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OF THE
VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE

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PREFACE

Through a second-hand book catalogue, the Rice Library was able to secure, in the spring of 1932, a small, but unique collection of documents. These were the volumes actually used by Sir Richard Webster (afterwards Lord Alverstone) when he was Attorney-General, in preparing his case for presentation to the Arbitral Tribunal which determined the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana. Each book of this collection contains the autograph of Sir Richard and two of them have marginal notes in his handwriting. The Synopsis is particularly well marked with "cites" and "mentions" which show the materials which appeared to Sir Richard to be particularly significant. He has also marked errors and given the references which verify the corrections.

In addition, the Rice Library has a full set of the London Times Weekly for the years when the dispute was in its most critical stages. The Times is an exceedingly valuable, indeed an essential, source for any study of the Venezuelan controversy. Besides its obvious value as a source of public opinion, and for its prints of the important documents, its editor, Mr. Buckner, and its New York correspondent, Mr. Smalley, played no little part in the settlement of the dispute.

With these materials as a starting point and chief source, it has been the purpose of this paper to interpret the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute in certain phases which have, so far, been neglected by historians.

In this thesis, the early history of the contested area
has been depicted because of its value in determining the right of the case. The Anglo-Venezuelan correspondence, as well as the Anglo-American and American-Venezuelan, has been used. For the period of the Anglo-American crisis, instead of discussing the documents alone, an attempt has been made to interpret public opinion, both English and American, and its bearing on the controversy.

The standard treatments usually become exceedingly sketchy after January of 1896. This paper attempts to remedy this fault somewhat, by continuing the discussion, in fuller detail, through the final award of 1899.
PART I
BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION OF THE NORTH COAST
OF SOUTH AMERICA

Vast expanses of mud, serried by the tide, and littered with huge unrooted trees, against a background of green forests and cloud covered sky—that is the first glimpse of the north coast of South America between the Essequibo and Orinoco Rivers. Upon closer inspection, one finds that great rivers, fed by myriad creeks, struggle with the tide for supremacy in the estuaries. In the coastal delta section, abundant rainfall, and tropical heat contrive a natural hot house in which vegetation is abundant and mammoth. Even the beetles are as large as clay pigeons. The land is swampy and the forest of giant trees almost impenetrable—except by way of the rivers and creeks.

The coastal rivers are curiously joined by natural canals, to form at high tide an almost complete inland water way from the Orinoco to the Essequibo—via the Barima, the Itabo Moreba, the Baramani, the Itabo, and the Moruka and Pomeroon.

Twenty-five miles from its mouth, the Essequibo is joined by a great tributary, the Mazuruni, and a few miles farther

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2. National Geographic Magazine, Nov. 1932, "A New World to Explore".
south-west the Mazuruni is joined by the Cuyuni, itself a mighty river. Separating this river system from that of the delta area are the Imataka Mountains, which range from 300 to 900 feet in height. The tributaries of the Cuyuni have their sources in these mountains. The Mazuruni rises in the Merume mountains which range from 2000 to 3000 feet. The Essequibo rises much farther to the south.

Since the boundary dispute, with which this paper deals, never included territory beyond the Essequibo, on the one side as an eastern limit of the Spanish claim, and the Orinoco on the other as the western limit of the Dutch claim, the area just described is the only region that need be discussed. The sum total of the disputed region lay between the Orinoco, the Caroni, (its major tributary) the Merume Mountains, the Essequibo and the Atlantic.

The aborigines in this section are of two chief tribes, the Arawaks, on the Essequibo and the Caribs of the coastal region near the Orinoco. The Arawaks were peaceful, faithful, and hardworking; while the Caribs were fierce, unfriendly, but with-all rather intelligent. These Indians could be civilized and taught to desire or use the products of the European culture. The forests were of valuable hardwood and produced annato dye and copaiba. This was enough to lure the Europeans to this fever-ridden and insect-infested area; to inspire them to build and to rebuild forts and missions; to encourage

them to endure loneliness and exile on the "wild coast" and finally to argue so determinedly about whose swamp it was that two great nations came close to war.
CHAPTER II
EARLY HISTORY OF SPANISH
AND DUTCH SETTLEMENTS

The early history of Guiana is a decidedly uncertain tale. However, there are a few points which the authorities agree. The Spanish first discovered the north coast of South America in 1501. Trading was carried on by England, France, Sweden, Holland and Spain, at various times in this section, labeled Guayana. Until the 1590's, there is no concrete evidence of any permanent settlement east of the Orinoco. Then in 1591, or 1595, the fortress of Santo Thome was established to better protect the other Spanish settlements in the Orinoco from raids by Dutch, English and French. Sir Walter Raleigh visited the Orinoco in 1595 and perhaps destroyed the town. Whether destroyed or not, it is fairly certain that in 1596 there was a Spanish settlement near the junction of the Caroni and the Orinoco rivers.

4. Raleigh tells of it in his "Discovery", Syn. p. 2, According to an anonymous paper believed to have been written by Usselinx, Guiana stretched from the Amazon to Trinidad. The Portuguese were 300 miles away in Brazil, the Spanish 200 miles distant from the recently discovered mine which he reported. Before this mine could be worked, the region would have to be fortified and settled, because the area was not accessible. Hence in 1604, Usselinx drew up a prospectus in which he maintained that the natives, not altogether uncivilized, were more friendly to the Dutch than to the Spanish; that the lands were fertile and the minerals abundant; that the Spanish were endeavoring to cut off Dutch trade, and that the heathen could be converted and trade increased.
The town of Santo Thomé was still small in 1611, and sometime before Raleigh's second visit to the Orinoco in 1618, it was moved down the river to a more easily defensible position. Again Raleigh left the place in ruins. It was rebuilt by the Spanish. But Santo Thomé's troubles were not yet over. The Dutch were now getting bolder and bolder. In 1629, and once more in 1637, this unhappy settlement was sacked and burned, this time by the Dutch. Certainly such a colony was not in a position to send out people to settle adjoining territory and no other Spanish post was established east of the Orinoco for over 150 years.

Meanwhile the Dutch had been busy. They came first as traders among traders, raiding and sacking wherever they could; then built for themselves a fortress and finally, more extensive and permanent settlements. As early as 1621, the first Dutch West India Company was chartered just as war, which had been going on intermittently for years, was renewed between Holland and Spain. The charter of this company called for trade rights anywhere in America.

Three years later, the first Dutch settlers arrived in America and chose for their fortress, the site of the old (alleged) Spanish fort at the junction of the three rivers.

3. English seem to have misquoted Charles Leigh (Blue Book, p. 4.) He speaks only of ships, not of settlements, U. S. Com., Vol. I, p. 56-68.
This was merely a permanent trading post and not a regular town. The Dutch found the trade unprofitable and very nearly abandoned the location, but they finally decided to keep the colony.

In 1637, De Escobar, a Spanaird, wanted to raid this post. But the Dutch were so firmly supported by the Indians (with whom they had intermarried), and aided by their gunboats, that the Spanish finally decided the case was hopeless.

The Treaty of Munster found the situation somewhat of a draw. The Dutch had one fort on the Essequibo and the Spanish had one on the east bank of the Orinoco. By this treaty, Spain and Holland agreed to respect each others' settlements on the 'wild coast', but the limits of those settlements were not defined. The question here was whether this treaty gave the Dutch the right to extend their settlements into areas claimed by Spain, but in the possession of Indians. Did this treaty allow for seizure of lands other than those held by the Portuguese? According to the early interpretation of these clauses, neither Spain nor Holland appeared to believe that

4. U. S. Com., Vol. I, p. 73, quotes extracts from Art. V and VI of Treaty of Munster. Spain and Holland mutually recognize possession by each other not only of "such lordships, cities, castles, fortresses, commerce, and counties in the East and West Indies, as also in Brazil and on the coasts of Asia, Africa, and America respectively, as the said Lords, the King and the states, respectively, holk and possess' , but also 'comprehending therein particularly the places and forts which the Portuguese have taken from the Lords, the States since the year 1641; as also the Forts and places which the said Lords, the States shall chance to acquire and possess after this, without infraction of the present treaty."
either might conquer territory claimed by other, but held by Indians.

As far as the limits held by either nation, in 1648, were concerned, the Orinoco was regarded not as the limit of Dutch settlement but as the closest Spanish settlement. The English Blue Book takes the attitude that the treaty of 1648 gave them (Dutch) liberty to make fresh acquisitions wherever the Spaniards were not already established. The old and exceedingly broad charter of the first West India Company included the right to trade anywhere in America. However, this charter expired in 1645. A new company was chartered in 1647 to trade "with the places of Essequibo and Pomeroon". This charter was effective with renewals until 1791, when the company was dissolved. There is in the documents of the period nothing about any settlement on the Orinoco, except a statement, of about 1700, which gave the general limits of the charter as from Florida to the Orinoco. There is no evidence to indicate that jurisdiction coincided with these limits.

The Dutch colonies flourished. In 1658, a Dutch colony had been established on the Pomeroon. This was in addition

to the settlements along the Essequibo. When two Jesuit missionaries came to explore Guiana in 1664, they found that Spain had abandoned the region.

Meanwhile the Dutch company granted to the Count of Hanau in 1669 "'a piece of land situated on the Wild Coast of America, between the river Oronoque and the river of the Amazons'. It added the condition, 'that such land should be 'at least six Dutch miles from other colonies there established or founded by the said charter ed West India Companies, or with its consent'". Instead of giving a claim to jurisdiction this grant really pointed out that while the Dutch had rights, they were certainly not exclusive rights, to the Guiana coast.

English invasions of the Koruka under Major John Scott in 1665, and 1666, interrupted briefly the activities of the Dutch, but through the loyalty of the Indians, the English were unable to secure supplies and were forced to withdraw. The Dutch resumed control and maintained their position till 1796. Meanwhile, the Spanish Queen, in a decree in 1671, advised the strengthening of fortifications on the Orinoco because of the nearness of the Dutch to that region. Although the English took this reference to mean settlement, it is probable that it referred merely to the Dutch custom of trading and fishing there. Early in 1648, a shelter was built on the Barima for the use of the Pomeroon postholder who occasionally visited that region.

During this same year the French raided Santo Thome and held it for a short while. The Caribs migrated quickly from the Orinoco to the Barima, the Waini, and the Amacura. By 1689, the French and their Carib friends had attacked the Dutch on the Pomeroon and laid waste to the whole settlement. That was the end, for many years, of the Pomeroon as a settled area, but it remained a part of the Essequibo colony, was guarded by a post, and was used as a source for dyewoods, timber and thatch.

There is some evidence that the Dutch traded in the Cuyuni savannah for horses for their sugar mills, along about 1693. This trade was carried on via the Orinoco and Aguirre. By 1701, however, this horse trade was not as brisk as it had been because the French and the Spanish were allied and that made the trip too hazardous for profit. A year later this trade was definitely forbidden by the Spanish. The Dutch post in this area was exceedingly short-lived and does not admit of definite location. The postholder appointed died and no other was chosen to take his place. After this fiasco of 1703, the Dutch plantations continued to extend up the Essequibo and the Mazuruni Rivers. Meanwhile the Wacupo and Pomeroon posts guarded the inland approaches to the Essequibo colony.

The treaty of Utrecht of 1714, confirmed the provisions of the treaty of Munster. At this time, Spain had no settlement or missions except on the right bank of the Orinoco. The trend, during the next 10 years, of the Dutch settlements was to move down the rivers towards the coast. The fertile lands near the junction were becoming exhausted and the sharp rise of the land up the rivers prevented a spread in that direction. The Spanish, in the meantime, were not idle. They established two missions in the Orinoco basin: one near Santo Thome, and the other near the mouth of the Caroni.

About this time, the Spanish were considering building a fort about 100 miles up the Orinoco to protect that region from Carib and Dutch attack. The Dutch West India Company closed the Cuyuni and Mazuruni rivers to trade except by their agents after 1730. During the next sixty years, a number of Capuchian Missions were established by the Spaniards between the Orinoco and the Yuruari. In 1732, the Dutch ordered the Caribs not to show the Swedes, who were attempting to build a fort on the Barima, a suitable place. Six years later, came the first hint that minerals existed in the Cuyuni, and the Dutch commandeur assured

1. The Blue Book maintains that Dutch held at this time the watersheds of the Essequibo, the Cuyuni, the Pomeroon and the Amacura. p. 9; but there is no definite citation and no other evidence to support such broad claims.
4. Blue Book , p. 9, 64.
5. Blue Book, p. 9; U. S. Com., Vol. IV, p. 11, shows others, some destroyed soon after foundation and others whose site is almost entirely conjectural east of the Yuruari.
the company that he would send Indians to investigate rumors for benefit of the Company.

When Storm Van Gravesande, the greatest of the governors of Dutch Guiana, arrived in the colony in 1742 he asked that a mining engineer be sent to explore for minerals. Just about that time, Thomas Hildebrant arrived in the colony. He found a copper mine a few miles from Kykoveral at the junction of the rivers. However, Hildebrant was too brutal and despite his labors, the mine did not pay. The road he had built through the forest from tide water to the mine was abandoned to the jungle. Meanwhile, the English had sacked Santo Thome again. (1740). It was rebuilt a year later. The Spanish continued their mission building program in the upper Cuyuni basin in the 1740's and 50's. These missions worried the Dutch government into seeking instructions concerning the boundaries of the colony. That there must have been considerable doubt in the minds of the Dutch, is evinced by fact that in 1747, the Company ordered that a map be made by a competent surveyor. This first map was lost and Storm Van Gravesande, while on a visit to Holland pointed out that unless the limits of the colony were known it would be impossible to halt the Spanish advance.

According to another report by Storm, five years later, the Spaniards were creeping in rather than invading, and they had the

Yuruarl Creek, a tributary of the Cuyuni. This region Storm regarded as indisputably Dutch. The Spanish would seem to agree with this version, because a Spanish official Don Alvarado, reported that in 1753, the Spanish could not penetrate beyond the banks of the Cuniri, Miamo and other tributaries of the Yuruari, and could not reach Cuyuni because of the presence of Dutch. In Oct. of 1753, secret instructions were sent to the Iturriga commission, (which had recently been appointed by the Spanish and Portuguese governments to look into their boundary question) that all territory between the Maranon and the Orinoco unquestionably belonged to Spain and Portugal and when the French and Dutch were driven out, it might again revert to its rightful owners.

Meanwhile, the Dutch had been warned of the approach of the Spanish-Portuguese Commission and with their Carib allies were planning resistance. They retired from the Orinoco and the Barima the better to defend the Essequibo, the Cuyuni, the Mazuruni, the Waini and the Moruka. Two years later, while the Dutch were establishing a post higher up the Cuyuni to prevent Spanish infiltration, Don Alvarado reported that: the missions were more in the hands of the Dutch than of the Spanish; and that the mission fathers were convinced of the existence of gold; and Dutch

2. Blue Book, p. 11.
had the Indians as their customers and allies, particularly along the Berims and the Amacura. Simultaneously, the Dutch West India Company notified the Dutch director-general that it was doubtful whether any real or definite limits could be set for the Essequibo colony.

The year 1756, marked the farthestest extension to the east of the Spanish settlements. After that, fear of the Spanish invasion dwindled rapidly away. The Dutch were left in undisputed possession of the Yuruari, a tributary of the Cuyuni. The Dutch post located in this area was not far at all from the Spanish, who, two years later were again threatening the Cuyuni post. The Dutch director-general protested, in the Remonstrance of 1759, that this region was not Spanish. D'Anville was cited as an authority to show this region as Dutch. However, D'Anville's map does not show this. When the States-General inquired as to the exact location of this post, it was reported to be about 15 hours higher up the Cuyuni, but even so, it would still be in Dutch territory which extended to the mouth of the Orinoco.

Trade was also carried on at the mouth of the Curumo, where the red slave trade flourished, much to the sorrow of the Spanish fathers, who cited, as a well known fact, that the Dutch

2. United States Com., Vol. IV, p. 11.
6. U. S. Com., Vol. IV, p. 40; See Map I.
claim from the Aguirre, due south by the Tucupo and Curumo to the Aripamuri. Spanish attempts to halt Dutch advances had failed for the time, and the Spanish never deigned to reply to the Remonstrance. In 1765 another Dutch fort was erected to replace the one destroyed by Spain in 1758. This one was about 100 miles up the Cuyuni river and marks the fartherest limits of the Dutch advance. However, this post was abandoned after three years and the Dutch retired to Toenamoete Creek where they maintained a post till 1772. Meanwhile the Spaniards had been, with more success, asserting their claims near the Orinoco, and the Barima.

In the confidential report of the boundary commission to the King of Spain, it was pointed out that the Spanish missions were too near to Essequibo and that under those conditions, their further extension should be to the west rather than to the east or south.

In 1761, the Spanish actually held no territory east of the Orinoco, except Santo Thome and the missions which were, until 1762, weak and ineffectual. At the same time, the Spanish provincial authorities were seeking permission to build a strong fort at Angostura, (on the Orinoco) to prevent the Dutch and the Caribs from ascending the Orinoco and trading there. No formal Spanish claim concerning territory east of the Orinoco is to be found in the Dutch archives, since the remonstrances of both 1769 and 1759 were not answered by Spanish. The only Spanish

3. Flores Expedition of 1760, p. 21, Syn.
threat to the Dutch on the Essequibo proper was the report of a mission somewhere in the vicinity of Arinda. Late in 1762, the King of Spain ordered the removal of Santo Thome and the mission, Susy, 34 leagues down the Orinoco to Angostura. This was followed shortly by the peace of Paris between England and Spain.

By 1765, the new Guiana City had been established at Angostura. There followed a rumor that new missions were to be built between the Cuyuni and the Mazuruni. The Dutch were determined to oppose these by violence, if necessary. The Dutch regarded Barima as the dividing line of jurisdiction. The next year, Centurion, the Spanish commandant, ordered a raid against the Dutch who were established near the mouth of the Orinoco. However, the raiders went beyond their instructions and attacked the Dutch in the Waini and Moruka. These raids gave rise to the second Remonstrance in which the Dutch affirmed their right to the Essequibo and the coastal rivers as well as the Cuyuni and all its tributaries. This claim was never denied, Centurion again reported, in 1770, that the Spanish had no fort in the Cuyuni, only mission villages on the north bank of the Yuruari. As for the murder of a guard at the Dutch post of Arinda, the Spanish knew nothing of that territory. Further, he pointed out that the coastal regions (usually the most valuable of any province) were, in this case, in the hands of foreigners since the Dutch were in control of the coast as far as the Orinoco.

5. Blue Book, p. 115; See "Errata" p. 3 and 4.
The Spanish governor of Cumana, when asked by the Secretary of State for an opinion on these observations, replied that he had no knowledge of any such events, nor were there any papers in the provincial archives on the question of limits. He maintained that he had been careful not to give any cause for complaint. Centurion's reports continued, but they were discounted by the Spanish authorities themselves, because they showed the "province of Guayana in too favorable a light." At the very end of 1772, a still more exaggerated report came from Centurion concerning the Spanish claims in Guiana (which he bounded by the Amazon, the Rio Negro, the Orinoco, and the Atlantic Ocean.)

The Spanish council of state limited Guayana as far as "effective possession" was concerned to a much smaller area, including only the Orinoco and its tributaries. By 1776, Centurion had retired from Guiana. The Valdes Map of 1776 showed the Barima as a place "where Caribs hold their fairs with the Dutch." During these years, the alliance of friendship and understanding between the Caribs and the Dutch was assiduously maintained. The Dutch claim, according to the postholder of Moruka, included the whole basin of the Waini. In 1780, England, already at war with France and United States, declared war on Holland. The next year, England conquered the Essequibo colony and sent an armed schooner as far as the Orinoco to clear the coast of pirates and privateers. The British map prepared to show these acquisitions gave

the boundary of the colony as the Amscura, which through mistake was called the Barima.

The English control was ended shortly by the French, who seized the colonies and restored them to the Dutch. Simultaneously the Spaniard, Inciarte, was urging that Spain take advantage of the fact that the Dutch had abandoned Moruka and build a post there. However, nothing was done. By 1788, the Spanish were feeling a little nervous and the Spanish confidential agent reported: "...and on no account permit the cutting of wood in the lower Orinoco, for those forests are the only safeguard and barrier against the Dutch, who, were they (the forests) cut down, would see our nakedness, and consequently attack us!"

...Don Miguel Marmion, in his full report of 1788 said: "...the rivers Orinoco, Caroni, Cuyuni, and Essequibo, form with the sea an island. And from its interior there are easy and short ways of communication by which the Dutch, as there is nothing to hinder them, come and go as often as they like, and wish to examine our possessions, watch our movements and acquire whatever information may be useful to them". Marmion also planned a Spanish fort at the mouth of the Curumo to protect the Yuruari missions, but that stream was not navigable just then, and so Marmion had to warn the missionaries to keep secret the Spanish plans, lest the Dutch hear of them and take measures to prevent them. The Spanish were especially worried about the proposed

village of Tumeremo, for if any information reached the Dutch, this village would probably be raided and its people massacred. However, the fort was never built.

The province of Guiana was evidently a poor struggling colony in 1790, because Marmion's successor, Don Luis Antonio Gil, described it as being in a state of "misery and want" and further than the "Dutch, the French, and Portuguese occupied the greater part of it." There was an attempt made by the Dutch in 1792 to incorporate in the Congress of Amiens, a delimitation of the Guiana province. Nothing came of these secret negotiations which would have placed the boundary at the Orinoco or the Barima. It was finally decided in 1792 not to establish a settlement at Tumeremo unless a fort was built to protect it. A year later, war was declared on Spain by France, and soon Holland was conquered by France and the Batavian Republic was established. The Dutch governor of this period reported that the Pomeroon and the Moruka "'up to now has been maintained to be the boundary of our territory with the Spanish upon what basis I do not know.'"

In 1795 peace was made between France and Spain, but in the next year, England again took the Dutch colonies and set down the boundaries on which there was no Spanish remonstrance as extending from the "Essequibo to Barima." The King of Spain

read this and took no action. A year later, Spain's anxiety was that England would take the whole of the Orinoco. An attempt, (entirely unsuccessful) to forestall any such act was made when the Spanish attacked the Dutch and English at the Moruka post.

CHAPTER III
MIDDLE OR
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

When the English took over the Dutch interests in Guiana, they found that the Spanish were keeping the Orinoco basin a wilderness simply better to protect the Spanish settlements in Popayan, Venezuela, Caracas, Cumana and Paris—lands lying between the Essequibo and the Orinoco were uncultivated. Don Francisco de Pecuena, special Spanish commissioner, said in 1802 that although all the land between the Orinoco and the Amazon belonged to Spain by right of discovery, yet she had abandoned this area for over a century and during that time, the Dutch and the French had established colonies there without any Spanish opposition. At length, the Dutch colonies on the Cuyuni were in a position to threaten the Orinoco settlements. After a year of truce war broke out again in Europe, and, of course, the struggle was continued in America. The English retained control of the Essequibo, but their claim was not recognized by Holland (or the Batavian Republic as it was then known). In 1804, according to the dispatch of Lieutenant Governor Myers of the Barbadoes, the Essequibo colony was bounded on the west by a line running due south from Cape Barima. At this time, the Spanish claimed the Moruka, which, according to Sir

1. Blue Book, p. 21, 153; Syn. p. 36.
2. Blue Book, p. 21, 139, 140.
Ralph Abercrombie's expedition, was the remotest colony of Essequibo. The English, in taking over Guiana, took the precaution of cultivating the friendship of the Indians by adopting the Dutch policy of "protection" which included presents for them. A protector was appointed for the coastal region of the north west which included the Pomeroon. The Junta Superior of Spanish Guiana sent to the King of Spain, at the end of the first decade of the 19th century, a careful report which corroborated the statements of the Englishmen Macrae and McCreagh concerning control south of the Orinoco. In that same year Colombia, of which Venezuela was a part, declared her independence from Spain. Four years later the treaties that closed the long European war were consumated. As a result, the English title to the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice was recognized. However, the limits of Essequibo were not and had never been authoritatively defined. Therein lay the root of the bitter argument that developed later. Soon after, a treaty was agreed upon by Spain and England, through which the latter was to secure most favored nation status as far as trade in Spanish colonies was concerned—in case these colonies should ever be opened to the trade of other nations. This would indicate that England's acquisition of the colony of Essequibo was not offensive to Spain. Between 1816-1820, the Venezuelans amused themselves by attacking the Spanish missions south of the Orinoco.

Meanwhile, the British government continued its protection of the Indians in the whole area. This of course including present giving.

In 1823, Hilhouse, one of these protectors, proposed a mission to define the bounds of the colony and to determine whether they were at the "Waini or elsewhere". As far as jurisdiction was concerned, England exercised it along the coast beyond the Pomeroon and the Moruka. In 1827, the Lieutenant Governor, d'Urban, when asked by English Government to report upon the "extent and situation of crown lords in the united colony of Demerara and Essequibo" said, that on the coast, the territory of the colony extended from the Abari to the mouth of the Barima and south from that point.

In 1830, Venezuela, severed her connections with Colombia and declared her own independence. During this period, certain murder trials showed that British jurisdiction had followed grants of land a considerable distance up the Essequibo, the Mazuruni and the Cuyuni Rivers.

CHAPTER IV
EARLY CRITICAL PERIOD

In 1835, the Royal Geographical Society was granted money by the British government to enable it to encourage the exploration of British Guiana. The Society then chose Mr. Robert Schomburgk to undertake this assignment. Schomburgk, although a native of Germany, had been for a long time, in the service of the English government, and had had considerable experience in exploring and mapping tropical territories—particularly the West Indies.

First he explored the Essequibo, and was the first to reach its source. Then he followed the Corentin and Berbice for their whole lengths. He made a detailed investigation of the possibilities of the place. Next he made the journey across the colony from the Essequibo to Esmerelda on the Orinoco. His observations determined astronomically a series of fixed points extending across the watershed of the rivers in the equatorial section of South America. For this service, he was awarded the Royal Geographical Society medal in 1840.

As a result of his travels in Guiana, he became convinced of the need of Great Britain to determine a boundary for British Guiana on the west. In December, 1840, he was commissioned by the government to perform this task.

He began his journey by stopping at the Waini to determine its exact location and also the depth of the river. Thence his route took him through the Mora passage to the Berima, where he found Indians who complained of Venezuelan raids and forced labor.

2. D. N. B. article on Schomburgk.

-23-
and who maintained that for years. They had regarded themselves as under the protection of the English. Schomburgk planted posts at the mouth of the Berima and on the right bank of the Amacura. He had planned to visit the nearest Venezuelan authority on the Orinoco, but the roughness of the water prevented his doing so. However, no Venezuelans had appeared to offer any comments or objection. He noted definite evidence of an earlier settlement on Point Barima. This absolutely convinced him of the English title to this section. Of course, the remains must have been Dutch (rather then French or Swedish) he assumes.

On the Amacura, Schomburgk visited Jan, the Arawak chieftan, who spoke Creole Dutch perfectly and likewise complained of the cruelty of the Venezuelans. Schomburgk refused to interfere, where the Indians were living on territory which be believed to be Venezuelan, no matter what their grievances were. His famous line was not entirely original. In fact there is considerable evidence that Schomburgk's idea was to make an "actual survey" of a line which he had already decided, after an observation of earlier maps and records, was the real boundary. Even Lord Salisbury many years later, found that the Schomburgk line discovered no new boundary. There were really two Schomburgk lines: one published in Parliamentary Papers of 1840 and the other in the Col-

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1. Blue Book, p. 210, 211; Blue Book tells of this and protests. Claims all lands "Contiguous to the River (Orinoco) to a considerable distance."
onial Office lists of 1886. Great Britain claimed, however, that only the map of 1886 was the Schomburgk map. Both of these maps contained some inaccuracies arising from the imperfect knowledge of the geography of the region which Schomburgk's sources possessed.

Later in 1841, the Venezuelans renewed their proposal for a treaty to determine the boundary question. England replied that it would, in her opinion, be more appropriate to investigate the question before making the agreement. England further assured Venezuela that the Schomburgk markers were merely indicative and by no means final. However, since these markers were so particularly obnoxious to the Venezuelans, Lord Aberdeen consented early in 1842 to order their removal, but desired at the same time to point out that in so doing, England was not relinquishing in any degree, her claim.

In 1843, Fortique (the Venezuelan minister) again asked for early settlement of the boundary question and in January, 1844, he presented the first formal statement of the claims of Venezuela to the territory as far as the Essequibo. This claim, he based on the following points:

(1) Spain's original discovery of America.

(2) Spain's early exploration and occupation of the Orinoco and contiguous territory— the Barima, Moruka and Pomeroon Rivers.

2. His line was a modification of those of Arrowsmith, Jefferys and Thompson by his own admission—p. 76, Vol. III, U. S. Com.
(3) In 1648, at time of Treaty of Munster, the Dutch had no possessions west or north of the Essequibo.

(4) Spain dominated the region as far as the Essequibo—any Dutch possession west of that river was an usurpation.

(5) Jan de Laet, a Dutchman of the University of Leyden, agreed with Raleigh that Spain occupied the Orinoco, the Moruka and Pomeroon. Many other authorities who agreed with this view were cited by Portique.

Lord Aberdeen promptly answered these claims by pointing out in March, 1844, that:

(1) There was Dutch trade in Essequibo area as early as 1580 (according to Jan de Laet.)

(2) In 1648, the Dutch did have settlements on the Essequibo.

(3) In 1657, the Dutch had posts on Pomeroon and Moruka.

(4) The Spanish attack on Moruka in 1797 was repulsed.

(5) Spain had no settlement in 1844 on the Essequibo, but England did have.

(6) England refused to accept the authorities cited by Portique as impartial and well informed. He further cited other authorities, at least equally reliable who disagreed.

(7) England might just as well, and with considerably more logic claim whole coast to Orinoco, but England was desirous of settling this dispute and so was prepared to offer Venezuela a boundary that would give her control of both sides of the Orinoco—in fact England would accept the Moruka River as her boundary on

the coast and would follow more or less natural boundaries in
the interior.

A year later, Venezuelan independence was formally recognized
by Spain. The English continued to exercise their rights of trade
and protection of the Indians along the "aini and Pomeroon. In
1850, the English consul at Caracas, Mr. "Wilson, reports that the
Landrovera party in Venezuela was again stirring up trouble by
saying that England meant to seize all of Venezuelan Guiana. As
a result of this unnessiness, England and Venezuela agreed in 1850
not to occupy or encroach upon the disputed territory. At that
time Tumeremo was the farthest east of the Venezuelan settle-
ment. A long revolution in Venezuela which lasted till 1876,
interrupted Anglo-Venezuelan negotiations concerning the boundary.

Señor Calcano addressed a communication to the Earl of Derby
in 1876. Calcano used the same claims as Fortique, adding only the
papal line of Demarkation, and a claim that the Capuchins had
occupied the territory "between the Crinoco and Cape Nassau, and
between the see and the river Caroni, extending from the eastern
banks of this and of the Parague to the shores of the Imataka,
of the Curumu, and of the Guyuni," The Spanish authority cited

7. At the same time, Venezuela addressed a letter to the United
States asking her to "...take an interest in having justice done
to Venezuela". This was the first official communication to the
American government on this subject. Bemus, VIII, p. 297.
for this claim (a Royal Warrant of 1736) said no such thing, the part Venezuela quoted was simply an interpolation. As for the names, Essequibo, Demerara, and Surinam, in the passage from the Convention of Aranjuez, the British maintained that a close and careful examination of the text would show that the colonies are really meant and that Essequibo referred to all the Dutch possessions between the Essequibo and the Orinoco. This message was followed soon (Feb. 1877) by a letter from Señor de Rojas, who was sent as minister from Venezuela to England. He suggested that a conventional line be agreed upon by treaty and then adopted. England delayed her decision pending arrival of the Guiana Governor in England and in May, 1879, De Rojas again suggested settlement, by treaty, of the boundary question. He reminded England of her promise, made two years earlier, to let him know her decision.

Salisbury, who had succeeded Lord Derby, replied in January of 1880, pointing out the British claim as extending from west of the Barima, south to the Imataca Mountains, and following them to the south. He informed De Rojas that for England to agree to the boundary Venezuela suggested would mean the surrender of some 40,000 British subjects and land which had been in the "uninterrupted possession" of Holland and Great Britain for 200 years. He suggested further that, in view of such widely divergent claims, both Great Britain and Venezuela should be prepared to offer real concessions if a settlement was to be effected.

De Rojas replied that he was prepared to make concessions and empowered to negotiate a treaty. Whereupon, Salisbury responded, (April 23, 1880) that he was expecting the Attorney-General of British Guiana in England shortly and would like to postpone discussion pending his arrival. When, five months later, no reply had been received from the British, De Rojas wrote to remind Granville of Salisbury's promise. In November of 1880, Pauncefote wrote that the long awaited Attorney-General had finally arrived. Granville, in February of 1881, finally answered by saying that England could no longer accept the Moruka line, but that she was willing to discuss a more northerly boundary. De Rojas in reply suggested: a line beginning a mile to the north of the Moruka and following a meridian drawn from this point on the coast westward to the point where this meridian crossed the 60 longitude from Greenwich, and following this meridian to south. If this suggestion should fail to lead to an agreeable settlement by treaty, then arbitration appeared to be the only other solution.

In September of 1881, Granville, rejected De Rojas' plan because it neglected natural lines, and would result in the surrender of large numbers of British citizens, but he substituted one which, in his opinion, was quite favorable to Venezuela. This line would start on the coast 29 miles due east of the right bank of the Barima River; thence south over the Yarikita hill to the 8th parallel of latitude; thence west

along this line till it reached the boundary line proposed by Schomburgk, which it would follow from that point on. This line had many advantages. It gave Venezuela complete control of its mouth of the Orinoco; it provided a well defined natural boundary which the Indians would understand. The mouth of the Waini would remain in English hands so that the inland waterways to the colony might be guarded.

Despite frequent inquiries during the next two years, no reply was forthcoming from Venezuela. Finally, in 1883, in response to another English question, Venezuela replied that no power in her government was strong enough to give away any of her territory, and suggested that the dispute be settled by arbitration. A year later, Gusman Blanco arrived in England and commenced negotiations [for the "simultaneous" settlement of the disputes] concerning a "court of Law", whose members would "be chosen by the parties respectively."

In 1885, Granville replied rejecting Blanco's suggestion concerning the court. They did begin negotiations about that time for a treaty of commerce. As a part of this treaty, there was incorporated an article which provided that any disputes which shall arise that could not be settled by friendly negotiations should be settled by arbitration. This treaty was forwarded to Blanco for his approval. However, Salisbury soon succeeded Granville and it was his belief that this treaty was unwise—in that it was too general. Neither did Blanco approve the working of the treaty and so the whole project failed.

4. Blue Book, p. 34.
In 1886, Roseberry, then Secretary of State for foreign affairs, suggested that the territory lying between the Rojas and Granville lines, be regarded as 'in dispute' and that either an arbitrator or a joint commission divide this disputed territory as equally as natural consideration would permit. Blanco, refused this offer; continued to hold to the claim to the Essequibo as the boundary, and demanded arbitration of this area. Blanco further complained that Great Britain had violated the terms of the agreement of 1850 concerning encroachments. He cited the signed admission of Mr. Turk; (an English official in Guiana): that he was in the Amacura, Marajuana and Waini Rivers; that he put up notices of the English claim which were removed by the Manoa Company officials; that a certain Robert Wells, an employe of the Manoa Company, and according to Blanco, an official of the Venezuelan Government, in that section, was arrested and tried by the Guiana court. Mr. Turk further stated that he did not need a pilot for either the Amacura or the Orinoco. These acts, according to Blanco, all seriously damaged the prestige of Venezuela. The Manoa Company officials were repeatedly warned that they were in British territory on the Amacura and Barima. Venezuela at the same time received from England a protest calling attention to the doing of the Manoa Company; and asking that Venezuela prevent any encroachment. If Venezuela did not, then, England would. Blanco

1. Blue Book, p. 34.
again pointed out further than the Venezuelan constitution definitely prohibited the alienation of any territory, hence arbitration offered the only possible solution.

In October, 1886, the London Gazette carried a notice warning that no grants made by the Venezuelan government in territory claimed or disputed by Great Britain would be recognized by that government. Anyone who wished to secure information concerning this territory might consult the map either in the Library of the Colonial Office in London, or in Georgetown. About this time, the British minister at Caracas called on Gusman Blanco and they discussed among other things, the boundary question. The President (Blanco) asserted that the treaty negotiated the year before referred to the boundary dispute, and when the British minister disagreed, grew quite violent. He likewise emphasized the warning that, although Venezuela had been weak, she was now strong—(suggesting in the British minister's opinion that Blanco believed the United States would come to Venezuela's aid.)

Venezuela definitely opposed the British warning as given in the London Gazette and announced her intention of erecting a light house on Barima Point. If England opposed this move then diplomatic relations would be severed. England consented, provided Venezuela understood that this should not prejudice England's

2. Blue Book, p. 372, 35; See Map II and III.
4. Blue Book, p. 35, 374, Venezuela charged that in 1836, Sir Robert Ker Porter, British Charge d'Affairs of Great Britain in Venezuela requested Venezuela to establish a light house on Barima Point. England maintained that this request was unauthorized and in fact unknown to British government till quoted by Venezuela.
claims in that area. Whereupon, the Venezuelan government definitely stated for the first time that they regarded the territory between the Pomeroon and the Orinoco as Venezuelan and demanded its immediate evacuation by England and the submission of the whole dispute to arbitration. Since England refused to accede to these demands, diplomatic relations were severed in March, 1887. An additional grievance cited by Venezuela was that England, contrary to her agreement of 1850, had allowed the working of mines on Venezuelan and disputed territory. Following the rupture of diplomatic relations, England requested Germany to take over the protection of British citizens and interests in Venezuela. During this same year, 1887, Venezuela let a contract for the construction of a railroad to Guacipati, for which the route lay through certain parts of British Guiana, (English claim). England issued a proclamation warning that such construction would be regarded as trespassing. Venezuela replied, 1888, through the German representative, that she was incredulous of such a protest, since the territory to be traversed by the railroad was the Yuruari valley, a section indisputably Venezuelan.

PART II
THE DISPUTE

CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES
ENTERS AS MEDIATOR

During the early decades of the 19th century, all of Europe was embroiled in wars. While Napoleon was capturing Spain, that nation's colonies in the new world, (which had been held in check only through strict supervision), under the leadership of San Martin and Simon Bolivar, revolted and declared their independence. Meanwhile, they opened their ports to the trade of foreign nations. England quietly, but most successfully, built up her trade in that area. Then, lo and behold, Spain and her Holy Allies made known their plan to reconquer these rebellious subjects and to divide the lands they held. However, should this be done, England would be excluded from a very lucrative trade.

Just at this point, Canning, the English Prime Minister, got a bright idea. He called in the American minister and suggested an Anglo-American declaration guaranteeing the independence of the Latin American nations, and promising to protect them vs. European aggression. It just happened that the American secretary of state, at this time was one of the most brilliant the United States has ever had—John Quincy Adams. He finally persuaded Monroe, the President, that the thing to do was to issue the guarantee alone—so that it would apply to all European countries. The result was
the world famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823. It had three main parts:

(1) No Latin American Republic whose independence has been recognized by the United States might be reconquered.

(2) There should be no further European colonization in America.

(3) Europe would be allowed to manage its own affairs without any assistance from the United States.

Even since 1823, the United States by virtue of this Doctrine, which became a cornerstone of America's foreign policy, has manifested an interest in Latin American affairs. This interest was displayed just after the American Civil War, when the French had made their unsuccessful attempt to establish an Empire in Mexico.

Therefore, just as matters between Venezuela and Britain came to an impasse, the United States interfered through its minister in London, (Mr. Phelps) a suggestion that Great Britain agree to submit the dispute to arbitration. Salisbury replied that at that time (February, 1887) Blanco's attitude prevented England from submitting the case to any kind of arbitration. In February, 1888, Bayard in a confidential note enclosed a translation of a note received from the Venezuelan minister concerning the railroad discussed above. It would seem from this correspondence that Britain had changed its boundary line. Bayard also suggested that Phelps call this railroad matter to the attention of Salisbury, and at the same time suggest that news of a settlement of the boundary question would be pleasing

to the United States. Venezuela appreciated the interference of the United States in this dispute, because alone she was powerless to hold out against Great Britain with any hope of success. By 1889, gold had been discovered on the Barima and Im Thurn reported 50 flourishing settlements in the Barima and Waini region. The waterways in the gold area were cleared and a gold station erected at the police headquarters at the mouth of the Barima. There was a real need for better policing of the gold areas for the protection of life and property. With the discovery of gold, the question of boundary became one of vital importance. Which government had the right to make valid grants? England was in charge, but, of course, her actions were protested by Venezuela.

Early in 1890, Senor Urbanja proposed to Lord Salisbury that diplomatic relations be resumed. The English in their reply of the following month (February) said England would arbitrate concerning the territory west of the Schomburgk line, but demanded recognition of her claim east of it. Venezuela replied by declaring that even England had nullified the Schomburgk line, and proposed arbitration as means of settling the dispute over territory between Essequibo and the Orinoco. And she demanded evacuation of territory between Pomeroon and Orinoco.

2. Foreign Affairs, 1888, p. 702.
In February of 1890, Great Britain, in a communication to Venezuela, in reply to the above demand, stated that she had examined all the evidence referred to by Venezuela and a great deal more besides and had come to the following conclusions: (1) Spain never had asserted any claim to the Essequibo (2) The claim of Great Britain to the whole basin of the Cuyuni and Yuruari was well founded and had been in continuous Dutch and English possession for 300 years. Hence, Great Britain refused to arbitrate her claim to this region. However, she was willing to arbitrate concerning a portion of the land beyond the Schomburgk line.

Two months later Venezuela appointed Dr. R. F. Seijas as "Special Envoy of Venezuela to the disputed territory." He proceeded to Demerara to investigate the progress of the invasion of Venezuelan territory—even beyond the old limits of disputed region. Later in the same month, following his inquiries, he lodged a formal protest on some 12 points, where, in his opinion, the rights of Venezuela had been violated—such as any and all grants of concessions, settlements and other invasions affecting the territory north of the Essequibo. Violation of Venezuelan sovereignty had been most flagrant in the Cuyuni, the Pomeroon, and the Barima and the Amacura, according to the protest.

In June, Señor Pulido was sent to carry on negotiations

with England to try to settle the dispute. He formally rejected
the English plan for limited arbitration and suggested instead:
(1) the Essequibo, its banks, lands etc., to be agreed to as
British. (2) Orinoco, its banks, lands, etc., to be agreed to
as Venezuelan. (3) Mixed commission to survey, explore, and
chart the intervening region to secure accurate information upon
which a decision could be reached concerning satisfactory natural
boundary. (4) In case the two countries were unable to reach a
decision, the dispute could then be submitted to arbitration.
(5) Both governments should agree to withdraw all signs of 'pre-
sumptive possession' in disputed region. A month later, Sanderson
replied on behalf of England that Venezuela had issued two
decrees establishing administrative districts in the Barima-Pomer-
on section and at the mouth of the Cuyuni. Since England effect-
vively controlled and was prepared to defend this area, such decrees
could have no practical result, and tended to contradict Vene-
zuela's protestations of friendship. Such an agreement would
necessitate real sacrifices on the part of England and only ap-
parent concessions on side of Venezuela.

In addition, England, in the opinion of the Foreign Office,
already had quite sufficient information for the settling of the
boundary question. Whereupon, Venezuela regretted the inability
to reach a decision and expressed the hope that England would
adopt a more conciliatory attitude. In the late fall of 1890,

Im Thurn, was appointed as deputy receiver, general comptroller of customs, chief commissary inspector and general of police in the north-western district. A regular settlement was rapidly developing in the new gold region of the Barima-Waini basin. About 50 squatters were given legal title to their lands, and timber cutting was carefully regulated. Im Thurn reported no trouble with the Venezuelans who occupied the left bank of the Amacura. Again, in 1890, the United States, not to be easily discouraged, offered through the American minister at London, Mr. Lincoln, the "earnest good offices of the United States" to restore diplomatic relations which might in turn result in a settlement of the old dispute. Salisbury replied that negotiations were already in progress for the restoration of relations between Venezuela and Great Britain, and that Britain would arbitrate the region outside Schomburgk line. A year later, Lincoln again expressed the hope that the matter of the boundary would be referred to arbitration.

In 1891, Venezuela made what Im Thurn characterized as a "haphazard" attempt to colonize, with some 60 settlers, the left bank of the Amacura. Venezuelans were reported as prospecting for gold on the Cuyuni and General Brineno was ordered to inspect the attitude of the English in the region of the junction of the Uruan and the Cuyuni.

2. Blue Book, v. 2, 3; Foreign Affairs, 1895, p. 250.
A rapid development of the lands in and near the Barima gold fields was evident. Houses, townsites, barracks, police station, all sprang up almost magically at Marawhana. In September a police station was established on the Cuyuni. When McTurk visited this area, he inspected the gold fields on the left bank (Venezuelan) of the Cuyuni, and he also warned those Venezuelans who were operating on the right bank, that they were within British Guiana.

Early in 1892, Great Britain called the attention of Venezuela to the danger that existed in having British and Venezuelan police forces so close to each other in the Cuyuni. England, although she did not recognize the claim of Venezuela to the left bank, did not intend to take the offensive, but warned Venezuela that any aggression on the right bank would lead to serious trouble. The gold boom was still strong and additional quartz was discovered near Barima Falls. Meanwhile, the relations of the British and the Venezuelans on opposite sides of the Amacura remained friendly. Meanwhile, Urbaneja in March 1892, in reply to the English note concerning the police situation on the Cuyuni, stated that the Venezuelans in question had been instructed to "avoid any conflict or quarrel with the agents of the colony of Demerara, and that it is desirable to adopt a moderate and pacific attitude, without...in the least degree sacrificing the national dignity."

Meanwhile, Venezuela was considering ways and means of again entering into direct communications with Great Britain without losing "face". Great Britain gave Venezuela an opening when she again set forth her friendly intentions and said she would welcome a resumption of direct discussion with an accredited Venezuelan representative. In the spring of 1893, Senor Michelena was sent to England as confidential agent. He proposed: a joint commission to examine evidence; and in case of disagreement, the appointment of an arbiter whose decision should be regarded as final. A preliminary convention should agree concerning a settlement of these matters before the resumption of open diplomatic relations which would lead in turn to a final settlement of this question as well as other.

By summer, England replied that the boundary question was the most important. England still refused arbitration, however disguised it might be. England charged that Venezuela had, several times, violated the agreement of 1850, before England ever had. On the other hand, as late as 1881, England refused to grant an application for grants in the disputed territory. Only when it became imperative did England (and then publicly) assert and take her rights in the disputed region. Hence England suggested omitting the promise to arbitrate and limiting the territory to be considered. Thereupon Mr. Michelena, called the

4. Cites establishment of Tumeremo, and Neuvo Providencia—of 1850 and 1858 respectively. There were also grants made by Venezuela to the Manoa Company—an American concern.
Earl of Roseberry a liar in polite diplomatic language—and said that his suggestions could not at all be accepted because that would imply a recognition by Venezuela of England's claims west of the Essequibo. The limitations suggested by England modified only slightly "the capricious line drawn by the explorer Schomburgk". Venezuela further pointed out that both settlements mentioned by England were outside even the British lines of division. Because of the disparity in size of the contestants, arbitration would seem a more just solution. England still did not feel that Venezuela had made any offer which she could accept. Michelena, in a lengthy reply to this statement, complained that England was not being conciliatory at all. He also quoted the United States message of 1888 which said that the British claim appeared to have no fixed limit. Several of the American Republics, said Venezuela, were willing to interpose their good offices to attempt to effect a settlement. Michelena further pointed out the differences in the lines offered by England in 1841, 1881, 1886, 1889, and 1893. He wound up his argument with a solemn protest against England's and British Guiana's activities.

During 1893, England was busily extending her area of control in the Berima gold district.* Police stations, hospitals and post

* See Map V.
* See Map IV for gold areas.
offices were built. The channel of the Barima was cleared and with the coming of settlers, agriculture increased. In the period 1894-1898, the government of British Guiana expended over $90,000 on public works in the northwest district. Stores and quartz mills sprang up in the wilderness. A regular schedule was maintained for boats between Mount Everard and Arakaka. The mining activities extended southward to the Cuyuni, where on the left bank the Venezuelans had established a post.

Once more, a year later, the United States intervened. Gresham told Bayard to reopen the question by pointing out that the United States and England had settled several disputes by arbitration, and suggesting this disagreement might be ironed out by the same method. However, in England's opinion, the same difficulties that had always stood in the way were still present, and so nothing was accomplished.

CHAPTER VI
THE AMERICAN
ULTIMATUM

In March of 1895, Venezuela wrote to the United States thanking her for the interest which she had taken in the dispute. A month later, Bayard, the American ambassador in London, reported that Lord Kimberly had shown him a map of the disputed territory, "on which were delineated in different colors, the three lines of delimitation". The Schomburgk line, which was one of these, had its northern terminus a short distance west of the mouth of the Orinoco. To this region England claimed absolute possession. This she would not submit to arbitration, but the area intersected by the two other lines, England was willing to settle by arbitration. Gresham, Secretary of State, died while in the midst of preparing a report for the guidance of President Cleveland. Just before his death, Gresham had been busy trying to persuade Venezuela to take steps for the resumption of diplomatic relations with England. However, Venezuela said she had tried before, and believed it was England's turn to offer concessions. Gresham wrote to Bayard that same month enclosing a joint resolution of Congress approved by Cleveland that friendly arbitration be used to settle the dispute.

1. Foreign affairs, p. 1480, 1895, Part II.
Meanwhile, Venezuelan troops stationed on the Cuyuni, had, without authority from the Venezuelan government, crossed over, and taken the British subjects, resident there, captive. Then the Caracas government heard of this action, it immediately ordered the release of the captives. The Venezuelan officers responsible for this outrage, were ordered to go to Caracas to account for their behavior. The British reoccupied the house on the Cuyuni, and the Venezuelan officers were punished.

In May, the United States was still using pressure on Venezuela to try to get her to reopen negotiations with England. She (United States) pointed out, at least, England was not demanding any preliminary concession from Venezuela.

In June, following Mr. Gresham's death, Cleveland chose Richard Olney, who had been attorney general, to serve as Secretary of State. Olney, in contrast to the mildmannered, frank, and simple Gresham, was a man of quick and rather violent temper. Cleveland decided that unless a crisis were developed, England would simply drag on the boundary dispute and meanwhile continue her infiltration of Venezuelan territory. On July 2, Olney's draft was finished and he took it to Cleveland's summer home for his approval. Five days later, Cleveland wrote rather enthusiastically to Olney that the note was..."the best thing of its kind I have ever read and it leads to a conclusion that one cannot escape if he tries—that is, if there is anything in the Monroe Doctrine

4. Gresham favored going slowly and in the notes he prepared there was no ultimatum. Life of Gresham, p. 793-797.
5. Olney afterwards described his message as "bumptious"—explaining that he believed England must be jolted out of her procrastination. p. 113—James—Life of Olney. Nevins, p. 633, 640.
at all. You show there is a great deal of that and place it, I think, on better and more defensible ground than any of your predecessors—or mine." Of course, Cleveland had some suggestions to make, and proposed to "soften the verbiage here and there."

During this same time, the United States was still arguing with Venezuela and attempting to induce her to reopen direct negotiations with England. At length, Venezuela promised to seek a discussion with England, provided the United States would assist Venezuela in forcing arbitration and provided England would send a representative to Caracas. Venezuela wanted assurance that negotiations would lead to a settlement, before she would agree to any discussion.

Finally on July 20, Olney dispatched his "20-inch gun" to Bayard. This note recited the long story of the dispute which dated as far back as 1814 at least. Olney maintained that the claims of both disputants had been vague, and only indifferently expressed until England had ordered the Schomburgk survey, and accepted the resultant line of demarkation. From that time on, the British claim had constantly increased—except for the Aberdeen line of 1844. It reiterated the story of the various English claims up to 1895.

Venezuela on the other hand, had constantly sought a settlement except for the interruption during the revolutions of 1848-1876. Every time Venezuela agreed to a boundary England,

changed her mind and moved the line a little farther west. Venezuela had made every effort short of complete humiliation to settle the argument, but despite her efforts, negotiations had reached such an impasse that Venezuela was forced to sever diplomatic relations in 1887. Although informal negotiations had been carried on for brief periods in 1890, and 1893, all official connections had remained severed. When the discussions of 1893 had failed to lead to an agreement, Venezuela had protested formally and had placed the blame on England. In 1881, United States wrote to Venezuela and expressed hope for settlement. As early as 1882, according to Olney, Venezuela had sought the advice of the United States with regard to the idea of settling the argument by arbitration. The United States had replied favoring arbitration and had offered her good offices, as a friend to both disputants, to help bring about the result. The position of the United States during the 80's had been that the determination of the limits was simply a matter of looking up the record. It was pointed out then that the United States' position of responsibility as regards Latin America had been recognized by Great Britain from the very beginnings of the Monroe Doctrine. All offers of mediation made by the United States had been refused. In 1889, when Britain announced the mouth of Barima as hers, the United

States attempted to secure, at least temporary reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Venezuela sent a special Envoy to London, but negotiations failed. Because of the disparity in strength of the disputants, Venezuela had always advocated arbitration as her only chance of securing justice.

According to the asserted international law, any "nation may avail itself of this right (of intervention in quarrel of two other nations) whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct menace to its own integrity, tranquility or welfare." In the judgment of the United States, the British-Venezuelan dispute violated that principle of the Monroe Doctrine which states that Europe shall establish no new colonies in America. The United States interpreted this clause to mean no boundaries should be changed (33,000 square miles) in such a way as to result in loss of territory by an American state to a European power.

So far Mr. Olney's note was based on sound opinions, but he included several unfortunate and exceedingly vulnerable statements. The first was to the effect that, "distance and 3000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient"...and further that European monarchial control of an American republican state was "incongruous and injurious."

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In addition, he said that the American states are by "geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions are friends and allies, commercially and politically of the United States," and finally, the United States, as an idealistic and civilized nation, interested in the cause of self-government, merely protested peacefully although, "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." The United States occupied this enviable position continued Olney, not because of its character and ideals, but because its infinite resources and isolated position rendered it invulnerable. If any European state should secure a large colony in the western hemisphere, then the United States would be forced to acquire large standing armies to protect her self. The United States was exceedingly loathe to take sides in this dispute, since her sole interest was in achieving a fair and just settlement of the difficulty. The United States could see no reason whatsoever for England's refusal to submit the whole question to arbitration. Finally, if England persisted in her refusal to refer the dispute to arbitration, it would "greatly embarrass the future relations between this country (the United States) and Great Britain." In conclusion, Olney particularly requested an early reply so that Cleveland could lay the whole matter before Congress in his annual message.

1. Blue Book, p. 17; Moore, p. 545-553.
The months passed. Fall came; then winter and yet there was no reply from England. In the meantime, the development by England of the Barima gold district continued. Salisbury was busy with the Eastern question, and the Boers in south Africa, and neglected the Venezuelan question. This, of course, tended to make Olney and Cleveland more furious than ever. Meanwhile Venezuela reported to United States that she had heard "rumors" that Bayard had told the British that there was no connection between the Cuyuni incident and the boundary dispute. Venezuela reiterated that those guilty had been punished and that the arrest of the British citizens was entirely unauthorized.

When Congress met, Cleveland simply summarized the Olney dispatch and set forth the opinion that the dispatch merely reaffirmed the traditional American position of protecting the weaker American states against outside aggression.

The earliest mention of the boundary dispute in the two leading periodicals of the period--the Nation and Harper's Weekly was in the fall of 1895. On October 24, the Nation said that it mattered not where the boundary lay, the essential point was to settle the matter before people did begin to care. At any rate, the dispute was none of America's business. Certainly, there could be no real danger of anti-republican propaganda emanating from Great Britain—for "the British colonies are more republican

2. Syn., p. 73; Foreign Affairs, Part II, 1895, p. 1487.
(although less anarchistic) than the general run of Central
and South American governments." Editorially the Nation added
that only a Lodge, a Blaine, a Campbell or a Tribune editor
would venture to pass on the merits of the dispute. As for
the American secretaries of state—Gresham, Frelinghuysen, and
Bayard—had all refused to express any opinion on the case. Blaine,
however, had, as in the Bering Sea case, (in which he was entirely
unsuccessful) said that "'the volume of evidence in favor of Vene-
zuela is overwhelming.'" The Nation further pointed out that Vene-
zuela had been actively trying, since 1881, to draw the United
States into the dispute. It also prophesied that since England's
attitude had ever been conciliatory, there would be no war in
which the United States would do the fighting and Venezuela get
the credit.

Harper's, likewise, early in November, while admitting that,
even friends of Britain didn't like the way England had grabbed
land in the gold fields, yet this was no occasion for warlike
feelings. Neither Britain nor Venezuela knew where the boundary
was. Of course, the United States could interfere, but why should
she? England would probably arbitrate—she was usually willing
enough to use that method in dealing with weak opponents. A
week later Harper's was still critical of Lodge and his jingo
friends who were taking advantage of the situation and trying to
rouse people to a war against England. However, Harper's was of

1. Nation, 1895, p. 284.
3. Harper's, 1895, p. 1032.
the opinion that Cleveland would not lose his head, and under
those conditions, the raving of the jingoes would do no real
harm.

On November 14, the Nation told of the capture of the
British post on Cuyuni, and asked what the United States would
do under similar circumstances.

A week later, the Nation reviewed the evidence in the case
as published in the senate documents. As a result of investiga-
tion of this evidence, the Nation found just one issue: Did
original Spanish discovery without settlement or occupation,
entitle her to the whole region? If so, then every Dutch settle-
ment there is usurpation. The fact of Dutch continuous occupa-
tion has not been denied. The mapmakers, the historians have
always described settlements as moving from the Essequibo to the
Orinoco and not vice-versa. The Nation pointed out, and it is
a pertinent note, that Venezuela, in citing Vattel, uses the
passage where he said that a nation may occupy only as much of
its territory as it desires, instead of quoting the paragraph
that really pertained to the case and which would indicate that
an old claim was inadequate—that in the final analysis—it was

1. Harper's, Nov. 9, 1895.
4. Cites book II, Ch. VIII.
5. "'If two or many nations discover and possess at the same time
an island, or any other desert land, without master, they ought to
agree between themselves and make an equitable partition; but if
they cannot agree, each will have the right of empire and domain of
the parts in which they first settled. It may happen that a nation
may be contented with possessing only certain places, or appropria-
ting to itself certain rights, in a country that has not a master,
and be little desirous of possessing the whole country. In this
case, another may take what the first has neglected.' Nation, Nov.
21, 1895.
occupation that really counted. The Dutch have occupied the Essequibo for 300 years. Why should the United States try to make their successors, the English, leave?

Harper's on November 23, was still optimistic and found the words of the Spectator, (which was supposedly posted on Salisbury's views) to the effect that an Anglo-American war, would, in reality, be a civil war, comforting. Cleveland and Congress, according to Harper's might be depended upon to see that no war was declared and no overt act committed, despite the jingoes. Of course, America would stand firmly for the Monroe Doctrine--preferring arbitration, and desiring no alliances. The following week, Harper's quoted Mr. Richard Harding Davis' statement that Venezuela believed that the Monroe Doctrine meant that the United States would protect any Latin-American country from the unpleasant consequences of any act it might commit. In the opinion of the Weekly, Venezuela should be disabused immediately of any such impression.

In discussing Cleveland's annual message, the Nation was sorry for the insult Salisbury had given in not replying to the Olney note in time for the annual message. Of course, the Turkish crisis could probably be the excuse, however, the real reason, in the Nation's opinion, was merely to offend the United States, and to supply material, "which under the Monroe Doctrine, he was bound to furnish," for jingo speeches, (sarcasm). Perhaps, if the American navy was larger, the reply would have come more promptly.

1. Harper's, November 30, 1895.
Commenting editorially in the same issue, the _Nation_ remarked that President's message charged England with taking Venezuelan territory. In this case, instead of merely advocating arbitration, the United States should make up its mind whether to fight for Venezuela or not. The next question was--just what was the controversy? If Venezuela could secure arbitration of the territory in the territory in the gold fields, settled by the British, then might she not demand arbitration concerning other parts of Guiana? Venezuela, according to the _Nation_ was barbarous and did not belong to the group of civilized nations. It might be wise for the United States to curb its protege. Just because a state is weak, she must not be allowed to force arbitration just because of her weakness. As far as the United States was concerned, she should remember that interference here would set dangerous precedents--and probably result in the United States assuming responsibility for all Latin America. Another consideration must be kept in mind. In diplomacy, one nation should make it easy for the other to give in--unless war was really desired. In this case, was America prepared in the event Salisbury would not give in? On the other hand, _Harper's_, two days later, said that the president's message was calm, courteous, and self-respecting in tone. It stated the Monroe Doctrine clearly and firmly. It recommended arbitration, which in view of the "threatening state of affairs in Europe, and Asia" would probably be accepted. However, the United States should give England plenty of time and Cleveland could be trusted to pursue a conciliatory policy.

1. _Nation_, 1895, p. 420.
CHAPTER VII

THE ENGLISH REPLY

The earliest British reply to Cleveland's note and his annual message was made by the London Times. The tenor of the remarks of this paper was almost entirely conciliatory. According to this paper, the only change that had occurred in the long drawn out argument has been that "the effective occupation of the British side of the contested boundary line has greatly developed, and consequently, the practical argument of possession has been added to other arguments of a more historic character." Since the Monroe Doctrine forbade only new settlements and since England had been scrupulous in her acceptance of this idea, the Monroe Doctrine could not apply here at all. England wanted only what was hers, but determining just what was British was the difficulty. If these British rights should prove to be less than the British claim, then the Monroe Doctrine might apply. However, as yet, the Doctrine did not apply, because so far England had merely increased her settlements, but not her claims. As these settlements were extended, the area she was willing to submit to arbitration became smaller, and England became less conciliatory. The Times then reviewed the various English offers of settlement—and pointed out the many alleged violations by Venezuela of the agreement of 1850, which had culminated in the Cuyuni incident. A nation must certainly be tolerant of a weaker neighbor, but within limits. Perhaps, it was suggested, if representatives of the United States "can assist in bringing about a final decision of
the question, without the necessity of resort to unfriendly measures, they,(the measures) will not...be unwelcome." Since so many rumors were rife concerning the American dispatch, the Times thought it wise to state that the communication simply, at considerable length, purported to give the history of the question and to set forth the principles which would guide the United States in the matter. It was inevitable that under the circumstances, the statement of the case by the United States was drawn almost entirely from Venezuelan sources. Any reply England would make, could be made only after careful investigation and consideration of the facts and principles advanced by the United States. Incidentally the rumor that a British force was marching upon Venezuela from Brazil was absurd—in the first place, it would be impossible geographically.

A week later, the Times pointed out that the Schomburgk line was drawn by a man who was in full possession of all the documentary evidence that existed on either side, and who had actually traveled over the disputed area and consulted the aboriginal inhabitants. Concerning the dispute, this same Schomburgk said that in the interior, "Her majesty's government has an undoubted right to any territory through which flow any rivers which fall into the Essequibo." If this judgment were accepted, than Britain was really entitled to far more than she claimed. Schomburgk's line did not follow this extreme claim, because of the desire of England to show a friendly attitude toward a weaker state. In October, 1895, the only land England could agree to

2. See Map #5 for various lines.
arbitrate was that beyond the Schomburgk line.

In another article, the Times reviewed, American public opinion. It seemed that some of the American papers were just a bit "previous" in criticizing the ultimatum sent Venezuela by England. This communication did not directly concern the disputed boundary, but it simply demanded an apology and satisfaction for the Cuyuni "outrage". Venezuela was small, it was true, but just because of that smallness, she should not be allowed to insult Britain with impunity. Neither the Monroe Doctrine nor anything else could obscure the fact that the Schomburgk line was the absolute minimum of the British title—according to the real merit of the case.

In commenting, a week later, on the situation, the Times discussed the American and British jingoism, mentioning a dispatch from Washington to the New York Herald which purported that Olney maintained that the Monroe Doctrine forbade any enlargement of colonies by force and hence that the Doctrine applied in this dispute. Further, the United States urged arbitration and would continue to consider herself a party to the quarrel until it was finally settled. Meanwhile, Venezuela was prepared to offer heroic resistance, in case England adopted a more aggressive tone. Simultaneously, Venezuela offered to follow any advice that might be given by the United States. The New York Herald's comment on this dispatch was decidedly significant—to the effect that even if Venezuela was telling the

United States the truth, why should that nation interfere?

Of course, the leading American jingo, Lodge and Chandler, were sure that war would result. In Chandler's opinion, expressed in the Evening Monitor, "war was inevitable, 'on account of British disregard of America's direct interests' and also because of 'British encroachments upon other nations all over the world.'" An offensive war would require time, he said, but a defensive war could come at once. Russia and the United States (neither with colonial ambitions) would be allies. (All the United States wanted was: Sandwich Islands, a foothold in West Indies and all of Canada. All England's commercial ships were to be swept from the seas.) Chauncey M. Depew agreed with the opinion that in case of trouble with England, the only help United States would be likely to get would be that of Russia, because other European nations had interests in the West Indies. According to Depew's belief, war would mean: conquest of Canada; crippling of English trade; destruction of American coastal cities; shrinkage of all financial securities of value, and bankruptcy of many industries. However, he too expressed the belief that the whole thing was for purposes of the presidential campaign. Again the Herald remarked that: "'England after all is England. Whether in British Guiana, or in the China seas, her policy is directed by the same ideas and the same men. And blood is thicker than water and our kin beyond the sea are closer to us than any Tartars or Romanoffs can ever be."

The New York World joined in rebuking Chandler for suggesting war with England and an alliance with Russia, the worst surviving despotism except Turkey. Such a course was "without excuse and any other object than the gratification of insensate hatred and malice and the acquisition of territory which we do not want." Pursuing its attitude of spreading calming propaganda, the Times quoted a letter from a gentleman, long a resident in Venezuela, who expressed the opinion that most Venezuelans cared "not a straw" for the question of the boundary. In his opinion, most of the trouble had resulted from the attitude of selfish Englishmen—of the worst sort, who sought to secure concessions by curryimg favor with the rulers of Venezuela.

Paunceforte delivered Salisbury's reply to Olney on Saturday, December 7, 1895. Of course, secrecy had been observed in the State department, but according to unofficial, though reliable, sources, it discussed at length the history of the boundary dispute for the past 40 years and the same source suggested that Great Britain had not departed from her determination to regard the Schomburgk line as the minimum boundary Britain could accept. The American jingo journals maintained that Cleveland's duck hunting expedition was simply part of a conspiracy with Salisbury to delay the game. But other American papers believed it was a fortunate accident which would allow public opinion to calm down—despite Lodge and the other jingoes. Among the calmer Americans, was Mr. Carter who (according to the Times was a foremost American authority on international law) declared that

1. Times, Nov. 1, 1895, p. 865.
the "Venezuelan dispute was of no real concern to the United States unless Great Britain seeks to extend her territory, of which there is no evidence." He further pointed out that if the United States tried to go counter to international law, she would have the sympathies of the civilized nations to brook.

In the meantime, the Times' Caracas correspondent, who found little, but exceedingly noisy anti-British sentiment, reported that he had interviewed the President of Venezuela and that Crespo realized that the Cuyuni incident and the boundary dispute were distinct. In his opinion, the Venezuelans had exceeded their authority and would certainly be punished. Of course, the Englishmen would be compensated. According to the Times' Washington correspondent, Venezuela had been advised by the United States to adopt a conciliatory manner. Speaking editorially, the Times throughout the dispute used an exceedingly conciliatory interpretation of all facts. The Times pointed out that President Crespo must take into consideration public opinion and hence could not give into Great Britain. The Times just did not believe that United States meant what it said in defending Venezuela. Certainly, the Monroe Doctrine could not be stretched "to assert that a state like Venezuela should never be subject to retaliatory measures even though she were to declare war and proceed to acts of hostility". There seemed to be some discrepancy in the words of Cleveland and Monroe. England did approve the Monroe Doctrine, but England was not quite so sure about the Cleveland-Olney apocrypha. Of course, it must be remembered

that after all, the Monroe Doctrine was not international law. As far as the Times could see there was a considerable parallel in the United States—Florida dispute and the British Guiana-Venezuela argument. In each case it was a matter of actual occupation vs. ancient claim. In closing, the Times Editor quoted the Paris Debates with regard to the comparative weakness of the United States in a military and naval way. For England's part, there was no desire for war, but if the dispute was not skillfully handled, it just might lead to trouble—for the United States.

As for Salisbury's formal reply, it really was in two separate dispatches, both of which were thoughtfully and skillfully written, taking advantage of all the unfortunate phrases that had slipped by Cleveland and Olney. In the first dispatch, Salisbury set forth the English position with regard to the Monroe Doctrine. In this case, the Doctrine simply did not apply: First, because the Doctrine was not international law, and secondly, because this question was not a case of England's interfering with Venezuela. Instead, England and Venezuela were simply neighbors who had been unable to agree concerning their division line. It was a matter in which the United States could have no practical concern. Even so, the United States, by its demands would affect to assume the right of demanding that all frontier disputes involving a Latin American country and a European Power should be arbitrated or "it will greatly embarrass future relations" between that Power and the United States. This, of course, amounted

to a virtual American protectorate over the Latin American states; in which case, Salisbury pointed out, it would be the duty of the United States to see to it that these states behaved themselves. Continuing, Salisbury remarked that arbitration, although an excellent idea, presented two most important difficulties: first, of finding a competent and unbiased arbiter, and, second, of securing compliance with the award of the arbiter. Further criticizing Olney's stand, Salisbury reminded the United States that only those directly involved in any argument were fitted to judge about that dispute and that any interference by a third and disinterested party was unjustifiable and not based on any rules of international law. Only if the interests of the United States were directly affected, did the United States have a right to intervene. Of course, the judge of that was the United States. However, even if the American government did find American "interests" in this case, she still did not have sole rights.

Salisbury found Mr. Olney's statement "that distance and 3000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied" ridiculous, in the face of the facts of the Union of Great Britain and her American colonies. England agreed with Monroe's statement that new colonies should not be made, but she was not prepared to admit the internationally binding character of the Doctrine, nor that the United States was interested in every frontier dispute that might arise on American

soil, and certainly Great Britain would not agree that the United States was at all entitled to demand that such arguments be settled by arbitration. However, Salisbury still hoped for a "reasonable arrangement."

In his second note, Salisbury dealt with the history of the dispute, from 1814, when Britain acquired formal title to Guiana, to 1895. Up till that time, Great Britain had not realized that any other nation was interested in the dispute and therefore had not given her facts to any other nation. Hence, the American note was based entirely on Venezuelan sources, which necessarily, would not allow of an unbiased report. Salisbury therefore summarized the dispute from the English point of view. Contrary to Olney's opinion, the disagreement had begun in 1840, rather than in 1814. Always, one of the chief bases of the Venezuelan claim was the original discovery of America by Spain. (As an aside Salisbury suggested that perhaps the United States would like to arbitrate its boundary with Mexico for the same reason.) Salisbury willingly admitted that the Schomburgk line of 1840 was one of "convenience and expediency" as Olney suggested—England greatly reduced her just claim in an effort to settle the matter in a friendly way. Conciliation had been the guiding policy of Great Britain at all times, while Venezuela had been ridiculously extreme in her demands. Against Fortique's claim of 1844, to the Essequibo as the dividing line, Lord Aberdeen offered his proposal to use the Moruka as the start-

ing point in the settlement. Since this offer was still neglected in 1850, England gave notice that it had lapsed. However, because of the anxiety of the people in Venezuela that England meant to extend her boundaries, Britain concurred in the mutual non-aggression agreement of 1850. The founding of a town on the right bank of the Yuruari in 1858 was the first, but not the last Venezuelan violation of this engagement to which she had, in setting forth her claims, so often appealed.

An intermission of some 20 years was furnished by major Venezuelan revolutions, but in 1879, following more violations of the 1850 agreement, Señor Rojas renewed the argument by claiming for Venezuela all the land as far as the Essequibo, but added that his country was moved by a "spirit of conciliation and true friendship" toward England. In reply, early in 1880, Britain maintained that by right of conquest and concession by treaty, the line should begin on the coast west of the Berima, and in the interior follow the natural watershed between the Orinoco and Essequibo river basins. On the other hand, if the claim put forward by Blanco in 1877 were allowed, some 40,000 Englishmen living on territory that had been held by Holland and England for 200 years, would be surrendered, to Venezuelans. Concessions on both sides would be necessary. It was then that Señor Rojas proposed his line which roughly corresponded to the Aberdeen line. Granville, unwilling to accept this line in view of the changes that had taken place between

1. Blue Book, p. 28; Moore, p. 569, 570.
2. Moore, p. 570, 571.
3. Blue Book, p. 29; Moore, p. 571.
1844-1881, countered by suggesting a boundary which amounted to a considerable reduction of the Schomburgk line. Venezuela again gave no answer, other than to grant further concessions in the disputed area.

In 1884, news arrived that actual settlement in the region had been attempted. Following a warning to Venezuela, a British magistrate was sent to assert British rights. The only replies England received were demands for unconditional arbitration. Finally, England, tired of trying to make an acceptable concession, adopted the Schomburgk line, because of the progress of settlement within that line. As for the territory beyond that line, England was and had always been willing to arbitrate that claim.

According to Salisbury, Olney was wrong in his interpretation of the Treaty of 1886. By it, Venezuela and England promised to submit future, not pending disputes, to arbitration. Hence this entente did not apply to the boundary dispute. Roseberry proposed that the region between the Rojas and Granville lines be divided either—by joint concession, or by arbitration, as equally as natural boundaries would allow. Blanco declined this offer and demanded arbitration of the whole area. England refused this demand, and Venezuela, soon thereafter, severed diplomatic relations when England did not evacuate all the territory west of the Pomeroon.

During the unofficial discussions of 1890, 1891 and 1893, neither government changed its position. As for the maps which

1. Moore, p. 571; Blue Book, p. 29.
2. Blue Book, p. 30; Moore, p. 572.
Venezuela used as evidence because they were published in England, Salisbury pointed out that the English government certainly could not be held responsible for them for that reason alone. Salisbury concluded with the hope that a settlement might soon be reached. England, he said, was ever willing to arbitrate concerning lands which possess only gold—all she desired to keep were the lands upon which her citizens had trustingly taken up their abode.

Bayard, in commenting on Salisbury's replies approved of the good temper and moderation of tone which were displayed in them. He mentioned, too, that the unreliable character of the Venezuelan rulers and people resulted in an intangible, but dangerous responsibility for the conduct by them of their own foreign affairs. Bayard, however expressed the belief that the intervention of the United States would check the land grabbing tendency which was something of an Anglo-Saxon characteristic.

CHAPTER VIII
THE CRISIS

Salisbury's replies were delivered by Pauncefote on December 7, 1895. Cleveland was in North Carolina on a duck hunting trip, and so Olney immediately set to work on his report on their contents, which took the form of suggestions for the special message to Congress. He advised the President to ask for an appropriation for the expenses of a commission to determine the true boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana. When this boundary was determined, it would be communicated to Great Britain. And "appropriation of territory or exercise of jurisdiction by Great Britain beyond this line, except with the consent of Venezuela, would be regarded as wilfull aggression upon rights and interests of United States which this government cannot suffer to go undefended." Then Cleveland returned, he and Olney discussed the matter, and then Cleveland worked on the message the rest of that night. By noon the next day, the message, after further revision, was ready. Even after the revision the message was still far from mild. Although, Cleveland changed the wording, the menacing passages were kept. This special message was sent to Congress on Dec. 17, 1895. Cleveland reviewed the dispute since Olney's note of July. He enclosed the documents to Congress with the comment that Salisbury's reply was un-

1. Nevins, p. 638.
3. Nevins, p. 640; McElroy, II, p. 188.
satisfactory in its opinion that the boundary dispute was not covered by the real Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, Cleveland remarked, was certainly not obsolete. In fact, it was quite vital, and so long as it existed, it should be enforced. Certainly, he argued, an extension of boundary was an extension of power and this was expressly forbidden by Monroe Doctrine. Perhaps, he admitted, the Doctrine was not international law. Even so, its relation to the United States was "peculiar, if not exclusive". England even admitted, said Cleveland, that the United States might be interested in any fresh acquisitions of territory in the Americas, by a European Power. Continuing, the message suggested that the fair, common sense method of settling the matter would be by arbitration. But England had declined such a course. This was of course, a disappointment to the United States. Now if Venezuela was still unwilling to accept Britain's scheme for partial arbitration, the United States had only one path open and that was to investigate the claims carefully and decide upon the boundary and then defend it by force of arms if Britain refused to accept it. In order to determine this boundary, the appointment of a commission by the President should be authorized and financed by Congressional act. Congress responded in the requested manner and authorized the appointment of a commission. In the opinion of Congress, a crisis existed which called for united congressional action. No time for

2. Times, Dec. 20, 1895; McElroy, II, p. 189, 190; Moore, p. 577, 578.
any criticism of the President that would allow the British press to say that Cleveland did not have support of his country. And disagreements with the executive policy must be silenced. $100,000 was made available for the commission's use.

At which point Mr. Boutelle (Republican) of Maine called the message the desperate device of an astute politician to divert attention from the colossal blundering of the administration. He pointed out that in leaving a loophole by which Venezuela might settle her dispute without American approval, the United States really gave away the Monroe Doctrine. The Senate cast all restraint aside and applauded enthusiastically. For once Cleveland gained the approval even of the Republican Senators. Members of the House regardless of party cheered to an echo the vigorous message of the President. The consensus of senatorial opinion was at first extremely patriotic, even jingoistic, as a Senator put it, "War would be a good thing even if we got whipped for it would rid us of English bank rule".

Of the high governmental officials only Bayard raised his voice in protest. On the 18th, he wrote, enclosing a copy of the Times, that he was gravely apprehensive of the policy which allowed the welfare and interests of America to be imperiled or complicated by such a country as Venezuela. He further pointed out that apparently the position taken by the President was such as to affect every European claim in America.

In his reply to Bayard, Cleveland admitted that he

was no authority on the Monroe Doctrine. He only knew that Bayard and others who were supposed to know had quoted the Doctrine as applying to this controversy. If the Monroe Doctrine was not obsolete, then it should be used, regardless of the consequences, when the facts called for its application. Cleveland then recalled Bayard's former friendly attitude toward Latin America, but added that in getting into this argument, the United States was defending, not Venezuela primarily, but herself. Proceeding further, Cleveland reminded Bayard that so far the United States had taken no stand as to which of the disputants was correct, but the United States did say that a controversy had arisen and continued in which the United States was interested and that this disagreement was of precisely such a nature as to be best settled by impartial arbitration. Continuing, Cleveland was just a little disappointed that England did not yield or concede something when the American government was trying to check the jingoes. The only possible complaint England could make concerning the United States would be the action of Congress in the Bering Sea Case—but that was not the fault of the administration. Since Great Britain maintained that she had a perfect case, why should she refuse arbitration? All that the United States proposed to do was to determine the facts of the case. When these had been attained, then Congress would be free to act.

As far as public opinion in America with regard to the message was con-

cerned, it was of three kinds: jingoistic, critical, and anti-jingoistic. In the first group were such papers as Watterson's Courier-Journal and Dana's New York Sun; in the second class were the Nation and Harper's while the New York World was in the third group. While the Sun was exhuberantly happy at the prospect of war, the World was calling Cleveland's message a "serious blunder." Continuing the World wanted to know why, if England wanted to attack us, should she do it through Venezuela when Canada was so much more conveniently situated? Then, too, how could England, who had owned land in the western hemisphere before we had and still controlled a greater area, be called a foreign country? However, despite the bluster, the World seriously doubted the probability of war and predicted "a more or less graceful backdown." The Sun's chief difficulty was in determining whether it hated Cleveland or England more. This presented quite a dilemma. The Boston Herald pointed out that Cleveland had taken a "new and dangerous path, the end of which cannot be foreseen." The Nation believed that Salisbury's estimate of the situation was sensible. In the light of this dispatch Cleveland's statement in his December 3, annual message, seemed "criminally rash and insensate," and his threat of war "disgraceful." Suppose the United States did help Venezuela in this case, then all Latin American nations would probably feel that they might do as they pleased and Uncle Sam would protect them. Then indeed the United

1. Nevins, p. 641; Times, Dec. 12, 1895.
States would need an army and navy. In seeking the reason for the almost magical change that came over Cleveland between 1893, when he believed that international law was based on justice, and 1895 when he joined the savages, the _Nation_ suggested the possibility that he might be attempting to bolster up the executive weakness of the Democratic party. The picture of Cleveland, always stolid, and reputedly, a conservative, as leader of the jingoistic Lodge, Chandler and others of their type was a bit uncongruous. Following somewhat the same idea, _Harper's_ noted the patriotic feeling aroused despite the conciliatory tone of Salisbury's reply. However, almost immediately an undercurrent desire for a quick peace appeared and grew constantly stronger. _Harper's_ faith in Cleveland was still strong enough so that that paper was not exceedingly worried about the ultimate outcome.

Aside from the newspapers, the three powerful moulders of public opinion, the preachers, the teachers and the lawyers were almost unanimous in their condemnation of Cleveland's message.

John Bassett Moore, one of the outstanding authorities on international law, warned Cleveland (whom he had loyally supported in the presidential campaign) through a letter to Wilson (Post-Master General) that his message had "started us on a course that involves not only the abandonment of all our traditions, but also participation in numberless quarrels." Arbitration was undoubtedly a fine thing said Mr. Moore, but nations just don't agree to arbitrate without first reaching a basis of settlement by direct negotiation. United States went a little far in saying that arbitra-

tion was the only way to determine a fair boundary. Further he pointed out that, by custom, boundaries in South America have almost always been determined by *uit possidetis* or actual possession. In addition Moore said "for 20 years Venezuela, instead of settling her boundary dispute, has in various ways, some of them obviously dishonest, been trying to drag the United States into the dispute, and the United States has progressed goodnaturedly, step by step, without examining the merits of the case, till at length, with a sudden impulse it leaps over the precipice blindly." And what was the position then held by the United States? It was substantially this: "When a weak American republic asserts a claim to territory in America as against a strong European occupant, and offers to submit its claim to arbitration, the European Power, if it refuses the offer, is to be considered as holding the territory by force, and as infringing the Monroe Doctrine." To Venezuela we say, "You are an American Republic, and in your claims against European Powers we back you. True, you settled your southern boundary directly on a basis of *uit possidetis*, but this principle, though applicable everywhere else in South America, is inapplicable to your eastern boundary. Even the great doctrine of prescription, recognized by every publicist from the age of Grotius, and the very foundation of the peace of nations is not applicable to that boundary. Claim what you will and propose arbitration of it and I will step in and say

1. McElroy, p. 184, 185.
it can be settled no other way. I know nothing of the merits of the controversy. I am simply backing you. This is according to the Monroe Doctrine." Moore believed though, that Cleveland did not mean what he said else, United States would be embarking on as "mad and fatal" a career as that which Louis XIV started for France.

Professor Beale of Harvard Law School, joined with John Bassett Moore in asserting that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable in this case. Professor Woolsey of Yale maintained that Cleveland, since he was attempting to enforce his decision after one of the disputants had rejected him, was a dictator, not a mediator. Chandler, meanwhile, introduced a $100,000 war expense bill in Senate.

In the opinion of the Times these things would aid greatly in calming down public opinion. Another thing that must be considered was that many had trusted Cleveland's sobriety. They were now disappointed at his metamorphosis into a jingo. Perhaps the ambition of a third term was responsible. As far as England was concerned the results of Cleveland's message were alarm and surprise, and as far as she could see, the only possible object to be gained through such definite procedure was a chance for a third term. It looked like a definite play for the Irish-American vote. Generally speaking, the English leaders, the people and the press all exhibited an admirable restraint and on the whole a conciliatory spirit. In the words of the Chancellor

2. One of the earliest results of the special message to Congress and its response was a tenseness that closely approached a panic on the Stock Exchange, Times, p. 1005, Dec. 20, 1895.
of the Exchequer, when the British case "'was laid before the people'" on either side of the Atlantic, "'the result would be happy, peaceful, and honorable to both parties.'" This was typical of the opinion of the British, but of course Sir John Redmond, still smarting, admittedly, from the rejection of Irish Home Rule was all on the side of America. In a letter to the *Times* one Englishman pointed out that there were two excellent reasons why United States and England would not go to war: (1) "If a near relation is rude and offensive, there is no sense of humiliation in not resenting the rudness, in order to avoid a family scandal," and (2) England has 1000 million invested in America—which is too much to pay to fight one's own 'kith and kin.' However, the *Times* while regretting the possibility of a rupture in Anglo-American friendship, believed England could not submit to such dictation as the United States would impose. The United States would certainly not do so. England though, while remaining firm in her insistence on her rights, should not adopt an aggressive tone. The attitude that the *Times* used throughout the dispute was quite comparable to that which an indulgent and devoted, yet wise parent would use toward a beloved but slightly naughty child. Cleveland's proposals were more astounding than any made since time of Napoleon. The Monroe Doctrine it characterized as "pious opinion" of America rather than international law. As for Olney's and Cleveland's 'deductions'—

they were preposterous". Britain certainly would not recognize
the right of any commission, appointed in such a way, to decide
the controversy. Neither could it expect any assistance from
England. The United States, said the Times, was pursuing im-
proper tactics. If she wished to fight Venezuela's battles,
then she should become her ally. As for the famous "3000
miles" sentence and the Latin American Republic phrases, the
Times waxed indignant, almost to the point of wordlessness—
but not quite, for this gem emerges: "'e think we have some-
thing of self-government here, even though we have not yet
developed a Tammany Hall"...It should be remembered that 1896
is a presidential year in America and the Democrats need the
Irish-American support.

PART III

THE

SETTLEMENT

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CHAPTER IX

THE RETURN OF SANITY

Following shortly upon the wave of war fever, there was a definite reaction in favor of peace. This sentiment as it was expressed in the newspapers, reflected public opinion, or influenced it, rather generally, at least, it is as reliable an index as it available. The causes for this rapid reversion of opinion were rather complex. In the first place, the panic, coming as it did in the midst of a financial depression, frightened business men and particularly those who were interested in businesses in which large shares were owned by Englishmen. Naturally this feeling was most widespread in the Atlantic seaboard cities, while the jingoistic spirit was strongest in the more western region. However, it was not difficult to find exceptions to this rule. The New York Sun defended the President, while the New York World criticized him for having "evoked either a storm of war or a storm of ridicule". The Tribune, meanwhile, had repented of its "patriotic debauch" and now believed that the patriotism was a "thinly veiled form of insanity." At the same time, America was beginning to realize that she could count

1. Times, Dec. 27, 1895, news quotes Sun and World.
on the support of no European country vs. England. The United States began, finally, after the figures concerning American and British navies were published, to see that perhaps England wasn’t really desirous of stealing American territory.

At length, the senate passed the commission bill, which in the opinion of the 'reformed' Tribune was needlessly offensive to Great Britain. Besides, it was appointed without the consent of either of the disputants and hence could not be a "competent court of arbitration." In addition, Cleveland had prejudged the case and all his commission was to ratify his judgment. Both the New York Herald and the World condemned the message as a blunder and as a mischievous "stretching" of Monroe Doctrine. As the financial situation grew more and more acute just at Christmas time, the Nation grew increasingly cross at the logic of Olney and Cleveland which would establish over the states of Latin America, protectorates which would not protect. Irritably the Nation asked: What business of the United States was this dispute? Must the United States turn itself into an armed camp because of Latin America's troubles?

Cleveland finally had to deliver a special message to Congress urging them to take action to protect America and its people during the financial crisis. Cleveland evidently had lacked imagination enough to foresee the "inevitable effect" of

5. Times, Dec. 27, 1895, p. 1024 quotes the Message.
his own threat of war. Meanwhile, Cleveland's supporters demanded that Wall Street display its patriotism by buying American securities at a loss. Chauncey Depew estimated the amount lost in the three days following the President's first special message at $400,000,000. According to the New York World, it was not the Monroe Doctrine part of the message that caused the panic, but the open threat of war. In addition, the World asked various important British leaders for an opinion: Gladstone advised use of common sense while Roseberry agreed and besides deplored possibility of war. The Times correspondent expressed the belief that "rational, peaceful and conciliatory views" were becoming constantly more dominant forces in American public opinion. The jingoism, in their enthusiasm for war, had stirred up a real alarm and their cry that all who disagreed with the President were traitors, met with laughter. The New York Tribune apparently had recovered safely from its attack of jingo insanity. "Let us have peace" had become its theme song and it applauded the common sense attitude of businessmen on both sides of the Atlantic, since it had greatly relieved the political tension.

However, the financial situation of December 23, was still acute. In the belief of Mr. Hepburn of the Third National Bank, Cleveland had brought American credit lower

than it had been since the close of the Civil War. In some quarters, there was some hope kindled because of the rise of prices in London. As for the sermons of December 22, they were almost entirely anti-jingoistic in tone. No president ever received a more unanimous and crushing rebuke than Cleveland got on that Sunday. "Morally, he was impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors."

The Times reported that Venezuela and Brazil had approved of the United States action publicly. However, a private telegram from Brazil expressed the opinion that really Brazil did not sanction the idea of a United States protectorate for Latin America.

Meanwhile, from Guiana came reports of enlarged development there, and the most pleasant relations with the increased Venezuelan garrison in the Cuyuni. Canada, ever loyal, would prepare to do her part in case of any trouble, England was assured. France in le Temps rejoiced at the apparent breaking of the bubble—that was Anglo-American friendship. In the Soir, more frankly, France stood by England in this case because of her own interest and not through love of England. Of the other continental nations only Russia failed to criticize Cleveland as entirely responsible for the crisis.

As for individuals, while Mr. Andrew Carnegie extolled the beauties of arbitration, Mr. Walter Phelps Dodge pointed out that Cleveland's message was an appeal for support of the people of a cherished principle and not an election device. The average American, he said (and truly) was very hazy as to what the Monroe Doctrine was; he cared nothing about Venezuela or her frontier; he liked Great Britain as the mother country, but he was still enough of a Puritan to undertake a "holy war" against his own "kith and kin" in defence of his convictions—even about little understood ideas or ideals. In a Bristol speech, the English chancellor of the Exchequer gave three excellent rules for keeping a war from developing from a disagreement: (1) "Use no provoking language", (2) "Do not be easily provoked", (3) "Keep your head cool", and the advised 3 that these rules be applied in Venezuelan crisis. For England, though, in the opinion of the Times Editor, there was a lesson in the crisis—she must "strain every nerve to retain...the indisputable command of the seas on which our Empire depends."

Late in December, the Times quoted Reuter's, New York correspondent to the effect that the President's boundary commission would be technical in character and that its investigation would be scientific and as nonpartisan as possible. The

1. Times, p. 1027.
2. Nation, Jan. 2, 1896, Cooper Union Meeting, Mr. Henry George expressed same idea. This was the best explanation of American public opinion.
3. Times, p. 1027.
Nation did not see how Salisbury could to other than ignore this commission: In fact it was "absurd" to believe that he would cooperate with it. Then it would be impossible to draw a fair line with only Venezuelan evidence. Under these circumstances, no decent lawyer would sit on the commission.

Almost as soon as Congress had approved the commission idea, Cleveland proceeded with the appointment of its members, January 4, 1896. The five men he chose were all exceedingly able and distinguished: David J. Brewer, associate justice of the Supreme Court; Richard H. Alvey, chief justice of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia; Andrew D. White, ex-President of Cornell University and ex-Minister to Russia; Frederick R. Coudert, one of the counsel for the United States in the Bering Sea arbitration; and Daniel C. Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University. The duty of this commission was "to examine upon the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana". The Commission under Justice Brewer as chairman, was to be entirely its own master and although the State department would give assistance, if needed, yet it was not to take sides. It was to seek all possible sources of information and apply all pertinent rules of municipal and international law and make its report to the President. Mr. Coudert had expressed an opinion previous to appointment that

England was absorbing territory. Now he would find out.

Both the Nation and the London Times felt, early in January, from a perusal and review of the events and press comments, that the fever for war in America had just about disappeared.

On January 3, Olney acknowledged receipt of a Venezuelan proposal that all the states of North, Central, and South America make an agreement so that the Guiana dispute could be settled quickly. By January, the World was quite out of patience with Cleveland. His view of the Monroe Doctrine was a "monstrous" and "inexcusable distortion." The Sun believed that the present prospect of war was past, but that an ultimate war with Great Britain was probable so long as Britain owned Canada—"an outpost of aggressive hostility against United States."

Senator Gray, a close friend of Cleveland, said that the commission was established to secure information for the American government and people—and not to dictate to Great Britain. In his opinion, the Monroe Doctrine could not apply to, nor the United States government have anything to do with, such a boundary dispute. Congressman Woodward quoted Cleveland as having said that war talk was to be deplored. An investigation had been begun, but no judgment should be given until the facts are determined. As for the Times itself, it suggests that perhaps the British Foreign Office should have given England's side of

2. Moore, p. 582.
of case wider publicity, especially since England as well as the United States has been flooded with Venezuela propaganda.

In Venezuela, the holiday season was one of great and enthusiastic anti-British demonstration. The Venezuelans demanded arbitration or war. The Herald at that point expressed belief that Venezuela should be warned that the United States had no intention of fighting Venezuela's battles. Further, Venezuela now decided to pay no indemnity for the Cuyuni incident. In the opinion of the New York World, Venezuela was simply preparing for war. The head of her army and navy arrived in the United States, and was quoted as saying: "It is not so much a question of British encroachments upon Venezuelan territory, as that encroachment, if submitted to, would have the appalling result of encouraging Great Britain to claim other portions of the western hemisphere." A naval base on the Orinoco would endanger all South America, he said.

About this time, Lord Playfair, who was interested in trying to avert trouble suggested (1) a conference between United States and all nations having colonies in western hemisphere to proclaim the Monroe Doctrine. In this way the Doctrine could become international law, (2) the dispute over the boundary might be settled by friendly arbitration of all unsettled land. (3) These arbitrators could use the information gathered by United States commission. Bayard, in transmitting this suggestion, favored the first point. Cleveland, however, disapproved of the

idea of a European conference because he believed the thing could be settled better by England and United States. The conversations between Playfair and Bayard continued, but Olney would not agree to the inclusion of settled districts just arbitrarily.

Then the conversations were continued through Smalley. The part played by the *London Times* New York correspondent, Mr. Smalley, in aiding in the peaceful settlement of this dispute, was enormous. He possessed the confidence of Buckner, the Editor of *Times*, and Buckner had access to the Foreign Office. Throughout the acute period of the dispute, the Times, of course, secured its information from, and based its opinions and views of, its New York and Washington correspondent. In reporting American public opinion, he carefully quoted a few adverse or jingoistic comments and then offset these with comments of a more conciliatory character.

Just at the time this controversy was at its peak, Dr. Jameson attempted a raid into the Transvaal, in South Africa. He failed. Thereupon the German Kaiser precipitated a general European crisis by sending the President of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, a telegram of congratulation. This was the traditional saving of the Venezuelan situation—but actually it had never, except perhaps for a moment, needed saving. In the first place, of the four men who were responsible for carrying on the official negotiations: Cleveland and Salis-

2. James, *Olney*, p. 120, 121.
3. Dennis, p. 37.
bury were definitely conservative, and on the whole sensible and able; while Chamberlain and Olney were definitely in favor of friendly Anglo-American relations. With the exceedingly able assistance of Smalley and Buckner, there was little real danger of a war despite the mouthings of Lodge, Davis, Chandler, and the Irish. Carl Schurz, meanwhile, suggested a joint commission, and just at this point, the question of settlements arose. The next suggestion of Smalley's was exceedingly valuable because it pointed the way out. Since information concerning the English side of the case was almost nil in America, he advised that an official statement of the English position would be exceedingly helpful. Frankness on England's part would greatly handicap the work of jingoists. In Conan Doyle's view, one reason for the slightly anti-English feeling in America was the fact that Englishmen tended to pick flaws in America rather than point out its virtues. Mr. Bryce alone, of British visitors to America, had been courteous. As for Venezuela, it was a poor and revolution-torn country, where there was almost no public interest in either of the disputes with England.

On January 4, England's chief interest, according to the Times correspondent, was American goodwill. In another article, it was suggested under date of January 7, that there was nothing of "particular sanctity" about the Schomburgk line. The main

consideration, of course, was to secure a boundary that would leave the settlements secure. The United States was warned, though, not to regard this conciliatory attitude as a surrender caused by any troubles England might have in Africa or Europe or Asia. However, just at this point, the Transvaal question and Anglo-German relations connected with it occupied the leading place both in the News and Editorial columns of the Times. The Venezuelan dispute became quite definitely secondary, and the tone of the writing showed that the English effort at conciliation was much more determined. The South African affair was not Venezuela's only rival, though, for the Armenian Massacres and the troubles in British India had also to be discussed at considerable length. On January 6, the Times editorial remarked significantly: "In the face of the many obvious dangers of the present state of things, our New York correspondent pleads again for the 'fullest and earliest disclosure of the English case,'" This would be evidence of the good faith of England and would certainly appeal to the American sense of fair play and reason. If legal difficulties prevent immediate publication of a Blue Book why not use the London Gazette to tell both Englishmen and Americans about the whole thing? The Nation pointed out, as early as January 2, that the Manoa Company, which had been granted a Venezuelan concession inside the British claim, was an American organization. According to the Times, these concession hunters had a great deal to do with bringing the dispute to a head. The

Manoa Company charter had been nullified in 1886 when Venezuela had failed in her effort to persuade Bayard to force arbitration on England. Then, in June 1895, just one month before Olney's message, this same Company was rechartered.

By the middle of January, with the decision of Great Britain to publish its evidence, the dispute was definitely over as far as any possibility of war was concerned—much to Mr. Lodge's disappointment. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan commission, through Olney, requested English cooperation in furnishing evidence. Mr. H. R. Mill, a geographer, in an article in *Nature* of January 2, objected to all the lines that had so far been proposed because they "cut natural features and mathematical lines all angles, and in irregular curves which it would be impossible to describe verbally or to lay out accurately on the ground without a survey as minute as for a railway." Since the region was one of the most densely forested in the world, cut by huge rivers and many creeks, such a survey would require years.

Throughout the last of January and early February, English leaders busied themselves making conciliatory speeches, in which they referred to war with America as an "unnatural horror".

1. *Nation*, Jan. 16, 1896, p. 43; *Nation*, Feb. 20, 1896, p. 149. reports an investigation conducted by *New York Evening Post* shows this Company did not influence American Government. In fact, Gresham had warned American officials against such connections. (1896)
American jingoes, though, were still unwilling to give up their war but the Davis resolutions, which reaffirm strongly the Monroe Doctrine, almost their final effort, failed. England was now willing to negotiate directly with Venezuela provided United States would see to it that Venezuela was reasonable.

CHAPTER X
THE END OF THE STORY

Meanwhile Olney had continued his negotiations with Salisbury through an unofficial channel—the London Times. Bayard wrote a confidential note to Olney in which he maintained that England desired an honorable settlement and that even the American version of the Monroe Doctrine would be approved. In reply, Olney suggested arbitration of the "settlements" dispute. The Times, in a private message, accepted binding arbitration provided all districts that had been bona fide settlements for 10 years were to be excluded on either side. Then Olney, on receiving no reply to his previous suggestion, wired to inquire the reason, since his plan was in line with the semi-official Times editorials. He reminded England that it would be most unfortunate if the dispute should continue on till summer—during Presidential campaign. Then, too, if, pursuant of his suggestion, negotiations were transferred to Washington, where England and Venezuela were both represented, a settlement could be arranged more conveniently. But haste should be made because the Venezuelan legislature would adjourn in sixty days.

Then came the opening of Parliament. This gave all the important English officials opportunities to make conciliatory speeches, which they did. The Queen led the way, followed closely by Salisbury, Sir William Harcourt, (who according to

1. Dennis, p. 39.
2. Dennis, p. 40.
3. Dennis, p. 40.
his own story, preached conciliation to Balfour, and Balfour.
On February 3, 1896, Bayard delivered to Salisbury, the messa-
2
from Olney, in which Brewer asked for British evidence.
Salisbury's reply to this very polite note was gracious. The
Nation suggested that compliments would come next and then
the whole thing would be settled. As a matter of fact, a gen-
eral Anglo-American arbitration treaty actually was suggested
and finally negotiated. But, of course, the Senate refused to
ratify it. This put the dispute back on a pre-July 20 basis.
Some of the American newspapers bragged to an unseemly extent
about the way Cleveland brought England to her knees—but this
was not representative of most of America. Salisbury agreed
early in March to the transfer of negotiations to Wash-
6
The Times approved this move

1. Dennis, p. 41; Harper's, Feb. 29, 1896; McElroy, II, p. 200;
Rhodes, Vol. VIII, p. 451; Salisbury's speech, quotes Parlia-
ment debates, 52, Feb. 11, 1896: "The mixture of the United
States in this matter (Venezuelan) may conduce to results which
will be satisfactory to us more rapidly than if the United States
had not interferred. I do not think the bringing in of the Monroe
Doctrine was controversially quite unnecessary for the United States
considering the position of Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea, it was
no more unnatural that the United States should take an interest
in it than we should feel an interest in Holland and Belgium...I
have derived an increasing belief during the last few weeks that
we shall...find some settlement of the question satisfactory and
that all danger of any conflict between the two nations who have
so many causes for wishing to be at peace, will be entirely re-
moved."
2. Blue Book, p. 32.
editorially because by it England "would have the satisfaction of dealing directly with the responsible and friendly government of the United States." The House of Commons gave the Cabinet a free hand and allowed no discussion. If the United States was able to 'manage' Venezuela then the dispute should be ended quickly. Of course, no details had yet been agreed upon officially. The next move should have been Olney's proposal of his joint commission. Meanwhile the Nation reminded the American people that it was not the gold fields, which Salisbury had refused to arbitrate, but the settled areas.

It was around this question that Anglo-American conversations revolved throughout the spring and early summer of 1896. Early in March, Andrade, Venezuelan minister in Washington, and Pauncefote, the English minister, entered into direct negotiations about the Cuyuni incident. This was the first official and direct communication that had taken place between these two nations since 1887.

By the end of the first week in March, Harper's believed that although England had not been "dignified" nor "frank" in her attitude toward Venezuela, nor friendly in her refusal to accept arbitration, yet she needed the friendship of the United States. However, Harper's did not modify its criticism of Cleveland and the jingoes and it thoroughly appreciated England's anxiety about

3. Times, March 6, 1896, p. 188, News.
her citizens—certainly they were entitled to "the right to security and protection afforded by the British law and the British system of administering laws."

Not to be outdone by the Blue Book, Venezuela presented to the United States a forty page printed report of the minister of the Interior, dated May 23, 1890 in which the story of British advances into alleged Venezuelan territory were described. The implication of this report, said the Times, was that England lured Venezuela to the coast and then persuaded the Indians to show them the gold mines of the interior.

The Commission, meanwhile, spiked a rumor that it had found the Venezuelan position untenable, by stating that it had just begun its investigation and the pending a view of the Spanish and Dutch archives, no decision would be reached. The Commission expressed a desire to see England and Venezuela settle the matter themselves. The Blue Book contained some errors, in the opinion of the Commission, but these were not intentional was quite evident since some of them prejudiced the British case.

Even the last vestiges of jingoism were fading out of picture by April of 1896. Both the Nation and Harner's complimented the Brooklyn speech of ex-minister Phelps. It was a..."Remarkable display of common sense on a topic which has apparently a remarkable affinity for folly and ignorance."

1. Harner's, March 7, 1896.
3. Times, March 27, 1896, p. 236.
chief difficulty in such crises continued the Nation is that those who, like Lodge and Chandler, are "one-third ignoramus, one-third to fool and one-third knave" rave on and on—then months later the able and sensible citizens speak. The Cuyuni incident was finally settled as the result of the Pauncefote-Andrade negotiations by Venezuela's agreeing to pay Great Britain a $5000 indemnity.

However, Smalley was worried in April, because Olney's proposal for settlement by a joint commission had not been accepted by Salisbury, and the United States had not agreed to Salisbury's counter proposal and time was approaching for the Senate of adjourn. The Times editor believed that Salisbury was spending his time on the general arbitration treaty and neglecting the Venezuelan case—but there was danger in such procedure. Smalley next reported that his fears were shared by Cleveland and tactfully suggested that Salisbury had better return to the question of "settlements".

Pauncefote, meanwhile, had been authorized to discuss the whole boundary dispute with Andrade anytime Venezuela should agree to such a course. The English government refused to be worried by the possibility of a report by the Commission in the fall.

On May 8, the American commission through Olney, requested documentary verification of Blue Book's statements. Salisbury replied that these additional documents were in process of publication and that advance copies would be sent the Commission.

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1. Nation, March 19, and April 2, 1896, p. 228; Harper's, Apr. 18, 1896.
2. Times, April 10, 1896, p. 270.
3. Times, April 24, 1896, p. 299.
as soon as possible. England would gladly render any further assistance in her power. Again in May, Salisbury repeated his statement concerning his willingness to settle jurisdiction of the unsettled regions by arbitration, regardless of Schomburgk line. In order to secure this result he proposed: (1) creation of a joint Anglo-American Commission to examine facts, a majority decision of this commission to be binding, (2) Venezuela and England would then attempt to settle their argument on this basis, (3) failing, arbitration (by a court composed of one British, and one Venezuelan, and one of their choice) should be used. (4) Bona fide English settlements of 1887 not to be included.

Olney replied that the United States was unable to accept this plan, because of the great chance that the joint investigating Commission of four would be unable to reach a decision. Then there was the ever troublesome question: "What is a Bona fide settlement? In June of 1887, he pointed out, the Governor of British Guiana, had said that any people who sought concessions in the disputed area were to be given to understand that Venezuela might secure such land at a future date. Nevertheless, British citizens might have been led to believe that they were settling on British territory. In his opinion, the commission should have an uneven number of members so that a decision might be reached. Occupation should be considered, but should not be the only factor of importance.

1. Foreign Affairs, 1896, p. 242, 243, 244.
On July 7, Salisbury corrected Olney's conclusion that all British settlements were to remain British, he only said that they could not be given to Venezuela. His intention was that the final disposition of these districts which had been long settled by British, should be by subsequent negotiation.

Although this nicety of explanation struck Olney as a little queer (since land which could not be held by Venezuela would surely revert to British Guiana), he asked if England would agree to arbitrate all territory except that which had been actually occupied by either party for a period of sixty years? This suggestion led directly, but not immediately, to the final settlement.

In the meantime, Venezuela had to be "persuaded" to be reasonable. In June, a Mr. Harrison, a British citizen, engaged in directing roadbuilding in the Berima-Cuyuni section, was arrested by Venezuelans for trespassing on their territory. This led to English police protection for surveyors and roadbuilders in that region. Mr. Harrison's release was immediately demanded, but was not secured till great pressure was brought to bear by the British government. This simply complicated the situation for the moment.

Despite the fact that no agreement had yet been reached in July, confidence was expressed that an amicable settlement would be reached by autumn. With the appearance in August of the additional Blue Book, the Times believed that all the Venezuelan

1. Foreign Affairs, 1896, p. 171.
2. James, Olney, p. 120-121; Foreign Affairs, 1896, p. 253; McElroy, II, p. 201; Times, July, 24, 1896, p. 507.
4. Times, July 24, 1896, p. 512; Aug. 21, 1896, p. 571; The Kaituma Railroad was a great surprise to British Guiana, since it was being planned merely to facilitate mining operations.
charges concerning alteration and expansion of Schomburgk line were effectively answered. The American and British peoples (by the fall of 1896) were growing exceedingly weary of the long drawn out dispute. All the passionately patriotic agitation had vanished.

Early in November, the American commission announced that, since it seemed probable that an agreement would be arrived at, through direct Anglo-Venezuelan negotiations, to settle the argument by arbitration, it would refrain from making any report. Instead, it would simply place its findings at the disposal of the arbitral tribunal.

On November 12, Pauncefote and Olney agreed upon the heads of a Treaty to be arranged between Venezuela and Great Britain, providing for arbitration of the disputed territory, excepting, however, settlements of fifty years standing. The tribunal was to be composed of two members of United States Supreme Court, two members of the British Supreme Court and a fifth member to be selected by the other four if they could agree; if not, then by the King of Sweden.

However, as Salisbury pointed out, this Anglo-American agreement still lacked the consent of Venezuela. Diplomatic relations should be resumed and then the various details could easily be worked out. He maintained though that the way was now open for an honorable and satisfactory settlement. Englishmen

2. Times, October 23, 1896, p. 715; James, Olney, p. 121.
3. Times, Nov. 13, 1896, p. 762; Salisbury's Childs hill speech was so friendly. Times, Nov. 13, 1896, p. 768.
5. Times, Nov. 20, 1896, p. 784.
generally seemed to share this view.

President Cleveland in his annual message to Congress in December, 1896, concurred with Salisbury in the view that the controversy was practically closed: "A complete accord has been reached between them, (United States and England) by which the substantial terms of a treaty of arbitration to be concluded by Great Britain and Venezuela have been agreed upon, the provisions of which embrace a full arbitration of the whole controversy upon bases alike, just and honorable to both the contestants." Only the formal treaty remained to be signed.

On February 2, 1897, the Anglo-Venezuelan treaty was finally signed in the State department at Washington. Since it was not an American treaty in form, it did not require the concurrence of the Senate. This treaty (Art. XIII) bound the signatory powers "to consider the results of the proceedings of the tribunal of arbitration as a full, perfect and final settlement of all questions referred to the arbitrators." This treaty was duly ratified and ratifications were exchanged on June 14, 1897.

Then the arbitrators were chosen. For the English, Baron Hershell and Sir Richard Henn Colling; for the United States, Honorable Kelvin U. Fuller and Honorable David J. Brewer. The fifth member of the arbitral tribunal was Frederick de Martens. However, before the court could meet, Baron Hershell died, and

Baron Russell was named to take his place.

A preliminary meeting was held in May of 1899 and de Martens was chosen as president. The informal first meeting of the court took place June 14, in Paris, and the trial was opened on June 15, with the hearing of the beginnings of the British case. From then till September 28, the trial continued.

After a careful five-day review, after all of the evidence was submitted by both sides, the Tribunal on October 3, rendered its unanimous decision. The chosen line gave to Venezuela control of the mouth of the Orinoco, the Barima, and the Amacura. England also lost a little land between the Wenamu and Cuyuni Rivers, which had been included in the Schomburgk line. Otherwise, that line was used. By this award, according to one of the British counsel: "Venezuela claimed 60,000 square miles and has obtained 200 square miles...All the plantations of valuable timber and the gold fields are indisputably settled to be within British territory."

The Venezuelen representatives, General Harrison and Mr. Mallet-Prevost, believed that Venezuela had profited greatly because of the intervention of the United States. In this way she had secured arbitration of the dispute and thereby Venezuela had gained control of the Orinoco, the Barima and Amacura mouths.

2. Times, 1899, p. 386.
3. Times, 1899, p. 634.
Yet the line was frankly one of diplomatic compromise and not really a determination of legal rights. In this sense it was not arbitration at all.  

Speaking editorially the *Times*, maintained that the decision was a "moral triumph" for the English, while President McKinley, in his annual message to Congress, on December 5, 1899, formally closed the discussion of the dispute by remarking, after a brief review of the case, that the decision reached was apparently, "equally satisfactory to both parties."

3. Moore, p. 563, cites McKinley's annual message of December 5, 1899, Foreign Relations, 1899, XXXII. For final line see Map #5.
March 1886

British Guiana

- Rivers

Colonial Office List
Key

Sketch Map Showing

Schomburgk Line 1841, 1842
Senor Fortigué's 1844
Lord Aberdeen 1844
Senor Rojas 1881
Extreme Br. Claim, not pressed
Territory outside Schomburgk line, Br. offer to arbitrate
Disputed Brazilian Boundary
Boundary with Dutch Guiana
Lord Granville's Line 1881

Final Line of Settlement
Handed down by Arbitral Tribunal
Oct. 1899
INDEX TO FOOTNOTES


Blue Book is Parliamentary Papers.

Syn. is Synopsis of Controversy.

Times is London Times Weekly.

Moore is Moore's International Arbitration, vol. III.

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