"GENIUS LOCI: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA OF PLACE IN CITY DESIGN"

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the establishment of a conceptual framework for the investigation of "place" as it is expressed phenomenologically, that is, through its "genius loci". Part I suggests that by viewing the phenomenon of genius loci according to three specific "perspectives" - philosophy, myth and poetic expression - we may formulate a normatively structured interpretative schema. Here, the assumption is that such perspectives contain within them universal values representing man's reaction to "the spirit of place" - such values can form a basis from which to construct the interpretative schema. Part II introduces and develops the proposed schema and suggests a methodology of use through the presentation of a case study. It further suggests that as architecture and urban design is, at its most profound, a "place-creating" act, it too may prove susceptible to such a schema. The intention of the thesis is to show that the notion of place is a fundamental need for man; that genius loci gives rise to the expression of this need as it exists phenomenologically and that this need is representative of a delicate balance between universal wants and localized conditions and dissimilarities. Ultimately in a world where such an equilibrium is disappearing, there is an urgent need for a greater understanding of "genius loci" and a reinterpretation of it in regard to architecture, and urban design.
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I  INTRODUCTION

A city and its architecture embody one of the finest expressions of man's social genius. Together they have throughout history functioned as a receptacle for, and a living exhibit of, the achievements of such a genius. Within a city's environs, its architecture, men have come together to partake of social discourse, and to reaffirm the humanity of their situation, their "human condition". The city then is truly part of an art "pestered by life". Such pestering has of late become problematic for the city as we have known it, an ethos of privatization at both an individual and collective level, combined with large unprecedented developments, have ensured that what was once the prime symbol of "collectivity" is slowly becoming its own antithesis.

A discussion of how we have arrived at this situation is largely unrelated to the subject at hand, and indeed has been told many times before elsewhere. What is worth discussing, however, is the conceptual framework which has brought us to our present repose, and whether such a framework is truly representative of our present day needs. This thesis would suggest that perhaps it is not. My theme is one of an "enlarged reasoning," a recognition of spiritualism as well as materialism, object as well as
subject, phenomenon as well as fact, genius loci as well as place.

Conceptual frameworks are generally useful, as metaphorical coathangers, upon which to organise and explain complex relationships. The schema presented within this thesis is such a coathanger. Western thought up to the eighteenth century had as one of its main concerns the explanation of the relationships of mind and nature, (expressed for example as the rationalism or empiricism of the Greeks to the theism of the middle ages), where all relationships were simply seen as facts of consciousness. This conceptual framework, however, was to change radically about the end of the seventeenth century with the emergence of a new philosophy of science developed by Rene Descartes.4

The basis of this philosophy was the concept of developing from "first principles" a totally rational framework for the new emerging sciences. Descartes believed in the absolute certainty of such scientific knowledge and saw in it an underpinning for all fields of learning. He sought a certainty which was basically mathematical in nature;5 regarding the properties of physical objects he wrote:

I admit nothing as true of them that is not deduced, with the clarity of a mathematical demonstration, from common notions whose truth we cannot doubt. Because all phenomena of nature can be explained in this way I think that no other principles of physics need be admitted, nor are to be desired.6
Descartes' "Discourse on Method" served as an introduction to this new phenomenon of science, it was to become also a major philosophical work of its time. In it, he presents a new method of reasoning based on "radical doubt". The method doubts everything until one reaches the one thing one cannot doubt – one's existence as a thinking being. Descartes thus concluded that the essence of human nature lay in thought, and that the tools for certain knowledge lay in intention and deduction. The effect of his position was to make mind more certain than matter, and to conclude, that these two were fundamentally different and separate.

If Descartes' greatest contribution to science then was his analytical method of reasoning, his even more profound contribution to western thought was this "De-cartesian" division between mind and body; aided by Isaac Newton's grand synthesis, formulated some years after Descartes' death, this view of nature was to dominate all scientific thinking. Of course, like all philosophical theories, it has not been without its problems. In psychology and psychotherapy, for example, it has led to confusion between the relationship of mind and brain; it made difficult for the founders of quantum theory the interpretation of their observations of atomic phenomena. It meant that the material universe was a machine, working according to mechanical laws. It was an attitude which in the long run
was to greatly influence the fledgling architecture and urbanism of the twentieth century. In Heisenberg's words:

This partition has penetrated deeply into the human mind during the three centuries following Descartes, and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.  

This revolution promoted by Descartes in the sciences also saw parallel developments in the architectural profession of the time. The eighteenth century brought with it an interest in a classical 'Neo-palladian' style which evoked a spirit of an ideal age, expressed in ideal forms and abstract geometries. The conviction generated through a belief in the power of the human mind resulted in a new idealised iconography. Such attitudes of the time were found expressed in large real, and theoretical, public buildings, which could be endowed with an austere and monumental character. Such preeminence of the mind also brought with it the concept of the architect as "form-giver".  

Ledoux, Boullee and others of the French Enlightenment became fascinated by the inorganic nature of geometric forms and equally perhaps, obsessed by the complete autonomy of their art.  

The Abbate, Carlo Lodoli, one of the guiding spirits of the enlightenment in Italy at the time, summed up this quest for intellectual purity by remarking:

Proportion, convenience and ornament can take shape only through the application of mathematics and physics
guided by rational norms... ornament is not essential but accessory to proper function and form.12

This autonomy which has parallels right up to the present day13 can be seen to have existed in two distinct primary ways; first of all there was the relationship of architecture to a mathematical order, as opposed to any possible natural one, and secondly there was the separation of idea from process, concept from execution, means from ends. The importance of such attitudes then lies in the fact that they are expressions of habits of thought which, over the last 300 years, have become deeply entrenched.

Today then, we still predominantly use a mechanistic, scientific paradigm by which to value our conceptual frameworks.14 The subordination of nature to human purpose has received the status of scientific objectivity and, by extension, is generally regarded as the only legitimate perception of reality. Such an attitude is governed by two general principles. The first of these is the primacy of the hierarchical over the communal relationship, Darwin's Theory of Evolution being an illustration of this principle in practice.15 It generally accepts a concept of "chance variation" and also "natural selection" to explain survival of the fittest. It is interesting to note that, at the time of Darwin's research, there was in fact ample evidence displaying cooperation as being at least as important a
factor governing the behaviour of species as was competition; this aspect of reality was largely set aside. It would seem that Darwin's triumph was as much that of a mythologist as it was that of a biologist.16

The second principle at work within such scientific positivistic thinking is the separation of "ends" and "means". Planned acts are seen as deriving their value by reference to a future end, and possibly, the efficiency of means by which that end might be achieved. Throughout the 50s, 60s and 70s it was these attitudes which largely governed urban design strategies; existing communities were sacrificed to make way for vast new developments and housing complexes. Throughout society in general we have in fact seen knowledge dissected into discrete disciplines, leading to not just a separation of means and ends but "means and means."17 The result of such separation of processes into distinct functions (all to the possible detriment of the understanding of their interrelationships), has led to our present day attitudes governing the health of our environment in general.18

Such a scientific framework has come under increasing criticism in recent years. The need for new interpretative schemas has arisen, for example, in modern physics where
revolutionary concepts have undermined accepted notions of material reality; in psychology also there is a need for new descriptions of the nature of consciousness. Where all this leads to is the understanding that the properties of systems derives from the relationships of their parts. A person, for instance, becomes more than just the mere analysis of physiological or psychological processes, rather, he must be seen in context, in relationship with others and with the social and physical environment. One might suggest that the classical positivistic paradigm, whereby the observer shall not enter into the description, is changing to one where the description shall equally reveal the properties of the observer. It represents an interaction alluded to by Louis Kahn in a description of his Philadelphia childhood,

A city should be a place where a little boy, walking through its streets can sense what he someday would like to be.

Such a change in attitude is not because the positivist orthodoxy is wrong but rather is biased; it overstresses one particular viewpoint, and can therefore ignore other important characteristics. There is a general inability of this conceptual framework to accommodate certain kinds of phenomena. There is therefore a need for an enlarged reasoning.
This thesis is concerned, through the phenomenon of genius loci, with such an enlarged reasoning. Today, the greatest forces shaping cities and urbanity in general are leftovers from our legacy of 300 years of positivistic conceptual frameworks. Cities have begun almost to represent mere physical interpretations of cash flow charts, critical path analyses and various other "technical strategies". We have tended to objectify our entire milieu, and have ignored the profound sense of unity which should exist between ourselves and our environment.

Ideas change fairly quickly, conceptual frameworks less so. They tend to be deeply rooted and often beyond the range of perfunctory conscious attention. In order then to initiate any possible "interpretative shift" we need to return to basics and ontological needs. This thesis suggests that our environment (including natural and man-made), must be viewed, first and foremost, within a phenomenologically scientific point of view, as opposed to a positivistic one. In addition, it will endeavor to point out that a natural interpretation of our build environment, a foundational critical norm might be approached by a return to one of the key "raison d'être" of environment, that of shelter, and especially its fundamental psychological affective dimension, namely, "the creation of place." A point of reference from which man can look out upon the world and
reaffirm his position within it. This sense of place has been fundamental to man throughout history, it is instilled within his philosophy, his mythology, and in artifacts of his poetic expression, such as architecture, urbanism, literature, sculpture and art. The first portion of this thesis will attempt a review from these "areas" in order to establish an understanding of the phenomenon of place and of its expression through its genius loci.

Architecture has always played a major part in the creation of place by man and attempts have been made previously to discover the nature of this phenomenon. These include the work of such notable authorities as Bachelard, Bollow, Norberg-Schulz and Schwarz. This thesis may also be viewed within this light, it shall attempt to understand the phenomenon of place, particularly in relation to architecture, and will suggest a hermeneutic framework comparable to other such environmental design frameworks as Newman's "Defensible Space," Lynch's "Routes and Notes" and Kahn's "Servant and Served Spaces." Such frameworks are admittedly only a small fraction of many conceptual paradigms necessary to environmental design, at an architectural and "city-design" level. They are, however, valuable metaphorical coathangers upon which to order and arrange complex ideas and experiences. In short, the aim here shall be to propose and elaborate a model for the understanding
and interpretation of our environment in relation to the phenomenon of place, and its genius loci.

If a truly phenomenological attitude is, as Husserl has suggested, "A return to the things themselves,"\(^2\) then this notion, as expressed through a concern for place, would seem a good starting point; the notion of "thing"\(^2\) then, after Husserl, is seen as being central to the proposed schema. The work and attitudes of Martin Heidegger have also been strongly influential in the development of the underpinnings to this thesis. Heidegger can be generally categorized as an "existential phenomenologist;" that is to say, his philosophy is concerned with a return to the real world, the world of experience, of emotion, of things, and of phenomena. It is to this world that architecture at its most truthful belongs. Over the past 300 years, however, "physics envy"\(^2\) has been influential in producing everything from semiotic triangles\(^2\) to naive functionalism. What we need today is a broader view of functionalism, an enlarged reasoning, a view of architecture phenomenologically - as something of our everyday world.

The suggested interpretative schema will use the concept of "thing" as a basic fundamental element existing at different architectural levels and environmental scales. Things in turn have their own fundamentally inherent "articulation"
and "patterning," depending on context. In order to clarify these notions it is proposed in part two of the thesis to use them to view critically the works of a number of architects and theorists. It is finally proposed to use them to investigate the phenomenon of place, the genius loci, inherent within the environment of Dublin, Ireland; a city which embodies a universally recognized "placial" quality.

Overall this thesis belongs to a phenomenologically scientific tradition as opposed to a positivistic one. A phenomenological view of place is a view of its everydayness, its spirit, its genius loci, its aura, in short, the very antithesis of a positivistic view of space. If we could as environmental designers respect such a spirit, (and ironically we have the scientific knowledge to do so), then we might again live up to the architectural legacy which still exists within the environmental "chaos" of our recent creation; one which tends to negate and scatter human activities, as opposed to ordering them, and is largely devoid of spaces of public experience, "public spaces for man."
1 The notion of "human condition" is an expression gleaned from the book, of that name, by Hannah Arendt, which is subtitled "A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man." It is insightfully discussed by Kenneth Frampton in "Modern Architecture and the Critical Presence," pp. 7-19.

2 For example, Colin Rowe and Fred Koelter's "Collage City," and Rob Krier's "Urban Space."

3 Such an enlarged reasoning is explored by Hans Georg Gadamer in "Truth and Method," where he alludes to the narrow "understanding" of cartesian thought through an examination of "truth" as it emerges in art.

4 For a rigorous discussion of the growth of science and its influence on architecture, refer to Perez-Gomez, "Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science."

5 It is worth noting that for the Greeks mathematics was more than just "numerical certainty," rather it embodied the notion of what might be learned and taught. "The mathematical is the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things." Krell, "Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings," p. 253.

6 Hooker, "Descartes," p. 86.

7 Through his Law of Motion, Newton overturned the idea of the universe as viewed through Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. In contrast to the "things" of Greek thought, Newton's "Every body becomes a universal entity at Motion in Geometric Space," Krell, op. cit., pp. 257-265.

8 As a conceptual schema it does not allow for the fact that the test itself can influence the results.


10 Form-giver in its widest sense; not only with regard to architecture, but also nature, McHarg, "Design With Nature," Ch. 7.
It has been suggested that the interest in "emphasised formal autonomy" was, in part, as a result of the emergence at this time of the engineering sciences. Deprived of the "how", architects concentrated on the "what." Perez-Gomez, "Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science," pp. 130-161.


The architecture of Aldo Rossi being, perhaps, one of the more significant examples.

In contrast to medieval science, modern science sees things as "calculable masses on a space-time grid," Krell, op. cit., p. 245.

Such a theory provides legitimacy to the notion of the individual versus the collective. It is also a conceptual framework which is "time-based," thus it sets the foundation for the predominence of time, over place, in society, during the following decades. Pike, "The Image of the City in Modern Literature," p. 118.


For a description of a method of understanding which seeks to overcome the possible limitations inferred by a mechanical metaphor, refer to Capro, "The Turning Point," Ch. 9.

Through such over-specialization, it is possible that a wholistic view of design and its value system may be lost. There is also the danger of an over-emphasis on the "process," while ignoring the "product."

Kealy, op. cit., p. 11.


The "what" and "how" of cities has become paramount, the "why" has been ignored.

"City design" as opposed to "urban design;" "city" being a noun, a thing, "urban" being merely an adjective.


Objects inhabit objective space, but things transcend into poetic space - Bachelard, "The Poetics of Space," pp. 201-206.
Refers to the notion of architecture being elevated, or reduced, to a certain science, "Physics envy" is a term attributed by Colin Rowe to Denise Scott Brown, Rowe, "Present Urban Predicament," p. 16.

Semiotic studies see buildings as metaphors, however, as Bachelard points out: "A metaphor should be no more than an accident of expression and it is dangerous to make a thought of it, a metaphor is a false image" .... "A great image has both a history and a pre-history, they are always a blend of memory and legend." Bachelard, "Poetics of Space," p. 77, p. 30.

"Chaos" is a prominent notion in Heidegger's philosophy. Through an enlarged understanding of our "being-in-the-world" we reduce the "chaos" around us; Being no larger falls into an abyss, Vycinas, "Earth and Gods," p. 126.

Frampton, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
Philosophy demands: seek constant communication, risk it without reserve, renounce the defiant self-assertion which forces itself upon you in ever new disguises, live in the hope that in your very renunciation you will in some incalculable way be given back to yourself.¹

"Words," said the White Queen to Alice, "meant what she wanted them to mean when she said them." The word "place" is of a similarly indeterminable nature. People vary in their attitude to place and the built environment in general.² However, one fact that is inescapable is that as people within the world we use and occupy "metaphorical places," and utilize our five senses to inform ourselves with regard to our surrounding environment. We unconsciously collect stimuli around us, we smell, touch, hear, taste and finally, of course, see. In this way we form complex mental images and the richer these are the more memorable are the contexts and the places. But are such experiences really "truthful" or should we more appropriately follow the "eternal scepticism" of Descartes.³

Such preoccupations concerning the true nature of our existence have always concerned philosophers from Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"⁴ to Heidegger's "Being and Time." The metaphysical question has been called the philosophical question par excellence;⁵ it attempts to deal
fundamentally with the essential questions and characteristics of being human, of "ex-sisting."

In 1844, August Comte's "Discourse Sur L'Esprit Positif" determined that human reason was entering its third and most mature phase of development; it was to be a time of real, certain and precise undertakings in the sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy and physics. The question of "ontology" or theory of being which had, here-to-fore, rooted the sciences to a common source was overturned. The era was in fact to produce an intellectual matrix which, almost inadvertently, fifty years later, was to help found a philosophical science to deal specifically with the phenomenon of existence - "existential phenomenology."

The turning point in development for this method of philosophical questioning occurred in February of 1927 when Martin Heidegger's book "Being and Time" was published. With it, Heidegger pulled together two disparate strands of predominantly European thought, "existentialism" and "phenomenology." He also called into question the whole history of "being," (as opposed to "Being"), from Plato to Nietzsche. Existential phenomenology or phenomenological existentialism began to be called the "new philosophy."
Existential phenomenology then is composed of two rather disparate yet complimentary pursuits, existentialism and phenomenology. Siren Kirkegaard is generally regarded as being the father of existentialism. He, like Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, shared a common resistance to an atomised way of looking at his existence and things in general. Kierkegaard conceived man as existence, a subject in relationship to God. In this way, man does not exist merely as a self contained spiritual subject but rather is only authentically himself in his relationship to the "God of Revelation." Kierkegaard's existence was conceived as being original and irrepeateable, radically personal and unique. This uniqueness suggests the solitary meditative quality of Kierkegaard's thought, it claimed validity only for the "thinker" himself and did not claim validity for others; in this way Kierkegaard renounced any possible dimension of universality claimed by scientific attitude. Such an outlook, of course, presented problems for him and his followers, since a philosopher, any philosopher, can hardly avoid the use of universal judgments to indicate universal and necessary structures of man. "In this sense he is, in fact, scientific."7

For Husserl this problem did not arise as he endeavored to develop his theories of phenomenology. Like Descartes, Husserl, originally a mathematician and physicist, was
disturbed by the confusion of language and welter of opinions existing, at the time, in philosophy. Influenced by the development of the sciences, Husserl sought to create a true philosophical science, one scientific by its own standards. In contrast to Kierkegaard's theological, anthropological approach to his conceptual framework, Husserl addressed himself to problems in the theory of knowledge and to establish a general critique of theoretical and practical reason. He endeavored to suggest how "seeing" functioned as a mental act and how objects were thus constituted in cognition, through their phenomenological essence:

To each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure phenomenon, which exhibits its intrinsic essence as an absolute datum. . . . The givenness of any reduced phenomenon is an absolute and indubitable givenness.®

Ultimately it was a theoretical framework which appealed to intuition and the essences of visual objects as opposed to pure logic. Indeed Husserl would have argued that any "rule of logic" is in fact unobtainable, without first actually assuming the rules of logic.®

Heidegger then, having been a pupil of Husserl, united these two philosophical schools in his book "Being And Time." Through the phenomenological theory of knowledge existentialism gave up its anti-scientific view. Phenomenology, in turn, enriched itself by borrowing many topics from
Kierkegaard's existentialism. In this way existential phenomenology became a "rare moment of equilibrium" in the history of philosophy and the question of being. It exhibits the truths of the "materialists" and the "spiritualists" without actually falling into the onesidedness of either system.

Materialism and spiritualism are two further streams of thought which represent the essential duality present in any endeavor to understand the nature of man's "being-in-the-world." Materialism sees man as simply a thing among other things in the world; existing simply within a moment, in the endless evolution of the cosmos. It harkens to an attitude that man is simply matter, a fragment of nature, devoid of spiritual extensions. "Scientism" may be seen as part of this materialistic "monism;" nothing becomes worth mentioning apart from those material things with which the sciences are concerned. As with most monisms, such attitudes fail usually by what they ignore, as opposed to anything else. Materialism seeks to ignore the fact that man rises above ordinary matter, things, due to the simple fact that he has meaning for himself, he has subjectivity and it is only through such subjectivity that other things and processes can really exist. Heidegger calls such a transcending of thingness by man as "no-thingness;" through it we "let be" the being of things.
In contrast to materialism then, which ignores the subject, spiritual monism errs in the other direction, it exaggerates the "I", and hankers toward the defication of the subject. Through this attitude of thinking the subject is seen not just as a subject in relation to lots of other subjects, each with an identity of its own, rather the subject is elevated to a great impersonal stature where other distinct subjects are viewed merely as "particularized dialectic moments," without meaning, except in relation to the all-governing subject. Such thinking is typically illustrated by Hegel's "Absolute Spirit," a subject that becomes so fantastic as to become identical with the traditional attributes of God. Spiritual monism then, just as material monism, detotalises reality, it again ignores; it ignores simply that man is a rather little subject, whose condition in the world is unmistakably "relative."

Existential phenomenology then, seeks to preserve the philosophical insights offered by both materialism and spiritualism, phenomenology and existentialism, but without any accompanying monism. Thus it accepts the thesis that man is subject within his world, but he is so only in relation to the things and places around him. It is this concept of the reciprocal implication of subject and world, this dialogue or encounter that may be termed the "primitive
The subject is open to the world his environment; and the places within it; he gains his measure from this relationship. In addition, the world gains its significance and meaning from such a habitation. (Figure 1.)

In 1927 then, Heidegger published his "magnum opus" and gave a concrete foundation to existential phenomenology. The importance of his thought, both autonomously and in relation to genius loci, lies in its phenomenological attitude to man's "being-in-the-world." It deals with things, places and ultimately the act of dwelling itself; which becomes for Heidegger, in the later stages of his philosophical development, a primary consideration. At the time of the publication of "Being and Time" Heidegger was an Associate Lecturer in Philosophy at Marburg University. He was familiar with all the major philosophical thoughts and debates of his day but had been influenced primarily by Kant, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Husserl.

Heidegger's thought throughout his life remained true to one main topic, that of man's existence within the world. His conceptual understanding of this developed through three major stages of thought: - from (i) "Dasein" to (ii) "Being" to (iii) "The Fourfold" - "man exists upon the earth, beneath the sky and between the mortals and the
We overcome subjectivity and objectivity through phenomenology and action. In this way the object becomes an event, a thing, existing in a multi-dimensional way. Thus it transcends itself from the static geometric object by which it is usually determined through cultural norms. Lerup, "Building the Unfinished," pp. 127-157.
This latter phase becomes more poetic in nature, albeit less rigorous than his earlier investigations. At all times he attempted an interpretation of man's being, his share in truth. This thesis might be seen in a similar light, that the truth of building is to be found in architecture and the truth of architecture is to be found in the phenomenon of genius loci.

It is important to realise that Heidegger's investigations are not simply a continuation of the traditional metaphysical "being" of man which in the late 1920's held sway. Rather it is of a more fundamental, ontological nature. He sees man, being, existing within the "light of Being;" such Being is always there, it simply must be brought into "unconcealment." The first two phases of this thought are generally seen as being interdependent. Dasein the stage to which "Being and Time" belongs, functions as a theoretical base to Being in phase two. This stage is rather more historically entrenched as within it Heidegger seeks to understand why Being, "which holds and carries the foundations of all philosophies," should be forgotten. He sees this as being characteristic of both modern metaphysics and science - the forgottenness of Being - which becomes ultimately a term of "nihilism."

In the third phase of his thought Heidegger metaphorically
returns to his philosophical roots, that is, the attitudes to be found in early Greek philosophy and their awareness of that dimension "ordained for the Gods." It is this final phase of thought that is Heidegger's most eloquent, and in relation to this thesis, it is perhaps the most pertinent. In it he endeavors to deal predominantly with the everyday world of man. He tries to approach the nature of a thing, and understand this "thingness" by letting the things be, rest in themselves, and appear as they are in the light of Being. It is in many respects a very human, ecological view of the world, as it suggests that earth and sky do have an inherent ordering which should be allowed hold sway. Genius loci in this respect would become a strong determining factor in environmental development. An understanding of this philosophy then can form a theoretical underpinning to any phenomenological interpretative schema, just as, for example, Descartesian philosophy forms an underpinning to most scientific schema. Ultimately Heidegger is saying that we must learn to see our real everyday world as it rests within its genius. By approaching near to real things we dwell "poetically" and authentically, we are at home.

(i) DASEIN
Dasein is characterised by an openness of man "being-in-the-world." Through such openness man recognises both death and
conscience. He discovers his future, his past and his presence, he discovers the passing of time and ultimately, his own temporality; time then is the very basis of being. Man approaches his own essence by understanding this and by adapting an appropriate relationship to his own way of being.

Having studied under Husserl, Heidegger endeavors to phenomenologically approach things; to allow them to appear in their own unconcealness. It is in relation to these things, these "indisposables," that man gains his character of existence; evidently from this there cannot be a world without man, but more importantly, no man without a world. For man then to reveal his very own being he must reveal the world in its unconcealness. In this respect he must act as caretaker for the world. With these thoughts Heidegger, in fact, paralleled the philosophies of the ancient Greeks who saw truth as the "disclosure of reality." Within the world of man there exists "things," the things of our surroundings. These are referred to as "implements" and are characterised by their "forness," their "handi-ness." The more an implement is fitted for its purpose the more primarily the user is related to it. However, an implement can lose its forness and become a mere "disposable," an object. It is within this constant tension between such a thing oscillating between a disposable and an implement that
the structure of Dasein is revealed:

The world as world is only revealed to me when things go wrong.19

Things are by nature "placey."20 However, such placeness and spaciality of implements is not merely to be seen in terms of just dimensions, rather it is based within the caretaking of Dasein; Dasein is structured through an existential understanding and "moodness." We understand each other only through our very way of existence; concern then for others is not a mortal attitude but an existential one, the understanding of this situation is always mood-like and through our moodness, Dasein is duly revealed, as being "thrown," that is, as being not entirely of our own making.21 However, through our understanding we can realise that we can "stand" our "thrownness," that is, direct and develop it. In this way the "Da" of Da-sein is realised.

For man to profoundly understand himself then, he must understand the thrownness of his situation, he does this by revealing Dasein. Such disclosure is for Heidegger of great significance as it represents for him, truth. However, just as Dasein is never fully revealed so also must truth be continuously rediscovered and gained by fighting against "seemingless." It is suggested that dread is the most apt mood to reveal an authentic Dasein. Through dread all things in the world become profoundly meaningless. Man in
this way is recalled from the inauthenticity of his everydayness, into the authenticity of his existence. Ultimately this mood of dread becomes a realization of our temporality and an approaching end. In death everyone is truly and uniquely alone with themselves:

Death in widest sense is a phenomenon of life. Everydayness discloses our inauthentic self and ever-present death reveals our authentic self. Death holds Dasein together.22

If the whole complex structure of Dasein were to be expressed in any particular simple manner it would be through the notion of "care." Care as "caretaking" through which we guard and nurture the world and allow the "to-be-in" of Dasein appear. Care as "concern" whereby we recognise that the sojourn of man on earth is a sojourn with others. Finally care as "self-concern" by which we recognise that by the understanding of Dasein as it is thrown we may move toward a more profound understanding of our own self.23

(ii) BEING

Dasein for Heidegger represented the truth of the openness of being. It was a way for him to lead man out of his subjectivistic, nihilistic, entanglements. Heidegger sees man as neither a source, nor a creator, of truth, rather he is truth itself as he allows truth to come into being through an attitude of respect, not domination toward his
true self. To reveal such truth man's thought must not be deterministically "logical" or "mechanistic;" rather it must reveal itself to the world and be set within it:

We do not possess a potentiality to think but that we are this potentiality.24

Being for Heidegger is an elaboration of this thinking of Dasein through perspectives of history, myth and language. This latter perspective is for Heidegger of deep ontological significance. It is only through words and language that things become, and are, things. An authentic language of man is needed to bring the silent words of Being into human sayings. Language in this way belongs to Being and is ultimately lord over man. Through history it is man's mission to allow the befalling of Being; through this befalling we help reveal Dasein and gain access to not just our primary historic past but also the throwness of Being. Finally, it is through myths that we have historically allowed Being to come forward and this can be seen to have occurred in three main ways, religiously, philosophically and artistically.

Overall, modern man has forgotten the historical and mythological perspective of his Being and so is unable to create for himself a meaningful future. Through Being man is capable of traveling a middle road
between subjectivism and objectivism. Indeed, such expressions become superfluous as man, living within the unconcealness of Being, partakes in a relationship of give and take. Today, however, modern man's subjectivism seeks to relate everything to his own measure and in so doing "seizes" the world causing a meaningless circle of use and exploitation. Modern man is seen then as forgetting Being and is only aware of the "beings" of "being." In contrast, Heidegger's thought parallels the Greek word for being, "eon," which implies "en" – the unifying one in such a way, man, his history, his myth, his language, lie together within the "befalling" of Being. To present such an all embracing concept, Being is metaphorically seen, at the end of phase two, as being similar to a lonely country road; a road of rare visitors which assembles the communities about it. In this way it links mortals and gods and reflects the vastness of the earth and the sky, such thoughts bring us to the final stage of Heidegger's development.

(iii) THE FOURFOLD

In this, the third and final phase of Heidegger's thought Da-sein, as "ex-sisting" becomes "dwelling;" the phenomenon of the world, its spirit or "genius" becomes central to the discourse. As we have seen with Dasein the phenomenon of the world was approached through the essence of man; the world was seen as a referential totality of things, as
implements:

Man in the mood of dread exists in the world authentically, whereas in his commerce with the things of everydayness, the implements, he exists inauthentically. 27

In contrast, in phase two man is approached through the essences of the world - the openness of Being becomes the world. By setting everything into its boundaries, Being throws everything into its light and thus brings itself to revelation, or to the world. Being is capable of both concealment and revelation. Through its revealing it merely exposes itself as concealed, it withholds itself.

Now in his third phase Heidegger, for the first real time in philosophical thought, seeks to understand the phenomena of the world and their physical manifestation upon the earth. It was only the Greeks before this who had attempted such a system of thought. 28 Now the problem of existence having developed through Dasein and Being becomes represented by this strife between the world and the earth. Such strife is seen as representing an extreme moment of truth as disclosure; the world becomes an earthy one, consisting of an assemblage of structural elements, the "earth," "sky," "mortals" and "gods." These are finally seen as the philosophically developed phenomenon of the world, the ultimate realities.
The Earth: The Greek word "physis" means nature. For the Greeks (up to Plato) physis represented "eo ipso logos," the ground where truth, language and thinking were rooted. "Logos" represented the bringing to light, or revelation, of physis. For Heidegger physis means both earth and world, Being relates to the world when revealing, and to the earth when concealing. Today physis, in the modern sense of the word, has become simply a sphere of homogeneous knowledge, a world of highly controllable, objectively viewed, nature. The question arises as to whether such nature is truly revealed or understood, or reciprocally, is man truly man by controlling nature. Existential phenomenology would, of course, suggest that it is not; that the essence of nature, its genius, can only be appreciated by letting it be the way it is, man's mission is, as guardian to such nature, to dwell is a world of phenomena.

Physis throws everything into its boundaries. It brings things forward in their ontological strength, their "somethingness." Physis then as earth is a cradle of life and a bed of death. The poet Holderlin calls nature "the all creating" and "the all living." The history of man can be seen to consist of the sway of physis - a rising and coming forward of being in a continually self-perpetuating way; thus physis is constantly revealing itself and is, in this way, representative of the world. It was Plato who replaced
truth as physis by truth as idea, thus causing "logos" to become "logic" and lodged in the mind, causing a split between appearance and being. Returning again to Holderlin, Heidegger sees physis as revelation, this being the ultimate truth:

In the awakening it comes to itself. The light lets everything come forward in its appearance and glow. Into which everything real, set aflame by it, stands in its own contour and measure.³⁰

By standing in thoughts of nature man guards these thoughts - he thinks. By standing in such thoughts, in the openness of Being, man adapts an open attitude; by such "letting-be" he lets himself into the midst of beings and "ec-sists."

Nature for Holderlin was holiness itself, it was timeless and transcended the gods themselves. It encompassed all of nature as it included all that was most open and true, it this way it was boundary-less, chaotic, however, through its revealing it gained for itself order, definition and imparted destiny.

The Gods: Heidegger's earth has been described as "that nearest the stars;"³¹ and in this, the last phase of his thought, this observation is all the more accurate. Early Greek philosophy had already established a similar train of expression, the most characteristic feature of which was its "world-iness." Gods were seen as approaching man in this
world they represented the very being or spirit of things and events. In this way the Greeks turned to reality what was divine and created in the gods their most real realities; the names of such gods structured history itself. There was Athene, the goddess of battle, representing decision; Apollo representing physis in retirement; Aphrodite, goddess of love, joy and beauty and Hermes the god of opportunity and luck. Such gods were unique and real, they indicated a relationship of give and take between the Greeks and their world. In fact, in this way they provided us with the very etymological roots of the term "genius loci." The Greeks achieved a balance between objectivism and subjectivism and the major religious modes of expression were reflective of this.

Greek religion comprised two forms of deities; those of Olympian, which were the deities of heaven and light, and those of Chthonian which represented the deities of earth and night. These two factions were seen as being in constant battle, echoing the Heideggerian notion of strife between world and earth. For Chthonian society women and particularly mothers were venerated. The "mother earth" was seen as the possessor of wisdom and Delphi was the mystical seat of this wisdom. In contrast, Olympian thought was less naturally inclined and more spiritual, whereas Chthonian religion celebrated physis, Olympian thought celebrated
logis, thus setting the seed for the development of a platonic subjectivistic outlook. Ultimately all the gods shared the characteristic of being messengers of the light of physis; that is, they formed a tangible framework for the understanding of the earthly phenomena. It was inconceivable for man to be capable of such insight without the gods:

Without the gods man is only a shadow of a dream. . . all men stand in need of the gods.33

It is through logos, light, that the world becomes known phenomenologically. In such a way the spirit, or genius of a thing or place is allowed to appear, - unlike any predominant subjective attitude - nothing is presupposed.

In summation, then, we have seen that the fundamental thinking of Martin Heidegger is concerned with the reality of the real world and with man's openness to this. Such a philosophy would, this thesis suggests, form an argumentative reasoning as to why, and possibly how, the phenomenon of genius loci might be studied. Only by the creation of place and by an openness to the phenomenological aspects of that place, i.e., its genius loci, can man authentically dwell within this world:

The place represents architecture's share in truth. The place is the concrete manifestation of man's dwelling and his identity depends on his belonging to places.34
Heidegger, we have seen, goes through three principle phases of development in his efforts to approach an understanding of man's Being. Through Da-sein he endeavors to comprehend man, "being-in-the-world." In his second phase he seeks to understand the openness of Being in the world. Finally in his third phase, he seeks to unite these thoughts by creating a structural framework appropriate to the openness of man's being-in-the-world. This third phase of thought is in fact most pertinent to the discussion at hand and will be returned to again in this thesis, with the introduction of an interpretative schema for the understanding of the phenomenon of genius loci. The notion of revealing or coming into unconcealness, we have seen, is central to Heidegger's understanding of Being. Physis is seen as the logos of the earth and sky. Myths are seen as the logos of the gods and poetic expression as the logos of man himself:

Poetry is primarily the naming of gods . . . to name gods is to open a world and the history of a nation.35

As a conclusion to this first section of the thesis it is proposed to look at these two final expressions of logos, as they are both indicative of man's openness to the world and unite him in a profound way to his phenomenological milieu. If Heideggerian thought then achieves anything, it is that it makes us question things and phenomena of which we might formally have been frivolously sure. It questions things
free of any prejudicial systems and thus lets reality say its word:

It is more sound for a thought to wander in the strange than to settle into the familiar.36 (Figure 2.)
Heidegger reaches for the deepest phenomena. Such phenomena are anterior to any theory and have their own stance outside the framework of such a theory. A theory is always subjective by being established by man and used as an instrument in man's hand; whereas that which is prior to all the theories belongs in the hand of Being itself. Vycinas, "Earth and Gods," pp. 153-154.
NOTES

1 Jaspers "Ways to Wisdom," p. 124.

2 For a good description of the notion of place, from a sociological viewpoint, refer to Relph, "Place and Placelessness."

3 Descartes' "Cogito Ergo Sum," "I think therefore I am" subjectivizes the phenomenological world, robs things of their being and ultimately ignores the possibility of any knowledge that might be obtained, other than epistemologically; e.g. through opinion, tradition, authority: Bernstein, "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism," p. 117.

4 Metaphysics in fact, (meaning meta-physics, special physics), comes from the placing of the topic in Aristotle's work.


6 Ibid., p. x.


8 Husserl, op. cit., pp. 35-40.

9 Ibid., p. vi.


12 Ibid., p. 34.

13 Etymologically "dwelling" alludes to notions of "nearness;" and care for your neighbours. Vycinas, op. cit., p. 265.

14 Ibid., p. 8.

15 Ibid., pp. 9-11.

16 By "ecological" I mean an awareness of nature's relationship to man, as opposed to man's relationship to nature.

17 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 34.
18 Ibid., p. 30.
20 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 39.

21 Thrownness refers to the fact that man's destiny is never really entirely of his own making; it is always shaped "for him," as well as "by him." Ibid., p. 43.

22 Ibid., p. 55.
23 Ibid., p. 54.
24 Ibid., p. 80.
25 Ibid., pp. 97-100.
26 Ibid., p. 110.
27 Ibid., p. 121.
28 Ibid., p. 133.
29 Ibid., p. 140.
30 Ibid., p. 149.
31 Ibid., p. 167.


33 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 218.
35 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 281.
36 Ibid., p. 320.
The myths of man are representative of his "religious history;¹ through them man endeavors to translate phenomena which are generally of a nature outside his realm of comprehension, into understandable dimensions. In this way, as Jung has pointed out, signs when pointing to the unknown become symbols, and symbols when pointing to something known become signs.²

It is generally regarded that the world of modern man has no place for myth; this thesis does not wish to prove or disprove this point;³ rather it would argue that myths, and their associated symbolic connotations are, like philosophy and poetic expression, of an ontological nature in the understanding of man's "being-in-the-world." They are therefore worth studying in relation to another of his ontological needs, that of place and genius loci. Myths have invariably been expressed in two principle ways, through ritual and ceremony, and as expressions of these, through art and architecture;

all architecture is one vast symbolism.⁴

The building customs and attitudes then of many ancient civilizations were deeply influenced by a wide variety of magical and mythological presences. Man seeked to link
himself, through his craft to the universe, so as to insure a stability and orientation in a passing world. Today, in a world dominated by man's subjectivism, it is perhaps difficult to comprehend such a mentality; maybe some insight may be gained through imagining ourselves in the Heideggerian mood of dread, lost and lonely upon a country road, amidst a dark, cold and moonless night, who in this situation, would not start "imagining?"

Man then in ancient history (and not so ancient), experienced the phenomena of the world at first hand. When it rained he invariably got wet, when the winds blew he got cold, and when the sun went down so also did man retire for the night. A comprehension of the phenomenon of the sky was perhaps one of the first sources of myth. The Polynesians for example saw the sky as descending at the horizon; they saw in it a representation of the earth on high while the earth below was seen as a vast cellar. In Egypt the sky was, in early times, seen as a vast flat rectangular plate, which rested alternatively on mountains or sky-pillars. In turn myths developed of four such magical sky-pillars being protected by four "caring" god-figures. The four pillars became characterised by four winds and four in this way became a predominant notion in religious ceremonies. The world was viewed as being divided into four regions or "houses" and each orientation began to be associated with a
particular colour. North became synonymous with black, south with red, green or blue with east and white with west. In town planning, settlements were invariably developed along two major routes running at right angles to each other and subsequently dividing the community into four parts. In Assyria even the buildings were set with their four corners facing the four cardinal points. In the Bible, Jerico, the prototype city, was founded, and set, "four sq."

A need for an understanding of their surrounding natural phenomena was also expressed by ancient man within his buildings. The early Egyptian temples, for example, were made in the image of the known earth. The ceiling became a sky supported by four pillars; the Propylea of the Acropolis had stars painted within the coffers. Tombs are similarly articulated so that even if one died to the profane world, one was buried in relation to the whole known cosmos.

In order to mythologically relate beyond their own cosmos, towards the sky, it was common for ancient man to consider high places sacred, as representative of "axes mundii." In Egypt there were the pyramids; India had her stepped ziggurats and so also had virtually every major city in Mesopotamia. Such vertical edifices were not just sacred and representative of sky-pillars, they were also shrines, places of rest for visiting gods. Man also created his own
visible gods; the pharaohs of Egypt were such; kings in
general were seen as being divine and living in heavenly
abodes, enclosed in paradise-like gardens. The building of
such abodes was governed by strict systems of rites; charms
were buried at gateways and bricks were only laid at
particular times of the year.

All of the above then were acts which enabled a
manifestation of the sacred, or an "hierophany." The
creation of these indicated a desire to establish a fixed
point, a centre, to give orientation. Sacred history
abounds in cultures which claimed to contain the site of the
center of the earth, "a place above all places." Mircea
Eliade has commented:

If a world is to be lived in, it must be founded.

Through the creation of sacred worlds religious man founds
his world and gives meaning and dimension to his own profane
existence. Traditional societies maintained an order within
their milieu, by means of a multiplicity of centers and a
constant reiteration of an image on a smaller and smaller
scale:

The creation of the world became the archetype of every
creative human gesture . . . in extremely varied
cultural contexts we constantly find the same
cosmological schema and the same ritual scenario:
setting in a territory is equivalent to founding a
world.
This constant need in man to express the recreation of the world ad-infinitum indicates his desire for a real world which is in "statu nascendi," that is, constantly coming forward anew.

Such a need is reflected in man's festivals where there is a ritual repetition of the gods' creative act; through such festivals man recreates his nostalgia for origins and "lives as close as possible to the gods." In such a way man re-orientates himself in the world and lives again within its mythical centre the place of origin par excellence. In order to understand such places man invested the phenomena of the place, their genius loci with divine meaning:

They invented divinities who took the place of the supreme beings; these then were the repository of the most concrete and striking powers of life.

In this way the gods of Heidegger's late philosophy along with the Greek notion of mother earth resound in mythical connotations. Ancient cultures revered women and their capacity to give birth. The feeling of the motherhood of earth was for man almost a mystically, cosmically structured feeling; one that went far beyond the notions of family or ancestral solidarity. The world was truly felt as created by the gods. Nature then was never just nature, rather it was full of symbolic connotations, it lived and spoke; it was a "thou" rather than an "it."
With modern man it is generally accepted that he has lost touch with such ancient religious symbolism and myth; however, to quote again Mircea Eliade, one might argue that there is unlikely to be such a thing as a "virgin cortex."¹²

"Do what he will man is an inheritor."

The non-religious man in the pure sense then perhaps does not even exist; being and sacred are fundamentally one. The notion of "profane" could not even exist itself without reference to that of "sacred;" etymologically profane in fact comes from "pro" meaning "before" and "fanum" meaning "temple."¹³ Religion then is always:

The paradigmatic solution for every existential crises; it allows access to the world of the spirit.¹⁴

It is in fact through language and etymological studies that man retains contact with his mythical origins, and language in this way, becomes the key to myth understanding. Ultimately it was through a "sharing" that language and myth created, historically, a revealing, an intellectual apprehension, thus we achieve Hamann's diction:

Poetry is the mother tongue of humanity.¹⁵

Myth and language then, play an interrelated role in the evolution of thought; from momentary experience through the creation of deities, to enduring concepts. This notion, in particular, adds considerable strength to Heidegger's
philosophy through its firm underpinnings upon etymological studies, especially with regard to building, dwelling and thinking. It is through language that we interpret the world and, through such an interpretation we create our frames of reference.

The spiritual excitement caused by some object which presents itself in the outer world furnishes both the occasion and the means of its denomination. Sense impressions are what the self receives from its encounter with the not-self, and the liveliest of these naturally strives for vocal expression; they are the basis of the separate appellations, which the speaking populace attempts.16

If we accept, then, that modern man cannot be totally isolated to the influence of myth or symbol it would seem that they would form an appropriate area of study as they deal with primary needs of man's dwelling within the world. They satisfy the need for orientation and clarification of one's own position. To quote Gaston Bachelard, "Being here is always maintained by a being from elsewhere."17 The city as a hierarchically layered artifact will always be an indication of this.

It was through the studies of Kevin Lynch in the early 1950s that such notions were re-introduced into the vocabulary of modern planning. His notions of "goal," "path," and "domain" were proposed as being fundamental to the formation of a comprehensible structured environment. Such a strategy requires goals, or places, and such places
require a distinct character, a genius loci. It has been suggested by others that another meaningful and valid method of organising space might be through a re-establishment of a "spacial mythology." While this thesis would not even begin to argue for or against this point, it would suggest that in the phenomenon of genius loci, we already have provided for us a "placial mythology," one capable of various levels of evocation whereby:

Consciousness frees itself from the passive in sensory impression and creates a world of its own in accordance with a spiritual principle. . . . Imagination augments reality.

This, then, is the inherent value of genius loci. Such evocation, which is above and beyond the physical space itself, is primarily phenomenological in nature; and any major studies of it have endeavored to approach it from such a viewpoint. One such critical work is Gaston Bachelard's "The Poetics of Space."

Bachelard had, previous to this work, made his name in the rather rigorous field of the philosophy of science. In his later years, however, he became interested in the phenomenon of our everyday world, and in particular those that may "reverberate echoes through the past." Bachelard sought also to understand the poetic or creative act which by being receptive to these phenomena, at the moment they appeared, was capable of "creating a new evocative archetype through
poetic expression." Bachelard looks upon such a creative act as being related to the soul, not the mind. It echoes similar spiritual beliefs expressed by Cyril Connolly:

The three requisites for a work of art are validity of the myth, vigour of belief and intensity of vocation.22

In order to approach a phenomenological view of space Bachelard studies a thing which has such a mythical evocative aura inherent within it, the home:

All real inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home.23

"Home" for most is, in fact, the ultimate place; what Bachelard seeks to examine is its ontological genius, through which it has the capability of focusing and integrating our deepest memories and dreams. Jung's archetypal child grows within such a home into a modern man, a man again in search of another home, another soul, a womb with a view! Bachelard's investigations are reminiscent of earlier sentiments expressed in relation to Heidegger's work; the real world and its values must be approached with care as they are ethereal in nature:

If a house is a living value, it must integrate an element of unreality; all values must remain vulnerable - those that do not are dead.24

An observation that is of importance with regard to Bachelard's study is the use he makes of the phenomena of
poetic expression - to read poetry is essentially to
daydream\(^{25}\) - he further suggests that:

To give unreality to an image attached to a strong
reality is in the spirit of poetry ... to enter the
world of the superlative we must listen to poets.\(^{26}\)

A good poem can indeed "possess us entirely"\(^{27}\) and through
it, the poet (practicing an "artform" unpestered by life)
can approach those phenomena which "reverberate echoes
through the past." Literature similarly, as another form of
poetic expression, can give us insights into the images and
"genii" that shape our own reality:

Literature speaks to us about the structure of
conciousness itself, most especially the structures of
our self and remembered experiences of life.\(^{28}\)

Authors such as Pater and Ruskin were particularly
celebratory of the power of memory and association that
architecture (as poetic expression) bestows:

The quite spaciousness of the place is itself like a
meditation, an act of recollection; and clears away the
confusions of the heart.\(^{29}\)

These are then two strong conquerors of man's forgetfulness,
poetic expression in its widest sense, that is, poetry,
literature, art, and also architecture:

We may live without architecture and worship without
her, but we cannot remember without her.\(^{30}\)

With this in mind, then, we may proceed to the perspective
of poetic expression and look to it for perhaps both, an expression, and an explanation, of the phenomenon of genius loci.
NOTES

1 Eliade, "The Sacred and the Profane," p. 100.
3 It has been suggested that our era lacking a valid mythology is not only incapable of creating sacred building but access to architecture itself is denied to us. Schwarz, "The Church Incarnate," p. 228.
5 Eliade, op. cit., p. 51.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 47.
9 Ibid., p. 76.
10 Ibid., p. 91.
11 Ibid., p. 128.
12 Ibid., p. 204.
16 Ibid., p. 89.
18 Dilet, op. cit., p. 6.
19 Ibid., p. 6.

Bachelard begins his study with the notion that imagination resides in two spheres; a formal one, which reacts to novelty and beauty and a material one; one that seeks a permancy in things. Bachelard suggests that it is the material one that is particularly necessary for the complete philosophical study of man's poetic creation; it seeks the eternal, the primitive. It will be suggested later in this study that Rossi's architecture is exemplary of this latter notion, while Venturi's epitomises the first.

Connolly, "The Unquiet Grave," p. 41.

Bachelard, op. cit., pp. 4-8.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid., p. xxiii.

Ibid., p. 51.

Ibid., p. xxiii.


Ibid., p. 32.

Ruskin, "Seven Lamps," p. 46.
IV THE PERSPECTIVE OF POETIC EXPRESSION

The concept of poetic expression in its widest sense, was particularly close to the heart of Martin Heidegger:

Art in its essence is poetry [dichtung] poetry as 'Dichtung' is the logos of physis as brought into the nation's world by the works of a man who is aware of logos - the fundamental language - and who lets it appear in his works. Not just artworks but also anything as 'thing' reflects or assembles the world.\(^1\)

The poetic expression by its nature is particularly applicable to the bringing to being of life-world phenomena. It can within itself represent images which may reverberate those echoes through the past, due to their deep ontological nature. Thus Gaston Bachelard, commenting upon the use of the poetic description in phenomenological studies, suggests:

It is more than mere description, on the contrary, we must go beyond the problems of description - whether this description be objective or subjective, that is whether it gives facts or impressions - in order to attain its primary virtues, those that reveal an attachment that is native is some way to the primary function of inhabiting... we need to seize upon the germ of the essential.\(^2\)

It is with these thoughts that we may begin to look to poetic expression, literature and art, for descriptions and artifacts which may not just seek to describe a place but to embody its very phenomenological essence, its genius loci.\(^3\)
The work of Henry James tends to allude to the phenomena of place in this way; thus he writes of the French Coast as that:

Region of intenser light a zone of clearness, and colour.\(^4\)

Writing about the numerous villas in Rome he remarks:

There are more of them with all their sights and sounds and odours and memories, than you have senses for.\(^5\)

He speaks in a similarly sensuous way with regard to what he calls the "truths" of London:

They colour the thick dim distances, which in my opinion are the most romantic town visas in the world, they mingle with the troubled light . . . as with the low magnificent medium of the sky where the smoke and fog and the weather in general, the strangled undefined hour of the day and the season of the year . . . all hang together in a confusion, a complication, a shifting but irremovable canopy. They form the undertone of the deep perpetual voice of the place.\(^6\)

These images then, are images of an inhabited space, which as Bachelard points out, "transcends simple geometric space."\(^7\) Phenomena and phenomenology, genius loci and the concept of place, belong then in a profound way to inhabited space, that which is experienced, seen, felt, smelt, touched and even tasted.\(^8\) They demand to be lived directly, and to be experienced. Much of modern architecture ignores this, scenography has become "all," to the detriment of the other senses. Kenneth Frampton has
commented upon this in regard to the contemporary problem of universal technology:

The tactile resilience of the place form, and the capacity of the body to read the environment in terms other than those of sight alone suggest a potential strategy for resisting the domination of universal technology.9

Architecture then as poetic expression initiates and aids recall, it provides the image for the moment of evocation that produces "vast structures of recollection raised from the ruins of the past."10 In fact, vast areas and entire towns and cities can be recalled through the experience of one or two specific phenomenon. It might be the fragrance of a coffee shop or the silhouette of a building against the skyline.

Dublin city represented for James Joyce such an intricate matrix of phenomena. Like many other great Irish writers of the past one hundred and fifty years or so, he was truly a product of the Dublin milieu into which he was born. He is one among many, Yeats, Shaw, O'Casey, Synge, Lady Gregory, Colum, Behan, Wilde, Swift, Beckett, Kavanagh, O'Flaherty, O'Connor, and O'Faolain; all have been shaped in some form by that city which is not just a dense social and cultural capital, but was as the height of its fame, the second largest city, of the largest empire the world had ever
known; an empire upon which the sun did, in fact, finally set.

Of Dublin, "that city where one is never more than twenty paces from a 'pint,'" Joyce was to write:

I want to give a picture of Dublin so complete that if the city one day suddenly disappeared from the earth it could be reconstructed. . . for myself I always write about Dublin because if I can get to the heart of Dublin I can get to the heart of all the cities of the world. In the particular is contained the universal. . . . one is always national before being international.

These are comments which bring to mind Schopenhauer's distinction between an object of science and one of art:

(The) object of science is a description of the universal that contains many particulars. The object of art is the making of particulars that contain a universal.

With a typically Irish outlook then, Joyce presented to the world in "Ulysses" a city which was "in his blood as opposed to his brain." Dublin became almost a character whose characteristics, charms and indiscretions Joyce continuously alludes to and describes, not so much in detail, but rather phenomenologically. Dublin's stream of consciousness becomes part and parcel of the novel. The chief characters themselves, Dedalus and Bloom, become mythical figures who venture forth into the urban labyrinth; or, as one typical Irish wit described it, due to its objectionable language:

More a public labyrinth than a Celtic toilet.
"Ulysses" then is as much a novel about Dublin as it is about anything else. Its stream of consciousness, metaphorically presented to us as "Anna Livia Plurabelle" flows silently through en route to the sea, and the world beyond.

Dublin has been fortunate in the intervening years since Joyce completed his literary masterpiece. It has retained its sense of spirit, genius, that so moved Joyce. This is largely due to its position as a capital of a social milieu of a deeply rooted nature. Physically, the island of Ireland exists "in the western ocean, about one short day's sailing from Wales;" as an island it is strongly defined and one has only to travel approximately fifty miles, in any one direction, in order to reaffirm the nation's physical isolation. The island, which historically has been remote, isolated and torn with continuous strife, echos with the ghosts of past generations, and their actions are to be remembered both in the physical artifacts left and in the names of particular places.

One such story told about how a particular place received its name tells about the exploits of the legendary figure, Cuchulainn:

They went to Mag Muceda, the pig-keeper's plain, and there Cuchulainn cut down an oak tree in their path and cut an ogam message into its side. He wrote, there, that no one was to pass that oak until a warrier had
leaped it in his chariot, at the first attempt. So they pitched their tents and set themselves to leaping the tree in their chariots. Thirty horses fell on that spot, and thirty chariots were smashed there and the place has since been called "Belach n'Ane," "pass where they drove."19

In addition to Ireland's isolation, and indeed because of it, the island never underwent the rule of Rome nor did it receive the grimy face lift of the industrial revolution. The one invasion that did leave an indelible mark was the advent of Christianity about the end of the fifth century. Prominent religious figures then, duly took up their place within the legends already deeply entrenched within the active imaginations of the Irish natives. Religion also promoted a widespread artistic and intellectual growth which throughout the "dark ages" was to earn for Ireland the title of "Island of Saints and Scholars."

The illustrated religious artifacts of the time speak of a people fully alive to the spirits about them. It is impossible to look at such works as "The Book of Kells" or "The Book of Durrow" and not feel moved as if one was almost looking at the landscapes which inspired them. An anonymous poem of the time speaks of the phenomena of the poet's everyday world:

I arise to-day
Through the strength of Heaven:
Light of Sun,
Radiance of Moon,
Splendor of Fire,
Speed of Lightning,
Swiftness of Wind,
Depth of Sea,
Stability of Earth
Firmness of Rock. 20

The poem also speaks of another phenomenon, that of a people and their world slowly becoming "one." Irish history abounds in such happenings, whereby the invaders or visitors have become "more Irish than the Irish themselves." An Irish native of Norman descent writing in Gaelic in the sixteenth century clearly belonged to the island his forbears had found to their liking:

Shore of fine fruit-bended trees
Shore of green grass-covered Leas;
Old plain of Ir, soft, showery,
Wheatful, fruitful, fair, flow'ry.

Home of priest and gallant knight
Isle of gold haired maidens bright
Banba of the clear blue waye
Of bold hearts and heros brave. 21

This tiny piece of rock then, set out on the western-most tip of Continental Europe, has always been capable, due to its strong phenomenological identity, to spiritually engulf its occupants and bring them willingly to its bosom. In the 1580's Edmund Spenser was to visit and live in Ireland for a number of years; the landscape he was to experience in Co. Cork was to strongly influence the writing of the "Faerie Queene." It is a landscape that comes readily to mind as one reads Spenser, the lush fields, laid beneath the
all too common "suddeine overcast," and "hideous storme of raine."  

The "Faerie Queene" describes, in passing, a peculiar and growing interest of the time, that of mingling man-made effects side by side with what nature provided; a fashionable enough past-time in Ireland during that era, and one that was slowly to extend to England. It was a movement which was to become particularly personified by an interest in the notion of "spirit of place," "genius loci." As a discipline, it was strongly influenced by literature, Virgil and Horace in particular, and also by painting, that other form of poetic expression unpestered by life:

Poetry, painting and gardening, or the science of landscaping will forever by men of taste be deemed three sisters, or the three new graces who dress and adorn nature.  

Such an interest in gardening paralleled developments in agriculture and also in the sciences. It was felt within man's capacity to improve upon nature:

At each the genius of the place is improved with the appropriate repertoirs of sinuous walks and streams, classical or gothic temples and follies, all of which features join the ha-ha as the essence of this early English landscape.  

In Ireland at the same time the milder climate, higher rainfall and natural rocky outcrops produced such a
spontaneous spirit of place that in 1737 Lord Orrery wrote to an English friend of:

A great difference in the complexion of the two islands. Nature has been profusely beneficent to Ireland and art has been as much so to England. Here we are beholders to nothing but the creation; there you are indebted to expensive and costly architects.25

However, Ireland was not totally immune to large scale landscaping endeavors at the time; poets bemoaned the loss of the natural countryside and felt its demise deeply:

Cause enough for grieving
My shelter a-felling,
The North wind freezing
And death in the sky.26

For the Irish though, there was to be more to "morn;" in 1800 when the Act of Union between England and Ireland was passed the golden age of Ireland's gentry passed with it. Writers and poets set to paper the tragic and moving nature of a decaying society. The era produced Goldsmith's "Deserted Village" and Maria Edgeworth's "Ormond" and "Castle Rackrent." Sir Aubrey de Vere (1788-1846) lamenting the loss of nobility of the Rock of Cashel writes:

Royal and saintly Cashel! I would gaze upon the wreck of thy departed powers; Not in the dewy light of matin hours, Nor the meridian pomp of summer's blaze, But at the close of dim autumnal days when the sun's parting glance, through slanting showers Sheds o'er thy rock - throned battlements and towers. 27
Such attitudes expressed through the poetry and literature of the time reflect a deeply felt, almost spiritual, affection for the things and places which surrounded the writers. The people were still innocent enough to instill those things and places of importance, within their everyday lives, with a mystical quality. Two English travel writers of the time remark:

It is indeed rare to pass a single mile without encountering an object to which some marvellous fiction is attached. Every lake, mountain, ruin of church or castle, rath and boreen, has its legendry tale; the fairies people every wild spot; the banshee is the follower of every old family; phookas and cluricanes are - if not to be seen, to be heard of - in every solitary glen. 28

Trees, in fact, played a particular part in the creation of such special places and powers. Their peculiarly self-contained "thingness" allied with their natural "axis mundi" promised fertility, luck and possibly evil. The cloudy skies and misty days merely encouraged such thoughts and imaginings.

From the late nineteenth century on, Irish writers began to sustain a renewed and invigorated nationalism in their work. The genius of the country was not just strong unto itself but in contrast to neighbouring England it shone as the proverbial candle in the night. "Dark Rosaleen," a poem by James Clarence Mangan, personified such a character or spirit; in it he describes a place, Ireland, possessed by a
woman's spirit. Ireland throughout this time was ravaged by famine and immigration. Irishmen, spread throughout the world, remembered with sadness the places of their childhood:

Adiou to Belashanny! Where
I was born and bred; Go
where I may I'll think of
you as sure as night and morn
The kindly spot, the friendly
town where everyone is known,
And not a face in all the place
but partly seems my own;
There's not a house or window,
there's not a field or link,
But east and west in foreign
lands, I'll recollect them still.29

The beginning of the twentieth century brought with it for Ireland a new blooming in the Irish literary tradition, and also independence. For the first time in almost eight hundred years Ireland was in a position to determine its own destiny. In literature W. B. Yeats cast his gaunt shadow over everything. As a child he had travelled between England and Ireland with his father; he was to spend his holidays with relations in Sligo, and it was to this county that he was to develop a lifelong emotional attachment. The images and aura of the place permeate his writings:

I longed for a sod of earth
From some field I knew, something
of Sligo to hold in my hand.
It was some old race instinct
Like that of a savage . . . .30
John Millington Synge was another writer partaking in the literary revival instigated by Yeats and Lady Gregory. He travelled the countryside and remote corners learning about the people, the legends, landscapes and places. Phenomena derived from the particular, but universal in their nature. Commenting upon a naively presented narrative which represented the plot of "Cymbeline," Synge remarks:

It gave me a strange feeling of wonder to hear this illiterate native of a wet rock in the Atlantic telling a story that is so full of European associations.  

Synge became enthralled with the people and the atmosphere of the countryside; reflecting phenomenologically upon the "vague but passionate anguish of the Irish twilights," he writes:

... This season particularly when the first touch of autumn is felt in the evening air ... makes me long that the twilight might be eternal ... at such moments one regrets every hour that one has lived outside of Ireland, and every night that one has passed in cities. Twilight and autumn are both full of the suggestion that we connect with death and the ending of earthly vigour, and perhaps in a country like Ireland this moment has an emphasis that, is not known elsewhere.

But if Synge's familiarity was with that of the countryside and the peasant, James Joyce's was to be the city and modern man; he was as we have seen to present Dublin to the world in detail, like a "written photograph;" an image flavoured with the past, present and future; he commented:
When you remember that Dublin has been a capital for thousands of years . . . it seems strange that no artist has given it to the world.33

A slightly later contemporary of Joyce's was to be Elizabeth Bowen, who was to become known for the vitality and vividness of her place descriptions. Descriptions which accurately captured the genius of the Anglo-Irish landscape still prominent at the time:

The castle was built on high ground commanding the estuary; a steep hill with trees continued above it. On fine days the view was remarkable, of almost Italian brilliance, with that constant reflection up from the water that even now prolonged the too long day. Now in the continuous evening rain, the winding wooden line of the further shore could be seen, and nearer the windows a smothered island with the stump of a watch-tower, where the castle stood, a higher tower had answered the islands.34

Other writers, O'Faolain, Lavin and O'Connor were to create, also at this time, a particularly Irish form of short story; full, like an impressionist painting, of timeless, ethereal feelings and emotions. One such writer, Martin O'Cadhain, has presented to us a powerful image of modern Ireland, and of a people caught within the dilemma of the modern human condition:

The houses were not strung together here, the nearest wavering thread of smoke seemed to her a mile away . . . like all the surrounding countryside her new house, had a certain stupid arrogance; it reminded her of the smug smile of a shopkeeper examining his bankbook . . . she shivered to think that from now on she would be simply one of the conveniences among the conveniences of this house.35
Literature then, just as art and all poetic expression, may be seen as a surface upon which the phenomena of our everyday world and the places about us can be etched. Ireland, a place of strong evocative ambience, has instilled whole generations of writers with emotional outpourings. On an international scale writers like Henry James and Lawrence Durrell have exhibited also this sense of topophilia, or love of place. It is a phenomenon that makes our life meaningful, as it is only through the contrast and duality presented by places that we can ultimately "be-in-the-world." Philosophically we create whole patterns, "gestalts" of such places in order to affirm our presence and place within the environment. We add strength to such feelings through primordial imaginings of myth, legend and religion, it is a phenomenon inherent to the human condition.

Architecture belongs to this condition in a unique and special way. In a way that no other art work can, it envelops and nurtures the actions of man, it exists within the milieu of "place" and may even create such a phenomenological feeling. How then can one interpret such a phenomenon? Part II suggests such a hermeneutic schema. It will be suggested that such a schema can form a normative datum from which to view genius loci, and in particular, the participation of architecture and urban design in such a "truth."
NOTES


3 Literature, in particular, has born testimony to the deeply rooted artifact that the notion of place, (and city place especially), has been in western culture. Pike, "The Image of the City in Modern Literature," p. 3.


5 Ibid., p. 491.

6 Ibid., p. 521.


8 Buildings are not just of the eye but also the hand; they are built for the sun and rooted in the earth. Schwarz, op. cit., p. 19.


10 Frank, op. cit., P. 45.


14 Ellman, op. cit., p. 505.

15 Perhaps it is not coincidental that Dedalus was the mythical architect of the labyrinth.

16 Ellman, op. cit., p. 18.

17 "Anna Livia Plurabelle" is the name given by Joyce to the River Liffey.


19 Ibid., p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 28.
21 Ibid., p. 51.
22 Ibid., p. 55.
23 Hunt, "The Genius of the Place," Introduction
24 Ibid., Introduction.
25 Trevor, op. cit., p. 56.
26 Ibid., p. 68.
27 Ibid., p. 82.
28 Ibid., p. 92.
29 Ibid., p. 102.
30 Ibid., p. 115.
31 Ibid., p. 120.
32 Ibid., p. 123.
34 Trevor, op. cit., P. 137.
35 Ibid., p. 147.
36 Refer also to the book of that name by Yi-Fu Tuan.
AN INTERPRETATIVE SCHEMA

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The phenomenon which this thesis seeks to understand is the nature of this shadow, the genius of the place. We have seen that the notion of place, of "being-in-the-world" is one deeply embedded in philosophy, myth and poetic expression. The work of Martin Heidegger has been suggested as being a particularly evocative, almost mystical, awareness of this phenomenon. In the later stages of his thought Heidegger developed an increased awareness and interest in "things," the true phenomenological objects of our world. It is proposed to commence our interpretative schema by a discussion of the phenomena of "thing:"

A phenomenological description is interested in the way a thing appears in use or in being handled by man.

The notion of thing belongs to the third and last major phase of Heideggerian thought, and is deeply influenced by the concept of the fourfold and man dwelling within these. A thing, by standing in the light of the world, and by reflecting this light, logos, brings into nearness the four of the foursome. Dwelling then, is seen as guarding the four. In order to further understand the "thingness" of a "thing" Heidegger discusses the notion of the artwork as
that thing in which profound truth is brought to stand.\textsuperscript{5}

In contrast to traditional philosophical modes of thought where objects are governed by an overwhelming subjectivity, Heidegger seeks to:

Free the question from all such prejudicial systems and thus to let reality itself say its word. This means letting things be the way they are assembled in the logos of being. Such letting-be is responding to the logos of being. The question thus becomes a response . . . to approach anything in the best and most complete way it is necessary to indicate many other things to which it refers.\textsuperscript{6}

With such thought Heidegger returns to former ideas of "serviceability" and "dependability." Through serviceability a thing becomes lost into the fulfillment of man's needs; an artwork however is never lost in this way, rather, it manifests itself in dependability; it erects a world within which truth is allowed to take place and through such a world the earth projects itself. Heidegger would suggest that man never actually "causes" an artwork,\textsuperscript{7} instead he is a helping hand to bringing into light that which already exists around him.

For a thing to be a place, a thing which takes place is necessary.\textsuperscript{8}

A place is always defined by "thing(s)," be they within or without the place itself. A thing, as place, cannot be known without the nature of the place which it assembles. By assembling a place a thing ultimately assembles the
foursome and grants it "stead;" in this way it approximates the world for man and makes it an essential aspect of his dwelling. Man needs a proximity to the world and to things. Etymologically, in German, and in many other languages, "thing" and "assemblage" are synonymous with each other, a true thing then "things" the world; to be aware of such phenomena is to:

Guard them in one's thoughts and in the things one makes and cultivates; is to dwell and be wise, all in one.

Dwelling ultimately becomes the "holy grail" of Heidegger's quest. When dwelling becomes perverted and no longer exists with the awareness of the fourfold it ceases to be "ec-sistence" but rather becomes "in-sistence," a subjective determinism. Etymologically Heidegger has shown the essential continuity of "being," "building," "dwelling" and "thinking." "Bauen," to build, connects with "buan," to dwell, and with "bin" and "bist," the original German words for "be." To dwell, therefore, is not something which is simple, rather it involves a sparing of the foursome; to build means to bring forward such a foursome and in turn holds a thing in its thingness. In order to express such an ontological attitude Heidegger returns again to poetry:

"Poetically man dwells on earth."

Poetizing and poetic expressionism becomes for him a true symbol of the real letting dwell. The poet is the man who brings to language "the house of the world for the dwelling
of man;" true dwelling saves the earth, receives the sky, awaits divinities and initiates mortals. To build to this attitude means to approach genius loci.

We may suggest then, that a thing through its "thingness" reflects the first, and primary manifestation, of the spirit of a place. A country road gathers around itself the landscape and gives it stead. Through it we recreate in our mind's eye places of various social and geographical scales, and these thus create a comprehensible environmental "pattern." A country road has a truth to its existence in a way that say a freeway cannot. The country road bends and twists and reveals in its nature the lie of the land and the dependability of the things that exist around it; it is never lost within a serviceability to man.

In a similar way, in a country the size of Ireland, the River Shannon acts as a source of gathering. Just as the Liffey, "Anna Livia Plurabelle," "things" Dublin, so also does the Shannon meander its way through the countryside responding to the elements around it, and leaving in its wake a mythical thread uniting the genius of the landscape.13

Place then is the consideration par excellence that earths and grants stead to settlement. We have seen how places in
mythology and poetic expression have always had things of high existential importance related to them. In Egypt the pyramids became not just burial chambers for the god-like kings, but also mythological mountains; which not only rendered orientation within a flat river plain, but also took this horizontal dimension and translated it into a vertical one, thereby uniting earth and sky, mortals and gods.

In a similar way, hundreds of years later, the Greeks created places by erecting temples, "edifices of transcendental importance." Such things were, however, of a fundamentally different character to a pyramid. In contrast to the flat planes of the Nile, the Greeks built within a country of rolling hills. In so doing, they made their things permiable, space interweaves and envelops the object and is in turn sculptured by it. In such a way, one might suggest, the temples related out beyond themselves through space to the hills, and emphasised not just their own gathering, but that at another level and scale, that created by the undulating countryside around.

A thousand years later and within an entirely different epoch, the Gothic cathedrals developed in response to their particular milieu:

The Gothic cathedral was not created because somebody invented rib-vaulting . . . they were worked out because
a new spirit required them.  

They again embody the mythical notion of vertical dimension and they personified the earth and genius loci as it existed around them. The forests, common throughout Northern Europe, can easily be seen to have had a spatial and structural influence on the intentions of the master builders. Such dependence of architectural form upon physiographic form has been commented upon by others:

"The horizontality of the Egyptian temples has . . . been ascribed to the level sands of the desert, and perhaps . . . the uneventful expanse may have something to do with the character of the architecture . . . in times and countries in which architecture is a living art, the general form of building corresponds to the environment, and the bristling pyramid of the Abbey of Mont St. Michel would be as impossible in the midst of the Roman Campagna or of an Illinois prairie as the spreading expanse of the temple of Karnak on the spike of the mont itself."  

In order for a thing to thing, to gather, and to act as a "goal" it requires both context and orientation, that is, "domain" and "path." Egyptian architecture, for example, was based on a highly developed orthogonal grid, which originated both in the lie of the Nile and in the notion of the four sky pillars. It was common for the Greeks when founding their temples to build, first of all, simple altars, so as to develop an initial familiarity with the site and its surrounding phenomena; they finally orientated their temples based on their observances. Similarly the
Gothic cathedral did not just invariably face east-west, toward the rising sun, but also gave orientation and meaning (both physical and mental), to the multitude of paths and domains that existed around it.

Goal and domain may also be seen as representing the age old duality of sacred and profane. Through the establishment of goals, true centers of meaning, we make more real the patterns of our own profanity. Such centers are those areas of stability where essential rituals are carried out. It might in fact be suggested that this spatial duality applies to all types of spaces from the identification of a country, to a region, to a city, to a building, and to all its constituent parts. This latter concept is eloquently epitomised in Louis Kahn's conceptual schema of "served" and "servant" spaces. Examples of sacred spaces include, as we have seen, pyramids, temples and cathedrals. By inference so also might we include such things as capitols, towers and prehistoric monuments. The original expression for profane has perhaps always been the dwelling unit; which when multiplied, creates community and domain.

Linking these two primary notions of space is a third type, the path. It is that which is transitory and unfocused, but which is of course imperative to the meaningful interpretation of the primary two. For path to be
meaningful in its own right, it needs a continuity of expression or "articulation," and a neutrality of hierarchy; it is space as "connector" and is only of meaning in relation to that which it connects, its goals and domains. It is to these three types of space that we cling to when we organise our spatial experiences. Goal, path and domain provide a "direction" in the creation of our interpretative schema for place. Gaston Bachelard has remarked upon the potential vividness of such concerns:

What a dynamic, handsome object is a path! How precise the familiar hill paths remain for our muscular consciousness.18

He continues quoting George Sand:

What is more beautiful than a road. It is the symbol and the image of an active and varied life.19

Henry James, in his description of London, also alludes to such notions:

It is no doubt, not the taste of everyone, but for the real London-lover the mere immensity of the place is a large part of its savour . . . practically, of course, one lives in a quarter, in a plot; but in imagination and by a constant mental act of reference the accommodated hunter enjoys the whole.20

Le Corbusier also paid homage to notions of goal, path and domain, although he perhaps overestimated the rational rigor of man by proclaiming:

Man walks in a straight line because he has a goal and knows where he is going.21

Le Corbusier, of course, as with many masters of the modern movement, recognised the phenomenologically existential element in architecture:
The purpose of architecture is to move us. Architectural emotion exists when the work rings within us in tune with a universe whose laws we obey, recognise and respect.\textsuperscript{22}

In his "Plan Voisin" for Paris, Le Corbusier pulled together the concepts of goal, path and domain in one gesture. He provided a portal to each of the cities' main entrances, thus creating a true phenomenological "thing" of high existential meaning.\textsuperscript{23}
NOTES

1 "Whatever is made of light casts a shadow; our work is of shadow; it belongs to light," Kahn, Tyng, op. cit., p. 168.

2 "Thing," becomes for Heidegger, a point of departure for studying works of art.


4 With such a view of dwelling man ceases to view shelter simply as material need but rather begins to see again the ethical function of architecture. Karson, "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture," p. 16.

5 A thing in its most profound sense is an "event" or happening of being. Through its thingness a thing oscillates between "disclosure" and "enclosure." If we seek to understand a thing, we seek, as the primitive fact of existential phenomenology suggests a dialectic play, a discourse between part and whole, local and universal, object and subject. By approaching a thing in such a way we exhibit ourselves as beings constituted by, and engaged in, interpretative understanding. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 123.

6 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 242.

7 Nor, for that matter, does his understanding of such an artwork ever achieve finality.

8 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 252.


10 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 262.

11 Heidegger, "op. cit., p. xiv.

12 Ibid., p. 213.
Such a physical manifestation was concretized in the twelfth century when the island was divided into four provinces; north, south, east and west. Schulz, "Meaning in Western Architecture," p. 96.

Lethaby, op. cit., p. 47.


A path to be a path must be "internally" unfocused; that is, it gives direction, rather than "containing it."

Bachelard, op. cit., pp. 6-15.

Ibid., pp. 10-15.

Zabel, op. cit., p. 519.


Ibid., p. 23.

Le Corbusier thus exhibited the essential duality of his attitudes, a "hedgehog" of Carthesian rigor, but a "fox" of phenomenological awareness.
VI AN INTERPRETATIVE SCHEMA

We have suggested that the phenomenon of genius loci has been expressed heretofore in philosophy, in myth and in poetic expression. We have seen also that a common thread of thought running through these three perspectives, in relation to place creation, has been the underlying notion of goal, path and domain. In order to understand then, genius loci, as it appears in our everyday world, we need to understand how goal, path and domain are expressed in such a world. In the introduction to the interpretative schema presented in this thesis it has been suggested that this is achieved through "things," "articulation" and "pattern formation," these then are the basic elements of the proposed schema.¹

If such a schema is sufficient to look at the configuration of place as it exists within our everyday world; and if as Goethe suggests, "The value of an idea is proved by its power to organise the subject matter," then such a schema should also provide insight into that act of place creation and poetic expression par excellance, architecture. If such is the case then such a study would not just provide a validity of sorts for the conceptual framework, but would also, through its implementation, clarify and explain this framework.²
The architecture of Louis I. Kahn comes readily to mind as being particularly representative of the acts of place creation, and poetic expression. It is perhaps not coincidental that a lot of Kahn's poetic theory came from a deep understanding of Heideggerian philosophy, Gestalt theory and Jungian psychology. His philosophy of architecture became, also for him, one of life:

Life to me is existence with a psyche; and death is existence without the psyche.3

Influenced by Jungian theory, Kahn saw the psyche as a prevalent soul which in fact transcended the individual and had, like a myth, a collective or universal nature. Furthermore from the late 1940's on he felt the deep chasm which existed for him between feeling and religion on the one hand, and thinking and philosophy on the other. Jung appealed to Kahn because he, unlike most psychologists of the time, recognised spirituality. By the late 1950's Kahn had read Jung's "Memories, Dreams and Reflections" and also "Man and His Symbols." In Europe at approximately the same time he was fascinated by the timelessly evocative architecture represented by Hadrian's Villa, Italian hill towns, Carcassone, the Parthenon and the Egyptian pyramids. Of the latter he was to remark:

Silence . . . the feeling you get when you pass the pyramids you feel that they want to tell you . . . not 'how' they were made, but what made them be, which means what was the force that caused them to be made . . . these are the voices of silence . . . .4
All this arose within him a need to get to the archetypal quality of architecture. Even his drawings of this period display a phenomenological quality of blue skys and earthy browns, evocative of the purity of gods and brute force of mere mortals. Kahn realised that the artist and scientist did ultimately seek the same goals but in different ways. Through exposure to German romantic thought he saw the poet and creative artists in general as being the mouthpieces of the diety; he believed that the way in which each individual expresses himself belongs to him. However, the expression, per se, wells up from universal, almost mythical, forces deep within.

Kahn in the late 1940s had begun to see feeling as being fundamentally more important than simple dry analytical thinking; he was drawn to the instinctive intangible side of the mental process, and saw thinking merely as something which emerged from feeling and helped to express it into an articulated shape. By the early 1960's, however, having been exposed to Jungian theory, Kahn began to see feeling and thought as parallel activities. Thought at its purest transcended into philosophy, and feeling into religion. When such thought and feeling reached their pure universal forms they joined together and achieved a "realization," a level of insight capable of producing a work of art.
Intrinsic to Kahn's thought at this time was his sense of order. By 1955 he would say "order is . . ."\(^6\) this was a deeply felt phenomenon for him as he believed in the notion (as so also did Einstein), that the world did in fact exist within some infutable order. It was such notions that lead, in 1959, to Kahn's concept of "form,"\(^7\) which for him represented an essence or "thingness," that was created by an ordered set of elements. The concept of form was as a direct result of exposure to Jung's notion of archetypes - psychological structures of almost mythical quality, originating at the deepest level of the unconscious. Through the concept of form Kahn used such archetypal structures as guidelines for his designs.\(^8\) He saw art as the only universal language of man, it strives to communicate in a way that reveals the human will to be:

When a great composition again presents itself it is as though someone you know well entered the room, someone you still had to see again to know. Because of its unmeasurable qualities it must be heard and again heard.\(^9\)

Form then, just as a true thing, implies a certain order of elements.\(^10\) Kahn uses the example of a chair, whose "chairness" requires a certain order. Such form is a realization of thought and feeling. It is therefore ostensibly neither arbitrary nor stylised, but yearns for a more profound understanding of the things which shape our everyday world.
It is with urban design that the phenomenological appeal of Kahn's thinking is particularly evident. At a time when rationale need and programming still held an overtly dominant position, Kahn wished to understand the intrinsic nature necessary to a modern city. He sought to develop a naturally evolving order based on vehicular movement; a type of movement from which zoning could evolve spontaneously. Kahn's efforts at a phenomenological view of architecture were, just as Heidegger's philosophical views, to develop in their mature years to an almost incomprehensible mystical level. Both are united in the common notion of the light of logos, and truth.

Through the phenomena of silence and light Kahn sought to express ideas which for him represented the origin of creative expression within the human psyche. Light was a means or tool of expression provided by nature; in this way it was the giver of life to architecture. The window was the most significant part of a room because it allowed light to enter, to bring out its genius. Frampton refers indirectly to this phenomenon in relation to light and climate control determining a regional approach to architecture:

The generic window is obviously the most delicate point at which these two natural forces impinge upon the outer membrane of the building; fenestration having an innate capacity to describe architecture with the character of a region, and hence to express the place in which the work is situated.
Through silence rose the desire of the psyche for expression; in this way the light is tamed, controlled and given inspirational and evocative purpose. The nature of a ruin became for Kahn important, not because of its possible age, but due to its silence. In Heideggerian terms the evocation of a ruin dwells also, not in its age, but in the emergence of its spirit, its independence to the serviceability of man.

Since Kahnian thought is based on such a phenomenological foundation it is not surprising that he speaks in this fashion also with regard to his buildings and urban planning proposals. For example, he distinguishes between the phenomenon of shopping and the physical act of buying:

Decentralization disperses and destroys the city. So-called shopping centres away from the centre are merely buying, shopping cannot exist away from the city's core.

In a similar vein he recognised the loss of place in planning:

The circumstantial demands of the car, of the parking and so forth, will eat away all the spaces that exist now, and pretty soon you have no identifying traces of what I might call "loyalities" - the landmarks. Remember, when you think of your city, you think immediately of certain places which identify the city, as you enter it. If they are gone your feeling for the city is lost and gone.

Cities are fundamentally about place creation, as is
architecture; any conceptual schema for a greater understanding of place and genius loci, should also, if it is appropriate, provide a greater understanding of architecture and architectural theory.

Nicholaus Pevsner begins his "Outline of European Architecture" with the oft-quoted sentence, "A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture."¹⁵ He goes on to suggest that the term "architecture" applies only to buildings designed "with a view to aesthetic appeal." Such an attitude is of course questionable since aesthetics cannot be "primary" in determining "architecture."¹⁶ In relation to all that has been said heretofore, it can, I believe, be suggested that architecture, "baukunst,"¹⁷ throughout history, was a term applied to buildings with special mythical or spiritual appeal; an appeal which transcends the mere bricks and mortar, to establish a phenomenological relationship with its users. Such a characteristic may be referred to as the "thingness" of the building. Lincoln Cathedral then is a piece of architecture due to its "thingness," its sense of gathering, both physical and spiritual; a bicycle shed is not, due to its lack of such potential. The concept of thing then sets into motion a mental framework by which man orientates himself, and provides for himself, a recognisable point of departure and return within the world.
The interpretative schema suggested within this thesis endeavors to understand this phenomenon of thing, as it relates to place, genius loci, and by inference, architecture. Architectural theories of the recent past seem to have lost sight of this primary notion of "thingness" and have, in Heideggerian terms, "drifted into chaos." We may in fact gain a validity of sorts for our interpretative schema, should it prove beneficial in use to understand existing architecture and architectural theory. With Kahn for example, we have seen that form was understood as manifesting an order, this was central to his theoretical underpinnings and his buildings reflect this. Most are true forms, things, organised within the rigor of an ordering pattern, derived from his Beaux-Arts training. Articulation for Kahn was always made subservient to the overall form and order.

Kahn was fortunate enough to the extent that many of his commissions were buildings of a "thing quality," museums, churches, libraries and assembly buildings. At the level of urban design where according to our schema "articulation" should be to the fore Kahn, in a sense, failed. His public housing in Philadelphia does not create a successful composition, formally, and is weak in providing a continuity of articulated "linkage space." Indeed the articulation of space to building is weak "spatially" in terms of height to
width. The architectural articulation, in detail, falls back to Kahn's favourite ploy of dominant structure, expressed, primarily, as precast canopies to doors and windows. This weakness of articulation, between building and urban space, is noticeable throughout Kahn's oeuvre. "The successful entrance," that piece of articulation of first order always seemed to allude him, as he was steadfast in his primary regard for formal expression above all else. The duality or ambiguity that such gives rise to can be seen clearly in the British Art Building at Yale, where the entrance to the gallery sneaks in under the corner of the building. In addition, the shop fronts at street level are not given the traditional expression of "shop" but are made in every respect subservient to the formal structure above them, as is also the rest of the surface articulation. There is no demarcation between front and back, and excluding the very tasteful choice of material, one is left with the feeling that the building would belong more to a green field than an urban site. One such building which is set in a green field, is Kahn's Exeter Library, where again the ambivalent articulation of the entrance is lost amidst the formal strength of the object as thing; the articulation also at all times, is made subservient to the nature of the brick structure itself.

In contrast to Kahn, Venturi, one of his former disciples,
would seem to have established his theoretical underpinnings not on form, or pattern, but rather on articulation. In his seminal work of 1966, "Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture," Venturi celebrates the wall as the point where program meets reality. He suggests that the richness of architecture lies in the manipulation of such an interaction. Within this realm of thought Venturi has attracted many followers and has achieved a laudible reputation. However, he seems to have done so at the cost of both formal strength and order. To substitute such "ontological requirements," Venturi has had to succumb to a mirage of pop symbolism and "signage." Such an attitude to the "bombastic" buildings of our recent past seems to reach its pinnacle of phenomenological awareness when in "Learning from Las Vegas," Rome's churches, streets and piazzas are co-related to Vegas' casinos, sidewalks and parking lots. One may in fact sympathise with Venturi, the pop sensibility of our contemporary populace would seem a legitimate way to order a corresponding architecture. However, what he seems to fail to recognise is that a casino, or parking lot for that matter, is only truly so due to a church and due to a piazza; there can be no profane space without sacred space.

To advocate a decorated shed as opposed to sculptural ducks
in merely to point up the absurdity of each. Both fail to be either "real things" or "meaningful articulation." One building of Venturi's which seems to exhibit this trait is his Guild House of 1963. Venturi comments that "the urban character of the street suggested a building that would not be an independent pavilion but instead would recognise the spacial demands of the street." However, the end result, indicative, it seems of a "decorated shed attitude" is, one might suggest, schizophrenic in nature. It is neither a successful urban thing, nor a convincingly articulated urban facade. It contains a narcissism of overscaled elements, topped by an empty symbol of "T.V. aerial," cum, "If this is the shed then this must be the decoration;" (which, in fact it duly is, as the real T. V. antenna is elsewhere). Ultimately such theoretical attitudes of Venturi are, one might suggest, indicative of a rebellious child brought up under the strict dogmas of the modern movement.

If Kahn's strength lies in formality and Venturi's in articulation, Christopher Alexander's would seem to be in the notion of pattern making; not surprisingly considering his thesis published as "A Pattern Language" in 1979:

Beyond its elements each building is defined by certain patterns of relationships among the elements . . . .

Although Alexander has not produced any major built projects
his writings have, in recent years, become particularly popular to the generations of designers who have become disenchanted with the quality of our modern environment, as produced through the idiom of "modern" architecture and "modern" planning.

Alexander's reactions to the emotional poverty experienced within such environments has been nothing if not rigorous and geared toward primary notions. However, due to their phenomenological leanings they have suffered, just as Kahnian and Heideggerian thought, in linguistic expression. What Alexander is ultimately endeavoring to understand is, not a theory which explains the process of design, but rather one that actually proceeds it and generates it:

An age old process by which the people of a society have always pulled the order of their world from their own being.23

From this perspective, beauty becomes something that is not just on the surface, or subjectively derived, rather it becomes the very essence of an object or thing. In this way, Alexander does approach the Heideggerian notion of a thing "resting in itself" and granting stead to the fourfold. True to his scientific background, Alexander began his search for a pathway to such a phenomenological view within his study "Notes on a Synthesis of Form," whereby he deduced from a study of traditional organic
buildings, that the ultimate result of design was "form;" form which was a result of logical organisation and method, as opposed to any actual intent. Architecture thus was seen as a series of autonomous generating systems.

In subsequent years such an autonomous system created for Alexander the concept of objects being fundamentally organised on the basis of "patterns," at all scales within our everyday world. Through such patterns Alexander approaches how an object "is" and how it is organised within its environmental world. With such a developing attitude it is not surprising that he should have become enamoured with the appeal of the order found in natural forms; referring to a Japanese Temple he writes:

As if someone had rolled up his shirt sleeve and put his arm down into the heart of nature and had actually plucked up something and brought it to the surface.24

In patterns, Alexander sees the possibility of forming a structured morphological approach to providing generic descriptions of our environment, and in particular, the man-made one of architecture. In this way he suggests we might approach that "quality without a name"25 that lies in those things of almost effortless beauty, of which we all have particular memories; be it an old stone wall, a weather-beaten country stye or a memorable city square. It
is upon the notion of pattern then that Alexander builds this theoretical ideas and it would seem that this is as much an aberation as is Kahn's formal elegance or Venturi's idiosyncratic articulation. The notions of such theorists gain their argumentative strength through the singularity of their application, to do so however, is to forsake an enlarged reasoning. The primacy of pattern in Alexander's thought does, of course, reflect his deliberate interest in the unheroic, the unintentional beauty of our vernacular, traditional environments, and his books are full of such wholesome images.

Regardless of Alexander's leanings his theoretical approach of recent years has been singular in attempting to understand the phenomena inherent within architecture, by which we create spaces which are in fact places, that is, spaces that are "at rest" within themselves. In this sense the space created, or "object as thing" will constitute a truth in itself, in Heideggerian terms it brings to stead the fourfold within the light of being:

A well designed house not only fits its context well but also illuminates the problem of just what the context is . . . the structure, if successful, will clarify the life it accommodates.

In this way Alexander seeks to understand an object as being-in-itself as a thing and being-for-itself as its perception; it is within the balance of these two phenomena
that awakens in us those "measureless depths" which enables us "to speak to ourselves as persons."

With such an understanding Alexander endeavors to overcome the Carthesian debate of mind versus matter, facts versus values, objective beauty versus subjective beauty. One might expand this notion to suggest that, in order to design, one must in fact overcome this Carthesian division of mind and matter. Louis Kahn talked of having a building be "what it wants to be;" Alexander speaks of the notion of allowing a natural order permeate our design methodology,

To make a thing which has the character of nature, and to be true to all the forces in it, to remove yourself, to let it be, without interference from your image-making self - all this requires that all of it is transitory; that all of it is going to pass. 29

In such a way we recognise our own temporal nature and in a Heideggerian sense of dread we become more fundamentally aware of our being in the world; we transcend our inauthentic everyday world.

I would suggest that what Alexander is finally alluding to within his pattern studies is that today we have lost the notion of thingness and the inherent concept of place-creation which it contains. The home, the most fundamental of places, has become a commodity lost within an inauthenticity of financial packages, built-in obsolescence,
artificial scarcity, changing fashions and image induced upward mobility. Thus the phenomena of home, as also the phenomena of place, through which we gain a fundamental sense of nearness to that which is around us, has become lost to our view.

Kahn, Venturi and Alexander provide for us explanatory models with regard to the notions of "thing," "articulation" and "pattern," and in their ability to organise and explain such concepts lies the validation of their selection. The work of three other theorists/practitioners remains to be commented upon before endeavoring to commence a case study of Dublin, Ireland. These three are Aldo Rossi, Ricardo Bofill and Luis Barragan. Rossi has written evocatively on the notion of the city, particularly in relation to its architecture and locus. They are notions which are particularly relevant to the sense of place in contemporary cities. Bofill is of interest as he, too, displays an obvious interest in the creation of an architecture of place. As of late he is representative of that new breed of contemporary architects who seem to display an overtly, self conscious, stylised approach to their design, and in this regard in particular, his work is perhaps worth discussing. Finally, Luis Barragan is worth an overview both for the uniqueness of his architectural output and for his insightful, though limited, theoretical writings. Barragan
has always expressed an interest in the phenomena of architecture, that which moves us from the inauthenticity of our life-world to the fleeting ethereality of another dimension; to pursuit such a course he has refrained from any stylistic emptiness but has maintained throughout an intellectual integrity reflected in his designs. A brief view of these works would be beneficial to the underlying tendency of this thesis, that is, an understanding of the phenomena of place.

It was in 1966 that Aldo Rossi published his major theoretical work entitled, "The Architecture of the City," in which he provides a persuasive argument for a return to the notion of architecture, and its embodiment in the monuments of the city, as being the most fundamental and essential shaping phenomenon of a city. In the pursuit of such a theoretical approach Rossi has been influenced strongly by theorists of the French Enlightenment and his work is therefore intensely rational and ideally platonic, heroic, at the expense of any possible attributes pertinable to the everydayness of our situation.

Nevertheless, his thoughts are exemplary as being an endeavor to return to the "things" of cities; those things which shape and in turn are shaped by the things around
them. In this sense Rossi represents the polar opposite of both Venturi and Alexander. Rossi seeks an eternal truth, rationally derived, while Venturi and, to an even greater degree, Alexander, seek to understand the nature of the culturally expressive artifact, which evolves naturally from its given circumstances. If such an attitude represents the "particularity" of a situation then Rossi ostensibly represents its "universality." This is in effect his greatest weakness, if it may be called that, he fails to give credence to the particularities of a situation, to its non-heroic manifestations; but in so doing his architecture does gain in an almost "pathos-like" evocative isolation. In regard to some of his projects such an isolation would seem appropriate, for example, his cemetery at Modena; however, for some of his other projects, including schools, housing and government buildings, it would seem that he fails, in Kahnian terms, to provide the appropriate spaces for such "institutions."

In his writings he fails it would seem to sufficiently distinguish between the monumentality, or "thingness of monuments," as opposed to simply mass housing. As he recognised, mass housing does partake in an influencial way in the formation of cities due in particular to its relatively inert nature. However, as a thing it can never embody the phenomenological aspects of myth, history and
spiritual intensity that the more collective artifacts of the city might; it can never actually allude to anything in a profound sense other than its real life situation. Rossi, however, is commendable for the fact that at the time of its inception, his opus, "The Architecture of the City" did try to deal with the notion of the city at a level which was then unknown. He endeavored to transcend problems of objectivity versus subjectivity and to approach the primitive fact of existential phenomenology, that is, the interaction which occurs between man and his world. Rossi also seeks to understand things as they rest in themselves, in this regard it is impossible to discuss Rossi without commenting upon his notions of "typology."

The type is the very idea of architecture, that is what is closer to its essence.\(^{34}\) He stresses also, with the help of Quatremere de Quincy, that the type does not represent a concrete model to be imitated, but rather is only a general idea which is common to many works.\(^{35}\) In this way one might concede that he does in fact try to link the notion of universality to particular environmental situations. While typology was not Rossi's major concern while writing his first major book, (unlike subsequent years), nevertheless, there is a noticeable lack of cogent examples of specific typologies. Through the notion of a "thing," as understood through the philosophy of
existential phenomenology, it is suggested that the useful though strait-jacketing effect of typology might be overcome. Indeed, it could also be suggested that, by using the idea of "thing," "articulation" and "pattern" as a point of departure, one might begin to see the development of architectural artifacts within history as a variation in the dominance, at any one time, of each of these three characteristics; such a historical overview would, I believe, provide an interesting theme for further study.

While being in danger of gross oversimplification one might suggest that "good" architecture, that is, "meaningful" architecture is the result of first and foremost the creation of a "thing," one that through is "articulation" and "pattern" grants stead to the truthfulness of its situation, and so creates a place of existential dimensions. With this in mind one might proceed to look at specific works of Rossi and in turn Bofill and Barragan.

One project of Rossi's which is particularly evident in pointing up the difficulties of his rationalized typological approach is his mass housing project within the Gallaratese Quarter just outside Milan. It is a design for which the design drawings are perhaps as well known as the project itself. Rossi's drawings are in fact a particularly
interesting aspect of his repertoire. He refers to them as being "analogous" to the design process itself; although due to their very richness of evocation of everyday phenomena (dark de Chirico-like shadows being particularly evident), they point up the overwhelming sterility of the built projects themselves. One might suggest that it is indicative of a design methodology based within a Carthesian tradition, the process is separated from implementation; the purity of object as intellectual product is unrelated to its implementation within the real world. The imagery of the project as monument is perhaps also questionable particularly in terms of the non-city like suburban quality of the environment. It would seem that overall the building, through an intellectual complexity, exhibits a physical simplicity, which ultimately belies the complexity of its usage, and embodies a monumentality that denies the historical and mythical image of housing as "background" as opposed to "foreground."

In contrast to this intellectual, rational purity that Rossi seeks, Ricardo Bofill seems to have set his rational tendencies on a much broader foundation, as is evident in his early mass housing commissions in southern Spain. In contrast to Rossi, Bofill seems to revel in the populist-possibilities of the situation and if the buildings do, through a neo-Gaudian expression, exhibit a somewhat
over exuberant articulation, nevertheless their pattern and thingness seem to form a cohesion that is at rest within itself and suggests a meaningful living situation;\textsuperscript{39} one that is contextual in its derivation. In recent years, however, Bofill has exhibited an increased interest in a monumental classicism and in so doing has approached a questionable polemic-stance, opposite to Rossi's, but with the same inherent anomalies. Bofill does seem interested just as Rossi in the creation of place, however, as Rossi also, the outward articulation belies the complexity of the situation and in fact lacks even the heroic optimism of Rossi's projects. The notion of "palace" it would seem is one of Bofill's more ironic statements. However, one cannot help but feel that through the creation of such a thing, such a pattern, that Bofill alludes to phenomena upon which he cannot deliver and in so doing the projects themselves show up the poverty of their metaphorical and thing-like quality.

The actual physical size of both Rossi's and Bofill's projects raise in fact another interesting, if not philosophically difficult, question. It is one which concerns the morality of creating such large physical manifestations which lack special social, cultural and most importantly, historical depth. Heretofore this thesis has revolved around an understanding of the notion of place as
that created at different environmental levels through the presentation of things, spacial or physical, allied to meaningful patterns and articulation. It is through the constant layering of such things, such patterns and such articulation that complex environments and meaningful unique places come forward and reveal themselves, creating in such a way the complex phenomena which constitute a "city." It might be suggested here that in order for projects like Rossi's or Bofill's to be successful they must adapt one of two possible strategies; they may either be projected and layered into areas of already existing complex historical, social, cultural, or mythological associations or, alternatively, they must be helped to create their own through the provision of meaningful things, patterns and articulation. It would seem that if "city design" exists as a design process then this is its ultimate goal.

Rossi in fact in "The Architecture of the City," gives recognition to the difficulty of city/urban design per se:

The assumption that urban artifacts are the founding principle of the constitution of the city denies and refutes the notion of urban design. This latter notion is commonly understood with respect to context, it has to do with configurating and constructing a homogeneous, coordinated, continuous environment that presents itself with the coherence of a landscape. It seeks laws, reasons and orders which arise not from a city's actual historical conditions, but from a plan, a general projection of how things should be. Such projections are acceptable and realistic only when they address one "piece of city" or when they refer to the totality of buildings; but they have nothing useful to contribute relative to the formation of the city.
It would seem then, that the major task of city design must be one of careful intervention, one which respects the most deeply ingrained truths and phenomena of the milieu, upon which it is superimposed.

In direct contrast to such complex problems lies the work of the Mexican architect Luis Barragan, whose life's work has contained a consistent domestic scale and has evolved the various poetic dimensions of the institute of home:

My home is my refuge, an emotional piece of architecture not a cold piece of convenience. I believe in an emotional architecture it is very important for human kind that architecture should move by its beauty; if there are many equally valid technical solutions to a problem one which offers the user a message of beauty and emotion that one is architecture.42

It is worth noting that Barragan is in fact an engineer by training and one may therefore surmise that he does not bring to his work any predominant architectural bias. He suggests that in regard to architects, their education can often estrangle them from their own emotional and intuitive capacities. Barragan's oeuvre has consistently shown an interest in the ability of such emotional, and intuitive directives, to produce an architecture of place, rendered through notions of almost mythical rituals and surreal imagery. Such rituals are at one with the traditions of Mexico where, "the past is always present and its architecture is charged with ancestral presences."43 To a
large extent Barragan has been in the happy position of not having to invent his myths, as he has worked in a country and society which, possibly due to its deep religious nature, has cultivated and maintained its own.

Barragan's projects have generally belonged to two main areas, small residences and large subdivision landscaping projects. In both facets of his work Barragan displays a sensitive relationship to his life-world and an intuitive understanding of the Heideggerian fourfold, earth and sky, mortals and gods. His subdivision project at El Pedregal, which is overtly ecological in nature, has been described thus:

> It was as if nature and man's creations joined in an atavistic chant, monodic on first hearing but which slowly began to reveal its richly intricate chromatic structure and subordinated differences of tone.\(^{44}\)

The nature of such subdivision projects usually involved the creation of places in the form of gateways and paths, forming a comprehensible pattern throughout the schemes. Barragan's interest in place is not unrelated to his interest in surrealist painting and the strong nature of "presence" which is characteristic of the paintings of a prime exponent of this genre - de Chirico. Alan Bownes points out that surrealism is a creative tradition which seeks:

> Not an artistic style nor an aesthetic doctrine; it is
best understood as an attitude to life, a sort of
religion that if accepted would bring about it was
believed the economic and spiritual liberation of man
... surrealism is based on the belief in the superior
"reality" of certain forms of association hitherto
neglected, in the omnipotence of the dream in the
disinterested play of thought.45

In many respects then surrealism seeks to understand the
phenomena of the life-world in terms of its temporal
aspects; in terms of the expectation, dread and anxiety that
we experience for the future and the memory and nostalgia
engendered by the past. As Heidegger would suggest it is
only through an acknowledgement of the future and the past
that the present is delivered up to us in its most real
sense. In this respect the notion of theatre is
particularly interesting, as it is an image which abstracts
temporality, and has influenced the work of a number of
architects from Palladio to Rossi to Barragan himself.
Through the experience of theatre we can become transported
from our everyday inauthentic "being" to another condensed
form of "being," full of real life phenomena. Much of
Barragan's work resounds with a theatrical sense; strong
planar elements create well defined fore-ground, middle
ground and back ground, rendering places emphasised through
the potential of their temporality. We await the actors to
take their place, realising on reflection perhaps, that we
ourselves are playing the roles.
In conclusion Barragan ultimately presents us with an image which through a taut simplicity of planar elements renders a phenomenological place. If the notion of place is essential to man's well being and, if it is through place that man reaffirms his position within the world and the reality of his life milieu, then alone upon the roof terrace of Barragan's own home one is confronted with oneself in reality. There are no visual props or gimmicks, rather man is here presented as a singular being existing within the fourfold, upon the earth, beneath the blueness of the sky and midst mortals and gods. It is as suggested within one of Barragan's favorite books, "The Unquiet Grave," by Cyril Connolly:

Art is made by the alone, for the alone.46
NOTES

1 Things render meaning to places, articulation provides the physical setting and pattern determines the activities.

2. It is suggested that the interpretative schema might not just help in the understanding of architecture, but also in the understanding of the "questions" which architects set themselves. "The correct question is always more useful than the wrong answer." Norberg-Schulz, "Intentions in Architecture," p. 127.


4 Ibid., p. 23.

5 It might be suggested that German romantic thought was in some respects a reaction to the principles of the French Enlightenment.

6 In this sense order does not necessarily mean beauty, since in nature order produced both beauty, and ugliness.

7 Form becomes the "what," design is the "how." Tyng, op. cit., p. 68.

8 Form alludes to notions of typology as indeed does the notion of "thing." Form however does not have shape or dimension; it simply has a kind of existence will. Ibid., p. 68.


10 Heidegger suggests that the "constant" of a thing lies in its form, (morphe); Krell, "Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings," p. 156.


12 "The quiet ruin reveals again the spirit out of which it once stood as a proud structure . . . now it is free of its bonds," Tyng, op. cit., p. 166.
13 Ibid., p. 107.
14 Ibid., p. 114.
16 (Architecture's) greatness lies not in it being somehow aesthetically pleasing but rather in their creative assertion of the absolute impossibility, in the fact that each of their forms opens the eternal gap. Perhaps in this one single instance it is truly permissible to separate habitable structure from structure which is symbolic . . . . Schwarz, "The Church Incarnate," p. 84.
19 The greatest danger of such populism is of course that through a loss of critical prejudgment, it might eventually undermine society's capacity to achieve any kind of built culture at all, other than the one of the "lowest common denominator."
20 One might suggest such notions represent ideology at its purest form. Frampton, "Modern Architecture and the Critical Present." p. 37.
24 Ibid., p. 65.
26 This is not to suggest that such aberations are necessarily bad; as Gadamer points out prejudices are inevitable; they are the basis for our openness to the world and through such openness we test and modify our views. Berstein, "Beyond Objectivism and Relativism," p. 126.
27 "The time has surely came to recognise that any argument, if pursued to its logical termination can only be self-destructive," Rowe, "Collage City," p 47.

28 Grabow, op. cit., p. 51.

29 Alexander, op. cit., p. 154.

30 It might be suggested that Rossi and Venturi are representation of the two primary forces in modern architectural theory today. Rossi seeks a formalism which is evasive and based on subjective criteria. Venturi is drawn by objectivist criteria in establishing a realism which with its populist tendencies can err toward "kitsch." (Kitsch is a derivation of the German "verkitschen," "to fake," things become "in order to" as opposed to, "for sake of"), Frampton, "Modern Architecture and the Critical Present," p. 14.

31 The soul of a city resides in its history, once this soul is given form it becomes the sign of a place. Rossi, "The Architecture of the City," p. 7.

32 For a good discussion of Rossi, and the rationalists in general refer to Jencks, "Late Modern Architecture," pp. 130-64.

33 Rossi, op. cit., p. 6.

34 Ibid., pp. 45-46.


36 "Typology" emphasizes technique, it describes the "what" and "how" but not the "why." Hannah Arendt's suggests that the most tyrannical government of all is not so much a human one, but one of attitude, one of technique. Rowe, "Collage City," p. 145.

37 They are analogous in that they create an analogical architecture, one which "synthesises the built forms of a collective memory," Rossi, op. cit., p. 67.

38 This is also an idea alluded to by Freud who suggests that spacial complexity can never "physically" match the layered, mental image which it is capable of evoking. Freud, "Civilization and its discontents," p. 17.

39 One which allows an understanding of the context of one's being. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 126.
As Husserl would suggest "The world reveals itself as that which is perceived and that part which is contextually supplied by memory, from whence it spreads out into the indeterminate and unknown." Husserl, "The Idea of Phenomenology," p. 13.

Rossi, op. cit., p. 116.


Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid., p. 8.

Bownes, "Modern European Art," p. 149.

Connolly, "The Unquiet Grave," p. 42.
Ultimately we all yearn for place, be it the real and mythical creations of our history, the reminiscences of our childhood, or the presentiments of our dreams. The "city" has always held an archetypal position within such thoughts, it is the human thing par excellence and the impressive embodiment of man's cultural, social and artistic intentions.

To be born in a famous town, Euripides suggests, is the first requisite of happiness, and indeed while such an expression would seem somewhat quaint to us today, its notion throughout history would seem to have had some authenticity. Towns have certainly been more durable than countries, and while national empires come and go cities always provide to their citizens an identity of real and comprehensible dimensions. Such an identity or sense of place has always been expressed through the works of artists influenced by such milieus, we think of Pater's Venice, Durrell's Alexandria, Hugo's Paris, Dostoevsky's St. Petersburg and Joyce's Dublin. Through the eyes and works of such artists we gain access to the complexity and layered simplicity, the temporal and atemporal qualities which constitute the reality of a city.
Things are only seen profoundly when seen in contrast; through the phenomena of the city and its life-world we reaffirm the singularity of our own existence, through the existence of others; we invigorate our own personal memory through the partaking in a communal celebration of history, and finally we occupy in a more real way the places around us, by relating to the spaces of our life world, as constituted by the collective city.

In many respects then the city is a concrete manifestation of a Heideggerian mode of thought. Through it we reveal the reality of our own situation; we recognise this reality as a sojourn with others; and finally through the creation of such a centre of human activity we guard nature and make more real the world around us. Urban living then is almost a philosophical attitude to life, one reflective of an urbane sensibility that, in a world of an ever-proliferation of suburban living, we seem to have lost. It is sobering to reflect that within the United States, a country young enough to have taken the notion of suburban living so much to heart, the late Lyndon B. Johnson was to write, "In the next forty years, we must rebuild the entire urban United States." Suburban living is also reflective of a certain philosophical attitude; it is one where the subject is given preference over the object and the individual over the collective. The true expression then of such a
collectivity, the things of the city, are forgotten and the individual is denied a specific discourse with them; thus a meaningful dimension of his life is ignored. The paths to and from his home become mere conduits for travel. The things of one's life become embodied through the office buildings and shopping malls, single-use objects, in single-use landscapes, evoking single-use rituals and memories. 4

In contrast, cities can offer opportunities for complex reflections of life though the collective artifacts of the city, the things of its deepest existence; through which we gain access to the past and future and realise the temporality of our present situation. Such things activate images within ourselves that reverberate those echos through the past. Through their "thinging" they create our history, they gather about them patterns and articulation that reflect upon a city's growth, development and change; in such a way they provide a sacred dimension, a sense of place within the profaneness and homogeneity of our life-world.

The true dimensions of all great and memorable cities, then, lies in their thingness or placeness, their genius loci, their complex layering of places as created by things, and as reflected in their gathering and construction over time. As each intervention is in turn placed within the
city, it recognises the reality of its situation and the authenticity of its life world. Is it any wonder then that many of the truly great cities, Rome, Venice, Paris, London, exist because their very foundation and raison d'etre is inextricably bound up in notions of settlement and place creation, fundamental requirements for man.

It is through the things of a city then, their pattern and articulation that we gain access to the real phenomena of its genius loci, in all its temporal aspects. Dublin City and its genius loci may be viewed in such a way.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the sixteenth of June, 1904, Leopold Bloom walked from his house in Eccles Street, around the corner to Dorset Street to purchase kidneys for his breakfast. In so doing he set in motion his fictional odyssey which forms the heart of James Joyce's "Ulysses." Through Bloom we experience the city in a unique temporal and phenomenological sense - not just mere description - but a common unheroic, singular and isolated man set within a collective milieu, he expresses the particular, but represents in word and action the universality of modern man's urban experience. Ulysses is an urban book; Dublin "the woman-city with her shirts lifted" is presented as a character within the book, it displays itself, as the book, to be a complex layered phenomena, culturally, socially,
historically, and architecturally; because, Dublin is an old city.

The recorded history of Dublin dates as far back as the second century, A.D. when Ptolemy of Alexandria made note of it as being a maritime city. This it would seem was its prime raison d'être, a sea port through which the produce of Ireland was gathered and disseminated across the sea to England, Scotland, Wales and beyond to Europe. The site is a natural one, the river Liffey meanders through, on its way to the Irish Sea. (Figure 3.) Bounded on both sides by noticeably higher ground it gathers to its banks a site with a strong sense of place; on the southern side in particular, the ground rises to form the Dublin mountains and creates an enclosure that is still perceivable today from the city's centre.

It was not until around the sixth century that a permanent and expanding community developed, with the appearance of Scandinavian seafolk. The Gaelic name "Dubh-Linn" meaning the "Black Pool" dates from this time. By the end of the twelfth century the city had largely come under the influence of Anglo-Normans who built defensive walls and established a castle, thus physically creating parameters for the city's growth, over the next four centuries. The
two cathedrals of the city date from this time, Christ Church, 1190, and St. Patricks, 1275, (both however were substantially renovated during the nineteenth century). Dublin, then and now, has always been a city under refuge; historically an English stronghold within an Irish milieu; today a source of employment and money within an economically poor land. Thus it has always been a point of attraction, a nucleus from which the rest of the island gained its measure and worth.

While the physical representation of the Anglo-Norman centre is still visible in the historical pattern of the city, Dublin today is largely a product of the legacy of things provided during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when Dublin flourished under British rule. (Figure 4.) It is however within the subtle interaction of these two periods of development, medieval and Georgian, that the genius loci of Dublin lies. In many respects it has been a beneficial union, the earlier city represents images of a dense matrix of things; urban life was manifested in the gathering of church and state and personified through the defensive battlements and gates. The oldest parts of Dublin still retain these qualities. The classical city of the Georgian era represents, in contrast, another notion as to what constitutes an urban way of life. Emphasis is placed on pattern and the creation of
paths though comprehensible articulation, the Georgian facade is the epitome of such an attitude. The combination of two such urban strategies provides a city with a variety of city form and a constant reiteration of its periods of development. (Figure 5.)

If such an environmental context forms the background to the Dublin experience then its primary manifestation is its human scale for the medieval and Georgian city are both products of craft-dominated societies; and Dublin above all is a human gregarious "town," which has never really grown to obtain the outward sophistication of a city. The buildings stand solemnly:

Fronts mounting above empty pavements . . . have a kind of dignity in their utilitarianism. They seem to say fashion has not made us, nor ever do its caprices pass our sand-cleaned doorsteps.9

Dublin lacks the grand gesture, a Rue de Rivoli or a Regent Street, rather the city, wrapped historically in a cocoon of poverty, has always witnessed a degree of change that has ensured the presence of a constant hybrid of historical developments. The artifacts thus produced are endowed with emotional and economical importance, they are modest, to the point, and lack the stylistic exuberance of their counterparts on the continent. The numerous churches, whose sacred spires seem to rise war-like in defiance of the profane horizon, testify to the commitment of a people,
ill-equipped to afford them. The churches stand "cheek by jowl" unto the streets, there is no intermediate "ritual space of initiation," rather the church is a fact of life, to be used, and abused, as one might use the local shop or pub. James Joyce has amusingly suggested that a good puzzle might be "crossing Dublin without passing a pub;" an equally good puzzle would be crossing the city without passing a church. It is between the pub and church the collective symbols of the profane and sacred that the Dubliner creates and synthesises his world. Nowhere is the juxtaposition between profane and sacred more obvious than along the quays, which date from the end of the seventeenth century. Here modest narrow fronted dwellings set off an articulation of immense unity. Churches stand and dignify the scene and give scale to one's progression along the river; a river which flows due east to Dublin Bay rendering in an absolute way the four points of the compass and giving orientation, at all times, to the citizens of the city. (Figure 6.)

The view of medieval Dublin from the quays is a particular embodiment of the aura of the city. The river and sky set and frame the view, and are responded to by the strength of the quay facades, and the upward movement of the medieval church spires. The medieval portion of the city forms in fact a geometric center to Dublin; the center of an oval
as carved out by two peripheral canals, the Royal and the Grand. (Figure 3.) The canals create an important physical boundary to central Dublin. A boundary of recognition which helps initiate a ritual of movement in and out of the city's "hearth." While the city then is not monumental in scale, or size, it does have a presence of great strength. The soft maritime climate grants a stillness to the atmosphere, the city is contained by the natural appropriateness of the site, and most importantly of all, the soft low sun casts shadows of 'de Chirico' like significance and four story buildings take on the size of major edifices.

The balance of sacred versus profane which constitutes a primary characteristic of Dublin is reflected strongly in the things of the city, their pattern and articulation. The collective institutions, as things, embody the sacred dimensions while the consistent articulation and patterning of the profane world lies personified most effectively in the Georgian period of the city; and the legacy of building which it inspired throughout the Victorian period. The Georgian facade is a true manifestation of a modular building system, carefully organised to give an economical and visually cohesive assemblage of varied facades. At its place of interaction with the collective artifact, the public domain of the street, it provides a hierarchy of human scale objects. A plethora of things that provide a
sensuality that is other than sight alone; it is in particular tactile and acoustic, the feel and sound of granite steps and an abundance of cast iron decoration, railings, light holders, foot scrapers, manhole covers and door knockers.

The development of Georgian Dublin began first of all north of the Liffey and indeed it is the north quays which contain the two most important architectural monuments of central Dublin, the Four Courts of 1786 and the Custom House of 1781. The first major Georgian speculation to occur in northern Dublin dates from 1730 when Henrietta Street was laid out by the Gardiner family. Nearby Parnell Square was developed by the same family in 1760, making it the second oldest square in Dublin next to (St.) Stephen's Green, which was laid out in 1663, (but not completed totally until the end of the eighteenth century); its original aim being to function as a "green belt," "wholie kept for the use of the cittizens and others, to walk and take the open aire, by reason this cittie is at present groweing very populous."12

St. Stephens Green is one of three major landmarks south of the quays forming with College Green and Merrion Square, two major thoroughfares of the city, Grafton Street and Nasseau Street. The latter of these is particularly interesting, as one complete edge of it faces onto Trinity College, a place
within a place, forming a boundary of strong robust granite topped by cast iron railings; they speak volumes for the urbane sensibilities of the generation that created them. College Green dates from approximately the middle of the eighteenth century when the west front of Trinity College was completed (1752), to compliment the Parliament House of Lovett Pearse which had been finished some twenty years previously. Major speculation at Merrion Square (1762), and St. Stephens Green (1764), are contemporaneous with these developments reflecting the general movement at the time, from the northern part of the city to areas south of the Liffey, around the "country residence" of Lord Kildare (1744); who had rather prophetically suggested that, regardless of the then remoteness of the site, "They will follow me wherever I go!"13

An important development in the layout of the city during this time occurred in 1757 when the "Commissioners for Making Wide and Convenient Streets" was established, and it is to this body that many of the wide "city-like" streets owe their creation. One particularly strong example of this strategy being Dame Street which owes the larger part of its development to Victorian business ventures, but which also is important for the physical, spatial link it creates between the analogous "Dublins" of the medieval period, and the Georgian and Victorian period.
If the monuments can be seen to form the true collective artifacts of the city, and if such artifacts transcend into true things when they grant meaningful spaces for the "human condition," then Dublin is truly a city of such things; things which stand forth to create and synthesize the pattern and articulation around them:

These are of stone, framed by the reticent brick terraces which are plain to the point of monotony and provide as it were a brick continuo for these great stone fanfares. It is the uniformity of streets and square in Dublin that gives the city its character. The unending succession of cliff-like terraces gain their effect from this plainness.

Like its monuments in fact, the profane architecture of Dublin is of a suitably sober nature, reflecting always the social and cultural milieu into which it has been cast. The Irish Georgian facade is always austere and never given over to excess decoration or the formation of formal pilastered squares as is found in London. Just as the stone of the monuments bears witness to the earth from which they rise, so also does the brick of such facades bear testimony to their locality and the importance of Dublin as a sea port, with brick being a common ballast on merchant ships. Beneath the Dublin sky the colours of such brick take on a special quality; its soft red, brown, pink and flesh colours seem to add warmth to the rays of a sun, whose efforts on the western coast of northern Europe do, at times, seem to be in vain.
Ultimately Dublin is a town before being a city just as the Irish have been described as "being a race before being a nation." At present the city is endeavoring to represent the hopes and aspirations of this nation; it is difficult, as the Irish, robbed of the initiative of their own destiny for almost eight hundred years, now must create one. The population of Dublin, increasingly consisting of country dwellers arriving to seek jobs and careers, exhibits in many respects a country town attitude; for such people the city contains a particularly confusing spectra of good and bad, a collective world of individual isolation. It will take a number of years before such a generation has the confidence to continue the building tradition of their urbane forefathers. What such people do bring with them however, is the awareness for a need of a public "place of appearance" for man, a space of communal interaction.

It is such places and such spaces that create the things which form the most characteristic feature of Dublin's genius loci. Such things exist at all environmental levels and together with pattern and articulation they create the sense of place that is Dublin; a description of the early eighteenth century remarks:

A Groupppe of buildings in a cloud of smoak,  
Where various domes for various uses made  
Religion, revels, luxury and trade  
All undistinguish'd in one mass appear.  
And widely diff'reing are united here.15
It is a description not dissimilar to one by James Joyce, almost two hundred years later:

Dublin wakes slowly and mistily; the spires step forward from the mountains, from the square splay of O'Connell Bridge wide streets feel their way southward into an easier and richer city. The generous horizons forsake the common brick; elegant buildings enoble Dublin with their cut stone.16 (Figure 7.)
AERIAL VIEW OF DUBLIN LOOKING WEST

Figure 7
NOTES

1 Urban dwelling consists in the assuring experience of being simultaneously located and open in the world, that is, located in the natural genius loci and open to the world through the gathering of the man made genius loci. Heidegger, "Die Kunst und der Raum," pp. 9 ff.

2 For an insightful discussion of "American Suburbia" refer to Slater, "The Pursuit of Lonliness."

3 Slater, op. cit., p. 82.

4 The works of architecture are communal forms and the individual cannot understand them as long as he is alone. Scharz, "The Church Incarnate," p. 53.

5 Described by Yeats as "an entirely new thing, neither what the eye sees nor the ear hears but what the rambling mind thinks and imagines from moment to moment," Ellman, "James Joyce," p. 531.

6 In this way Joyce is representative of attitudes which were prevalent in literature during the early part of the twentieth century, where the city and its elements were portrayed less and less as elements perceptually fixed in relation to each other and more and more as a succession of fluid and unpredictable juxtapositions. Another shift was from the urban community as a pattern of the whole to the isolation of the individual within it. Pike, "The Image of the City in Modern Literature," Ch. 2.


8 Kenny "Literary Dublin," p. 4.

9 A description by Yeats of Sligo town which seems also appropriate to Dublin. Trevor, "A Writer's Ireland," p. 112.

13 Ibid., p. 133.
15 Craig, op. cit., p. 17.
16 Delaney, "op. cit., p. 79.
POSTSCRIPT

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The notion of a thesis might be defined as a proposition, or a laying out of an argument. The discussion presented here would seem to constitute such a thesis; it suggests that the notion of "place" is a necessity for the creation of meaningful space in cities, and in particular modern cities. It further suggests that one useful way of understanding the notion of place is through an interpretative schema of "thing," "pattern," and "articulation." Similar notions have been seen to have been reflected in philosophy, mythology and various forms of artistic expression most notably in literature. We have seen through all these perspectives a constant need on man's behalf to create a meaningful framework for his life-world, be it either in spatial or temporal terms. It has been further suggested that the modern city would seem to tend, in recent years, to a manifestation that can primarily be interpreted only in temporal terms; there results a spatial ambiguity that needs to be clarified and understood. It is this enlarged understanding that this thesis is calling for; it seeks to understand the city in spatial terms, in terms of the places that it contains and the things, articulation and patterning that determine such places and their inherent genius loci. It is these places
that, one might argue, best embody the real temporal dimensions of a city.

In many respects however this attempt to understand the notion of place has been a diversion, since the primary source of inspiration for this thesis had been an interest of a rather different "hue." It had been one of a wish to understand the nature of "regionalism" in city-design. The justification of this thesis, (if one is indeed required), is due to the fact that the notion of place creation and in particular the notion of "genius loci" inherently presupposes a sense of regionalism. Kenneth Frampton, a strong advocate for regional identity over the last few years, has commented upon the fundamental interaction of place and region:

If any central principle of critical regionalism can be isolated then it is surely a commitment to "place" rather than space . . . its salient cultural precept is place creation; the general model to be employed in all future development is the enclave - that is to say the bounded fragment, against which the ceaseless inundation of a place-less, alienating consumerism will find itself momentarily checked.¹

While Frampton is to be credited with bringing such notions again to the fore in architectural thought, they are not, in essence, particularly new. Vitruvius, for example, in regard to the design of private houses, was to write:

We must . . . take note of the countries and climates in which they are built. One style of house seems appropriate to build in Egypt, another in Spain, a
different kind in Pontus, one still different in Rome, and so on with lands and countries of other characteristics.\textsuperscript{2}

More recently Louis Mumford has expressed similar sentiments:

There are two elements in every architecture, indeed in every aesthetic or cultural expression. One of them is the local, the time bound, that which adapts itself to special human capacities and circumstances, that belongs to a particular people and a particular soil and a particular set of economic and political institutions. Let us call this the regional element, though one must of course include this term for more than purely geographical characteristics. The other is the universal: this element passes over boundaries and frontiers, it unites in a common bond people of the most diverse races and temperaments, it transcends the local, the limited, the partial.\textsuperscript{3}

Sigfried Giedion for many years the standard bearer of the modern movement also wrote as far back as 1954:

International architecture is something that hovers in mid-air with no roots anywhere . . . experience is showly showing us that the rationalistic and exclusively materialist attitude upon which the latest phase of western civilization has been grounded is insufficient . . . now that we are separated by several decades from the birth period of the early 20's we are able to discern that certain regional habits and regional traditions lay concealed within the germinal nuclei of the various contemporary movements.\textsuperscript{4}

It is notions such as these that the critic Kenneth Frampton has built upon. He writes with regard to a "critical" regionalism, one which mediates the impact of universal civilization with elements derived indirectly from the
peculiarities of a particular place. In his article, "Toward a Critical Regionalism," he makes the point that today "modern building is now so universally conditioned by optimized technology that the possibility of creating significant urban form has become extremely limited." "Significant" for him he seems to suggest involves a dialectical interplay between civilization and culture, that is to say, that urban design becomes significant when rooted in the particularized interactions of civilization and culture.

The antithesis of this he suggests are the two symbiotic instruments of megalopolitan development, the freestanding high rise and the serpentine freeway. These are symbols of the victory of universal civilization over locally infected culture. What this produces is an urban landscape of uniformity, one which was described by Aldo Van Eyck nearly twenty-five years ago "as mile upon mile of organised nowhere." Van Eyck suggested then a need to get closer to the shifting centre of human reality, and build its "counter-form." It is this final image which suggested the underlying theme of this thesis, that is, that what lies as a basis for critical regionalism is a yearning for the creation of place; that is to concretize this shifting centre of human reality. The notions of "thing," "articulation" and "pattern" would seem to be instructive in achieving this aim.
The strength and weakness of such a schema would seem to lie largely in its generality. Through such a generality however it overtly recognises that the creation of architecture, and cities, is as much a single all embracing idea as it is a reconciliation of many varied and often conflicting intentions or ideals. What the proposed interpretative schema provides us with is, at the very least, in Rossi's words, a "tendency;" one that suggests a return to the relevance of notions expressed in philosophy, myth and artistic expression; to rediscover again our need for the things of our everyday world. These things, in Heideggerian terms, have a life and quality of their own, a quality to which we need to be more open. Levi-Struss, commenting with regard to the idea of quality in relation to space, suggests that it is in fact, possibly, independant of us:

Space has values peculiar to itself, just as sounds and scents have their colours and feelings, their weight. The search for correspondences of this sort is not a poet's game or an act of mystification . . . these correspondences offer the scholar an entirely new terrain, and one which still may have rich yields. 

It is due to a lack of interest in the quality of space and its physical embodiment in place that the dilemma of the modern city has arisen; influenced greatly by its architectural god-fathers, the city became no more than a grotesque magnified version of the typical "free plans"
promoted by the early masters of the modern movement. While this may be a slight over-simplification of the situation it is worth noting, in regard to the proposed interpretative schema, that for modern architecture it was the notion of articulation which was primary; it provided the "planar element" which was central to the new spatial experience which the modern movement wished to evoke. Notions of pattern and in particular things were secondary. In fact, the concept of type, which embodies a notion of thingness was an anemia to the modern movement; the basis of which might be described as being of a "biotechnical deterministic" nature; Alan Colquhoun has written:

The modern movement in architecture was an attempt to modify the representational systems which had been inherited from the preindustrial past and which no longer seemed meaningful within the context of a rapidly changing technology . . . the essence of the functional doctrine of the modern movement was not that beauty or order or meaning were unnecessary, but that it could no longer be found in the deliberate search for final forms.9

In lieu then of things, which create the collective artifacts of the city historically; the modern city has been unable to embody a meaningful hierarchy within its milieu. For many, the city which was, at one time, "the space of man's public appearance" has become instead, "a paved solitude."

The theme of the thesis has been one of an enlarged
reasoning; through the interpretative schema we need to approach a greater and more fundamental understanding of the things of our cities, the "things," "pattern" and "articulation" which help constitute their genius loci. It is through such an understanding that we might attain a philosophical, mythical and poetic depth of insight into our own being and, in so doing, begin to dwell poetically. In order to do so we must again begin to view, in a fundamental sense, the things of our everyday world. Ernst Cassirer has commented upon such a principle:

It is the necessary destiny of culture that everything which it creates in its constituent process removes us more and more from the originality of life. The more richly and energetically the human spirit engages its formative activity the further this very activity seems to remove it from the primal source of its own being. More and more, it appears to be imprisoned in its own creations, which cover it like a delicate and transparent but unbreakable veil . . . if all culture is manifested in the creation of a specific image-world of specific symbolic form, the aim of understanding is not to go beyond all these creations but rather to understand and elucidate their basic formative principle. It is solely through the awareness of this principle that the content of life acquires its true form . . . .

One might add that in this way also, dwelling takes place.
NOTES

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