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Enslaved Native Americans and the Making of South Carolina, 1659–1739

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues for the importance of enslaved Native Americans in the history of early South Carolina. European colonists were forced to draw from captives originating in North America and Africa if they wanted to use enslaved labor since South Carolina was a site of slaving from two continents. Many colonists ended up a polyglot African/Native American population to coerce labor from in their economic pursuits. The gendered dynamics of the trans-Atlantic (more male) and Native American (more female) captive trades led to opportunities for marriage between enslaved people from both continents, whose offspring were called “Mustees.” By understanding the place of enslaved Native Americans—making up a full quarter of the enslaved population of South Carolina in the early eighteenth century—this dissertation argues for drastically different interpretations of the workings of the captive trades and the development of the colonial state, the social and spatial development of enslaved society, the development of plantation management, and finally the formation of a creole culture. I propose a transformative understanding of the entangled histories of the peoples who made up the enslaved population of early South Carolina and how they came together through circumstance to forge a new culture from their accumulated knowledge and experience by intertwining the histories of enslaved Native Americans and Africans. This dissertation is interdisciplinary in method, utilizing an ambitious approach with history, sociology, anthropology, and geography. Enslaved Native Americans have been erased from the broader histories of enslavement in the Americas and I am writing them back into the narrative, not as a first chapter, giving way to African slavery, but as important actors in their own right. My project therefore undercuts racist teleologies undergirding popular assumptions of both the inevitability of the disappearance of Native American
peoples as well as chattel slavery in the Americas as being only the history of African peoples.
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I always have found a disconnect between the image of the historian as this singular figure, spending years alone in archives and writing, and my own experiences as a member of multiple intellectual communities. All the many faults of this dissertation are mine. All the strengths belong to constellations of the people I have mentioned.
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Source Abbreviations


CSCDEP Johnson, D. Andrew. Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples.


MRIS Miscellaneous Records, Interregnum Series, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.

MRMS Miscellaneous Records, Main Series, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.

MRPS Miscellaneous Records, Proprietary Series, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.

NAS National Archives of Scotland.

SCDAH South Carolina Department of Archives and History.

SCG South Carolina Gazette.

SCHGM The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine.

Shaftesbury Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Langdon Cheves, ed. The Shaftesbury Papers. Charleston: South Carolina Historical Society, 1897.


WMQ  
*The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series.*

WPA  
Works Progress Administration Transcripts, South Carolina Department of Archives and History
Notes on Terminology

In this dissertation I have not changed any spellings from primary sources.

All currency is in colonial South Carolina pounds (£) unless otherwise noted.

One of my analytical rubrics is the way colonists in South Carolina racialized enslaved people in documentary records. There are problems with assuming the ethnocultural background of enslaved people in this manner. I acknowledge that by accepting the racial discourse of colonists, I am also reifying the colonial discourse on human difference. I have decided to go ahead and use this racialized discourse because although race has always been a contested category, it is useful to consider the perceived ethnocultural differences between enslaved peoples because there were reasons colonists employed it and there were ethnocultural differences between enslaved people in early South Carolina. Hopefully scholars in the future will be able to decolonize this discourse and move closer to understanding the ways enslaved people in early South Carolina thought about their own histories and cultures.
Introduction

In October 1739, Joseph Wragg placed an advertisement in the *South Carolina Gazette* for three enslaved men who had run away from his plantation on Goose Creek. Wragg, one of the most successful merchants, planters, and slavers in South Carolina, had waited about a month after the escape to take out the advertisement. Two of the enslaved men, England and Prosper, had run away within roughly a week following one of the watershed moments in the history of slavery in North America: the Stono Rebellion. The third man, Prince, waited three weeks to join England and Prosper, taking a horse from Wragg to aid in his flight. In many ways, the flight of England, Prosper, and Prince was similar to the actions of countless others who were held in bondage and had chosen to resist their status as dominated chattel property in the colonial era and beyond. But in another sense, this simple advertisement hints at a story more complicated than most historical narratives of enslavement in the early Americas have captured. Prosper and Prince were England’s sons, and they were described as belonging to different racial categories. England was described as being a “Negro,” while Prosper and Prince were “Mustee[s].” All three worked in the same skilled trade: bricklaying. Inscribed on the bodies of these men were phenotypical descriptors understood by Wragg to denote their origin—what we may consider to be their race—in which lay a story that scholars have overlooked and this dissertation seeks to interrogate. Wragg and other colonial South Carolinians used the term “Mustee” to refer to the offspring of a Native American and a
person of African descent. Prosper and Prince were the physical and cultural embodiment of an early history of slavery in South Carolina.¹

Wragg’s runaway advertisement serves as an apt introduction to the historiographical issue at the heart of “Native Americans and the Making of a South Carolina Enslaved Society.” While three enslaved men had absconded from Wragg’s plantation, a fourth member of their family did not. Due to the way colonists described enslaved people in early South Carolina, the mother of Prosper and Prince must have been an enslaved Native American woman, although we have no way of knowing if she was living at the time of the escape. Prosper and Prince were therefore the offspring of overlapping slaving projects, one based in the Americas and the other in West Africa.² Their parents came from different worlds, but they managed to recreate social ties in South Carolina. The presence of enslaved people such as England, Prosper and Prince, his two sons, and their unnamed mother in early South Carolina forces us to

¹ *SCG*, October 13, 1739, and *BD*, 727–9.

² In this dissertation, I have employed the language of “slaving” and “captives” to and from South Carolina. One incongruence I have noticed in the languages used by scholars of trans-Atlantic “slavery” and those of Native American “slavery” is that scholars of trans-Atlantic slaving typically dub people in the midst of a forced migration “slaves,” while scholars of Native American slaving often call analogous victims in the Americas “captives.” In order to level my language between these various sites of slaving, I consciously call people who had been captured (in either North America or Africa) and were in the process of migrating “captives.” I have conceived of a difference between captivity and enslavement. In order to conceptualize these trades in a similar vein, I am considering people to have been “enslaved” when they were coerced to labor against their will, while “captives” were more simply being held against their will. Practically speaking, this means that while this solution is far from ideal, whenever slavers were bringing people to Charles Town—as it were, into the European colonial project—they were “captives,” while when they were living and working on plantations, they had been “enslaved.” Some of my thinking on this comes in response to Joseph C. Miller, *The Problem of Slavery as History: A Global Approach* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), especially 19–29.
reconceptualize the origins and development of colonial slavery in the histories of the Americas.

Not only was enslavement an increasingly institutionalized social status for peoples of African origin, but for roughly the first fifty years of the colony, South Carolina was also a site of the slaving and marketing of Native American captives on a massive scale. Although most Native Americans traded through Charles Town ended

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up somewhere in the Caribbean or other colonial outposts, a significant number relative to the local enslaved population remained in the colony. As was the case with enslaved Africans, Native Americans were ripped from their communities and thrust into a society in which they were dominated and exploited by European colonists. The concept of commodifiable humans was based on the systematic dislocation of human bodies out of one context and coerced migrations into others, with enslaved peoples being forced to adapt to circumstances over which they had no control. Captives entered South Carolina from virtually all directions, and they were each victims of this forced social re-embedding. Together, they made the best of their collective dreadful situation by creating a new subaltern society and culture forged in bondage. When studying commodity-plantation societies dominated (in numbers) by enslaved people, scholars often call this necessary adaptation “creolization,” which I conceive of as a type of cultural formation in the context of the early-modern Atlantic.  


I am employing the term “creolization” in this dissertation, which I define as a type of cultural formation particular to societies where large numbers of enslaved peoples labored on plantations and had limited interaction with dominant Europeans. Creolization has become an expansive concept in scholarly discourse and following anthropologist Sidney Mintz, I think we need to be as specific as possible as to the social situations where this type of culture formed. At the other end of the interpretive spectrum, historians James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra have argued that the terms of scholarly discourse have served as artificial boundaries between sociocultural formations among disparate groups in the early-modern Atlantic where similarities across the
Enslavement in the early modern Atlantic was not only a tearing of the social fabric of individuals—social death—but also the forced re-embedding of peoples in bondage. In colonial South Carolina, the sociocultural disruption of slavery featured the forcing together of peoples of a multitude of origins. Although they would not have thought of themselves as such, we know some of these peoples as “Gambians,” “Angolans,” and “Eboe Negros,” but also those we know of as Choctaw, Tuscarora, Westo, and Creek peoples, to name but a few. They came from Africa and North America, but also parts of the Caribbean such as Anguilla, Curaçao, and Barbados. These people, forced into daily contact with each other, began to form new social bonds out of the existential horror of enslavement. Intermarriage between people of different West-African identities was commonplace, but so was intermarriage spanning continental origins. Prosper and Prince were the products of the overlapping nature of slaving to interpretive divides can be useful; ethnogenesis of Native Americans, creolization of enslaved Africans, and hybrid European cultures had enough similarities that thinking across these divides can be useful. My solution, thinking that Mintz, Sidbury, and Cañizares-Esguerra are each correct, is to reconcile these ideas. I think ethnogenesis is useful as a concept to use at a broad level to think about how the early-modern colonial milieu rapidly gave people reason to adapt their cultures (often in the face of violence), while creolization is a particular type of ethnogenesis, a way to think about plantation contexts with, as Mintz argues, specific types of social necessities. Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Three Ancient Colonies: Caribbean Themes and Variations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, “Mapping Ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic,” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 181–208; and Sidney Wilfred Mintz and Richard Price, An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976).

Sociologist Orlando Patterson famously defined slavery as “social death” and argued “slavery is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” Patterson’s definition, centered on the social dislocation of enslaved peoples from their kinship contexts, goes a long way toward explaining the social meaning of slavery. Thus defined, slavery is a wrenching away of peoples, but this is only half of the story. Enslaved peoples always attempted to recreate social bonds once placed into new contexts. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 13.
South Carolina: their mother was Native American, while their father was of African descent. 

This dissertation argues for the entangled histories of indigenous Americans, peoples of West-African origin, and indentured Europeans as coerced labor in South Carolina, which went on to become one of the most important colonial projects (and settler-colonial societies) to be constructed on a foundation of enslaved labor in early-modern North America. These people labored on early plantations and set the social, cultural, economic, and even spatial framework with which larger influxes of captive people from West Africa later in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would contend. The enslaved people in this study and their descendants were the foundation upon which later, better-documented, and more-studied people continued to strive for friends, family, and indeed, freedom. Integral to the foundation of the society and culture of the enslaved in South Carolina were Native Americans. Slaving, often used by Native American warriors and European colonists as either the reason for warfare or a happy byproduct thereof, was a way to dispossess indigenous peoples without killing them. The fate of slaving victims in colonial North American plantation contexts is a central historical problem that I aim to better understand with this dissertation.

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6 Examples of regional or ethnic descriptors used by colonists in runaway advertisements include a “Gambia Negro” named Tony, SCG, April 2, 1741; an “Angola” named Cudgoe, SCG, April 16, 1741 and an “Angola” woman named Jenny, SCG, June 4, 1744; Primus was described as an “Eboe,” SGC, July 5, 1735; Will was said to be from Anguilla, SCG, March 13, 1749; Clacs was “Born in Curacea as he says,” SCG, February 25, 1749; and Paul was from Barbados, SCG, Aug 24, 1752.
Indigenous peoples in the Americas became victims of colonialism in ways beyond material, cultural, and historical dispossession. Slaving by outside indigenous groups and European colonists was a central component of the early modern colonial world, as everyone in the Americas attempted to survive the shock and barbarity of life in the wake of European intrusion. It is true that countless Native Americans died prematurely from diseases brought to the Americas after 1492, and European colonists, in their quest to dominate the Americas, killed massive numbers of people as well. But as scholars have recently argued, slaving was a third defensive front that Native Americans had to face, and the consequences of disease, warfare, and slaving were integral, intertwined components of the eventual American conquest.7

Captives taken by indigenous people or colonists in order to eventually trade (or give) to European colonial outposts did not vanish. In most instances, colonists who were lucky enough to own—by which I mean a European legal property relation—a captive Native American either put them to labor or sold them to someone else. The end result for Native American captives was almost always forced labor in a European colony.\(^8\) Scholars have written about the ways colonists coerced labor out of indigenous peoples in many circumstances in the early-modern period, but one colonial context we know little about is plantations where colonists forced bound indigenous laborers to produce agricultural staples for marketing in the broader early-modern Atlantic economy.\(^9\)

Historical narratives of the development of plantation economies and enslavement of peoples from West Africa have been a vital thread in early American and Atlantic historiographies for decades. Scholars have brilliantly recovered the ways enslaved peoples from West Africa were coerced into producing commodities such as sugar, tobacco, and rice, as well as uncovering ways the enslaved coped with their terrifying...

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\(^8\) Some captives were ransomed back to their people, which was in effect another form of sale, but was nevertheless a sale out of the colonial regime. Other Native American captives were kept for a term and then released in a similar manner to European indentured servants.

existence. There is a problem in this literature that I am solving with this project. The eventual dominance of the enslaved population of peoples from West and West Central

Africa on plantations developed over time. In addition, over the course of the eighteenth century (by historical actors and then by scholars studying those same pasts) the terms “slave” and “negro” became conflated as enslaved Native Americans became less visible on plantations. These dynamics have led historians to overlook enslaved Native Americans in surviving records from the colonial period. Scholars have generally interrogated the problem of race-based slavery as a binary proposition involving whites and blacks, but working backwards from the assumptions of late-era statutory enslavement suffers from the problem of telos. The development of early enslavement in South Carolina was much more complex than later appeared. My dissertation corrects this oversight and begins a much-needed conversation about how we should understand the roles that enslaved Native Americans played in plantation societies, using South Carolina as a case study.¹¹

During the first decades of the South Carolina colony, there was an abundance of land available for conquering but colonists lacked both labor and capital. There was little indigenous resistance to colonists setting up plantations distant from Charles Town. Colonists set about attempting to discover agricultural crops that would prove fruitful for

¹¹ For a scholar pointing out one of the central issues this dissertation investigates, the largely-unaddressed history of enslaved Native Americans in the development of colonial regimes of enslavement, see Rebecca Anne Goetz, “Rethinking the ‘Unthinking Decision’: Old Questions and New Problems in the History of Slavery and Race in the Colonial South,” The Journal of Southern History 75, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 599–612.
export, natural resources to extract such as minerals, and how to raise livestock, the most readily available lucrative economic activity. But none of these economic avenues were very lucrative and many, such as growing citrus fruits and mining for gold and silver, failed. Some European colonists quickly learned that their most-lucrative avenue for capital accumulation was through trading with indigenous peoples in the region. Likewise, Native Americans in southeastern North America learned—or as in the case of the Westos, already knew—that indigenous captives were valued by European colonists. A single Native American captive was potentially worth “up to 160 deerskins—about twice as much as a hunter could expect to take in a given year” in early Charles Town.¹²

Not surprisingly, many Native men seeking money to buy European goods chose to hunt people rather than deer. Captives, in conjunction with animal skins, were the most-effective media of trade relations between colonists and Native Americans. For roughly forty years, the economy of South Carolina was stagnant and the most successful colonists bought and sold Native American captives, most of whom they exported to other colonies.

At the same time, South Carolina was founded in an English Atlantic context where the enslavement of peoples from West Africa in colonial outposts was on the rise. Barbados was in 1670 the most-successful colony in the English Empire in economic terms. In the three decades before Carolina was founded (partially by Barbadians), the strategy employed by Barbadians became the agricultural production of sugar for export and coerced labor to produce it. A similar strategy was implemented in the Chesapeake colonies of Virginia and Maryland. During the seventeenth century, planters in all three

¹² Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 54–55.
of these successful plantation colonies shifted from indentured servants as the bulk of coerced labor and toward enslaved Africans. Colonists in early South Carolina, from the beginning, assumed that enslaved Africans would be an important part of the colonial labor force. Colonists were unable to convince slavers to bring captive Africans to Charles Town in large numbers well into the eighteenth century, but colonists nevertheless found ways of buying some captives before a more regular direct trade with transatlantic slavers began in the late 1710s.

Charles Town was the major exporting hub of the massive trade in enslaved Native Americans between 1670 and 1716 and in fact was a net slave exporting port until well into the eighteenth century. But many colonists took advantage of the enslaved Native Americans coming to the entrepôt not merely as capital, but also as valuable sources of knowledge and labor. My dissertation seeks to understand the place of enslaved Native Americans, making up a full quarter of the enslaved population of South Carolina, in the development of slave society and culture. I argue that enslaved Native Americans must be taken seriously as historical actors and that the entangled histories of the peoples who made up the enslaved population of early South Carolina came together through circumstance to forge a new culture from their accumulated knowledge and experience. By doing so, the history of slave society and culture in South Carolina becomes much more diverse in its origin, and how we understand the history of the colony looks drastically different. By using South Carolina as a case study, one of the probable implications of my dissertation is also to raise the question of whether similar work should be undertaken by scholars of other societies based on enslaved plantation
labor including the destinations of many captives sold through Charles Town such as Barbados and Jamaica.\footnote{13}

Deeper empirical study of the enslaved people on the ground in South Carolina—including large numbers of enslaved Native Americans—also offers a way to integrate the vast scholarship on African/Atlantic slaveries with newer histories of Native American slavery. Over the last fifteen years, scholars have become increasingly aware of the centrality of the enslavement of Native American peoples in the histories of both the successes of European settler-colonial projects and the decimation and reconfiguration of Native American sociocultural organizations. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the growing trans-Atlantic slave trade at points coincided directly with the mass enslavement of Native American peoples as well. Scholars working on slavery in the Atlantic and the Americas are only beginning to examine these two captive trades (one from Africa to the west, the other from the Americas and in this case to the east) overlapped and were intertwined. When scholars have included enslaved Africans and Atlantic slaving with the slaving and enslavement of Native Americans in the early-modern colonial Atlantic, indigenous peoples have either been a small part of narrating larger stories, or indigenous experiences have been interpreted as separate intellectual problems. On the ground, colonial slavery was much messier.\footnote{14}

\footnote{13}{In terms of historiography of enslaved peoples in South Carolina, my central interlocutors are Wood, \textit{Black Majority}; Morgan, \textit{Slave Counterpoint}; Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade}; and Edelson, \textit{Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina}.}

\footnote{14}{As an exemplar of this type of scholarship, see Michael Guasco’s excellent study of ideas about enslavement in England before the rise of the English Empire, \textit{Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).}
The enslaved population of early South Carolina was the product of the dynamics of these transatlantic slaving, Native American slaving, and broader Atlantic economic contexts, along with how colonists on the ground in the colony conceptualized labor and production in the colony. Native American slavers exported around the same number of indigenous captives in Charles Town between 1670 and 1715 as transatlantic slavers imported to the city between 1670 and 1740. But enslaved Native Americans did not comprise a majority of the colony’s enslaved population. Although slavers lacked the labor they sought, they also lacked capital. Selling Native American captives to other colonies made sense to slavers who needed credit to buy European goods with which to trade with willing Native Americans. Slavers kept some captives but sold most to other colonies, meaning a small percentage of all the captives brought into the colony stayed and made up part of the enslaved society. This number of enslaved Native Americans might have been small compared with the overall number of peoples shipped out of the colony, but in a lightly-populated economic backwater of the English (and after 1707, British) Empire, these Native Americans had social significance. Enslaved Native Americans’ importance lay in the social and cultural histories of the enslaved, but they also played a major (coerced) role in the history of the colony more broadly.

I make four broad claims in this study. First, to better understand the broad history of slaving in early-modern European colonial projects we must consider the structures and contingencies affecting slavers’ decisions to deliver captives to a colonial marketplace. For early South Carolina, this means following evidentiary trails leading back to different continents. The ethno-cultural makeup of the enslaved population was shaped by slavers showing up in places where captives could be purchased or by
slaver/colonists capturing and enslaving local people. Colonists in South Carolina, therefore, with a constant labor shortage, had to at least consider purchasing indentured Europeans or captives from Africa or the Americas, depending on the contingencies of the various slaving projects at specific points in time. Second, I contend that slaving and enslaving Native Americans in South Carolina played a central role in the development of the colony and not only as export commodities. European colonists coerced enslaved Native Americans to labor from the earliest years of the colonial project. This means that although Native Americans were a minority in the total population, they helped build South Carolina. Third, though enslaved Native Americans were a minority of the enslaved population, their knowledge and labor mattered for the social and economic trajectories of the colony. Finally, and more tentatively, I argue for the importance of enslaved Native Americans—particularly women—in the making of the lowcountry creole plantation culture.

I have conceived of this dissertation as a succession of layers of the history of the enslaved in early South Carolina, and it is laid out in four parts. Like peeling an onion, each successive part moves us closer, from the outside in, to the lives of enslaved Native Americans on early South Carolina plantations. The first part seeks to trace the origins of the enslaved population of colonial South Carolina through slaving in and out of the colony. Many scholars have studied various aspects of slaving West African captives across the Atlantic to the Charles Town. More recently, historians have become interested in Native Americans as slaving victims, but no one has conceived of early South Carolina as a nexus of Native American and West African slaving. Only by tracing the multiplicity of sources for enslaved people to the colony does the heterogeneous enslaved population
come into clearer focus. Colonists in South Carolina who wanted to purchase (or steal) people to enslave and put to labor on early plantations had access to very different peoples depending on the time and place in which colonists sought out labor. Sometimes Native American captives were available for sale. At others West Africans arrived from the Middle Passage or other colonies. In a few instances there were large numbers of European indentured servants available in Charles Town. Most of the time, colonists in South Carolina who were seeking labor could not be picky about the origins of enslaved and indentured peoples.

The first part of the dissertation reveals where the enslaved and indentured population came from and uncovers connections among slaving, capitalist economic development, and colonial state-building. Though other historians have acknowledged South Carolina’s progression from chaos to order, my project is concerned with when, how, and in particular why colonists decided to strengthen the state apparatus.¹⁵ I do not think a more complex and coercive state was a foregone conclusion in South Carolina. Colonists on the ground had to acquiesce and desire a relatively more centralized colonial government. I structured this section as three chapters.

Chapter 1 traces slaving into and out of the region between 1659 and 1718, when the pirate, Stede Bonnet, was captured and executed in the colony for piracy. This date is emblematic of the changing relationship colonists had between their individual economic interests and the colonial state. During the 1710s, a shift in the political economy away from slaving indigenous peoples as a primary economic strategy and toward agricultural production led colonists to accept more state control and regulation of the economy. Bonnet’s trial and a book describing his trial that was published by Nicholas Trott
signaled the end of Charles Town’s relatively open engagement with pirates and piracy.\textsuperscript{16} Over this period colonists often found it to their advantage to go into slaving indigenous peoples to sell to other colonies or in South Carolina. A lack of capital for investment in the colony meant that colonists decided the violent primitive accumulation of slaving provided the best return on investment. But the Lords Proprietor opposed colonists slaving for their own ends, so colonists worked against the institutionalization of many structures of the early-modern European state such as securing contracts. In this context, Charles Town became a hub for pirates looking for provisions and a market to sell their wares. In essence, the most successful colonists in early South Carolina were essentially pirates as well, even if not all of them personally plundered the seas.

The political economy of South Carolina began to shift by the second decade of the eighteenth century. Slaving to Charles Town was increasingly difficult in the southeast because survivors of the depredations of warfare and slaving in the late-seventeenth century were coalescing into larger indigenous political units too powerful and dangerous to enslave, so slaving colonists and their indigenous partners were forced to range farther west to the point of diminishing return. In the same decade, rice production took off, and these exports were met with favorable market conditions in Europe. The final contextual piece of the shift in political economy between 1700 and 1720 happened at the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713. In the peace agreement, the British Empire was granted the Spanish \textit{asiento} (a monopoly on slaving to the Spanish American colonies, which was initially granted by the British Crown to the South Seas Company). Whereas in the seventeenth century, the English Crown depended largely on a

\textsuperscript{16} Nicholas Trott, \textit{The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet, and Other Pirates} (London: B. Cowse, 1719)
navy made up of privateers, after 1713, the British Crown set about to make the Atlantic Ocean safer for commerce.\textsuperscript{17} Between 1700 and 1720, slavers and other colonists, set about slowly shifting between a political economy based on pure primitive accumulation—settler colonialism and slaving—to one based on expansionist colonization and agricultural production. As historian Alan Gallay has noted, the violence of colonial slaving was the means through which South Carolina colonists accumulated the capital to invest in becoming planters.\textsuperscript{18} In 1719 colonists, many of whom have been active participants in slaving Native Americans and resisting the administrative goals of the Proprietary regime, finally gave up on Proprietary rule and asked the British Crown for outside support. This chapter argues that only by tracing the outlines of the multidirectional slaving trades to Charles Town can we better understand the shift in slaving and the political economy of the colony that led preeminent colonists to argue that the Lords Proprietor was not exerting enough control. The irony in this situation was that many of these same men and their forebears had spent the first fifty years of the colony undermining the Lords Proprietor every way they could.

The second chapter narrates the history of slaving peoples from West Africa to the colony beginning with the concurrent rise in state power during the late 1710s. Regular arrivals direct from West Africa began in earnest in 1717, right after the colony

\textsuperscript{17} Although, as Douglas Bradburn has shown, the English Navy could provide protection to merchant vessels when English merchants thought their return on investment would be high enough, at least during Queen Anne’s War. The English were not able to project power over the Atlantic like they would later be. Bradburn, “The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690–1715,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly} 68, no. 3 (2011): 361–86.

\textsuperscript{18} Gallay, \textit{Indian Slave Trade}, 6–7.
reached 4 million pounds of rice exported in one year. Of course, export production in the colony led metropolitan capitalists to extend more credit to colonists than ever before and much of this increase went toward purchasing more Africans. Tracing the origins of enslaved Africans to the colony, via the Middle Passage as well as between intercolonial slavers, Chapter 2 gives the most-precise social picture (in terms of region of origin) of captive Africans coming into the colony in the current historiography.19 These arguments are necessary to give a fuller picture of the social origins of the total population of enslaved people in South Carolina through my entire periodization. In order to better understand the sociocultural contexts of enslaved Native Americans on plantations, I must first follow the threads of coerced migration to the colony from both North America and West Africa (often via the Caribbean). I argue that we should divide the Atlantic captive trade to South Carolina between 1710 and 1739 into three distinct eras. In the first era, a few ships traded captive Africans to the colony, while during the second (1724 to 1729), many more ships landed in Charles Town, mostly from the Bight of Biafra and Senegambia. In the final era, the 1730s, the trade accelerated again and the origin of most captives shifted to West Central Africa.

In conjunction with increases in slaving to the colony across the Atlantic, colonists began borrowing capital from merchants (and other colonists) backed by

19 One of the main reasons I have been able to do this in such a way, unlike previous scholars, is because I have had the work of Gregory E. O’Malley on intercolonial slaving at my disposal. See O’Malley, Final Passages: The Intercolonial Slave Trade of British America, 1619-1807 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014); "Diversity in the Slave Trade to the Colonial Carolinas," in Michelle LeMaster and Bradford J Wood, eds., Creating and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Era Histories (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2013), 234–255; and “Beyond the Middle Passage: Slave Migration from the Caribbean to North America, 1619-1807,” The William and Mary Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2009): 125–72.
enslaved humans for security. The mortgaging of enslaved people, either for the typical farming need for loans up front in the expectation of a future crop, or for the purchase of more people to enslave, became an important component of the South Carolina economy. Mortgaging enslaved people was not the main source of credit for all colonists, but these securitized loans were a method planters (and incipient planters) could use to increase capital outlays in their plantation operations. The overwhelming majority of mortgages were backed by human chattel property, since most land in the colony was worth little. These sources, rarely used by scholars, are second only to probate inventories for the numbers of enslaved people enumerated in surviving sources during the period under study. Enslaved people, by the early 1720s, were being regularly collateralized to secure their owner’s loans. Chapter 2 therefore shows how rice planting, trans-Atlantic credit flows, slaving West African peoples, and the colonial state becoming more secure for contractual arrangements each intersected in the years after the Yamasee War to construct the rice regime.

Chapter 3 shifts to the other side of the issue of slaving to South Carolina starting in the 1710s, namely by interrogating the fate of the Native American captive trade. The Yamasee War (1715–1717) served as the earthquake in southeastern North America caused by the epidemiological onslaught against indigenous peoples after the Columbian Exchange, warfare caused by the shocks of colonialism, and the slaving that disease and warfare made easier. This chapter argues that the ways captive Native Americans came into South Carolina did not change, despite changes to the ways colonial officials handled

new captives coming into the colony. The volume of Native American captives coming into the colony dropped significantly by the end of the Yamasee War, but in 1716, colonists on the ground in South Carolina decided that for the first time, the colonial state apparatus should exert coercive power and seriously mediate relations between indigenous and colonial traders. The colony was weak, slaving was less profitable as an economic activity than it had been, and planting rice was more than promising. In this context, colonial officials decided to restrict and regulate exchanges between Native Americans and colonists, especially for captives.

Colonial officials decided that Native American captives coming into the colonial system were not in themselves problematic. The reason for officials’ heightened scrutiny of interactions between Native Americans and colonists was the geopolitical dangers inherent in the enslavement of children belonging to members of the region’s powerful confederations, Cherokees and Creeks. But at the same time, colonial officials could not interrupt relations with allies, and giving or trading captives was a central component of Native American geopolitical action. For South Carolina leaders, the solution to this problem lay in the marketplace for captives. Officials inserted the state between indigenous interlocutors and the colonial marketing of captives in the Atlantic. In this way, the colony would neither insult allies, nor would the confederacies find their people enslaved and living in the colony. Representatives of the South Carolina government, in turn, used this flow of captives into the colony to raise money for colonial administration. The state not only saw to it that most captives were sold at auction in Charles Town—and a condition of the sale was immediate removal of the captives from the continent—but colonial officials also collected duties on each captive exported. In these ways, control of
the Native American trade became a site of state-building between 1716 and the 1730s in a way never previously implemented by governmental representatives.

While the first part of this dissertation is concerned with describing how and why the enslaved population of South Carolina developed as it did, the second part, comprised of two chapters, is an investigation of the enslaved population on the ground in the colony. I have conceived of it as a new social history of the enslaved in South Carolina. This section seeks to embed the story of enslaved Native Americans into that of the larger enslaved African population of the colony. I also aim to better situate these ethno-cultural groups vis-à-vis each other with respect to how colonists described them according to race, sex, and age, as well as the way the dynamics of geography and space factored into the social history of the enslaved.

Chapter 4 is grounded in my reading of all known extant sources pertaining to early colonial South Carolina. I constructed a database from these sources listing every enslaved person in the colony between 1670 and 1739 whom I could link with an owner at a point in time.²¹ I then used this dataset to trace the contours of the enslaved in South Carolina over time, particularly in the ways people were described by sex and as being either “Negro,” “Indian,” “Mustee,” or “Mulatto.” Caught between the structures of slaving to the colony, Native Americans were overrepresented in the population of enslaved women by the eighteenth century. Native Americans made up a full quarter of the enslaved population of the colony between 1700 and 1720, while Native American women made up a third of all enslaved women. This chapter also discusses the ways race

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²¹ My database currently has over 15,000 enslaved people I have culled from surviving sources. For more on the Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples (CSCDEP), see Appendix I.
and sex intersected at the plantation level. Ownership of enslaved Native Americans was not evenly distributed among European colonists. By the early eighteenth century, Native Americans were not typically owned by colonists as their only investment in human property and located near the leading edge of colonization, as one may expect. By the 1720s, enslaved Native Americans were more likely to be embedded in larger populations of enslaved peoples on plantations.

Using the same dataset, Chapter 5 discusses the spatiality of enslaved society. The names of owners and the dates included in records of enslaved people allow me to relate the history of owning specific people to colonial land records. By mapping land ownership and relating it to ownership of enslaved people using a historical Geographic Information Systems (GIS) methodology, I have been able to identify crude trends in the way enslaved people were situated in space and over time and, in particular, with respect to how they were identified by race.22 One important factor in the development of enslaved society in early South Carolina often overlooked by scholars was the spatial dynamics of colonization and the resulting distances between and locations of clusters of enslaved peoples. This chapter follows the spatial and environmental dynamics of the social history of the colony. It is less obvious than first appears to argue that the geopolitical and geographical contexts in which Europeans founded South Carolina were different than those faced by other successful agricultural plantation colonies in the English empire—in particular Virginia and Barbados—but these differences in some ways set the bounds of sociocultural development in South Carolina. By the 1720s, enslaved Native Americans who toiled on plantations were held in clusters by rich

22 For more on my GIS methodology, see Appendix II.
colonists who were either slavers, had been in the colony a long time, or were the children of early colonists. As the rates at which slavers brought captive African peoples into the colony hastened beginning after 1710, about the same time slavers looking to exchange Native American captives mostly moved toward different markets, enslaved Native Americans on plantations became a sign of either individual or familial longevity in the colony. In short, most enslaved Native Americans ended up on large plantations with many enslaved people of African descent and not atomized throughout the colony.

After laying the groundwork of 1) how enslaved people ended up in South Carolina and 2) how the enslaved society shifted over time, the third section (Chapter 6) is a study of plantation management. If colonists wanted to maintain their attempts at dominance of enslaved Native Americans, it must have been for a reason. Chapter 6 is an answer to the problem of how early planters coerced and to what ends enslaved Native Americans were deployed on plantations. I argue for the importance of enslaved Native Americans as sources of knowledge and labor for the economic history of the colony and the development of rice as a staple commodity. Planters, either out of sheer pragmatism or a rational strategic approach, forced enslaved Native Americans to work on producing provisioning crops which in turn allowed other laborers, mostly African, to be forced to grow export commodity crops.

Scholars have spent much time scrutinizing the origins of rice agriculture in the colony, debating what role West African knowledge—what Judith Carney calls a technology transfer—played in adapting rice to the lowcountry.²³ My contention is that,

as in so many other ways laid out in this dissertation, by concentrating on West African contributions scholars have overlooked an important component of making export agriculture viable in the early modern era: feeding enslaved people in an efficient manner. I argue that directed provisioning was a central component to the history of the rise of the rice regime in the lowcountry. Enslaved Native Americans toiled away on many early rice plantations in a manner analogous to the knowledge and labor coerced out West African peoples. As Native Americans became increasingly hidden in sources in the 1730s, many enslaved “Negroes” continued to intercrop provisioning grounds in a Native American style. Enslaved Native Americans were therefore integral to the development of rice culture in the lowcountry.

At this point, my project turns to the perspective of the enslaved. The fourth section is a cautious attempt at shifting the gaze of this project. After spending much of this dissertation viewing enslaved Native Americans as historical objects—captives who were traded, enslaved people who were forced to live and labor with certain people and in certain spaces, coerced to work in directed ways—the goal of the final chapter is to open another historiographical conversation. How can we talk about enslaved Native Americans on plantations as cultural producers, as historical actors, as individual people? Using archival records and archaeological evidence, I argue for the historical cultural significance of one enslaved Native American woman. Nanny, as she was called in a probate inventory, who lived and probably died among a group of enslaved people from Africa. She was torn away from her family, forced to move away, forced to labor on a plantation, and yet she survived. Nanny survived for at least close to twenty years of

terrifying plantation labor, but we know almost nothing about her or other enslaved Native Americans on colonial plantations, especially in the British Empire. The story I lay out about Nanny is limited because she left such a faint trace in the documentary evidence colonists produced, but it also is deepened by the material cultural archive of archaeology.

In both Native American and most West African cultures, potting was gendered to be the work of women. And despite the fact plantations were locations where European colonists enforced the subjugation of enslaved people, the will of the enslaved could never be completely suppressed. Nanny’s womanhood is central to my interpretation. Saidiya Hartman was correct when she argued that enslaved women’s gender was in many ways not of their own making, but scholars such as Stephanie Camp have deepened the way we think about women, gender, and plantations. Enslaved women were forced to conform to the gendered roles ascribed to them by Europeans while under the gaze of their oppressors, but the “rival geographies” carved out by enslaved people on plantations allowed them to practice rival genderings as well. In these spaces, enslaved women produced ceramics that have survived broken, scattered, and buried, not unlike other historical fragments of the enslaved. But in ceramics—which scholars have dubbed “Colonoware”—we can view pieces of their lives beyond the gaze of their oppressors and bypassing the problems of power in archival curation. My rendering of Nanny’s story is skeletal. This chapter lays out some groundwork for scholars to work toward making sure
In the future we can have more to say about Nanny’s story and the stories of other enslaved Native Americans on early-modern plantations.²⁴

In the introduction to *Black Majority*, Peter Wood wrote that while researching early South Carolina, he found that “Negro slaves played a significant and often determinative part in the evolution of the colony.” Scholars have spent countless hours working on expanding this thesis, and Wood’s argument, over forty years later, remains a point of historiographical consensus in the study of South Carolina and beyond. Wood wanted to point out the multicultural origins of early American history by highlighting the ways silenced people were crucial to the success of European (and implicitly, American) colonization. I see my dissertation as furthering Wood’s agenda by recovering another group of people—these people colonized, enslaved, and erased from histories of plantation colonies—who were nevertheless vital in the social and cultural histories of plantation societies.

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Chapter 1
Proprietors, Pirates, and Planters

All covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
-Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*¹

Thomas Hobbes published *Leviathan* in the aftermath of a particularly tumultuous period in the history of England and more broadly, Europe, but although his political philosophy was important in intellectual discourse of the seventeenth century, his ideas of humanity’s state of nature were soon superseded in impact by the writings of John Locke. Locke wrote the founding legal document of the Carolina colonial project for his main benefactor, Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper in the late 1660s. But on the ground in the first decades of the Carolina project, life did not align with Locke’s ideas about social contracts. It more closely resembled a Hobbesian state of nature, a “continual state of fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Cooper and Locke envisioned a utopian, semifeudal society based on a rigid social hierarchy from colonial nobles all the way down to people enslaved as chattel. But for nearly the first fifty years of the colony, the political economy more closely resembled Hobbes’s covenant with no sword than Locke’s state of pure equality. There was for many practical purposes no functioning colonial state until the late 1710s, especially in areas where mediation by the state promoted capital investment in the colony. Until the era of the Yamasee War control on the ground came mostly at the end of the barrel of a

musket or whip of individual colonists and can be described as successful colonists controlling tiny, nearly-independent fiefdoms far from the gaze of the metropole.²

Colonists near Charles Town who became (or whose proximate descendants became) early “leaders” of the colony and staple-producing planters made the most of their favorable location at the nexus of two arenas of sociopolitical turmoil: the Atlantic in the age of piracy and relatively weak imperial power projection, and the southeastern “shatter zone.” By the 1660s, when the Carolina project began in fits and starts, other English colonies had begun setting precedents with respect to coerced labor in the Americas. Colonists in New England, Barbados, and the Chesapeake had already carved out legal and social niches for varying levels of unfreedom, from abject heritable chattel slavery to rigidly-defined indentures and points in between. In this way, Carolina’s forebears had already set the terms of the social discourse for English North American colonial ventures. There was a trade across the Atlantic in African captives, as well as a trade between colonies in the Americas. Likewise on the continent (and throughout the Americas) there were native peoples who were more than willing to raid their enemies for captives to give or sell to the colonies. The founding of Carolina, therefore, met at the intersection of a multiplicity of captive trades; its architects provided an intellectual rationale for taking advantage of these flows of people, and its colonists possessed the desire to take advantage of continental and Atlantic slaving from the outset. In short,

Carolina colonists made their way and the colonial project viable by ruthlessly exploiting the logics of trade and coerced labor already present at the colony’s founding.³

Histories of the captive trade in early South Carolina – as well as the rest of the British Atlantic – have concentrated on trading captives of either African origin or, more recently, Native American origin. But the slave trade was much more complex than either of these approaches allows. In early South Carolina, colonists wanted coerced laborers, but as residents of a colonial backwater they could not demand much attention from the trans-Atlantic slavers until the colony had enough exportable production to make it worth the while of Atlantic slavers to ship directly to Charles Town and a state apparatus viable enough at securing property and contracts to make investment relatively safe. Colonists sought out captives for labor, but also to trade in order to accumulate capital, and in true Hobbesian fashion, they used brutality and the spaces between the incipient colonial state to advance their individual interests amongst the anarchy around them.⁴

This chapter argues the proprietary regime of the colony lacked the coercive power to institute a rational, financial-capitalist, imperial order on the project. The failures of colonial administrations were most pronounced in ways that would have promoted outside capital investment, namely an inability to regulate trade, deter pirates, and secure contracts. Slavers on the ground in South Carolina wanted the state weak in

³ Robbie Ethridge and Sheri Marie Shuck-Hall, Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); and Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

⁴ By “state” I mean an apparatus or institution with a monopoly on legitimate violence within its bounds, with the desire to make the actions of people legible, especially for taxation purposes, and the ability to act as a largely coherent geopolitical entity. Before the late 1710s, South Carolina lacked all three of these criteria.
these ways because it allowed them to have the space to amass capital through colonial primitive accumulation. The relationship between slaving and other commodity production, particularly agricultural, created tension between those who sought to solidify institutional control and those who preferred the chaos in and around the colony. Many colonists did everything they could to avoid being controlled by the Proprietors and actively sought out pirates with whom to trade, used the fealty of colonists and travelers assuming a viable state in order to exploit them, and indeed became land-bound pirates themselves by plundering peoples all over the southeast. South Carolina is unique in this era of empire-building, even in the context of the late seventeenth-century English colonies, aptly described by historian Trevor Burnard as having a certain “grubbiness” about them. In South Carolina, colonists long resisted most functions of the early-modern colonial state, and the resulting levels of colonial violence emanating from this atomization of colonial interests were wrought upon peoples from the Mississippi River east to at least the littoral of the Red Sea. The captive trade to Carolina in turn reflected this political economy, and enslaved people from various parts of North America, Africa, and even Asia turned up in South Carolina by the end of the proprietary era. In the 1710s three converging contexts led Carolinians to finally decide to take part in building a colonial state more effective in attracting capital investment for commodity production. First, the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) gave the British peace with the Spanish Empire, the South Seas Company received the Spanish Asiento granting them a slaving monopoly to Spanish America, and with these developments the metropole had reason to concentrate on controlling piracy in a way the empire had not previously attempted. Secondly, the Native American captive trade to Charles Town declined drastically in the years leading
up to the Yamasee War (1715-1717), so plundering the southeast for humans became much more difficult and less lucrative. Thirdly, coinciding with the decline of the Native American slave trade, Carolina colonists began concentrating more on export commodity production led by rice (with a large boom beginning in 1709) and naval stores. This slow transition from piracy to planting meant that by the late 1710s the captive trade to South Carolina began to take on a more deliberate and rational structure. But by the time direct imports of enslaved people from Africa began to take off, South Carolina had possessed an enslaved majority for somewhere around two decades made up of one quarter Native Americans and the majority people of African descent from diverse parts of Africa and numerous colonial possessions, not all of which were British.5

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Karl Marx thought argued that “so-called primitive accumulation” was “nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as ‘primitive’ because it forms the pre-history of capital, and the mode of production corresponding to capital.” This could mean the separation of peasants from their land, leaving the peasantry with only their labor to sell, but it also could be the profits from slaving, as was the case for capitalists in Liverpool in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. More recently, historian Robin Blackburn has argued that early-modern economies based on labor of enslaved people was another type of primitive accumulation because labor was organized around “non-economic coercion; the direct producers were obliged by brute force to produce a surplus and a marketable commodity.” I am thinking of primitive accumulation in the colonial Americas as the violence that allowed capital accumulation by Europeans through slaving and enslaved labor. See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, (Penguin Classics, 1992), 875–875 and 925–925; and Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800 (London: Verso, 1997), 515.
This chapter has two intertwined narrative trajectories and arguments. First, the captive trades to Charles Town in these early years should be described as episodic, sporadic, and multivalent. Slavers, coming from every direction into the colony, were not able to provide a regular supply of new slaving victims for sale in Charles Town. Colonists who wanted to purchase (or capture) people to use as coerced labor had to choose from whatever supply of captives happened to be available, whether African, Native American, or European. Second, coinciding with (and in fact co-constitutive) with these chaotic captive trades was the lack of almost any formal institutional control of social or anti-social behaviors in the colony outside of the granting of lands, although it is an open question if land disputes were adjudicated and any state coercive power was used by leaders in securing claims. Since the greatest profits could be gained through the Native American trade for captives and skins and colonists representing the proprietary interests wanted to monopolize the trade, there was a nearly-constant battle fought over governmental authority in the colony. Colonists wanted access to the trade and resisted imperial structures so long as the Native American trade was their main source of capital. This chapter, therefore, aims to place these multiple captive trades to and through Charles Town in the context of a general lawlessness in and around the colony. The narrative is structured chronologically and traces the Native American and African captive trades and piracy into the colony, as well as other anecdotal instances of the impotence of colonial institutions to exert almost any control over colonists. The multiple foci of this chapter plot a larger narrative arc of the sort pointed out by historian Jack Greene in his magisterial *Pursuits of Happiness: from chaos to order.*

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6 Jack P. Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early*
When the ship *Carolina* made it to Port Royal in 1670, the colonial adventurers came upon a region where social stability was in the process of coming apart at the seams. The Spanish colonial mission project begun after the founding of St. Augustine in 1565 was coming increasingly under fire by new people who had recently moved to the area. Native American societies were also attempting to make sense of this colonial violence. The progenitors of this unrest were dubbed “Westos” in English and “Chichemecos” in Spanish. Scholars now think these migrants to the southeast settled in 1659 near modern Augusta, Georgia, after being pushed out of their lands on the eastern side of Lake Erie during the 1650s in the colonial wars over controlling the trade in beaver pelts and then moving south from Virginia to the Savannah River. The Westos had learned through their experiences in the northeast and Virginia that raiding other native people could work as a means of survival in a world of colonial violence and dislocation, so they began putting more emphasis on raiding for food and captives to trade back to Virginia. In 1662, the governor of St. Augustine complained to the king that in Guale, a Native American region with communities ordered around the Spanish mission system along the modern Georgia coast, “some Indians said to be the Chichimecos have made inroads” and were being assaulting the missions. These new interlopers in the southeast sought “to destroy the provinces and terrorize the Indians, pagan as well as Christian,” according to Spanish officials. And by 1667, native peoples in the northern reaches of Guale, near modern Savannah, Georgia, began retreating to Santa Catharina de Guale (St. Catherine’s Island) about thirty miles to the south, “fleeing from the Chichimecos who made war on them.” Westos had already begun using the

logic of the trade in Native American captives to the English that would soon engulf the southeastern part of the continent. As a result of collusion between some Carolina colonists, Westos, and other Native American groups interested in trading, the entrepôt port town of what was ostensibly to be a plantation-slave agricultural colony, was instead a net exporter of enslaved people until about 1716. Some Carolinians simply made the most of—and amplified—the brutality they encountered upon initial colonization.⁷

When searching for a place to colonize along the Carolina coastline after the failed first foray at Cape Fear (1664–7), colonists befriended Cusabo peoples living between the modern Cooper and Savannah Rivers. The Carolinians were directed to colonize the area around Charles Town because these Cusabos were enemies and likely victims of Westo raiding. Nicholas Carteret related that the Westo had “ruinated” a village on St. Helena Island and “killed severall of those Indians, destroyed and burnt their habitations and that they had come as far as Keyawah [the area around modern Charleston] doing the like there.” By promoting the colonizing of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, with their limited inland navigability compared to either the Savannah or Santee Rivers, Cusabos managed to give themselves a geographic advantage and limited Carolinians’ contact with Westos. According to Carteret, the local indigenous people said to the English colonists, “Hiddy doddy Comorado Angles Westoe Skorrye” (which is as

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much as to say) English very good friends, Westoes are nought. They hoped by our arrival to be protected from the Westoes.” In another letter, Cartaret relayed to Barbados that he was told by indigenous people in the region that if the Westos “ketcht us they would eat us.” It was therefore Cusabos who facilitated the initial creation of Charles Town on the west bank of the Ashley River in 1670. Port Royal, farther south, was a better port, and the Savannah River offered better transportation infrastructure from which to set up a colonial project. The very location of Charles Town near the confluence of two rivers with little reach inland and sandbars at the harbor entry was therefore a direct result of the Native American captive raiding being perpetrated by Westos and promoted by Virginians, whether Carolinians realized it or not.8

Unlike the histories of earlier English colonial ventures such as Virginia, Bermuda, Massachusetts, and Barbados, the founders of Carolina had a ready framework at their disposal for implementing chattel slavery. In the founding document of the Carolina project, *The Fundamental Constitutions*, by John Locke, the new colony was to be organized along rigid feudal lines. There were to be Landgraves (one per county),

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8 “Nicholas Carteret’s Relation of Their Planting of Ashley River [1670]” in Salley, *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 118–9; also in *The Shaftesbury*, 166–7. Cartaret’s letter to George Carteret, November 22, 1670, is in *Shaftesbury*, 238. Also see Marion Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763*, (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

Historical Native American polities in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries did not call themselves Cusabo. They were Native Americans who lived in the area around Charles Town at its founding. A 1682 description of Carolina used more specific names such as Santee, Itawans, Kiawahs, Stonos, Edisto, Cusso, St. Helena, Kussoe, and Sewee. See R. F, *The Present State of Carolina with Advice to Settlers* (London: John Bringhurst, 1682), 14–6; Gene Waddell, *Indians of the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1562-1751* (Spartanburg: Published for the Southern Studies Program, University of South Carolina, Reprint Co., 1980). Also see chapter 5.
Cassiques (two per county), and Baronies (four per county) and common land tenure was to only be allowed through the annual payment of quitrents – essentially a feudal land tax. But the system Ashley and Locke imagined also made room for slavery. The enslavement of peoples of African origin was explicitly sanctioned in the document: “Every Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his *Negro Slaves*, of what Opinion or Religion soever.” By the time a colony was founded on the western bank of the Ashley River, an African source of enslaved labor, institutionalized earlier in Barbados, was given legal sanction in the empire.⁹

In the 1660s, when the Carolina project began in fits and starts, other English colonies had already set precedents with respect to coerced labor in the Americas. Colonists in New England, Barbados, and Virginia had already carved out legal and social niches for varying levels of unfreedom, from abject heritable chattel slavery to rigidly-defined indentures and apprenticeships. In this way, Carolina’s forebears had already set the terms of the socio-legal discourse for North American English colonial ventures. There was already a trade across the Atlantic in African captives, as well as a trade between colonies in the Americas. Likewise on the continent there were native peoples who were more than willing to raid their enemies for captives to sell or give to colonists. The founding of Carolina, therefore, met at this intersection of multiple, largely unregulated, captive trades; its architects provided an intellectual rationale for taking

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advantage of these flows of people, and its colonists possessed the desire to take advantage of both continental and Atlantic slaving.\(^{10}\)

Although colonists in the early Carolinas were desperate for sources of labor, they most often had to reconcile themselves to a fluctuating availability of coercible labor from Africa, North America, and Europe. Euro-American colonists may have had a desire for more servants and people to enslave, but practically speaking access to increasing numbers of Native American captives fell to a small number of colonists who preferred to sell them to other colonies and not fellow Carolinians. This trade of Native Americans out of Charles Town (and probably Port Royal, too) during the early years of the colony is difficult to trace, but in all likelihood colonists with close familial or business links to Barbados shipped a large number of them to the sugar colony to work on Caribbean plantations. Many Barbadians envisioned Carolina as a provisioning colony for the already-lucrative sugar interests, but colonists on the continent ultimately provisioned the Caribbean with food as well as enslaved labor. Even with an expanding

access to Native American captives, the coerced labor force in seventeenth-century Carolina was incredibly polyglot and only became overwhelmingly African sometime in the late 1720s (see chapter 4). In fact, due to the sporadic nature of captured (and indentured) peoples coming into the colony, at varying points colonists had easier access to Africans, Native Americans, or Europeans, depending on the contingencies of the trades. Intermittent large influxes of indentured Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans meant that in some years, colonists looking to purchase coerced laborers could see the numbers of people from each region of origin vacillate wildly. Some years there were more Native Americans than anyone else, others it was Africans, and occasionally there were large influxes of European servants for sale. 11

The first colonists brought both enslaved Afro-Caribbean peoples and European indentured servants with them to the continent. Although slavery was intended to be a cornerstone of the social organization of the colony, along the lines of other English ventures in the Caribbean and Chesapeake, extant sources show many more indentured than enslaved people among early colonists by a wide margin. The best sources for the early numbers of indentured and enslaved peoples in the colony are the warrants colonists used to take up lands. The Lords Proprietor granted land warrants to colonists for a particular number of acres depending on the size of their household, so it was to colonists’ advantage to claim everyone, including enslaved and indentured people. In the

first three years of land warrant records, there were 84 servants claimed for land rights and 11 enslaved Africans. There were probably a number of colonists defrauding the Lords Proprietor through these policies because colonists could claim young adult family members as “servants,” thereby allowing the patriarch a larger amount of land, and a few years later the younger family member would also be granted land when their indenture was over. In essence, some of these servants were probably only servants in name and never treated as if chattel property, though they also would have labored on early plantations. Even with an inflated number of servants in the records, there was still a much larger number of people who were bound for a term rather than indefinitely.12

Unlike island colonies such as Barbados, where there was no indigenous population at the time of English colonization, northern colonies on the continent where powerful Native American polities made large-scale enslavement of native peoples more difficult by 1670 (and certainly after King Phillips’ War in the mid-1670s), or colonies geographically hemmed-in by the Appalachian mountains in the Chesapeake, Carolina was perfectly situated to take advantage of the asymmetries of power created by the Westos’ recent migration to the Savannah River. The geography of southeastern North America was also more conducive to trading for goods from halfway across the

12 See land warrants for Stephen Bull, 1671; Thomas Clutterbooke, 1672; Samuell Boswood, 1672; Henry Hughes and John Coming, 1672; Richard Cole, 1672; Joseph Dalton, 1672; John Williamson, 1672; Samuel West, 1672; Thomas Gray, 1672; John Pinkard, 1672; Thomas Hurt, 1672; Florence O’Sullivan, 1672; John Coming, 1672; George Beadon, 1672; Thomas Butler, 1672; Nathaniel Sayle, 1672, the first warrant to include African slaves; John Culpepper, 1672; Jane Robinson, 1672; John Robinson, 1672; Richard Cole, 1672; Richard Deyos, 1672; Dorcas Smith, 1673; John May, 1673; William Thomas, 1673; Joseph West, 1673; and Thomas Smith, 1673 in Warrants. For land-granting policies see Robert Ackerman, *South Carolina Colonial Land Policies* (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1977).
continent. From Charles Town, traders could travel west to the Mississippi River and beyond without any major geographic obstacles, as the region lies on the southern Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal plains. Ranging across long distances was much easier than for traders from more northerly English colonies. This geographical and environmental advantage gave Charles Town traders easier access to their suppliers and victims and it gave Native American traders reason not to travel farther north to Virginia.

Within a year of colonizing the western bank of the Ashley River, the Grand Council of the colony complained on September 27, 1671, of “the great quantity of Corne from time to time taken out of the plantations by the Kussoe and other Southward Indians.” The Kussoe were an indigenous polity who, according to Maurice Matthews, were among the local “Indians all About vs” who were friendly, wanted to trade, and were “Affraid of ye very foot step of a Westo.” Then, in late September, 1671, the Council debated what to do with “two Kussoe Indians now in this Towne.” The following week, the Grand Council decided in order to “dispos[e] of the Indian prisoners,” volunteers who had taken part in the raid could “secure and maintaine the Indians they have taken” unless the Kussoe people sued for peace and paid a ransom. At the latest, in 1671, the Native American trade in captives out of the colony began with two Kussoe prisoners and had quickly turned into granting sanction to militiamen to take captives in order to turn them into commodities for private gain in the Atlantic marketplace.¹³

¹³ Instructions to ye Governor and Council of Carolina, September 27, 1671, and October 2, 1671 in “Council Journals, Green Copy, Aug 25, 1671- July 11, 1721,” S 188001, SCDAH; also in A. S. Salley, ed., Journal of the Grand Council of South Carolina. (Columbia, S.C., Printed for the Historical Commission of South Carolina by the State Co., 1907), 8–9; as well as in William James Rivers, A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary Government by the Revolution of 1719, with an Appendix Containing Many Valuable Records Hitherto Unpublished (Charleston,
Although we know a few enslaved African people came with the original colonists to Carolina, subsequent trading or forced migrations are harder to delineate. Surviving evidence points to there being three enslaved people of African origin out of the 110 migrants on the first ship, *Carolina*: John, Elizabeth, and John Jr., each “servants” of the first governor, William Sayle of Bermuda. Sayle’s son, Nathaniel, took out land warrants in 1672 after his father’s death in the name of John Sr., Elizabeth, and John Jr., plus another African man named William. Colonists also wrote in 1671 that they had planned for ships to bring supplies to the new colony along with more enslaved Africans. Even for a colony built on the logic of chattel slavery, with early colonists from Bermuda and Barbados, two English island colonies with a history of slavery, the evidence of enslaved people in the early days of the South Carolina is sparse. But in an August 1671 deposition in St. Augustine, a Native American told the Spaniards “many Negroes have come to work” in Carolina, indicating that there were more enslaved African peoples in the colony than most early records indicate.14

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Accordingly, the enslaved population of Carolina seems to have increased dramatically within the first couple of years after 1670. A Spanish soldier was deposed in 1672 after a trip to Carolina and thought there were about one hundred enslaved Africans in the colony. A few weeks later, a Carolina runaway turned up in St. Augustine and estimated the population to be around 800 English and 300 enslaved Africans. Even though these estimates were little more than general impressions, there were obviously many more than three enslaved Africans in Carolina by 1672. Where could these people have come from? With little economic activity in the colony from trade, they probably weren’t shipped by merchants to sell to colonists. Some were brought to the colony about a year after initial colonization with Sir John Yeamans. Historian Robert Weir has tellingly described Yeamans and other Barbadians as being “like pirates ashore.” A few others undoubtedly came from two sources: colonists with either their own (or their family having) plantation interests in other colonies; or traded to the colony by seafaring pirates looking for an easy outlet for human plunder.  

A few months after colonists landed on the banks of Ashley River in 1670, Henry Brayne, captain of the Carolina, wrote to Ashley about the supplies he had left in the colony to set up a plantation for Ashley. Cattle, hogs, sheep, geese, turkeys, and chickens were all among the animals Brayne had left for the project, but he also dropped off “one lusty negro man 3. Cristian servants and a oversear I brought out of Virginia.” This unnamed man is our oldest surviving mention of an enslaved African person on the ground in the colony of Carolina. But it was a later part of Brayne’s letter that illuminates

the socioeconomic milieu of the English Atlantic of the second half of the seventeenth century. Brayne asked Ashley for a letter of marque; he wanted permission to be a privateer. In 1670 there was undoubtedly more chance to find extraordinary profit as a ship captain in plundering the shipping from other imperial interests than from simply moving cargo around the Atlantic and risking being attacked by pirates or privateers. Brayne knew his quickest route to riches was to use his seafaring skills to become an imperially-sanctioned pirate and not a planter in a new and untested colonial venture.\footnote{Henry Brayne to Lord Ashley, November 9, 1670, \textit{Shaftesbury}, 214–7. Brayne was apparently shipping goods (and people?) back and forth from Barbados in 1671. See Lord Ashley to Joseph West, April 27, 1671, Public Record Office, \textit{Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series ... Preserved in the Public Record Office}, vol. 7 (London, 1860), Item 511, 207–208.}

Increasing trade with pirates must not have satiated colonists’ desire for enslaved people in the first years of the colony because in 1674 two major strategies were implemented in order to establish a more steady and secure supply of enslaved people for the colony. First Ashley, who in 1672 was granted the title Earl of Shaftesbury by King Charles II, sent his agent in Carolina, Andrew Percival, private instructions concerning trade on the continent. Shaftesbury wanted Percival “to endeavour to begin a Trade with the Spaniards for Negroes, Clothes or other Commodities.” Percival was ordered to attempt setting up a clandestine trade with St. Augustine, run from Shaftesbury’s plantation, St. Giles Kussoe, on the western bank of the upper Ashley River. Shaftesbury made sure to explicitly order Percival “that at present you are noe way under the [colonial] Government of the plantation at Ashley River.” Although Shaftesbury’s plan to trade for African captives with St. Augustine never took off—in fact, the opposite occurred and enslaved people in South Carolina ran away to Florida for many decades.
after colonization—the second innovation in trade from 1674 eventually remade the social geography of the southeast and wrought untold devastation to peoples for at least one thousand miles to the west: direct trade with Westos for Native American captives.\textsuperscript{17}

The captive-raiding Westos decided in late 1674 that it was to their advantage to attempt forging a trading alliance with the struggling colony of Carolina. To this end, a small group of Westos showed up at Shaftesbury’s St. Giles Kussoe plantation. Henry Woodward was the colony’s most experienced cross-cultural mediator and he agreed to leave immediately and travel with the group of Westos to their town, Hickauhaugau, because they were “very unwilling to stay ye night yet very desireous yt I should goe along wth them.” After traveling roughly one hundred miles west, the party arrived at Hickauhaugau, which Woodward described as “built in a confused maner, consisting of many long houses whose sides and tops are both artificially done with barke uppon ye tops of most whereof fastened to ye ends of long poles hang ye locks of haire of Indians that they have slaine.” The Westo were “well provided with arms, amunition, tradeing cloath & other trade from ye northward.” Their trading relationship with Virginia meant

\textsuperscript{17}“Instructions for Mr Andrew Percivall,” May 23, 1674, \textit{Shaftesbury}, 440–445. There are two early accounts of indentured and enslaved people running away. First, in November 1671, Dennis Mahoon, a servant bound to Richard Cole, “among others” had run away from the colony “to attaine the protections of the Crowne of Spaine” in St. Augustine and attempted to convince other servants to go with him. Mahoon was sentenced to 39 lashes on his bare back. Rivers, \textit{A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary Government}, 376; and Salley, \textit{Journal of the Grand Council}, 14. The second account is from 1673 when John Godfrey and Maurice Matthews were sent looking for two runaway servants, “Richd Batten & Wm Loe,” who had also “stolen a negro belonging to capt Nathl Sayle & divers other goods &c.” Council Journal, February 24, 1673, \textit{Shaftesbury}, 419–20.
the Westo had material advantages over virtually every other Native American polity in the southeast because they “truck[ed in] drest deare skins furrs & young Indian Slaves.”\textsuperscript{18}

During his visit to Hickauhaugau, Woodward managed to forge a trading relationship with the Westos—it seems likely this arrangement was actually the success of Westo geopolitical strategy and not Woodward—in the name of the Lords Proprietor, who wanted a monopoly on the Native American trade in order to help recoup their investments in the colony. To this end, Woodward expected Westos to show up again at St. Giles Kussoe “in March wth deare skins, furrs, & younge slaves.” As a gift for trekking to Hickauhaugau, Westos had given Woodward “a young, Indian boy taken from ye falls of yt River.” A new, much more violent and intense chapter in the trade in captive Native Americans from native polities to English colonial possessions in the southeast had begun. The asymmetries in English and Spanish colonial policy towards native people created drastic asymmetries in power in the southeast after the Westos
migrated to the Savannah. The “Man eaters” had English guns and access to an insatiable
Atlantic market for captives to use as enslaved labor; southeastern North America had
native peoples with a trading relationship with Spanish colonists, who had a policy of not
trading firearms to Native Americans. Over the next forty years, an enormous area of the
continent and a huge but unknown number of people would be swept up in the ensuing
cycles of warfare, raiding, and epidemics wrought by Carolinians and their captive-
trading partners.\(^{19}\)

As early as 1671, laws in the colony imposed by the Lords Proprietor called for
“Noe Indian upon any occasion or pretense whatsoever is to be made a Slave, or without
his owne consent be carried out of our Countr...” The Proprietors reiterated the same
passage again in 1672. But after Westos made contact with Woodward, the Proprietors
expected to exclusively trade with them, in full knowledge of their reputation as slavers
or “Man eaters.” A regular trade in Native American captives to Charles Town had begun
in earnest by 1675. But the problem for the Lords Proprietor and their colonial
administration was they really had no way of enforcing a trade monopoly, which
remained the case throughout the proprietary era. There are few documents tracing the
carnage, terror, and dislocation brought by Westos in their trading to Carolinians after
1674, but the trade became the best way for colonists with access and connections to
suppliers to make money. Henry Woodward, point of contact between Westos and the
Proprietors, kept an account book of his dealings as the “Indian Agent” of Shaftesbury
between 1674 and 1678. The book contains gifts given to native peoples and goods

\(^{19}\) Ibid. On the importance of asymmetrical power dynamics following the
introduction of firearms in different regions of North America, see David J. Silverman,
_Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America_ (Cambridge:
exported out of the colony in return. In typical fashion, Woodward gave these groups things such as brass kettles, linens, knives, beads, and gun powder. Woodward then exported skins—deer, beaver, bear, otter, foxes, “Catts,” and “Raccoones”—back to Europe. There is no mention in the account book of with whom Woodward was dealing, but a significant portion of these goods must have gone to Westos. It is particularly remarkable that Woodward gave gunpowder and shot at various times but never any muskets or other guns, which makes Westos even more likely as the major partner in this trade, since they certainly had guns and it was in the interests of both the Lords Proprietor and Westos to keep their relationship strong. One thing is lacking in the account, though: Native American captives (although in June 1677 there is a line for them stating “Indian slaves bought of them and sold (not sold),” but no monetary value was attached). It appears Woodward either kept no record of Native American captives in his books although the reasons why he would not remain unclear, or he kept these records in separate logs that are now lost, or the Proprietors, through Woodward, were not the ones doing the bulk of the trading.  

The proprietary trade monopoly, like almost everything else administrative in the colony had little in terms of enforcement mechanisms. In one example of colonists circumventing the monopoly, John Boone (who was later a known Native American slaver and trader with pirates) went before the Grand Council of the colony with “Capt.

Titus the Indian Interpreter” to “declare that the Indian prisoners which the Sowee and other our Neighbour Indians have lately taken, are Enemies to the said Indians who are in Amity with the English, and that the said Indian prisoners are willing to worke in this Countrey, or to be transported from hence, upon which it is Conceived that the said Indian prisoners may be transported by any who have or shall purchase them.” Boone was seeking sanction to sell prisoners out of Carolina who were taken by Seewees, who were enemies of the Westos and lived between the Ashley River and Santee River, and ignore the proprietary monopoly. The Grand Council, typically much more pragmatic than the utopian Proprietors, doubtless let Boone have the captives, and there were certainly other colonists acting in their own interests in selling Native American captives. There were multiple trades in Native American captives going to and through Charles Town as early as the 1670s. The Lords Proprietor had a trade with Westos, although Woodward’s lack of accounting on it leaves doubt on how extensive the trade was for captives. Other colonists probably were trading with Westos for captives and circumventing the proprietary monopoly, and there was a third trade, exemplified by Boone’s Sewee captives.21

The Lords Proprietor must have had an inkling that their monopoly was not working the way in which they had hoped because sometime in 1680 they appointed a commission “to heare and determine differences between the Christians and the Indians.” Orders to the commission included not allowing any “Indian that is in League or friendly correspondence with us” and lived within 200 miles “to be made slaves or sent out of the Country without special directions from us,” and to “regulate all disputes in or about

Trade or Commerce” between colonists and Native Americans. One exception to this second order dealt with the Westos. The Lords Proprietor wrote the commission was “not to meddle with or contradict any orders that we have or shall give concerning the Trade with the Westos & those other remote nations.” In essence, the Proprietors were arguing that no captives were to be taken from friendly polities within two hundred miles and all trade with Westos was the purview of Proprietors; this structuring was for the good of the colony. This fictional arrangement would not last much longer.22

The supposedly-exclusive trade deal between the Westos and the Lords Proprietor in theory worked to the benefit of both parties. The Proprietors could make some money back toward their investment in the colony, which was originally to be earned through quitrents on land but these taxes were almost never paid, and the Westos received a monopoly on access to the firearms that was a central reason for their militaristic advantage in the southeast. But since the monopoly was unenforceable on the ground, the Proprietors could not control the enslavement of Native Americans and the Westos could not control access to firearms among other native polities. By 1680, the pressures coming from colonists’ easy access to trade for skins and captives and Native Americans’ easy access to guns and other European goods gave Westos reason to see their advantages eroding away. At the same time, Woodward attempted to gain a handle on the proliferation of extra-monopolistic trade by telling some Westos that John Boone and John Moore, both “illegal” Native American slavers, could not be trusted in their dealings with Westos. According to the Grand Council, Woodward told the Westos that Boone

and Moore were attempting to “Espy and observe there strength and maner whereby they might ye easier be destroyed” and if the Westos did not obey requests to come to Carolina plantations, “they should be sent in shipps beyond seas and sold for slaves.”

The outbreak of the Westo War happened soon thereafter. The Grand Council blamed it on Westos, having “contrarie to their League made with the Govermt of” Carolina “killed taken and destroyd severall of our Neighbor Indians and as yet further Intend and Indeavour to prosecute their hostilitie against them to the greate disturbance and discouragmt of the people of this settlemt & hazard of the securitie and peace thereof.” Woodward took the blame from the Grand Council. The Lords Proprietors, an ocean away, had a different take, though. When the Proprietors heard of the war, they wrote to Andrew Percival and told him to attempt to sue for peace as soon as possible, but if they would not be receptive, Percival was to “send to the Cofitaciquis the Esaus and all other nations, and enter into a League with them against ye Westoes.” The Proprietors were careful to make sure Percival made one stipulation of peace being that Westos agree to only trade at two plantations: Shaftesbury’s (St. Giles Kussoe) and one called Mepkin belonging to Sir Peter Colleton, another of the Lords Proprietor, on the upper Cooper River, and thereby solidifying the proprietary monopoly.

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24 June 1, and June 4, 23, and 24, 1680, in Salley, *Journal of the Grand Council*, 84–5; Proprietors to Andrew Percival, February 21, 1681; and March 9, 1681, BPRO, Vol. 1, 106–8, 112–4. Mepkin plantation was about twenty three miles north of Charles Town on the eastern shore of the western branch of the Cooper River near modern Moncks Corner. During the eighteenth century, Mepkin was a main plantation operation of Henry Laurens.
Scholars have interpreted the Westo War as a result of the treachery of colonists with interests in creating more chaos and thereby reaping the benefits of more captives to enslave. In these narratives, an anti-Westo alliance is assumed to have been the instigator of the war against the Westo/Proprietor/Woodward alliance. But the Westos had something to gain in fighting anti-monopoly colonists and their lowcountry native allies as well, namely taking out rising native rivals who had gained access to European trade and the colonists offering up goods to other native polities against their agreed trade protections with the Lords Proprietor. Slavers like Maurice Matthews, John Boone, John Godfrey, and John Moore were in no uncertain terms some of the most ruthless men in this anarchic and brutal context, but that in itself does not necessarily mean they instigated the war. No matter whom we blame for the war, the conditions were perfect for such violence to begin, in large part because the Lords Proprietor and their decade-old state institutions had no control over trade on the ground.

The fallout from the Westo War included the destruction of the Westos as a regional powerhouse political entity. The Westos had enemies all around them and doubtless paid the price for their predatory economy. The Proprietors wanted to try the same strategy again, if not with Westos, then with “some other nation in the roome of ye Westoes (whome we deeme ruined) and whose Government is less anarchicall then theirs that shall be furnished by us with armes and ammunition” and control this polity by monopolizing their access to European goods. The people who supplanted the Westos were called Savannahs, a group of Shawnees who had moved south in the years before the founding of Carolina and had vast trade networks spanning a large section of the
continent. It was not long before the next large war over capturing and enslaving Native Americans broke out.²⁵

Although the timelines appear blurred in the historical record, the final war against the Westos in 1680 led into a war between the Savannah and the Waneah (or Waniah, Winyaw) people who lived around 55 miles northeast of Charles Town near what is now Winyaw Bay. The Lords Proprietor were enraged with colonists over this war and wrote a long letter castigating them for it in 1683. The justification given to the Proprietors by unnamed colonists was that the Savannahs were so powerful the colonists could not turn them down and the Waniahs had “cut off a boat of runaways.” The Proprietors gave little credence to these arguments, instead claiming that the reason colonists wrote they had to be engaged in “sending away Indians” was for “a much greater regard to their private Proffitt yn benefits ye Publick.” The slavers also argued it was their duty to buy captives from the powerful Savannah because “Humanity Induceth” them “to keep them from being put to Cruell Death.” The Proprietors thought the war was started because the Savannahs were not producing as “was expected in Beaver &c. that they might have Indians to transport” because the Proprietors could “imagine no other reason, a quarrel is picked with the Waniahs.” The Proprietors were therefore “convinced ye sending away ye Indians made ye Westoes & Waniah Warrs & continues them & will not onely continue them but make other warrs if ye Indian are suffered still to be sent away, and warr is very inconvenient for planters.” The problem was rooted, to the

Proprietors, in the fact that many of these men were only dabbling in agriculture. The longest and most biting censure was saved for last, concerning the colonists’ insistence that captive-selling was the humane action they should take for the poor, unfortunate Waniah. “By buying Indians of ye Savanas,” the Proprietors continued, “you induce them through covetousness of your Guns Powder & Shott & other European comoditys, so make warr upon their neighbors to Ravish the wife from ye Husband, kill ye father to gett ye childe & to burn & destroy ye habitations of those poore people into whose country we are cheerfully received.” The Proprietors, exasperated at the way their utopian colonial project had devolved into inciting wars for slaving, were nonetheless guilty of the same sins as their slave-trading colonists. They were “very Jealous that the Private gaines that some make by buying for slaves of the Indians sways more to ye opinion that they ought to be transported than the Publick safety.” Those private gains were supposed to have been monopolized and sent back to Europe.²⁶

Around the same time the Proprietors were busy attempting to rein in the Native American captive trade to the colony, Veracruz was sacked by pirates. With “seven or eight ships [including one from Carolina], five or six barques, and twelve hundred men,”

²⁶ Proprietors to the Governor and Deputies of the Province West and South of Cape Fear, September 30, 1683. Secretary of the Province, South Carolina Entry Book of Instructions and Other Records, B800105, SCDAH, 72–7; BPRO, Vol. 1, 255–61; Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 11, 508–10.

There are extant records for at least some of the Native American captives shipped out of the colony. Some colonists actually applied for and received permits for shipping Native Americans out of the colony from the Westo and Waniah Wars. All were from late 1681. There were captains of six ships aiming to transport a total of thirty five captured Waniah, “Seraguee, Chattooe, Westoe, and Yanock,” along with one “Appenock” girl. One ship, the Hopewell, captained by Solomon Robinson, applied for permission to transport twenty captives. See Susan Baldwin Bates and Harriott Cheves Leland, Proprietary Records of South Carolina: Abstracts of the Records of the Register of the Province, 1675-1696, vol. 1 (Charleston: History Press, 2005), 46–48, 50–51 and CSCDEP.
pirates attacked Veracruz in May 1683. For three days, the pirate horde sacked the city and “brought away abundance of negroes, Mulattoes and Mesteios.” The haul was so large the pirates could not sell it in one location. In 1686 runaway servants in St. Augustine reported that Charles Town had received around two hundred “Negroes” from the sack of Veracruz “and other places.” In 1687, former Governor Joseph Morton was accused of harboring “one Capt. Yankey,” one of the Veracruz plunderers, along with another “privateer,” who had “come into Carolina with a Spanish Prize they had taken which being Contrary to the Kings Commands.” Even though the trade in Native American captives continued apace, in the early 1680s the Lords Proprietors and eventually the Crown began voicing more concern over piracy pertaining to South Carolina. One observer noted in 1682 that Charles Town had “100 Privateers here all shar like though not at the taking of the prize.” A winning economic strategy for some colonists was to accumulate capital through slaving and then trade for stolen goods and other humans from pirates and regional merchants. Piracy in South Carolina was a growing problem for both the imperial metropole and the Lords Proprietor.27

King Charles II ordered the Lords Proprietors to pass a law similar to one passed in Jamaica “against such illegal proceedings by passing a law for Restraining & punishing Privateers & Pirats” in 1684. The Crown’s orders did little to stop the deprivations in the Caribbean and Atlantic or the welcome reception of pirates looking to liquidate their plunder in Charles Town. In the less than four years between the sack of

Veracruz, when Joseph Morton was governor of the colony, and the Proprietors’ letter of accusations in March 1687, two governors were accused of harboring and profiting off pirates (Morton and Joseph Quary), and at least one known Native American slaver was accused of dealing with pirates (John Godfrey). James Colleton, the governor in 1687, was eventually accused of both being a Native American slaver and a dealer with pirates. In many ways, three groups—pirates, slavers, and colonial administrators—overlapped and promoted each other. Often they were the same people.28

While the Proprietors and Crown were attempting in vain to control trade in and out of the colony, by banning men such as Arthur Middleton, Maurice Matthews, and James Moore (all known Native American slavers) from holding public office, a group of Scottish Covenanters started a new colonial outpost at Port Royal and named it Stuart’s Town. Led by William Dunlop and Henry Erskine, the Scots began this southern outpost of Carolina in 1684. These colonists quickly came to understand the benefits of their location, between Charles Town and the Yamasee towns to the south, which gave them

A central tenet of settler colonial ideology is the removal of the indigenous other, who always has rhetorical space for claims of colonized land and is therefore always an intellectual problem for the colonizer, and the introduction of an exogenous other who can serve as a subservient labor force. In this case the exogenous others were enslaved Africans. For more, see Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 387–409; Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Complicating this formulation, for an argument about how colonists needed control of some Native Americans to help justify their land claims, see Hayley Negrin, “Indian Women Work the Ground: Enslavement and Civility in the Early American South,” in Thomas Blake Earle and D. Andrew Johnson, eds., Atlantic Environments and the American South (forthcoming).

an advantage in trading with Yamasees. Within three months of colonizing Port Royal, the Scots began cultivating a trading relationship with Yamasees by offering them “arms and other things” and convincing them to “make warr with the Timecho [Timucua] Indians who [were] Christians and had a Spanish Fryer.” In essence, the Scots were promulgating a second foreign policy via the Yamasees. Yamasees then “killed fifty of the Timechoes and brought away two and twenty prisoners which they deliver[ed] to the Scots as slaves.” Woodward wrote that many of the principal Scots had traveled to “Amecaraw, on the South side of the Westo River,” for reasons “easy to guess.” Stuarts Town quickly became a second entrepôt for Native American captive trading to Carolina against the desires of the Proprietors, colonial administrators, and traders dealing through Charles Town. William Dunlop was also working on making Port Royal a hub of trade and point of disembarkation for the importation of enslaved Africans because there was “Little or no prospect in white Servts.” Writing to Sir James Montgomerie, Baronet of Skelmorlie, Dunlop requested for enslaved Africans to be loaded in Barbados, “and so straight to Port-Royall.” For Dunlop, the Scots’ “chiefe care” was “to provide Negroes.” If this had worked, the Scots could have completely bypassed Charles Town.29

29 Lords Proprietors to Governor Joseph West, March 13, 1685, BBRO, Vol. 2, 28; and Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 12, 11–2; “Examination of several Yamasee Indians whose spokesman, one of their Cassiques declared the following,” BPRO, Vol. 2, 66; Henry Woodward to Deputy Governor, John Godfrey, March 21, 1685, BPRO, Vol. 2, 49; also in Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 12, 19; William Dunlop to James Montgomerie, 1686, P900104, SCDAH.

Dunlop’s attempt at slaving Native Americans for export and having Africans imported is an example of what I have termed “displacive colonialism,” whereby the goals of colonists were to remove indigenous peoples from their land and replace them with other controllable populations to exploit labor from: enslaved Africans. I think this is a useful variation in certain contexts when collaborators doing the slaving were themselves indigenous peoples trying to displace their enemies and with whom they did not view as having what we would consider racial or ethnic solidarity as developed.
Stuarts Town became a rival colonial project to Charles Town, though it was ostensibly part of the same colony. To this end, Henry Woodward (who had fallen out of the graces of the Proprietors after the ordeal with the Westos but by the middle of the 1680s had made his way back into prominence) and some of his allies were arrested in Stuarts Town for attempting to trade with Native peoples between Port Royal and the Savannah River because Lord Cardross and William Dunlop had claimed that trade for the Scots. The Proprietors ordered Cardross arrested, but Cardross refused to accompany officials to Charles Town, claiming he was too ill to travel and his co-arrestees ran away, one into the woods and the other to the Yamasees. The colonial government could not even arrest a colonist whose whereabouts they knew for impeding relations with external Native American polities. Cardross wrote the governor, (pirate-friendly) Robert Quary, arguing he did not realize the warrant was for his arrest. William Dunlop wrote to Governor Quary blaming the colonial administration for the chaos in the southern part of the colony on a lack of magistrates and, to prove the Scots’ good intentions, gave up some runaway servants working on building a boat to escape. Dunlop was hoping to secure the autonomy of the Scots by appearing to be in league with the colony although the Scots had grander ambitions, but Stuarts Town was destroyed by the Spanish and their Native American allies in 1686.30

amongst Native American peoples by the nineteenth century. For more see D. Andrew Johnson, “Displacing Captives in Colonial South Carolina: Native American Enslavement and the Rise of the Colonial State after the Yamasee War,” Journal of Early American History 7 (Summer 2017), 115–140 and chapter 3 of this dissertation.

Another problem the colony faced concerned indentured servitude. The practice of “spiriting” social outcasts in the British Isles by either convincing them to sign up for colonial indentured servitude or outright kidnapping them remained a problem in the empire in the 1680s. Charles II decreed in 1682 that the “lewd sort of people called Spirits” were still operating in the metropole and instituted new laws for legally creating indentured servants. Contracts of indenture were to be executed in the presence of and endorsed by a local magistrate, then the contract had to be recorded by local clerks, and young people had to receive parental permission. Merchants and planters sought protections from being held liable for illegally obtaining indentured servants, pushing Charles II to make this decree. In South Carolina, no matter how little colonists such as John Dunlop thought of indentured servants, they kept coming into the colony. Even beyond spiriting, the status of bound Europeans could also come into question in South Carolina. For example, around 1684, Ann Fisher, “a Poore Widdow,” petitioned for the release of her son, William. Fisher argued that her son had been enslaved in Carolina, contrary to his contract. Six years before, William was “put out & and apprentice, until Elias Clifford for 7 yeares to learne only the Practicall art of Navegation.” But according to the petition, Clifford “by reason of his debauched life” sold his ship in Barbados and “turned planter in Carolina & doth there greatly inslave ye sd Wm Fisher in diging planting and Landworke wch is expresly against his Indentures.” Clifford had turned his apprentice into an indentured servant.31

31 King and Council, Whitehall, December 13, 1682, BPRO, Vol. 1, 233–6. This law was also renewed in March 1686. For Fisher, see “A petition of Ann fisher a Poore Widdow in name of herselfe & William Fisher her inslaved soonn who is now in the Plantation of Carolina,” BPRO, Vol. 1, 313–4.
Although indentured servitude has not played a major role in most early South Carolina narratives—the practice is usually depicted as an institution in other North American colonies—bound European labor must have come into the colony at rates high enough to make the legislature act in 1683, 1685, and 1687. Shiploads of servants with no contracts (meaning not held by a colonist on the ground) kept showing up in Charles Town and the legislature passed a law to end its practice. Unfortunately the text of this statute is missing, but it would have been passed in the hopes of ending temporary gluts in the market for bound European labor, which some colonists could have preferred less than enslaved people. This statute was renewed in 1685. Then, in 1687, the legislature decided to standardize the length of indentures according to the age of the laborer. Children under ten years old were to serve until they turned 21. If they were between ten and fifteen, they were to serve seven years, and if over fifteen, they had to serve five years. It is likely that similar to other social relationships defined by the control of labor in the colony, the state had little impact on how these contracts played out on the ground. In short, there was little legal recourse bound laborers could access via state institutions, which was how owners of bound labor preferred it. 32

By 1690, the trade in enslaved peoples continued as it had in the 1680s. The Lords Proprietor could not control trading outside the colony. Pirates were regularly showing up in Charles Town. And there was some “legal” trade between Carolina and the Caribbean. James Colleton was forced out of the governorship after calling for martial law, probably in order for him to enrich himself in the Native American trade, and was replaced by Seth Sothell. Sothell was twice governor of North Carolina, but was a

prototypically corrupt, gentrified colonial administrator in North Carolina. He used his position to make money on the trade with Native Americans, including captives, confiscated ships and their cargoes in direct opposition to the Navigation Acts, and stole goods from fellow colonists. Eventually he was run out of North Carolina, only to turn up in Charles Town expecting to become governor, as he had managed to purchase a proprietary share in the venture. It was not long before Sothell was up to his old tricks, inviting pirates to the colony, and offering them privateering commissions. Sothell also removed Paul Grimball and Barnard Schenking, two men held in high esteem by the Lords Proprietor, from high public offices, and he was Governor when some colonists attacked “the Cherokee Indians.” These colonists, probably Native American slavers, had “without any warr first proclaimed by the Grand Councill or authority from the Government fallen upon the Cherokee Indians In an hostile maner and murdered severall of them wch may be of very dangerous consequence.” Sothell was either in on the attack, or could not stop it. Even in the 1690s, the power of the colonial state was in many ways more theoretical than actual. The same problems of administration that had plagued the colony since its inception continued apace. Metropolitan leaders expected social deference and granted it to members of the gentry like Sothell without investing enough in coercive power to make their social order a reality. Meanwhile, on the ground in the colony, chaos reigned and the most ordered spaces were individual plantations where the threat of the lash applied the coercion necessary to keep enslaved peoples from running away en masse or revolting against their captors. As in other colonies during this era, the state apparatus served to enrich administrators but did little else.\footnote{On Colleton’s actions, see William Early of Craven to Seth Sothell, May 27,}
In 1696 imperial administrator, Edward Randolph, described the commerce of Carolina to the Commissioners of the Customs. Randolph wrote Charles Town was “free to all from all places.” The colony had a trade with “Carasan [Curaçao] from whence the manufacture of Holland is brought to Charles-Town, and carried by New england men and other illegal traders to Pennsylvania, Boston, &c.” Then, “plantation commodities” were traded back to the Dutch port of Curaçao. Trade between English ports and those belonging to other imperial interests was not illegal, so long as there were no enumerated commodities flowing out of English possession via the colonies. There is no doubt enumerated commodities were heading to Curaçao and other ports. Randolph also wrote about how in 1693 “seventy pirates having run away with a vessel from Jamaica came to Charles-Town, bringing with them a vast quantity of gold from, the Red Sea.” The pirates were greeted and “entertained and had liberty to stay or goe to any other place.” Then the governor, John Archdale, seized the ship “as a wreck, and sold” it. Colonists had “no regard for the Acts of Trade,” added Randolph, and the “Governor is a favourer of the


On the attack of the Cherokee, see Craven to Seth Sothell, James Colleton, Thomas Smith, Joseph Blake, and Barnard Schenking, May 13, 1691, BPRO, Vol. 3, 15–16. In 1693, the Commons House of Assembly reported that the Savannah, allies to some Carolina factions, “had been at one of the Charrekeys Townes and meeteing onely with ye old men there: (the young men being absent) killed them and Carryed away the women and Children and Sold Some of them for Slaves to the English Traders who had brought them to this Settlement and Sold them for slaves.” In a geopolitical sense, the colony needed both the Savannah and the Cherokee as allies. The trade in Native American captives could often create tension in such alliances. See January 13, 1693, A. S Salley, ed., Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina (Columbia: Printed by the State Co., 1907), 12.
illegal trade, having given his permit to the master of a furraigne [foreign] vessell to
trade.” Nearly thirty years after the colony was founded, very little had changed in its
relations to the continent or the Atlantic, with the possible exception of a few enslaved
people from Asia ending up toiling away in the colony.  

The trade in Native American captives, a central impetus for pushback by
colonists against creating functioning governmental structures conducive to promoting
external capital investment, was also creating friction between Carolina and its ostensible
allies on the continent. For example, in 1692, “Alatamhaw cheife King of the ymasees”
demanded the Grand Council retrieve “an Indian boy yt he calls his Sonn.” A colonist,
Phillip Mullins, had possession of the boy, and the Grand Council sent Joseph Blake
(future governor) to offer Mullins £8 for the boy. The colonial state could not (or would
not) even keep the children of important strategic allies from being enslaved and kept in
the colony unless the presence of enslaved allies created diplomatic friction. Around the
same time the Lords Proprietor decided to take “all the Indians into their protection
within four hundred miles of Charles Towne and Likewise have by theire order Required

34 Randolph to the Commissioners of the Customs, November 16, 1696,
Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society, Vol. 2, 195–6; and "Articles of
High Crimes and Misdemeanours charged upon the Governours in severall Proprieties on
the Continent of America and Islands Adjacent, by E. Randolph, received March 24,

There are a few traces of enslaved “East Indian” people in the colony from later
records. The first came in 1720, Rebecca Flavell sued John Sauseer for the “hire of East
Indian Man Cooper from December 31 1716/17 to March 31, 1717/8 is 3 mos att 5/
Day… £22.10,” Judgment Roll 1720, Box 16A, No. 162A, Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Rolls, SCDAH. There is no way to tell how long the cooper had been in the
colony, but it seems like he had been there long enough to be regarded as trustworthy
enough to rent out his labor.

On smuggling in Curaçao, see Linda M. Rupert, Creolization and Contraband:
that noe such Indian be Sold as a Slave and Sentt out of the Country.” Twenty-two years after the founding of Charles Town, the Proprieters still thought they could control colonists’ behaviors by decree, but without any coercive power to enforce it, they were continually proven wrong.  

In 1698 the Royal African Company lost its monopoly on the transatlantic slave trade from Africa to the Americas in the English Empire, but South Carolina’s political instability likely kept large-scale slavers from shipping directly to Charles Town until 1710. Charles Town was too risky to invest in transatlantic slaving, even with demand in the colony. In addition, the colonial administration had grown more sophisticated in the ways to defraud and steal from shipping into the colony. In 1700, Governor Joseph Blake was accused of “driv[ing] a fine Trade of seizing and condemning vessells right or wrong, he is sure to be the gainer, haveing the judge always on his side, and his Creatures at his back to appraize them.” Colonial officials set about confiscating ships at Charles Town on almost any pretense and then sitting juries of their allies to confirm the theft in order to grant an air of authority on the proceedings. One example was the affair concerning the Cole and Bean galley. The Cole and Bean was a ship taken from the French during the recent Nine Years’ War, “lawfully condemned in ye high court of admiralty,” and was registered as an English ship on March 17, 1695. The ship had sailed to Virginia and Jamaica without certificates stating its lawful trading within the empire without incident, but when she landed in Charles Town, the Cole and Bean was confiscated anyway. The ship had cost £1200 sterling in London to fit her out, but was bought for £755 (depreciated Carolina currency) in Charles Town by George Logan, one

of the appraisers of the confiscated property, for Governor Blake. Then Blake had the
ship sent to the “Bay of Campeech to load log-wood” and intended to sell the ship and
cargo for £2700 in Curaçao. Nicholas Trott wrote to the Lords Commissioners of Trade
& Foreign Plantations that Governor Blake, “resolved to have her seized,” had the ship
condemned in the Court of Admiralty, where disgraced former governor Joseph Morton,
also Blake’s brother-in-law, was judge. The ship was condemned and Judge Morton cut
off any hope of appeal to Admiralty Courts in England. Then, around the same time, the
South Carolina legislature passed a law opening up Admiralty Court judges to liability in
colonial courts. The Admiralty Courts were designed to be only beholden to the
sovereignty of the King and the colonial courts were essentially threatening independent
Admiralty judges with liability suits stemming from their decisions that infuriated the
metropolitan imperial interests.36

We do not know if the cargo in the holds of the Cole and Bean held human
property although the chances were high. But ship from a couple years earlier certainly
had captives on board. In July 1697, the Turtle set sail from Barbados with “some sugar,
Rum, Malosses and Negro Slaves, to the value of above Twelve hundred pounds,” bound
for Charles Town. The sloop arrived on August 14th in Charles Town harbor and made
itself known to the “Navall Officer there Mr. Jonathan Amory.” Amory then proceeded to
confiscate the vessel and “proceeded against her and her Cargo, in the Court of Admiralty

36 Edward Randolph to the Lords Commissioners for Trade & Plantation, May 27,
1700, BPRO, Vol. 4, 164–7; Benjamin Niccol, John Cross, Patrick Walsh, and Gyles
Been of London, Merchants Owners of the Cole & Been Galley, Paul Walsh Master, To
the King, BPRO, Vol. 4, 139–40; Trott to the Lords Commissioners of Trade & Foreign
Plantations, April 7, 1702, BPRO, Vol. 5, 47–53; Joseph Morton to the Proprietors,
of Carolina, as forfeited on pretence that the master was a Scots man, and so not navigated according to the Act of navigation.” On August 27th, the court condemned the ship because the captain was a Scotsman, a highly questionable reason for confiscating a ship and cargo. What happened to the enslaved Africans on board? They likely ended up in the colony, sold by local merchants to other colonists. Amory, Advocate General of the Admiralty Court of the colony, was also a merchant. He had “purchased a French prize” brought to Charles Town in 1692, so he was known to deal in confiscated (or outright stolen) goods, like many of his fellow colonists.37

Although the trade in African peoples to South Carolina remains largely opaque, in 1698 the assembly passed a law in response to the number of enslaved Africans in the colony. Titled “An Act for the Encouragement of the Importation of White Servants,” this law was aimed at counterbalancing the large number of enslaved Africans with commodified European labor. Since a “great number of negroes which of late have been imported into this Collony may endanger the safety thereof,” the Assembly thought it prudent to promote indentured servitude, except Irish servants. One key feature of the law was to order colonists to take one indentured servant for every “six men negro slaves above sixteen years old” when it was “his lot to have one” and two servants for every twelve African slaves. Colonists were to take turns in buying indentured servants when they came into the colony and chosen at random with colonists’ names “put in a bagg or box” to draw lots. This statute was aimed at accounting for the many indentured servants coming into the colony with no contract as well as spreading out the European population

37 For the case of the Turtle, see Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1930), 249–50; for a short biograph of Jonathan Amory, see BD, 37–8.
amongst the rising enslaved population. Like most of the statutes of the early colony, this one was in all probability mostly ignored. The trade with Native Americans and illegal shipping were much more lucrative than worrying too much about the demography of the colony.\(^{38}\)

In the summer of 1700, the Grand Council appointed James Moore to be governor of the colony. Moore was a longtime foe of the Lords Proprietor, one of the leading Goose Creek Men, and deeply involved in the Native American captive trade out of the colony. Moore had married Margaret Berringer, the daughter of Lady Margaret Yeamans, and he inherited through his wife Sir John Yeamans’s plantation at the confluence of Goose Creek and Cooper River. But he made his home at a plantation he named Boochawee, located at the intersection of multiple Native American paths in and out of Charles Town, giving him a strategic location in dealing with Native American peoples (see Map 1.2). The Lords Proprietor had long tried to keep Moore out of public office, but they ultimately failed. When he finally assumed the position of colonial governor, Moore had decades of experience in limiting attempts at creating an imperial/colonial state in opposition to his slaving interests, and in 1700 he became the head of the same weak colonial state. Then in 1702, Queen Anne’s War gave Moore the cover to go on the largest plundering raids of the colonial period in the southeast.\(^{39}\)

\(^{38}\) “An Act for the Encouragement of the Importation of White Servants,” ratified August 26, 1699, Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 153–6; Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, 250.

Map 1.2: James Moore’s Boochawee Plantation, Goose Creek

James Moore’s plantation, Boochawee, is labeled “Capt Moor” near the center of this detail of a 1697 map which was based on Maurice Moore’s descriptions used for a map in about 1685. Notice how Moore’s plantation had poor water access, which was unusual the early years of the colony, but he was located at a vital crossroads which today is situated in downtown Goose Creek, South Carolina. Moore could have been granted land elsewhere, but he must have wanted direct access to the trading paths and cared little about only having access to the upper reaches of what became known as Fosters Creek. Detail of Pierre Mortier, Carte Particuliere de la Caroline (Amsterdam, 1696), SCDAH.

Moore wanted to send a large expedition to attack St. Augustine and the colony’s satellite missions for Native American captives. In 1702, he was finally able to justify mounting attacks on Guale, Mocama, and St. Augustine. Moore led 500 English militiamen and 300 Yamasee warriors against the Spanish missions and colony in a two-pronged attack. Robert Daniell led troops over land and Moore led an assault by sea. But an Apalachee informant had divulged the plan to the Florida administration. The siege of St. Augustine was a disaster for the Carolinians, but the invasion did finally destroy the long-preyed-upon mission provinces of Guale and Mocama. Carolinians and their Yamasee allies undertook the expedition with “hopes of mighty Plunder” and they
achieved their goal. The raids turned into nothing “more than a Project of Freebooting under the specious Name of War.” Even though St. Augustine did not fall, with the expedition having to “raise the siege and set fire to their own ships and return home by land,” the goal of “Plundering, and Slave-Catching” worked “well enough” to send “their Plunder to Jamaica” while holding St. Augustine under siege. James Moore was embarrassed by the lack of success against the Spanish and was accused of “designing nothing less than ingrossing” himself after “already almost utterly ruin’d the Trade for Skins & Furs (whereby we held our chief correspondence with England) & turned it into a Trade of Indian catching or Slave-making, whereby the Indians to the South & West of us are already involv’d in blood & confusion; a Trade so odious and abominable, that every other Colony in America (altho, they have equal temptation) abhor to follow.”

Moore also granted commissions to colonists “to set upon, assault, kill, destroy & take captive as many Indians as they possibly could, the profit and produce of which Indian Slaves were turn'd to his private use.”

Although Moore was disgraced and removed from office by the Lords Proprietor in favor of Nathaniel Johnson in 1703, he led more attacks to the south of Carolina beginning in the winter of 1703–4 on the mission province of Apalachee. Moore had promised to finance the expedition himself, with the most obvious method of financing

being promises of repayment in piratical plunder and slaving. The expedition consisted of 50 white colonists and somewhere around 1,000 Native American allies. An account by Moore was published in the *Boston News-Letter* on May 1, 1704. On December 14th, 1703, they came upon a fort called “Ayaville.” Realizing that an assault would not work, the invaders decided to burn a church which made up part of the fort. Moore’s marauders “took about twenty-six men alive, and fifty-eight women and children.” The next day at St. Lewis Fort, 168 “Indian men killed and taken in the fight; but the Apalaichia Indians say they lost two hundred, which we have reason to believe to be the least.” Two days later, Moore met with the cassique of the “Ibitachka,” who decided to buy off the raiders with “his church’s plate, and ten horses laden with provisions.” Next, they marched through “five towns, which had all strong forts, and defences against small arms. They all submitted and surrendered their forts… without condition.” Moore bragged he had captured “all the whole people of three towns, and the greatest part of four more.” The pillagers had “totally destroyed all the people in four towns,” and the only ones left were people who scattered under the assaults. Apalachee was broken and along with it the entire Spanish mission system in Florida. The raiders came away with untold plunder and captives. The power dynamic was changing between Native American slavers and their colonial counterparts. 41

A committee in the Commons House of Assembly in 1706 discussed bringing charges against one of the major Native American slavers, John Musgrove. There must

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have been a faction of members of the Assembly who were against Musgrove because other actions of this kind are unmentioned in documentary evidence but had to have taken place. At the same time the Assembly was discussing the depredations perpetrated by Musgrove, they were also working on the bill that would eventually set up the Commissioners of the Indian Trade in order to attempt rationalizing and regulating the trade that for the previous 35 years had been uncontrollable. The charges against Musgrove serve as a representation of the tactics the South Carolinian traders in Native American captives used in the early-eighteenth century, so each of the “Severall Abuses by him done and committed amongst our Neighboring and friendly Indians” deserves discussion. Musgrove may have been exceptional in the scope of his exploitation, but certainly not in the style.42

The first accusation against Musgrove was that he had cheated some unnamed Creeks “arbitrarily and of his own accord” by charging them for “their Skins” and promising to offer them as a present to the governor of the colony and also “hindered them from going to war upon that account” as allies to South Carolina. These Creeks, it seems, were enraged by the demand for gifts. The second complaint leveled against Musgrove was that he “arbitrarily and of his own accord tooke and Received Elombee and Wacoca free people and made them his slaves” by promising to set them free and did the same to “six of the laivollios, a free Apalchia people” and had “sold them for slaves.” Then, he was accused of taking “A free Indian woman belonging to the Coolomio Town and brought her as a slave to the Savanna Town” and also “tooke a free Woomelaw

42 This John Musgrove was the father of the more famous John Musgrove who married Coosaponakeesa (Mary Musgrove), the cultural go-between in the founding era of Georgia. Wednesday, December 11, 1706, Journals of the Commons House, Nov 20, 1706- Feb 8, 1706/7 (Rough Copy), S 165226, SCDAH.
woman” to either sell or keep. Musgrove also “tooke at one time eight Worstora free people and made them Slaves.” He was also blamed for threatening “the lives of the Tuckesaw Indian King and another” unless they would give him four captives in satisfaction for the “Indian Wives” of Musgrove and another trader. The charges also argued that Musgrove had taken from the “Illcombaw and Wacoa Indians” two captives, one horse, and “some say six and others say sixteen free Indians” under the pretense that the “Illcombaw and Wacoa Indians had killed several of his cattle.” Lastly, Musgrove supposedly ordered around the (essentially captive to the colony) free Apalachee peoples who had migrated to the Savannah River in the aftermath of James Moore’s raids by pretending to represent the colonial government. In addition, Musgrove “sometimes orders [Native Americans] to go to Warr and no white man should go” and also to have them “do such things as he pleased.” John Musgrove’s behavior was likely similar to other slavers like him though his exploits are better documented. The individual actions of Native American slavers were a crucial factor in keeping the region and colony in a constant state of chaos well into the eighteenth century.43

These geopolitical actions were not without imperial consequences, though. The Spanish in Florida and the French from the new colony of Louisiana retaliated for the raids on St. Augustine and Spanish missions by attacking Charles Town in 1706. In August of that year, during an outbreak of yellow fever in Charles Town, a joint expeditionary force of French and Spanish ships sailed for Charles Town Harbor. The invasion was a complete disaster for the French and Spanish. The reports back to London of the aftermath of the incident are an example of the fuzziness of the recording of Native

43 Ibid; Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 214.
American captive-taking. Two reports survive describing the many prisoners taken during the invasion. One reported “wee have in all about two hundred & thirty Prisoners French & Spaniards,” while the other stated “wee having now in all abt 230 Prisoners French & Spaniards and abt ninty or 100 Indians which they brought with them.” 100 Native American captives, almost certainly sold into Atlantic slavery, were not worth mentioning in one of these reports. But these Native American captives, quite possibly Choctaws, mattered to their sellers. They mattered to their buyers. And they certainly mattered to their families, social connections, and as historical agents as well. 44

Meanwhile on the Atlantic side, the captive trade to South Carolina became slightly more legible in the 1700s. The first known ship to have made the transatlantic voyage from West Africa to Charles Town was in 1701. Evidence of this voyage is thin, but the ship embarked with 103 captives from the Senegambia region of West Africa and landed in Charles Town with 91 captives aboard. The next transatlantic ship known to have made the trip from Africa to South Carolina was in 1710, nine years later. There are statistics beginning in 1706 on how many African captives were imported into the colony, and it is not clear how they were distributed between enslaved people traveling from Africa versus from the West Indies. The total number of people listed stands at 337 in the years between 1706 and 1710. Between 1711 and 1715 the number rose to 905, and (corresponding with the collapse of the Native American captive trade and Yamasee War) between 1716 and 1718 importations rose to a total of 1,169. A second dataset, the

Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, shows a different perspective on the Atlantic captive trade to Charles Town. The two datasets appear very different. The first line was compiled by Elizabeth Donnan in her magisterial work on the slave trade to America, and the second comes from Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database project. Donnan’s statistics come from both transatlantic and intercolonial slave trading, while the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database concentrates on ships crossing the Atlantic. Both sources are incomplete as to the total number of enslaved African peoples ending up in South Carolina and most certainly underestimate the true scope of the forced migration (See Table 1.1). Of the transatlantic voyages, the few known with points of origin came mostly from Senegambia and the Gold Coast, with one ship coming from the Bight of Biafra. Even the people forced to migrate across the Atlantic to South Carolina as chattel property were polyglot in their regional origins.  

Table 1.1

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On September 17, 1708, Governor Nathaniel Johnson replied to an inquiry about the state of the colony. His response is the most comprehensive description of the colony in the proprietary era and is often used by scholars to understand the colony in the early-eighteenth century. Although the overwhelming majority of Native American captives brought into the colony were sold to other colonies, such as “Boston Road Island, Pennsylvania New York & Virginia,” where they “export[ed] Indian slaves,” when placed in the context of the population of the colony, a large number of enslaved Native Americans remained. The attacks on the Spanish missions earlier in the decade likely were a point at which the number of Native American captives remaining in the colony rose drastically, as “Indian men slaves by reason our late conquest over the French & Spaniards and the success of our forces against the Appalaskye and other Indian engagements are within the 5 years increased to the number of four hundred, and the Indian women slaves to four hundred and fifty.” The population of enslaved Africans was rising, with the number increasing by 500 in the five previous years (300 men and 200 women). Johnson wrote the principal supplier of enslaved Africans was still the Caribbean — specifically Barbados and Jamaica — but pirates and other smugglers also were sure to still be supplying the colony as well.46

Smuggling remained a problem in the (newly-minted) British Empire in the later part of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Governor Johnson wrote to the Proprietors that the colony had a thriving trade with St. Thomas (Danish), Curaçao (Dutch), and Madeira (Portuguese) for everything outside of enumerated commodities. Around the same time, it came to the attention of imperial leaders in the metropole that

46 The Governor and Council to the Proprietors, September 17, 1708, BPRO, Vol. 5, 203–6.
Carolinians, in conjunction with Rhode Islanders, were smuggling rice directly to Portugal in opposition to the Navigation Acts, which had become an enumerated commodity beginning in 1705. It was therefore illegal for rice to be shipped from a British colony to a foreign port without first going through a British port. The scheme consisted of three ships being loaded in Charles Town with “clearings for Rhode Island.” In Rhode Island, they received “certificates to cleare their Bonds att Carolina and thence Reloaded their Ships.” The Rhode Island certificates would have been the documents necessary to redeem their £1000 shipping bond in Charles Town in the name of delivering the goods to the port where they claimed to be going. South Carolinians had found a partner in Rhode Island, a “place where all Roguery’s are committed.” Then, in ships supposedly filled with fish to sell in Portugal — fish wasn’t an enumerated commodity — these merchants and captains would also add back rice to the load, making direct shipment to Portugal, usually Lisbon or Porto, virtually undetectable. It may also have been important for these smugglers to ship fish and rice together because South Carolina rice planters wanted to reach the Portuguese market in time for Lent, where the Portuguese Catholics would have been more likely to eat both fish and rice and prices would be high. And it is in shipments such as these to Rhode Island where most of the enslaved Native Americans were probably shipped out of South Carolina, right alongside provisions, wood, or other goods not covered by the Navigation Acts.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}; John Lloyd to William Popple, December 30, 1708, BPRO, Vol. 5, 230. For rice being added to the enumerated commodities, along with molasses, see Sir Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, and John Raithby, \textit{The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland}, vol. VI (London: Printed by G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1811), 477.}
All smuggling was not out of the colony, as enslaved Africans were being trafficked into South Carolina as well. One ship, the *St. Christopher*, operated by the Royal African Company, was to make a slaving voyage between Gambia and Bermuda in 1702. The captain of the ship, Daniel Johnson, Jr., the son of a prominent Bermudian, was to load his vessel with African captives in order to take them across the Atlantic for sale, but the voyage did not go as planned. South Carolina governor Nathaniel Johnson wrote that the ship “being unable to proceed her voyage He made for Turks Islands a place uninhabited and there meeting with a Bermuda vessell he put part of his Negros on board her and consigned them to his Father.” The rest of the captive Africans “he put on board of a Carolina Vessell then with him att Turks Islands and came with them hither and immediately sold them.” The Turks Islands (modern-day Turks and Caicos Islands) lie to the south of the Bahamas and remained virtually uninhabited in the early-eighteenth century, with pirates being some of the only frequent visitors. Governor Johnson argued that Daniel Johnson had left the *St. Christopher* at the Turks Islands and loaded the cargoes onto different ships. One went to Bermuda and the other Charles Town. Nathaniel Johnson warned that he “could not see any Designe there could be of Defrauding Her Majesty” from avoiding payment of the duties on the captives, but he could envision others acting in similar ways to avoid the Navigation Acts.48

The Royal African Company investigated the case of the *St. Christopher* and came to a far different conclusion than Nathaniel Johnson. In the Company’s telling, Captain Daniel Johnson had a “considerable Cargo trading up the River Gambia,” and when he returned to the Royal African Company’s fortress at the coast, James Fort, it had

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“been plundered by the French.” Johnson then decided to take the cargo across the Atlantic and sell it beyond the gaze of imperial agents. With a fortress in disarray, there would have been no paper trail concerning the contents of the ship. The *St. Christopher* contained “Slaves Teeth and Wax,” which Daniel Johnson sold to his father in Bermuda for their “owne use and afterwards burnt the Shipp St. Christopher at Turks Island.”

Sailors captured in Bermuda claimed to know nothing about any captives going to South Carolina. Why this discrepancy? It is certain that Governor Nathaniel Johnson was opposed to regulating the trade with and slaving of Native Americans although he was appointed by the Lords Proprietor and was supposedly a man working in the interests of the imperial metropole. It is entirely plausible that Johnson made up the enslaved cargo from the *St. Christopher* making it to Charles Town to seem as if he was attempting to deal with the problem of pirates and smuggling in the colony while at the same time profiting off the exploitation and enslavement of Native Americans and possibly pirates as well. One other possible scenario was that the captives did in fact make their way to Charles Town and were sold there. Later in the eighteenth century, South Carolina planters became fixated on enslaved people from the Senegambia region of West Africa because many of these people came from societies where rice was grown. It is likely that enslaved people from the Senegambia region helped elaborate the technology and strategy of rice planting in the eighteenth century, and quite possibly these enslaved people from the *St. Christopher* had a hand in the evolution of rice culture.  

By about 1710, the supply of Native Americans able to be enslaved by colonists began dwindling. With the Spanish missions destroyed, the coalescence of other native polities into stronger defensive confederations, and epidemic diseases ravaging the interior of the southeast around the turn of the eighteenth century, the Native American captive trade to South Carolinians began to dry up. Thomas Nairne, the main Indian Agent for Carolina, wrote about visiting the Chickasaws, relatively new allies of Carolinian traders. According to Nairne, in 1708 “no imployment pleases the Chicasaws so well as slave Catching.” In order to catch people to trade to Charles Town, Chickasaws went “a man hunting to the Chicsaws [Choctaws], Down to the sea side along both sides of the great river, and 150 miles beyond it.” Chickasaws were slaving all the way to Texas or Oklahoma, or around 1,000 miles west of Charles Town. Nairne was for this trade not only as a slaver, but also for imperial strategic reasons. Enemies of the Chickasaw were allies with the French at their new colony of Louisiana (especially Choctaws), and Nairne was pleased these Chickasaw slavers were only dealing with British traders. The French in Louisiana, meanwhile, had little interest in trading for Native American captives. Louisianans attempted instead to trade with Chickasaws and divert them from British influence. The French were able to trade with Chickasaws for some goods, but the slaving continued. One economic problem with ranging so far away from Charles Town for captives to sell as slaves was the added expense of the extra time
and effort it would take to move the captives all the way to the port. Sometime around 1710, slaving in the distant west must have reached a point of diminishing returns for Carolina traders. In short, slavers were ranging so far from Charles Town they became less likely to undertake raids for the trade. The slaving of Native Americans continued, but Charles Town became less attractive as a marketplace.  

It was fortuitous for Native American captive traders when groups of Tuscaroras began attacking North Carolinians in late 1711. All of the sudden there was a new supply of potential people to enslave, and many South Carolinians, led by John Barnwell, decided to go on an expedition to help the remote part of the Carolina project to their north. Barnwell was from Dublin and had migrated to South Carolina around 1700. He lived at Port Royal and became one of the largest landholders in the southern part of the colony. When his estate was inventoried in 1724, Barnwell owned 19 enslaved people, one of whom was a Native American, and one indentured servant. In the winter of 1712 he led the assault on the Tuscaroras with a force of thirty “white men” and 528 Native Americans, made up of Yamasees, Esaws, “Hog Logees,” Apalachees, Cusabos, Waterees, Sugarees, Catawbas, “Suterees,” Waxhaws, Congarees, Santee, PeeDees, Winyaws, Cape Fears, “Hoopangs,” “Wareperes,” Cheraws, and “Saxapahaws.” Within a  

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decade, virtually all of these native politico-cultural identities would cease to exist, but in
1712 they set out to attack the Tuscarora and capture as many enemies as possible. 51

Barnwell decided to assault a fort to demonstrate to the Tuscarora that the
expedition was not only a show of force. But while Barnwell and his colonial staff were
preparing, “some of my Yamasees were so mettlesome as to advise to force it by Assault,
will ing to flesh while they were hot, I immediately ordered the Attack...the enemy were
so desperate, the very women shooting Arrows, yet they did not yield untill most of them
were put to the sword.” The next step was to plunder, where Barnwell placed the blame
firmly on their native allies: “they judging the business was over, Crowded in on all
hands to plunder which proved ye destruction of several... while we were putting the
men to the sword, our Indians got all the slaves & plunder.” After raiding the area for a
few weeks, the expedition ran upon a Tuscarora fortification with many Euro-American
colonists held inside as captives. With wounded mounting, Barnwell decided to head
back to South Carolina. A few months later, a second expedition was mounted, headed by
James Moore, Jr. (son of the slaver/governor). This second expedition included fewer
Native American warriors because colonial traders had convinced their native partners
not to take part. Slavers, “profligate wretches,” wanted the plunder for their individual
“sordid gain.” Colonists wanted to loot for themselves. Moore assaulted a fortress he
called “Noo He Roo Ka Fort” (Neoheroka). Moore reported in the aftermath of the
assault that the Tuscaroras had lost 270 men “with total losses not less than 800.” He later
wrote the numbers as “Enemies Destroyed is as follows - Prisoners 392, Scolps 192, out
of ye sd fort & att Least 200 Kill'd & burnt in ye fort — 166 Kill'd & taken out of ye

51 John Barnwell, February 4, 1712, and March 12, 1712, “The Tuscarora
fort.” The 392 prisoners were almost certainly sold into slavery through Charles Town, and organized Tuscarora resistance to Euro-American colonial incursion was thus broken. Historian Alan Gallay has estimated that somewhere between one- and two-thousand Tuscaroras were captured and sold into slavery during the war.\(^5\)

The supply and demand pressures on Native American traders in skins and captives and their South Carolina counterparts were not remedied in the Tuscarora War. The colony was exporting enormous numbers of skins. Between June 6, 1712, and June 6, 1713, 73,790 deerskins were exported from the colony, with 75 “Indians” traded away in the records over the same time span. Charles Town merchants were the people making the profits off both these trades, and the colonial traders were almost always in debt. As skins and captives were increasingly hard to come by, the colony’s main trade partners, Yamasees, also incurred major debts to colonial traders. In April 1715, the colony sent two important representatives in Native American relations to Pocotaligo, a Yamasee town a little over 20 miles north of Port Royal. Thomas Nairne and John Wright were experienced traders and diplomats for the colony and hoped to be able to curb growing anger toward the colony from the Yamasee. Unfortunately, the two men brought vastly divergent messages. Nairne, a British imperialist, understood the need to keep allies such as the Yamsasee for security of the colony and was reconciliatory. Wright, meanwhile, had major problems with personal debt. About ten months earlier, Wright had sold 43 enslaved people to merchant Samuel Wragg, almost certainly for debt. In 1720, merchant

Robert Nesbit struck £786.6.8 off his accounts for bad “debets taken out of the Company Books” in Wright’s account (for more on Wright, see chapter 4). The messages of the emissaries could not have been more contradictory, but according to historian Alejandra Dubcovsy, these types of mixed signals were “emblematic of the Yamasee-South Carolina relations.” Wright said, according to the Huspaw King, “the white men would come and [fetch] [illegible] the Yamasees in one night, and that they would hang four of their head men and take all the rest of them for Slaves.” Nairne and Wright were executed the next morning, and the conflict we call the Yamasee War had begun.

Virtually all of the smaller Native American nations of the southeast who had been clinging to their independent survival were either enslaved or coalesced with other larger groups such as the Creeks, Catawba, or Cherokee within a few short years. The trade in Native American captives therefore became untenable as a primary economic endeavor for colonial traders, but deerskins proved lucrative for many years afterward.53

Roughly two weeks after James Moore, Jr. destroyed the Tuscarora fortress at Neoheroka, the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, ending the War of Spanish Succession—known in British America as Queen Anne’s War—and ended the state of war between Great Britain against (largely) France and Spain and their Native American allies. These peace accords became one of the impetuses for colonial officials in the imperial metropole to invest more in controlling shipping from pirates and privateers. Without a


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large war against Spain and France, there was less reason to promote privateering, and
the imperial metropole thus sought to make transatlantic (and intercolonial) trade more
legible and regulated. The South Seas Company now had the Spanish *Asiento* monopoly,
and South Carolina, one of the colonies widely known to be a safe port for pirates, began
actively working against the same types of pirates and smugglers the colony had done so
much business with since 1670. Although pirates were still in the area — Edward Teach,
better known as Blackbeard, famously blockaded Charles Town in 1718 — and the
numerous missionaries for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts
(SPG) complained repeatedly in the 1710s of pirates stealing their dispatches back to
London, imperial and colonial officials finally decided to control piracy. Whereas SPG
missionary Gideon Johnson complained in 1708 of the entire colony being made up of “a
perfect Medley or Hotch potch made up of Bank[r]upts, pirates,” and other undesirables,
by 1718 colonial administrators were changing their handling of piracy.54

In August 1718, the ship named *Royal James*, belonging to the famous pirate,
Stede Bonnet, “proved very leaky,” and the captain decided to stop at the Cape Fear

54Gideon Johnston to Lord Bishop of Sarum, September 20, 1708 in Williams and
Waddell, *Letters from the Clergy of the Anglican Church*, 80–5. On other missionaries
complaining, see in the same volume William Wye to Reverend Dr. Astry, June 26, 1716,
314; Thomas Hassell to the Society, October 11, 1718, 316; William Guy to the Society,
November 20, 1718, 316–7; and Churchwardens and Vestry of St. Andrew’s Parish to the
Society, November 16, 1719, 321.

On the importance of the Treaty of Utrecht as a landmark in European imperial
relations—especially for the British—see Mark G. Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of
the British Empire, 1570-1740* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundo Institute of
Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2015);
Paul W Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill:
Published for the Omohundo Institute of Early American History and Culture by the
University of North Carolina Press, 2011); and J. H Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic
World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2006).
River. Repairs to the ship were difficult and took weeks for the crew to complete. While Bonnet was stuck in North Carolina, word came to the South Carolina administration of his whereabouts, and the governor, Robert Johnson, decided to send Charles Town merchant, smuggler, and slaver, William Rhett, with two ships against Bonnet. After a bloody battle, the pirates were defeated, and Rhett brought them to Charles Town to face British imperial under Judge Nicholas Trott. Over 20 pirates were executed at Chalk Point in Charles Town. Bonnet escaped, proving he still had support in the colony, but was recaptured, tried, and hanged as well. For the trial, Trott wrote a legal manifesto on the laws of piracy, which historian Mark G. Hanna has called “arguably one of English America’s first great contributions to the ‘law of nations’ and remaining today one of the seminal works of piracy law.” Trott’s remarks were published in 1719 in The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet and a few years later in Daniel Defoe’s popular A General History of the Pyrates. Although piracy in South Carolina was not completely stopped with Bonnet, his capture, recapture, and famous trial sent the symbolic message that the colony was no longer a sympathetic place for pirates. The colonial administration would finally attempt to follow imperial laws of the sea, and this was no small part in the building of a state apparatus in Charles Town conducive to Atlantic commerce that required more capital investment.55

The enslaved population of early South Carolina was an atomized conglomeration of peoples from many places and cultures. Had the colonial administration been able to rationalize and regulate trading in and out of the colony, it would likely have led to a

more homogenous population of enslaved peoples. The weakness of the state in securing contracts and advancing a unified diplomacy in the late 1710s meant that colonists ruthlessly sought out whatever economic activities would pay the highest return with the least effort—something people operating under the logic of capital typically will attempt—but by actively resisting the creation of a state promoting outside European investment instead of violent primitive accumulation, colonists made this period of South Carolina history last almost fifty years. Driven by the Native American captive trade and offering safe harbor for pirates and smugglers, the South Carolina economy took longer than other colonies in the subtropics to develop a plantation-based, staple-producing economy, even after colonists learned and adapted rice-growing methods.

Three contextual factors led South Carolinians to finally stop opposition to the formation of an integrated Atlantic colonial state. First, the Native American captive trade, long liberalized by traders and to the peril of the colony, was in essence too successful, and the supply of possible captives became nearly nonexistent. Secondly, the Peace of Utrecht gave the British reason to apply pressure to the imperial periphery to control piracy because trade was the future of British dominance. And third, alongside the decline in the Native American trade in captives, exporting rice and naval stores became much more attractive central economic activities for colonists. Planters needed the power of the state to back up property claims and credit/debt flows in ways pirates did not, so South Carolina pirates, both on land and over the seas, decided to move toward state-building. By the end of the 1710s, the populations of enslaved people coming into the colony began to become somewhat less atomized and kaleidoscopic, instead
becoming more rational and predictable, though these newcomers were added to the mosaic already present in the colony.
Chapter 2

The Rise of the Transatlantic Captive Trade

On June 16, 1733, The South Carolina Gazette featured an advertisement by Charles Town merchants Paul Jenys and John Baker for the sale on the following Wednesday of “a choice parcel of Negroes, imported in the Ship Cato… from Africa.” According to the Voyage: Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, the Cato arrived in Charlestown with 217 captive Africans, although the region of embarkation from Africa remains opaque. During the 1730s, Charles Town merchants had little trouble in selling the commodified bodies of captured African peoples to colonists of the lowcountry. In fact, one central reason Charles Town became an important destination for slavers looking to ply their human wares on the continent of North America, both transatlantic and intercolonial, was that colonists in South Carolina always demanded more slaves, and, beginning in the 1710s, many colonists had the capital accumulated to purchase captives without resorting to risky credit arrangements. Jenys and Baker, like other merchants, often sold the enslaved Africans quickly and without relying on extending credit to suspect colonists. But with the cargo of the Cato, some buyers did resort to collateralized credit in the sale of a few of the enslaved people on board. The financial instrument some buyers used was the mortgage. Over the three days following the initial sale, Jenys and Baker accepted sixteen enslaved men and women as collateral for mortgages against the purchase of slaves from the Cato.¹

¹ SCG, June 16, 1733. For more information on the Cato, see Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. For the mortgages stemming from the enslaved cargo of the Cato, see MRMS, Volume BB, SCDAH, 95–105.
As evidenced by the case of the *Cato*, in the early 1730s, the captive trade to South Carolina had changed dramatically from the ad-hoc and diffused system from the first fifty years of the colony. Changes in the 1710s both inside and outside the colony remade the nature of the colonial economy. After the Peace of Utrecht, 1713, British metropolitan administrators decided it was to their advantage to suppress piracy and privateering, partially due to the Spanish granting the captive trade *asiento* to British interests. At around the same time, the decline in the trade in captive Native Americans to Charles Town was due in part to the power of the newly formed Native American confederacies in the southeast leaving fewer native peoples vulnerable to slaving. The coterminous western expansion of slave-raiding across the Mississippi River into modern Arkansas, especially by Chickasaws, made the trade less lucrative in Charles Town. The catastrophic war that broke out in 1715 only sped up the trend of better-defended Native political alliances and dwindling supply of possible captives. The third factor playing into the changing nature of the slave trade to Charles Town during the 1710s was the speedy increase in developing rice as a major export. In 1709, rice exports nearly tripled to over 1.5 million pounds and steadily increased such that by 1720, the colony exported nearly 6.5 million pounds annually. Safer seas for commerce and the shift toward the primary economic activity of many colonists concentrating on plantation produce meant that supplying captive Africans to the colony became more economically viable, and rising exports to the metropole resulted in access to more metropolitan credit. The decline in the Native American captive trade, along with the rise in rice production, gave colonists reason to make the colony safer for outside capital investment as a means toward economic development. The sum of these changes, along with the decision of colonists to
stop resisting proprietary/imperial administrative structures in the colony, made Charles Town a much more attractive location to ship captive Africans directly across the ocean.²

This chapter is an exploration of the coerced migrations of enslaved African peoples to South Carolina in the period roughly between 1717 and 1740. After the Yamasee War, direct trans-Atlantic trade in African peoples began picking up in terms of both the number of shipments and the number of people transported to Charles Town. Simultaneously, the trade in captive Native Americans dropped in economic importance almost immediately but did not end, which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. This study follows the trade in West-African peoples into the colony until 1740 when, in the aftermath of the local Stono Rebellion, and the Atlantic-wide conflicts of the War of Jenkins’s Ear (and the War of Austrian Succession) precipitated a drastic reduction in the trade in enslaved peoples to South Carolina. For example, in 1739 there were nine known transatlantic captive voyages to land in Charles Town, five in 1740, and only seven over the next eight years. In 1739 alone, 2,380 West African people disembarked from ships in South Carolina, while between 1741 and 1749, there were


The returns on investment of slaving west of the Mississippi River may have been lower for South Carolina traders, but this does not mean slaving was less attractive on the continent or in the Atlantic markets. Carolina slavers also probably ran into competition from slavers in the early eighteenth century such as Comanches and other indigenous peoples who were raiding the southern plains for captives and plunder to either trade to Spanish colonists in New Mexico and Texas, or incorporating them into their own societies. See Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery the Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016), 176–179; Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 26–34; and Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 80–86.
only a total of 1,281 captive people landing at the port. This was a dramatic change from the 1730s.³

Following each thread of the trade in captive Africans to Charles Town from the 1710s until 1740, this chapter begins with a discussion of the shifting contexts in which colonial and imperial structures were finally applied in such a way by colonists and imperial administrators alike as to attempt to control the situation on the ground in the colony in the late 1710s and early 1720s in a different manner than previously. Next, I shift perspective and interpret the rise in the trans-Atlantic captive trade from West Africa in each of three chronological periods in turn, as well as place them in the context of the intercolonial trade centered in the Caribbean. During the first phase of the trans-Atlantic trade (1710–1723), sporadic ships made the Middle Passage directly to Charles Town. The second phase was between 1724 and 1730, when many more ships were directed to South Carolina and the bulk of the enslaved embarked from the Bight of Biafra or Senegambia. In the third phase, from 1730 to 1740, the trade spiked to the highest levels up to that point and the victims were mostly from West Central Africa. Finally, I discuss the rise of an important mechanism in financing the transatlantic trade to colonists over this period: mortgages. Using enslaved people for collateral was one important method that Charles Town merchants and their British creditors relied on—in a striking correlation with the number of West-African peoples shipped directly to Charles Town—during the 1720s and 1730s. This type of exploitation of human bodies, collateralizing them, paved the way for more human bodies to end up in the colony. By placing all these trades in captive peoples side by side, the ultimate aim of this chapter

³ Voyages.
and the next is to better understand the groups of people who ended up on the ground in South Carolina and were legally defined as “slaves” by colonists.

The trans-Atlantic captive trade had little direct impact on early South Carolina. Indirectly, the major hubs of British captive African trafficking, Barbados and Jamaica, were central to enslaved African people’s importation into the colony. But as rice exports increased, the relative relationships between Charles Town and the trans-Atlantic and intercolonial captive/slave trades shifted. Between 1706 and 1710, 74% of enslaved people of African descent shipped into Carolina came via the Caribbean. Over the course of the 1710s, the ratio of 3 enslaved people via the Caribbean to every one directly from Africa steadily dropped. Between 1711 and 1715, 55% of enslaved Africans came directly from West Africa. From 1716 to 1720, this number increased to 62%.

This major shift in the trade in captive peoples to South Carolina was a direct result of the move by colonial elites and metropolitan administrators to better secure property in the colony and in the Atlantic. Only then would transatlantic slavers provide numbers of captive Africans comparable to colonial demand. In 1719, Carolina colonists, led by the “Goose Creek Men,” overthrew the proprietary regime and asked for the Crown to take over administering the colony. The proprietary rebels argued that the Lords Proprietors were not providing the colony with the necessary support to protect the security of the colonial project. Ironically, many of these same colonists, and/or their direct ancestors, had spent the previous fifty years pushing back against virtually everything the Lords Proprietor had wanted to do in terms of administering the colony.

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and made it nearly impossible for the Lords to collect any tax revenue. From the perspective of the Lords Proprietor, why would they want to continue subsidizing a colonial venture that was uncontrollable and unprofitable?

When the Commons Assembly ousted the proprietary government in 1719, the Crown provisionally took over colonial administration, since the Lords Proprietor still technically owned their shares in the colony. It took more than a decade for the Crown to settle accounts with the proprietors, and even then, one shareholder, John Carteret, 2nd Earl Granville, refused to sell and continued to control the northern half of North Carolina until the lead up to the American Revolution. But in the 1720s, the provisional (or, “Interregnum,” as the South Carolina Department of Archives and History calls the period) Royal government oversaw a strengthening of institutionalized structures of power. The new Royal administration, first led by Governor Francis Nicholson, set about solidifying property through the legal system, and better enforcement of the imperial Navigation Acts. It is not coincidental that the first lawsuit over a Charles Town merchant and ship captain breaking their £1000 bond with the Crown to assure adherence to mercantilist policies was filed in 1723 against merchant Samuel Eveleigh and Captain Solomon Middleton. Eveleigh and Middleton were charged with loading the sloop *Quaramity* in Charles Town with enumerated commodities and sending it to Providence. Although the suit doesn’t make explicit arguments about what happened to the cargo, it is obvious the *Quaramity* did not deliver the same goods to Providence. Eveleigh, a leading merchant in the colony, and Middleton, likely a relation to the prominent Middleton family of the colony, lost the suit and owed the King £1000 in penalty. Only a few years earlier this lawsuit and outcome would have been unenforceable, but by the 1720s, South
Carolina was becoming a safer location for investment because of this concerted effort to institute a British-style rule of law for the first time.\textsuperscript{5}

With the increase in rice production and naval stores for exportation, British merchants became gradually more willing to open larger lines of credit to Charles Town merchants, facilitating an increase in the number of trans-Atlantic slavers finding Charles Town a promising destination for their cargoes. According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, between 1710 (when direct shipments from Africa began in earnest) and 1715, only one slaver made it to Charles Town each year. There was then a spike in shipments to the colony between 1717 and 1719, with thirteen known vessels carrying captive Africans to Charles Town, no doubt in response to a major labor shortage caused by the violence of the Yamasee War. Then, the number of ships dropped off until 1724, when the numbers of Africans shipped to South Carolina began climbing to the highest numbers to that point in the history of the colony.\textsuperscript{6}

By the 1720s major sources of captives traded to the colony in the decades prior, (pirates, privateers, and continental Native American slavers) were drying up, but the other source of enslaved African and creole peoples, the Caribbean via merchants, continued to provide captives to South Carolinians throughout the colonial period. Even as the share of enslaved Carolinians via the Caribbean fell to 2\% of people shipped to the colony between 1735 and 1740, British colonies to the south continued to be a source for


\textsuperscript{6}Voyages.
enslaved people and in fact regained a larger share of the (diminished) Charles Town market during the 1740s. Historian Gregory O’Malley has argued the “ethno-linguistic composition of the intercolonial migration” to South Carolina “differed markedly” from peoples traversing the Middle Passage directly to Charles Town in the period between 1711 and 1725. Because the large Caribbean hubs of the trans-Atlantic slave trade sourced African captives from different areas than the direct trade to Charles Town, the continuance of the intercolonial trade diversified the sociocultural background of enslaved peoples in South Carolina more so than had all slavers arrived to the colony via the trans-Atlantic trade. Roughly half of all Africans shipped to the Caribbean between 1711 and 1725 in voyages whose origins can be traced came from ports along the Gold Coast and about a quarter from the Bight of Benin. Over the period between 1710 and 1723, in direct trans-Atlantic shipments of African peoples to South Carolina with known points of origin, 60% came via Senegambia, 30% from the Gold Coast, and 10% from the Bight of Biafra. Nearly half of the people shipped in between 1711 and 1725 traveled in ships from unknown ports in West Africa.\(^7\)

The trans-Atlantic captive trade to Charles Town between 1710 and 1740 can be divided into three distinct eras. The first, from 1710 to 1723, was when direct trans-Atlantic slaving to Charles Town began with any sort of regularity. In most years, there was only one ship to land at Charles Town, but there was a spike in 1717–1719 that accounted for 13 out of the total of 22 voyages in the thirteen-year period. In this first era,

\(^7\) Voyages; O’Malley, Final Passages, 176, 185–6. O’Malley is basing this argument on the assumption that enslaved people being trans-shipped to Charles Town from the Caribbean would likely have been made up of people from similar backgrounds to those being shipped in the trans-Atlantic trade. I have reassessed the Voyages database and my numbers differ slightly from O’Malley.
a total of 2,637 people were shipped to South Carolina. The second era spanned the years between 1724 and 1729. In this period, a total of 4,807 African peoples landed in South Carolina off the Middle Passage, with Senegambia and the Gold Coast being the major regions of export, but Sierra Leone also became a site of embarkation for the first time. The final era under study was also by far the largest in terms of both number of voyages and the number of peoples transported to Charles Town. Between 1730 and 1740, West Central Africa took over as the major region of embarkation by an overwhelming margin. Half of all the African peoples who disembarked in Charles Town during this eight year period came from West Central Africa and were generally considered by colonists to be “Angolan.” The Bight of Biafra (18%) and Senegambia (11%) remained the other two significant regions of origin of slaving voyages during the third era of the trans-Atlantic captive trade to South Carolina. Even though the trendline was toward colonists importing an increasing number of captive Africans to enslave, the origins of these people did vary drastically over time.

The differences between these three eras of the trans-Atlantic trade in human commodities were in terms of numbers of peoples transported and their shifting origins in West Africa. In the first stage of the trans-Atlantic trade in captive Africans (1710–1723), there was an average of 1.58 ships that arrived in Charles Town each year, but with most years seeing only one. The second era, between 1724 and 1729, was delineated mostly by an increase in the number of ships travelling to Charles Town, which increased to 4.5 per year, with a parallel increase from an average of 203 enslaved Africans landing in Carolina in the first period to an average of 801 per year in the second. The provisional assumption of colonial administration by the Crown, making investment in slaving
ventures to the colony safer, coincided with a boom in rice and led to merchants and colonists investing more heavily in importing captive Africans than ever before. The third era, between 1730 and 1740 differed in both the scale of the trade and the origins of the enslaved. In this period, the scope increased by, on average, a factor of three each year from the second period, with the average number of people disembarking in the colony up to 2,421 each year crossing the Middle Passage in (on average) 10.5 ships per year. 1740 serves as a distinct break in the trade of enslaved people to the colony because in the wake of the Stono Rebellion and the War of Jenkins’s Ear between the British and Spanish, the trade virtually vanished overnight for the entirety of the 1740s.

The Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database is a critical source for scholars seeking to research the African diaspora between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it does have limitations. In this case, I have estimated the percentages of peoples transported to Charles Town between 1710 and 1723 by excluding the trans-Atlantic slaving voyages with evidence of landing in Charles Town but for which the region of origin in west Africa are unknown. Omitting these people from my calculus is not ideal because it means that ten out of twenty-one voyages, accounting for 1,493 people who disembarked in Charles Town out of a total of 2,637, or 57%, cannot be considered as having any specific regional origin without further deep archival research on each ship. However, it is not unreasonable to think these people’s Middle Passage originated in the same three regions as the known voyages: the Bight of Biafra, the Gold Coast, and Senegambia (See Table 2.1). 8

8 The percentage of people shipped to Charleston between 1711 and 1740 on ships from “Other Africa” is 36 with the raw data from the Voyages database. I have looked at each of the 149 voyages to Charles Town in the period under study in context
and concluded that 20 of the voyages from “Other Africa” can be safely interpreted to have come from specific regions. My methodology was to consider each ship captain and if they had other voyages to known locations in West Africa close in time to the unknown one(s), I have concluded in all likelihood they went back to the same region after a successful slaving voyage. I broadened the dataset out beyond only voyages to Charles Town and included any shipments the captains made. By so doing, I have reduced the percentage of the unknown regional origin of people disembarking in Charles Town from 36 to 26%.

Voyages I have re-interpreted as coming from a specific region are: *Princess Carolina*, 1737 and 1739, Voyage ID (VID) 26156 and 26268, Senegambia; *America*, 1724 and 1725, VID 16331 and 16393, Gold Coast; *Greyhound*, 1724, 1725, 1732, 1733, 1734, VID 16339, 16410, 16723, 16760, 16790, Bight of Biafra; *Hill*, 1733, VID 16727, Senegambia; *Molly*, 1737, VID 26157, West Central Africa; *Amoretta*, 1738, VID 16879; *Pineapple*, 1735, VID 92406, West Central Africa; *Glasgow*, 1727, VID 25141; *Ruby*, 1719, VID 76103, Senegambia; *Happy Couple*, 1735, VID 16791, Bight of Biafra; and *Cartaret*, 1717, VID 76691, Bight of Biafra.
1710 was when surviving sources show that merchants and slavers began landing captive African peoples in South Carolina directly besides a single voyage a decade earlier. Compared to more successful colonies in the era like Barbados, Virginia, and Massachusetts, South Carolina was an economic backwater, though the developing rice complex would prove to be the solution to colonists’ economic problem of export production. Over the same period, 48,208 captive Africans landed in Barbados and 63,101 landed in Jamaica. With only 2,637 captive Africans landing in Carolina during this era, Charles Town was a peripheral but growing market for trans-Atlantic slavers. Rising rice and naval store exports allowed Charles Town merchants the credit to involve themselves in some trans-Atlantic slaving voyages, albeit at a sporadic rate compared with the lucrative sugar islands in the Caribbean. But South Carolina colonists had long been investing in African labor before direct shipments of enslaved Africans came across the Atlantic to the colonial lowcountry’s entrepôt.\(^9\)

\(^9\) *Voyages.*
The intercolonial trade in captive Africans was the source of nearly all African peoples forced to migrate to South Carolina before 1710, as previously discussed. But after 1710 and the beginnings of a direct trade from Africa to the colony, the intercolonial trade remained a major source of enslaved Africans for South Carolina colonists. Historian Gregory O’Malley compellingly argues that although the intercolonial trade to South Carolina fell in terms of relative importance with respect to the numbers of people transported directly from Africa in the 1710s, the trade continued through the eighteenth century. Intercolonial traders had three advantages trans-Atlantic slavers could not easily combat: they were closer to colonial markets and could react to market conditions faster; mainland colonies produced provisions for the sugar colonies and return trips with enslaved Africans made sense to shippers; and since intercolonial traders were normally not specialists in the slave trade, they were willing to accept slimmer profit margins that could be absorbed by their other trade goods. Of the 111,309 captive Africans who disembarked in Barbados and Jamaica between 1710 and 1723, somewhere close to 2,000 were then trans-shipped to South Carolina.\(^\text{10}\)

The regional origins of enslaved Africans shipped from the Caribbean to Charles Town differed from those shipped directly to Charles Town, with over one fourth coming from the Bight of Benin, a region of Africa not represented in the imports to Charles Town from this era (see Table 2.4). The bulk of enslaved people transported to Barbados and Jamaica came from the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin (86%), whereas in direct importations to South Carolina, the bulk came from Senegambia and the Gold Coast

\(^{10}\) O’Malley, *Final Passages*, 171–85; O’Malley, “Beyond the Middle Passage,” 142; *Voyages*. 
(89%). Borrowing O’Malley’s methodology of assuming a similar ethno-cultural makeup of trans-shipped peoples to that of the full population of Middle Passage transports, South Carolina colonists would have purchased a relatively large number of peoples out of the Bight of Benin region. O’Malley argues there were somewhere around 1,925 people trans-shipped from the Caribbean to South Carolina during this period, so that would mean roughly 539 people ended up in South Carolina via the intercolonial trade from the Bight of Benin, or 8% of the total of all African peoples imported during the era. Scrambling the regional origin picture even more, the intercolonial trade also would have imported around 39 people each from Southeast Africa and Sierra Leone.\(^1\)

By integrating the regional origins of people transported to Charles Town directly from West Africa along with those trans-shipped via the Caribbean, a different, and more

\(^{11}\) O’Malley, *Final Passages*, 186. *Voyages*. O’Malley’s periodization is slightly different from mine. I have used his estimations for the years between 1711 and 1725, although I doubt the numbers would be very different if we had the same periodizations.
complex, regional makeup of the captive and enslaved peoples landing in Charles Town between 1710 and 1723 begins to take form. Instead of all the transports coming from three regions (Senegambia, Gold Coast, and Bight of Biafra — see Table 2.1), now six regions were represented. The largest numbers of people came the Bight of Benin, a different region than the origin of earlier shipments. If Caribbean imports are taken into account, instead of Senegambia being the dominant region the Gold Coast becomes by a thin margin the region with the largest number of people imported into the colony.

Although the intercolonial trade waned in importance for South Carolina colonists as a major source for captive Africans by the 1720s, during this first stage of the trans-Atlantic captive trade, trans-shipped peoples still made up around 42% of those forced to migrate to the colony. Most of the enslaved people trans-shipped to Charles Town were likely to be recent arrivals to the Caribbean, so the islands served more as a regional hub than as a source for mixing newly arrived African peoples with those who had long been in the Caribbean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold Coast</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegambia</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Biafra</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bight of Benin</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Africa</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>4564</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outside of aggregate sources, the first era of the direct trans-Atlantic slave trade to South Carolina is difficult to delineate. Only one voyage has left data for the rough demographic breakdown of the enslaved people onboard: the *Lady Rachel*. In December 1722 a ship owned by the Royal African Company, the *Lady Rachel*, sailed from London
to Gambia. The ship had made a slaving voyage the previous year to Antigua and made another attempt six months after returning to London. Captained by Charles Landsell, Lady Rachel landed in Gambia in February, 1723 and remained there until May, collecting captives to transport across the Atlantic to Charles Town. Although the investors and Captain Landsell had intended to ship 300 people to Charles Town, after three months of purchasing captive people for his cargo, Landsell decided he had reached a point of diminishing return for the enterprise and set sail with 221 people aboard. After an average-length passage of 67 days and the death of 29 enslaved people (for a mortality rate of 13.1%), Lady Rachel made it to Charles Town on July 11, 1723. In the ship’s hold were 192 people. 152 (or 79.2%) of the captives aboard were male, while the other 40 (20.8%) were female. For shipments from the Senegambia region during the early eighteenth century, the ratio of four males to each female was typical. Other shipments of enslaved people from the region likely conformed to this skewed sex ratio, while shipments from other regions such as the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast probably were more like 60% male (3 men to every 2 women). If we were to zoom out, though, for all the British North American colonies, between 1721 and 1725, 73% of all transported Africans were male, so the 1723 voyage of Lady Rachel was in sum rather average for the traffic across the Atlantic in commodified people.\footnote{For the Lady Rachel, see VID 76693 in Voyages; David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 124, 251.}

Another, more opaque, slaving voyage, the Hope, showed up in the account book of Charles Town merchant Robert Nesbit. Charles Town merchant account books or papers are rare before the writings of Robert Pringle and Henry Laurens, both of whom
began writing later in the century, when the trans-Atlantic trade in captive peoples was normal business. The account book of Nesbit offers a glimpse into the particular example of the *Hope*, listed by Nesbit on August 11, 1722. This voyage of the *Hope* is mysterious. It neither turns up in the *Voyages* database nor in Gregory O’Malley’s intercolonial database, although there are voyages by ships of the same name within a couple of years of 1722 in each database, but the destinations of these voyages were Barbados and New York, respectively. Nesbit’s book offers no other information beyond the name of the ship, so my conclusions about its origin are provisional. In his cash book for August 11, 1722, Nesbit “Sold for account of the Hope” ten African children (See Figure 2.1). As Nesbit only sold ten enslaved Africans, this was most probably an intercolonial shipment. As evidence from the 1730s shows, Charles Town merchants taking part in the trans-Atlantic trade were typically undertaken by a single merchant house for each voyage, as opposed to numerous merchants investing in the same shipment. Between 1710 and 1723, trans-Atlantic shipments of enslaved Africans averaged 126 captives reaching Charles Town. It is highly unlikely, then, that the *Hope* was a trans-Atlantic voyage with only ten enslaved Africans consigned to Nesbit. The demography of the people sold by Nesbit also point to an intercolonial voyage.\footnote{Cash book of Robert Nisbet, Charles Town Merchant, 1720-1723 NAS, microfilm, GD237/1/150; *Voyages* database.}
Of the ten Africans sold by Nesbit (including one sick boy Nesbit reluctantly decided to keep for himself), there were six buyers. One of these transactions was for cash, namely the two girls Nesbit sold to John Hampton for £175. But the rest of the sales were on book credit for varying lengths of time and for different terms. None were sold via mortgage. Two boys and one girl were purchased by John and James Goodby, who promised to pay Nesbit in rice and pitch in March, when the rice crop would be ready. The Goobys paid Nesbit with four barrels of rice weighing in total 1876 pounds on February 22, 1723. Nesbit credited the Goobys for £217 for the rice, nearly paying for the
enslaved children—the children were sold for £270—but the Goodbys still owed Nesbit £714 for other debts they had incurred from the merchant. In this way, John and James Goodby bought enslaved people on credit from Nesbit just like they bought other goods, and the credit Nesbit offered them was accounted for in the same way as well. The rest of the buyers were to pay in cash with terms varying between payment in two months to payment in nine months. The even sex ratio of five boys and five girls is also evidence of this voyage of the Hope being intercolonial, as trans-Atlantic slavers were male dominated. The most likely scenario is that Nesbit had a business connection in the Caribbean and he had requested enslaved children (notice none were adults) and wanted an even number of boys and girls for his customers in Charles Town. Nesbit was not a major investor in slaving. Between 1720 and 1723 there are only a few mentions of his dealing in enslaved peoples, but Nesbit also knew that along with his other business interests, including buying and selling flour, pitch, tar, and logwood, it made economic sense to buy and sell human commodities when the opportunity arose.\footnote{Cash book of Robert Nisbet. Sex ratios of the enslaved population of South Carolina will be discussed further in Chapter 4.}

Beginning in 1717, the numbers of African peoples imported directly to Charles Town from Africa began increasing. Coinciding with the concentration on building a contract-securing state apparatus, investment in slaving to South Carolina made much more economic sense after 1716. Rice exports were booming (see Table 2.6) and planters needed more labor for their cash crop and naval stores, which were subsidized by the empire. Even with a dip in exports in the aftermath of the disruptions of the Yamasee War—burned plantations, many enslaved people either killed or had escaped, many
colonists either killed or fled the colony—rice and naval stores were promising enough, with the help of state power exerted in the name of securing property rights and contracts, to promote the trans-Atlantic trade as relatively safe and profitable for the first time. And the new, investment-friendly state apparatus, taken over by planters in 1719 and offered to the Crown for administration, was partially funded by imports of enslaved peoples. In 1720, a description of the colony sent back to London stated that since the Yamasee War, “the white inhabitants have annually decreased by the massacres of the Indians,” but at the same time “the numbers of blacks … have very much increased … [and] have occasioned ye inhabitants to buy Blacks to the great indangering the Province.”15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (in pounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1714</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1717</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1718</td>
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<td>1720</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1723</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the increase in the trade of captive Africans to the colony, there was also an increase in revenue for the colonial administration. The Crown took over administering

the colony after the coup d'état of 1719. South Carolina then became a royal colony on a provisional basis. One of the last statutes passed under the Proprietary regime included an import duty on captive Africans, but the Lords Proprietor vetoed the statute a few months before the coup. Then, after the royal governor, Francis Nicholson, arrived in 1721, another statute was passed placing duties on “all negro slaves imported from Africa directly, or any other place whatsoever.” £10 was the duty on captive Africans over ten years old and for children under ten it was £5. While the overall revenues of the colony are hard to delineate since so many colonists simply refused to pay taxes on their property and surviving records are incomplete and the percentage of the overall income of the provisional royal administration remains unknown, the tax revenue on duties paid for captive Africans certainly offered a more steady stream of revenue for the colonial government. For example, between January 1, 1722, and September 29, 1723, a period where the numbers of people transported in the trans-Atlantic trade was lower than it had been a few years earlier, the colony collected £3625 on “Sundry Negroes Imported.” By the early 1720s, the trade in African peoples to the colony was playing an increasing role in funding the colonial government. The two institutions thus became mutually reinforcing for the first time in South Carolina. Colonists wanted a stronger colonial government to protect their property (land and enslaved people), and a central mechanism for funding a stronger colonial government was the promotion of slavery as a social institution, whereas before the goal of many colonists had been slaving as an economic strategy.  

16 See “An Act for Laying an Imposition on Negroes, Liquors, and other Goods and Merchandizes…” and “An Act for Granting to His Majesty a Duty and Imposition on Negroes, Liquors, and other Goods and Merchandise, Imported into and Exported out of
The second era of the trans-Atlantic slaving boom took place during an excellent export market for rice from South Carolina. Unlike the first rice boom, which began around 1708, in the mid-1720s, European colonists had acquired enough capital through the violence of colonialism to invest ever-more in the labor of enslaved people, but the security offered by the royal government also made investment ever-more secure. While there were 4,564 African peoples imported into South Carolina in the 14 years between 1710 and 1723, in the next six years there were 4,807 from trans-Atlantic slaving voyages alone. The rates of trans-Atlantic importation increased during this era to an average of 801 enslaved Africans arriving each year, which was an average increase of about 250% over the previous thirteen years even if the relatively large intercolonial trade is included. By 1724, rice and naval stores were proven moneymakers and trans-Atlantic slaving to Charles Town had become a normal part of the Atlantic commerce at the port. The sources of captive Africans had not changed much outside of the increased volume and two voyages (one each in 1727 and 1728) from Sierra Leone (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
But 1724 was also the beginning of the enormous influx of African peoples that lasted unabated until after the Stono Rebellion in 1739 (See Table 2.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1712</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1714</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1719</td>
<td>2,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>3,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1723</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1725</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Voyages*.

The demography of the imported captive peoples during the period between 1724 and 1729 looked similar to the previous era not only in terms of the regional origins of the captives, but also with respect to the age and sex breakdown. There were 27 known trans-Atlantic slaving voyages to Charles Town in these six years, but only three have left us with demographic evidence. Each of the vessels were supplied with captives from slavers in the Senegambia region of West Africa. These voyages continued the sex and age trends from the earlier period of the trade from Senegambia to Charles Town. The *Cape Coast Frigate* (1724), *Diligence* (1726), and *Samuel* (1726) each had between 78.7% and 85% men aboard when they landed in Charles Town. Likewise, they each were between 85.3 and 92% male when boys are included in the analysis. Women and girls were in short supply, making up between 7.5% and 13.3% of the total (See Figure 2.9). The *Samuel* was owned by Samuel Wragg, who in 1722 had come to an agreement with the Royal African Company to be their sole merchant connection in Charles Town,
originally contracting “for 300 Slaves yearly at South Carolina.” But for Wragg,
knowledge of market demands in South Carolina and an exclusive contract with the
Royal African Company did not mean he could be too specific in the human merchandize
that slavers brought to Charles Town. It was thus not the demand side of the captive
peoples trade that led Wragg’s voyage to be 90% male captives.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} Voyages, VID 76695, 76971, and 76130. These voyages of the \textit{Diligence} and
\textit{Samuel} were unusual in their numbers of enslaved people making the Middle Passage.
They were the two voyages with the smallest numbers of people to land in South
Carolina during the period. The \textit{Cape Coast Frigate} was much more representative in
terms of numbers of people.

There are some data on a few more ships from 1724. The \textit{America} arrived in
Charles Town in July 1724 with 116 enslaved Africans with 97 Men and Women; and 19
Boys and Girls. On the same day, the \textit{Greyhound} was listed as making a landing at
Charles Town with 158 Men and Women, and 29 Boys and Girls, for a total of 187
enslaved Africans. Charles Town merchants, Joseph Wragg, along “Messrs. Gibbons and
Allen” entered the \textit{Ruby}, in a joint venture between the two merchant interests, for a total
of 112 enslaved people. Wragg accounted for 24 men and women, along with 3 boys and
girls, while Gibbons and Allen accounted for 78 men and women and 7 boys and girls.
On October 20\textsuperscript{th}, Charles Town merchant Charles Hill accounted for the ship \textit{Pearl
Galley}, filled with 193 enslaved Africans (153 men and boys and 40 boys and girls).
Interestingly, the \textit{Pearl Galley} had stopped in Barbados before heading to Charles Town
and the crew had dropped off three enslaved people there before taking the bulk of the
human cargo to South Carolina. For information on these voyages, see Elizabeth Donnan,
\textit{Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America}, vol. 4, (Washington,

On the dealings between Joseph Wragg and the Royal African Company, see the
Royal African Company, Minutes of Committee, 1722–1727 in Donnan, \textit{Documents
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America}, Vol. 4, 268–72. On the decline
of the Royal African Company during the 1720s and 1730s, see William A. Pettigrew,
\textit{Freedom’s Debt: The Royal African Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave
Trade, 1672-1752} (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early
American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2013), chapters
5 and 6.

For the sexual dynamics of slaving in West Africa and the Atlantic during this
era, see Eltis, \textit{The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas}, 98–113. Joseph C. Miller,
\textit{Way of Death Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830} (Madison
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), chapters 4 and 5; Paul E. Lovejoy,
\textit{Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa}, 3rd edition (New York:
Trade}, 2 edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 164–173. For works
Table 2.8: Demography of Three Slaving Voyages to Charles Town, 1724–1726

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cape Coast Frigate, 1724</th>
<th>Diligence, 1726</th>
<th>Samuel, 1726</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150 people disembarked</td>
<td></td>
<td>44 people disembarked</td>
<td>35 people disembarked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.7% men</td>
<td></td>
<td>84% men</td>
<td>85% men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3% women</td>
<td></td>
<td>8% women</td>
<td>7.5% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7% boys</td>
<td></td>
<td>8% boys</td>
<td>5.0% boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3% girls</td>
<td></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.5% girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.3% male</td>
<td></td>
<td>92% male</td>
<td>90% male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.0% children</td>
<td></td>
<td>8% children</td>
<td>7.5% children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, by the mid-1720s, the relative significance of the intercolonial trade waned in South Carolina, but as there were advantages to this nimble trade over the less-responsive trans-Atlantic trade, merchants and slavers did not completely stop selling enslaved Africans from other colonies until 1808.\(^{18}\) During the period between 1724 and 1729, when the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Charles Town was booming, somewhere around 500 enslaved people landed in the port via other colonies. Statistically, the significance of this trade had diminished a great deal, but it nevertheless continued on through the eighteenth century. In these six years, the makeup of the regional origins of enslaved people imported to Barbados and Jamaica were: Gold Coast (11%), Bight of Benin (9.7%), Bight of Biafra (4.8%), West Central Africa (4.2%), Senegambia (1.7%), Sierra Leone (1.3%), Windward Coast (.5%), and the other 66% of voyages are of specifically discussing the transatlantic trade to South Carolina, see Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974); Daniel C Littlefield, *Rice and Slaves: Ethnicity and the Slave Trade in Colonial South Carolina* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 58–61; and Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

\(^{18}\) With any legal basis, anyway.
unknown origin. Even though the intercolonial trade served a decreasing significance with respect to the importation of enslaved Africans, a significant percentage of these people came from regions outside those where direct slaving transports to Charles Town originated. Like in the earlier phase of the trans-Atlantic and intercolonial trades, people hailing from regions such as the Bight of Benin, the Windward Coast, or West Central Africa would have been more culturally isolated in South Carolina than those from Senegambia, the Gold Coast, or the Bight of Biafra. The success of rice exportation meant that colonists had an ever-growing appetite for enslaved African peoples, and by the 1730s the scale of the trans-Atlantic trade would continue to increase. With this third era, the people in South Carolina from West Central Africa would see a massive influx of people from that region in Africa.¹⁹

Along with higher numbers of importations of captive peoples from Africa via transatlantic slavers, increasing rice exportation provided merchants with incentive for further investment (and credit, a topic I will discuss below) in ever more slaving and commodity production. Although the totals remained high, a dip in the export totals for rice in the early 1720s rebounded drastically between 1725 and 1729 with the total number of pounds exported doubling from 7 million to 14 million. In these few years the rice complex became hegemonic in the lowcountry. Rice exports did fluctuate in the 1730s, but even in down years, between 1728 and 1740, exports never fell below the 12.8 million pounds exported in 1728 and reached an astronomical high of 43 million pounds in 1740 (See Figure 2.10). As one would expect, as rice exports increased, so did the

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¹⁹ O’Malley, *Final Passages*, 174–9; *Voyages*. 
importation of enslaved African peoples (compare the trend lines in Tables 2.9 and 2.10).

More commodity exports and more captive African imports also meant more revenue for the colonial administration to use in the defense of the colony from enemies, both internal and external, as well as helping secure the viability of financial capitalism.

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According to the ledger of the public treasurer of the colony, which records begin in 1725, the colony collected £2,180 on duties on enslaved people between April 16 and July 24, 1725. Between September 29, 1725 and March 26, 1726, the amount was £3,100. Between March 28 and September 26, 1726, duties increased to £10,205. Between September 29, 1725 and September 29, 1728, the duty total was £2,988. A decade earlier the colonial government would have had great difficulty in raising such large sums through taxation, but the combination of exporting rice and importing people to enslave made the administration more economically viable. From 1720 to 1740, the enslaved population of South Carolina nearly doubled each decade.

Enslaved people ran away “almost as soon as they landed” in South Carolina. Although enslaved people had fled to St. Augustine since the earliest days of the colony, in the 1720s, the South Carolina legislature began, as historian Jennifer L. Morgan has argued, “to involve itself in the inevitability of runaways [rather] than in the unlikely event of their return.” The St. Augustine problem was not going away. For years, Carolina colonists had been at odds with the proprietary government over the use of Native Americans as patrollers of enslaved people who had absconded; the Proprietary faction wanted to employ Native Americans, while many colonists resisted this system because the Native American slaving business was so profitable. Why pay Native American hunters in the region to find runaways when colonists could instead promote Native Americans to go on slaving raids for private profit? In 1721, the slave patrol, used to slow runaways and monitor slave movement around the colony, was merged with the militia, making it more of a formidable institution for quelling enslaved peoples’ unrest. Certainly some of the funding of the patrol came via the duty on the importation of
captive peoples. Due to the rapidly growing numbers of enslaved people in the colony, the colonial legislature decided in 1734 to fund a full-time patrol. By the 1730s, the colonial government could afford it.\(^{21}\)

While the South Carolina project became more important as both an economic hub and slaving destination in the 1720s, the colony was still a relative backwater when it came to the trans-Atlantic captive trade in the 1730s. Carolina colonists continued to purchase captive Africans at increasing rates, but Charles Town remained a secondary port of importation compared with the sugar islands. The brisk Charles Town market was more appealing to slaving merchants in the 1730s, but they still could not demand a supply from the mangrove-rice-growing regions of West Africa. Specifically, South Carolina colonists developed a preference for “Gambia Negroes,” as Henry Laurens would later attest, because many of the peoples from this region came from rice-growing cultures. But a shift in the British trans-Atlantic slaving trade toward sourcing more people from Angola meant that Charles Town merchants such as Joseph Wragg, Paul Jenys, and Benjamin Savage were restricted to importing captive people from West Central Africa and not Senegambia. This shift, along with the higher volume of enslaved people being imported into South Carolina, meant that beginning in 1730, a new group of people began having demographic significance in the colony: West Central Africans, who

made up a full 50% of the 24,214 Africans transported across the Atlantic to the colony between 1730 and 1740 (see Figure 2.4).22

The 1730s was a decade of unabated slaving imports from Africa. Although the annual numbers fluctuated, the volume of captive people coming into the colony remained higher than at any point prior. In fact, the average number of people imported directly from Africa went from 557 in the 1720s to 2318 in the 1730s, or more than four times higher. Slaving imports during a decade of colonial expansion and relative economic stability are to have been expected in a slave-based agricultural regime with a proven record of agricultural commodity exportation, but the numbers of enslaved people imported were rising (increasingly) faster than the Euro-American population, indeed faster than at any previous point in the colony’s existence. The increase of slavers directing captives to the colony was directly intertwined with continued increases in rice exports, as well as increases in the use of mortgaging enslaved people as collateral for the purchase of more captives for colonists to enslave. A disgruntled colonist wrote to the *South Carolina Gazette* in March 1738 that low prices for rice during the previous year, along with a poor harvest to export in that year (see Figure 2.10 for the decrease in rice exports in 1738), should have been enough to slow down the importation of such large numbers of enslaved people, but merchants were continuing to take advantage of planters

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22 Laurens wrote in 1755 “Gold Coast of Gambias are best, next to them the Windward Coast are prefer'd to Angolas,” Laurens to Smith & Clifton, July 17, 1755, in Hamer, Philip M., ed., *The Papers of Henry Laurens, Volume One: Sept. 11, 1746–Oct. 31, 1755* (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Historical Society by the University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 294–5. *Voyages* database. For accounts of two slaving ships leaving the Gambia River region for South Carolina in 1731, see Frances Moore, *Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa: Containing a Description of the Several Nations for the Space of Six Hundred Miles Up the River Gambia* (London: Edward Cave, 1738), 70–1.
by their importation because “Negroes may be said to be the Bait proper for catching a Carolina Planter, as certain as Beef to catch a Shark.”

In the same editorial, this anonymous writer argued that merchants were offering enslaved people on credit to colonists who had no way of paying back the loan. By merchants offering credit terms of 18 months, colonists were “tempted to buy more Negroes than they could possibly expect to pay in 3 Years!” During the 1730s, merchants shifted away from using personal bonds where planters offered a contract to the merchant for a set amount of produce (typically rice or naval stores), to be due at a later date. The lengths of these bonds varied depending on when the loan was made, when the harvest was expected to be processed and ready to market, and doubtless the merchant’s esteem of the borrower as well. The colonial Court of Common Pleas Judgment Rolls are littered with lawsuits over default on such bonds, with these suits becoming more prevalent after the overthrow of the proprietary regime. With Crown rule came more robust contract law. For example, Charles Town merchant, Richard Splatt, sued John Parker for an unpaid bond in 1720. Splatt had sold Parker six African men on credit in 1718 with a penalty sum of £5,000 and the buyout to be 77,000 pounds of marketable rice. Splatt won the lawsuit, as he had a signed bond and Parker had no evidence of payment. The penalty sum for default on a bond in Colonial South Carolina was twice the amount of the loan and the court could rule for double the penalty sum, in effect meaning a judgment could possibly be four times the original loan. Similarly, Alexander Nesbit—a Charles Town merchant who apparently did not import enslaved Africans himself and therefore only traded them occasionally—bought two enslaved African men from Joseph Wragg in 1729.

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for 5,187 pounds of neat rice Nesbit had received from Theodore Tremaine. Nesbit used his credit with Wragg in conjunction with his being a creditor of Tremaine to purchase people for himself.24

The 1738 letter to the South Carolina Gazette gets to the heart of the change in the way credit worked in South Carolina. Merchants and colonists offered credit for virtually any good one can imagine as collateral, but enslaved people were the big-ticket items in this context. By the late 1730s, merchants apparently were using bonds less than they had been in previous decades and were using mortgages more. By planters and planter-hopefuls offering up enslaved collateral for more enslaved people, they instantly raised their own risk in the investment while reducing the risks for merchants. While the anonymous writer saw financial ruin for the colony on the horizon, someone calling themselves Zoilus asked the next week, “is this any Thing strange or surprising to find some smutty Corn in so large a Field?” Of course there were some planters who took advantage of too much credit, but it was their own fault and for the good of the colony. Only after the Stono Rebellion of September 1739 did the nightmares of white colonists about the enormous enslaved population of the colony come to fruition. At a broad scale, it was not a financial collapse that shook the colony, but instead was the attempt by

24 Splatt v. Parker, May 2, 1720, Court of Common Pleas Judgment Rolls, SCDAH, Box 16A, no. 42. In the 1720s there were many lawsuits over these type bonds in the 1720s and many fewer in surviving records from the 1730s. Mortgages offered an easier way for the creditor to collect: the contract also served as a bill of sale unless the terms of the contract were met.

Alexander Nesbit Account Book, 1727–30, NAS, microfilm, GD237/1/151. According to Nesbit’s accounts, he dealt more with the exportation of rice and deerskins than importing enslaved Africans.
European colonists to control and exploit the very people undergirding both economic production and finance.\textsuperscript{25}

But viewing the Stono Rebellion as a result of demographic pressures is only part of the picture. The finance markets colonists were embedded in drove them to seek ever-higher production through extracting more labor from the labor they controlled and purchasing more enslaved labor. It was a cycle that spun out of control by the later 1730s with the poor rice prices of 1737 and 1738 and the poor harvest of (calendar year) 1737 exacerbating the situation. Increasing pressure on enslaved people to produce ever more from indebted planters played no small part in setting the context of the Stono Rebellion. The question then becomes, how did the market for credit and enslaved imports develop, especially with respect to mortgages, the most punitive type of credit (with the steepest penalties) for borrowers with which to default?

Using enslaved people as commodities in the form of collateral was one way South Carolina colonists could receive more credit from local merchants and increase their control of the two factors of production the colony sorely lacked: capital and labor. The early economy of Carolina was based on the production of two exportable commodities that could make use of an abundance of land, as well as require low capital and labor inputs: cattle and captive humans. The advent of the rice boom, beginning around 1709 (discussed further in Chapter 6), provided the impetus for colonists to increase investment in their plantation operations in labor and to seek outside capital, thereby allowing incipient planters to produce more rice for export. It is therefore not coincidental that alongside the drastic increase in rice exports from the colony there were

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{SCG}, March 9 and 16, 1738. The name “Zoilus” had classical connotations of a merciless intellectual critic.
concurrent increases in captive imports, directly from Africa, as well as the rise of a local credit market based largely on an underused form of exploitation forced upon enslaved colonists: turning them into collateral.26

Without banks in South Carolina, colonists turned to local merchants and each other to finance expanding their operations. Merchants used mortgages as a last resort, but so did potential debtors because of the steep penalties debtors faced with default. Of the 217 African men and women who disembarked from the Cato in 1733 at the beginning of this chapter, only around seven or eight were sold using a mortgage to securitize the loan. Still, from the beginning of the colony in 1670 up through 1739, there were at least 3,259 individual enslaved people named as collateral in mortgages in South Carolina. Some of these people were used as security for a loan more than once. Other mortgages offer the only extant source for connecting specific colonists to slave ownership. In terms of the volume of documentary evidence on slavery in South Carolina, mortgages list more enslaved people than either bills of sale or wills. Only probate inventories list more enslaved people. Mortgages make up about 19% of all enslaved people in extant records, but have been almost completely ignored by scholars (See Table 2.11).27


Simple formal loans in South Carolina were essentially personal bonds, or what we would consider more akin to an IOU or promissory note. The debtor declared he or she was borrowing an amount of money from a creditor, to be paid off by a certain date with whatever interest was due. Bonds were a more formal agreement than the widespread system of book debt in colonial America. Book debt was usually interest-free and used for small purchases in economic situations with little specie in circulation and worked in a reciprocal manner. Mortgages took the idea of the personal bond a step further by having the debtor agree to a penalty sum of twice the amount of the loan in case of default. In order to make these transactions more secure, collateral worth twice the amount of the loan was essentially sold to the creditor, and colonial officials passed statutes ordering that these contracts must be recorded by the state in order to make them

Table 2.11: Enslaved People in South Carolina Mortgages, 1670–1739

Source: CSESCD

legally binding in court. If the debtor paid off the loan and accrued interest, the bill of sale was thereby nullified, and ownership reverted to the borrower. In early South Carolina, these types of credit arrangements almost always featured enslaved people as collateral.²⁸

To refer back to the slaver, Cato, from the introduction to this chapter, Jenys and Baker sold people from West Africa, fresh off the Middle Passage, using mortgages to secure their sale only with the captives they could not otherwise sell. All of the mortgages except one came in the few days following their advertised sale. Jenys and Baker were desperate to rid themselves of these people-as-investments, while buyers who were desperate enough to want to buy captives through a mortgage, likely at a discount, entered into contracts with the merchants to finance expanding their enslaved labor force. The problem for scholars, as always, is the pesky silences in the sources. In these transactions, the debtor likely would have been given a bill of sale for the captives being purchased, while the merchant held the mortgage and had it recorded. Virtually all of the planter-held bills of sale from the early years of the colony are missing, and our only record of these mortgage arrangements are the state copies. This lack of information is compounded by the demand for double the loan amount for mortgages. I can therefore say that Miles Sweeny mortgaged four “Negro” men to Jenys and Baker two days after the sale from the Cato and that this was almost certainly for the purchase of two enslaved Africans, but not which two of the four listed were being put forth as outside collateral

²⁸ I surveyed every extant mortgage between 1670 and 1739. The first statute on record in South Carolina pertaining to mortgages was passed in 1698. See “An Act to Prevent Deceits by Double Mortgages and Conveyances of Lands, Negroes, and Chattels, &c.,” in Thomas Cooper, ed., The Statutes at Large of South Carolina: Acts from 1682 to 1716, Vol. II (Columbia: A. S. Johnston, 1837), 137.
versus which ones were the collateral coming directly from the sale. Either way, Sweeny wanted to purchase captives using credit, Jenys and Baker were willing to sell captives using a mortgage, and Sweeny had to bring more collateral to the contract than only the captives being purchased. Colonists such as Sweeny were therefore using their enslaved property to labor, to store value for possible future sale and reproduction, but also to finance the expansion of their businesses.\textsuperscript{29}

While Jenys and Baker were the single largest mortgage creditor through the 1730s, with Joseph Wragg and Richard Lambdon also repeatedly using mortgages to sell captives, other merchants who took part in the trans-Atlantic captive trade were more averse to using these financial instruments. Some, like Benjamin Savage (who regularly invested in transatlantic slaving voyages in the 1730s but only shows up in a few mortgages), may have doubted the security of mortgages because of the ever-present threat of debtors mortgaging property more than once and/or the esteem he held for possible debtors. Beginning in the 1690s, the South Carolina assembly began passing statutes in an attempt to make it increasingly difficult to mortgage the same property more than once. For instance, Samuel Pickering mortgaged four people, including a girl and a boy, to Peter Ceely in 1725. Then, four days later, he mortgaged eleven people—including the same four from the previous contract—to merchants William Dry and Robert Tradd. Similarly, James Bullock mortgaged 12 people to John Herring in 1730. On the same day he also mortgaged the same people—all named in the exact same order—to James Crockett. It seems Pickering and Bullock had figured out how to use the

\textsuperscript{29} For the mortgage between Sweeny and Jenys and Baker, see MRMS, Vol. BB, SCDAH, 96.
same people for concurrent mortgages. Statutes may have made mortgaging safer for creditors, but double mortgaging was a strategy debtors continued to use. In 1731 the new Royal government passed yet another law in an attempt to crackdown on double mortgages.\footnote{On Mortgage statutes from the 1690s, see “An Act to Prevent Deceits by Double Mortgages and Conveyances of Lands, Negroes and Chattels, &c.,” October 8, 1698, 137–8; and under “English Statutes Made of Force,” see “An Act to Prevent Frauds by Clandestine Mortgages,” 1712, 535–7 in Thomas Cooper, ed., The Statutes at Large of South Carolina: Acts from 1682 to 1716 (Charleston: A. S. Johnston, 1837). Another key moment in the history of mortgages in South Carolina came in 1731 when the Crown officially took over the colony and remade the administrative apparatus, including how mortgages were handled. See “An Act for Remission of Arrears of Quit-Rents…,” August 20, 1731, 289–304, in Thomas Cooper, The Statutes at Large of South Carolina: Acts from 1716 to 1752 (Charleston: A.S. Johnston, 1838). Scholars today often research colonial South Carolina beginning in 1731 (I think) because the record-keeping became much more rational and research-friendly. With respect to mortgages, before 1731 they were thrown in amongst other “Miscellaneous Records,” while after there were separate mortgage books.


Some colonists used the capital embodied in the flesh of their chattel human property to borrow money apart from simply buying captives on credit. Between 1723 and 1726, Ebenezer Ford mortgaged Carolina, Scipio, Essex, and Frank, each an adult “Negro” man, on three different occasions to three different lenders. Similarly, in 1730, colonist Matthew Miller mortgaged two Native Americans, a woman named Nanny and an unnamed child, to John Dart and Thomas Binford. Two years later, Miller again mortgaged Nanny, along with three enslaved Africans, to Daniel Greene. Like Ebenezer Ford, Miller was using his enslaved human property as security for loans outside the captive trade and did so on multiple occasions. But Matthew Miller was also an outlier in
the credit market because some of the property he used as security, enslaved Native 
Americans, was very unusual in South Carolina.31

The earliest extant mortgage using enslaved people as collateral in South Carolina 
dates from 1680, but the second one was not until 1689. Colonists turned more towards 
the financial instrument with the rise in rice as the main staple export commodity in about 
1710. It took capital to increase the labor a colonist could manage as well as to acquire 
more enslaved or indentured labor. The mortgage therefore became a useful tool for 
colonists to access capital for investing in their plantation projects, especially for 
colonists without large sums of capital or productive output. An overwhelming majority 
of surviving mortgages included enslaved humans as collateral, but some seem to have 
been colonists putting forth everything in their possession in exchange for a loan worth 
half the collateral. Most of these contracts were incipient planters putting forth the few 
bound people they controlled and gambling that by using the loan for capital investment, 
it would put them in a better position to produce a respectable return on investment in the 
export economy. In other words, mortgages were how small slaveowners could increase 
their enslaved labor force or purchase other capital outlays to become real planters. I 
think this is the reason so many of the debtors do not turn up in any other source as 
owning enslaved people—they were running small operations and gambling on the future 
output of their enslaved people, using those very people as the wager. Many of them

31 See Ford/Hays/Russell mortgage, WPA, Vol. 59; Ford/Moore/Morris/Plummer/Roland/Taveroon mortgage, WPA Will Transcripts, 1722– 
Miller/Scott mortgage, WPA Will Transcripts, 1731–1733, Vol. 64; and Miller/Greene 
mortgage, WPA Will Transcripts, 1731–1733, Vol 64.
obviously lost the bet. The winner of these gambles, when the debtor defaulted, was the creditor (usually a merchant), who then legally owned enslaved people worth twice the merchant’s capital outlay, plus any payments the debtor had made. The risk for the creditor was, of course, if the enslaved person used as collateral died, ran away, or somehow became unable to labor, or if the creditor could not otherwise collect. Mortgaging enslaved people must have been a lucrative business for merchants and other creditors because so many kept loaning money to capital-and-labor-hungry colonists. As it turned out, the mortgage was an ideal method to bundle access to capital (via credit) and labor to colonists.  

32 From the perspective of the prospective lender, slave-backed mortgages could appear a relatively safe investment. Merchants were not the only colonists acting as creditors in early South Carolina. Other colonists often lent money to others in the area, and some even used the continued payment of interest after the due date on the note to turn the arrangement into what amounted to annuities. If the creditor needed money, it could be called in at any time, but otherwise it would continually accumulate interest. As Russell Menard has argued, the credit flows in South Carolina extended from Charles Town to the countryside, but mortgages show that most colonists preferred to finance

32 One of the problems with securing debt with specific individuals was that they were not abstracted in the same way as most other commodities. By this I mean that by placing named individuals as security on loans, it may have in some instances been more difficult for debtors to convince creditors to accept a different person in payment. This system was much simpler (and much less abstracted) than the ways historian Edward Baptist has argued about the securitization of enslaved people in nineteenth-century America. A hundred years after these Charles Town merchants loaned people money backed by mortgages financial institutions bundled and sold shares to investors, thus making the fate of specific individuals matter less to investors. See Edward E. Baptist, “Toxic Debt, Liar Loans, and Securitized Human Beings,” Common-Place 10, no. 03 (April 2010), http://www.common-place-archives.org/vol-10/no-03/baptist/.
their operations in other ways and that many merchants, even those investing large sums in the captive trade, either did not want to sell people on mortgages, or lacked the economic leverage to force well-off colonists into these contracts.33

Beginning in the late 1710s, after the Yamasee War and the near-collapse of the violent accumulation of human capital afforded by the trade in captive Native Americans, some South Carolinians were in a position to invest more heavily in slaving African peoples while maintaining connections to the intercolonial slave trade as well. Exports of rice rose by a factor of 35 between 1708 and 1735. Naval stores remained important staples through the late 1720s, when the imperial metropole stopped paying subsidies on them. But in order to build a profitable rice plantation, especially as colonists moved more toward harnessing flows of water to increase output, colonists looking to become planters constantly faced the problem of having plenty of land but too little labor. In response to the demand for credit, mortgages backed by enslaved people became increasingly popular beginning in 1722. Between 1713 and 1721 there were 15 people used as collateral. There were 18 in 1722 alone. Between 1720 and 1725 there were 161 people named as collateral. From 1726 to 1730 there were 467 and between 1731 and 35 the number jumped to 751. In all, between the few odd mortgages secured by enslaved people in the seventeenth century to the normalization of financing credit outlays in this

way by 1739, over 3,200 enslaved people were exploited through the promise of their future labor or sale.\textsuperscript{34}

In collateralized-human mortgages, the people used as security for loans were overwhelmingly of African descent in South Carolina, despite the presence of significant numbers enslaved of Native Americans. Over the entire period of this study, there were only 37 Native Americans mortgaged, a number that represents a proportion far below their demographic significance in the colony. In fact, 10 of these Native people came from one exceptional mortgage in 1711 when David Davis, Goose-Creek Man and son-in-law of notorious slaver and Governor James Moore, mortgaged 95 people to the merchants Godin and Guerard of Charles Town, which was by far the largest amount of property mortgaged in the period under study. One other mortgage featuring Native Americans stands out as well. In 1730, John Kitchen mortgaged four Native Americans, everyone he owned, along with his 56 acres of land, to Matthew Beard in exchange for £200. Kitchen had migrated from Massachusetts around 1720 to join other Congregationalists in Dorchester on the Ashley River. Since the trade of Native American captives into the colony had been drastically reduced by 1720, Kitchen was unlikely to simply find these four people at a sale. Instead, he either brought them with him from New England, or he sought out enslaved Native Americans for purchase when he arrived in South Carolina. Either way, John Kitchen’s 1730 mortgage is exceptional. In the document he called himself a planter, though with 4 enslaved people and 56 acres, he probably was not growing rice for export. Then, in 1734, Kitchen sold the same four

Native Americans, plus two more, to Matthew Beard. Kitchen turned up again, this time as having been buried in late 1735 in the St. Andrews Parish register, but instead of a planter, he was listed as an overseer. It seems Kitchen schemed to buy up enslaved Native Americans, which were less expensive than enslaved Africans, and use mortgages to access more credit that he could then reinvest in more enslaved Native Americans. But in 1734, he must have defaulted and had his plans of being a slave-owning planter ruined, which was probably a typical outcome for people of Kitchen’s economic stature.35

In early South Carolina, mortgages backed by captive humans and their labor became important financial instruments at the same time colonists were investing in rice as a staple commodity. Financial capitalism between colonists was inextricably connected to the subjugation of Native American and African peoples by creditors and debtors agreeing to wager future produce on the control of individual people. Creditors outside the colony injected capital through South Carolina merchants, who then allowed credit to flow into agricultural production. While South Carolina colonists in the early eighteenth century enslaved and forced a diverse group of people to work in various capacities—owing to historical contingency and plantation management—enslaved people being used as collateral were almost always African and, in a ratio of 2 to 1, male. Finance, then, became one of the ways that over the course of the early eighteenth century, even in a colonial center of slaving Native Americans, the commodification of human bodies became attached to people from Africa and coded black.

35 Davis/Godin/Guerard mortgage is in MRPS, 1709–1725, S213001, SCDAH, 136-9; Kitchen/Beard mortgage, WPA Will Transcripts, 1729–1731, Vol. 62A; Kitchen/Beard bill of sale, MRMS, Vol. AB., 1735-1736, SCDAH, 104-5; and for notice of Kitchen’s death, see Mabel L. Webber, “Register of St. Andrews Parish, Berkeley County, South Carolina. 1719-1744 (Continued),” SCHGM 13, no. 3 (1912): 158.
The Stono Rebellion serves as a distinct break in the history of the captive trade to South Carolina, not because of the violence of the event itself, but instead the reaction to it by white colonists. In the spring of 1740, following the late-summer rebellion the year before, the South Carolina legislature passed a series of three laws pertaining to the specter of the enslaved majority. The most famous of these statutes, the “Act for the better ordering and governing Negroes and other Slaves in this Province,” which ended up being the basis for most of the laws concerning enslaved people in the American south right up to the Civil War, was not the first one passed into law. Legislators passed a law imposing new duties on imported captive peoples and mechanisms for making the trade legible to the colonial state. Whereas between 1721 and 1740, the duties on importing captives had remained at essentially £10 for adults and £5 for small children, the new duties were aimed at making slaving—at least with respect to importation—economically unviable. Duties were raised to £100 for adults, £50 for children between 3’2” and 4’2”, and £25 if smaller. The new law was to go into effect after fifteen months, enough time to let slaving merchants have a slaving ship show up in Charles Town that had been ordered before the law was passed. At least some merchants did not want to stop slaving, as Robert Pringle wrote in 1740: the act “is not yet passed but will very Soon, So that there is Time to Import a Pretty Many Negroes here before Said Act Commences.” Overall, merchants shied away from the trade for what amounted to a decade. In the ten years between 1730 and 1740, 24,214 enslaved Africans landed in Charles Town. Between 1740 and 1750, the number fell to 3,616 people, a drop of almost a factor of seven. The colonial state thus exerted its power in order to limit the individual actions of merchants and other colonists by making importing captive people to the colony prohibitively
expensive. Passing such a statute and enforcing it would have been unthinkable twenty
years earlier.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{36} Robert Pringle to Samuel Saunders, April 2, 1740, Walter B. Edgar, ed., \textit{The
Letterbook of Robert Pringle} (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Historical
Society and the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South
Carolina Press, 1972), 174–5. Pringle also wrote a similar message to his brother living in
London. His idea was to import as many enslaved Africans as he could before the higher
duty went into effect. From his letters it does not seem he succeeded. Pringle to Andrew
Pringle, April 21, 1740, 185–6.

The third law was passed the same day as the slave code and was a reordering of
patrols. For the law on enslaved import duties and slave patrols, see Thomas Cooper, \textit{The
Statutes at Large of South Carolina: Acts from 1716 to 1752} (Charleston: A.S. Johnston,
1838), 556–68 and 568–73. For the 1740 slave code, see David J. McCord, \textit{The Statutes
at Large of South Carolina: Acts Relating to Charleston, Courts, Slaves, and Rivers}
(Columbia: A.S. Johnston, 1840), 397–417. Also see Hadden, \textit{Slave Patrols}. 
Chapter 3

Displacing Native American Captives after the Yamasee War

In April 1715, an eruption of violence broke out in southeastern North America that historians refer to as the Yamasee War. There were sudden attacks against South Carolina in what seemed to colonists to be a general war of all southeastern Native polities against them. In reality, not all Natives went to war in 1715 against the British, but there were nonetheless a huge number of Native American warriors out either to chastise South Carolinians or to push the colony into the sea. The turning point in the war came when delegates from South Carolina convinced groups of Cherokees to fight, especially against members of the Creek Confederacy. Social and economic pressures stemming from the longstanding intercultural trade in Native American captives and deerskins provided much of the impetus for the attack. In the end, the colony survived but most of the smaller Native American polities in the region did not.

South Carolina’s direct involvement in the war ended in 1717 with a tenuous peace with Creeks. Afterwards, the British used the trade between the colony and Native Americans, now focused more on deerskins than Native captives, to begin the process of building a functioning geopolitical state, which many colonists had for the most part actively avoided since the colony’s founding in 1670. Alongside attempts to secure contracts (as discussed in the previous chapter), in this era colonial officials also set about unifying colonial diplomacy through asserting regulation on the trade with Native Americans. Although the numbers of Native captives dwindled after the war, some did continue coming into the colony via Native American and colonial traders. We can begin
to understand how colonial leaders built a state apparatus and why it grew by looking at the continued trade in captive Native peoples in the region because, rather than abolishing a practice that had been one of the main causes of the devastating war, the post-1715 colonial state chose to assert power by taking an active role in that enslavement. This practice of “displacive colonialism,” a conception that adapts aspects of settler colonial theory, illustrates that the removal of Native peoples was a founding goal of settler colonial projects and that Native peoples were not passive victims but active historical agents in the colonial world, and in this case actually aided the process of colonial state-building after the Yamasee War.

I employ “displacive” instead of “settler” because settler colonial theory concentrates on the gaze of the colonizer. As James Merrell has argued, the term “settler” itself implies an earlier unsettled period before colonization. Native American peoples took an active part in the construction of colonial worlds. They often fought back against colonialism, but also sometimes ended up supporting the creation of more powerful colonial projects in the process of doing what they perceived as being in their best interest in specific historical contexts. Additionally, thinking in terms of “displacive colonialism” brings to the fore previously obscured continuities across the rupture of the Yamasee War in South Carolina and better encompasses the colonial milieu of North America, where Native American polities often possessed power greater than European colonies. Some Native peoples actively helped colonists eliminate their enemies (usually other Native groups), thereby aiding the displacive colonial project.¹

Although historians correctly point to the Yamasee War as a turning point in the trade in enslaved Native Americans in the Southeast, a close examination of the persistent, if drastically reduced, trade after the war illuminates numerous significant aspects of the eighteenth-century British colonial project in South Carolina. The historiographical trends in the study of Native American slaving in the Southeast argue either that the dwindling of the trade after 1715 made it largely irrelevant or that its purpose changed. Scholars have discussed the continuation of a diminished trade into at least the 1720s, but in these interpretations the trade began to function differently. As this chapter contends, there was more continuity across the break of 1715 than previous interpretations allow.  

By developing a displacive colonial project, South Carolinians operated under the logic of elimination while the changing contexts in the 1710s meant that prominent colonists sought different tactics to achieve the same strategic ends. The colonial state-building project during this decade also included an attempt to regulate and rationalize the trade of Native American captives in the colony that began prior to the Yamasee War. Even as the Native American captive trade out of Charles Town diminished, the basic

52; and James H. Merrell, “Second Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians,” *WMQ*, 69, no. 3 (July 2012), 451-512 at 473-480.

colonial strategy of Native American enslavement and removal remained constant for over sixty years. Before 1715 slaving was diffused and liberalized in the ways slavers interacted with the state with relatively little oversight. With the onset of the Yamasee War, colonial administrators sought to rationalize and control Native American slaving to the colony more directly than they had previously been able. In this way, the sporadic enslavement of Native Americans remained a central strategy in displacive colonialism well into the eighteenth century. Practically speaking, the main change in the way this strategy functioned during and after the Yamasee War was in the role of the state. Representatives of the South Carolina colonial government, acting for the first time as what we may consider to be civil servants, became the largest trafficker in Native American captives in the colony after the Yamasee War. This was a change because earlier in the colony’s history, administrative titles and slaving Native Americans for personal gain was normal.³

The colonial administration and individual colonists continued to acquire Native American captives as gifts, as prisoners, and as commodities, thus providing continuity with the earlier period of Native American slaving when Charles Town was actually a net exporter of captive peoples. Like before, after 1715 the overwhelming majority of these people were probably traded to the British Caribbean possessions. The removal of Native American captives to British colonies through the port of Charles Town continued well into the 1720s rice boom and through the post-war increase in African captive imports. The period after the overthrow of the proprietary regime but before the British Crown

assumed full control of the colony (roughly 1719 to 1731) is generally understudied in histories of colonial South Carolina. By outlining the continued movement of Native American captives into and out of the colony, this chapter addresses the geopolitical and interpersonal politics between South Carolina and various Native American polities in an Atlantic context. The colonial government had the ability to simply make captives disappear, not only by killing them, but also by using them as a tool of British displacive colonialism by taking people colonists considered an indigenous other and moving them off the continent where they could be exploited as an exogenous other.\(^4\)

Thus after the Yamasee War, South Carolina elites merely attempted to rationalize the Native American captive trade and make it more legible to the burgeoning late-1710s state, thereby rendering it both more profitable to the state apparatus and less dangerous to the commodity-producing colonial project. As anthropologist James Scott has argued in more recent contexts, a major component of early modern state-building was a forced simplification of complex social interactions in areas of interest such as taxation, which thereby made complex realities more easily followed and monitored, or “legible.” This simplification and rationalization would then allow representatives of the colonial administration to (better) read, for the geopolitical security of the colony and taxation, the trade between Native peoples and South Carolina. In so doing, the incipient colonial state could better control what Native people were enslaved. At a high level, the trade was not something only being driven by colonists, but instead operated under the

\(^4\) Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 16-52.
impetus of southeastern Native Americans. Colonial officials came up with a solution for an intercultural social practice they could not have scuttled completely.\(^5\)

A major motive for trading in Native American captives was the deerskin trade, which remained lucrative long after 1715. In order to obtain deerskins and maintain good relationships with native polities, South Carolina had to accept the continuation of the captive trade, which remained an important part of Native geopolitics. By arguing only Native Americans from polities \textit{not} allied with the colony were enslaveable, the colony paired acceptance of British colonial sovereignty with the threat of removal. But recognizing the danger of having a relatively large population of enslaved Native Americans residing in South Carolina, colonial officials opted for funneling these captives to the Caribbean, where they would be safer to use as laborers. This transshipment of Native American captives was also beneficial because it helped further justify Carolina’s existence. Additionally, by trading these captives, colonists and the colonial state were able to accumulate capital for colonial economic growth and stability, both of which were required components of state building. While the ways the trade functioned between Native and colonial cultures remained the same after the war, the mechanisms and the scope of the trade did change on the colonial side. Planters in the colony used the crisis of the Yamasee War to construct and interject a new state

\(^5\) On states and legibility, as this may require amplification as readers may not be familiar with this book, see James C. Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.
apparatus with the aim of rationalizing and monopolizing the trade, albeit to similar horrific ends for the captives as before 1715. ⁶

One important way that South Carolina’s colonial government interjected itself into the Native American captive trade after the Yamasee War crisis was by reducing the number of locations where trading could legally occur and by creating a state-run monopoly. Since 1707, the colony had attempted by statute to regulate the trade because “those persons that trade among the Indian in amity with this government, to generally lead loose, vicious lives, to the scandal of the Christian religion, and do likewise oppress the people among whom they live, by their unjust and illegal actions, which if not prevented may in time lead to the destruction of this Province.” This logic — slavers keeping the trade illegible to the weak state apparatus — led the colony to make feeble attempts at forcing traders to be licensed and bonded, and this policy did not change until after the Yamasee War. It was then that a major rift between planter interests and merchant/trader interests came to the fore. The planter faction, who dominated the Commons House of Assembly, realized that although the trade in Native captives had been the major cause of the recent Yamasee War, it was necessary to maintain the practice of receiving Native captives into the colony for diplomatic reasons. With the colonial government controlling the practice, the Native captive trade could become a

true diplomatic tool used to promote the interests of the entire colony as envisioned by new planters.

Another major reasons for this shift in administering trade with Native people was that the planters saw much less profit in the Native captive trade than in previous years. Not only was a supply of possible captives becoming harder to find due to endemic warfare, slaving, and disease in the region, but agricultural exports were also becoming more profitable. Instead, the continuation of the trade even after the war was necessary to maintain close diplomatic ties with local Native groups for whom slaving remained a vital component of their diplomatic practices. The colonial state stepped in to mediate the trade more than ever before by having all transactions take place in three colonial garrisons handled by representatives of the colonial government. The Commissioners of the Indian Trade would serve as administrators to the trade. Proprietary officials had attempted similar statutory fixes before, but now there was more reason to concentrate resources on enforcement. Thus in 1716, a law was passed that stated that private individuals were to have no trading relationship for “any furrs, skins or slaves” with any Native Americans outside the colony. In this vein, public trader—i.e., a trader working as a representative of the state—Theophilus Hastings was ordered in 1718 to “take into your Possession, all Goods, Wares, Slaves, Horses, Skins or other Things” for “the Publick” but also to only deal with “those Indians in Amity with this Government.” Hastings was ordered to trade “Arms, Ammunition, Goods, Wares, and Merchandize” for “Skins, Furs, Horses, Slaves,” or anything else it was “customary to receive from the Indians.”
Hastings also had to brand items, captives included, with “TH” before shipping them to Charles Town.  

The overwhelming majority of the capital raised through the sale of captives by public traders like Hastings went to help finance the colonial government. Once captives made it to Charles Town under the monopoly, the colony sold them at auction and added the proceeds to the colony’s coffers. Buyers were required to ship the captive out of the colony as soon as possible. In 1720, to “strengthen that frontier” and “increase its inhabitants and trade,” some South Carolina officials called for “yet greater penalties the selling as a slave” Native allies and that only “deputies from the publick” could purchase captives. Then, the “deputies” had to “transport them to the Islands there to be sold on condition not to be sent to the continent again.” The *Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade* are littered with similar transactions in a dry, bureaucratic language. In one case, the clerk recorded auctioning “three Indian Slave Boys” for £131 15s, and in one well-documented period, between December 1714, and December 1716, the colonial government received £308 in export duties on the sale of 308 Native Americans. This number does not account for the auctioning off of captives held by the colony. Even though after the war the numbers of people shipped out of the colony were certainly much lower, this example illustrates how colonial leadership monetized captives. In short, the South Carolina government almost certainly became the largest Native American slaver after 1715 and made revenue both by auctioning off captives and by

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then charging export duties on them as well. The colonial government was more than willing to sell these Native people to other British colonies but therein lay the major difference: before the war it was individuals who were profiting and after the colonial state served as a slaving broker between Native American slavers and slaving colonial merchants. By liquidating these captives in the human sink of the Caribbean, South Carolina’s leaders raised money to help fund the colonial government, but also offered a solution to the geopolitical problem of indigeneity in a displacive colonial context.8

The most substantial changes to the prewar structuring of the trade were officials’ channeling through the colonial government and its great reduction in volume due to the dwindling supply of possible captives. However, despite only anecdotal and incomplete evidence, it remains clear that the captive trade retained both political and economic significance within the colony. For example, in a report to the Committee on the Treasurers Accounts from November 1725, officials noted that £25 was “cash recd for Indian Men sold for account of the public.” But the extant records are not systematic; there is no continuing log of such sales. The most complete record is in the Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, but those records end in 1718. If the levels of captives sales recorded between February 1717 and August 1718 in the commissioners’ journal offers any insight into slaving to the colony after 1718, then there may have been more captives sold out of the colony than scholars have ever considered (see Table 3.1).

8 BPRO, vol. 8, 226-227; November 30, 1717, JCIT, 235; the duty was recorded on December 15 1716, Journals of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, William Summer Jenkins, Records of the United States of America Microfilm Collection, Library of Congress (hereinafter, “JCHA”), 1715-1734/5, Roll 2, 209–10. Lorenzo Veracini calls this type of removal an “ethnic transfer,” even though in this instance it was on a small scale compared to more famous examples like Cherokee removal in the 1830s; see Settler Colonialism, 35.
These numbers were undoubtedly inflated by the continuing violence in the region after the colony made peace, but they show that Native peoples still offered up captives for sale. During this period, there is record of 64 Native American captives, almost all of whom were auctioned off in Charles Town.9

Table 3.1: Native American Captives in the Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, 1717–8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 8, 1717</td>
<td>“six Indian Slaves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 20, 1717</td>
<td>“seven Indian Slaves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6, 1717</td>
<td>“Sale of five Indians”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 1717</td>
<td>“an Indian Slave Woman”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 1717</td>
<td>“Col. Hastings delivered… twenty-one Indian Slaves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1717</td>
<td>“two Indian Women”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 1717</td>
<td>“one Indian Woman and one Indian Boy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 1717</td>
<td>“a Mustee boy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 20, 1717</td>
<td>“nine Abeakah Indians”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 1717</td>
<td>“three Slaves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 25, 1717</td>
<td>“an Indian Slave Woman”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 27, 1717</td>
<td>“three Indian Slaves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 25, 1718</td>
<td>“an Indian Slave Boy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 1718</td>
<td>“an Indian Boy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4, 1718</td>
<td>“an Indian Slave”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>64 captives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some of these people were likely captured in the later stages of the Yamasee War, but after South Carolina made peace with the Creeks war, fare continued in the southeast long afterward, particularly between Creeks and Cherokees, albeit at a lower intensity. This persistence likely accounts for the drop-off in the number of captives brought to the trading factories by 1718 when most of the belligerent polities had come to terms on peace with the colony. But the Creeks and Cherokees, two important trading and political partners for South Carolina, continued to fight each other. Thus captives kept coming into

the system, likely because the colonial government did not want to insult Native American traders and diplomats who sought to give and trade captives into the colony and because colonists’ demand for enslavable captives was not satiated. For colonial officials, better control of the captive trade and the positive revenue stream produced by captive sales offered them better legibility of Native American slaving, as well as an avenue for exerting new-found state power. Additionally, the continued movement of Native people off the continent aided the broader South Carolina displacive colonial project by reducing the number of indigenous people in the southeast, even if the colony was not at the same time expanding into new indigenous areas.10

As the Native American captive trade declined, trans-Atlantic slaving to Charles Town increased. This increase in the African captive trade to the colony also provided an opportunity for the colonial administration to increase its revenue. The Crown had taken over administration of the colony after the coup d'état of 1719 when a faction of colonists overthrew the Proprietary administration. South Carolina then became a royal colony on a provisional basis, while in the metropole the Crown worked out the legal ramifications of the rebellion. One of the last statutes passed under the Proprietary regime raised an import duty on captive Africans coming into the colony, but the Lords Proprietor vetoed the statute a few months before the coup. However, after the royal governor, Francis Nicholson, arrived in 1721, another statute was passed placing duties on “all negro slaves imported from Africa” or anywhere else. £10 was the duty on captive Africans over ten years old and for children under ten it was £5. Although the overall revenues of the colony are hard to delineate since so many colonists simply refused to pay taxes on their

10 Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 87-88.
property (and thus the percentage of the overall income of the provisional royal administration remains unknown), the tax proceeds from duties on enslaved Africans certainly offered a steady stream of revenue for the colonial government. For example, between January 1722 and September 1723, a period where the number of people transported in the trans-Atlantic trade was lower than it had been a few years earlier, the colony collected £3625 on “duty of Sundry Negroes Imported.” Thus by the early 1720s, slavery was playing an increasing role in funding the colonial government. The two institutions thus became mutually reinforcing for the first time in South Carolina history; colonists wanted a stronger colonial government more akin to their conceptions of English law and order to protect their growing property (both land and humans) and a central mechanism for funding a stronger colonial government was the promotion of slavery as a social institution. The colonial state apparatus thus managed to better control both imports and exports of captive people and collected duties in both directions.¹¹

But even as trans-Atlantic slaving was relatively easy to monitor for the colonial state, Native American peoples handing over captives to colonists remained much more difficult to monitor and control. Although South Carolinians had since 1670 exploited captives in the name of their displacive colonial project, the movement of captives into the colony remained largely the purview of southeastern Native peoples. The new colonial state apparatus could only partially control the colonial response. Thus,

Intercultural diplomacy remained of utmost importance to both colonists and Native peoples.

In June 1717, Thomas Broughton, colonial trade representative, received “one Indian Woman and one Indian Boy” as presents from “the Ittawan Indians.” The giving of gifts to allies served an important diplomatic function in most Native American cultures, and the giving of captives could thus strengthen connections. Colonists knew they were in no position to refuse such gifts from Native American allies. They also knew the inherent diplomatic dangers in keeping gifted captives, but were usually able to circumvent this danger by selling these people to other colonies. According to historian Brett Rushforth, in the Great Lakes region, the logic of Native American diplomatic slavery was used by Algonquian leaders as a double-edged sword: it strengthened bonds between the giver and recipient, but it also drove a wedge between the recipient’s people and the captive’s people, which afforded the giver power in the geopolitics of the receiver. Operating similarly in the southeast, diplomatic captive trading was a powerful tool to reinforce alliance structures. But the Caribbean market allowed South Carolina officials to evade the second part of this Native American logic by, practically speaking, making these captives disappear, while simultaneously putting them to use in the larger imperial project. The society that an enslaved person came from had little chance of ever finding out what happened to their captured kin.12

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Often Native captives were given as diplomatic tokens to officials of the colony. For example, in 1724, Governor Francis Nicholson reported to the Commons House of Assembly that George Chicken, who had recently been appointed the sole commissioner tasked with heading the colony’s relations with Native Americans, had presented him with “three Indians.” The captives had apparently been brought to one of the colonial trading outposts and sent to Charles Town to be offered to the governor. Nicholson proposed “to keep two of them to Send as presents to their Royal Highness’s the Prince and Princess of Whales,” and figured they were worth about £50 each. The third, Nicholson reasoned, should be “Sold towards defraying the charge,” along with skins also offered as gifts. Similarly, in 1727, a Lower Creek diplomat presented the governor

It does seem that after Rushforth’s monograph on Native American enslavement in New France we should be careful not to assume that Native American peoples understood themselves to be working under western market logic, even when it appears to be, but some of these sales would be difficult to describe otherwise. The journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade of South Carolina are littered with dealings of this type. Between 1716 and 1718 there are numerous instances where it is implied in the journal record that colonial representatives had purchased slaves from Native Americans in exchange for European goods. Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 156–7 and “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance,” WMQ 63, no. 1 (January 2006): 53–80. I think that a similar logic to enslavement and the giving of slaves operated in Native American cultures in the southeast. For a southeastern anecdote showing distinct similarities between the way Rushforth argues Algonquin peoples understood the concept of slavery as being akin to keeping pets, see Michelle LeMaster, Brothers Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations in the Colonial Southeast (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 94.

Jessica Stern has done important work on parsing out the differences between a gift exchange and a commodity exchange. Most importantly, Stern argues, gifts were not fully alienated from the giver, whereas commodities were. Gifts kept a connection between the item and the giver, whereas commodities were controlled by the receiver and became fully alienated upon the transaction; Stern, The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), ch. 4; and “Native American Taste: Re-Evaluating the Gift-Commodity Debate in the British Colonial Southeast,” Native South 5, no. 1 (2012): 1-37.
with a white eagle wing and a Yamasee boy. South Carolina officials conformed to Native understandings of diplomacy.

The policy of removing captives brought to the colony was not absolute, however. In the later stages of the Yamasee War, John Musgrove went as South Carolina’s envoy to bring the Creek to peace negotiations. The task was risky, but Musgrove somehow managed to complete his mission. The Creeks gave him “some slaves, skins, [and] horses,” but Musgrove’s acceptance of such presents, for his personal gain, was illegal under the acts regulating the trade. Instead Musgrove petitioned the Commons House for permission to keep the gifts. The main political rift in the colony was between the representatives of the proprietary interests, influenced by merchant interests led by the governor, and the Commons House, led by planters. The reaction to Musgrove’s petition highlights this split. Proprietary Governor Robert Johnson thought Musgrove should be allowed to keep the people as gifts, while the Commons House wanted to buy the captives from Musgrove and return them. The planter-led Commons House had different goals than the proprietary governor over the use of the trade, which eventually became an important point of friction that ended up with the overthrow of the proprietary regime in 1719. Even with such exceptions, most Native American captives coming into the colonial system through diplomacy certainly ended up cast into the stream of captives leaving Charles Town for the Caribbean.13

13 Friday, November 15, 1717, JCHA, 369–70; Crane, The Southern Frontier. Denise Bossy has used the gift of the eagle wing and Yamasee boy to great effect. See “The ‘Noble Savage’ in Chains: Indian Slavery in Colonial South Carolina, 1670–1735” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2007), ch. 5. On Musgrove, see Friday, November 17, 1717, JCHA, 370. On colonial diplomacy between Native Americans and South Carolina, see LeMaster, Brothers Born of One Mother. On southeastern post-Yamasee War
Selling prisoners of war taken by colonists and their allies in joint expeditions served as a second means of capturing and eliminating Native American peoples after 1715. “Just war” ideology, as South Carolinians understood it, argued that people could be converted into chattel property as captives of war in exchange for their not being executed. The Yamasee War had little bearing on this belief or its continued implementation. During the war, South Carolina officials followed the logic of displacive colonialism by wanting to extirpate or remove the Santee people who were living near the colony along the river now bearing their name in a prime location for colonial expansion. In late November 1716, the Commons House of Assembly decided to convince “King” Robin, of the “Ittuans” (Etiwan people, who by 1715 lived just north of Charles Town amongst colonists in a single village), to “cut off the Santee Indians and … persuade them … by the taking of slaves.” Two weeks later, the Commons House unceremoniously took up the possibility of using the proceeds of the sale of the captive Santees in possession of the state to pay the wages of colonial soldiers fighting in the war. By January 25, in addition to the Santee people in custody, Congaree people from further inland were also ordered to be auctioned. Before they could be sold, the Etiwans demanded the Santee and Congaree women and children to enslave for their own purposes, apparently leaving only the men to be shipped “off to some of the Islands, and not upon any part of the main of America.” South Carolina officials had little control over the introduction of diplomatic slaves, with their Native American allies dictating the geopolitics, see Alejandra Dubcovsky, *Informed Power: Communication in the Early American South* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), ch. 7.
trade. Captives obtained as prisoners of war in joint colonial expeditions, in contrast, were the direct result of war-making by colonists and their Native allies.\footnote{Thursday, November 29, 1716 and Friday, January 25, 1717, JCHA, 183, 229-230. On the development of the ideology of enslavement in the “just war” in English/British juridical discourse, see Christopher Tomlins, \textit{Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128-131 and Michael Guasco, \textit{Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 192.}

Obtaining captives as prisoners of war remained a key geopolitical strategy pursued by South Carolina well into the 1730s. In 1720 the colony had a “small war” with the “Vocamas [Waccamaw] nation on the Wineu [Winyaw] River” with less than “100 men.” The Waccamaws paid dearly for the colonists’ “small war,” with “60 men women and children…taken and killed.” As with most other Native American captives coming into South Carolina, Waccamaws taken by colonists likely ended up in the Caribbean. The captive trade was an attractive way to help defray the costs of war-making and also fit into Native American alliance warring practices. Colonial militias had to accommodate Native American cultures because colonists could not successfully make war without Native allies. The colony, based on slavery and indigenous elimination from colonial spaces and potential colonial spaces since its inception, never had enough free men to field an army large enough to fight alone. In fact, the colony often resorted to arming enslaved men in times of crisis. Taking captives and enslaving them worked well for both colonists and Native American allies; the practice was therefore an accommodation of southeastern intercultural relations.\footnote{Letter to Mr. Boone, June 24, 1720, BPRO, vol. 8, 25-27. On colonial Carolinians’ use of Native American rivalry to their benefit, see Matthew Jennings, \textit{New Worlds of Violence: Cultures and Conquests in the Early American Southeast} (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000), 210-11.}
The largest and best-documented case of directly using warfare in the production of new captives was against Yamasees in 1728. Yamasees, seen as instigators of the war in 1715, had never agreed to a peace with South Carolina. Instead, many fled south and settled just outside the walls of St. Augustine, while some others moved westward to the Creeks. In this era the two great antagonists of South Carolina were the Spanish and the Yamasees, so an alliance between the two seemed doubly worrisome to British colonials. In 1722, the colonial government sent Theophilus Hastings to convince the Creeks either to negotiate the relocation of the Yamasees back into the orbit of South Carolina (and away from the Spanish) or to attack them. Hastings was promised £300 for the journey, £50 for each captured or killed Yamasee, and £1000 if the Yamasee were destroyed, but neither this scheme, nor one the next year, came to fruition.16

Yamasees had by the early 1720s begun attacking the outer limits of colonial expansion in South Carolina. Charles Town officials demanded that St. Augustine intervene to stop the raids, but in return received “a very imprudent and saucy letter” from the Spanish governor. When none of their other schemes to subdue the Yamasees succeeded, colonial officials finally staged a large-scale military expedition against the Yamasees living near St. Augustine in 1728. John Palmer was ordered “to raise one hundred white men and one hundred Indians” and attack the Yamasees in order “to revenge the injuries they had done this province.” The force ended up consisting of “seventy-nine white and ninety odd Indians.” Alexander Parris, Commissary Officer,


16 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 247-251, 265.
remarked that when they found the Yamasee town, the expedition “soon made themselves masters of it. Killing thirty men dead, wounded several more and took fifteen prisoners and brought them away.”  

South Carolina officials decided in 1728 to use the same method of war-making they had employed since 1671: taking prisoners of war and selling them into the Atlantic captive market where they were deemed less dangerous to colonial projects on the continent. Additionally, by 1728 the Yamasees living at St. Augustine had been essentially cut off from their longtime allies, the Creeks, and could be considered what the French called une petite nation, a small independent political unit. Yamasee geopolitical isolation meant they were expendable to South Carolina. It made more sense to turn enemies into capital in colonial account books than to kill them outright, and it also opened up more space on the continent for colonial expansion. But by the 1720s, such isolated Native American polities were fewer in number than they had been before.

17 Alexander Parris to the President of Councils, March 27, 1728, BPRO, vol. 13, 187-189. According to the muster roll, Palmer had 107 white men; see BPRO, vol. 13, 194-196. Charlesworth Glover, Agent for the colony, reported to the Lower Creeks in Coweta on April 15, 1728 that “Palmer hath cut off a Town of the Yamasees and burnt Augustine Town, Killed and took near 50 Indians, among which was a Cowetaw fellow, which Col. Palmer let go again,” BPRO, vol. 13, 164.

1715. The social and political reorganizations made by Native survivors of epidemic diseases, warfare, and the captive trade made such opportunities for Euro-American colonists more sporadic after the Yamasee War. Still, the practice of attacking, capturing, and removing *petite nations* continued. In 1735, the Commons House offered a bounty of £50 to anyone, enslaved or free, who should kill a Tuscarora. Then Thomas Broughton, Lieutenant Governor, also proclaimed that in addition to the bounty placed on dead Tuscaroras, £60 would be given for “every Tuscarora Indian who shall be taken alive.” Living captives had resale value. To the South Carolina government, the Tuscarora who did not migrate northward and join their Iroquoian relatives of the Five Nations in the 1710s were so small and geopolitically insignificant that colonial officials thought there would be few repercussions to fear if they actively attempted to exterminate the Tuscaroras as a viable independent political unit. The profits from the sale of Tuscarora captives and the space created for colonial expansion were much too tempting to ignore when the potential consequences seemed small. However, captives coming into the colony as the spoils of war eventually petered out because politically isolated groups rapidly disappeared and the large confederacies could better defend themselves from slaving.19

19 June 6, 1735, Salley, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, November 8, 1734–June 7, 1735*, 233; SCG, June 28, 1735. By 1740, this calculus seems to have changed. A proclamation printed in the SCG in 1740, in preparation for an assault against St. Augustine during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, James Oglethorpe of Georgia specifically demanded “No Indian Enemy is to be taken as a Slave, for all Spanish and Indian Prisoners do belong to his Majesty, and are to be treated as Prisoners, and not as Slaves,” SCG, 11 April 1740. Such a declaration and the ability to execute it would have been unthinkable twenty years earlier.

On the Tuscarora and South Carolina, see LeMaster, *Brothers Born of One Mother*; Stephen Feeley, "Before long to be good friends: Diplomatic Perspectives of the Tuscarora War," and LeMaster, "War, Masculinity, and Alliances on the Carolina
The third, and most historically elusive, method Native American captives came under colonial control was through market transactions that were on the surface unrelated to Native diplomatic goals. Native Americans continued to bring captives to sell either to colonial officials or to traders in exchange for European goods. Representatives of the colonial government decided in the crisis of the Yamasee War to channel all legal trade with indigenous peoples through the colonial state apparatus, including people. The shift from a proprietary- to a locally- and then Crown-controlled regime after 1719 eventually brought an end to the state-run monopoly on all trade, and trading with “Indians in Amity” reverted to private interests, though with continued scrutiny by the state. Although the trade was highly regulated compared with the earlier history of the colony, the end of the monopoly also increased the possibility of Native American captives being sold illegally to colonists in the geographically expanding and sparsely populated colony beyond the gaze of the colonial state apparatus. In this way, the marketing of captives continued alongside diplomatic captive-gifting and captives as the spoils of war.20

 Trafficking humans between individual Native American slavers and individual colonists continued. In a dispersed colony like South Carolina, with one center of administration, and a large number of enslaved Native American already in the colony, it

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For the war with the Kussoe and the selling of captives, see September 27 and October 2, 1671, Council Journals, Green Copy, 25 August 1671-11 July 1721, SCDAH, S 188001, 8-9.

was relatively easy to purchase and enslave captives illegally and not be caught. This illegal trade, although in opposition to the new colonial administrative structures, and a type of smuggling, nevertheless also served the displacive colonial logic of elimination. The people turned illegally into chattel property and who remained in South Carolina were displaced from their communal lives and thus atomized, rendering them less dangerous. The 1716 law banning individual trading with Native Americans and setting up the state-run monopoly continued one facet of the earlier trading laws: only friendly Native Americans could be trading partners, and only enemy Indians could be enslaved. Following this reasoning, the Commissioners of the Indian Trade in 1717 gave orders to Eleazor Wiggins, a longtime trader currently representing the colony: “You are not to buy knowingly, any free Indian for a Slave, nor make a Slave of any Indian that ought to be free.”

As the colonial government attempted (with mixed levels of success) to become the sole gatekeeper of trafficking humans into the colony, it also dictated who was enslaveable. But in a continuation of the realities of slaving since 1670, on the ground these policies often did not work. For example, in 1717 Rowland Evans purchased a Cherokee woman and child outside legal channels. Evans claimed he was told they were Yamasees (enemies) and not Cherokees (allies). Since the colonial government had deemed Cherokees unenslaveable, officials wanted to purchase the captives from Evans, who demanded “not less than fifty pounds” and was paid as much so the woman and child could then be returned to the Cherokees. Likewise, in 1717 John Barnwell asked the Commons House for the services of an enslaved mustee, or a person of mixed African

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21 May 14, 1717, *JCIT*, 182
and Native American ancestry, purchased from Cherokees. Because Barnwell was a member of the colonial elite, the Assembly granted him ownership of the captive, in return for posting a large bond, regardless of colonial law. In theory, these were the ways the colonial leadership intended for the trading laws to operate: the government found out that an unenslaveable person was traded to a private individual and then stepped in to prevent a diplomatic crisis, or they instead could grant captives to trusted elites as they saw fit.22

Even after the Crown provisionally took control of the administration of the colony in the early 1720s and the trade monopoly reverted back to private control, the same rationale of transforming Native Americans into property applied. In 1724 Thomas Montjoy, a trader working in a Creek village, was caught having “bought” a “Cherokee Wench & Child” who were “taken by the Creek Indians” in the ongoing Creek-Cherokee wars. South Carolina officials, attempting to tack between warring Creeks and Cherokees while remaining allies with both, could not stand for a Carolina trader owning recently captured Cherokees with the possibility of the Cherokees finding out. Following legislative precedence, the solution of the Commons House was to purchase the woman and child from Montjoy and return them to their people. For my purposes, the key to the transaction Montjoy made for the Cherokees was that he bought them. This was neither a diplomatic gift of captives nor were these people direct prisoners of South Carolina’s war-making; the Creek warrior who sold them to Montjoy, after capturing the Cherokee

22 March 1 and 3, 1716, JCHA, 14–19; Wednesday, July 10, 1717, JCIIT, 198-199.
woman and child, made a commodity exchange, likely for European wares to which the Creek warrior otherwise had little access.  

Similarly, the most dangerous diplomatic crisis in surviving records came about in the aftermath of illegal sales of Native American captives to individual South Carolina colonists. In late 1726 representatives of South Carolina attempted to negotiate an end to the endemic warfare between factions of Cherokees and Creeks. For South Carolina, the Yamasee War ended with an uneasy peace between white colonists and Creeks in 1717, but other Native polities, especially Creeks and Cherokees, remained belligerents and the relationship between the colony and Creek Confederacy remained uneasy well into the 1720s. Accordingly the Cherokees’ relatively precarious geopolitical situation vis-à-vis Spanish and French colonies necessitated a closer relationship with South Carolina if they wanted access to the benefits, as they understood them, of European colonialism. But the weakened postwar British colony saw an advantage in promoting warfare between Carolina’s most-powerful competitors in the region, a strategy laid out as early as 1717: “This makes the matter of great weight to us, how to hold both [Creeks and Cherokees] as our friends, for some time, and assist them in cutting one another's throats without offending either.”

This strategy worked well for close to a decade, but by 1726 the geopolitical calculus had changed. An alliance between Lower Creeks and Yamasees living near St. Augustine, along with the threat of war with the Spanish, gave colonists reason to attempt

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23 June 1724, 11, 12, and 15, Salley, JCHA, 28, 36, 40-41 .

24 Letter to Joseph Boone, April 25, 1717, CO 5/1265, f. 69, National Archives of Great Britain, Kew.
bringing the Creeks closer as allies and in so doing, making areas west of the colony safer because the south was becoming more dangerous. The leaders of South Carolina now pressed for peace between the Cherokees and the Creeks. The three parties arranged a council. The Cherokee delegation arrived first in Charles Town for negotiations. More skeptical of the British and possessing more geopolitical power, the Creeks were slower to arrive.\(^{25}\)

In the meantime, members of the Cherokee delegation, waiting in Charles Town, made an unsettling discovery: two Cherokee children were being held as slaves in the colony by South Carolina colonists. A Cherokee girl was being held by James McNobney and a boy by the widow Sarah Bohannon. The Cherokee delegation, representing the colony’s strongest Native American ally, demanded the children be set free. But this simple demand pitted the British belief in private property against the geopolitical circumstances of the colony. In response, an assembly-appointed committee decided the easiest solution was for the colonial government to purchase the children and return them to the Cherokees. The Commons House thus attempted to turn the crisis into a market transaction, but the solution required the cooperation of Bohannon and McNobney. McNobney “absolutely refus’d on any account to part with the girl,” while Bohannon wanted to extort the colony for £170, an amount far exceeding the market value of captive Native American boys in the period. The Assembly took this demand as “the hight of Arrogance … and a gross imposition on the Publick.” Colonial officials decided that two enslaved children were not worth straining relations with the Cherokees. The

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problem was not that the children had been taken captive and enslaved in the colony, as there were many enslaved Native Americans living as chattel property in South Carolina. Instead, the problem lay with the illegibility of the enslaved children to the colonial state apparatus, even in the city of Charles Town. The colonial government therefore eventually liberated the boy and girl from their captors, paying Bohannon the £170 she demanded and McNobney the enormous sum of £200.26

Each of these enslaved Native Americans who came into the colonial system after the Yamasee War has survived in records because they created some type of political

26 January 27 and February 2, 1727, Salley, *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina November 15, 1726-March 11, 1726-7*, 90, 96. This was an unusual situation for the colony, but the confiscation and reallocation of slave property in the name of diplomacy did have precedent. During the Yamasee War, South Carolina’s government decided to trade with the Tuscarora for captives taken in an alliance with the colony. A few years earlier, during the Tuscarora War, an expedition from South Carolina had captured and enslaved hundreds of Tuscarora, some of whom remained in the colony. The arrangement was to trade enslaved Tuscaroras back to the Tuscarora in exchange for new captives, irrespective of the property rights of said Tuscarora owners of enslaved people. See Saturday, March 17, 1716, JCHA, 47–8 and Ramsey, *The Yamasee War*, 164–5.

Enslaved Native American boys in the period were worth somewhere between £50 and £100. Even at the upper end of these values, Bohannon was attempting to receive something close to twice the going rate for other Native American boys. For examples of values placed on Native American boys in the era, see Johnny (£50), Peter Guerin Inventory, February 4, 1723, MRIS, 92; “Mahaw Boy named Tom” (£80) and “Mahaw Boy named Boatswain” (£50), Joseph Atwell Inventory, March 1723, MRIS, Book C, 93; Hector (£50), Alexander Mackey Inventory, April 29, 1723, MRIS, Book C, 120; Squire (£50), James Moore Inventory, August 15, 1724, MRIS, Book D, 33; unnamed Indian boy, Joseph Sereven Inventory, June 20, 1725, MRIS, Book D, 175-176; and an “Indian Boy” named Robert (£67), Mortgage from Alexander French to Thomas Cooper, 8 December 1725, MRIS, Book B, 248-249. Even well into the 1730s, enslaved Native American boys were valued roughly the same. See Hadley in Moses Hawkes Inventory, 1736, Probate Records SCDAH, Book H, 30–1. For the amounts paid McNobney and Bohannon, see July 15 and 17, 1727, Ledgers of the Public Treasurer, 1725-1776, Vol. 1, 1727-1737, SCDAH, 89.

As a comparison, see the values of “Negro” boys in James Moore’s inventory: Sambo (£150), Johnny (£130), George (£130), Peter (£80), and Sammy (£80). The range of values between these boys was most likely due to age differences.
friction between South Carolina and various Native American societies. But what of market transactions comparable to the one Montjoy made for the Cherokee woman and child? It is likely that much of this illicit captive trafficking would have gone unnoticed although it was congruent with the aims of displacive colonialism. The only way colonists could procure captives in this way was to remain illegible to the colonial state that had begun funneling the flow of captives into and out of the colony. With a relatively large enslaved Native American population and a dispersed geographic footprint, many colonists would have found it easy to trade for Native American captives despite the statutory ban put in place in 1716. Since the colony had a large minority of enslaved Native Americans, the mere presence of newly acquired Native American captives would not necessarily have been a reason to suspect illegal trade. If Native American captives made it undetected into the colony, they were likely to go unnoticed. Conditioned to trading for Native American captives since the 1670s, individual South Carolinians had little reason to stop attempting to procure them after the Yamasee War, especially since Native American captives were always less expensive than their African counterparts in Charles Town. The growth of rice culture demanded more labor than the colony could provide, and although African captive imports skyrocketed after 1717, South Carolina planters were always looking for more forced labor at cheap prices. It is probable, then, that there was a continued illegal trade in Native American captives as commodities into the colony after 1716 that remains largely obscured to modern scholars.27

Probate inventories constitute one possible avenue for finding enslaved Native Americans traded to individuals after 1716. The advantage of probate inventories (over wills) is that these records give a snapshot of all the chattel property of the deceased. In this way, scholars can see a colonist’s entire enslaved population in a more comprehensive manner than in any other source. Since enslaved Native Americans were not unusual in the colony, their mere presence in the probate inventories between 1720 and 1740 is not sufficient to build an argument for an illegal trade. There is another way, though, to find the echoes of an illegal trade: unattached children in the probate inventories. Since most of the probate inventories through the 1740s continued to describe slaves as either “negro,” “Indian,” “mustee,” or “mulatto,” it is possible to find Native American children in the 1720s and 1730s who were unlikely to have been born on the same plantation because there were no other “Indians” in the record. By the 1720s it was rare to have a Native American “nuclear family” on a plantation, increasing the likelihood that Native American children were not born there. It is therefore reasonable to deduce that if they were too young to have been traded before the Yamasee War and have no discernible parentage in the probate inventory, then there is a fair chance that they were traded illegally to the colony.28

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28 More evidence pointing toward this argument is the lack of enslaved Native Americans in the extant bills of sale and mortgages, which lead me to think Native Americans did not change ownership as often as enslaved people of African descent. See Chapter 2.
There are eight such cases in the probate inventories between 1720 and 1740. There were also a few possible candidates in the *South Carolina Gazette*, first published in 1732. In January 1735, an “Indian Fellow about 17 Years of age” was advertised for sale in the paper, which would have meant he was born about 1719. There are also two instances of “Indian Boys” being brought to jail in Charles Town in 1736. In 1738, “an Indian Boy named Camp,” accused of stealing “some Linnen,” was tied up by his master “in order to make him confess.” The owner, James McLellan, ended up cutting Camp’s “throat with a Penknife” and, although a doctor tried to save him, “he died the same Evening.”

It is unlikely that every one of these 13 cases were in fact a product of illegal trade. Still, 13 cases located in the samplings of society found in the probate records and the few mentions in the newspaper are enough data to argue that it is highly probable more colonists did in fact trade with Native Americans for captives to be smuggled into the colony outside the best-documented instances like the politically explosive case with the Cherokees in 1727. In addition, there is little to signify any illegal exportation of captive Native Americans obtained in this way to other colonies, likely the result of

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30 *SCG*, January 17, 1736; July 17, 1736; and June 22, 1738.
attempts to bypass governmental controls on shipping as well as taxation.\(^{31}\) It is safe to conclude that although this trade continued well beyond 1715, there is no way of knowing its full magnitude.

Most of the captives mentioned in the *Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade* between 1717 and 1718 were purchased by traders in South Carolina’s trading factories. After colonial officials purchased these captives, they legally became chattel property for life unless manumitted. Even the possibility of extracolonial capture, analogous to the ways Native American slaves were enslaved to come into South Carolina, did not change an enslaved person’s status in the colony. Essentially and ideally, once an indigenous person had been atomized and eliminated, in the view of the displacive colonial state, they were always atomized and eliminated. For example, in 1717 John Fancourt petitioned the Commons House for redress in the matter of an enslaved Native American girl he owned at the outbreak of the Yamasee War. During the early stages of the war, Fancourt’s property was raided, and at least the one enslaved girl was captured and taken back into a belligerent native society. Then, when relations were restored between South Carolina and the unnamed captive-takers, the girl was sold to the Theophilus Hastings at the “Charikee” factory representing the colonial monopoly. As expected after 1716, the girl was then auctioned off in Charles Town and trafficked to another colony. Fancourt, finding out about her sale and exportation post hoc, demanded that the colonial government take responsibility for selling his property. The Commons

House decided to send Fancourt’s matter to the Commissioners of the Indian Trade for adjudication where they finally agreed with Fancourt: once his property, always his property. Although they could not return the enslaved girl to Fancourt, as she had legally become the property of someone else (in another colony), the Commissioners could pay him just compensation, determined to be £30 for Fancourt’s entire interest in the girl. The state would pay for the confusion and the girl would remain displaced from the continent.  

The case of Fancourt and the enslaved girl is a testament to the legal weight that came with accepting captives into the colonial system. Whether ownership transferred to a private company, individual, or even the state, once this transfer occurred, in the eyes of the British Empire it could not be undone unless there were extreme geopolitical pressures exerted by powerful indigenous confederacies. It was a conscious decision on the part of colonists who accepted Native American captives to add to the colonial labor force through their taking of ownership whether their intention was to keep the purchased person(s) or sell them to some other legal entity in the colonial world. In this way, the transfer of Native American people from Native polities to colonial polities was fundamentally political and always consistent with the logic of displacive colonialism, whether they remained enslaved in the colony or were transported elsewhere. But in other ways, the buying and selling of Native Americans, either through the colonial government or not, was economic. John Fancourt had an economic interest (on paper) in the enslaved girl, as was true in the cases of McNobney and Bohannon with the Cherokee.

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32 Friday, November 15, 1717, JCHA, 368; Monday, November 25 and Saturday, November 30, 1717, JCIT, 232, 235.
children. Even in the period between 1716 and 1721, when the South Carolina
government monopolized the trade, virtually all of the Native Americans who ended up
enslaved in the colony were understood by colonists to be capital that they could invest as
best suited their purposes. On the auction block in Charles Town, the calculus underlying
the context of each captive and the way the colony should interpret their origin were
transformed into socially dead chattel property thus eliminating the geopolitical
significance of these people and opened up more space for British displacive
colonialism.33

Close attention to the forced migrations of Native Americans around imperial
possessions illuminates the nature of Euro-American colonialism, as well as the social
and cultural histories of Atlantic slavery, each at a more empirical level. These captive
and enslaved people were significant sociocultural historical actors. Even though their
demographic significance pales in comparison with the array of African peoples who
were either already on plantations where these Native Americans ended up or were
making the Middle Passage around the same time, their histories matter. If the number of
people moving through Charles Town proffered by Alan Gallay is anywhere close to the
volume removed (somewhere between thirty and fifty thousand) there were more
enslaved people moving out of Charles Town between 1671 and 1715 than were
transported to the entirety of the English/British North American colonies over the same
period (around twenty-two thousand). The era after the Yamasee War, then, becomes the

33 For the best estimate of the numbers of Native American slaves traded through
Charles Town, see Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 299. On social death, see Orlando
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982).
point where Charles Town went from being a captive-exporting port, in some ways akin to Calabar, Whydah, or Luanda, to being a captive-importing port.\textsuperscript{34}

That these enslaved Native Americans hailed from vastly different social, cultural, and environmental contexts than most other enslaved people on these plantations meant that they possessed forms of knowledge that could be valuable to larger sociocultural groups, no matter where they ended up. In this way, their presence mattered despite their relative demographic insignificance. For the small percentage who were forced to toil on plantations in South Carolina, social and cultural disconnections were vast but probably not as complete, as they remained on the continent and likely had more opportunities to interact with free people of sociocultural groups similar to theirs. In addition, South Carolina had had a relatively large enslaved Native American population since the 1670s, and those enslaved peoples played a significant role in the creation of cultures in the lowcountry. The “creole” cultures that newly enslaved Native Americans encountered in the lowcountry was not as foreign to them as it may appear to us. Further analysis of the continued trade in Native American captives should open dialogue toward the reconsideration of the social and cultural histories of colonial South Carolina, as well as the Atlantic destinations of the victims of the trade.\textsuperscript{35}

At the conclusion of the Yamasee War, the trade in Native American captives differed only in the numbers of people forcibly removed and in the way the South Carolina colonial government attempted to control it. All three methods by which Native

\textsuperscript{34} Gallay,\textit{ The Indian Slave Trade}, 299; for estimates of the numbers of people moved across the Atlantic in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, see \textit{Voyages}.

\textsuperscript{35} Two works on South Carolina typical of this vast Atlantic historiography are Charles W. Joyner, \textit{Down by the Riverside: A South Carolina Slave Community} (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), and Morgan, \textit{Slave Counterpoint}. 
American captives came into the British colonial system before 1715—as war captives, diplomatic gifts, and exchanged commodities—continued to be deployed well after the war, and the strategies colonists implemented never changed. The elimination of the “Indigenous Other” at the time of the Yamasee War went from chaotic and liberalized to rationalized and institutionalized by the newly empowered colonial state in the aftermath of the crisis. Even when representatives of the colonial government decided it was in the best interest of the colony to channel the trade through regulations and a short-lived monopoly, market and diplomatic logics reigned. Native Americans had a history of selling their captives (or enslaved people obtained in other ways) to colonists for European goods, as well as using captives as diplomatic gifts to allies. These intercultural exchanges, along with the collusion of colonists and Native American allies in expeditionary raids on enemies for capturing prisoners of war to sell abroad, remained a vital part of the diplomatic and economic strategies of displacive colonialism in southeastern North America. To the colonists, one advantage of the Atlantic system was an insatiable appetite for forced labor that could be removed to the Caribbean, far away from contexts where these unfortunate people could cause the most trouble to colonial projects. In South Carolina, the Atlantic market for enslaved people acted as a sink, whisking away dangerous people (and ideas) with legitimate claims of sovereignty over land colonists demanded to locales where they could be better subjugated and exploited. In these new contexts, Native American captives became enslaved British colonials with influence on the history of plantation societies from the inside, not only as the more indirect influence of providing capital for investment in plantation agriculture and
enslaved Africans typical of current historiography, but also as physical cogs in the
machine of early modern British displacive colonialism.

The trade in enslaved people changed drastically between 1670 and 1740 in South
Carolina, but the violence inherent in turning people into property was a constant. In
South Carolina, the desire to create a colony based on enslaved labor remade the entire
southeast of North America. In turn, Charles Town went from being a chaotic captive-
export port during its first fifty years to being an African-captive-importing port
afterward. The desire for people to enslave drove colonists to resist some of the structures
of the early-modern colonial state until it made sense for them to do so. In this context, a
polyglot population of enslaved people toiled away in the colony for seven decades
before groups of Angolans (and probably others as well) living along the Stono River,
relative newcomers to the colony, decided they had had enough. Over the next twenty
years, a drive by the imperial metropole to control seafaring trade, the dwindling of the
supply of possible Native Americans to capture and enslave, and the success of rice
cultivation made colonists decide to reverse course and ask for the British Crown to take
over the colony to protect their shifting economic interests. When the Stono Rebellion
broke out in 1739, the response by the colonial state apparatus was swift and successfully
suppressed the importation of many more enslaved Africans for the greater part of a
decade until it made sense to colonists to seek out more slaving voyages. In essence, then,
slavery made the state in South Carolina, and thereafter the state reified slavery while
slavery helped pay for the state to function. The population of enslaved people imported
into the colony either via continental or Atlantic slaving shifted over time — in terms of
origin, ethnicity, sex, age, etc. — depending on the relationship colonists had with the
incipient displacive colonial state and the historical contingencies of slaving in different regions over time. The following chapter investigates the social picture of the enslaved that resulted in slaving to and from early South Carolina.
Chapter 4

Native Americans and Africans in South Carolina’s Enslaved Society

On February 13, 1683, Joseph Calfe, George Gourdin, and Robert Adam, each a Carolina freeholder, appraised the “goods and chattel” of John Smyth, who had recently died. Smyth was a cassique (a lesser noble in the feudal scheme of early South Carolina) and merchant who migrated to the colony in about 1675 and was a member of the early colonial elite, serving as a member of the governor’s Grand Council and as the deputy of the Lords Proprietors. John Smyth’s probate inventory, therefore, is an outlier. Most colonists would not have owned as much moveable property as Smyth commanded. His inventory shows us the upper limits of what a colonist could have accumulated. The labor force Smyth controlled hailed from three continents and numerous cultures but ended up sharing the same sociocultural milieu. When Smyth migrated to South Carolina, he brought along seven indentured servants. Among the housewares, cattle, and farm implements in his inventory taken eight years later, were sixteen people considered Smyth’s property. Three of these coerced laborers were European indentured servants; three were enslaved Africans named Sambo, Smart, and Tony; one was an African woman named Doll; one was a “Mulatto” woman named Mary, plus her four unnamed children; three others were “Indian” girls named Betty, Jenny, and Sarah; and the last was an “Indian” boy named Hercules. In colonial South Carolina, enslaved people of African
descent often toiled alongside enslaved Native Americans and indentured Europeans. In the earliest years, European indentured servants outnumbered all enslaved people.\(^1\)

As the previous section of this dissertation attests, the dynamics of the captive trades in and out of South Carolina shifted between 1670 and 1739 according to the numbers of people vulnerable enough to be enslaved, and with the colony’s relationship to Atlantic markets and to colonists themselves. The social dynamics of the enslaved population in the colony shifted accordingly. By the 1730s, peoples from West Central Africa, referred to in sources as “Angolan,” had come to dwarf the numbers of people coming into the colony at any previous time. But coerced migration into the colony had an earlier history. Even though West Central Africans came to dominate the ethnic background of people historian Stephanie Smallwood dubbed “saltwater slaves”—people who had survived the dislocation and horror of the Middle Passage—captives ending up enslaved in South Carolina entered plantations where peoples of earlier forced migrations were already living, laboring, and dying. Most enslaved West African peoples traded to colonists probably did not leave the colony. Instead, some survived to help produce new generations of enslaved peoples for colonists to exploit. Insights on colonial Native American slaving raise further questions of social change. Foundational works on the enslaved society in South Carolina by scholars such as Peter Wood and Philip Morgan

asked different questions and were not as concerned with the indigenous American origins of this society of enslaved peoples. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the enslaved population of the colony between its founding and the drop-off in the trans-Atlantic captive trade. In order to think more empirically and historically about slave society and culture, we must first know more about the social contours of the enslaved over time.\(^2\)

Even though the literature on slave society in South Carolina concentrates on the role West Central Africans—and in the case of rice culture, peoples from the Gambia region—played in the history of South Carolina, I argue in this chapter that when slavers began shipping large numbers of “Angolans” to the colony in the 1730s, these peoples’ final point of disembarkation was into a society where enslaved people already had worked out ways to cope with their conditions and reconstruct a social life. There was already a relatively large population of enslaved peoples living in South Carolina, a significant number of whom no doubt could trace their personal histories back to an earlier time in the colony. Enslaved Native Americans played an important and sustained role in the social development of a creole society in South Carolina, and, in particular, Native American women were central to social production and reproduction over the first seventy years of the colony. West Central Africans were important to this society and

culture going forward, but they must have been disoriented and traumatized people when they arrived in the lowcountry, where thousands of enslaved people were already surviving such brutal conditions. This chapter outlines the social history of enslaved peoples in South Carolina, builds upon the histories of the captive trades to the colony, and allows for the reconsideration of the place of enslaved Native Americans in South Carolina slave society.3

In the first decade of the colony (1670–1680), records of bound laborers are scarce. Enslaved people of West-African descent from the Caribbean arrived alongside their captors in 1670, but evidence of their numbers is at best impressionistic. There were others, like Henry Brayne, captain of the first ship to colonize the Ashley River, aptly named Carolina, who brought enslaved people and servants very early. After landing the original colonists, Brayne took the Carolina to Virginia to retrieve “one lusty negro man 3. cristian servants and an oversear,” along with his wife. Evidence of the contours of the people on the ground in the first decade is best viewed through one source: land warrants. Of 184 enslaved or indentured people listed in surviving records, 170 are in land warrants.4


4 Henry Brayne to Lord Ashley, Barbados, Nov. 9, 1670, Shaftesbury, 214–217; Warrants; and CSCDEP.
Warrants were the first step colonists took toward achieving a legal claim to a physical space in colonial courts. When a European arrived in Charles Town, they applied for a warrant for land. The amount granted by colonial administrators varied according to how large the colonist’s household was, which included the number of their dependents. It was important for colonists applying for land to count everyone they had in their household. Enslaved people and European servants show up in these records because they equated a larger land claim for the head of the household. Colonists applied for these warrants and then set out to stake a claim somewhere within the colonists’ imagined bounds of the colony. In the early years, the actual acreages granted mattered little in practical terms because there was so much space available with frontage on navigable waterways and because giant plantation acreages would take many years’ worth of coerced labor to construct. But the warrants were the first part of the mechanism by which the Lords Proprietor began turning indigenous lands into private property.\footnote{For the early land-acquisition system in the colony, see Robert Ackerman, \textit{South Carolina Colonial Land Policies} (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1977), 23–25.}

During the 1670s, there are 147 people listed as “Servants” and 37 listed as “Negros” in the land warrants. Some of the servants were family members of heads of household (for example, nieces and nephews), but most of them were not related. There were 38 colonists in the 1670s who brought servants into the colony and applied for land warrants. Of those, seven brought only enslaved African people, and another seven brought both enslaved people and servants. A full 80% of all bound labor was European. Out of 45 colonists who applied for warrants and claimed bound laborers, only 14 included enslaved “Negroes.” The colonists bringing in a coerced labor force of both
European and African peoples were among the elite, such as Nathaniel Sayle (governor), Joseph West (lieutenant governor), and Lady Margaret Yeamans (wife of John Yeamans, a major Barbadian planter and early governor of South Carolina). In short, the bound population in the early colony was overwhelmingly made up of European servants.\(^6\)

While bound Europeans outnumbered enslaved African, of equal or greater import may have been the sexual imbalance of bound laborers. Servants were overwhelmingly male, almost 6.5 to 1, while enslaved Africans were close to 3 to 1 male. This lack of women among the bound Europeans and enslaved Africans may have been a choice of early heads of household to bring men to the new colonial venture before women. The colonists with the most options were people who owned relatively large numbers of enslaved people in other colonies, such as Margaret Yeamans, who took out grants based on eight enslaved Africans, six of whom were male, and one indentured servant. In fact, the majority of the enslaved women who were represented during the 1670s came with the more elite colonists, who had also brought a larger number of men than women. Colonists who brought fewer than 5 enslaved and indentured people in the aggregate accounted for 51 bound laborers with a sex ratio of 364. This sexual imbalance in enslaved and indentured peoples coming to South Carolina via the Atlantic would

\(^{6}\) **Warrants.** Much of this chapter is based on a database I constructed from primary source records on enslaved people in the colony, the Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples (CSCDEP). For more information on my methods and sources for this database, see Appendix I.

The mean number of servants for each claimant (with servants) was 3.75, while the mean number of enslaved people was 2.64. Among the seven colonists who claimed both enslaved Africans and European servants, the averages were 2.57 servants and enslaved people.
continue for decades beyond initial colonization. Bound women were a luxury of richer colonists.\footnote{CSCDEP.}

Surviving records from the 1680s list twice as many bound people as those from the 1670s. More colonists owned indentured servants than enslaved peoples, although there were more enslaved peoples than indentured servants in the total numbers of each group. Whereas in the records from the 1670s only 20% of the bound people (servants included) were “Negro,” in the 1680s, this number more than doubled to 41%. Most of the enslaved Africans in the 1680s (58%) were simply listed as “Negros” and without any indication whether they were men, women, or children. The sex ratio of enslaved Africans remained strongly skewed towards men and boys though the relative number of women and girls had increased from 27% in the 1670s to 39% in the 1680s. Although there were higher numbers of African women in the colony, they were still far outnumbered by men, which slowed the rates of natural increase among the enslaved population. This shift in the sex ratio of enslaved people was likely a strategic choice by some colonists to bring more women to South Carolina after the earliest work of colonization had passed.\footnote{CSCDEP. There were 231 European servants and among enslaved people, there were 43 labelled “Indian,” 197 labelled “Negro,” and one “Mulatto,” for a total of 241 people. Six other enslaved people had no racial marker identified. The total number of African peoples went from 37 in the 1670s to 197 in the 1680s.}

Sex ratios are calculated to be the number of men per 100 women. Among demographers, a sex ratio at birth should be somewhere about 105–106 male infants to 100 female and lowering to around 101–102 in adulthood. The sex ratio numbers I calculated in different ways through this chapter are far outside any normal human populations, even those decimated by warfare.

By “bound,” I mean either European indentured servants or enslaved peoples from Africa or the Americas.
Although the overall number of bound laborers in the records increased from the previous decade by 2.5 times, sources for the 1680s retain a significant level of opacity when we try to understand social history on the ground. The 1680s also is when we find the first evidence of enslaved Native Americans being owned in the colony, as opposed to the earlier evidence of Native American slaving and trading but not of colonists owning and enslaving Native Americans. In the 1680s, there are 43 enslaved Native Americans in the records for South Carolina. This number is higher than it would otherwise be, though, because 35 out of the 43 Native Americans showed up in applications for shipping clearances filed in 1681. These unfortunate captives were probably shipped to other colonies and enslaved. Most of them were described as being Westo or Winyaw people, but a few were also called “Appenock,” “Seraguee,” “Chattooe,” and “Yanock.” The sex and age of captives for shipment are only available for six of them: three boys and three girls. With no adults listed, these indigenous people fit our broader understanding of how the Native American captive trade worked. The remaining eight enslaved Native Americans in the records tell a similar story.9

9 Each of these shipping clearances can be found in Bates and Leland, eds., Proprietary Records of South Carolina, vol. 1, 46–51. William Haslip, shipping clearance for the Tryall, May 31, 1681; John Holland, shipping clearance for the John & Martha, October 1, 1681; Robinson Solomon, shipping clearances for the Hopewell, October 14 and 15, 1681; John Harlow, shipping clearance for the Agreement, October 14, 1681; Magnis Pople, shipping clearances for the Returne, October 14 and 20, 1681.

The Lords Proprietor set about to regulate trading between colonists and Native Americans in 1680, as well as create checks and balances on the exportation of Native American captives who were from friendly polities to the colony. These shipping clearances were an obvious attempt at making the origins of captives knowable to colonial administrators. These records prove the Proprietors’ attempts were short lived. See Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 57–65.
There is a suspicious lack of enslaved Native Americans in records from the 1680s. Four of the eight enslaved Native Americans in surviving South Carolina records were in John Smyth’s 1683 probate inventory: three girls (Betty, Giny, Sarah) and one boy (Hercules). Also in 1683, William Jackson willed two enslaved Native Americans to Milleson Jackson, along with two unspecific indentured servants. Of the enslaved Native Americans, one was a boy and the other a man named Dan. The final two enslaved Native Americans in the record both came from 1688. That year, Thomas Gibbes willed to Rebecca Gibbes an unnamed Native American girl along with an African man named Peter, and Henry Huse’s (Hughes) probate inventory listed a Native American boy named Cubbitt. Even though there certainly were more Native American captives coming into the colony through slaving in southeastern North America, in the 1680s there are no other records of specific enslaved Native Americans located in the colony.¹⁰

During the 1680s, South Carolina colonists with bound laborers seem to have specialized in controlling people of one group or another. There are a total of 20 inventories and wills containing specifically delineated enslaved and indentured peoples. In these, there was only one person who has both a will and inventory in the records: Sarah Tothill, Jr., who died in 1684. In all, there were 76 people listed in the inventories and wills (see Table 4.1). There were probably more enslaved Africans in the colony than European indentured servants by this time. Although there were eight enslaved Native Americans and the male/female split was 4/4, seven of the eight were children, which we should expect. The one Native American adult listed was a man named Dan who was in

the will of William Jackson, alongside an enslaved Native American boy and two
European servants. Probate inventories show colonists generally stuck to one type of
bound labor, with John Smyth’s large, diverse inventory being an outlier. Out of the
eleven inventories from the 1680s, only Smyth’s shows any kind of diversity among
ethno-cultural delineators placed upon bound laborers (Table 4.2). If these data are any
indication, South Carolina colonists had either not come to the conclusion that a
diversified workforce was to their benefit, or they were mostly unable to dictate what
peoples would make up their plantation workforces, whether because of a lack of capital
or the shifting intersections between when colonists were looking to purchase laborers
and the ebbs and flows of the various trades in captive peoples over time.\footnote{CSCDEP. I am using all available data to generalize about the larger population
of the colony, although the surviving documents are neither comprehensive nor are they
scientific in their sampling. For more, see Appendix I.}

My method of accounting for blind spots in the records, such as the lack of
enslaved Native Americans and the counterintuitive demographic strength of indentured
servants, is to use probate inventories and wills as a crude indicator of the overall
population. Inventories can serve as a counter dataset – in this case, a subset of my larger
data – for comparative purposes. Using this method, I can compare the social dynamics
on display in inventories with those in my full database, as well as those in the database
without including the inventories to see how well they map onto each other.

The types of bound laborers colonists brought to the colony could also have been
due to the colonist’s origin, with people coming from the British Isles more likely to
bring servants and those coming from the Caribbean more likely to bring enslaved
people, but more work needs to be done to argue this hypothesis.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Numbers of People in Wills and Inventories from the 1680s}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Race & Female & Male & \# w/o sex & Total \\
\hline
European & 3 & 7 & 2 & 12 \\
Native American & 4 & 4 & 0 & 8 \\
“Mulatto” & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
African & 14 & 24 & 11 & 52 \\
\# w/o Race & 0 & 1 & 5 & 6 \\
Total & 22 & 36 & 18 & 76 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
Table 4.2: Probate Inventories from the 1680s by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>“Negro”</th>
<th>“Indian”</th>
<th>“Mulatto”</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Folwell, 1680</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Richard Banks, 1681</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Horton, 1682</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Smyth, 1683</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Collins, 1683</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Tothill, Jr., 1684</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret Simpson, 1684</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Van Aersien, 1687</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Williamson, 1688</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Huse, 1688</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Codner, 1688</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colonists who brought enslaved people from other colonial plantation settings had a more concentrated population of enslaved Africans than of either Native Americans or European servants. The example of John Yeamans illustrates this point. Yeamans was a royalist who migrated to Barbados in 1650. By the 1660s, he was a successful planter and colonel in the militia. When he migrated to Carolina in 1671, he brought eight enslaved Africans and one European servant with him. Other well-off colonists followed a similar trajectory with respect to bound laborers. These data prove the partitioning between ethno-cultural identifier and ownership. There were 29 colonists in the records from the 1680s noted as owning enslaved Africans with bound laborers from no other group. In this group of people, there were 142 total enslaved African peoples out of 197 (making

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12 The first governor, Nathaniel Sayle, claimed four enslaved Africans for land warrants in 1672. John Lawson claimed ten African peoples in 1683 land warrants; Christopher Kelly claimed fifteen in 1685; Thomas Bolton claimed six in 1686. See Warrants.
up 72% of the total) from the decade in all records. Many more colonists owned only either enslaved Africans or European servants than a number of each.  

More colonists in the 1680s had only European indentured servants (43) than only enslaved Africans (29). Among colonists with servants, the average number they claimed was 4.30 people. Most had fewer than 5 servants. Owners of only servants’ contracts accounted for (89%) of the total servants. This means that although 72% of enslaved Africans were owned by colonists with only Africans, 89% of European servants were owned by colonists with only European servants. The overwhelming number of African peoples and indentured servants (81%) were owned by colonists who only claimed ownership of one group or the other. This partitioning of the early labor force may have owed much to whatever coerced labor was available when new colonists first set up their operations if they had the capital to invest in labor.  

An exception to the general separation between owning enslaved Africans and Native Americans, John Smyth, provides a clue to what colonists with means but not a large enslaved population may have wanted to do. With relatively good access to capital, Smyth organized a diversified plantation labor force originating in different parts of Africa, North America, and Europe. Smyth’s diverse enslaved population probably means he bought laborers on at least a few occasions. Since the origins of peoples for sale in Charles Town shifted back and forth, Smyth probably had little say in where his enslaved and indentured laborers came from but was desperate enough to buy them  

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13 Agnes Leland Baldwin, *First Settlers of South Carolina, 1670–1680* (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1969).  

14 CSCDEP.
anyway. As a member of the colonial elite, Smyth (and others like him) may very well have accidently showed other colonists one successful method for structuring a plantation workforce although others could not immediately follow a similar path. It took time for colonists to follow suit.\textsuperscript{15}

Records from the 1690s were similar to those from the previous twenty years. There were still very few mentions of bound laborers compared with our best estimates of the population in the colony. There are a total of 288 people in extant sources listed as enslaved or indentured. The greatest change from the previous decade was a drastic decrease in the number of indentured servants (see Table 4.3). In the 1690s, I could find only 14 servants, with 13 coming from land warrants and the other one being an indenture from 1698 where James Deall contracted himself to Thomas Foster. This precipitous drop off in the number of servants claimed in land warrants probably results from fewer colonists of means migrating by the 1690s. South Carolina was a gamble many migrants were not as willing to take, likely because no one had yet found a successful way to produce valuable export commodities. It was also a dangerous proposition to property holders because there were few legal protections for property in the colony. New colonists were therefore arriving with drastically fewer servants because a larger proportion of them were poorer and therefore more desperate and willing to attempt making their fortune in a place with cheap land and many possible, yet unproven, paths to economic success.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Unlike indentured servants, the number of enslaved Africans rose slightly from 197 in the 1680s to 230 in the 1690s. Fewer enslaved Africans were also claimed in land warrants. The number of enslaved Native Americans in the sources remained virtually the same. If applications for shipping clearances are taken out of the equation, there were eight enslaved Native Americans in the records from the 1680s. In the 1690s, there were ten, and two of those Native Americans were listed in a land warrant for Joshua Snell. Snell applied for lands in 1694 after migrating to the colony. These two unnamed Native Americans are the only two to ever show up in the records of land warrants. Snell was therefore bringing enslaved Native Americans with him when he migrated to South Carolina. If the two Native Americans in Snell’s land warrant are taken out of the total, there were the same number of enslaved Native Americans as the previous decade.  

\[17\]  

Another demographic continuity displayed in documentary evidence during the 1690s is the disparity in the sex ratio, particularly for enslaved Africans. In records where sex was denoted, the imbalance in the African population remained the same as the previous decade. There were still 1.56 male Africans for every female Africans. Even if the data is broken down by imprecise age descriptors—where I can denote it as such—there were 56 African men and 38 women (sex ratio of 147). There were still many more enslaved male than female Africans on the ground in South Carolina through 1700.\textsuperscript{18}

A trend in the bound labor population that began to shift during the 1690s was the separation between ownership of different ethno-cultural categories by individual owners. Between increased pirate activity in North American ports and more Native American captives coming into the colony, Europeans may have had somewhat better access to different peoples they could enslave. Most colonists owning indentured and/or enslaved peoples are in the records as only owning Africans (57 out of a total of 69, or 83%). But unlike the 1680s, during the 1690s, colonists owning indentured servants or enslaved Native Americans were much more likely to possess a more diverse bound labor population. There are 12 colonists in the records owning European servants or enslaved Native Americans. There were two colonists who only owned servants, Anthony Boreau

\textsuperscript{18} CSCDEP.
and Thomas Forster, and they each owned one servant. There were only three colonists who had servants and enslaved people.¹⁹

There is more evidence of colonists owning a more diverse bound population in the 1690s than previously. The wills of Holland Axtell and John Godfrey certainly did not describe the entire bound labor force subjugated by each man. Godfrey and Axtell were among the richest and most important men in the colony. It is therefore probable that when Holland Axtell listed an African man named Guy and a Native American boy named Nero in his 1692 will, he was giving specific favorite enslaved people working as domestics or skilled laborers. John Godfrey listed two enslaved African men, Samson and Sambo, along with a Native American boy named Ishmael in his 1690 will for the same reason. Although we do not know the full makeup of their bound labor population, Axtell and Godfrey were in possession of a more diverse enslaved population at their deaths than found in the great majority of earlier records.²⁰

The two final colonists with records proving they owned enslaved Africans and Native Americans, Thomas Greatbatch and Francis Turgis, offer a more comprehensive view in their probate inventories. Thomas Greatbatch (or Greatbeech) died in early 1695. In his inventory, Greatbatch possessed four enslaved people. There were two “Negro” men, one “Negro” woman, and one Native American boy. First migrating to South

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Carolina from Bermuda in 1678, Greatbatch had by the time of his death gone from having no indented or enslaved laborers in his first land warrant, to owning these four people in 1694. Greatbatch had therefore been able to slowly accumulate enough capital to take advantage of the various captive trades coming in and out of the colony and at his death controlled a group of enslaved people analogous to the larger movements of people in and out of the colony. The inventory of Francis Turgis, from 1697, shows a colonist who had accumulated 14 enslaved people since migrating to the colony in 1684. The appraisers were vague with their descriptions of the enslaved people Turgis owned, but there were seven unnamed African people, one African man named Sackard, one listed as a Native American, and five merely labeled children. Either Francis Turgis had purchased several children from some of the numerous slavers coming into the colony, or his enslaved women were having children on his plantation. Either way, there was at least one enslaved Native American living among his other enslaved African peoples. While the numbers of colonists owning enslaved peoples from North America was increasing, the general separation between owners of enslaved Native Americans and Africans persisted. The examples of Greatbatch and Turgis show how for colonists on the make in early South Carolina, taking advantage of the different captive trades and being willing to purchase both Native Americans and African people was a strategy for social mobility.\(^{21}\)

Following the turn of the eighteenth century, the longstanding separation between owning enslaved Native Americans and Africans began to shift. Although there are no probate inventories with enslaved people between 1700 and 1709, the outlines of a move toward a more diverse enslaved population by more colonists during this decade can nevertheless be traced. Out of the 35 owners of enslaved people, 11 owned Native Americans. 31% of colonists in extant records owned enslaved Native Americans during the 1700s, whereas it had been much lower at 14% in the 1690s and 7% in the 1680s. This rise is reasonable considering that during the 1700s, South Carolina reached the apex of the Native American captive trade through the colony, especially with the raids on the Spanish mission provinces of Guale, Mocama, and Apalachee, and the opening of trading relations with Chickasaws.22

A census relayed by South Carolina’s governor to the Lords Proprietor in September 1708 outlined the overall population of the colony. Governor Nathaniel Johnson reported that there were 9,500 total inhabitants in the colony. Of these, 1,360 were “freemen,” 900 “free women,” 60 “white servant men,” 60 “white servant women,” and 1,700 “white free children.” This means that out of the 9,500 total people in the colony, 3,960 were free European colonists and there were 120 indentured servants. The rest of the population, 5,540 people, were enslaved and described by Governor Johnson as either “Negro” or “Indian.” Of the peoples of African origin, there were 1,800 men, 1,100 women, and 1,200 children. Native Americans made up a minority—albeit a

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and Providence Saltus, October 18, 1697, Clara A. Langley, *South Carolina Deed Abstracts, 1719-1772* (Easley, S.C: Southern Historical Press, 1983) vol. 1, 120.

22 CSCDEP.
significant one—of the enslaved population, with 500 “Indian men,” 600 “Indian women,” and 300 “Indian children slaves.” Johnson’s numbers were obviously estimates, but he did describe a colony with a diverse enslaved population. In this report, people of African descent made up 74.5% of the total number of enslaved people, with Native Americans making up 25.5%. The Lords Proprietor, always disgruntled about the liberalized and chaotic way colonists went about trading with Native Americans for captives and skins, likely were not pleased with the high numbers of enslaved Native Americans in the colony.23

The 1708 census is also of note for analyses that can be inferred from it. These numbers are the basis for Peter Wood’s argument about when South Carolina became a “black majority” colony. To Wood, “the exact moment at which black inhabitants exceeded white appears to have fallen around 1708.” But in 1708 there already was a clear majority of enslaved people in the colony. An appropriate term for the first decade of the eighteenth century should be that South Carolina had developed into a colony with an “enslaved majority,” which happened a few years earlier than Wood argues. 1708 as a point in time when enslaved people overtook free people in the colony loses its narrative power if enslaved Native Americans are added to the numbers. In fact, enslaved Native Americans made up 15% of the entire population of the colony, and although influxes of Native American slaving victims to Charles Town was probably more sporadic after 1708, there were certainly more Native American captives coming into Charles Town than African captives before the Yamasee War. It was not until 1717

23 Governor and Council to the Proprietors, September 17, 1708, BPRO, vol. 5, 203–6; CSCDEP.
that slaving captives directly from Africa took off, so there is no reason to think the rate of Africans coming into the colony bypassed the numbers of Native Americans whom colonists enslaved and kept in South Carolina. Wood’s point works over the early history of the colony, but it seems that he was probably off by about a decade as to when enslaved Africans became the numerical majority of the colony. Enslaved Native Americans were a quarter of the total enslaved population in the 1700s, but their greatest social significance may have come when sex is also taken into account.\(^{24}\)

The imbalance between sexes in the enslaved population of South Carolina continued through the 1700s, even during the height of the Native American slaving to the colony. However, the more balanced numbers of Native American men and women in the census, 500 and 600, respectively, means one of three things. First, typical early-colonial Native American slaving cultures had changed. Slavers were no longer, or at least to a lesser degree, favoring women and children to the extent they had during the previous century. There were far more enslaved Native American men in the colony than I would expect with a total of 600 women. This may have been partially due to the large influx of indiscriminately captured Native peoples who had been living in the Spanish missions earlier in the decade. Secondly, the number of enslaved Native American men may be explained by them being captured when they were children and then growing up under the horrors of early-colonial chattel slavery. There were more “Indian boys” in the records before 1709 than men and women combined. The third, and most likely, scenario was a combination of the first two, with patterns of the sex of Native American captives

\(^{24}\) *Ibid.* I am referring here to Peter Woods important monograph, *Black Majority*, 143. I find Wood’s interpretation here odd because he clearly understood that enslaved Native Americans were a significant percentage of the enslaved population in the colony, but nevertheless situated his argument with white/black as the population equation.
shifting more toward a balance as more southeastern Native polities became embroiled in slaving to South Carolina, but also boys enslaved in the colony before 1708 showing up as adult men in the census. There were more enslaved Native American men in the colony than simply studying the cultures and machinations of the captive trade in the southeast would suggest.25

Even though the sex ratio in the 1708 census was skewed toward women with respect to enslaved Native Americans (83.3), once enslaved Africans are added back to the picture, it looks very different. Not only were adult enslaved African women still outnumbered by men (1,100 to 1,800), but the disparity was actually higher than my data for previous decades (See Table 4.5). Native Americans were therefore a minority in the enslaved population of the colony, but their significance, particularly the social and demographic significance of women, is all the more apparent when their numbers are placed in the context of the entire enslaved population. Native Americans made up 25.5% of enslaved people in the 1708 census, but the percentage of enslaved women who were Native American was just over a third, or 35.3%. The structures of slaving to the colony from both Africa (mostly via the Caribbean or pirates) and North America had in essence made Native American women more demographically significant in this context than the numbers alone imply.26

25 Governor and Council to the Proprietors, September 17, 1708, BPRO, vol. 5, 203–6; Wood, Black Majority, 142–150.

26 Governor and Council to the Proprietors, September 17, 1708, BPRO, vol. 5, 203–6; CSCDEP.
Table 4.5: Sex Ratios for Enslaved Africans in South Carolina by Decade, 1670–1709

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>1670</th>
<th>1680</th>
<th>1690</th>
<th>1700</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio (Men per Hundred Women)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sex ratios are much more difficult to ascertain with children in this dataset. In the 1708 census, children made up 27% of all enslaved people, but neither their ages nor sexes were recorded. Children made up 29.3% of the enslaved African population and 21.4% of enslaved Native Americans. A sex ratio of near equilibrium (100) makes sense in the context of 1700s South Carolina, since children were so often the victims of slavers and any children born in the colony would have been equally likely to be designated male or female. Finally, if I take this sex ratio (105) and apply it to the census data for

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27 For the 1670, 1680, and 1690 numbers, I am using CSCDEP. For the 1700 number, I am using the census because the other data are so spotty. If I were to use the database, the sex ratio would come out to 141, or a roughly similar but somewhat smaller number, and still greatly skewed toward men. Ibid.

The population of South Carolina, 1708, according to the Governor’s Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race and status</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free European</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>3960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indentured Servant</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3270</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
children, I can infer rough estimates of the entire enslaved population of children according to race and sex (Table 4.6).²⁸

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>769</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next logical analysis to consider is ownership of enslaved peoples (as there were no servants in the records from the 1700s) at the intersections of race, sex, and rough age descriptions. The differing intersectional breakdown in ownership of enslaved people is nonetheless useful in considering the ways previously mentioned groups were split up at the plantation (or, at least single owner) level. Analyzed this way, women and girls were more spread out than their demographic strength suggests. 65% of all known owners of enslaved people between 1700 and 1709 owned at least one female enslaved person, although women and girls only made up 44% of the enslaved population. This means that colonists were interested in owning some enslaved women even though their numbers were low compared to men and boys. 24% of the total number of colonists owned at least one female enslaved Native American. 44% of the total number of colonists owned at least one female enslaved African, while 12% owned females without a discernible racial descriptor. 9% owned at least one enslaved female African and one enslaved female Native American. In sum, female enslaved people made up a minority of the enslaved population, but were people that colonists wanted to own, but they either did

not have the ability to control as many women and girls as they would have liked, or they preferred to keep their female (dual) laboring population in the minority compared to males. A look at ownership of enslaved men and boys will make this more apparent.²⁹

Between 1700 and 1709, 76% of all owners of enslaved peoples controlled at least one male enslaved person, compared with 65% for female enslaved people. Of the total number of enslaved people in the colony, men and boys made up 56%.³⁰ The average number of enslaved men per owner was 2.92, while for women the average number was 2.77. The will of James Moore (1703) contains the largest number of enslaved people in the records from the decade, but there were six colonists with more than ten enslaved people as well.³¹ But most of the records only offer glimpses into the people each colonist owned. The median number of enslaved men and boys owned by each colonist was one, and two for women and girls. Almost all of these records showing a colonist owning only one enslaved person during the decade are of the type prone to only mentioning one

²⁹ CSCDEP; Morgan, Laboring Women. There were only 34 colonists in all records from the first decade in the eighteenth century I could cull ownership of enslaved peoples from, which is admittedly a small number considering there were 1,360 free Euro-American men in the 1708 census.

³⁰ Using the numbers from the 1708 census and my estimates in Table 4.6.


There were 6 colonists with records of 10 or more enslaved people: George Dearsley, (20 people in a will); Joseph Croskeys (11 people in a will and an estate settlement), Robert Daniel (15 people he offered as gifts), John Wright (10 people from a civil suit), and James Bullock (12 people in a mortgage without any sex descriptors). See Dearsley Will, June 20, 1700, WPA, vol. 54, 69–70; Croskeys Will, December 2, 1700, WPA vol. 52, 40–41; Croskeys Settlement of Will, July 17, 1704, WPA vol. 54; Daniel Gift to Robert Daniel, October 17, 1709, MRPS, 1709–1725, SCDAH, S213001, 42-3; and Wright v. William Reynolds, March 13, 1705, Court of Common Pleas Judgment Rolls, 1705–1707, SCDAH, Box 1C, No. 693.
enslaved person. Bills of sale, mortgages, and wills often mention only domestic enslaved people, even though there were obviously others not listed—so they are certainly incomplete at the level of the individual colonist. But in the aggregate, I think they serve as a useful sample.32

First, in a lawsuit filed in the Court of Common Pleas on March 13, 1704, John Wright accused William Reynolds of breach of contract. Wright claimed he had hired Reynolds as overseer of his plantation near Goose Creek for a term of one year. Reynolds, in turn, was to be paid £25 by Wright for his services. Wright wanted Reynolds to use the labor of twelve enslaved people to grow three acres of rice for his cattle, but instead Reynolds grew another (illegible, unfortunately) crop and then had the enslaved people make “tarr” instead. Wright was suing Reynolds for £50 for both wages and loss in productivity due to Reynolds’s misuse of his enslaved people, which were listed in the judgment roll. These people consisted of four “Negro” men, named Toney, Mingo, Will, and Gabriel; three “Negro” women, two of whom were named Moll and another Judy; two “Negro Guys 12 years or upwards” (usually called “boys”); one Native American man; and one “East Indian” man named India. This workforce, probably only a portion of Wright’s total population of enslaved people (as he was a major dealer in Native American captives) varied in sex, age, and ethno-cultural background. They hailed from at least two, and probably three, continents.33

32 CSCDEP.

33 Wright v. Williams. It appears as if the enslaved man named “India” came from India, but he could also have been from virtually anywhere between Madagascar and India along the Indian Ocean littoral. As discussed in Chapter 1, there were reports of pirates coming to Charles Towne after plundering the Mughals in the late-seventeenth century, so he could have been a victim of these pirates’ slaving.
True to the larger trends in the makeup of the enslaved population, if skewed more heavily toward males, the people Wright ordered to work under William Reynolds consisted of a minority of women (28%) and a minority of Native Americans (9%). In this grouping, the women were each of African descent, along with most of the men. John Wright, as a major slaver, probably possessed more enslaved people than were discussed in this 1704 lawsuit. A decade later, in 1714, Wright was desperate for liquidity in his capital and took out two mortgages with Charles Town merchants and slavers Samuel Wragg, Jacob Satur, and Joseph Wragg. These mortgages were dated the same day in June 1714, and encompassed a total of 44 enslaved people. Of these people, there were 15 Native American women, three Native American men, 17 African men, eight African women, and one “Mulatto” man. It is telling that Wright was offered loans through a mortgage and not simply book debt in 1714. A year later Wright was among the emissaries sent to Pocotaligo, an important Yamasee town, attempting to avert a war. One account claimed that while Thomas Nairne was conciliatory in his tone, Wright “said that the white men would come and [fetch] [illegible] the Yamasees in one night, and they would hang four of their head men and take all the rest of them as Slaves.” Yamasees tortured and murdered most of the emissaries, except two who escaped, thus providing the act signaling the beginning of the Yamasee War. Wright was no doubt worried about his creditors when he went to Pocotaligo and threatened the already-enraged Yamasees.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., Wright’s two mortgages to Samuel Wragg, Jacob Satur, and Joseph Wragg, and are each dated June 15, 1714, in WPA vol. 56, 42–47. Also see Gallay, \textit{Indian Slave Trade}, 328; Michelle LeMaster, \textit{Brothers Born of One Mother: British-Native American Relations in the Colonial Southeast} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 1; William L. Ramsey, \textit{The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South} (University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 227–228.
Wright’s later dealings and credit problems are not intended as a post hoc argument for his ownership of more enslaved people than listed in his 1704 lawsuit, but instead are meant to show that trading with Native peoples could be a lucrative business, as long as the trader understood how to manage debt and the trader’s position as a debt/credit middleman between merchants and Native peoples. Wright also shows in these two episodes that a man who came to the colony with nothing could end up a large slaveholder. He first migrated to South Carolina in October 1684 as a servant indentured to Robert Hull. For Wright, an enslaved workforce made up of Native Americans, West Africans, and at least one person from either East Africa or South Asia, was a strategy he employed by the early eighteenth century and continued to use even as the number of enslaved people he owned grew up until his execution in 1715. It is likely, though, that even for an owner of a large number of enslaved people, the people listed as collateral are somewhat of an anomaly. There were slightly more women than men. Wright’s activities as a slaver gave him greater access to women and girls than most colonists had, and he took advantage of it. Out of the 23 women and girls females listed in the mortgage, 15 were Native American. At the same time, his access to enslaved African peoples would

Wright’s mortgage means the Wraggs and Satur found him a credit risk and collateral was the only way they would forward him money. Wright’s problems were likely due to taking out loans with merchants for goods to trade to Native peoples for captives and skins and then trading these goods to Native peoples on credit, only to have these Native trading partners not be able to pay back the advances. This was a common problem for colonial traders dealing with Native American clientele.

Nairne left no probate inventory from 1715, but when his widow, Elizabeth, died in 1722, she possessed nine enslaved African men, three (presumably) African women, two Native American men, four Native American women, and seven enslaved children who had no further description. Nairne’s enslaved laborers were therefore of a very similar makeup to those of Wright, even if he controlled fewer people in total. See inventory of Elizabeth Nairne, November 29, 1722, MRIS Vol. C, SCDAH, S213002, 20–1.
have been similar to other colonists and the ratio of male to female Africans reflected the market in Charles Town, with 17 men to 4 women and 4 girls. In this way, Wright was able to use the structures of the captive trades to South Carolina such that he owned people who, as a group, had a more balanced sex ratio than the colony, in part because he could more easily draw on different sources.  

There are many more records from the 1710s than any previous decade, a trend that continues through the rest of this study. Between 1710 and 1719, there are 114 enslaved Native American peoples, 510 African-descended peoples, three people labeled as “Mulatto” (compared with two in the previous forty years), two people described as “East Indian,” the first record of anyone called a “Mustee” in the colony, nine indentured servants, and 120 with no identifiable ethno-cultural descriptor. In effect, there were slightly more than eight times as many enslaved Native Americans and 2½ times as many Africans in the records as the previous decade, although the overall enslaved population of the colony certainly did not increase by numbers anywhere close to this rate.  

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35 For Wright’s status as a servant, see Robert Hull, November 25, 1685, Warrants, 181–2; the mortgages are in Ibid.

At the time of his death, Wright also owed Robert Nesbit, another Charles Town merchant, the enormous sum of £786 6s 8d, which Nesbit finally wrote off as “bad debets taken out of the Company Books” on May 20, 1720. See Cash Book of Robert Nisbet, Charles Town Merchant, 1720-1723, GD237/1/150, NAS.

36 The enslaved “East Indian” people could very well have been the same person, as there are two lawsuits where Rebecca Flavell sued over breach of contract about an enslaved “East Indian” man, each against different defendants. Rebecca Flavell v. John Sauseer, December 31, 1717, Court of Common Pleas Judgment Rolls, 1719, SCDAH, Box 16A, No. 162A; and Flavell v. John Kinaird, 1719, Court of Common Pleas Judgment Rolls, 1719, SCDAH, Box 5A, No. 109. CSCDEP. I think one reason for this large increase in the number of records was the new efforts of colonists to better secure contracts. See Chapter 2.

There are 759 enslaved (or indentured) people listed in records from the 1710s, compared to 149 from the previous decade. CSCDEP.
In addition to the drastic increase in the numbers of enslaved (and indentured) people represented compared with the previous decade, in the 1710s there were also many more colonists in the records as owning enslaved people. There were also 18 colonists in possession of ten or more enslaved people, a significant increase from the previous decade. Of the entire number of colonists in my 1710s dataset, 15% show up as controlling ten or more enslaved people, and none had any of the few indentured servants listed. Between 1700 and 1709, the average number of people held by colonists with more than ten enslaved people was 13.8, while between 1710 and 1719, the average jumped to 24.6, or almost double. The average for the 1710s rose by so much because there were many colonists in the records owning more than 20 enslaved people, as well as four colonists with enormous numbers of enslaved people: Peter LeSlade (36), John Wright (44), John Whitmarsh (57), and David Davis (98). Even though the average rose significantly, the median (or, the midpoint of the dataset) only rose from 12 in the 1700s to 14 in the 1710s. A few colonists were consolidating their wealth and control over huge numbers of enslaved people at a much faster rate than even people in the range of the median from the previous decade. Though the percentage of the total number of colonists with ten or more enslaved people stayed roughly the same, the percentage of colonists in extant records as owning between five and nine enslaved people rose from 8.8% in the 1700s to 18.1% in the 1710s. This means that in the 1710s, most owners of enslaved people (66.9%) were only represented in records as owning between one and four people, or what amounted to a ten percentage point drop from the previous decade. In short, owning enslaved people was becoming less possible for people who had none, while
Colonists with enslaved people were increasing the numbers of people they owned. Unsurprisingly, colonists used capital to accumulate more capital.\textsuperscript{37}

Sometimes colonists forsook their investments in human property. For example, John Row manumitted two enslaved “Axossiah Indians[s]” in 1710, a woman named Venus and a girl named Elizabeth. Another one of the manumissions was when Thomas Cutler released John Gambo, also known as Jack Cutler, from what amounted to an indenture, although it was written like a manumission. John Gambo, who was also the only male manumitted during the decade, was according to Cutler “a free negroe having faithfully served out his Time,” which was four years, “According to the Contract Agreed upon in London.” It turned out that Gambo had signed an indenture in London to work in South Carolina in about 1713, and Cutler was following through on the contract. This is the only case of a West African person being released from an indenture in early colonial South Carolina. But John Gambo is the exception that proved the rule; to release him, John Row felt like it needed to be done as if it were a manumission because only European indentured servants were released without this paper trail recorded by the state. What amounted to “racial” categories mattered in South Carolina in 1717, even if “Negro” had not yet become synonymous with “slave.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{37} CSCDEP. Peter Le Slade Bill of Sale to Peter Poitevint and Jacob Caitteau, March 22, 1716, WPA vol. 56; Le Slade Mortgage to John de la Pierre, March 22, 1716, WPA vol. 56; Wright Mortgage to Wragg, Satur, and Wragg, June 15, 1714, WPA, vol. 56, 42–47; John Whitmarsh Will, June 1, 1718, WPA, vol. 1; and David Davis Mortgage to John Guerrard and Benjamin Godin, May 13, 1711, MRPS, 1709–1725, S213001, SCDAH, 136-9.

\textsuperscript{38} CSCDEP. The John Row manumission is dated June 9, 1710, MRPS, 1709–1725, SCDAH, S213001, 81. Thomas Cutler manumission for John Gambo (aka Jack Cutler), April 4, 1717, WPA vol. 63.
Of those eight people manumitted in the 1710s, three were explicitly labeled “Indian,” four were called “Negro” (including John Gambo), and one was not given a racial descriptor. This was a woman named Phillis who belonged to Edmund Bellinger and was the wife of “Indian Cuffey,” who was a Euhaw living somewhere near Port Royal in 1715 when he was the first person to tell European South Carolinians of the impending attacks by Yamasees. Cuffey wasn’t manumitted because he wasn’t enslaved in 1715, but his name is certainly of West-African origin (probably Akan), so he may have been of mixed African/Native American origin, or an African man who had become a Yamasee, or his Native American parents lived in close association with (enslaved or formerly enslaved) African peoples in the southeast. No matter the reason, Cuffey was deemed a hero to the colony, and the next year, his wife, Phillis, was manumitted, most likely in appreciation of Cuffey’s intelligence-sharing with the colony. In her manumission, Phillis was dubbed “Wife of Indian Cuffy Yamesa.” Archival materials will not divulge the background of Phillis, but she could have been another Native American woman manumitted. Either way, enslaved Native American women, as represented in manumissions (three or four out of eight), far outpaced the numbers of enslaved Native American women in the larger population. These manumissions may in fact be an indicator that, although it is a small sample size, “negro” was becoming at some level more associated with “slave” since colonists were more likely to manumit Native Americans. It was not that Native Americans could or should not have been enslaved, but maybe that colonists had a more-expansive social vision of the possibilities
for Native Americans, especially considering how there remained large numbers of free Native Americans in the region.\textsuperscript{39}

Out of all the enslaved people from the 1710s in which their sex is discernible, 47\% were women or girls. This means that the sex ratio had become nearly balanced among the entire population. For Native Americans, the drastic difference in sex ratio actually grew more skewed, down to 47 men and boys for every 100 women and girls. Within the population of enslaved Africans, the sex ratio was 134. The African population was still heavily male (though less so), and since it was a larger population, the overwhelming number of female Native Americans compared to male in the archive brings the overall sex ratio down, but still skewed toward men and boys.\textsuperscript{40}

Another factor playing into the convergence of the sex ratio within the enslaved population during the 1710s is the number of children in the records. There are 79 female and 76 male children in my dataset. The difference, again, is the number of enslaved Native Americans. There are 19 Native American girls and eight boys, but interestingly none were considered younger than an age where colonists could exploit productive labor from them and labeled as an “Indian child.” In later probate inventories, when there were many more examples, small children were merely labeled as the child of the mother. In the 1710s, for example, there was a lawsuit between Anne Rowsham, who was the

\textsuperscript{39} For Phyllis’s manumission, December 20, 1716, see WPA vol. 56, 169. Edmund Bellinger was a landgrave of the colony and one of the members of the elite, so he probably saw it in his interest to manumit Phillis as an example to other enslaved people with important information. For more on Bellinger, see BD, 74. For more on Cuffey, see William L. Ramsey, “A Coat for ‘Indian Cuffy’: Mapping the Boundary between Freedom and Slavery in Colonial South Carolina,” \textit{SCHM} 103, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 48–66, especially 62–3.

\textsuperscript{40} CSCDEP. Even though these populations of enslaved people were slowly moving toward normal, stable, human sex ratios, they were still drastically skewed compared to what we know about human populations in stable demographic conditions.
widow of William Rowsham, and Robert Dews. Dews was the executor of Rowsham’s husband’s will, and Anne Rowsham sued Dews for trespass. Rowsham accused Dews of taking “One negro man named Harry of the value of £150, one negro man named Titus of the value of £200, one negro woman named [illegible] of the value of £200, and her two children of the value of £100, one Indian woman named Peggy and her child both of the value of £100.” Rowsham claimed Dews “fraudulently” on his “behalf to deceive and defraud of the negroe and Indian slaves” and not give them over to Rowsham. This is an intriguing case—how did Dews convince 12 enslaved people they belonged to him?—but notice how the small children, both Native American and African were only listed as the child of their mother. This means these women and children were either taken captive and enslaved together, or the children were born enslaved in South Carolina. In sum, one of the reasons the sex ratio of the enslaved population of South Carolina was heading toward equilibrium in the 1710s was enslaved children who were either born in the colony or forced to migrate there.41

41 SCSCD. Anne Rowsham was suing for £1300. *Rowsham v. Robert Dews*, May 4, 1717, Court of Common Please, Judgment Roll 1717, Box 10A No. 57A, SCDAH. Rowsham also sued Dews the same day for five more enslaved Africans worth a total of £1600. *Rowsham v. Dews*, Court of Common Pleas, Judgment Roll 1717, Box 10A, No. 58A, SCDAH. Dews later sued Rowsham for an £800 bond she had taken out from her husband before his death. See *Dews v. Rowsham*, Court of Common Pleas, Judgment Roll 1717 Box 10A No. 123A, SCDAH.

As with almost anything to do with age in these records, there is rarely an age described in terms of how old enslaved people were. Instead, they were described as “child,” “boy,” “girl,” “man,” “woman,” etc. For this, I am counting “boys” and “girls” along with “children,” even though the descriptors “boy” and “girl” probably conveyed something like “old enough to work but not an adult” in its implied meaning. This brings the question of just when colonists considered enslaved people to be “adults.” I have no hard answer to this, but it likely had something to do with marriage/reproduction, so “boy” and “girl” would have ended sometime during enslaved peoples’ teen years.

If children are taken out of the equation and only adults are counted, the sex ratio climbs to 119, from 113 if children are counted. Either way, this was a drastic reduction
While the numbers of Native Americans were being outpaced at the level of the colony, on the third of plantations where they were found they made up a disproportionate percentage of people. Since the trade in captive Native Americans began to dwindle in the 1710s, with the two exceptions of the periods during the Tuscarora and Yamasee Wars, and direct shipments of African captives from West African ports began in earnest, it would seem that during this decade the numbers of colonists who owned enslaved Native Americans would begin to shrink. After all, diseases that became endemic to the lowcountry from the lands east of the Atlantic, such as malaria, tended to kill Native Americans more than West Africans. In my dataset, 31% of all colonists claiming ownership of enslaved people during the 1710s had at least one enslaved Native American. Although the importation of enslaved African peoples was increasing overall, this percentage is identical to the previous decade. Colonists were indeed adding enslaved people to the ranks of bound laborers, but the rate of ownership of enslaved Native Americans held steady and made up 18% of the enslaved population. Of the colonists with at least one enslaved Native American, the average number of enslaved Africans was 10.3, while the number of Native Americans was 3.1. This means that while 31% of all colonists with bound laborers in extant records had at least one enslaved Native American, and those enslaved Native Americans made up on average 30% of their enslaved population. Native Americans were not, in general, isolated among the larger enslaved African population, but were instead concentrated at the plantation level.\footnote{in the numbers of men compared to the numbers of women from the previous decade (167).}
Beginning in the 1720s, when the British Crown took provisional control of the colony after the anti-Proprietary coup in 1719 but before the Lords Proprietor had reached an agreement over selling their proprietorships back to the Crown, record-keeping in the colony became much better. Imports of captive peoples increased from West Africa (particularly late in the decade), while the trade in Native American captives to the colony slowed significantly. Although the population of both Europeans and enslaved Africans rose during the decade, there are far more records than one would expect even for this increasing population compared to earlier sources. The reason there are so many more people in extant records comes from two co-constitutive factors: more credit flowing into the colony (mortgages in particular) and better record-keeping by colonial officials, especially in matters pertaining to contract law. There are far more enslaved people listed in the 1720s (3755) than any previous decade. There are so many records for the decade that more than twice the total number of enslaved (and indentured) people are listed than in the entire history of the colony up to that point, and this happens again in the 1730s, where I have been able to find record of 9821 enslaved people.43

Even though the trades in Native American captives slowed down starting in 1716, there are actually 41% more enslaved Native Americans listed in surviving records from the 1720s than the 1710s. This seems to be due to the increased interest on the part of representatives of the colonial government in making property, chiefly enslaved human property, more legible — or more knowable and more surveillable — and thereby rendering property more secure. In the 1720s there is also the first real aggregate data

42 CSCDEP. For Native Americans making up 18% of the population, n= 630, or the number of people who had an ethno-cultural identifier in the records but there were also 120 without any discernable race listed and nine indentured servants.

43 CSCDEP.
with respect to people labelled “Mustees” (63) and “Mulattos” (9). European indentured servants had not disappeared, though, with ten showing up during the decade. The average number of bound laborers each colonist claimed also rose in the 1720s from 6.2 (1710s) to 8.9 people. There were again more colonists in records with fewer than five enslaved people than more, but their percentage fell to just over half (to 53% from 65.6%). The largest shift was in the direction of colonists owning ten or more enslaved people. In the 1710s, only 14.8% of colonists are in records as holding ten or more people in bondage, whereas in the 1720s, this number jumped to 26%. The group of colonists with large numbers of enslaved people went from controlling 58% of all people in the records to 73%. Meanwhile, colonists controlling between five and nine enslaved people ticked up slightly, from 19.7% to 21%, but their relative share of the enslaved population fell, from 21% to 15.2%. Although each of these groups of colonists rose in number from the 1710s (in the archival records), the colonists with the most enslaved people were increasingly outpacing the rest of owners of enslaved people. In South Carolina during the 1720s, the trend of labor-rich colonists consolidating labor power continued apace. And forcing enslaved laborers to remake landscapes for commodity production furthered this process of stratification.44

There are many more colonists in records from the 1720s who owned at least one enslaved Native American than earlier and more enslaved Native Americans in total, but the share of colonists (who owned enslaved or indentured peoples) with Native American

peoples dropped when compared to all colonists (to 21.5% from 31% in the 1710s). Colonists with enslaved Native Americans averaged many more enslaved people (17.4 people) than did the average of all colonists (9 people). It turns out that ownership of Native Americans, by the 1720s, had become a function of how rich one was: the more property, the more likely a colonist was to own enslaved Native Americans. Within many of these populations of enslaved people forced together by individual colonists, though, the relative demographic strength of Native Americans dropped significantly. These 90 colonists are in records as owning a total of 1567 enslaved (and indentured) people, and 192 of them were Native American (12.3%) and 48 of them were “mustee” (3%). In all slightly over 15% were either labeled “Indian” or “Mustee.” 27% of the colonists who owned enslaved Native Americans also owned at least one “Mustee” person. There was a new generation of Native Americans being born on plantations. Many of these people were described by colonists as “Mustees,” or being products of the colonial world shared by enslaved Africans and Native Americans.45

Benjamin Clifford gave seven enslaved people to his three children, Ann, Elizabeth, and Benjamin, in 1726, and six of the people given were described as “Mustees,” while the other was a “Negro” man named Tom. Among the “Mustees” in the gift were Bess and Mollie, two women; Jemy and Toney, two boys; and Bristow, a young child. Although there is no indication as to any familial relationship between these enslaved people, it stands to reason that they may have been related. The record of Clifford’s gift is an outlier because no other colonist had as many enslaved “Mustee” people in the data, although there were two (Abraham Fleur de la Plaine and Nancy

45 CSCDEP.
Gilbertson) with four listed in sources. Almost all of the other colonists with enslaved “Mustees” but no Native Americans did also own peoples of African descent. In all, 26% of all colonists in the dataset owned Native Americans and/or people labeled “Mustee.” While the demographic importance of enslaved Native Americans was waning under the importation of enslaved Africans and the attrition of high mortality rates in plantation contexts, 26% of all colonists with bound laborers still owned enslaved Native Americans or their direct descendants in records from the 1720s. Native Americans were therefore persistent on South Carolina plantations well after the trade in Native American captives almost completely collapsed.  

Native American and “Mustee” sex ratios grew more balanced in the 1720s. Whereas in the 1710s, the sex ratio for enslaved Native Americans was an extremely-female-heavy 47, in the 1720s it had moved up to 86, meaning there were many more men and boys compared with the numbers of women and girls in previous eras. For people called “Mustee,” the numbers look more in line with a typical human population with a sex ratio of 114 (32 men and boys, 28 women and girls). The people called “Mustee,” as expected, look more balanced because all of them were probably born in the colony and therefore did not follow the structured sex preferences of the trades in captives, as did the victims of the Native American and West African captive trade. In other words, although the Native American captive trade was skewed toward women and children, human biology is not, and the children born to enslaved Native Americans were

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46 Benjamin Clifford gift to his children, March 15, 1726, MRIS, vol. E, SCDAH, S213002, 539–540; Abraham Fleur De La Plaine Will, August 2, 1721, WPA vol. 1; and Nancy Gilbertson Probate Inventory, August 25, 1726, MRIS, vol. E, S213002, SCDAH, 107–8; and CSCDEP.
even in terms of sex. “Mustees” were creoles in the sense that they were born and raised as enslaved people.\textsuperscript{47}

Even if the sex ratio was slowly balancing in the Native American and “Mustee” populations, the age characteristics of each group were different. Enslaved Native Americans, most of who were traded as captives to the colonies in previous decades, were considerably older than “Mustees.” The Native American population was 28% children, while “Mustees” were 69% children. Though the “Mustees” were younger on the whole than Native Americans, 94% of the “Mustee” children were labeled either as boys or girls, meaning they were not small children and therefore had been born after the beginning of the eighteenth century. In terms of small children, there were many more labeled Native American than “Mustee.” Enslaved Native American women were, as a group, having children in the 1720s with other Native Americans who either lived outside the colony, were enslaved within it, or with enslaved people of African descent in the colony.\textsuperscript{48}

In the African-descended population of the colony, the sex ratio of the adult population remained skewed toward men in the 1720s. Enslaved Native American women of childbearing age must have therefore been at least partially desired by European colonists for their reproductive labor even well after the decline in the Native American captive trade to the colony.\textsuperscript{49}

An example of the familial relations that could come from the groupings of people forced onto plantations in early South Carolina is from the 1721 will of Abraham

\textsuperscript{47} CSCDEP.

\textsuperscript{49} CSCDEP. Men still greatly outnumbered women with a sex ratio of 160, while in the overall population of enslaved Africans, the ratio fell to 151.
Fleury de la Plaine. De la Plaine, a Huguenot refugee, had migrated to the colony in 1684 and started a plantation at the head of Goose Creek. In de la Plaine’s will, he gave a number of enslaved people to his brother, Isaac Floree. These enslaved people included “two negroe men named Sambo and Charlott,” two “negro boys named John and Simon,” “two mustee girls Katee and Nany,” and their mother, an enslaved Native American woman named Diana, along with “Frank a Mustee boy, who was also Diana’s son and “a young child at her breast.” Diana was a Native American woman, and her four children were described as “Mustees” by De la Plaine; but in this order for manumissions, Diana could only be freed after giving birth to another enslaved child and then working for Isaac Floree for two more years. None of Diana’s children were to be manumitted. De la Plaine then ordered that at his brother’s death, his son-in-law, Peter Bacot was to receive “negro Sambo” and “mustee boy Frank the Son of Diana.” It is difficult to ascertain the father of Katee, Nany, Frank, and the infant, but it may have either been either Sambo or Charlott, although Diana could have had a different partner of African ancestry. While I have not been able to trace what happened to most of the enslaved people de la Plaine gave to his brother in his will, Frank turns up in Peter Bacot’s 1735 probate inventory, along with another “Mustee girl” named Amerita. As De la Plaine’s will attests, the number of enslaved people he controlled was largely owed to the reproductive labor of Diana, and the document also shows how control of enslaved Native Americans and their children passed through the generations in colonial South Carolina.  

CSCDEP; Abraham de la Plaine, February 20, 1684, Warrants, 336–337; Daniel Ravenel, *Liste Des François et Suisses. From an Old Manuscript List of French and Swiss Protestants, Settled in Charleston, on the Santee, and at Orange Quarter, in Carolina, Who Desired Naturalization, Prepared Probably about 1695-6. With Introductory Remarks ...* (Charleston, 1868), 20; will of Abraham de la Plaine, August 2,
Similar to de la Plaine, James Gilbertson migrated to South Carolina in 1686. Gilbertson’s will, in conjunction with the probate inventory of his daughter, Nancy, gives more description of how successful, diverse plantations were built over time by enslaved labor between the early years of the colony and the 1720s. James Gilbertson left his wife, Mehitable, ⅓ of his “negroe and Indian slaves,” while leaving his plantation where they resided on the north side of Wadmalaw River to his daughter, Nancy, along with the bulk of his estate. Nancy Gilbertson had not yet reached adulthood in 1720, but was James’s “beloved and only Daughter.” But Nancy and Mehitable were not the only people to receive property in Gilbertson’s will. There was also a “Molato Woman Ruth” who was to be “free immediately” after Gilbertson’s death. Ruth was to be able to live on the Wadmalaw plantation, but James Gilbertson also freed Ruth’s “three female Children Betty, Mally, and Keatty,” who were to “be free att the age of one and twenty years.”

Gilbertson, it seems, had an enslaved woman whom he treated (on paper, at least) as if she were special to him, although the asymmetry of power between them was vast.51

In addition to giving his daughter ⅓ of his enslaved people, and freeing Ruth’s and likely his children, James Gilbertson also made a provision for an enslaved Native American man named Cyrus: “he shall have every tenth barrel he makes upon the Plantation for his own proper use.” Cyrus was a cooper on the Wadmalaw plantation, and Gilbertson wanted to give him some bit of autonomy. Ultimately, Nancy Gilbertson died sometime before August 25, 1726, when her probate inventory was taken at her inherited

1721, Probate Court records, Charleston. County, Book 1671-1727, 167; Peter Bacot Probate Inventory, June 4, 1735, Probate Book, 1732–1736, SCDAH, 179–81.

51 James Gilbertson Will, August 16, 1720, MRPS 1719–1721, S213001, SCDAH, 57–59; Gilbertson land warrants, January 7, 1686, Warrants, 184; and BD, 278.
Wadmalaw plantation. At her death, Nancy Gilbertson controlled 26 enslaved people and two indentured servants. It is unlikely that Gilbertson, a minor in 1720, would have accumulated large numbers of enslaved people by running her plantation for the few years she was an adult. It is therefore reasonable to think that the enslaved people in her 1726 probate inventory were almost all part of her father’s estate. If we include Ruth and her three enslaved children who were manumitted in the will, ⅔ of James Gilbertson’s human capital consisted of 30 enslaved people (26 in Nancy Gilbertson’s inventory and the four James manumitted). The only overlapping person mentioned between the two documents was the “Indian” cooper, Cyrus. James Gilbertson’s population of enslaved people was therefore very diverse. There were five Native Americans, four “Mulattos,” four “Mustees,” and 17 Africans. Out of these 30 people, 11 were children (37%), and at least 3 of them were probably Gilbertson’s own children. Nancy Gilbertson’s probate inventory also listed a “cropp of rice now on the ground containing about forty acres,” along with farming and cooper’s tools. 40 acres of rice fields was no small task to construct and maintain, so James Gilbertson began the work on the fields long before his death. Gilbertson’s large rice plantation was therefore a byproduct of the labor of diverse enslaved—and indentured, as there were two European servant women with long terms remaining on their contracts in Nancy Gilbertson’s probate inventory as well—people laboring in the 41 years between James Gilbertson’s original land warrants and his daughter’s probate inventory.52

During the 1730s one group of bound laborers became more visible than in the previous few decades. European indentured servants began showing up again in larger

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numbers in documentary evidence with the beginning of the publication of the *South Carolina Gazette*, the colony’s first newspaper, in 1732. Between 1732 and 1739, there were 101 indentured servants in all records. 82 of these people were listed in runaway advertisements. In fact, indentured servants made up 21% of all runaway bound laborers listed in the newspaper during the 1730s. It would be hard to argue that servants made up anything close to 21% of the bound labor population in the 1730s, so it was probably the case that they were more likely to run away. The ideology of race, as it was developing in the 1730s, could have meant that servants’ masters were more lenient on them running away than the brutal response colonists could deal out to enslaved people for absconding. At the same time, there were 9 enslaved Native Americans for whom ads were taken out by colonists and 19 “Mustees,” totaling 9% of all runaway enslaved people, or a much higher percentage than any other indicator of how large their demographic proportion was during the decade.\(^{53}\)

As a contrast, if I use probate inventories as an indicator of the demography of enslaved people in the colony, a method many scholars use, the numbers are very different (Table 4.7). Using this metric, the population looks to be almost entirely “Negro” through the decade (96.8%). But the probate inventories are somewhat misleading because while the population of enslaved people was overwhelmingly “Negro” by the 1730s, either newly-imported peoples from Africa or people often termed “creole” who were born in the Americas, more data is required to produce a better outline

\(^{53}\) CSCDEP. In a research paper I wrote during my doctoral coursework, I found that through the 1740s and early 1750s, there were far more runaway “Mustees” than Native Americans and “Mulattos” combined. I concluded this was likely due to the age of these people, who were born to enslaved Native Americans after 1710. My dissertation research has proven this out – there were many more “Mustee” people described in the 1720s than at any previous point.
of the bound population. And although the percentages do not change very much by adding over 5,000 more data points from the difference in the enslaved African population comes out to be about one percentage point, which does not at first glance appear to be a large difference. But that percentage point represents almost 235 people from other ethno-cultural groups who would be missed, making up 68% of those groups (as described by colonists) that are necessary to understand the rise in the numbers of African people and the increasing demographic insignificance of other peoples, in particular enslaved Native Americans and “Mustees” (Table 4.8). Without delving deeper into the possible empirical source base, these groups would stay further hidden from historical observation and analysis. Ignoring these sources would also hinder our understanding of how a diverse enslaved population became subsumed into a “Negro” enslaved population. 54

54 Ibid.
Table 4.7: Numbers of Bound People Listed in Probate Inventories from the 1730s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Identifier</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Mulatto</th>
<th>Mustee</th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>No Racial identifier</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of People</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3391</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>4510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of People in Inventories where Race can be Identified</td>
<td>.02%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>.01%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>99.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of People in All Records where Race can Be Identified</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>95.8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: The Numbers of European Servants, Native Americans, “Mulattos,” and “Mustees” in Records other than Probate Inventories from the 1730s and Percentages of the Total Number in the Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>“Indian”</th>
<th>“Mulatto”</th>
<th>“Mustee”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of People not in Probate Inventories</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Number of People in the Dataset from the 1730s Classified as such</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.
As the enslaved population of the colony became more and more African during the 1730s with huge numbers of people being imported into the colony in partnerships between Charles Town merchants, London merchants, and slavers, the sex ratio of the enslaved people of the colony did not head toward equilibrium. In my dataset for the decade, there were 5,050 men and boys and 2,795 women and girls where their sex was described by colonists. This means that the overall sex ratio of the enslaved population of the colony was still a staggering 181. There simply were not as many women and girls as men and boys, likely due in large part to low fertility rates and the huge influx of enslaved male Africans during the decade.\textsuperscript{57}

Even as more enslaved African people came to the colony against their will in the 1730s, there remained a lack of women compared to the number of men. This would have meant that the enslaved Native American women in the colony were still in high demand to both colonists and enslaved men looking for women as sexual partners. In records denoting a sale or use as collateral in a potential sale (bills of sale, mortgage, or advertisements for sale in the \textit{South Carolina Gazette}), 39\% of all enslaved female Africans were used by colonists as capital in a market during the 1730s while the same analysis comes out to be 30\% of enslaved female Native Americans. If adult women are the ones considered, the percentages move in opposite directions. For enslaved Native American women, only 22\% of them were listed in records as being put into the open market, while for African women the number was 43\%. These percentages are high and certainly reflect a bias in the reasons colonists decided to produce these documents of the

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.} There were also 1,871 people who had no sex listed, and I have tried to not make any assumptions based on any other indicators such as names, so they have been removed from the discussion about the sex imbalance, as with previous decades.
enslaved. Colonists for the most part only wanted to record their enslaved people when it pertained to changes in ownership. Still, in terms of being traded by colonists, African women were twice as likely to be sold or gambled on as collateral in the 1730s by their European owners than were Native American women.\footnote{58}

I do not intend to imply that enslaved women and girls did not change owners during the decade, though. Many of these people did change hands, but the majority did so with the death of their European enslaver and may not have changed locations. For enslaved Native American women, 22% were sold, mortgaged, or advertised for sale, but another 59% changed hands at the death of their owners. Although African women were much more likely to be put through one of these traumas, at 43% of all African women, roughly similar numbers found themselves laboring for new colonists with the death of their oppressors (53%). In total, 81% of all enslaved Native American women in my dataset changed owners during the decade, while 96% of African women did. When it came to commodification, enslaved Africans were much more likely to be abstracted into capital than were Native Americans or their children, “Mustees.” Access to credit in the colony, as seen in the rise in mortgages with enslaved people as collateral, meant that humans were more commodifiable than before the 1710s and colonists took advantage by over-representing enslaved Africans and under-representing enslaved Native Americans (and “Mustees”). The “chattel principle” therefore became more closely associated with peoples from Africa, even while there were still many enslaved people in the colony of

\footnote{58} Ibid. For enslaved African women, I am including those who were presented as gifts, whatever the European colonists’ reason.
Native American descent. In short, “Negro” became more synonymous with “slave” even as the dynamics on the ground betrayed this growing conflation.\textsuperscript{59}

In early South Carolina, enslaved Native Americans played an outsized role in the social development of the enslaved in the colony, at least in the locales where they were coerced into laboring for the benefit of European colonists. Not all colonists owned Native Americans, but for the large minority of colonists who did, they were a central feature in their economic successes by the 1720s and 30s. By the time of the Stono Rebellion, Native Americans had been laboring on South Carolina plantations for almost as long as the colony had existed and there was a new generation of their descendants beginning to come of age, even as Kongolese rebels slaughtered and burned their way toward St. Augustine in September 1739.\textsuperscript{60}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. The numbers for enslaved men were 46\% sold, advertised for sale, mortgaged, or given away and 47\% changed owners because of a colonist’s death (total of 93\%). For Native American men, the numbers were 34\%, 45\%, and 79\%, respectively, although the number represented in the data is much smaller. For the “chattel principle,” see Walter Johnson, \textit{Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), chapter 1.

Chapter 5

Plantations and Enslaved Peoples in Space

Comparisons between the most successful English plantation colonies in North America and the Caribbean based on enslaved labor, Virginia, Barbados, and South Carolina, have been carried out by scholars with great success. After fits and starts, Virginia served as a model for English colonial ventures long after its 1607 founding in that the English Crown offloaded the economic risks of colonization to private interests and success only came with agricultural export commodities. Likewise, a significant proportion of early colonists in South Carolina had witnessed or learned about the rise of the plantation regime in Barbados, which began with colonists following the Virginians in planting tobacco but in short time shifted to sugar. But there were dramatic differences between the histories of Virginia and Barbados from which Carolina adventurers could learn. Virginia was the first permanent English colony in North America, and colonists worked out in real time solutions for their labor shortage with privatized land, indentured servitude, and enslavement. A similar social trajectory played out in Barbados on a shortened timeline: Barbadians invested heavily in slavery sooner than wealthy Virginians. South Carolinians, founded much later, had the benefit of having a socioeconomic model already working in sites such as Virginia and especially Barbados. But one way these colonies diverged was in the use of space. In addition to obvious
environmental differences, the Virginia, Barbados, and Carolina projects were placed into dissimilar geographic and political contexts that made them different in their spatiality.¹


Jamaica was a much larger island than Barbados but developed as an English colony in a very different manner, as a military garrison attempting to conquer the island from Spanish colonists. The colonization of Jamaica by the English therefore had a very different spatial trajectory. See Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Conquest of Jamaica: Oliver Cromwell’s Bid for Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, An Imprint of Harvard
In Virginia, the powerful Powhatan Confederacy kept Virginians hemmed mostly into their small peninsula for around twenty years. It was not until the late 1620s that Virginians moved into lands near Kiskiack, present-day Yorktown, across the Virginia Peninsula to the Pamunkey (York) River. Most early colonial expansion followed the banks of the James River. Colonists in Virginia had a difficult time spreading out because of the large numbers of hostile indigenous peoples in the vicinity. The direct overland distance between Jamestown and the main Kiskiack village was about 13 miles. At the opposite end of the spectrum of space and indigenous resistance was Barbados. When the English first arrived, the island was depopulated, probably in the wake of Spanish slaving decades earlier. But the Barbadians were restricted in space; the small island quickly became crowded with plantations and beginning in the 1640s some colonists began concentrating on growing sugarcane after production of Brazilian sugar dropped. It was not long before the best of the island’s arable land was worked by indentured and enslaved peoples producing sugar for export. Of the two great colonial models for the Carolina project based on enslaved labor and agricultural production to export, Virginia could potentially increase in size over an entire continent but faced stiff indigenous resistance, while Barbados was easy to conquer geopolitically but was tiny in size. In contrast, South Carolinians had little trouble spreading out in every direction following initial colonization. Carolina adventurers faced little initial indigenous resistance and a seemingly-infinite amount of possible land to colonize.²

² Anthony S. Parent, *Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660-1740* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2003), chapter 1;
With the geopolitical milieu of southeastern North America shaped by a recent violent interloper (the Westos) preying on the smaller groups of peoples in the region, South Carolinians were welcomed by the local Native American polities, sometimes collectively referred to as “Cusabo[e]s.” The indigenous peoples living near the eventual location(s) of Charles Town sought out colonists in order to ally with them and to keep the new colony away from the Westos. Colonists happily agreed and built Charles Town on the western bank of the Ashley River (Map 5.1). These Europeans were able to spread out quickly in all direction compared with the first decades of Virginia and much farther apart than in Barbados. As contemporary archaeologist Stanley South has convincingly argued, early colonists sought out lands where (relatively) deep water met with high ground. In 1672, Ashley wrote to Joseph West, who was in the colony, ordering West to find a place “on Ashley or Cooper River in a place of the greatest pleasantness and advantage for health and profit which must be where there is high Ground, near a navigable River.” Seeking out these specific geographic contexts would allow colonists to have what were in essence their own small ports for shipping materials back and forth to Charles Town. The only problem was that in the lowcountry, such sites were (and are) rare.  

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3 Ashley to Joseph West, June 25, 1672, *Shaftesbury*, 405–6; and Stanley South, “Deep Water and High Ground: Seventeenth Century Low Country Settlement” (South
With seemingly little to fear in terms of indigenous resistance to colonization, Europeans spread out in all directions across the lowcountry. In the first four years after

Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1980). Ashley’s desire would turn into his St. Giles Kussoe plantation two years later.
1670, colonists used a diffused and haphazard method to find the best locations for personal plantations with small riverine ports. Henry Woodward’s plantation was located on John’s Island at Abhapool Creek, a tributary of the Stono River, which was 28 miles from Charles Town by sea or about 20 miles up the Stono River and then five miles overland to the town. John Coming’s grant at the “T” in the Cooper River was 38 miles north of Charles Town by boat. Lady Margaret Yeamans’s grant on the south side of Goose Creek near where it meets Cooper River was 27 miles upriver from Charles Town. Anthony Ashley Cooper’s St. Giles Kussoe plantation and trading post, which was founded in 1674 on lands previously occupied by the Kussoe, was 21 miles up Ashley River from the main colony (Map 5.2). With little early indigenous resistance, colonists were able to select what they thought to be the choicest lands to build what amounted to small satellite colonies. Although travel over water was for the most part easier than over land, slow-moving—and in many places tidal—waterways were nonetheless slow in terms of travel time to and from far-reaching colonial outposts. Many South Carolina colonists may have experienced Barbados or other island colonies, but nothing like the distances involved in the lowcountry. The John Coming grant and plantation at the “T” in the Cooper River was nearly double the farthest distance across Barbados (about 22 miles). After 30 years of colonization, South Carolina was enormous compared with Virginia and Barbados in terms of the geographical extent of colonial landholdings.  

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4 My comparison for the geographic scope comes from Lorena Walsh. See *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit*, 45.
South Carolinians were familiar with the experiences of colonists (and enslaved peoples) coming from Barbados and other locales, but the spatiality of the colony was new. With so few prime geographic areas to colonize and little apparent need for the colony to be compact for defense besides seaborne attack by imperial rivals, the spatial footprint of the colony blew up almost immediately. This geographic spread, normally represented in maps as a creeping tide showing the farthest extent of colonization, should
instead be thought of as small colonies with vast lands between them that were either unoccupied or were controlled by indigenous peoples. South Carolina was a colony built out of multitude smaller neighborhood colonies. Colonists only took control of the spaces between after the first few decades following 1670, especially after they realized unoccupied lands adjacent to swamps within about 30 miles of Charles Town were excellent environments for growing rice.  

The spatiality of colonial expansion and labor in early South Carolina, as much as the demographic trends, had an effect on the development of social and cultural formations among enslaved people. Enslaved people on early South Carolina plantations were socially isolated by the simple fact of the diffuse expansion of the colonial landscape. Over time, enslaved people became increasingly situated in closer proximity to each other even as the colony expanded in overall footprint, but in the early years, most must have considered themselves to be in the middle of nowhere. The sociocultural milieu for early bound laborers in the colony was therefore highly localized. Over time, as the bound population of the colony increased and were coerced into new spaces—both in an outward extension of colonial control and into the spaces between colonial control—enslaved peoples became less isolated. South Carolina plantations are famous for having been isolated compared with enslaved people in the Chesapeake, but enslaved people toiling away on plantations had more enslaved people in their vicinity due to

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5 Virginia expanded, especially after 1618, in a similar manner, but whereas Virginia’s “Hundred” grants were planned clusters of colonization, in South Carolina expansion in this early period was based on the desires of individual colonists as where to locate a new plantation. Most colonial expansion in Virginia by 1635 (28 years after colonization) was directed inland following both banks of the James River. Bernard Bailyn, *The Barbarous Years: The Peopling of British North America: The Conflict of Civilizations, 1600-1675* (New York: Knopf, 2012), 78–96; Walsh, *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit*, 32–46; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, 94–102.
colonists’ decisions to reconfigure the landscape for rice production in the eighteenth century, alongside an increasing average number of enslaved people per plantation over time. Historian Philip Morgan dubbed lowcountry plantations “insular” because the geography of colonization was such that each plantation was isolated and because compared with the Chesapeake, plantations were larger in number of enslaved people on each. For the modern reader, a mile (or a few miles) between plantations may seem like vast distances, but people in the early-modern colonial world were accustomed to walking—or riding, or boating—over far greater distances on a regular basis. It is reasonable to think that these distances would have had a limited impact on the moving around of bound laborers when they had free time, especially in the early years before the movement of enslaved people came under greater scrutiny.6

This chapter argues the spatial history of slavery in colonial South Carolina was one of European colonists starting plantations in distant locales but sometimes in clusters. Enslaved people likely interacted on a normal basis with people on nearby plantations. Over time, colonists began seeking out the swamplands they had previously tried to avoid. This meant that many of the spaces between plantations were reduced. Even though colonists initially tended to specialize in the types of bound laborers they owned and exploited, whether enslaved Africans, enslaved Native Americans, or European indentured servants, tracking ownership is not the only way to determine groupings of enslaved people. Different groupings of people were sometimes located on nearby plantations in the same area and therefore were not as isolated from each other as would first appear. If we consider the spatiality of colonization and enslavement, the exigencies

6 Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint*, 44.
of the captive trades and the caprice of owners of bound peoples were not the only factors in play when determining the sociocultural context of enslaved and indentured peoples. The purchasing whims of nearby landowners also played an important role determining with whom and how enslaved people could interact on a regular basis. The spatiality of enslavement therefore was central to the process of cultural formation, a process of creolization in the lowcountry, which will be discussed further Chapter 7. The spaces inhabited by enslaved and indentured peoples were highly localized in South Carolina in the early years and slowly gave way to more sociocultural mixing over the years as the spaces between clusters of coerced peoples became smaller. When it came to the types of work enslaved peoples were forced to do on plantations, though, in many ways the colony was much smaller. The environmental imaginations of planters narrowed over time and plantation landscapes became increasingly similar. Planters, as a group but also as individuals, developed their own cultural understanding of work and production, generally with the goal of rice or other commodity production and in particular with the ways they conceived of their plantations, such that by the early eighteenth century the particularities of space mattered in each plantation’s economic relationship with Charles Town. On some plantations, colonists’ main economic strategy was rice cultivation, while others packed bricks. In short, although enslaved people were isolated—albeit less so than in the seventeenth century—the landscape of the plantation became more standardized.

When colonists decided on a location for Charles Town in 1670, they set about constructing the colony in a compact fashion. Colonial officials initially distributed lands in a small area within about two miles of the location of the town on Albemarle Point
along the Ashley River in an area known today as West Ashley (Map 5.3). Colonists used no formal legalistic means to secure the plats. The Lords Proprietor quickly became unhappy with the direction colonists were taking with land tenure, so in 1672 they implemented new orders called the “Temporary Agrarian Laws,” which focused on distributing land for private ownership in a European manner. Records for land warrants thus begin for the colony in 1672. The Proprietors ordered colonial officials to grant warrants for certain acreages to colonists, and then the colonists had to go find a place “not within the compass of any lands heretofore laid out or marked to be laid out.” The surveyor would then survey the land and officials would issue a grant. It is unclear whether initial grants were giving legitimacy to the situation on the ground or if this was when colonists started dispersing, but colonists took this opportunity to claim lands distant from Charles Town. It was in this moment when John Coming took out a warrant for lands across the Ashley River in what today is downtown Charleston, along with land that became his plantation at the “T” in the Cooper River. The language of the warrants gave colonists free reign to claim land wherever they pleased so long as no one had registered a claim to the same tract. In fact, only two years earlier, some of the Etiwan people were living on the land Coming took out on the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper Rivers. It is uncertain if Etiwans still lived on and used these lands in 1672.7

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7 The quote is from the warrant John Coming used for 810 acres where he picked out the land at the “T” in the Cooper River in 1672. November 23, 1672, Warrants, 51–2. On early land policies, see Robert K. Ackerman, South Carolina Colonial Land Policies, (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1977), 20–37. After colonists started claiming lands on the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper Rivers, the Etiwan who lived there may have moved across the Cooper River to live with fellow Etiwan on the land today known as Daniel Island, which they also controlled in 1670. By the early 1680s, the Etiwan had moved somewhere to the east of Wando River. See Gene Waddell, Indians of the South
As Map 5.3 attests, these early colonial holdings around the original site of Charles Town were not the makings of grand plantations, although there were a few other areas colonists staked out for themselves early. The sum total of all this land, located between Wappoo Creek to the south and a large bend in Ashley River to the north, is less...
than 6000 acres. The largest, labeled “L” on the map, was 420 acres and belonged to Ashley, while the smaller plots were less than 50 acres and a few were as small as ten. It is likely, then, that virtually all of the indentured or enslaved people in the colony before 1672 were in this small area at least part of the time. After the “Temporary Agrarian Laws” made it to the colony in 1672, though, colonists spread out. It is unclear if some colonists had already staked out lands along lowcountry rivers before 1672 and the land warranting and granting process was in effect bestowing a legal claim of title for the situation already present on the ground. In any event, by 1672, colonists sought out particular types of land to set up plantations and in doing so, many ended up being great distances from the colonial center of Charles Town.

As colonists dispersed in space, so did the enslaved population of the colony. In many cases, enslaved people on distant plantations were in much closer proximity to Native American villages than to Charles Town. Henry Woodward’s plantation on Abgapoola Creek near the Stono River was much closer to the Stonos than to the central colonial settlements (Map 5.2). Enslaved people in Woodward’s outpost probably spent more time interacting with Stonos than with other European colonists or even enslaved people on other plantations. There are records of Woodward owning seven enslaved “negroes” in the 1680s, but surviving records are not comprehensive, so it is impossible to know if there were any more. Some of these people likely traveled back and forth to Charles Town and with Woodward on his Native American trading expeditions, but for the most part the enslaved people on Woodward’s plantation would have spent more time
among themselves and local Native Americans than anyone else. Enslaved people on other early plantations likely experienced a similar social life.  

One area where a cluster of early plantations sprang up in the early years was the upper Ashley River. In 1674, after nearly three years of recurring violent conflicts with the Kussoe people who lived between the Ashley and Edisto Rivers, South Carolinians made peace with the Kussoes and forced them to cede their lands west of the Ashley River. Shortly after the land cession, Ashley granted himself the lands on the western side of the upper Ashley River that became his St. Giles Kussoe plantation and trading post, where Henry Woodward ran the proprietary trade with the Westos. Two years prior, Maurice Morris, land surveyor for the colony, decided the same Kussoe land was the ideal location for Ashley’s plantation. It was not long after Ashley set up his operation that other colonists took lands nearby. In 1675, John Smyth founded a plantation across the river from St. Giles Kussoe and Jacob Waight took the land just downriver from Ashley. Waight’s land was about 2 ½ miles upriver from Thomas Butler’s 1672 grant (Map 5.4). There were other grants in the area, but these are the ones with documentary evidence of enslaved or indentured people.

For Woodward’s enslaved people, Land warrant for 400 acres, November 2, 1683, Warrants, 323–324.

In this map, each dot represents one enslaved or indentured person. The dots have been displayed randomly within each plat for better viewing, even though each living quarter would have been near the river.

As Map 5.4 illustrates and the previous chapter argues, even though colonists were largely specialists in bound laborers from Africa, North America, or Europe, the
relative proximity of plantations would have mattered when it came to social interactions. The enslaved and indentured people in Map 5.4 are represented according to the way colonists designated them by race. Even though the sites of Ashley’s St. Giles Kussoe plantation and Jacob Waight’s were somewhere around three miles apart, St. Giles Kussoe was a major trading location. Even closer, John Smyth’s plantation was across the river from Ashley’s, on a section of Ashley River where the distance across the water could be as little as 50 feet. Officials certainly granted lands along this section of the Ashley River in the 1670s and 1680 to other colonists, but these are the only plantations I have been able to identify with evidence of bound laborers from the early years. Some warrants were apparently never laid out, while others were granted only to have the colonist either never occupy the land or occupy it only briefly. Some of the land was later re-granted by colonial officials to different colonists as if the first grants had never existed. For my purposes, these three plantations made up a neighborhood of plantations in the 1670s and into the 1680s. Waight’s land was abandoned at some point and was granted to Richard Godfrey in 1700. Smyth’s lands diverted to the colony at his 1682 death and in 1696 became the location of the planned town of Dorchester. There was so much land available to colonize and Europeans were so interested in expanding the colony that many early grants lay abandoned for decades.

Isolated as they were from much of the larger Carolina project, owing to the diffused spatial culture of expansion, the bound laborers on Ashley’s, Smyth’s, and Waight’s plantations almost certainly would have had the opportunity to interact with each other on a regular basis. Since Ashley’s plantation was a trading hub, people from nearby locales would have frequented it, along with Native peoples from around the
southeast. Although there is no record of Ashley owning enslaved Native Americans on his plantation, his representatives, Andrew Percival and Henry Woodward, ran the proprietary trade with the Westos from St. Giles Kussoe. Native American captives therefore at least came through the area on their way to Charles Town to be sold to other colonies. In other words, Ashley’s plantation was at the very least used as a Native American slaving site. Ashley’s use of enslaved Native Americans for labor may be in question, but the same cannot be said of John Smyth. Smyth had no problem taking advantage of enslaved Native Americans at his plantation across the river, as his probate inventory shows. Jacob Waite owned a very different bound population, with only three European servant men in 1675. In the vicinity of St. Giles Kussoe, there were enslaved people of both African and Native American descent, as well as European indentured servants. Even though colonists in the seventeenth century generally specialized in bound laborers of one type or another, plantations constructed around St. Giles Kussoe shows that there could be ethnic diversity at the level of plantation neighborhoods. 10

A similar dynamic continued in the colony until the 1690s, when colonial officials began giving out new grants for lands previously “owned” by colonists who had either never occupied them, or had died with no heirs to take them up. Colonists expanded the Carolina project north to the Santee River (French Huguenots) and south to Port Royal

(Scots at Stuart’s Town) in the middle of the 1680s. Other colonists continued to fill in favorable spaces in between the Santee and Port Royal. The footprint of chattel slavery in the colony thus expanded as well, even though many of the enslaved people remained highly isolated, with many living on plantations nowhere near anyone else of their sociocultural background beyond possibly the few people directly toiling away with them or nearby free Native Americans. In fact, some early plantations were far closer to Native American towns than to other colonial outposts.

For instance, Paul Grimball, William Crabb, Gyles Russell, and Joseph Morton founded plantations near the lower Edisto River in the early 1680s (Map 5.5). On each of these plantations, save William Crabb’s, there is evidence of enslaved African people between 1680 and 1686. Gyles Russell controlled at least 5 enslaved Africans. During the raids by the Spanish on the Scottish Port Royal colony at Stuart’s Town in 1686, Spaniards supposedly “carried away 13 Negroes and Two white men Prisoners” from the northern plantation of Joseph Morton (governor of the colony) located along Toogoodoo Creek. A more likely scenario is that the enslaved men willingly went with the Spaniards to St. Augustine to avoid the depredations of isolated colonial enslavement at the behest of Morton. Paul Grimball’s plantation on Edisto Island was destroyed by the Spanish in the same expedition, and the Spaniards retreated with “17 Ethiopians and white servants,” who also probably decided to run away with the possibility of freedom in the Spanish colony. For argument’s sake, there were at least 25 enslaved Africans in total on these three plantations in 1686. Russell’s land was about six miles west of Grimball’s and Morton’s about six miles north of Russell. These distances were easily traversable in one day by water, weather permitting. But for enslaved people on Russell and Grimball’s
plantations, Edisto villages were even closer. Bohickets and Stonos were also living nearby across the Edisto River, and Kiawahs were no more than five miles to the east of the Stonos on the island currently bearing their name. In short, during the 1680s, there were far more Native Americans living in the region near the mouth of Edisto River than Europeans or Africans. Since physical proximity was a central component of regular social interactions in the early modern period, plantation neighborhoods like the one on the lower Edisto River in the 1680s certainly featured a great deal of interaction between enslaved and indentured peoples on early plantations and Native Americans outside of direct colonial control. But these interactions were not necessarily positive for the participants. If, for example, Paul Grimball had owned an enslaved Westo at his Edisto Island plantation, the Edistos living nearby may not have appreciated having members of their former slaving enemy so close. Then again, if Grimball (or someone else nearby) did own a Westo person, they were much more likely to be a woman or child than a man, which could have reduced Edisto animosity toward this hypothetical individual. Another possibility was that people from rival Native American or West African polities could have been enslaved on the same plantation. Either of these situations could have been upsetting or enraging to the enslaved people and a headache for the European colonists. On early plantations, if European colonists found themselves owning rivals of either other enslaved people or nearby indigenous people, they would have had reason to seek out trading the enslaved person for another bound laborer. Or perhaps the colonist would have had to figure out how to cope with enemies in the neighborhood, since the supply of captives in these early years was so sporadic.\footnote{MECSC. On Morton’s losses, see J. G. Dunlop, “Spanish Depredations, 1686,”}
Although Dunlop claimed Grimball lost “17 Ethiopians and white servants,” Grimball’s own accounting of his losses to the Spanish in the raid do not include any bound laborers. Grimball was an important colonist in South Carolina during the 1680s and 90s and there are records of him controlling enslaved people at a later date, so it does seem likely to me that there were probably bound laborers at his plantation in 1686. Perhaps this evidentiary curiosity can be explained by an accommodation between St. Augustine and Charles Town in the time between the 1686 raid and the 1689 date of Grimball’s accounting. Another possibility is that Dunlop was exaggerating the extent of the raids and Grimball didn’t lose any enslaved people to the Spanish at all. See “Paul Grimball’s Losses by the Spanish Invasion in 1686,” SCHGM 29, no. 3 (1928): 231–37. On travel times in this area during the 1680s, see J. G. Dunlop, “Capt. Dunlop’s Voyage to the Southward. 1687,” SCHGM 30, no. 3 (1929): 127–33.
Starting in the 1690s, the advent of rice agriculture in the colony made colonists rethink their relationship with environmental landscapes in the lowcountry. The swamps colonists had long avoided began being understood as potentially profitable locations. This, in conjunction with the location and importance of the Yamasee to the south of the colony to trade in Native American captives and skins, hemmed in the colony somewhat to the south. European colonists began taking up lands to fill in the spaces between neighborhoods and thereby gradually began bridging the spatial gaps in the colonial project while the overall footprint of the colony expanded as well.

In the early eighteenth century, there is much more extant data to use in making geospatial arguments. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), it is possible to map enslaved people in space and over time and better understand spatial dynamics of the social and cultural histories of the enslaved. One type of GIS analysis I will explore is called a “directional distribution,” which is one way to analyze a spatial dataset. Directional distribution analyses find the geographic mean of a spatial dataset and then calculate a central axis (or trend line) to which the data are collectively oriented. Finally, this analysis computes an ellipse containing these data within a pre-specified number of standard deviations. In my distribution analyses, I have used one standard deviation. This means that roughly $\frac{3}{4}$ of a particular datatype are contained within the ellipse. These analyses can be run on different variables in a dataset and will produce multiple ellipses on a single map that can be compared.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Appendix B.
In this case, my directional analyses are based on comparing the spatial dynamics of race in early South Carolina. The first map in the series is a comparison of enslaved African peoples and European indentured servants between 1670 and 1700 (Map 5.6). In this map, the distribution analysis of all bound laborers in the period with an ethno-racial descriptor attached is in black. The purple, which is the distribution of only enslaved Africans, is skewed south of the total dataset, and indentured servants are positioned northward when compared to the Africans. This means that colonists with indentured servants were more likely to have put them to work in the northern part of the colony than colonists with enslaved Africans. Indentured servants were dispersed up the Cooper River in a much smaller elliptical pattern than enslaved Africans, who were generally more spread out (larger ellipse), but also were much more likely to be forced by colonists to work in the southern parts of the colony along the Stono/Wadmalaw Rivers and sea islands southwest of Charles Town.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} This dataset covers such a long amount of time because the numbers of data are sparse in the early years. MECSC.
Since the evidence of ownership of enslaved Native Americans is fleeting in the early years of the colony, they do not make up a large enough dataset to compute geospatial analyses until the eighteenth century, even though they certainly were in the colony earlier. Between 1700 and 1720, the two major groups of bound laborers were enslaved Africans and enslaved Native Americans. Notice on the directional distribution for these years (Map 5.7) that the enslaved Native Americans were located primarily in
the northern part of the colony and centered on the Goose Creek area. The majority of enslaved Native Americans were located in a more confined area than enslaved Africans but were also situated on plantations farther inland. This means that colonists who decided to keep enslaved Native Americans lived, or wanted their bound laborers to live, on plantations closer to the paths leading to Charles Town through which Native American captive traders traveled on their way to market their human wares. It seems likely, then, that inland colonists could very well have purchased captive Native Americans to enslave and exploit from Native American or European slavers traveling through the area and thus bypassing the Charles Town marketplace. It is also no coincidence that many of the most notorious Native American slaver colonists lived within the ellipse encompassing one standard deviation of data on enslaved Native Americans, such as James Moore, James Moore, Jr., and John Wright, all of whom lived on or near Goose Creek.

Another reason for this concentration of enslaved Native Americans may have been geographic self-selection. Colonists who wanted to engage in trading (or servicing the trade) with Native Americans decided on colonizing these farther-inland locations in order to have easier access to trade and traders. Otherwise, in an era when colonists demanded navigable stream access at their plantation, why did James Moore decide to build his Boochawee plantation by a Native American crossroads with no direct navigable water access? People in close proximity to Native American slavers had easier access to Native American captives to enslave than did many other remote colonists. This dynamic would explain the compact space (compared with the rest of the enslaved population) of the ellipse containing two thirds of the enslaved population. It also means
that the “Goose Creek Men” who rose to dominance in the proprietary era were both strategic and lucky in their chosen spatial contexts. First, not all Native American slavers lived in the region encompassed by the 1700–1720 enslaved Native American ellipse, but trade (and violent primitive accumulation) was why many colonists lived there. These slavers quickly became the most economically successful colonists in Carolina. The Goose Creek Men were the first to achieve regular access to land, labor, and capital. It is therefore not coincidental that colonists around Goose Creek were some of the first to successfully cultivate rice. Second, rice may have been the answer to South Carolina’s agricultural production woes because it was planters in this inland region who first sold it commercially. By this I mean that it was these inland plantations, many of which were inexorably tied to Native American slaving, where the first colonial planter gentry arose because these colonists figured out how to grow rice, a crop well suited to their particular environmental contexts. If so, this would explain why rice became the major export commodity in the lowcountry instead of something else with more demand in England like long-staple cotton.  

14 John Stewart wrote of colonists near Goose Creek planting rice as early as 1690. Stewart, “Letters from John Stewart to William Dunlop,” SCHGM 32, no. 1 (1931): 6. In 1690, Stewart was managing Governor James Colleton’s plantation on the upper Cooper River (just north of the bounds of the 1700–1720 ellipse) and wrote to William Dunlop, who had returned to Scotland after the Spanish destroyed Stuarts Town in 1686, about his agricultural experiments. I have found no records of Colleton owning enslaved Native Americans, but John Stewart was a Native American slaver and James Colleton was accused of being a slaver and dealing with pirates as well. Wadboo was even further upriver on the western branch of the Cooper River, close to modern Moncks Corner, than the plantations inside the ellipse. At this point it is speculation, but perhaps the Lords Proprieters granted themselves “baronies” in the locations they did because of access to Native American trade and slaving. The proprietors were not making returns on investment in other ways, so maybe this is another spatial dynamic in the early colony.

On Colleton, see Chapter 1; on John Stewart and slaving, see Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717
In the period between 1720 and 1740, the spatial center of gravity shifted in the enslaved Native American population. As the power of the Goose Creek Men began to wane with the decline in the Native American captive trade and as rice planting increasingly became the central export economic activity, ownership of enslaved Native American populations shifted. 

Americans shifted farther south and broadened out (Map 5.8) toward the rice districts nearer the Stono and Edisto Rivers (and farther south, even though this area is outside the purview of my study). At the same time, notice how the ellipse for total people with racial identifiers listed almost directly correlates with the ellipse for enslaved African peoples. This is an indication that across the three periodizations of my current analysis (Maps 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8), bound labor was becoming more closely aligned with the designation “negro.” Even though there were more enslaved Native Americans listed in surviving records from the 1720s than any decade before or after, the number of captive Africans being imported to the colony was increasing much faster. In fact, there were more enslaved Native Americans in extant records from the 1720s (well after the decline in the Native American captive trade) than in all previous decades combined. Part of this is due to the nature of sources because enslaved people often turn up in documentary evidence at the end of a tenure somewhere, often in sources such as a bill of sale or probate inventory. It is therefore safe to assume a lag in time from when these people show up in a particular historical context and their documentation in that context. It follows that if there were more examples of enslaved Native Americans in the 1720s, after the decline in numbers of captive people coming into the colony in the 1710s, then most of these people had been on these plantations for years already. Nevertheless, this increase in conjunction with a drastic rise in the numbers of “mustees” (mixed Native American-African children) shows that there were many more enslaved people of direct Native American descent than we generally assume and they were spread throughout the colony.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} The number of enslaved Native Americans in my database for the years 1670 to
Although this dataset shows a southward slide of enslaved Native Americans and mustees in the time between 1720 and 1740, the instances where data of ownership of land and humans intersected are small in number. By this point in time, colonists had

1719 is 181. There were 188 in surviving records from the 1720s and 103 from the 1730s. There were also 63 “mustees” in the 1720s and 115 in the 1730s, whereas only one mention survives from earlier records. Of course, the population of enslaved Africans was increasing during the 1720s and 1730s. CSCDEP.
filled in the spaces between early plantations and had begun speculating on inland grants for future use or sale. Part of the reason my “All Data for Race” ellipse does not encompass land farther south is almost certainly due to the problems of mapping plantations in that direction—it is much more difficult and my spatial dataset is less complete the farther I get away from the Ashley and Cooper Rivers. This practical issue does not explain the fact that I do have plantations mapped down to the South Edisto River, and enslaved Native Americans and Mustees are skewed in that direction. Part of the answer comes from sheer volume. There were more (and increasingly so) enslaved Africans in the colony in the 1720s, and the numbers being imported by Atlantic slavers and Charles Town merchants skyrocketed in the 1730s. With greater numbers spread more evenly around the various areas of heaviest colonization, ⅔ of enslaved Africans being located in the most-heavily-colonized part of South Carolina between 1720 and 1740 makes sense. But what about the shift in the location of enslaved Native Americans from the 1700–1720 ellipse?
In the 1700–1720 ellipse showing the spatiality of enslaved Native Americans (blue ellipse, Map 5.9), the majority of Native Americans living as enslaved property in the colony followed a central axis nearly parallel to the general direction of the winding Cooper River with the ellipse centered on the Goose Creek area and reaching south to the Stono River. Over the next twenty years, the dataset shifted dramatically for enslaved
Native Americans while only expanding for both enslaved Africans and the entire dataset delineated by race. The biggest shift came in the location of enslaved Native Americans and Mustees. The 1700–20 ellipse measures 21 miles in length, while the 1720–40 ellipse is 26 miles. This means that the majority of enslaved Native Americans (within one standard deviation of the central directional axis) were more spread out in the data than in the previous window of time. In addition, the northern bounds of the 1720–1740 ellipse is eight miles to the south compared with 1700–1720, even as the ellipse lengthened.

Relative to the total number of enslaved Native Americans in my geospatial dataset, which is a subset of my Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples project, there were far more enslaved Native American and Mustee people farther to the south than earlier in the eighteenth century. This is particularly useful information because in this same period, rice planting ramped up in the low-lying areas to the southwest of Charles Town after European colonists decided these environments were even more conducive to growing rice than locations such as on plantations near Goose Creek, one of the early areas where rice was cultivated in South Carolina. This shift follows the trajectory of the colony, from Native American slavers (some of whom practiced rice culture) to rice planters, as well as the southward shift in Native American slaving (particularly trade with Yamasees) in the eighteenth century.

One of the southern colonists with enslaved Native Americans during the 1720s was Henry Bower, who must have forced enslaved Native Americans to work on his plantation long before any of these people showed up in surviving documents. Bower’s narrative arc from new colonist to well-off planter is typical in an early South Carolina context, with the exception that he seems not to have invested heavily in rice production
by the time of his death. Bower and his wife, Mary, show up in records as early as 1689 as executors of a will, but Bower was first granted a land warrant in 1697. Although later granted other lands, the Bowers seem to have resided on their plantation on the western side of Edisto Island at least since sometime in the 1690s (Map 5.10). By the time of Henry Bower’s death in about 1725, he had turned his operation into a diversified plantation based on marketable commodities. Among the accoutrement in Bower’s probate inventory were livestock and products produced from animals: sheep with shears, horses, swine, and cattle, along with steer hides, tallow, and beef were what some enslaved people were forced to labor upon. In terms of agriculture, Bower had “Indian Corn,” “Indian Pease,” cotton, a rice fan and two sieves, and a “tobacco ingine & bench vice.” Tar and staves, also present, were naval stores enslaved people produced through harvesting forests. Bower also had tools for numerous specialized occupations: joiner tools, whip- and cross-saws for sawyers, carpentry tools, smith tools, cooper tools, and even “turners tools” (for making pottery). Although Bower technically did grow rice, it would be hard to call him a “rice planter,” since he only had one rice fan and it appears he concentrated more on livestock products.16

Bower, having no adult sons, decided in his will to sell off his thriving plantation operations and split the proceeds between his adult daughters and widow. Although Bower was by no means a large planter at his death, with 17 enslaved people enumerated in his inventory, he was well-off and his plantation was close to being self-sufficient. In his inventory, along with 15 enslaved African people, were two Native Americans. The first enslaved Native American listed in his inventory (and earlier, will) was a woman named Lilly, whom he willed to his daughter, Mary Russell. Listed among the enslaved people to be sold with his plantation was a Native American man named Peter. Colonists usually listed their enslaved men beginning with their most valuable, and Peter was listed only behind a man named Tom, so it goes to reason that Peter was likely a craftsman of some sort. In sum, although Bower’s plantation was on the southern end of this study and
had enslaved Native American people in surviving documents from the 1720s, their story, at this level of abstraction, was in many ways typical. Bower exploited an ethno-culturally diverse enslaved population to carve numerous Atlantic commodities out of swamps and forest.\textsuperscript{17}

About 29 miles away from Bower’s plantation to the northeast, as the crow flies, was the plantation of Charlesworth Glover (Map 5.11). After the Tuscarora War, Glover purchased an inland plantation just north of the upper Ashley River a little over a mile from Dorchester along Eagle Creek and moved to the colony from North Carolina. It seems that in an era of colonial expansion, Glover wanted to emulate the Goose Creek Men by moving into a longer-colonized area and following their economic lead. Although ostensibly a planter, Glover’s main economic pursuits (at least in terms of his own effort) was always trading and negotiating with Native American polities, but particularly with Creeks. Glover ran Fort Moore (Savana Town) on the Savannah River, near the site of the Westo town decades earlier, and he also went on diplomatic missions for the colony of South Carolina. Running a plantation seems to have been the least of Glover’s worries, although the sources are silent as to how the plantation was managed. By the time of his death, Glover was well-off. His entire estate of moveable property was appraised to be worth £4436 12s 6p, which was not enough to consider Glover one of the richest men in the colony—a comparison point may be George Smith, whose inventory was taken in 1735 and was appraised at £15,552 2s 6p, or almost four times Glover’s

\textsuperscript{17} Henry Bower Will, July 26, 1724, MRIS, vol. B, SCDAH, S213002, 266–269; Bower inventory, \textit{ibid}.
inventory—but Glover was a well-off planter/trader controlling 20 enslaved people at his death.ⁱ⁸

Though Charlesworth Glover shaded more toward trading than planting as his main vocation, the similarities between how he ran his operation and Henry Bower (in an entirely different area of the colony) are striking. Bower’s plantation sat above riverine

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tidal swamps along the Edisto River near its confluence with the Atlantic Ocean, while Glover’s plantation was over 25 miles upriver from Charles Town Harbor and located on a small creek. But as his probate inventory attests, he shared many of the same goals of production that Henry Bower did on Edisto Island, with a similarly diverse enslaved population. The inventory included “Clean Rice” and 50 bushels of rough (or, not processed) rice, as well as “corn & pease in ye Corn house.” Along with this agricultural produce, Glover had 77 head of cattle, oxen, two swine, and 20 head of sheep. There were also carpentry tools, cooper tools, and brick-making tools. The enslaved people on Glover’s plantation made bricks, which was an important economic activity in certain areas of the colony where the clays in the soil were conducive to producing the building material. The soils on these two plantations were drastically different, with virtually no overlap in the soil types, according to later United States Department of Agriculture soil surveys. The soils made brickmaking attractive for Glover and impractical for Bower. In this way the hyper specificity of location in space mattered for the lives of the enslaved as well as the economic output of plantations, but generally speaking, Glover’s and Bower’s productive output was very similar. Besides Glover’s brick operation and Bower’s cotton production and dabbling in growing tobacco, they shared much in their plantation operations even though they were so far apart and their plantations were in very different environmental contexts.19

19 This plat may be off by some acreage. It is unclear if Glover owned some of the lands to the east of the plat I have drawn, although it seems likely he did since he did grow rice, in which he (or his manager) most likely ordered enslaved people to use inland swamp rice cultivation techniques. It more recent history, there was swampland encompassed by this plat, but either way Glover had direct access to at least some inland swampland. I used the USDA’s website, websoilsurvey.nrcs.usda.gov to survey the soils
The soil types may have been the impetus for Henry Bower and Charlesworth Glover to decide whether to go into brickmaking, but in one way they were similar: their enslaved workforce was made up of both Native American and African peoples. Bower owned Lilly and Peter, while Glover owned four enslaved Native Americans, Nane and another unnamed women, along with Phillis and Felicia, two “girls.” None of the four enslaved Native American women and girls was bequeathed to any of his descendants in his will, so it is reasonable to think Glover considered them to be field hands. While Bower and Glover lived in very different parts of the ever-expanding colony, they used the spaces under their control in similar manners, each exploited the labor of enslaved Native Americans and Africans, and in particular they both forced women of both ethnocultural backgrounds to labor on their plantations.20

The questions that initially animated my interest in using historical GIS came from wondering how the enslaved Native American population was diffused into the larger enslaved population of South Carolina. I wondered if these people were coerced into being part of the leading edge of Euro-American colonialism, parts of what some may call a colonial “frontier” or “borderland,” or possibly these peoples’ locations turned out to be a function of proximity to the sites of the trade with other Native American polities. My findings point more toward a correlation between regions where Native American slavers lived and finding records of enslaved Native Americans. This may

20 Henry Bower Inventory; Charlesworth Glover Inventory; Charlesworth Glover Will, December 28, 1730, WPA vol. 66, 13–17.
Enslaved Native Americans were isolated in newly controlled colonial spaces, but in South Carolina for most of the period under study, most spaces were isolated and often newly controlled. In this sense, enslaved Native Americans were dispersed—through the structures of the captive trade, the caprice of colonists, and the contingencies of history—throughout much of the enormous geography of the colony. They were a leading edge of colonialism, but in many cases no more than enslaved “saltwater” Africans fresh off the horrors of the Middle Passage. There was no giant cluster of plantations in early South Carolina with large numbers of colonists controlling enslaved Native Americans, even though in the first twenty years of the eighteenth century there were more of them living between the upper Ashley River, Goose Creek, and the “T” in the Cooper River than anywhere else in the colony. Enslaved Native Americans were therefore to a large degree spatially atomized at the level of the plantation among the larger enslaved African population. The ramification of this dynamic for cultural formation will be discussed in Chapter 7.

As the spaces between neighborhoods filled in during the early eighteenth century, enslaved Native Americans remained spread around; some colonists owned enslaved Native Americans, others did not. Plantation location seems to have had bearing on the ethnocultural makeup of coerced laborers when it came to Native Americans.

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21 I do not intend to overstate this point. Without yet being able to map all known colonists who owned enslaved people, I cannot say definitively that there were more enslaved Native Americans around where slavers lived, although the evidence points in that direction. There were slavers who lived all over the colony as well, so even if slavers sold captive Native Americans to their neighbors—which seems like was the case—enslaved Native Americans were not densely concentrated in one area.
Colonists who traded with Native Americans for captives to enslave like John Wright, James Moore, and Charlesworth Glover probably had a higher percentage of enslaved Native Americans on their plantations (although virtually all evidence points to slavers selling many more people than they kept), and there was a distinct spatial correlation between slaving and plantation location. The specific environmental context of plantations did help circumscribe the limits of what was possible for European colonists to force enslaved Africans and Native Americans to produce, but in a general sense, they were nonetheless very similar with respect to the producing for outside markets and internal consumption. If, by the first decades of the eighteenth century, plantation production was to a certain extent homogenous – a matter of degree of intensity between a few crops, animals, and mineral goods – can the same be said of the labor regimes? How did enslaved Native Americans fit into the ever-evolving task system on South Carolina plantations, if at all?
Chapter 6

The Maize and “Pease” Complex

We esteem not Puddings good, in the Guys of Hogs,
We with such Offal feed Platinum Dogs
And Pease, we know are good to feed fat Swine;
Strong Beer, and Toast, to make Men drunk betime;
If that's the Reasons, we English Grain should crave,
We'll leave it off, and follow those we have:
For good Rice-Puddings, doth it far exceed;
So does our best white Callivant Pease indeed:
Our Barbadoes Rum, and Madera Wine,
Pleases Planters better than Strong Beer that's fine,
In which we put white Rice-Bread Toast,
If Farmers had such, they'd thereof boast.
-Early eighteenth century poem from South Carolina

In 1699 Edward Randolph, Surveyor General of Customs in the English colonies, wrote to the Board of Trade about the state of economic production in South Carolina. Randolph relayed that colonists had busied themselves with all sorts of products such as “Cotton, Wool, Ginger, Indigo, etc.” None of these crops, however, had appeared to be promising enough to drive heavy investment. Instead, colonists were “set upon making Pitch, Tar, and Turpentine, and planting rice, and can send over great quantityes yearly, if they had encouragement from England to make it, having about 5,000 Slaves to be employed in that service.” Randolph believed that promoting commodity exports from the colony by suspending duties – mentioning specifically rice, pitch, and tar – would in turn jumpstart the economy. Randolph was not alone, however, in seeking to promote the colony’s economic development through the production of staples. In the same year,

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William Thornburgh sent to the Lords of Commissioners of Trade “a sample of Carolina rice” so they could view the possibilities of producing the grain in South Carolina. As it turned out, naval stores (tar, pitch, and turpentine) were especially efficient to produce as a byproduct of clearing land for agricultural use. Then, in 1700, Randolph wrote that Carolina planters had “now arrived at the right method of raising and husking rice,” probably meaning they had learned some or all of this processing knowledge from one or more enslaved African hailing from the rice-growing regions of West Africa. Colonists had long experimented with growing rice, but even when they determined the crop was agriculturally viable, there were other problems to overcome. A lack of labor and capital along with successful strategies for their implementation hindered colonists’ visions of exporting vast amounts of agricultural produce for profit.²

In the early years of the Carolina project, colonists had access to enormous amounts of land relative to their small numbers. Carolinians, however, lacked the labor and capital necessary for wide-scale production. Colonists made use of their abundance of land by raising cattle and hogs in an open range. As colonists accumulated more capital, some through the exportation of provisions to the Caribbean but more through the trade with Native Americans for animal skins and especially people, the labor and capital factors of production began catching up with land. Some colonists began undertaking more intensive production, especially of rice and naval stores. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, naval stores emerged as major items of export production. Requiring

more labor than free-ranging cattle but less than staple agriculture, clearing forests and producing naval stores became big business in South Carolina. Adding to the on-the-ground realities of production in South Carolina, the English empire had a bounty on the production of naval stores, making them more lucrative. The downside to naval stores was the competition: virtually all English colonial outposts produced them, outside of some of the Caribbean islands.³

Colonists and proto-planters built a heterogeneous enslaved society and in turn gave themselves a broader range of knowledge from which to draw when managing their plantations. By the early eighteenth century, South Carolina planters increasingly concentrated production in four areas. First, naval stores provided them with much-needed income and served a dual purpose in that cutting down trees was also a prerequisite for preparing land for agricultural use. Second, especially after 1708 and 1709, planters increasingly moved toward the production of rice, a process that could dovetail with the production of more naval stores.⁴ Third, planters continued raising cattle. Very little labor was required to maintain huge stocks of cattle; each was marked


⁴ The difference in rice exports between 1708 and 1709 was drastic, going from 675,327 pounds in 1708 to 1,510,679 in 1709 and continued to trend upwards through the 1730s. See Richard Dwight Porcher, Jr. and William Robert Judd, *The Market Preparation of Carolina Rice: An Illustrated History of Innovations in the Lowcountry Rice Kingdom* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014), 17.
with an individual planter’s brand or ear cropping. Fourth, and arguably most important, planters set about producing food in order to maximize enslaved labor for use in other, more-marketable activities. The goal with provisioning was to produce the most food with the least amount of effort so as to avoid siphoning too much labor away from commodity production. Historical contingencies had aligned for colonists; just as planters began to understand rice as a possibly viable staple commodity, the continental slave trade in Native Americans approached its peak in the southeast. It is no coincidence that some of the first areas to produce rice were plantations along Goose Creek. Many of the colonists with holdings on Goose Creek were also heavily involved in the Native American captive trade. Instead of selling all these enslaved peoples to the Caribbean or other colonies (especially New England), many colonists held at least a few indigenous people in bondage for themselves.

Two prevailing developments in South Carolina colonial historiography have minimized the importance of enslaved Native Americans in the creation of the lowcountry empire based on rice production. First, scholars have considered the

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5 Many of the records of cattle markings are extant. For an example, see Livestock Marks Book, 1695–1725, S213012, SCDAH. On the economics and practical implications of lumber in the lowcountry, see S. Max Edelson, “Clearing Swamps, Harvesting Forests: Trees and the Making of a Plantation Landscape in the Colonial South Carolina Lowcountry,” Agricultural History 81, no. 3 (2007): 381–406.

importance of enslaved Native Americans as a source for capital. The violent capital accumulation of the trade in Native American captives offered some colonists valuable export capital they could then transform into what they really wanted: enslaved Africans. Second, scholars have focused their energies on debating the agricultural origins of rice in the colony and concentrated on the central questions of how much credit do Europeans on one hand and Africans, on the other, deserve for the rice complex and the rise of staple agriculture in the lowcountry. Beginning in the 1970s, the main historiographical trend was to carve out a place for African knowledge and skillsets in the growing and processing of the grain. Over time this thread of inquiry began to acknowledge more and more ways in which African slaves were fundamental to the creation of the rice complex and not mere unskilled labor. Today there is consensus that enslaved African peoples were critical in the development and elaboration of rice production in the lowcountry, and the debate is generally over to what degree. Conclusions over the actual genesis of rice in Carolina are much more contentious. One side argues that the rice culture as it developed in Carolina could only have been produced by wholesale environmental-cultural transportation of African agricultural ways across the Atlantic, while the other argues the actual people and place of its original cultivation in Carolina are murky at best. My own reading of the sources leads me to think we cannot know who originated rice cultivation. European colonists wanted to try growing it before 1670. There were enslaved Africans in the early colony, some of whom may have been from the rice-growing regions in West Africa. Somehow out of this milieu came upland rice cultivation. The arguments for West African knowledge systems transferring to the lowcountry are much more compelling with the elaboration and innovation of rice culture over the eighteenth century, which
began to look more and more like the sophisticated water control systems and processing methods of mangrove swamp cultivation in parts of West Africa. Once again, however, left out of these debates entirely are the ways enslaved Native Americans, somewhere around one-fourth of the colony’s slave population during the early eighteenth century when rice went from a solution to the solution, fit into the production of rice.7

These historiographical debates have been important in showing the centrality of the trade in Native American captives to the economy of early South Carolina and the geopolitical reorganization of southeastern native societies. They have simultaneously permitted us to understand the contributions of peoples of African descent made to the formation of the lowcountry economy and society. However, enslaved Native Americans made up one quarter of the enslaved population in the colony during the period when rice culture was developing and were as integral to colonial society as other colonists, free or

enslaved. According to historian Max Edelson, as colonists “synthesized agricultural traditions from throughout the Atlantic world to plant the Lowcountry, settlers became planters.” What these synthetic landscapes lacked were solutions to the problem of a long-term production complex. As late as 1687, colonists argued South Carolinians had not found “any Commodityes fit for the market of Europe but a few Skins they purchased from the native Indians and a little Cedar with which they helpe to fill the ship that brings the skins for London.” Ballast as a major export, it seems, was a target for jokes about 1680s South Carolina.8

As useful as these debates have been, it is my aim to shift the focus to the way Carolina planters utilized the knowledge and skills of enslaved Native Americans to manage plantations. South Carolina colonists often controlled a heterogeneous population of bound laborers, originating in Africa, North America, and Europe, and used these peoples’ skillsets to their pecuniary advantage. Native Americans from southeastern North America were proficient at intercropping — or growing multiple crops on the same land — a group of crops centered on maize and various types of legumes (pulse). Maize and, as the colonists referred to them, “Indian Pease” were nutritious and ecologically compatible, allowing large quantities of food to be produced with minimal labor.9

8 Edelson, Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, 50; British National Archives 5/288, fol. 120, cited in John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 171.

9 Most of the agricultural efficiencies that come from this type of intercropping derive from the ability to produce more calories on less land. On the labor and nutrition of this Native American agricultural complex, see the work of Jane Mt. Pleasant, “A New Paradigm for Pre-Columbian Agriculture in North America,” Early American Studies 13 (Spring 2015), 374–412; and “Food Yields and Nutrient Analyses of the Three Sisters, A Haudenosaunee Cropping System,” Ethnobiology Letters 7, no. 1 (2016), 87–98.
Planters understood the importance of these crops and used their enslaved Native Americans to grow them, allowing other (largely African) laborers to concentrate more on producing export commodities.

By studying fragmentary evidence of plantation management, this chapter traces how enslaved Native Americans were used on the plantation and shows their significance well beyond their eventual demographic decline during the 1720s. Probate inventories offer a means of deciphering how colonists ran their plantations, but very few are extant before 1720 with slaves and produce enumerated. In fact, there are none between 1700 and 1710 and only five between 1710 and 1720, none of which provide much evidence of plantation production. After the Crown provisionally took over administration of the colony in the early 1720s, the data in the probate inventories became much clearer. By the 1720s, there is evidence that planters directed enslaved “Negroes” to intercrop maize and pulse on plantations without enslaved Native Americans. Many (but not all) rice plantations still used Native American agricultural practices by intercropping corn and pulse, and often these planters also had Native American slaves in their inventories. Of the very few sources from the era that are available, three stand out: an account book dating between 1699 and 1707 that belonged to plantation manager Daniel Axtell, and promotional pamphlets published by Thomas Nairne in 1710 and John Norris in 1711. Studying exports can provide us with useful perspectives of what planters produced through coercive labor, but are silent concerning how they produced crops and other labor strategies went into export commodity production. After a discussion of provisioning strategies in English colonial and West African contexts and southeastern Native American agricultural practices, Nairne, Norris, and Axtell will help fill in the spaces left
by the absence of sufficient planter documentary sources for the earlier years. Then, I will turn to the broader economic and environmental contexts in which the colonists’ decisions to invest heavily in rice made it seems like a good idea. It was not coincidental that the rise of rice came on the heels of the largest influx of Native American captives in the history of the colony, but climatic and economic pressures also aligned for planters. Finally, I will use probate inventories for evidence of enslaved Native Americans and intercropping.10

Provisioning and security were central concerns of displacive colonial projects. All English colonies faced the problem of feeding colonists, both free and coerced. South Carolina proved to be somewhat unique in how colonists decided to deal with the problem of caloric energy when considered alongside other English plantation colonies. This distinctiveness was not because they raised livestock, as was a goal of every colony—even tiny, isolated Bermuda—but instead Carolina colonists came to a novel cluster of crops they forced enslaved people to plant for their own subsistence and to sell in intercolonial provisioning markets. In Barbados, which was in many ways the blueprint for South Carolina’s socioeconomic organization, planters by the mid-seventeenth century were ordering bondsmen and bondswomen to grow “Corn, Yeams [yams], Bonavists [a type of African bean], Cassavie [cassava], Potatoes,” as well as “Oranges, Limons, Lymes, Plantines, [and] Bonanoes,” according to Richard Ligon. Colonists were also planting crops among fallen trees. Enslaved Africans ate plantains, which were “the only food they live upon.” Similarly, around the same time, Henry Drax

wrote about the management of his sugar plantation in Barbados and called for planting rows of maize between rows of sugar while elsewhere growing cassava, millet (a West-African grain), potatoes, and plantains. But by the eighteenth century, due to its small size and the profitability of sugar, Barbados was almost completely dependent on provisioning imports from places like the Carolinas, Chesapeake, and New England until the late-eighteenth century.\(^\text{11}\)

As historian Carolyn Arena has recently pointed out, enslaved Native Americans were taken from Guiana to Barbados (which had been depopulated before English colonization) from the very beginning of the colony in 1627. Enslaved Africans were also present among the initial colonizers but were not imported in great numbers until the price of Brazilian sugar dropped in the early 1640s and English investment underwrote larger slaving importations. The crops Ligon and Drax promoted for provisioning had come through the Columbian Exchange, although none were from Europe. In Barbados they grew tropical cultivars from Africa — yams, Bonavist beans, and especially plantains — and from the Caribbean, Central, and South America — cassava, potatoes, and maize. The provisioning staples in Barbados and Jamaica, taken from the Spanish by the English in the 1650s, remained cassava, millet, yams, and plantains. Although these crops were planted using intercropping strategies, only maize and potatoes were grown in

the subtropical climate of lowcountry South Carolina. Meanwhile, by the second half of the seventeenth century, colonists in Virginia and Maryland were producing maize and wheat, the crop Europeans always desired. In one example, William Byrd I directed labor toward maize and wheat flour production for trading to Caribbean sugar colonies. The provisioning complex in South Carolina therefore differed from the Chesapeake colonies as well, as wheat was not a major provisioning crop in the lowcountry.12

Another potential route for the transmission of the maize and peas complex in South Carolina was West Africa. Since peoples of West-African descent came with the first colonists to Carolina, African agricultural knowledge came as well. Europeans first noted maize as being grown by West-African peoples along the Gold Coast at the beginning of the seventeenth century. West Africans adopted maize as “a vegetable niche

crop tucked within a complex system,” according to historian James C. McCann. In other words, maize (along with other American crops such as cassava and potatoes) was added to West-African agricultural regimes as one more crop among many in a risk-reducing diversified system of crops. Since there was no large-scale migration of Native Americans to West Africa, seeds and rudimentary knowledge of how to grow these crops was what made it to Africa. This is in direct contrast to the case of the arguments in Judith Carney’s *Black Rice* whereby an entire agricultural regime was transported across the Atlantic to South Carolina in the hulls of slaving ships. Instead of growing maize with “Indian Pease,” West Africans learned to intercrop maize with cowpeas, with which they were long familiar. But the methods West Africans used in their intercropping were not the same as Native Americans. It is therefore probable that the maize and peas complex of colonial South Carolina came directly from enslaved Native Americans and not from the Caribbean or West Africa.\(^{13}\)

> As systems of both knowledge and production, indigenous American agriculture proved central to colonization in early Carolina, as it had in every European colonial project in the Americas. Europeans were astounded at the productivity of Native American food systems. In particular, they marveled at the production of maize.

Indigenous peoples in southeastern North America practiced a style of agriculture that was based on the concept of intercropping, involving the interlacing of flora species over the same area in ways where the selected species complemented each other environmentally as well as nutritionally. Cultures could diverge somewhat regarding specific crops planted, but the staples were maize and pulse. Maize was fundamental to southeastern Native peoples’ ways of life. By the early modern period the benefits of maize and its supplemental crops had been adopted universally overland for well over 1000 miles inland from the Ashley River in every direction. There were enough similarities across cultural and linguistic boundaries that generalizations about the way agriculture worked as a gendered labor system, as well as maize’s place in southeastern Native Americans’ understandings of their own identity, can be made without overly distorting the array of indigenous cultures Carolina colonists interacted with in the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries.

Although there is evidence that the move to the cultivation of maize in the centuries before 1492 may have led to worse nutrition of its early adopters, by the early modern period, the culture of maize had been elaborated to such an extent that supplemental crops made the complex both prodigious and nutritious. Pulses (legumes — in this case “pease” and beans) were nitrogen-fixing for the soil, whereas maize extracted nitrogen. Low-lying crops such as squash or pumpkins shaded the intercropped maize and pulses, while also blocking sunlight to keep unwanted weeds from growing. In short, Native Americans in southeastern North America had devised an agricultural system that may have appeared to be chaotic and even lazy from the perspective of European observers, but in terms of labor input and nutritional output, was prodigious. Native
Americans, through their agricultural regimes, demonstrated an acute awareness of soil management. In South Carolina, colonists understood the power of indigenous foodways and sought to co-opt them for their own ends.\textsuperscript{14}

An excellent example of how Native Americans understood the origin of their agricultural ways, inextricably intertwined with their personal and gendered identities, is on full display in the Cherokee story of Selu. According to Cherokee legend, Selu ("Corn") and her husband, Kana Ti ("Lucky Hunter"), had two sons. The sons began wondering if their mother was a witch and watched her through the cracks in their cornhouse. They saw

Selu standing in the middle of the room with the basket in front of her on the floor. Leaning over the basket, she rubbed her stomach - so - and the basket was half full of corn. Then she rubbed her armpits - so - and the basket was full to the top with beans. They boys looked at each other and said, 'this will never do; our mother is a witch. If we eat any of that it will poison us.' The sons did kill their mother, but they dragged her body around the circle, and whenever her blood fell on the ground the corn sprang up.\textsuperscript{15}

Selu, then, became the personification of the maize complex, and as a woman, she helped explain the gendered division of labor in Cherokee society. Ultimately, women were the agricultural experts, but men and boys were not without training in agricultural practices as well.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{15} James Mooney, Myths of the Cherokee (New York: Dover Publications, 1900), 242–52.

\textsuperscript{16} On Selu, see Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 17; and Tom Hatley,
Women began the annual planting rhythm with the sowing of household crops. Planting a fast-growing strain of maize that took only two months to harvest, along with other complementary crops, women were the sole tenders of gardens. Complicating gendered conceptions of Native American agriculture, men began the planting cycle with the communal village fields in May, after the household gardens were planted. Men first cut down trees (in a new field) or saplings (a previously cultivated field) and then burned the underbrush. Next, the entire village went to the fields to plant the crops in these communal fields. Men joined with the women and children to make sure the village’s crop was planted. After the village fields were sowed in maize, they then attended to various types of pulse and other low-growing crops such as “Pompkins, Gourds, Squashes, Mellons, Cucumbers” and “Potatoes.” In 1664 while exploring the rivers around the lowcountry, William Hilton found “several plats of Ground cleared by the Indians after their weak manner, compassed round with great Timber-Trees; which they are no way able to fall, and so keep the Sun from their Cornfields very much; yet nevertheless we saw as large Cornstalks or bigger, than we have seen any where else.” Although most field labor was performed by women, all Native American peoples took part in the production of food from childhood through adulthood and although men only took part in the preparation, planting, and harvesting of the communal fields, they possessed the knowledge of the agriculture of their people. By the time of the founding of

the 1670 colony of Carolina, English colonists knew to seek out this native agricultural knowledge as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{17}

Although the Lords Proprietor envisioned a colonial landscape of rationalized English-style wheat fields and well-ordered gardens sitting alongside fenced cattle, their initial orders to the deputy of the governor (and second governor) of the colony, Joseph West, were for the colonists “to be employed about planting Indian Corne, Beanes, Pease, Turnipps, Carretts & Potatoes for Provisions” and continued that West should seek out local Native Americans to learn “the proper season to plant Corne & Beans & Pease.” Local knowledge and the reputation of Native American agriculture as the best strategy for gaining a foothold on the continent won out over the English-style ideal colonial planners hoped for in the long run. The broader goals of English empire-building and promoting the cultivation of commodities unavailable within the Anglo-Atlantic system such as cotton, silk, wine, were secondary to finding a mere subsistence. As historian Joyce Chaplin has pointed out, although knowledge about Native American agriculture had diffused across the English Atlantic during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, those

taking part in new colonial ventures always sought out local indigenous peoples to assist in crop production, in terms of both labor and knowledge. English colonists understood local environmental contexts mattered.18

Mississippian Native American societies developed strict hierarchical social structures around maize agriculture, the remains of which can still be seen in the ruins of giant mounds in places like Cahokia, Illinois, and the Etowah Mounds in northern Georgia. But by 1670, the social shock instigated by colonialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through warfare, slavery, and disease, dubbed a “shatter zone” by anthropologist Robbie Ethridge, was enough to force native peoples to reorganize themselves socially. Social reorganization did not dislodge maize cultivation as their main staple choice, though. Even with major social dislocation and new crops introduced through the Columbian Exchange, the maize/beans complex remained the system optimized for indigenous peoples to cultivate for subsistence. English colonists therefore knew the types of knowledge and labor existed to aid their colonial incursions on the continent.19


Though it is likely impossible to parse out at an individual level the cultural background of virtually any of the specific Native Americans who either lived in South Carolina during the early years of the colony as slaves, or interacted with colonists through less directly coercive means, in many ways regional indigenous agricultural regimes were very similar. Like Cherokees and their understanding of themselves through the story of Selu, agriculture was typically considered to be the domain of women. But there were exceptions to such a simple gendered reading of Native American societies. Placed in a different context, all southeastern Native American peoples could potentially be coerced into using their knowledge and skill in the maize/beans complex toward other ends: those of European planters. Although indigenous peoples in the southeast based their agricultural regimes on intercropping maize, some sort of pulse, and a ground-cover plant (usually assumed to be squash in general literature), they also grew other edible crops that modern westerners would only see as weeds. In addition, they used swidden techniques when clearing new fields and planted crops among the stumps, which made intercropping an even more efficient use of space and labor. Native American agriculture in the southeast, then, was extremely efficient at maximizing caloric output while minimizing labor requirements. It was largely for these reasons that European colonists understood indigenous foodways as a practical solution for the problem of sustenance in early colonial projects. The founding of Carolina was in this sense little different except for in one significant area: Carolina was the first English colony to condone chattel slavery from the outset.20

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20 *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a “pulse” as “the edible seeds of leguminous plants cultivated for food.” I prefer to think of these plants in general terms as pulses because the specific botanical species they were growing are usually obscured in the
The demography of enslaved Native Americans in South Carolina factors into the labor-knowledge of the enslaved in the colony and affected how Native Americans were used. Of 339 enslaved Native Americans enumerated in extant records between 1670 and 1730, 153 (45%) were women, 43 (13%) were girls, 7 (2%) were female with no age listed, and 51 (15%) were boys. In this systematic accounting of the surviving records, three out of every four enslaved Native American were of the gender or age to be agricultural workers in their home society; there were very few men. South Carolina slave holding colonists therefore possessed enslaved Native Americans who were potential provisioning laborers by an overwhelming percentage compared with those with the gendered expectations of doing other types of work, even though men also took part in planting communal crops in southeastern native societies. But gendered divisions of labor in native societies did not mean men and women always worked in expected ways on plantations. Virtually all Native American captives kept in South Carolina as enslaved people had the capacity to grow the maize/bean complex. Yet this does not, on its own, explain how colonists utilized their labor. The writings of Thomas Narine, John Norris, and Daniel Axtell clarify how colonists used enslaved Native Americans and how they relied on their expertise.\textsuperscript{21}

John Norris and Thomas Nairne wrote their pamphlets for publication in Great Britain to promote immigration to South Carolina. Each described the environmental conditions of the colony and how one should go about setting up and running a

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\textsuperscript{21} CSCDEP.
plantation. The tracts are therefore part propaganda and part lived experience. For instance, their descriptions about the salubrious weather are less believable than the methods they promoted for plantation management. Carolina was hot, humid, and disease-ridden. But each author wrote about the same agricultural undertakings. A new colonist should plant corn, “Indian pease,” and rice, and each author gave details about how to make a new plantation function. For colonists, Norris thought “Indian Corn,” which he wrote Carolina colonists called “Virginia Wheat,” was the most useful crop for a new planter. Continuing, Norris wrote of “near Twenty Sorts of Indian Pease and Beans, some of them very good for Food, exceeding the best English Pease.” By 1710 rice had become a viable commodity, so Norris and Nairne wrote that new colonists should set up a plantation to produce exportable rice. Rice was the center of the ideal plantation, but neither author argued that it should be the sole crop cultivated. The milling process of rice was inefficient to the point that a skilled slave woman using a mortar and pestle could only expect about sixty-five percent whole, and thus marketable, grains. The rest were broken during milling. Most yielded less. Slaves therefore ate maize, pulse, and the unmarketable rice produced on the plantation.²²

Beginning around Michaelmas (September 29), Norris suggested that a new colonist should take his slaves or servants and cut down all the trees in an intended field, leaving a stump of around three feet in length. Then, colonists should take the logs and cut them to lengths of “Eleven or Twelve Foot long” and build a fence around the field. Norris does not discuss cattle, but fencing in croplands was likely to keep out all the free-ranging cattle. Next, the incipient planter should pile up tree limbs and “together with the

²² Norris, Selling a New World. 89–90; Carney, Black Rice, 126.
Under-Shrubs, being grub[bed], or rooted up, is all cast into Heaps” and left until spring. In February or March, the land was then burned, in a nod to Native American swidden agricultural practices. Norris wrote of planting maize and “Pease” in “March, April, or May, or a Week in June” and after breaking the soil

we plant an English Acre of Land by Dropping about Five Grains in each Hole so made, which is cover'd with Part of the Earth dug from thence; then, when the Corn is so planted, we, with our Hoes, which is about nine Inches broad in the Mouth, cut up the Grass, Weed, and Trash, whatever it be that grows in the Field amongst the Corn… then, about a Month after the Corn is planted, we make smaller Holes, with out Hoes, between each Hold of planted Corn, into which we drop Eight or Ten Indian Pease, less than an English Peck suffices to seed an entire Acre, which being cover'd very slightly with Earth, the Pease and Corn grows together ‘till separated at Harvest.

Norris advocated intercropping maize and pulse in the manner of Native American agriculturalists. From one acre, a planter could expect “twelve or fifteen Bushels or more” of pulse and “Twenty or Twenty Five Bushels of Corn, sometimes more; there has been Forty bushels of Corn from an Acre, besides twenty of Pease,” all coming from planting a half bushel each of maize and pulse. Nairne was less specific about the methods for growing crops, but offered estimates of what could be expected come harvest: after being seeded with one gallon of maize, one acre of “Indian Corn” would produce somewhere between eighteen and thirty bushels, along with six bushels of “Indian Pease, which run like a Vine among the Corn.” These harvests must have astounded British readers used to the lower-yielding wheat harvests. South Carolina colonists had, in the name of efficiency, forsaken the European ideal of single-crop fields. Making this point explicit, Norris argued “one Acre of good Rice, is as Valuable as two or three Acres of English Grain.” He probably was not far off in that assessment, whether
meaning “as Valuable” either in terms of amount of grain produced or in profits one could expect.  

Norris also thought that in one year, a “good Labouring Man” servant or enslaved person could “clear, fence, plant, hoe, harvest, and beat out, or thrash, at least four Acres of Corn and Pease,” or “Three Acres of Rice.” One enslaved person could therefore produce close to one hundred bushels of corn, or more, and around forty bushels of pulse; Native American agricultural ways could be put to use by planters to feed large numbers of people with few laborers. In conjunction with the production of naval stores and rice, the maize/pulse complex was what allowed South Carolina planters the ability to direct more of their coerced labor away from sustenance. Although many scholars have argued that enslaved people in South Carolina started out by producing most or all of their own food, it seems more likely planters divided up the labor—especially if they had enslaved Native Americans on their plantation—and directed food production for the entire population, free and enslaved. Scholars have argued that slave provisioning took off around 1720, but this was likely because the sources are much better after 1720, where there is more evidence of provisioning in probate inventories. Contra to this interpretation, clergyman Francis Le Jau, who lived on Goose Creek, an area of early rice adopters, wrote in 1710 “the Slaves shall be fed and provided for by the Masters, and the whole time of the Slaves shall be their Masters.” Nairne and Norris show how individual

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23 Nairne and Norris, *Selling a New World*, 96–104.
In the early 1680s, London merchant Daniel Axtell began promoting migration from the British Isles to Carolina and planned on migrating there with his family. He was most likely the son of an officer in Oliver Cromwell’s army who oversaw the trial of Charles I and was later executed in 1660 after the restoration of the Crown. Axtell and another Londoner, Joseph Morton, were instrumental in convincing hundreds of colonists to migrate to Carolina and were each rewarded with the feudal title of Landgrave. Morton took up lands to the south of Charles Town along the Edisto River and quickly became the governor of the colony. “Daniell Axtell of London Marcht” received a warrant for three thousand acres on December 13, 1680. He did not spend much time in Carolina before his death in 1684. Daniel Axtell’s son, Holland, took his father’s title of Landgrave, but his widow, Rebecca Axtell, lived on and oversaw their main plantation, named Newington. The plantation was located on the upper reaches of the Ashley River, near the present city of Summerville. Newington was probably the result of Axtell’s original 1680 grant of three thousand acres, and this plantation has the only surviving account book from the early years of the colony.

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25 Axtell warrants are in Warrants, December 13, 1680 and for Lady Axtell, see February 24, 1687: “James Colleton ordered for 2900 acres to be laid out to Dame Rebecca Axtell due to her for the arrival of Landgrave Daniell Axtell and Lady Axtell, John Hulton, Mary Hulton, Rebecca, Hollan Elizabeth and Ann Axtell, William and Daniel Hulton.” On Axtell, see Alexander Moore, “Daniel Axtell’s Account Book and the Economy of Early South Carolina,” SCHM 95, no. 4 (1994): 280–301; Salley,
Rebecca Axtell hired a younger relative, Daniel Axtell, in 1699 to run her business interests in Carolina, which included a sawmill, a tannery, and a tar kiln, as well as the Newington plantation, which was one of the largest in the area. Rebecca Axtell added another 4,400 acres to the plat after the Landgrave’s death. Between 1699 and 1707 the younger Daniel Axtell oversaw the production of numerous commodities including lumber, naval stores, and leather. At Newington, Daniel Axtell produced upland rice, corn, and salted beef for export. But all the production of the plantation was not intended for the Atlantic trade. Enslaved people at Newington also produced beef, pork, honey, eggs, cotton, and tallow for local markets, along with rice and maize. The account book of Daniel Axtell covers his dealings on behalf of Rebecca Axtell’s interests, and Daniel was paid one fifth of the net profits from the operation as compensation. This invaluable document is the best contemporary evidence available to us that can help us understand the workings of early plantations in South Carolina. Newington was an exceptional plantation enterprise in that it was the central cog in a much more grandiose operation than many other colonists could afford to run. In terms of how the agricultural output was managed, it was most certainly akin to others in the area. Although the main goal of the plantation was staple crop production to sell on open Atlantic-wide markets, much of the business Axtell noted in the book were conducted locally, mostly with neighbors along the upper Ashley River.26


There is no way to know the exact makeup of the enslaved population Daniel Axtell coerced into working in these different business ventures, but it is clear that the population consisted of both enslaved Native Americans and Africans. There are hints in the account book as to how he employed some of the enslaved individuals whose labor was at his disposal. Daniel Axtell understood Newington plantation as the central operation in the business, and any labor moved over to the sawmill, kiln, or tannery were considered by Axtell to be debts owed back to Newington. Some of Rebecca Axtell’s enslaved African people were put to work at the sawmill, which was accounted for as credits owed to the plantation. Axtell also rented the use of a house and an “Indan woman” from the mill, each of which had previously been leased to William Norman, Jr., from 1701 to 1703, to a different unnamed colonist. In his 1692 will, Holland Axtell gave two slaves to his mother, Rebecca: an African man named Guy and an “Indian Boy” named Nero, which adds more proof of a heterogeneous enslaved labor force including numerous Native Americans in the population at Newington. Axtell also rented out other slaves to his neighbors, like he did with “negro Sary” for “6 royals & ½” in 1705. But according to the account books, the renting of enslaved people outside of Axtell’s operations was rare.\textsuperscript{27}

The local economy around Newington shows that planters traded different foodstuffs among themselves. Using a double booking system, where each left page had the debits for an account and the right page, the credits, Axtell was able to keep up with his book debt. For instance, in 1701, there are eleven debits to “Mr. Hawkes,” who owned a plantation to the east of Newington. Newington was not producing enough food

\textsuperscript{27} Will of Holland Axtell, WPA Vol. 1.
to supply all the enslaved people working in Axtell’s disparate ventures. Axtell therefore had to purchase potatoes, maize, and “Indan Pease” from his neighbor, who possessed a surplus. Likewise, in 1699, Axtell purchased four bushels of (probably English) peas and eight bushels of “Indan pease” from Thomas Osgood, another neighbor. But there were fluctuations in the flow of this local trade. Sometimes Axtell sold maize to his neighbors when he had a surplus. The summary of food sold from the plantation in 1702 shows the varying markets Axtell directed the production of Newington toward. Axtell sold 6,000 pounds of rice (probably rough, or not milled) to Charles Town merchant and planter George Logan, and 390 bushels of maize to Joseph Boone, Rebecca Axtell’s son-in-law who she had given 1,000 acres adjoining her lands upon her husband’s death. Axtell also sold 128 pounds of pork, corn to “Mr. Simmons” and “Mr. Chamberlin,” and other amounts of rice and corn without recipients listed. For the end of the year of 1702, Axtell noted charges for rice (for planting, perhaps), potatoes, and “roum at crismas for negros” and a year-end profit of £125.2.7½, five or six times what an average laborer could make in wages.28

Daniel Axtell understood the usefulness of Native American-style legumes as a dietary staple but was either unwilling to direct his enslaved laborers (at least one or two of whom were Native American women) to grow them, or his production was only for internal consumption and therefore never shows up in his account book. Provisioning was always a central component of chattel slavery in the colonial Atlantic. Unlike other planters with fewer productive operations outside of agriculture, Axtell decided to employ those coerced laborers at his disposal with provisioning as a tertiary production

strategy. As one of the largest and most sophisticated enterprises in the colony—with special labor demands, as there is no evidence of any other tannery or sawmill in the colony during this period—Axtell’s management shows a plantation running more on marketable produce than provisioning. Some, or all, of this strategy probably came from the labor needs of running the tannery, kiln, and mill, thereby limiting access to provisioning labor. With more labor at his disposal, Axtell would have likely directed more enslaved labor toward provisioning. Axtell’s strategy was therefore to rely on neighbors for provision crops, neighbors who at the time were probably less able to make forays into wider Atlantic markets than with Newington. Without such local support, Axtell would have been forced to use more labor for food production. Especially conspicuous in the account book is the lack of any mention of Newington producing “Indian pease,” although Axtell purchased them repeatedly from his neighbors such as Thomas Osgood, John Deare, and James Boswood. Newington produced maize, not only for consumption within his enterprises, but also to sell, depending on harvests and provisioning requirements for his labor force. Axtell’s bookkeeping shows him to be a shrewd businessman, capable of directing multiple business ventures and moving labor around between them as needed in order to make Newington a successful plantation. It seems unlikely that knowing neighbors were efficiently growing corn, pulse, and other ground-cover crops in the Native American style, Axtell would have rejected the use of such agricultural strategy. The more likely scenario was that his provisioning demands were such that with so much enslaved labor going toward the tannery, kiln, and sawmill, he never could grow enough to feed everyone. The solution was therefore to purchase provisions from his neighbors, many of whom were growing maize and pulse. In the
period between 1699 and 1707, when Daniel Axtell decided to leave the colony, export production of rice and naval stores increased, as did profits. The trend in the broader colony followed a similar trajectory over time.29

Surviving naval port lists beginning in 1717 show that Charles Town was actually exporting maize and pulse to various locales in the Caribbean including Curaçao, Madeira, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas. South Carolina plantations were so prodigiously producing Native American staples they could feed their exploding population (though it was increasing in large part due to slave imports) as well as sell some for profit. The amounts of these exports were relatively small compared with the ever-expanding rice production, but it was steady and continuous.30

Norris made a special note when listing the material goods an industrious colonist needed to set up a plantation in South Carolina for whether the immigrant was rich or poor. He had very specific recommendations for how the ideal enslaved population of a new plantation should be made up. For the poor colonist, he should buy “Two Slaves; a good Negro Man And a good Indian woman” [emphasis in the original]. Norris went on to write that the slave man should be used to plant, including maize and pulse in the intercropped manner he earlier described, while the Native American woman should work in the “careful Management of the Dairy, Hogs, and other Profits that might arise from her Diligence.” But this characterization does not make sense. Why use an African


30 Clowse, Measuring Charleston’s Overseas Commerce, 75. The dataset on maize and pulse shows exports from 1717 through the entire colonial period. It is unclear where these products came from after about 1750, when colonizers began migrating to more inland locations in large numbers, but all the produce before 1739 came from the lowcountry.
man to grow crops the Native American woman would have knowledge and experience cultivating? Norris was likely playing to the gendered expectations of his audience, where agricultural labor was a masculine domain. It was more likely that he thought planters should use the African men to produce export commodities such as naval stores and raising livestock. In describing the ideal breakdown of labor for a rich immigrant, however, Norris recommends purchasing “Fifteen good Negro Men… Fifteen Indian Women to work in the Field… Three Indian Women as Cooks for the Slaves, and other Hous[e]hold-Business” and “Three Negro Women… to be employ’d either for the Dairy, to attend the Hogs, Washing, or any other Employment they may be set about in the family.” For Norris, the colonist of means should purchase eighteen Native American women, more than the total of men, although he thought the enslaved labor force should ideally total half men and half women. Meanwhile Nairne, a Native American agent for the colony who was deeply invested in the Native American captive trade and who also owned numerous enslaved Native Americans, made no mention of indigenous slaves, probably because the trade was controversial and he was the main colonial representative for the colony to southeastern native peoples.  

For the rich colonist, then, Norris thought the slaves should “Clear, Fence, Plant, Hoe, Reap &c. only Three Acres each,” or a total of ninety, with thirty acres in “Corn,  

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31 Nairne and Norris, Selling a New World, 127–9, 132. The best evidence of Native American slaves owned by Nairne is in the probate inventory of his wife, Elizabeth, who died in 1722, six years after Thomas was executed at the start of the Yamasee War. In her inventory, Elizabeth Nairne had nine slaves labeled as Negro (all men), six labeled as “Indian” (four women and two men), two women without a racial classification, and nine children with no race listed, all of whom would likely have been classified as “Indian” or “Mustee.” See Elizabeth Nairne’s probate inventory, MRIS Book C, 1722–1724, SCDAH, 22.
Pease, Potatoes,” and “Pompions” [pumpkins] and the other sixty dedicated for marketable rice. Nairne described the harvesting as taking place for rice in September and into October, maize and pulse from October to the tenth of November, and “Several Kinds of Pulse are ripe in May and June.” Native American agricultural methods had been an integral part of the colony from the very beginning, evidenced when one of the original colonists, Joseph Dalton, wrote to a Proprietor, Peter Colleton, in 1671 about how “a crop of pease and corne from the same ground in a yeare Crop like to be good.” These agricultural practices ended neither when rice became the staple crop of the lowcountry, nor when indigenous slaves became much more difficult to procure after the supply dwindled in the aftermath of the Yamasee War. In fact, with their respective rhythms of production, rice was suited well for the maize/pulse complex. But local contexts were not all that mattered. Outside forces also played a role in the timing of rice’s rise to hegemony.32

The English loved their wheat. In years of good harvests, everyone ate wheat in Northern Europe, while in poor harvest years, poor people had to eat grains such as barley and oats, typically reserved for livestock. But wheat was not very prodigious compared with other grains (especially rice and maize), so Europeans never achieved a level of abundance in producing their calories and lack of sufficient grains often led to social unrest. The price of wheat was therefore fairly unstable (Table 6.1). Poor English would often rather substitute rice for wheat when wheat was expensive because barley and oats were considered animal fodder and rice could make products white, like those

32 Nairne and Norris Selling a New World, 39, 133; Joseph Dalton to Peter Colleton, Shaftesbury, 348.
produced with wheat, but was much cheaper. The demand for rice would therefore increase in England when the price of wheat was high. It was fortuitous that South Carolina planters had accumulated enough capital through raising livestock and trading with Native Americans and had converted it into enough labor power to devote an increasing amount of effort to rice production, when the price of wheat began to climb to the highest prices anyone living had ever seen in England.\(^\text{33}\)

\[\text{Table 6.1: Price of Wheat in England, 1650–1750 in Shillings Per Bushel}\]

![Graph of Price of Wheat in England, 1650–1750 in Shillings Per Bushel]


The first good surviving data on South Carolina rice exports is from 1699. In that year, 131,207 pounds were exported. Since these sixty-five tons of rice were not the first harvest, Carolina planters had been developing their techniques as well as clearing land

for years before 1699 and exporting increasing amounts of it. With respect to wheat in
England, though, 1699 saw a fairly high price of wheat at 5.65 shillings per bushel. As
the incipient export market in rice began ramping up in the early eighteenth century,
spikes in exports coincided with spikes in the price of wheat (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). In
1704, South Carolina exported 759,536 pounds of rice, more than double the total from
1700. Beginning in 1705, rice was added to the list of enumerated commodities that the
mercantilist English empire demanded go through England before being shipped
elsewhere and thus making transportation to markets with high demand more difficult.
This mercantilist economic structure, in conjunction with a drop in the price of wheat,
meant a significant drop in rice exports. The Atlantic rice trade had grown to a level at
which the metropolitan policymakers thought it should be regulated. Starting in 1707, the
price of wheat played into an enormous rise in exports. 1709 saw the highest price of
wheat in England for the entire century between 1650 and 1750. Even as the overall price
of wheat was trending downward due to the “Agricultural Revolution” in England, year-
to-year volatility could still wreak havoc on the price of wheat. So, in 1709, the price of
wheat more than doubled from the 1707 levels. 1709 also was the year when rice went
from an excellent export commodity for South Carolina (675,327 pounds in 1708) to a
major export commodity (1,510,679 pounds in 1709). Not only was 1709 the first time
the colony had exported over one million pounds, but planters also exported almost one
million pounds more than the year before. Although there are correlations between wheat
markets in England and rice exports from South Carolina, this alone is not enough to
explain the rise of risiculture.34

34 Richard Dwight Porcher, Jr. and William Robert Judd, *The Market Preparation*
Between 1702 and 1707 rice exports from Charles Town did not increase by much, partially a result of changes in mercantilist policy hurting merchants attempting to trade with continental Europe. Still, after 1709, rice exports remained over one million pounds for decades, and by 1713 they were almost at four million. The share of South Carolina Rice: An Illustrated History of Innovations in the Lowcountry Rice Kingdom (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014), 17; Gregory Clark, “The Price History of English Agriculture, 41–123; and R. C. Nash, “South Carolina and the Atlantic Economy in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” The Economic History Review 45, no. 4 (1992): 682–4. For rice being added to the enumerated commodities, along with molasses, see Sir Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, and John Raithby, The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. VI (London: Printed by G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1811), 477.
Carolina’s export economy became increasingly centered on rice, even though naval stores remained important as well into the 1720s. Why the sudden increase? It certainly had to do with the markets in Europe, but by taking a step back, it becomes apparent that a major factor playing into rice’s jump in importance in 1708 and 1709 was the weather. In both years, there were El Niño events (a warming of the equatorial Pacific Ocean, which can cause global weather to fluctuate in somewhat predictable ways) that historical climatologists have rated somewhere between moderate and severe in strength. Practically speaking, El Niños tend to cause southeastern North America to have a colder, wetter winter than usual, and although the data is sketchier, there does seem to be a correlation between El Niños and worse harvests in Europe. For South Carolina, then, El Niños may actually have inadvertently helped rice cultivation, since the rice plant is more susceptible to drought than an abundance of water. In 1708 planters may have had a large harvest relative to the amount of acreage planted. Meanwhile, demand for rice may have been higher in England (and the continent, as well) because crop yields were not as good.

The data from historical climatologists, read alongside the price of wheat and the increase in exports of rice from Charles Town leads me to argue there was a climatological context that helps explain rice in Carolina. It seems that during this small window of time, more Carolina colonists saw that they could export rice for profit. In early 1709, a large amount of rice produced in South Carolina was met in England by high prices on wheat. This is in no way to argue that colonists saw a fluctuating climate as reason to increase rice production, but the El Niños in these years were felt by planters in terms of increased production of their already-planted acreage as well as price incentives in Europe. Part of the enormous increase in exports between 1708 and 1709 in
all likelihood came from increased yields per acre due to better water supplies to the rice fields, and part was owed to the continued concentration on clearing fields and planting. After 1709, rice exports trended upward to the 1730s. From this perspective, the “rice boom” of the 1720s, as many scholars have dubbed it, really began in 1709. Nairne and Norris wrote their pamphlets in the aftermath of these boom years. Even with price and ecological incentives, producing export commodities was always dependent upon feeding laborers.

Planter-directed provision fields for both free and enslaved populations living on a plantation did not develop alongside the growing emphasis placed on using enslaved labor to control water in the second quarter of the eighteenth century. Many plantation managers put enslaved people to work growing food, but some apparently did not. Although it is difficult to ascertain who the recipients of food imports were—Charles Town residents in various trades also had to eat—there is evidence that maize was imported into the colony after 1717, even though some planters were exporting maize and pulse. Much of the historiography of the rice complex is tied up in the development of the task labor system, which Philip Morgan has shown was central to slave life in the lowcountry. The task system proved to be an inadvertent way for enslaved people to have some autonomy; if they could get their daily task done, they could then have time for their own purposes, which probably included growing more food. With tasked labor came more opportunities to have independent slave-run gardens to produce the foods they

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wanted. As many planters began to specialize more and more with respect to rice production and water immersion techniques, especially by the middle of the eighteenth century, some planters forsook directed provisioning altogether, instead opting to buy rations and have slaves consume their broken rice. Others, like Henry Laurens, even had a provisioning plantation to complement his other ventures and feed his export-producing laborers. But in the period between 1720 and 1740, as the task system was being developed unevenly over time and space and from plantation to plantation, directed slave provisioning remained the normal strategy for plantation management.36

Beginning in the 1720s, the records are much better for explaining how provisioning worked on many rice plantations. This is probably the reason why scholars have thought this was the period in which it began. In the absence of account books or planter papers, probate inventories are often the best indicator of the actual produce of a given plantation. The limitation of probate inventories, like other similar sources, is that inventories are a snapshot the holdings of one person at the time of their death. Despite this drawback, inventories provide a relatively comprehensive list of the decedent’s moveable property albeit with a seasonal variance of the amounts of produce on hand. For example, Thomas Grimball, a planter who lived south of Charlestown, died in 1722 and had in his inventory sixty-five head of cattle, eighteen sheep, six lambs, 200 bushels of “Corn and Pease,” eight barrels of “Small Rice” (edible but not of a quality for export), and fifteen barrels of neat (exportable) rice. Grimball’s enslaved labor force consisted of thirty-two people; two of them were “Indian” women, and three were “Indian” children.

It seems likely that Grimball wanted his plantation enterprise to have some Native American slaves in order to plant the intercropped “Corn and Pease.” Likewise, Samuel Wigfall’s 1725 inventory included 725 bushels of rice, 180 bushels “Corn & Pease,” 220 head of cattle, and twenty-one enslaved people including one Native American and one mustee woman. On many plantations in South Carolina during the 1720s and 30s, rice production along with the maize/pulse complex was a successful strategy for planters to employ for maximum production.  

Although the contours of plantation production are difficult to trace in a systematic manner due to the inconsistency of probate inventories, the surviving evidence allows us to draw some conclusions about how planters structured their production. Probate inventories work well as a sample of the population because of the high mortality rates of early South Carolina. But plantation output is vague because, in the absence of produce in the listing, an inventory is often not sufficient evidence to argue about the production of the plantation. Numerous planter probate inventories between 1720 and 1736 tell of patterns of production similar to those of Thomas Grimball and Samuel Wigfall, with enslaved labor from Africa and North America intercropping maize and pulse as well as growing rice for Atlantic markets. As late as 1736, Joseph Sumner’s inventory contained “Negroes,” “Indians,” and “Mustees,” with maize and “pease” listed as well.  

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37 For Grimball’s Inventory, see WPA vol. 58; Samuel Wigfall’s inventory is in MRIS, vol. B, SCDAH, 282–3.  
38 Joseph Sumner Inventory, April 3, 1736, Probate Inventories, 1732–36, SCDAH, 320–1.
Probate inventory data can show how, in the absence of earlier data, plantations with evidence of the maize and peas complex were much more likely to have enslaved Native Americans than not. In the 1720s, there were seven inventories featuring enslaved Native Americans, Africans, and the corn and peas complex, and there was one with only Native Americans. Meanwhile, there were seven with enslaved Africans but not Native Americans. Over half of all inventories with evidence of maize and peas had enslaved Native Americans (62%). Out of all inventories with enslaved peoples from the 1720s, Native Americans are found in 34%. Enslaved Native Americans were therefore twice as likely to be found on plantations with maize and peas than in all probate inventories. In fact, using A/B statistical testing, plantations with enslaved Native Americans had a 97.6% chance of outperforming the overall number of inventories when it came to production of the maize and peas, and therefore the presence of enslaved Native Americans proves to be statistically significant.\textsuperscript{39}

There were other planters who, at least by the time of their death and subsequent inventory, had an enslaved plantation population consisting only of people labeled “Negro.” When produce was listed, some of these plantations had only rice enumerated, though this does not preclude other types of provisioning cultivation. But a large number of plantations, even those without enslaved indigenous people listed, intercropped maize and pulse for provisions. For example, Shem Butler’s probate inventory from 1723 explicitly shows he was intercropping maize and pulse (See Figure 6.1). Butler, with a

\textsuperscript{39} I surveyed all extant probate inventories from the 1720s: the total number of inventories was 180 and 62 had enslaved Native Americans. Probate inventories with the maize and pease complex had a 97.6% probability of outperforming the overall number of probate inventories when it came to also including enslaved Native Americans or “Mustees.”
plantation on each side of Ashley River, had no enslaved Native Americans in either locale, but still planted intercropped fields, as his inventory lays bare. A well-to-do planter such as Butler, with fifty-one enslaved people spread over two plantations, still ordered provision grounds to be planted. As late as 1745 it was normal for the probate inventories of rice planters to also be producing maize and pulse, even though the number of enslaved Native Americans enumerated had decreased.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Figure 6.1: Excerpt from Shem Butler’s Probate Inventory, August 7, 1723}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Shem_Butler_Inventory_Memorandum_of_Relationships_of_Slaves_1723.png}
\caption{Excerpt from Shem Butler’s Probate Inventory, August 7, 1723}
\end{figure}

Over the course of the eighteenth century, enslaved Native Americans dwindled from the documentary record. As the social status of “slave” became increasingly intertwined with “Negro,” enslaved Native Americans disappeared, along with other racial monikers such as the children of Native Americans, “Mustees.” But enslaved Native Americans and their offspring continued to toil away and be exploited on South Carolina plantations. Even when they remain obscured from historians, the cultures of Native Americans were still shaping life on plantations after rice became the central crop of the lowcountry. A trend of colonists possessing enslaved African and Native Americans in their probate inventories, along with “Corn and Indian Pease,” began as early as 1683 in John Smyth’s inventory. By the 1730s, inventories of decedent colonists with produce often contained enslaved “Negroes” with rice, “Corn and Indian Pease.” In

\footnote{Shem Butler Inventory, MRIS, Book C, SCDAH, 196–203.}

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1732, John Arnoll owned five “Negro men” and also had listed the rice/maize/pulse complex in his inventory. Andrew Allen’s inventory, taken in 1735 at Goose Creek, featured an enormous enslaved population of 108 people, with none listed as Native Americans, although he did advertise for return of a runaway “Mustee Man Joe” in the *South Carolina Gazette* in 1733. Allen’s inventory also contained 7,400 bushels of unprocessed rice, 3,354 ½ bushels of maize, and 621 bushels of pulse. Even on a highly Africanized plantation during enormous imports of African peoples, Native American agriculture, integrated into South Carolina plantation management from the seventeenth century, remained an important strategy planters employed well after the waning of the trade in Native American captives in 1715. Similarly, the much smaller operation run by William Webb, whose inventory was taken in March 1733, used the labor of seven people of African descent, but had “a heap of Corn and Pease,” a sure sign the crops were being harvested together. But in the 1730s, enslaved Native Americans had not completely disappeared. In one example, Richard Singleton, a Goose Creek planter with multiple plantations, still had enslaved Native Americans and Mustees, as well as a crop of rice and 250 bushels of corn and “pease.” Although the physical presence of Native Americans on South Carolina plantations became less important to colonists over the eighteenth century, they were nonetheless crucial to the development of a viable export-commodity agricultural system in the colony.41

41 Inventory of John Smyth, February 13, 1683, Records of the Secretary of the Province of South Carolina, SCDAH, 26–7; John Arnoll Inventory, October 4, 1732, WPA vol. 64, 478; Andrew Allen Inventory, October 18, 1735, Probate Inventories, 1732–36, SCDAH, 238–44; Runaway advertisement for Joe by Andrew Allen, SCG, April 28, 1733; William Webb Inventory, March 5, 1733, Probate Inventories, 1732–36, SCDAH, 267–8; Richard Singleton Inventory, March 24, 1735, Probate Inventories, 1732–36, SCDAH, 300–3.
The rise of enslaved “negroes” growing maize and peas can be seen in aggregated probate inventories as well. In the 1730s only 6% of inventories with maize and peas also had enslaved Native Americans. But, as with the previous decade, in the inventories with maize and peas, Native Americans were overrepresented. There were a total of 256 probate inventories from the 1730s with enslaved people listed, but enslaved Native Americans only turn up in 1% of all of these inventories. This means that plantations with maize and peas were six times as likely to also have enslaved Native Americans as in the larger dataset. Like the previous decade, the presence of enslaved Native Americans offers a statistically significant variable when it comes to also showing signs of producing the maize and peas complex. Even though the demarcated demographic significance of enslaved Native Americans was waning, they were still working on plantations with maize and peas. The flip side of this, of course, is that most plantations with evidence of maize and peas didn’t have enslaved Native Americans in the 1730s. Enslaved “negroes,” some of who were undoubtedly descendants of Native Americans, continued growing these indigenous crops and in the manner of Native American historical practices.

Without considering their integral place in the agricultural system, as I have argued, we may not be able to make any convincing conclusions about the place of enslaved indigenous people forced to work on South Carolina plantations. But now the importance of enslaved Native Americans to the rice complex can be better understood.

42 I surveyed all the extant probate inventories from the 1730s, of which there are 256 with enslaved people listed. Probate inventories with the maize and pease complex had a 90.5% probability of outperforming the overall number of probate inventories when it came to also including enslaved Native Americans or “Mustees.”
The knowledge and skills indigenous peoples (of both sexes) possessed in terms of efficient and nutritious agricultural produce was put to efficient use by South Carolina planters. The intercropping skills Native American children were taught and that were then perfected by women gave them extra value to the Carolina rice planter. This is an important insight because it means especially after about 1715 and the Yamasee War, enslaved Native Americans seem to have been less likely to be sold from plantation to plantation. In this respect, people of African descent were more easily replaceable, especially if, like most of the enslaved people of African descent in South Carolina, they had not come from a rice-growing region of West Africa such as Senegambia. Over time though, as in a case such as the inventories of colonist/planters such as John Arnoll and Andrew Allen, people of African descent began doing the work previously done by enslaved Native Americans.\footnote{I am basing these conclusions about enslaved Native Americans moving between plantations on mortgages and bills of sale.}

By investigating intra-plantation provisioning, the way we think about the task system should also be reconsidered. Philip Morgan built his seminal work on the differences between the task (Carolina) and gang (Chesapeake) slave work systems. In this formulation, by the eighteenth century, enslaved South Carolinians in rice parishes had time to plant their own food if they met their daily work quota. There is ample evidence to support the assertion that the task system did become the norm in South Carolina. But what of planter-directed provisioning for the plantation? Planters found it a more efficient use of the labor-power they controlled to have a few enslaved people (indigenous if possible, especially if they went into rice planting) work on plantation provision fields while other coerced laborers toiled away at planting rice, moving
massive amounts of earth in order to control water for the rice, or other tasks such as producing naval stores or meat for export. Provisioning, then, was implemented by planters in order to keep as many enslaved people as possible laboring on marketable products, a finding in contrast to interpretations emphasizing the free time of the enslaved under the task system. Enslaved people in all likelihood ate food produced through centralized plantation provisioning strategies, as well as crops they grew for themselves. Planters at least thought that the efficiency and nutritional value of Native American agriculture was a way for them to exploit those they held in bondage more productively than allowing them to fully provision themselves.44

Rice agriculture in colonial South Carolina was not destined. A set of historical phenomena intersected to make growing rice seem like a good idea for colonists. One of those phenomena was colonists’ slaving of Native American captives into and through the colony. Colonists exploited enslaved Native Americans to help them build the rice empire. The contingencies that set the context for rice agriculture included Native American knowledge and labor in a fundamental way. Someone had to feed the laborers growing export commodities. With little to sell, colonists relied on provisioning crops, and many had Native Americans intercrop the maize and peas complex to fuel the engine of incipient plantations that would later make some colonists among the richest in the British colonies.

Studies of plantation management in early South Carolina have tended to concentrate on the question of how lowcountry colonists established the rice complex in

the eighteenth century which, by the American Revolution, boasted many of the greatest fortunes in continental British North America. The decision by planters to put most of their efforts into producing rice may seem at odds with what one would expect an English colony to produce. Rice was a commodity northern Europeans had little-to-no experience with producing, featuring low English demand in a mercantilist system, and it was also bulky and relatively cheap. The historical intersections of colonial crop experimentation, in conjunction with a few enslaved Africans with knowledge of rice cultivation, and the violent capital accumulation afforded by the trafficking in Native Americans to and through Charles Town, coincided with environmental contexts to remake the landscape of the lowcountry. In this story, enslaved Native Americans played a major role in feeding plantation labor forces so others held in bondage could be forced to toil away on producing for foreign markets.
Chapter 7

Nanny, Popogusso, and the Sherds of History

*Enslaved women appear as historical subjects through the form and content of archival documents in the manner in which they lived: spectacularly violated, objectified, disposable, hypersexualized, and silenced. The violence is transferred from the enslaved bodies to the documents that count, condemn, assess, and evoke them, and we receive them in this condition.*

-Marisa J. Fuentes, *Dispossessed Lives*¹

Thus far, this dissertation has argued for the need to incorporate enslaved Native Americans into the larger African-descended enslaved population of early South Carolina. In uncovering the milieu faced by captive Native Americans turned into colonial slaves, I have mostly concentrated on forces beyond the control of individuals unlucky enough to end up enslaved on plantations. Whether discussing the captive trades, social dynamics, or work regimes, enslaved Native Americans have been viewed from the perspective of historical objects and not subjects. This chapter aims to reorient our gaze and to recover the historicity of the enslaved. Archival gaps make searching for sources of enslaved Native Americans on plantations a methodological challenge. But by incorporating arguments put forth in previous chapters with specific historical circumstances and material archaeological records, I will sketch out the life of a single enslaved Native American woman, called “Nane [Nanny]” by her colonial oppressors. Nanny lived on the plantation near Dorchester along Eagle Creek, just north of the Ashley River, belonging to Charlesworth Glover (previously discussed in chapter 5).

The only historical trace of Nanny in the documentary archive is that she was listed as an “Indian Woman” among the chattel property belonging to Charlesworth Glover when his estate was inventoried in February 1733. This single snapshot is the only documentary evidence we have to know that she existed. Attempting to find her historicity therefore requires methodological flexibility and creativity. Against her will, Nanny’s life became inexorably entangled in that of her captor, Charlesworth Glover. The colonial archive was produced in a manner to explicitly narrate the story of her captor, while simultaneously dehistoricizing Nanny almost to the point of total erasure. Herein lays the problem of finding historical subjecthood for enslaved Native Americans on plantations in the early modern Atlantic: there are only glimpses that enslaved Native Americans lived and died alongside peoples of African descent. When enslaved Native Americans are described under colonial power, they were typically being used as domestic labor (women) or as guides (men). My interpretation of the life of Nanny, then, is offered as a historiographical corrective. Certainly, many enslaved Native Americans were coerced into working as domestic servants, or guides, or even as skilled artisans. But, at least in the case of colonial South Carolina, the majority of enslaved Native Americans were kept on plantations and probably worked in the fields. These representational fragments of Nanny, in all their contingencies and my historically rooted speculations, forms an attempt at finding the historical narrativity in her life. In this way, my skeletal relation of Nanny’s life is part composite biography and part quest to find the subjecthood of enslaved peoples long ignored.²

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² Probate inventory of Charlesworth Glover, February 17, 1733, MRMS, Vol. CC, S213003, SCDAH, 15–18. For an example of Native American women as enslaved
Beginning to recover Nanny’s subjecthood leads to other sets of questions. If Nanny has a historical narrative we can sketch (however tentatively) over time, what does her historicity mean for our understanding of cultures of the enslaved that developed on plantations among these diverse populations? What does their historical experience mean for how we understand ethnogenesis and creolization? How does Nanny, as a representative of other women like her who were enslaved on early South Carolina plantations, force us to reconsider the uneven constellations of sociocultural interactions on early plantations in South Carolina? In other words, what does Nanny’s place on Charlesworth Glover’s plantation mean for cultural formation of enslaved peoples in South Carolina? This chapter offers some cautious ideas about a methodological

domestics, see the story of Yarico in Richard Ligon, A True & Exact History of the Island of Barbados (London: Humphrey Moseley, 1657), 54–55.


approach by bringing together various archives into an interpretive triangulation between different modes of analytical inquiry in order to narrate the lives of people like Nanny.

Out of the hundreds of enslaved Native Americans I have found in colonial South Carolina, I chose to focus on Nanny for a few reasons. First, Nanny was on a plantation with a population of enslaved Native Americans (Nanny being the only one at the time of the inventory, although Glover had a second plantation with two enslaved Native American girls and one woman) along with enslaved “Negroes.” Second, Glover’s inventory included the maize and “pease” complex, meaning they were practicing Native American agricultural ways (see Chapter 6). Third, Glover’s plantation has been excavated by archaeologists, who recovered many sherds of colonoware ceramics. And finally, Glover’s history offers enough evidence to begin considering where Nanny came from and how she may have lived. Nanny’s story can be seen in relief against the history of Glover, and then through Nanny I eventually hope to glimpse the histories of other Native American women in similarly oppressive contexts. By offering and ruminating on the implications of a fragmentary narrative of Nanny’s life, I seek to interrogate the way scholars write about cultural formation in contexts similar to early South Carolina. Finally, I will use an array of sources and previous arguments from this dissertation to sketch out a narrative the life of Nanny. This chapter is part biography, part methodological overview for future work.

More than a century before South Carolina was founded, indigenous peoples in southeastern North America began undergoing radical cultural change in the aftershocks of early European colonialism. By 1670 southeastern Mississippian hierarchical chiefdoms had fractured, and the peoples had already been working toward understanding
this new colonial context — a shatter zone — even though many (or more likely, the overwhelming majority) of them had never seen a European. When colonial adventurers and their coerced enslaved colonists set foot along the banks of the Ashley River the world they invaded was already drastically different than it had been in 1492. Or even 1650. The chain reaction set off by what historian Ned Blackhawk has called the “maelstrom of colonialism” created social crises for indigenous people over much of the continent. In this new, more violent and virulent colonial world, Native Americans were in the process of attempting to regroup when South Carolina was founded. Native Americans in the southeast, then, were already undergoing colonial ethnogenesis.3

One site where we can see proof of social dislocation and ethnogenesis inherent in coloniality and where I can also draw an analogy to what happened on early South Carolina plantations is a Cherokee archaeological site in Townsend, Tennessee. Located north of most Cherokee town locations and east of the Overhill Towns, Tuckaleechee Cove was the site of a Cherokee settlement during the era of the founding of South Carolina and the trade to Charleston in Native American captives. Archaeologist Jon Marcoux has convincingly argued that this group of Cherokees moved to the cove to escape colonial influence and slaving in the face of the southeastern Shatter Zone. In Tuckaleechee Cove, archaeological artifacts point toward Cherokees coming from different areas, with slightly different pottery traditions, intermingling and creating a new

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pottery type, which Marcoux has dubbed Tuckaleechee. Pottery production in Africa and the Americas can be understood as a “conservative tradition,” according to anthropologist Katherine Howlett Hayes, with mothers teaching their daughters the skills to continue making ceramics. Anthropologists think that “abrupt changes in manufacture might be related to broad social disruptions,” while “conformity of style and manufacture in a period of social upheaval might be an expression of orthodoxy, a conscious reproduction of tradition in defiance of pressures to change.” Pottery, then, can open a window into a cultural milieu.  

To find the origins of Nanny, I must first outline the history of Charlesworth Glover, her colonial captor at the time of his death in the early 1730s. Nanny’s story is inextricably bound by Glover’s due to the structures of power inherent in the production of documentary evidence. The chronology of Nanny’s biography will be framed by Glover’s out of empirical necessity. Virtually all of my arguments about Nanny are based on Glover’s biography (in which most crucially I can find a sociocultural background from which she came), the previous chapters in this dissertation, archaeological evidence found on early plantations including Glover’s, and Native American cultural histories. Nanny’s captors never intended for her to be historicized, and it is therefore difficult to recover her historical subjecthood. The rest of this chapter is but a first step in working

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4 Jon Marcoux, *Pox, Empire, Shackles, and Hides: The Townsend Site, 1670-1715* (University of Alabama Press, 2010), 38; *The Cherokees of Tuckaleechee Cove* (Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 2012); Katherine Howlett Hayes, *Slavery Before Race: Europeans, Africans, and Indians on Long Island’s Sylvester Manor Plantation, 1651-1821* (New York University Press, 2013), 98–100. In Hayes has found that on Sylvester Manor plantation on Shelter Island, off the coast of eastern Long Island, New York, interactions between enslaved African peoples and local Native Americans (some of whom worked on the plantation, though their status is obscured) can be seen in pottery production innovation.
through the problems facing scholars who are interested in narrating the lives of Native Americans on colonial plantations.

Charlesworth Glover was born in Henrico County, Virginia, in 1688, but when he was eight years old, his parents moved to North Carolina as part of a late-seventeenth-century European migration between the two colonies. Glover’s father ended up as the acting governor in North Carolina less than a decade after moving his family from Virginia.\(^5\) Glover began his rise to prominence in North Carolina during the first decade of the eighteenth century by working for local merchants like John Blount and being a trading factor, which sometimes included escorting enslaved people.\(^6\)

At the latest, by the time he was 18, Glover had taken up land along the Neuse River in North Carolina. These lands were among the colonial expansion to the south along the Pamlico and Neuse Rivers that created friction between local Native peoples and colonists who a few years later were major factors in the attacks on North Carolina,


\(^6\) One surviving record of William Glover as an owner of enslaved people is from January 6, 1706, where one Rebekah Baily was taken into state custody for “receiving Six pair of Buttons of the Estate of Mr Thomas Peterson of A certaine Negroe Woman belonging to William Glover Esqr, confesses to the Same.” Baily was sentenced to “receiving five Strokes on her bare back” for the theft, but the enslaved woman is not mentioned again. Saunders, *Colonial Records of North Carolina*, vol. I, 650. For the lawsuit, see *Blount v. Wilkins*, July 30, 1707, William S. Price, ed., *North Carolina Higher-Court Records, 1702-1708* (Raleigh: Dept. of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, 1974), 359.
which began the cycles of violence we call the Tuscarora War. When colonial Surveyor General and naturalist John Lawson was ritually executed in September 1711, many of the Algonquian peoples of what is today eastern North Carolina attacked colonial outposts without warning.\(^7\)

During the early stages of the Tuscarora War, Charlesworth Glover helped the colonial effort by gathering and transporting provisions and other war materials for the South Carolina army led by John Barnwell that had travelled overland to aid the desperate North Carolinians. Glover’s job was to acquire “so much corn as [would] load his sloop” in the northern portion of the colony and sail through the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, to the southern part of the colony for the South Carolinians to use upon their arrival. In early 1714, Glover appears in the historical record as having been living in Tom Blount’s town for four months.\(^8\)

Tom Blount [or, Blunt] was a well-respected Tuscarora werowance living in the northern part of Tuscarora territory. When many of the smaller Algonquian polities, such as Corees, Pamlicos, Bear Rivers, and southern Tuscaroras, wanted to go to war with North Carolina, Blount resisted, and his people remained neutral. A couple of months after the massacre at “Noo He Roo Ka [Neoheroka] Fort” (discussed in Chapter 1), the

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acting Governor of North Carolina, Thomas Pollack, signed a treaty with Tom Blount. In exchange for Blount persuading the Tuscaroras following him to help secure the colony from small bands of Native resistance, North Carolina would view him as the “King” of the Tuscaroras, and peace would follow for those who agreed to Blount’s preeminence. Blount agreed with Pollack’s terms. The treaty also called for Blount to send warriors out and kill or capture as many enemies of North Carolina as possible. Polities such as the Corees, Mattamuskeet, and Pamlicos were virtually destroyed in the ensuing violence.⁹

During the chaos and violence following South Carolina’s second excursion into North Carolina, some Native Americans allied with the southern colony took Tom Blount’s wife and two children as captives, likely to sell into the slave market. In response, James Moore, leader of the second South Carolina expedition, sent his brother, Thomas, along with Charlesworth Glover, to find and redeem Blount’s family.¹⁰

Possibly in response to connections he made with South Carolinians during the expeditions against the Tuscaroras, sometime after October 1714, Glover moved to South Carolina. He bought a plantation near Dorchester and Ashley River (discussed in Chapter 5), moved to the southern colony, and began taking on important roles in the colony with respect to Native American trade and diplomacy. A few months later, the Yamasee War broke out. Glover aided the colony in its fight against the indigenous peoples allied against it and served as a diplomatic emissary. Then, on July 10, 1716, the Board of the

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Commissioners of the Indian Trade of South Carolina named Glover the assistant factor at the Savannah Town trade outpost (near present-day Augusta, Georgia), and by the fall, he was promoted to run the operations there. For the rest of his life, Glover was an important agent for South Carolina’s relations with western Native Americans and in particular the Creeks.11

The previous sketch of Glover’s biography is vital for my reassembling of Nanny’s life because it is in his history that I can find traces of where Nanny likely originated. We know that Nanny was an enslaved Native American woman and that she was being held captive by Glover when he died in 1732. Glover was a latecomer to the trade with Native Americans for captives, so his opportunities were circumscribed more than slavers in prior decades. He could have come across Native American captives in his early dealings with North Carolina merchants. He could have come into possession of Nanny during the Tuscarora War. He could have bargained for Nanny during the Yamasee War. Or he could have traded for her after the war as a colonial trade representative and Creek diplomat. Glover’s continued importance to colonial officials in South Carolina beginning in 1716 means he did not deal in Native American captives on

his own account because at the point where he began dealing with indigenous peoples on behalf of South Carolina, the colonial government had set about making such individual interactions illegal (see Chapter 3). In fact, Glover successfully defended himself in the winter of 1718 against accusations from John Sharp, another colonial trader, that Glover had been dealing “clandestinely with some Charikee Indians, on his own Account, for Skins, in exchange for Rum.” The problem for Sharp’s accusations was that Glover’s account books, which he produced, were in order. Glover was exonerated in the eyes of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade. The next day, Glover also received payment for a captive “Indian Slave Boy” who was sold to him at Savannah Town because he used some of his own money to purchase the boy, who was surely then auctioned off in Charles Town. Glover, it seems, neither wanted to deal illegally, nor was he likely to have purchased Nanny from another colonist (see Chapter 4).12

In all likelihood, Nanny came under Glover’s control before he took up working for the colony of South Carolina in 1716. Glover’s access to the numbers of captive Native Americans he could possibly have enslaved dropped precipitously after 1716. I therefore think Nanny’s unfortunate turn in being captured and then enslaved by Glover began in North Carolina.

One thing we do know about Nanny was that her appraisers placed a value on her of £100 in Glover’s inventory. There were two more female enslaved Native Americans in Glover’s inventory, but they were located at a secondary southern plantation (which will be discussed in more detail below). One was an “Indian Girl” named Phillis, valued at

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£50, while the other “Indian Girl” was Felicia, valued at £120. It seems likely, then, that Nanny, although not labeled as “superannuated,” as enslaved people who were too old or physically broken to work were often labeled in probate inventories, was nearing the upper end of her laboring value. If a “Girl,” Felicia, was worth more to appraisers than Nanny, it must have been because Felicia was younger and just beginning to enter her (re)productive prime. Nanny wasn’t necessarily being devalued for being old, but she nonetheless was valued somewhat less than some other enslaved Native American women in probate inventories from the era. Lilly, belonging to Henry Bower (see Chapter 5), was valued at £130 in 1725, as was Rose, who was an “Indian Woman” in David Peyre’s 1735 inventory, and Sary, found in Jonathan Ward’s inventory the same year. David Anderson held Betty captive at the time of his death, and she was, like Nanny, valued at £100. On the other side of “superannuated,” “Old Indian Catherina” had a value placed on her of a mere £10 in George Smith’s 1735 inventory. It thus follows that Nanny was most likely an older woman, but still of laboring age, perhaps in her early thirties.

If Nanny was somewhere in her thirties in 1733, she was likely to have been born around the turn of the eighteenth century. The moment when Glover had his best access to captives to enslave came during his tenure in Tom Blount’s town. The Tuscarora warriors in Blount’s town must have taken a relatively large number of captives, some of

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them while Glover was living there. Blount trusted Glover enough to go on an expedition to find Blount’s family, who had been taken captive. It is not much of an interpretive leap to think Nanny was a slaving victim and then a gift to Glover. Corees, Cothechneys, Marramuskeeyes, and Pamlicos were each an indigenous polity that became a victim of these Tuscarora attacks. Because they were so small, there would have been little or no pushback from colonial authorities on Glover’s taking members of these polities due to their geopolitical insignificance. While it was possible she could have come from any number of sociocultural groups and ended up owned by Glover, I think that Nanny was a Pamlico. Even if she was not a Pamlico, all of the peoples taken captive under Blount’s direction were southern Algonquians. While Glover was living in Tom Blount’s Tuscarora town, the Pamlico were decimated by warrior attacks and ceased to be a political unit. It is therefore highly plausible that Nanny, a relatively young girl in 1713–1714, would have made a likely slaving victim: old enough to work and travel but not yet physically mature.

After Glover moved to South Carolina, with his enslaved people in tow, he put them to work on his Ashley River plantation. Instead of taking up a land grant at the leading edge of colonial expansion, Glover decided to purchase a plantation in a longer-colonized section of South Carolina. In so doing, Glover made apparent his desires to be a planter and not merely a trader and diplomat among Native Americans on behalf of the colonial administration. Had he not wanted to produce agricultural goods, Glover could have easily moved to Charles Town, but instead he chose a site where untold hours of labor had been expended in turning it into an operational rice plantation. This added value to the land would have made it much more expensive than the cheap, uncolonized
landscapes on the colonial periphery. Growing marketable goods was therefore not exactly a secondary pursuit for Glover. Although Charlesworth Glover was portrayed in much of the surviving primary sources as an “Indian Trader”—and every historiographical mention of him follows suit—it is clear that through this plantation purchase, Glover had a more complex idea of how he would profit from the post-Tuscarora/Yamasee War milieu, and it included forcing enslaved people to produce agricultural commodities.\textsuperscript{14}

Nanny was probably somewhere between 10 and 14 years old when Glover forced her to move to his newly acquired plantation in South Carolina. We do not know what Nanny thought of being socially dislocated in such an absolute fashion, but it is safe to assume that she entered the unknown with her captor, along with whomever else Glover was holding captive as slaves, in total dread. As a Pamlico (or, for that matter, any of the other southern Algonquian peoples from what is today eastern North Carolina), Nanny possessed a conception of slavery, although at her young age and in the violent, chaotic world from which she came, it is unclear if she knew what to make of the life that lay ahead of her, or even if she knew how long the journey would be. She may have

considered herself to be in something akin to *popogusso*, or what John White had reported a century earlier that the Roanoke peoples defined as “a great pit or hole in which is a place of torment after death” a century earlier. One thing is for certain, though: Charlesworth Glover put Nanny and the rest of his enslaved captives to work on his plantation.\(^\text{15}\)

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**Figure 7.1: A Southern Algonquian Woman in the Late Sixteenth Century**

Although this image is from a century earlier, John White’s drawing of this young Secotan woman gives us a glimpse of what Nanny may have looked like. Source: Detail of John White, “A younge gentill woeman daugther of Secota” in Thomas Hariot, A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia (Frankfort, 1590). Image Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University.

\(^{15}\)A *Vocabulary of Roanoke: From the Writings of Thomas Hariot, John White, and Ralph Lane, and Including the Pamlico Vocabulary of John Lawson* (Southampton, Pennsylvania: Evolution Publishing, 1999), 18.
We also know that Glover decided to call her “Nanny.” In the early eighteenth century, the name Nanny was used in English as the diminutive form of the feminized names Ann, Nanon (in French), and the related Annette and Nanette. But it was also a popular name for enslaved women. In fact, in my Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples, there are 206 people labeled women, girls, and children who were listed as being called Nanny using some spelling or other. Of these 206 people, 25 were labeled as either Native American or “Mustee” in colonial records, which is many more than we should expect as a proportion of the entire naming dataset. Of people in records as having a race listed in my dataset (n=12,937), 5% were labeled as either Native American or “Mustee.” But out of the 206 women, girls, and children named Nanny, 25 were either Native American or “Mustee.” 12% of all people in my dataset named Nanny were of indigenous descent, while only 5% of the overall number I can say were indigenous. When viewed in a different way, of all the enslaved women, girls, and children who were described as female (n=4251), 7.8% were Native American or “Mustee.” If an enslaved woman was named Nanny in early South Carolina, she was essentially 2.5 times more likely to be Native American or “Mustee” than the entire population was to be indigenous and over 1.5 times as likely to be Native American or “Mustee” than all enslaved women, girls, and children. While an enslaved woman having the name Nanny was not uncommon in early-modern colonial settings, during Glover’s lifetime the name certainly was not as associated with either women’s reproductive labor or the stereotype of enslaved women as caretakers of children that it would later assume. In fact, the Oxford English Dictionary only added the word Nanny as a noun meaning either a child’s caretaker or nursemaid in 1785. With such a strong correlation between
the name Nanny and indigeneity in early South Carolina, it seems likely enslaved Native American’s reproductive labor was one of the cornerstones of the Nanny trope.\textsuperscript{16}

Glover acquired Nanny as a sexual partner and for her reproductive labor. As John Lawson wrote of North Carolinian Algonquians in the early eighteenth century, they had groups of “Trading Girls” who were young, unmarried girls, “design’d to get Money by their Natural Parts,” with which practice Glover was certainly acquainted. In Algonquian society “Trading Girls” eventually were married and faced no stigma about their sexual past, unlike similar women in Euro-American contexts. The simple act of continuing to call her Nanny subjugated her and could have inscribed on her one type of labor Glover expected.\textsuperscript{17}

When Nanny reached adulthood, likely after Glover moved to South Carolina, Glover expected, as historian Jennifer L. Morgan has argued, to exploit two types of labor from her: productive and reproductive. Nanny was coerced into working in the fields on Glover’s plantation to produce provisioning crops and was also tasked with the burden of reproducing and raising the next generation of enslaved labor, a fate shared by enslaved women in South Carolina no matter their origin. But for Nanny, the reproductive labor she was tasked with may have been for naught. She had no discernible children in Glover’s inventory with her.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{17} John Lawson, \textit{A New Voyage to Carolina}, (London, 1709), 183–184; Morgan, \textit{Laboring Women}.

\textsuperscript{18} Morgan, \textit{Laboring Women}.
There is no evidence of any children belonging to Nanny on Glover’s main plantation (see figure 7.2). There are a few possibilities of where Nanny’s children may have been at the time of Glover’s death, if she had any at all, though. First, they all could have died young. Infant mortality was high in the lowcountry, and endemic diseases such as malaria may have taken an outsized toll on Native American children. Second, Glover may have sold Nanny’s children; however, there is no evidence of their sale, and the trends in the colony were for colonists to keep enslaved Native Americans (see chapter 4). Third, Nanny’s children may have been of mixed-race descent and labeled “Negro,” as there were no other “Indians” or “Mustees” on Glover’s main plantation. I find this possibility unlikely because the appraisers of Glover’s estate, like many other appraisers in early South Carolina, delineated between enslaved people of Native American and African descent. Fourth, Nanny may have used abortifacients to stop any pregnancies. Fifth, Nanny’s (surviving) children may have been on Glover’s second plantation.
Figure 7.2: Detail of Charlesworth Glover’s Probate Inventory

Nanny is listed on the fourth line: “1 Indian Woman Nane.” Notice that the “Negro” women listed below Nanny also have their children named with them. For Glover’s main plantation to have so many enslaved people—20 adults—there were only two children and none were labeled as being a “boy” or “girl.” See Inventory of Charlesworth Glover, February 21, 1733, Probate Inventories, 1732–1736, SCDAH, 15–18.

In 1729, Charlesworth Glover repeated his method of buying land instead of taking up unclaimed (by colonists) territory and purchased 1000 acres (in two transactions) on the west side of South Edisto River from Thomas and Joseph Boone. This land had probably been worked by enslaved people to produce rice and other crops before Glover purchased it because in his inventory, taken slightly over three years later, there was homeware, along with 300 bushels of “Ruff rice” and “Corn & pease in ye Corn house.” Glover had 9 enslaved people on this plantation when his inventory was taken. At this plantation there was one “Negro” woman, three boys, and two girls, along with “an old Indian Woman” and two “Indian” girls. Based on the time of year when the inventory was taken, in late winter, it seems Glover may have moved his enslaved men to his home plantation near the Ashley River to build more rice infrastructure while leaving numerous enslaved women and children at his Edisto plantation to process the “Ruff
rice” and to prepare it for market. In all likelihood, then, Phillis and Felicia, the two “Indian Girls” at Edisto, were Nanny’s daughters.19

Nanny’s situation was dire. Even if Phillis and Felicia were Nanny’s daughters, they were dislocated from each other at a direct distance of around 25 miles and it is unclear if Glover forced them to be apart all the time, or only for part of the year. Nanny’s existence was one made up of numerous types of social dislocations. She had been forcibly removed from her Pamlico (or other Algonquian) family. She had been forcibly removed from North Carolina, where at least there were significant numbers of other people of cultural origin similar to her. Then, if she had any at all, Nanny had lost her children, either to early deaths or to the caprice of Charlesworth Glover. She was also forced to grow crops using southeastern Native American techniques (see chapter 6), as can be seen in Glover’s inventory, which indicates that there were maize and “pease” on both of his plantations. Although featuring some semblance of a work regime she would have been familiar with, her productive labor was being used to enrich Charlesworth Glover in his quest to purchase more enslaved people and cultivate more land. In fact, one record in the Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, dated September 13, 1717, shows that Glover, who was then the head factor at the Savannah Town trading post for South Carolina, agreed to sell to the colony “all the Corn he hath planted on his own Account, and shall deliver and put into the Trading Houses, at Savano Town.”

Nanny therefore grew maize directly used to feed people whose goal was to further settler colonialism and enslave other indigenous peoples of the southeast. *Popogusso*, indeed.²⁰

If the two Native American girls on the Edisto plantation were Nanny’s children, the odds are that their father was also Native American. In South Carolina during the 1730s, children who were half indigenous were usually called “Mustees” (see chapter 4), so Nanny must have found some level of intimacy with a Native American man because there were no “Mustees” on Glover’s plantations. We have no way of knowing who this man (or men) may have been, but he could have been another enslaved person belonging to Glover who was dead by 1733, or an enslaved Native American man on a nearby plantation, or even an indigenous man living in the region who did not fall under colonial control. Nanny seems to have refashioned some semblance of an indigenous attempt at a family life, though violently circumscribed by her status as a human commodity.²¹

Although she was the only Native American present on Glover’s main plantation in 1733, Nanny may not have been the only Algonquian to have been forced to work for Glover in South Carolina. In 1725, Glover complained to the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly that “Chickesaw Indians” had “taken from him a Tuscarora Indian Wench, which he hath had upwards of Eight years.” This means that Glover had in some

²⁰ September 13, 1717, *JCIT*, 209; Glover’s probate inventory.

²¹ Glover’s plantation fell within the bounds of one standard deviation in my directional distribution analysis. This means that Glover’s plantation was within the bounds of the largest concentration of enslaved Native Americans (and Mustees) in the colony between 1720 and 1740, making the likelihood of there being enslaved Native Americans on nearby plantations higher than at the periphery. See chapter 5. Older, longer-colonized areas in the colony with rich planters, such as along the Ashley River and Goose Creek were where more enslaved Native Americans were as well. See chapter 4. In sum, although my spatial data is incomplete for the area around Glover’s plantation, all signs point to there being a high likelihood of there being more enslaved Native Americans in the area.
way ended up with a Tuscarora captive during the Yamasee War. Records are unclear as to whether the Tuscarora woman—another Algonquian—was ever returned to Glover, but it is more than likely that she willingly left with the Chickasaws as her prospects with Glover were certainly dire. It is impossible to say whether this Tuscarora woman, who ran away with some Chickasaws was Nanny, the “Old Indian Woman” in Glover’s probate inventory, or another woman altogether, but it seems more likely to me that she was another person Glover had enslaved.22

Nanny’s sociocultural life was not a complete break from her origins, at least in her interactions as an enslaved woman on a plantation. While she suffered from what sociologist Orlando Patterson called “natal alienation,” or a dislocation from her history and people, she, along with the other enslaved people on the plantation somehow managed to create new social bonds in this brutal context. Nanny probably sought out indigenous people in South Carolina with whom to make connections. She also must have forged connections with the other enslaved women on Glover’s plantation, if for no other reason than their shared experiences of being enslaved women. Unfortunately, the best documentary evidence of connections between Nanny and the enslaved women of African descent on the plantation—flora, Subbina, Princess, Pegg, Sauce, and Venus—is that they were listed together in Glover’s inventory. To better understand these connections, we must turn to the material record of the plantation.23

22 A. S. Salley, Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina for the Session Beginning Feb. 23, 1724/5 and Ending June 1, 1725 (Columbia: Printed for the Historical Commission of South Carolina by the State Co., 1945), 20.

23 Glover’s probate inventory; Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 5.
Although we do not know the date Glover moved into his plantation near the Ashley River, by the time of his death there was a stately house and rice plantation on the premises. According to an advertisement in the *South Carolina Gazette*, Glover’s house featured “a beautiful Dwelling-House… 2 Floors, 4 Rooms on a Floor with Buffets, Closets, &c. a dry Cellar underneath, with several and convenient Rooms pleasantly scituated” (See figures 7.3 and 7.4). The property was a well-developed plantation by the early 1730s. Fortunately, archaeologists Michael Trinkley and Debi Hacker excavated the site in the 2000s and published their findings in 2008. The slave quarters of this plantation, named “Tranquil Hill” by later owners, featured an abundance of Colonoware ceramics, which is typical of lowcountry plantation sites. Although the ceramic assemblage from this site is not ideal because if a lack of interpretation of the archaeological materials by modern scholars, it can lay out some groundwork for thinking about other, less-well-documented plantation archaeological assemblages in the area with similar sociocultural contexts.²⁴

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Figure 7.3: Advertisement for the Sale of Charlesworth Glover’s Estate

To be Sold at Vendue, on the 22d of March, a Plantation within a Mile of Dorchester Town, belonging to Col. Glover’s Estate, containing 600 Acres of very good planting Land, with a beautiful Dwelling-House 45 Foot long, and 35 Foot wide, 2 Floors, 4 Rooms on a Floor with Buffets, Closets, &c. a dry Cellar underneath, with several and convenient Rooms pleasantly situate, a good Pasture, Barn, Negro Houses, &c. Alto 1000 Acres of extraordinary good planting Land over Pond Pond River, about 4 Miles from Mr. Parker’s Ferry, a Barn, Dwelling-House, &c. upon it, several good riding Horses, stock of Cattle, Houseold Goats, &c. The sale will begin at 9 o’Clock; any Person purchasing the above Lands, paying a small part ready Money, 7 Years will be given for the Remainder, paying lawful Interest from the Day of Sale: The Terms of Sale will be fully explained at the aforesaid Day of Sale, by Malachi Glaze and Lawrence Sanders.

South Carolina Gazette, February 24, 1733.
This is watercolor of Glover’s house near the Ashley River, later called “Tranquil Hill” from the early nineteenth century. Although the building may have been renovated, it was the same basic structure that Charlesworth Glover built sometime around 1720. Unknown, *Tranquil-Hill The Seat of Mrs. Ann Waring, Near Dorchester*, 1805–1820. Watercolor, 10 1/4 x 13 3/4 in. Image Courtesy of the Gibbes Museum of Art/Carolina Art Association.

Archaeologists have had problems determining the differences, in some contexts, between Colonoware ceramics produced by Native Americans in southeastern North America and Colonoware ceramics produced by enslaved African peoples. Archaeologist Leyland Ferguson offered an explanation in his groundbreaking 1992 monograph, *Uncommon Ground*: “However it happened, Colono Ware resulted whenever the colonial experience affected the techniques of manufacture, the form, or the location of handbuilt
pottery.” Ferguson’s ensuing argument, based more on interpolation than direct empirical evidence, was that his “new concept of Colono Ware took into account the more complex processes of colonial creolization: demography and culture varied from place to place within the colonies, some Indians worked as slaves on plantations and some blacks lived in Indian villages; both Africans and Indians were capable of making pottery and evidence suggests that both did.” In other words, the contexts of specific plantations mattered. The histories of enslaved peoples on each plantation can help describe the blurring and shading of Colonoware ceramic styles that have made analyzing origins of large numbers of sherds difficult to pinpoint. Whereas European and Asian ceramics can be dated and sourced with some accuracy, due to popularity of decorative patterns and production techniques, Colonoware is much more difficult to date, and archaeologists rely on the context in which Colonoware is found to date it; if Colonoware was recovered in the same spatial strata as a popular European ceramic, it must have been produced during the same window of time.  

Ferguson noted that an almost perfect specimen of Colonoware was found in the Combahee River in Colleton County, South Carolina, a jug that was produced using a coiling and modeling method (Native American). The shape of the jug, on the other hand, was typical of potters in central Nigeria, even during the twentieth century. And the designs on it were typical of stamped designs of the Muskogean peoples along the Georgia and Florida coast. In this vessel, we can see ethnogenesis taking place between African and Native American peoples. What this jug shows is a Native American style construction of an African vessel form. The only problem is that it has no context, no  

history, and therefore is analytically problematic. This vessel does, however, offer us a means of conceptualizing what may have been produced on plantations where there were both enslaved Native American and African peoples, a plantation not unlike the one where Nanny lived.\(^{26}\)

At the enslaved peoples’ living site on Glover’s plantation, Trinkley and Hacker recovered nearly 10,000 artifacts, of which almost 6,000 were Colonoware ceramic sherds. There also was more than one clay extraction pit, ostensibly for the production of Colonoware, as Glover was not ordering bricks to be produced on this plantation (see chapter 5), but was on his Edisto plantation (See Figure 7.5). This means that from an early date, the enslaved people on Glover’s plantation were producing Colonoware for their own use. In the house servant quarters, which may have been constructed later, there was less Colonoware, which is indicative of the house servants having access to old wares from the main house. But the bulk of the Colonoware was in the enslaved quarters, near pits for clay extraction. There was even a piece with an “x” cut into it, which Ferguson and others have argued are West-African cosmological symbols. But how do Nanny and the rest of the enslaved women speak to us through these small pieces of broken ceramics? To find this answer, we must look at nearby plantations with similar context.\(^{27}\)


\(^{27}\) Unfortunately, the Colonoware at Tranquil Hill has not been categorized according to physical traits like at many other lowcountry plantations. I am therefore unable to make any stronger arguments about the styles or origin of the ceramic culture there. In the future, I aim to work with archaeologists to better describe this assemblage, which is housed at the South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology at the University of South Carolina. Trinkley and Hacker, *Tranquil Hill Plantation*, 59, 100; and Ferguson, *Uncommon Ground*. 
The taxonomy of Colonoware has gone through a long period of contestation within the archaeological community, going from one type, to two, and now to three (or more). Unfired sherds, pottery residuals, and smoothing stones found at quarters of enslaved peoples have led scholars to argue that Colonoware was produced by the enslaved, though it must also have been traded in some instances. In 1989, Patrick H. Garrow and Thomas R. Wheaton offered up “Yaughan” (African) and “Catawba” (Native American) types as ways of distinguishing Colonoware. The two types could most easily be distinguished by “sherd thickness, firing and characteristics, and the relative quality of manufacture.” Thicker, more crudely manufactured pottery was Yaughan, which was named after a plantation dig site where the archaeologists uncovered pottery made by the enslaved. The second type was dubbed “Catawba” because the indigenous people of the
same name were known for their pottery production in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These typologies have largely remained intact with the exception of a change to Catawba pottery, which is now dubbed “River Burnished.” Then, “Lesesne Lustered” Colonoware was added by archaeologist Martha Zierden, lying, according to Zierden’s colleague Ronald A. Anthony, “morphologically between” the other types. Some archaeologists have argued that “Lesesne Lustered” ceramics were meant for sale in the local marketplace, or were designed for particular uses. But I think that what may appear to be a cause—market forces or planter desire—may have been an effect of creolization on plantations between enslaved Native American and African women and then was demanded in the marketplace.28


The “Lesesne Lustered” typology came from the evidence discovered at a plantation on Daniel Island belonging to Isaac Lesesne. Like Glover and Drake, Lesesne was living in South Carolina by the early eighteenth century, and there is record of him owning enslaved Native Americans and Africans. On the excavation, see Martha A. Zierden, Leslie M. Drucker, and Jeanne A. Calhoun, Home Upriver: Rural Life on Daniel’s Island, Berkeley County, South Carolina (Charleston: Carolina Archaeological Services/Charleston Museum, 1986). The only record of Lesesne owning enslaved people I have found is dated 1726. Lesesne gave his wife, Frances, an “Indian Boy,” a “Negro Wench,” and some rice. It is unsurprising that a plantation where the colonist owned enslaved Native Americans and Africans was the first place archaeologists came to the conclusion for a new typology for Colonoware. See MRIS, vol. E., 1726–1727, SCDAH, 390.

More recently, Anthony has concluded that there is another type of Colonoware in the lowcountry, which he dubbed “Stobo” after the site where he first encountered it, Archibald Stobo’s early plantation near Willtown on the Edisto River. For my purposes, this delineation Anthony made between Lesesne and Stobo typologies is what is most
One major issue facing the study of cultural formation, or ethnogenesis, in the early modern Atlantic is the sociocultural instability for all peoples in the colonial milieu. As historian Alexander X. Byrd has shown in the Biafran diaspora that became Igbo, archaeologist Jon Marcoux has shown in Cherokee towns, and literary scholar Kathleen Donegan has argued for early-colonial Europeans, all identities, and thus cultures, were in social shock during early-colonial contexts. For enslaved Native Americans and Africans on South Carolina plantations these sociocultural disconnections meant that when they arrived as slaves in South Carolina, they were different people than they had been even in the recent past. Tracing culture back to a more stable past, it follows, is fraught unless we can know the specifics about the producers and their cultural artifacts. Unfortunately, in the case of the material culture of enslaved peoples on early colonial plantations, little is known about specific producers of what amount to cultural detritus (broken ceramics), and is complicated even more by these material cultures physical state: broken, scattered, and intermingled. Ultimately, archaeological scholars have, over time, deepened our understanding of ceramics found in contexts of the enslaved on early

useful. Stobo ceramics are understood as a subset of Lesesne ceramics and are closer in some traits known to be similar to early colonial Native American ceramics, such as coarse temper, coarse paste, and red filming. For a succinct summation of Anthony’s reasoning, see “Revisiting Colono Ware Variety in the South Carolina Lowcountry,” *South Carolina Antiquities* 48 (2016): 27–39. On the Stobo excavation, see Martha Zierden, Suzanne Linder, and Ronald W. Anthony, *Willtown: An Archaeological and Historical Perspective* (Charleston, SC: The Charleston Museum, 1999).

plantations, but as the archaeological analysis has become more fine-grained, it has also grown more kaleidoscopic and fragmented our ability to generalize from the particular. Plantation excavations, then, can become studies of the hyper-local (which they should be), but this specificity can also work against attempts at broader sociocultural-historical analysis. The need of historians to take the particular and make arguments about representativeness and to consider the ways different historical cases overlap can be impossible if each case is so specific as to render comparison useless. History can become antiquarianism. 29

Creolization is an uneven and halting process and until there is a semblance of sociocultural stability—through a few generations in the same spatial context—should be difficult to trace. In the case of early South Carolina, most early-colonial plantation excavation sites considered by archaeologists to be where the enslaved were located feature a mixture of ceramics thought to be of Native American origin, African origin, European origin, and some lying between in vessel type, construction technique, and aesthetics (certainly, the European ceramics are the easiest to build arguments about their origin since there is much more legible evidence). But this type of complex sociocultural mixing is what we should expect from the slaving chaos in early South Carolina contexts

29 I do not mean to imply that the pressures on European colonists at, for example, Plymouth Colony, were akin in degree to the horrors of the Middle Passage, plantation slavery, or the colonial strategies (and pathogens) working against Native Americans. Instead, I am arguing that everyone in the colonial world suffered from different kinds of social, cultural, and intellectual breaks depending on their particular histories and relations of power in particular contexts. See Alexander X. Byrd, “Eboe, Country, Nation, and Gustavus Vassa’s ‘Interesting Narrative,’” The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2006): 123–48; Marcoux, Pox, Empire, Shackles, and Hides; Kathleen Donegan, Seasons of Misery: Catastrophe and Colonial Settlement in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvanıa Press, 2016). For a broad example of this type argument, see Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra, “Mapping Ethnogenesis."
(see Chapter 1). The chaotic nature of both the archaeological and documentary record surviving from early South Carolina leaves us with another problem: documentary evidence of enslaved populations does not map onto thus-far-excavated archaeological evidence in a direct way. In other words, the plantations where I have found the best documentary evidence do not align with excavation sites where I think archaeologists have found the best material evidence for these cultural questions. To find a way out of this quandary, I propose turning back to the historical record to inform the material culture found on some plantations. Only after discussing a few excavated plantations where colonists either enslaved Native Americans and Africans, or probably did so, based on my reading of the primary sources, can we then turn back to the question of creolization among enslaved women.\(^3^0\)

First, the plantation along the Stono River that belonged to Jonathan Drake has

turned up numerous ceramic vessels (mostly bowls) considered by archaeologists to be of
early Creek origin and another type produced by Yamasee and Apalachee peoples. There
were many similarities between Drake and Charlesworth Glover. Each was heavily
invested in the Native American trade in the early eighteenth century. Each was a
prominent member of the militia. Drake and Glover each also divided their respective
resources between trading with indigenous peoples and planting. But unlike Glover,
Jonathan Drake was born in South Carolina, and was well-connected in the indigenous
trade before Glover even came to South Carolina. In fact, around the same time Glover

(Atlanta: Brockington and Associates, Inc., 1994); Ronald W. Anthony, *Dill Sanctuary
Archaeology: The Catherine Parker Site*, (Charleston: The Charleston Museum, 2014);
Kenneth E. Lewis, *Hampton: Initial Archaeological Investigations at an Eighteenth
Century Rice Plantation in the Santee Delta, South Carolina* (Columbia: Institute of
Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina, 1979); Michael Trinkley
and Debi Hacker, *Investigation of an Eighteenth Century Overseer Site (38CH1278),
Christ Church Parish, Charleston County, South Carolina* (Columbia: Chicora
Foundation, 2005); Michael Trinkley, Debi Hacker, and Sarah Fick, *Liberty Hall: A
Small Eighteenth Century Rice Plantation in Goose Creek, Berkeley County, South
Carolina* (Columbia: Chicora Foundation ;, 2003); William B. Lees, *Limerick: Old and in
the Way: Archaeological Investigations at Limerick Plantation* (Columbia: Institute of
Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina, 1980); Andrew Agha and
Nicole M. Isenbarger, “Recently Discovered Marked Colonoware from Dean Hall
Plantation, Berkeley County, South Carolina,” *Historical Archaeology* 45, no. 2 (2011):
184–87; Michael Trinkley and Debi Hacker, *Rouapelmond: An Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Century Interior St. Helena Parish Plantation, Beaufort County, South Carolina*
(Columbia: Chicora Foundation, 1999); Michael Trinkley and Debi Hacker, *Tranquil Hill
Plantation: The Most Charming Inland Place* (Columbia: Chicora Foundation, 2008);
Martha Zierden and Ronald W. Anthony, *Unearting the Past: Learning for the Future:
Archaeology at Drayton Hall, 2005* (Charleston: The Charleston Museum, 2006); Martha
Zierden, Suzanne Linder, and Ronald W. Anthony, *Willtown: An Archaeological and
Historical Perspective* (Charleston: The Charleston Museum, 1999); Michael Trinkley
and Debi Hacker, “With Credit and Honour”*: Archeological Investigations at the
Plantation of John Whitesides, a Small Planter of Christ Church Parish, Charleston
County, South Carolina* (Columbia: Chicora Foundation, 1996); and Thomas R.
came to South Carolina, Jonathan Drake was appointed as a member of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade (1716), when the incipient colonial state attempted to centralize and rationalize trade with indigenous peoples (see Chapter 3). Drake used his plantation as a site for trading with Native Americans, but before the Yamasee War he moved northward to a plantation he called “Cuttbaw,” but which was later known as Cote Bas, located between the Back and Cooper Rivers. Sometime between the autumn of 1731 and the spring of 1732, Drake died. In his will, Drake left an “Indian Man” named Caesar to his son, also Jonathan, and a “Mustee” girl named Jude to his underage daughter, Anne. Like Charlesworth Glover, Jonathan Drake controlled a population descended from indigenous and African peoples. Drake probably controlled more indigenous peoples during the first two decades of the eighteenth century, but as with Glover’s captives, some almost certainly did not survive into the 1730s. There is a significant chance, then, that the various ceramics found at Drake’s early plantation on James Island were produced by enslaved Native Americans, although their interactions with enslaved Africans remain unclear.  

Broom Hall, located on the upper reaches of Goose Creek, offers us more evidence of early ceramic culture on South Carolina plantations. The land where Broom Hall was eventually developed was passed back and forth between colonists until Benjamin Gibbes decided to construct a plantation on the location in the 1710s. Upon Gibbes’s death in 1722, his widow, Amarinthia, married merchant Peter Taylor. Taylor

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lived at Broom Hall until his death in 1765 (Amarinthia died in 1732). There is little evidence of the enslaved people at Broom Hall until Taylor’s probate inventory, but the appraisers of his chattel property did not delineate along racial lines among the 70 enslaved people. Although his inventory keeps the racial background of his enslaved people opaque, Taylor did describe by race the people he deigned to leave to his friends and relatives in his will. Taylor left a “Mustee girl named Rinchy” (in his inventory she was called “Rentia a Girl”) to Jane Douxsaint and to Roger Smith “a Mustee man named Yatkney by trade a cooper.” The presence of these enslaved mustee people, one not yet an adult, at Broom Hall in 1765 is evidence that Gibbes and/or Taylor had owned enslaved Native Americans earlier in the century, possibly still did, and certainly controlled some of their descendants at the time of his death.32

The archaeology of Broom Hall tells a similar story of intercultural mixing. Archaeologist Michael Trinkley argued that his team sorted through the Colonoware ceramic sherds from the dig, “sometimes the two wares [River Burnished and Lesesne] are very difficult to categorize and brings into question the existence of two ‘types.’” There were also sherds judged by Trinkley to be Yaughan, or more West-African in origin. The typologies themselves overlapped in such a way as to make distinguishing them a judgment call. In addition, there was no visible evidence of producers using the coiling method (typically considered to be Native American) when constructing the clay

32Peter Taylor’s will is in Charleston, SC, Record of Wills, 1760–1767 (microfilm), 533–537; his probate inventory is in Charleston County Probate Court, Estate Inventories, 1765–1769, 191–194. On Taylor, see BD, 665–666. For the history of Broom Hall, see Henry A. M. Smith, “Goose Creek (Continued),” SCHGM 29, no. 4 (1928): 273–278; Michael J. Heitzler and Richard N. Côté, Historic Goose Creek, South Carolina, 1670-1980 (Easley, S.C: Southern Historical Press, 1983), 94–95; and Heitzler, Goose Creek, A Definitive History: Planters, Politicians and Patriots (Charleston: The History Press, 2005), 202–207.
vessels. A lack of visible evidence of coiling is a necessary but not a sufficient sign of molding vessels; due to the historical exigencies of the material archive itself, Trinkley may simply not have uncovered any sherds showing coil vessel formation even if it was used. The confusion of grouping these ceramics, mean dated to about the time of the Stono Rebellion, shows that a complex interaction of ceramic cultures was a product of the colonial milieu of enslavement at Broom Hall: peoples of indigenous origin in North America and West Africa.33

Along the eastern shore of Wando River, about 14 (direct) miles southeast of Broom Hall, was the plantation founded near the end of the seventeenth century by Thomas Lynch and dubbed the “Brick House.” Lynch made his Brick House plantation his main home and became a prominent politician in Christ’s Church Parish. Lynch migrated to South Carolina when he was a small child in the 1670s with his parents from Ireland, and by the time he died in 1738, he was one of the most prosperous planters in the colony, with seven working plantations listed in his probate inventory. At his death, Lynch controlled 192 enslaved people, all of whom were labeled “Negro.” But Lynch’s lack of evidence of owning enslaved Native Americans in 1738 does not mean he either did not earlier, or that his inventory appraisers saw any reason to delineate by race amongst those enslaved. At the Brick House, archaeologist Eric Poplin found “protohistoric Native American ceramics” that appeared “to have been in use at the site during the early decades of the eighteenth century.” There was also a kiln at the site, which makes sense considering the Wando River area became known as possessing good clays from which to make bricks. Thus in all likelihood, the bricks of Lynch’s Brick

House were produced on site. But bricks were probably not the only ceramics made at the plantation.\textsuperscript{34}

At the Brick House, Poplin found poorly formed ceramics with evidence of finger marks, which seems like a sure sign at least some of the Colonoware was produced locally—probably on the plantation—and not obtained through trade, since ceramics meant for markets would have been more carefully constructed. In addition to the “protohistoric” Native American ceramics, Poplin also interpreted some of the Colonoware as being shallow hemispherical bowls, which was a common form in later African-American Colonoware assemblages in the lowcountry. In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, Lynch’s plantation was located near the area of the upper Wando River that was populated by lowcountry Native Americans like the Wando, Etiwan, and Sampa. Poplin also noted that of early-colonial Native American ceramics, Brick House had the largest assemblage of any early lowcountry plantation and they were not found in “stratigraphically separate contexts from the historic artifacts.” These Native American ceramics were therefore in use among other artifacts and not before, which would have been evident through being discovered at lower strata and led to a conclusion that indigenous peoples had been on the site before colonists. Instead, what Poplin found was an intermixing of ceramic typologies, indicating material cultural interaction at the Brick House from its founding by Lynch.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Thomas Lynch Inventory, Charleston County Library, Probate Book, 1736–1739, 286–304; Eric C. Poplin, \textit{Archaeological Data Recovery of the Thomas Lynch Plantation (38CH1479 and 38CH1585), RiverTowne Development Tract, Charleston, South Carolina} (Charleston: Brockington and Associates, Inc., 1998); and \textit{BD}, 419.

\textsuperscript{35} Poplin, \textit{Ibid}. Another analytical avenue Poplin posits is the use of clays with mica in them to distinguish between potters and craftsmen producing for markets. Clays with mica are not found in marine clays, but are in piedmont clays, leading Poplin to
argue that Potters may have used clays they considered better-suited for ceramics (with mica) whenever they could access them. Other sites in the lowcountry have contained clays with mica in early (as in relatively early mean dated ceramics, which could have been produced earlier) contexts. See Trinkley et al., *Broom Hall Plantation; Trinkley, Debi Hacker, and Nicole Southerland, Archaeology at an Eighteenth Century Slave Settlement in Goose Creek, South Carolina* (Columbia: Chicora Foundation, 2003).

Other plantations offer similar glimpses as well. Magnolia plantation, founded by Thomas Drayton in the 1680s along the Ashley River, has all the hallmarks of a site of enslaved Native American/African creolization. Thomas Drayton owned numerous enslaved “Indians” and “Africans” when his chattel property was inventoried in 1724. There were 93 enslaved people overall, with six labeled “Indian.” One of the “Indian” men even possessed a name we usually associate with West-African naming rhythms: August. Preliminary excavations have been done at Magnolia, and Colonoware was among the assemblage, but more archaeological work needs to be done at the oldest slave sites. For Thomas Drayton’s probate inventory, see MRIS, vol. D, 1724–1725, S213002, SCDAH, 39–42. For the excavation at Magnolia, see Craig Hadley, *Archaeological Excavations at Magnolia Plantation & Gardens Slave Street, Volume 1* (Living History Group, 2009).

Another tantalizing piece of evidence comes from Drayton Hall, which was founded in the late 1730s by John Drayton, a younger son of Thomas Drayton. Although Drayton Hall’s later founding date initially led me to think there was little chance of finding early American/African creolization, some of the evidence there points toward Native Americans being on the plantation. There were three sherds discovered on the plantation by Martha Zierden and Ronald Anthony that were called “red filmed.” These sherds appear similar to Apalachee and Yamasee ceramics found on Native American sites, but these sherds appeared “more similar to Yaughan [African] than to River Burnished [Native American, such as Catawba] colonoware.” Perhaps John Drayton inherited some of his father’s enslaved Native Americans and they lived at Drayton Hall. See Martha Zierden and Ronald W. Anthony, *Unearthing the Past: Learning for the Future: Archaeology at Drayton Hall, 2005* (Charleston: The Charleston Museum, 2006), 84–85; and *Archaeological Testing, 2004: Drayton Hall* (Charleston: The Charleston Museum, 2004).

A final example, which has not been excavated, is the inland plantation of Peter Simons, called “Northampton.” Simons died in 1724, and his inventory shows that he was growing rice on the plantation and that he had a diverse population of indigenous Americans and Africans among his enslaved people. For his inventory, see MRIS, vol. D, 1724–1725, S213002, SCDAH, 86–87. On the plantation, see Andrew Agha, Charles F. Philips, Jr., and Joshua Fletcher, *Inland Swamp Rice Field Context, c. 1690-1783* (National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form, 2011).
minority of the population and Native American women were overrepresented in the population of enslaved women (see chapter 4). Even though the process of creolization was uneven and variegated from plantation to plantation, we can draw some tentative conclusions for the place of women such as Nanny and others like her. Since ceramic production was almost always the domain of women in both indigenous American and West-African cultures, we can think of these ceramic data as an archive of the work and culture of women in the colonial milieu, and since Native American women made up a third of the enslaved population in the early eighteenth century, their cultural presence should be apparent with rigorous material cultural analysis.

First, women like Nanny, who came from what anthropologist Robbie Ethridge has convincingly dubbed the southeastern “shatter zone,” there was no relatively static (and therefore more easy to delineate) origin culture from which they came. Even before being enslaved and turned into commodified colonial labor, Nanny’s world was broken. She, like anyone else thrust into such a dire situation, did her best to understand her surroundings and create new social bonds, which in conjunction with a new labor-ecological context, served as the impetus for ethnogenesis. Instead of conceptualizing creolization as rooted in terms of shared cultural grammars, scholars should contemplate the common ground subjugated and enslaved people found as stemming from an analogous shared cultural trauma.

Second, even though there were many Native Americans enslaved on South Carolina plantations relative to the population of the colony, there were also many more Native Americans either living “independently” as vassals of the colony or as more-distant coalescing confederacies. These colonized (and in the process of being colonized)
peoples also interacted with colonists, both free and enslaved. This means that the ceramics found on plantations will not reveal whether they were produced on a particular plantation or elsewhere. We can say, though, that women sharing the experience as victims of the violence of early modern plantation labor, both productive and reproductive, would most likely have searched for common ground across the vast cultural divide separating indigenous Americans from peoples of West Africa. In terms of ceramics, this probably would have meant enslaved women shared best practices and sought to incorporate aesthetics potters found appealing or cross-culturally important. Even before they were able to share much in terms of language, the materiality and visual nature of ceramics may have provided an avenue for social building blocks out of the wreckage of colonialism and slavery.

Nanny may have been in what she thought was something like Popogusso, but she also shared numerous forms of trauma with the “Negro” women on the plantation as well. We can see a genealogical record of what Anglican missionary Francis Le Jau complained about in 1708, calling out “the constant and promiscuous cohabitating of Slaves of different Sexes and Nations together," in cases such as the 1739 runaway advertisement in the South Carolina Gazette where England (“Negro”) had fled with his two sons, Prosper and Prince, who were described as “Mustee” (see Introduction). The missing person in the story of these runaways was England’s wife: Prosper and Prince’s mother was a Native American woman. The documentary record, therefore, can show us direct intimate sexual interactions between enslaved people of different continental backgrounds, but can remain silent on how creolization happened within the genders. Archaeological remains of ceramics offer us another archive in which we can see
gendered knowledge in material form and further study will be an avenue for scholars to think about tracing creolization along gendered lines. In this way, Nanny, and the multitude of women almost completely erased in the documentary archive like her call to us to understand how their lives mattered, too.\footnote{Francis Le Jau, to the Secretary of the SPG, September 15, 1708, \textit{The Carolina Chronicle of Dr. Francis Le Jau, 1706-1717}, ed. Frank J. Klingberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), 42; SCG, October 13, 1739.}

Nanny was only one of thousands of Native Americans who were enslaved and forced to labor in early South Carolina so that colonists could eke out a profit. As this chapter has shown, writing these types of histories is difficult, can be stylistically uneven, and can focus on people who we do not intend to focus. The problem is the nature of colonial power in the production of historical artifacts historians are most-comfortable using—written documents—were constructed to reflect enslaved peoples’ social status. Nanny had a story. She has a story. It is up to scholars to figure out how to better find it.
Conclusion

In a March 1937 interview with a representative of the WPA Slave Narrative Project, formerly-enslaved man, “Uncle” Albert Carolina, talked about his mother’s family. The 88-year-old of Murrells Inlet, South Carolina, remembered his maternal grandfather as an “Indian,” with a skin-tone “brighter” than other enslaved people. “Who round here bright as my Grand-father?” he reminisced. For Albert Carolina, in this setting, the main point to make was the racial “brightness” of his mother’s family. He offered little other about his grandfather beyond his being an “Indian,” with this one major exception. Carolina’s grandmother was “African” and “had a little bowl made out of clay.” Although the interview lacks detail after Carolina’s description of his grandparents, the interviewer, Genevieve W. Chandler, ended the transcription with “(A description followed of how his grand-parents built a kiln of clay pots and baked them.)” Carolina’s grandparents were potters.¹

Other formerly-enslaved people in South Carolina described Native American heritage to WPA interviewers as well. Mary Frances Brown, of Charleston, said her “Gran’ma trained with Indians – she bin a Indian.” Julia Woodbury said her mother “was a freeborn woman” and “her people was dese Chee Indians.” Similarly, Martha Richardson, of Columbia, relayed that her father was an “Indian” and her mother a

¹ Interview with “Uncle Albert Carolina, March 25, 1937, “Federal Writers’ Project: Slave Narrative Project, Vol. 14, South Carolina, Part 1, Abrams-Durant,” manuscript/mixed material, Library of Congress, 198. These transcriptions are problematic because of the biases placed upon the speakers in terms of both the methodologies of questions employed by interviewers, but also the methods used to transcribe them. With this in mind, I am using the original transcriptions because I do not think the sections I am using are themselves as problematic as in other lines of questioning.
“mulatto.” Richardson’s father “love to hunt,” but since there wasn’t much game around, he “sometimes make a little money a showin’ people how to make Indian medicine, dat was good for many complaints, how to cover deir houses, and how to kill deir hogs, 'cordin' to de moon.” A great storyteller, Richardson’s father would also tell his children about the “great Catawba Indians” who made their own medicines and hunted bears. Not only did each of these formerly enslaved people claim a Native American ancestry, they were also proud to be descended from free Native peoples.²

Even though the enslavement of Native American peoples funneled through Charles Town as commodities had ended nearly two centuries before these Great-Depression-era interviews, in the minds of some formerly enslaved people of South Carolina, they were directly (and closely) descended from Native Americans. Their personal histories were tied up in the heterogeneous population of coerced laborers present in the early years of the colony. Certainly, some of these interviewees were direct genetic descendants of Native American peoples, but the larger point here is that even if not, they certainly claimed a cultural inheritance from Native peoples. In South Carolina, enslaved Native Americans and Africans intertwined their histories in direct, familial ways. After being disembedded from their social contexts, enslaved people began forging local cultures in their specific sociocultural contexts, often isolated plantations in areas distant from the marketing hub of the colony. In daily interactions, they learned to accommodate each other and became increasingly intelligible amongst themselves. The

² Interview with Mary Frances Brown, Ibid., 132; Interview with Julia Woodbury, “Federal Writers’ Project: Slave Narrative Project, Vol. 14, South Carolina, Part 4, Raines-Young,” manuscript/mixed material, Library of Congress, 229; Interview with Martha Richardson, Ibid., 19.
subaltern peoples of colonial South Carolina—the enslaved, no matter the origin, as they did in other early-modern colonial contexts—managed to find enough common ground to begin assembling new sociocultural structures in the face of unspeakable oppression.\textsuperscript{3}

Histories of the colonial world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are incomplete without taking enslaved Native Americans who were forced to labor and help build colonial projects into full account. Peoples indigenous to the Americas were present and held in captivity or enslaved in every colonial context. But scholars should not only discuss enslavement of Native Americans as something that happened but was a precursor to the more important story, that of the transatlantic captive trade and the enslavement of African peoples in the Americas. Instead, as I have argued, enslaved Native Americans ended up becoming African Americans right alongside enslaved peoples from Africa. Though their stories may have begun in disparate parts of the globe, enslaved Native Americans and Africans became creole Americans together.

\textsuperscript{3} The WPA Slave Narratives Project contains people claiming Native American ancestry in 13 out of 16 states where interviews were held. Certainly a significant proportion of these people had Native American ancestors who were not enslaved, but a running theme through many of these interviews is enslaved Native American or “Mustee”—to put it in the racial parlance of eighteenth-century South Carolina—were direct ancestors of “Indians.”
Appendix A

The Colonial South Carolina Slavery Database, 1670–1739

As I began to consider methods of interpreting the place of enslaved Native Americans in early South Carolina, I kept coming back to the idea that the only way to understand the social context of these people was to embed them into the larger population of peoples of African descent. Since the way colonists described enslaved people according to race, sex, and age was important to my arguments throughout much of this dissertation, I decided to construct my own database of all the evidence I could find of enslaved people in the colony. Such a project would allow me to discuss the intersections of race, sex, and age on plantations and throughout the colony over time. The problem with such a methodology is that there is nothing close to a comprehensive record similar to the famous 1850 United States Federal Slave Census. Surviving records are either incomplete or nonexistent. I am therefore offering this essay as a description of my sources and methods for the Colonial South Carolina Slavery Database (hereinafter CSCSDB).

Virtually all of the sources I used in constructing the CSCSDB can be found in the South Carolina Department of Archives and History in Columbia, South Carolina. Some have been published, but whenever possible, I have consulted the archival material. For the sake of expediency and remote research, when I did not have time to read the archival material, some volumes I have consulted have been the transcripts of early South Carolina records produced in the 1930s by the Works Progress Administration. Almost all of the sources I have consulted are transactional in nature: bills of sale, mortgages, inventories of deceased colonists, or wills. With the exception of probate inventories,
extant records from early South Carolina can tell us a little about a specific person (or group of people) on a specific date, but little else.

When writing the history of slavery in early South Carolina, the overwhelming majority of sources are either state records or state copies of private records (such as mortgages) since there are almost no private “planter papers” in the sense historians typically use the term. Instead, what we have been left with are snapshots of enslaved people. The information contained in the aggregate is uneven. The record is better for a plantation if we have a probate inventory than only a single mortgage with one enslaved person listed as collateral. This problem means that the surviving evidence is skewed one way or another depending on the history of evidentiary production and archival curation. I have constructed the CSCSDB under the working assumption that when aggregated, the unevenness in source materials is less of an analytical problem. Some of these historical snapshots are sparser than others, but when I compile them together over time, I think I can use them to produce the fullest (and most empirical) picture of slave society over time ever assembled in the historiography of early South Carolina.

My goal was to create a database of every enslaved (or indentured) person I could tease out of the archive, but since the records offer different information, I had to devise a way to standardize the dataset. I settled on a 16-field rubric for the data:

- Name (of the enslaved or indentured person)
- Owner at the time of the record’s production
- Four separate fields for date (Month, Date, Year, and Decade)
• Race (Negro, Indian, Mustee, Mulatto, or European)
• Sex (Male, Female)
• Age (Adult, Man, Woman, Boy, Girl, Child, Infant, Elderly)
• Location
• Mortgaged to (the creditor in a mortgage agreement)
• Willed to (the beneficiary in a will)
• Sold to (the purchaser)
• Type of Record
• Source
• And a final field for any other information I may find useful in the future

As one can easily see, in no record does every field have information. For example, sometimes there was no information about race, or in many cases, nothing about the enslaved person’s location. When there was no evidence, I have left the field blank. I have not inferred evidence if it was not available in the source.

Another issue when considering aggregating data such as these is the need to standardize the ownership of enslaved people. For instance, on November 25, 1736, Charles Walles sold an enslaved “Negro” boy named Fortune to Charles Starnes. Ownership of Fortune changed hands on the date of the record, so I had to come to a conclusion as to how to code his owner in the record—should it be the buyer or the seller? I decided that for all records, the person who owned enslaved people when a transaction commenced would be my “owner.” In my reading, Fortune’s “owner” was therefore Walles, and he was “sold to” Starnes. In my GIS database, if I had spatial data for this transaction (of which I do not), Fortune would have belonged to Walles on
November 25th and then to Starnes on the 26th (see next appendix). My field for “owner” thus implies ownership of coerced laborers up to the date of the transaction if ownership changed hands in the record.

Using this methodology, I created the CSCSDB, and it currently lists 15,518 people. But this method leaves open the question of individuals being listed more than once, on the off chance that they came up in multiple documents. Colonist William Harvey took out advertisements in the *South Carolina Gazette* in 1732, 1733, 1735, and 1738, and in each case was looking for “a Mustee Woman” named Diana.¹ In each of these advertisements, Harvey wanted to find the same woman. In order to keep the dataset complete, I have kept each of these entries in the database, especially since they were taken at different times. Other cases of the same enslaved person being listed more than once, which are much more difficult (or impossible) to track, also pose little problem to such a large dataset, and I have therefore left them in my analysis. My analysis is based on the extant records, in all their flaws.

¹ *SCG*, October 21, 1732; July 7, 1733; May 24, 1735; and April 6, 1738.
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Appendix B

Mapping Enslavement in Colonial South Carolina

My spatial project does not cover the entire colony, but the central areas between Edisto Island to the south and the upper branches of the Cooper River to the north. It therefore does not include colonies on the Santee River to the North or areas further south, along the ACE Basin (Ashepoo-Combahee-Edisto Rivers) or the Sea Islands further south.

The idea for this GIS project was simple. I wanted to trawl through all the surviving documentary records from early South Carolina to collect every instance where I can link a specific enslaved individual to a specific owner at a point in time, which turned into my Colonial South Carolina Database of Enslaved Peoples. Then, I would map out early plantations using ArcGIS software and analyze the enslaved population in space and over time in a way no one has done before. This simple premise became a methodological obstacle when I realized just how difficult it is to map early plantations in South Carolina. One of my arguments in this dissertation is how the colonial state apparatus in early South Carolina was in many ways completely inept, owing much to the way many prominent colonists preferred to keep it inept. No doubt part of this argument came out of my attempts to understand early colonial land tenure. The record-keeping for land tenure was horrible. In fact, when the British Crown officially took over control of the colony in the early 1730s, one of the first goals was to produce better land records. From this disarray with respect to land ownership came the “Memorials of 17th and 18th Century South Carolina Land Titles.”
After being disappointed about how difficult I was finding it to put geographic boundaries on early plantations, I ran across the Memorials from the 1730s. These are amazing documents, but can be confounding to piece together land plats in time and over space. I have likened this project to trying to build an intricate jigsaw puzzle where the pieces have to be placed in many layers, the pieces are different heights and not uniform, and of uncertain dimensions, all while the only picture for reference is the very top layer. Needless to say, I have spent much more time mapping plantations than anticipated.

The relational nature of land plats is another added dimension of complexity. If I was not precisely sure where one plantation went, it would throw off all other others in the area as well, since most points of reference in narrative descriptions of land, as well as plat drawings, are other people’s lands. This problem, in addition to the problem where in many cases I would only know that colonist X received 500 acres of land along a river or creek but not know the relative shape of the plat, made me realize that my mapping would be highly interpretive. Most scholars implementing GIS software like it for its highly accurate geographic capabilities (as well as the ability to layer multiple datasets). I imagine my GIS project is much more impressionistic than most, but I also do not think the fuzziness of plantation boundaries mattered in the ways I wanted to interpret the data. I am concerned with the relational and, more generally, spatial layout of plantations, which means that I care more about the broad trends than specific plantations and high geographic accuracy.

One way I have flattened the story of where enslaved people were in early South Carolina was by situating them in space. I had to make a decision for every intersection of documentary evidence with my plantation maps. A colonist owning enslaved people
corresponding to a plantation on my maps did not necessarily mean the people were ever on that particular location. I have therefore used my best judgment when deciding to link enslaved people with plantations, though to my relief, sometimes the enslaved person’s location was listed in the historical document. Another way this method flattens history is by my setting boundaries to where these people were. Enslaved people were put to work in all sorts of ways moving around the colony, but I have had no real way to account for it. The data is often uneven, so I also decided to use relatively long amounts of time in each window for analysis.

In order to make my analysis uniform, I also made a decision about mapping ownership. Many of the records I use are where enslaved people were changing owners on the day the record was produced (such as a bill of sale or deed of gift), so I have in these cases delineated the seller as the owner and not the buyer. This was intended to lend a structural uniformity to the entire dataset; in every case, the colonist who came into the historical picture as owning the enslaved person(s) I listed as the owner, whether ownership changed or not. This means that when enslaved people show up on my maps, they had been there before the date of the record but maybe were not after. A future avenue for research should be to trace the spaciality of buying and selling enslaved people.

Last, I want to point out how my work on this project would be far behind where it currently stands without the meticulous work of Henry A.M. Smith. Smith was a judge and historian of early South Carolina who produced historical maps and plantation biographies of early land ownership in the South Carolina. I cannot imagine the amount of labor he put into these projects, which went unfinished. Smith’s papers and drawings
are at the South Carolina Historical Society in Charleston, but unfortunately they remain unprocessed almost a century after his death.
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