led by Phibun in 1948 to 1957, Sarit in 1957 to 1963, and Thanom in 1963 to 1973. A question may arise following these confined control as to whether the period that followed were in fact a veto control or just a confined control under disguise. In answering this question, we must observe how fragile the situation was when the military had to step down from power in 1973.

During the period that immediately followed, the Thai military, even though still possessing fundamental power in politics, had momentarily lost its ability to use the confined method against the civilians because of its inability to maintain its rule and let the situation in 1973 out of hands.
In the next period, the military started to regain its influence by cooperating with the civilian government. Soon military leaders were able to direct what to do and what not to do in terms of national security and military affairs. During this period, the political system was categorized as cooperative-type and not confined-type because civilian leaders still possessed a substantial level of influence in policy-making, especially in foreign affairs. And it was because of this civilian influence, depicted by military leaders as being too conservative, that the military removed the civilian government from power in the name of liberalism at home and detente with neighboring communist powers. From 1977 onward, political power was in the hands of two military leaders: General Kriangsak who ruled under an unconfined-type and General Prem, the present Premier, who uses a cooperative control coupled with the policy stipulating that only through cooperation with civilian
leaders will the military control itself last and be
accepted by the general populace.

In this thesis we have seen an attempt to assess the
more or less workable typologies of military control under
both military and civilian governments. We have seen that
military control does not derive its effectiveness solely
from the seizure and exercise of governmental power. It
also was found that the type of military control varied with
the levels of both civilian leaders and general populace
interference in the national politics. The weaker the
oppositions are, generally, the longer the military controls
last. Although I can not generalize about the performance
characteristics of these types of military control, it is
possible to identify what are the most common types of
control and what kind of military control usually follows
the other. Recall that the confined-type, with its strict
control, is the most common while the corrective-type is the
least common. Also, interestingly, the veto-type usually followed the confined-type or unconfined-type. It can also be noted that normally the veto-type and corrective-type in all four countries do not last as long as the other three types.

This thesis does no more than approach the types of military control. Much additional research will be needed to achieve a fuller understanding. The categories, judging by the four cases, certainly seems suggestive and can, little or much, be supported by illustration from each case. Many things still need to be solved. Criteria would need to be made more incisive and distinguishable by further examination of other cases. In any event, this thesis may, hopefully, be a part of a starting point. There are other military controls that are interesting for further studies. Some of these are from other regions such as Pakistan in Southern Asia, Vietnam in Indochina, or South Korea in East
Asia. The framework and some of the questions of military
control that have been seen here may indicate directions
that could be taken. If this is the case, then this thesis
has accomplished something of its intention.
NOTES

Chapter One


5. Ibid.

Chapter Two


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 222.

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 92.
10. Ibid., p. 91.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 207.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 45.
22. Ibid.
23. Not only that corruption went on behind U Nu's back, but as time run, U Nu became ever more interested in religious affairs, while his Cabinet Ministers became involved in intercine party struggles.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 207.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Von der Mehden, op. cit., p. 207.
35. Feit, op. cit., p. 100.
36. Hoadley, op. cit., p. 36.
37. Ibid.
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