A Phenomenological Critique of Irene McMullin’s Formulation of Heideggerian Temporality

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Abstract

This paper aims at differentiating Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology from Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenological ethics on the experiential level of encountering otherness. In addition to drawing from each author’s seminal texts, I will contextualize the disagreement between Heidegger and Levinas to Irene McMullin’s *Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations*. McMullin, in her response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger’s ontology, provides a formulation of Heideggerian temporality that markedly deviates from Heideggerian ontological commitments in *Being and Time*. I present and develop two deviations: (a) McMullin positions Dasein’s original encounter with the Other before the establishment of Dasein’s ontological structures (i.e., Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others) and (b) McMullin attributes Dasein’s inauthenticity to the Other’s limitation of Dasein’s temporalization of Being. I contend that both deviations correspond with Levinas’s phenomenology of temporality more than Heidegger’s phenomenology of temporality. It is through McMullin’s deviations, therefore, that distinctions can be drawn between Heidegger’s ontological articulation of Being-guilty, the call of conscience, Being-towards-death, and Angst on one hand and Levinas’s metaphysical articulation of conscience, shame, and death on the other.
Introduction

I will begin with a passage from Simon Glendinning’s *On Being With Others: Heidegger – Derrida – Wittgenstein*: “When philosophers talk about the external world, they typically populate it with small-to-medium-sized dry-goods: pens, desks, sticks, and so on … Yet much of our lives is occupied with far more exotic creatures, namely, *living* things, and particularly, *living* human beings” (1). I selected this excerpt for a few reasons. First, it communicates a central aspect of my argument in this paper. While our experience of the world is certainly influenced by the material “things” surrounding us, it is extremely important to consider the intersubjective phenomena that shape our everyday activities. Our experience of the world, in other words, is inextricably tied to other people who are *there* with us. These Others, who imbue our quotidian experience with meaning, comprise an inescapable aspect of our existence that must be examined.

Second, this excerpt provides some insight into Glendinning’s approach to philosophical inquiry, which I find quite admirable. In his book, Glendenning approaches several issues in the area of social ontology from analytical and Continental standpoints, including the problem of other minds and the phenomenon of Being-with-others. Glendenning grapples with the problems of epistemological skepticism (i.e., what can we know about the Other?) and existential solipsism (i.e., how do we encounter the Other as Other?) in a way that scholars from any philosophical tradition can find interesting and engaging. I hope to achieve a similar level of breadth and depth with my arguments in this paper, such that scholars from any philosophical tradition can benefit from the subsequent discussions.

Finally, this excerpt represents a good starting point for introducing my phenomenological investigation. To call the investigation “phenomenological” alludes to a methodology that is, in part, highlighted by Glendenning’s excerpt. Primarily, the term “phenomenological” refers to
being concerned with the experience of phenomena. The things themselves (e.g., the pens, desks, sticks, and so on) are not necessarily the priority; rather, the philosophical emphasis is placed on the experience of the phenomena associated with the things themselves. To avoid oversimplification, however, the phenomenology referenced here and throughout my paper will not take the form of “descriptive psychology.” Phenomenology does not simply entail the description of conscious experience (i.e., “I am staring at a computer screen while moving my fingers across the keyboard”); instead, it entails a rigorous analysis of the conditions for the possibility of meaningful experience. What conditions make my experience of the world, of Others, of things possible at all? In his lecture on “Methodological Atheism: An Essay in Second-Person Phenomenology,” Steven Crowell situates “meaning” at the center of phenomenological analysis. According to Crowell, “For [Husserl and Heidegger], philosophy thematizes meaning (Sinn), our experience of something as something. Such meaning is presupposed in both metaphysics and epistemology – that is, in any discussion of entities and our knowledge of them” (2). Phenomenology, therefore, takes issue with how we experience things, equipment, and people as things, equipment, and people in their respective senses. To exemplify phenomenological analysis, I will discuss an approach to phenomenology that sets the stage for my ensuing argumentation: Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology.

Often labeled Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time re-centers the question of the meaning of being (BT, 21). An, if not the, essential component of Heidegger’s ontological

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1 I am referring to “the things themselves” in a substantive sense; that is, phenomenology does not concern itself with the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be considered a desk, table, or chair. I am not, therefore, contradicting Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological mandate: “To the things themselves!”

2 To be clear, I am not denying the existence of other forms of phenomenology. I am attempting to carve out the phenomenology with which I am concerned in this paper.
interrogation of meaning is “Dasein,” which is left untranslated by scholars\(^3\) (ibid, 27). Heidegger introduces Dasein with the following description: “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’” (ibid). Heidegger presents two ontological features of Dasein in this excerpt: every person can be classified as Dasein, and Dasein is capable of asking questions about its Being\(^4\). I would like to dwell on the second ontological feature for a moment. When Heidegger states that Dasein is inquisitive in relation to its Being, he means that “in its very Being, [Dasein’s] Being is an issue for it” (ibid, 32). As a college student, for instance, I am always taking issue with the ways in which I relate to the normative standards for being-a-student. That is to say, I measure my individual manifestation of studenthood against communal norms for successfully or un成功fully being-a-student. By studying, taking notes, attending office hours, and engaging in other actions associated with being-a-student, I am constantly orienting myself towards being a better student. In the Heideggerian sense of the term, I care about being-a-student. The meaning of being-a-student, to put otherwise, comes into view only through my existential projection onto its possibilities: “The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself” (ibid, 33). Dasein’s Being, thus, cannot be conceptualized along essentialist lines as

\(^3\) At several points in the text, however, Heidegger presents “Dasein” as “Da-sein,” alluding to a possible translation of “Being-there” (BT, 27). While I will leave Dasein untranslated for the sake of my analysis, it could be helpful to keep this translation in mind, especially in the sense that Dasein “dwells” within the world (i.e., its perpetual there-ness) (ibid, 80).

\(^4\)There is a distinction between “Being” (ontological) and “being” (ontic) within Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. The type of analysis associated with Being, or Dasein’s essential ontological structures such as Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others, is existential: “The question about that structure aims at the analysis … of what constitutes existence” (BT, 33). On the other hand, the type of analysis associated with being, or Dasein’s manifestation of a particular possibility (e.g., teacher, student, or farmer), is existentiell: “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself … The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call ‘existentiell’” (ibid).
philosophy has done in the past (e.g., the ego cogito, a Christian soul, or a rational animal); instead, “existence is the determining character of Dasein” (ibid).

The ontological contention that Dasein’s existence determines its “character” also sheds light on how Dasein experiences phenomena. Dasein does not interact with worldly phenomena as a detached, removed observer; instead, Dasein’s Being has an “essential state” of Being-in-the-world (ibid, 80). This means that “‘I reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’ the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way” (ibid). My practical identity of being-a-student makes the classroom familiar to me: I know that I should sit in a desk, quietly listen to the professor, use my pen to take notes in my notebook, raise my hand when I have a question, and so on. Moreover, the world associated with being-a-student refers to an equipmental totality that, in part, constitutes the meaning of being-a-student (e.g., pens, desks, notebooks, and so on) (ibid, 97). What it means to be a student, in other words, includes a set of coordinated activities that employ the equipment of studenthood. Additionally, according to the earlier formulation of phenomenology, the equipment is encountered as equipment precisely because I am immersed in the practical identity of being-a-student.

Phenomena, therefore, are revealed in disparate ways according to Dasein’s situatedness in the world. I have a concrete example in mind from a few years ago. While staying at home over spring break, my dad asked me to assist a family friend who was tasked with re-painting our kitchen ceiling after it was damaged by a leak. This family friend was quite familiar with performing home repair tasks, including painting and fixing water damage. Our first task was to analyze the ceiling, identify the damage, and devise a plan for re-painting. He began the task by asking me, “What do you notice about the ceiling?” I provided no insight. I simply pointed out the damage, which was clearly marked by the dark splotches that juxtaposed the originally bright
coloration. When I asked him the same question, he spoke about the ceiling in astounding detail. He pointed out a variety of painting patterns, the intended purpose behind each pattern (i.e., whether the pattern at issue was the result of structural or aesthetic aims), and places where previous painters had, insignificantly or significantly, erred. To me, the bearer of the untrained eye, the ceiling lacked significance. To the experienced handyman, however, the ceiling was situated within a referential totality of phenomena, including the equipment associated with being-a-handymen and the dwelling associated with the practical identity as such. This latter component will become increasingly important in the following sections, as the meaning of “practical identities” is intimately related to Heidegger’s notion of Being-with-others.

To continue with the introduction of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, another essential component is time. As Heidegger notes, “[W]henever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light … as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it” (ibid, 39). The meaning of being-a-student, for instance, depends upon my temporal involvement in the practical identity as such; that is, whether I am a good student greatly relies upon my temporal manifestation of studenthood, including the time spent studying, writing, and reading for my courses. In a broader sense, Heidegger conceives of temporality from the standpoint of Dasein’s ontology as opposed to an objective sense of time (e.g., increasing entropy) presented by the natural sciences (e.g., physics). In this sense, Heidegger does not differentiate between past, present, and future as the Western hegemonic conception of time does. According to Heidegger, “Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been” (ibid, 401). The meaning of Dasein’s Being simultaneously considers the ways in which the past, present, and future influence Dasein’s possibilities-for-Being. The meaning of being-a-student,
therefore, is influenced by previous students who came before me, students that I associate with now, and the student that I wish to be. Even though I have partitioned the meaning of being-a-student into the usual temporal categories, I do not experience the normative standards associated with being-a-student in this manner; instead, they cohesively inform my existential project.

The phenomenological issue of temporality (i.e., how we experience time) resides at the center of this paper. I will approach Heidegger’s conception of temporality from a variety of standpoints, including Jean-Paul Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, Emmanuel Levinas’s *Totality and Infinity* and *Time and the Other*, and Irene McMullin’s *Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations*. For the most part, I will engage with Irene McMullin’s book on Heidegger’s social ontology. In particular, I will contend that McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian temporality deviates from Heidegger’s ontological commitments in *Being and Time*. I will develop this argument in the subsequent sections. In Section 1, I will present McMullin’s account of Heideggerian temporality. In Section 2, I will critique McMullin’s account of Heideggerian temporality. In Section 3, I will respond to potential objections raised by McMullin in defense of her interpretation of Heideggerian temporality. Before arriving at these sections, however, I would like to complete the introduction by situating McMullin’s work in the context of phenomenological scholarship.

In *Time and the Shared World*, Irene McMullin attempts to resolve several criticisms raised against Heidegger’s account of intersubjectivity. While many theorists have attempted to reconcile the tension between Heidegger’s social ontology and notable objections to it (e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre’s critique), McMullin’s approach is unique. McMullin offers a reading of Heidegger’s social ontology grounded in the relationship between Dasein’s temporal particularity and Dasein’s fundamental ontological structure of Being-with-others; that is, McMullin presents a novel
understanding of Dasein’s temporality in order to explain the ways in which Dasein engages with the Other in her particularity. McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality is developed in response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s criticism in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre criticizes the ontological structure of Being-with-others for not being able to capture the particularity of the Other. McMullin’s interpretation, therefore, is highly attuned to Sartre’s criticism because she explains the ontological structure of Being-with-others through Dasein’s encounter with the temporal particularity of the Other.

I take issue with this formulation of Heideggerian temporality in several ways. First, I argue that McMullin’s formulation is phenomenologically ambiguous, which lends itself to distorting Heidegger’s work. Second, I argue that McMullin’s explanation of Being-with-others through Dasein’s encounter (i.e., inaugural instance) with the temporal particularity of the Other (i.e., foreign originary temporality) distorts Heidegger’s original formulation of Being-with-others. Finally, I argue that McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality aligns more closely with Levinas’s conception of temporality, namely that the ethical resistance experienced in the face of the Other gives rise to Dasein’s temporal experience. Because McMullin’s account of temporality resembles Levinas’s conception of temporality more so than Heidegger’s, I also assess the importance of this similarity in relation to Heidegger’s ontological conception of authenticity.
Section 1: Irene McMullin’s Formulation of Heideggerian Temporality

In this section, I will establish Irene McMullin’s account of Heideggerian temporality. It is important to note that this section will lay the foundation for the subsequent sections, which take a critical stance on McMullin’s account. Before arriving at the treatment of McMullin’s account as such, however, I will incrementally progress through the arguments which precede McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian temporality. To begin, I will describe the equiprimordiality of Being-with-others and Being-in-the-world as ontological structures of Dasein’s existence; that is, Dasein’s fundamental ontology is essentially defined by its dwelling within a familiar association of phenomena (i.e., the world) and the world’s reliance upon the existential presence of Others as co-constitutors of communal meaning. Next, I will present Jean-Paul Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger’s ontological structure of Being-with-others, specifically Sartre’s argument that Heidegger’s ontological structure inaccurately represents the ways in which Dasein encounters Others as Others. Finally, I will present McMullin’s response to Sartre’s criticism, which includes McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality. Even though the majority of this section is dedicated to the explication of McMullin’s central thesis (i.e., Dasein encounters Others by confronting a foreign originary temporality), I will conclude the section by providing a glimpse into the tension between McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality and Heidegger’s ontological commitments in Being and Time.

The Equiprimordiality of Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others

As discussed in the introductory section, Heidegger describes Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world, which portrays Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being as always already dwelling within a certain referential totality of phenomena (HCT, 190). For instance, the carpenter familiarizes himself with the tools in his workshop (e.g., the hammer) and situates their functionality within
his overall projects (e.g., building a birdhouse). The carpenter utilizes his tools in order to complete his projects, and he completes his individual projects for the sake of being a carpenter. In general, the carpenter’s specific modality of being (i.e., his being-a-carpenter) positions his equipment within a referential totality (i.e., a context) for understanding what it means to be a carpenter. As Heidegger notes, “This already indicates a certain structural correlation among the characters mentioned, namely, that it is the references which let things be present and that the references in turn become present or apppresented through the referential totality” (ibid). The hammer, in other words, becomes a “tool” (i.e., presents itself as “equipment”) when it is placed within the ontological context of carpentry (i.e., when it is used for the sake of being a carpenter). The equipment associated with carpentry “is discovered along with the work itself” in the same manner that “we distinguish alarm clock, stopwatch, and the like” (ibid, 192). Being-in-the-world, therefore, delineates Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being and Dasein’s comportment towards worldly objects (e.g., the carpenter encounters the hammer as equipment).

In addition to presenting objects in a worldly manner, Dasein’s Being-in-the-world also presents Others in a worldly manner; that is, Others are always already included in Dasein’s orientation towards its projects. To return to the carpenter once again, the carpenter designs his products to be used by consumers, factoring the averageness of Others (e.g., the size, residence, and general desires of Others) into his measurements. In this sense, “the work-world at the same time appresents the world in which users and consumers live, and in this way it appresents them too” (ibid). Even though Others are not physically present when the carpenter completes his projects, the carpenter’s work always already incorporates Others into the planning and execution of his projects. Others, thus, might not be explicitly acknowledged in Dasein’s projection onto possibilities-for-Being; nevertheless, the phenomenon of Others intrinsically belongs to the notion
of Being-in-the-world because the world always already indicates the presence of Others. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger provides several examples of Others being encountered along with that equipment with which Dasein concerns itself, such as a cultivated field and an anchored boat (*BT*, 153-154). According to Heidegger, “The Others who are thus ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is present-at-hand; such ‘Things’ are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others” (ibid, 154). Although Dasein encounters Others from the standpoint of its own projects (i.e., constitutes the being of the Other within its referential totality), Heidegger argues that Dasein also acknowledges the distinct projects of Others, which transcend (i.e., exceed) Dasein’s projection of itself onto possibilities-for-Being. In this paper, the tenability of this argument will be thoroughly contested.

The appresentation of Others in the carpenter’s work exemplifies the ontological structure of Being-with-others. Dasein might not necessarily be *with* Others in a physical sense (i.e., spatially proximal to Others), but Dasein is *with* Others in an ontological sense (i.e., existentially proximal to Others). The unfolding of Dasein’s existence is directly affected by the existence of Others, especially when considering the publicity of normative conditions for understanding being (i.e., the evaluation of one’s success or failure at being something). As mentioned in the introduction, Dasein’s futural projection onto possibilities-for-Being includes the availability of public norms by which Dasein normatively assesses its success or failure at being something (e.g., a carpenter or a teacher). Normativity, therefore, presupposes the presence of conditions by which Others can assess the conformity of Dasein’s being to the ideality of being. I interpret Heidegger’s

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5 By “ideality of being,” I am referring to societal prescriptions that constitute the meaning of practical identities. To be a carpenter, teacher, or father is to, in part, align oneself with idealistic conceptions of these identities.
existential connection between Being-with-others and the ontological meaning of care, thus, to signify the existential presence of Others as a necessary condition for normativity (ibid, 157). In other words, if Dasein takes issue with its Being (e.g., cares about its ability to succeed at being-a-carpenter), Dasein’s care-ful orientation towards its mineness must be predicated upon the existential presence of Others, which suggests a shared world between Dasein and Others. As a result, Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others equiprimordially determine Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being (ibid, 149).

Heidegger’s account of Being-with-others, however, raises questions concerning the nature of Dasein’s encounter with Others. If Dasein encounters Others through its own projects, then Dasein most likely is not encountering the Other in her particularity; rather, Dasein assimilates the Other’s existence into its generic, preconceived notions of what the Other should be. The carpenter approaches Others as consumers, homogenizing Others into a similar mode of being. On the other hand, even if Dasein encounters Others irrespective of its projects (i.e., out of its world), Dasein still might not encounter the Other in her particularity because Heidegger posits a shared world alongside Dasein’s own projected world. In the shared world, Others are encountered according to shared meanings, as Dasein employs common notions of what it means to be something. The carpenter, therefore, might encounter a teacher not in her particularity (i.e., her specific way of being-a-teacher) but rather as a teacher solely in the generic sense. The “as” resides at the center of this phenomenological problematic; if Others cannot be encountered as Others in their otherness, then Heidegger’s account of Being-with-others overlooks a crucial aspect of human experience: confronting difference. In other words, Heidegger must answer a critical question: can Dasein experience the particularity of the Other’s alterity through the ontological structure of Being-with-others? Jean-Paul Sartre asserts the negation.
Before introducing Sartre’s criticism, I would like to qualify the aforementioned objection. The objection that Dasein overlooks the Other’s alterity ought to be considered in light of Heidegger’s discussion of leaping-in/ahead and the hermeneutics of empathy. In his section on “The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with,” Heidegger outlines the existential modalities through which Dasein interacts with Others’ projects (*BT*, 158-163). For instance, Heidegger presents the modality of “leaping-in” wherein Dasein appropriates Others’ projects: “It can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can *leap in* for him” (ibid, 158). Leaping-in, therefore, acknowledges the distinctiveness of the Other’s project (i.e., Dasein understands the Other’s project as something to be assimilated into its existence) without necessarily acknowledging the distinctiveness of the Other’s alterity as such (i.e., Dasein excludes the Other’s particular orientation towards the project). Heidegger recognizes that leaping-in, as a form of interpersonal “domination,” mostly “pertains … to our concern with the ready-to-hand” (ibid). In this sense, the existential modality of leaping-in concretely displays the objection raised above, namely that Dasein’s existential projection occludes the Other’s alterity from view. Heidegger, however, presents two other existential modalities that more closely resemble a consideration of the Other’s alterity.

In contrast to the domineering character of leaping-in, Heidegger posits leaping-ahead as a liberating force for Others’ projects. Leaping-ahead reflects an appreciation of the Other’s freedom in relation to Dasein’s existential projection: “This kind of solicitude pertains … to the existence of the Other, not to a ‘*what*’ with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for it*” (ibid, 159). As Heidegger notes, the existential modality of leaping-ahead is not concerned with the specific project of the Other; instead, Dasein is concerned with the Other’s existence insofar as the Other’s actualization of ontic possibilities
reflects her distinctiveness. To clarify the existential nature of leaping-ahead, Irene McMullin describes an experience in which she patiently waited for the Other’s project to be completed as opposed to leaping-in for the Other. Specifically, while visiting the park with her nephew, McMullin recounts the experience of watching him struggle to tie his shoes. As she explains, “I admire his sheer will to achieve this ability in spite of continued frustrating setbacks and I restrain myself from taking this opportunity to practice from him” (TSW, 227). More explicitly, she resisted the urge to “leap in and take over this careful struggle to be from him – I hold myself back in a type of restraint that is nevertheless characterized by … an expressive encouragement and recognition of his struggle” (ibid). McMullin could have easily taken over the task from her nephew, grabbing the laces and quickly tying them in order to “be back to make dinner” (i.e., pursue her own existential projects) (ibid). Rather than leaping-in for her nephew, McMullin enriched the actualization of his ontic possibilities by nurturing his individual development and growth. The existential modality of leaping-ahead, thus, more clearly exhibits a consideration of the Other’s alterity.

Finally, I will consider the existential implications of Heidegger’s “hermeneutic[s] of empathy” (BT, 163). Heidegger’s development of empathy can be contrasted with Husserl’s phenomenology of empathy from Ideas II (IdII, 239-240). Even though Heidegger does not mention Husserl by name when critiquing his phenomenology of empathy, it is evident from the referenced sections that Heidegger is attempting to distance his social ontology from that of Husserl. In his section on “Empathy towards other persons as an understanding of their motivations,” Husserl states that “others are apprehended in analogy with one’s own Ego as subjects of a surrounding world of persons and things to which they comport themselves in their acts” (ibid, 240). This notion of analogy is central to Husserl’s social ontology; that is, the ego
comes across the phenomenon of the Other through an analogy between it-self and the Other. Under this view, Heidegger contends that “[t]he Other would be a duplicate of the Self” (*BT*, 162). Because the Other is understood through the lens of the ego (i.e., the Self), the Other would not truly be encountered; rather, the ego would simply encounter itself from the standpoint of another person. Heidegger, more explicitly, contends that “[t]he presupposition which this argument demands – that Dasein’s Being towards itself is Being towards the Other – fails to hold” (ibid). In fact, Heidegger posits that the phenomenology of empathy presupposes the ontological structure of Being-with-others. As he notes, “‘Empathy’ does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does ‘empathy’ become possible” (ibid). Heidegger challenges the primacy of empathy in the relationship between Dasein and Others; for, Dasein’s dwelling within a world (i.e., a surrounding world of persons and things to which it comports itself, as Husserl puts it) already suggests a relationship between Dasein and Others. In short, Dasein’s existence assumes a social ontology within which the phenomenon of empathy arises.

Empathy, albeit not the primordial manifestation of Being-with-Others, is still useful for Heidegger’s explication of social ontology. In particular, Heidegger puts forth the hermeneutics of empathy to describe the breakdown associated with Dasein’s existentiell categorization of Others. Basically, Heidegger contends that Dasein’s Being-with-others might be “led astray and obstructed by the various possibilities of Being which Dasein itself possesses, so that a genuine ‘understanding’ gets suppressed, and Dasein takes refuge in substitutes” (ibid, 163). In this brief excerpt, Heidegger acknowledges the criticism mentioned above, namely that Dasein’s Being might obscure the Other’s alterity when projecting itself onto ontic possibilities. The substitutes within which Dasein takes refuge could be understood as those generic notions of being a teacher, carpenter, and father that overlook the particularity of the Other’s practical identities. In short,
Heidegger attempts to avoid the ontological conception of the Other as being derived from the ontology of Dasein; rather, Heidegger employs the hermeneutics of empathy as a means of expressing Dasein’s shortcomings in the face of understanding the Other’s alterity. This, however, represents the extent to which Heidegger deals with this issue. Moving forward, it is important to remember these existential modalities (i.e., leaping-ahead and the hermeneutics of empathy) for the ensuing discussion of Sartre’s criticism and McMullin’s conception of Heideggerian temporality. The former mischaracterizes and the latter markedly deviates from Heidegger’s ontological account of Being-with-others.

_Jean-Paul Sartre’s Criticism of Heidegger’s Being-with-others_

In _Being and Nothingness_, Jean-Paul Sartre differentiates his phenomenological orientation towards the Other from Heidegger’s ontological structure of Being-with-others. Specifically, Sartre takes his phenomenological account of encountering the Other to actually achieve transcendence (i.e., that which exceeds constitution by the Self) instead of Heidegger’s immanence (i.e., that which falls within constitution by the Self), which is disguised as transcendence (_BN_, 336). In this sense, Sartre contends that Heidegger’s Being-with-others cannot access the particularity of the Other’s alterity. Moreover, Sartre offers a stronger version of this contention, namely that Heidegger’s Being-with-others precludes Dasein’s ability to encounter the Other’s alterity in her particularity. I will establish Sartre’s transcendence in relation to Heidegger’s allegedly duplicitous transcendence, and then, I will present Sartre’s specific criticism of Heidegger’s notion of Being-with-others.

Unlike Heidegger, Sartre introduces “consciousness” as a fundamental concept for his phenomenological ontology (ibid, 23). In order to develop his phenomenological account of consciousness, Sartre compares it with that of Husserl. First, Sartre assumes the intentional form
of consciousness; that is, “[c]onsciousness is consciousness of something … [which] means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness” (ibid). An essential component of consciousness from a phenomenological perspective, therefore, is that consciousness is intentional (i.e., it is directed at something). While agreeing with the structure of intentionality, Sartre disagrees with the established correlation between “noesis” and “noema” or, roughly, the intentional act and the intentional content. As Sartre notes, “Husserl defines consciousness as transcendence … But from the moment that he makes of the noema an unreal, a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to his principle” (ibid). By invoking Berkeley’s phrase, Sartre associates Husserl’s phenomenological reduction with Berkeley’s empiricism. Husserl, in his epoché, solely concerns himself with the being of phenomena (i.e., what is phenomenologically experienced) as opposed to the being of the thing-in-itself. From his phenomenological analysis of how we experience phenomena, Husserl seeks to establish the essential structures of consciousness in order to ascertain how the Ego experiences noema. As a result, Sartre criticizes Husserl for positing essential structures of consciousness that comprise “an Ego.” Even though Sartre maintains the transcendence of consciousness, Sartre rejects Husserl’s substantiation of consciousness through the positing of a noesis (i.e., an Ego) that is distinct from the experience of a noema. In other words, for Sartre, “there is never an Ego-consciousness but only consciousness of the Ego” (ibid, xii).

Sartre takes consciousness to be fundamentally constituted by nothingness and negation. Each of these terms significantly contributes to Sartre’s account of transcendence. If there are no essential structures of consciousness that comprise the Ego, “consciousness must be qualified … as revealing intuition or it is nothing” (ibid, 23). Even so, Sartre dismisses the former description because it does not reflect the ontological character of consciousness; instead, it assumes a pre-
existing knowledge that portrays consciousness in an epistemological manner, which Sartre associates with Cartesian dualism: “[t]he reduction of consciousness to knowledge … involves our introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is typical of knowledge” (ibid, 12). Again, Sartre wishes to distance his account from a substantiation of consciousness that interprets it to be “a noumenal being” as opposed to “the transphenomenal being of phenomena” (ibid, 24). Sartre, in short, affirms a relational ontology. In this sense, Sartre accepts Heidegger’s definition of Dasein and applies it to consciousness, namely that consciousness “is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself” (ibid). Transcendence, for Sartre, can be found within the intentionality of consciousness (from Husserl) and the relational ontology (from Heidegger) that undermines the metaphysical presuppositions of the noesis/noema distinction. The latter component of Sartre’s transcendence highlights the nothingness of consciousness, such that the being of consciousness must be for-itself rather than in-itself. The for-itself, as an ontological category for understanding the being of consciousness, also alludes to negation.

The phenomenon of negation appears in a variety of forms within Sartre’s ontology. He first distinguishes between external negation and internal negation. The former does not implicate the being of the Self, whereas the latter does. According to Sartre, “The [external negation] appears as a purely external bond established between two beings by a witness. When I say, for example, ‘A cup is not an inkwell,’ it is very evident that the foundation of this negation is neither in the cup nor in the inkwell” (ibid, 243). To ontologically determine that a cup is not an inkwell, in other

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6 Sartre employs these Hegelian terms within his phenomenological ontology to depict the relational being of consciousness and the absolute being of the thing-in-itself. The for-itself, as Sartre notes, is “a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not” (BN, 127). On the other hand, Sartre can merely state that the in-itself “is” because any ontic determination introduces the negation of the for-itself (ibid, 29).
words, does not impact the cup or the inkwell in their respective beings; indeed, a consciousness observes the differentiation without being existentially affected by it. In contrast, the phenomenon of internal negation carries implications for the Self’s existence. As Sartre notes, “[C]onsider such expressions as ‘I am not rich’ or ‘I am not handsome’ … [T]he denial itself comes to influence the inner structure of the positive being who has been denied the quality” (ibid). To ontologically determine oneself as not being rich or handsome affects the projection of the Self onto possibilities-for-Being. Paired with Sartre’s commitment to a relational ontology, the relevant distinction between internal negation and external negation becomes clear: internal negation calls into question the existential possibilities experienced by the Self while external negation does not. It is not the case that not-being-handsome simply “passes into nothingness while I keep intact the positive totality of my being,” but rather, not-being-handsome “will explain my melancholy as well as … my failures in the world” (ibid). When describing the existential implications of not-being-handsome on the Self, Sartre highlights the discrepancy between traditional metaphysical articulations of the Self (i.e., the Self possesses the property of “handsomeness”) and his phenomenological explication of the Self (i.e., the phenomenon of “not-being-handsome” determines the being of the Self through and through). Internal negation, therefore, is fundamental to understanding the existential movement of consciousness as a for-itself and the Self’s ontology as such.

The characteristics of nothingness and negation exemplify the transcendence of consciousness. Both of these phenomena interact with that which is other or different from the Self.

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7 Taking the previous formulation of the for-itself (I am not what I am and am what I am not), we can further explicate Sartre’s example of “not-being-handsome.” The fact that the Self negates being-handsome does not, in effect, remove being-handsome from influencing the Self’s ontological projection. I might not “be-handsome” (I am not), but I still measure myself against the ontic yardstick of “being-handsome” (I am).
(i.e., that which exceeds the Self). With this in mind, I would like to introduce a further extrapolation of negation in the context of the Self’s encounter with another person (i.e., another for-itself), which Sartre refers to as “double negation” (ibid, 379). This concept will lay the groundwork for the ensuing discussion of the perpetual conflict between the Self and the Other. Through double negation, Sartre attempts to elucidate the ontological determinations that proceed from (and are refused by) the Self. Sartre explains it as follows: “What I refuse to be can be nothing but this refusal to be the Me by means of which the Other is making me an object” (ibid, 379). In the previous exploration of internal negation, the Self negated possibilities-for-Being that inevitably influenced its ontological constitution; however, in double negation, the Self’s negation can receive a response, potentially in the form of a negation. When taking into account the consciousness of the Other, the Self’s refusal can be refused by the Other, or, to employ the appropriate terminology, the Self’s negation can be negated by the Other. For now, the important aspect of double negation resides within its indication of transcendence. Implicit within the concept of double negation is the notion that Others’ ontological determinations of the Self influence the Self’s projection onto possibilities-for-Being. I will present the phenomenon of double negation in more detail below while also identifying Sartre’s main argument against Heidegger’s Being-with-others, namely that Being-with-others cannot capture the phenomenon of double negation.

Sartre frames the relationship between the Self and the Other as being mired in conflict. The conflict between me and the Other hinges upon objectification; that is, the conflict arises from a struggle between myself and the Other in determining the existence of each other. When making

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8 This phenomenological description will be explicitly demonstrated in Sartre’s example of “the person looking through the keyhole.” In this example, the Other determines the Self to be a voyeur who looks through a keyhole, and the Self could potentially refuse this determination.
the Other into an object, “he appears to me as a transcendence-transcended. That is, by the mere fact that I project myself toward my possibilities, I surpass and transcend the Other’s transcendence” (ibid, 363). As referenced above, the carpenter’s project requires the constitution of Others as consumers and, as a result, determines the being of the Other along the lines of an average consumer. The Other’s ability to determine her own existence (i.e., her freedom to constitute her own being), thus, has been overtaken by the carpenter’s placement of the Other into his referential totality of meaning. Sartre describes this phenomenon (i.e., the notion that the Self constitutes the being of the Other within egoistic parameters) as the Other’s being-for-me (ibid, 343). In contrast, when the Other objectifies me, my being in relation to the Other can be characterized as being-for-the-Other.

Being-for-the-Other describes the phenomenon of the Other’s look. The Other’s look provides a novel modality of being in the sense that the Other’s look is inimitable by the Self; the Self cannot look at itself in the same way the Other does. In other words, in order for the Self to be revealed to the Self from the standpoint of the Other (e.g., in experiences such as shame), the Other’s look is a necessary condition for experiencing these possibilities-for-Being. Sartre’s noteworthy example for demonstrating the objectification of myself by the Other’s look is the shame experienced when caught looking through someone’s keyhole (ibid, 350). Sartre imagines himself looking through a keyhole into someone’s room and “all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure” (ibid, 349). The feeling associated with being caught is the phenomenon of shame: if the Other witnesses me peeping

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9 As Sartre puts it, “I am incapable of apprehending for myself the self which I am for the Other, just as I am incapable of apprehending on the basis of the Other-as-object which appears to me, what the Other is for himself” (BN, 327).
through a keyhole into someone else’s room, then the Other determines me as a voyeur, a stalker, or a creep. Shame involves “the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object” (ibid, 350). In this case, when one states “I am ashamed of myself,” the object of shame is the Self which is experienced by the Other, as the Other’s determination of the Self overrides, supplants, and transcends the Self’s constitution of itself. The Self’s transcendence, in essence, has been transcended by the Other.

For Sartre, the relationship between Self and Other can be summarized as a dynamic struggle for freedom. According to Sartre, “While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me” (ibid, 474-475). The Other ultimately represents either a transcendence-transcended or a transcendence-transcending, subjugated by my freedom to determine her being or subjugating my freedom to her revelation of my being (e.g., as a stalker). In both cases, transcendence reigns supreme in Sartre’s analysis of the relationship between the Self and the Other: either the Self is transcending the Other’s transcendence or the Other is transcending the Self’s transcendence. Sartre, however, heavily relies upon the Other’s ability to transcend the Self’s transcendence (i.e., the Other’s ability to determine the Self’s existence) when differentiating his intersubjective account from that of Heidegger. Sartre contends that Heidegger’s ontological structure of Being-with-others excludes existential situations in which Dasein experiences its transcendence being transcended by the Other; that is, under Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Sartre impugns Dasein’s ability to encounter the Other as disparate from Dasein’s projection onto possibilities-for-Being (ibid, 334-335).
In particular, Sartre problematizes Dasein’s ability to pass between the ontological structure of Being-with-others and the ontic reality of encountering the Other in her particularity. Sartre takes Heidegger’s Being-with-others to signify an *a priori* condition of Dasein’s Being, which “thereby exhausts all possibility of relation with others” (ibid, 335). The *a priori* nature of Being-with-others ignores the experience of particular instances of Others (e.g., specific friends, family members, and neighbors) because *a priori* structures are not contingent upon Dasein’s empirical experience of the world, which accurately describes the persistence of Being-with-others even in the physical absence of Others. *A priori* structures do not arise or develop from Dasein’s concrete encounters in its world; rather, *a priori* structures are those which account for the experiencing of phenomena (i.e., the conditions for the possibility of experience). As Sartre notes, the *a priori* refers to that which “unifies experience” (ibid). To consider Heidegger’s Being-with-others as an *a priori* condition is to capture the notion that Dasein always already finds itself in a shared world with Others, including certain relationships with those Others. Being-with-others, as an *a priori* structure, accounts for Dasein’s incorporation of Others within its projects and Dasein’s experience of Others in accordance with shared meanings of the communal world. Neither incorporation within projects nor subsumption under public meanings, however, captures the particularity of the Other; in fact, both sets of possibilities for Dasein are “flight[s] toward the self” (ibid). Being-with-others, according to Sartre, does not achieve a recognition of Others as distinct from Dasein’s projected world (i.e., transcendence); rather, it asserts the solipsistic tendencies of Dasein’s Being, which lends credence to Sartre’s labelling of Heidegger’s transcendence as “a concept in bad faith” (ibid). Sartre, therefore, points out that Heidegger’s ontological structures
(e.g., Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others) are incommensurable with ontic analyses pertaining to the concrete experiences of Others. As a result of Dasein’s inability to transcend itself, Sartre contends that Heidegger’s Being-with-others precludes Dasein from experiencing the Other in her particularity. The posited ontological relationship “between me and an abstract Other… renders impossible any concrete connection between my being and a particular Other given in my experience” (ibid). Dasein encounters the Other according to pre-determined notions of what the Other ought to be, and these notions are ineluctably derived from Dasein’s conception of the Other that conforms to the shared meanings of the communal world (e.g., teacher and carpenter). Sartre not only indicts the phenomenological ability of Dasein to transcend the world-constituting subjectivity emphasized in the philosophical tradition (i.e., Dasein’s projection), but Sartre also undermines the phenomenological ability of Dasein to encounter the Other on her own terms. By presenting Dasein as essentially constituted by its Being-with-others, Heidegger provides an a priori condition of Dasein’s Being that abstracts from concrete relationships with specific Others. For this reason, Heidegger is unable to transfer his conclusions about otherness from the ontological level of analysis to the ontic level of analysis, preventing Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein from describing daily interactions between people. I will now introduce Irene McMullin’s response to Sartre’s objections, which attempts to demonstrate the ways in which Heidegger’s Being-with-others accesses the particularity of the Other.

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Dan Zahavi, in his article on “Intersubjectivity in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,” recapitulates the argument in the following manner: “As Sartre points out, any ‘theory of intersubjectivity’ which attempts to bridge the gap between the self and the Other by emphasizing their similarity, undifferentiatedness, and a priori interconnectedness is not only in constant danger of relapsing into a monism that in the end would be indistinguishable from solipsism, it is also losing sight of the real issue: our concrete encounter with this or that transcendent Other” (267).
McMullin’s Response to Sartre

Sartre’s criticism relies upon a certain conception of aprioricity (i.e., what it means for something to be a priori). Heidegger’s aprioricity, according to Sartre, emphasizes Dasein’s existential constitution of Others at the expense of accurately capturing the Other’s otherness. Dasein determines the Other’s existence according to its already established ontological categories, precluding an ontic understanding of the Other’s being. Irene McMullin’s argument in *Time and the Shared World*, however, presents Heidegger’s aprioricity as being responsive to the ontic reality of Others, undermining the foundation of Sartre’s criticism. By invoking Heidegger’s intertwining of the ontological with the ontic, McMullin contends that Heidegger’s aprioricity takes into account both the ontological structures by which Dasein experiences Others and the ontic reality of Others. McMullin unites these distinct levels of phenomenological analysis through her explication of the “inaugural instance” in which Dasein encounters the Other (*TSW*, 93).

Before resolving the perceived tension between the ontological and the ontic in Heidegger’s intersubjectivity, McMullin distinguishes Dasein’s comportment to equipment (*Zuhanden*) from Dasein’s comportment to things (*Vorhanden*). Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being-in-the-world privileges the appearance of tools above the appearance of thingly objects, as Dasein’s pragmatic orientation supersedes any theoretical stance on its projects. Thingly objects usually become present when Dasein’s referential totality is interrupted by an obstacle, impediment, or barrier. For example, when the carpenter’s hammer breaks, the carpenter suddenly becomes aware of the hammer’s thingness (i.e., its thingly qualities as opposed to its pragmatic qualities for completing a task) (*BT*, 103). In this case, the carpenter experiences resistance to the satisfaction of his projects, which illuminates “the normative dimension of the world’s resistance to Dasein’s practical modes of comportment” (*TSW*, 82). The carpenter’s broken hammer defies
incorporation and subsumption into the familiar significance of his projects, demonstrating that Dasein can experience phenomena outside of its projected world. Dasein’s categorization schemas, in other words, can be resisted by the things themselves, providing McMullin with the notion of ontic responsiveness necessary to overcome Sartre’s criticism.

Although Dasein’s mode of encountering objects in the world essentially differs from Dasein’s mode of encountering Others, the capacity for ontic reality to determine Dasein’s ontological structures applies to both modes of encounter (BT, 121). In the former modality of being, Dasein approaches objects in the world as equipment or things according, in part, to the object’s ability to be incorporated within Dasein’s projects. This introduces the possibility that objects can resist Dasein’s projection (e.g., the carpenter cannot use the broken hammer in order to complete his projects). In the latter modality of being, Dasein approaches the Other from the “categories… found within this or that Dasein’s particular, finite existing” (TSW, 88). According to McMullin, “To take seriously the fact that the mode of being of Dasein is always this or that finite, factical existence involves recognizing that the categories are themselves dependent on the particular beings encountered in that existence” (ibid). To evaluate Dasein from an existential-ontological standpoint, therefore, requires us to understand the formation of ontological categories as a product of Dasein’s everyday interactions with specific Others (i.e., ontic encounters). As a result, ontic reality plays a decisive role in the determination of ontological structures. Not only do ontic encounters determine ontological structures, McMullin contends that ontic encounters also have the ability to initiate ontological structures. This is especially true, according to McMullin, in the “complete absence of particular instances of concrete encounters… [such that] there could be no genuine being-with” (ibid, 89). In the extreme case that Dasein never encounters
Others, the ontological structure of Being-with-others never emerges; the initiation of Being-with-others is entirely contingent upon an inaugural instance\textsuperscript{11} of confronting the Other.

Notice the difference between Sartre’s conception of aprioricity and Heidegger’s conception of aprioricity espoused by McMullin: Sartre posits the a priori as that which is divorced from the ontic reality of Others, whereas Heidegger presents the a priori as that which captures the ontological structures of Dasein while maintaining a responsiveness to the ontic reality of Others. Indeed, Dasein’s ontological structures have ontic foundations (BPP, 19), conveying the notion that “concrete encounters… [are] the necessary condition for the possibility of an ontological category’s meaning holding for what it does” (TSW, 88-89).

Moreover, Sartre’s criticism overlooks the prominence of normativity in the construction of Dasein’s ontological structures. Sartre argues that Dasein constitutes the Other as opposed to encountering the Other in her particularity, framing Dasein’s world-constituting capacity as the sole determinant of the Other’s existence. In contrast, McMullin identifies a normative dimension to Dasein’s experience with equipment, the world, and Others; that is, the resistance experienced by Dasein when navigating its existence can be attributed to Dasein’s desire to “get things right” (ibid, 84). The mineness of Dasein, therefore, orients itself towards improvement, betterment, and goodness within its practical identities by seeking out objective methods of measurement (ibid, 84-85). The carpenter, for instance, is motivated to refine his craft by normative claims arising from himself, the ideal of carpentry, and Others with whom he interacts. Although Heidegger might disagree with her linguistic choices, McMullin employs these sources of normativity as

\textsuperscript{11} McMullin employs the term “inaugural instance” to explicate the coming-into-being of Being-with-others as an ontological structure of Dasein’s existence. Although McMullin appears to reject this conceptualization of Being-with-others, I will argue in “McMullin’s Formulation of Heideggerian Temporality” that she retains some fundamental aspects of this view.
transcendent properties of Dasein’s existence, which inform its projection. Without considering the normative claims made on Dasein’s existence by Others, Sartre’s criticism fails to account for an essential aspect of Dasein’s encounter with Others. To further explain the concept of normativity in Heidegger’s ontology, McMullin investigates the normative pluralism associated with Dasein’s existence in “Resoluteness and Gratitude for the Good.”

McMullin’s aforementioned paper concerns the nature of Dasein’s resoluteness. Just like other terms in Heidegger’s lexicon, “resoluteness” signifies a specific existential phenomenon that differs from its common meaning. Resoluteness portrays authentic Dasein’s reaction to the breakdown in its existential outlook; that is, authentic Dasein becomes resolute in the face of Angst, taking responsibility for its own existence (i.e., its mineness) in contrast to inauthentic Dasein’s cession of its ownmost responsibility to publicized caricatures. Clearly, there are several Heideggerian concepts pertaining to the existential phenomenon of resoluteness, so I will attempt to succinctly elucidate the notions of Angst, authenticity, and inauthenticity. To frame the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity generally, authentic Dasein understands itself as actively participating in the normative determination of what it means to be something, and inauthentic Dasein passively accepts the normative determination of what it means to be something from publicly available measures. The existence of inauthentic Dasein evinces a categorical mistake: Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being requires Dasein to take responsibility for itself, but inauthentic Dasein exhibits the Being of a thing, giving itself to the whims of the world in average everydayness (BT, 230). Heidegger characterizes inauthentic Dasein’s ontological inconsistency as “Dasein’s… ‘fleeing’ in the face of itself” (ibid). Angst, on the other hand, is that which brings Dasein “face to face with its Being-free for … the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is” (ibid, 232).
Angst, therefore, concerns Dasein’s Being-in-the-world (ibid). When experiencing the existential anxiety associated with Angst, Dasein does not concern itself with certain possibilities of being something; rather, Dasein is concerned with its ownmost possibility-for-Being\(^\text{12}\). The functionality of Angst, thus, neatly maps onto the distinction between inauthentic and authentic Dasein in the sense that Angst forces inauthentic Dasein to confront its lack of ownership over its Being. Subsequently, authentic Dasein responds to Angst with a resolute attitude in which Dasein “takes up again the practical identities and abilities-to-be that collapsed in existential death – but in a way that is somehow inflected with the insight gained through that breakdown” (“RGG,” 1). McMullin’s characterization of Angst as a “breakdown” emphasizes an important aspect of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis, namely that Angst prevents Dasein from projecting itself onto possibilities-for-Being in its average everyday manner. Resoluteness, however, provides authentic Dasein with the ability to recognize its normative participation\(^\text{13}\) in ontological projection after existential breakdown, and, as McMullin asserts, the recognition achieved by authentic Dasein is influenced by three distinct sources of normativity.

McMullin identifies the self, specific Others, and conventional modalities of being as normative sources for Dasein. First, it is important to connect the existential anxiety of Angst with the normative force experienced by Dasein. Within the occasion of breakdown, Dasein is left with

\(^{12}\) “Ownmost possibility-for-Being” includes a consideration of Dasein’s particular projects (e.g., being-a-teacher) without focusing on their quotidian contents (e.g., grading papers); rather, the focus shifts to Dasein’s mode of projection onto possibilities-for-Being. Dasein adopts a novel orientation towards its phenomenological experience of normativity, comprehending itself as actively participating within its projection.

\(^{13}\) That is to say, resolute Dasein acknowledges the ways in which it accepts, adopts, and applies normative standards for successfully or unsuccessfully being something (e.g., a teacher, carpenter, or a father) within the context of its existence. Inauthentic Dasein, on the other hand, does not acknowledge its normative participation in its own existence; rather, it exhibits a passive reception of normative standards from society without questioning its potential distinctiveness.
its ownmost possibility for determining itself, which highlights its fundamental capacity for being something; additionally, Dasein’s ownmost possibility-for-Being highlights the capacity for Dasein to *succeed or fail* at being something, demonstrating what McMullin refers to as an essential “orientation toward measure” (ibid). This tracks with the earlier observation that Dasein’s existential-ontological structure of care (i.e., Dasein cares about who it is) orients its mineness towards normative evaluation (i.e., measurement). In terms of the self’s status as a normative source, McMullin contends that resolute Dasein “experiences a gap between the public rules and the desired condition towards which she understands them to be aiming – a gap that she honours by enacting that identity in her own particular way” (ibid, 3). Resolute Dasein differs from inauthentic Dasein in that inauthenticity precludes Dasein from noticing a discrepancy between its manifestation of being and the ideality of being presented within publicly available norms. Resolute Dasein, however, experiences the normative claim arising from its own distinct manifestation of practical identities. Furthermore, resolute Dasein differs from inauthentic Dasein in that resolute Dasein experiences normative claims arising from specific Others. As McMullin notes, inauthenticity portrays other Dasein as co-constitutors of conventional meanings; that is, inauthentic Dasein understands other Dasein as anonymous participants in constructing the communal significance of what it means to be something (ibid, 4). Resolute Dasein, on the other hand, encounters other Dasein in their particularity (i.e., as distinct from the averageness of ontological categories) just as resolute Dasein recognizes the discrepancy between its own manifestation of being and conventional modes of being (ibid).

This is to say that McMullin poses two phenomenological approaches to encountering Others in Heidegger’s ontology: as being “one among many in a shared community” and as being “face to face with another self who has the authority to call into question both convention and my
entitled sense that I am free to pursue the good however I see fit” (ibid). The former mode of 
encountering Others refers to the generic structure of Being-with-others; that is, Dasein encounters 
Others according to shared meanings in the communal world, which Dasein and Others establish 
together. This seems to be the object of Sartre’s criticism. The latter mode of encountering Others, 
however, falls outside the scope of Sartre’s criticism. When resolute Dasein confronts Others, 
“Dasein does not see other Dasein simply as interchangeable bearers of averageness but as … 
independent sources of normative claim that help it to answer to its normative neediness” (ibid). 
In this sense, Dasein finds a source of normativity in its relationship with specific Others, as Others 
question, dispute, and challenge the ways in which Dasein exists. But, how does the portrayal of 
Others as sources of normativity allow Dasein access into their particularity? McMullin contends 
that resolute Dasein’s response to existential breakdown illuminates the Being of Dasein such that 
resolute Dasein can comprehend the particularity of its own being along with the being of Others 
(ibid). In other words, the process by which resolute Dasein grounds its being in normative sources 
other than publicized notions of being (e.g., the self) can be employed for understanding Others as 
well. Because I understand my “studenthood,” for example, as distinct from the generic conception 
of being-a-student, I can also perceive the carpenter as distinct from the generic conception of 
being-a-carpenter associated with his own ontic category.

Although McMullin’s response to Sartre’s criticism seems multi-faceted, its disparate parts 
are intimately related. McMullin differentiates Heidegger’s aprioricity from Sartre’s aprioricity by

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14 This distinction will become incredibly important in the second section, which criticizes 
McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality. The first form of encountering the Other 
will be associated with Heidegger’s conception of temporality as presented in Being and Time 
(assemblage of anonymous Others’ temporalities), and the second form of encountering the Other 
will be associated with McMullin’s deviation from Heideggerian temporality (foreign originary 
temporality).
demonstrating the interconnectedness of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Dasein’s existence. In short, the ontic informs the ontological such that Dasein’s empirical encounters with Others heavily influence the ontological structures by which Dasein experiences the world (e.g., Being-with-others). Sartre’s inaccurate characterization of Heidegger’s aprioricity, therefore, undermines his argument that Heidegger’s Being-with-others cannot pass between the ontological and ontic levels of analysis. Sartre, additionally, overlooks the normative dimension of Heidegger’s Being-with-others. Dasein’s existential-ontological structure of care orients Dasein towards measuring itself against normative standards, which are generated by itself, Others, and conventional modes of being. As McMullin argues, Dasein does not only project the being of Others onto themselves, as inauthentic Dasein might; rather, resolute Dasein comes up against normative resistance in categorizing Others in the world (i.e., Dasein finds itself incorrectly or correctly classifying Others). When confronting specific Others (i.e., ontic reality), resolute Dasein distinguishes between the established norms and another Dasein’s manifestation of those norms in its being. As a result, Dasein experiences the particularity of Others while also understanding them in relation to generic notions of being (e.g., a teacher, a carpenter, or a father). It is normativity, thus, that undergirds Dasein’s fluid relationship between ontic and ontological dimensions of existence: the grounding of Dasein’s existence, in part, within its own normative participation assists Dasein in perceiving Others as distinct from established ontological categories. To make Dasein’s encounters with specific Others intelligible, however, I must investigate Dasein’s original instance of confronting an Other, namely the inaugural instance in which Dasein meets “a foreign originary temporality”¹⁵ (ibid).

¹⁵ The phenomenological notion of a “foreign originary temporality” (along with the “inaugural instance”) will receive extensive philosophical treatment in the following section.
McMullin’s Formulation of Heideggerian Temporality

By attributing the formation of ontological structures to ontic encounters with specific Others, McMullin must explicate the emergence of Being-with-others as an ontological structure through Dasein’s encountering specific Others. Additionally, McMullin’s exposition of the existential-ontological process by which Dasein finds itself with Others must incorporate the previously discussed notion of normativity. If specific Others make a normative claim on the being of resolute Dasein (i.e., a claim concerning the moral standing of Dasein’s existential projection), then McMullin’s “inaugural instance” must embody a particular normative structure. Indeed, McMullin contends that the Other’s normative claim places a demand on Dasein to accommodate the Other’s mode of temporalizing “through the establishment of binding public standards” (TSW, 158). That is, within the co-constitution of public standards for being something by Dasein and Others (e.g., being-a-student or being-a-carpenter), Dasein must recognize Others’ temporalities as aligning with, contradicting, or normatively assessing Dasein’s temporal mineness. Before presenting McMullin’s account of the Other’s normative claim on Dasein, I will roughly outline Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s temporal mineness (i.e., the temporal structure of Dasein’s Being).

The foundational components of Dasein’s temporality make possible the existential-ontological structure of care. By explicating Dasein’s mineness through the structure of care, Heidegger portrays Dasein’s temporal nature as a unified phenomenon. It is not the case that Dasein’s “care-structure… first arise[s] from a coupling together, but is articulated all the same” (BT, 364). Similarly, the nature of Dasein’s temporality cannot be differentiated and analyzed separately; rather, Dasein always already manifests its various modes of temporality in its Being. In the introduction, I presented Dasein’s temporality as thrown projection, but I did not mention
another component of Dasein’s temporality: falling. Thrownness and projection respectively account for Dasein’s sociohistorical grounding in time and Dasein’s futural projection onto possibilities-for-Being, but Dasein’s “existential meaning in the Present” is captured through the phenomena associated with falling\(^{16}\) (ibid, 397).

In Dasein’s (futural) projection onto possibilities-for-Being, Dasein’s thrownness (i.e., the has-beenness of Dasein’s existence) and fallenness (i.e., the making present of Dasein) also influence Dasein’s projection. In this sense, “*temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity... is grounded... the unity of the care-structure*” (ibid, 401). To exemplify the temporal unity of Dasein’s existence, imagine the temporal factors affecting the carpenter’s completion of his projects. The carpenter’s pragmatic orientation towards his craft might include a historical understanding of carpentry (e.g., his father’s orientation towards carpentry), the prevalent normative understanding of carpentry in the present (e.g., the average, everyday orientation towards carpentry), and his deviation from the publicly available norms associated with carpentry. In short, the carpenter’s projection onto possibilities-for-Being cannot be neatly parsed into discrete temporal units (e.g., past, present, and future); instead, the carpenter’s projection always already exhibits the unified care structure enabled by Dasein’s temporality.

Furthermore, Dasein’s temporality exhibits an ecstatic organization. To describe the nature of Dasein’s temporality as ecstatic is to say that Dasein’s temporality “*is the primordial ‘out-side-of-itself’ in and for itself*” (ibid, 377). The ecstatic organization of Dasein’s temporality, thus, tracks with Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being-in-the-world such that Dasein is always already outside of itself in relating to otherness. Heidegger’s rejection of the traditional subject/object

\(^{16}\) For the purposes of the current section, the conceptual parameters of “falling” are not as relevant as the inclusion of falling within Dasein’s temporal structure.
dichotomy manifests itself in Dasein’s ecstatic temporality: Dasein’s relationship with the world is already assumed in what it means to be Dasein, especially from a temporal standpoint. As McMullin notes, “To understand Dasein’s primordial temporality as expressive or ecstatic is to recognize the fundamental other-directedness of Dasein’s existence – the fact that its very way of being is a pressing out into relations with that which it is not” (TSW, 117). The notion of ecstatic temporality will be further investigated in the next section of this paper, especially in relation to McMullin’s assertion that Dasein’s ontological structure of Being-with-others essentially depends upon the inaugural instance in which Dasein encounters specific Others.

Although I have barely scratched the surface of Dasein’s temporality as presented by Heidegger, the two components mentioned above (i.e., the unity of Dasein’s temporal expression and the ecstatic nature of Dasein’s temporality) provide sufficient background for the ensuing discussion of McMullin’s argument. By combining these two components of Heideggerian temporality, the disclosure of Dasein’s mineness becomes intelligible. Dasein discloses its mineness by expressing its temporal particularity within practical identities; that is, because Dasein “speaks itself out” into the world through temporal expression (i.e., ecstatic temporality) and temporal expression constitutes Dasein’s care structure (i.e., its mineness), Dasein’s mineness is revealed through its temporal particularity (ibid, 116). According to McMullin, “Recognizing another Dasein as Dasein… involves understanding particular events as actions; in other words, as commitments to possible ways for this other to be his or her own self” (ibid, 165). The carpenter’s being, for instance, can be understood through his enactment of carpentry in temporally unique ways: the conscientious pace of the carpenter’s drawing, building, and touching up in relation to his projects reveals the ontic nature of his carpentry (i.e., the meaning of his being-a-carpenter). In effect, Dasein encounters Others by confronting their foreign originary
temporalities, which “involves an ecstatic encounter with the temporalizing of the others whose now-saying *I must take into account*” (ibid, 158).

The Other’s normative claim on Dasein’s temporalizing, thus, is contingent upon Dasein’s acknowledgement of the Other’s temporal alterity. This acknowledgement, according to McMullin, “would not achieve obligating force if the others did not require me to *accommodate* my temporalizing to their time through the establishment of binding public standards” (ibid, 133).

As mentioned above, Dasein encounters Others’ temporalities in the context of constructing communal ontological meanings (i.e., what it means to be something). In these shared meanings, Dasein’s temporal expression is relativized according to Others’ temporal expressions, demonstrating that Dasein’s temporal mineness not only fails to compose the totality of significance in the shared world but is also limited by the temporalities of Others (ibid, 159).

Others’ temporalities, in other words, are taken to be essential in the constitution of shared meanings, and, as a result, Others’ temporalities determine the appropriateness of ontic categories (i.e., normative stipulations for assessing the relationship between Dasein’s manifestation of being and the ideality of being). McMullin, however, provides another method by which Dasein experiences the Other’s normative claim: resolute Dasein distinguishes the Other’s being from the ontological significance of public meanings (i.e., experiences a normative resistance to inauthentically classifying Others). This capacity arises from resolute Dasein’s ability to distinguish itself from conventional modes of being and apply the same perceptive distinction to the being of Others (“RGG,” 4).

McMullin, therefore, puts forth two modes of encountering Others: an acknowledgement of Others as essential and committed to the construction of public meanings and an acknowledgement of Others as distinct from average everyday conceptions of being. Because the latter mode of
encountering Others presupposes the presence of average everyday conceptions of being (i.e., resolute Dasein must first recognize the existence of shared meanings), the former mode of encountering Others seems more fundamental to Dasein’s initial confrontation with an Other’s existence as Other. Even though the former mode of encountering Others can be taken as more fundamental than the latter, McMullin does not provide a coherent phenomenological account of Dasein’s “inaugural instance” in which Dasein experiences the Other as Other for the first time, generating an ontological structure of Being-with-others. In the next section of the paper, I take issue with the lack of coherence between McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality and Heidegger’s ontological commitments.

Briefly, I would like to elucidate McMullin’s employment of the “inaugural instance,” which accounts for the origination of Being-with-others. In her section “The Heideggerian A Priori,” McMullin presents the emergence of Being-with-others as a response to encountering another Dasein: “… if I had never encountered another Dasein then the category of understanding specific to others would be unavailable – since it is dependent on the intuited beings that exist in their own right. In other words, in the complete absence of particular instances of concrete encounter, there would be no genuine being-with” (TSW, 89). This is a controversial claim for which McMullin does not provide direct support from Heidegger’s texts; that is, Heidegger never definitively establishes a one-to-one relationship between ontic phenomena (i.e., specific Others) and

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17 McMullin could argue that she is drawing from Heidegger’s section on “The Hermeneutical Situation at which we have Arrived for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care; and the Methodological Character of the Existential Analytic in General” (BT, 358-364). In this section, Heidegger states that “[t]he ontological ‘truth’ of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth” (ibid, 364). This excerpt, however, is not contextualized to McMullin’s phenomenological articulation of the “inaugural instance,” and, as a result, I am skeptical of granting her this potential interpretation. I will say more on this issue in the next section.
ontological structures (i.e., Being-with-others). Later in the section, McMullin describes her aforementioned position in relation to another view that posits ontological structures as existing within Dasein’s subjectivity, and, according to this view, it is simply a matter of “triggering” the initiation of such ontological structures. According to McMullin, “Though concrete others may be necessary as triggers, then, the innate idea of ability is already there, waiting for the inaugural instance of concrete otherness to ‘summon’ it into ‘unfolding’” (ibid, 93, emphasis added).

McMullin rejects this view because it assumes an underlying subjectivity that contradicts Heideggerian ontological assumptions, namely this view “substitutes a substantial self … for the relational self that is constituted through its activities of existing” (ibid). The interesting aspect of McMullin’s response, however, is the object of rejection. McMullin is not rejecting the notion of an inaugural instance from which ontological structures arise (e.g., Being-with-others); rather, McMullin is rejecting the assumption that ontological structures are free-floating potentialities within Dasein’s self that are waiting to be actualized. In this sense, McMullin retains the presupposition of an inaugural instance. When further justifying her position, McMullin states that “the possibility of understanding in terms of this or that category is only a possibility insofar as the category is ‘actualized’ through a concrete encounter with the particular that inaugurates it” (ibid). In other words, McMullin affirms the existence of an inaugural instance without necessarily developing its phenomenology.

In general, I have attempted to lay the foundation for a tension between, on one hand, McMullin’s response to Sartre’s criticism which emphasizes an ontic responsiveness to specific Others in the constitution of ontological structures and, on the other hand, McMullin’s inability to phenomenologically present a coherent account of the “inaugural instance” in which Dasein confronts an Other as Other. In short, McMullin posits an ontic responsiveness to specific Others
without carefully considering its resulting phenomenological impact on Heidegger’s ontological notion of Being-with-others. It is my aim in the next section to explore the inconsistency between these two arguments: the initiation of Being-with-others through a specific instance of foreign originary temporality and the always already existent nature of Being-with-others that makes sense of Others’ temporalities.
Section 2: Objections to McMullin’s Formulation of Heideggerian Temporality

In the previous section, McMullin’s response to Sartre’s objection took the following form: Heidegger’s ontological structure of Being-with-others does not preclude Dasein from encountering specific Others; rather, these concrete encounters contribute to the establishment of ontological structures by which Dasein understands Others. In some cases, moreover, these encounters initiate ontological structures, as indicated by McMullin’s allusion to the inauguration of Being-with-others through “particular instances of concrete encounter” (TSW, 89). This section, in turn, aims to investigate the intentional implications\(^\text{18}\) of McMullin’s contention. In a phenomenological sense, what constitutes Dasein’s initial encounter with a “foreign originary temporality?” In other words, how can we ground this inaugural instance within Dasein’s phenomenological experience of the world? These questions are essential for understanding McMullin’s response to Sartre’s criticism. McMullin’s response positions her argument within a precarious situation: on one hand, McMullin overcomes Sartre’s criticism by highlighting the ontic dimensions of Dasein’s Being, but, on the other hand, McMullin deviates\(^\text{19}\) from Heidegger’s ontological commitments in \textit{Being and Time}. I contend that McMullin’s emphasis placed on the former exacerbates the latter.

Additionally, the current section takes advantage of the phenomenological ambiguity in McMullin’s account. I take McMullin’s clearest depiction of the original encounter to appear in her section on “The Other’s Claim,” but this depiction leaves much to be desired (ibid, 158-161).

\(^{18}\) While not explicitly mentioned, “intentional implications” were discussed throughout the first section. The phrase refers to the experiential assumptions associated with adopting a certain phenomenology. In this sense, I am inquiring into the consequences of McMullin’s “inaugural instance” being paired with Heidegger’s notion of Being-with-others.

\(^{19}\) In effect, if McMullin deviates from Heidegger’s ontological commitments, it can be argued that McMullin is not actually defending Heidegger’s Being-with-others against Sartre’s objection.
The aforementioned section, for the most part, already assumes a phenomenological account of an original encounter with the Other as Other, allowing McMullin to formulate conclusions without making incisive distinctions between theoretical stances. For instance, McMullin argues that “Levinas and Heidegger (and indeed Husserl) should be understood as existing much more on a continuum characterized… by… a gradual progression toward understanding the nature of time as ‘a relationship with the other as other’” (ibid. 160). While McMullin’s contention might accurately portray the relationship between Levinas and Heidegger, its generality effaces essential differences between the two thinkers on the level of phenomenology. Furthermore, as McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian temporality becomes increasingly similar to Levinas’s account of alterity, it is also important to recognize the ways in which McMullin’s interpretation mimics Levinasian ethics, which might inspire conclusions that conflict with traditional conceptions of Heideggerian ontology. Because McMullin draws a comparison between the two thinkers without clarifying the relationship, I aim to establish disparities between these phenomenological positions and assess the resulting consequences for McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian ontology.

Thus, in this section, I have two interrelated goals. First, I intend to flesh out the original encounter within which Dasein confronts an Other as Other, which raises concerns about McMullin’s deviation from Heideggerian ontological commitments. Second, I intend to invoke Levinas’s temporal dialectic between the instant and the Other in order to simultaneously accentuate McMullin’s deviation from Heideggerian ontological commitments and differentiate Levinas’s conception of temporality from Heidegger’s conception of temporality. By conducting this analysis, my ultimate goal is to demonstrate a clear distinction between Levinas’s phenomenological ethics and Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, which carries intentional implications for encountering the Other as Other.
Within this sub-section, I will attempt to develop an understanding of McMullin’s articulation of the original encounter in “The Other’s Claim.” Again, McMullin is ambiguous about the phenomenology of Dasein’s original encounter; as a result, this sub-section aims at grounding Dasein’s original encounter within a potential phenomenological description. In particular, I contend that McMullin’s conception of the original encounter, at first, seems to be compatible with Heidegger’s formulation of Being-with-others. This is because McMullin describes the original encounter as Dasein confronting an anonymous assemblage of Others’ temporalities (i.e., a foreign originary temporality20) that comprises the meaning of ontic categories (e.g., being-a-teacher). Whether this phenomenological description accurately represents Heidegger’s formulation of Being-with-others will also be addressed, including a discussion of “leaping-ahead” and “hermeneutics of empathy” that were introduced in the first section.

As mentioned in Section 1, McMullin’s explication of the Other’s normative claim involves “Other Dasein requir[ing] me to accommodate my temporalizing to their temporalizing through the establishment of binding public standards” (ibid, 158). While Dasein temporalizes itself according to communal meanings of being (e.g., the communal meaning of being-a-teacher), Dasein also acknowledges its own temporalization as failing to comprise the totality of significance within public categories of being; that is, Dasein, by itself, does not establish the meaning of public categories. Instead, Dasein’s comportment towards possibilities-for-Being

20 McMullin employs “foreign originary temporality” in her essay on “Resoluteness and Gratitude for the Good.” She defines it in the following manner: “an encounter that initiates and underwrites the shared roles and norms that constitute the world as a public domain of significance” (“RGG,” 4, emphasis added). This also supports my interpretation that McMullin adopts the framework of “inaugural instance” (i.e., the emphasis on “initiates” in the previous excerpt) within her social ontology.
already recognizes Others’ temporalities as also constituting the meaning of being. It is not the case that, as a student, my own temporalization of studenthood (i.e., the unfolding of my being-a-student in time) constitutes the communal meaning of being-a-student; rather, my temporal approach to being-a-student represents one among many disparate temporal approaches, which normatively affects my manifestation of studenthood. In other words, the disparate approaches to temporalizing studenthood coalesce and normatively ground the communal meaning of being-a-student, which stands as a measure of the appropriateness of my temporalization of studenthood. For instance, my studying habits for an upcoming exam might pale in comparison to other students who are studying more efficiently and effectively than me (i.e., more thoroughly engaging with the course material), but a comparison in this sense requires a shared conception of meaning. What it means to be a good student (i.e., the normative expectations for successfully being-a-student), therefore, is determined by the collective temporalities (i.e., the disparate temporalities of being) that shape communal meaning.

This particular characterization of the Other’s normative claim illuminates a potential conceptualization of Dasein’s encounter with a foreign originary temporality. When orienting myself towards the fulfillment and actualization of a practical identity (e.g., being-a-student), I confront the normative force of Others’ temporalities. I cannot unilaterally constitute the meaning of being-a-student from my own temporality; instead, I must measure myself against publicly available norms which relativize and place limits upon my enactment of studenthood. Since “student” is a categorical designation, I do not completely define what it means to be a student; rather, I confront a definition of studenthood already crafted by Others, which imposes normative conditions upon me. As McMullin notes, “Dasein’s temporalizing essentially involves an ecstatic encounter with the temporalizing of the others whose now-saying I must take into account” (ibid).
To be clear, I am maintaining that Dasein plays some role in the determination of public meanings and the normative grounding of its own manifestation of being (e.g., resolute Dasein’s recognition of its active participation in relation to normative standards), but I am emphasizing that Dasein does not solipsistically constitute communal meanings. According to this conception of the Other’s normative claim, Dasein originally encounters the Other as Other when orienting its mineness towards objective (i.e., intersubjective) standards for normative evaluation. Within the phenomenological experience of orienting oneself towards a practical identity, Dasein encounters a foreign originary temporality as representing an assemblage of Others’ temporalities. The foreign originary temporality, on this conception, represents the collective sense of anonymous Others’ temporalities.

This conception of the original encounter neatly corresponds to Dasein’s temporality as presented in Heidegger’s *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. According to Heidegger, “When we say ‘now’ we are never directed toward the now as toward a merely extant thing … If in saying ‘now’ we are not addressing ourselves to anything extant, then are we addressing ourselves to the being that we ourselves are” (*BPP*, 259)? Heidegger is describing average everyday Dasein’s phenomenological experience of time, which emphasizes Dasein’s pragmatic orientation towards its projects. Dasein, therefore, incorporates the “now” into its temporalization of practical identities: I have two hours until my next class, I have a week to write my paper, or I can leave class because the professor is fifteen minutes late. In my experience of the “now,” I disclose that for-the-sake-of-which I am (e.g., being-a-student). This observation should also clarify the unified nature of Dasein’s temporality. I do not experience my studenthood as discrete segments of at-the-time, now, and then; instead, I understand the “now” as connected to my past and future temporalizations of being-a-student (e.g., if the professor is currently 15 minutes late, I am justified
in leaving class because I have other assignments to complete). The kind of student that I am, in short, becomes apparent in my temporalization of the now.

To return to the aforementioned conception of original encounter, it is precisely the original temporalization of the now that forces Dasein to confront a foreign originary temporality. When being-a-student for the first time, I must signify the “now” in relation to Others’ significations of the “now,” and, as I continue being-a-student, my temporalization will continue to shift along with my exposure to Others’ temporalizations. I hesitate to provide an empirical example for fear of distorting the phenomenology, but I think it would be helpful to exemplify the phenomena at issue, as long as it is understood that the following example cannot represent the entirety of the phenomenological analysis. With that being said, I have in mind a kindergartner coming home from school and being told by her parents to complete her homework. In this scenario, the student encounters the general category of being-a-student and its appropriate temporalization. The student does not attribute the foreign originary temporality to the parents explicitly, but the student still encounters the foreign originary temporality indicative of being-a-student (i.e., a practical identity). Thus, the inaugural instances in which I encounter specific Others need not bind the foreign originary temporality to specific Others’ temporalizations. In other words, I might gain a sense of what it means to be a student from other people, but, under this conception of original encounter, it is not these particular peoples’ temporalities that comprise the foreign originary temporality. Instead, it is the general category of being-a-student (i.e., the collection of anonymous Others’ temporalities) that constitutes the encounter with a foreign originary temporality, and the foreign originary temporality is presented to Dasein by means of specific Others who normalize studenthood.
On first glance, McMullin’s account of “foreign originary temporality” takes on the form discussed above. Before identifying the ways in which McMullin’s account of foreign originary temporality deviates from this interpretation, I would like to justify the similarity between this interpretation and Heidegger’s ontological commitments in *Being and Time*. My main contention (i.e., McMullin distorts Heidegger’s conception of temporality by deviating from his ontological commitments) depends upon this similarity; however, I must first present what I take to be Heidegger’s conception of temporality. I will offer an interpretation based on the following passage that resides at the center of this phenomenological dispute: “The ontological ‘truth’ of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth” (*BT*, 364). Given McMullin’s adoption of the “foreign originary temporality” and the “inaugural instance,” she appears to interpret the passage literally: the primordial foreign originary temporality (i.e., the ontic, or existentiell, instance of the Other’s temporality) gives rise to the ontological structures of Dasein (i.e., Being-with-others). A different interpretation, however, can be gleaned from Heidegger’s excerpt in *Being and Time*. This interpretation, as I will contend, is more similar to the phenomenological account presented above, namely that Dasein encounters a foreign originary temporality as an assemblage of anonymous Others’ temporalities. I will, additionally, argue that my interpretation does not detract from or conflict with Heidegger’s other social ontological commitments manifested in “leaping-ahead” and “the hermeneutics of empathy.” These relations can also be situated within my interpretation of Heidegger’s social ontology.

In “The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with,” Heidegger presents a phenomenology of encountering the Other along with the underlying ontological assumptions pertaining to Being-with-others (ibid, 153-163). Heidegger, for instance, states that “Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world; and the Dasein-with of
Others is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world” (ibid, 156). We often confront Others through our involvement in worldly projects, such as the carpenter’s placement of Others into the ontic category of “the average consumer.” We meet Others “at work,” that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world” (ibid). This phenomenological description demonstrates an ontological assumption underlying Being-with-others, namely that Dasein’s projection onto possibilities-of-Being includes an existential consideration of Others. It is important to note that Heidegger does not limit Dasein’s encounter with Others to project-related interactions (i.e., Dasein’s incorporation of Others into its existential projects); that is, Heidegger offers other phenomenological descriptions of Being-with-others, including leaping-ahead and the hermeneutics of empathy. As mentioned in the first section, both leaping-ahead and the hermeneutics of empathy more closely resemble an acknowledgement of the Other’s particularity than the ontic generality associated with project-related interactions. This phenomenological description demonstrates another ontological assumption underlying Being-with-others, namely that a breakdown in ontic understanding can elicit individualized existential considerations of Others. Based on this schema (i.e., project-related and breakdown-related interactions), I will relate both forms of interaction to my interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of temporality in order to establish its similarity to his ontological commitments.

My interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of temporality, corresponding to McMullin’s original formulation, depicts Dasein as encountering a foreign originary temporality comprised of anonymous Others’ temporalities. To become a carpenter, in an original sense, is to encounter the temporality of carpentry; therefore, under my interpretation, Dasein’s orientation towards a practical identity requires a recognition of Others’ temporalities that normatively influence Dasein’s ontic manifestation of existential projects. Becoming a carpenter, in other words, includes
an acknowledgement of other carpenters who have established the normative guidelines for being-a-carpenter. The practical identity, or the project-related interaction with Others, primordially appears to Dasein in its Being-with-others. This is not to say that Dasein’s understanding of Others can be completely reduced to project-related interactions; rather, it is simply to posit a foreign originary temporality associated with project-related interactions. Subsequently, ontic distinctions can be made within the larger category of a practical identity (e.g., this carpenter deviates from the norm in a certain way). The breakdown-related interactions (i.e., leaping-ahead and hermeneutics of empathy) associated with an inability to understand Others in the context of agreed-upon social categories (i.e., practical identities) only become possible after Dasein orients itself to a particular practical identity. If someone is completely unfamiliar with carpentry, how will they distinguish good carpenters from bad carpenters? Moreover, even McMullin’s example from the first section illuminates the priority of project-related interactions when developing a phenomenological sense of foreign originary temporality. To quickly recapitulate, McMullin describes her patience when waiting for her nephew to tie his shoes at the park. In order for McMullin to partake in the breakdown-related interaction\(^\text{21}\) with her nephew, however, she must understand the practical identity of being-an-aunt or being-a-parental-figure in relation to her nephew. Those practical identities carry certain normative guidelines that might not be explicitly acknowledged but are societally accepted (i.e., the ideality of being). For Heidegger, therefore, I interpret his conception of temporality as being originally tied to a project-related interaction with Others that subsequently enables breakdown-related interactions with ontic Others.

\(^{21}\) By invoking “breakdown-related interaction” in this context, I am referring to the breakdown of “being-an-aunt” in light of the expected response from McMullin. Based on the situation, McMullin might be compelled to assist her nephew in the project of tying his shoes; however, McMullin wishes to allow her nephew to flourish, develop, and grow on his own, which potentially defies the expectations proceeding from the familial relation.
To return to Heidegger’s passage that relates the “ontological truth” to the “primordial existentiell truth,” I would like to finish by developing Heidegger’s ontological commitments in relation to my interpretation. Heidegger, in short, does not explicitly state that the primordial existentiell truth “gives rise to,” “initiates,” or serves as “the inaugural instance” of ontological truth; instead, I take him to be stating that the aptness of ontological structures is directly influenced by the ontic instances experienced by Dasein. Instead of asserting the priority of breakdown-related interactions over project-related interactions (as McMullin poses for her interpretation of foreign originary temporality), it seems that Heidegger privileges the project-related interactions over the breakdown-related interactions for understanding Dasein’s orientation towards practical identities and, as a result, Being-with-others. Heidegger’s ontological commitments, in general, relate to the prioritization of project-related interactions above breakdown-related interactions for conceiving of a foreign originary temporality. I will acknowledge that my interpretation of Heideggerian temporality (i.e., foreign originary temporality) is not directly supported by the text of Being and Time either (i.e., like McMullin’s). My interpretation, however, is not meant to completely undermine McMullin’s interpretation, but rather, I am attempting to illuminate the phenomenological ambiguity associated with McMullin’s interpretation. As such, McMullin’s intentional implications are impugned in the sense that my interpretation could also accurately depict the phenomenology of encountering the Other as such. With this in mind, I will now present the ways in which McMullin deviates from Heidegger’s ontological commitments, namely those commitments related to the prioritization of project-related interactions above breakdown-related interactions.

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22 This will be explicated in the following sub-section, namely that McMullin’s positioning of the experience of the Other’s temporal alterity prior to Dasein’s gearing into the world privileges the breakdown-related interaction above the project-related interaction.
McMullin’s Deviation from Heideggerian Ontology

I have offered an account of Dasein’s encounter with a foreign originary temporality: Dasein encounters a foreign originary temporality as it orients itself towards the fulfillment of a practical identity in which it experiences a collection of anonymous Others’ temporalities. Now, I will compare this account of the original encounter to McMullin’s discussion in the corresponding section of her book: “The Other’s Claim.” Throughout the section, McMullin appears to shift from the previous account of the Other’s claim to a different phenomenological account of the Other’s claim. Originally, McMullin describes the Other’s claim as accommodating: the Other’s claim requires Dasein to accommodate Others’ temporalities in the co-constitution of communal meanings (TSW, 158). This conception of originally encountering otherness mirrors the conception developed above, namely that Dasein encounters the foreign originary temporality through orienting itself towards a practical identity comprised of Others’ temporalities.

McMullin, however, suggests a more original encounter with the Other in the latter half of the section. According to McMullin, “[W]e are limited by the presence of the other’s temporal alterity and seek to overcome this limitation through establishing and maintaining public measures to level down the difference – the most obvious being vulgar time’s imposition of clock regulations for all life” (ibid, 160-161). The limitation of Dasein’s temporal manifestation of being, thus, does not arise from the co-constitution of meaning with anonymous Others’ temporalities; rather, the limitation of Dasein’s temporal manifestation of being can be traced to an earlier encounter with

23 McMullin is not explicitly distinguishing between these two forms of encounter; that is, the encounter with a foreign originary temporality and the encounter with communal meanings (i.e., an assemblage of anonymous Others’ temporalities) are not clearly differentiated by McMullin. Instead, I am making this distinction based on my reading of McMullin. After describing Dasein’s temporal accommodation to co-constitute communal meanings, McMullin speaks of “[t]he limitation of the I by the other [that] occurs in the most primordial dimensions of Dasein’s ecstatic temporality, in its pre-reflective and immediate taking heed of the other’s temporal expression”
a foreign originary temporality. McMullin contends that the co-constitution of communal meaning, as opposed to representing Dasein’s initial acknowledgement of Others as Others, is Dasein’s attempt to escape the limitation caused by Dasein’s encounter with temporal alterity. This contention positions the confrontation with temporal alterity before Dasein’s orientation towards a practical identity. Thus, I find McMullin’s articulation of Dasein’s original encounter with the Other to deviate from Heideggerian ontological commitments outlined in Being and Time. First, if we encounter the Other before orienting ourselves towards practical identities (i.e., public measures for being), how does McMullin account for Heidegger’s contention that we encounter the Other “‘at work,’ that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world” (BT, 156)? Moreover, McMullin must reconcile her analysis with Heidegger’s explicit statement that “[t]he Other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world” (ibid). Second, if McMullin situates Dasein’s existential movement towards inauthenticity within its original encounter with the Other, how does McMullin account for Heidegger’s explication of Dasein’s inauthenticity? The “leveling down” phenomenon associated with inauthentic Dasein appears in McMullin’s section on the Other’s claim and Heidegger’s section on das Man. In the excerpt above, McMullin seems to attribute “leveling down” to Dasein’s attempted escape from the original limitation placed on its temporalization of being by the Other (TSW, 160-161). In contrast, Heidegger attributes Dasein’s “leveling down” to its attempted escape from the responsibility of its ownmost possibility-for-Being (BT, 234). I will, in turn, explore each of these difficulties below.

(1) Here, “primordial dimensions of ecstatic temporality” seems to refer to a genetic phenomenological determination, such that the ontological structure of ecstatic temporality is given its form by the Other’s claim. McMullin continues by stating that “[t]his limiting and relativizing of my now-saying by the other is … the essential requirement for the establishment of the sequentiality of everyday time” (ibid). In this sense, McMullin is positing an encounter before the everyday time of practical identities (i.e., the assemblage of anonymous Others’ temporalities).
Dasein’s encounter with the Other, according to Heidegger, portrays the Other as “Dasein-with in the world” (ibid, 156). While Heidegger does not explicitly take this encounter to be originary, this designation can be inferred from other existential-ontological assertions. Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being (i.e., Being-in-the-world) is equiprimoridal with Being-with-others such that Dasein’s world assumes, incorporates, and relies upon the existence of Others. Additionally, just as Dasein finds itself within a world (i.e., a referential network of significance), Dasein finds Others “at work” in their existential projects (e.g., teacher, parent, or farmer) in the shared world (ibid). That is to say, Dasein encounters Others according to two phenomenological criteria: Others are understood to possess their own projects with which they concern themselves, and Others are confronted in the communal world between Dasein and Others. How, then, does Dasein originally encounter the Other? I believe my preceding analysis maps neatly onto Heidegger’s ontological commitments: Dasein originally encounters the Other as Other when it orients itself towards the achievement of a practical identity. Within Dasein’s orientation towards a practical identity, its referential network of phenomena associated with its desired practical identity acknowledges the existence of Others and refers to the presence of a communal world. In other words, the account in which Dasein’s achievement of a practical identity results in the confrontation with a foreign originary temporality nicely captures the ontological commitments in *Being and Time* (i.e., Dasein’s encounter with Others according to the ontological structure of Being-with-others). McMullin, however, rejects “the practical identity” (i.e., project-related interaction) characterization of a foreign originary temporality because Sartre’s criticism seems especially attuned to its constitution of the Other as the product of Dasein’s projects and understanding of communal categories. McMullin positions the original encounter with a foreign
temporality before Dasein’s adoption of a practical identity, and, as a result, her deviation from Heidegger’s ontological commitments becomes quite apparent.

In McMullin’s account of Heideggerian temporality, Dasein encounters specific Others before it encounters the communal categories indicative of Others (i.e., the encountering of Others “at work”). It is not the case that Dasein originally encounters the Other according to communal categories of meaning; rather, Dasein experiences the limitation of the Other when presented with “the other’s temporal alterity” as such (*TSW*, 160). That which gives the Other her otherness, therefore, is the Other’s temporal alterity, which “makes itself known in a past that I can never fully access and a future that I can never entirely predict” (ibid, 161). The difference between McMullin’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of originally encountering the Other, thus, can be localized to the context within which Dasein experiences the otherness of the Other. In Heidegger’s conception, the context in which Dasein primordially experiences the otherness of the Other is the shared world wherein communal meanings are already established and recognized by Dasein and Others. In McMullin’s conception, the context in which Dasein primordially experiences the otherness of the Other is outside of the world, prior to the establishment and recognition of public standards for ontic meaning, or, to put this in other terms, abstracted from any worldly context (i.e., a context in which Dasein projects itself onto definite possibilities-for-Being). Under McMullin’s interpretation, Dasein’s original encounter with the Other’s temporal alterity comes before the comprehension of the Other in worldly terms (i.e., prior to the understanding of the Other as a teacher, student, or farmer), and, as previously discussed, Dasein’s original encounter with the Other’s temporal alterity *initiates* the understanding of Others in relation to worldly terms.

My analysis, on this issue, has come full circle: Dasein’s original encounter with the Other’s temporal alterity, according to McMullin, cannot occur “in the world” (as Heidegger
states) because it must initiate the ontological structures of Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. This markedly deviates from Heidegger’s articulation that we originally confront the Other within the world and in accordance with the existential projects in which she is engaged. Rather than the Other’s temporal alterity as such constituting the experience of the Other (as in McMullin’s account), it is the alterity of the Other’s temporalization of a practical identity that constitutes the experience of the Other for Heidegger. Furthermore, if the alterity of the Other’s temporality catalyzes the ontological structures of Dasein (i.e., Being-with-others and Being-in-the-world), then, in a sense, the experience of the Other brings Dasein into Being. The Other’s existence provides an outside, an externality, or a limit against which I experience the boundaries of my temporalization of Being. This notion that Dasein’s Being originates in its experience of the Other’s alterity is especially noticeable in the discrepancy between Heidegger’s and McMullin’s explanations of inauthenticity.

As indicated in the excerpt above, McMullin attributes Dasein’s inauthenticity to the original limitation placed on Dasein by the Other: Dasein “seek[s] to overcome [the Other’s] limitation through establishing and maintaining public measures to level down the difference” (ibid). The phenomenon of “leveling down” is essential to Heidegger’s characterization of inauthenticity in Dasein’s average everyday mode of being. In its average everydayness, Dasein is absorbed in its worldly projects, and, as a result, Dasein has the tendency to engage in behaviors as They do; that is, Dasein follows the prescriptions of the They in its everyday activities (BT, 164). Whether it is called conformity to social norms or respect for cultural traditions, Heidegger’s inauthenticity aims at disclosing the existential-ontological influence of Others on Dasein’s quotidian behavior, especially in relation to Dasein’s assimilation to “averageness” (ibid, 165). According to Heidegger, “This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein
which we call the ‘leveling down’ of all possibilities of Being” (ibid). While Heidegger relates Dasein’s inauthenticity to Being-with-others, it does not seem like Heidegger establishes a relationship of causation between the two phenomena. Indeed, Dasein’s inauthenticity is determined by Being-with-others (e.g., I adopt popular opinions concerning art, literature, and the media), but Heidegger’s notion of inauthenticity discloses a more profound conclusion about the movement of Dasein’s existence. Dasein, in being inauthentic, “flee[s] in the face of the ‘not-at-home’; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein – in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being” (ibid, 234). Basically, in Dasein’s inauthenticity, it conceals itself from its ownmost possibility-for-Being, a care structure that does not exclusively respond to the prescriptions of the They as if they were causal or natural laws. Dasein’s inauthenticity, on Heidegger’s account, cannot be reduced to a relationship with Others; rather, it is relationship between Dasein and itself.

McMullin’s account of inauthenticity, on the other hand, seems to deviate from Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity. According to McMullin, Dasein’s original encounter with a foreign temporality initiates Dasein’s ontological structures. These ontological structures include those phenomenological movements towards establishing, maintaining, and adhering to communal meanings, which, McMullin contends, represent an escape from the limitations imposed by the Other on Dasein (TSW, 160-161). Therefore, McMullin attributes Dasein’s inauthenticity to the original encounter with the Other because Dasein’s orientation towards practical identities represents a compensation for the phenomenal difference between Dasein’s limited temporalization of Being and the Other’s creation of the limit on Dasein’s temporalization of Being. Dasein overcomes the Other’s limitation by creating categories in which Dasein can become one among Others (e.g., as a teacher, carpenter, or student) as opposed to one limited by
the Other. In comparison to Heidegger, McMullin identifies the condition for the possibility of Dasein’s inauthenticity not within Dasein itself (i.e., with its pure possibility-for-Being) but with the Other’s limitation of Dasein’s temporalization of Being. For McMullin, Dasein is not fleeing its uncanniness when it inauthentically inhabits the world; instead, Dasein is fleeing the Other’s boundary placed upon its existence. The Other’s temporal alterity, as seen above, brings Dasein into Being, which does not seem to be supported by Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being.

McMullin’s account of the original encounter between Dasein and a foreign temporality deviates from Heidegger’s ontological commitments in two ways. First, McMullin positions the original encounter before the existence of ontological structures whereas Heidegger seems to situate the original encounter within the shared world (i.e., after the initiation of Dasein’s ontological structures). Second, McMullin attributes Dasein’s inauthenticity to the limitation placed on Dasein’s Being by the Other instead of attributing Dasein’s inauthenticity to its flight from its ownmost possibility-for-Being. In effect, McMullin’s account can be summarized as such: the experience of the Other’s temporal alterity brings Dasein into its Being. In addition to calling into question her adherence to Heideggerian ontology, McMullin’s comparisons of Heidegger and Levinas also become suspect when she inaccurately characterizes Heideggerian temporality and its relationship to Dasein’s ontology. Throughout the remainder of the section, I will accentuate McMullin’s deviation from Heideggerian ontology by demonstrating her proximity to Levinas’s phenomenological ethics, which, I hope, will shed light upon the overall distinction between

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24 In a sense, McMullin’s characterization of the relationship between the Other and Dasein (i.e., the limitation and the escape from limitation) runs the risk of mimicking the Sartrean model of transcendence-transcended discussed in the first section, as Dasein achieves a transcendence of the Other’s limitation by returning to the “for-itself.” Although I will not explicate this comparison any further, it is an interesting observation nonetheless.
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology and Levinas’s phenomenological ethics on the matter of encountering otherness.

**Levinas’s Phenomenological Equivalence between Alterity and Temporality**

In *Totality and Infinity* (TI), Emmanuel Levinas attempts to separate himself from the Western philosophical tradition, which privileges a thematizing consciousness that reduces the other to the same. While Levinas presents two instances in which the philosophical tradition breaks from its totalizing conception of Being (Plato and Descartes), the majority of thinkers participate in the prioritization of interiority (i.e., sameness) over exteriority (i.e., otherness). Socratic maieutics, for Levinas, exemplifies the neglect with which philosophy overlooks the importance of exteriority in the subject’s relationship to *logos*. Socratic maieutics, in short, assumes that knowledge already exists within individuals, and it is simply a matter of asking questions in order to bring about the specific knowledge at issue. By situating knowledge/truth within the individual (i.e., the soul), Socratic maieutics represents the phenomenon of “interiority” that Levinas indicts: “Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain” (*TI*, 51). Teaching, as Levinas contends, does not entirely labor upon already-existing knowledge within myself; rather, teaching arises from my encounter with the Other’s face, which ruptures my interiority and calls my freedom into question. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology also emblematizes the placement of interiority above exteriority. By positing ontological categories through which we comprehend entities within the world (e.g., Dasein and *das Man*), Heidegger develops concepts that homogenize the Other’s existence. Because these ontological categories are derived from the Self and imposed upon the Other, Levinas contends that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology perpetuates the philosophical trend of reducing the other to the same: “[T]he work of ontology consists in apprehending the individual … not in its individuality
but in its generality … The relation with the other is here accomplished only through a third term which I find in myself … Philosophy is an egology” (ibid, 44). This criticism of Heidegger should look familiar; however, Levinas differs from Sartre in that Levinas attempts to transcend, rather than remain within, ontology. I will argue that McMullin does the same.

The Other’s face is a central aspect of Levinas’s phenomenology. Prior to experiencing the Other’s face, the ego\textsuperscript{25} solipsistically dwells within its world; that is, before the ego encounters the face of the Other, the ego is entirely concerned with its appropriative practices by which it transforms the other into the same (e.g., eating). The ego, however, confronts the face of the Other as something that cannot be appropriated; the face of the Other is a command, a call, and an interdiction which defies the ego’s appropriative nature. By simply existing, the ego consumes the other through eating, laboring, and bathing in the elements (e.g., breathing in the air), but the Other’s face introduces a different kind of resistance to the ego’s consumptive practices, namely the Other’s face presents an ethical resistance. As Levinas notes, “He thus opposes to me not a greater force … but the very transcendence of his being by relation to that whole” (ibid, 199). The Other’s primordial form of resistance is not physical (i.e., a greater force); instead, it contests my being in the world as such (i.e., the practices by which I sustain myself through transforming the other into the same). Fundamentally, the Other’s face breaks the totality of my world. In contrast to my familiar habitation within the world, the expression of the face arises from outside of my world, negating my being while simultaneously giving rise to an ethical dimension of existence. According to Levinas, “The alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique ‘matter’ possible for total negation. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which

\textsuperscript{25} For terminological clarity, I will employ “ego” and “existent” as synonyms. Both of these terms signify “that entity which has not encountered the Other’s face.” Other terms, such as “I” or “self,” assume a more complex subjectivity, which I do not find justified prior to “ethics.”
exceeds my power infinitely … The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill” (ibid, 198). When encountering the face of the Other, the “I” receives a command (“you shall not commit murder”) that contradicts the I’s normal method for engaging with alterity (i.e., appropriation) (ibid, 199). Regardless of the I’s obedience or disobedience in relation to the command, the I acknowledges the command and, as a result, experiences the possibility of ethical action towards the Other. The Other’s alterity reorients the I’s freedom towards goodness (ibid, 200).

To connect Levinas’s account of the Other’s face (i.e., alterity) with temporality, I will draw from his essay on Time and the Other (TO). As a starting point, Levinas invokes the concept of “hypostasis” (TO, 43). In the process of hypostasization, the anonymous being of the “there is” (il y a) adopts a discrete position in the economy of being. Being is taken up as a being, or, as Levinas puts it, “the existent contracts its existing” (ibid). The distinction between anonymous being (existence) and particular beings (existents) mimics Heidegger’s ontological distinction between Being and beings (i.e., the essence on one hand and its manifestation qua entities on the other). Unlike Heidegger, however, Levinas carefully distinguishes between the phenomena experienced by the existent prior to encountering alterity and the phenomena experienced by the existent subsequent to encountering alterity. It is not the case, therefore, that Levinas assumes the existence of the existent’s relationship with alterity (i.e., Being-with-others); instead, Levinas’s phenomenology attempts to explicate how the existent arrives at the acknowledgement of exteriority, unfamiliarity, and alienation in relation to its existence. Enjoyment, for example, precedes the experience of phenomena normally associated with Dasein’s dwelling in its world. Enjoyment describes the mode of being in which the ego concerns itself with the “ensemble of nourishments” offered by the world (ibid, 63). As Levinas notes, “What seems to have escaped Heidegger … is that prior to being a system of tools, the world is an ensemble of nourishments”
Antecedent to Dasein’s disclosure of itself and its accompanying worldly equipment, Levinas presents a phenomenological status wherein the ego does not comprehend the world as organized around its practical identities, but rather, the ego bathes in the elements (e.g., “smells a flower” and “stroll[s] … to enjoy the fresh air”) (ibid). The elements do not represent intentional content for consciousness or become subsumed in the ontological totality of projected existence. Simply, the elements are enjoyed.

Does the phenomenon of enjoyment position the ego within time? Levinas temporalizes the hypostasized existent to the present without the possibility of conceptualizing the past or the future. To clarify the existent’s presence, Levinas asserts that hypostasization, as a process of contracting existence, provides the existent with mastery, sovereignty, and freedom over its existence. The existent, in other words, possesses the ability to determine its existence. Although the existent exercises power over its existence (e.g., enjoyment and consumption), the existent finds itself in a state of solitude; that is, “[t]hrough its identification, the existent is already closed up upon itself” (ibid, 52). The language employed by Levinas to describe the existent’s relationship with its existence emblematizes the solitary nature of hypostasization. With the use of words like “alone,” “despair,” and “abandonment,” Levinas paints a lucid picture of an existent that is trapped in the instant of the present (ibid, 54-55). In effect, hypostasis does not “introduce time into being. Although giving us the present, we are given neither a stretch of time set within a linear series of duration, nor a point of this series” (ibid, 52). The phenomenological character of enjoyment exemplifies this analysis by demonstrating the separation of the ego from the totality of the world.

While Levinas never specifies the phenomenological character of hypostasization in Time and the Other, I take enjoyment to represent the subject’s initial position-taking in the economy of being. I believe the section on “Affectivity as the Ipseity of the I” in Totality and Infinity supports my interpretation (117-120).
As the ego enjoys the elements (e.g., a refreshing drink of water), the ego’s satisfaction of its needs (e.g., thirst) indicates an interiority that enjoys, needs, and is satisfied by nourishing activities (TI, 117-118). The resulting separation between the interiority of the ego and the (relative) exteriority of the world, through the experience of enjoyment, isolates the ego from the totality of external entities. Additionally, the experiential structure of enjoyment consists in the ego being transfixed by the temporal presence of stimulation, sensation, and satisfaction, eliding any conceptualization of the past or future. To summarize, the hypostasized existent can be characterized by two existential dimensions: (a) its mastery over existence and (b) its solitary confinement from anything other than itself (i.e., temporality/alterity).

The condition for the possibility of temporal experience (i.e., a rupture of the instant) is the Other. Levinas hints at this conclusion by stating that “time can indicate another relationship between existing and existent … [which] will later appear to us as the very event of our relationship with the Other” (TO, 54). The Other, however, does not simply signify a foreign existent; rather, the Other, for Levinas, signifies the overcoming of the existent’s mastery, the rendering of the existent’s activity passive, and the alienation of the existent from its existence. In turn, the Other inverts the essential properties of the existent: (a) the Other usurps the sovereignty of the existent and (b) the Other places the existent within time. As mentioned above, enjoyment captures the existent’s solipsistic, alimentary absorption of environmental resources, and enjoyment occurs within the temporal location of the present. In contrast to enjoyment, Levinas deploys “suffering” and “death” as phenomena that situate the existent within time. As Levinas notes, “This way death has of announcing itself in suffering … is an experience of the passivity of the subject, which until then had been active and remained active even when it was overwhelmed by its own nature” (ibid, 70). Suffering follows enjoyment: after basking in the warmth of the sun and consuming the
rejuvenating nutrients, the existent endures a frigid night, an empty stomach, and an unquenched thirst. That which originally sustained the existent has vanished (i.e., the temporal location of the present), and that which currently motivates the existent refers to the inaccessible past and potentially resides in the unforeseeable future (i.e., the Other). Moreover, suffering alludes to death, or, as Levinas describes it, “something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as something whose very existence is made of alterity” (ibid, 74). Suffering and death, therefore, refer to the future (i.e., the ungraspable, unknowable, and unconquerable).

The existential relationship between suffering, death, and the future reveals an encounter with alterity. Implicit within Levinas’s phenomenological description of suffering and death is an allusion to the future. In the throes of enjoyment, the existent is situated within an experience of the present; however, when confronted with its inevitable demise, the existent encounters a limit on its existence. The limit is not present in the existent’s worldly experience because, if it were, the existent could simply appropriate it; rather, the limit resides beyond the present within the mystery of the future. The phenomenological structure of death as defined by alterity, thus, introduces the future, but Levinas cautions us to not equate the “future that death gives” with time (ibid, 79). In effect, Levinas posits a gap between the existent’s presence and the future of death that only becomes related via the existent’s “face-to-face with the Other” (ibid). In its entirety, Levinas states that “the encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship” (ibid). The diction of “encroachment” highlights the precarious nature of the relationship between the present and the future. If Levinas depicts the present and future as being contiguous, he would collapse the alterity of the Other by guaranteeing the presence of the future (i.e., the future will become present); however, if Levinas depicts the
present and future as being completely distant from one another, he would preclude the alterity of the Other from rupturing the existent’s presence (i.e., an experience of the Other’s face). Encroachment, thus, captures the trace of the Other that is neither completely present nor absent: “The relationship with the Other is the absence of the other; not absence pure and simple … but absence in a horizon of the future, an absence that is time” (ibid, 90).

Levinas describes the trace of the Other in his phenomenology of Eros. To dispel the traditional phenomenological account of love as unifying, fusing, and assimilating the I and the Other, Levinas undermines the common conception of the I “[p]ossessing, knowing and grasping” the Other within the experiential structure of Eros (ibid). For instance, Levinas references the “myth [that] Aristophanes tells in Plato’s Symposium” wherein two halves reunite to complete one another or, as Levinas describes it, “a return to the self” occurs (TI, 254). Instead of simply rejecting the appropriative conception of Eros that has permeated the philosophical tradition, Levinas asserts the ambiguity of love’s phenomenological status; that is, love simultaneously represents a biological need that can be satisfied and a metaphysical desire that transcends the economy of satisfaction (ibid, 255). Within the experience of love, the lover experiences the beloved in specific ways; however, the lover never possesses the beloved as one possesses an object. That which escapes the grasp of the lover, or makes the grasp impossible, is the Other as such, the inability for the I to completely staticize the Other within its totality. Accordingly, Levinas asks, “Can this relationship with the other through Eros be characterized as a failure?” His response emblematizes the inability for the Other to be completely present or absent in its loving relationship with the I: “Once again, the answer is yes, if one adopts the terminology of current descriptions, if one wants to characterize the erotic by ‘grasping,’ ‘possessing,’ or ‘knowing.’ But there is nothing of all this, or the failure of all this, in eros” (TO, 90). Neither success nor failure
can neatly summarize the capacity for the I to reach the Other within the phenomenological structure of love. It is, therefore, in love that the trace of the Other can be experienced.

To complete the introduction of Levinas’s conception of temporality, it is necessary to form the connection between “the future that death gives” and the temporality promised by face-ing the Other. Both death and the face of the Other contest the appropriative nature of the I; that is, in both cases, the I experiences an insurmountable limit. Death cannot be incorporated within the ego’s totality, and the face of the Other introduces the ethical command (“thou shalt not kill!”) that cannot be overcome by the I. For the latter, it is not simply the particular, ontic Other that cannot be eliminated (i.e., killed), but rather, within the concept of “killing,” an ethical command has already been acknowledged by the I. The command serves as an ethical limit to the freedom of the I. In general, both the phenomenon of death and the face of the Other manifest as limits for the existent’s existence. These limits, respectively, introduce the past and future as possible temporalities and connect, albeit not completely, the existent with these temporalities. The temporal alterity of death and the face of the Other, as limits placed on the existence of the existent, are the conditions for the possibility of experiencing time as such, which significantly overlaps with McMullin’s position on Dasein’s encounter with the foreign originary temporality.

*The Intentional Implications of McMullin’s Proximity to Levinasian Temporality*

Prior to the introduction of Levinas’s conception of temporality, I presented two contentions in which McMullin’s conception of encountering a foreign originary temporality deviates from Heideggerian ontological commitments in *Being and Time*. First, McMullin positions the original encounter before Dasein’s immersion into a shared world with Others. Second, McMullin describes Dasein’s inauthenticity as a phenomenal adjustment to the temporal alterity of the Other as such. Both of these contentions neatly track with Levinas’s characterization
of temporality as a series of limits placed on the existence of the existent. Consequently, McMullin’s contentions correspond nicely with Levinas’s phenomenological requirement of the Other for temporal experience, namely that the ecstatic structure of temporality is initiated by encountering the face of the Other.

Recall that Dasein is always ahead-of-itself. According to Heidegger, “We have given an existential formula for the structure of care as ‘ahead-of-itself – Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)’” (BT, 364). Defined by the ontological concept of care, the meaning of Dasein’s Being can never be pinpointed to the present moment; rather, the meaning of Dasein’s Being unfolds throughout time within its distinctive temporal expression. Dasein’s adoption of practical identities, as mentioned earlier, exhibits the temporal structure of thrown projection in that practical identities (e.g., teachers, students, and carpenters) prescribe a socio-culturally informed orientation towards existence. For example, the meaning of the carpenter’s being cannot be particularized to swinging the hammer or arranging the plywood within any isolated instant; instead, the meaning of the carpenter’s being must be understood in the context of the project for-the-sake-of-which the carpenter works (e.g., building the birdhouse). In this sense, Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being lends itself to experiencing otherness, as it incorporates phenomena into its worldly projection. Assumed in this temporal description, however, is the ecstatic structure itself; that is, the assumption that Dasein’s projection always already includes a temporal propulsion into the following instant, the next moment, and the future constitutes Heidegger’s construction of Being-in-the-world. Moreover, by its equiprimordial status with Being-in-the-world, Being-with-others also bears the ecstatic structure of temporality. McMullin’s proposal that the ontological domain of Being-with-others arises from the ontic
encounter with a foreign originary temporality, thus, attempts to locate ecstatic temporality’s origin within the encounter as such.

Levinas’s phenomenological analysis of temporality resembles McMullin’s contention that the ontic Other initiates the temporality of Dasein’s Being (i.e., ecstatic temporality). Although the existent, for Levinas, exercises sovereignty over its existence, the existent finds itself trapped in the instant, a state of solitude. That which liberates the existent from the instant imposes limits upon its existence. It is only through the limitation of the existent’s existence (i.e., the supplanting of its egoism) that the existent encounters something other than itself, phenomena comprised of alterity as opposed to identity. In a similar sense, the temporal alterity of the Other as such, according to McMullin, imposes a limit upon (pre-)Dasein’s existence (*TSW*, 160-161). This limit, in turn, gives rise to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. In relation to the former, Dasein’s temporal projection into practical identities originates within the inauthentic movement towards ontic categories (e.g., teacher, student, and carpenter). Dasein, according to McMullin, creates public categories of meaning in order to overcome or “level down” the original limitation placed on Dasein’s temporal expression by the Other (ibid). In relation to the latter, Dasein acknowledges the existence of another temporality (i.e., a foreign originary temporality) that militates against its solipsistic existence. The similarity between McMullin’s and Levinas’s accounts of temporality, thus, relates to the transcending of ontology, namely that the origin of Dasein’s ecstatic structure of temporality (i.e., the constitutive element of its Being) can be traced to an event, a force, or a proscription that resides beyond the ontological existence of Dasein. In other words, the Other’s claim reaches Dasein from elsewhere, outside of the totality that it fundamentally challenges. As a result, McMullin’s explication of temporality more closely aligns
with Levinas’s equation between temporality and alterity than with Heidegger’s presentation of temporality as emanating from Dasein’s ontological structure of care.

The existential implications of McMullin’s alignment with Levinasian temporality concern Heidegger’s description of Dasein as “Being-guilty” for its existence (BT, 332). In relation to the call of conscience, the phenomenon of Being-guilty communicates Dasein’s responsibility for its ownmost possibility-for-Being. As Heidegger notes, “And only because Dasein is guilty in the basis of its Being, and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling, is conscience possible, if indeed the call gives us this Being-guilty as something which at bottom we are to understand” (ibid). This account of Dasein’s guilt, however, is contingent upon the locating of Dasein’s responsibility for its Being within itself, which also assumes the attribution of Dasein’s inauthentic movement to its fleeing from its ownmost possibility-for-Being. That is, Dasein can only be guilty in its Being when possessing the capacity to be authentic and, subsequently, opting out of its authenticity. As demonstrated above, McMullin’s account of inauthenticity deviates from Heidegger’s positioning of inauthenticity within Dasein’s ontological existence. Instead of attributing inauthenticity to Dasein’s ontology, McMullin ascribes inauthenticity to the Other’s claim. If Dasein is not fleeing its ownmost possibility-for-Being when existing inauthentically but rather fleeing the Other’s claim on its temporalization of Being, is Dasein guilty (i.e., responsible) for its Being? Better yet, in relation to whom is Dasein guilty? McMullin does not provide answers to these questions and, as a result, does not adequately grapple with the existential-ontological implications of assigning an originary limit to Dasein’s Being that arrives from the Other.

To further explore the existential implications of McMullin’s argument, it is important to consider the phenomenological differences within the experience of Being-guilty between Heidegger’s and McMullin’s positions. On Heidegger’s account, the call of conscience
individualizes Dasein such that Dasein “bring[s] itself back to itself from its lostness in the ‘they’; and this means that it is guilty” (ibid, 333). Dasein does not discover the Other when experiencing the phenomenon of Being-guilty; rather, it discovers itself. Heidegger, in the following sentence, clarifies that “the sort of thing which Dasein gives itself to understand would be information about itself” (ibid). Within the call of conscience, Dasein experiences that which constitutes its ontological totality or, to put otherwise, that which makes Dasein what it is. Missing from the description of Being-guilty, however, is Dasein’s dependence on the Other’s claim that brings it into Being. At the core of encountering guilt, Dasein is concerned with itself and its ownmost possibility-for-Being without consideration of the Other’s claim. On the other hand, if McMullin’s characterization of the foreign originary temporality is considered phenomenologically accurate, the phenomenal content of Being-guilty might be fundamentally altered. Instead of Dasein finding itself as itself within the call of conscience, Dasein might find itself as a product of the Other’s claim. Would this phenomenological conclusion not alter the primordial relationship exhibited within the experiential structure of Being-guilty? It would no longer be a question of how Dasein relates to itself, but rather, Being-guilty would concern the manner by which Dasein relates to the original limit placed on itself by the Other. The phenomenal content associated with Being-guilty, therefore, would drastically shift from a focus on the self (i.e., Dasein’s responsibility for itself) to a focus on the Other (i.e., the Other’s responsibility for Dasein’s existence).

Moreover, the alterity of the phenomenal content within the experiential structure of Being-guilty differs in kind from the alterity of the caller within the experiential structure of the call of conscience\(^\text{27}\). In fact, the latter presupposes the former. For instance, in “Second-Person

\(^{27}\) In other words, within the phenomenological experience of the call of conscience, we can differentiate between the source of the call and the content of the call. I am focusing on the latter, namely the content communicated by the call. Under McMullin’s conception, the content of the
Phenomenology,” Steven Crowell contends that the call of conscience “is a second-person phenomenon, since the second-personal character of the call that overcomes me is already included in the ontology of *Dasein*” (*PS*, 87). Crowell attempts to undermine the solipsistic conception of the call of conscience as emerging from Dasein itself, in contrast to a conception of the call of conscience that maintains a transcendent origin (i.e., beyond the ontological totality of Dasein). Crowell, in his justification of a transcendent origin, even mentions the Other’s claim on Dasein’s Being: “the others with whom *Dasein* is make a claim on it in a way that is not reducible to any characteristics that might be named” (ibid). A distinction can be drawn, however, between Crowell’s articulation of the alterity within the call of conscience and the alterity, at the core of Being-guilty, within McMullin’s account of temporality. When indicting McMullin’s conception of the Other’s claim, I am not indicting the Other’s claim that emerges from Being-with-others (as Crowell indicates); rather, I am concerned with the originary limit placed on Dasein’s Being by McMullin’s foreign originary temporality, which is more primordial than the ontological category of Being-with-others. Beginning at the ontological level of Being-with-others already assumes the agreed-upon nature of Dasein in its experience of Being-guilty. McMullin, however, has altered Dasein’s experience of Being-guilty in that Dasein no longer experiences itself as “Being-its-Self … the *Being* of its basis” (*BT*, 330). Instead, Dasein’s existential freedom accompanying “[t]he nullity we have in mind” is created by the Other’s claim (ibid, 331), or as Levinas puts it, “[f]reedom consists in knowing that freedom is in peril” (*TI*, 35). In accordance with McMullin’s argument, the Other becomes the basis of Dasein’s Being, which affects Dasein’s responsibility for itself and “responsibility to others” (*PS*, 87).

call is defined by alterity because it refers to that which is other than Dasein; however, the source of the call can also be defined by alterity, as Steven Crowell contends in “Second-Person Phenomenology” and his more recent lecture on “Methodological Atheism.”
Notice that the order of responsibility has been inverted by McMullin’s explication of Heideggerian temporality. Rather than Dasein being responsible to Others when experiencing the call of conscience and the associated phenomena of Being-guilty (as Crowell argues), McMullin’s temporality makes the Other responsible for Dasein’s Being. At issue in McMullin’s temporality, therefore, is the nature of Dasein’s Being and its experience of Being-guilty. For the former, Dasein cannot simply be constituted “by the nullity of Being-a-basis” because its constitution is fundamentally determined by the Other’s claim (BT, 331). Although Heidegger describes “[c]are itself … [as] permeated with nullity through and through,” McMullin’s formulation of temporality suggests that the Other’s claim permeates the ontological structure of care through and through (ibid). In particular, from the outset of Dasein’s existence, McMullin’s formulation of temporality as alterity influences the possibilities onto which Dasein projects itself. For the latter, Dasein’s experience of Being-guilty in its very essence is constituted by the Other’s claim as opposed to being constituted by the nullity of Dasein’s Being. The ontological concept of guilt, taking ownership of one’s existence, gains a novel signification from the introduction of a foreign originary temporality. Dasein is indebted to the Other for its existence, and, as such, the experience of guilt ought to reflect this condition. In contrast to Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s nullity, Levinas’s phenomenology seems to account for the consideration of the Other within the I’s experience of guilt (i.e., shame).

Levinas’s phenomenology of shame describes the Other’s command as a binding restriction on the I’s freedom. In effect, the Other’s claim (i.e., the face of the Other) calls the I’s freedom into question such that the I re-orient itself to welcome the Other (i.e., towards morality). According to Levinas, “Conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to my powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in question the naïve right of my
powers” (*TI*, 84). Conscience, for Levinas, is not simply a matter of re-orienting Dasein towards itself for the sake of considering its existential responsibility (i.e., its responsibility for its own existence); rather, conscience re-orients the I towards itself for the sake of considering its existential responsibility to the Other. Additionally, the freedom that constitutes the I’s existence cannot solely be characterized as nullity (as Heidegger’s phenomenology does); instead, the freedom that constitutes the I’s existence must be formulated in terms of the I’s status as “usurper and murderer” (ibid). In a sense, the call of conscience for Heidegger and conscience for Levinas require the I (i.e., Dasein) to consider its ontological totality, but Levinas’s examination of conscience goes a step further: the I understands its ontological totality as inherently violent in relation to the Other. It is the latter characterization that accounts for the origination of morality (and the originary limit described by McMullin): “Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent” (ibid). Under both conceptions of conscience and guilt, therefore, Heidegger and Levinas depict the I’s (i.e., Dasein’s) reflection upon its existential practices; however, only Levinas’s phenomenology captures the Other’s originary limit on the I’s freedom that accompanies the experience of conscience and guilt.

In this section, I have attempted to clarify McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality while also attempting to demonstrate McMullin’s deviation from Heidegger’s formulation of ontology in *Being and Time*. At first, I outlined a potential conception of Dasein’s originary encounter with a foreign temporality from McMullin’s initial contentions. Next, I charted McMullin’s departure from this conception of the original encounter in two fundamental ways: McMullin describes the original encounter as occurring prior to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world (and Being-with-others) as well as explaining the inauthentic movement of Dasein’s Being. As a result, I contend that McMullin’s conception of the original encounter diverges from the first conception,
which tracks with Heidegger’s commitments in *Being and Time*. Finally, I presented Levinas’s phenomenology of temporality wherein he described the conditions for the possibility of temporal experience as encountering the face of the Other. McMullin’s phenomenology of temporality, in short, corresponds with Levinas’s phenomenology of temporality more than Heidegger’s phenomenology of temporality. In order to evaluate this comparison, I re-considered the existential-ontological concepts of Being-guilty and conscience in light of the originary limit placed on Dasein’s Being by the Other. In turn, Levinas’s phenomenological ethics, more so than Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, captures the existent’s experience of temporality, guilt, and conscience as it pertains to the Other. McMullin’s temporality, thus, more closely resembles Levinas’s temporal articulation of the Other.
Section 3: McMullin’s Responses and Concluding Remarks

McMullin could respond to my argument in the following manner. First, McMullin could call into question my interpretation of her phenomenology; that is, McMullin could indict my reading of her text, especially the alleged differentiation between Dasein’s encounter with a foreign originary temporality that brings it into Being and Dasein’s encounter with an assemblage of anonymous Others’ temporalities that co-constitute communal meanings. She could, in short, deny the existence of this distinction. Second, McMullin could call into question my reliance on Heidegger’s ontological commitments in Being and Time; that is, McMullin could simply ask, “What are the implications of my ‘alleged’ deviation from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as presented in Being and Time?” Is it not customary within the realm of Heideggerian scholarship to develop Heidegger’s ontological concepts and apply them to pertinent criticisms (like Sartre’s)? She could, in short, impugn the importance of my criticism. Finally, McMullin could respond by situating her phenomenology between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies on her posited continuum, claiming to exhibit the best of both phenomenologies. McMullin contends that “Levinas and Heidegger (and indeed Husserl) should be understood as existing much more on a continuum characterized… by… a gradual progression toward understanding the nature of time as ‘a relationship with the other as other’” (TSW, 160). In effect, McMullin could argue that, instead of deviating from Heidegger’s ontological commitments, she is actually positioning her phenomenology of the foreign originary temporality between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s articulations of otherness, such that McMullin preserves the ontology of Dasein while also accounting for the temporal experience of alterity. I will handle each of these responses in turn.

My criticism portrays McMullin’s foreign originary temporality as extra-mundane, primordial, and inaugural. It is that which initiates the Being of Dasein along the lines of the
equiprimordial ontological structures of Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others. The Other, as I have argued, brings Dasein into Being by introducing a limit upon its temporalization. Dasein, in response, attempts to overcome this existential limit by establishing communal meanings. These are not the same forms of temporalization; rather, the former constitutes a foreign originary temporality under McMullin’s conception of social ontology while the latter constitutes Dasein’s temporal orientation towards practical identities. At this point, McMullin might insert her response, namely that she never posits a distinction between the former and the latter forms of temporalization. Indeed, McMullin might contend that both forms of temporalization are included within Dasein’s phenomenological experience of the Other’s alterity. As she notes, “On Heidegger’s account … such encounters involve a type of immediate claim to temporal acknowledgement – an acknowledgement that involves some minimal degree of heedful self-limiting” (ibid, 159). In this sense, it is not the case that McMullin presents an earlier encounter with the Other that inaugurates Dasein’s Being; rather, she interprets Heidegger’s social ontology as positing a “particular type of check or boundary” that limits Dasein’s temporalization of Being (ibid). McMullin does not describe the phenomenology of the temporal limit in such a way that distinguishes between extra-mundane or mundane interactions with the Other; instead, McMullin describes Dasein as experiencing the temporal limit of the Other in a variety of ways without necessarily taking a phenomenological stance on the priority of any singular interaction. McMullin, therefore, takes her interpretation to neatly fit within Heidegger’s discussion of Being-with-others.

McMullin, however, acknowledges the irregularity of her interpretation in the following paragraph of her text: “This is an uncommon way in which to read Heidegger” (ibid). What makes her interpretation uncommon, according to McMullin, are “the Levinas-inspired interpretations
claiming that … Dasein’s fundamental egoism is evident in the solipsism of mineness” (ibid). The uncommonness of McMullin’s interpretation, in other words, arises from its immunity to Levinas’s criticisms. Under McMullin’s conception of Heidegger’s social ontology, Levinas’s criticisms no longer apply because they fail to recognize the alterity implicit within Heidegger’s conception of temporality. As McMullin states, “Heidegger’s position can and should be read as advocating a position on temporality somewhat similar to Levinas’s own: namely, that ‘time itself refers to this situation of the face-to-face with the Other’” (ibid, 160). Therein resides the crux of the issue: McMullin’s interpretation of Heidegger’s social ontology collapses the phenomenological distinctions (i.e., intentional implications) between the two articulations of temporality. On one hand, Heidegger employs temporality in an ontological fashion such that “[t]he existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality” (BT, 488). There is no “foreign originary temporality” or “inaugural instance” discussed in this text; rather, these phenomena are introduced by McMullin’s analysis. While Heidegger refers to existential limits on Dasein’s temporalization that exceed ontological projection (e.g., leaping-ahead and hermeneutics of empathy), the emphasis is placed on Dasein’s ontological projection (i.e., orientation towards practical identities) rather than breakdown-related interactions with the Other. This reaffirms the notion that McMullin’s interpretation of Heidegger’s social ontology deviates from Heidegger’s ontological commitments.

On the other hand, Levinas employs temporality in a metaphysical fashion such that “time is not the achievement of an isolated and lone subject, but that it is the very relationship of the subject with the Other” (TO, 39). The experience of time emerges from a series of existential limits

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28 In this context, “metaphysical” does not signify the traditional meaning in the philosophical canon. Instead, metaphysics refers to the phenomenological movement towards otherness: “The metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other” (TI, 33).
placed on the ego’s appropriation of alterity (i.e., suffering, death, and the face of the Other). These originary limits are explicitly mentioned in Levinas’s phenomenological descriptions, whereas they seem to be absent from Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions of Dasein and Being-with-others. This is not to say that Heidegger’s ontology cannot accurately describe our confrontation with otherness and the Other as such; rather, my point is to identify and emphasize the discrepancies in phenomenological descriptions overlooked by McMullin. Once McMullin introduces the notions of “foreign originary temporality” and “inaugural instance,” she erases fundamental distinctions between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s articulations of temporality. My analysis is explicitly concerned with this erasure, the blurring of lines between these distinct phenomenologies. To further justify my criticism, it is important to note that McMullin even acknowledges the hastiness with which she draws these conclusions: “[T]hese are clearly controversial claims that cannot be adequately argued for here” (TSW, 160). McMullin, thus, asserts her position without actually developing Levinas’s conception of temporality and comparing it to Heidegger’s conception of temporality. Without substantiating her comparison between the two thinkers, I find McMullin’s first response to be unsuccessful in overcoming my criticism. To be clear, McMullin’s first response is that she accurately interprets Heidegger’s account of temporality without positing a division between a foreign originary temporality and the collection of anonymous Others’ temporalities. My argument, however, contests this response in two ways, namely by re-asserting McMullin’s deviation from Heidegger’s ontological commitments and by demonstrating McMullin’s mischaracterization of the relationship between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of temporality.²⁹

²⁹ The second part of my argument might seem irrelevant, but McMullin’s mischaracterization of the relationship between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of temporality directly influences her interpretation of Heidegger’s social ontology. If McMullin assimilates Levinas’s
In turn, McMullin might impugn the relevance or importance of her deviation from Heideggerian ontological commitments. If McMullin does, in fact, present a division between a foreign originary temporality that brings Dasein into Being and a collection of anonymous Others’ temporalities that co-constitute meaning, why does this matter? Is this simply a scholarly contention on how we ought to read Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and nothing more? What is actually at stake in McMullin’s reading of Heidegger’s ontology? As I mentioned in the previous section, McMullin’s interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology not only affects how we ought to approach Levinasian and Heideggerian scholarship; rather, it also affects the fundamental phenomenological concepts discussed by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. For the most part, I only concerned my analysis with the phenomena of Being-guilty and conscience, but my analysis could also be applied to other phenomena, such as anxiety and Being-towards-death. McMullin’s establishment of a foreign originary temporality (from which Dasein’s Being arises) seems to also call into question the mood (anxiety) and the understanding (authentic Being-towards-death) associated with authenticity, especially if its discursive element (call of conscience) is fundamentally altered.

Anxiety and authentic Being-towards-death re-orient Dasein to its ownmost possibility-for-Being. As Heidegger notes in his section on death, “[T]he state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety” (*BT*, 310). Anxiety individualizes Dasein such that Dasein takes issue with its ontological projection as such. Moreover, anxiety is intimately related to authentic Being-towards-death in that Dasein’s authentic orientation towards death conjures up the mood of anxiety. Heidegger phenomenology into Heidegger’s phenomenology, we ought to consider the ways in which McMullin distorts Heidegger’s phenomenology to incorporate Levinas’s phenomenology within it. This carries intentional implications for McMullin’s interpretation of Heideggerian temporality.
continues by stating that “[i]n this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence” (ibid). In this excerpt, Heidegger alludes to his ontological definition of death (i.e., “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”), which is distinct from traditional definitions of death derived from biological understandings of personhood (ibid, 294). When Dasein authentically orients itself towards death (i.e., when it anticipates death as certain, individualized, and so on), Dasein experiences a “freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they,’ and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious” (ibid, 311). In the existentiell modification of authenticity, Dasein experiences death as a phenomenon that “lays claim to it as an individual Dasein” as opposed to Dasein’s inauthentic understanding of death as a phenomenon that is temporally remote and indefinite (i.e., “something that will happen in the future”) (ibid, 308). With Heidegger’s formulation of anxiety and death in mind, is there “freedom towards death” in McMullin’s formulation of the foreign originary temporality as an inaugural limit placed on Dasein’s temporalization of Being?

In a similar manner to Heidegger’s notions of Being-guilty and the call of conscience, McMullin’s interpretation seems to distort the phenomenological formulation of Being-towards-death and anxiety. First, the phenomenon of death should be re-contextualized within Dasein’s experience of the foreign originary temporality. The limit placed on Dasein’s temporalization of Being by the foreign originary temporality, in itself, represents ontological death. Dasein experiences a limit against which it cannot project itself onto possibilities-for-Being; indeed, within this encounter, Dasein confronts the possibility of the absolute impossibility of its existence. Second, and more importantly, McMullin’s foreign originary temporality alters the “freedom” associated with Dasein’s authentic Being-towards-death. If McMullin’s construction of a foreign
originary temporality signifies a form of ontological death experienced by Dasein, it is not the case that death liberates Dasein from its inauthenticity (i.e., the illusions of the They); instead, death imposes a different form of ontological order on Dasein’s existential projection that does not liberate but restricts it. Levinas makes a similar argument in *Time and the Other*: “Being toward death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility … Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the subject seems to reach the *limit* of the possible … It finds itself enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive” (70-71, emphasis added). McMullin’s foreign originary temporality corresponds more closely with Levinas’s phenomenology of death in that the foreign originary temporality produces a limit for Dasein’s ontological possibility. Furthermore, under McMullin’s conception, Dasein’s orientation towards death takes on a different form as well. The foreign originary temporality, as a manifestation of ontological death, does not refer to Dasein’s ownmost possibility-for-Being in a positive sense (i.e., Dasein is not presented with the opportunity to take responsibility for its Being); rather, the foreign originary temporality refers to the ontological limits of Dasein’s temporalization, invoking the Other’s command on Dasein’s existential projection. In short, it restricts Dasein’s freedom in the face of the Other’s temporalization.30

For these reasons, McMullin’s second response fails to undermine the importance and relevance of my criticism. I am not simply identifying a scholarly issue with McMullin’s reading of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. I am offering a critique of McMullin’s phenomenology, which carries significant implications for Heidegger’s fundamental existential-ontological concepts and their relationship to Levinas’s phenomenology. I will now turn to McMullin’s final response,

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30 Although I do not substantively deal with “anxiety” in this analysis, it is associated with death in its phenomenological manifestation. Anxiety, therefore, would allude to the existential limit of the foreign originary temporality as it restricts Dasein’s freedom.
namely that she might situate her phenomenology between that of Levinas and that of Heidegger on her posited continuum. I take this response to be McMullin’s strongest because she does, in fact, maintain the ontology of Dasein while incorporating the alterity equated with temporality. In other words, McMullin’s interpretation of temporality in general includes Heidegger’s ontological formulation of Dasein and Levinas’s metaphysical formulation of the Other, which could position her between the two phenomenologies.

In order to endorse this response, however, McMullin must acknowledge a few shortcomings in her analysis. First, she must acknowledge that her response to Sartre’s criticism is not entirely based on Heidegger’s ontological commitments. Originally, McMullin provided an interpretation of temporality in order to undermine Sartre’s criticism of Heidegger’s social ontology. If McMullin chooses to pursue the aforementioned response, she is basically admitting to deviating from Heidegger’s social ontology as presented in *Being and Time*, which diminishes the responsiveness of her argument. Second, she must acknowledge the discrepancies between Levinas’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenology. If she situates herself between the two phenomenologies, she must accept that they differ at some fundamental level of analysis. My arguments, up to this point, have clarified the potential discrepancies between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies and, as a result, could serve as a resource for McMullin’s phenomenology as she refines it. Finally, McMullin must acknowledge that her “foreign originary temporality” draws heavily from Levinas’s phenomenology in a manner that is entirely different from her development of Heidegger’s phenomenology. She must, in some sense, acknowledge the validity of my criticism in order to reap the benefits of Levinas’s phenomenological explication. If McMullin pursues the route of situating herself between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s
phenomenologies, I think that her conceptions of the “foreign originary temporality” and “inaugural instance” will become more coherent and robust in the face of my arguments.

I would like to conclude with the following consideration. My criticism of McMullin’s formulation of Heideggerian temporality is not meant to be all-encompassing or represent the final words on this subject. I have attempted to explore the intentional implications (i.e., phenomenological assumptions) associated with McMullin’s phenomenology and, in turn, expose their problematic tendencies in relation to Levinas’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this sense, my aim was not simply to criticize McMullin’s work; instead, I have also aimed to engage with phenomenological scholarship in a nuanced manner, especially in relation to Levinas’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies. McMullin’s work, thus, provided a situation, a place, and an intellectual avenue for exploring the phenomenological differences between Levinas’s and Heidegger’s work. It is my hope that these phenomenological differences can be explicated in greater detail elsewhere.
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