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The Development of Slaving Societies in the Americas: Marginal Native and Colonial Slavers in São Paulo and Carolina, 1614–1715

By

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ABSTRACT

The Development of Slaving Societies in the Americas is a comparative history of slaving, slavery, and ethnogenesis that focuses on changes in slaving practices in São Paulo and Carolina between 1614–1715. It illuminates how colonial slavers co-opted Native practices of slavery in Brazil in the late sixteenth century and in Carolina in the seventeenth century to create slave trades that trafficked in Native people. This dissertation reveals how Native and colonial figures used slaving as a profitable strategy to create wealth in people as dependents and as commodified, exchangeable trade goods, effectively transforming our understanding of Native peoples lived experiences as captors and captives in colonial borderlands. Through analyses of colonial council records, wills, inventories, and the correspondence of Jesuits, Franciscans, and colonial officials, this work follows those actors who benefitted from slaving and those commodified by it, demonstrating that slaving societies formed based on the slaving strategies employed by colonial and Native actors. As Native slave trades proved profitable and violence spread, Native and colonial slaving led to the coalescence of Native groups through incorporating refugee Natives fleeing slavers and Native slavers themselves. Building on studies of Native slavery in Latin America the project draws on insights from Africanists to move beyond Eurocentric colonial categories of enslavement—free versus unfree. Instead, the dissertation analyzes how the slaving strategies of colonists and Native groups in two borderlands created slaving societies who focused their socio-economic organization and production on the enslavement of Native peoples in the Americas. Through a comparison between the creation of Native and colonial slaving societies in São Paulo and Carolina, this dissertation makes two interventions: one historical, through identifying broader patterns of slaving strategies in the Americas, and another historiographical, by moving beyond nationalistic narratives of slavery, violence, and cross-cultural exchange.
O desenvolvimento das sociedades de escravização nas Américas: Indígenas e colonos escravistas em São Paulo e na Carolina, entre 1614 e 1715

Miller Shores Wright

Resumo

O desenvolvimento das sociedades de escravização nas Américas é uma história comparativa da escravização, escravidão e etnogênese, cujo foco está nas mudanças e nas práticas escravistas em São Paulo e Carolina entre 1614 e 1715. O presente estudo investiga como os escravistas coloniais transformaram práticas indígenas de cativeiro no Brasil no final do século XVI e na Carolina no século XVII e criaram o comércio de escravos especializado na negociação de povos indígenas. Esta tese revela como os sujeitos indígenas e coloniais usaram a escravização como uma estratégia lucrativa para gerar riqueza nas pessoas como dependentes e como mercadorias comercializáveis mercantilizadas, transformando efetivamente nossa compreensão sobre as experiências vividas pelos povos indígenas não apenas como cativos, mas também como captores nas fronteiras coloniais. Por meio de análises de registros das câmaras coloniais, testamentos, inventários e correspondência de jesuítas, franciscanos, e funcionários coloniais, este trabalho segue os atores que se beneficiaram da escravidão e os mercantilizados por ela, demonstrando que as sociedades escravistas se formaram com base nas estratégias escravistas utilizadas por atores coloniais e indígenas. Como o comércio de escravos indígenas provou ser lucrativo e a violência se espalhou, a escravização indígena e colonial à coalescência de grupos indígenas ao incorporar indígenas refugiados que fugiram da escravidão e os próprios escravistas indígenas. Com base em estudos sobre a escravidão indígena na América Latina, a tese baseia-se em percepções de africanistas para ir além das categorias coloniais eurocêntricos de escravidão – livre versus não livre. Em vez disso, a tese analisa como as estratégias escravistas de colonos e grupos indígenas em duas terras fronteiriças criaram sociedades escravistas que concentravam sua organização e produção socioeconômica na escravização dos povos indígenas nas Américas. Por meio de uma comparação entre a criação das sociedades de escravização indígenas e coloniais em São Paulo e Carolina, esta tese traz duas contribuições centrais: uma histórica, ao identificar padrões mais amplos de estratégias escravistas nas Américas, e outra historiográfica, indo além das narrativas nacionalistas da escravidão, violência e intercâmbio cultural.
Acknowledgements

Every person and project is the product of a village. I am fortunate enough that numerous people at both Rice University and UNICAMP continually go out of their way to foster a sense of community, which has been paramount to my progress as a scholar, a professional, and a person. My advancement is the product of untold hours and incalculable (to me, at least) financial investment. This project is the result of those who saw potential in myself and encouraged my success. For that I am eternally grateful.

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## Source Abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPROSC</td>
<td><em>Records in the British Public Records Office relating to South Carolina</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td><em>Annaes/Anais do Museu Paulista</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCHASC</td>
<td><em>Journal of the Common House of Assembly of South Carolina</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGCSC</td>
<td><em>Journal of the Grand Council of South Carolina</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHGB</td>
<td><em>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHGSP</td>
<td><em>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de São Paulo</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCDAH</td>
<td>South Carolina Department of Archives and History.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHGM</td>
<td><em>South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHM</td>
<td><em>South Carolina Historical Magazine</em>.</td>
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<td>SCHS</td>
<td>South Carolina Historical Society.</td>
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Notes on Terminology

In this dissertation I have attempted to stick to original spellings and punctuation in English language sources. Where I feel it is necessary to change the usage, tense, and punctuation of a source, or clarify by inserting brackets I have indicated accordingly. I translated all quotations from Portuguese, Spanish, or French into English unless otherwise indicated. In the cases of translations, I have attempted to use modern English language conventions and taken some liberty with punctuations for clarity.

I use the broad term Native to designate people of Native American and Indigenous descent in the Americas. However, I often do not know the ethnocultural background of many of these people. As explained in the introduction the use of the term Native is intentional, but not intended to flatten out Native identities and ethnicities. Where I can with certainty, I use the ethnic and cultural designations that people gave themselves or the closest term I can apply with confidence. This does not mean that people at the time referred to themselves by those terms unless where indicated. Due to the nature of colonial sources, the terms, names, and classifications given for Native, African, and Afro-descended peoples were imposed by colonists or by other Natives. Often in analysis of colonial sources we have to trust Native knowledge and colonial translation that historical actors correctly identified the people they referred to.

In 1709 the Portuguese crown purchased the Captaincy of São Vicente and created São Paulo and Minas de Ouro. However, because most of my focus is on the town of São Paulo, its suburbs, and local cities, I use the term São Paulo and São Vicente interchangeably at times unless specifically referring to the captaincy of São Vicente. In the region of Guarani inhabitants in the Rio de la Plata, Spanish and Portuguese colonial officials created several different versions of the term Guairá, Guayrá, and Guaíra to denote the region and political organizations. Because
my focus is on the development of Slaving societies in São Paulo, I use the Portuguese term
Guairá to denote the larger region and district of the Guarani inhabitants and Spanish missions
established in the sixteenth century that in Spanish is typically known as Guayrá. I also use
Carolina and São Paulo to refer to the colonial regions and their hinterlands with the knowledge
that colonial ambitions were always far grander than the realities of colonial power at the time—
if ever.
Introduction: Deserted Towns and Villages, Comparing Native Slaving in the Atlantic

In a 1721 fragment of a map of North and South Carolina, hidden under a description of “Exceeding Good Land” is a denotation that reads: “Province of Apalatchee Now Deserted.”¹ The map is filled with descriptions of Native and colonial towns, battles, paths, rivers, the quality of the lands, and even flora and fauna. But the description of the province of Apalachee as deserted begs the question why? The use of the term “now” suggests that it was not always so. What happened to Apalachee to cause its people to desert it?

Figure 1: Fragment of a 1721 Map entitled “A most particular and curious Ms. Map of North and south Carolina” in “Map of Indian Tribes of the Southeast, 1715” Collection, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, South Carolina.

¹“A most particular and curious Ms. Map of North and south Carolina,” 1721, in “Map of Indian Tribes of the Southeast, 1715, 32-06-07 in Maps of the South Carolina Historical Society (SCHS), Charleston, South Carolina.”
Thirty-seven years later in 1758, another map was published in London that centered on the Rio de la Plata and depicted the regions of Paraguay and Tucuman. The map references historical events, the locations of towns, rivers, and provinces. Between the northern reaches of the Uruguay River and the demarcation of the frontier with Brazil is a description that reads, “Here are a great many Deserted Towns and Villages.” Like the description of the province of Apalachee in the 1721 map, the map of Paraguay and Tucuman raises the question, why were there a great number of deserted towns and villages in that region?

Figure 2: Fragment of 1758 Map entitled Paraguay and Tucuman by John Gibson and Emanuel Bowen, in the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

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In this dissertation, I answer what happened to those Native communities depicted in Apalachee and the region of South America known as Guairá. The answer is slaving. Despite the vast physical distance between Apalachee and Guairá, both communities represented in the maps shown above fell victim to slaving raids. Between 1614 and 1715, Native and colonial slavers developed slaving strategies and Native slave trades to capture and enslave other Natives peoples. Over that period slavers developed slaving strategies based on Native practices of captivity and transformed those practices into Native slave trades that commodified enslaved Natives as exchangeable commodities with monetary evaluations. As the violence and destruction of slaving spread, Native slaving also proved profitable for Native and colonial communities. These communities—both Native and colonial in São Paulo and Carolina—developed slaving societies based around the capture and enslavement of Natives for the Native slave trade.

In the maps, the deserted landscapes depicted as devoid of people were the product of slave raids that enslaved and killed tens of thousands of Native peoples and left countless others as refugees forced to flee their homes and the regions. But maps are political documents; put more crudely: maps lie. In the words of Gregory Waselkov describing southeastern North American Native maps, “every one of these documents is a representation of geographical reality, reality is perceived from culturally determined points of view.” In the case of Guairá and

Apalachee, neither place was totally deserted by Native peoples. Numerous Native peoples fled to the woods to escape slavers and returned to their communities or what was left of them to rebuild afterwards. In Apalachee, the slave raids from Carolina that destroyed the towns and Spanish Franciscan missions in the region intensified in the 1690s but peaked between 1704 and 1706. The map made in 1721 depicting the devastating effects of those slave raids was not too far removed. In Guairá, and the neighboring provinces of Tape and Uruguay, the slave raids that destroyed the Jesuit missions were conducted from São Paulo in the 1630s and 1640s. Meaning the description of desolated towns in Guairá on the 1758 map was written over a century after the events. The mapmakers either read historical accounts of the slave raids or those events continued to have such an impact a century later that cartographers in England wrote about them.

The Native peoples of Guairá and Apalachee, along with the Guaiáná, Mocama, Guale, and numerous other Native peoples attacked by slavers during the period, were forced to recreate what they could of their societies in response. Many faced new realities as slaves, some fought back, while others were forced to flee as refugees. But still others—enslaved and free—chose to become slavers themselves. This dissertation reveals how Native and colonial actors used slaving as a profitable strategy to create wealth in people as dependents and as commodified, exchangeable trade goods, effectively transforming our understanding of Native peoples lived experiences as captors and captives in colonial borderlands.

I began the research for this project thinking that I would focus my analysis on what happened to the Native inhabitants enslaved on the Spanish missions of Guairá and Florida.

However, I came to understand that the story of Native enslavement and the Native slave trade, could not be told without understanding how Native slaving strategies developed into what I am calling slaving societies. In this dissertation, I argue that by analyzing the development of Native and colonial slaving strategies in São Paulo and Carolina, we begin to understand how slave societies, racialized slavery, and slavery as institutions developed. In both Carolina and São Paulo, the transition from Native captivity to slave societies followed strikingly similar patterns. The comparison of the development of slaving societies in the Americas helps reveal what aspects of colonialism, slaving, and slavery were parochial outliers and which were fundamental aspects of the early modern Atlantic.

A slaving society, as I define it, is one in which the society was organized around the economic production of enslaved human beings. Both Native and colonial communities in the Americas created slaving societies that organized their economies around the capture and enslavement of Natives. Slaving societies differ from societies with slaves and slave societies as articulated by Ira Berlin. As Berlin argues, in a slave society “slavery stood at the center of economic production, and the master-slave relationship provided the model for all social relations.” In societies with slaves “slaves were marginal to the central productive processes,

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4 These terms will be explained in more detail below.
5 Robbie Ethridge uses the term “Militaristic slaving society” which she defines as Native societies that asserted control over the Native slave trade and through their slave raiding, spread internecine warfare and created widespread dislocation, migration, amalgamation, and, in some cases, extinction of Native peoples.” Robbie Ethridge, “Creating the Shatter Zone: The Indian Slave Traders and the collapse of the Southeastern Chiefdoms,” in Light on the Path: The Anthropology and History of the Southeastern Indians, edited by Thomas J. Pluckhahn and Robbie Ethridge (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006): 207–218, 208–209. For the most part, I consider the Native slaving societies in my analysis to fit Etheridge’s criteria. However, not all slaving societies in my analysis are Native. Therefore, I use the term slaving society.
slavery was just one form of labor among many.”

However, as seen in the analysis of the development of slaving societies in São Paulo and Carolina, slaving societies can be seen as a fluid stage in the process of transforming a society with slaves to a slave society, one in which the society was organized around slaving as a strategy. Native captivity practices in North and South America could be categorized as societies with slaves, where captives and slaves functioned as a status for some laborers but one in which the expectation was that status was not the norm, permanent, hereditary, or racialized. Even Portuguese and English colonial settlers who brought their own ideologies and legal customs of slavery, initially functioned in the Americas as societies with slaves largely because they were forced to adopt aspects of Native social organization and captivity practices. Through co-opting some of these practices and the creation of a Native Slave trade, Native and colonial societies began to implement slaving strategies.

Conceptualizing slaving as a strategy allows us to see how Native and colonial communities employed those strategies and how slaving societies were created and functioned. As Joseph C. Miller argued, slaving should be viewed “as a strategy that people in historical positions of marginality have pursued, since time immemorial, with significant consequences for themselves and for others around them.”

Marginality refers to the historically contextualized positionality of slavers with relation to their own communities, or put another way, being on the margins of those who controlled access to resources in those communities. One of the resources that historical actors sought to control was people and the products of their labors. Marginal

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actors pursued slaving as a strategy in order to create wealth in people as dependents, by
benefitting from the value gained for the exchange of those people, or profiting from the value of
the labor of the enslaved—i.e, selling or consuming what they produced. Slaving was a strategy
to create outside laborers for the benefit of the slaver. Slaving is different from enslaving, the
ongoing process of keeping a person in the status of slavery, therefore Miller argues, “[o]ne may
define ‘slaving’ as a strategy and practice of agents defined other than as masters, thus acting
within specifiable contexts, of claiming absolute power over outsiders to pursue specific
purposes internally.”9 But what is key to slaving as a strategy is that it was employed, used,
adapted, innovated, and abandoned at times. As a process, it is fluid and malleable. Therefore,
slaving could take on the characteristics of Tupi-Guarani slaving where female captives were
kept as wives or concubines, or in the case of the Creeks in North America, where children were
fully adopted into society as kin in the place of a lost loved one. As will be shown in this
dissertation, Native and colonial slavers in São Paulo and Carolina developed slaving strategies
by co-opting Native captivity practices and adapting them to the emergence of a Native slave
trade.

Native peoples of southeastern Brazil and southeastern North America practiced forms of
captivity and bondage before contact with Europeans. Native warfare often focused on the taking
of captives, particularly women and children, to demonstrate men’s martial prowess and to
appease the loss of kin. In Indigenous South America, female captives were often taken as wives
or concubines, and men, women, and children were taken to be ritualistically tortured and
cannibalized. Part of the cycle of vengeance between groups, among Tupi societies the taking of
captives and their ritualistic execution and consumption offered males the path to manhood,

9 Joseph C. Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History, 45.
honor, a new name, and access to women. Vengeance and the taking of captives offered warriors the pathway to the “land without evil” upon their own deaths. In Native North America, bondage existed as one possible outcome for captives, alongside adoption, ritual torture, and execution that sometimes-included cannibalism. As among the Tupi, adult men were usually killed on the battlefield or sacrificed to honor lost kin in ceremonies that—depending on the cultural context—at times involved anthropophagic practices. Vengeance and reprisal—typically at the clan level, but at times encompassing whole polities—led to cycles of culturally contingent violence known at times as “mourning” wars or “crying blood.” A person kept in bondage could be forced to labor on behalf of their master, but their status was not permanent or hereditary. The norm in early modern societies across the globe before the sixteenth century, was for women and children to greatly outnumber men as captives. Despite innumerable differences in cultural

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12 Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History, 49.
practices and cosmological beliefs, Native societies in southeastern North and South America had their own practices of captivity and bondage before the arrival of Europeans.\(^{13}\)

When Europeans contacted Native peoples, they were often given captives as part of the diplomatic process of gift-giving and reciprocity.\(^{14}\) Scholars like Alida C. Metcalf for Brazil and Theda Perdue and Nancy Shoemaker for eastern North America have shown the roles and importance of Native women in diplomatic and gift-giving exchanges between Natives and Europeans; women were given as diplomats, captives, wives, relatives, interpreters, and go-betweens.\(^{15}\) Due to the labor needs of early European colonists, the exchange of captives as

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\(^{13}\) Trying to describe the diversity of captivity practices across Native North America and Indigenous South America is problematic at best and naïve at its worst. Here I have generalized aspects of Tupi captivity practices and those of groups in eastern North America, particularly in the Southeast and among the Iroquois. This historiographical focus is intentionally limiting to focus on the works that highlight Native captivity practices of peoples who played larger roles in the Native slave trades in São Paulo and Carolina.


diplomatic gifts, soon devolved into a barter and exchange of captives for goods. An
overwhelmingly male European colonial population looked to Native laborers to provide
sustenance, manual labor, foraging, as well as domestic and sexual labor. Through the creation of
diplomatic relations, alliances, and familial networks, the pace of exchange of captives
intensified over time. Captives were also taken in colonial wars declared just wars and kept as
slaves who (in European traditions) were spared their lives in return for service owed their
captors. Colonial officials and religious leaders in both cases struggled with the juridical status of
Native captives—whether Native captives were slaves or servants. The distinction typically
involved the question of whether servants could be purchased or sold. In the Iberian world this
process revolved around the concept of resgate/rescate “ransom” or the purchase of a Native
captive from other Natives to save the captive’s life in return for their obligatory service.16

While jurists and theologians debated the legality and morality of the colonial
enslavement of Natives, colonists and Natives found the exchange of Native captives with
colonists profitable. In Southeastern Brazil Natives exchanged captives for European metalware,

16 The employment of concepts of “Just War,” resgate, and the legalities of Native slavery in
Carolina and São Paulo will be discussed further in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. For explanations of
the process of resgate and the taking of captives in just wars in the Iberian world see: David J.
Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005) and Andrés Reséndez, The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of
Indian Enslavement in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016). For the analysis of
the changes in the enslavement of Native peoples in the Iberian Atlantic with the passage of the
New Laws in 1542 see Nancy E. van Deusen, Global Indios: The Indigenous Struggle for Justice
in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015). For discussions of the
legality of the enslavement of Natives in Brazil see Metcalf, “The Entradas of Bahia of the
Sixteenth Century,” The Americas 61, n. 3 (January 2005): 373–400; Stuart B. Schwartz,
Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its Judges, 1609–1751
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) 122–139; José de Alcântara Machado, Vida e
Morte do Bandeirante (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1972) 157–173. For discussions of
the legality of Native slavery and just wars in English North America see Alan Gallay, The
Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717 (New
cloth, and eventually occasional firearms. In the 1615 inventory of Francisco Ribeiro, resident of São Paulo, he listed six pairs of scissors and nine combs specifically for “resgate” (ransom or barter) in the sertão (interior) of Brazil. In the same inventory Ribeiro listed 31 enslaved Natives designated as being “Tememinós,” “Goamemins,” and “Carijós.” In North America, Native communities like the Westo and Yamasee developed strategies of exchanging Native captives and animal furs with colonists for firearms, as well as for European cloth and wares. The Carolinian trader Thomas Nairne described slaving among the Chickasaw in 1708. Nairne stated that, along with the honor of taking captives, the exchange of “one slave brings a Gun, ammunition, horse, hatchet, and a suit of Cloathes, which would not be procured without much tedious toil a hunting.” Colonial authorities frequently outlawed the enslavement of Natives and placed restrictions on how Natives could be enslaved, but as long as Natives saw slaving

20 Thomas Nairne, Nairne’s Muskhogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition to the Mississippi River (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988) 47.
strategies as profitable and colonists were willing to acquire Native laborers for their own gain. The trade continued.

The distinction between the legality of Native enslavement and the reality of the Native slave trade underscores the importance Native actors played in the development and expansion of the Native slave trade. In both the interiors of São Paulo and Carolina, over the course of the seventeenth century, Native actors developed slaving strategies that helped them survive the chaos, violence, and demographic collapse precipitated by war and disease that came with European colonization.21 As I argue in this dissertation, Native priorities and decisions need to be prioritized when considering how the Native slave trades in Brazil and North America expanded. Native actors were not duped into enslaving other Natives. Native peoples transformed practices of Native captivity to fit their own needs and demands and to gain what they could from colonists. Natives shaped and determined the distinctions of who was enslaved, how they were enslaved, and who was traded to Europeans and who were kept as dependents.

This should be of no surprise to scholars of slavery in the Atlantic. As scholars of slavery in Africa have already shown, Africans determined the nature of the African slave trade and which Africans were sold into the Atlantic. Miller highlights this aspect of the African slave trade by demonstrating the marginal position of the Portuguese during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.22 The priorities, demands, and influence of Africans in the African slave trade can be seen through analyses of the practices of slaving and slavery among the Jaga or Imbangala, the Kingdom of the Kongo, and Mbundu of West Central Africa, as well as the

Asante, Dahomey, and Kaabu in West Africa, to name only a few examples. In John Thornton’s analysis, “Europeans did not possess the military power to force Africans to participate in any type of trade in which their leaders did not wish to engage. Therefore all African trade with the Atlantic, including the slave trade, had to be voluntary.” As Africans shaped and determined the African slave trade, so too did Native peoples of the Americas shaped the Native slave trade.

This dissertation builds on the work of those scholars of Africa, particularly Joseph C. Miller’s articulation of a well-known Africanist aphorism that wealth in people motivated slaving strategies. Leaders in a real and symbolic sense acquired more power and prestige with the number of dependents they had access to. Dependents could be free or enslaved, consanguineal or affinal kin, or fall into the myriad categories that overlapped and blurred those binaries. The concept of wealth in people made slaving an advantageous strategy for marginal actors to pursue to attempt to create dependents. We can see the concept of wealth in people applied in the Americas as Tupi headmen acquired captive Native women as concubines or wives. Women were more valuable as captives because of their reproductive capacity as both

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producers and reproducers. The tendency to adopt women and children into Native North American societies also follows these patterns. Slavers could create dependents, and thus power through slaving. Additionally, slaving provided the prestige of captive-taking through military victory but also through the goods that Europeans exchanged for captives. A headman who could provide his clan and people with European goods could attract more warriors and ask for more service and favors from those clients. Thus, slaving as a strategy provided marginal Native peoples and groups with the ability to create dependents through slaving, the power of military victories, and the value of European goods that enslaved Natives were exchanged for.

In the context of the Americas, wealth in people became particularly acute because of Native population decline. Moreover these demographic losses were intensified by what Robbie Ethridge termed the “Mississippian Shatter Zone” in the North American Mississippian context. Shatter zones are meant to depict “large regions of instability from which shockwaves radiate out for sometimes hundreds and hundreds of miles.” These shock waves in seventeenth century Native America consisted of the convergence of: the “structural instability” of Mississippian chiefdoms, demographic decline due to the introduction of Old World diseases, the emergence of “nascent capitalist economic systems” through the development of the Native slave trade, and “the intensification and spread of violence” because of “the emergence of militaristic Native salving societies.” Ethridge’s shatter zone is a useful analytical framework for viewing slaving in the Americas, because it conceptualizes a space for understanding the effects of

26 Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History, 91; Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 54, 237–239. 
27 Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement, 106–108. 
28 Ethridge, “Creating the Shatter Zone,” 207–217; Ethridge, “Introduction: Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone,” 2–4; Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 4–5. 
29 Ethridge, “Creating the Shatter Zone,” 208. 
30 Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 4.
colonialism in the interior of Native America far beyond the colonial gaze. The shatter zone also grapples with the destructive and regenerative nature of the transformation of Native societies after the first century of sustained contact. In Brazil and North America, the timelines of sustained contact look different, but it needs to be remembered that Hernando de Soto was traversing the North American Southeast in the same decade (1530s) that Martim Afonso de Sousa established Brazil’s first colony. In the wake of European colonization, Native peoples were forced to adapt to their new realities, and they did so in Native ways focused on Native priorities. Framing these new challenges, transformations, and opportunities from the perspective of Natives allows scholars to see how Native peoples influenced and shaped their own world in distinctly Native ways.

I see Native slaving strategies and the creation of Native slaving societies in the interiors of São Paulo and Carolina as distinctly Native responses, adaptations, and innovations to the chaos and turmoil of the seventeenth century. One of those strategies was the process of coalescence that went hand in hand with slaving. Native peoples created strategies of cooperation, integration, and coalescence that over the course of the seventeenth century would develop into distinct ethnic groups and polities. Coalescence involved migratory, relocated, or refugee Native groups that consolidated together for survival. Sometimes these coalescences were done on a complementary level and at other points with clear power disparities between groups. The Yamasee and proto-Creeks are two examples from Native North America, whereas the Tupi communities who slaved alongside the Paulistas in the 1630s and the enslaved Guaraní Carijó communities are examples of two coalescent peoples from southeastern Brazil. John E. Worth argues that a process of “aggregation” occurred when refugee and immigrant Native

31 St. Augustine in Florida was founded in 1565 and São Paulo was founded in 1554.
groups attached themselves to pre-existing polities, typically as subordinate groups. These groups persisted as lineages within the dominant group or sometimes as newly adopted clans within those groups. Some scholars suggest that the variances in clan structures across southeastern North American groups can be explained by the aggregation of outside groups as new clans within the pre-existing clan structures. The Yamasee, Westo, Savannah Shawnee, and others were aggregated into the emerging Creeks in this manner, either as separate towns or possibly even as distinct clans.

Native slaving societies transformed Native communities by creating new networks, communities, polities, and problems. But, as shown by the descriptions of deserted Native towns and villages in the maps (Figures 1 and 2), the Native slave trade had devastating demographic effects on the Native populations of the North American Southeast and the interiors of Guairá, São Paulo, and what would become the states of Minas Gerais, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás. Examining the development of slaving strategies in São Paulo and Carolina demonstrates the Native influences on the colonial expansion of Brazil and North America. Yet, Brazil and Carolina were very different contexts and cases. The Native and

colonial peoples of Brazil and Carolina, the physical and geopolitical environments, and the historical timelines were all different. So why compare these two cases and how?

Despite Miller’s arguments about the inherent abstraction and ahistorical nature of comparisons of slavery, I see value in comparing the development of slaving strategies and societies in Carolina and Brazil. By examining slaving strategies, the categories of analysis are processes that were historically contingent. Their development depended upon the changing contexts of the seventeenth century America. Furthermore, focusing on Native slaving strategies and their co-optation by colonists problematizes the false binary of enslaved versus free. The variety of methods of procurement of captives, the often illegality of their statuses as slaves, and the influence of Native conceptions of bondage problematize the dichotomy of slave versus free.

The usefulness of comparing the development of slaving societies in São Paulo and Carolina can be seen in the historical and colonial trajectories of both cases. Between 1750 and 1850, São Paulo and Carolina would become leading entrepots of the importation and exploitation of enslaved people of African and African descent. Rice cultivation and then cotton provided the impetus for the economic expansion of Carolina. After the discoveries of mineral wealth in what would become Minas Gerais led to the increased importation of enslaved

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35 Miller argued in order to perform a formal comparison, scholars needed to “compare like contest with like context, and circumstances in Brazil and North America did not correspond remotely to this logical premise, either internally or over time.” I argue that when historical contexts are considered the comparison of different contexts demonstrates and historical trajectories reveals the fluid, historically contingent Nature of slavery. With that said, Miller also objected to the comparison of slavery as abstracted institutions, and not slaving as a historicized strategy which he was a proponent of. Miller, *The Problem of Slavery as History*, 20–24, 121–125, quotation on 121.

Africans, São Paulo was one of the leading coffee-producers in the world by the mid-nineteenth century. But between 1615 and 1700 for São Paulo, and 1670 to 1715 for Carolina, both colonies were on the margins of Portuguese and English colonial projects. They were peripheral frontier colonies. But in those contexts, both societies developed slaving societies that co-opted Native slaving strategies to produce wealth in people as slave societies dependent upon the labor of enslaved Natives. São Paulo and Carolina demonstrate the colonial pattern for frontier colonies where there was limited access to merchants and capital that could have provided enslaved laborers from Africa.\(^{37}\) The racialization of slavery in both colonies followed a pattern that created flattened-out Native identities as “Indians,” that then further generalized enslaved status onto blackness with the introduction of enslaved Africans. Furthermore, in the fluidity of Native bondage in which the status of Natives as slaves was often illegal, colonists created new structures of servitude where the legal status of those Natives was intentionally blurred. But comparing the two cases demonstrates how that fluid enslaved status of Natives hardened over time and paralleled the racialization of slavery.

For Native peoples in both cases the destruction and dispossession of Native populations created coalescent and aggregate Native populations that came to be considered ethnic categories or polities. The Creek confederacy in its ethnic diversity came to be seen as a collective Nation despite its emergent as a coalescent slaving polity based around the towns of Coweta and

Cusseta. The ethnonym (or misnomer) of a generalized Tupi-Guarani identity in Brazil developed out of the coalescence of enslaved Native populations in colonial contexts. Furthermore, slaving created the networks that exacerbated the dispossession of Native peoples through cycles of indebtedness and dependence upon European goods. In Brazil, slaving continued as a frontier strategy through the nineteenth century and arguably till today. In Carolina, the Yamasee War of 1715 ended brought on the end of the Native slave trade but created the networks of economic dependence upon Europeans that would continue to be exploited in the deerskin trade. Furthermore, in both cases the transition from Native slavery to the dependence upon the enslavement of Africans and people of African descent led to the conflation of slavery, and the enslaved, with blackness. The future trajectory of slavery in both Brazil and North America was directly shaped by the Native slave trade.

I am not the first to suggest such a comparison. In a 2005 analysis of the Native slave trade in the Amazon, Barbara Sommer suggested the comparison between the Native slave trade in the Amazon and São Paulo with the southern English colonies in North America, arguing the case was similar because “shifting alliances and warfare were used to obtain captives and where allies could become slaves when links to the interior broke down.” Sommer’s argument about the fluidity of alliance structures and how Native peoples adapted slaving strategies at the expense of others can be seen in the analysis of the Westo, Savanna Shawnee, and Yamasee in chapter 4.

The English, Spanish, and Portuguese language sources analyzed in this dissertation differ in significant ways but are not as disparate as the contexts of the two cases might suggest.

The council minutes from the town council of São Paulo and the Carolina Commons House of Assembly provide much of the basis of the analysis throughout the dissertation. These sources illustrate the quotidian activities of the local governments over time, but they also focus occasionally on exceptional historical events. They read as local bureaucratic colonial documents that served the interests of local elites. They are most illuminating on the conflicts between local elites and their control over the local government. Letters and official orders from colonial officials higher up than the town council provide more insight. They reveal differences in priorities on the local and imperial levels and shed light on issues in dispute.

Despite the existence of numerous sources in both cases, there are important imbalances between what sources are available in Carolina and São Paulo and what those sources focus on. After the unsuccessful Dutch invasion of Northeastern Brazil in 1624 and the successful invasion in 1630, the records of the Brazilian colonial government remain focused on the war with the Dutch and less so on a peripheral space such as São Paulo. On the Carolina side, the published papers of Lord Shaftesbury, the proprietor most responsible for the founding of the colony, detail the interactions with Native peoples at the founding of the colony and are indispensable in understanding the first five years of Carolina. The published papers of the Lords Proprietors

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40 Many of these documents can be found in the published volumes of the Documentos Históricos: Provedoria da Fazenda Real de Santos (RJ) available online at the Hemeroteca Digital Brasileira, Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. http://hemerotecadigital.bn.br/acervo-digital/documentos-historicos/094536

from the British Public Records Office also provide detailed orders to Carolina officials as to how the Proprietors in England wanted the colony run on their behalf. These records are invaluable for the first two decades after the establishment of the Carolina colony in 1670. However, these records demonstrate the desires of colonial officials in the metropole who were often left in the dark by colonists on the ground. By the 1690s colonial officials were actively flouting the will of the Lords Proprietors with very little recourse available to the Lords in response. The records can be interesting for an analysis of land grants, laws passed, and offices bestowed, but by the eighteenth century it becomes clear the Proprietors were either by design or by negligence aloof to the goings on in Carolina. For example, the records are silent for years about James Moore’s 1704 attack on the Spanish missions of Apalachee.42

In Carolina, the official colonial records pertain to the world as seen through the eyes of the Proprietors in London, the officials in Carolina they appointed, or those actively trying to deceive them. Here, the narratives of individual colonists become increasingly valuable, especially as they pertain to relations with Native peoples and the Native slave trade.43 These

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*Proprietary Colony, 1663–1721* (Columbia, S. Car.: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1995).


narratives give details about the happenings in the interior of Carolina that colonial officials either were unaware of or chose not to record.

In a similar fashion, the Spanish records from Florida as well as Guairá, Paraguay, and the Rio de la Plata provide some of the best details about Native activities in the region and especially attacks against Spanish missions. The Spanish records in Florida come from colonial officials but provide better access to Native accounts and perspectives than do English sources. The accounts of Franciscan missionaries in Florida recorded detailed accounts of mission life and the larger Native societies of Florida. In Guairá, Paraguay, and the Rio de la Plata the sources come from Spanish officials, but mostly from the Jesuits running the mission systems. In both cases the Jesuit, Franciscan, and Spanish colonial officials recorded in detail the attacks against the Spanish missions by Native peoples and the English and Portuguese. These sources still convey the views of colonists and missionaries, and in spite of their colonial gaze, they provide some of the best evidence available to understand Native life during the period.

One key difference in the sources available for Carolina and São Paulo are the forty-seven published volumes of wills and inventories from São Paulo. The wills include detailed

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accountings of the internal social and familial networks of the residents of São Paulo, known as Paulistas, often indicating their motivations and rationales for actions taken. Furthermore, the post-mortem property inventories convey the socio-economic, financial, and material cultural details of life in São Paulo in the seventeenth century. Taken together, the wills and inventories demonstrate the slaving strategies implemented by Paulistas, as well as their effects on life in São Paulo, and the changing legal categories and practices used to define enslaved Natives. They also provide extensive demographic and familial data on enslaved people of Native and African descent. The wills and inventories can be used to piece together what life on a Paulista estate looked like and the lived experiences of the enslaved.

When analyzed together, the colonial sources from Carolina and São Paulo, as well as from the neighboring regions of Florida and Guairá, allow for a triangulation of sources; that makes it possible to understand historical development and change over the seventeenth century. For the Portuguese and English sources there are corresponding Spanish sources. Many of the slaving raids, conducted by Natives or colonists show up in one set of sources or the other. Larger raids and historical events show up in both sources. This allows the contexts to be understood from the perspective of colonists who were enslaving Natives and those—like the Jesuits and Franciscans—defending against the enslavement of Natives. Additionally, the use of the wills and inventories of São Paulo reveal details absent from the scant documentation in the probate records of Carolina. The reason for the absence of details about enslaved Natives becomes clearer when considering the illegality of the enslavement of certain Natives and the prohibitions against their sale out of Carolina. What remains hidden in official records for São Paulo and Carolina can be revealed in the Spanish sources. The use of Spanish sources to
corroborate the English and Portuguese sources helps the task of comparing Carolina and São Paulo.

Moreover, when those colonial sources are combined with ethnohistorical and cultural research for Native peoples it allows for the interpretation of events among Native peoples in the interior, beyond the colonial gaze. Understanding Tupi motivations for enslaving the Guarani inhabitants of the Spanish missions becomes only possible through reading both the Portuguese and Spanish sources. Similarly, understanding Yamasee coalescence into a slaving polity becomes clearer when we understand their contentious relationship with Spanish missionaries and the attraction of English traders. Understanding who the Westo were only remains possible through combining ethnohistorical research with French, Dutch, Spanish, and English colonial sources. It remains possible—and necessary—to analyze colonial documents to understand Natives’ lived experiences, their priorities, and decisions without privileging the perspectives of colonists.47

Here it is important to note that throughout the dissertation I make a concerted effort to highlight the voices and actions of Native and enslaved peoples wherever I can—to understand their motivations and lived experiences. This dissertation is about Native priorities, decisions, actions, experiences, and influences. However, based on the available source base, this is not an easy task. The sources are riddled with accounts and reasoning that project colonial desires and

epistemologies onto Native peoples. I try throughout this work to highlight the most egregious of those cases where I can. I also try to highlight specific details about Native peoples. Native and colonial slaving, the enslavement of Natives, and the Native slave trade had vast consequences on the lives of slavers and the enslaved alike. At times, where the sources allow, I make an effort to show the humanity of both slavers and the enslaved. This is an intentional attempt to focus on the lived experiences of Native slavers and the enslaved as well as to move beyond generalizations about these historical actors often found in the literature.

This endeavor is perhaps made more difficult by my own choice to use the term Native consistently throughout the work to describe Native American, Amerindian, American Indian, Aboriginal, and Indigenous peoples of the Americas. Wherever I can I try to be as specific as possible about which Native groups are being discussed and when. However, due to the intentional effort on the part of colonists to categorize Native peoples as a collective, it often remains unclear in the sources as to which Native peoples are being considered. For the Westo for example, there is still some doubt as to what they called themselves. Furthermore, the indiscriminate employment by the Jesuits, Franciscans, and colonial officials of misnomers and ethnonyms such as “Tupi” or “Chichimeco” underscores the historicized nature of the terms in question. In the sources we often do not know who the Native person being referred to was or anything about their background. The colonial naming of people and places had a generalizing, flattening-out effect, that created collectivities from peoples who often had no reason to see

48 These terms contain histories and politics of representation and colonization, autonomy and self-identification with imposition and categorization. In Brazilian Portuguese and Latin American Spanish, the accepted terminology for indigenous peoples of the Americas that has come to be employed is indígena/o. In the United States and Canada, there is disagreement between the use of indigenous, Native American, American Indian, and First Nations. These debates are ongoing and necessary.

themselves as such. I am forced to use a generalized flattened out identity—Native—because I do not know the ethnic, demographic, or political identification of the person in question. I refrain from employing the term Indigenous alone to prevent confusion with global indigeneity and the conflation of peoples indigenous to a region of the Americas with Indigenous peoples of the Americas. For example, the people known as the Westo were Indigenous to North America but were not indigenous to the North American South when they migrated there in the 1660s. The most appropriate term I could use to describe people indigenous to Native North and South America would be Native American, American Indian, and Indigenous peoples. However, I have decided to shorten that term to Natives and apply it throughout.

“The Development of Slaving Societies in the Americas: Marginal Native and Colonial Slavers in São Paulo and Carolina, 1614–1715” consists of six chapters structured in three parts. Each part of the dissertation contains two chapters on the development of Native slaving and the Native slave trade: one in São Paulo and one in Carolina. This dual structure allows for parallel views of the development of slaving strategies and slaving societies in each locale separately while drawing inferences from the comparisons and previous chapters. In order to reorient the reader in each locale between chapters, each chapter begins with brief descriptive vignette of slaving. Part I “Native Enslavement and Native Slave Trades” focuses on how Native priorities and decisions influenced slaving strategies and the creation of each locale’s respective Native slave trades. 

Chapter 1: “Malocas, Paulistas, and Tupi Pombeiros—The Development of the Native Slave Trade in São Paulo”
Trade in Southeastern Brazil, 1560–1630,” analyzes how Native middlemen adapted Native captivity practices to create a Native slave trade to supply Brazilian colonists with enslaved Natives. Chapter 2 entitled “‘Striped Indians’ and Slaving Monopolies: Ethnogenesis and Competition in the Seventeenth-Century North American Southeast,” focuses on how the arrival of the Westo in the North American Southeast created the Native slave trade. The Westo strategy of attempting to create a monopoly over the slave trade in the South fueled competition over the trade and its expansion.

Part II “Adaptation and Expansion of Native Slaving,” focuses on how Native peoples adapted and innovated slaving strategies over time not only to survive but also to profit. These adaptations and their co-optation by Carolina and Paulista colonists led to the further expansion of slaving and the Native slave trade. Chapter 3: “Enslaved Soldiers, Paraná Contraband, and the 1628 Bandeira,” examines the development in São Paulo of “enslaved” soldiers who slaved alongside Paulista colonists. The chapter charts the spread of slaving and its culmination with the infamous 1628 bandeira slave raid against the Spanish missions of Guairá. Chapter 4: “‘Wee have set them on worke to doe all these horrid wicked things to get slaves to sell yᵉ dealers in Indians’: Native Competition and the Spread of Slaving in Carolina, 1680 to 1706,” examines the development of distinctive Native slaving strategies by the Westo, Savanna Shawnee, and Yamasee in Southeastern North America. The adoption and adaptation of slaving strategies in the Southeast demonstrates how pervasive slaving became by the turn of the eighteenth century, and howslaving had become a survival strategy for Native groups of Southeastern North America.

Part III, “Coalescence and Consequences,” charts the changes in slaving and consequences after the major expansion of Native slaving in São Paulo in the 1630s and 1640s, and in Carolina at the turn of the eighteenth century. Chapter 5 entitled “The Business of the Land: the Spread of
Slaving into the Interior of Brazil,” maps the change of slaving strategies toward smaller expeditions that targeted Native communities further into the western and northern interior of Brazil. The chapter also demonstrates the parallel hardening of enslaved statuses of Natives with the beginning racialization of Native peoples as a generalized servant class in São Paulo. Chapter 6: “‘All the Damages and atrocities of which they are capable of’: The Rise of Coweta and Cusseta and the Destruction of the Florida Mission System,” focuses on how Coweta and Cusseta developed as slaving societies that used coalescence and slaving strategies to incorporate outsiders. The chapter further explores how that coalescence fueled the destruction of the Spanish Mission system and eventually led to the Yamasee War of 1715, which effectively led to the end of the Native slave trade in the North American Southeast.

The conclusion presents arguments as to what can be gained and lost by comparing the development of slaving strategies and slaving societies in Carolina and São Paulo. The conclusion focuses on how similar developments in Native slaving and the Native slave trades led to different outcomes. At issue is how the spread of slaving societies and the Native slave trade continued in Brazil as it spread alongside of and drove the expansion of colonial Brazil into the South American interior. However, the same expansion of slaving strategies in the North American context led to the end of the Native slave trade in the Southeast. The conclusion ends with considerations of the racialization of slavery in the Americas and what it means that racialization occurred first in São Paulo and Carolina with Native peoples and then came to tie bondage to blackness with the expansion of the importation of enslaved Africans in both locales in the eighteenth century.

The dissertation ends with a historiographical question and a challenge. What does the development of Native slaving societies and Native slave trades in seventeenth-century São Paulo and Carolina tell us about the Atlantic slave trade? How and why do scholars separate out the
enslavement of Natives and the enslavement of Africans and people African descent as different? I contend that by looking at the patterns of the development of slaving societies in the Americas indicates that the Native slave trade should be considered part of the Atlantic slave trade. Both trades were driven by the adaptation and co-optation of indigenous slaving strategies in the Americas and in Africa, and both were fueled by colonial credit, goods, and demands for labor. We should not separate out the enslavement of Native peoples and peoples of African descent based upon racial categories that were created during the development of the Atlantic slave trade. Comparing slaving strategies and the development of slaving societies in Carolina and Brazil throws a wrench into that historiographical divide and offers new ways of thinking about the development of slaving, slavery, and slave trades in the Americas and the Atlantic World.
Part I: Native Enslavement and Native Slave Trades
In February of 1614, Jesuit Father Joseph Cataldino informed Captain Thomas de Naxara, the Lieutenant Governor and Justicia Mayor of Santa Fe de la Vera Cruz, about the creation of four reductions (mission villages) in the region of Guairá. Cataldino reported that there were four Jesuits in the Guairá reductions with more than 1,500 “tribute Indians” who had been “reduced, and taught, and baptized by the said four fathers.” With this report about the success of the four Jesuits in converting the Native populace, Cataldino spelled out three challenges to the reductions: “defending them from the Portuguese and malocas [Native raids] and bringing them [the Natives] out of the mountains so that they keep the faith.”

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51 Cataldino gave this testimony to Lt. Gov. Naxara to give to Royal officials in Buenos Aires, to inform the court of King Philip III. “Informe Sôbre a Fundação das Reduções do Guairá, Feita à Pedido do Respectivo Superior Padre Joseph Cataldino,” Sante Fé, February 2, 1614. Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá (1594–1640), Ed. Jaime Cortesão, Vol. I of Manuscritos da Coleção de Angelis (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil, 1951) 148–154. While the Jesuits wanted to create a new “culture” for the Natives they sought to convert, this was the point of the process of “reducing” them through indoctrination in the catholic catechism. The reduction redução/reducción was a village or settlement organized for the conversion of Natives to Christianity that was attended to varying degrees by a missionary. The process of “reduction” developed over time, and always was subject to historical contexts with specific cultural and social expressions. This process was never uniform and always fluid. However, the point of the reductions/missions/aldeias (towns) of the Jesuits and other religious orders was to bring Native peoples together to create Christian subjects. The Jesuits sought to reorganize Native life around Catholicism, which in effect disrupted Native cultural patterns and lifeways, also while often facilitating the spread of old world pathogens. For further analyses of the work of the Jesuits see: Alida C. Metcalf, "Jesuits in Brazil: Defining the Vision," in The Mercurian Project: Forming Jesuit Culture, 1573–1580. Ed., Thomas M. McCooog, S.J. (St. Louis, Missouri: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2004); Thomas M. Cohen, The Fire of Tongues: António Vieira and the Missionary Church in Brazil and Portugal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); for the reductions of Guairá see Guillermo Wilde, Religión y Poder en las misiones de Guaraníes (Buenos Aires: Editorial SB, 2009).

52 “Informe Sôbre a Fundação das Reduções do Guairá,” in Cortesão, Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá, 149.

unwittingly, Cataldino highlighted three strategies Natives developed in Southeastern Brazil and the Rio de la Plata region by the seventeenth century to counter the disruption caused by contact with Europeans. Natives turned to Jesuit missionaries like Cataldino and voluntarily moved to Jesuit run mission villages designed to “reduce” Natives into pliable catholic subjects. Native peoples could also flee to the mountains and forests, known as the sertão, away from the coasts and waterways where Portuguese and Spanish colonists and missionaries could be found. A third option involved violence. Native peoples made war against the colonial invaders and conducted raids against Natives allied with Europeans that became known as malocas or raids against Native communities by other Natives or colonists. Native peoples of Southeastern Brazil and the Rio de la Plata region applied all of these strategies at different points to counter the New World that had been created after contact with Europeans.

However, in 1614, the threats of violence against the newly constructed reductions in Guairá were not fueled by internecine conflict between Native groups. The Portuguese colonists of Brazil were preying on the Guairá reductions:

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54 The term maloca or malaoca had contextual meanings in colonial Latin America. It began as a term in Brazilian Portuguese or Spanish in the Rio de la Plata region which meant an “unexpected attack by Indians” from the Mapuche word Malocan “to make war, to fight.” Over time this term came to signify the dwellings of Native peoples and came to signify more broadly across South America “a large hut in certain Indian villages; the village itself.” "maloca, n.". OED Online. March 2020. Oxford University Press. https://www-oed.com.ezproxy.rice.edu/view/Entry/113021?redirectedFrom=maloca (accessed May 12, 2020). See also Gilberto Sánchez Cabezas, “Los mapuchismos en el DRAE,” Boletín de Filología 45, n. 2 (2010): 149–256.

the malocas come there [the reductions] from the province of Brazil, where the said Portuguese enemies are, where they kill them, and do many other bad treatments, robbing them and taking their children and their women from their birth[place] all against their will and sometimes this witness has seen it being [done] in the province of Guairá and the said coast of Brazil.56

As Cataldino made clear, the Portuguese were part of the malocas, and they were capturing and stealing women and children. Cataldino was describing the Portuguese colonial slave raids from Brazil against the Guairá reductions as early as 1614. These slave raids which at times involved Portuguese colonists, their Native allies, and other Natives who sought to trade with the Portuguese in Brazil, were all part of a larger Native slave trade that developed in Southeastern Brazil by the turn of the seventeenth century.

The Portuguese who attacked those reductions came from, “the province of Brazil and the town of São Paulo” and they came “to spoil the said repartimientos of the above reductions.”57 The repartimiento or “distribution” was the Spanish system for Indian draft labor that developed in colonial Spanish America.58 The Portuguese were not there to destroy the reductions and scatter the Native population, they were they to capture and enslave the Native labor force that lived on the reductions. Cataldino argued that if the Jesuits did not defend the Natives “there would be no Natives in the said province of Guayra, and all of them would have been taken

57 “Informe Sôbre a Fundação das Reduções do Guairá,” in Cortesão, Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá, 152.
58 In the repartimiento system “Indian communities filled a quota of laborers for a prescribed time.” Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, Colonial Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 139. Some scholars have described repartimiento as a system where “the Spaniards were able to divide up the Indians and to make use of them as though they were cattle,” Germán Arciniegas, Latin America: A Cultural History (London: Barrie & Rockcliff, 1969) 52. Both Spanish subjects and the Jesuits received grants of repartimientos through the royal governors. For example, in 1596 the Jesuits in Villa Rica were given a gift of 18 Natives in an encomienda. “Doação de 18 Yanaconas à casa e igreja da companhia de jesus de Vila Rica do Espírito Santo, Assunção, October, 9 1596” in Cortesão, Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá, 122.
against their will.” By 1614, the Portuguese colonists from São Paulo, known as Paulistas, had developed patterns of entering the interior of Brazil seeking Natives to enslave. These raids (called *entradas* or *saltos*) from São Paulo and other towns of the surrounding Piratininga plateau later became known as *bandeiras* and the men who participated in them as *bandeirantes*. By the first decades of the seventeenth century, the *bandeirantes* and their Native Tupinikin allies developed slaving societies that regularly sent slaving expeditions into the interior to enslave Natives. In the words of John Monteiro, “virtually every aspect of the formation of São Paulo during its first two centuries was tied in some fundamental way to the expropriation, exploitation, and destruction of indigenous populations.”

By the first decades of the seventeenth century, the Paulistas and their Native allies developed a slaving society based on slave raids into the interior to capture and enslave Native peoples to work the Paulista wheat farms and cattle ranches on the Piratininga plateau. The majority of enslaved Natives of São Paulo were not sold onto sugar plantations on the coast or into the Atlantic Slave trade, but were kept in São Paulo as farmers, ranchers, servants, and porters that carried goods across the *Serra do Mar* mountain range that separated São Paulo from the Atlantic coast. Here those enslaved people, created a new society and culture through the

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61 Enslaved Africans were present in every Portuguese American colony since their establishment. However, in the case of São Vicente, those enslaved Africans were fewer in number than in the Northeastern captaincies, and were largely restricted to certain sugar plantations on the coasts. Enslaved Africans were part of São Vicente society from the beginning, but because Paulistas of the Piratininga plateau neither produced significant staple crops nor mined mineral wealth, enslaving Natives became the path to wealth for the Paulistas.
coalescence of diverse Native peoples in Paulista society. The Paulistas came to call those people *Carijós.*

As this chapter will show, the Paulista communities of slavers and enslaved that developed by beginning of the seventeenth century emerged from Native practices of captivity, warfare, and social relations. The first Portuguese settlers and families that inhabited the Piratininga plateau came to adopt Native practices, spoke a native Tupi-Guarani *lingua-geral,* and ate mostly Native diets. This resulted in the creation of a frontier *mameluco* (of Native and European descent) slaving society and an enslaved Native *Carijó* ethnicity that was forced upon the mostly enslaved Tupi-Guarani Native population of the region as well. Who and how the Paulistas targeted Native people to enslave developed from Native practices of internecine warfare and that developing slave trade expanded as demands for enslaved captives increased. Previous scholars have shown the ways that Paulista society developed from a slaving society to a slave society. In this chapter, I explain how a mostly Native-driven economy of slaving developed in the Brazilian *sertão* (interior) to provide the enslaved Natives for the Portuguese on the coasts. These Native *pombeiros* or *mus* as they were sometimes called, developed strategies of slaving in the Brazilian *sertão* to exploit the Portuguese colonists’ needs for labor. However,

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64 *Pombeiro* was a term for local traders who operated in the interior of Angola and the Kongo who exchanged goods, including enslaved people, between the interior and the Portuguese and other Europeans on the coasts. *Mus* is a term of unknown origin which designated a middleman trader in Southern Brazil. Both terms will be defined more thoroughly below.
as the captaincy expanded into the interior and the need for enslaved laborers increased, Paulistas began to use the power of the local colonial state to justify and outfit the infamous large-scale *bandeiras* of the first half of the seventeenth century.

This chapter will follow the development of the Native slave trade in southern Brazil from Native captivity practices through the Portuguese exploitation of internecine conflicts to the creation of Native middlemen slavers in the *sertão*. Competition over how to manage Native laborers, led to conflict between Portuguese colonists and the Jesuits over Native raids into the interior and the legalities of enslaving Natives. But by the first decades of the seventeenth century, Native *pombeiro/mus* middlemen emerged as the intermediary slave traders in an existing interior slave trade that followed Native practices. As I argue, the co-optation of Native slaving practices created a Brazilian shatter zone of expanding violence and slaving that moved far beyond the loci of European contacts with Natives.65

Similar to what occurred in New Spain and elsewhere in colonial America, Portuguese colonists exploited Native captivity practices and cannibalism to justify the *resgate* (ransom) of Native captives to save them from being sacrificed by their Native captors. Colonists kept those—and other Native captives taken in so called Just Wars—as slaves in return for their salvation. As conflicts between Native peoples expanded to include the Portuguese, Just Wars became pathways toward the capture and enslavement of Native enemies. These legal justifications for the enslavement of Natives created the framework for a captivity trade that developed where marginal actors began to provide Portuguese colonists with enslaved Natives in exchange for European goods. These marginal actors were often Native men or *mamelucos* who

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65 Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, *Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). The details of the shatter zone as a concept will be explained below.
worked as intermediary go-betweens among Native and colonial communities.\textsuperscript{66} They used their positions in both societies to create connections that fostered the development of a Native slave trade. As shown by Cataldino’s efforts in 1614, Jesuits tried to prevent the development of the Native slave trade, but colonists saw it as a way to create wealth in people as dependents in the absence of valuable cash crops.\textsuperscript{67}

\textit{Figure 3: Map of Southern Brazil and the Upper Paraná River Valley. European settlements are underlined in black with Rio de Janeiro (labeled São Sebastian) in the Upper right corner then moving to the left: São Paulo, Santos, Villa Rica, and Ciudad Real de Guayrá. The names of certain Native groups are underlined, and the important river names are designated in grey.}

\textsuperscript{66} The development of the concept of Just Wars will be defined further below. For the role of go-betweens in the Native and African slave trades in Brazil see Metcalf, \textit{Go-betweens}, 157–194.

\textsuperscript{67} Modified from a fragment of a map by Arnoldus Montanus, “Paraquaria Vulgo Paraguay Cum Adjacentibus” 1671, (London: John Ogilby) in David Rumsey Historical Map Collection. https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~292987~90066917:Paraquaria-Vulgo-Paraguay-Cum-adjac?sort=Pub_List_No_InitialSort%2CPub_Date%2CPub_List_No%2CSeries_No#
From the middle of the sixteenth century to end of the seventeenth century, the upper Paraná River valley, from at least the Paranaiba to the head waters of the Tibagi and Iguazu Rivers, developed into what could be called a shatter zone. Anthropologist Robbie Ethridge uses the concept of the shatter zone as an analytical framework to explain the way the interconnected North American Mississippian World was transformed due to the historical contexts of the late sixteenth century to the early eighteenth century. While Ethridge used the idea to explain a specific time and place, the concept of a shatter zone helps reconceptualize the vast consequences that contact, the spread of disease, warfare, slaving, and the development of a capitalistic market economy had on the Native communities of Brazil. The shatter zone is not meant to depict pieces of shattered glass breaking away from a defined uniform whole, but rather cracks in the glass that began at a certain point of contact and reverberated beyond that specific locale. This can be a useful analogy in thinking about what occurred in Native communities beyond the gaze of colonial documents. Where contact points occurred, they were often documented, but the reverberating cracks continued far beyond what was written down by colonists.

Contact with Europeans disrupted Native societies. Specifically, for the Tupi-speaking peoples of the Brazilian coast, including the Tupinikin, Tememinó, Tupinaé, and Tupinambá, the important leadership roles of headmen and priests, and the importance of warriors and conflict to memory and identity, led to Native responses to European contact that both aided and resisted conquest, but also facilitated survival, coalescence, and demographic collapse. The importance

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68 Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, for a definition of the Mississippian shatter zone see pages 4-5.
69 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 8–9; Monteiro, “Tupis, Tapuia’s and Historiadores,” 24; John Manuel Monteiro, “Os Guaraní e a história do Brasil meridional: séculos XVI-XVII” in História dos índios no Brasil, (org.) Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, 2a edição (São Paulo:
of conflict and vengeance in the Tupi warrior complex led numerous Tupi groups to ally themselves with Europeans, in order to gain an advantage over their own Native enemies. The Portuguese found it advantageous to exploit those internecine conflicts.

Monteiro was critical of the separation of religious and political (read military) analyses of Tupi and Guarani societies. For Monteiro “a large part of the ‘differences’ existing between the Guarani and the Tupi of the coast comes from a question of approach: if for ethnology war was the engine of Tupinambá society, Guarani studies emphasize religion as a unifying element.” Monteiro argued that in this case some of the blame “for this selective approach,” was due to “ethnographic projection.” Monteiro, “Os Guarani e a história do Brasil meridional,” 480–481.

Numerous scholars have tried to comprehend the Tupi warrior complex and the place in Tupi society of headmen, priests, vengeance and anthropophagy. Pierre Clastres argued that Tupi headmen were in the process of consolidating power over Tupi societies at contact with Europeans. Clastres, saw the state as control over violence and because Tupi headmen could not maintain that control, they were subverted by prophetic Native priests that called the Tupi to migrate in search of the “land without evil.” Pierre Clastres, A sociedade contra o estado (investigações de antropologia política) (Porto: Afrontamento, 1979). Hélène Clastres argued that in the context of this internal crisis in Tupi-Guarani societies, the Karai (the prophets of the jungle) reminded the Tupi-Guarani people of their myths and heroes and encouraged them to abandon the aldeias and villages to head into the mountains and forests of the interior. Hélène Clastres, La terre sans mal: le prophetisme tupi-guarani (Paris: Seuil, 1975). However, other scholars countered that Clastres placed too much significance on the separation between headmen/warriors and the Native priests. Renato Sztutman argued that in Tupi-Guarani cosmology it made no sense to separate those positions between religious and political leadership as may occur in secularized western thought, that: “what feeds them agency is precisely this ability to aggregate relationships, whether in the world of enmity, in the world of foreignness, or in the world of supernaturality.” Renato Sztutman, "O profeta e o principal: a ação política ameríndia e seus personagens” (Tese de doutorado, Universidade de São Paulo, 2005) 28. Carlos Fausto argued that the Clastres overemphasized the “search for the ‘land without evil’ and forgot about xamanism.” Fausto argued that contact with Europeans had a direct effect on Tupi shamanism that began to blame deaths and epidemics on the new Christians and baptisms, and thus the Native priests encouraged people to abandon the missions and aldeias. Fausto, “Fragmentos de história e cultura Tupinambá,” in Cunha, História dos Índios no Brasil, 385–387, quotation on 386. Manuela Carneiro da Cunha and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro saw revenge, and its guarantee of social memory between enemy groups, as the institution that determined Tupi society. Cannibalism was only a single factor within the spiral of vengeance conflicts, but it guaranteed social memory, identity, and a connection between the dead of the past and the dead of the future, through the living. Manuela L. Carneiro da Cunha and Eduardo B. Viveiros de Castro, “Vingança e temporalidade: os Tupinamba,” Journal de la Société des américanistes 71 (1985): 191–208. I find the evidence presented to support the conclusions of da Cunha, Castro, and Sztutman that scholars have imposed western ontologies and cosmologies...
Competition over Native Labor: The Jesuits and the Slavers

Although Cabral landed on the Brazilian coast in 1500, the Portuguese did not attempt to seriously colonize Brazil until the 1530s after the Spanish and French began to also show interest in establishing themselves in Brazil. Between 1531–1532, at the behest of the Portuguese crown, Martim Afonso de Sousa established colonists on the island that became known as Ilha de São Vicente off the coast of the present-day state of São Paulo. As the colonists moved inland, they were fortunate enough to come into contact with a Portuguese sailor or convict named, João Ramalho, who had been either abandoned or shipwrecked on the coast of Brazil between 1511 and 1513 and established himself among a Native group of Tupinikin who lived on the Piratininga plateau above the coastal escarpment. Ramalho married a Native woman named Bartira, who was the daughter of the Tupinikin head man, Tibiriça. Ramalho fully incorporated into the community—which allowed him to intercede on the behalf of the Portuguese colonists on the coast and create an alliance with Martim Afonso. In exchange for the Portuguese remaining on the coasts, Ramalho was given a monopoly over supplying the coastal colonist with enslaved Native captives. The first alliance in what became the captaincy of São Vicente established the precedent for the colonization of the rest of the Plateau: the Portuguese

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Metcalf argues that Ramalho’s marriage to Bartira was never recognized by the Catholic church and that Ramalho maintained relationships with other Native women. Metcalf also contends that Ramalho’s relationship with Bartira allowed him to gain the status and prestige of a Tupinikin headman over time. I argue that while Ramalho’s relationship with Bartira was not recognized as a Catholic marriage, the conveyance of power through the relationship suggests that the relationship abided by existing Native customs of marriage rather than those of Catholic Europeans. Metcalf, *Go-between*, 85–86; Metcalf, *Family and Frontier*, 28–30; Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 17; Mário Neme, *Notas de Revisão da História de São Paulo: Século XVI* (São Paulo: Editôra Anhambi, 1959) 44–57, 135–143, 157–209.
encouraged internecine Native conflicts so that their allies could supply them with enslaved Natives.

The Portuguese developed this trading and diplomatic strategy of colonization while reconnoitering along the coast of Africa since the middle of the fifteenth century. In order to facilitate future communication and trade, the Portuguese seized children to raise as interpreters or left behind European men who were thought to be expendable—such as degredados (criminal exiles). In order to survive, these castaways were expected to establish themselves in local African communities and if they did, they and their children often became go-betweens and interpreters for the next stages of colonization and trade between Europeans and Africans. The Portuguese, and French, replicated this strategy along the coasts of Brazil (and elsewhere) after 1500, where they left European men to be incorporated into Native communities to facilitate the brazilwood trade. This strategy worked in the case of the colonists of São Vicente and João Ramalho in the 1530s.

By the middle of the 1540s the colonists of São Vicente began to expand beyond the coastal escarpment and up onto the Piratininga Plateau. By 1553, Father Manuel Nóbrega established a Jesuit mission at São Paulo among the Native Tupinikin community of João Ramalho’s father-in-law, Tibiriça, who converted to Catholicism and was baptized as Martim Afonso Tibiriça. The descendants of Tibiriça and João Ramalho would become some of the early colonial leaders in a community that was in many ways more Native than Portuguese. The region around the town of São Paulo emerged as a region of co-existence between independent Native villages which contained European men and their mameluco children and Jesuit mission

72 Metcalf, *Go-Betweens*, 20, 58–60.
villages which sought to “reduce” Natives peoples to Catholicism. São Paulo as a Native and
colonial community was built on providing Native captives and supplies to the larger colonial
settlements on the coast at São Vicente. This strategy encouraged violence among Native peoples
to provide those captives.

São Vicente and São Paulo became embroiled in larger colonial and Native conflicts
during this period. In the middle of the sixteenth century, certain Tupi-speaking groups, such as
the Tupinambá of the coasts of Rio de Janeiro and São Vicente and the Tupinikin of the
Piratininga Plateau of São Vicente, began to ally themselves with Europeans in their own
internecine conflicts. The introduction of colonial actors further intensified these wars. The
Tupinambá-led conflict against the Portuguese and their Tupinikin allies began in the 1540s as
the War of the Tamoios that lasted into the 1560s. From 1555–1567, desperate Tupinambá
villages banded together in the Confederation of the Tamoios to try to defeat the Portuguese. In
the middle of this devastating conflict, in 1554, when São Paulo was founded by the Jesuits, an
unknown plague began to spread among the Natives. In 1562 a smallpox epidemic ravaged the
new community on the Piratininga plateau. War, disease, and unrest caused by enslaving
captives in the War of Tamoios and Jesuit attempts to missionize the Native populations changed
Native lifeways.

For the Portuguese colonial project, what developed after the war of the Tamoios was a
competition over how to implement and administer Native laborers. In the Northeast of Brazil,

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74 Monteiro, _Blacks of the Land_, 8–22.
75 Metcalf, _Family and Frontier_, 36–37; Metcalf, _Go-between_, 119–156.
76 Metcalf, _Family and Frontier_, 38; Metcalf, _Go-between_, 119–156. See also: Aylton
77 The divide over how to administer Natives was not always a binary. The Jesuits supported and
allowed for the enslavement of Natives and Africans if it were done in a “just” manner. As
Monteiro showed, the founding Jesuits of São Paulo, Manuel de Nóbrega and Saint Joseph of
in Pernambuco and then Bahia, Portuguese settlers and Jesuits turned to enslaved Africans to provide that labor. In São Vicente, they turned to enslaved Natives. A competition over how to administer the Native laborers that saw two competing systems develop: colonial settlers largely advocated for enslaving Natives and the Jesuits advocated for what would become the mission *aldeia* system.  

However, alongside the competing interests of the colonizing settlers and Jesuits a slaving economy in the interior developed to supply the enslaved Natives to the colonial settlements on the Piratininga Plateau and the coast. Native peoples and *mameluco* colonial backwoodsmen began to enslave people. By the end of the sixteenth century, colonial demand outstripped the supply of enslaved Natives from the interior and the Portuguese settlers of São Vicente began conducting the infamous *bandeiras*. While the *bandeiras* had devastating consequences on the Native populations of the interior and the Guairá reductions, I argue that the Anchieta, were ambivalent toward the just enslavement of Natives if not sympathetic toward it. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 27. As will be discussed elsewhere the question remained what defined “just” enslavement.

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro argued that the word *aldeia* “should define only the human settlements of a particular Native community, formed according to its own choice, according to the ecological and social determinations of its culture, while *aldeamento* should be reserved for Native villages created under duress by civil and religious authorities, according to the needs of colonial logistics. Constructed according to regular plans, bringing together often displaced and different groups, located weeks of travel away, these *aldeamentos* were directed and supervised by the colonial administrative apparatus. These cannot, under any circumstances, be assimilated to the *Taba* of the Tupi or original *aldeias* of other communities.” *Taba* was the tupi name for their own villages. Here *aldeia* can have the specific meaning of a Native village, controlled and administered by Native, but also as any type of village. *Aldeamentos* were closer approximations to mission villages, reductions, or Indian towns in this sense. Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, “L’histoire des Amérindiens au Brésil”, *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 57 (maio 2002) 1327.

Monteiro defines *Mamaluco/a* or *mameluco/a* as the children of a “white father and Indian mother.” *Mamelucos* were the children of Native and European ancestry who were typically recognized by their fathers as their children, if not outright legitimate. The Portuguese used the term *bastardo*, for the children of Native and European ancestry they did not recognize as legitimate. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, xxx, 158–159.
Native slaving strategies and slave trade developed before—and would continue to be implemented after—the large scale *bandeira* slave raids from São Vicente.

In the 1560s the Jesuits founded three more mission villages near São Paulo: São Miguel, Nossa Senhora dos Pinheiros, and Itaquaquecetuba which administered mostly Tupinikin and Guaiáná Native peoples.\(^8^0\) Around 1580 the Jesuits created another mission village in the region at Nossa Senhora da Conceição dos Guarulhos which administered mostly Guarulhos (Guaiáná) peoples.\(^8^1\) At the beginning increasingly diverse groups of Native peoples were brought to the Jesuits and the mission villages grew quickly.\(^8^2\) In 1585, the Jesuit Father Manuel Viegas reported that in São Vicente “a new port” was opened to “a people called Maromemim” (Guarulhos) who lived with the “goianã,” “Carojo” (Guarani), and another people called “Ibirabaquiyyara” who may have been southern Kayapó.\(^8^3\) Viegas stated that the Natives close to

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\(^8^0\) The Guaiáná were Gê-speakers which demonstrates the increasing ways in which the Jesuit missions became locales that fostered the coalescence and integration of disparate Native groups in a process of ethnogenesis. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 9–10, 28. Alfred Métraux argued that the Guaiáná of the São Paulo region may have spoken the Tupi *lingua geral*, Guaiáná outside of São Vicente were Gê speakers. That the Guaiáná of São Vicente adopted the Tupi *lingua geral* demonstrates the influence that Jesuits and the coalescence of Native groups in aldeias and missions had on Native cultures. Alfred Métraux and Estevão Pinto, *A religião dos Tupinambás e suas relações com a das demais tribos tupi-guaranís* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1979).

\(^8^1\) José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, “Notícia raciocinada sobre as aldêas de índios da província de S. Paulo, desde o seu começo até à actualidade,” *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro* (RIHGB) 8 (1846): 204–254, 226–228.

\(^8^2\) Oliveira argues the mission village of Nossa Senhora da Ajuda de Itaquaquecetuba was founded west of São Paulo on the margins of the Tieté. Over time, it apparently came under the secular power of the Paulistas and through cultural intermixing with enslaved Natives and Africans was subsumed into Paulista society. Oliveira, “Noticia raciocinada sobre as aldêas de índios da província de S. Paulo,” 231, 234–235.

\(^8^3\) “Carta do P. Manuel Viegas ao P. Geral Aquaviva sobre a visita do P. Cristóvão de Gouveia, a língua Tupi e os Índios Maromemins,” S. Vicente, Março 21, 1585, in Serafim Leite, *História da Companhia de Jesus no Brasil*, 10 vols. (Belo Horizonte: Editoria Itatiaia, 2000) 9:385. Monteiro suggested that the “Ibirabaquiyyara” people in Viegas’s account were a group of southern Kayapó. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 29. The southern Kayapó were Gê-speakers who inhabited a region northwest of São Paulo and were known as fearsome warriors and thus often
São Vicente, “some of their sons and daughters are with the whites,” some “are already Christians,” and they speak the language of “these our Indians, that are called tupím.”

The Tupi language Viegas described was the lingua geral, a tupi dialect, that Natives, Jesuits, and colonial settlers developed in order to communicate with each other on the coasts of Brazil. The lingua geral probably had several geographic variations yet was a form of Tupi that was spoken by Natives, priests, and colonists alike. As Monteiro has argued, it was inherently a colonial dialect. As other scholars have pointed out the Jesuits were active participants in the creation of these colonial languages. The Jesuit Antonio Ruiz de Montoya described the reduction of Nuestra Señora de los Reyes in Guairá as being formed “from various Indian nations which speak different languages, although they can communicate in the common language, Guarani.”

The Guarani spoken in the Jesuit reductions of Guairá was not the same lingua geral spoken in São Vicente, but may have been similar enough to have been mutually intelligible. What remains clear is through the coalescence and creation of a common language the process of cultural change—or distortion—occurred in both locations. As scholars have avoided by the Paulistas. The southern Kayapó destroyed two bandeiras in 1608 and 1612 respectively and were then driven by subsequent bandeiras into thesertão where they avoided conflicts with settlers for another century. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 53–54.

86 Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 142.
87 Several Tupi-Guarani languages of the coast of Brazil and the Brazilian/Bolivian/Paraguayan/Argentinian interior, such as Tupinambá, Guarani, and Chiriguano, are “as close to each other as dialects of a single language.” This has led to the hypothesis that Tupi-Guarani speakers migrated from the interior to the coasts relatively recently before the arrival of the Portuguese in 1500. The tendency for migration with Tupi-Guarani speakers becomes evident as “the Tupi groups, with each successive differentiation, seem to become more migratory, less attached to physical spaces. The languages and (if we can move from language to culture) the cultures become more and more mobile.” Greg Urban, “A História da Cultura Brasileira Segundo as Línguas Nativas,” in Cunha, História dos Índios no Brasil, 89 & 93.
already argued in the context of Guairá, as well as Florida, Mexico, and Peru, the religious orders and the Catholic church “contributed mightily to the homogenization” of Native groups by “creating indigenous lingua francas for catechization.”

The Jesuit’s attempts to convert the Native populations through the establishment of mission villages (aldeias) instead of encouraging the mass enslavement of Natives was reflected in the Portuguese crown’s law of 1570 which regulated Indian slavery but did not outlaw it. Building from Portuguese laws of enslavement and ransom (resgate) in Iberia during the Reconquista and in Africa, the law restricted the enslavement of Natives to those taken captive in a Just War declared by the King or governor. In Brazil, that form of captivity and ransom

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88 James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, “Mapping Ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, No. 2 (April 2011), 195. David J. Weber, *Bárbaros*. Sergio Buarque de Holanda argued that the Portuguese language only supplanted the língua geral in São Paulo in the nineteenth century. Sergio Buarque de Holanda, *Caminhos e Fronteiras* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1956, 1994) 10. Monteiro argued that more linguistic research needed to be done on both the língua geral of São Vicente and the linguistic connections with the caipira dialects of modern Brazilian Portuguese. Monteiro suggested that over the seventeenth century the predominantly Guarani enslaved population of São Vicente increasingly spoke a “bastardized Guarani” among themselves and the “Portuguese” colonists, who were most likely predominantly of European and Native ancestry, spoke a creolized form of Portuguese that may have been an ancestral form of the Caipira dialect that borrows heavily from Tupi-Guarani. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 156–157.

89 Discourses on cannibalism and anthropophagic practices were used by Europeans, Africans, and Natives in the Americas to justify killing and enslaving people. In sixteenth and seventeenth-century West Central Africa, many communities saw any activity that was deemed too individualistic and contrary to communal kinship values as witchcraft, or when transmuted to Europeans as consumption, “man-eating,” or cannibalism. In North America tales of Native “man-eaters” were applied to groups like the Mohawk that destroyed communities and possessed distinctly anticommmunal practices, often of stealing people as captives, of “consuming” them into their communities—as shown in the next chapter when coastal Carolina Natives told Europeans the Westo slavers were “man-eaters” in 1670. Tales of witches, “jaguars,” and possessed peoples who consumed others abound in the documentary records of South American Natives. Europeans used local tales of witches and cannibals, who at times and places practiced ritualized anthropophagy to justify the enslavement of those peoples in Just Wars. The feared “demonic,” “savage,” “other” encountered by Europeans in Africa and North and South America was created as much in the imaginings of Christian writers in Europe as it was by those who witnessed adoption, captivity, and anthropophagic practices among Native and African peoples. Slavery
included those captives ransomed from other Natives so they would not be killed via
anthropophagous practices.\textsuperscript{90} As Metcalf notes this was an alternative the Jesuits initially
accepted in order to promote conversion and prevent cannibalism. However, as captives
continued to be ransomed and made slaves over the 1550s and 1560s numerous Jesuits, such as
Manuel Nóbrega, began to oppose \textit{resgate} because they feared colonists were manipulating it to
encourage war between Natives.\textsuperscript{91} The issues surrounding the legality of Native slavery and the
numerous exceptions created to allow for it by the Portuguese crown and colonial officials
created opportunities for colonists on the ground to disregard the laws and Native slavery
actually spread after their issuance.

As will be shown in this chapter, although the law of 1570 was an attempt by the Crown
to settle the question of enslaving Natives, there were so many loopholes within it that the
colonists of Brazil and São Vicente actively flouted the new law and the enslavement of Natives
increased in Brazil after 1570.\textsuperscript{92} How colonists in São Vicente used those laws to encourage war
and slaving can be seen in a 1585 petition to the governor of São Vicente, Jerônimo Leitão,

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was viewed as a moral way to offer salvation through conversion to peoples, who in the minds of
European jurists, conversed with the Devil. For detailed descriptions of how the Portuguese and
Europeans used accusations of cannibalism to justify slavery in Africa and the Americas see: ;
Metcalf, \textit{Go-Betweens}, 157–193; Jared Staller, \textit{Converging on Cannibals}; Rachel B. Herrmann,
\textsuperscript{90} Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 27; Metcalf, \textit{Go-betweens}, 157–193.
\textsuperscript{91} Metcalf, \textit{Go-Betweens}, 179. For the history of the conflicts between Jesuits and colonists over
the treatment and administration of Natives in Brazil see: Dauril Alden, \textit{The Making of an
\textsuperscript{92} Metcalf, \textit{Go-Betweens}, 182–183.\end{flushright}
written by the council members of the villages of the captaincy. The petition argued for a just war to be declared against the “Indians named carijós” (Guarani) who over the past 40 years had killed more than “150 white men, both Portuguese and Spanish, they even killed fathers of the Society of Jesus who went to indoctrinate and teach them our holy catholic faith.” While the residents of São Vicente made the claim that the Carijós “deserved” the war because of these actions, in the beginning of the request the residents also gave their own reasons to enslave those Natives. The residents complained that they needed slaves to work their farms and *fazendas* because in the past six years “more than two thousand” of the “pieces” (enslaved people) had died due to disease. The settlers of São Vicente argued that they needed more enslaved Natives to “plant and benefit your *fazendas*” to “make sugar cane.” This request by the colonists shows

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93 “Treslado de hum requerimento feito pelos oficiais das camaras desta capitania de São Vicente ao Capitão Jeronimo Leitão e assim o treslado dos asentos e capitulações que com ele concluirão sobre a entrada que ora se a de fazer ao gentio do sertão,” Abril 10, 1585, in Atas-CMSP 1:275–279, quotation on 276.

94 The quotation is from “a entrada que ora se a de fazer ao gentio do sertão,” Abril 10, 1585, in Atas-CMSP 1:275. The original text reads “mais de duas mil pessoas digo pecas de escravos. . .”. *Peça de escravo* literally “piece of slave,” or *peça do gentio da terra* “piece of the Heathen of the land” were common terminology in official Portuguese documents used to refer to enslaved Natives during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Another term that appeared frequently was *negros da terra* “blacks of the land” or *negros da gentio da terra* “blacks of the heathen of the earth,” were used to refer to Native peoples and were differentiated from people of African descent who were designated as *negros tapanhum* (*tapanhum* was a tupi word for foreigner, “foreign blacks”), *negro de angola*, and *negro de guinea*. Portuguese designation of Native peoples of South America as *negro* should be seen in the context of prior (and contemporary) Portuguese colonial endeavors in Africa. See John Manuel Monteiro, *Negros da terra*. Muriel Nazzari, “Vanishing Indians: The Social Construction of Race in Colonial São Paulo,” *The Americas* 57, n. 4 (April 2001): 497–524, and Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery: Changing Legal Practice regarding Indians in Seventeenth-Century São Paulo,” *The Americas* 49, n. 2 (October 1992): 131–155.

95 The Portuguese crown owned and invested in some of the first sugar *fazendas* (estates) and *engenhos* (sugar mills) in the colony to encourage colonization. Within the context of the April 10, 1585 Auto, the colonists are telling the crown that they have paid the *dizimos* (tenth) taxation on sugar to the crown and church and that it is in the Crown’s interest for the Paulistas to acquire enslaved Natives to work both the crown’s and their own estates producing sugar. “a entrada que ora se a de fazer ao gentio do sertão,” Abril 10, 1585, in Atas-CMSP 1:276. For more on early
that by 1585 they were already extensively utilizing enslaved Natives in São Vicente, not only for portaging goods from the Piratininga Plateau to the coast, but also for sugarcane production on smaller estates on the planalto (plateau) and larger ones on the coast near Santos.96 Furthermore, it demonstrates that disease heavily affected the Native populations and required a constant supply of enslaved people from the sertão. Finally, the residents understood the new law and rules for Just Wars (the captives from which could be legally enslaved) to the point they were willing to get the Governor to authorize the expedition.

As was common for colonists across Brazil at the time, the residents of São Vicente understood the requirements for a Just War. They argued that conditions for a Just War against the Carijós were met because they “are the enemies of these our topeniquis Indians our friends to whom each day they give war, and they ask us to rescue them from” the Carijós.97 This appeal on behalf of their Tupinikin allies highlights that the Tupinikin continued to be an integral part of São Vicente’s social and political world. Moreover, the Tupinikin who had allied with the Portuguese and Jesuits before the founding of São Paulo, were still fighting against Guarani groups in the interior. These conflicts could have been an excuse the residents of São Vicente used to justify the expedition, continued internecine conflicts between Native groups that remained hostile after the War of the Tamoios, or they could have been conflicts that continued to spiral as Native groups sought to supply the growing demand for enslaved Natives in the

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97 “a entrada que ora se a de fazer ao gentio do sertão,” Abril 10, 1585, in Atas-CMSP 1: 276.
region. Governor Jerônimo Leitão authorized the expedition as an *entreda* and declared that the captives taken were to be divided between the different towns of the captaincy, but the residents were to indoctrinate them in the Catholic faith, “and give them good treatment as free heathens and for them to help them in their service in what is lawful.” However, in authorizing the expedition as an *entreda* and not a Just War, Governor Leitão was forced to declare the Natives taken as captives free because he had not declared a Just War against the Carijós which would have allowed the settlers to legally enslave Native captives. By authorizing the entrada, Leitão provided legal cover for the settlers to conduct the expedition, enslave the Natives, but hide the fact that the requirements for a Just War had not been met. With the help of the “Vigairo” (Prelate/Vicar) of São Vicente, the Governor put in place a strategy of legal enslavement of Native people captured on expeditions into the sertão who would be legally “free” in name only. The manipulation of legal rationales to enslave Natives was a pattern that continued well into the seventeenth century in Brazil and elsewhere.

The cycle of slaving and spiral of internecine conflict continued to intensify in São Vicente. In 1590, the former allies of the Portuguese, the Tupinikins, and the “people of paraopava,” destroyed an expedition of fifty men into the sertão led by Domingos Luís Grou and

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99 This system of ransom or *resgate/rescate* functioned similarly in Spanish America where Native captives were ransomed from other Natives to ostensibly save them from death in return for their conversion and service to their new Portuguese/Spanish masters. This system was seen as an opportunity for salvation of those Natives in return for their labor, but was often exploited as a legal justification for enslaving Natives. See Camila Loureiro Dias, “O comércio de escravos Indígenas na Amazônia visto pelos regimentos de entradas e de tropas de resgate (séculos XVII e XVIII),” in *Revista Territórios & Fronteiras* 10, n. 1 (Jan-Jul, 2017): 238–159. For the Spanish American contexto see David J. Weber, *Bárbaros*, and Reséndez, *The Other Slavery*. 
Antonio Macedo. After destroying these expeditions, “All of the aldeias of the sertão of this captancy” joined together to attack the settlers of São Vicente. This was the second time a combination of Native groups allied together to destroy the colony. The allied Natives attacked the Pinheiros mission village and killed many enslaved and Christian Natives, “destroyed many fazendas,” “burned churches,” and there was “danger of depopulating” the Pinheiros mission.

The residents of São Vicente were surprised the Tupinikin would turn on them, because “they were our neighbors and were friends with us and were our compadres,” for many years and thus “Seriously deserved punishment.” The town council of São Paulo feared the Natives attacking them were “people of the Paraiba and Guaraimimis and the Indians of the sertão.” It remains unclear exactly why the Tupinikin turned against the Paulistas and Jesuits, but the São Paulo council could not fathom that their actions in enslaving Natives of the sertão and encouraging the conflicts between them could lead to their allies taking up arms against them. Six months later the Paulistas reported they “survive[d] the great war of our heathen friends of the sertão.”

In July of 1591 another slaving expedition on the Piratinininga plateau “found people,” killed some, and took others captive as “some peças [pieces] of male and female slaves.” On their return the expedition was attacked and most of the Paulistas killed near the place called Parnaíba by a group of Natives. The wave of Native attacks against the Paulistas and the disruption of

100 Monteiro argues the “people of paraopava” were a group of Guaianá Natives. Julho 7, 1590, Atas-CMSP, 1: 403–405. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 38.
103 “Camara a 16 de fevereiro 1591 ano,” Atas-CMSP, 414–415, quotation on 415.
104 “Treslado de uma carte que se mandou aos senhores grandes,” Atas-CMSP, 1:410–411. This transcript was most likely written around the first meeting of the year of the São Paulo council in January of 1591.
105 Peças was the term used by Portuguese colonists to designate the unit of an enslaved person. The categorization of a unit or “piece” to be counted of a human being may be the clearest
their slaving expeditions spurred the settlers to retaliate. In the region near São Paulo, between 1590 and 1595, the Paulistas killed, enslaved, or drove off their former Tupinikin allies, the Guaiuaná, and the Guarulos.106

From Native Captivity to Slavery: “Tupi” Slave Raids in the Interior

As the Native slave trade developed in São Vicente, it was shaped by Native practices of captivity and concubinage that predated Europeans. The Portuguese and other Europeans increasingly co-opted those practices away from the gifting, barter, and exchange of captives to the purchase of enslave Natives. This transformation occurred over the second half of the sixteenth century, and while Portuguese settlers learned to exploit it to their advantage, it was shaped by preexisting Native practices of captivity.

What can be gleaned from European sources about captivity among Native peoples is that many Natives incorporated captives as wives and concubines before significant changes occurred to practices of captive exchange after the arrival of Europeans. The Jesuit, José de Anchieta, who spent most of his life among Brazilian Natives in the sixteenth century, described a Native headman, named “Cuy obiy,” of the Piratininga valley in São Vicente who was married but he “married with another, who was Guayaná of the bush, his slave taken in war, whom he had as his wife.” Anchieta described another Native headman named Araguaçú, “that married with one of his Tamoya slave girls.”107 Nadia Farage explains the process of how women among the Caribe

106 Monteiro estimates that the Native population within a 60 kilometer (37.28 miles) radius were the victims of those successive attacks. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 38.
on the Rio Branco in Northern Amazonas came to be seen as exchangeable commodities in the eighteenth century. Farage argues that because captive Native women were seen as a marker of prestige for Caribe warriors, a Native man who could give captive women as gifts was expressing his power and prestige. When Caribe men began to barter with the Dutch for European manufactures, they were engaging in reciprocal trade between allies, through the diplomacy of gift-giving. Farage explains that over time, “an essential transformation” occurred where the “symbolic value of women” was equalized “with that of manufactured goods.” Farage continues, “as a result of which the Dutch, the givers of manufactured goods, came to occupy the structural position of givers of women.”

This transformation explains directly how Native captivity practices could be co-opted and transformed, intentionally or unintentionally, by colonists through diplomatic gift-giving that became the exchange of captives for commodities.

Native peoples of the Piratininga plateau also practiced forms of polygamy and the marriage of captive women. The Paulista settlers apparently adopted the practices of polygamy and concubinage with enslaved women. Father Manuel da Nóbrega, first Provincial of the Jesuit mission in Brazil and one of the founders of São Paulo, complained that “In this land there is a great sin, which is that almost all the men have their slave women as concubines, and other free Indians whom they demand as wives for their males slaves, according to the custom of the land, which is to have many women.” From these comments, it appears that Native and Portuguese men were in the habit of providing enslaved women for their own households as well as for the

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enslaved men in those households. Native women captives were offered as gifts or exchanged as commodities with Native followers and Europeans. The result being that women captives were often coerced into sexual relationships with both European and Native men. While during the first years of contact, marriages and polygamy allowed for the creation of alliances between the colonial settlers and Native groups which “conferr[ed] prestige on the colonists within the structure of indigenous society,” the Native practice of taking slaves as concubines began to be exploited through barter and ransom.110 The willingness of Portuguese settlers to create domestic relationships with local women was not exclusive to South America and was implemented elsewhere in Africa and Asia. However, this means that Native communities who provided women captives to Portuguese settlers, as gifts or as exchanged commodities, controlled settlers’ access to those women. This practice was not exclusive to Native America, but in the context of Brazil meant that Native captivity practices influenced how and who Paulista settlers could exchange for.

How Paulistas co-opted and expanded those practices can be seen in their own council records. In 1592, as São Paulo was in the midst of a several-years-long war against their Native neighbors, the town council forbade the settlers of the town to “ransom with the guainazes in their lands nor to send slaves against them nor to go out to the trails when they come to us.” The Paulistas explained the reason for these actions was that they “were at war and the people are needed on the land for their defense.”111 Although the Paulistas justified their actions in time of

110 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 21. Monteiro argues that the Portuguese marrying Native women or taking Native concubines, was common practice across the Portuguese empire and intended to create alliances between the Portuguese and local Native groups. See also: Charles R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415–1825 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
war, what they reveal are the three ways in which Paulista settlers acquired enslaved Natives: through ransoming captives, through sending enslaved Natives on raids, and through bartering for enslaved people. This reveals three facts about what was happening among Native communities in the interior beyond São Paulo. First, that a barter system for ransoming captives existed within the interior where Natives, in this instance the Guaianá, brought captives to the Paulista settlers to either ransom their own captives or to trade for them. Secondly, that certain Paulista settlers were willing to trade with people that the town and captaincy were at war against. Thirdly, and most importantly for my argument in chapter three, the Paulista council’s prohibitions show that settlers were in the habit of sending out previously enslaved people to enslave other Natives. This single example shows how Paulistas were able to co-opt Native slavery practices to trade and raid for Native captives.

The ransom and barter system shows that Native groups such as the Guaianá were actively taking captives to trade with colonial settlers. This barter system developed from first contact between Europeans and Native settlers and was arguably unsuccessful for a period of time due to Native peoples ensuring that “the terms of exchange were linked intrinsically to the forging of alliances with the Europeans.” However, as time passed and the Portuguese presence and slaving encouraged increases in conflicts between Native groups over the sixteenth century, interior slaving became less tied to diplomacy and more enmeshed in labor demands.

112 While resgate (ransom) was the purchase of a captive in order to save them from being killed, barter was the exchange of a captive. Technically, resgate was legal at certain periods of time in order to save the Native person’s soul through baptism. Purchasing a captive to save their lives in exchange for their service was legal. Whereas bartering for an enslaved Native, was illegal unless they were to be killed. The lines between what was barter and ransom were, if not intentionally blurry, easily manipulated.

The Portuguese increasingly co-opted the Native practice of gifting captives and transformed it into one of purchasing captives.

Having subdued or driven off the independent hostile Native groups in the region of São Paulo, Paulistas carried their violence into the interior. On February 8, 1597, in the town of Asunció, in Spanish Guairá, João Gonçalves was granted an encomienda over 230 native people in the region of Itepopo, on the Paraná river above the Falls of Iguazu. Among those 230 Natives who Gonçalves now demanded labor from, were “twelve alone who escaped from the tupis,” from a town that was destroyed in the “province of Guairá.” The Jesuits of Guairá came to call the Tupis “the Indians that extend from Brazil to these lands.” This demonstrates the Jesuit and Spanish colonial officials’ active participation in creating an ethnonym to describe diverse array of Native peoples based on their diplomatic relationships with the Portuguese and their activities rather than on their ethnicities.

While Natives from the Brazilian coast and interior were known to travel great distances to wage war on their enemies, the fact that “survivors” of destroyed “tupi” villages found refuge among the towns of the Paraná River demonstrates that colonial and indigenous warfare were

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116 “Carta Anua do Padre Nicolau Duran em que Dá conta do Estado das Reduções da Província do Paraguai, Durante os Anos de 1626 e 1627, na parte que diz respeito às Reduções do Guairá,” Córdova, Novembro 12, 1628, in Cortesão, Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá (1594–1640), 233. In the original Spanish transcript of the text the phrase reads “Tupis (que son los indios que se comunican del Brasil a estas tierras)” with comunicar conveying the idea of physical movement which could also be phrased as “commute from Brazil,” “pass over or through from Brazil,” or “extend from Brazil to.”
forcing migrations of Native peoples away from those conflicts. However, as slaving and warfare depopulated regions and created refugee groups, those Natives and colonists who utilized slaving as a socio-economic strategy were forced to raid further afield into the interior to acquire captives. As Alida Metcalf has argued, the process of looking to the sertão for wealth shaped the colonization of São Paulo. Because the Paulistas could not grow cash crops at the levels of the Northeastern captaincies and did not find significant deposits of mineral wealth in the region until the end of the seventeenth century, the settlers turned to the interior to create their wealth and find their labor—both in the form of enslaved Natives. In patterns influenced by Native captivity practices, Paulistas created wealth in people as dependents, domestic partners, producers of subsistence goods, and as will be shown in Chapter 3, as warriors used to enslave other Natives. However, to maintain this supply and expansion westward across the seventeenth century, the Paulistas were forced to travel deeper into the interior to find captives.

As can be shown by the survivors of Tupi attacks that fled to the Guarani towns of the Paraná River, many groups who were driven out by warfare coalesced with other Native peoples, often with the assistance of other colonial powers, be they Spanish colonizers or Jesuits.

While the use of enslaved people as soldiers is not unusual in world history—and was logical when considering prior Portuguese colonial experiences in Africa—we do not know how the “enslaved” Natives who participated on slaving raids thought of their relationship with the Paulista settlers. Clearly the Paulistas saw those Natives as slaves; they referred to them in

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council minutes as “escravos.” But did those Natives see themselves that way? Did they see those expeditions against former foes to provide captives as assisting allies, or as something in between? Without the words of those Natives involved, there is no way to know.

Here a historiographic comment needs to be made about an apparent hesitance on the part of some scholars to call the barter and ransom of enslaved Natives a slave trade. Brazilian historian Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, argued that “the accumulation provided by the trade in enslaved Natives proved to be incompatible with the colonial system.” Alencastro asserted that the colonist’s dependency on merchants from the metropole (Lisbon) and those who traded in enslaved Africans prevented the crown and financial interests from investing in the enslavement of Natives in Brazil. I argue that this view unnecessarily prioritizes the needs and desires of those in the metropole. Other scholars have demonstrated that Native slave trades existed in sixteenth century Bahia, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Amazon, and nineteenth-century Goiás. When we look at the Brazilian sertões the path to wealth on those colonial peripheries were not found through the trade and exploitation of enslaved Africans. The path to wealth in those regions was found through Native slave trades and in areas through the exploitation of mineral wealth. In the sixteenth and seventeenth-century sertões of São Vicente, a Native slave trade developed to supply enslaved Natives to the Paulista settlers.

Moreover, as I argue, by focusing on the activities of Native peoples, and particularly Native merchants on the margins or frontiers between colonial settlers and Native communities

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of the interior, it becomes clear that an internal Native slave trade conducted by Native peoples developed to supply enslaved people to Portuguese colonists. This “barter” and “ransom” of enslaved people was a Native slave trade that saw Native middlemen place themselves in positions of power through providing enslaved people to the colonists. As I will demonstrate, the exchange of commodified enslaved Natives should be classified as a slave trade even if that trade did not result in the accumulation of specie or was specifically prohibited by law. The distinction remains important because it highlights the role of slavery in colonial formation in Brazil, and Carolina, and undermines the historiographically constructed distinctions between the enslavement of Natives and the enslavement of Africans in the Atlantic. As will be shown by the end of this chapter, while describing different practices, Portuguese settlers did not make the distinctions between enslaving Natives and enslaving Africans.

**Just War, Free Peças, and the Legalities of Enslaving Natives**

Early Christian theologians and philosophers developed the concept of Just War to rationalize the realities of war with the paradox of Christian teachings of love. Over a millennia of Christian debates on the ethics and morality of war led to a war being declared just when certain loosely defined criteria were met: the war must be authorized by a sovereign, those attacked must be shown to deserve the response, and those declaring war must show a just or good cause.121 The vagaries and subjectivity of such criteria led to the development of Just War doctrines and the declaration of Just Wars by Christian monarchs, Popes, and other leaders in the

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name of the defense or expansion of Christianity—as seen most infamously in the Crusades and Reconquista. But the ideology of defense of Christianity in the Reconquista was expanded to the colonization of Africa, the Americas, and the world where captives taken in wars declared just could be enslaved. These concepts were expanded to the trade for enslaved Africans, who even when exchanged via trade, were assumed to have been taken in Just Wars by other Africans. The concepts of Just War and their application in the Reconquista, the Atlantic islands, and in Africa provided the legal and moral justification—and institutional framework—for conquest and enslavement of Native peoples in the Americas.¹²² In the Americas, arguments about the bellicosity and cannibalistic nature of Native peoples were frequently used as justifications for the declaration of Just Wars against Native peoples.¹²³

As can be seen in the São Paulo council records of the 1590s, Paulistas used the Just War clause of the law of 1570 to declare wars to attack and enslave whichever interior Native group happened to oppose them. However, these actions, and particularly the competition with Jesuits over the locations of aldeias and their use of Native labor across Brazil spurred the combined Spanish/Portuguese crown to declare again the freedom of Natives.¹²⁴ After the unification of the Iberian Monarchy in 1580, the Hapsburgs tried to clarify the issue of Native slavery in Brazil.¹²⁵

¹²² Metcalf, Go-betweens, 168–176. For a discussion of how both Spanish Catholics and Puritan New Englanders saw the Americas and Native Americans as under the sway of Satan and used Christian theology as the justification for colonization in the Americas see: Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550–1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
¹²³ Deusen, Global Indios, 161–163.
¹²⁴ For a detailed explanation over the struggle between Jesuits, colonists, and the crown over how to administer and legally classify Native peoples in Brazil see Stuart B. Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its Judges, 1609–1751, particularly Chapter 6: “Judges, Jesuits, and Indians.”
¹²⁵ For differences in the application of laws regarding Native peoples to Portuguese and Spanish America before and during the Unified Iberian Crown see: Deusen, Global Indios.
As summarized by historian Stuart Schwartz, in 1595, the Iberian Monarchy issued a law that
defined ‘just war’ as consisting only of actions authorized by the crown, insisted that wages be
paid to Indian laborers, and commanded the governor, magistrates, and captains in the colony to
enforce the statute.”

This would have outlawed wars, like the one the São Paulo council
ordered funded on November 29 1592, when they outfitted Alvaro Neto explicitly “for the
war.” Along with the 1595 law, the crown gave the Jesuits permission to bring Natives down
from the sertão to coastal areas, a process which came to be known as descimento or descending,
through which Natives would be placed in villages under the control of Jesuit administrators.

The Jesuit victory over the Portuguese settlers was an illusion, because many colonists mostly
ignored the new law. In 1605, the crown passed another law that restated the 1595 law, but still

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126 The Spanish/Portuguese crown passed a law in 1587 which restated the law of 1570 and
forbade the enslavement of Natives, but like almost every previous and subsequent law regarding
enslaving Natives in Brazil, the 1587 law was ignored by colonists. Schwartz, Sovereignty and
Society in Colonial Brazil, 131, note 19 on page 131. See also Alida Metcalf, “The Entradas of
Bahia of the Sixteenth Century.” For a broader analysis of legal statutes regarding Native
laborers in Brazil see: Beatriz Perrone-Moisés, “Índios livres e índios escravos: os princípios da
legislação indigenista do período colonial (século XVI a XVIII)” in Manuela Carneiro da Cunha

127 29 de Novembro, 1592, in Atas-CMSP, 1: 450. It is unclear which war this was to pay Neto
for, but it was probably for part of the almost continual conflicts in the period between 1590 and
1595.

128 Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil, 131. For a definition of the process of
descimento Alida Metcalf argues “The goal of an entrada was to ‘descer’ Indians, i.e., to descend
Indians from the more populated sertões to the coast, the vast majority of whom became slaves.”
Metcalf, “The Entradas of Bahia of the Sixteenth Century,” 382. Camila Dias argues that in the
eighteenth-century Amazon, “‘descimento’ designated an expedition that had the objective of
making pacts of alliance and friendship with the Indians and the term ‘tropa’ was generally
accompanied by a second word that signified the principal objective: war or ransom.” With
ransom here referring to the word resgate and the term tropa signified troops. Camila Loureiro
Dias, “O comércio de escravos indígenas na Amazônia visto pelos regimentos de entradas e de
tropas de resgate (séculos XVII e XVIII),” 245. Mathias Kiemen argued that some colonial
officials used different names, such as resgates (ransoms), descimentos, or entradas depending
on which part of the colonial administration had authority over that category of expedition.
Mathias C. Kiemen, The Indian Policy of Portugal in the Amazon Region, 1614–1693 (PhD.
Diss., Catholic University of America, 1954) 122–123.
to no avail. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese settlers of Brazil found the combined Spanish/Portuguese monarchy unable to enforce the statutes it issued regarding the illegality of the enslavement of Natives. The Jesuits continued to be unable to get many Brazilian colonists to listen to their pleas and local colonial officials were often in cahoots with the slaving settlers.

In 1609, the crown passed another law, that this time forced the Portuguese settlers of Brazil to react. The 1609 law “prohibited the capture of Indians, and declared that all Indians were free, whether converted and civilized or unconverted and savage, and could not be obliged to work for anyone against their will.”¹²⁹ The law also re-stated that Native laborers were entitled to wages.¹³⁰ Despite the 1609 law mostly restating statutes from prior laws, Brazilian colonists were apoplectic over the news and became violent in settlements like Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, where they claimed that Spanish laws could not apply to the Portuguese colonies. Furthermore, colonists blamed the Jesuits for the passage of the law and found a sympathetic ear in the Governor of Brazil, Diogo de Meneses, who petitioned the crown on behalf of the colonists and emphasized Brazilian colonists’ need for Native laborers.¹³¹ The crown compromised and issued a new law in 1611 that restated that Natives were free and could not be sold, but established exceptions in which Natives could be enslaved. The crown established the criteria for Just Wars, allowed for expeditions to ransom Natives taken prisoner by other Natives, and allowed Natives

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¹²⁹ Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 138. For a text of the law see “Alavará, Gentios da terra são livres, [1609]” in Georg Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil 1500–1640 (São Paulo: Edições Loyola,1982) 227. Savage is the word used by Nazzari to describe how the Portuguese saw the Native population, here it means uncontacted Native peoples.
¹³¹ Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil, 136–137.
to be utilized in personal service to the colonists. In 1611, the Spanish/Portuguese crown built back into its own legislation all of the loopholes that allowed colonists to clandestinely enslave Native peoples in Brazil. Between 1570 and 1611, Jesuits and the Hapsburgs tried to ensure the freedom of enslaved Natives and prevent their ill treatment. Despite all their efforts, colonists continued to ignore the crowns’ laws and the Jesuits pleas, and enslaved Natives. However, after 1611, colonists did begin to hide how they described enslaved Natives in legal documents.

In São Paulo, the colonists who owned enslaved Natives acquiesced to the new laws—at least in their legal documents. As Muriel Nazzari has demonstrated, “Every seventeenth–century Paulista testator” “proclaimed the freedom” of their “peças”—enslaved Natives. For example, Beatriz Rodrigues de Moraes declared in her 1625 inventory “that the peças that my husband and I have are free and I ask that they are treated well.” However, those very same wills and inventories bequeathed the peças that they declared to be free to their descendants, and declared that those Native peoples owed their descendants personal service. Beatriz Rodrigues’ listed the thirteen “Free” Natives right after the debts her estate owed and allocated them to Beatriz’s descendants or to pay her debts. But the testator stipulated that those Natives were to be treated “as free and free they are and pay them for their work in the way his majesty commands.”

Beatriz Rodrigues—or the scribe who recorded her will—ensured that, at least on paper, she met all the legal requirements of Spanish/Portuguese crown regarding her Native “free peças.” However, free people are not inherited as servants and free people are not used as goods to settle

132 Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 139 and Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil, 137–139.
133 Nazzari, “Transition to Slavery,” 139.
134 “Inventario de Beatriz Rodrigues de Moraes,” 1625, in Inventários e Testamentos, do Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (AESP-IT) 8: 7.
135 Nazzari, “Transition to Slavery,” 139. See also Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, chapter 4.
136 “Inventario de Beatriz Rodrigues de Moraes,” 1625, in AESP-IT, 8: 15.
debts. As Nazzari argues, “The same wills and inventories that assert the freedom of peças, provide ample evidence that Paulistas inherited them, bartered them, donated and bequeathed them, gave them in dowries, and even covertly sold them.”¹³⁷ The Paulista solution to ostensibly abide by the Crown’s new laws was to audaciously declare the Natives free even as they bequeathed them to descendants and allocated them to pay debts in the same documents. While those Native people may have been de jure free in the Spanish/Portuguese metropole, they were de facto still enslaved in São Vicente.

The Crown’s repeated declarations of the freedom of Natives shows that conflicts existed over how to administer Native laborers in colonial Brazil between colonists, Jesuits, and colonial and royal officials. However, the continued reissuance of those laws, further demonstrates the ineffectiveness of those laws and the colonial state. The new laws of 1609 and 1611 did not stop Native slavery in Brazil and they did not stop the Paulistas from slaving. As seen in the 1614 report of Father Cataldino about attacks on the Guairá reductions, the Paulistas continued enslaving the Native peoples of Guairá. In fact, the demand for enslaved Natives in São Vicente only grew in the first decades of the seventeenth century. The Paulistas responded to the need for enslaved laborers by launching more slave raids into the sertão. But they also expanded their reliance on “Tupi” and mameluco intermediaries to provide enslaved Natives. As will be shown, marginal Native intermediaries developed an entire slaving market in the interior of São Vicente that went as far as the Jesuit reductions in Guairá and Tape.

Tubarão “the Shark,” Native Pombeiros, and Slaving on the Margins

¹³⁷ Nazzari, “Transition to Slavery,” 139–140.
In Southeastern Brazil, a Native slave trade emerged at the turn of the seventeenth century at the Port of Patos among the Native “Carijó” (Guarani) peoples of the coast of what is today Santa Catarina. Between 1605 and 1607, the Jesuit father Jerónimo Rodrigues met some of the Carijós who participated in the Port of Patos slave trade and called them “thieves, tyrants, and sellers of their relatives.” Rodrigues met the infamous Native slaver Tubarão, (tubarão is shark in Portuguese) and his three or four brothers who were said to all be Native priests, but “they are all great tyrants and salesmen, and of whom the whites make a big deal, because they fill their ships with peças.” But Tubarão was no headman, he was said to “not be a principal, nor to have people, but to have great fame as a sorcerer.” Even if Tubarão and his brothers were Native priests, they had no followers. They were marginal figures, who established themselves and their notoriety in the Patos region through the slave trade. Father Rodrigues saw Tubarão as haughty and self-confident, particularly when he reportedly urinated while sitting in a hammock next to one of the Jesuit priests in response to their attempts to get him to stop slave trading. Tubarão sold many people to the Portuguese (and possibly others) on the coasts, but he kept some enslaved people in his home that he did not want to give away, “saying they are his slaves.” Rodrigues reported that Tubarão was not a headman, but had made himself like a

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138 Monteiro argues that the Port of Patos was located at what is today the Brazilian city of Laguna, not at the Patos Lagoon in present-day Rio Grande do Sul further to the south. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 83, n. 19.
141 Jerónimo Rodrigues, “A Missão dos Carijós – 1605-1607,” in Leite, Novas Cartas, 222. It remains unclear if Tubarão was a Native priest or was viewed as such by the Jesuits and their Native allies as a “witch” of sorts, outside of regular channels of society as a slaver.
headman who had “to be esteemed by the whites, but this is because he is a great Indian thief for white people.”

Tubarão is a difficult figure to understand. He was said to have no following but appeared to be powerful enough to enslave and sell other Natives. Tubarão’s lack of followers probably refers to him not being a traditional headman, not that he did not have a retinue around him. The

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143 Jerónimo Rodrigues, “A Missão dos Carijós – 1605-1607,” in Leite, Novas Cartas, 224. The “Lagoa dos Patos” near the modern-day city of Porto Alegre can be found at the very bottom center of the map confirming Monteiro’s argument about the Port of Patos being located at the present day city of Laguna as shown. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 83, n. 19. Modified from a fragment of a map by Arnoldus Montanus, “Paraquaria Vulgo Paraguay Cum Adjacentibus” 1671, (London: John Ogilby) in David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~292987~90066917:Paraquaria-Vulgo-Paraguay-Cum-adjac?sort=Pub_List_No_InitialSort%2CPub_Date%2CPub_List_No%2CSeries_No#
Jesuits encountered Tubarão and his brothers in a tijupá or small hut, with a small retinue of followers—some who were relatives and others who were enslaved women and children.\textsuperscript{144} It remains unclear if Tubarão and his brothers used their powers as famous sorcerers/prophets to create a following, enslave people, and establish themselves. Perhaps the Jesuits only encountered a fraction of Tubarão’s retinue, but it remains difficult to ascertain from the accounts how exactly Tubarão established himself as a slaver.

The term \textit{feiticeiro} or sorcerer was often applied by Europeans translating Natives to dark shamans, or people who displayed anticommunal and antisocial practices, such as slaving.\textsuperscript{145} Tubarão’s Portuguese name, Shark, translated into Portuguese from an unknown Tupi dialect, was almost assuredly given to him or, to phrase it differently—Tubarão earned his name. We know this because sharks are apex predators, like jaguars and anacondas in other South American Native cosmologies, they occupy the top positions in those social hierarchies—on the same plane as humans.\textsuperscript{146} This can be shown by the Tupinambá headman Cunhambebe’s response in the 1550s to the captive German sailor Hans Staden’s question about if humans

\textsuperscript{144} The phrase used in the text is “entramos em um tejupar” which indicates a small hut of Native construction with hammocks inside it. Jerônimo Rodrigues, “A Missão dos Carijós – 1605–1607,” in Leite, \textit{Novas Cartas}, 222.

\textsuperscript{145} As Neil Whitehead argues “the ‘rescue’ of cannibal victims by vengeful whites and the sale of those victims as plantation slaves actually did double violence to the reproduction of indigenous society. . .first, through the commercialization of war and, second, through the commodification of the captive.” The commercialization and exchange of captives instead of their consumption into the community via anthropophagy threatened the very social order of and the ritual production of enemies as a part of group cohesion. Whitehead, \textit{Dark Shamans}, 238–242, quotation on 242. See also Whitehead, “Native American cultures along the Atlantic littoral of South America, 1499–1650,” \textit{Proceedings of the British Academy} 81 (1993): 197–231 and Carlos Fausto, \textit{Inimigos Fiéis: História, guerra e xamanismo na Amazónia} (São Paulo: Editor da Universidade de São Paulo, 2001).

\textsuperscript{146} Tupinambá youths were trained to ritually sacrifice jaguars (usually cubs) in the place of human captives. Carlos Fausto, “Banquete de gente: Comensalidade e Canibalismo na Amazónia,” \textit{Mana} 8, n. 2 (2002): 17, 22.
should eat each other: Cunhambebe responded, “I am a jaguar.”\textsuperscript{147} As Carlos Fausto argues, claiming the spiritual power of an apex predator could be seen as a claim to “overcome the human condition (either positively as immortality or negatively as anti-sociability.”\textsuperscript{148} Cunhambebe as a headman with social responsibilities probably was staking a claim to the former rather than the later. But Tubarão earned his claim to anti-sociability as a predatory shaman, either as a witch cast out of his own community for anticommunal behavior or as a slaver who consumed people. In either case, Tubarão’s cosmic association with a predator spirit made him a marginal character to be feared by others, which gave him power.\textsuperscript{149}

But if we begin to think of Tubarão as a marginal slaver, as a middleman, who negotiated the sale of enslaved people to Europeans, some of whom he kept for himself and his followers, his positionality in southern Brazil begins to appear more clearly. Tubarão used slaving as a strategy. According to the reports, Tubarão and his brothers, used slaving to make themselves powerful. They probably did not wage war on other locales but served as middlemen in those wars and traded most of those Native captives to the Portuguese and other Europeans on the coasts. However, they did not sell everyone; some enslaved people were incorporated into Tubarão’s household. We know one boy was claimed as a slave and that there were multiple women in the household. Tubarão demonstrates how a marginal figure in the Patos region used slaving to establish himself. He was but one example among many in a growing regional slave trade.

\textsuperscript{148} Fausto, “Banquete de gente,” 25.  
Another example of intermediary slavers can be provided from the 1630s, when Father Antonio Ruiz de Montoya described what Father Cristobál de Mendoza learned while working at the Guairá reduction of Jesús-Maria about “some Tupis who serve as traders and brokers for the townsmen of São Paulo.” The Portuguese called them “pombeiros” and the Natives called them “mú, or ‘contractors.’” Pombeiro was a term that developed in the sixteenth-century Kongo, to signify “the itinerant peddlers” who “took modest quantities of goods on consignment and hawked those goods on a cash basis in surrounding villages and local markets (or pumbos) for whatever slaves they might buy.” That Paulistas called Native middlemen pombeiros reinforces the connections between sixteenth and seventeenth-century Brazil and West Central

151 Montoya, *Spiritual Conquest*, 170. Both pombeiros and mú are italicized in C.J. McNaspy, John P. Leonard, and Martin E. Palmer’s translations of Montoya’s account. Montoya reported that the Natives called the Tupi traders mú which may be from Tupi-Guarani or the lingua-geral. However, according to Ralph Bluteau in Portuguese mú also signified “a mule.” *Vocabulario Portuguese & Latino, Aulico, Anatmico, architeconico*. . . ., 9 volumes (Coimbra: No Collegio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 1712–1728) 5:614 and 9: 63, in the Dictionaries of the Biblioteca Brasiliana Guita e José Mindlin.
152 Miller argues that the term pombeiro developed in reference to the traders that linked the Kongo capital at São Salvador with the Mpumbu market at the Malebo Pool and that “the generic term for these African consignees derived from the name of their principal destination at that time.” Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death*, 189. See also: Willy Bal, “Portugais pombeiro, commerçant ambulant du ‘sertão,’” Annali dell’Istituto Universitario Orientalis (Naples) 7 (1965): 123–161. In the 1728 Portuguese dictionary of Raphael Bluteau, the term pombeiro was defined as “In Angola, the Portuguese call their creole slaves pombeiros, whom they taught to read, write, & count, who are going to deal with the blacks, & buy them.” In a description of Africa written by Dapper included with the definition “these pombeiros are sometimes whole years away from their master’s house, busy buying slaves, ivory, copper, and other commodities, whose portage costs them nothing, because they carry it with them on the backs of the new blacks, who they bring to the house.” Bluteau, *Vocabulario Portuguez & Latino, Aulico, Anatmico, architectonico*. . . ., 8 volumes (Coimbra: No Collegio das Artes da Companhia de Jesus, 1712–1728) 6:588, in the Dictionaries of the Biblioteca Brasiliana Guita e José Mindlin http://dicionarios.bbm.usp.br/pt-br/dicionario/l/pombeiro . Miller argues that the definition of pombeiros given in Bluteau’s dictionary developed over time and that “The image of the pombeiro became that of a trader’s slave, or hanger-on, probably a local person of lowly status whom traders commissioned to hawk small quantities of goods in the immediate vicinity of a trading station.” Miller, *Way of Death*, 190.
Africa. It further demonstrates that the Paulistas saw those Tupi middlemen who traded for them in the sertões as slave traders. Portuguese colonists in America applied terminology and strategies learned from over a century of prior colonization in Africa and the Atlantic isles. Montoya stated “These pombeiros exist also in Angola for the transport of blacks, installed there by those who have a monopoly on the trade in blacks.”\textsuperscript{153} For Montoya, the slave trade he witnessed in the interior of South America was comparable to that of Angola at the time.

However, pombeiros in West Central Africa played a different role than did those in southern Brazil. In the sixteenth century Kongo, pombeiros connected relatively centralized polities as local traders who worked as intermediaries between larger markets and worked on consignment.\textsuperscript{154} In southern Brazil, Native traders did not connect large polities but functioned out of trading posts that connected distant polities or trading as they moved between decentralized polities—like coureur de bois in New France. However, in both West Central Africa and southern Brazil the middlemen in the slave trade, operated by “presenting goods directly to producers” in the local “manner of effective exchange.” These intermediary middlemen most likely had kinship and communal contacts with the people they exchanged European goods with for enslaved Natives.\textsuperscript{155} Those kinship and communal ties appear to have connected many of the Brazilian pombeiro middlemen with both Native and European communities.

Father Montoya also recounted that the Natives called the Tupi pombeiros as mú. This term was not isolated to Montoya or the Native peoples that interacted with him. In 1635, the Jesuit Father Francisco Ximenez described some “mus of the Portuguese” named “Ibiraparobi”

\textsuperscript{153} Montoya, \textit{Spiritual Conquest}, 170.
\textsuperscript{154} Miller, \textit{Way of Death}, 189.
\textsuperscript{155} Miller, \textit{Way of Death}, 189.
and “Parapopi,” who were “merchants” in the region of Tape. Father Ximenez stated that Parapopi had “sold all this nation” and “all the Tupis come to stop by the river” to trade with him “as by the land.” The Portuguese trusted Parapopi with “all their rescates,” “and from his house the fleets of miserable captives depart every year.”

Here, Parapopi worked from a fixed location where he connected both Native peoples and Europeans. By 1635, the word mu was still being employed to categorize the slave traders who bartered or ransomed enslaved people to the Portuguese.

Montoya described the activities of those Tupi pombeiros/mus in the sertão:

They divide up districts and each one at his post has his crew and exchange table for buying Indian men, women, and children. For this purpose the inhabitants of the coastal towns in Brazil send them axes, cutlasses, knives, and all sorts of hardware, old clothes, hats, jackets, and a thousand knickknacks to be used for buying souls . . ..

Montoya said that “although they claim to be Christians, these pombeiros are the very devils of hell.” The Tupi pombeiros’ “customhouse[s]” were “full of pagan women purchased for their impure deeds.” Their slaving strategies were to “incite the pagan Indians to wage war on each other, to seize and take each other prisoner, and bring them for appraisal and sale.” Montoya described a developed slave market network with “Tupi” intermediaries living at trading outposts who functioned as middlemen for the Portuguese colonists by providing European goods in exchange for enslaved Natives. This is a slave trade.

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157 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 170.

158 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 170.
But there is a distinction as to how those pombeiro/mus lived that shows the Native Tupi-Guarani influences on the trade. Montoya recognized that the slave traders called themselves Christians and understood that this provided them a connection to the Church, if not to the Jesuits in Guairá, then to the Jesuits or settlers in São Paulo. But they kept numerous Native women in their households as concubines. As mentioned previously this practice was customary among the Tupi-speakers of the Piratininga valley. The accumulation of Native women as enslaved concubines was not a new development; it was the continuation of Native practices of captivity and slavery.

However, by the 1630s when Montoya was writing, the market for enslaved Natives in the sertão had reached a point of commodification that no longer accorded with Native concepts of gift exchange for alliance building. Montoya recounted that Natives would “even hand over their relatives and the dwellers in their own houses for an axe or a cutlass, which is the going price.” While Montoya may well have exaggerated when claiming that Native peoples sold their own people, he specifically highlighted the difference between a “relative” and a “dweller” in a household. If wealth in Tupi-Guarani society was viewed as wealth in people, as suggested by Native headmen’s accumulation of female concubines and their children, then the possibility of trading a member of a household becomes clearer. We do not know if those Natives traded dependents from their households or their own relatives to the pombeiros/mus, but there are historic examples of people trading family members in order to pay debts.159 However, what is

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159 We do not know the statuses of the “relatives” and “dwellers” in the households that Montoya referred to. Those relatives could have been consanguineal or affiliated kin, but the “dwellers” of the household were most likely dependents of some sort. While we do not have evidence of debt peonage among the Tupi-Guarani, in societies where specie was not circulated but debt accumulation began in the manner that Montoya described, then paying those debts in the form of people was logical. As Joseph Miller argued “African debtors, if they could, paid off their obligations to itinerant outsiders with commodities, mostly extracted; if they could not, again as
clear are the prices offered for an enslaved person: “an axe or a cutlass.” Once a monetary price, in the form of other goods, was set on enslaved Natives the process of commodified slavery had begun. Montoya described the existence of a slave market occurring in multiple regions or nodes in the interior of South America away from the Portuguese settlements on the Brazilian coast and the Spanish presence in Bolivia, Guairá, and the Rio de la Plata.

According to Montoya, the Tupi pombeiro/mus slave market was established to the point where,

> When several lots have been assembled, they send word to São Paulo and the other coastal towns, and boats and canoes come up which transport them at a considerable profit. Costing originally two or three pesos, they bring fifteen or twenty pesos in the towns, and if taken to Rio de Janeiro can be sold for forty or fifty cruzados. 160

The prices of those enslaved Natives increased the further from the interior they went which demonstrates the demand for those enslaved Natives and the existence of multiple market nodes. Trade networks of the size and complexity Montoya described, were not ad hoc developments, they required time to develop, as well as a relatively constant supply and demand. The Native slavers of the interior met this demand and developed their own strategies to do so by adapting their own cultural concepts of captivity to the new realities.

The exact roles of those Native “Tupi” Pombeiros/mus remains unclear in the Native slave trade. Monteiro argues that those pombeiros were enslaved Natives utilized by the Paulistas in the sertões. He contends that “if this practice was indeed widespread, as it appears to have been, it would reflect a trend toward the internalization of the original aspects of slaving, as the peasants in agrarian Asia also did, they conceded dependents.” Miller, *The Problem of Slavery as History*, 104–106, quotation on 105.

Paulistas came to depend less on independent intermediaries and more on their own slaves.”161 While the use of enslaved warriors on slave raids is supported by the records, there is no evidence that the pombeiros/mus intermediaries described by the Jesuits were themselves enslaved. In fact, examples like Tubarão in the Patos region demonstrate that marginal men could elevate themselves to positions of power via the slave trade. It makes more sense that those pombeiro/mus intermediaries were connected, via kinship or marriage, to the Native communities that supplied them with captives to sell to the Portuguese, than that they themselves were enslaved. Understanding how those intermediary slave traders incorporated and maintained themselves at their trading posts is essential to understanding how the internal Native slave trade worked in southeastern Brazil.

Mamelucos, Go-betweens, and the Paulista Slave Trade

While some Jesuits described the middlemen of the Native slave trade as Pombeiros, Mus, or Native priests, scholars have demonstrated that other intermediaries facilitated that slave trade as well. Historian Alida Metcalf demonstrated how mameluco men served as go-betweens, interpreters, and slavers in sixteenth century Bahia. In the 1570s, mameluco men like Domingos Fernandes Nobre and Álvaro Rodrigues, used their connections to both Natives and Europeans as middlemen and led several expeditions into the sertões from the Portuguese settlements of the Recôncavo. Domingos Fernandes Nobre even abandoned his Christian name in the sertão and took on his Native name to become Tomacaúna.162 Many of those mamelucos adopted the customs of Native peoples while in the sertão, painting themselves, participating in rituals, and

161 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 56.
162 Metcalf, Go-betweens, 185.
tattooing their bodies. Those men often created alliances in the sertão with Native groups by taking Native women as wives and establishing themselves in communities living as Natives. As Metcalf documents, those *mamelucos* convinced some Native groups to “descend” to the Portuguese settlements on the coast, bartered with Native peoples for slaves, and established slave trading posts in the interior.¹⁶³ These *mameluco* men served as middlemen between the sugar planters of Bahia and the Native communities of the interior and one of the chief functions they helped serve in the sixteenth century was to provide enslaved Natives for the Portuguese *fazendas*.

While this has been demonstrated in Bahia and Pernambuco, the same questions have not been asked in São Vicente about the role that *mamelucos* played in the trade that developed in the *sertões* of Southeastern Brazil. Many of the first inhabitants of São Vicente (and arguably large swathes of Brazil) were of European and Native ancestry. But as Monteiro asserted, people who were categorized as *mamelucos* were those, who Portuguese colonists recognized as having Native and European ancestry. *Mamelucos* were typically viewed as at least nominal Christians, free, and often described as Portuguese. Over time the *Mamelucos* came to be viewed in Portuguese society as white. The eighteenth-century Paulista historian and genealogist, Pedro Taques Leme defined them: “*Mamelucos* (these are the whites).”¹⁶⁴ Might this have been an initial step toward the notorious process of *Branqueamento* (whitening) in Brazilian society?

Some of the leading families of São Paulo could have been classified as *mamelucos*. The daughter of the Tupinikin headman Martim Afonso Tibiriça who helped the Jesuits settle São Paulo, converted to Christianity and married a Portuguese man named Lopo Dias. Their

descendants became one of the leading families of not only São Paulo but of the Piratininga Plateau.\textsuperscript{165} In 1607, the \textit{mameluco} Belchior Dias Carneiro commanded a \textit{bandeira} into the sertão and was attacked by the southern Kayapó, but still managed to return to São Paulo with hundreds of captives.\textsuperscript{166} However, the records in São Paulo do not contain descriptions of the roles \textit{mamelucos} played as intermediaries and go-betweens as they do elsewhere in Brazil.\textsuperscript{167}

Perhaps they served the same functions as \textit{mamelucos} in Bahia and Pernambuco. The Paulista society that developed on the Piratininga plateau has been characterized as a frontier culture that “freely borrowed from the Portuguese and the Indian.”\textsuperscript{168} In the first decades of the seventeenth century, while connections with West Central Africa were arguably stronger in Pernambuco and Bahia, Montoya’s use of the term \textit{pombeiro} to describe Native middlemen in the slave trade makes clear the influence of Africa on the Portuguese colonization of Brazil. Paulistas intermarried with local Native groups, took enslaved Native women as wives and concubines, spoke the Tupi \textit{lingua-geral}, ate like Native peoples, and maintained the outward professions of Christianity.\textsuperscript{169} It stands to reason that some of the nominal “Tupi” intermediaries that the Jesuits encountered in the sertões, who sold slaves to the Paulistas and professed to be Christians, were \textit{mamelucos}. Perhaps they were the relatives of Paulista \textit{mamelucos} who they established trading networks with to exchange captives for goods. While this is plausible based on the behavior of \textit{mamelucos} elsewhere in sixteenth-century Brazil, further research and

\textsuperscript{165} Metcalf, \textit{Family and Frontier}, 30. Leme, \textit{Nobilarchia Paulistana}.


\textsuperscript{167} The records of the Holy Office of the Inquisition are some of the best records that give first hand testimony of what many mamelucos did while in the sertões. While those records are extensive for Bahia and Pernambuco in the sixteenth century, there is very little on the province of São Vicente. See Metcalf, “Entradas of Bahia of the Sixteenth Century.”

\textsuperscript{168} Metcalf, \textit{Family and Frontier}, 38.

\textsuperscript{169} Metcalf, \textit{Family and Frontier}, 38.
evidence is required to be able to confidently say for certain that is what was occurring in the *sertões* of São Vicente.

At the very least, by the 1630s, an extensive market in enslaved Natives existed in the *sertões* of Southern Brazil that supplied enslaved Native laborers for the coasts of Brazil.\(^{170}\) Paulista demands for enslaved Natives created a shatter zone in southeastern Brazil, that led to an escalating cycle of violence, slaving, physical and cultural destruction, and disease among the Native peoples of the region. This caused Native peoples to employ several strategies to attempt to counter the new threats. Some allied with Europeans against their Native enemies to provide the Europeans with captured Natives. The Tupinikin pursued this strategy with the settlers of São Paulo and the Jesuits against their Tupinambá enemies, some of whom allied themselves with a small colony of French in Guanabara Bay after 1555.\(^{171}\) Others sought refuge with the Jesuits on the *aldeias* of São Vicente and the reductions of Guairá. Here a process of ethnogenesis occurred as the Catholic missionaries forcibly altered Native cultural practices to strict Christian doctrines and ideology while bringing together various disparate groups. Other Native peoples chose instead to flee into the *sertões* of the interior to escape colonial settlers and the shatter zone they created. After 1595, groups of Guaianá and Kayapó fled the Piratininga plateau away from the slaving raids of the Paulistas and their allies.

Demonstrating the development of a Native slave trade and Native slaving strategies in São Paulo runs against the historiographical grain in describing the development of São Paulo. Native slavery is portrayed as peripheral to the development of Brazil and unsustainable. Furthermore, Native slavery is portrayed as having been imposed upon the Native peoples of

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\(^{170}\) This assuredly supplied enslaved Natives for Spanish subjects of Guairá and the Rio de la Plata as well.

Brazil, not something that developed from Native captivity practices. Luis Alencastro contended that Native headmen in Brazil “represented too unstable a power to extract captives from their own community or organize it as a predatory community.” But, as I argue, Native slavery and the Native slave trade developed in the interior of São Paulo precisely because Natives adapted captivity practices to their new realities. These were the Tupi pombeiro/mus that Father Montoya described or Tubarão of the Port of Patos, who as marginal figures positioned themselves in the borderlands between a Native interior and colonial settlements and used their position to enrich themselves through the slave trade. As shown, these actors infiltrated far into the interior of the continent and spurred the competition and violence over access to enslaved laborers and resistance against being taken captive for that slave trade. While the barter and ransom of enslaved Natives subsequently could not supply the demand for enslaved Natives in the captaincy of São Vicente, it did fuel that demand. After 1595, when the Paulistas had killed, enslaved, or driven off neighboring Natives, they began to range further and further into the sertão in search of Natives to enslave. Alongside that process, a parallel Native trade in Native captives emerged to supply the Paulista demands. The Native slave trade that developed in the interior of Southeastern Brazil was directly related to the Paulista expansion and resulting waves of violence. Despite some scholar’s refusal to acknowledge the internal dynamics, a Native slave trade existed in the sertões of southeastern Brazil by the 1630s. However, as will be shown in subsequent chapters that Native slave trade could not satiate the Paulista demand for captives. The Paulista solution increasingly became large scale slave raids that brought further death and destruction at an alarming rate. As will be analyzed in chapter 3, Native peoples developed

172 Alencastro, O Trato dos Viventes, 118.
predatory slaving societies to continue slaving alongside the Paulistas even if their own statuses as enslaved or free remained unclear.
Chapter 2: “Striped Indians” and Slaving Monopolies: Ethnogenesis and Competition in the Seventeenth-Century North American Southeast

In 1659 the Governor of Spanish Florida, Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, received a report from a lieutenant that eighty leagues north of the Spanish missions on the Florida Gulf Coast at Apalachee:

there had arrived by a large river some striped Indians, and with them white people, and that they brought some firearms and among them two campaign pieces, and they came doing much damage, and the quantity is up to a thousand men and whites suspected to be some of those Englishmen who reside toward Jacán (Virginia).173

Those “striped Indians” were unknown to the Spanish in 1659. Moreover, they were unknown to the Natives of the region who informed the Spanish of the devastation those newcomers inflicted upon the Natives peoples of the interior of southeastern North America. The stripes that made this group distinct to the Spanish and their Native interlocutors were most likely facial or body painting that was unfamiliar to the Natives. These newcomers came with firearms and either mortars or light canons, which were very rare among Native groups of the South during this period. The Spanish suspected that the Europeans among them were from Virginia which suggests that the Native peoples who invaded the Southeastern interior in 1659 were people that would become known as the Westo, who were slaving alongside Virginians in order to sell enslaved Natives to Virginia colonists.174

In response to the Westo raids in the interior of the Southeast, Governor Aranguiz y Cotes proposed the construction of a fort at Apalachee to protect the Spanish missions in the

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173 Jacán was the name the Spanish used for the area around the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia. Aranguiz y Cotes, Letter to the Crown, November 9, 1659, in John E. Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 17.
region and their Native residents and allies. In the Act, Governor Aranguiz y Cotes clarified the
new threat that demanded the creation of the fort:

that through the provinces of Apalachicola and that of the Chacatos, bordering on
that of Apalache, people are coming in great quantity, and those who they could
be is not well understood, due to the little capacity of the Indians, more than that
they are white and blond people, and they bring in their company many warrior
Indians, their faces striped, and who use firearms and come laying waste to the
land.175

In 1659, the Westo attacked Apalachicola communities, where the Chattahoochee and Flint
Rivers combine to form the Apalachicola River, and, further to the South, Chacato communities
that occupied the headwaters of the Chipola River near the confluence of the Chattahoochee and
Flint Rivers. These newcomers and their ‘white and blond’ allies caused chaos among the
Apalachicola and Chacato in present day Georgia, Alabama, and the Northern panhandle of
Florida.

The year 1659 marked the arrival of the Westo in the Southeast, where by 1663 they
established themselves permanently on the Savannah River and proceeded to enslave countless
numbers of Native peoples in the region for the next seventeen years. The Westo arrived in the

175 Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, “Auto concerning proposed Infantry post in Apalachee,
October 21, 1659,” Santo Domingo 839, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain. In Worth,
Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 15. This 1659 description given by the Spanish Governor
Aranguiz y Cotes of the Westo as ‘striped Indians’ becomes clearer as it is indicated that the
invading Natives painted stripes on their faces which made them unique at the time to other
southern Native groups. As a relevant aside, the French term for the Erie, la Nation du Chat, the
“Cat Nation” or “Panther Nation,” may be better translated as a reference to the chat sauvage
which in New France was the French term for racoon. Therefore, it is possible that the French
called the Erie la Nation du Chat because their warriors painted their faces with stripes, like that
of the tail of a raccoon, suggesting the often fragile links between what Europeans called
Natives, what Native groups called other Native groups, and what those peoples called
themselves. Misnomers and ethnonyms pervade seventeenth-century accounts, but offer clues to
the migration and transformation of a band of Erie, into the Ricahecrian, often called
Chichimeco, who became best known as the Westo. Bowne, The Westo Indians, 38. See also
Association, no. 102 (Spring 1991) 2.
Southeast after they were driven out of the area around Lake Erie by Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) raids and found refuge along the Virginia fall line.\textsuperscript{176} When the Westo began to conduct raids in the Southeast, they did not settle in the region as farmers or hunters; they established themselves as slavers—as hunters of people. In this chapter I argue that the Westo reinvented themselves as a slaving society in the Southeast before the arrival of the English in Carolina in 1670. The Westo were a marginal group from the Great Lakes region who migrated to the south and created a new identity as slavers of other Natives they exchanged for firearms with the English. In this chapter, I argue that because the Westo chose to remain a slaving society, and not to implement another socio-economic strategy for survival. In the process of enslaving they ignited conflicts in the Southeast from 1659 to 1680 that eventually led to their own destruction as a distinct people. The Westo created the conditions necessary for the drastic expansion of the Native slave trade in Carolina and the larger Southeast over the course of the second half of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{177} Furthermore, the Westo set the stage for other Native groups and Carolina colonists to use slaving as a survival and economic strategy. The threat of the Westo and subsequent slaving societies like them contributed to a process of ethnogenesis that saw Native groups either disperse and flee from the devastation, coalesce together to defend themselves and enslave others, or seek alliances with and protection of Europeans either as “settlement Indians” in Carolina or on Spanish Missions.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{176} The Virginia fall line is part of the Atlantic Seaboard Fall Line which is a geographical feature made up of a series of escarpments that separate the Atlantic coastal plain from the Appalachian piedmont. It is marked by series of waterfalls and rapids along most rivers.

\textsuperscript{177} For details on the Native slave trade out of Carolina to the Caribbean see: D. Andrew Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans and the Making of South Carolina, 1659–1739” (PhD Dissertation: Rice University, 2018).

\textsuperscript{178} Bowne, \textit{The Westo Indians}, 104.
This chapter will follow the ethnogenesis of the Westo from their origins in the Great Lakes region to their creation of a slaving monopoly with Carolina traders in the 1670s. Along the way the Westo reinvented themselves as a smaller mobile polity of hunters and slavers in the Southeast. The Westo implemented this strategy to great success in the 1660s and 1670s. I will demonstrate how the Westo had already drastically changed the southern social and geopolitical landscape before the arrival of Carolina colonists in 1670. After the Westo established a monopoly trade with Carolina in 1674, the Westo sought to defend their position as the premier slaving group in the region. Chapter Four will address the consequences of the Westo slaving monopoly, in this chapter, I will illustrate how the Westo used slaving as a strategy to reinvent themselves.

In response to their own forced dispersal from the Great Lakes region, the group that became known as the Westo developed a slaving strategy that I call a slaving monopoly. Having learned firsthand in the northeast the importance of access to European goods, the Westo sought to position themselves as the sole trading partner of first the Virginians and then the Carolinians. The Westo traded furs and enslaved Native laborers to the English settlers— as it became clearer there was a persistent and growing demand for them. The Westo sought to control this trade and in so doing they created the conditions necessary for the expansion of the Native slave trade in the seventeenth-century Southeast.\(^{179}\) The Westo served as a conduit for the movement and transformation of strategies developed in the Beaver Wars of the mid-seventeenth-century Great Lakes to the Southeast, where they had a devastating effect on Native populations. In so doing, the Westo encountered and helped create other slaving societies, both Native and colonial, that also sought to create their own monopolies over the trade in enslaved people. Within the first

four years of the creation of the Carolina colony, the Westo and the representatives of the Carolina Lords Proprietary formed an alliance to pursue slaving monopolies. Neither would be successful in maintaining a slaving monopoly, but the competition for enslaved Natives, drove the expansion of the Native slave trade. The arrival of Carolina colonists increased the demand for enslaved Natives in the North American Southeast. On the colonial side, the Carolina Lords Proprietors created a monopoly trade with the Westo that prohibited other Carolina colonists from trading in furs and enslaved Natives with other Native groups. As will be shown in more detail in Chapter Four, this infuriated other colonists who often used the power of the local state to thwart the Lords Proprietors’ monopoly. But as will be illustrated in this chapter, Native responses to European demands, and especially Native adaptations of their cultural ways and development of new strategies spurred on the development of the Native slave trade in the Southeast.

The effects of Westo slave raids into the Southeast became clearer to the Spanish after the first report of Westo raids in the interior in 1659. On June 20, 1661, in the Spanish province of Guale, on the coast of what is today southeastern Georgia, out of the north, “walked a nation of a great number of Indians who said they were Chichumecos [and among] them some Englishmen with firearms,” who “made an entrada in the province of Guale.” As reported, more than two thousand Westo, whom the Spanish called “Chichumecos,” came down the river “that is called Santa Ysabel,” the modern Altamaha River in “two hundred canoes” and attacked

181 Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Letter to the Crown, November 15, 1661, Contaduría 965, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, sections published in Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 15.
the coastal mission of Santo Domingo de Talaje.\textsuperscript{182} The Guale peoples of Talaje and a Franciscan missionary abandoned the mission of Santo Domingo and fled to the Mission San Joseph de Sapala, located on Sapelo Island off the Georgia coast.\textsuperscript{183} Governor Aranguiz y Cotes responded by dispatching Sergeant Major Juan Sánchez de Uriza northward to counter the invasion and by June 29, sent Captain Antonio Menéndez Márquez to Guadalquini with orders to head “to the town and village of Sapala, where all the missionaries and Indians of that province had retreated to” after the first Westo assault.\textsuperscript{184} The Westo invaders subsequently attempted to attack Mission

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\textsuperscript{182} Aranguiz y Cotes, November 15, 1661, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 15–16. That the Spanish called the Northern invaders \textit{Chichimecos} is puzzling considering the word \textit{chichimeca} was a Nahuatl word used “to designate the peoples who lived north and west of the Valley of Mexico and has been variously translated to mean ‘son of dogs,’ ‘rope suckers’ or ‘eagles.’” This word referred to diverse groups of peoples who occupied those regions organized by both hunter-gatherer and sedentary agriculturalist societies. For the Aztecs, \textit{chichimeca} connotated a collective Chichimec descent from hunter-gatherer peoples, and tied into their own origin story as migrants “from a place in northern Mexico called Aztlán or Aztlan.” Charlotte M. Gradie, “Discovering the Chichimecas,” \textit{The Americas} 51, no. 1 (Jul., 1994) 68, 73. For this reason Spanish colonizers began to apply the term \textit{Gran Chichimeca} to the area of the north central plateau of Mexico and its inhabitants, regardless of their social, cultural, or political affiliations, as \textit{Chichimecas}. For detailed ethnographic, historical, and anthropological analyses of \textit{la Gran Chichimeca} see: Andrés Fábregas Puig, Mario Alberto Nájera Espinoza, and Armando Vázquez Ramos Cds., \textit{Territorio y Imaginarios en la Gran Chichimeca} (Guadalajara, Jalisco: Seminario Permanente de Estudios de la Gran Chichimeca, Impre-Jal, 2017) and Johnathan E. Reyman Ed., \textit{The Gran Chichimeca: Essays on the Archaeology and Ethnohistory of Northern Mesoamerica} (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1995). During the second half of the sixteenth century, the Spanish and their allies in New Spain waged an almost continual war against the “Chichimeca” peoples in the north central plateau. During this period the term \textit{Chichimeca/o} began to connotate “wild,” “savage,” or “warlike” Native peoples. Gradie argues that after the end of the Chichimeca War in 1590, the use of the term \textit{Chichimeca} to designate “warlike” Native peoples declined gradually to be replaced by specific names of communities and peoples. \textit{Chichimecas},” 78–84, 87. However, while this may be true in Gran Chichimeca, Governor Aranguiz y Cotes applied the term \textit{Chichumecos} to Native invaders of Spanish Florida almost 70 years later, in 1661. Aranguiz y Cotes, November 15, 1661, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 15–16.

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\textsuperscript{183} Aranguiz y Cotes, November 15, 1661, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 15–16. See also Worth, 10–11 for the location of Mission San Joseph de Sapala in 1661.

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\textsuperscript{184} Antonio Menéndez Márquez, Petition to the Crown, March 20, 1673, Indiferente General 124, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, sections published in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 15–16.
San Joseph de Sapala on Sapelo Island, building a large raft in order to cross modern Doboy Sound, and invade the island. However, around seventy of the Westo were thwarted by mother nature when the current along the coast swept the attackers out to sea where “they drowned in view of everyone.” The Westo attackers who survived retreated northwest up the Altamaha river, with captives and loot raided from Mission Santo Domingo de Talaje. Governor Aranguiz y Cotes wrote that the Westo “turned around to retreat through where they came” to “Tama” and “Catufa”—near the fall line of Oconee river in present day central Georgia.

Capt. Márquez’s account differed from that of Governor Aranguiz y Cotes, and placed the numbers of the Westo at “more than 500 men, among Indians and other nations that use firearms.” The Spaniards and their Native allies followed the retreating Westo and engaged them at least once where the Westo lost ‘many more, who in their retreat and flight died of hunger on the roads.” Spanish and Native forces continued to pursue the Westo westward and probably with the aid of forces from Apalachee captured four Westo in Apalachicola. The Spaniards sought to interrogate their Westo captives but found that their Apalachee allies could not communicate with them. However, some Chisca Natives were with the Spanish and could

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185 Fray Jacinto de Barreda, Certification Regarding the State of Guale, April 10, 1663, in Montiano, 1739, in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 93–96, quotation on 93.
186 Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Letter to the Crown, September 8, 1662, Santo Domingo 225, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 16.
187 Márquez, Petition to the Crown, March 20, 1673, in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 15.
188 Worth suggests that the forces used to pursue and capture the Chichimecos in Apalacheicola came from nearby Apalachee. Aranguiz y Cotes, November 15, 1661; Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 16.
communicate with the four Westo captives. The Westo captives said that they came from the north from the region known to the Spaniards at the time as Jacán (Virginia) and that “near to their lands . . . was fortified a nation of white people who made war on them every day, and who were approaching these provinces.” The Spanish called the Native raiders who invaded Guale in 1661 Chichimecos, a name originally meant to describe peoples from North Central Mexico which in broader Spanish America had become a term for semi-nomadic Native raiders. While

189 That the Westo who invaded Guale in 1661 came from the north is further reinforced by the fact that the Chisca were the only Natives with the Spanish who could communicate with them, being that the Chisca had been known to inhabit the area north of the Apalachicola peoples, today eastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia, between the Apalachicos and Jacán (Virginia). This former location of the Chisca placed them in closer proximity to Virginia and this northern group of Eries and Ricahecrians before they moved south to become the Westo. Worth places the location of the Chisca group that was used to aid the Spanish in interrogating the Westo as West of Apalachicola. While this may be possible, Native groups in the interior of North America were always mobile, it may be more properly said that the Chisca formerly inhabited the region north of the Apalachicola. This would place them closer to the Westo from Virginia and make sense why they could translate for the Westo captives. It appears that a group of the Chisca migrated south to be closer to Spanish Florida as early as 1624. It is possible that the Chisca were driven South toward the Spanish by previous slave raiders from the North such as the Haudenosaunee. For a thorough account of the movements and migrations of Native groups in the South after the European invasion of North America see Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 85 and Charles Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando de Soto and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1997) 203.

190 Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 16 and Aranguiz y Cotes, 1662.

191 Rather than being seen as an historical outlier the use of an ethnonym historically based in the Central Valley of Mexico, for Native peoples who came from the Great Lakes region and raided Native towns and Spanish missions, shows the movement of Native peoples across continents, but also the ways in which Spanish officials thought about those Native peoples. It emphasizes the sixteenth and seventeenth century connections between New Spain proper and la Florida for Spanish officials. Further research needs to be done on the prior careers of the Spanish officials in la Florida. Furthermore, scholars need to explore the connections between Native peoples in New Spain and Florida, considering that numerous Spanish sources document the forced or unforced migrations of Natives from New Spain to Florida. For example, a Royal Cédula to the Governor of Florida dated March 8, 1702 informed the Governor of Florida that the Crown had ordered the Governor of the Yucatan to send twenty-four Native families to aid St. Augustine in spinning and weaving. Royal Cédula to Governor of Florida, March 8, 1702, Santo Domingo 836–137, Archivo General de Indias, Reel 27, Stetson Microfilm Collection, PK Yonge Library, University of Florida.
the name Europeans called them changed over time, by 1661 the Westo were conducting seasonal slave raids into the interior of the Southeast and ventured as far as to attack the Spanish missions of Guale on the Georgia coast. The Westo attacks devastated the interior of the Southeast to supply the slave markets of Virginia, but the Westo found themselves slaving in the Southeast only after being displaced from the Great Lakes region by the powerful Haudenosaunee between 1654–1656.

**A Slaving Ethnogenesis**

The people who became known as the Westo to the English of Carolina were called by several different names throughout the colonial period. The Haudenosaunee referred to them as the *Riguehrnon* (*hronnon* meaning “people of” so “people of Rigue”), the French Jesuits called them *la Nation du Chat* and the *Erie*, the Dutch called them *Black Minquas* and the *Arrigahaga*. The Virginians called them the *Richahecrians*, the Spanish called them *Chichimecos*, and the Carolinians called them the *Westo*. Current scholarship holds that at least parts of the Erie Nation, after a series of devastating defeats at the hands of the Haudenosaunee, migrated to the Virginia fall line around 1656 and then again moved further

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192 Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 17. For a detailed explanation of the transformations and ethnogenesis that accompanied the Native group that was known as the *Erie, Ricahecrian, Westo, and Chichimecos* see: Bowne, *The Westo Indians*. The term *Westo* was used by coastal Carolina Native peoples to refer to the slavers that were assaulting them. The only word that is recorded that may be of the Westo language is the name of the town, Hickauhaugau, the Westo occupied on the Savannah River between 1663 and 1680. We do not know how the people of Hickauhaugau referred to themselves. Despite the term *Westo* probably signifying something akin to “enemy,” *Westo* was what other Native peoples of the Carolina coast called the people of Hickauhaugau and is what most scholars know those people as today. Therefore, I have chosen to use the name Westo throughout this text for the people of Hickauhaugau, except in specific instances where the change of their name is significant.

south into modern South Carolina and Georgia between 1659 and 1661. Like numerous other Native American groups, the Westo showed that mobility was a survival strategy and that raiding for captives in order to trade people to Europeans was beneficial—economically and strategically—in the seventeenth-century South.

The Erie, who lived upon the southern shore of the lake that bears that name, first appear in the colonial documents in the 1630s, and by the 1640s, they had developed a trading partnership with the Susquehannock peoples of Chesapeake Bay. The Erie traded beavers and other furs to the Susquehannock in exchange for firearms and Europeans manufactures. Since 1630, the Susquehannock obtained those goods primarily from the English trader William Claiborne at Kent Island in Chesapeake Bay and overtime from other Virginians, Marylanders after 1634, and Swedes at Delaware Bay after 1638. The Haudenosaunee unsuccessfully sought to destroy the Susquehannock in 1651 and 1652, and again in 1663. However, between 1654 and 1656 the Haudenosaunee were successful in dispersing the Erie.

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194 Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Letter to the Crown, November 9, 1659. Santo Domingo 839, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain. In Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 15. Aranguiz y Cotes, November 15, 1661, in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 15–16.

195 For the impacts of slaving and mobility as strategies that developed among Native groups in seventeenth and eighteenth-century North America see: Bowne, The Westo Indians; Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw; Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Reséndez, The Other Slavery; Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country; Stephen Warren, The Worlds the Shawnees Made: Migration and Violence in Early America (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2014).


A group of the dispersed Erie fled south and established themselves in Virginia on the fall line of the James River by 1656. Numbering between 600 and 700 people, they became known to the Virginians as Rickahockans/Richahecrians. These Iroquoian speaking peoples were only a fragment of the Erie Nation, and as they fled the Great Lakes region, they began to develop a strategy of positioning themselves between other Native groups and Europeans in order to gain access to European markets and to operate as middlemen in the trade of beavers and furs for guns and ammunition. This strategy was implemented by numerous Native groups in northeastern North America in the seventeenth century, but was arguably best employed by the Haudenosaunee and the Susquehannock. In Virginia, the Westo took that strategy a step further and began to provide enslaved captives to Virginia planters as commodities. The Westo strategy of selling captives during the period may have developed

199 The mid-seventeenth-century Beaver Wars saw the Haudenosaunee conquer and either incorporate, destroy, or displace the Wenros (1638), the Hurons (1649), the Petuns (1650), the Neutrals (1651), and the Eries (1656). Bowne, *The Westo Indians*, 11, 50–51. For further explanation of the Five Nations Iroquois and the Beaver Wars see: Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 61–62. There is some disagreement between scholars as to what drove the Iroquois expansion and aggressive actions towards their Iroquoian-speaking neighbors. Eric Bowne argues that specifically the Haudenosaunee attacked the Susquehannock and Erie in the 1650s because the Erie supplied Ohio Valley furs to the Susquehannock in exchange for firearms obtained from Europeans in Chesapeake and Delaware Bay, Bowne, 50–51. Richter argues that the need for captives to replace lost kin through mourning wars became the driving force behind the Haudenosaunee attacks against their Iroquoian speaking neighbors who had not joined the Iroquois league. Richter asserts the Erie and Susquehannock, like the Hurons, Petuns, and Neutrals, “shared with the Iroquois mixed horticultural and hunting and fishing economies, related languages, and similar beliefs, making their people ideal candidates for adoption.” Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 65. The truth probably depends on the perspective because both arguments provide suitable explanations as to why the Haudenosaunee expanded the Iroquois League so rapidly during the seventeenth century. As will be explained in this chapter, one of the attributes that made the Westo different is they sold enslaved captives while the Haudenosaunee incorporated and adopted captives as kin via “requickening” ceremonies.
200 The Westo continued to trade in furs with Virginians and subsequently the Carolinians. Although there is little concrete evidence of the direct exchange of enslaved Natives with Europeans by the Westo their raids indicate that they exchanged them with someone. Enslaved
from their migratory nature and lack of established villages to promote incorporation. But the
point at which the Westo began to take war captives and not incorporate them into their own
communities is the point at which the Westo began to develop a slaving society.201

Westo slaving in Virginia is often thought to have been an adaptation and adoption of
Native practices of captivity into a more commodified form of slavery, where Native captives
were sold to Europeans. Native peoples continually adopted and adapted European practices and
goods to their own uses and likewise at times adapted their needs to supply European demands in
exchange for their own desire for European made goods. In Virginia, the Westo applied
economic strategies learned and adapted from the Haudenosaunee and the Susquehannock: cut
off other Native groups from access to Europeans and monopolize the trade in European goods
and firearms.202

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Natives brought the most value to the group and thus drove their strategy of creating a slaving
201 A slaving society is a society where slaving, the capture and enslavement of human beings, is
the driving socio-economic force. In my use of the term, I intend to bridge the gap between
slaving as a strategy of the marginalized as defined by Joseph C. Miller and the binary created by
Ira Berlin of slave societies and societies with slaves. Slaving as a strategy was meant to
historicize and contextualize the timeless strategies of slavers “who resorted to slaving to convert
Berlin classified societies with slaves as societies where slavery existed but the socio-economic
organization of society was not dependent upon slavery. In slave societies, all social organization
was based around slavery and its use to produce profit. Societies with slaves could become slave
societies over time, but as Berlin argues the “transformation generally turned upon the discovery
of some commodity.” Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 8–9. I contend that Berlin’s binary does
not create room for societies that employ slaving as a strategy—for societies where slaving
became the economic center of production and where enslaved people became the commodity at
the center of society.
202 Bowne, The Westo Indians, 26–27; Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 41–43; Snyder, Slavery
and from Virginia, 1607–1675,” in Ethridge and Hudson, The Transformation of the
Southeastern Indians, 1540–1760, 65–78.
However, the Westo developed a new socio-economic strategy in slaving. The Westo adapted the Haudenosaunee and Susquehannock practice of taking captives for mourning wars and instead of incorporating many of them into their communities via adoption and replacement of kin, the Westo sold those captives to the English. \(^{203}\) In Virginia, the Westo “engaged in commercial slaving to acquire guns and ammunition and not just replace their dead.”\(^{204}\) While captivity and forms of slavery existed in Native American societies across the continent, the decision by the Westo to focus their strategies on slaving and not the incorporation of outsiders into their community allowed for them to immediately benefit from their trade connections with the English and other Native groups. Westo exchange of captives instead of incorporation meant that the group could keep itself amply supplied with firearms, ammunition, and other European wares without devoting the men and time necessary to either maintain hunting grounds for furs or the time necessary to steal those furs from others via raids. This allowed for mobility and migration, which made sense for a small marginal refugee group having been recently dispersed by the Haudenosaunee.

Moreover, the development of a slaving society also meant that the Westo remained a relatively smaller group numerically. \(^{205}\) The Westo undoubtedly incorporated some captives into their communities, either as slaves or as adopted kin, but they did not develop a coalescent strategy that would prove to be the decisive survival strategy for Native groups. For example, other displaced Iroquoian-speakers driven west by the Haudenosaunee coalesced into the Wyandots around the northern Ohio River valley. \(^{206}\) The Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creeks,

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\(^{204}\) Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 97.


Cherokees, Catawbans, Yamasees, and others would all develop strategies of incorporating disparate groups in order to grow in strength. In a time period of demographic collapse due to war, disease, and slaving, coalescing as a strategy made sense for survival. Those people conducted slave raids and became the societies that took slaving in the North American Southeast to its heights at the turn of the eighteenth century. Yet, the Westo did not pursue that strategy and chose not to incorporate other large disparate groups; the Westo built no confederacy. Instead, in the late 1650s the Westo chose to raid the Virginia backcountry for enslaved Natives and whatever booty could be taken from those communities. As the Westo pushed further into the Southeast they found well populated areas that offered up ample opportunities to exploit their new slaving strategy. After suffering through Haudenosaunee raids, the Westo themselves became a militaristic slaving society, that “through their slave raiding, spread internecine warfare and created widespread dislocation, migration, amalgamation, and, in some cases, extinction of Native peoples.” In the face of new challenges, war, migration, disease, and new cultural encounters, the Westo adopted and adapted a new strategy for themselves that positioned themselves, on the borderlands and as middlemen between Native groups and Europeans, which allowed them to briefly monopolize the Native slave trade in the South.

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208 Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 93. Ethridge argues that while both were slaving societies, there was a difference between Haudenosaunee raiding as a militaristic slaving society and commercial slaving societies of the Westo and Occaneechi. I argue that the Westo, despite never becoming a very large group, could be categorized as both commercial and militaristic slaving societies. The Westo engaged in the commercial slave trade by trading people for guns instead of incorporating their captives into their own communities and they also engaged in militaristic slaving that arguably destroyed the polities of Tama and Cofitachequi, and resulted in the coalescence of numerous groups in response to Westo raids.

209 The process of adaptation and change in the face of cultural encounters between Native Americans, Europeans, and Africans that occurred after contact between those peoples have been
From Dispersion to Coalescence: A Ripple Effect

After the destruction of Mission Santo Domingo de Talaje, many of the Guale refugees of this mission reestablished themselves in a mission community on St. Simons Island, and called it Santo Domingo de Asajo. Movement—or flight—to the Sea Islands along the coast of Georgia and northern Florida became a strategy for the Native peoples of Guale and Mocama in the face extensively conceptualized. James H. Merrell argued for a reconceptualization of the New World as a “Native New World” where scholars should ‘think of a ‘world’ as the physical and cultural milieu within which people live and a ‘new world’ as a dramatically different milieu demanding basic changes in the ways of life. James H. Merrell, “The Indians’ New World: The Catawba Experience,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 41, n. 4 (October 1984): 538. In this Native New World, Native peoples “had to blend old and new ways that would permit them to survive in the present and prepare for the future without utterly forsaking the past.” James H. Merrell, *The Indians’ New World*, xxxv. Michael Witgen expanded on Merrell’s concept of the Native New World and argued that the introduction of Europeans, Africans, and Atlantic markets “demanded that the Native peoples, like the peoples of empire, reimagine their social identity in the wake of the epic encounter that brought their two worlds into contact.” By focusing on the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes region, Witgen emphasizes a process of change that Native peoples underwent during the process of increasing incorporation into Atlantic markets, but a process of change that occurred largely absent from European voices and along Native social and cultural pathways, Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*, 19. Much of the drastic changes in Native communities occurred episodically from the late sixteenth century to the early eighteenth century. Eric E. Bowne designated the changes Native communities underwent during the period as “the seventeenth-century transformation,” Bowne, *The Westo Indians*, 4. Alejandra Dubcovsky characterized Native approaches to those changes in the seventeenth-century South as “[m]aking sense of these new forces required Indians to work through increasingly localized and fragmented channels of communication, an unstable and often violent political climate, and a reduction in the size and influence of most existing polities.” Alejandra Dubcovsky, *Informed Power: Communication in the Early American South* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016) 38. Anthropologist Robbie Ethridge argued for an “interpretive framework” for that period defined as the “Mississippian shatter zone.” Ethridge sees the Mississippian shatter zone as existing in a specific time and place, but arose from the “inability of chiefdoms to withstand the full force of colonialism,” along with “the introduction of Old World pathogens,” and the development of “a nascent capitalist economic system by Europeans through a commercial trade in Indian slaves and animal skins,” which resulted in “the spread of violence and warfare through the Indian slave trade” and thus “the emergence of militaristic Native slaving societies.” Robbie Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 4. The Westo were a prime example of a militaristic slaving society. See also, Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*; and Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

210 Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 18.
of slave raids because the isolated locations made them harder to reach, as can be shown by the
failed Westo attack of 1661 against Mission San Joseph de Sapala. Moreover, the island missions
were easier for the Spanish in St. Augustine to resupply or to reinforce by ship. However, as time
would tell, the island locations of missions—while providing protection from land-based raids
composed largely of Natives—made those missions vulnerable to sea-based raids of European
pirates and privateers.211

It appears that although the Westo were able to destroy Mission Santo Domingo de Talaje
in 1661, the subsequent failed attack against Mission San Joseph de Sapala proved too costly.
The exact numbers of captive Natives taken from Santo Domingo de Talaje remains unclear, but
we do know that the Westo chose not to attack a Spanish mission again for another 19 years. It
appears, instead, that the Westo chose to attack other Native communities in the Southern
interior, avoiding the Spanish missions, but filling the ranks of the refugees that fled to the
Spanish missions for sanctuary and relief from those slave raids. As Governor Aranguiz y Cotes
noted in 1662, a year after the raid on Santo Domingo de Talaje, that “notice has been had from
other [provinces] of pagan Indians who came fleeing from [the Westo].”212 Around this date, or
by 1663, the Westo created a permanent settlement on the Savannah River, which was likely the
site of the Westo village of Hickauhaugau visited by the Englishman Henry Woodward in
1674.213

211 John Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 36.
212 Governor Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Letter to the Crown, September 8, 1662, Santo
Domingo 225, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain. In Worth, Struggle for the Georgia
Coast, 18. Brackets inserted for clarity.
213 Dr. Henry Woodward to the Earl of Shaftesbury, Carolina, December 31, 1674, Shaftesbury
Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, No. 96, in “Woodwards Westo Discovery,”
The Shaftesbury Papers: and Other Records relating to Carolina and the First Settlement on
Ashley River prior to the Year 1676, Ed. by Langdon Cheves (Charleston: South Carolina
While the Westo stopped raiding Spanish missions for a while; they did not stop raiding Native towns of the South. In 1662 they attacked the Native town of Huyache, most likely located at the mouth of the Savannah River, about 5 leagues North of the boundary line of the province of Guale.\(^{214}\) As related by Governor Aranguiz y Cotes,

> there newly arrived at that province [Guale] the Indian warriors that they call Chichimecos, who were the same who last year laid siege to the village and doctrina of Santo Domingo de Talaje, and today find themselves in the village which they call Huyache, five leagues distant from Guale, which they destroyed and put to the knife as many people as they found in it . . .\(^{215}\)

In response, Governor Aranguiz y Cotes ordered a garrison of Spanish infantry from the presidio in St. Augustine to be sent to Santa Catalina de Guale, “so that they [the Chichimecos] might not raze and destroy it, violating the temples and convents of the missionaries as they did in the [convent] of Talaje.”\(^{216}\) This attack on Huyache may have occasioned the arrival of the Westo on the Savannah River upstream from Huyache. The Spanish response to this attack outside the province of Guale was to move Mission San Diego de Satuache further southward to St. Catherine’s Island where it became associated with Santa Catalina de Guale after 1666.\(^{217}\)

\(^{214}\) Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Order to Captain Matheo Pacheco y Salgado, October 10, 1662, Transcribed in Pacheco y Salgado, 1698, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 18–19; Bowne, *The Westo Indians*, 78.

\(^{215}\) Aranguiz y Cotes, Order to Captain Matheo Pacheco y Salgado, October 10, 1662, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 18–19. *Doctrina* was the Spanish term for a resident mission center where a friar called a *doctrinero* resided. In the terminology of the Spanish Franciscans, and other groups as well, the *doctrina* emphasized permanence and centrality with the presence of the resident friar, as opposed to the *visita* which was a mission station only visited by a friar at periodic intervals throughout the year. For more information about the terminology and background of the Franciscan order in Florida see: Rev. Maynard Geiger, O.F.M., “The Franciscan Conquest of Florida (1537–1618)” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1937) in *Spanish Borderlands Sourcebooks*, vol. 23, *The Missions of Spanish Florida*, ed. David Thomas Hurst (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991): 221–312, see 254–255 on *doctrinas* and *visitas*.

\(^{216}\) Aranguiz y Cotes, Order to Captain Matheo Pacheco y Salgado, October 10, 1662, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 19.

\(^{217}\) Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 19.
Governor Aranguiz y Cotes instructed the friars of Guale to consult with the caciques and micos of Guale and give a report as to the state of the province.\textsuperscript{218} The Guale friars reported that, by April of 1663, the Chichimecos “went away very much farther to the mouth of another river which one can only descend through it to the province of Cofitachique, or to that of Escamaçu, distant from this [province] of Guale.”\textsuperscript{219} Cofitachequi, was a province in the interior of South Carolina, that had been a paramount chiefdom when Hernando de Soto captured their cacica in 1540, and Escamaçu was located north of Guale along the present coast of South Carolina.\textsuperscript{220} This places the Westo on or near the Savannah River by April 1663, where they would make their home along the fall line at Hickauhauagau for the next 17 years.

The Guale friars further discussed the arrival in Escamaçu of another group of Native peoples in the region, the Yamasees. Fray Carlos de Anguiano reported that Escamaçu “today it is all settled from Colon to what they call the Uyache Eslaçu across the mainland by Yamasis.”\textsuperscript{221} It appears that Uyache Eslaçu was probably a reference to Huyache, located north of Guale around the mouth of the Savannah River and Colon further north from there along the coast of South Carolina.\textsuperscript{222} The Yamasees as a people are first recorded in the 1663 reports of the

\textsuperscript{218} Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Order to Captain Antonio de Argüelles, March 24, 1663. Transcribed in Antonio de Argüelles, Petition to the King, 1662, Santo Domingo 23, Archivo General de Indias, in John E. Worth, Spanish Florida Collection, at the P.K. Yonge Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. Microfilm Reel 1.
\textsuperscript{219} Carlos de Anguiano, Certification regarding the state of Guale, April 6, 1663, in Don Manuel de Montiano, Documentary package Concerning Guale and Mocama, August 18, 1739, Santo Domingo 2584, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 92.
\textsuperscript{221} Fray Carlos de Anguiano, Certification regarding the state of Guale, April 6, 1663, in Montiano, 1739, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 92.
\textsuperscript{222} Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 98, n.5.
Spanish friars of Guale. It is likely that the Yamasees developed from disparate groups of coastal Native peoples around the mouth of the Savannah River who banded together in response to the introduction of the Westo in the region. The Westo were forcing the migration and coalescence of other groups, much in the way the Haudenosaunee forced the Erie band that became the Westo to flee south.

As numerous scholars have demonstrated, Native groups often coalesced into political entities in response to the slave raids of outside groups; the Yamasees most likely developed in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{223} By 1663, the Yamasees lived in at least six villages located respectively “six, eight, four, three, two, and more days distant by road from these provinces” of Guale. Fray Juan de Uçeda of the convent of San Diego de Chatohace reported that Yamasees had told him on March 24, 1663 that the Westo were planting fields “in the lands of the Yamasis” and the Westo were thus not a threat during that planting season to attack the Guale missions.\textsuperscript{224} Fray Campaña further confirmed the location of the Westo, upriver of Escamaçu, and that because the Westo would have to come through the Yamasees first that “they must first find resistance, and those who would impede the passage and with much brevity bring the news to this province.”\textsuperscript{225} In 1663, this places the Westo within the former territory of the Yamasees, north of Guale, which was likely the permanent settlement they established on the Savannah River at Hickauhaugau.

The numerous slave raids into the South from the Westo base(s) in Virginia and then subsequently from Hickauhaugau after 1663, created waves of refugees and resettlement among the Native peoples of the South whom they were attacking. Westo activities during this period

\textsuperscript{224} Fray Juan de Uçeda, Certification regarding the state of Guale, April 7, 1663, in Montiano, 1739, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 92–93.
\textsuperscript{225} Fray Juan Bautista de Campaña, Certification Regarding the State of Guale, April 14, 1663, in Montiano, 1739, in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 94.
reveal themselves in reports of the Spanish who countered Westo raids against missions, but also incorporated victims of Westo slave raids, such as the Yamasees, into those mission communities. As previous scholars have demonstrated, Westo slave raids helped further the process of ethnogenesis among Native mission communities that had already begun with the establishment of the Spanish missions a century earlier.226 What is significant is that the Westo were already established and successful slavers by the time the Carolina colony was established in 1670. But the Westo were also not powerful to successfully attack Spanish missions on their own. With the introduction of the Carolina colony, the rate of violence and slaving in the Southeast would continue to grow, forcing Natives being victimized and the new colonial settlers to react.

**Westo Raids: Native and Carolinian Responses**

When English colonists arrived in Carolina in 1670 at the behest of the Lords Proprietors they encountered coastal Native peoples who “doe seeme to bee very well pleased att our Settlinge here” and “shewed them selves very kinde & sould vs Provisions att very reasonable rates & takeinge notice of our necessittys did almost daylie bringe one thinge or another

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226 In the words of John E. Worth, “Guale and Mocama were not purely aboriginal social entities with an overlay of Spanish presence, but rather syncretic societies that took shape within the expanding Spanish colonial system centered at St. Augustine. Guale and Mocama were thus in actuality more a product of the colonial era than a victimized relic of the Precolumbian past.” Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 9. See also: Dubcovsky, *Informed Power*, 110; Ethridge, *Chica to Chickasaw*; Amy Turner Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana: Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, for the Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, 1994); Jerald T. Milanich, *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006).
otherwise wee must undoubtedely have binn putt to extreame harshipps.”

Stephen Bull, the Deputy of one of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, was appreciative of the coastal Natives’ assistance in the early days of the settlement of Carolina, but Bull was quick to realize that those local Natives also required something in return. Carolina coastal Natives were:

expectinge protecton vnder vs w[ch] wee have promised them ag't another sorte of Indians that live backwards in an intier body & warr ag't all Indians they are called Westoes & doe strike a great feare in these Indians havinge gunns & powder & shott & doe come vpon these Indians heere in the tyme of their cropp & destroye all by killinge Caryinge awaye their Corne & Children & eat them & our neibouringe Indians doe promise Ayd vpon all Exigencies w[ch] they have manifested.

Coastal Carolina Natives wanted the new English settlers to protect them from Westo slave raids that they had been subjected to for over seven years by the time Carolina colonists arrived in 1670.

Carolina Coastal Native groups were composed of numerous smaller groups who after alliances with the English in the future often became known as “settlement Indians” or were largely incorporated into the Yamasee and Catawba groups over time. These lowcountry groups included the Congarees, Seewees, Winyahs, Waccamaws, Cape Fear Indians, and a large group of coastal Natives that became known as the Cusabos. Among the Cusabos were some groups

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227 Stephen Bull to Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, Albemarle Point, September 12, 1670, Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 35, in Langdon Cheves, ed., The Shaftesbury Papers (Charleston: South Carolina Historical Society, 1897, 2000) 194. I have not corrected the spelling within the Shaftesbury papers in order to maintain accuracy.

228 Stephen Bull to Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, September 12, 1670, in Cheves, The Shaftesbury Papers, 194.

that interacted more regularly with Carolina colonists including: Edistos, Kiwahs, Kussoes, Stonos, Wandos, and others.\textsuperscript{230} Some of these coastal groups turned to the new English settlers to protect them from the Westo and other slavers.

Coastal Natives were clearly afraid of the “Westoes,” but the reasons given highlight what made the Westo presence in the Native South so devastating. The first reason given is that the Westo possessed European firearms. While Natives in the Southeast had been aware of European firearms for over a century at this point, access to them remained limited, especially due to restrictions the Spanish crown placed on selling firearms to Native groups.\textsuperscript{231} The Dutch, English, and Swedes in Northeastern North America had no such qualms, and specifically the Westo trade with Virginia provided that colony with furs and enslaved Natives from the south in exchange for arms, ammunition, and other Europeans wares.\textsuperscript{232} If we consider Native concepts of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{230} Ethridge argues that the Cusabos were made up of “the Ashepoos, Bohickets, Combahees, Edistos, Escamaçus (or Santa Elena or Saint Helena Indians), Etiwans, Ahoyas (Hoyas), Kiwahs, Kussahs, Kussoes, Mayons, Damas, Stalames, Stonos, Toupos, Wandos, Wimbees, and Witcheaughs.” Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 108. Waddell argues that nineteen Native groups were “probably indigenous to the lower coast of South Carolina between 1562 and 1751.” They include the seventeen of the eighteen mentioned by Ethridge above that made up the Cusabos (except the Damas) and the Sampa and Sewee Groups. Waddell, \textit{Indians of the South Carolina Lowcountry}, 3–6.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{231} David J. Weber points out that in Spanish Florida these prohibitions were sometimes violated, especially after the destruction of the Guale, Mocama, and Apalachee Missions in the Eighteenth century. David J. Weber, \textit{Bárbaros}, 182–183. There also appears to have been an illegal contraband trade in arms, but due to lack of supplies this trade never had the ability to compete with English or French suppliers to Natives groups in the South. See Bowne, \textit{The Westo Indians}, 68, and Gregory A. Waselkov, “Seventeenth-Century Trade in the Colonial Southeast,” \textit{Southeastern Archaeology} 8, no. 2 (1989): 120–121.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{232} While there is some debate as to the effectiveness of European arms in battle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, everywhere Native peoples had contact with Europeans, Natives wanted firearms. Bowne argues that “Throughout eastern North America during the seventeenth century, native groups with privileged access to European arms and ammunition were almost invariably successful in campaigns against their bow-and-arrow adversaries.” Bowne, \textit{The Westo Indians}, 62–67, quotation on 67. David J. Silverman argued that Native peoples fully recognized the potential of firearms in warfare against each other and colonists, and that access to firearms transformed Native America through the deerskin and Native slave trades. David J. Silverman,
arms and ammunition as indicators of status, as gifts from foreigners and friends, Native men (typically headmen) who were able to secure such gifts from Europeans attracted more followers because they could provide their followers with such European goods. Even if arms did not convey a tactical advantage on the battlefield,—which they did by the 1660s—having access to firearms did convey a social and political advantage among Native communities. However, due to their effectiveness and status as gifts to dependents, the Westo clearly wanted firearms and were willing to go to great lengths in their slave raids in order to obtain them. Furthermore, in all of the early Spanish accounts of the Westo and many of the English accounts, Southeastern Natives and Europeans continually mention that the Westo possessed firearms. Natives and Europeans repeatedly commented on the Westo possessing firearms because it was important. This suggests that firearms conveyed more of a tactical advantage than just spiritual symbols or prestige trade goods.

Thundersticks. Daniel K. Richter argued that among the Iroquois the difference in arms that mattered in the first stages after sustained contact with Europeans at the turn of the seventeenth century was metal weapons and not just firearms. Metal arrowheads made flint arrowheads and wooden armor obsolete in Native warfare—which drastically changed the ways the Iroquois conducted themselves in battle. Richter argues metal weapons led to the abandonment of massed formations which gave way to “small-scale raids and ambushes.” Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 54–55, quotation on 54. However, Richter’s arguments focus on Iroquoian warfare in the first half of the seventeenth century. Evidence suggests that by the 1650s and 1660s, firearms conveyed a tactical battlefield advantage over Native enemies without them, especially in Native warfare focused on hit and run raids.

Returning to Stephen Bull’s 1670 description, the second reason given by coastal Carolina Natives to fear the Westo was that the Westo “doe come vpon these Indians heere in the tyme of their cropp & destroye all by killinge Caryinge awaye their Corne & Children & eat them.”

The coastal Natives told Bull they feared being attacked and killed by the Westo, of having their corn crop stolen and risking starvation, but also they feared that their children would be stolen and that they would be eaten. While some may view descriptions of cannibalism as fabrications, colonial accounts depicted instances of ritual torture and cannibalization of captives among some Native groups. Flesh eating was about the consumption of an individual in order to consume their spiritual power. In this light it made little sense to consume children, when they could be adopted or kept as slaves.

Therefore, Bull’s account should be read as a separation between the stealing of corn and children, and the eating of adults, most likely adult male warriors. In either case, Bull’s account argues that victims of the Westo slave raids were terrified of the Westo and also believed that they practiced cannibalism.

By 1670 the Westo were feared in the Native South because they were organized slavers. As another early Carolina colonist, William Owen, described the situation, the local Coastal Natives:

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235 For further discussions of the practices of anthropophagism see the introduction and Chapter 1. See also Jared Staller, *Converging on Cannibals: Terrors of Slaving in Atlantic Africa, 1509–1670* (Athens, Oh.: Ohio University Press, 2019) and Rachel B. Herrmann Ed., *To Feast on Us as Their Prey: Cannibalism and the Early Modern Atlantic* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2019).
236 Daniel Richter outlined the common occurrence of ritualistic cannibalism in execution rituals in Iroquoian mourning wars, and argued those rituals were shared by most Iroquoian speaking peoples in the Northeast. Bowne argues that for the Westo, their Erie and Iroquoian roots suggest that they practiced forms of mourning war rituals that could have included ritualistic cannibalism. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 36 & 70. Bowne, *The Westo Indians*, 70.
to ye Southward they will not goe fearing the Yamases Spanish Comeraro as ye Indian termes it. ye Westoes are behind them a mortall enemie of theirs whom they say are ye man eaters of them they are more afraid than ye little children are of ye Bull beggers in England.\textsuperscript{237}

Although William Owen downplayed the fears of the coastal Natives by comparing them to children, again those Native peoples feared that the Westo were “man eaters.” Furthermore, here we see that the coastal Natives and thus the English were not only aware of the Westo, but also the Yamasee who as Spanish sources have shown were frequently seeking Spanish protection from the Westo in the province of Guale. Worth described the situation for the coastal Native populations of Carolina as having been “more or less forced into an alliance with their new English neighbors,” in order to escape the depredations of the Westo.\textsuperscript{238}

Further evidence of the local Native groups’ fear of the Westo can be seen in the account of Captain Henry Brayne who captained the Carolina voyage that established the Carolina colony in 1670. In April of 1670, Brayne arrived on what the Carolina colonists named the Ashley River and established a fortified town 4 miles upriver.\textsuperscript{239} Capt. Brayne departed for Virginia, to resupply and after riding out a “Hurry Cane” (hurricane) he returned to Carolina on August 22\textsuperscript{nd}, arriving:

at our River’s mouth and came to anchor to stop the tide of ebb: and seeing some Indians on shore I tooke my boat M’ Carteret and one of the two Indians on shore of our Country which I had to Virginia with me and 2. Or 3. servants with a gun or two and went towards them and coming neere we spied a Flagg of truce about


\textsuperscript{238} Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 24.

\textsuperscript{239} Lesser, \textit{South Carolina Begins}, 124–125.
quarter of a mile from two or three of those Indians that the boddy of them had sent downe to the water side to invite us on shore, but our Indian was verie sure thay was none of our Country Indians which made me begin to mistrust that they were eyther Spanish Indians or those that we call westows . . .

Capt. Brayne continues that while the rest of the group kept their distance, they “sent our Indian toward them” and the group ashore sent a solitary man as well. After the two came closer and discarded their weapons before meeting, the Westo man assaulted the Native man Brayne sent to \textit{parlè} (negotiate) and “indevered to take hoult of hime.” The Native man of Bray’s party “being a brave, bould spritly fellow sprang from hime and made towards us” where the party escaped to their boats and despite “9 or 10 musquits fired after us” no one of the party was harmed.241

In August 1670, Brayne and the English were arriving in what became Carolina where the Westo were the dominant military presence in the region. Eric Bowne argues that the Westo may not have been antagonistic to the presence of Carolinians as is, but did not want the English to initiate trade with other Native groups in Carolina.242 The Westo wanted to monopolize trade with Europeans in the region, but especially did not want the other groups to acquire access to guns and European wares. Moreover, the Westo understood enough about English and European culture to know that a white flag was a sign of truce. As Mr. Carteret explained in his own account of the events the “flagge of truce which as we neared proved to be a white Hankerchif which made us question amongst ourselves how the Indian might come by it.” Carteret continued that once the English were close to shore “we made our Indian call to them (but they not

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[240]{Henry Brayne to the Lords Proprietors, Barbados, November 20, 1670, Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 48, in Cheves, \textit{The Shaftesbury Papers}, 226–227.}
\footnotetext[241]{Brayne to the Lords Proprietors, November 20, 1670, in Cheves, \textit{The Shaftesbury Papers}, 226–227.}
\footnotetext[242]{Bowne, \textit{The Westo Indians}, 80–81.}
\end{footnotes}
answering) he told us they were Westoes, and if they ketcht us they would eat us.”243 While it may appear like a small matter, the Westo’s prior experiences with Europeans were evident in their first interactions with the English. Not only did they understand the cultural symbol and performance of waving a white flag to get the English to speak to them, they did so, not using Native cloth, but a European-made handkerchief. Further proof was the Westo’s possession of firearms—let alone their skillful use of them. According to Carteret, as the English and their Native allies escaped the Westo ambush, the Westo were “very good marksmen for theire bullots gras’d just opposite against us and had they given theire Peeces their full charge they had undoubtedly shott some of us.”244 Westo access to arms and ammunition out of Virginia, and their skill with firearms made them a fearsome foe for Native groups of the South and Europeans trying to start a fledgling colony. The Natives of Carolina were afraid of the Westo and what they would do to them if they captured them, Coastal Natives made a point to convey that to the English and sought alliances with them in order to avoid the Westo. In the words of another Carolina colonist, Maurice Mathews, the coastal Carolina Natives were “All about vs are our friends” but are “Afraid of ye very foot step of a Westoe; a sort of people y’liue vp to the westward [which they say eat people and are great warriors].”245

Westo raids increased after the settlement of Hickauhaugau, which led numerous Native groups in the region to ally themselves with the Carolinians.246 One of those Native groups was Cofitachequi which Dr. Henry Woodward visited in the interior of Carolina in 1670 and

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244 N. Carteret to Sir George Carteret, November 22, 1670, in Cheves, *The Shaftesbury Papers*, 239.
described it as a “fruitfull Provence where ye Emperour resides.”247 At the time Cofitachequi was a powerful community that boasted over “1000 bowmen.”248 Woodward traveled “14 days . . . from Charlestowne West and by North,” in 1670 to visit Cofitachequi, calling it a “2nd Paradise.” The leaders of Cofitachequi saw the value in an alliance with Carolina, and as John Locke stated “Woodward hath made a league with the Emperor thereof and the Petty Cassiques in the way.” Woodward created an alliance with the headman of Cofitachequi and also with the leaders of smaller towns who were either subject to Cofitachequi, or were in route between Charles Town and Cofitachequi. Those Native allies were “Assissting with provisions intelligence and armes,” and they “supply provisions and help to plant.”249 Even large communities like Cofitachequi saw the benefits in allying themselves with the new English presence at Charles Town. The Westo slaving presence in the South created reasons for both coastal Lowcountry Native groups and interior piedmont groups to seek alliances with Carolina.

While some Lowcountry Native groups sought European alliances to counter the Westo, other interior groups sought to curtail Westo access to markets to sell enslaved Natives in exchange for guns and ammunition in Virginia. In June of 1670, a German-born explorer named John Lederer traveled southwest from Virginia to an Occaneechi town on an island in the Roanoke River near the confluence of the Dan and Staunton Rivers near the present-day Virginia/ North Carolina border.250 Originally from the North Carolina piedmont region, by

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249 “John Locke’s Carolina Memoranda,” The Shaftesbury Papers, 249.
1650, the Occaneechis had moved north to where Lederer encountered them and had developed into “one of the earliest examples of . . . a commercial slaving society.” By 1670, the Occaneechis had positioned themselves between the Virginia trading outpost at Fort Henry and the southern trading path and began to operate as middlemen and controllers of Native access to Virginia markets, not just as Native slavers.

By 1670 the Occaneechis had positioned themselves to control access to Virginia forcing other groups like the Westo to negotiate with them. This can be illustrated through Lederer’s experiences in the Occaneechi town in 1670. During his visit, a group of “Rickohockan(s)” arrived with their “faces . . . coloured with Auripigmentum,” to negotiate with the Occaneechis. The commentary about the color of the face paint of the Richahecrians, as the Virginians called the Westo, stands out in comparison to the Spanish commentary about “striped Indians,” because the choice of a yellowish-orange gold sulfide for face paint stood out to Lederer as differing from the Occaneechi Natives in that town and apparently from other groups he had met previously. That evening, the “Rickohockan(s)” were invited to a dance by the Occaneechis, whereupon the Occaneechis surprised the Richahecrians and they were “barbarously murthered.” Lederer was surprised by the slaughter of this group of Richahecrians by the Occaneechis, but in the context of competition over access to trade with

251 Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 97.
253 Lederer, “Continuance of the Second Expedition,” 26. Italics in the original
Virginians the Occaneechis actions make more sense. The Westo brought violence with them in their slaving expeditions to the South. Not all southern Natives sought only to defend themselves from Westo aggressions, some groups like the Occaneechis competed with the Westo over access to Europeans and as will be shown, other Native peoples later tried to supplant the Westo.

The Carolinians become Slavers of Natives

Not all coastal Carolina groups saw the arrival of Carolina colonists as a good thing. The Lowcountry people known as the Kussoes were originally friendly with the Carolina newcomers but by 1671 the relationship had turned sour. In September 1671 the Carolina council reported that a “great quantity of corne from time to time [is] taken out of the plantations by the Kussoe and other Southward Indians” and that the “said Indians will not comply with any faire entreaties to live peaceably and quietly but instead . . . do threaten the lives of all.” The Colonial council

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256 Bowne, The Westo Indians, 80. There is some disagreement among scholars as to whether or not another group that Lederer mentioned, “the Oustack Indians,” were Westo as well. Lederer describes the Oustack as “a people so addicted to Arms, that even their women come into the field, and shoot arrows over their husbands shoulders,” and that they “prey upon people, whom they either steal, or force away. . . to sacrifice to their Idols.” Lederer, “Continuance of the Second Expedition,” 30. Some scholars associate the Oustack with the Westo, due to similarities in their names and slaving practices, See: Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 106 and John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922) 292; John T. Juricek, “The Westo Indians,” Ethnohistory 11 (1964): 134–173. However, Eric Bowne argues that while the Oustack could have been a group of Westo, that Lederer is the only contemporary source that asserts their existence and connection. Bowne, The Westo Indians, 33. I argue that because Lederer differentiated between the “‘Rickohockan(s)” and the “Oustack Indians” then he clearly saw them as different groups of people. Lederer, “Continuance of the Second Expedition,” 22–31.

257 Maurice Mathews to Lord Ashley, August 30, 1671, Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 75, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 335.

accused some of the Kussoes of “invad[ing] some of our plantations in the night time,” and of threatening to ally with the Spanish against the English. In response the council commissioned Captain John Godfrey and Captain Thomas Gray for the purpose of “an open Warr [that] shall be fortwith prosecuted against the said Kussoe Indians and their co-adjutors.” Just over a year after the colony was founded, Carolina colonists declared their first war against a neighboring Native group.

However, the Kussoes appear to have responded to this declaration of war by avoiding the Carolina colonists. They did not abandon the area, but worked to avoid contact with settlers, to the point where they fell out of the records of the Carolina council for three years. When the Kussoes did reappear in the records in 1674, Carolina colonists were accusing them of “hav[ing] secretly murdered three English men.”

The Carolina Grand Council made their conflict with the Westo official during this period as well. In 1672, the Council dispatched thirty men “to the Southward against the Westoes who are said to lurke there with an intent to march secretly to this place.” The rumor of Westo actions was enough for the Carolina Council to send men after them. By September of 1673, the Carolina Council had enough of the Westo threat. Like the Kussoes a year later in 1674, the

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259 Council Journal, September 27, 1671, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 342.
261 Council Journal, August 3, 1674, A.S. Salley Jr., ed., Journal of the Grand Council of South Carolina, August 25, 1671–June 24, 1680 (JGCSC) (Columbia, S. Car.: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1907) 69. As historian Alan Gallay points out the Carolina colonists had trouble identifying Native peoples and often used ethnonyms or misnomers for large groups of Native peoples. Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 51–52, 371–372, n. 41. As the Spanish called northern raiders Chichimecos at the time, James Merrell argues a similar point with regard to how the Carolina colonists called numerous peoples of the Carolina piedmont Esaw whether correctly or incorrectly. James Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 47.
Council responded to a “murthre committed by a certain nation of Indians called Westoes,” and sent a party of men under Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Godfrey and Captain Maurice Mathews against them. They were tasked to “marche against the said Indians to kill and destroy them or otherwise subject them in peace.” On top of the alleged murder, the Council was afraid of the Westo’s “continuall Alarums & publick declaration of an intended invasion in & upon this settlement.” The murder of colonists and the rumor of threats from the Westo and other Native groups like the Kussoes kept Carolina on the defensive.

Furthermore, what is clear is that some local Native communities were giving the Carolinians information on Westo activities in the region, and it appears that the Esaw were one of those peoples. In an October 7, 1673 declaration the Council said as much as to the value of local knowledge,

> the improvemen' as well as the safety of this settlm' consists in the knowledge of the lands & inhabitants contiguous to this place.\(^\text{264}\)

The Carolina Council recognized that part of their safety was dependent upon help and assistance, particularly in the form of information from local Native peoples. As anthropologist Eric Bowne has argued in relation to colonization in the seventeenth century, “much of the early success of native groups” was based “on the ignorance and inexperience of the colonists.” While even Native newcomers like the Westo could easily learn the region and its peoples, “Europeans, on the other hand, did not know the trail systems, the best methods of travel, or even what food to take on their journeys.”\(^\text{265}\) The Carolina Grand Council recognized this fact, and sought out Native allies to assist them,

it is advised that the present Warr of the Westoes will be most effectually accomplished by the assistants of the Esaugh Indians who are well acquainted with the Westoes habitations and have promised all the help they can afford.\textsuperscript{266}

The Esaw people saw it to their advantage to assist the Carolina colonists against the Westo who had almost certainly raided Esaw villages for slaves. The Carolina colonists sent four delegates to the Esaw to negotiate this alliance, two of whom were council members. When Carolina objectives aligned with other Native groups, both saw the advantage of working together. We do not know the outcome of the war with the Westo but by 1674, with the Carolina blaming the Kussoes for murdering Englishmen, the colony was having a difficult time defending itself.

In response to the Kussoe attacks on three Englishmen, the Grand Council of Carolina ordered that the appointed commanders including Maurice Mathews to “use all meanes to come up with the said Indians, whether to take or destroy all or any of them, the whole matter being left to their advisement.”\textsuperscript{267} The councilmembers knew that they would have to go searching for the Kussoes “fforasmuch as these Indians have no certain abode” for justice to be served.\textsuperscript{268} We do not know what became of Mathews expeditions to find and deal with the Kussoes, but we do know that by 1675 they were forced to negotiate with Carolina and cede lands around the Edisto and Ashley Rivers. These lands became part of Lord Shaftesbury’s plantation at what would become St. Giles Seignory in his Barony as a Lord Proprietor under the management of Andrew Percival. The land grant for this property was signed over from “The Cassiques naturell Born Hears & Sole owners & proprietors of great & lesser Cussoe” on behalf of “ourselves, our subjects & vassals, grant, &c., whole part and parcel called great & lesser Cussoe unto Right

\textsuperscript{266} Council Journal, October 7, 1673, in Cheves, \textit{Shaftesbury Papers}, 428.  
\textsuperscript{267} Council Journal, August 3, 1674, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 70.  
\textsuperscript{268} Council Journal, August 3, 1674, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 69.
While it remains unclear if all of the Kussoe were included in “greater & lesser Cussoe” it appears that the price of conflict with Carolina was the ceding of their lands to Lord Shaftesbury.  

Conflict between Carolina colonists and local Natives in the period was not limited to the Westos and Kussoes. Before the Kussoes were accused of murdering three Englishmen, on July 25, 1674, a leader of the Stono, another Native people of the Lowcountry, was accused of plotting against Carolina, “to confederate certaine other Indians to murder some of the English Nation, and to rise against this settlement.” Captain Maurice Mathews with nine other colonists were tasked with capturing the said “Casseca” and bringing him back to Charles Towne “to answer to these things.” The Carolina colonists began to see that their presence among some of their Native neighbors was not as welcome as it had initially been in 1670. War with the Kussoes and ill treatment of other coastal Native peoples contributed to the souring of relations between Coastal Natives and Carolina colonists. The Carolina response to such threats was harsh. Capt. Mathews was given orders “if any opposition happen,” he was able “to use his discretion . . . for the security of himself and the said party of men, whether by killing & destroying the said Indians and his confederates or otherwise.” As with the Kussoes in August of 1674, Capt. Mathews was given extensive leeway to deal with this Stono headman as he saw fit. Similarly, like the Kussoes, the Stono would resist the Carolina colonists until forced to cede lands to them.

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269 March 10, 1675, from the South Carolina Historical Society Collections, Volume V, cited in Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 69–70.
270 For several years after the establishment of Shaftesbury’s plantation at St. Giles it was still referred to as “Cussoe house” by Carolina colonists. For example see Council Journal, June 1, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 84–85.
272 Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 68–71.
The local Natives were not the only peoples to oppose the new settlement and worry Carolina settlers. The Spanish in St. Augustine were always forefront in the settlers’ thoughts. The records from John Locke’s memoranda as secretary of the proprietorship between 1667 and 1675 show that fear of the Spanish and particularly “Spanish Indians” remained forefront in the Carolina colonists’ minds. Locke and the Proprietors were particularly worried about the news of Englishmen being detained at “St. Katharina” (St. Catarina) would have an ill effect on colonists immigrating from Barbados to Carolina. However, after a brief show of force by the Carolina colonists their settlement was left in peace for the time being. Yet, when threats to Carolina came, the locals and the Lords Proprietors continually viewed the Spanish as the source of such hostility whether it was justified or not. As seen above, the fear of a Kussoe/Spanish alliance or Native Stono confederations gave the Carolina colonists reasons for alarm. This pattern of hostility and suspicion between English Carolina and Spanish Florida would continue well into the eighteenth century with alternating periods of hot and cold war.

Early Carolina conflicts with their Native neighbors highlight another aspect of the colonial settlement of Carolina: Carolina colonists encouraged Native slaving and slave trading with Native peoples from the outset of the colony. When Carolina declared War against the Kussoes in 1671, in October of that year the Grand Council ordered “every company” that engaged Native enemies to “secure & maintaine the Indians they have taken” until they could be “transport[ed].” The phrase, to “transport,” those Natives, was a euphemism used by English

273 For an example of this see: “John Locke’s Carolina Memoranda,” Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 95, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 256. For a description of John Locke’s services as Secretary of the Proprietorship see Lesser, South Carolina Begins, 16 & 23.
274 “John Locke’s Carolina Memoranda,” Shaftesbury Papers, 257.
colonists of the period to mean “transport to the West Indies as slaves.”

One year after the establishment of the Carolina colony, Maurice Mathews and other colonists were enslaving and trading Native peoples like the Kussoes that they had once called “our friends.”

Some scholars have suggested that the Carolina colonists were not slaving at this early point and their expeditions against the Kussoe and Stono should not be categorized as such because those peoples, along with other Lowcountry Native groups like the Kiawah and Edistos, were settled near and among the Carolina colonists thus becoming “Settlement Indians” as Carolina colonists would come to describe those groups. Other scholars have suggested that Carolina colonists like Maurice “Mathews, for example, used the Kussoe expedition as an excuse to capture scores of Kussoes, whom he later sold into slavery.” While there is no direct evidence that Mathews directly sold the Kussoes into slavery, it can be assumed that the Natives who “they have taken till they can transport the said Indians” was most likely referring to

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277 Maurice Mathews to Lord Ashley, August 30, 1671, Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 75, in Cheves, *Shaftesbury Papers*, 335.
278 Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 50–52. Some of the confusion may arise from the speed at which things changed for the Carolina colonists with the Kussoes. Maurice Mathews in August of 1671 called the Cussoo Indians our friends: with whom I had been twice before,” Maurice Mathews to Lord Ashley, August 30, 1671, Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 75, in Cheves, *Shaftesbury Papers*, 335. However, by October of that year the Grand Council had declared war on the Kussoes and sent the same Mathews against them. Historian Alan Gallay argued that “From first settlement of the colony, the Kussoe, for instance, had refused to ally with the English.” Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 51. While a majority of the Kussoes may have chosen not to ally with Carolina, clearly Mathews had been among them several times before October of 1671 and considered them friendly, at least to him. Therefore, it appears that the relationships between Carolina and Carolina colonists and certain Native groups were more complex and nuanced, than simple enemies and allies. This is a characterization of the realities of Carolina colonization (and elsewhere in the Early Modern Atlantic) where factions or individual interests within colonial and Native groups could have drastically different interests than those of the official government. As we will see in the case of colonists in Carolina and São Paulo, local governments actually vied directly against the will of their own metropoles in Europe at times.
279 Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 110.
Kussoes taken by Mathews’ expeditions.\textsuperscript{280} Based on the “transport” of Natives out of the Carolina colony it was clear that the colonists were enslaving Natives and selling them into the Atlantic Slave Trade. A distinction for scholars appears often to center around whether those actions were part of the Lords Proprietors’ plans or the actions of individual colonists.\textsuperscript{281}

The difference in interpretation often centers on the scale at which the analysis is done. If one views the Carolina colony from the records and orders of the Lords Proprietary, one could see the clear orders of the Lords Proprietors against enslaving Natives in the Temporary Laws added to the Carolina Constitution in December of 1671. The law states clearly that

\begin{quote}
Noe Indian upon any occasion or pretense whatsoever is to be made a slave or without his owne consent to be carried out of our Country.\textsuperscript{282}
\end{quote}

Here the transport and enslavement of Natives appeared to be forbidden by the proprietors after the actions of the Carolina Grand Council against the Kussoes and Stonos in the early autumn of the same year. But while the Lords Proprietors ordered that no Native was to be enslaved against their will, the trade in Natives by local officials would only continue to grow. In the words of historian Alan Gallay, “[w]ith the governor and council typically placing their interests above those of the proprietors, there was little respect for the law.”\textsuperscript{283} Therefore, Carolina’s Lords Proprietors frequently tried to exercise control over trade with Native groups, in either skins, pelts, or enslaved Natives, but the local government largely ignored them whenever they could. Local officials and elites turned to trading with anyone in order to turn a profit, and often the people in the Atlantic markets they turned to were pirates.

\textsuperscript{280} Council Journal, October 2, 1671, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 9.
\textsuperscript{281} For a detailed analysis of the parallel development of the Native and African Slave trades in Carolina see D. Andrew Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans”.
\textsuperscript{282} “Temporary Laws to be added to ye Former,” December, 1671, in Cheves, \textit{Shaftesbury Papers}, 367.
\textsuperscript{283} Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade}, 50.
The Lords Proprietors were largely unsuccessful in limiting the enslavement of and trade in Natives by Carolina colonists. As in Brazil, the enslavement of non-Christian peoples was justified in most European societies based upon the concept of Just War, as declared by the crown or their colonial representatives. In the case of Carolina, a Just War would have to be declared by the Lords Proprietors. But like the Paulista councils of the late sixteenth century, the Carolina Council justified their actions as “just” wars without feeling the need to consult with the Lords Proprietors, as they did in the case of the Kussoe War in 1671. This made sense when expediency was necessary, the Lords Proprietors were in England, and South Carolina could be destroyed by the time letters were sent to the metropole and back. Both in São Paulo and Carolina, the realities of sixteenth and seventeenth century communication allowed the colonial Councils to act first—often in their best interests—and to beg for leniency from the metropole later.

The Lords Proprietors made their conditions for the legal enslavement of Natives clearer in instructions of June 1684 sent to the Carolina Governor Joseph West. Referring to their order of September 30, 1683, the Lords Proprietors called for licenses to be issued for “the transportation of such Indians as should be taken by the English in a Just & necessary Warr.” The reason given for this allowance of Native slavery was “for the Incouragement of the soldiers who should be employed in such war.” If the Lords Proprietors wanted to end the “sending away of Indians,” based on the determinations of their “Consciences” to not “suffer it any longer,” due to their “tender Regard of ye safety of ye inhabitants of our province,” they could

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have simply outlawed the trade and transportation of enslaved Natives altogether.\footnote{“Whitehall, September 30, 1683,” in Salley, \textit{BPROSC}, first citation on page 255, second, third, and fourth citations on page 260.} However, as Alan Gallay has argued “by allowing ‘licensing,’ the proprietors opened the door for the same abuses that had existed before—Europeans setting Indians to capture other Indians for the purpose of obtaining captives to sell to the English.”\footnote{Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade}, 65.} Licensing was intended to control who was allowed to slave, not to end slaving. As will be shown, the enslavement of Natives was not something that the Lords Proprietors were against, they were only against Carolina colonists using the arguments of Just Wars to enslave Native peoples and challenge their own monopoly over the Native trade. As in São Paulo, legal justifications for Just Wars and the legal enslavement of Natives were often abused, manipulated, and at times flat out ignored by colonists who saw the Native slave trade as an easy path to wealth.

The justifications that the English used for capturing and selling Native peoples can be seen in the records of the Carolina Grand Council when determining how to deal with Kussoe prisoners after the colony declared war on those peoples in October 1671. The soldiers on the expedition were ordered to “secure and maintaine,” the Native peoples they had taken until they could be transported out of the colony. But the Grand Councils’ orders continued

\begin{quote}
But if the remaining Kussoe Indians doe in the meane time come in and make a peace and desire the Indians now prisoners, then the $s^d$ Indians shall be sett at liberty having first paid such a ransome as shall be thought reasonable by the $s^d$ grand Councill to be shared equally among the company of men that tooke them.\footnote{Council Journal, October 4, 1671, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 9.}
\end{quote}

If the captured Kussoes were ransomed, they were to be set free—but only if the Kussoes made peace first. The Carolina colony justified the capture and transportation of enslaved Natives as
war measures. The Carolina Grand Council may have inserted this language into their order to justify the reasons why they sold the captives into the Atlantic trade. By this logic, Carolina colonists could not be held accountable for “transporting” captive enemies out of the colony because their own peoples refused to make peace and ransom them. In contrast to the “ransoming” of captive Natives, English colonists “repatriated Spanish and French soldiers they captured in War.” As scholars have argued in the Carolina context and elsewhere, taking captives for ransom in loosely justified wars could develop directly into slaving and the development of slave trade markets. This also occurred in São Paulo and other regions of Brazil, in other English colonies such as Virginia, and in New England after the Pequot War of 1636–1637 and King Philip’s War of 1675–1676. The practice of enslaving Native peoples and selling them out of the Carolina colony would continue to expand into the 1680s despite the Lords Proprietors’ decisions to change their strategies regarding neighboring Native groups.

**Slaving Monopolies: the Westo-Carolina Alliance of 1674**

The results of the 1673 Westo War remain unclear. What is known is that on May 23, 1674, Lord Shaftesbury sent instructions to Dr. Henry Woodward regarding the Native trade that

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pointed to a new strategy for handling volatile Native groups. First, Woodward was instructed to “treate with the Indians of Edisto for the Island and buy it of them and make a Friendship with them.” This shows that the Carolina colony still sought to make allegiances with Lowcountry groups they saw as amicable with them. Furthermore, Woodward was to “setle a Trade with the Indians for Furs and other Comodities that are either for the Supplye of the Plantation or advantageous for Trade.” Woodward was given ambiguous instructions to make arrangements with some groups of “Indians” to supply Shaftesbury’s own plantation and to make a profit off of the trade of commodities. The instructions explicitly listed furs as one of those commodities of the Native trade. The instructions stated further on in the document “[y]ou are to consider what other Comodities besides these we already know are to be had from any of the Indians which may be profitable unto us.” Plantations needed food and laborers. Shaftesbury implicitly gave Woodward the discretion to deal in enslaved Natives and to procure them for Shaftesbury’s plantation. The Lords Proprietors sanctioned their agent to create treaties with Native groups to supply their plantations and turn a profit. They granted Woodward one-fifth of the profits from the Native trade.

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291 “Instructions for Mr Henry Woodward,” May 23, 1674, Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 446.
292 D. Andrew Johnson highlighted that enslaved Natives are mostly absent from Woodward’s account book of trade conducted with unspecified Natives assumed to be the Westo. Except for a 1677 entry that states “Indian slaves bought of them and sould” there is no mention of trade in enslaved Natives. Henry Woodward, "Accounts as Indian Agent of the First Earl of Shaftsbury, 1674-1678,” P 90010, South Carolina Department of Archives and History. Johnson argues that it is unclear why enslaved Natives were kept out of that account book aside from the 1677 entry that has no value assigned for the sale of those enslaved Natives. Johnson also contends that the absence of gun sales in the accounts, but the presence of the sale of gunpowder and shot, suggests that Woodward was trading with the Westo because they already possessed firearms.
293 “Instructions for Mr Henry Woodward,” May 23, 1674, Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 446.
Beyond the instructions to create a trade with “the Indians,” Woodward was told how to handle two specific groups: the Westo and the “Cussitaws” (Cusseta). He was to make peace with either the Westo or with the “Cussitaws,” who were said to be a stronger nation who could help Carolina destroy the Westo. The Lords Proprietors did not state a preference for which nation Woodward made an alliance with, although there is some indication that they perceived

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294 “Instructions for Mr Henry Woodward,” May 23, 1674, Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 446. The mention of the Cussitaws by Lord Shaftesbury is noteworthy because the identity of the Cussitaws at this moment remains debatable among scholars. In an April 10, 1677 order, Dr. Henry Woodward was reported to have made peace with “ye Westoes & ye Cussatoes, two powerfull & warlike nations.” “Excerpt from ’order Concerning the Trade with the Westoes and Cussatoes Indians,’” April 10, 1677, in Bowne, The Westo Indians, 123. Anthropologist John R. Swanton argued that the Cussitaws/Cussatoes or Kasihta were the same people as that of Cofitachequi. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 216–225. Swanton separated the Koasati and the Kasihta. In Swanton’s Early History of the Creek Indians the Koasati were the “Coste or Acoste” that showed up in the De Soto chronicles but were not the same people as the Kasihta, p. 201. The Koasati were mentioned again in the 1567 Pardo accounts but then not again by Swanton until 1701. It is probable that these two groups that once occupied villages in the Tennessee River valley were the same people. Other scholars have argued that the Kasihta and the Cussitaws were the same people, but have disagreed whether they were once part of Cofitachequi. Ethridge argues that the Cussitas, or Couisatta speakers, were the Coste people encountered by De Soto who moved South into present day Alabama and Georgia in the seventeenth century in response to Westo and Occoneechi slave raids. Ethridge, Chickasaw to Chickasaw, 112–113. John Worth argues that the Cussetaws and the Kasihtas were the same peoples, and Kasihta along with Coweta would become “ancestral head-towns of the Lower Creek.” Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 43. See also John E. Worth, “The Lower Creeks: Origins and Early History,” in Indians of the Greater Southeast: Historical Archaeology and Ethnohistory edited by Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000). However, What remains puzzling is the Cofitachequi were mentioned in contemporary accounts by the Carolina colonists. Woodward, met their “Emperor” and made an alliance with those people in 1670. “John Locke’s Carolina Memoranda,” Shaftesbury Papers, British Public Records Office, Bundle 48, no. 53, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 249. It is possible that Carolina colonists confused the Cussatoes with the people of Cofitachequi, but more probable that Swanton was mistaken. Furthermore, if the Cussatoes were the same people as those of Cofitachequi why was peace necessary if they were already on good terms? By 1680 the people of Cofitachequi had fallen out of the historical record as will be discussed further, but the Cussatoes as a people continued in those records and became part of the Creeks. Therefore, it is more likely that the Cussatoes and the people of Cofitachequi were separate groups at this period. James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 40–48; Robin A. Beck Jr., Chester B. DePratter, Robbie Ethridge, Charles Hudson, John E. Worth, “On Interpreting Cofitachequi,” Ethnohistory 55, no. 3 (Summer 2008) 483.
the power of the Cusseta. The Lords Proprietors desired peace with whichever group could supply them, and them alone, with the best commodities, as long as Carolina’s Lowcountry allies were protected. The Lords Proprietors had shifted their perspective on how best to deal with the neighboring Native populations. They wanted to use trade and alliances to supply their plantations and to turn a profit, but also to make sure that those trade agreements did not upset those Lowcountry Native groups that were allied with them and that would become known as Settlement Indians.

While the Lords Proprietors encouraged Woodward to make peace with either the Westo or the “Cussitaws,” in October of 1674 the Westo came to Lord Shaftesbury’s plantation to negotiate with Dr. Henry Woodward who was a representative of Carolina. We do not know exactly why the Westo approached the Carolinians, but Bowne argues that the Westo were likely feeling pressure from Native peoples like the Cussatoes and Esaw, groups they had victimized in previous slave raids, while simultaneously being pressured by the Occaneechis over control of the market in enslaved Natives with Virginia.\(^{295}\) This led the Westo to approach the Carolinians at exactly the same time Carolina was considering peace with them. Both the Westo and the Lords Proprietors wanted to create slaving monopolies to profit off of the Native trade and to exclude competitors.

After exchanging their goods with Lord Shaftesbury’s agents, the Westo invited Woodward to come with them because “they seem[ed] very unwilling to stay ye night yet very desireous y’ I should goe along wth them.”\(^{296}\) Woodward claimed that he knew them to be Westo


because he was “not understanding ought of their speech.” On October 10, 1674 Woodard left Shaftesbury’s plantation and traveled Northwest with ten of the Westo “towards ye head of Ashley River.” During the trip Woodward commented that he witnessed where “these Indians had drawne upon trees (the barke being hewed away) ye effigies of a bever, a man on horseback & guns.” Woodward attributed these signs as indicators of “their desire for friendship, & comerce wth us,” where clearly they indicated that the Westo saw the Carolinians as possible trade partners for furs and guns. The effigies hewn in the bark also suggest that the Westo or some other Native group that used that trade path had traded with the Carolina settlements before. After bivouacking for the night, the group passed the headwaters of the Ashley River and headed Southwest and crossed the Edisto River.297 The group traveled along the Edisto River for several days passing the headwaters of the Port Royal River and continued “West a little Southwardly in the afternoon wee mett two Indians wth their fowling peeces, sent by their cheife to congratulate my arrivale.” Here upon the Savannah River, called “ye Westoe River” by Woodward, he was “carried to ye Cap’ta hutt, who courteously entertained mee wth a good repast of those things they counte rarietys amongst them.” Once the rain stopped the Westo leader took Woodward “about a league upp” the Savannah River by canoe where on the Western banks sat the Westo town of Hickauhaugau. 298

297 “Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 457–458. Woodward’s commentary on the effigies of a beaver, a man on horseback and guns that had been hewn into the bark of trees on the path to Hickauhaugau suggest that the Westo, or another Native group had been traveling to the Carolina settlements to trade. We do not know if the symbols were carved by the Westo or others but they indicate that Natives knew beaver furs could be traded with Europeans for guns if that path was followed. For additional commentary on the use and control of Native paths and information networks at the time see Dubcovsky, Informed Power.

Due to its location, Hickauhaugau was most likely the same town along the Savannah River that the Spanish suspected the Chichimecos (Westo) moved to “in the land of the Yamasis” in 1663. When Woodward arrived at Hickauhaugau in late October of 1674, he fired his “fowling peece & pistol wth was answered with a hollow & immediately thereupon they gave mee a vollew of fifty or sixty small arms.” This greeting of volleys of gunfire into the air is interesting in that, while it would become customary among Native peoples in the South, it shows that the Westo not only had access to significant amounts of firearms, powder, and ammunition, but they were also quite accustomed to them. While the greeting served as an announcement to the whole community of the arrival of Woodward as a dignitary, it also demonstrated the Westos’ military strength, a fact that Woodward was keenly aware of. Upon arrival Woodward was greeted by “a concourse of some hundred of Indians, drest up in their anticke fighting garbe,” where Woodward was taken to their headman’s home “which [was] not being capable to containe ye crowd y’ came to see me.” The headman subsequently “made long speeches intimateing their own strength (& as I judged their desire of friendship wth us,” while trying to impress Woodward by slathering his “eyes and joynts with beares oyl” and presenting him with deerskins and a plentiful supply of food sufficient enough “to satisfy at least half a dozen of their owne appetites.” The Westo clearly sought to both impress and court

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299 Don Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes, Order to Captain Antonio de Argüelles, March 24, 1663. Transcribed in Antonio de Argüelles, Petition to the King, 1662, Santo Domingo 23, Archivo General de Indias; Citation from Fray Juan de Uçeda, Certification regarding the state of Guale, April 7, 1663, in Montiano, 1739, in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 92–93.

300 Woodward’s Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 459.

301 For a description of the Westo experiences with firearms and subsequent military advantages due to them see Bowne, The Westo Indians, 67–71.

Woodward through their displays of strength, food, and supplies of deerskins, understanding that skins as a commodity would be something he, and most Europeans, were interested in.

Woodward remained ten days in Hickauhaugau where he assessed the town’s defenses and their prospects as trading partners. He commented on the uniqueness of the layout of Hickauhaugau, “which is built in a confused maner, consisting of many long houses whose sides and tops are artifitially done wth barke upon ye tops of most whereof fastened to ye ends of long poles hang ye locks of haire of Indians they have slaine.”303 What appeared confusing to Woodward—who only had previous experience with Southeastern Native peoples—would have appeared like a normal palisaded Iroquoian town, including longhouses decorated with the scalps of enemies. The palisade around the town and longhouses with scalps fit the description of Iroquoian villages, which further substantiates that the Westo were originally a branch of the Richahecrians and Erie of the Great Lakes.304

Woodward clearly saw the Westo success as slavers and trading partners with Europeans. He stated “they are well provided with arms, ammunition, tradeing cloath & other trade from ye northward for which at set times of ye ye ar they truck drest deare skins furrs & young Indian Slaves.”305 Woodward’s account was written to Lord Shaftesbury in which he was not only explaining Westo strengths and trade practices, but identifying what commodities they could provide in exchange for which other commodities. The Westo already supplied enslaved Natives and dressed skins and furs to “ye northward” which the Carolinians and Lords Proprietors understood to be Virginians. Woodward was describing the benefits and costs of trade with the

303 “Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 460.
305 “Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, Shaftesbury Papers, 460.
Westo. They could be both strong potential allies against other Native groups and the ever-feared Spanish as well as advantageous trading partners who could supply the Carolina colony with furs for trade and enslaved Natives for Carolina plantations and the Atlantic market.\footnote{For more on the benefits of trade for both the Westo and the Carolinians in 1674 see Bowne, \textit{The Westo Indians}, 85–88.} Woodward himself was given a “young, Indian boy taken from ye falls of y’t River.”\footnote{“Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, \textit{Shaftesbury Papers}, 461.} This demonstrates that Woodward had no qualms about enslaving Natives, and also knew that the Lords Proprietors had no such trepidations about the practice of slavery. There is no other comment given about Native slavery among the Westo, making the practice appear as normal as it was among Native and European societies at the time.

As will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, Native women and children were most often targeted as captives and enslaved. As shown by Woodward’s account the Westo in this period targeted “young Indian Slaves.”\footnote{“Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, \textit{Shaftesbury Papers}, 460.} For the Westo and other Iroquoian peoples, this selective process developed as a response to losses due to mourning wars, but also due to the chaos of diseases, wars, and slaving that numerous groups were subjected to in the seventeenth century. As Christina Snyder has argued, “Because Native nations strove to sustain population levels, they often chose women and children over male captives” which “resulted in severely imbalanced sex ratios for victims and victors alike.”\footnote{Christina Snyder, \textit{Slavery in Indian Country}, 66.} These customs of gender selection of captives developed from Native captivity and slavery practices that often saw adult men killed in battle or tortured as captives and women and children adopted to replace lost kin according to mourning war rituals. While several Native societies in the Southeast came to practice similar
rituals, the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples of the Great Lakes were renowned for such ritualistic adoption, meaning the Westo would have been no strangers to these customs.\footnote{For gender and age differences in captives in the Native slave trade, Mourning Wars, and Native Slavery see: Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 236–241; Richter, \textit{Ordeal of the Longhouse}, 61–69; Brett Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) 46–47; and D. Andrew Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans and the Making of South Carolina.”}

The Westo targeted the young and women captives for enslavement, but it remains unclear if they adopted some of those captives into their communities. They may have done so to sustain population levels, but the Westo mostly sold those they enslaved—young and old, men and women. That the Westo did not use captivity and adoption, or coalescence of smaller bands to substantially increase their own numbers remains one of the characteristics of the Westo as a slaving society. The Westo appear to have placed value in their mobility as slavers and the ability to position themselves on the borders of colonial settlements first in Virginia and then on the Savannah River.

During the time Woodward stayed among the Westo, he learned more about how Westo slaving affected other Natives in the Southeast. Woodward commented that “Eight daies journey” up the Savannah River from Hickauhaugau the river split at the falls, and upon those branches of the headwaters of the Savannah River “inhabit ye Cowatoe and Chorakaie Indians w\textsuperscript{th} whom they are at continual wars.” Westo slaving in the region had clearly angered the Cherokee and Coweta peoples of the interior. During Woodward’s visit, two Savanna Natives came to Hickauhaugau having traveled “twenty days journey West Southwardly from them.”\footnote{“Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, in Cheves, \textit{Shaftesbury Papers}, 460–461.} The Savanna were a group of Algonquian-speaking Shawnee who had also moved into the Southeast.
in response to Haudenosaunee raids. Similar to the Westo, the Savanna Shawnees, and other groups like the Yuchis, had learned from being victims of Haudenosaunee raids that mobility was a strategy for survival. Occupying spaces abandoned by other groups, and on the borderlands between other Natives and Europeans, proved to be a survival strategy that brought access to European arms and ammunition, most often in exchange for furs and enslaved Natives. Nevertheless, slaving and mobility placed limitations on the optimal population size of the Westo. They could not increase their numbers if they sold all of their captives. But a larger polity also would have been less mobile. For the Westo, mobility was favored over increasing the size of the polity.

The Savanna Shawnee that came to Hickauhaugau in the fall of 1674, could not directly communicate with the Westo, “but by signes they intreated friendship of ye Westoes.” It is not known why the Savanna Shawnee came to entreat with the Westo, but occasional alliances between transitory groups of slavers in the Southeast occurred. The Savanna Shawnee warned the Westo ‘that ye Cussetaws, Checsaws & Chiokees were intended to come downe and fight ye Westoes, at which news they expeditiously repaired their pallisaodes, keeping watch all night.” The Savannah Shawnee reasons for informing the Westo of this forthcoming combined Cusseta, Chickasaw, Cherokee attack, or even if the attack occurred, remain uncertain, but the Savanna Shawnee may have felt vulnerable having newly arrived in the Southeast from the Ohio River Valley and were in search of not only allies but trading partners. The Savanna Shawnee arrived

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315 Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 161. Bowne claims the Savanna Shawnees had ulterior motives for coming to Hickauhaugau in 1674, possibly to trade, but what exactly those ulterior motives were at the time, we do not know, *The Westo Indians*, 85.
in Hickauhaugau with “Spanish beeds & other trade as presents making signes y\textsuperscript{t} they had commerce w\textsuperscript{th} white people like unto mee, whome were not good.”\textsuperscript{316} Apparently the Savanna Shawnee had been trading with Spanish Florida but found either that relationship or the trade goods the Spanish provided to be wanting. The Savanna Shawnee appeared to come seeking peace with the Westo and in search of trading partners. Yet, in a few years’ time the Savanna Shawnee would come to replace the Westo as the premiere slaving partner of Carolina.

Woodward left Hickauhaugau escorted by ten Westo back to Lord Shaftesbury’s plantation on the Ashley River. Woodward would not allow the Westo to enter the plantation but expected them to return “in March w\textsuperscript{th} deare skins, furrs & younge slaves.”\textsuperscript{317} This marks the beginning of the Westo/Carolina alliance that would last six years and—at least on paper—provide Lord Shaftesbury and the other Lords Proprietors with a monopoly over the Native trade in furs and enslaved Natives. As Eric Bowne argued, in exchange for furrs and enslaved Natives, “[e]ssentially, the agreement with Woodward gave the Westo a monopoly on legally exchanged arms originating from the Carolina colony.”\textsuperscript{318} Therefore, the Westo and the Lords Proprietors benefited from both sides of this slaving monopoly. But as will become apparent, not all colonists, or other Natives, benefitted from this arrangement.

**Slaving Strategies and the Failure of Monopolies**

Several things about the changing nature of the Native slave trade and slaving in the Southeast become clear after a further analysis of Woodward’s trip to Hickauhaugau. First, the Westo needed allies. The Westo had been at War with Carolina, but also the people of

Cofitachequi, the Esaw, Cusseta, Coweta, Cherokees, Chickasaws, Occaneechis, Guale, Mocama, Yamasees, and probably other Native peoples as well. Westo slave raids made them numerous enemies in the Southeast and as can be seen overtime, some of those enemies began to coalesce as political entities to defend themselves from slavers like the Westo. The Cusseta and Coweta would eventually become founding components of the Creek Confederacy, and the Esaw would become a key group within the Catawba confederacy. Bowne has categorized this coalescing of disparate groups in the face of slaving raids as “the aggregation strategy.” These groups like the Creeks, Catawbas, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees, survived the first waves of slave raids in the south, aggregated and coalesced in response to those raids, and subsequently became slavers themselves. But before those groups coalesced, they were subjected to Westo and other slave raids. In 1674, the Westo were being pressured by these Native groups to their West and South, from the Occaneechis in the North, and Carolina in the East. In that context, the Westo saw an alliance with Carolina as advantageous for their own survival.

Two other developments become clear from Woodward’s visit to Hickauhaugau. First, the great distances involved in slaving in the late seventeenth century South only increased as the demand for enslaved Natives grew. This likely placed strains on the capacity of a smaller slaving polity like the Westo to send sufficient numbers of warriors the needed distances to capture other Natives, but also to maintain defenses at home against other slave raiders and enemies. The mobility of a smaller slaving polity sacrificed the numbers necessary to defend against other

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319 See Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, Chapter 6; For the Catawba confederacy see Merrell, *The Indians’ New World*; and for the development of the Creeks see Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670–1763* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).
raiders and supply increasing numbers of Enslaved natives to English traders. Second, the number of groups willing to compete with the Westo’s desire for a slaving monopoly to provide those enslaved Natives to English colonists in Virginia and Carolina also increased. By 1674, the Occaneechis had effectively cut the Westo out of the Virginia market for the guns and ammunition. Furthermore, the Westo feared the Cherokees would ally themselves with Virginia traders and further isolate them from access to their supply of arms and ammunition.321 Before the Westo/Carolina Alliance, the Esaw were working with Carolina against the Westo, and other groups like the Cussetas had positioned themselves as attractive possible trade partners to Carolina. Other groups of migratory slavers were also coming into the Southeast such as the Savanna Shawnee and the Yuchi, who had no qualms trading enslaved Natives for Europeans’ arms and ammunition. The Westo desire for a slaving monopoly was failing. The pressure on the Westo to secure their existence on the Savannah River in 1674 was heightening and an alliance and monopoly with Carolina seemed like a logical solution to that problem.

As for the long distances traveled by Southeastern slavers, people would travel far to acquire arms and ammunition or to avoid being victims of slavers themselves. The Westo moved from the Lake Erie region to the Virginia fall line, then to the Carolina piedmont, and slaved as far south as the Spanish missions of Florida and as far west as the Chickasaws in what is today western Tennessee. The Haudenosaunee, who raided for captives to adopt or sacrifice to appease their dead kin, drove the Westo from Lake Erie and the Shawnee out of the Ohio River Valley, as well as frequently attacked the Chickasaws near the confluence of the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers. Iroquois, Westo, and Occaneechi raids pushed the Yuchi, Cusseta, and Chisca out of the

321 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 55.
Tennessee River Valley.\textsuperscript{322} Archaeological evidence demonstrates that the Native peoples of North America traversed vast swaths of the continent in periodic migrations and in elaborate trade networks before the arrival of Europeans.\textsuperscript{323} However, as European diseases, wars, and slaving spread across the continent the intensity of migrations and movement of Native peoples escalated. As Robbie Ethridge argued the “late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a time of profound social transformation among the Native people of the southern United States.”\textsuperscript{324} The development of slaving societies among Native and colonial peoples were key drivers of those transformations and decisions often made out of the necessity of survival spurred on the further enslavement of others. As slaving increased and required raiders to travel further distances to acquire captives, smaller polities that sacrificed size for mobility were placed at a disadvantage. Groups who coalesced and aggregated together with others, could both defend their towns, fields, and people, as well as conduct slave raids farther afield. As will be seen with coalescent societies in chapter 4 and 6, strength in numbers became a strategy to slave farther away and supply captives to the ever-increasing demand of English traders.

Shortly after the Westo/Carolina Alliance developed in the fall of 1674, Cofitachequi fell out of the historical record. The last recorded use of the term “Cofitachequi” by contemporary colonists was in February of 1681 when the Lords Proprietors sent instructions to Andrew Percival to make peace with the Westo during the Westo War that—unbeknownst to the Lords Proprietors—would end with the destruction of the Westo.\textsuperscript{325} The Proprietors told Percival that if

\textsuperscript{322} Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 110–115.


\textsuperscript{324} Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 2.

peace with the Westo was not possible that he should “get the Government to send to the
Cofitachequi the Esaus and all other nations, and enter into a League with them against ye
Westoes.” While it is clear the Lords Proprietors were willing to abandon the Westo if they
needed to, they were still trying to maintain their monopoly over the Native trade. What is
important here is that the proprietors appear not to have been aware that the people of
Cofitachequi were probably already dispersed by 1681. What remains clear is that there was a
considerable disturbance after 1670 among the people of Cofitachequi. The Westo were
continually slaving among those people, which most likely led to their dispersion. Some of those
peoples would coalesce again over time in the face of the Westo and other slavers as the
Catawbas.

As we have seen with the example of the Westo, slaving and migration were survival
strategies adopted by numerous groups in the face of increased slaving by others. As historian of
slavery Joseph C. Miller argued,

slaving strategies motivated competitors to react, on scales ranging from
interpersonal relations, between individual masters and the people whom they
acquired; to local and regional competition, between slavers seeking power
through slaving and opponents less committed, if not actively opposed, to their
strategy.

326 “Instructions for Mr. Andrew Percivall,” February 21, 1680/1, in Salley, BPROSC, 1663–
1684, 106.
327 Despite the perfunctory alliance between Carolina and Cofitachequi, it appears the Westo
continued to enslave the people of Cofitachequi. It is possible that Carolina colonists were
confused as to the true nature of the polity of Cofitachequi and other Siouan speakers of the
Carolina piedmont area, and began to apply the term Esau to most piedmont peoples, but the
proprietors at least understood them to be separate peoples still in 1681. Merrell points out that
Carolina colonists, like most Europeans, continually inserted their own frameworks of hierarchal
leadership onto Native polities that did not apply, such as talk of kings and emperors among
Native peoples. In fact, the word Esaw meant ‘river” in local Siouan languages and thus likely
applied to diverse groups of piedmont peoples who lived along the regions rivers such as the
328 Bowne, The Westo Indians, 86; Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 108.
329 Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History, 23.
For the Westo, slaving and movement to new borderlands, occupying spaces between colonists and other Native groups—first in Virginia and subsequently on the Savannah River—provided a strategy that not only gained access to European markets but also asserted their own dominance in the region at the expense of other southern Native groups. The Westo developed a slaving society by focusing their movements and actions on the goal of exploiting the Native and colonial rivalries over markets for enslaved Natives. The Westo then developed a slaving monopoly with the Carolina Lords Proprietors, that paralleled the slaving monopoly that the Lords proprietors wanted. However, as will be seen, the Westo were not the only Native group to implement this strategy in the South. Moreover, competition over access to the markets in enslaved Natives would increase, from both other Native groups and other Carolina traders and planters who saw the Lords Proprietors/Woodward and Westo alliance as a hindrance to their own needs. Both the Westo’s and the Carolina Lords Proprietors’ inabilities to protect their slaving monopolies would result in the expansion of violence and slaving in the region. That failure would cost the Lords Proprietors in England their colony. In the end, as chapter four will show, the conflagration of slaving that the Westo brought to the South would result in their own destruction and the spread of slaving across the South.
Part I Conclusion

In Part I: Native Enslavement and Native Slave Trades, we see the emergence of Native slave trades in São Paulo and Carolina that developed from Native captivity practices. Native peoples began to employ slave raids known as Malocas in the interior of Brazil to provide enslaved Native captives for Portuguese settlements on the coast. The co-optation of Native practices of captivity and concubinage developed into a Native slave trade complete with vast networks of Native slave traders—known as pombeiros and mus—who negotiated with Native peoples for Native captives in exchange for European goods. In Carolina, the Native slave trade was introduced with the migration to Southeastern North America of the Westo and other Native slave raiders who had previously traded Native captives with Virginians in exchange for European goods and especially firearms. The Westo developed a specific predatory slaving strategy in southeastern North America, where they sought to create a monopoly over the Native slave trade through the creation of an alliance with Carolina and preventing other Native groups from accessing European traders. Part I demonstrates how Native peoples and colonists in São Paulo and Carolina adapted and co-opted Native captivity practices to create slave trades. Furthermore, it provides specific examples of how Native peoples created and employed slaving strategies to benefit from those Native slave trades. Native middlemen and Native slavers benefitted from their involvement in the Native slave trade through the acquisition of dependents for their own use and prestige or by exchanging those captives with Europeans for goods and arms that brought more power and prestige. Once Native slaving proved beneficial to some Native groups, those without access to European traders sought to create access to them. Competition over the Native slave trade increased, and slaving strategies continued to adapt as Native slaving continued to expand in Carolina and São Paulo.
Part II: Adaptation and Expansion of Native Slaving
Chapter 3: Enslaved Soldiers, Paraná Contraband, and the 1628 Bandeira

In March of 1603, the São Paulo Council reported that Captain Roque Barreto had previously sent his brother, Nicolau Barreto, “with close to three hundred men and more gentiles [unconverted Natives] and war slaves” up the Paranapanema River valley “against the law of his majesty” to enslave Natives.\(^{330}\) Captain Barreto argued the expedition was necessary because the villa of São Paulo “was becoming depopulated because the slaves fled every day.”\(^{331}\) They sent the illegal expedition despite the “guaramimis” being “at the door and we do not know what they will do and the heathen and slaves who remain . . . can flee.”\(^{332}\) The Procurador (council attorney) of São Paulo, Jorge de Barros, had received news a year before that the “guaramimis were determined to rise against us.”\(^{333}\) When Nicolau Barreto returned, he reportedly captured 2,000 Tememinó Natives from the Paranapanema River valley.\(^{334}\) The Paulistas often openly flouted the Unified Iberian monarchy’s laws against the enslavement of Natives. When Paulistas justified their slaving expeditions, they did so by declaring the expeditions: as Just Wars against


aggressive Natives, as searches for mineral wealth, to recapture self-liberated enslaved Natives, and as necessary to populate the community.\footnote{I use the term self-liberated to reframe the power dynamics of bondage and center those enslaved individuals who chose to escape bondage through fleeing captivity.}

For example, the 1598 expedition of Afonso Sardinha the younger went to the *sertão* with “other young men and more than one hundred Christian Indians” with the “intent to go to war and raid” and search the “land with the intension to go take gold and other metals.”\footnote{Atas-CMSP, 2:46–47.} The search for precious metals, going to war, and slave raiding were all used to justify the expedition. The Paulistas understood that if they were unable to find gold or other precious metals, they would still make money by enslaving Natives.\footnote{Monteiro attributes the search for gold and other precious metals to the arrival in Brazil of Governor-General Dom Francisco de Sousa who both founded and encouraged expeditions into the interior of Brazil in search of wealth between 1591–1601. Sousa returned to Brazil in 1608, as Governor of the South and Marquis of the Mines, and encouraged some modest mining discoveries in São Vicente. However, Paulistas at the time understood that the search for gold and precious metals was encouraged by the governors and crown and therefore used those legal justifications to conduct slave raids into the interior. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 49–51.} Paulistas gave similar rationales for expeditions into the interior of Carolina in search of precious metals, and when they did not find those metals, the colonists often either used brute force to enslave Natives as Hernando de Soto had in the 1540s, or diplomacy to barter or form alliances in exchange for enslaved Natives, as Henry Woodward would in the 1670s. Paulistas, and other slavers, used just about any excuse they could find to send expeditions into the *sertão* that they hoped would find the next Potosí, but they were content with enslaving Natives when those endeavors failed.

As the numbers of slave raids increased in the seventh century, the composition of the participants involved in the expeditions into the *sertão* began to change. As can be seen in the 1602–1603 expedition of Nicolau Barreto, there were three categories of participants that were
involved in that raid: almost three hundred “men” (who were most likely Portuguese and *mamelucos*), but “more” of the expedition was made up of “gentiles” (non-Christian Natives) and “war slaves.” The Paulista Town Council clearly designated three categories of combatants on that, and subsequently many, expeditions: The Portuguese and *mamelucos* who were assumed to be Christian men, the non-baptized Natives who were thus considered allies or subjects of the Paulistas, and enslaved people taken in wars. The term “war slaves” (*escravos de guerra*) referred to people enslaved in previous wars, but in this instance, it also conveyed those enslaved Natives used in warfare, in slave raids. This dynamic shows up repeatedly in the Acts of the Council of São Paulo and indicates the complex relationships between Paulista colonists and both Native allies and enslaved Natives as well as the transition over time within those relationships.

In the first decades of the seventeenth-century, as São Paulo developed a slaving society ever-more dependent upon the enslavement of Natives, the number of slave raids increased, and they became larger, better funded, and better organized despite their continued questionable legality. Even as Paulistas continued to use Native intermediaries in a Native slave trade, the *bandeira* slave raids became the chosen avenue for capturing Natives. As the century progressed into the 1630s, Jesuit reductions in the region of Guairá became the main targets.

However, as shown in the description of the 1602-1603 Barreto *bandeira*, Native combatants of various designated legal statuses comprised the majority of combatants on those

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339 Muriel Nazzari called the process of commodification and valuation of “Indian servants” over the seventeenth century in São Paulo as the “transition toward Slavery.” But, Nazzari was specifically analyzing those Native peoples categorized as servants and captives, not those who may have retained more autonomy and been allies of the Paulistas. Muriel Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery: Changing Legal Practice regarding Indians in Seventeenth-Century São Paulo,” *The Americas* 49, n. 2 (October 1992): 131–155.
expeditions. In this chapter, I argue that as the Paulista bandeiras grew in frequency, size, and became more militarized in their structure, Native combatants on those expeditions increasingly came from the ranks of communities of those who had been previously “enslaved” by the Paulistas. While Native warriors made up the majority of combatants in Paulista wars and raids since the arrival of the Portuguese in Brazil, the numbers of enslaved Native warriors came to fill the ranks of those raids as the bandeiras became the dominant mode of acquiring Native captives. This process means there were communities or retinues of Native men organized in a loose form as warriors to accompany Paulistas on slave raids. However, during this transition, there still remained Native allies to the Paulistas and for some—either recognized or unrecognized—kinship bonds between Portuguese, Mameluco, and Native Paulistas. As bandeirantes (participants in bandeiras) increasingly used bandeira slave raids to acquire Native captives, Native warriors who had been previously subjected became more common—either as slaves or subject vassals who owed some form of obligatory service—combatants on the Paulista raids. Despite the assertion of Alencastro, Native warriors fighting alongside the Paulistas developed a “predatory community”—or in my terms a slaving society—based on the continuation of Native practices of captivity. ³⁴⁰

In this chapter, I will follow the transformation of the Paulistas Just Wars into the large-scale bandeiras and their subsequent destruction of the Guairá missions in the 1630s. Through an analysis of the expansion and militarization of slave raids in the first decades of the seventeenth century, I will demonstrate how confusion over the legality of Native slavery and the statuses of enslaved Natives allowed for the further enslavement of thousands of Natives. As enslaved Natives became the means to commodify other Native captives and the numbers of enslaved

³⁴⁰ Alencastro, O Trato dos Viventes, 118.
Natives in Paulista communities expanded, the use of enslaved Natives in agricultural tasks later expanded. After the destruction of the Guairá reductions, as enslaving Natives became increasingly difficult and the distances traveled resulted in diminishing returns in the numbers of captives, the settlers of São Paulo converted their enslaved populations away from capturing other Natives to producing agricultural commodities. Yet, the path to wealth in slaving had been established in the frontier regions and the need for enslaved Natives would increase as mineral deposits in what became Minas Gerais were found at the turn of the Eighteenth century.

After an analysis of the militarization of bandeiras, I will examine the conflicts that arose in Guairá over trade with Natives and colonial settlers of the region and over control of the Native Guarani populations. Settlers in São Paulo and Spanish Guairá all tried to control access to the Native people of Guairá who colonists saw as a critical supply of forced labor for their own purposes. Colonial settlers competed in a contraband trade along the Paraná River in enslaved Natives and other goods and with the Jesuits over access to the Guarani communities. This competition fueled the militarization and expansion of the bandeira slave raids and resulted in the massive Paulista bandeiras of 1628–1632 that resulted in the destruction of the Jesuit reductions in Guairá. Through those massive slave raids and the introduction of tens of thousands of Native captives into Paulista and Brazilian society, the distinctions between who was a subjected vassal and an enslaved Native blurred and finally were largely eliminated with the Paulistas imposing a de facto slavery and subjugation on all Native peoples in their communities.341

341 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, especially chapters 2 and 4, and Muriel Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery.”
Enslaved warriors were not novel to the Portuguese, particularly considering their historical experiences with various African groups in Angola, West Africa, and with Muslims in the Mediterranean. As Joseph C. Miller argued in the case of Africa, “[g]roups dedicated to strategies other than reproduction, especially ones involving mobility—say, military bands or trading parties traveling by canoe or caravan—tended to sustain their numbers and hence their activities by recruiting boys and men through slaving.” As has been demonstrated in chapter two with regard to the Westo and Savanna Shawnee, mobility offered specific advantages to groups who utilized slaving as a survival strategy. Furthermore, as shown with the Haudenosaunee and other coalescent Native groups in the Southeast, adoption of war captives was a strategy implemented to replace population losses. By the seventeenth century, Paulistas had co-opted Brazilian Native practices of captivity and concubinage, into the enslavement of Natives and a growing Native slave trade. Furthermore, the Paulistas began to co-opt and transform Native practices of internecine warfare into the bandeira slave raids which both escalated the cycle of slaving and increased the number of slave raids and distances traveled into the sertão necessary to acquire Native captives. However, as I argue, in São Paulo the demand for enslaved Native soldiers became the raison d’être for the bandeiras. Alongside the decline in local Native populations due to migration, war, slaving, and disease, the expansion of slaving strategies created a need to enslave more Natives. If not to employ new captives directly as warriors, then to have enslaved Natives labor to provide the sustenance for Native warriors who could then capture more Natives. This change shows a change in the Paulista social organization toward a more militaristic slaving society. In the first decades of the seventeenth century,

342 Miller, *Problem of Slavery as History*, 91.
colonists and Natives in São Paulo created a slaving society with the capture of Natives as the driving economic and social preoccupation.\textsuperscript{344}

The arming of enslaved people is and was as historic and varied a practice as slavery itself. As one scholar notes, “the number of cases” of arming enslaved people in history “could easily be extended to include almost every known slave society.”\textsuperscript{345} The arming of enslaved people was analogous to plantation slavery, in that “if plantation slavery provided landholders with a way to accumulate wealth,” then “the arming of slaves provided political elites (or those hoping to become political elites) with a way to accumulate power.” Therefore, the Paulistas’ employment of enslaved warriors to enslave other Native peoples “represented to slaveholders an instrument of statecraft,” if even on the local level.\textsuperscript{346} Moreover, if, as Joseph Miller argued, slaving is viewed as a strategy by marginal actors who sought to create dependents and use them to their advantage, then the use of enslaved warriors to enslave others is a primitive form of accumulation in capital in the form of commodified human beings—i.e. through wealth in people.\textsuperscript{347} This interpretation particularly lends itself to the conditions in Carolina and São Paulo. Though Carolina colonists did not employ enslaved Natives at any mass scale like the Paulistas,

\textsuperscript{344} In a more strictly Marxist interpretation, the Paulistas were establishing something akin to a slave-slave cycle, where enslaved Natives labored as warriors to enslave other Natives. In Walter Rodney’s classic formulation, the trade in slaves for guns cycle had devastating effects on the development of Africa. While my arguments do not speak toward economic development, the gun-slave cycle provides a rough analogy of the slave-slave cycle the Paulistas developed in the first have of the seventeenth century. Walter Rodney, \textit{How Europe Underdeveloped Africa} (New York: Verso, 2018, 1972) 106–174.
\textsuperscript{347} Miller, \textit{Problem of Slavery as History}, 105–107.
both societies enslaved Natives as an economic strategy in the absence of mineral wealth and successful cash crop cultivation.

In the specific case of enslaved Natives in Brazil, a Dutchman reported in 1618 that the “local defense” of Rio de Janeiro was dependent upon the enslaved Native warriors who were “so obedient that they go into battle for their masters.”\textsuperscript{348} One scholar argued that the first test of the enslaved status of enslaved soldiers in Brazil came when many self-liberated and freed men of African descent resisted their enslaved status after the conflict over the Dutch invasion of Pernambuco in 1630.\textsuperscript{349} However, I contend that since the founding of the captaincy, the questionable status between Native crown vassals and enslaved Natives blurred in São Vicente. In societies where captives stood a chance of being adopted and socialized within a community, like Native societies of Brazil, enslaved/captive status was not permanent or hereditary. In São Paulo, the contradictions between vassals and slaves were resolved in favor of the slaveowners by middle of the seventeenth century. While Paulistas denied the legal enslaved status of their \textit{peças} (enslaved people) by swearing those Natives were free, Paulistas began to expect hereditary service from subjugated Native peoples. The effects of this transformation can be seen in the semi-governmental use of enslaved Native warriors in the large scale \textit{bandeiras} of the first decades of the seventeenth century. While this transition from a slaving society to a slave society developed over time, there was a period in the early seventeenth century where confusion existed


\textsuperscript{349} Kraay argues the first instance of debated freedom/manumission for enslaved men who served as soldiers on behalf of the Brazilian settlers occurred in the conflicts in Pernambuco. Kraay, “Arming Slaves in Brazil,” 155.
between what the Portuguese colonists saw as a permanent status of servitude and what Native peoples saw as something more akin to a subject/vassal relationship and captivity. It needs to be cautioned that enslaved status, particularly illegal enslaved status, was developing in Paulista society where the lines between dependent clients and socially isolated and alienated, kinless enslaved people were unclear. This process was parallel to the commodification of those enslaved subjects in the wills and inventories of the Paulistas as well. Therefore, misunderstanding over what slavery was and what dependence meant to whom became the norm in early seventeenth-century São Vicente. Native peoples applied Native concepts of captivity; Paulistas applied colonial concepts of bondage. As Paulistas increased their reliance on slave raids for Natives, the \textit{de facto} and \textit{de jure} enslaved statuses of Natives in São Paulo began to come together. Distinctions in bondage eventually would clarify and harden with regard to the enslaved status of Natives.

This leaves the question of what Native peoples who peacefully “descended” into Portuguese communities thought their future relationships with the Paulista settlers would be? Alida Metcalf argues that the process of descending Native peoples in late sixteenth-century Bahia involved two strategies employed by colonists. One, through persuading Native headmen to bring entire communities to the coast with them, and two, through barter and exchange of Native captives. While Chapter One discussed how the barter strategy developed into a Native slave trade, descending entire Native groups to the coast was also a strategy used by both colonists and Jesuits. However, this strategy often involved a bit of deception on the part of \textit{mameluco} intermediaries and Jesuits who promised the Natives a better life on the coast with the Portuguese.\footnote{Metcalf, “The Entradas of Bahia of the Sixteenth Century,” 391–393.} The Jesuit, José de Anchieta wrote that the Portuguese colonists tricked Natives
into slavery because the Natives did “not understand what it is to sell freedom” or had been “induced with lies and deceit, and at times with many lashes.”

This type of persuasion, whether through force or friendship, was used to “descend” Natives to early seventeenth-century São Paulo. In 1607, on the road to Villa Rica in Guairá, Manuel Preto encountered “many temiminos” who came in “peace” and “in search of whites.” Preto convinced the Tememínó to return to his home in São Paulo and it remains unclear as to what happened to those Natives. However, Manuel Preto was infamously reported to have “conquered” numerous Natives and had been able “to count on his fazenda . . . 999 Indians of the bow and arrow.” The description of their weapons suggests that Preto utilized those Tememínós on his property as warriors. Manuel Preto would become one of the most renowned bandeirantes, and he was reported by one Jesuit to be the “great promoter, author, and head of all of these entradas and malocas.” Preto had “walked in them all his life, taking other Portuguese and Tupis in his company to bring Indians” by “force of arms” back to São Paulo. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the Tememínó that “peacefully” returned to São Paulo with Manuel Preto in 1607 may have suffered the same fate as those Preto enslaved in later bandeiras.

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such as the 1628 bandeiras. Moreover, it is likely the Tememinó made up the core of the 999 warriors that Preto was reported to have on his property.

Paraná Contraband and the Portuguese, Spanish, and Jesuit competition over Guarani populations

As noted in Chapter One, by 1614 the Paulistas had moved beyond raiding the Paranapanema River valley and were launching punitive expeditions into Guairá, not with the intent to trade with Native peoples along the way, but solely to enslave Natives and return them to São Paulo. The Brazilian Governor-General, Tomé de Sousa, had forbidden commerce or travel between Guairá and São Vicente in 1553. Nevertheless, the road between Guairá and São Paulo had been traversed for some time by local Natives and Spanish and Portuguese colonists. The fact that Sousa closed the route before the founding of São Paulo suggests that Natives frequently utilized the route and perhaps had for centuries. Despite continued royal prohibitions, in 1603, four Spanish soldiers from Villa Rica de Espírito Santo in Guairá arrived in São Paulo expressing friendship and a desire to trade with the Paulistas who were “of one common king.” At the behest of the town council and Captain Pedro Vaz de Barros, twelve to fifteen men were sent to accompany the Spanish soldiers back to Guairá.  

355 “Informe Sôbre a Fundação das Reduções do Guairá,” in Cortesão, Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá, 149.
357 Holanda, Caminhos e Fronteiras, 21–25.
would use that same path in 1611, when he led the first known slaving expedition to Guairá and returned to São Paulo with five hundred Guaraní captives.  

While the commerce between Guairá and São Paulo remained illegal, this did not stop Paulistas from making the journey. Manuel Preto was in route to Guairá when he reported he encountered the Tememinó who returned to his fazenda with him in 1607. In 1603, a Portuguese man named Pedro de Acosta was fined 100 pesos by the Spanish for arriving in Guairá from São Paulo “against the order that your majesty has given.” Acosta came with a “black slave of Angola” that was ruled to be “forbidden and contraband.” It remains unclear what Acosta was doing in Guairá in 1603, but the allegation was that he was engaged in contraband trading of some sort, perhaps exchanging enslaved Africans for Spanish silver. The Spanish soldiers who came to São Paulo that same year expressed interest in trade with the Paulistas, and while Paulistas began raiding Guaraní Native communities shortly thereafter, they initially continued to try to trade with the Spanish subjects living there. In 1616, four Paulistas were apprehended by the Spanish in Guairá and taken prisoner for traversing the forbidden route between the two regions. Two of the men were natives of the island of Madeira: one was born in

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359 Carvalho Franco, *Dicionário de Bandeirantes*; Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 51. Tememinó was an ethonym that in Tupi-Guarani dialects meant “grandson” or “descendent” which offers an interesting counterpoint to the term Tamoio meaning “grandfather” or “ancestor.” See Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 82, n. 5.


362 Enslaved people of African descent were present in São Vicente since its founding with some of the larger sugar planters in Santos importing enslaved Africans as early as the 1540s. However, the enslavement of Natives was the driving labor force in São Paulo and the Piratininga Valley until at least the eighteenth century. The plantation sugar zones in the Northeast and on the coasts of Brazil accounted for the majority of enslaved Africans in Brazil at the time. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 18, 29, 58. Metcalf, *Family and Frontier*, 42.
Viana do Castelo in Portugal and the other on the island of Terceira in the Azores. They told the Spanish that they did not know the route was prohibited and that the “two young sons” of Baltazar de Godoy took them above “the falls” and from there Natives led them to Guairá.  

These two young sons of Baltazar de Godoy were two of his first four children, named: Belchior, Baltazar, Gaspar, and João. The two eldest, Belchior and Baltazar the younger, being teenagers at the time were probably the ones who guided the Portuguese merchants to Guairá. Balthazar de Godoy the younger married Antonia Preto, the daughter of Manuel Preto, making it likely he participated in slaving expeditions with his father-in-law. Sons-in-Law often became the favored inheritors of property through daughters in seventeenth and eighteenth century São Paulo as sons were expected to either also marry advantageously or make their own paths in the sertão as had their fathers and grandfathers. The two young sons of Baltazar the elder, knew the paths into Guairá all the way to the Paraná River as teenagers and young adults, suggesting they had been taught that route by others and that many Paulista colonists were experienced on that path in to the sertão.

In the same year of 1616, Spanish officials were complaining about the entrance of any “Portuguese”, “man of another nation”, “women clerics”, or “religious” coming from São Paulo to Guairá without a license from the King. The Spanish officials wanted to know how many of them had entered Guairá from São Paulo, “and what they have done,” who “they have brought

363 “Auto cabesa de Processo para la averiguacion de quien dio faumo., a juda, y favor a quatro Portugueses, que dentran a esta por la via de San Pablo, contra lo prohibido. Año 1616,” in Bandeirantes no Paraguai, 20–23. Quotations on 21. The falls referenced by the Portuguese were most likely the Guairá Falls on the Paraná River which are now under Itaipu Lake after the creation of the Itaipu dam in 1982. The Paraná River there remains the border between Paraguay and the former region of Guairá in the current Brazilian state of Paraná.

364 Leme, Nobilarchia Paulistana, 3:141–158.

365 Metcalf, Family and Frontier, 116–117. See also Nazzari, Disappearance of the Dowry.
into that town,” the “negros and negras they have left and in whose power they are” in, “and why they are laboring”?

The Spanish officials were upset that the Spanish Captain Francisco Benitez had returned to Villa Rica from São Paulo around 1604 with the three Portuguese men named: Pedro Gonçalves Barbosa, Diogo Nunez, and Nicolao Machado. Captain Benitez was arrested for bringing the Portuguese to Villa Rica after he “found” Barbosa and Nunez “in one of the Indian towns six or seven leagues” from São Paulo. Barbosa and Nunez married women in Villa Rica, when years later in 1616, Benitez was accused of breaking the royal laws against traveling between São Paulo and Guairá. Benitez had married the daughter of the Paulista Joseph Camargo several years before he returned to Villa Rica from São Paulo with the Portuguese men. However, while Benitez was absolved of the crime by the Spanish, the episode reveals the commonality of interactions between the colonial residents of Guairá and São Paulo—common enough for residents to intermarry.

Despite the Spanish prohibitions, the commerce and interactions between the Portuguese from São Vicente and the Spanish of Guairá continued. As shown above, the evidence for those interactions typically only appears in sources when those involved were caught by Spanish officials. For example, in 1621, “certain contraband Portuguese” were found without licenses at

366 “Proceso obrado en la villa Rica del espíritu santo, contra el Capn. Franco. Benitez, por haver metido tres Portugueses por la via de San Pablo. Año 1616.” in Bandeirantes no Paraguai, 23–45, quotations on 24. Here the Spanish use of “negro y negrá” refers to people of African descent who were probably enslaved or assumed to be so by the Spanish officials who asked “whose power they” were in. Further evidence of this is the reference to “indios” separately in the same document.


the confluence of the Ivaí and Paraná Rivers. Judging by the contents of their baggage they were intent upon trading either with local Natives or with the Spanish settlers of Guairá. Their baggage contained mostly metal trinkets and dishes, cloths and clothes, scissors, knives, beads, and a few swords, daggers, and shotguns. The Portuguese also brought two enslaved women of African descent with them into Guairá, which supports the Spanish officials accusations that Portuguese merchants from São Paulo were selling enslaved people of African descent in Guairá against Spanish law. The Portuguese violated prohibitions on trade between the colonies and regulations protecting the Asiento contracts for sale of enslaved Africans in Spanish America—with the laws at their core having been designed to ensure the Spanish crown received the Quinto Real or “royal fifth” tax placed on every sale of enslaved Africans. The Spanish had no qualms with enslaving Africans, as demonstrated by the fact that the two unnamed women of African descent who had been confiscated from the Portuguese were subsequently auctioned off to the Spanish Sergeant Major, Miguel Gonçales Correa, in Ciudad Real del Guairá for 600 pesos.

Spanish colonists in Guairá and Paraguay and the Portuguese Paulistas saw the advantages of commerce between the two provinces notwithstanding the restrictions from the

369 “Auto cabesa de Processo contra unos Portuguezes que vinieron por la via de San Pablo, camino prohibido. Año 1621,” May 1, 1621, in Bandeirantes no Paraguai, 45–66, quotaion on 45. The Spanish auto declares that the Lieutenant Governor and Justicia Mayor, Juan Barba de Añasco, encountered the Portuguese at the “ranches of the mouth of the uvay” on his way to Ciudad Real del Guayrá. This means the river in question was almost assuredly the Ivaí River where Villa Rica del Espiritu Santo was located at the time and north along the Paraná River from Ciudad Real del Guairá located on the Piquiri River.

370 For a detailed explanation of how the Unified Iberian Monarchy and merchants structured, conducted, and financed the Asiento Negros see Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492–1640 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 112–121.

371 “Auto cabesa de Processo contra unos Portuguezes,” May 1, 1621, in Bandeirantes no Paraguai, 49.
colonial governments and the metropole. When the four Spanish soldiers from Villa Rica came to São Paulo in 1603, the São Paulo council stated that “it seems good to everyone for the profit that was expected from that path,” to Guairá, if opened up, they would “have trade and friendship” as Christian subjects unto the same king.  

Scholars have argued that the Spanish settlers of Guairá and the Paulistas had more interests in common than apart during the first decades of the seventeenth century. Spanish settlers were also interested in enslaving and extracting coerced labor from the Native populations of Paraguay and Guairá on their ranches, farms, and in the production of yerba mate. The real threat to Portuguese and Spanish settlers’ control over Native laborers was the Jesuits. As one scholar argued, there was “collusion between those interested in mercantile and slaving colonization in the Spanish and Portuguese possessions to combat, and at the same time take advantage of, the enclave represented by the missions and the Jesuits.” As Father Montoya described the Spanish colonists of Guairá “[m]any among the Spanish are eager for His Majesty to hand the Indians over to them in encomienda” in order “to impose upon them the unparalleled yoke of personal service . . . which in the Indies has caused the death of countless people.” The Paulistas sought to create trading

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372 “A junto que se fez sobre a vinda dos soldados de villa riqua,” 1603, Atas-CMSP, 138.
373 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 57; Richard M. Morse, The Bandeirantes: The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders (New York: Knopf, 1965) 25.
375 Davidoff, Bandeirantismo, 46. Commas inserted for clarity.
376 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 132. For the Jesuit perspective on the debates between the Jesuits and the Spanish over personal service and the encomienda system see Pedro Lozano, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús de la Provincia del Paraguay, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Manuel Fernández, y del Supremo Consejo de la Inquisición, 1755) Vol. 2, chapter 9.
relationships with the Spanish of Guairá while they continued to enslave the Native peoples of that region. The Jesuit reductions in Guairá offered both tempting targets and an opportunity to remove the Jesuit presence among the Native populations of Guarani, that by the 1620s had become the Paulistas main supply of Native captives.

As shown in the continued commerce and interactions between São Paulo and Guairá, the Portuguese and Spanish colonists were comfortable violating the prohibitions of the crown and both communities competed with the Jesuits for access to and the administration of Native laborers. The Paraná contraband trade reveals the colonial networks created through Native intermediaries and the increased competition over Native laborers in the *sertão*. By the 1620s, the Paulistas had become dependent on Guarani captives as laborers and had developed pathways and connections to Guairá.

**Capricious Councils and Enslaved Warriors in São Paulo**

During the first decades of the seventeenth century the Paulistas began to organize their inhabitants into a more structured militia. In 1610, the Paulista council ordered a roll taken of all the residents of São Paulo of fighting age, their sons over the age of fourteen, and “the slaves.” 377 The Paulistas were preparing themselves for more conflicts but also saw the enslaved as part of that fighting force. Despite the Iberian Monarchy outlawing the enslavement of Natives in 1609, the Paulistas still saw those people as enslaved and as part of their fighting force. Further proof of the use of enslaved Natives as warriors can be found in the councils requests for a list of weapons in each household, which included rifles, swords, daggers, “bows and arrows and more

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weapons” along with their numbers of slaves. By 1624, the Superintendent of the aldeias, Manuel João Branco, referred to the “companies that went to the sertão.” The use of the term companhias, as in militia or military companies, demonstrates the militarization of those bandeiras.

By the 1620s, the São Paulo council also passed laws prohibiting its residents from traveling to Guairá in accordance with the orders of the crown. In 1623, the town council imposed a fine of 200 cruzados “and two years exile in maraião (Maranhão)” on the Northern coast of Brazil for anyone caught going to Villa Rica or aiding those who did. The council threatened its inhabitants with a fine of 20,000 reis and “exile to the fort of Rio Grande” for going to the sertão. The council justified their punishments against those who went into the sertão to Villa Rica for “taking” Natives. However, that same year of 1623, the council approved the Captain of the Indians, Fernão Dias, to go to the sertão because there “were few people... in the sertão.” Dias’ request went against the wishes of some of the residents, either because those residents had been prohibited from going to the sertão themselves, or because the residents did not excuse his absence. Notwithstanding, the council approved Dias going into the sertão as “more service” to the crown. As shown by the Barreto expedition in 1602–1603, the Paulista council played favorites with who was allowed and who was punished for going to the sertão.

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379 Jaime Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a Formação Territorial do Brasil (Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1958) 76.
380 April 1, 1623, in Atas-CMSP, 3:29–30, quotation on 30.
381 April 1, 1623, in Atas-CMSP, 3:29. It is unclear in the contexts if the fort referred to was on the Northern Rio Grande in the current Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte, or the Southern Rio Grande in the current state of Rio Grande do Sul.
382 September 2, 1623, in Atas-CMSP, 3: 50.
383 September 2, 1623, in Atas-CMSP, 3: 50.
As demonstrated in Chapter One, colonial and imperial laws were largely ignored by many Paulistas. While in the *sertão* Captain Dias sent news to the Council that he had encountered Francisco Rodrigues da Guerra of São Paulo in the *sertão* illegally and demanded that Rodrigues be punished. Dias further accused Rodrigues, along with Paulo do Amaral, Antonio Pires, Alonso Pires, and Jorge Rodrigues Diniza of declaring their intent to violate the Councils’ prohibitions against going into the *sertão*. Dias entered the *sertão* with his company of settlers and “the Indians of the aldeas,” meaning that Dias’ expedition had the official sanction of the town, and the others did not. Dias’ expedition had the same goal of returning with enslaved Natives as the other expeditions. In the end, the Governor General of Brazil, Diogo de Mendonça Furtado pardoned those men Dias accused of going to the *sertão*, because “it was necessary for the good of the people.” The residents of the town council and the colonial government of Brazil could not agree on how to properly discipline those residents who went to the *sertão* to trade with or enslave Natives. The next year Francisco Rodrigues da Guerra was elected a judge of the town of São Paulo. If the council records of seventeenth century São Paulo are any indicator, the town also had frequent problems with “homicides” and “delinquents,” as most frontier settlements did. Disputes between colonial factions often determined the legality of expeditions into the *sertão*.

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384 September 16, 1623, in *Atas-CMSP*, 3:52. It remains unclear in the texts if Francisco Rodrigues de Guerra and Jorge Rodrigues Diniza second names were Rodrigues or Roiz. In the acts the transcription reads as Roiz but with a ~ or ’ above the “i” which could be a spelling or an indication of an abbreviation of a longer word. Francisco Rodrigues de Guerra is referred to as Francisco Rodrigues elsewhere in the Council minutes.

385 September 16, 1623, in *Atas-CMSP*, 3: 52.

386 December 16, 1623, in *Atas-CMSP*, 3: 64.

In the 1620s the Paulistas began to more seriously attempt to hide their illegal slaving activities from colonial officials. In 1624 the residents of São Paulo were ordered to pay half of the quinto (royal fifth) on their enslaved Natives.\textsuperscript{388} The Paulistas refused and declared that they were following the Crown’s laws and those who “had newly descended from the sertão . . . were free and freed.”\textsuperscript{389} The Superintendent of the aldeias in São Paulo, Manuel João Branco, was worried that the Paulistas were illegally expropriating Native laborers by forcing them to leave the aldeias and onto the Paulistas’ properties.\textsuperscript{390} An example of this activity can be seen in 1607, when Manuel Preto descended a group of Tememinó to his own property instead of to aldeias administered by the Jesuits or by the Town council.\textsuperscript{391} In response to the Paulistas’ 1624 pleas not to pay the quinto, Governor-General Furtado ordered that “all the residents of this town that went to the sertão pay the fifth of the pieces that they brought” back with them.\textsuperscript{392} In order to not pay the quinto, the Paulistas assured the colonial officials they had “promised freedom” to certain Native leaders and “with this caution” the Natives they promised liberty to “came with all

\textsuperscript{388} No justification was given for why the Governor-general of Brazil ordered only half of the “of the people that you have in your houses” be evaluated for the quinto real. This appears as an act of leniency by the Governor-general because the Paulistas were used to paying no taxes on enslaved Natives. January 13, 1624, Atas-CMSP, 3: 75–77.

\textsuperscript{389} The phrase used in the records is “livres e libertos” meaning (free and freed). The designation between those Natives who had always been free and those who were recently freed remains an important distinction. In the records the connotation is that the Paulistas themselves did not free those enslaved people but that the Crown did through the passage of the laws of the early seventeenth century because those freed Natives were only “freed according to said law” suggesting that the Paulistas did not want those enslaved Natives to be freed and may not have treated them as “livres e libertos” accordingly. Atas-CMSP, 1624, 3:77–79, quotation on 78.

\textsuperscript{390} January 13, 1624, Atas-CMSP, 3:75–77, quotation on 76. Jesuits, colonial officials, and settlers had argued over who would control access to the administration of the Natives who lived on secular or Jesuit aldeias since the beginning of the settlement of Brazil. For the detailed politics of how those arguments played out in São Paulo see Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 133–137.

\textsuperscript{391} “Termo de requerimento do procurador dos índios aos oficiais da câmara,” January 7, 1607, Atas-CMSP, 184–185.

\textsuperscript{392} February 10, 1624, Atas-CMSP, 3:83–84, quotation on 83.
their people.” Paulistas declared enslaved Natives on their estates as free to abide by the Crown’s laws against Native slaving and to not pay taxes on those slaves.

While the colonial government sought to extract taxes from the colonists for the enslaved people they owned and stop the enslavement of Natives, the Paulista residents did what they could to avoid those taxes. Avoiding royal and colonial taxes on enslaved people is part of what made enslaved Natives attractive to colonial settlers in both São Paulo and in Carolina. It was difficult for colonial officials to monitor where Natives came from, whom the colonists traded with to acquire them, and how often those transactions occurred. Enslaved Africans and indentured Europeans had to cross the Atlantic and arrive in a port. This made it easier (but not foolproof) for Royal officials to monitor those transactions and tax the purchase and sale of enslaved people at auctions and sales. Contraband smuggling always occurred, but as the trade in enslaved Africans expanded it became more difficult for small time merchants to gain access to slave ports. In the 1620s, Portuguese merchants who carried the Spanish Asientos (monopoly contracts) had a vested interest in preventing others from violating their own monopolies. On the contrary, slavers and slave traders of Natives in the Americas chronically violated colonial rules, monopolies, and avoided taxes. The illegal enslavement of Natives went hand in hand with the contraband trades in both Carolina and São Vicente. As one scholar said of the early Carolina colonists “the most successful colonists in early South Carolina were essentially pirates.” The enslavement of a Native laborer was a form of primitive accumulation in the commodification of a laborer in the Americas. Therefore, colonists often went out of their way to hide their enslavement of Natives, their contraband trade in enslaved Natives and other products, and their

393 Atas-CMSP, 1624, 3:94.
394 Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea, 116–119.
tax avoidances. For example, in 1629, the Jesuits accused the Paulistas of using “the ship of the friars of St. Benedict” to hide the transportation of thirty-three enslaved Natives sent from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro.\(^{396}\) By the late 1620s the Paulista settlers became more brazen in their slave raids and contraband activities.

In 1627, The Paulista council ordered the arrest of Antonio Raposo Tavares and Paulo do Amaral for “being inciters of these people” by encouraging the Paulistas to go “into the sertão” where they “cannot go.”\(^{397}\) It remains unclear if Tavares and Amaral were arrested, but the conflict over their conduct demonstrates that the bandeira expeditions into the sertão, the administration and treatment of Natives in São Paulo, and the payment of the quintu tax on slaves were highly contested local issues among the Paulistas and with the colonial government. Paulistas ignored the town council when it did not serve their needs, as they largely ignored the laws of the colonial government.

However, less than two weeks after the orders for the arrest of Tavares and Amaral were issued, the Paulista Council received news of an external threat that caused them to rally together for a time. In October of 1627, the Council learned that “the Spanish of Villa Rica and more settlements” came into the lands of the crown of Portugal “seizing more of them.” The Council accused the Spanish of “descending all of the gentiles [Natives] of these crown” lands “for their repartimentos and service,” meaning the Spanish had seized Natives of the interior of São Vicente and returned with them to Guairá.\(^{398}\) The Spanish invasion from Villa Rica “resulted in great damage” to the captaincy of São Paulo, particularly with regard to access to Native

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\(^{396}\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 338.

\(^{397}\) September 25, 1627, in *Atas-CMSP*, 3: 281.

The warning to the São Paulo council needs to be considered with two important pieces of context. First, the Spanish in Villa Rica and the Portuguese in São Paulo were subjects of different colonial governments—but both were subjects of King Philip IV of Spain and Portugal. So, while Paulistas found Spanish encroachment on Portuguese crown lands perturbing, the Iberian monarchy would not have been troubled by it. This indicates, that the real problem was with Spanish subjects descending Natives in Guairá away from São Paulo for their own labor drafts and personal service. This further strengthens the evidence that the Spanish also were competing over subjugating the Native peoples of Guairá. Starting in 1628, the Paulista *bandeiras* responded to Spanish competition by enslaving tens of thousands of laborers.\(^{399}\)

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\(^{399}\) October 2, 1627, in *Atas-CMSP*, 3:282. Monteiro attributes these statements to the leading citizens of the São Paulo council, and places Antonio Raposo Tavares as one of those voices. Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 61. This seems odd considering that two weeks before the same council issued an arrest warrant for Tavares. We have no evidence suggesting that Tavares was or was not at that council meeting, but Monteiro’s phrasing suggests that the leading citizens of the council were making an accusation in front of the council when the minutes read as a warning. Monteiro attributes the threat to the Paulista enslaved labor supply in Guairá, as the motivating factor for the large bandeiras that began in 1628.

\(^{400}\) It is possible that many of the Paulistas of Portuguese, and other nationalities and ethnicities, harbored ill will toward the Spanish Monarchy. The attempts by the Spanish crown to outlaw the enslavement of Natives angered many Paulistas, as well as the Crown’s support of the Jesuits and their attempts to monopolize control over the Brazilian Native populations. Numerous Paulistas, Brazilians, and Portuguese merchants were or rumored to be New Christians (*conversos* or *marranos*) who had been forced to convert to Catholicism in the middle of the sixteenth century, after many had been expelled from the kingdom of Castile in 1492. For example, Antonio Raposo Tavares’ mother was reported to have been a descendent of New Christians, Cortesão, *Rapôso Tavares*, 87. Portuguese Brazilians also may have felt genuine national or imperial pride for the kingdom of Portugal during the Iberian Unification and wished to see the end of Spanish rule over Portugal. However, those colonists also would have understood that the King of Spain was also the king of Portugal, and attacking Spanish subjects was akin to an act of treason or war, which could be punished brutally. Therefore, it is not hyperbole to suggest that the decision to attack Spanish Guairá was done lightly. For the persecution and survival of Iberian Jews and New Christians in Portugal, the Portuguese Empire, and beyond see Studnicki-Gizbert, *Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, 23–27.
Guarani Natives and destroying the Jesuit missions in Guairá and the Spanish town of Villa Rica.401

The 1628 Bandeiras and the Destruction of the Reductions of Guairá

By 1628 the Paulista council either forgot about Antonio Raposo Tavares’ arrest warrant or decided to ignore it, because in August of that year Tavares led a massive bandeira against the Jesuit reductions in Guairá.402 According to Montoya, there were more than twenty-five reductions in the Guairá region at the time, the majority of which were located in the drainage basin created by the Piquiri, Paraná, Paranapanema, Tibagi, and Uruguay rivers.403 Jesuit accounts differ as to the exact number of reductions raided by the Paulistas, but between 1628 and 1631 the Paulistas attacked at least twelve to thirteen missions in the Guairá region.404

402 A possible reason for the São Paulo council’s deference toward Antonio Raposo Tavares was that he was the Ouvidor (ombudsman or justice) and a captain of the captaincy of São Vicente since 1624 on behalf of the Counts of Monsanto who were the capítães donatários (lord proprietors) of São Vicente. This made Tavares a powerful man in the captaincy if not always powerful among the councilmembers of the São Paulo council. This separation of royal and captaincy legal and judiciary power over the captaincies created many administrative, bureaucratic, and legal problems in Brazil. For Tavares’ role as a captaincy official see Cortesão, *Rapôso Tavares*, 90–93. For the complexities of the Portuguese colonial system and captaincies see Schwartz, *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil*; Roseli Santaella Stella, *Brasil Durante el gobierno Español, 1580–1640* (Madrid: Fundación Histórica Tavera, 2000); Erik Myrup, *Power and Corruption in the Early Modern Portuguese World* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015).
404 According to Montoya, we know that the Paulistas attacked thirteen different missions in Guairá and can identify by name the missions of São Miguel, São Antonio, São Francisco Xavier, and Vila Rica de Espirito Santo. Montoya stated that there were twenty-five residences in the region of Paraguay under Jesuit control. We do not know if these were missions, Native villages, reductions, or colonial towns. Montoya, *The Spiritual Conquest*, 101–106, 134. The accounts of the other Jesuits, Justo Mancilla and Simão Masseta, claimed that the Paulistas attacked twelve missions in the region as well as other Native villages, and destroyed the missions of Encarnação, São Antônio, São Miguel, Jesus Maria, São Paulo, Os Seite Angeles,
The *bandeira* of Antonio Raposo Tavares left “São Paulo on the first day of August, 1628” heading in the direction of Guairá with nine hundred heavily armed “Portuguese” and “two thousand and two hundred Indians in other periods unjustly captured.” It is probable that the majority of those Natives “unjustly captured” at this time period belonged to a Tupi-speaking people the Portuguese called the Tememinó, and that many of them had been captured by previous Paulista *bandeiras* led by Nicolau Barreto, Belchior Dias Carneiro, and Manuel Preto in the first decades of the seventeenth century. The Paulistas employed captured Natives as warriors in larger numbers than the Portuguese involved in the raids against the Guarani peoples of the Spanish missions. The reliance upon Native warriors complicated the relationships between the Paulistas and Native warriors, making it hard to categorize those relationships as chattel slavery, personal servitude, or compulsory labor. The reality was more complex, with these categories overlapping and intertwining depending on the context. As one scholar has argued about the historical practice of arming slaves “in the long run the practice could (and often did) complicate questions of power and powerlessness among both the enslaved and the free, by placing the dependent in a position of power and, in turn, the powerful in a state of dependence.” Furthermore, slavery as an institution remained in the process of development. Paulistas and Natives involved in slaving and the enslavement of Natives did not understand those relationships in those contexts in clear cut free versus unfree binaries. The Native/colonial

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São Tomé Apostolo (shown in Figure 5). “Relação feita pelos padres Justo Mancilla e Simão Masseta,” *Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Guairá*, 312–327.

405 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 311. As early as 1628 the inhabitants of São Paulo were a diverse array of Europeans, Africans, and Native descended peoples. As Montoya stated, São Paulo Paulistas were from Castile, Portugal, Italy, and numerous other nationalities. Montoya, *The Spiritual Conquest*, 101.


milieu that was characteristic of seventeenth-century Paulista society was a fluid and adaptive place that allowed for unclear distinctions between enslaved people and warriors, free and unfree.

The Paulistas became reliant upon enslaved “Tupis” to assist them on bandeira slaving expeditions to maintain the supply of enslaved Natives coming into São Paulo. The need to replenish the enslaved population of São Paulo can be traced to the epidemics of disease that ravaged Native communities who moved close to the Paulistas and the flight of enslaved Natives from São Paulo. The Spanish Governor of Paraguay, Don Luis Cespedes Xeria, who visited São Paulo and accompanied some of the forces of the 1628 Tavares bandeira, counted the

408 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 57–59.
number of Paulista resident “soldiers” at 400 in the town in 1628. Cespedes counted the number of men on the Tavares bandeira as “nine hundred men from that village and its jurisdiction with three thousand Indians.” While Natives made up the majority of combatants in most bandeiras, Cespedes’ account demonstrates that the Paulistas understood their dependence upon their enslaved warriors to maintain the supply of enslaved Natives. Cespedes later complained to the king of Spain about the bandeira and demanded that the king “punish these traitors.” At the time Cespedes claimed that the Paulistas justified the expedition as necessary to return the numerous enslaved Tupis, Tememinós, Pé Largos, and Carijó Natives who fled from São Paulo to the Guairá reductions.

Several officers who became infamous bandeirantes on the 1628 Tavares bandeira were designated leaders of the expedition: Antônio Raposo Tavares as Captain Major, Manuel Preto as Master of Camp, Antônio Pedroso as Captain of the vanguard, and Salvador Piris as Captain of the rearguard. The Jesuits took note of the leaders of the bandeiras to denounce them in their accounts of the events sent to the Governor of Brazil, Dom Luis Diogo de Oliveiro, the King of Spain and Portugal, Phillip IV and Pope Urban VIII. The Jesuits sought intervention on their

410 “Carta del Gobernador Don Luis Cespedes Xeria,” in Fundación de Brasil, 436.
411 “Carta del Gobernador Don Luis Cespedes Xeria,” in Fundación de Brasil, 436.
413 Monteiro argued that this change in the tactics of the bandeira leaders, such as the splitting of forces and the division of responsibilities among the leaders, as in the bandeira of Antônio Raposo Tavares, was a moment when the Paulistas realized that the slaving expeditions provided better opportunities to capture and enslave Natives than through the trade for enslaved Natives with their Native allies. Monteiro, “São Paulo in the Seventeenth Century”, 201.
414 Also, on this expedition were the alferes (lieutenants) Bernardo de Sousa and Manuel Morato, with the judges of the Villa of São Paulo, Sebastian Fernandez Camacho and Francisco de Paiva.
behalf and the Natives who lived on their reductions, hoping that those officials would punish the leaders of the expeditions. The council minutes of São Paulo in August and September of 1628 are filled with references to “absences” of many of those officials who the Jesuits named participated in the expeditions. The Paulista council would publicly decry the bandeiras when it suited them to save face with colonial officials but would also look the other way when they were beneficial to the community.

The 1628 bandeira was divided into four groups, with Tavares leading one, and the Captains Pedro Vas de Barros, Brás Leme, and Andrés Fernandes leading the others. It passed the Tibagi river on September 8th, where the bandeirantes constructed a palisade and base, from which to attack the reductions and villages in the region. The bandeirantes killed those who resisted, some of them elderly and infirm, and enslaved the rest of the population. The Paulistas then returned to their palisade with their captives and kept them there, increasing the numbers of captive Natives with each foray until they reached a certain number, who they would send back to São Paulo in chains. The sophistication and coordination of the slaving expeditions shows considerable planning by the Paulistas. They were not sudden opportunistic raids. The expeditions were organized to enslave as many Natives as possible. This reflects the

Captain Andrés Fernandez and Judge Pedro Alvarez joined from the village of Santana de Parnaíba, located near São Paulo. Further participants in the expedition from São Paulo were the Aldermen Mauricio del Castillo and Diego Barbosa, the Council Procurator Cristóbal Mendes, and the Ombudsman Amador Bueno along with his brother, son, and son-in-law. “Mancilla e Masseta”, 311–312.

Alderman Diogo Barboza, Judge Francisco de Paiva, and Council Attorney Cristovão Mendes were reported as absent on August 6, 12, 18, and 20, 1628, Atas-CMSP, 316–319; Alderman Mauricio de Castillo and Council Attorney Belchior Melo were declared absent by the council on August 26, 1628, Atas-CMSP, 320. The council frequently solved this problem by electing other officials to serve in their places. Atas-CMSP, 316–322.

“Mancilla e Masseta”, 311–312.

“Mancilla e Masseta,” 312.
implementation of Native knowledge of the communities, terrain, and region. Although specifics as to the structures and leadership roles of Natives in these expeditions is wanting, the size of the expeditions and numbers of Natives involved suggests leadership roles for Natives and likely Native unit organization to a certain extent as well.

The reduction of Encarnação and the surrounding aldeias were the first sites in Guairá attacked by the forces led by the captain of the vanguard, Antônio Pedroso. Fathers Mancilla and Masseta said that the day that the Paulistas arrived at the reduction of Encarnação, the men of the community had gone to tend the yerba mate fields, leaving the women and children in the care of the Jesuits. The Paulistas captured a great number of those women and children and brought them back to the palisade they had constructed on the Tibagi River. Three of the Jesuits, the Superior Montoya, Cristóbal de Mendoza, and José Domenech, went to the palisade after the attack to plead with the Paulistas to free those captured Natives. The Paulistas and the Native soldiers with them refused, attacking the fathers, and subsequently capturing José Domenech and wounding Cristóbal de Mendoza. The Paulistas accused the fathers of heresy, saying the fathers “were not priests but devils” that “preached lies to the Indians.” It is possible that this accusation of heresy was how the Paulistas came to justify the enslavement and massacre of

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418 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 312.
419 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 313; Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 101. On a side note, in this case, we have an example of the sensationalism in the Montoya account, when Montoya claimed that in this moment of violence against the Jesuits who came to the Paulista palisade, “one of them aimed a musket at my chest, and I bared my breast so that the ball would enter without resistance.” While we do not have evidentiary reason to question Montoya’s bravery in this episode, it is an example of the work he produced in his accounts. Furthermore, Montoya had reason to show his bravery in the face of such difficulties because he was writing this account for the king of Spain, hoping for the intervention of the king on the Jesuit’s behalf against the Paulistas. Montoya’s account is more flamboyant and dramatic than the accounts of father Mancilla and father Masseta which cover the same events. Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 101.
Christian Natives in the reductions. It is noteworthy that this type of animosity against the Jesuits was common in Brazil and Guairá. The work of the Jesuits in “reducing” or “descending” the Natives of Guairá, Bahia, and elsewhere in South America, created competition over access to Native laborers between those Jesuits and Portuguese and Spanish colonists.\textsuperscript{421} The competition over Native laborers could justify, in the minds of the colonists, the animosity towards the Jesuits, because the colonists wanted to create plantations (fazendas in Brazil or haciendas in Spanish America) using Native laborers.\textsuperscript{422}

After the attack against the Encarnação reduction, the Paulistas stayed in their palisade and attacked the Native communities of nearby Native “gentiles who are not yet reduced due to a lack of fathers.”\textsuperscript{423} Those Natives had not yet been introduced to the Catholic doctrine and had not gone through the process of descimento through being convinced to move to a Catholic mission and have their communities organized around that mission. Even Native peoples who lived outside of the reductions in Guairá were still subject to the Paulista assaults. In the meantime, the Paulista bandeirantes stayed near the palisade they constructed on the Tibagi river for the next four months as they raided the surrounding Native communities. This must have required a massive supply of food, for both the bandeirantes and the Native captives, either taken from the local Native communities attacked, or in the form of baggage brought from São Paulo. During “this so-called peace” with the Jesuit reductions, Jesuit fathers attempted to negotiate with the Paulistas again to liberate the Native captives, or, at the minimum, to let them

\textsuperscript{421} This competition can be seen in the Brazilian colonists vocal and often violent responses to the repeated attempts of the Portuguese and subsequent Unified Iberian Monarchy to outlaw Native Slavery, See Metcalf, “Entradas of Bahia” and Schwartz, \textit{Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil}, 122–139.

\textsuperscript{422} Monteiro, “São Paulo in the Seventeenth Century” 131; Wilde, \textit{Religión y poder}, 88–93.

\textsuperscript{423} “Mancilla e Masseta,” 314. Gentio (gentile) was a common way for the Jesuits and other Catholics to refer to unconverted Natives at the time.
administer the sacraments to them, especially to allow them to baptize the old, infants, sick, and dying. The Paulistas refused and continued to attack the surrounding Guarani villages.

This lull in the attacks against the reductions ended when a Native leader, named Tatavrana, who the Paulista Simeon Alvarez “had unjustly captured some years ago,” fled from São Paulo with his followers in the direction of the Guairá reductions. Because these Natives had been declared fugitives from São Paulo, the Paulistas obtained justification, in the form of a “title” (an official document from the Council of the Vila of São Paulo) to recapture them. When the Jesuits said the Paulistas had no right to recapture Tatavrana—implying they knew Tatavrana as well as where he and his followers were—Antônio Raposo Tavares responded by launching another expedition from the Tibagi palisade and on January 30, 1629 attacked the reduction of São Antônio which harbored Tatavrana. For the Paulistas this attack was justified by the need to recapture Tatavrana as a runaway, which seems to be a flimsy excuse to kill and enslave other Natives at São Antonio. However, these legal justifications were common. The Jesuits Mancilla and Masseta also refer to a “provision of the Holy Office of the Inquisition” which was issued to a São Paulo judge, Francisco de Paiva, to procure “a heretic” that had fled into the sertão. Paiva used this provision to justify the expedition in which he participated under the command of Pedro Vas de Barros. The Paulistas used whatever legal justifications they could in order to enter the hinterlands of the sertão and capture Native peoples. In this

424 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 314.
425 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 314. It is noteworthy here when discussing the status of Native captives in São Paulo that Tatavrana was not a leader of a group of runaways, but a leader who convinced his prior followers who were also captives to run away. How that factors into the status of enslaved Natives in São Paulo shall be discussed further below.
426 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 315.
427 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 315.
428 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 330.
429 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 330.
period, the *entradas*, *bandeiras*, and other expeditions to the *sertão* of Brazil frequently were justified as reconnaissance missions, to procure gold or silver, or as just wars against the enemies of the king—wars which were often justified by the anthropophagic practices of the Natives. However, as Metcalf succinctly asserted, despite starting out as expeditions with these goals in mind:

> entradas quickly evolved into something quite specific. The goal of an entra
der was to ‘descer’ Indians, i.e., to descend Indians from the more populated sertões to the coast, the vast majority of whom became slaves.\(^{430}\)

Here we can see some of the justifications that the Paulistas used in their slaving expeditions against the Guairá missions: to recapture runaway enslaved Natives and to capture Native heretics as well. Nevertheless, not all the expeditions were legally justified. Some did not even bother to find legal reasons to attack the Jesuit missions.

Despite, or because of, the successes of the 1628 and 1629 Tavares *bandeiras* the Paulistas returned to Guairá for more captives. Two months after the attack against the reduction of São Antônio two more expeditions attacked other reductions. The *bandeira* of Manuel Morato attacked the *aldeia* of Jesus Maria on March 20, 1630 and three days later the *bandeira* of Antônio Bicudo de Mendoza attacked the reduction of San Miguel de Ibitiruna.\(^{431}\) It appears that during these attacks against those *aldeias* and reductions, the forces of Brás Leme and Pedro Vas de Barros attacked the villages of the Guairá peoples that the Jesuits had not “reduced” on to reductions.\(^{432}\) However, it appears those “wild people” called Caayu, Huybay, and Ybianguira put up strong resistance against the *bandeiras* of Leme and Barros because those expeditions

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\(^{430}\) Metcalf, “Entradas of Bahia,” 382.

\(^{431}\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 316.

\(^{432}\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 319
“returned without people and with much loss and death of their own.” The Jesuits argued that the Paulistas decided to attack Jesus Maria and São Miguel because on the previous expedition against the reduction of “San Antônio, they captured more people in an hour than they had in many months.” The Jesuits provided this rationale on behalf of the Paulistas—that attacking the Jesuit reductions was easier than attacking the villages of the Natives living in the forests and sertão—“since, due to the concentration of population on the missions, the attacks resulted in more imprisoned peças (enslaved Natives).” Following the attacks against Jesus Maria and São Miguel, the Paulistas expeditions continued and attacked the reductions of Encarnação of Natingui, São Paulo, Los Angeles, and Apostolo São Tomás “with much cruelty and oppression.”

Villa Rica and the nine surrounding settlements “of Indians whose service” the Spanish “employed” were not spared by the bandeiras either. A force of the Paulistas “progressively devastated” the outlying Native settlements first, forcing many to flee to Villa Rica. The Paulistas besieged the 130 men of the town and the Native refugees with them for some time until the besieged “were perishing from hunger, since the raiders from São Paulo controlled the fields and prevented them from getting any food.” The majority of those besieged in Villa Rica were able to flee with the arrival of the Benedictine Bishop of Paraguay, Cristóbal de Aresti, who bought time for their escape by attempting to negotiate with the Paulistas. Most of

434 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 319.
436 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 319.
437 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 104.
438 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 104.
the Guarani Natives fled south down the Paraná River to Maracayú above the Iguazú Falls.439 After the Fall of Villa Rica, the Provincial Superior, Father Francisco Vázquez Trujillo, decided that the remaining reductions of Guairá, San Loreto and San Ignacio, needed to be abandoned and encouraged the Natives to flee south down the Paraná River to safety.440

Yet, as the Native refugees and Father Montoya among them reached the Guairá Falls near the Ciudad de Guairá, they found the Spanish settlers awaiting them. On the East side of the Paraná the Spanish “had built a stockade fort on the shore there to block us and take the people prisoner.”441 Here lies the best evidence that the conflict in Guairá was not a geopolitical rivalry between the Spanish and Portuguese settlers but rather a competition over Guarani laborers.442

Although the Spanish of Ciudad de Guairá were unsuccessful and the Guarani Natives and Jesuits escaped down the Paraná River, the Spanish settlers attempted to capture and enslave the refugee Natives of the reductions when given the chance. For both the Spanish of Guairá and the Portuguese of São Paulo, the Jesuit reductions posed a greater threat to the organization and exploitation of that labor. This animosity was caused by the Jesuits arguing against the slavery and personal service the Spanish and Portuguese colonists wanted to impose on the Native peoples. However, the Jesuit concerns for Natives need to be analyzed in the context of the compulsory labor and cultural destruction the Jesuits imposed on Native peoples through the process of “reducing” them on missions. The actions of the Spanish of Ciudad de Guairá lends

439 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 105, 214.
440 Monteiro argues that the reductions of San Loreto and San Ignacio were two of the oldest reductions and thus more fully integrated into the economy of Guairá. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 62.
441 Montoya, Spiritual Conquest, 108.
credence to the 1627 warning the Paulistas received about Spanish settlers taking the Guarani Natives into their own repartimientos and personal service. The Paulistas wanted access and control over those Natives and were willing to destroy the Jesuit reductions and attack Spanish settlements to achieve those ends.

Clearly the success of the expeditions that attacked reductions, in comparison to the relative failures and losses of life for those expeditions tasked with attacking outlying Native communities in the sertão, changed how the Paulistas chose what Native peoples to target to enslave. The reductions of Guairá proved easy targets as the Jesuits themselves recognized. The social organization the Jesuits imposed upon Native peoples on reductions, made them easier targets for the Paulista raids because they were more physically concentrated in one area, and less prepared for attacks due to the Jesuits’ focuses on conversion. As Monteiro argued, “the reductions may have been seen by the Paulistas rather as amplifications, since the population density of the missions was much greater than the free villages of the Guarani, Guaiuaná, and Gualacho (Kaingang).” The Paulistas saw opportunities to exploit the weaknesses of the Jesuit reductions and used whatever legal rationale they could conjure up to do so.

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443 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 57. Historians continue to debate the reasons the Paulistas attacked the Jesuit reductions of Guairá. Some scholars conclude that the Paulistas pursued the Reductions because they were vulnerable or as part of Geopolitical rivalry with the Spanish Crown, whom Paulistas undoubtedly distrusted. But as the records of the town Council of São Paulo, the Jesuits, and the Spanish records of Guairá and the Rio de la Plata show, the Paulistas and Spanish both wanted access to Guarani laborers. Some scholars argue this is because the mostly Guarani Natives who inhabited the Guairá reductions had already been “pacified” or “reduced” by the Jesuits and thus were more suitable as slaves for a colonial regime. I find any argument about the suitability to slavery of any collective group of people or individual as highly skeptical. See Carlos Henrique Davidoff, Bandeirantismo, 55–57. For a discussion of reasons attributed to Paulista motivations for attacking the Guairá reductions. Monteiro argued that “this notion underestimates, on the one hand, the pre-contact importance of Guarani horticulture, while overestimating the efficacy of the Jesuits’ cultural project on the other.” Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 59.
Due to the uncertainty over the number of reductions and villages attacked, it is impossible to confirm the numbers of Native people captured or killed by the Paulistas on these expeditions. According to Mancilla and Masseta, there were more than twenty thousand Natives captured in the Tavares bandeira—and this number does not include those who were killed during the attacks or perished on the journey between Guairá and São Paulo. These numbers are shockingly high for a single expedition, but they demonstrate that the business of slaving expeditions was enormous during the time. It is possible that the numbers of Natives enslaved were exaggerated by the Jesuits in their reports to increase the perceived suffering and destruction of the Natives in an attempt to ensure Crown intervention. However, we do not have reason to think that the Jesuits manipulated the numbers because they were corroborated by other contemporaneous accounts. In 1636 a resident of São Paulo, Manuel Juan de Morales, said of the Paulistas “twice they went to the grand villages of Guairá all Christian subjects to the Crown of Castile” and estimated that the Paulistas captured thirty-thousand Natives in those two expeditions. In addition, in the same year, the number of Natives baptized by the Jesuits in the twenty-five reductions and other Native villages in Guairá was close to 94,900 people. This number did not include all of the Native peoples of the region because the Jesuits separated those who had been baptized from those who had not. Montoya explained that in the reduction of Natividade de Nossa Senhora: “around six thousand souls have been settled here. By now some

444 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 336.
445 Juan Manuel de Morales, “São Paulo, os paulistas e as bandeiras julgados por um Espião Castelhano” São Paulo, 1636, in Coleção de Angelis, Vol. 1, 184. It is difficult to understand exactly which bandeiras Morales was referring to, because he stated that the Paulistas went “twice” to Guairá, but he mentioned more than one expedition. Furthermore, by 1636 there were more than two expeditions to Guairá from São Paulo.
446 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 177.
Twenty-six hundred have received baptism and the rest are in preparation for it.”

For example, according to Montoya the reduction of Jesus Maria had two thousand families in it, or close to ten thousand people. In 1636 Guairá, it is reasonable to suspect that there were more Natives residing outside of the reductions than within them.

Because of this, the number of Natives captured could reach as high as between twenty and thirty thousand people, considering the size of the reductions and the bandeiras. However, Montoya declared that “the number of people they took away is not known.” Yet, the amounts the Paulistas paid in tithes to the church upon their return to São Paulo is known. Montoya asserted that the Paulistas “gave five hundred persons to the religious as his share” and “the secular priest got two hundred.” According to this account, if the Paulistas gave the customary tenth in their tithes to the church, that would mean that the Paulistas had captured over seven thousand Natives. Moreover, these numbers are comparable to the numbers of Native people brought back to Bahia in the entradas of the second half of the sixteenth century. In line with these numbers, between seven and thirty thousand Natives were captured by the Paulistas—possibly more. However, without a doubt the 1628 bandeira of Antonio Raposo Tavares was enormous, and the participants captured and killed thousands of Natives from Guairá.

In the descriptions of the Jesuits, the “Tupi” Natives were said to have been “in other times unjustly captured” by their Paulista “masters.” The ethnonym “Tupi” was imposed on

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447 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 165.
448 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 169.
449 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 185.
450 Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 185.
452 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 311. It needs to be restated the “tupi” Natives the Jesuits referred to were an ethnically and culturally diverse group of people who most likely spoke a tupi form of the lingua-geral that many Paulistas also spoke. See Chapter One.
those Natives who served as soldiers alongside the Paulistas in the expeditions against the Guairá reductions. What remains uncertain is the legal status of those warriors. Tatavrana and his followers were said to be “unjustly captured,” but he was also said to have “many vassals.”

This example offers forth the real possibility that whole groups, polities, and/or villages were enslaved by the Paulistas, or were “descended” together and maintained their Native hierarchies and social structures after they came to live among or near the Paulistas. Either way, the Paulistas came to treat those Natives as enslaved. Tatavrana led his people into “captivity” by the Paulistas and because of their treatment as slaves, he then led them out of São Paulo to the Guairá reductions. Even if the Paulistas’ title to return Tatavrana and his followers was only a legal excuse to capture more Natives, it remains clear that the Paulistas saw some of those Natives as enslaved, or at the very least that they owed them some obligatory service.

This example demonstrates how cooperative misunderstandings between groups can work. Tatavrana and headmen like him descended their people among the Paulistas, either through force of arms, enticements, or lies. However, Tatavrana discovered that he and his people did not like living among the Paulistas—because they were probably being treated as enslaved—and Tatavrana led his people to the relative safety of the Jesuit reductions. But what of other headmen who did not leave, did they maintain this cooperative misunderstanding and convince their “vassals” to fight for the Paulistas and enslave other Natives? The examples of how descimentos worked on the

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453 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 314.
454 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 314.
ground and the room for misunderstanding were high. Some of those who descended among the
Paulistas and maintained their social structures may have believed themselves to be subjects or
vassals of the Paulistas but not their slaves. As the seventeenth century progressed that
slippage in the legal statuses of Natives descended among the Paulistas would crystalize into a
form of commodified bondage.

The Jesuits accused the Paulistas of slaving by “going to the sertão (Sertão) and taking
out, and bringing by force of arms the Indians for their slaves, and to sell them.” Bandeirantes
like Manuel Preto used those Natives he enslaved and brought back to São Paulo in their retinues
to go slaving with them on future expeditions. However, not all Paulistas had acquired as many
Natives warriors as Preto. How other Paulista settlers utilized enslaved Natives as slavers can be
shown in one example from the 1628 expedition. The Jesuits told of a “shameless tupi named
Francisco” who’s “master” was the secular cleric Juan Alvarez of São Paulo, who sent Francisco
in the “company of Antonio Raposo Tavares to capture Indians and he had given him his

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456 I am calling this form of mutual mutually understood short term agreement without an
understanding of the long term cultural incomprehension and incongruencies as “cooperative
misunderstanding.” What Richard White called the ability of two culturally different peoples to
not “understand and appreciate the other’s cultural perspective,” but their ability to capitalize on
“creative misunderstandings.” Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, empires, and
republics in the Great Lakes region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991,
2011) XXI. However, I do agree with James H. Merrell that the confluence of Native and
European cultures led not to the creation of a “middle ground” of creative understanding, but the
continuance of misunderstanding despite examples of its short-term points of accommodation
and creativity. In the case of Paulistas and Natives in São Vicente and Guairá, the cooperative
misunderstanding they created over descimentos, alliances, captivity, subject vassals, obligatory
service, and freedom was short lived and crystalized into the killing, enslavement, and
subjugation of Native peoples in the region for centuries. The Brazilian nation—and the United
States of America’s—relationship with Native peoples reflects the exploitation of those
cooperative misunderstandings. White, *Middle Ground*, xx–xxiii. See Also James H. Merrell,
*Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2000) and Merrell, *The Indians’ New World*.


458 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 310.
shotgun, and the said Tupi brought him twenty *piezas (peças)*” or twenty enslaved Natives.\footnote{Mancilla e Masseta,” 324–325.} The secular priest Juan Alverez gave the “tupi” man named Francisco a shotgun and ordered Francisco to go capture twenty Natives for him. This reveals two aspects of how some Paulistas utilized their enslaved Natives to enslave others. First, Alverez armed Francisco with his shotgun and ordered him to go slaving on the Tavares *bandeira*. Secondly, Francisco had a Christian name suggesting that he had been baptized and most likely was part of Alverez’s own household. Furthermore, on the voyage to São Paulo, Francisco placed Alverez’ “twenty pieces” of enslaved Natives Francisco captured at the end of a line “of forty souls” who had been enslaved and bound together for the march back to São Paulo, suggesting that the practice of entrusting an enslaved Native man with arms, sending him on expeditions, and having him cooperate with other Paulista settlers was a common practice for the *bandeirantes*.\footnote{Mancilla e Masseta,” 325.} It remains unclear if this practice gave Francisco an increased degree of relative autonomy, but the practice appears to be common enough to be unremarkable at the time.

The road back to São Paulo was a long and arduous journey that lasted forty days, where many enslaved Natives starved to death or were killed for falling behind or becoming sick. The Jesuits reported “the inhumanity and cruelty” that the *bandeirantes* inflicted upon the captive Natives. These cruelties were also inflicted upon the captured Natives by the “tupis” or “some chiefs of the recently captured.” The Paulistas would promise the recently captured chiefs, on one hand so that they did not run away, that in their houses and estates in São Paulo they would have a very good life, thus temporally as well as spiritually, as if you could have a name of life as [a] perpetual captive, and on the other hand threatening them that if they ran away they would be killed, and in fact when someone runs away, they would send their tupis in search of him, and returning him, cruelly bound him.\footnote{Mancilla e Masseta,” 327. Brackets inserted for clarity.
The enslaved “Tupis” were used as slave catchers as well as warriors on the *bandeiras*. The psychological manipulation of those captured reflects the tricks used by *mameluco* middlemen in sixteenth-century Bahia, and all over Brazil as I argued in chapter one, who coaxed, cajoled, and threatened Native headmen in order to get them to descend their communities to the coasts among the Portuguese.\(^462\) The Paulistas offered the captured Natives two options: captivity in de facto slavery or death. One “Tupi” headman, Quaraciti, made it clear that he understood what the Paulistas and Natives were doing to the Reductions of Guairá. Quaraciti “praised himself in the presence of the Portuguese for having gone with them to destroy the village of Jesus Maria,” and threatened the Native captives “that if they fled to join the Fathers again, he would have to come back with the Portuguese to plunder it again.”\(^463\)

The Jesuits blamed the “tupi” warriors as much for the cruelties inflicted upon the reductions as they blamed the Paulistas because “the cruelty of the tupis was no less than that of their masters” and declared they deserved to be punished the same.\(^464\) The Jesuits claimed the “tupis” were cruel “when they accompany their masters,” but were much more so “when they send them alone to assault, and capture Indians.” The “tupis” would gather together “one hundred and two hundred Tupi Indians of various owners, and forcibly bring as many [Native captives] as they can, hurting and killing with much cruelty, according to the example and instruction of their masters who sent them.”\(^465\) The Jesuits saw the “Tupis” as full combatants in the conflicts against the Guairá reductions, even if as subjected vassals or servants to the Paulistas.

\(^462\) Metcalf, *Go-Betweens*, 185.
\(^463\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 327.
\(^464\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 328.
\(^465\) “Mancilla e Masseta,” 328–329.
What becomes clear from the accounts of the 1628 *bandeira* is that the Paulistas utilized enslaved Natives as warriors and slavers against the Guairá missions. That Native headmen were persuaded to bring their people to live among the Paulistas and then were subsequently treated as vassals or servants. This occurred through misunderstandings that the Paulistas exploited to take advantage of Native peoples. Through captivity some enslaved Native peoples maintained their own Native hierarchies and leadership positions and some, like Tatavrana, were able to persuade their followers to flee captivity in São Paulo. Others accepted or exploited their new positions among the Paulistas, if not as enslaved people, then as vassal warriors aiding the Paulistas destroy their enemies. The Jesuits suggested that the “tupis” learned their cruelty and captivity practices from their Paulista “masters.” As I argued in Chapter One, the reverse occurred. The Paulista settlers appropriated Native practices of captivity and warfare to create a Native slave trade in the interior of São Vicente. Those practices were then extended into using enslaved Natives or “descended” Natives as warriors and slavers to capture other Natives. But in the co-optation of Native practices, the European-derived legal statuses of those enslaved or captive Natives who fought alongside the Portuguese in slave raids blurred. As the “tupi” headman Quaraciti made clear, he was proud of his achievements in war alongside the Portuguese against the Jesuit reductions. If captivity and war prowess were markers of successful Native leaders, did enslaving traditional enemies for or alongside the Portuguese lessen those victories in the eyes of those Native participants? Tatavrana and Quaraciti may have given very different answers to that question. The binary of free versus unfree did not suit the conditions of those “tupi” Natives who were captured and fought alongside the Paulistas.

After the successes of the *bandeiras* against the Guairá reductions, the Paulistas expanded their slave raids into the Jesuit reductions of Tape, Uruguay, and Itatim in the 1630s
and 1640s. During these expeditions and the further expansion of Paulista slaving, the enslaved statuses of the Natives of São Paulo became clearer even in the continued protests of the Jesuits, the Papacy, and the Unified Iberian monarchy. However, around this period the Paulistas suffered several setbacks on slaving raids as the Spanish and the Jesuits began to arm the Natives of their reductions in defense against the Paulista bandeiras. The Paulistas changed tactics yet another time and began relying again on smaller scale expeditions to replenish the numbers of the enslaved Guarani who labored on the fazendas of many of the bandeirantes of the late 1620s and 1630s. After the great Paulista bandeiras of the 1630s and 1640s the slaving society made its transition toward a slave society, where enslaved Natives began to be commodified and protected by the local state. The Jesuits continued to protest the enslavement of the Natives, but found themselves drowned out by the local slaving state. In the words of Don Luis de Cespedes Xeria, Governor of Paraguay, he asked the King of Spain who would punish the Brazilian state and the Paulistas for their crimes when it “is a cause of disorder” that “their very justices are the captains and those who lead them.”

466 “Carta del Gobernador Don Luis Cespedes Xeria,” in Fundación de Brasil, 436.
Chapter 4: “Wee have set them on worke to doe all these horrid wicked things to get slaves to sell yᵉ dealers in Indians”: Native Competition and the Spread of Slaving in Carolina, 1680 to 1706

In April of 1680, certain “Cheife people of the Westoes” came to the plantation of a Captain Walley for a conference held by the Grand Council and Governor of Carolina, Joseph West. The Carolina Council wanted to convey to the Westo that “they should not Intermedle nor disturb[e] any of our Neighbour Indians,” and warned the Westo that they should avoid “som[e] of the people whose friends they had causeleslie [causelessly] killed for whose bloud noe Repara[t]ion hath yet been made.” But the Council clarified that it did not intend to hold all the Westo accountable or “destroy a great manie for the offences of a few.” 467 The Carolina Council sought peace with the Westo, despite the Westo having clearly killed colonists or allied Native peoples who sought revenge for those killings. Due to the references for the need for blood retribution on the part of those offended by the Westo, they were probably Native “friends” of Carolina because clan violence in the Native South demanded retribution for the murder of kin. 468 The Carolina Council wanted to continue the monopoly trade in enslaved Natives with the Westo, despite some violence between the Westo and other Native groups in the region.

However, the Westo response makes it clear that something had drastically changed in the Westo-Carolina relationship by 1680. Adriano, an “aged and Considerable person” of the

467 April 12, 1680, A.S. Salley Jr., ed., Journal of the Grand Council of South Carolina (JGCSC), August 25, 1671–June 24, 1680 (Columbia, S. Car.: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1907) 83–84. Quotations on 83 and brackets inserted for clarity. The date of the council journal for April 12, states “1780,” which is clearly a typo as the journal entry is situated between an entry from December 1678 and June 1680.

468 Natives of the North American South most often cited the need to silence the “crying blood” of deceased relatives. This blood vengeance, most often involved the taking of the offenders life by clan relatives of the deceased, or the murder of a clan relative of the offender. Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 80–91, “Crying blood” and blood vengeance explained on 80–81.
Westo, responded to Governor West and the Council, that Dr. Henry Woodward had warned the Westo that “the people of Kaiawah were bad” and the Westo should kill “Cap' Moore and Mr. Boone” who were on their way to the Westo to ensure the “maintenance of ye peace and security of ye settlers.” 469 James Moore and John Boone, along with Maurice Mathews, were notorious slavers who illegally traded for enslaved Natives against the wishes of—or unbeknownst to—the Lords Proprietors. These men and their political allies came to be known as the Goose Creek faction, which often found itself at odds with the wishes of the Lords Proprietors. 470 In 1675, Boone petitioned the Carolina Council to allow him to sell Native prisoners taken by the Seewees, enemies of the Westo, out of the colony to “be transported by any who have or shall purchase them.” 471 By 1680, the Westo wanted Boone and Moore dead, for having come to the “Countrey to Espy and observe there strength and maner whereby they might ye e easier be destroyed.” Woodward told the Westo that “if they did come to ye English settlm' upon” the invitation of Boone and Moore, that they would “be sent in shipps beyond seas and sold for slaves.” Following the warnings of Woodward, the Westo feared that while they were treating with Gov. West and the Carolina Council “the English below are fitting themselves to come to

469 The Kiawah were a lowland Native group that Carolina colonists came to call “Settlement Indians.” April 12, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 83–84. It is interesting that the known Westo speaker was named Adriano, a name of Romance origins. It remains unclear if Adriano was given this name by the English, or by the Spanish in Florida, or if he took it upon himself. That a Westo man in Carolina in 1680 was using a name with Portuguese/Italian origins demonstrates the level of cross-cultural exchange that was occurring in the Southeast at the time. The most plausible explanation is that Adriano received the name from the Spanish through at least a nominal baptism by Spanish friars. Could Adriano have also been a former captive from Spanish Florida who had been incorporated into the Westo community. We may never know.


destroy them in their towne.”\textsuperscript{472} The Westo did not trust the Carolina Council and Governor’s abilities to restrain Carolina colonists from trading with other Native slavers. Plainly, the diplomatic situation and slaving monopoly between the Westo and Carolina trade partners was falling apart, and the internal political situation in Carolina was partly to blame for it.

Much like the situation in São Paulo, the Lords Proprietors could not successfully prevent colonists from trading with Native peoples for enslaved Natives outside of their monopoly alliance with the Westo. Native competition over access to Carolina traders spurred on the slave trade over the last two decades of the seventeenth century. A simplified telling of the story is that the colonists used the Savanna Shawnee to destroy and replace the Westo in 1680. The Savanna Shawnee became important slavers and suppliers of Native captives for the English, but they were not alone in that endeavor. Yuchis, Chiscas, Cowetas, Cussetas, Yamasees, Catawbas, Chickasaws, and Cherokees began to vie with the Savanna Shawnee for access to English traders.\textsuperscript{473} The Savanna Shawnee channeled access to some of this trade through the town they created on the Savanna River after the displacement of the Westo, but like the Westo, the expanding trade in Native captives in the Southeast eventually drove them out. However, the displaced Westo should not be seen as having been replaced by the Savanna Shawnee. Despite the attempts of the Proprietors to recreate their monopoly with another Native group, the Savanna Shawnee and other local Native groups had their own diplomatic interests. The displacement of the Westo resulted from increased competition among Native slaving peoples over access to English traders.\textsuperscript{474}

\textsuperscript{472} April 12, 1680, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 83–84.  
\textsuperscript{473} Warren, \textit{Worlds the Shawnee Made}, 94.  
\textsuperscript{474} D. Andrew Johnson argues that blaming the Westo War on Goose Creek slavers such as Maurice Matthews, James Moore, John Boone, and John Godfrey downplays Westo geopolitical and socioeconomic motivations for trying to limit the Goose Creek slavers abilities to trade with
This chapter shows that Native slavers implemented several different and overlapping slaving, coalescence, and diplomatic strategies to attract English traders and refugee groups to their communities, to create alliances to protect against other slavers, and to provide slaves to exchange for English arms and manufactures. Various groups used different strategies. However, Native peoples that coalesced into larger polities mostly survived. As I argue, those who were unable to create connections with both neighboring Native groups and Europeans often fell victim to slave raids. Native peoples chose when, how, and with whom to create alliances and trade networks that shaped the development of the Native slave trade in the region. Three distinct slaving strategies were employed by the Westo, Savanna Shawnee, and Yamasee during the expansion of the Native slave trade out of Carolina. The Westo tried to maintain a monopoly on the Native slave trade and limit other Native groups’ access to Carolina traders. The Savanna Shawnee attempted to conduct trade as middlemen traders and slavers where they opened access to other Southeastern groups to English traders. The Yamasee coalesced as slavers by migrating toward the Carolina settlement at Port Royal but also by maintaining their connections across polities in the Southeast, even among peoples they conducted slave raids against. These three slaving strategies and how Native peoples adopted, adapted, and changed their strategies in the face of other slaving threats demonstrate how Southeastern Natives shaped the development of the Native slave trade and the Southeast. This chapter will show that slaving and coalescence were two intertwined strategies that Natives used to negotiate the vexed diplomatic, military, and...
social landscape in which they found themselves living after the arrival of the Westo in the South and the English at Charles Town.

In 1680, at the conference at Captain Walley’s plantation, the Westo understood that if captured by the English, they would be shipped “beyond [the] seas” and sold as slaves. The Westo were aware of the fate of many Native captives through their trade with Woodward and the Lords Proprietors, but the Westo also feared that this ill fortune could befall them as well, especially if they engaged with slavers like Boone and Moore. As fate would have it, without informing the Lords Proprietors, the Grand Council turned on the Westo in June of 1680 and with the help of the Savanna Shawnee virtually destroyed the Westo as a collective polity. The Carolina council justified their actions against the Westo, because the Westo had “killed taken and destroyd severall of our Neighbor Indians and doe as yet further Intend and Indeavor to prosecute their hostilitie against them to the greate disturbance and discouragm: of the people of this settlem:.” The Council prohibited the trading of any “provision for Warr” to the Westo, but also recognized that “Certaine of the people and Inhabitants of this province have bought and purchased severall of the said Neighbour Indians from the said Westoes.” The Council promised that the Natives bought from the Westo “shal be restored to their former liberty and

475 April 12, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 84.
476 June 1, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 84–85. In 1680, the South Carolina and Spanish Florida records were unclear which Native groups aided the Carolina Council in the Westo War. Spanish records stated the Natives who helped the English against the Westo were “probably the Chiscas”. “Testimony of Daniel Turner,” March 6, 1680, Pablo de Hita Salazar to the Spanish Crown, A.G.L. 58-1-26, in José Miguel Gallardo, “The Spanish and the English Settlement in Charles Town,” SCHM 37, no. 4 (Oct., 1936) 137–138, quotation on 138. The Lords Proprietors recognized that the Savanna Shawnee were the group that aided Carolina colonists against the Westo in 1683. September 30, 1683, Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina 1663–1684 (BPROSC), ed. A. S. Salley Jr. (Atlanta: Foote & Davies Company, 1928) 255–256.
477 June 1, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 84–85, quotation on 84.
478 June 1, 1680, Salley, JGCSC, 84.
freedome” but it remains unclear if that ever occurred.\textsuperscript{479} The Council blamed Woodward for “induceing ye said Westoes for the destruction of Certain of ye people of this settlem” and ordered Woodward to pay a £1,000 bond prohibiting him from “trade Negotiate or Correspond wth: ye nation of the Westoes.”\textsuperscript{480} The Carolina Council issued the bond against Woodward, the agent of the Lords Proprietary, for inciting the Westo to enslave other Native allies, but found no fault with colonists who purchased Native allies from the Westo in violation of the Lords Proprietors’ monopoly trade with the Westo. The Council’s actions were clearly not taken on behalf of the interests of the Lords Proprietary. As had become clear over the last two decades of the seventeenth century, the Carolina Council used the power of the local state and the absence of the Lords Proprietors to allow colonists to circumvent the Lords Proprietors’ monopoly over the slave trade. The Carolina council’s betrayal of the Westo became possible because of competition between Native enslavers to provide Native captives to the Lords Proprietors, Carolina Council members, and other Carolina colonists.

When the Lords Proprietors heard of the Council’s actions against the Westo they were incensed. The Lords Proprietors declared they “cannot but accuse you of great neglect in not informing us y’selves” of the War with the Westo. The Proprietors argued that if “friendship had been preserved with ye Westoes it would have kept all the neighbouring Indians from dareing to offend you (the Council).” The Lords Proprietors ordered the Council to “make Peace with the Westoes as soone as it can be had” because “[p]eace is the Interest of Planters.”\textsuperscript{481} The Lords Proprietors saw peace with the Westoes and control over the trade in Native captives with them as the path to prosperity in the colony for themselves “by making ourselves usefull to them (the

\textsuperscript{479} June 1, 1680, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 84.
\textsuperscript{480} June 4, 23, 24, 1680, Salley, \textit{JGCSC}, 85.
Westo) by trade.” 482 If the Council could protect their neighboring Native allies from the Westo raids it “would have made” coastal Natives “love as well as feare you.” 483 What the Lords Proprietors failed to realize is that numerous colonists did not seek to protect their Native allies from the Westo, nor intend to respect the Proprietors’ monopoly. Colonists sought access to the Native slave and fur trade, through connections to other Native groups that could provide those commodities in violation of the Proprietor’s monopoly.

But the Proprietors were not tied to a Westo alliance beyond the Westo ability to provide the Proprietors’ a monopoly over trade with local Natives. If the Westo could not provide that monopoly, they were expendable. The Proprietors sent instructions to the Secretary of the colony, Andrew Percival, “to get a Peace with the Westoes,” but demanded that the Westo “shall doe no Injury to any Indians we have taken into our Protection.” 484 Furthermore, the Westo were to trade with the Carolina colonists at only two plantations: St. Giles Kussoe owned by Lord Shaftesbury and Mepkin owned by another Lord Proprietor, Sir Peter Colleton. 485 Although both of these stipulations would prove difficult to regulate, the Lords Proprietors wanted to maintain their monopoly over the Native trade with the Westo to the exclusion of the other Carolina colonists. But, if the Westo did not conform to those stipulations, then Percival was to contact the people of Cofitachequi, the Esau, “and all other nations, and enter into a League with them against ye Westoes.” 486 The Proprietors were willing to replace the Westo with another group,

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482 February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:153. Parentheses included for clarification.
483 February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:153.
484 “Instructions for Mr. Andrew Percivall,” February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:106–108. First quotation on 106, second on 107.
485 “Instructions for Mr. Andrew Percivall,” February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:107. See Also: Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans,” 52.
486 “Instructions for Mr. Andrew Percivall,” February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:106.
any group that was strong enough to maintain the monopoly and provide a buffer to keep “other Indians” from “daring to defend us.”

Although the Proprietors’ intentions for the colony and their monopoly were clear in their instructions to Percival in 1680, as with numerous other decisions at the time, they were not based on what was occurring on the ground in Carolina at the time. The Westo had slaved among the people of Cofitachequi for almost a decade at that point and references to the Cofitachequi as a collective polity virtually disappear from the records after this. The people of Cofitachequi were not powerful enough to counter the Westo and may have already been dispersed.

Furthermore, the Proprietors were ignorant of Westo motivations for attacks against Natives allied to Carolina. The Westo were attempting to prevent rival Native groups from gaining access to Carolina traders and to firearms. In the process, the Westo were making more enemies in the South by seeking to defend their own monopoly trade with Carolina. Moreover, the Proprietors could not imagine that their own colonists were working with other allied Natives to circumvent the Proprietors’ monopoly with the Westo, or that when the Westo retaliated, it was to protect their own monopoly over the trade with the Proprietors. In both cases, the Lords Proprietors’ instructions to Percival came too late. By the time the Proprietors sent their instructions to Percival in February of 1680/1, the Westo had been dispersed by the Savanna Shawnee. The Proprietors recognized the fate of the Westo as “ruined” in March 1681.

Many Westo were enslaved by the Savanna Shawnee and sold to the English. By 1683, the picture of what happened to the Westo was clearer to the Lords Proprietors: “the Indian Dealers have writen us there are not 50 Westohs left alive & those divided.”

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487 “Instructions for Mr. Andrew Percivall,” February 21, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:106.
488 March 7, 1680/1, Salley, BPROSC, 1:115–120. Quotation on 117.
489 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 255–263. Quotation on 257.
accused the Carolina Council of instigating the Westo War when “y<sup>e</sup> heads of y<sup>e</sup> Westohs being taken whilst they were in treaty w<sup>th</sup> y<sup>e</sup> Govern<sup>l</sup> & so under y<sup>e</sup> publick faith for their safety & put to death in cold blood & y<sup>e</sup> rest Driven from their Country.”<sup>490</sup> The Westo were destroyed in 1680 as a strong slaving polity. As colonist Maurice Mathews wrote of the Westo in May 1680, they “did begin to insult over our Nighbour Indians but wee did forbid them to injure any of our friends and they have since forborn. They are few in number and hated by many.”<sup>491</sup> Mathews, having likely profited from the destruction of the Westo, was aware that they posed no threat any more to the colony.

However, the Westo were not entirely destroyed in 1680. Three maps from 1715, 1720, and 1721 locate the Westo among the people who became the Lower Creeks. These were probably refugee bands who fled to live among the emerging Cowetas and other Lower Creeks on Ocmulgee Creek, the Flint River, and the Chattahoochee River. However, as Figure 6 demonstrates, the Westo were clearly still demarcated as a separate town in 1720. In the 1715 Map from the British Public Records office, a town labeled as “Westas” was located adjacent to the Coweta town. These maps show that the Westo were not entirely destroyed. They continued as a distinct people into the second decade of the eighteenth century, after which they were

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<sup>490</sup> September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 256.
incorporated into the growing Lower Creek communities as numerous other Native peoples were.\textsuperscript{492}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6}
\caption{Map of Charles Towne, Westo, and Savannah, c. 1700. Modified portion of a 1720 Map by Herman Moll, changed to highlight the locations of the “westras” next to the Cowetas on a branch of the Altamaha River and the locations of the “Savannahs” and Charles Town. From Herman Moll, 1720, A new map of the north parts of America claimed by France.}
\end{figure}

By 1680 Carolina colonists had already created slaving connections with other Native groups in the South. This can be seen by looking at the Native participants in slaving raids at the time. In 1680, the Westo along with slavers from the Chiluque and the Uchise (Ochese) attacked

\textsuperscript{492} Two of the three maps, one dated 1715 and the other dated 1721, can be found in the collection of three maps in “Map of Indian tribes of the Southeast ca. 1715,” South Carolina Historical Society, Map, maps/plats 32-06-07. The third map from 1720, in Figure 1, is Herman Moll, 1732, A new map of the north parts of America claimed by France under ye names of Louisiana, Mississipi i.e. Mississippi, Canada, and New France with ye adjoining territories of England and Spain: to Thomas Bromsall, esq., this map of Louisiana, Mississipi i.e. Mississippi & c. is most humbly dedicated, H. Moll, geographer. [London: Sold by H. Moll, 1720] Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/2001624907/. The manpower estimates given on the 1715 map do not correlate with other sources. The “Westas” town was labeled as having 15 men and Coweta with 30 respectively. Coweta was a large and powerful polity in 1715 with hundreds of warriors, if not thousands. Therefore, the reference to 30 men makes little sense in that context.
the Spanish missions of Guale again. The Governor of Florida, Don Pablo de Hita Salazar, reported that “the enemy Chuchumecos, Uchises, and Chiluques, with the instigation of Englishmen, invaded the island of Santa Catharina in the province of Guale, and that of Guadalquini.” The Native slavers attacked the Native town of San Simón on Guadalquini Island (St. Simons Island) first, killed some Native Colones inhabitants, and then retreated. Within days, the Native slavers with “more than three hundred men” attacked the mission of Santa Catharina, and “among them came some Englishmen, who instructed them, and all with long shotguns, which have caused much horror to these natives, who abandoned the island of Santa Catalina.” The Westo, Chiluque, and Uchise drove the inhabitants out of the mission and off of St. Catherine’s Island. The Spanish responded and attempted to dislodge the Native slavers from the island, but the attackers quickly withdrew northward toward Carolina, suggesting the attack was a slave raid rather than an attempt to occupy Guale.

It is unclear whether the English or the Westo decided which Natives participated in the 1680 raid. The Westo may have been open to aid from other Native groups based on their unsuccessful raids against the Spanish missions in 1661. The Chiluque and Uchise could offer

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493 Scholars have debated the origins and identity of the Uchise and Chiluque with uneven results. The Chiluque have sometimes been mistaken for the Cherokee, who the Spanish called the “Chalaque,” but were most likely inhabitants of the Santa Elena/Escamaçu region and may have been proto Yamasee peoples. The Uchise or Ochese became the Lower Creek peoples who began to consolidate on the present day Ocmulgee River or what the English called the Ochese Creek. The association of the Ochese with the Ochese Creek would provide the name for the confederation that became the Creek peoples. Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 25–26, 30–31, 90, n. 47. See also: Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 48–52; John H. Hann, “St. Augustine’s Fallout from the Yamasee War,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 2 (Oct., 1989) 180–200.
494 “Hita Salazar to León, July 22, 1680,” in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 85–86, quotation on 86.
495 Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 31.
496 Don Pablo de Hita Salazar, Letter to the King, May 14, 1680, Santo Domingo 839, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Seville, Spain. Quoted in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 31.
more men and thus a better chance at overcoming the Spanish and Gualean defenses.\textsuperscript{497} Governor Hita Salazar offered some contexts when he reported that,

all were at war, and the Chiluques and Uchizes sociable, treating and trading with these provinces in good friendship, and only the Chichumecos were always enemies, and last year they all made peace and established friendship with the English, which they conserve, and this year these three nations have been declared enemies.\textsuperscript{498}

The Uchises and Chiluques had been at peace with the Spanish prior to 1680. Clearly, something changed in that year to cause them to ally with the Westo and English and raid the Spanish missions of Guale. Most likely, it was the expansion of Carolina traders’ connections into other Native communities that allowed for the creation of that Native alliance for the 1680 raid. The alliance appears entirely transactional when viewed through the history of the Westo in the 1670s who were said to have angered nearly all of the surrounding Native groups they previously preyed upon.

With the animosity of other local Natives toward the Westo in mind, the 1680 allied slave raids against Guale demonstrate how Westo control over their slaving monopoly with Carolina was deteriorating. The Westo could no longer shut out their neighbors from accessing Carolina traders. The Chiluque and Uchise presumably acquired firearms from Carolina traders who were circumventing the Westo-Carolina monopoly. Once colonists like Moore and Boone saw that they could induce other Native groups to slave against the Spanish missions, the Westo and Proprietor monopoly over the slave trade with Carolina was doomed.

\textsuperscript{497} Based on previous Westo attempts and strategies aimed at limiting other Native groups’ access to Carolina traders, the decision to join with the Uchise and Chiluque may not have been originally proposed by the Westo.

\textsuperscript{498} Don Pablo de Hita Salazar, Letter to the King, May 14, 1680, Santo Domingo 839, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Seville, Spain. Quoted in Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 31.
It did not take long for the Carolina council to turn on the Westo. The Council justified those actions as in defense of their “Neighbor Indians” but the Lords Proprietors quickly saw through that ruse. The Lords Proprietors were clear to the Council that “we must plainely tell you y‘ we are very Jealous ye. Private Gaines y‘ some make by buying slaves of ye. Indians.” The Proprietors were angry that colonists were violating their monopoly by trading in enslaved Natives, not that enslaving occurred. After the near destruction of the Westo in 1680, the Council gave three reasons to the Lords Proprietors as to why the War with the Westo and their enslavement were necessary. First, that the Savanna Shawnee had “united all their tribes” and grown too powerful making it “[d]angerous to disoblige them.” Secondly, that an additional War with the Waniah, a people who lived northeast of Charles Town near what is today Winyaw Bay, was underway and the Savanna Shawnee were assisting Carolina colonists against those peoples. Third, as the Lord Proprietors summarized the Council’s argument “[t]hat humanity Induceth you to buy their Slaves of them to keep them from being put to Cruell deaths.”

The Lords Proprietors saw through each one of these justifications given by the Council. They accused the Council of having “much greater Regard to their private proffitt” than for the “benefit of y‘ Publick.” The Lords, almost rhetorically, asked whether or not supplying the Savanna Shawnee with “Gunn’s powder bullet and all things they have need of” would not make the Savanna Shawnee even stronger than they were now and thus “Joine all the other Scattering nations to them.” As to the second reason, the Lords Proprietors were perplexed by the existence of the conflict with the Waniahs and asked “how came the war w‘ y‘ Waniahs”? The

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499 June 1, 1680, Salley, JGSC, 84.
500 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 255–263. Quotation on 255.
502 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 256.
Proprietors accused the Council of betraying the Westo and suspected that the Savanna Shawnee had not achieved a “profitable trade to ye.” Indian Dealers y’ was expected in beaver,” they instead sought out “Indians to transport for we can imagine no other Reason a quarrell was picked w’t y’ Waniahs.” The Lords understood that the Savanna Shawnee were looking for Natives to enslave. The Lords scoffed at the Council’s pretense for the Waniah War. The Council argued they had successfully “cut off a boat of [Native] runaways” when in fact the Lords had been “informed” that those enslaved Natives had “arrived safe in Antigua.”

503 Here is clear evidence of the transportation of enslaved Natives out of Carolina to the Leeward Islands.

Lastly, the Lords Proprietors were not convinced by the claims of the Council of humanitarian motives for purchasing Native captives. The Lords responded that,

by buying Indians of y’ Savannahs you induce them through Covetousness of your guns Powder & shott & other Europian Comodities to make war upon their neighbours to ravish the wife from the Husband Kill the father to get y’ Child & to burne & Destory y’ habitations of these poore people. 504

The Lords saw no humanity in enslaving people who had “charefully Recêd” the colonists “when we were weake.” 505 The Lords Proprietors saw how the colonists had provided firearms to the Savanna Shawnee to encourage them to attack, scatter, and enslave the Westo and Waniah. The Lords admitted they, or the Council, were responsible for this: “wee have set them on worke to doe all these horrid wicked things to get slaves to sell y’ dealers in Indians.” 506 The end result for the Lords Proprietors was clear. The Native slave trade caused the Westo and Waniah wars, and “it will not only Continue them but make other wars if y’ Indians are suffered still to bee sent

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504 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 258.
505 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 258.
506 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 258.
away.” The Lords saw the spread of conflict among Native peoples over the slave trade, despite their own attempts to profit from a more limited trade. To say the least, the Lords Proprietors were not pleased with the actions of the Carolina Council in 1680.

Nevertheless, despite their admonishment of the Council, the Lords Proprietors agreed on the need for taking prisoners; they only wanted that process to be for the “ye benefitt of ye publick”—meaning for their own benefit. They had no qualms with the sale of war captives. In the same letter in which they castigated the Council for its actions, they recognized that should war arise “wth. some Indians” it may have been necessary to allow the soldiers to take Native captives and “make ye best Advantage of their prisoners.” They saw it as a means to motivate colonists to fight in those conflicts against Natives. The Lords Proprietors saw it fitting that some “Indians . . . may be exported” as long as they were interviewed with interpreters to determine which Native group they came from and to record which colonists took them captive. The Lords did not want to end the slave trade; they wanted to license it and prevent the enslavement of Native allies. The Lords made this clear in their letter:

nor doe wee hereby meane there should bee a Standing law for ye Transporting of Indians, but wee hereby intend there shall be a pticular License for every Parcell of Indians Transported.

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507 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 258.
508 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 255.
509 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 260.
510 September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 261. The reference to “every Parcell” of Native peoples transported out of the colony as slaves parallels the way that the Portuguese and Paulistas referred to enslaved Natives as peças or “pieces” of enslaved people. The language reflects the commodification of people to be counted and transported as any other good in both settings.
The licenses were to be voted on by the Council and other colonial officers and the Lords promised swift penalty to any who sold enslaved Natives without a license. The licenses were to regulate and thus profit off of the Native slave trade, not to end it.\(^{511}\)

Alan Gallay argued that the enslavement of Native peoples “as practiced in Carolina was undertaken illegally by Carolina laws and moral standards” and thus the Lords Proprietors viewed the capture of Natives during slave raids as “morally reprehensible” because they were not captured in a Just War.\(^{512}\) As shown in the previous chapter, in São Paulo Just War rationales often offered pretexts that colonists used to justify war. The Lords Proprietors criticized the Carolina council for their actions against the Westo and Waniah in 1680, but these criticisms need to be weighed with respect to the Lords’ concerns over maintaining a monopoly over the Native slave trade and maintaining peaceful relations with their Native neighbors so that their own burgeoning plantation prospects could prosper. The Lords’ efforts to license and regulate the Native slave trade prove that intent; licenses were about controlling and profiting off of the Native slave trade, not about its morality.\(^{513}\) The Lords Proprietors saw the increased competition and spread of Native slaving as a problem. They approved of the enslavement and trade in Natives for their own profit.


\(^{513}\) Gallay’s argument also lends too much weight to colonists adherence to colonial laws in seventeenth-century Carolina. As Gallay highlights for the Spanish case in the Americas, slaving and slavery continued in Spanish America, despite the crown outlawing the enslavement of Natives. In the English case in Carolina, as the continued trade and harboring of pirates by colonists shows, laws and orders from the metropole were enforced when they were convenient. See Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans,” 50–56; Ethridge, *Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 108–110, 275, n. 60.
Savanna Shawnee Middlemen Traders and Slavers

After the Savanna Shawnee assisted Carolina colonists in scattering and enslaving the Westo and Waniah in 1680, the Savanna Shawnee became the dominant slavers in the Native Slave Trade from their base on the Savannah River. But the Savanna Shawnee developed a different strategy from that of the Westo, with whom the Savannah Shawnee initially sought peace with when they migrated to the South from the Ohio and Delaware River valleys in the 1670s. Both the Westo and the Savanna Shawnee migrated south to escape Haudenosaunee violence. However, the Savanna Shawnee did not seek to replicate the Westo slaving monopoly but rather sought trade relationships with both Carolina traders and Native groups in the interior. They positioned themselves—both spatially and relationally—between Carolina traders and Native groups in the interior as middlemen in the Native slave trade but they did not try to block others from trade. Violence and slaving had their places in Savanna Shawnee society, as their attacks on the Westo and Waniah show. However, the Savanna Shawnee saw the value in serving as mediators and middlemen in the slave trade instead of trying to monopolize access to Carolina. Reciprocity and open communication between Native groups was the driving motivation. The Native slave trade flowed through them, while other Native groups benefited as well.514

The Savanna Shawnee settled in three villages on the Savannah River, across from what is today Augusta, Georgia. From this base the Savanna established a buffer between the English and Spanish that other Native groups took advantage of by also moving to the region.515

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514 Warren, Worlds the Shawnees Made, Loc. 1758–1781. This could be seen as similar to the strategy the Occaneechis employed from their island in the Roanoke River. The Occaneechis attracted at least two other towns, the Tutelos and the Saponis, to join them there in what could be seen as a loose form of coalescence. Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, 97–98.

Savanna Shawnee presence in the Southeastern trade became so ubiquitous that by 1710 the Anglican missionary Dr. Francis Le Jau commented on the widespread use of the “Savannah Language” that “shou’d be called Saonah.” Le Jau was most likely referring to a distinct trade dialect of Shawnee of the central Algonquian language family when he stated that the Savanna Shawnee language was understood by traders throughout the continent from Carolina “to Canada inclusively.” According to Le Jau, the Savanna Shawnee “came orginally from Albany [New York] and settled near this province Even before the Nation of the Westo were destroyed and to this day [1710] they keep about the places where the Westo lived, but perhaps not so numerous,” referencing the Savanna Shawnee settlements on the Savannah River near the former Westo town of Hickauhaugau.  

John Archdale, who was appointed Governor of Carolina in the 1690s saw divine providence at work in the Savanna Shawnee forcing the Westo “out of that province.” Despite the effects of the “thining [of] the Indians, to make room for the English,” the Savanna Shawnee remained “good Friends and useful Neighbours to the English” into the eighteenth century.

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516 Frank J. Klingberg, ed., *The Carolina Chronicle of Dr. Francis Le Jau, 1706–1717* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956) 68. Brackets inserted for clarity. The low numbers of Savanna Shawnee in 1710 may have been a result of their departure in large numbers from the Savannah River after 1707, when the Savanna Shawnee “Revolted” against Carolina. The reason for the Savanna Shawnee departure from Carolina will be discussed in Chapter 6. Thursday, June 12, 1707, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, June 5, 1707–July 19, 1707, (JCHASC)* Ed. By A.S. Salley (Columbia, S. Car.: The State Company, 1940) 25–28. The *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina* will be referred to here on out as *JCHASC* with the volume specified by date. Brackets inserted for clarity.

Scholars have argued the Lords Proprietors sought to recreate a slaving monopoly specifically with the Savanna Shawnee much like the agreement they struck with the Westo.\textsuperscript{518} The Lords Proprietors wanted “to sett up some other nation in the roome of ye Westoes (whoome we deeme ruined)” and determined to furnish them “with armes & ammunition: but with restriction to them not to furnish any other nation.”\textsuperscript{519} The Lords wanted to monopolize trade with a single Native group to create “a dependence upon us.”\textsuperscript{520} The Lords wanted “some other Nation” to take the place of the Westo, but did not care which. In February of 1681, once war

\textsuperscript{518} A respected scholar of the Shawnee peoples, Stephen Warren, argued that “English laws encouraged the Shawnees’ status as middlemen in the Indian slave trade.” Warren, Worlds the Shawnees Made, Loc. 1769. As shown in Chapter Two, the Lords Proprietors sought to establish a monopoly over the Native trade. Monopolists typically do not encourage the prospects of middlemen. Warren makes this argument based on a misreading of the Lords Proprietors response to the Grand Council that prohibiting “ye buying slaves of any other but ye Sevanahs & allowing it to them & in exchange giving ym. Gunns powder bullet and all things they have need of. . .” September 30, 1683, Salley, BPROSC, 1: 256. The misreading is based on the fact that the Lords Proprietors posed the response as a question. In the fuller quotation the Lords Proprietors asked a question in response to the Councils’ reasons for the 1680 Westo War, “wee aske you whether ye prohibiting ye buying slaves of any other but ye Sevanahs & allowing it to them & in exchange giving ym. Gunns powder bullet and all things they have need of be not ye. way not only to keep united all the tribes of ye. Sevanas but to Joine all the other Scattering nations to them yt. they may have their protection & partake of ye. same privileges & so make them become formidable indeed”? The Lords Proprietors’ question was in response to the Council arguing “[t]hat ye. Sevanas having United all their tribes are become powerfull yt. it is Dangerous to disoblige them.” In the full context the Lords Proprietors were stating that if they gave the Savanna Shawnee the same trading relationship they had agreed to with the Westo that it would make the Savanna Shawnee more powerful, which would make them even more of a problem than they already were in the words of the Carolina Council. The Lords Proprietors instead chose to license the Native slave trade, but not to restrict those licenses to the Savanna Shawnee. This subtle but important difference demonstrates a shift in the trading strategy of the Lords Proprietors that exacerbated and spread the Native slave trade by not focusing on one Native group as the Lords’ previous monopoly with the Westo had. However, before this shift the Lords sought to recreate their monopoly trade with a single nation, but not with the Savanna Shawnee.

\textsuperscript{519} March 7, 1681, BPROSC, 1: 116.

\textsuperscript{520} March 7, 1681, BPROSC, 1: 117.
with the Westo seemed inevitable, the Lords had suggested an alliance with the “Cofitaciquis the Esaus an all other nations” in order to “enter into a League with them against yᵉ Westoes.”

But the Lords changed strategy by 1683 after learning of the Carolina Council’s work with the Savanna Shawnee against the Westo and Waniah. While the Lords Proprietors sought to recreate trading relationships with local Natives, after the wars of the 1680s they did not want to restrict that trade to one group. By 1683, the Lords Proprietors outlawed the Native slave trade except “such Indians as should be taken by the English in a Just & necessary War.” By 1684, the Lords clarified that no license should be given for “the transporting of Indians bought of other Indians by way of trade.” This effectively meant that the Native slave trade was illegal, except when the Lords Proprietors declared a Just War and issued a license. However, this did not stop the trade on the ground. For example, in November of 1683, the Lords Proprietors punished Maurice Mathews and James Moore for “most Contemptuously disobey[ing] our orders about sending away of Indians & have contrived most unjust wars upon yᵉ Indians in order to yᵉ getting of slaves.” The grave punishment for Mathews’ and Moore’s brazen disobedience was their removal as deputies of the Lords Proprietors and their prohibition from serving in the military or civil service in the colony. The Lords Proprietors still harbored ill will toward Maurice Mathews, James Moore, and Arthur Middleton, the leaders of the faction of Carolina colonists they called “yᵉ dealers in Indians.” The Lords recognized that despite their efforts the Goose Creek Men “can wᵗʰ a bole of punch get who they would chose of yᵉ parliament” in

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521 February 21, 1681, *BPROSC*, 1: 106.
Carolina. Just as had been true a century earlier in São Paulo, laws prohibiting Native slaving continued to be ignored in Carolina as long as there was no real punishment for breaking them.

Yamasee Slaving and Coalescence

Although the Savanna Shawnee became favored trading partners of Carolina, they were not the only Natives who moved near the Savannah River to access Carolina traders. By the eighteenth century, a group of Yuchis joined the Savanna Shawnee on the Savannah River. Eventually, numerous Native groups entered the slave trade with Carolina including, the coalescing Catawbas, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Cherokees. One group, the Yamasees began to coalesce and attract other Natives to move closer to the Carolina settlement after 1683. They had begun to coalesce in Spanish Florida as refugees in the 1660s, but in the wake of the Westo, Chiluque, and Uchise slave raid of 1680, some Yamasees reached out to Carolina for trade and protection.

528 Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 158–164.
529 Scholars have suggested that the Chiluque who conducted slave raids alongside the Westo and Uchise in 1680 may have been proto-Yamasees, but their origins remain uncertain. However, it is likely that the Yamasee coalesced out of the remnant communities that were once part of Ocute and Altamaha combined with other refugees and local Native communities. Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 162–164; Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 9, 25–26, 30–31, 90, n. 47. Dubcovsky, Informed Power, 110–112; Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 48–52; Hann, “St. Augustine’s Fallout,” 190–191. Scholars disagree as to the reasons the Yamasee abandoned Spanish Florida in the 1680s and their subsequent migration north toward the Savannah River and Port Royal, South Carolina. Alejandra Dubcovsky argues that the Yamasee “rejected missionization and guarded their autonomy from San Agustín.” The Spanish refusal to sell firearms to Native peoples in great numbers, further alienated the Yamasee from the Spanish as they came increasingly under attack from slave raids from the North. Dubcovsky, Informed Power, 110–111, quotation on 110. John Worth contends that the pressure of Northern Native slave raids and slave raids by coastal pirates forced the Yamasee to abandon Spanish Florida. Worth shows that in 1683 alone the population of the Guale and Mocama missions was depleted by half due to the flight of Yamasees. Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 36. The Spanish
In 1683 numerous Yamasees began to leave La Florida. Some moved Northwest among the Apalachicolas in the Chattahoochee and Flint River valleys, others moved closer to where many of their communities had previously lived north of the Savannah River and south of Charles Towne. Under the leadership of the headman Altamaha, Yamasee refugees and some Guale and Mocama peoples from Sapala, Asajo, Tupiqui, and Ospo—Native towns on the Atlantic coast that had been devastated by previous slaving raids—began to coalesce as a community near Port Royal Sound. The Yamasees were greeted at Port Royal Sound by a group of newly arrived Scottish settlers who established Stuart’s Town in 1684. In January of 1685, the Scottish settlers reported “that yesterday some mo[r]e of the nation of the Yamasee’s arrived at St. Helena to settle with those of their nation formerly settled their having come from abo[ ] S. Augustine.” Having come from among the Cowetas and Cussatoes as well as from Spanish Florida, by February 1685 the Yamasee had amassed “a thousand or more & dayly more expected” in the vicinity of Stuart’s Town. The leaders of the Scottish at Stuart’s Town, Lord Cardross and William Dunlop, wrote that they had agreed with the Yamasee,

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Autos of 1684 and 1685 relate the effects of those pirate raids, see Autos, November 6, 1684; May 20, 1685; “Autos about the Invasion of pirates,” 1684–1685, in the John E. Worth, Spanish Florida Collection, AGI Microfilm 4, Santo Domingo 856 (58-2-6) at the PK Yonge Library at the University of Florida. Pressure from slave raids from the North and piratical slave raids from the coast, along with the refusal of the Spanish to sell firearms to Natives all influenced Yamasee decisions to turn away from Spanish Florida. Both Yamasees who rejected missionization and Yamasees on missions moved north after 1680, though, some Yamasees stayed in Spanish Florida. Different Native communities made different decisions as to what they thought was best for their future.

that they remaine here during their good behaviour, and the truth is they are so considerable and warlike that we would not doe utherways. The wholl nation is not yet come which we cannot weell oppose nor is it atte your or our intrist.  

The imbalance of power was clear in the Scotsmen’s letter. Cardross and Dunlop understood that they were allowed to settle in the region at the behest of the Yamasee, even as they asked the Lords Proprietors to grant them a degree of independence from Charles Towne. The Proprietors gave the Scots at Stuart’s Town a “vague independence” over their own affairs, which the Scots used to ally themselves with the Yamasee and assert control over the Native trade in their region. According to historian D. Andrew Johnson, “Stuarts Town became a rival colonial project to Charles Town,” despite being “ostensibly part of the same colony.”

The Scots in Stuart’s Town immediately began to use that independence to profit off of Yamasee slaving. William Dunlop had shown a desire for enslaved Africans to be transported from Barbados to Port Royal, and Henry Woodward suspected Caleb Westbrooke, an English trader living in Stuart’s Town, of encouraging the Scots to pursue slaving with the Yamasee. In March of 1685, Henry Woodward reported that John Chaplin “saw armes & other things delivered to the Yamases And that they are gone agt. the Tinechoes but hee knows not against what place nor who the Tinechoes are.” The Timucua peoples lived in northern central Florida

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534 Cardross and Dunlop to Peter Colleton, March 27, 1685, in Insh, “Arrival of the Cardross Settlers,” 76.
535 For a more detailed account of the motivations behind the Scottish settlement of Stuart’s Town and their relationship with the English in Charles Towne and England, see Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 74–91.
536 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 79.
538 Henry Woodward to John Godfrey, March 21, 1685, BPROSC, 2: 49. Henry Woodward had been suspended from representing the Proprietors after his disagreements with the Carolina Council over the Westo War, but had found his way back into their graces by the mid 1680s. Colonel John Godfrey was Deputy Governor of the Colony and also Woodward’s father in law.
where the Spanish had established numerous missions among them since the 1610s.\(^{539}\)

Woodward reported that it was “easily to be judged upon what account” the Yamasee traveled to Timucua—exchanging slaves for arms was the reason the Yamasee turned on the Spanish.\(^{540}\) In February of 1685, a group of Yamasees led by headman Altamaha invaded Florida and attacked the Spanish mission of Santa Catalina de Afuyca in the Timucuan province.\(^{541}\) The Yamasees burned the mission village, killed eighteen Natives and took twenty-one Native captives and sold them in Stuart’s Town for 30 shotguns and cutlasses. The Yamasees brought back twenty-two women and three young men from the raid, showing the common imbalance in sex ratios of captives.\(^{542}\) Some were sold to an Englishman who took those captives to Charles Towne and some to an Irish ship.\(^{543}\) By 1685, the Yamasees and Scots at Stuart’s town had established another entrepot in Carolina for the Native slave trade, and the Yamasee began to coalesce as a community and polity around the strategy of enslaving Florida Natives. After having been victims of Westo slaving, the Yamasee saw safety in becoming slavers themselves.

The Lords Proprietors’ allowance of the creation of a rival entrepot for the Native slave trade at Stuart’s Town can be viewed in two distinct ways. From one perspective it illustrates


\(^{540}\) Henry Woodward to John Godfrey, March 21, 1685, BPRO 2: 49. Altamaha may have never had any allegiance to the Spanish, but other Yamasees did, one Yamasee headman even went as far as to try and warn the Spanish missions in Guale and Mocama of the impending raids. Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 46, 54, n. 45.

\(^{541}\) Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 46.

\(^{542}\) “Statement [by Nicolás (Guale), St. Augustine, December 29, 1685],” in Auto, Marquez Cabrera, St. Augustine December 29, 1685, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 37–39, especially 39.

\(^{543}\) Declaration of John Livingston, 1686, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 152–153.
that the Lords began allowing other colonists to benefit from the Native slave trade. They wanted to limit and regulate the Native slave trade, but not to outlaw it. On the other hand, it suggests that the Lords Proprietors may not have been able to stop colonists from Native trading even if they wanted to. Stuart’s Town may have been viewed more as an outlet or additional trading post for the Carolina colony than as a rival trading post for the Native slave trade with Charles Towne. With either interpretation, the establishment of Stuart’s Town further encouraged Native groups to court and create connections with colonists to trade enslaved Natives with.

It remains unclear why the Yamasees began slaving among Timucuan-speaking peoples on the Spanish missions that some Yamasees had once occupied, and some continued to do so at the time. Scholars have demonstrated that despite migrations and occasional attacks between groups, the Yamasee developed and maintained kinship alliances with multiple Native groups inside and outside of the Spanish missions, including Timucuans, Guales, Mocamas, and Apalachicolas. These connections and networks probably relied on centuries-old Native social and kinship connections from previous alliances and networks during the period of paramount chiefdoms. What becomes clear is the fracturing and recoalescence of Native peoples in the Southeast was not a new strategy, and, it relied upon kinship, trade, and communication networks that continued to crisscross Native polities. Native communities came together and split apart for survival or when it was in their own interests to do so. The Yamasee who left the Spanish missions in 1683 and 1684 saw the opportunity in 1685 to exploit the weakness of the missions many of them had previously known.

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However, the Yamasee towns that began to coalesce around Port Royal did not seek to create a slaving monopoly as the Westo did. Like the Savanna Shawnee, the Yamasee strategy focused on maintaining alliances and networks between themselves and other peoples in the interior. Some Yamasees kept connections open with the Spanish missions even after the 1685 Altamaha raid against Santa Catalina de Afuyca. The most fruitful of those connections came from the emerging proto-Creek towns of Coweta and Cusseta. The Yamasees offered the proto-Creeks access to the English and Scottish traders at Port Royal and the Creeks offered the Yamasees emerging powerful allies in the interior who could ward off other Native slavers. The Native trade and alliance networks established along the Savannah River and at Port Royal allowed multiple Native groups to access Carolina traders through the Savanna Shawnee and Yamasee as middlemen. These networks proved mutually beneficial for all for a time. When viewed from the colonial side, the expansion in the Native slave trade is often viewed as a reflection of colonial competition to gain access to enslaved Natives. From the Native perspective, the Native slave trade is better understood as an effort by Native polities to protect themselves from slaving, which necessarily involved gaining access to trade with Carolinians. Slaving and coalescence became one of the most successful strategies for protection against other slavers. The Yamasee pursued this strategy in their relationship with Stuart’s Town, but it ultimately backfired on them.

After the 1685 Altamaha raid, the Spanish were furious over what they saw as a betrayal by their former Yamasee allies and decided that the Scots in Stuart’s Town were to blame. In

546 See Stetson “Melchor Portocarrero to Francisco Salazar,” September 15,1683, AGI 58-1-37, bnd 2342, Reel 16 Stetson Collection, PKY.
August of 1686 “Three Spanish Gallies with some hundreds of armed men” fell upon the English and Scots living at Port Royal and on the Edisto River “without the least provocation or notice given of the same killing some, taking and carrying away prisoners.”\(^{547}\) Arriving at Stuart’s Town on August 17 the Spanish and their Native Guale allies burned the town, and proceeded north toward Charles Towne. On August 24\(^{th}\), the Spanish arrived on Edisto Island plundering and burning several English plantations, including Carolina Governor Joseph Morton’s plantation and that of his secretary Paul Grimball.\(^{548}\) The Spanish captured enslaved Africans and European indentured servants from the English and Scottish plantations and took them back to St. Augustine with them.\(^{549}\) The Spanish discovered Catholic vestments and silver altar candlesticks on a Carolina plantation “ten leagues” from Charles Towne. Based on the engraved names on the candlesticks, the Spanish determined that they came “from the last sack of Campeche or from Vera Cruz” in Mexico which had recently been sacked by pirates who were trading with the English at Charles Towne.\(^{550}\) The Spanish also interrogated several captives who reported seeing Spanish captives and slaves from Campeche and Vera Cruz in Carolina.\(^{551}\) The

\(^{547}\) Major William Dunlop, “Memorial of the hostilities committed in the Province of Carolina by the Spaniards,” 1689, in Papers of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina in the Malmsbury Collection, South Carolina Department of Archives and History (SCDAH).

\(^{548}\) Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 146.

\(^{549}\) William Dunlop to Sir James Montgomery, October 21, 1686, Dunlop Papers, GD, 3/E2/115 SCDAH, P900104; Dunlop, “Memorial of the hostilities,” 1689, SCDAH; Paul Grimball, “Paul Grimball’s Losses by the Spanish Invasion in 1686,” *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine (SCHGM)* 29, n. 3 (July 1928): 231–237.

\(^{550}\) Juan Márquez Cabrera, Auto of September 27, 1686, St. Augustine, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 156–157.

\(^{551}\) Juan Márquez Cabrera, “Autos made about the entrance into the port of the Galliots, of which Captain Alexandro Thomás de León, deceased, was leader, and the expulsion of the inhabitants of Santa Elena, of the English Nation,” 1686, Document 11, in Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 146–161.
Spanish returned to Port Royal in December 1686 to finish what they started, and they effectively destroyed the rest of Stuart’s Town and the Scottish presence there.\footnote{Dunlop, “Memorial of the hostilities,” 1689, SCDAH.}

The Scottish colonists under Dunlop wanted revenge for the destruction of their colony, but their initial attempts were thwarted by James Colleton, the new governor of Carolina appointed by the Lords Proprietary, who forbade an attack on the Spanish.\footnote{Lords Proprietors to Governor James Colleton, October 10, 1687, \textit{BPROSC}, 2: 221.} The Lords Proprietors blamed the Spanish attacks on Carolina colonists for, against “our own Repeated orders to the contrary,” having received “Pyrates and Privateers that have unjustly burnt and Robbed the houses of the Spainyards.”\footnote{Lords Proprietors to James Colleton and the Grand Council, March 3, 1687, \textit{BPROSC}, 2: 184.} In 1687 Dunlop recruited around sixty Yamasees and 37 Englishmen to return with him to Port Royal and move southward to exact revenge on the Spanish. But after a brief foray near Port Royal, the Yamasee headman Altamaha refused to proceed any further against the Spanish to the south stating “he would not goe kill Spaniards for they had never killed any of his people,” which brought Dunlop’s expedition to an end.\footnote{In the source Dunlop refers to the Yamasee headman as Matamaha, but it is likely, but not certain, he was referring to the same Yamasee headman Altamaha. J. G. Dunlop, “Capt. Dunlop’s Voyage to the Southward. 1687,” \textit{SCHGM} 30, n. 3 (July, 1929): 133.} A year earlier, Altamaha led an expedition against the Timucuan Spanish mission of Santa Catalina de Afuyca. Clearly, the Spanish attacks on Port Royal made him and other Yamasees reevaluate their relationships to the Scottish. The Yamasees decided to not commit to either the Spanish or the English, but to keep their options open and to invest in their connections with other Native communities. Historian Alejandra Dubcovsky shows that by, “[b]alancing Spanish and English threats” after the 1686 Spanish attack on Port Royal, “Altamaha maintained open paths to both Lower and Upper Yamasee towns” in ways “that best served his peoples’ interests.”\footnote{Dubcovsky, \textit{Informed Power}, 113.}
ability to negotiate and arbitrate their relationships with Europeans showed the motives behind
the Yamasee slaving strategies. Slaving was a means to an end. A means toward coalescence,
strength in numbers, and access to firearms. As important as access to Europeans and slaving
was, connections to other Native groups, Yamasees, Apalachicola, and others remained more
important when the community was threatened. The Yamasee understood that the Spanish and
English were to be feared, but not more so than isolation from other Natives in the South.
Isolation led to enslavement.

**The Expansion of the Native Slave Trade**

By 1690, Carolina Governors, the Council, Lords Proprietors, and colonists alike were
sending expeditions farther and farther into the Southeastern interior to find new Native trading
partners. In the summer of 1690, John Stewart wrote that he had received instructions from
Governor Colleton that he was “to Cross the Mountains to go a trading to the Chekesas
[Chickasaws] who live on the Lake of Canada.”\(^{557}\) Although Stewart was mistaken as to the
geography of the interior of America, he was commissioned to make 5% of the profits from one
caravan on the journey and 2% from the other two caravans as the designated “Supervisor or
Indian factor” of the expedition.\(^{558}\) These titles and instructions were the licenses the Lords
Proprietors created to regulate the Native trade in slaves and furs. Stewart’s title, the makeup of
the expedition, and the share of profits suggest how Carolina traders financed the early
expeditions into the interior: with numerous investors, some strictly as benefactors, and those

\(^{557}\) John Stewart to William Dunlop, Watbu, June 23, 1690, in “Letters From John Stewart to

\(^{558}\) John Stewart to William Dunlop, Watbu, June 23, 1690, in “Letters From John Stewart to
who conducted the journeys. While Woodward contacted the Chickasaws as early as 1685, by
1690 Stewart prepared an expedition specifically for trade with that group. By the late 1690s, the
Chickasaw established themselves as feared slavers in the Tennessee and Mississippi Valleys
who exchanged captives for arms and European goods with Carolina traders. After spending
years among the Natives of the South, in 1693 Stewart recorded having traveled 930 miles west
in order to trade with the Cusseta, Yamasee, Chickasaw, Savanna Shawnee, “Talabusies”
[Tallapoosas], “Canagies” [Congarees], and “Milawilaes.” By the turn of the eighteenth
century, Carolina traders could rely on steady supplies of Native captives and furs provided by
Apalachicola, Yamasee, Savanna Shawnee, Catawba, Chickasaw, and other Natives in exchange
for arms, cloth, and metalware. The Native slave trade in the South was expanding and the
violence, migrations, and coalescence that accompanied that trade increased in kind.

Native competition over access to European traders also fueled further divisions among
Carolina traders. In 1690, Stewart reported to William Dunlop that Captain James Moore had
“got not much” from a journey to the Cherokees and was pestering Governor James Colleton “to
have a license from him as general to go [on] a 2d voyage to the Tireaglis a peoples west of the
Cherokees.” Moore’s experience with the Cherokees and subsequent Shawnee and Catawba
slave raids against the Cherokee soured many English on trading with the Cherokees in the early
1690s. Due to this violence, Robbie Ethridge argues the Cherokees distrusted Carolina and allied
Native slavers, which effectively kept the Cherokees relatively isolated from Carolina traders

559 John Stewart to William Dunlop, Virginea, June 20, 1693, in “Letters From John Stewart to
are thought to be a possible Euchee group who lived in the Middle Tennessee River Valley at the
time. John Bernard Marcoux, Pox, Empire, Shackles, and Hides: The Townsend Site, 1670–1715
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010) 42.
who passed them over to trade with the Chickasaws by the end of the seventeenth century. However, the Carolina council recorded trips by Moore to the Cherokee as early as 1690 despite being prohibited from doing so by the Carolina Governor. For example, Governor James Colleton declared martial law in 1690 after James Moore and Maurice Mathews openly defied orders not to send an expedition to trade with the Cherokees. Governor Colleton gave orders for “Cap. Warren to take his company to stop and sease upon Moor [Moore] and his Indian trade”—meaning the goods destined to be traded with the Cherokee. Despite these orders, “Moor [Moore] and 50 others” marched to trade with the Cherokee in defiance of the Governor. The Lords Proprietors and the Carolina council may have distrusted the Cherokee and favored the Savanna Shawnee as trading partners, but slave traders like James Moore, had no qualms about trading with the Cherokee.

While this may seem like political jockeying between colonial factions, it is worth noting that members of the Goose Creek faction including Moore and Mathews were actively trading with the Cherokees while the Governor and members of the Council were trading with the Savanna Shawnee for Cherokee captives. Licensing clearly had not slowed down colonists’ abilities to defy the will of the Lords Proprietors and trade with other Native groups to benefit themselves. The Cherokees’ inability or refusal to trade with certain Englishmen in Carolina

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561 Ethridge, *From Chicaza to Chickasaw*, 161.
made them targets of English and Native slave raids. In May of 1691 the Lords Proprietors wrote
to the Carolina Governor and Council that they had been informed that “some of the inhabitants
of Carolina” had without justification or declaring war “fallen upon the Chorakee Indians in an
hostile māner and murdered severall of them.” The Proprietors feared that such hostilities
would spread and threaten “not onely to yce peace of our province. But alsoe to Virginia and
other majties Colonys in America.” Perhaps the Proprietors feared a larger conflict akin to what
had recently embroiled the Chesapeake colonies during Bacon’s Rebellion and did not want to
give the Crown any pretext to seize the Carolina colony from the Lords. The Carolina Council
blamed the Savanna for the conflict with the Cherokees—much as they blamed the Westo for the
Westo War in 1680. Council records from January of 1693 stated “That the Savana Indians had
beene at one of the Charrekeys Townes and meeteing onely wth yce old men there: (the young
men being absent) killed them and Carryed away the women and Children and Sold Some of
them for Slaves to the English TradEd who had brought them to this SettlEd and Sold them for
slaves.” There is no further commentary given as to the Council’s stance on the sale of those
enslaved Cherokees in Carolina, suggesting they found such sales commonplace and acceptable.

In response to Governor Colleton’s actions against Moore, the Goose Creek faction
ousted Governor Colleton and appointed Seth Sothell as their own colonial Governor in the
summer of 1690. Sothell invited pirates to trade with the colony and benefitted from the

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565 Lords Proprietors to Governor Seth Sothell, May 13, 1691, BPROSC, 3: 15–16, quotation on 15.
566 Lords Proprietors to Governor Seth Sothell, May 13, 1691, BPROSC, 3: 15–16, quotation on 15.
567 January 13, 1692/3, JCHASC, 1693, 10–12, quotation on 12.
568 Lords Proprietors to the Governor, May 27, 1691, BPROSC, 3: 23–29; September 22, 1691,
BPRO 3: 31–32. See also Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans,” 61–62; Lesser, South
Carolina Begins, 44–45; and Michael J. Heitzler, Goose Creek: A Definitive History, Volume I:
Native Slave trade as his Goose Creek allies assuredly did. Despite his ouster, James Colleton also benefitted from the Native slave trade. In 1690, John Stewart pitched the idea to Governor Colleton of a joint venture in which Stewart and Colleton would “speak to the Yamassi King, to enter in covenants w[ ] me for 300 Indians yearly to work to mee in silk and cotton, and I to pay to them for every acre cotton so managd as I should direct and Inspect—for which I w[d] pay them—such a quantity of Indian trade and for every hand of silk so much.”\(^569\) It is unclear as to the status of the “300 Indians” who would work the cotton and silk for Stewart, but it appears that Stewart would not be paying the workers for their labor but the Yamasee “king,” headman Alatamaha, for securing those laborers for Stewart. This would either look something akin to enslavement or the labor draft system as it functioned on Spanish missions in Florida at the time. However, Stewart was heartbroken when Colleton cut him out of the deal and “brought Alatamoha to mak the bargan with himself, excluding me, for 300 hands for 7years!”\(^570\) All sides of the Carolina factions wanted access to enslaved Native laborers and were willing to betray each other politically to achieve those ends and enslave Native enemies and allies in order to provide those laborers. The disputes between colonial factions in Carolina were not over the existence of the Native slave trade, but which faction had access or monopoly over it. Competition between colonists over enslaved Natives and over connections to Natives willing to supply those captives fueled cycles of conflict that exacerbated Native wars, violence, and slaving, much as had been true in São Paulo a century earlier.


Stewart’s, Moore’s, Mathew’s, and others’ expeditions in the early 1690s demonstrate the quick expansion and the growing competition over the Native slave trade in the region between Native groups and colonists alike. The competition over who had control over the Native trade led to constant squabbling and political maneuvering in the Carolina colony between colonial factions representing themselves and agents of the Lords Proprietors who at least nominally represented the Lords’ interests. Numerous scholars have demonstrated the ways in which factionalism and abuse of the power of the colonial state in Carolina led to infighting, rivalries, piracy, smuggling, and conflict. Fewer scholars have directly tied the relative lack of a colonial state apparatus to increased slaving, warfare, and piracy. The reality of colonial statecraft in the seventeenth century was that the colonial state existed to benefit and protect those in power. However, the competition that occurred in Carolina did not occur solely among colonial factions in search of Native captives to trade into the Caribbean or to work their burgeoning plantations. Competition over supplying those captives also fueled conflict between Native groups and exacerbated intercolonial conflicts between the English, Spanish, and French.

While colonial factions sought out new Native trading partners, Native communities sought out new Native and colonial allies and new victims. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Native nations that survived managed to coalesce in the face of violence, such as: the Cowetas, Cussetas, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Catawbas, and Yamasees. In so doing Native groups also developed slaving strategies to provide Native captives to different Carolina

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572 Johnson, “Enslaved Native Americans.”
colonists, often times by preying on each other or those Native groups unfortunate enough to not secure alliances with other Native peoples and colonists.

The Westo, the Savanna Shawnee, and the Yamasee developed three distinct slaving strategies in response to the Native Slave trade. The Westo originally tried to create a monopoly trade with Carolina and deny other Native nations access to Carolina traders—much like the Occaneechis denied the Westo access to Virginia traders after the 1670. As migrant slavers new to the Southeast, the Westo saw the advantage of being feared by their new Native neighbors. The Savanna Shawnee on the other hand saw the advantage in working as middlemen in facilitating the Native slave trade. Also migrant refugees fleeing Haudenosaunee violence from the North, the Savanna Shawnee displaced the Westo while also opening up access to Carolina traders through them to their new Southeastern neighbors. The Yamasee developed a final strategy one of coalescence and connection across groups. The Yamasee coalesced in Spanish missions and Apalachicola towns in response to Westo slave raids in the 1660s and 1670s. However, by 1680 they had grown weary of being victimized by Native slavers and moved away from the Spanish missions to consolidate around Port Royal as slavers themselves. In so doing, the Yamasee relied on kin connections across Southeastern Native groups that were either newly created or maintained throughout the period. The Yamasee coalesced as former victims of slave raids to themselves become slavers, much like the Savanna Shawnee and the Westo did, but with shorter more local migrations. However, as the Native slave trade expanded further and violence escalated, Native groups like the Westo, Yamasee, and Savanna Shawnee changed strategies, improvised, and adapted. What is important is that Native decisions, choices, and connections about slaving shaped how the Native slave trade developed more so than any lords in England or
Spain. Native competition over access to European traders shaped the development of the trade, not vice versa.573

But as the Native slave trade developed one strategy became increasingly deadly: isolation. Those Native polities who were unable to create connections with other Native groups were often preyed upon by slavers. In São Paulo and Guairá, the competition over control of Native laborers pit Portuguese and Spanish colonists against the Jesuits and the representatives of the Unified Iberian crown. In Carolina, colonial factions of all stripes competed to find Native trading partners to supply Native captives. In both Carolina and São Paulo Native groups adopted slaving strategies and coalescence as the primary tool of survival during this period. In short, the strategy became: enslave others before being enslaved. This strategy worked for a time, but as conflicts between groups intensified, slave raids intensified in their frequency and in their numbers. By the first decade of the eighteenth century, slave raids conducted by coalescing Native and colonial slaving societies reached their zenith. This peak would result in the destruction of a familiar foe—the Spanish Missions of Florida and the process of coalescence around slaving would create powerful Native groups in the region like the emerging Coweta and Cusseta.

573 Too often Native motivations for slaving and their participation in the Native slave trade are parsed down to economic motivations or dependence upon European goods. The ejection of Carolina traders from Native Southeastern communities should dispel that notion. Understanding how and why Native captives and Native captivity brought prestige to Native leaders and created connections across groups through the ability to provide goods, gifts, and captives provides a better explanation for Native motivations for slaving than dependence upon European goods. See Steven C. Hahn, “The Mother of Necessity: Carolina, the Creek Indians, and the Making of a New Order in the Southeast, 1670–1763,” in Ethridge and Hudson, *The Transformation of the Southeastern Indians*, 97–99.
Part II Conclusion

Part II: The Adaptation and Expansion of Native Slaving shows the development of varied slaving strategies that Native peoples and colonists used in the expansion of Native slaving. In São Paulo, the blurred lines between enslaved Natives and “descended” allies created space where Paulistas employed Native warriors on slave raids where the status of those warriors as enslaved was unclear. As Native slaving spread further into the *sertões* of São Paulo, Paulistas began increasingly to use larger more militaristic raids to acquire Native captives. This culminated in the *Bandeiras* of the 1630s and 1640s that destroyed the Jesuit missions of Guairá and enslaved tens of thousands of Natives. In Carolina, the Westo attempt to establish a monopoly in the Native slave trade was thwarted by competition from other Native groups vying for access to English traders and by Carolina colonists seeking to defy the Lords Proprietors monopoly over the Native slave trade. The Westo, Savanna Shawnee, and the Yamasee all employed variations of slaving strategies and coalescence to better position themselves in the Native slave trade. Slaving and coalescence were not just parallel strategies employed by Native groups to survive but intertwined processes of incorporation of outsiders through diplomacy and captivity. As competition over the spread of Native slaving increased, Native peoples adapted Native captivity practices to new realities and relied on older Native networks to create new connections and communities. These slaving and coalescence strategies were beneficial to some groups and proved disastrous to others in Carolina. In São Paulo, as increased numbers of enslaved Natives were introduced into Paulista society, the lines between dependent “free” peoples and enslaved servants among the Paulistas began to harden and Native peoples in São Paulo became increasingly categorized and treated as enslaved.
Part III: Coalescence and Consequences
Chapter 5: The Business of the Land: The Spread of Slaving into the Interior of Brazil

The Paulista Bandeiras of 1628–1632 destroyed the missions of Guairá, enslaving tens of thousands of Natives and driving thousands more south into the regions of Tape and Uruguay. The Paulista Bandeiras destroyed the missions of Guairá, enslaving tens of thousands of Natives and driving thousands more south into the regions of Tape and Uruguay. Guairá reductions that were not destroyed, like Acaray and Iguazu, were moved south out of Guairá due to the scarcity of food for the residents and refugees from other reductions and because of “the fear of the Portuguese.” The destruction of the Guairá reductions accelerated the process of ethnogenesis occurring on the Jesuit reductions as refugee peoples from numerous Native groups fled and sought shelter among coalescing Jesuit reductions in Tape, Uruguay, and Itatim. However, even as the surviving reductions relocated further south, the Paulistas did not spare these missions their attacks. On December 2, 1636, Antonio Raposo Tavares led a force from São Paulo of “140 Portuguese with 1500 Tupis” against the Jesuit reductions of Jesus Maria, San Cristobál, Santa Ana, and San Joachin in Tape. The Paulistas were able to destroy three of the four reductions but were driven out of the reduction of Jesus Maria by the Jesuits and 300 Natives. As the Native refugees from the reductions of San Cristobál, Santa Ana, and San Joachin marshalled forces around the reduction of Natividad to counterattack the Paulistas, the Paulistas were forced to withdraw from the region. However, in 1638 the Paulistas returned with expeditions led by Andres Fernandes, Francisco Paiva, Fulano Pedroso, Domingos Alvares,

574 “Mancilla e Masseta,” 336; Montoya, The Spiritual Conquest, 185.
The Guarani and Jesuits began to see firearms and fighting back as the only solution to the Paulista invasions.

The Guarani and other Natives of the reductions began to fight back alongside the Jesuits and the Jesuits began to appeal to Spanish colonial officials to arm and organize Natives in the reductions. In 1638 Guarani Natives repelled a Paulista invasion led by Pedro Leite Pais near the reduction of Caçapaguaçu, killing nine Paulistas and taking another seventeen prisoner. The Jesuits, used this success to argue forcefully for the Spanish crown to arm the Natives of the region with firearms, having “seen from experience that the said Portuguese are afraid of firearms alone.” The Jesuits suggested to the Cabildo of the Asunción to take eight thousand silver pesos “to buy firearms, especially arquebuses for this city against the said Portuguese, and against the Payaguas and Guaycurus.” The Jesuits saw the arming of the Natives of the reductions as the only solution against the Paulistas and other hostile Natives who raided the reductions of Guairá, Tape, Uruguay, and Itatim. In time, after the defeat of the Paulista bandeiras, the organization of the missions around military leaders and their descendants, “together with the political-administrative and the religious, constituted the foundations of the missionary regime” of the eighteenth-century Guarani missions.

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577 “Auto do Comissário do Santo Ofício Padre Diogo de Alfraro com uma informação de Duas Testemunhas sobre os Estragos Causados pela Bandeira de André Fernandes,” February 4–5, 1638, in Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Tape, 163–164.
579 “Carto do Cabido Eclesiástico de Assunção informando o Vice-Rei do Peru da Benevolência com que o Governador do Paraguai Trata os Bandeirantes ultimamente Aprisionados,” April 18, 1639 in Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Tape, 268–269.
580 “Carto do Cabido Eclesiástico de Assunção informando o Vice-Rei do Peru da Benevolência com que o Governador do Paraguai Trata os Bandeirantes ultimamente Aprisionados,” April 18, 1639 in Jesuítas e Bandeirantes no Tape, 268–269.
Native resistance came to a head with the defeat of the 1641 *bandeira* led by Jerônimo Pedroso de Moraes on the Mbororé River, a tributary of the Uruguay River. The Natives of the Acaragua mission and surrounding areas defeated the Portuguese and “tupis” on the banks of the Mbororé River forcing them to retreat. The retreating Paulistas died of hunger and disease causing the Jesuits to praise the victory “in which the flower of the *Sertãoistas* [sic] have been killed, wounded, and affronted.”\(^{582}\) Raposo Tavares’ retreat from Tape in 1636, followed by the defeats at Caçapagauça and Mbororé, signaled the end of the large scale Paulista *bandeiras* against the Native populations of Guairá, Tape, Uruguay, and Itatim. The distances crossed to get to the further southern regions and the costs of armed and organized Native groups willing to defend themselves was too much for the Paulistas. As John Manuel Monteiro argues, “the militarization of the Jesuit missions, more than any other factor, determined the end of large-scale raids on the Guarani.”\(^{583}\) There continued to be sporadic raids into the Guairá, Tape, Itatim, and Uruguay regions but the days of the large scale militarized *bandeiras* that destroyed the missions of Guairá were over. The *Paulistas* reverted to smaller scale raids into the interior west and north of São Paulo and the Native slave trade to provide enslaved Natives.

\(^{582}\) Claudio Ruyer “Relació de la Guerra y victoria alcanzada contra los Portugueses del Brasil año 1641 en 6 de Abril,” *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de São Paulo (RIHGSP)* 10 (1906): 529–553, especially 552. Italics added

\(^{583}\) Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 63. See also Metcalf, *Family and Frontier*, 47. A noticeable difference developed in Carolina and Brazil regarding the arming of Jesuit and Guarani missions. The Guarani repulsed Paulista *bandeiras* but never conducted counter raids into São Paulo. In the shatter zone in Southeastern North America, both the Spanish in Florida, their Native allies particularly the Apalachees, and even the Choctaw and other French allied Native nations conducted counter raids against Native slavers who supplied the English with Native captives. The presence of the Jesuits among the Guarani could have limited the impulse for revenge, but also further limited Guarani need for enslaved Natives and access to Spanish slavers. The removal of the Guarani missions into Uruguay and Tape, meant that the newer established Guarani missions were further from São Vicente and Portuguese settlements until the end of the seventeenth century.
The Paulistas responded to resistance in Guairá by reverting back to smaller expeditions based around familial investments and connections. The term *armações* (meaning “armatures” or “backers”) came to designate these smaller expeditions, which were supplied by an *armador* or outfitter who provided the supplies, arms, and enslaved Natives for the expedition in exchange for half the captives taken.\(^{584}\) The *armações* were family affairs, with fathers and fathers-in-law providing the capital, financial risk, and laborers, while younger sons, brothers, nephews, sons-in-law and cousins provided the labor and risked their lives in the *sertão*. While numerous scholars have insisted upon the importance of the elite family of the sugar planter in the development of colonial Brazil, Alida Metcalf and Muriel Nazzari argued that the development of the colonial family in São Paulo was distinct. In the absence of profitable cash crops to be sold in Atlantic markets, the enslavement of Natives provided the path to wealth for Paulistas. After the destruction of the Guairá missions, wealthy *bandeirantes* established themselves as planters on large tracts of land known as *fazendas*.\(^{585}\) Antonio Rapôso Tavares established his family’s *fazenda* on the Tietê river at Quitaúna, where in 1632 he claimed ownership over 117 enslaved Natives.\(^{586}\) Other *bandeirantes* families, like the Fernandes’, Barros’, Preto’s, Dias’, Paes’, Bicudo’s, and Bueno’s established themselves on fazendas on the Piratininga Plateau.\(^{587}\) But by the middle decades of the seventeenth-century, the pattern in São Paulo developed around *armação* expeditions funded by established Paulista families that sent younger family members

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into the *sertão* to make their wealth.\textsuperscript{588} Those men saw the *sertão* and the capture and enslavement of Natives as the path to continued wealth. Parents and in-laws provided the capital to younger sons and sons-in-law for expeditions into the *sertão* to capture Natives to labor on plots of land that younger family members hoped to establish themselves on. This pattern pushed younger sons further and further into the interior of the state of São Vicente and beyond into Minas Gerais, Goiás, Tocantins, Mato Grosso Do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul.

For instance, Luis Ortiz de Camargo, declared in his will, written in 1658, that he saw the *Sertão* as “the remedy for his impoverished state.” Camargo had presented himself to join an expedition into the *sertão* “which was the ordinary business of this land.”\textsuperscript{589} The business of São Paulo was slaving in the interior of Brazil. As I argue in this chapter, the culture that developed around this slaving society drove the expansion of colonists further and further into the interior. Meaning, that while São Paulo would transform over time into a town more dependent upon profiting from the products of enslaved people (i.e., a slave society) the slaving society that Paulistas developed in the seventeenth century spread beyond the town itself to dictate the future colonization of the interior of Brazil.\textsuperscript{590} In fact the business itself involved a significant investment of capital on the part of the *armadores* mostly in the form of guns, ammunition, and in chattel property via enslaved laborers. Guns and powder took on an increasingly important role in their costs and tactical importance for slavers over the seventeenth century.

\textsuperscript{588} Nazzari, “Transition Toward Slavery,” 139–141.
\textsuperscript{589} “Testamento de José Ortiz de Camargo,” 1658, AESP-NP, cx. 7
Armações: The Familial Business of Slaving

The culture of familial investment in slaving had two overarching effects on the development of São Paulo. First, slaving was seen as the path to wealth and the best opportunity to create wealth for younger sons. Parents, in-laws, and other family, often having made their own wealth from enslaving Natives, were invested financially and emotionally in the success of slaving expeditions. The futures of their sons and daughters depended upon slaving. Second, the dependence upon slaving was exacerbated by the Portuguese pattern of partible inheritance favoring all sons and daughters. Thus, parents in seventeenth-century Paulista society often saw it as advantageous to concentrate their wealth in the inheritances and dowry’s of daughters in order to attract more established marriage partners and to ensure the continuation of property. Sons, and especially younger sons, were expected to make their wealth in the sertão like their fathers and grandfathers.591 The continued movement of sons into the sertão and away from communities further led to the expansion of slaving and the colonial frontier. Third, the continued introduction of enslaved Natives from vastly different geographic regions, ethnicities, and cultures flattened out Native identity in São Paulo into a generic class of “Indians.” This class of enslaved and free Native dependents increasingly came to define the “peasant”—free poor—class in São Paulo.592 The development of the Paulista slaving society continued to drive

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592 Metcalf, Family and Frontier, 200–203.
the expansion of the Portuguese further into the interior of Brazil and the development and
ethnogenesis of a peasant class in São Paulo. Put simply, the continuance of slaving affected the
interior of Brazil, and the demographic and cultural development of São Paulo, even after the
Paulistas stopped large scale slave raids.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the business of slaving incorporated São Paulo
into commercial networks in Brazil that provided the Paulistas with credit and supplied guns and
ammunition for the slaving expeditions. Paulistas often had to turn to merchants in Rio de
Janeiro and elsewhere to supply the guns, ammunition, and powder for the armações. The
practice of armações became so commonplace that Paulistas factored them into the inventories
of the deceased, as Felipa Gaga, had recorded for her deceased husband Antonio Castanho da
Silva in 1647. Felipa testified that Antonio sent three men to the sertão “with blacks” (meaning
enslaved Natives) and wanted to ensure that those three men brought herself and her heirs the
part—in enslaved Natives—owed them as part of her husband’s estate. Sylva was prolific in
funding armações. He declared in his will that he funded three separate armações with “João
Danhaya,” Antonio Rodrigues, and Antoni Alves—“with the agreement that of the people that
are brought back” Sylva would be given half. Sylva was heavily invested in slaving by the end
of his life. He asked his wife to let his cousin Isabel de Proença live on some of his lands until
her sons returned from seeking their own fortunes in the sertão.

Familial arrangements for armações also show up in the wills and inventories of
Paulistas. In 1649, Francisco Borges declared in his will, that he had “outfitted” his “sons Gaspar

593 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 72.
Borges and Francisco Borges with all that is necessary to go to the *sertão*, so that of the people they bring back from the said *sertão* they will give me half and they will keep the other half” for themselves.\(^{597}\) Part of the goods necessary to go to the *sertão* included a “five and a half fathom chain” (approximately thirty three feet in length) equipped “with eighteen collars” that was evaluated at four thousand Reis.\(^{598}\) Borges removed this chain from his inventory to be given to his sons on their expedition. But Borges maintained another 4 separate chains with twelve collar shackles apiece, no doubt to control the over seventy-eight named enslaved Natives he claimed in his inventory.\(^{599}\) Slaving was a business and one that frequently was litigated after the death of a slaveowner.

Because slaving was the business of the *sertão* it also took on a speculative nature beyond the establishment of younger male family members, but still focused on the acquisition of enslaved Natives. In 1663, Francisco Cubas Preto declared in his will that he “made an agreement with an Indian of the Aldeia of Marueri [Barueri] by the name of Marcos to whom I gave all the trappings of the *armação*(dei *armação* todo *aviamento*) and two blacks of the gentiles of the land to bring me people that are acquired with this” in return for a shotgun.\(^{600}\) Preto made this arrangement with Marcos, while he had “two of my sons with their shotguns each” and another two sons “in possession” of 11 “of my blacks” who went to the “*sertão de Tobayaras*.\(^{601}\) It remains unclear if Marcos was meant to meet Preto’s sons in the *sertão* of *Tobayaras* or conduct his own *armação*, but it does convey the continued participation and

\(^{597}\) “*Inventario e Testamento de Francisco Borges,*,” 1649 *AESP IT* 39: 85–122, 89.\(^{598}\) “*Inventario e Testamento de Francisco Borges,*” 1649 *AESP IT* 39: 101.\(^{599}\) “*Inventario e Testamento de Francisco Borges,*” 1649 *AESP IT* 39: 93, 97–98.\(^{600}\) “*Inventario de Francisco Cubas Preto,*” 1673 *AESP IT* 18: 307–350, 314.\(^{601}\) “*Inventario de Francisco Cubas Preto,*” 1673 *AESP IT* 18: 314. Tobajaras probably indicates an expedition to the Paraíba River Valley, but this is unclear.
influence of Natives on the slaving expeditions. The enslaved Natives sent with Preto’s sons were supposed to return with newly captured Natives. Based on Marcos’ residence in an aldeia and not on Preto’s fazenda, as well as the agreement made between Preto and Marcos, Marcos can be presumed to have been free. Yet, Preto entrusted two enslaved Natives with Marcos and instructed them to acquire more in the sertão. This example highlights the numbers and influence of enslaved and free Natives, mostly men, on the slaving expeditions.

Whether enslaved or free, Native men made up most of the combatants or laborers on the armações. Native knowledge of the interior became particularly valuable as Paulistas began to explore the largely unknown sertões of what would become Minas Gerais, Goiás, and Mato Grosso, and Mato Grosso do Sul in the second half of the seventeenth century. Native men and women provided the subsistence for those expeditions: by hunting game and foraging on shorter expeditions and by laboring on subsistence plots strategically located on routes for longer expeditions. Natives would be sent ahead to plant crops on the paths of expeditions to feed the slavers and their captives on the return journey. Places like Plantas do Urucujá on the trail to Minas Gerais and Batatais on the trail to São Paulo started as small plots on well-worn routes into the sertão and developed into large encampments. In the Paraíba Valley, towns like Taubaté (1643), Guaratinguetá (1651), and Jacareí (1653), and to the west of São Paulo, Jundiaí (1655), Itú (1656–1658), and Sorocaba were established along routes to the sertão as base camps for slaving expeditions that developed into towns overtime.

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602 As Monteiro highlights Batatais translates to “potato fields.” Plantas do Urucujá was said to be maintained by a woman named Ana Tobajara, Tobajara being a Tupi speaking Native group suggesting she had at least partial Native ancestry. Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 75. Sergio Buarque de Holanda, Caminhos e Fronteiras.

603 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 100.
The prevalence of enslaved Natives on these expeditions can be seen in the inventories of the Paulistas. In the 1648 inventory of the frequent-funder of armações, Antonio Castanho da Sylva, the first enslaved Natives listed to be given to his wife were “Sabina and her husband Domingos who is in the sertão.” In the same list of thirty-seven enslaved Natives willed to his widow and daughter, Natives named Francisco, Inasio, Bernardo, Gregorio, and Lianor were also listed as “in the sertão.” These enslaved Natives were not self-liberated or absent in the sertão—they were there at the instruction of Sylva. A separate list in the inventory of Natives listed as “absent and runaways” included Bastião, Francisco, Marina, Bento, Pedro, and Thomé. Instead of working as warriors in bands on the largescale bandeiras of the 1630s and 1640s, numerous enslaved Native men worked as slavers alongside or at the behest of the Paulistas who claimed ownership over them. Native men were still working in the sertão to capture other Natives, but the distinction of scale and process may be an important one. Instead of fighting as organized bands with designated Native leaders, enslaved Native men were now working alongside other enslaved Native men of various ethnic and geographic origins, at the behest of their masters, with Paulistas on smaller scales. Violence remained a critical component to the enslavement of Natives. But for Natives participating in the slave trade, the prowess of providing captives to family members and dependents was replaced by the commodification of people for goods. As Camila Loureiro Dias argues in the case of the Amazon, payment and other incentives played a role in the motivation of many of those men. Marginal actors—be they free Native men living in aldeas, or landless and poor Paulistas—turned to slaving to enrich themselves.

604 “Inventario de Antonio Castanho da Sylva,” 1648, AESP IT 36: 133.
Granary of Brazil?

But enslaved Natives only returned a profit when sold or through the sale of the products of their labor. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the vast number of enslaved Natives brought into São Paulo were not sold outside of the captaincy but maintained as laborers and dependents within it.\textsuperscript{606} Between 1630–1680, those enslaved Natives were employed to create what Monteiro called the “golden age of wheat production in São Paulo.”\textsuperscript{607} Monteiro argues that wheat became the predominant agricultural export for the Paulistas during the period and was produced almost exclusively for sale outside of the colony.\textsuperscript{608} While wheat became the major grain exported by the colonists, the economic importance of wheat to the Paulistas is sometimes overstated in Monteiro’s arguments. In the inventories and wills of the Paulistas, cattle, livestock, and enslaved Natives appear more consistently than the presence of wheat, whereas wheat appears alongside other staples such as manioc, corn, beans, and crops such as cotton, and sugarcane. Muriel Nazzari calculated that in a sample of 48 Paulista estates analyzed between 1640 and 1651, “55 percent cultivated cotton and produced cotton cloth, 65 percent raised pigs and sold pork, 38 percent raised cattle, 35 percent cultivated wheat.”\textsuperscript{609} But the records of the Paulista council show that disputes between São Paulo and Santos over the cost of wheat in Santos and the licensing of wheat traders was common.\textsuperscript{610} For example, in the 1660 inventory of Maria

\textsuperscript{606} One priest estimated that the number of enslaved Natives sold at auction in São Paulo in a four-year period was between 11,000 and 13,000 people. Monteiro demonstrates that while a considerable amount of people, it was only a small portion of the number of enslaved Natives within the captaincy. Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 64. For this anecdote, Monteiro consulted, Francisco Ferreira, “La Causa del Brasil estar en el triste estado en que está son las injusticias notables que en el se hacen contra los indios,” Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Fondo Gesútico, Rome, 721/I.

\textsuperscript{607} Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 104.

\textsuperscript{608} Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 104–108.

\textsuperscript{609} Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 136.

\textsuperscript{610} For example, see February 22, 1637, \textit{Atas-CMSP}, Volume 4 (1629–1639), 336–337.
Bicudo, she declared that she gave Salvador Bicudo de Mendonça “a load of flour and a few meats” to take to Bahia, presumably for sale. In the same inventory, Maria Bicudo’s estate evaluated 50 alqueires of wheat flour at 8,000 reis and another 50 alqueires of wheat in grain at 4,000 reis. These means that Maria Bicudo’s estate was producing considerable amounts of wheat at the time. But also on the same estate close to one hundred enslaved Natives and Africans were employed in raising cattle, brewing aguardiente, growing cotton, sugar cane, corn, and beans. Wheat may have been a crop grown for export by the Paulistas but it was only one of numerous agricultural endeavors undertaken by the Paulistas.

Monteiro’s argument for the importance of wheat is stronger when considering the gendered division of labor in Native societies and their influence on Paulista agricultural practices. Following Native social organization and gendered hierarchies, women labored in the fields and men fished, hunted, warred, slaved, and traded. As seen in previous chapters with the case of slaving, indigenous influences on Paulista society permeated most aspects of life on the Piratininga plateau. This means that enslaved women and children remained the producers of agricultural products on roças for provisioning or on fazendas for sale or export. Wheat, like sugar cane, was an agricultural import to the Americas, but unlike sugarcane required far less

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611 “Inventory of Maria Bicudo,” 1660, AESP IT 16: 61–156, 81.
612 “Inventory of Maria Bicudo, 1660,” AESP IT 16, 97. An alqueire was a “unit of dry measurement equivalent to approximately 13.8 liters.” Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, xxix. These rates would place the price of an alqueire of wheat flour at 160 reis and an alqueire of wheat grain at 80 reis.
613 “Inventory of Maria Bicudo,” 1660, AESP IT 16, 80–81.
614 “Inventory of Maria Bicudo,” 1660, AESP IT 16, 80–84.
616 See Holanda, Caminhos e Fronteiras; Metcalf, Family and Frontier; and Gustavo Velloso, Ociosos e Sedicionários, 2016.
intensive labor for production.\textsuperscript{617} Monteiro argues that despite the difference in labor demands, when considering the harvest and clearing of areas for planting, “the scale of production could be increased in proportion to the expansion of the work force.”\textsuperscript{618} While to a certain extent this is true, especially access to cleared land and available seed, but wheat still allows for months of relative inactivity compared to more labor intensive crops. With all the available evidence and diversification on Paulista fazendas it appears that wheat was incorporated into Paulistas society not only because it was preferred by Europeans on the coasts, but also because it fit into a labor regime that allowed for women to work the fields and men to attend to the business of cattle ranching and slaving. Men were needed for clearing land in the spring, planting in the early summer, and harvesting in March.\textsuperscript{619} At other points men were employed in other duties, whereas women would tend the wheat fields as well as some livestock, the estate, and the roças for provisioning. Like Carolina, and much of colonial America, colonial agricultural endeavors


\textsuperscript{618} Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 107.

\textsuperscript{619} This assumes that Paulistas grew wheat on a single year cycle, planting seeds in early summer and harvesting in mid spring as was the case in Lima, Peru. Martha G. Bell, “‘Wheat is the nerve of the whole republic’: spatial histories of a European crop in colonial Lima Peru, 1535–1705”, \textit{Journal of Historical Geography} 59 (2018) 43. See also, Martha G. Bell, “The Governance of Food Technology and Environmental Resource Flows: Connecting Mills, Water, Wheat, and People in Colonial Lima, Peru (1535–1700),” (Ph.D. Dissertation: Pennsylvania State University, 2013) and T. Vergara Ormeño, \textit{Hombres, Tierras y Produtos. Los Valles Comarcanos de Lima} (1532–1650) (Lima, 1995). However, in parts of Mexico and elsewhere, two or three harvests per year were possible, see J.C. Super, \textit{Food, Conquest, and Colonization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America} (Albuquerque, 1988) 34 and R.L. Lee, “Grain Legislation in Colonial Mexico, 1575–1585, The Hispanic American Historical Review 27 (1947) 650–651.
often consisted of long periods of experimentation with both new and old world produce and
techniques. Wheat may be the grain of choice for the Paulistas because it was desired for bread
by European settlers and because it could be tended by enslaved Native women without
disrupting the slaving, trading, and cattle ranching activities of enslaved Native men. As Gustavo
Velloso argues, as Paulistas began to disrupt Native life and patterns of production, violence,
flight, theft, murder, destruction of property, and rebellion followed as occurred on the estate of
Pedroso de Barros in 1652.\textsuperscript{620} As Paulistas increasingly categorized and codified enslaved status,
enslaved Native men and women responded to enslavement by challenging their masters and the
colonial regime.

**Changes in the Enslaved Native population and Enslaved Status of São Paulo**

Some of the increased violence and resistance by Natives in São Paulo in the 1650s and
1660s can be attributed to the increased number of Guaianá and Guarulhos male captives brought
into captivity from slave raids to the north and west.\textsuperscript{621} Those captives were often men
introduced in smaller numbers and were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically distinct from the
majority *Carijó* Guarani enslaved population.\textsuperscript{622} In the 1649 inventory of Francisco Borges, the
enslaved Natives were separated between those labeled as Carijós, those “new goanazes”
(Guaianás) recently brought from the sertão, and those ‘goanazes’ who had not yet been brought
back from the sertão by Borges’ sons Francisco and Gaspar.\textsuperscript{623} As early as 1658, the diversity of

\textsuperscript{621} Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 166–168.
\textsuperscript{622} Monteiro, *Blacks of the Land*, 68–69.
\textsuperscript{623} “Inventario e Testamento de Francisco Borges,” 1649 *AESP IT* 39: 93,
the enslaved Native population can be seen in the will of José Ortiz de Camargo, who boasted that he had in his service “heathens of all nations.”

Despite the increased diversity of the enslaved Native population, if we look more closely at the use of the terms for enslaved Native captives in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, a racialized pattern emerges. Although the enslaved Natives on Francisco Borges’ estate were divided into Carijós and Guaianás, the ethnic terms clearly referenced more than ethnic and cultural background of the enslaved. Carijó signified a flattened-out Guaraní identity, which came to encompass all those enslaved Natives who were administered or claimed by private owners. As Monteiro argued “carijó came to acquire a generic meaning associated directly with Indian slavery.” Carijó like the term ladino or crioulo in other colonial contexts came to signify an enslaved person who was acculturated into colonial society, as opposed to newly arrived enslaved Natives. The flattening out of the Native population served to create an enslaved class and tie slavery to indigeneity.

This can be seen in the changes over the seventeenth century in how Paulistas classified and treated children of mixed European and Native descent. In the beginning of the century, as in the sixteenth century, the term Mameluco was used to designate the children of Europeans and Natives, typically European men and Native women. Over the course of the seventeenth century, Mameluco came to signify those children of European men and Native women who were recognized by their fathers, not necessarily as legitimate heirs, but as offspring. For example, in the 1647 will and inventory of Mécia Nunes, she declared that an enslaved Native woman

624 “Testamento de José Ortiz de Camargo” 1658, AESP-NP, Box 7.
626 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 158.
627 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 158; Nazzari, “Vanishing Indians,” 505.
named Inês’ children, Alberto, Maria, and Aña “are all said to be the children of Manoel Rodrigues and because he was present, he was declared to be the father of the said _mameluquos_.” Manoel Rodrigues was declared responsible for the three children who were to be declared free. This distinction of freedom, in this instance appears to not be a rhetorical trick to mask their enslavement, as noted by a judge’s enforcement of the decree. 628 The declared liberty of the Euro/Native children of Inês, can be contrasted with the treatment of the illegitimate children of Francisco Cubas Preto in 1672. Preto declared in his will that “I have three sons, bastards (_bastardos_), that say they are mine, namely Innocencio, Paulo, and Paschoal . . . the bastard children are not my heirs.” 629 The term _bastardo_ came to signify those children of mixed Native European ancestry who were not recognized as legitimate heirs. This effectively bound those children to the status of their mothers, as slaves, to be inherited and sold. Large segments of the “Portuguese” Paulista society were themselves of mixed Native ancestry. But by recognizing certain children with Native women as _mameluco_ heirs, those of Euro/Native ancestry accepted into Paulista society essentially became Portuguese. Subsequently, by the eighteenth century, the term _mameluco_ fell into disuse, and the term _bastardo_ came to signify anyone of Native/European descent who was not recognized by their fathers and many Native people living outside of _aldeias_. 630

The changes in the racial and social categorizations of enslaved and free Natives can be seen as markers of the racialization of slavery in São Paulo. Muriel Nazzari argues that this racialization occurred in the nineteenth century, with Native people outside of the _aldeias_.

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becoming increasingly categorized as *pardo* or of mixed African descent.\(^\text{631}\) However, with the racialization of the terms *mameluco* and *bastardo* we can see that the connection of slavery or the obligation of service to one of these categories and not to the other, meant that legal status was being mapped onto racial categorizations. The introduction of large numbers of enslaved Africans alongside the eighteenth-century mining boom in what would become Minas Gerais, no doubt affected the racialization of slavery in São Paulo—tying blackness to enslavement as it did in most other places of the colonial world. However, that enslavement (even if illegal enslavement) was first tied to distinctive racial categories of *carijós* and *bastardos* shows that this process was bidirectional. The proximity to bondage could also be seen as the distance from whiteness, the distance from recognized kinship with whites.

The flattening out of Native identities and the creation of generic terms for Natives paralleled the process of clarifying their enslaved statuses. Since the 1609 and 1611 laws that prohibited the enslavement of Natives except in the case of just wars, Paulistas subverted and actively flaunted those laws by enslaving Natives. As seen in Chapter 1, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the Paulistas dealt with the royal prohibitions against the enslavement of Natives by asserting the freedom of enslaved Natives in their wills and inventories. This can be seen in the 1616 will and inventory of Antonio Rodrigues who declared “I have in my house people of my service,” that he left to his “wife and sons and daughters,” who were “free with the condition that they are treated well, as free.” From reading this section of the will, it appears those Natives were free. But in case there was any confusion in the status of those servants, Rodrigues clarified that “the services” owed his family by those servants were “obligatory.”\(^\text{632}\) In

\(^{631}\) Nazzari, “Vanishing Indians,” 509.

the same will, Rodrigues declared he bought “a bastard son” of Belchior da Costa, “by the name of Garcia Rodrigues,” and that child was to be free “without obligation to anyone.” Rodrigues understood how to declare a child free—without service obligations—when he chose to do so. Furthermore, in the same inventory Rodrigues declared that he was owed “twelve pieces *(peças)*” from his brother-in-law, Sebastião Preto, in recompense for 20 that he had given him in the *sertão* and these twelve should be given to me with their families.” Rodrigues was demanding enslaved Natives owed to his estate by his brother-in-law, in exchange for giving him others enslaved Natives in the past. Rodrigues’ will demonstrates the euphemisms and language that Paulistas employed to both hide the fact that the Natives they claimed were enslaved and to ensure that those enslaved Natives were treated as commodified parts of their estates to be exchanged as credit, debts, and passed on to heirs.

However, by the second half of the seventeenth century, the Paulistas did only the bare minimum required by law to hide that the Natives they claimed to possess were enslaved. For example, in the 1675 will and inventory of Aleixo Leme de Alvarenga, no effort was made to declare the freedom of the Native servants of the estate as was required by the crown. Alvarenga declared, “that I possess the pieces *(peças)* that they find with me.” Alvarenga was also paid 22,000 reis by the monastery of São Bento of Santana de Parnaíba, for an enslaved Native man named Jeronymo he sold to Friar Mathias of São Bento. Alvarenga declared that he should be paid in dollar or with “a black” of equal value. This episode not only shows that the sale and purchase of enslaved Natives was occurring, let alone between private estates and local friars,

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635 The original phrase in Portuguese is “Declaro que possuo as peças que se me acharem.”
but that Alvarenga placed a specific evaluation on Jeronymo. Alvarenga made it explicit that Jeronymo was an enslaved commodity that had a corresponding value in specie.

Alvarenga’s will and inventory reveal more sales and evaluation of enslaved Natives in the payment of debts. The judge, Balthazar Carrasco dos Reis, ruled that three enslaved Natives in Alvarenga’s estate, named Domingos, Ventura, and Catharina, should be sold for $75,000 Reis, and another enslaved man named Bento should be sold for $42,000 Reis.\(^{637}\) These enslaved people were to be sold to create cash to settle the debts of the estate. The judge, Carrasco do Reis, also evaluated and “auctioned off” seven other enslaved Natives to pay debts owed to Matheus Corrêa Leme: Alberto, Mauricia, and Silvana at $50,000 Reis; Anselmo at $25,000 Reis; Gaspar and Francisca at $36,000 Reis, Baptista at $16,000 reis, for a total of $127,000 reis.\(^{638}\) Muriel Nazzari argues that it is noteworthy that the evaluation and sale of enslaved Natives occurred to cover the debts of estates. Nazzari maintains that this change reflected a “transition toward slavery” as judges began to value the rights of creditors over those of debtors, forcing the sale of peças to cover debts.\(^{639}\) However, in the inventory of Alvarenga above, we can see that evaluation, sale, and purchase of enslaved Natives was commonplace and occurred outside of the need to liquidate assets to pay debts. In the case of Jeronymo, Alvarenga was owed a debt from a previously negotiated sale. The reason the transaction appears at all in the inventory is because Alvarenga had not yet received compensation.\(^{640}\)

This fact reveals the nature of the documents in question. The wills and inventories only accounted for active debts and credits owed by and to the estate of the deceased. More details


\(^{639}\) Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 145.

about the nature of those debts and credits typically arose only when inheritances were disputed. These are not bills of lading, account books, or deeds of sale. Only unsettled transactions and debts were recorded in the inventories. Therefore, the assumption that sales and evaluations of enslaved Natives only occurred when states were bankrupt belies the innumerable number of transactions that occurred outside of wills and inventories.\textsuperscript{641} For example, in the vast array of Paulista inventories analyzed we do not know how most estates came to possess their livestock, just as we are not given the source of enslaved Natives. We have already seen Paulista attempts to hide the true nature of the enslaved statuses of the Natives possessed on Paulista estates. Due to the laws of the time, and the illegality of Native slavery, Paulista testators were inclined to claim enslaved Natives in their inventories as free servants. If enslaved Natives were listed as enslaved—as enslaved Africans were—they could be seized by creditors. Furthermore, slaveowners would be required to pay taxes on those slaves. The regime of personal service justified via just wars and resgate allowed Paulistas to claim Native servants as part of their estates. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Paulista judges were respecting the rights of debtors by allowing them to inherit enslaved people and then pay off their debts, instead of

\textsuperscript{641} Nazzari argues that by looking at Paulista wills and inventories, a change occurred in the statuses given to enslaved Natives over the seventeenth century. Nazzari argues that Paulista judges did not allow the evaluation of enslaved Natives in the first half of the century so that Natives could be retained by heirs to labor to pay off the estate’s debts of the estate. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Paulista judges began to allow for the evaluation of the services of enslaved Natives to be sold to pay off debts. While Nazzari clearly demonstrates this trend and how it reveals the further commodification of enslaved Natives in São Paulo over the seventeenth-century, it relies on an investigation of wills and inventories and focuses on those forced to settle debts via bankruptcies. My suggestion is that countless sales and exchanges of Natives occurred outside of bankruptcy settlements, and despite the lack of evidence for those sales, need to be considered when discussing the commodification of Natives. Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” especially 145-150.
forcing their sale to appease creditors as Paulistas began to do in the second half of the century.\footnote{Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 145.}

While the use of enslaved Natives to settle debts shows the further commodification and hardening around the enslaved statuses of Natives, the question of why judges began to evaluate enslaved Natives and auction them off to settle debts needs to be revisited. While judges may have seen the need to protect the interests of creditors over debtors, this was further exacerbated by the inequality created by massive, landed estates by the Paulista elite who were often the judges who made these decisions or related to those judges.\footnote{Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 183.} The Paulista elite ensured that the laws worked in their favor. In a society where land had little value, labor became the most important asset to control.\footnote{Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery,” 142–143, 147.} In the words of the scholar José de Alcântara Machado, enslaved \textit{peças} were “the most valuable property in this land.”\footnote{José de Alcântara Machado, \textit{Vida e Morte do Bandeirante} (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1929, 1979) 171.} Furthermore, the continual decline in the number of newly arriving Native captives from the \textit{sertão}, meant that access to enslaved Natives was being curtailed. It is probably no coincidence that the first evaluations of enslaved Natives in inventories occurs with the increase in the value of enslaved Natives and the decline in their supply.\footnote{Monteiro, \textit{Blacks of the Land}, 151.}

\textbf{Paulista Slaving Unabated}

Most importantly, by the second half of the seventeenth century, almost all colonial opposition to the enslavement of Natives in São Paulo had been removed. The Jesuit response to
the *bandeiras* of the 1630s were vocal protestations sent to the Governor of Brazil, Dom Luis Diogo de Oliveira, the Unified Iberian Crown, and to the Vatican. The Vatican responded by publishing the Papal Brief of December 3, 1639, that reasserted the Bull of 1537 that declared the freedom of the Natives of the Americas. In June of 1640, the Paulistas responded by expelling the Jesuits from São Paulo, seizing all their property, and asserting local control over the mission villages of São Paulo. The Jesuits were only allowed to return to São Vicente in 1653 after having agreed to not attempt to implement the Papal Brief of 1639. The Jesuits were effectively removed as protectors of Natives in Brazil. The Paulistas had eliminated their main opposition to the enslavement of Natives in São Paulo. In fact, Paulistas effectively were allowed to enslave Natives at will between 1640 and 1691. In 1691, the Portuguese crown reasserted the liberty of Natives in Brazil, however due to Paulista complaints, by 1696 the Portuguese crown compromised and allowed for Natives to be administered as personal servants.


648 Pedro de Moraes Madureira, “Expulsão dos jesuítas e causas que tiveram para ella os paulistas desde o anno de 1611 até o de 1640, em que os lançaram fora de toda a capitania de São Paulo e S. Vicente,” *RIHGSP* 3 (1898): 57–123.

by the Paulistas. The Paulistas won the debate over control of Native labor, by 1696, enslaved Natives may not have been called slaves, but they remained so in all but name.

The 1640 Jesuit expulsion from São Paulo coincided with the dissolution of the unified Iberian monarchy and the declaration of Portuguese independence. While the Spanish were preoccupied with the Dutch, the Duke of Braganza, Dom João IV, declared himself King of Portugal in 1640. This conflict would continue until the Spanish recognized Portuguese independence in 1668. The Portuguese war with the Dutch in Pernambuco continued until the Dutch were forced out of the colony by the Portuguese in 1654. The Dutch invasion of Brazil and colonial wars became the sole focus of the unified Iberian monarchy and the Brazilian colonial officials in Salvador remained focused on ousting the Dutch, not on events on the colonial periphery such as in São Paulo.

The Dutch War and the 1640 expulsion of the Jesuits provided significant distractions and context for the grand Paulista bandeiras of the 1640s in which the Paulistas tried to recreate the success of the grand bandeiras of the 1630s. The sons of Pedro Vaz de Barros sent expeditions to the Tocantins and the mouth of the Amazon. Antonio Raposo Tavares conducted another bandeira in 1648 against the Jesuit missions in Itatim in the Paraguay River Valley. Tavares’ expedition was repulsed by the mission Natives and he and many of his followers were forced to retreat North via the Madeira River to the mouth of the Amazon. While some of the members of these expeditions returned to São Paulo with retinues of captured

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651 For a complete history of the wars of the restoration of the Portuguese Monarchy see Luís de Meneses, *História de Portugal Restaurado*, 4 volumes (Galrao, 1679). For details of the restoration see volume 1: livro segundo, 57–111.
Natives, compared to the Guairá *bandeiras* these grand raids over vast distances of Brazil were failures. The failure of those large expeditions encouraged the smaller expeditions of the 1650s and 1660s, that came to categorize the slaving strategies of that period.

The colonial government even began to turn to the Paulistas for help during the Dutch invasion. In 1647, Antonio Pereira de Azevedo organized a company intended to be sent to Bahia to assist the Portuguese in the reconquest of Pernambuco. However, Azevedo instead followed Raposo Tavares to Itatim to attack the Itatim missions in 1648.\(^{655}\) Despite this insubordination, the colonial Governor-General, Francisco Barreto, turned to the Paulistas in 1657 to request their aid “to punish the insolence with which the *Barbaros* (Natives) usually descend on the Reconcavo,” of Bahia. Barreto told the Governor of São Vicente, Manuel de Souza de Silva, that he understood “that only the experience of the *sertanistas* (backwoodsmen) of that captaincy will be able to overcome the difficulties that this one finds in totally destroying those *Aldeias* (Native villages).” Barreto requested at least twenty Paulistas “with up to 200 *Indios* good soldiers in that kind of war.” Barreto promised the Paulistas that “all those who are imprisoned in this conquest” will be taken “as your captives to that captaincy” and the “resolution that this government made with the Bishop, Theologians, and Ministers who formed a council in which the war was declared to be just, supposing the deaths robberies, fires, and more hostilities that came to us, and slaves who are imprisoned during it, his Majesty confirmed them slaves.” Barreto was expressly telling the Paulistas that the conflict had been declared a Just War and they had the permission to enslave the Natives of the Bahian *sertão*, and those

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captives “can serve them as slaves without the slightest scruple on their consciences.” The colonial government was now encouraging the spread of slavery beyond the sertão of São Paulo into the interior of the rest of Brazil. As shown in Figure 7, São Paulo served as an entry way into the interior of Brazil and the future colonization and the slaving that accompanied it.

Figure 7: Fragment of a Map of South America showing limited Brazilian expansion into the Sertão by 1722. As noted the location of the interior mines "les Mines" would become Minas Gerais and slaving into the interior of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco would shape the future colonization of Brazil. From L’Isle, Guillaume de. Carta d’Amerique. 1722. David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.

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Barreto encouraged the Paulistas to bring Natives who were experienced in that kind of war meaning the destruction of Native villages and capture of Natives in the sertão. Colonial and Native Paulista slaving strategies were now desired to help the colonial government. The wars against the Dutch and their Native allies, like the Janduí, continued in Northeastern Brazil after the ouster of the Dutch in 1654. As Brazilian colonists tried to reassert control over the interior of the Northeastern captaincies of Bahia and Pernambuco, conflicts erupted with local Native populations who opposed the spread of the sugar industry and cattle ranching. Over the course of the last decades of the seventeenth century, the conflict would spread into the sertões of Rio Grande and Maranhão and become known as the Guerra dos Bárbaros. Paulistas were enticed with promises of land, titles, and Native captives to come help the colonists of Northeastern Brazil pacify the Native populations of the interior of those captaincies. In so doing, Paulista slaving strategies further spread across the interior of Brazil.

Over the course of the seventeenth century, slaving strategies that developed in the sertões of São Vicente were exported across the interior of Brazil. The colonization of Paraná, Minas Gerais, Goiás, Tocantins, and the interior of the Northeast were influenced by Paulista slave raids into those regions and the enslavement of captives from those regions. As slaving spread and began to be encouraged by the colonial government, the pattern of slave raids into the interior developed. Some of the Paulistas and those who imitated their strategies would occupy

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new lands in the interior, employing cattle ranching and slaving, while searching for alternative forms of wealth be they in minerals as in Minas Gerais or Drogas do Sertão as in Maranhão and the Amazonas. As a result of the discovery of mineral wealth in Minas Gerais and the conflict over control of those mines in the War of the Emboabas (newcomers) in the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were competing interests to those of the Paulistas and their concerns often remained peripheral to those of the larger Brazilian colonial interests. However, the business of the sertão, the business of the enslavement and exploitation of Native peoples in the interior continued.

With the discovery of the mines in the 1690s, and previous Paulista expansions into the interior, Paulistas—especially the poor and those without large landholdings—increasingly departed for what became Minas Gerais or other opportunities in the interior. The attractions of the mines and the limited access to new captive Natives meant the numbers of enslaved Africans imported into the region expanded. With this influx, came changes in the racial classifications of people of Native descent as pardos meaning of ‘brown’ skin. This process of racialization of Natives as pardos over the course of the eighteenth century, was a similar process to what occurred in the seventeenth century among the Native populations designated as carijós or bastardos. Muriel Nazzari calls this process “the disappearance of the Indians,”

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663 Metcalf, *Family and Frontier*, 83.
meaning that a further flattening-out of racialization occurred that designated people of Native
descent and people of African descent as *pardo*. The move toward the term *pardo* may reflect
an emphasis on the part of colonial authorities on the slave or free status of those who could be
enslaved over their racial classifications. The racialization of slavery and connections between
blackness and slavery would only intensify over the nineteenth century in São Paulo.

But while São Paulo transformed from a slaving society to a slave society by the end of
the seventeenth century, the influences of slaving strategies developed through the capture and
enslavement of Natives spread into the interior and continued with the further colonization of
Brazil. The development of a rural peasantry and a landed elite, and the inequality between them,
first began with those Paulistas who were able to acquire and maintain the most enslaved
Natives. Many of those who could took their enslaved Natives to the mines to improve their
fortunes and those who did not moved further into the interior in search of new opportunities.
The landed elites who remained in São Paulo focused their energies on profiting from providing
for the needs of the mining zones. By the middle of the eighteenth century the stratification of
São Paulo society was hardening between the elite planters, peasants, and the enslaved. This
stratification and family strategies meant to maintain wealth in few hands resulted in further
migration of those without opportunities into the interior. The lure of free land, Native laborers
to exploit—as slaves or *administrados* (administered)—and mineral wealth drew Brazilian
colonists further into the interior in a process that shaped the colonization of Brazil. While São

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666 Metcalf, *Family and Frontier*, 86.
Paulo may have changed over time, the patterns and strategies developed by the slavers of the seventeenth century would be taken further into the interior and continue the process of dispossession, enslavement, and exploitation of Natives in Brazil.  

\[^{668}\text{Metcalf, } Family and Frontier, 205.\]
Chapter 6: “All the Damages and atrocities of which they are capable of”: The Rise of Coweta and Cusseta and the Destruction of the Florida Mission System

Around the time that the English monarch, James II, was deposed for his Catholic sympathies in 1688, the Lords Proprietors and Carolina colonists had reasons to fear continued conflict with the Spanish. Despite their relative lack of knowledge of the area, the Spanish were suspicious of rivals to their claims to the Gulf of Mexico after Frenchman Monsieur La Salle’s 1682 expedition down the Mississippi and his 1685 mission that mistakenly landed in Texas. Beginning in 1685, the Spanish began to receive word of Woodward and other Englishmen’s activities among the Cusseta and the Coweta in the Apalachicola province. Spanish Franciscans had unsuccessfully attempted to make inroads among the Apalachicola previously in 1633 and 1679 but were driven out by resistant Natives. By 1681 the Spanish had constructed a mission at Santa Cruz de Sabacola below the confluences of the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers. From Santa Cruz de Sabacola and San Luís de Apalachee the Spanish began to make inroads among the Southern Apalachicola towns, of Apalachicola, Sabacola, and

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670 For rumors and news of the French expeditions arriving in St. Augustin see: Testimonios of Francisco Romero and Carlos Peréz, May 12, 1687; Testimonio of Sebastian Sanpayo, May 20, 1687; Martín de Rivas and Pedro de Iriarte to Governore Aranda y Villaneda, May 27, 1687, in Autos of Inquiry made Concerning the Impossibility That exists for Achieving the Exploration of the Coast of the Said Bay of the Conception, Which They Call Of the Holy Spirit, Which is Planned to be Made from Apalachee,” 1687, in John H. Hann Collection at the University of Florida, 2009.


Tallapoosa. However, the northern Apalachicola communities of Coweta and Cusseta, had begun to align themselves with English traders in Port Royal and Charles Town. The northern Apalachicola towns of Coweta and Cusseta had little reason to ally themselves with the Spanish and Spanish friars. In 1679, having grown weary of Franciscan friars making inroads among the Southern Apalachicola, the Coweta “threatened the religious [Franciscans] with the Chuchumecos,” if the Spanish did not remove their friars from Apalachicola, which obliged the Franciscans “to depart from their lands and they returned to the said province of Apalache.” The Spanish reported that those who opposed the friars, “appear to have communications with the Chuchumeca nation with great friendship because of the fact that those of Apalacheocola have communications with the English of the settlement of St. George [Charles Town].” The Spanish friars left because “they did not wish to admit them because of the cacique of Cabeta’s [Coweta] having voiced his opposition.” As Dubcovsky argues, the Coweta’s ability to threaten the Franciscans with slave raids by the Westo, shows the extent to which Coweta’s power had grown in the region by the end of the 1670s. By 1682, the Spanish recognized the growing power of Coweta in the region, calling the headman of Coweta “the most feared cacique” in all the regions that “border with the Chuchumecos.” For the Spanish, the Coweta were the power in the region.

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677 Dubcovsky, *Informed Power*, 135, 254, n.30. The Westo were still seen as a viable fighting force in the 1680s according to the Spanish records. This may be due to uncertainty as to the fate of the Westo after their Westo war or their coalescence with the Coweta.
But Coweta’s ability to use the Westo as a legitimate threat to cause the Spanish Franciscan friars to leave Apalachicola not only implies the growing power of Coweta in 1682, but it suggests that Coweta had created an alliance with the Westo by 1680 and that the Westo were still in the South after the Carolina-Westo War of 1680. A Westo-Coweta alliance changes the way scholars understand the intertwined nature of slaving and coalescence in the Southeast at the time. As seen in Chapter 4, the Westo were not entirely displaced from the Southeast after the Westo War of 1680. Remnant bands of the Westo remained in the Southeast and incorporated into the Proto-Creek towns of Apalachicola. By looking at the Apalachicola towns of Coweta and Cusseta, this chapter argues that coalescence among the Coweta and Cusseta was directly tied to the incorporation of refugee Native slavers like the Westo. In the fluid and dynamic process of coalescence in the late seventeenth-century Southeast, Native peoples were incorporated as individuals through marriage, adoption, or kept as captives. Marriage, adoption, and captivity could lead to the introduction of individuals, families, or even small bands. These people were brought in as captives, as refugees fleeing captivity and enslavement, or themselves as slavers. In the case of the Westo incorporation among the Coweta, they were incorporated as refugees and slavers.

Following Henry Woodard’s 1674 account among the Westo, the traditional telling of Coweta/Cusseta/Apalachicola relations with the Westo suggests continued animosity between the groups after the Savanna Shawnee warned the Westo in 1674 that “Cussetaws [Cussetas], Checsaws [Chickasaws] & Chiokees [Cherokees] were intended to come downe and fight ye Westoes.” Woodward reported further that the Westo were “at continual warrs” with “ye

679 Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, Carolina, in “The Shaftesbury Papers,” Volume 5 in Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society (Richmond: William Ellis
Cowatoe [Coweta] and Choraka [Cherokee] Indians.”\textsuperscript{680} Scholars have used Woodwards’
description to argue that the Westo maintained hostile relations with all of their neighbors from
1675 to 1680. Gallay argued “[t]he Westo continued theirs wars with the Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Chisaca [Chicasa], Coweta, and Cuseeta [Cusseta].”\textsuperscript{681} As newly arrived migrants from the north
who slaved across the Southeast, the Westo likely had few friends among Natives of the
Southeast when Woodward visited Hickauhaugau in 1674. But by 1680 the Westo were reported
to “have courted the Apalachecolos” most likely referring to Coweta, Cusseta, or both.\textsuperscript{682}

By 1677, the Lords Proprietors were no longer referring to the Westo and Cusseta as
being in a state of war. Referring to “ ye Westoes & ye Cussetoes, two powerfull & warlike
nations,” The Lords ordered that,

\begin{quote}
  a strict peace & amity [be] made Betweene those said Nations and our people in
our province of Carolina, which will conduce very much to ye peace & settlement
of our said people there, & ye encouraginge of others to come and plant there when
those fierce and warlike nations are not onely at peace with us, but are become a
safeguard unto us from ye injuries of ye Spaniards and other Indians.\textsuperscript{683}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{680} “Woodwards Westo Discovery,” December 31, 1674, Carolina, in “The Shaftesbury Papers,”
460.
\textsuperscript{681} Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade}, 56, 372, note 54. Gallay cites John E. Worth, \textit{The Struggle
for the Georgia Coast}, who cites Woodward’s 1674 account. Gallay also cites José Miguel
Gallardo’s translation of the testimony of “David Turner” taken by the Spanish in 1680.
However, Gallardo’s translation of the testimony of “Daniel Tornelo” or “Daniel Turner” does
not mention the Coweta, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Chicasa, or Cusseta at all. Turner reported
“another Indian troop of a different nation, probably the Chisacas, came and fought the ones
supposed to be the Chichimecos” seven months prior to his testimony. This nation may have
been the Savanna Shawnee instead of the Chiscas, considering the Chiscas aided the Westo in a
raid against the Spanish mission on Santa Catalina in Guale. “Testimony of Daniel Turner,”
October 25, 1679, in “The Spaniards and the English Settlement in Charles Town,” translated by
\textsuperscript{682} “Pablo de Hita Salazar to the King, St. Augustine, May 14, 1680,” in “Matheos-Apalachicola
Phase VI,” Hann Collection, 25–28, especially 27.
\textsuperscript{683} “Order concerning the Trade with the Westoes and Cussatoes Indians,” April 10, 1677, in
William J. Rivers, \textit{A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary
The Westo and the Cussetas were not seen by the Lords as opponents or rivals with each other, or as standing against the Lords’ plans, but as key trading partners and buffers to Spanish encroachment and the threat of other Native nations. If the Cusseta and Westo were not cooperating at this point, the Proprietors had already made connections among both of them and saw their cooperation with the colony to the advantage of Carolina. The Proprietors reinforced this idea by demanding the use of licenses for commerce or “correspondency wth. any of ye Westoes, Cussatoes, Spaniards, or other Indians that live beyond Porte Royall, or at ye same distance from o’ present Settlem’t that ye Westoes & Cussatoes doe now inhabit.” Again, the Westoes and Cussatoes were referred to together as the examples for the rules determining how trade with Native groups was to be conducted in Carolina at the time. Furthermore, members of the Carolina council were intended to understand the distances between these places, suggesting a level of familiarity that had become common place. The same day of April 10, 1677 the Lords declared their monopoly over the “whole trade & commerce wi. ye Westoes, Cussatoes, & other Nations,” because “it is absolutely necessary that trade be carried on with those nations, that soe they may be supplyed with comodoties acordinge to agreement made with them, By which meanes a firme and lasting peace shal bee continued.” We do not know if these trade agreements made between Carolina and the Westo, and Carolina and the Cusseta, reflect the geographical and/or diplomatic proximity at the time of the two Native groups, but the Spanish

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684 “Order concerning the Trade with the Westoes and Cussatoes Indians,” April 10, 1677, in Rivers, A Sketch of the History of South Carolina, 389.
685 “The Article and Agreement of ye Lords Proprietor of Carolina, Betweene themselves, concerning the trade there,” April 10, 1677 in Rivers, A Sketch of the History of South Carolina, 390.
records reveal that the Westo made overages to the Coweta by 1679 and possibly to other Apalachicolas towns like the Cusseta during this period as well.686

Furthermore, the 1680 alliance between the Westo and the Coweta parallels the 1680 Westo, “Chiluques,” Ochese raid against Santa Catharina island in the province of Guale.687 John Worth argues that the Chiluque were proto Yamasee peoples who occupied the Santa Elena/Escamaçu region near Port Royal at the time.688 This alliance is often viewed as a temporary arrangement forced upon the Westo or a necessity they endured in order to have a great enough strength to renew attacks on the Spanish missions. In this chapter, I argue that the 1680 alliance needs to be seen as the creation—or fulfillment—of networks that linked the Westo, Ochese, and proto Yamasee peoples together in the Southeast as slavers. While many of the Westo were killed, enslaved, and dispersed, during the Carolina-Westo War of 1680, not all were destroyed in the South. Some Westo bands used prior connections to other local groups to remain in the South. The year 1680 need not be seen as the end of the Westo; it was the beginning of the connections between Ocheses, Yamasees, and outside slavers that would develop into the coalescence of the Creek peoples.

686 “Pablo de Hita Salazar to the King, St. Augustine, May 14, 1680,” in “Matheos-Apalachicola Phase VI,” Hann Collection, 25–28, especially 27.
687 It is important to clarify that the Uchese/Uchise (Ochese) as written in Spanish documents were not the same people as the Uches (Yuchis or Euchees). The Ochese occupied the Ocmulgee River and when used in Spanish documents appears to refer to proto-creek peoples before the migration of Coweta and Cusseta to the River around 1690. The Uches inhabited the Tennessee River Valley above the French Broad River until their dispersal in the 1690s and migration among other Piedmont Native communities including the Ochese. A 1736 Spanish list of provinces indicates that the Spanish saw the peoples as distinctly different despite the similarity in the spelling of their names. Don Luis Rodrigo de Hortega, “Certification given by Captain Don Luis Rodrigo de Ortega about the limits and ownership of these provinces of Florida,” 1736, Document 15 in Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 183–185.
688 Worth, Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 25–26, 30–31, and especially 90, n. 47.
The Native Slave trade reached its zenith in the first decade and a half of the eighteenth century. The slave raids of 1702–1706 which resulted in the virtual destruction of the Spanish mission system in Florida were the culmination of the spread of slaving strategies among Native groups of the Southeast. Strategies of slaving and coalescence devised to benefit and ensure the survival of Native peoples in the Southeast strained the demographic realities of Native peoples in the South. Larger slaving groups continued to coalesce as slavers, and disparate groups either migrated away from the threat of violence or incorporated themselves into or with larger slaving groups. The larger coalescent Native confederacies of the eighteenth centuries—the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Catawbas—developed in this period. However, as conflict between groups spread, the demand for enslaved labor grew in Carolina largely due to the expansion of Rice production in the colony and the need for enslaved laborers on plantations in the Caribbean. This strained the demographic constraints of the Native Southeast and created intensified conflict between groups. These conflicts culminated with the Tuscarora War of 1711–1712 and the Yamasee War of 1715–1717 which saw Carolina’s Native slaving allies turn on the Carolina colony and almost destroy it. With the British acquiring the Spanish Asiento in the aftermath of Queen Anne’s War, the Carolina colony no longer saw the enslavement of Natives as a viable solution to their labor needs as enslaved Africans—despite the taxes placed on their sale and transportation—replaced enslaved Natives in Carolina as a more viable solution for labor needs.

But before Southeastern Native peoples turned on the Carolina colony, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, powerful groups like the Coweta and Cusseta sought to use their English trading partners for revenge against their Native enemies in Spanish Florida. This chapter will demonstrate how Native slaving strategies and priorities—not those of the English
in Carolina—led to the destruction of the Spanish missions. With the 1702–1704 raids against the Spanish missions among the Apalachees at San Luis and Ayubale and in Guale north of St. Augustine, the Apalachicola towns settled old scores from Apalachee reprisals of 1694 while eliminating the threat from the Spanish missions to the south for good and expanding their influence in the region. Among Native peoples of the Southeast, slaving brought influence and power in the region by attracting English traders who brought guns and European goods with them, and by attracting other refugee groups who sought to join the growing power of towns like Coweta and Cusseta. By the first decades of the eighteenth century, slaving developed from a survival strategy learned from other slavers into a means to assert the power of the consolidating groups. Between 1702 and 1711, the destruction of the Florida mission system transformed the coalescing towns of Coweta and Cusseta from coalescent polities to an emerging Creek confederation.689

By the time the Scots arrived with Lord Dunlop to construct Port Royal in 1684, the leaders of the new settlement intended to create trading networks with the Coweta and Cusseta. As Lord Dunlop stated, “We are in order to this plan laying down a method for correspondence and treade with Cuita [Coweta] and Cussita [Cusseta] . . . who have several yeirs left off any Comercie with the Spanirds.”690 The Scots received this information either from the Coweta and Cusseta, or through Yamasee allies whom the Scots created a strong alliance with upon their arrival at Port Royal. It appears that creating connections with the Yamasee in Port Royal meant creating further connections among the Coweta and Cusseta as well. This change in the nature of

689 Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 68–74.
the Coweta and Cusseta relationship with Spain remained outside the knowledge of the Spaniards for a time. Spanish Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera assured the King “that they and their vassals are bound to be reduced with time.”

Spanish *Entradas* and Apalachicola Flight

In 1685, Spanish Lieutenant Antonio Matheos traveled into Apalachicola in search of Woodward and other Englishmen who the Spanish believed were encroaching upon their interests. The Apalachicolans fled their towns in the face of the Spanish and their Apalachee allies’ advance. Infuriated, Matheos responded by capturing and torturing Natives for information about the whereabouts of the Englishmen. He was told that many Englishmen had fled to Charles Towne with the Westo, while seven others were said to be hiding in the four Northern Apalachicola towns: “two in Tasquique, two in Casista, two in Colome” and one in “Caueta [Coweta].”

Matheos was greeted at Coweta by three men holding a white cross displaying their peaceful intentions toward the Spanish. The men from Coweta gave Matheos a letter in English “a paper with writing on it that I do not understand.” The letter was from Henry Woodward to Matheos and mockingly read,

> I am very sorry that I came with so small a following that I cannot await your arrival. Be informed that I came to get acquainted with the country, its mountains,

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691 “Juan Márquez Cabrera to the King,” St. Augustine, January 2, 1682, 13.
693 Antonio Matheos to Juan Márquez Cabrera,” Casista (Coushatta), September 21, 1685, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III” 12.
Woodward openly mocked Matheos’ efforts in Apalachicola and threatened to expand English interests further into Spanish provinces all the way to Apalachee on the Gulf Coast. The brazenness of Woodward’s letter shows the inroads English traders had made among the Coweta by 1685. Woodward made connections with numerous Native groups in the southern interior—ostensibly at the behest of the Lords Proprietors. While it is possible the Coweta messengers may not have been able to read Woodward’s message, at the very least they sent a message to the Spanish by handing it over to Matheos. Coweta wanted peace with Spain, but retained the right to trade with the English at Charles Town. Coweta was asserting its autonomy in the region by defying the Spanish and Matheos’ orders to turn over the English traders among them and cease trading with them.695

Matheos was furious with the people of Coweta and Apalachicola and called a council meeting for the caciques of the region to join him and turn over the English. Matheos heard rumors that the English were constructing a trading post among the four northern towns of Apalachicola and that Westo and Yamasee were active in the region as well. Matheos pressured the Apalachicola headmen for information about the English, but they offered up very little. Matheos warned that “if they again introduced Any Englishman into any of the places of Apalachicoli that . . . they would suffer blood and fire.”696

694 “Paper of the Englishmen translated into Castilian,” September 2, 1685, Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III” 22. Although the letter remained unsigned it is believed that Woodward was the author.
695 Antonio Matheos to Juan Márquez Cabrera,” Casista (Coushatta), September 21, 1685, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III” 16–17.
As soon as Matheos left Apalachicola, Friar Juan de Mercado at Santa Cruz de Sabacola sent word to Matheos that Woodward and the English had reappeared from hiding among the Apalachicolans. Matheos heard that the English got a “good reception” in Apalachicola which showed their “contempt for the compassion that we have had for them.” Matheos would not show such “compassion” when he entered Apalachicola a second time.

The English connections extended beyond Apalachicola. Friar Mercado reported that one Englishman was married to the “niece of Juiaui” who was a kinswoman “of the caciques of San Luis.” This familial connection reveals two aspects of Native geopolitics and social relations at the time. One, that the English had made inroads by creating trading relationships through marriage with the people of Apalachicola by 1685. Marriage into an important matrilineage created kinship and clan protections for European outsiders. Reciprocity would not only be given but expected between those married and their larger kin and social networks. The marriage of Euro-Americans to Native women established connections between traders and the community, becoming a pattern in southeastern North America that persisted into the nineteenth century.

Much like the connections made by João Romalho in São Paulo, the “niece of Juiaui” and the Englishman could serve as go-betweens in their respective communities to manage, increase, and assuage negotiations and trade between the two groups.

Secondly, the Friar’s report makes it clear that the Apalachicola had kinship ties to the Apalachee in Spanish Florida. Native familial, social, and political connections spanned

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697 Fray Juan Mercado to Antonio Matheos, Sunday [1685], in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 25.
699 Fray Juan Mercado to Antonio Matheos, Sunday [1685], in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 25.
communities across Southeastern North America that often intersected European imperial alliances and networks. Native peoples understood the importance of connections to Florida and Charles Towne but also understood the importance of maintaining and employing connections among Native communities through kinship networks. As Alejandra Dubcovsky argues “Apalachicolas and Apalachicola networks determined not only who could and did move in la tierra adentro [the interior] but also who did so successfully.” Fray Mercado understood the importance of Native networks in the region and thought the news of an Englishman’s marriage to an Apalachicola woman with matrilineal connections to the Apalachees important information for Antonio Matheos in San Luis de Apalache to have.

As Matheos and Mercado were receiving reports of Yamasee and English activities in the interior, the Yamasee headman, Altamaha, led the 1685 expedition against the Timucuan mission of Santa Catalina de Afuyca. The Spanish Lieutenant of Timucua reported to Governor Marques Cabrera that “fifty men” including the cacique from “Santa Catalina de Ahoica” were missing after the raid conducted by the “Jamase [Yamasee] enemy.” The Yamasee/English raid against Timucua needs to be taken into consideration as to how the Spanish were threatened by the English presence among the Apalachicola in 1685. Governor Cabrera feared English expansion into Apalachicola would mean more raids against Spanish missions and responded accordingly. The Governor ordered Matheos back into Apalachicola to capture the English and the caciques that sheltered them because the Apalachicola were “repeat offenders in their obstinacy and ignoring of the compassion with which they have been treated and the dangerousness of the

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700 Dubcovsky, Informed Power, 135. Italics in the originally brackets inserted for clarity.
701 Manuel Gómez to Márquez Cabrera, Santa Fé November 12, 1685, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 32.
702 Márquez Cabrera to Antonio Matheos, no date, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 33.
enemy whom they introduce.”

The English presence in Apalachicola coupled with the Yamasee raids into Florida were seen as a dire threat by the Spanish.

By the end of 1685, the Spanish began to suspect that Coweta and Apalachicola were actively working with the Yamasee and Carolina against the Spanish missions. In December of 1685, a Christian Guale man from the village of Zapala named Nicolás testified to the Spanish authorities about what he saw during his time in Charles Towne. Nicolás left Zapala to avoid punishment from a person he would not identify and traveled with Yamasees from Guale to Port Royal. As detailed briefly in Chapter 4, in Port Royal, Nicolás reported seeing twenty-two women and three young men taken by the Yamasees from Timucua in 1685 sold to the English for “thirty-four shot-guns, powder and balls, and twelve cutlasses.”

Nicolás also reported that “six [English] soldiers and a captain with fifty Yamasee Indians had departed for Caueta [Coweta] and that he had heard it said that they would return within five or six months.” This captain was reported to be Henry Woodward or “Captain Henrique” as he was known to the Spanish, who traveled to Coweta during that period accompanied by 50 Yamasee. What remains telling is that the English traveled with the Yamasees to Coweta, along Native paths that the Yamasee knew well. Clearly as early as 1685, the Coweta, Yamasees, and English saw something to gain from their cooperation and commerce. The Yamasees also said they would be

703 Mártinez Cabrera to Antonio Matheos, no date, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 33.
gone and return within a certain period of time, and it remains speculative, but this could have provided enough time to conduct slaving raids and return to Port Royal.\textsuperscript{707} While Cusseta created connections with Carolina as early as 1679, the Coweta were trading—most likely in skins and slaves—with Carolina via the Yamasee by 1686. In the same year, Yamasee families were reported to be living in “little houses (casillas)” within two leagues of Coweta. Additionally, Yamasees living among the Apalachicola town welcomed a party of forty-five other Yamasees who arrived there armed with muskets and pistols and accompanied by an Englishman in 1686.\textsuperscript{708} Spanish spies reported the Yamasee turning over young male captives to the Apalachicola and giving female captives to the English after the raid against Santa Catalina in 1685. We do not know if those young male captives were tortured to death, made slaves, or adopted into the Apalachicola community. But they were clearly given either as diplomatic gifts, tribute, or as spoils of war for participation in the raids. The exchange of captives in Apalachicola after the 1685 Altamaha raid against the Timucuan mission at Santa Catalina reveals the existence of an alliance of at least a commercial slave network if not direct proof of Apalachicola and Yamasee cooperation slaving against the Spanish missions. Furthermore, Apalachee spies for the Spanish also reported “Chichimecos” (Westo) traveling with the English among the Apalachicolas.\textsuperscript{709} That parties of Westo remained among the Apalachicola in 1686 demonstrates their survival and acceptance among the Apalachicola communities of Coweta and Cusseta, specifically because of their connections to the English as slavers.

\textsuperscript{708} “Mathoes, to Márquez Cabrera, San Luis, May 21, 1686,” in Auto, Márquez Cabrera, St. Augustine, May 26, 1686, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 69–70.
These slaving connections provide context for Matheos response to the 1685 Altamaha raid and reports of English traders among the Apalachicola. Upon entering Apalachicola again in the winter of 1685–1686, Matheos was greeted with unwelcome responses by local Natives who fled before him and his advancing Spanish and Apalachee troops. Matheos captured two Natives of Coweta and two from Atassi who were out hunting and tortured them for information. The Natives reported they had not seen the English but knew that they had established a storehouse close to Coweta. Upon reaching the English storehouse, Matheos found “five hundred and six deerskins, twenty-three beaver skins, eight pairs of coarse red stockings and three of white ones, and a yard and a half of red scarlet basting with a trimming of false gold.” Matheos said the skins may not have been worth much “because the deerskins appeared more like cat than deer,” which, along with the relative absence of English goods, suggests that the storehouse belonged to the Coweta who were preparing for the arrival of English traders. Matheos burnt the storehouse and sent news to the outlying Apalachicola towns to call the caciques of “Caueta, Casista, Tasquique, and Colome” to come and speak to him in Coweta, but “neither cacique or any leading men appeared.” After waiting twenty-two days, the headmen of Apalachicholi, Ocone, “Achito, Alape, Tacussa, [and] Ocuti” came with leading men from “Osuche and Ocmulge” to speak with Matheos. These headmen explained to Matheos that they were not guilty “in the entry of the Englishmen, because if they had given him some welcome in their villages, it had been largely forced on them by the threats of” the towns of Coweta, Cusseta,

Tuskegee, and Colome. Matheos threatened to burn the headmen’s villages if they did not turn over the Englishmen. The Apalachicola headmen again pleaded that they had been forced to welcome in the English, and revealed “that the cause of their having gone to San Jorxe (Charles Towne) and for the Englishmen having come to their province has been some five slaves that they had there, for whom they have sent a quantity of deerskins and pelts on different occasions, but they have never been able to obtain them and that if they did not do it now, they would be abandoning them.” Apparently Apalachicola captives had been taken to Charles Towne, either as slaves or hostages, to ensure the cooperation of the other Apalachicola towns. Those five “slaves” may have been captives that the Apalachicola gave to the Coweta, who then transported them to Charles Towne to ensure the cooperation of the smaller Apalachicola towns. This detail reveals another complexity in the fast-shifting alliances and negotiations that were occurring between Native towns and groups and the two competing European powers over the deerskin and slave trades. Matheos warned the headmen of the Apalachicola towns that they were not worthy of mercy from the Spanish but pardoned them with a final warning not to let the Englishmen or other enemies of Spain enter their province again. Matheos then burned the four other Apalachicola towns of Coweta, Cusseta, Tuskegee, and Colome.713

What Matheos and the Spanish saw as a justified act against the “traitors and disobedient” northern Apalachicola towns, without a doubt further drove those communities into the arms of the English and their Native allies.714 The northern towns of Apalachicola severed ties to the southern towns and by 1690 Cusseta and Coweta moved their villages from the

714 Antonio Matheos to Márquez Cabrera, San Luis, February 8, 1686, in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 50.
Chattahoochee River to the Ochese Creek in Central Georgia. By 1691 numerous other Apalachicola Natives and other Native ethnicities began to coalesce around the Ochese Creek where for the next twenty years they waged war against the Spanish missions to the South.\textsuperscript{715} In this process those Apalachicola towns would slowly turn themselves into the group the English came to call the “Creeks” based on the Ochese Creek that they called their new home. Having moved closer to Charles Towne, these new Creek people would create new coalescent communities that—retaining ethnic, town, and linguistic distinctions—confederated around mutual protection and economic opportunities by providing skins and enslaved Natives to Carolina. It is important to note that while the Creek peoples coalesced around the strategies of slaving and coalescence, those connections were built on centuries of prior relations, kinship, diplomacy, and shared cosmologies with other Native peoples of the Southeast. Slaving and coalescence provided incentives to rework and adapt older relationships and networks, but Native peoples relied on Native knowledge and traditions to implement those changes.

**The Rise of Coweta and Cusseta**

In April of 1690, Carolina trader and slaver George Smith returned to Charles Towne with the headmen of Coweta and “Cusheda” who brought “2800 skins and furs” with them. The Coweta and Cusseta headmen “now return’d loaded with presents: they have, being 2500 fighting men, deserted the Spanish protection and com’d and setl’d 10 days Jurnay nearer us to Injoy the English frier protection.”\textsuperscript{716} The English understood the importance of the move of the Cowetas and the Cussetas to the Ochese Creek closer to Charles Towne and that their 2,500

\textsuperscript{715} Auto, September 18, 1691, AGI Santo Domingo 228, Stetson Collection, Reel 22. Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 50–51.

fighting men would aid in protecting the colony and providing the colonists with deerskins and enslaved Natives. Although Matheos burned the physical towns of Coweta and Cusseta in 1686, by 1690 the increasingly amicable relations between the English settlers and the Lower Creeks on the Ochese Creek led to the expansion of the slave and deerskin trade. Apalachicola towns were growing in influence as well as they continued to coalesce with outside groups. The Carolina Council reported in January of 1693 that “Some Northerne Indians were come to Settle amongst Taskegus [Tuskegees] and y\textsuperscript{t} they give an account that Some Northerne Indians Intend next Somer to settle among the Cowataws [Cowetas] and Cussetaws [Cussetas].”\textsuperscript{717} The Coweta were already attracting others to migrate to live among them with reports of Chickasaws and Ticopachas (Tukabatchees) declaring their intentions to move to Apalachicola at the time.\textsuperscript{718} Joseph M. Hall Jr. traces the alliances and connections made during this period through Creek origin stories, demonstrating specifically that the Tukabatchee remembered the exchange of medicines between the two towns to create peace and led to the migration of the Tukabatchee from central Alabama to the Ochese Creek. Native peoples at the time saw strength in numbers together; Natives of the Southeast saw their best chance of survival in slaving others instead of being enslaved.\textsuperscript{719} Despite the conflicts with Spanish Florida, the Apalachicola towns were profiting and growing from trade with Carolina settlers and attracting Native newcomers—such as the Chiaha and Yuchis from the Tennessee River Valley—into their settlements.\textsuperscript{720}

\textsuperscript{717} January 13, 1692/3, in A.S. Salley, \textit{Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, For the Four Sessions of 1693 (JCHASC)} (Columbia, S. Car.: The State Company, 1907) 10–12, quotation on 12. Brackets inserted for clarity. The \textit{Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina} will be here on out cited as the \textit{JCHASC}.


\textsuperscript{719} Hall, \textit{Zamumo’s Gifts}, 100–103.

\textsuperscript{720} Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 165–167.
In the face of Westo and Chisca raids in the early-mid 1670s the Coweta and Cusseta responded by creating connections and alliances with the Westo. Through incorporation and coalescence Coweta and Cusseta created and maintained connections with the Yamasee as well. This strategy has been viewed as one of playing the Spanish and English off against one another—via maintaining their own autonomy.\(^{721}\) While Coweta and Cusseta undoubtedly valued their autonomy, the pursuance of connections with Westo and Yamasees shows that they also understood the value of connections with the English via other Native slavers.

But the Carolina Council took umbrage at the news of northern Native groups coming to settle among the Tuskegee, Coweta, and Cusseta. The Council feared a return of a hostile group like the Westo and suggested “that all possible means be used to prevent the settlem' of [sic] Any Northern Nation of Indians amongst out friends more Especially of y'e Rikohogo’s or Westos a people which formerly (when well used) made an attempt to Distroy us.”\(^{722}\) This evidence shows that the Carolina council wanted to keep their Native trading partners strong, but also under their control and influence. The Council feared growing connections between Native groups to the north particularly the Haudenosaunee who they erroneously declared as Westo allies. Perhaps in light of Metacom’s War between 1675–1678 in New England, in 1691 the Carolina council feared an alliance between the Westo and the Haudenosaunee because “the Mawhawkes are a numerous, warlike nation of Indians, and strictly aleyd to the Westo and have formerly Distroyed Severall English Inhabitants of New England.”\(^{723}\) The council appears to have equated all


\(^{723}\) January 14, 1692/3, *JCHASC*, 1693, 12–13, quotation on 13. The Carolina Grand Council’s description of “ye Rikohogo’s or Westo” as the same group provides the best existing evidence of the connections between the Rickahockans/Richahecrians of Virginia and the Westo. Furthermore, their connection to the Mohawk and Haudenosaunee here is even more telling because it goes against current scholarly interpretation of the relationships between the
Iroquoian-speakers from the North with both the Haudenosaunee confederacy and with the
Westo, and either been unaware of the Westo demise as an independent polity in the 1680s or
received news of their continued presence. Regardless, in the 1690s the Carolina council was
afraid of the creation of alliances of Native groups against themselves, but also made efforts to
expand access to other Native groups in order to expand their access to the deerskin and slave
trade. This change was a clear departure from the monopoly strategy of the 1670s but also
reflects a change in how Native nations dealt with each other during the expansion of the Native
slave trade. Groups like the Coweta and Cusseta began attracting in other Native slavers like the
Yamasee as trading partners or the Westo as refugee slavers. That Native groups like the
Tukabatchee and others decided it was in their interest to move closer to the Coweta and Cusseta
on Ochese Creek demonstrates the growth in power of those Native towns.

Native slaving and coalescence were two intertwined sides of the same coin during the
era of the slave trade. Worth argues that slaving and hunting were socioeconomic activities that

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Erie/Richahecrian/Westo and the Haudenosaunee who drove them out of the Lake Erie region in
the 1650s. Either the Carolina Council was mistaken in suggesting alliances between the
Mohawk and Westo and the nature of the relationship between Iroquoian-Speakers from the
great lakes—which is very possible—or by the 1680s the relationships between the Westo and
the Haudenosaunee had changed. A third, and in my opinion most likely option, is that the
Richahecrians and Westo were never a single unified polity either in the South or North. The
people known as the Westo and the Richahecrians—like the Shawnee, and the Susquehannock
after Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676—consisted of mobile communities that moved frequently. The
Westo as Carolinians knew them, consisted of a large group that chose slaving as their
survival strategy in the South. However, this does not eliminate the real possibility that people known as
the Richahecrians or other Iroquoian Speakers from the Great Lakes region and Ohio River
Valley maintained kinship, communal, and diplomatic connections with the Westo, but remained
separate polities.

It is also possible that the Haudenosaunee or one of the Five Nations was attempting to attract
the remnants of the Westo back north as they had done with the Susquehannocks in the wake of
their defeat at the hands of Virginians in Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. The relationships between
the Haudenosaunee and Iroquoian-speakers in the Southeast—or with peoples the
Haudenosaunee had previously driven into the Southeast—provide an area of further possible
research for scholars.
weakened hereditary chiefdoms to the advantage of individuals. While Worth does not use Miller’s language of marginality, it applies here to those Natives who saw advantages in the acquisition of wealth in people. However, the incorporation of Native captives, refugees, and slavers, were beneficial to the community as a whole and to individuals. In Native communities, the incorporation of captives brought prestige and laborers to individuals and their matrilineages as either adopted kin or as slaves. Captives could also be exchanged as diplomatic gifts or given to dependents in return for their loyalty. Refugees fleeing slaving could also be incorporated into Native communities through aggregation where the refugees became subordinate to their host community. But refugee or smaller groups of slavers were also incorporated into Native communities, arguably because of their experience as slavers and their connections to European traders. Westo acceptance into the Coweta and Cusseta communities and their connections with Yamasee communities displays these strategies. Coalescence was not a uniform archetype pattern. It was variable across groups. Understanding how the realities of slaving motivated groups to accept outsiders as both slavers and the enslaved demonstrates the variable possibilities and power of connections between Native peoples. Native peoples developed Slaving strategies to survive and benefit from the Native slave trade. They did so using Native logics and knowledge. Coalescence occurred during the height of the Native slave trade because, like slaving, it was a strategy that provided opportunities for Native communities to enhance their own positions, provide for their communities, and survive.

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726 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 21–24.
728 Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 250–251.
As the 1690s progressed, slaving and slave raids intensified across Southeastern North America. Attacks and reprisals escalated between the Apalachicola towns centered around Coweta and Cusseta near the Ochese Creek and the Spanish missions of Florida. The Spanish reported that a group of “Uchises, Yamasees, and Englishmen” attacked the Timucuan town of San Juan de Guacara in 1691 and enslaved numerous residents. Spanish missionaries in Apalachee reported other attacks against Spanish missions in the region during late 1691. An unidentified party of “enemigos” attacked the Chacato town of San Carlos on the Apalachicola river in 1692, and another party of Apalachicola returned in 1694 to destroy the town. The Spanish decided to respond to the 1694 attacks by recruiting a party of over 400 Apalachee warriors and seven Spanish soldiers to attack the Apalachicola communities on the Ochese. The Apalachees captured at least 50 people and plundered nearly eight hundred pesos of trade goods and skins. This Apalachee attack and the pleas of the Spanish and English governors to discontinue fighting led to an end of the raids and counterraids in the second half of the 1690s. Carolina Governor John Archdale told the Spanish Governor, Laureano de Torres y Ayala that he had commanded the Apalachicolas not to “commit any Acts of Hostility on any of your Indians,” and he expected the Spanish to give similar orders to their “Vassals.” Archdale saw the Spanish reprisals against the Apalachicolas as destabilizing, but he understood how little control the English had over their “Vassals,” stating to Governor Torres y Ayala, “Surely you cannot be


ignorant of the Temper of the Indians as well as my self, how hard a matter it is to keep them from taking Revenge for any Injuries received, to the third and fourth Generation; making personal murders oftentimes National Quarrels.”

Although the English and the Spanish were allies at the time against Louis XIV in France during the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697), Spanish and English colonists in America—and especially their Native allies—did not trouble themselves over the affairs on the European continent. While the Lords Proprietors lamented the “Difference with ye Cussitaws to & the King of Spaines Subjects which wee are sorry for” in June of 1695, Cusseta and Apalachee conflicts continued. What Archdale did not wish to address to the Spanish Governor at the time was that the Apalachicolans were trading captives taken from the Spanish missions to the English in Charles Town. The “personal murders” were part of reprisals for slave raids that had escalated to the point of “National Quarrels.”

In 1695, Joseph Blake, the acting governor of Carolina, responded to the raids from Apalachee into the Ochese communities by writing a letter to the Governor of Florida, Torres y Ayala, complaining about the invasion. Blake had received word “of apalachinos indios” (Apalachee) who had been “burning and robbing the land of Cavetta, Cassito, Ocomulque, Tasquique, Uchichi, and the places of Ocone, all of which are within my government and jurisdiction.” Torres y Ayala responded to Blake with disdain “You are evidently new in that

governorship to write in such a manner,” and should “ask the old vecinos (neighbors) whether those towns you call yours have not always been under this government’s protection, until out of wickedness they rebelled and have remained so, fomented by your settlement, doing all the damages and atrocities of which they are capable.”  

The Spanish/English alliance in Europe was being tested in America over the annual back and forth raids between the Apalachee and Apalachicola. In response to these incessant raids, under the direction of the Spanish, Apalachee Natives began building a wooden blockhouse in San Luis de Apalachee in 1696 that was completed in 1697 and intended to “serve as a reasonable shelter or defense for the natives from the incursions which the neighboring Indians make at the instigation of the English of Saint George” (Charles Towne). The need for the blockhouse in San Luis de Apalachee spoke to the frequency of raids and counterraids between communities along the Ochese and in Apalachee, Timucua, and Guale.

The escalations in violence in the 1690s could suggest that Native groups were solidifying their alliances and networks among themselves—Native allies of Spain versus Native allies of Carolina. However, this binary based around allegiances to Europeans quickly falls apart in the face of evidence. As shown by Matheos’ expeditions into Apalachicola in 1685, some Apalachicola towns still favored connections with Apalachee kinsmen and by proxy the Spanish. The Native informants Matheos sent into Apalachicola reported familial and trade connections between Apalachicola, Apalachees, Yamasees, and others. Those connections did not end with the flight of the four northern Apalachicola towns to the Ochese Creek in response

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to Matheos’ invasion.\textsuperscript{736} The Spanish demands for labor and service that came with the building of the blockhouse and the Spanish soldiers and settlers that came with it drove some Apalachees away from San Luis de Apalachee. In 1699, the headmen of the Apalachee towns of San Luis and Ivitachuco reported that, “the natives of San Luis” withdrew “a league into the woods, for their places had been seized for the Spaniards.” Some Apalachees fled to the missions in the Guale province, “where many die without confession, because they do not understand the language of the missionaries of that province.” Others turned to the English, most likely through connections with the Natives of Ochese Creek. Sometime after 1696, the “mico (headman) of la Tama” had some skins prepared for the Spanish in San Luis and was not paid for his work as a tanner.\textsuperscript{737} The mico of la Tama responded to this offense by going to “the place of Saint George” (Charles Towne) and the other headmen of San Luis and Ivitachuco lamented his leaving, “from his revolt we are disconsolate, for fear others may follow him.” \textsuperscript{738} The coalescence and migration of communities in response to the generation or more of slaving that occurred in the wake of the arrival of the Westo created connections between and across Native groups in the Southeast.

\textsuperscript{736} Fray Juan Mercado to Antonio Matheos, Sunday [1685], in Hann Collection, “Antonio Matheos Project, Phase III,” 25.


\textsuperscript{738} “Don Patricio, Cacique of Ivitachuco, and Don Andrés, Cacique of San Luis, to the King, February 12, 1699,” AI 54-5-19: 138, in Boyd, Smith, Griffin, \textit{Here They Once Stood}, 24–26, especially 25.
Native peoples maintained these connections, via trade and kinship networks, despite—and perhaps because of—the increased number of raids between the Apalachicola and Apalachee.\textsuperscript{739}

The mico of la Tama was the headman of the lineage of the mission of La Purificación de Tama which was established by refugee Tama or Altamaha peoples who fled south in the wake of the Westo slave raids in the Oconee River Valley in the 1660s. These peoples were ethnically, culturally, linguistically, socially, and historically linked to the former Ocute Paramount chiefdom and the Yamasees, such as the Yamasee headman Altamaha, who raided Spanish missions in Timucua in 1685. Yamasee, Altamaha, and Tama are all thought to be linked linguistically to the same southern province of the Ocute Paramount chiefdom which declined in power after the Hernando de Soto expedition first encountered it. Even before the collapse of paramount chiefdoms Native communities were used to patterns of separation and relocation of towns. It should not be surprising that Native peoples used and maintained those patterns and connections across communities. The Tama Mico’s flight from the Spanish at San Luis after 1696 and into the arms of the English—and more probably their Native allies along the Ochese—suggests that Altamaha, Yamasee, and Tama peoples maintained connections across towns and communities—even in the face of escalating violence from the slave trade.\textsuperscript{740}

Trade and connections between Apalachicola and Apalachee towns continued despite slave raids, but the violence encouraged by European slavers and traders did exacerbate conflict. The construction of the blockhouse at San Luis appeared to have fostered a détente of sorts between the Apalachee and Apalachicola for a time after 1697. Trade between the two provinces continued. However, the actions of a Spanish rancher, Francisco Florencia, would upset the brief

\textsuperscript{739} Dubcovsky, Informed Power, 148–149 and Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 56–59.
\textsuperscript{740} Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 81, 99 and Hall, Zamumo’s Gift, 83–87.
détente. In 1699, the cacique of the Apalachee town of Ivitachuco, Don Patricio Hinachuba complained that he and his people were “much aggrieved for many reasons, the principal being what Francisco Florencia did this past winter to the pagan Indians of the Province of Tasquique” (Tuskegee). Francisco Florencia—the brother-in-law to the Teniente of Apalachee, Captain Jacinto Roque Pérez—led a party of forty Chacato Natives on a buffalo hunt when they encountered twenty-four Natives from Tuskegee “coming peacefully to trade in this province, to sell their buffalo skins, leather shirts, and madstones” (*piedras besales*). Upon learning from the Tuskegees that they would encamp that night nearby, Florencia returned with his men that evening and attacked the Tuskegee camp killing sixteen and the survivors fled into the woods. Florencia “gathered up the spoils” and returned to Apalachee where “they painted the shirts in Ayubale; and it is very well known in this province that they have sold all the plunder.” Hinachuba warned the Spanish chaplain in San Augustín, Don Antonio Ponce de León, about the killing of the Tuskegees, “it is certain that the deed is such that all of us will have to pay for these activities, since this aggravation has aroused misgivings, although to this date the opening of hostilities which we expect has not begun.”

Hinachuba was correct to fear reprisals for killing the Tuskegees—hostilities did come.

Don Patricio Hinachuba’s letter illuminates the common practice of trade between the towns of Apalachicola and Apalachee. Tuskegee was one of the four Apalachicola towns burned by Matheos in 1685 and that subsequently removed and rebuilt their community on the Ochese in the beginning of the 1690s. These hostilities with the Spanish and migration toward Charles Towne did not stop some Tuskegees coming to Apalachee for trade by the end of the 1690s.

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Hinachuba welcomed Tuskegee trade and saw it as commonplace, despite Tuskegee conflicts with the Spanish. Moreover, Hinachuba understood that crying blood (clan vengeance) demanded retribution from the Tuskegees and that they would retaliate in time for the murder of their clansmen. Hinachuba knew that the actions of Florencia and the Chacatos could have dire consequence for the Apalachees at Ayubale.

In a debate over an incident that occurred sometime after February in 1701, it appears that a limited “peace” was renegotiated between the Apalachicolas and the Apalachees. In early 1701, “a hinija (second man) and others of the Principal chiefs of the pagans from the province of Apalachicola” came to Apalachee “offering to renew the peace with the Apalachians (Apalachees) and reaffirm the submission previously given to Your Majesty,” according to Governor Zuñiga. The Apalachees accepted this peace, and sent four men to the Apalachicolas to against the wishes of the Spanish Governor who had prohibited Apalachees to go to Apalachicola in order to stop their sale of Spanish horses in exchange for English cloth or guns. The four Apalachees went to the Apalachicolas and either because of a dispute or by Apalachicola design, the four Apalachees were captured, and while one escaped, “the other three

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742 Hahn argues that attempts to establish peace between the Spanish/Apalachees and the Apalachicola commenced as early as November 1700. Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 58. At that time Governor Zuñiga warned the Chacatos against upsetting this process by having “inflicted some injuries and fatalities upon the pagans with whom we are trying to re-establish friendship.” Governor Zuñiga, “An Order from the Governor Don Joseph de Zuñiga, San Augustin, November 5, 1700,” AI 58-2-8, in Boyd, Smith, Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 30–32. It is unclear who exactly desired peace with the “pagans” in this order, the Spanish and/or Apalachees, and if “pagans” referred to all of the Apalachicola or the Tuskegee whom the Chacatos had killed with Florencia the year before.

743 “Governor Zuñiga to the King, Upon the Raid into Santa Fé and the expedition upon which Captain Romo was sent. San Augustin, September 30, 1702,” AI 58-2-8, in Boyd, Smith, Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 36–38.

were killed and sacrificed in a cruel and inhuman manner.” Governor Zuñiga suspected that the peace overtures had all been “a subterfuge, since the pagans did not desire anything except pack horses which the English ask of them for their traffic.”

The “peace” agreement established between the Apalachees and Apalachicolas appears to have been spurred on by Apalachee desires for English goods and the Apalachicola used their interests to trick them.

The Apalachicolans took their hostilities further and on May 20, 1702 attacked the mission village of Santa Fé in the Province of Timucua. For three hours, one hundred Apalachicolans attacked and burned the mission church until the inhabitants of Santa Fé succeeded in repulsing the attackers. A group of the Timucuan defenders pursued the Apalachicolans only to be ambushed where “up to ten of our Indians died in the skirmish” including the Spanish deputy adjutant Juan Ruíz de Canicares. After the raid, one hundred Apalachicolans from “Achita” returned bearing “many scalps, a chest of clothing and some objects of silver.” The attackers were successful in destroying the mission as well as sending the message to other Natives allied with Spain that hostilities would continue.

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746 For the escalation of violence in 1701–1702, Hahn cites an auto of August 5, 1701 that describes Governor Zuñiga’s seizure of an Apalachicola man named “hafuluque” who was accused of setting fire in the region of the Spanish ranch at la Chua, in the Timucuan province. Auto, August 5, 1701, AGI-SD 858, f. 473–474, Worth Collection, reel 5 no. 7. Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 59–60, 287. Hahn argues that the Governor’s seizure of Hafuluque angered the Apalachicolans and the attack on Santa Fe was the result. However, it is unclear if the seizure of Hafuluque occurred before or after the murder of the Apalachee traders in Apalachicola in 1701. Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 165,190.


Governor Zuñiga reported to the King that because of the raid against the Timucuan mission at Sante Fé, “The Apalachee Indians are now fearful of the hostilities and injuries which their villages will have to suffer from the raids the Apalachicolas will make unless they are curbed and punished until they cease these invasions.” As the Headman Hinachuba knew in 1699, despite on and off again trade between the two groups, the Apalachees understood that Apalachicola reprisals and invasions would continue unless they were forced to stop.

With this in mind, the Apalachees and “some Christian Chacatos” asked for permission for eight hundred Natives to invade Apalachicola to “avenge these slayings and hostilities.” They further asked Governor Zuñiga for “some soldiers and a leader to direct them” on this expedition. The Apalachees wanted revenge for the attacks against the Timucuans and also the killing of three of their own in 1701 and looked to the Spanish for help and assistance in this effort. The Governor agreed and ordered Captain Don Francisco Romo de Uriza to lead the expedition against the Apalachicolas. Governor Zuñiga further warned that if the expedition did not succeed against the Apalachicolas then “it will be necessary to employ greater severity with larger forces against the pagans (Apalachicolas) and the English who encourage them, for the opinion exists that an Englishman led the band which entered Santa Fé.” The Spanish saw the continued conflict between the Apalachees and Apalachicola as a conflict between pagan and converted Natives—Spanish Allies versus English allies. But as shown by the continued communication, movement, and trade between the Apalachicolas and Apalachees despite raids and reprisals Native conceptions of the conflict were more nuanced. The Spanish offered

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protections (and abuses) in the form of mission villages, priests, and garrisons, whereas the English offered guns and trade. Native alliances offered autonomy and strength in numbers, often with access to English traders as well as the community the Apalachicolas, Tukabatchees, Westos, Yuchis, and Yamasees created on the Ochese Creek. Native leaders in Apalachee and Apalachicola tried to create access to both groups, as autonomous peoples. However, as raids and counter raids, escalated the conflicts of violence and retribution the Apalachees and Apalachicolas were drawn further into those who sided with Spain and those who sided with English traders. Put simpler, the Spanish and English were pulled into conflicts between Native peoples and further exacerbated the violence.

The Apalachee, Chacato, Spanish invasion of Apalachicola in October 1702 was a disaster. Captain Romo de Uriza reported that of the eight hundred men that left Apalachee, the “company of Indians who return number perhaps three hundred men without arms, most of which were abandoned to the enemy.” The Apalachicola ambushed the expedition and routed the Apalachee, Chacato, and Spanish and were reported to have taken “many captives.” This rout thoroughly demoralized the Native residents of the Apalachee missions. Captain Uriza told Governor Zuñiga that at most Apalachee could muster “about fifteen hundred” men against the

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751 Hahn argued that conversion to Christianity played a role in whether Natives sided with the Spanish or the English in these conflicts. This cannot be denied with respect to Apalachicola raids against Spanish missions. However, the rolls of Spanish priests and soldiers in abusing and exploiting Native peoples who they viewed as subjects probably played a larger role in exacerbating conflicts than the adoption of Christianity. Scholars must be careful to not accept the Spanish interpretation of events that the Apalachicolas were invading Apalachee and Timucua because of their hatred for Christianity. Hahn, _Invention of the Creek Nation_, 56–58.


753 Manuel Solano to Governor Zuñiga, San Luis, October 22, 1702, Boyd, “Further Consideration,” 469.
anticipated Apalachicola invasion, but that “they exhibit[ed] a preference for flight, for which they value their feet.” Several Westo women, two men of African descent, and three Englishmen including Anthony Dodsworth accompanied the Apalachicola forces composed of “Chiscas, Chichimecas, Apalachicolas, Chacatos and Yuchis” but no Yamasees. A Chacato woman reported to Uriza that the next step for the Apalachicola was “to depopulate the [Apalachee] villages of Bacucua and Escambé, as well as Timucua, and carry off the women.” The absence of the Yamasee puzzled Uriza, who did not know that the Yamasees were preparing to assist the English on an attack against St. Augustine.

In February of 1702, the South Carolina Council received word “to Expect The Warr is Begunn before this” with Spain and France, and they began to prepare the colony’s defenses. In August of 1702, the council learned that “our Queene Ann hath been pleased to proclaime warr against ye Crowns of France & Spain . . . Which gives us Reason to Recomend to yo: Consideracon The takeing of St: Augustin before it be strengthened with french forces.” The Council minutes of 1702 repeatedly reference their fear of the new French colony “on the south side of the Bay of appalatia,” referring to the newly founded French colony of Mobile. Governor James Moore was declared the head of the expedition of “no less than 350 white men” and Colonel Stephen Bull was appointed the “Commander of fifty men and the Indians to be raised.” The purpose of the expedition was to sack St. Augustine before it could be reinforced,

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754 Romo de Urisa to Governor Zuñiga, San Luis, October 22, 1702, Boyd, “Further Consideration,” 471.
755 February 2, 1701/2, JCHASC, 1702, 31.
756 August 20, 1702, JCHASC, 1702, 64.
757 August 28, 1702, JCHASC, 1702, 84–85.
but the incentives for those on the expedition were made clear, “The Encouragement to be free Plunder and share of all Slaves.”\textsuperscript{758}

The expedition was a disaster. Having left Charles Town on October 16\textsuperscript{th}, with a column by land led by Colonel Robert Daniell and Governor Moore approaching by sea, they arrived to blockade St. Augustine in November 1702. Colonel Robert Daniell sacked the mission villages of San Pedro de Tupiqui, San Phelipe, and Santa Maria in route to St. Augustine. The remnants of the Guale and Mocama towns fled to St. Augustine in the face of the English advance. By 1711 these towns joined together into the town of San Juan del Puerto and became the last mission village in Florida.\textsuperscript{759} Upon their arrival at St. Augustine, the English and their Yamasee allies sacked the city but were unable to take the formidable Castillo de San Marcos where the garrison and most of the city’s inhabitants took refuge. As the English and Yamasees besieged the Castillo, Moore sent Colonel Daniell to Jamaica to return with the necessary artillery to destroy the Castillo’s walls. After a two-month siege, awaiting the reinforcements and artillery from Jamaica, a Spanish fleet from Havana arrived to relieve the Spanish garrison and blocked the smaller English vessels in what is probably the confluence of the Tolomato and Matanza rivers. Moore was forced to burn his fleet and retreat by land northward to a relief fleet that took him to Carolina. The expedition was seen as a disaster, and Moore was blamed and mocked for the defeat, even as the colonists and Yamasees squabbled over the captives and spoils taken.\textsuperscript{760}

No less than 150 inhabitants came out against Governor Moore and signed a petition complaining about Moore’s conduct as Governor. They complained about Moore packing the

\textsuperscript{758} Whether those slaves were to be of Native or African descent was not clarified. August 28, 1702, \textit{JCHASC}, 1702, 84.
\textsuperscript{759} Worth, \textit{Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 50.
Carolina assembly with allies—an accusation that was undoubtedly true but mundanely commonplace for Carolina during the period. The inhabitants were also “asham’d to mention” the Governor’s defeat and retreat from St. Augustine and sought to try him for it. They argued that the “true Design of the Expedition, was no other then [sic] catching and making slaves of Indians for private advantage.” The colonists accused Moore of seeking to enrich himself and his adherents through the Native slave trade and the expeditions against the Spanish and their Native allies. Although the dissenting colonists’ objections need to be taken with a grain of salt, because they also sought to enrich themselves in the same manner, they were not wrong about Moore’s intentions—Moore fully intended to enrich himself and his Goose Creek allies by turning the trade with Natives “into a Trade of Indian or Slave-making.”

While the failure of the St. Augustine expedition turned many colonists against Governor Moore, the number of Natives captured, and booty taken motivated Creeks and Alabamas to move closer to alliances with Carolina. The new French colony’s alliances with the Mobiles and Choctaws probably spurred this on too, but also the Apalachicola victory over the Spanish in 1702 and the—successful-with-regard-to-plunder—St. Augustine raid made the English and their Apalachicola and Yamasee allies more enticing friends. This meant that despite Moore’s position becoming tenuous in Carolina, Carolina’s geopolitical position and trade networks improved

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761 “The Representation and Address of several members of this present Assembly return’d for Colleton County, and other Inhabitants of this Province, whose Names are hereunto Subscribed,” 236–247, in Daniel Defoe, “Party-Tyranny, or an Occasional Bill in Miniature; as now Practiced in Carolina. Humbly offered to the Consideration of both Houses of Parliament,” (London: 1705) in Salley, Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650–1708, 241.

762 “The Representation and Address of several members of this present Assembly,” 240.
after 1702. By 1704–1705, the proto-Creeks, including the Alabamas would create a loose alliance with the English in Carolina against the Spanish and Apalachees.\textsuperscript{763}

The governor that replaced Moore, Governor Nathaniel Johnson, decided to determine the situation among Carolina’s new Native allies. In 1703, Governor Johnson decided to send Moore among the Apalachicola on this mission.\textsuperscript{764} Moore had other ideas on how to make amends for the damage to his reputation caused by the failure to take St. Augustin in 1702. Moore assembled 50 white men, and a thousand Natives, along with some men of African descent, for the expedition.\textsuperscript{765} The disparate numbers of colonists and Natives involved in the expedition—and the diverse origin of those Natives, consisting of Apalachicolas, Alabamas, Abekas, Cherokees, Chiscas, Cowetas, and Yamasees—suggest that those Natives saw the gains to be had in raiding Apalachee.\textsuperscript{766} On January 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1704, Moore and his Native allies fell on the Apalachee town of Ayubale killing around twenty men and taking around two hundred people prisoner after they burned the church, convent, and stockade.\textsuperscript{767} The next day, the Spanish Lieutenant Governor of Apalachee, Captain Juan Ruíz de Mexía, assembled thirty Spaniards and around 400 Apalachees to repulse Moore. The Spanish and the Apalachees were routed, and

\textsuperscript{763} Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade}, 138. For details on the Choctaw and Mobile alliances with the French see Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 194–231.
\textsuperscript{764} JCHASC, 1703, 121.
\textsuperscript{765} James Moore, “Extract of Colo Moore’s Letter to the Lords Proprietors 16 April 1704,” In Hann, \textit{Apalachee}, 386–387. The Spanish governor Zuñiga reported that there were men of African descent involved in Moore’s 1704 expedition “on the 25th of January of January of this year, the enemy attacked Ayubale, one of largest places in Apalachee, and captured it with a large force on foot, of English, Negroes, and Indians.” In “Extract from a letter of Governor Zuñiga to the King, San Augustin, February 3, 1704,” In Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, \textit{Here They Once Stood}, 48.
\textsuperscript{766} Ethridge, \textit{Chicaza to Chickasaw}, 209.
\textsuperscript{767} For a detailed analysis of the attack on Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Ayubale and the Native legacies for both the Apalachicola and Apalachee see Dubcovsky, “All of Us Will Have to Pay for These Activities.’
Ruiz was taken prisoner along with another two hundred Apalachees. The Apalachicolas tortured some of the Spaniards and Apalachee captives “who were roasted with much barbarity and cruelty” by binding “them to some stakes by the feet and hands and set[ting] them afire until their lives were extinguished.”

The route of the defenders drove numerous Apalachee villages to reconsider resistance. Many Apalachee fled, others joined the Apalachicola to fight against the Spanish and other Apalachees. The headman of Ivitachuco brought Moore the Church silver and horses loaded with provisions in exchange for letting his people live. At least four other Apalachee headmen and their communities agreed to go willingly with Moore back to Carolina. These connections demonstrate the lasting connections between the Apalachee and Apalachicolas. Even while the Apalachicolas were destroying Apalachee communities, connections still existed that allowed for communication and negotiation between the victor and vanquished. While the possibilities were limited due to the power imbalance in this context, it does offer a glimpse of how Native communities maintained connections with people they warred with, and how those connections could be beneficial if only for survival. Alejandra Dubcovksy illustrates this by focusing on the experience of one Native resident of Patale, Antonio, to show the “plurality of Apalachee

769 “Letter of Governor Zúñiga to the King, San Augustín, March 30, 1704,” 49.
response to the ongoing violence.” Antonio survived the raids and hid in the woods outside of town to see who of his peoples survived and decided to pursue the attackers afterwards. Dubcovsky theorizes on whether Antonio found his family, joined them, or rescued them. That Antonio thought he could negotiate with the Apalachicola captors demonstrates what was possible with captivity and enslavement among the Native peoples of the South at the time.

Because some Natives decided to join Moore willingly, while others were captured and enslaved by the English and Apalachicola, the precise number of Apalachee enslaved on the expedition remains uncertain. In one account, Moore declared that in “this Expedition I brought away 300 men, and 1000 Women and Children have killed, and taken as slaves 325 men, and have taken Slaves 4000 Women and Children; tho’ I did not make Slave, or put to Death one Man, Woman or Child but what were taken in the Fight, or in the Fort I took by Storm.” Within his own account Moore contradicted himself. Here the expedition either brought away 300 men and 1,000 women and children or brought away and killed 1,300 men women and children—while enslaving another 4,325 people. The exact numbers remain unclear. Elsewhere, Moore claimed the “number of free Apalatchee Indians, w[ch are now under my Protection, bound with me to Carolina, are 300; the Indians under my Command killed and took Prisoners in the Plantations, whilst we stormed the Fort, as many Indians as we and they took and killed in the Fort.” Somewhere between 600 and over 5,000 people voluntarily left Apalachee or were enslaved by the English and Apalachiolas.

Complicating matters further was the return of an Apalachicola expedition in the summer of 1704. A reported 3,000 “pagan” Natives and a few Englishmen descended on Apalachee again.

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773 “Extract of Colo Moore’s Letter to the Lords Proprietors 16 April 1704,” 386
on June 23rd, 24th, and 29th of 1704. This raid attacked the western Apalachee towns taking thousands more captives, driving refugee Apalachees westward toward Pensacola, and forcing the Spanish to abandon San Luís. The Apalachees who were not enslaved or went voluntarily with the Apalachicolas, fled into the woods. Governor Zuñiga wrote to the crown that “this exodus [of Apalachees] has been under way, I believe, since the end of January,” 1704. An estimated 400 to 800 Apalachees, Chacatos, and Yamasees from Apalachee fled to the French in Mobile. After both invasions Apalachee was desolated. The captives taken from Apalachee were between 2,000 and 4,000 with an additional number brought to Carolina as virtual hostages who settled among the Native communities on the Savannah River. Between Moore’s 1702 expedition and the Apalachicola expedition of 1704, the Spanish missions of Apalachee were destroyed and the English and Apalachicolas “succeeded in depopulating the Province of Apalachee, together with the greater part of Timuqua.” Similar to the Guairá bandeiras, the destruction of Apalachee marked the end of the Spanish the mission system across Florida. While the missions of Paraguay would rebound in the eighteenth century, the Florida missions would never recover.

777 “Governor Zúñiga to the King, San Augustín, September 3, 1704,” 66.
The raids against the Spanish missions of Apalachee and Timuqua marked a turning point in the Native slave trade. Between 1705 and 1709, the English and their proto-Creek allies would return to Florida again and again to enslave the Natives of the peninsula. In 1705 and 1706, they raided what was left of Apalachee and Timuqua. Figure 8 below, a 1721 map of Carolina, depicts the “Province of the Timoquas” with a description that states “wholly lais waster being destroyed by ye Carolinians 1706.” The same map lists the “Tocobogga Indians” on the “St. Pedro River” of the Florida Gulf Coast north of what is today Tampa Bay, Florida, were “destroyd” in “1709.” In a 1715 Map from the British Public Records Office near the Flint River north of Apalachee a description states that “Here 400 Apalasky Indians were killed and taken by 6 of our traders and the Creeke Indians in 1708.” The proto-Creeks and the English persistently raided the Natives of Florida pushing numerous nations south as far as the Florida Keys. Between 1706 and 1711, thousands of Native peoples were evacuated from the Florida Keys to Cuba where they coalesced in new communities.

780 Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 64–65; Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 210–211. See also both sets of “The Notebook of Letters” 1707 from Microfilm Reel 5, SD 858 (58-2-8) in the John Worth Collection of microfilms from the Archivo General de Indias found at the P.K. Yonge Library at the University of Florida.
781 “A most particular and curious Ms. Map of North and south Carolina,” 1721, in “Map of Indian Tribes of the Southeast, 1715, 32-06-07 in Maps of the South Carolina Historical Society (SCHS), Charleston, South Carolina.
782 It is unclear if this description is meant to refer to the 1705 and 1706 raids against the Apalachee and misrepresented the date. “A very curious Map in ms. of North and South Carolina,” 1715 from the British Public Records Office in “Map of Indian Tribes of the Southeast, 1715, 32-06-07 in Maps of the SCHS.
Along with expanded raids into Florida, the proto-Creeks and the English looked further afield to expand the Native slave trade. In January of 1706, the French reported that the Choctaws of present-day southern Mississippi and Alabama “had been attacked by four thousand Indians, led on by the English, who had carried off upwards of three hundred of their women and children.”783 During the period, English traders made advances into both Chickasaw and Alabama towns and used their successes in Florida and the lure of guns for slaves to encourage the Chickasaw to enslave Native groups allied with the French.784 This expansion demonstrates the height of Native slaving in the southeast. The French recorded raids and counter raids between French and English allies. The Chickasaw and Alabamas raided the Choctaws, who counterraided the Alabamas. In 1706, the Tunicas fled the Chickasaws to seek refuge among the

783 La Harpe, Historical Journal, 34.
784 Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 211–220.
Houmas, and then displaced the Houmas to the banks of Bayou St. John. The pace of raids escalated as Native nations fought for survival, and the English sought to benefit from the expanding trade and prevent the French from getting a foothold among the Alabamas and Chickasaws.

Meanwhile slaving in Florida continued. In the 1715 British Public Records Office Map of Carolina, at a location on the “St. Whan” (St. Juan) River south of St. Augustine reads, “Here the Yamassee Indians leave their canoes to goe a slave Hunting it being 6 days running from St. Whan’s River Mouth.” This location north of the Native town of Mayaco means that the Yamassee were slaving far south into Florida close to Lake Okeechobee. The Yamassee would have taken Canoes from the coast of Georgia south to the mouth of the St. John’s river near present-day Jacksonville Florida and then south past St. Augustine near present day Orlando where they left their canoes to go slaving further south. In 1708, the Governor of Florida, Francisco Corcoles y Martínez wrote to the crown about the situation in Florida stating, “Nothing of all this has sufficed to prevent the enemy from continuing his constant killings and hostilities, which since the siege [of St. Augustine] they are doing, departing for this purpose from the Indian villages adjacent to Carolina, being aided by the English with guns, ammunition, cutlasses, and pistols, and even being accompanied by some English who urge, incite, and encourage them to these assaults.” The governor complained of the scale of the slaving, “each

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785 La Harpe, Historical Journal, 35. Ethridge, Chicaza to Chickasaw, 211–220. For an analysis of how the Houma nation developed and implemented adaptive relocation strategies to deal with other Native nations as well as the French, Spanish, British, and Americans, see J. Daniel d’Oney, A Kingdom of Water: Adaptation and Survival in the Houma Nation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020).
786 “A very curious Map in ms. of North and South Carolina,” 1715.
787 “Governor Francisco Corcoles y Martínez to the King, San Augustín, January 14, 1708,” in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here they Once Stood, 90–91.
day they are carrying, a growing number of these barbarous Indians, for there are not now left any of the Christians which were in Apalachee, Timuqua, Guale, and parts of Mayaca and Jororo. Altogether those they have carried off to sell as slaves must number more than ten or twelve thousand persons.”

These descriptions demonstrate the scale of the expansion of the Native slave trade during the first decade of the eighteenth century, the vast distances that became necessary for Native slavers to cover, and how depopulated the Native population of Florida had become.

By the first decades of the eighteenth century the nature of the Native slave trade in the Southeast changed. Thousands and thousands of Natives were enslaved across the Southeast. Those Natives who were exchanged with the English for guns and European goods were bound for plantations in Carolina or the Caribbean. The vast majority of those enslaved stayed in Native communities as dependents. For Moore’s 1702 raid he stated that natives took as many captives as his men did. For every English raid there were raids that the English were minimal actors in or not involved at all. This means that Native peoples found a need and use for Native captives, not just as exchangeable commodities with Europeans. Adoption, coalescence, and exchange of dependents all played roles in the expansion of the Native slave trade. Native captives were exchanged between Native groups as gifts to entrust goodwill. Influxes of captives—particularly women and children—were adopted into communities to take the place of lost kin or strengthen a group’s numbers. Whole groups were also adopted into these communities, as refugees from slaving and as seen in Chapter Four as slavers themselves. All these processes led to strategies that encouraged the incorporation of outsiders into larger groups and the process of coalescence.

788 “Governor Francisco Corcoles y Martínez to the King, San Augustín, January 14, 1708,” 90–91.
Furthermore, the exchange and gifting of captives attracted dependents and smaller groups toward larger groups. Both the physical and relational movement of the Alabamas, Tallapoosas, and others closer towards Coweta and Cusseta can be seen as part of this process. Coweta and Cusseta could supply the Yamasee, Westo, and others who sought their alliances with captives to be given as dependents. Headmen and warriors could provide not only European goods to their families and clans but also dependents to work on their behalf and adoptive kin to replace lost loved ones.\textsuperscript{789} In societies ravaged by war, slaving, and disease slaving strategies and the creation of dependents worked with the process of coalescence in larger numbers. Coalescence and slaving went hand in hand.

In addition, slaving and coalescence led to the creation of larger political, kinship, and economic networks among peoples of the southeast. The loose affiliation of towns that occasionally worked together to raid and enslave other Natives began to form confederacies and alliance structures that would eventually evolve into tribal and national structures. For example, in 1705, amidst the height of Native slaving in the Southeast a coalition of Native peoples signed a treaty with the English at Coweta. Centered on the Coweta and Cusseta, the diversity of Native signatories shows the power of coalescence at the time. The treaty was signed by the Okmulgee (a Hitchiti town), Okfuskee (a Coosa town), Poofchatche (Oakchaya), Shufthatchee (a Chiaha town), Tuckabatchee (Tallapoosa), and two Alabama towns. The Abekas and Altamahas (Yamasees) joined this alliance as well but not as signatories.\textsuperscript{790} This alliance declared that these

\textsuperscript{789} For a detailed account of this process with the headman Brim’s of Coweta and his followers see Hahn, \textit{Invention of the Creek Nation}, 71–74. For the roll of “big men” in kinship-based societies that practiced reciprocity see Marshall Sahlins, \textit{Tribesmen} (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968) 86–90.

\textsuperscript{790} Gallay cites \textit{The Humble Submission of the Kings, Princes, General, &c. to the Crown of England}, August 15, 1705, Broadsides, Great Britain, photostatic copy in Rare Book Room,
Native towns would not allow the French or Spanish to settle in the area, they would be friendly with the English, and “the friends and enemies of the English would be their friends and Enemies.” This alliance demonstrates two important changes in the networks of the South. First, and less importantly, it represented the Native signatories understanding that their interests paralleled those of Carolina in their imperial wars with other European colonial ventures. This meant that Native peoples now had an interest in keeping out the opponents of Carolina and cooperating with English traders. Secondly, and more importantly, it represents the potential of coalescence and slaving as strategies for survival. The signatories all remained separate towns and peoples, most with their separate languages, who thought of themselves as separate peoples for at least another century. But they had shared interests geopolitically, socially, and economically in working together and slaving. While Hahn argued the alliance created “a fleeting sense of political order among the various Indian towns,” that desperate towns saw the advantages of slaving and moving physically and relationally closer together demonstrates those Native networks of kinship and reciprocity working. The people who became the Creeks may not have thought of themselves as a nation at the time (some never did) but slaving created opportunities for alliances and networks of protection along Native pathways. Slavers often became friends of other slavers; this arguably is a characteristic of a slaving society. The connections and networks built between slavers at the turn of the eighteenth century proved to be stronger than their connections with Carolina traders.


792 Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 67.
By 1711–1712, Carolina slavers John Barnwell and James Moore were leading expeditions of Carolina colonists and Native allies against the Tuscarora in North Carolina—which officially became a separate colony in 1712. The Tuscarora War began when the Tuscarora captured and killed the famed colonist John Lawson over fears of the encroachment of Swiss and German settlers that Lawson sold land titles to along the Trent and Neuse rivers. Tuscaroras and their allies then turned on the Neuse River settlers. Barnwell and Moore were called in by the South Carolina assembly in response to the pleas of Neuse River inhabitants for aid against the Tuscaroras and their Coree allies. Barnwell and Moore led hundreds of Natives into North Carolina composed of: Apalachees, Cape Fear Indians, Catawbas, Cherokees, Congarees, Cusabos, Esaws, Hoopengs Peedees, Santee, Saraws, Saxapahaws, Sugarees, Suterees, Wareperes, Waterees, and Waxaws, Wianahs, and Yamasees, and Yuchis.793 This coalition of Native peoples and Carolinians routed the Tuscarora, killing hundreds, enslaving hundreds more, and sending the survivors fleeing northward to seek refuge amongst—and eventually become the Sixth Nation of—the Haudenosaunee.794

Similar to the proto-Creek slaving expeditions against the Apalachee between 1702–1706, the piedmont peoples who participated in the Tuscarora War saw the benefits of a collective slaving strategy against the Tuscarora. But as many Native combatants saw during the war, the English colonies were not as strong as—and more divided than—they once seemed. Native combatants had come to the aid of North Carolina colonists who needed their help. Moreover, Native peoples had created connections and networks during the Tuscarora War that made communications and understandings easier. The peoples of the southeast came to

793 Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 267–268.
794 Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 54.
understand that English colonists were encroaching upon other Native peoples lands as well and the price of resisting those encroachments was death or enslavement.\textsuperscript{795} When Native peoples of the Southeast had their own concerns about the ill-treatment of Native women by colonists, the abuses of English traders, the enslavement of kin, and increased indebtedness, they had ready-made networks and open pathways on which to discuss these problems and determine plans of action.\textsuperscript{796}

On April 15, 1715, at the Yamasee town of Pocotaligo, Native frustrations with Carolinians boiled over into what became the beginning of the Yamasee War. The Yamasees received a delegation of Carolinians including the trader Thomas Nairne for peace talks. At dawn the morning afterwards, the Yamasee surprised and killed most of the colonists and tortured the survivors, roasting Nairne for several days.\textsuperscript{797} This spark lit the flame that almost engulfed the Carolina colony at the hands of the colony’s former Native allies. The Yamasees, Yuchis, Savannahs, Apalachees, and Ochese Creeks (Coweta and Cusseta) all found common cause to turn against Carolina. Catawbas, Cherokees, Abekas, Coosas, Alabamas, Tallapoosas, and Choctaws would all join the cause for their own diplomatic interests.\textsuperscript{798} The bonds, networks, and strategies created by these communities during the period of the Native slave trade prompted them to reject that trade and turn against the English, or at the very least exploit the weakness of the English traders isolated amongst them once the war began.

\textsuperscript{795} Merrell, \textit{The Indians’ New World}, 71–72.
\textsuperscript{796} William L. Ramsey, \textit{The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 13–33. See also Larry E. Ivers, \textit{This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern Frontier, 1715–1728} (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016).
\textsuperscript{798} Ramsey, \textit{The Yamasee War}, 101–103.
But the core Native combatants of the Yamasee War lost. The Yamasee were scattered, the proto-Creeks on the Ocmulgee River were forced to migrate westward. The Savannah River was largely abandoned as the central hub of the Native slave trade with Charleston, while Charleston and Carolina survived and found themselves in stronger position vis a vis their former Native allies. Because of the rejection of the English traders and their abuses by Native peoples, the Native slave trade began to decline sharply, but the patterns of Native coalescence persisted even as the Yamasee War devastated and destroyed several Native groups of the southeast.\footnote{Ramsey, \textit{The Yamasee War}, 171.} The Coweta and Cussetas removed themselves to the Chattahoochee River Valley and absorbed Yamasee and Savanna Shawnee refugee communities.\footnote{Hall, \textit{Zamumo’s Gifts}, 128–131.} This coalescing Creek confederacy came to rely on strategies of accepting European gifts and goods while keeping them politically at a distance. After the Yamasee War, in a time of crisis Native peoples of the Southeast again turned to Native patterns and connections to create new strategies. Coalescence survived the Yamasee War, but the Native slave trade with Carolina would not. While Native peoples of the Southeast continued to practice Native captivity, slavery, and adoption among themselves arguably up until Removal, they no longer sought to capture and exchange enslaved Natives with European colonists. However, Native/European networks once used for the Native slave trade would be transformed for the expanding deerskin trade. That trade and the expansion of the importation of enslaved people of African descent would further transform the Southeast but patterns of coalescence and the creation of dependents through gift-giving persisted.
Part III Conclusion

In Part III: Coalescence and Consequences, I argue that the process of coalescence and slaving among Natives in São Paulo and Carolina developed in different directions. Natives and colonists in São Paulo and Carolina had developed slaving societies and competition over access to European traders pushed the acquisition of Native captives to unprecedented levels of violence and destruction. In Brazil, after the destruction of the Guairá missions and the repulson of bandeirantes by armed Natives in Uruguay and Tape, Paulistas were forced to change their strategies and resort to smaller slaving expeditions into the west and northern sertões. These new expeditions into the interior led to the spread of Native slaving into the interior of São Paulo and elsewhere as Paulistas, Natives, and other colonists saw Native slaving as an advantageous strategy to employ on the frontiers of Portuguese colonies. As Paulistas introduced Native peoples from more distant communities and different Native ethnic groups, the identity and status of Native peoples in São Paulo became increasingly generalized as an enslaved class. In Carolina, the intertwined processes of slaving and coalescence led to the rise of communities like Coweta and Cusseta who incorporated both slavers and the enslaved into their community as an emerging coalescent slaving society. The Coweta and Cusseta used access to English traders, the arms they provided, and the enslaved people they demanded as an opportunity to destroy the Spanish missions of Florida in 1702–1706. In the aftermath of the destruction of the Florida mission system, Coweta and Cusseta used their networks and connections developed during the Native slave trade to turn against the English colonists and almost destroy the Carolina colony in the Yamasee War. This war led to the decline of the Native slave trade in the region. Whereas in São Paulo, over the course of the seventeenth century Native slaving spread into the interior of Brazil and the status of enslaved Natives in São Paulo hardened and became fixed.
Conclusion: Comparing Slaving Societies Convergence and Divergence

By looking at the development of the Native slave trades and slaving societies in São Paulo and Carolina in the seventeenth century, we can see the development of several patterns of Atlantic slaving. First, marginal actors employed slaving as a strategy when they saw the potential to benefit from supplying enslaved captives to both Natives and Europeans. Natives in São Paulo and Carolina already employed cultural mechanisms for incorporating outsiders into their communities as adopted kin or slaves that could be exchanged as gifts. Secondly, slaving became a survival strategy for many Native groups during the seventeenth century. For some groups like the Tupi-speakers of the Piratininga Valley and the Coweta and Cusseta in southeastern North America, slaving provided the means to defend themselves against other slavers. However, this strategy often backfired in the long run—as it did for the Tememinó captives who fought alongside the Paulistas in the bandeiras of the 1620s and 1630s. These groups inhabited a blurred space between chattel slaves and dependents that was continually contested on the ground in São Paulo. As the lines between slaves and dependents blurred in São Paulo over the seventeenth century—many of those inhabitants came to be associated with enslaved dependents rather than as autonomous groups.

In Carolina, slaving backfired for numerous groups like the Westo and Yamasee who paid the price of their isolation from other Native groups. But that isolation also led to their incorporations and coalescence with the Lower Creeks. Their experience as slavers was valued by Coweta and Cusseta, and Native peoples of the South relied upon new connections like those developed with the Westo in the 1680s and older connections like those maintained with the

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801 Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History, 24.
Yamasee to coalesce into larger slaving polities. Those connections facilitated the networks of alliances that sparked the Yamasee War. These same groups incorporated refugees of slaving raids in the process that John Worth called “aggregation,” where an outside group coalesced with an existent group typically in a subordinate position. In this process, the lines between slavers and enslaved began to blur among those polities that coalesced which became the larger confederacies of eighteenth-century southeastern North America: the Creeks, Cherokees, Catawbas, Chickasaws, and Choctaws.

Coalescence among Native peoples also occurred in São Paulo for the enslaved warriors, laborers, and dependents. The enslaved ‘tupi’ who fought as warriors with the Paulistas and labored on fazendas growing local produce and wheat, consisted of people from dozens of different nations not limited to the: Tupinkim, Tupinamba, Tamoio, Tememino, Guaiá, Guarani, southern Kayapó and others. The Portuguese and Jesuits imposed overarching ethnonyms on these people that designated them tupi or guarani. After the bandeira raids on Guairá enslaved Native people in São Paulo became increasingly known as ‘carijos’ (signifying Guarani roots) and then just generic “índios” or “bastardos.” This process of ethnogenesis among enslaved and free Natives in colonial communities arguably created the concepts of a homogenized Native people and a Native race out of people who previously had not seen themselves as a collective. Coalescence occurred with the refugee Guarani populations in the

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803 Ramsey, Yamasee War, 101–158.
805 Monteiro, Blacks of the Land, 148.
806 Muriel Nazzari, “Transition toward Slavery.” As Monteiro argued ‘The Potiguar, Tupinquim, Tememinó and Tupinaé were all Tupinambá in a certain sense, however in the colonial context, clearly, they were not. In this sense, to understand this “Native Brazil,” we must first review the tendency of successive generations of historians and anthropologists who sought to isolate,
Rio de la Plata and arguably among the Native groups of the sertões of Pernambuco and Bahia during the *Guerra dos Bárbaros*. However, outside of populations that were placed in aldeias to be administered by the state (Native populations that were technically free but effectively maintained in servitude) in the eighteenth century, there is very little evidence of coalescence among groups in the interior. I suspect that coalescence did occur among Native populations who removed to the interior of Brazil away from slave raids, but I do not have the evidence to demonstrate this in the seventeenth century.

In both Portuguese Brazil and English North America, colonists needed laborers to provide crops for sustenance and for profit as well as Native allies who could protect them from other more hostile Natives. In many colonial examples in the Americas, enslaved Africans often came to meet that demand where products like sugar, tobacco, and rice became cash crops able to produce levels of profit in European markets to attract traders who sold enslaved Africans.

The Brazilian historian Fernando Novais, while focusing on sugar production, argued that the Atlantic “slave trade” in Africans, as the “supply of slaves to the colonies, opened up a new and important sector of the colonial trade, while the capture of Native peoples was an internal

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808 Alencastro, *O Trato dos Viventes*
business of the colony.”\footnote{Novais, Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777–1808), Nona Edição (São Paulo: Hucitec Editora, 2011) 104–105. Novais’ work is full of examples of the dangers of reading regional or eighteenth and nineteenth-century contexts backwards and applying the as rules for other times and regions. Sugar was not the basis for all colonization and slavery in the Americas. We cannot insert colonial systems in places where historical actors did not implement them. Also, as shown by this dissertation, the wishes of European investors and proprietors in the colonies were often—just that—wishes that were not realized by colonial actors on the ground.} But, as I have already noted, Native peoples and colonists of São Paulo and Carolina created Native slave trades within the colonies that extended into the interiors of South and North America—and also into the Atlantic. Stuart Schwartz argued that in Brazil the transition from employing enslaved Natives to enslaved Africans was “well on its way” by the seventeenth century, “especially in the northeastern sugar region where capital had accumulated and the patterns of international commerce were securely established.”\footnote{Schwartz, “Indian Labor,” 79.} The qualifiers in Schwartz’s argument are important. Atlantic merchants—and the metropoles and crowns that supported them financially and legally—were invested in producing, profiting off, and taxing the exchange in enslaved Africans. The logistics of early modern empire meant that it was easier for imperial bureaucracies to account for and tax the importation of enslaved Africans to the Americas.

There is a reason Native slave trades flourished in the absences of imperial authority, supervision, and capital. As Alan Gallay succinctly explained in the Carolina case: “Capital-hungry colonists, with no access to labor or mineral wealth as existed in other colonies, stole human beings to fulfill their self-gratification.”\footnote{Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 357.} In peripheral places on the fringes of European empires—where cash crops were not or could not be produced, like Carolina and São Paulo—

\footnote{809}Fernando A. Novais, Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777–1808), Nona Edição (São Paulo: Hucitec Editora, 2011) 104–105. Novais’ work is full of examples of the dangers of reading regional or eighteenth and nineteenth-century contexts backwards and applying the as rules for other times and regions. Sugar was not the basis for all colonization and slavery in the Americas. We cannot insert colonial systems in places where historical actors did not implement them. Also, as shown by this dissertation, the wishes of European investors and proprietors in the colonies were often—just that—wishes that were not realized by colonial actors on the ground.\footnote{810}Schwartz, “Indian Labor,” 79.\footnote{811}Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 357.
Native slaving became the path to wealth. Enslaving Natives was a Native solution to demographic collapse and the spread of the Native slave trade. Enslaving Natives was also a colonial solution to the absence of merchants to provide enslaved Africans and the absence of capital to purchase enslaved Africans. This wealth can be demonstrated in the values attached to enslaved Natives in colonial inventories, the sale of their produce, but also in their value as dependents in colonial and Native households where retinues and accumulation of people demonstrated wealth and status. In short, Native slaving was successful on the frontiers between Natives and Europeans. Because of this, indigenous slavery often persisted in some form with the expansion of colonial projects in the Americas and the forms and statuses of enslaved Natives in bondage often straddled a gray area between Native bondage and chattel slavery.

This is particularly true in considering the transformative role women and gender played in the coalescence of peoples involved in the Native slave trades in Carolina and São Paulo. In both locales the overwhelming number of captives taken and exchanged were women and children. This led to imbalanced sex ratios among the enslaved populations which shaped the formations of those enslaved cultures. For example, in São Paulo enslaved women were kept as concubines, helping to both create networks among enslaved and free Natives, and with Portuguese settlers. However, this pattern also disrupted Native marital patterns and family

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structures. The subjection of Native women to nonconsensual partnerships with men of Native, European, and African descent helped further create an overarching collective ethnic identity of ‘índios’ in São Paulo where what determined the fate of a child’s enslaved status was recognition of parentage by a white man. 816 In Carolina, most of the enslaved Native population was exported outside of the colony, mostly to the Caribbean. 817 We do not know the exact sex ratios of those exported slaves, but those enslaved Natives maintained in bondage within the Carolina colony were overwhelmingly women and children. 818 These Native women were often employed in provisioning larger plantations and in domestic work, meaning their agricultural knowledge of local produce allowed planters to focus other enslaved laborers on Rice production in the early decades of the eighteenth century which subsequently led to the large-scale importation of enslaved Africans. But Native women in the Carolina case were also subjected to nonconsensual relationships with white slaveowners and often with other enslaved people: African men. Many of the descendants of Native women and African men came to be categorized racially by colonists and colonial officials as “mustee.” Over time, this led to the development of an enslaved class that was defined as being of African descent, largely erasing the connections with enslaved Natives by the middle of the eighteenth century. 819

This observation suggests a pathway for further research that analyzes the roles enslaved Native women and gender played in the racialization of slavery in São Paulo and Carolina. How did Native enslaved women in Carolina and São Paulo shape both colonial and Native societies through their domestic and reproductive labor? Further examination may illuminate differences

817 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 6–8, 144–148.
818 Ramsey, Yamasee War, 174–177.
in the process of the racialization of slavery in São Paulo and Carolina as well as possible differences in that racialization when enslaved women were the coerced partners of free men of European descent and when they were the coerced partners of enslaved men of Native and African descent. What role did the tying of enslaved status to blackness in the Carolinas help in rhetorically and literally erasing enslaved Natives from the history of slavery as well as lead to concepts like the one drop rule in the United States of America? In São Paulo, can the manipulation of racial categories of whiteness through recognition by a white father be seen as a precursor to the process known as *Branqueamento* or “whitening?” These are questions and routes of analysis that need to be explored. The sexual and labor relationships of enslaved Native women were at the core of the cultural, societal, and racial formations of free and enslaved peoples in Carolina and Brazil. Exploring enslaved Native women’s roles in these processes stands to make a significant contribution to how we understand women’s roles in slavery, coercion, violence, and cultural formation and their lasting legacies in the modern world.\(^{820}\)

There exist innumerable fundamental differences between the case of São Paulo and Carolina, including the distinctions in the cultures and societies of Native, European, and African peoples in both cases. However, for my concerns, the greatest difference appears in the relationships established between Native warriors and settlers during the slave raids. In both contexts, independent indigenous peoples led slave raids against other indigenous communities, independent from European settlers. But, in São Paulo, the Native warriors who fought alongside the Paulistas in slave

raids were considered slaves or dependent subjects; they lived among the Paulistas. In Carolina, for the large slave raids, Native warriors were allies of Carolina and had their own villages and peoples apart from the colony; they were not subordinate to Carolina but were allies. This fundamental distinction in European-Native relations shaped the formation of these slave societies in important ways. The Native warriors of São Paulo (or their descendants) appear to have fallen into more dynamic forms of slavery as the seventeenth century progressed. This, and the nature of the *mameluco* (Euro-Native) culture in São Paulo at the time, led to the creation of a servant class of Native peoples in São Paulo in the seventeenth century who, if not legally enslaved, were enslaved in everything but name until the middle of the eighteenth century.821

In Carolina, a large portion of the Native peoples maintained their absolute independence from the settlers.822 This is because enslaved Natives were mostly exported out of the colony, which means that the enslaved indigenous population in Carolina did not form to the extent it did in São Paulo—the enslaved population that developed in Carolina was predominantly of African descent during the Native slave trade. With that in mind, between 1670 and 1715, Carolina exported more enslaved Natives than it imported enslaved Africans. The enslaved Native population at its height represented only about 25% of the entire enslaved populations residing on plantations in Carolina.823 Most enslaved people in Carolina were of African descent. Although enslaved Natives played key roles in the development of Carolina culture, they were never the majority—Peter Wood was right about that.824 This is different from what occurred in São Paulo where the enslaved population always consisted of people of Native and African descent, but in the seventeenth century enslaved

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822 In the case of the local coastal peoples allied with or under the protection of Carolina that came to be known as “settlement Indians” see Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 51–52.
Natives made up the majority. This Native proportion of the enslaved population in Carolina, and the imbalance in sex ratios between Native women and African men, is linked to the common practice of relationships between Native women and African men on plantations. This common occurrence directly impacted the future of slavery in North America, as Carolina legislatures tied slavery to blackness, helping to make the history of slavery in the North American South a history of centuries of racialized slavery.

When considering the contextual developments that changed the futures of the Native slave trades and Native slavery in Carolina and São Paulo, two processes stand out. First, São Paulo continued to expand as a slaving society on the frontier.825 One reason for this was that the Paulistas expelled the Jesuits in 1640; the strongest colonial voices in opposition to the enslavement of Native peoples were removed. The independence of Portugal (with most of its colonies) from Spain in 1640 meant that the Paulistas were no longer required to respect the laws of the Unified Iberian Crown. By the eighteenth century, the Paulistas ceased to be a slaving society and became a slave society, that is, a society where slaves were the main labor force producing goods for the Brazilian market. The economic emphasis on the production of slaves was refocused on what slaves could produce. Despite this, the strategies developed in São Paulo were employed in the sertões of Bahia, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul and Goiás—arguably even further into the interior of Brazil, even into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.826

Slaving strategies existed elsewhere in Brazil and persisted not solely because they were learned and implemented by colonists expanding into the interior—this did occur—but because they were slaving strategies developed by Native peoples that made sense in Native labor regimes.

Colonists encouraged, exacerbated, and profited from the exploitation of Native slaving, but slaving and the acquisition of captives continued to be a pathway for Native men to distinguish and provide for themselves and their communities.  

The pattern of *mameluco* men using their connections in both Portuguese and Native society to descend Natives continued in Amazônia where they came to be known as *cunhamenas*. The discovery of gold and precious stones in what became Minas Gerais at the turn of the eighteenth century spurred the introduction of vast numbers of enslaved Africans into São Paulo which changed the composition of the enslaved population. But it did not change the strategies employed by settlers and some Native groups on the expanding colonial frontiers of Brazil. Native slaving continued in Brazil and shaped the colonization of the Brazilian interior and the formation of the Brazilian nation to this day.

In the Carolina case, the Native slave trade largely came to an end with the culmination of two geopolitical events in the first decades of the eighteenth century that transformed the trajectory of the Carolina colony and the history of North America. First, after the destruction of the Spanish mission system Native slaving in the southeast continued to spread and escalate to an unsustainable level. By 1715 the Yamasee and their Lower Creek allies had enough of the costs of slaving that led to reprisals by their Native enemies and the abuses of Carolina traders. The Yamasee and their Creek allies turned on their former Carolina allies and almost destroyed the Carolina colony. However, through the assistance of the Cherokee, the colonists won the Yamasee war and scattered the Yamasee as a polity and pushed the Lower Creeks further into the interior. At this juncture, Native peoples in the southeast began to turn to the French and Spanish again as allies and attempted to keep the British at arms-length for a while as they

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coalesced together as unified polities. Slaving continued among Native communities, but Carolina colonists turned away from the purchase of enslaved Natives and toward the importation of enslaved Africans. Secondly, the Yamasee War coincided with the end of the Queen Anne’s War and the British acquisition of the Spanish *asiento* contracts to supply enslaved Africans to the Spanish Americas. With the acquisition of these contracts and the increasing production of Rice in South Carolina, colonists turned away from the enslavement of Natives as the British Crown found a vested interest in the exportation and taxation of enslaved Africans to the Americas when Native slavers proved least willing to provide enslaved Natives. The consequence was the spread of racialized chattel slavery across the south, instead of the continued enslavement of Native Americans.

Finally, the comparison of slaving strategies in the Americas suggests the developments of colonial and indigenous patterns of exchange, diplomacy, negotiation, and violence that exacerbated the devastation of Native peoples in the Americas through wars, slaving, enslavement, and the diseases that accompanied contact. But Native peoples could not have known this. In the seventeenth century, Native peoples used Native strategies and Native connections to create new Native alliances and polities that shaped the future of the Americas. The large coalescent peoples of the North American Southeast used slavery and coalescence as parallel survival strategies. Native polities used the connections, networks, and alliances created during the Native slave trade to oppose Carolina in the Yamasee War and moreover to coalesce among those Native partners after defeat in that war. Coalescence and slaving allowed for the reincorporation of Native peoples in the Southeast in ways that did not occur for the Native slavers in São Paulo. However, the persistence of the Guarani Native populations may have been based on their coalescence around missions in the seventeenth-century Rio de la Plata and their
subsequent contestations over control of those spaces in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In both cases, Native peoples continued to use Native cosmologies and priorities to make their decisions in an ever-changing world.

Recently, the Atlantic scholar Manuel Barcia lamented the failure of different Atlantic Historiographies to communicate with each other across language barriers and field. Barcia also suggested that much work was needed “in order to address the disconnect between Atlantic and Native American histories.”829 This dissertation seeks to address both of those issues by bringing together Native American, Brazilianists, Early North American, Africanist, and Atlantic historiographies to argue that we cannot understand the development of the Americas, of slaving or slavery in the Americas, without understanding how Native peoples influenced and shaped them. Furthermore, for too long scholars have created siloed Atlantics where colonial empires and subjects interact within their British, Portuguese, Spanish, French, and Dutch bubbles. By connecting Brazilian, Latin American, and American scholars in English and Portuguese, the goal of this dissertation is to rethink the nationalistic divides placed on our scholarships and attempt a truly Atlantic analysis of Native America.830 Within that intention, I do not seek to recreate a siloed Atlantic separate from the rest of the world, but to analyze a perspective based on its own terms—to look at the connections and similarities in the developments of processes influenced by peoples of the Americas, Europe, and Africa.831 As Nicholas Canny argued, “the endless interesting potential comparative studies” in Atlantic history, “indicate[] that the totality

830 For a detailed critique of the siloing of colonial Atlantics see: Jorge Cañizares Esguerra and Benjamin Breen, “Hybrid Atlantics: Future Directions for the History of the Atlantic World,” History Compass 11, no. 8 (August 2013): 597–609.
of the Atlantic experience will be savored only when the achievements of the particular are placed in the context of the more general.” Comparing the development of Native and colonial slaving societies in the Carolina and Brazil aims to do just that.

With that said, the pattern of adaptation and co-optation of Indigenous slaving strategies to meet local geopolitical realities and the demands of Europeans on the coasts looks remarkably similar to the history of slaving and slavery in Africa. Scholars from Africa and of colonial Africa have already demonstrated how the slaving strategies of Africans and their geopolitical and social priorities shaped the exportation of enslaved Africans out of the continent. Conceptualizing how Native slaving strategies shaped the formation of Native slave trades in the Americas parallels the work already done by Africanists. But this begs the question, what if the strategies of indigenous peoples in America were similar to the strategies of indigenous peoples in Africa, what are the real differences between the slave trades in Africa and the Americas?

Certainly, the tens of millions of enslaved Africans imported from Africa through the Atlantic to the Americas were greater in numbers than the enslaved Natives exchanged in the Native slave trades in the Americas. Furthermore, we cannot easily pinpoint the numbers of people enslaved by Africans in Africa—or the number of Native peoples enslaved by Native peoples in the Americas. The legalization of the trade in enslaved Africans across the Atlantic produced that documents that scholars today base their estimates on the numbers of enslaved Africans sold through the Atlantic trade. We are only able to assess the magnitude of the Atlantic slave trade in enslaved Africans because of the records produced by it. Relevant to discussions of those numbers, the demographic collapse of Native populations in the Americas—"a destruction

of life on a scale without precedent in human experience”—was caused by disease, war, slavery, and displacement that came with sustained contact between Natives and Europeans. This depopulation of the Americas generated the demand for enslaved African laborers.833 The numbers of Africans enslaved in the Atlantic trade are linked to the demographic collapse of Native populations. The Native demographic crisis in the Americas worsened through the spread of Native slaving and the Native slave trade. Those connections need to be explored further. According to Dias, the trade in enslaved Africans ‘attributes cohesion to the Atlantic space,” but ‘there are processes that occur because of exchanges and dynamics that equally converge with Atlantic circuits, but which do not necessarily go through the trade in enslaved Africans.”834 To understand these convergences and processes, we need to understand how slaving societies developed in the early modern world.

One of those processes was the creation of racial categories in the Atlantic; categories arguably exacerbated and developed within the Atlantic slave trade. Should scholars separate the patterns of enslavement of peoples in the Atlantic based on racial classifications? I argue no. By looking at Native influences on colonial slaving strategies in the Americas, we can see the Atlantic slave trade as one large interconnected market that developed from the European co-optation of indigenous captivity practices in both the Americas and Africa. The Native slave trades in the Americas should be seen as part of the Atlantic slave trade, not separate from it. This can be seen in the decline of the Native slave trade in Southeastern North America only when English colonists secured access to supplies, networks, and contracts for enslaved Africans via the Spanish Asientos. Analyzing the creation of slaving societies, how they created racial and

834 Dias, ‘Os índios, a Amazônia e os conceitos de escravidão e liberdade’, 247.
rational justifications for slavery, how they transformed those categories over time, and the social, cultural, and legal consequences of those processes is of the upmost importance.

In fact, we learn more about slavery by analyzing the process of enslavement and slaving strategies. The institutions of slavery—in all their violence, destruction, and cruelty—were created and constructed by the development of slaving strategies and through the process of enslavement. Thinking about how those processes played out, how they changed, adopted, and survive to this day shows the longevity and consequences of slavery. Today, in Charleston, South Carolina there are streets named after native enslavers, like the Bull and Blake families. The Lord Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper’s name adorns rivers, neighborhoods, and streets. Today in Brazil there are highways, neighborhoods, cities, and statues to famous bandeirantes that exalt them as explorers and frontiersmen. Infamous Native enslavers like Bartolomeu Bueno da Silva, better known as Anhanguera (the sly devil), has a statue at the Tenente Siqueira Campos Park on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo and Antonio Raposo Tavares has statues at the Paulista Museum in São Paulo and even in Beja, Portugal. Native enslavement is seen as an afterthought to the more important story of the enslavement of Africans. Colonial enslavers of Natives are exalted as explorers and founders of cities. Only recently—if at all—have scholars and the public begun to rethink the legacies of colonial enslavers of Natives. Native slavery and the Native slave trade need to be contextualized and memorialized as brutal parts of colonization in the Atlantic and Americas, not as transition steps to the enslavement of Africans or peripheral concerns.

The exploitation of Native bodies is linked to the expropriation of Native lands in North and South America. The history of that exploitation and dispossession shapes the rights available to Native peoples and the avenues available to them to adjudicate and defend those rights in
Brazil, the United States of America, and across the Americas today. In the case of the United States, following the work of Reséndez, how could there be an increase in Native enslavement in some western “free” states, during and after the American Civil War—a war aimed at preventing the expansion of institutions of racialized slavery of people of African descent? The reason, as I see it, is that slavery was not—and is not—a rigid institution of fixed status frozen in the past. Enslavement is best understood as slaving: a process of strategies applied by people in different times and contexts to exploit other human beings. By studying the history of Native slavery, slaving strategies, and slaving societies, it is possible to demonstrate the adaptability, legacies, and permanence of slavery.

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836 Reséndez, The Other Slavery, 266–321.
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