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THE INFLUENCE OF S.L.A. MARSHALL
ON THE UNITED STATES ARMY

by

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ABSTRACT

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Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, a journalist, influenced the United States Army in several ways beginning in 1943. First as a combat historian in World War II, then as a military critic, writer, lecturer, operations analyst, and consultant, he presented several practical and innovative ideas to the army. He pioneered the group after action interview technique for clearing up the confusing, often conflicting stories of participants in combat. As a result of his interviewing over 500 units in World War II, Marshall came to certain conclusions about what motivated Americans to fight. His subsequent experiences in other wars reinforced his theories. His ideas reached many soldiers and caused great controversy. Although he had great initial success in his efforts to reform the army, he spent his last years in a repetitious re-education process caused by such factors as institutional resistance to change. While some of his ideas have been incorporated into army policy, the most lasting influence has been through the education of the
post World War II generation of junior officers who were stirred to articulate their ideas and experiences by their exposure to Marshall. These men are the key policy-makers of today's army.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Researching and writing this paper has been of enormous benefit to me both as a historian and as a professional officer. For this reason, I find it hard to express the depth of my gratitude to the many people who made it possible. Indeed I do not know where to begin. Since alphabetical arrangement would be too impersonal, I choose to acknowledge my thanks in chronological order, beginning with the man who stirred my concern for conducting effective combat training, Lieutenant General A.S. (Ace) Collins, who kindly offered to edit this paper, but who died before it was completed.

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Marshall, while she very tactfully refrained from trying to influence the tone of the paper. Dr. Richard Sommers, Archivist-Historian of the United States Military History Institute, and Mr. Dennis Vetock, research Assistant at the Institute, both provided valuable assistance in locating materials in that collection. I would like to thank all those who allowed me to interview them in person or on the phone, for their kindness and frankness gave me both information and encouragement to carry on. Those who responded to my requests for information in the certain professional journals and in letters provided insights and information invaluable to this paper. Finally, I would like to thank Professor John F. Guilmartin for guiding me to many materials which rounded out my research.

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The conclusions [about how American soldiers overcame their fears in combat] to which the American Historical Teams came, as a result of many thousands of interviews with individuals and groups fresh from combat, are now widely known. They form the basis of the magnificent American campaign histories and have been publicized in pungent, capsule form by the leading historian of the European Theatre, General S.L.A. Marshall. Marshall is, in a sense, an American du Picq. 1

So wrote John Keegan, eminent military historian and senior lecturer at the British Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. A keen student of the behavior of men in battle, Keegan made a point which might stir the mind, if not the heart of any American interested in the age-old question: "How am I likely to react in combat?" Keegan's pointing to S.L.A. Marshall as a source of knowledge of Americans in battle would lead one to believe that Marshall may have had an influence on the United States Army. Indeed, two pages later Keegan remarked: "His arguments were unusually effective, so that he has had the unusual experience, for a historian, of seeing his message not merely accepted in his own lifetime but translated into practice." 2

Yet curiously enough, while Marshall himself was a prolific writer (something in excess of 30 books on war and
history, depending on how you define authorship) and the prevailing consensus in military and historical circles is that he had a marked influence on the post-World War II American military, there is no book or article which critically examines that influence or what nature it took. This paper is an attempt to correct that situation.

There are only two sources which even touch the subject of Marshall's influence. The first consists of the amorphous body of articles in professional military journals which refer rather uncritically to Marshall's accomplishments. Such explanatory articles (they might better be described as biographical sketches) were considerably more common in the late 1940's and early 1950's, when Marshall's reputation as an analyst and historian was first being made. Current literature (since 1970) virtually refrains from such comments, presumably because the editors assume their reading audience knows about Marshall. Indeed this assumption is not far wrong, for most soldiers have some idea of who he was and what he said. However, it has become obvious in the course of this research that there was more to Marshall and his ideas than is immediately apparent.

The second source of knowledge about Marshall and his influence is an inherently biased one -- his autobiography.
Although fascinating reading and, as far as I can tell from spot checking his stories, basically true, this book presents a distorted view of his influence. This tendency is, of course, not peculiar to Marshall and is common to most autobiographies, for they naturally put the author at center stage. All other parties to his life take on, at most, supporting roles and often play no more than bit parts. Shift the focus of attention by reading some biography of someone else in the cast, and you have what seems to be a totally different story. Obviously, then, an autobiography should not be taken too seriously when pursuing a balanced perspective of a person's influence.

So what are we left with? There is no digested body of knowledge, such as a critical biography, which would give an idea of how Marshall fit into his time and what he accomplished of lasting value. Dr. Roger Spiller, formerly a research fellow at the Combat Studies Institute and presently the command historian for the United States Readiness Command, is doing research for a biography of Marshall. He has already edited a publication of the Combat Studies Institute: "S.L.A. Marshall at Leavenworth," which presents five lectures which Marshall gave at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from 1952 to 1962. This booklet helps trace Marshall over perhaps his most
influential years and as such provides an idea of how both his ideas and his personality developed during that period. Perhaps the largest single mass of material about Marshall is contained in the S.L.A. Marshall Military History Collection in the library of the University of Texas at El Paso. This collection consists of most of Marshall's papers, personal library, momentos, correspondence, and memorabilia, still in the process of being cataloged. The United States Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, has a small collection of documents relating to Marshall. Some of the interviews Marshall made in World War II are there, but most are in the National Archives or Library of Congress with the rest of the Historical Branch's source documents. Other than that, there is nothing.

So how can prominent historians like Keegan say that Marshall was a success in his own time? There seems to be no one who has proven it. It is as if the statement were axiomatic — hardly the kind of thing an interested party would be satisfied with if he were trying to get some idea of Marshall's role in the history of the United States Army!

As a professional soldier with more than a passing interest in military history, I came upon Marshall in a rather circuituous way. Encouraged by my company commander to do some extra reading on the subject of training soldiers
(and feeling a marked gap in that aspect of my own training), I bought a copy of *Common Sense Training* in the Post Exchange book section. When I noticed that it was by Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr. -- perhaps the first general to chew me out -- who was an acknowledged expert in the field of training, I knew I had a valuable book in my hand. This book provided me with a new insight into what it meant to train soldiers. I devoured the book and paid particularly close attention to where I could go for more ideas on the subject. General Collins suggested that the serious professional:

> Look back so you can think ahead. Read books such as *The Armed Forces Officer* and S.L.A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire*. ... Browse through some old Operations Research Reports such as "Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea". ... 3

I tucked that information away and went about my business as a combat arms officer. The next time I got a chance for reflection was at the Armor Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. There I happened upon *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation* in the library. In the military history class at the school, *Sinai Victory* was used in a group discussion examining the 1956 Arab-Israeli War. One thing led to another until suddenly I connected General Collins' suggestion about reading what S.L.A. Marshall wrote on war with these books. So when I arrived at Rice
University to pursue my Master's Degree in military history, the first item on my list of possible thesis topics was S.L.A. Marshall. So I had been acquainted with Marshall for several years and felt that my generation of officers probably knew next to nothing about him besides whatever tidbits and vague references they might have read in military magazines. Hence, this paper.
"Good God! You must be dumber than I thought. Your initials spell SLAM, and you don't realize that's money in the bank? It's perfect for a sports editor. It's perfect for anything. Nobody can forget that name."
still being felt today. How could a single civilian cause such a stir? Was it skill? Luck? Genius? It was all of these and more.

Who was this man and what was his background? He was Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, the son of a brickmaker, brought up in El Paso, Texas. In a sketch of Marshall's later career, certain elements of his personality would stand out. First, he was what some people would call "a character." When you met him, you were either charmed by his wit or repulsed by his vulgarity. This contrast served to gain him many allies in his crusade to reform the army, as well as many enemies who opposed him. Part of what fascinated his friends was his keeness for detail and his eye for the dramatic -- his ability to tell a story full of color and excitement, a story which often focused on the activities of common people accomplishing uncommon things. The writings which later caught the interest of so many young officers had this same quality of the dramatic. This dramatic characteristic was Marshall's vehicle for presenting his ideas. Indeed without this element, he might never have gotten such a following and probably would not have contributed as much as he did to military affairs.

Another major element in Marshall's career involved his
prolific output. At the peak of his career, he was writing a syndicated newspaper column, articles for military journals, and historical narratives of recent battles. He spoke to the public on radio and to the army in lecture halls. He appeared before congressional committees and Kiwanis clubs. And before every audience he preached the same gospel: this is a great nation and we are a great people, but certain aspects of our military have to be changed and we must change them now! A man with less energy and weaker powers of concentration could not have kept up such a pace nor reached as many people.

Yet another aspect of his personality which made his later success possible was his boldness. Repeatedly Marshall faced situations which demanded a decision, the results of which would have important repercussions. Very often he could have made the safe choice -- the one which would not have required him to place his life or reputation on the line. His habitual response, however, was to dare to risk -- to march forward boldly where others might have hesitated. Life to him was a gamble. Without taking risks nothing could be gained. Often, because he refused to stand back and let events take their own course, he had a significant impact on subsequent developments. His efforts
at keeping the historical officers on duty in Europe in the face of the rapid demobilization program after World War II was a result of just this kind of boldness. And without their presence and continued activities, the excellent *The United States Army in World War II* historical series would never have achieved the distinction it did.

Another part of Marshall's effectiveness was his ever-widening circle of friends. Drawn to Marshall for whatever reason, these people played a major role in his success. Again and again, Marshall would call on them to help in his efforts. They gave him not only the moral support necessary to sustain him, but also information which was difficult to obtain, introductions which led to more friendships, and resources which made it possible to gather more information. Largely because of his vast coterie of friends in many professions and on many levels, Marshall could make the most of rapidly unfolding events — he could almost "make his own luck."

The final aspect of Marshall's personality which had an effect on his reception as a military writer and critic was his vanity — a double-edged sword. On the one hand, his ambition drove him ever to strive in the face of opposition. While he was writing about the courage of the
common soldier, the public was interested in the wonders of technology. While the government sank vast sums into atomic weapons, he preached that weapons were only as good as the men behind them. On the other hand, while his ambition drove him forward, his ego held him back. It was an obstacle to his success because people reacted negatively to his rough, boisterous, and sometimes rude ways. They were put off by his pontifications and arrogant predictions. Had he been a mild-mannered commentator, he would never have had such problems -- nor would he have had such influence.

How did Marshall develop as he did? What events in his early life affected or presaged what he was to become? Forrest Pogue, eminent military historian and biographer of another Marshall, provided a fitting warning for anyone trying to draw too certain a conclusion from a man's childhood:

"What sort of boy was he? What promise did he show? These are questions no biographer can answer with any assurance. The records are always scant and the temptation to find the lineaments of greatness already prefigured in the child. For Marshall, the records -- that is, contemporary testimony -- are almost wholly missing. Almost all that can be reported of the boy is what the man at the age of seventy-six recalled and chose to reveal. This then is a chapter of memories."  

It is difficult now for us to imagine what early
twentieth-century life in the small border town of El Paso was like for a young boy. Though Texas had enjoyed statehood for over sixty years, trouble with Mexico continued. Civil war and revolution in Mexico spilled over into the border towns in the form of raids by such men as the notorious Pancho Villa. Because Villa spent a great deal of time in Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande from El Paso, it was inevitable that a curious young Sam Marshall would occasionally venture into Mexico to taste the adventure and excitement of a lawless town. That conditions in El Paso were less than orderly is evidenced by the fact that within two years of Sam's arrival, the United States government sent a punitive expedition into Mexico risking war to restore order. Indeed, it would not be far off the mark to consider El Paso still a "wild west" town, with all the images of gunfighters, saloons, and loose women which the term brings to mind. It was in such surroundings that Sam grew up.

And it was here -- as a boy of fifteen -- that Sam first came to know the United States Army. Eating daily at a mess hall at nearby Camp Cotton, he came to know the soldiers of the first American unit to lose men in World War I. Of his associations with these regulars, Marshall would later
My main contacts were with the enlisted men. . . . I enjoyed the association with these old pros all the way. They did not talk down to me or seek to embarrass me, and I enjoyed their friendly conversation over the following months. While associating with them did not really draw me to the military, it had the residual benefit that at age fifteen I lost all fear of being in the infantry. Whereas nearly every youth regards the army with a little awe and trembling, though he is loath to admit it, the men of F Company helped make my putting on a soldier suit a quite natural thing. 3

So at a very impressionable age, Marshall formed a view of life in the army from the soldier's perspective -- a view he would later draw on and add to.

Besides his early connection with the army, life in El Paso had other influences on the growing boy. Something about the town encouraged the teenagers to ignore schoolwork and concentrate on having fun. Enamored of girls and games, young Sam decided that he would forego homework and place his academic career in the hands of his memory by paying close attention in class. He attributes his later abilities of concentration and memorization to this decision.4 While he was honing these skills, he twice failed high school history. But one thing his teacher said stayed with him throughout his life: "Forget about the dates and personages. The object of studying history is that we
may learn from its processes. Either we do, or we repeat our mistakes." He remembered this years later in the Pacific, when he insisted that the army could learn from what he was finding out as an historian.

Yet another result of his living in that rough-and-tumble world was the development of a certain quality which is sometimes called, in another place and time, being "street-wise." He learned in El Paso that a quick wit, a strong will, a bit of bluff and bluster, and a lot of daring made the difference between victory and defeat: he particularly enjoyed watching bullfighters risk their lives in the ring. To survive in such an atmosphere, much less thrive in it, he had to develop a sixth sense for dealing with others, knowing when to apply tact and when to apply force.

El Paso had the stuff of which legends were made: action, violence, colorful characters, and a long history. In the days before radio and television stole the free time of children, telling stories and listening to them formed a major pastime. Sam must have had ample opportunity as a lad to hear master storytellers spin a web of suspense and adventure. As he got older and began to make his living as a journalist, words became his stock in trade, and he may
very well have drawn upon his early experiences to judge what did and what did not work in capturing the attention of his audience.

Sam's experiences were not always pleasant ones. Though he developed a knack for taking a risk and enjoyed the exciting life, he had some weak spots too. Never a tall man (his Army I.D. cards from 1945 on listed him as being 5' 5 8 1/2" and over 160 pounds), he had a great deal of energy and drive. While it is impossible to prove, it is tempting to speculate that his character was affected by his desire to prove himself to others. Another flaw in his character developed because of his competition with his brother, Charles Burton Marshall. Whereas Sam experienced trouble in school and never achieved academic honors, Burton later graduated from Harvard and got his doctorate. Throughout his life, Sam never resisted poking fun at "those university guys," even when he was surrounded by them. Perhaps because he perceived his shortcomings in this area, he became a diligent, persevering worker — a description which helps explain how he was able to write so much.

When the United States entered World War I, Sam was still in high school. In November 1917, he joined up and soon found himself undergoing a life quite different from the
easy-going, rambling life of a student in a one-horse town. He hated the regimentation inherent in the military, especially the spit and polish and reveille. His self-discipline and strength (being an apprentice brickmaker required long hours at gruelling tasks) enabled him to handle with ease the adjustment to the physical and mental demands of the service, but he never developed a high regard for parades, inspections, or—most of all—getting up early:

When I joined the Army in 1917, I found that everything in the military to my delighted amazement was strangely easy for me, with one exception—reveille. That song of Berlin's, "Oh How I Hate To Get Up in the Morning," had been written just for me.

So I started looking about for ways to beat reveille and discovered that by putting in for school duty, I could avoid all formations. Hence I applied, and because practically no one else was playing eager beaver, I got it. I went to grenade school, demolitions school, bayonet school, topographical school and infantry specialist school. By the end of seven months I was the best qualified NCO in the Regiment. My superiors thought this was proof of great diligence on my part. Not so, I was simply looking for a chance to get more sleep, though I kept that secret to myself. 11

Before he returned to El Paso in 1919, Marshall saw action in the Soissons, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne
campaigns and was promoted to second lieutenant of Infantry. An astute observer of human nature even at that age, Marshall wondered why men marching only eleven miles to the front reached their trenches dead tired, and why six weeks later those same men marching away from the front would march three times as far and arrive as if it had been "a breeze." Though he would not solve the problem for another two decades, he remembered instances like that throughout his life.

The life of a returning soldier in 1919 was not all parades and glory. When he left active duty in September 1919, Marshall had a hard time settling back down. His horizons, like those of countless others who had gone off to war, had been broadened. He tried going to college, for though he had not graduated from high school, the Texas School of Mines (later the University of Texas at El Paso) allowed returning officers to enter without a high school diploma. But Sam did not finish and wandered from job to job for the next three years, trying many manual labor jobs including brickmaking and mining. In the meantime, he married Ruth Elstner and soon had a child to support. Times were hard.

While watching an Armistice Day parade in 1922, Marshall
felt deeply depressed. He owed three thousand dollars, had no job, and worse yet, had no prospects of any. Realizing that he was standing before the offices of the El Paso Herald, Marshall decided he had nothing to lose and went in to apply for a job. With a display of what would later become typical Marshall bravado, he managed to impress the editor:

The pay range was from twenty to forty-five dollars a week, depending on experience.

"Mr. Martin," I said, "I'd like to start at forty-five."

That brought him from his chair.

He waggled a finger at me and shouted: "Are you crazy? You have just about talked yourself out of any chance to start."

"No," I answered him, "I'm remarkably sane at this moment. I happen to be three thousand dollars in debt and have a family to support. If I start at twenty-five or so, my creditors will be on my neck and I will be pestering you. That will finish me. But at forty-five, I can begin paying off, and they'll see the wisdom of easing off. If I haven't made good in thirty days, I'd expect to be fired. So the most you can lose is two hundred."

He pondered for all of two minutes. "It sounds like a sporting proposition. You're on. Just don't tell anyone how much money you're making."

"When do I start?"

"Right now."

Hallelujah! I had become a reporter.
The next day he was off to a promising start with a story on the front page, thanks to another typical Marshall talent: being lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time.

Within a month, still on the payroll, Marshall decided that being a good reporter meant that he must be able to write not only about local events but also about politics, sports, the economy, and humor. But realizing also that a successful reporter must have a special talent, he made a crucial career decision:

Within the next hour on that same day I had my formula, my plan for my professional life. In foreign affairs, instead of following the crowd and educating myself on Europe or the Pacific, I would specialize in Mexico and the Central American states. That way, I would get a crack at a revolution more or less regularly. Finally, I would train myself to be a military critic. The goal would necessitate much home study and the building of a special library, but once I made it, I would have practically no competition in the country.

Because of this decision, he was to have two parallel, often simultaneous careers: one as a journalist, and one as a soldier.

Within a few months, he was writing a regular sports column for the paper and in his own time pursuing the study of war. During his time as a sports writer, he reached a
daily output of four thousand words, a pace which he continued throughout his life. Believing that "writing is not a gift or an art but a willingness to accept the required self-discipline," Marshall seldom let a day go by in his adult life that he did not determine to sit down to write even if he felt "the well was dry."

Of Marshall's time as a newspaper reporter in El Paso, a friend wrote:

The four years with the El Paso Herald were crucial in Marshall's career. Fort Bliss was a way-station for a host of army officers who would rise to high rank. Here Marshall made army friendships that lasted for life. In these years, too, he commenced to read military history as a conscious process of self-education in the military art. But most important, in these years, were the rough and tumble associations formed by a tough editor in the frontier environment of West Texas. Marshall became involved with the "outlaw" baseball teams formed in defiance of Judge Landis, helped manage the football teams sponsored by the mining companies, and wrote the wire stories on once great pugilists making their last fights in the Juarez Bull Ring. It would be said of Marshall in later years that he had mastered the art of communicating with the common soldier (of whatever race or social status) on a footing of mutual respect, and with compassion and understanding. No army career course in the psychology of leadership could have given Marshall the finely honed ability to perceive the varieties of human response to life and death, challenge and despair, danger and fatigue, which he developed in the West Texas years. 16

That same friend would expand on that thought by noting
that Marshall's love for the good story with a human interest angle began in this period. He would later concentrate on the underdog, the soldier with a speech impediment or some other abnormality because he had an emotional attachment to men like that which began when he was a young reporter in El Paso. Indeed, one of the repeated themes in Marshall's subsequent writings about war was that the common man, no matter what others may think of him, had a certain dignity and courage which often came out only in the trying circumstances of battle. Perhaps this insight was an extension of his own sense of inferiority.

Having become the city editor by the time the El Paso Herald folded in 1931, Marshall was lucky enough to get a job on the Detroit News. A large newspaper in a large city, the News became Marshall's home until 1961. Though he missed the camaraderie of the small town paper, he found among his acquaintances at his new paper a few who would touch his life and encourage him along the way towards his dream. The editors of the News were just that way. Allowing him to write on any subject he cared to, they helped him build that all-round talent he had identified earlier as requisite for a successful columnist. But they also allowed him to travel south of the border to cover the occasional small
revolutions, and in 1936, to travel to Spain for the Spanish Civil War, which he covered from the Loyalist side.

Finally, his editors over the years (including in the 1940's and 1950's) gave him leave to serve with the military, realizing that a good story or two was certain to come of every such opportunity.

In the 1930's, Marshall began writing seriously on military matters. He had been reading works by such eminent military thinkers as J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Henry Liddell Hart and was greatly impressed by their theories. J.F.C. Fuller learned of Marshall's interest just before the war and began a correspondence which lasted for more than thirty years. It was through an article on the future of mechanized forces which Marshall wrote for the *Infantry Journal* in the late thirties that brought him to Fuller's attention. Fuller wondered where Marshall had gotten the ideas for his article. Marshall replied that Fuller's *Lectures on Field Service Regulations III: Operations Between Mechanized Forces* [FSR III] was his primary source. Fuller wrote back, "My Dear Boy, so far as I know you are the only person in the United States or Britain who is taking me seriously." So pleased was Fuller that he made Marshall his literary agent in the United States. Evidence
of their growing friendship appeared immediately. When Marshall's second book, *Armies on Wheels*, came out in 1941, General Fuller wrote the foreword; and Fuller not only asked Marshall to write the foreword for the American edition of *FSR III*, which appeared in 1943, but also dedicated his *Machine Warfare*, also published in 1943, to Marshall. In honor of his two British mentors, Fuller and Liddell Hart, Marshall dedicated his 1963 work, *Battle at Best* "To my great and good friends, two wise men in the art of warfare, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, who have helped me immeasurably through the years." He also had Fuller write the forward for that book. As for Liddell Hart, Marshall wrote him in 1942, requesting a copy of his *The British Way in Warfare*, which was difficult to get in the United States. Liddell Hart replied, but that was to be their last correspondence until after the war. Visiting Liddell Hart after the war, Marshall told "the Captain" how much his writings had meant to him as a young journalist in the twenties, trying to develop knowledge of the military art. Liddell Hart's reaction caught Marshall off guard:

He looked down at me from his great height and said almost mournfully, "Slam, why in heaven's name didn't you ever tell me? I had no idea you drew anything from my work. I thought it was all Fuller." I felt sudden shame. He was right. I had never said one word in praise.
Through his correspondence with these two innovative thinkers, Marshall became not just an ordinary military enthusiast but a pioneer in both military history and military theory.

Another friendship which would reap great dividends blossomed about this time as well. Marshall's writings for the *Infantry Journal* brought him to that publication's editor, Colonel Joseph I. Greene. Greene backed Marshall for years and helped him get his start in the book publishing world. Several of Marshall's early books were published under the auspices of the Infantry Journal Press and its successor, the Combat Forces Press.

Although Marshall had been to Spain and seen many revolutions and wars in Spanish American countries, his work as a serious military critic (as distinct from a military correspondent) did not begin until WW II. During these early war years, Marshall had begun making a name for himself in the Detroit area, not only as a newspaperman, but as a radio commentator. His manner and ideas very often stirred up controversy. In early 1940 he predicted on the radio the impending disaster in Europe, while writing a book on the subject — *Blitzkrieg*. While it was still in manuscript form, the events he foresaw took place. A year later,
Marshall wrote another book, *Armies On Wheels*, which predicted that the German invasion of Russia would fail. As would happen repeatedly later on, he opposed the popular view of events.

When the United States entered the Second World War in 1941, Marshall, a middle-aged journalist, decided that he would not remain at home with the newspaper. He sought action and contacted the chief of public relations to announce that he was prepared to serve. The reply?

"Wouldn't think of wasting your talents in my office. Sit tight. The army will make the best use of you."

The years of hard work as a writer with a deep interest in things military were about to pay off. Marshall's energetic character, dramatic sense, journalistic ability, and military knowledge, acquired through years of self-discipline would suit Marshall for the rest of his career. The years 1900 to 1941 were indeed his years of preparation.
CHAPTER ONE -- LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS

PART II:

Combat Historian -- 1941 to 1946

"The dust churned up by Patton's tanks does less to distort perspective than the dust raised by the archivist as he thumbs through records half a century old."

Hugh M. Cole,
Post-war Chief of the E.T.O. Historical Division

After Pearl Harbor, Marshall began working for the government, first as a civilian advisor to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, then as major in the Army of the United States. In September, 1942, he was the officer in charge of the Orientation Section, Information Branch, Special Services Division, Army Service forces, Washington, D.C. 1

In this position, he wrote or edited the Small Guides to Foreign Countries series, designed to help our troops when they arrived in foreign countries.

But Marshall's writing talents were not confined to such mundane matters. His director volunteered him to write the policy for the relocation of the Japanese Americans on the West Coast, which included the recruiting of the 442nd Nisei
Combat Team. With a great deal of help from several others, he not only wrote the policy, but carried it out.

Shortly after finishing this task, he was assigned to write pamphlets describing the battles in which American forces had taken part. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, himself had decided to distribute such pamphlets to our wounded in hospitals abroad. When Sam Marshall told his boss that no one in the War Department could provide the kind of information required to make the pamphlets readable, his director balked, saying that he could not go to the chief of staff with that news. Marshall said he would do it himself, and with the boldness that had become second nature to Marshall, he did.

General Marshall reacted to this information with aplomb, merely asking Major Marshall what the Historical Section of the General Staff was doing. The major replied, "Sir, it is still bogged down researching World War I." General Marshall made a few notes, and dismissed the writer by telling him he could forget about the pamphlets.

This short and seemingly insignificant interview changed not only the course of S.L.A. Marshall's career, but also the nature of American military history. Although General
Marshall was not ready to give up the idea of producing a popularly written series of pamphlets for the benefit of wounded troops, he recognized that first he had to do something to ensure no more time would be lost covering the war at all. Evidently, Major Marshall had impressed him as a man who knew what he was about, because Sam soon found himself relieved of all other duties, closeted with two other officers on the fifth floor of the Pentagon, and assigned to G-2 (Intelligence). Together, the three were given the duty of deciding how to write the military history of the U.S. Army in World War II. This was July 1943, and the war had been going on for over a year and a half. As no one had told them how to accomplish their task, they were not bound by what had been done in the past. They had to rely on their own creativity and experience. The Branch's first specific task assigned on August 1, 1943, was to write the popular studies on specific operations that General Marshall had ordered.

In the musical 1776, the character of John Adams mentions that the Declaration of Independence was written by "a farmer, a lawyer, and a sage." The background of the three key members of the Historical Branch was similarly diverse. Lieutenant Colonel John Mason Kemper was a thirty-year old
professional soldier, USMA Class of 1935, with a Master of Arts from Columbia (awarded in 1942). Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Taylor was a Harvard history professor. And Marshall (promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in April) was a newspaperman. To these three was given the mission of determining why the history of World War I had not been finished long ago and of developing a better program for the Second War.

Marshall says that he determined the cause to be that "... the historians had not been given access to command decisions or to the fighting zone, and that, unless we were given these rights and supported in them, we would fail also." Because Kemper was the chief, and the professional soldier, he decided that he would be the "point man," going forward to the front, winning support for the effort. Meanwhile, Marshall would remain behind as the editor, for his expertise lay in the writing field. Taylor would train and organize the teams of historians which would go out to each major command.

This system lasted for one invasion: Kiska in the Aleutians in August 1943. Frustrated, Kemper decided on his return trip that Marshall should do the leg-work while, he, Kemper, ran the show from the rear. Soon thereafter, Kemper
sent Marshall to the Pacific for the up-coming invasion of the Gilbert Islands. Meanwhile, Kemper made plans to recruit and train combat historians to go out in three-man teams to each of the overseas theaters. His sending Marshall, however, was done before he received permission.

Stopping first in Oahu, where the 27th division was stationed, in late October 1943, Marshall, by bluff and bluster, finagled support for his efforts. He was briefed on the operation and embarked with the rest of the Division on the transport ships. During this time, he and the division G-4, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Ferris, had the expedition weighed — not only the equipment carried by the individual soldier, but the entire cargo, including the thirty-day fuel supply. This data, possibly the only such information ever actually procured on the spot, formed an important part of Marshall's 1949 book, *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation*.

When the troops stormed the beaches of Makin (or Butaritari) Island in November, 1943, Marshall followed the second wave ashore. He realized that though he did not know exactly what method to use to get through the "fog of war," he was no use to anyone aboard ship. But the beach at which he landed proved uninteresting, so he returned to his ship.
At noon, he joined another battalion in its assault of another beach.

With this battalion he had another experience which would later figure in his writings:

... When their officers got this company going again, I followed along for about a hundred yards into the bush. There, after just a few stumbling steps, I fell apart. My senses reeled. I was hit by such weakness that I dropped my carbine and could not unbuckle my belt, but that was not the worst of it. Within seconds my nerve had gone completely and I shook all over from fear.

I lay flat under a pandanus tree, telling myself: "It's combat fatigue. You've been kidding yourself. You are too old for the wars." Being unable to walk, and scarcely able to think, I decided to stay where I was, wait for a stretcher-bearer to come along and get me back to The Calvert, where I would stay. ...

Before any aid man came my way, a rifleman stopped and stared at me. Then he took a bottle of pills from his jacket and downed a couple of them.

I asked weakly, "What you got?"

"Salt."

"Gimme some. Nothing can make me feel worse than I do."

He gave me the bottle ... I washed down eleven salt tablets with the lukewarm water from my canteen. ... Within the next ten minutes my nerve and strength were fully restored, and I was never again troubled; yet that lesson had to be
learned the hard way. No one had ever told me that one consequence of dehydration is cowardice in its most abject form. 10

Once recovered, Marshall racked his brain for a method to get at historical truth, to write an accurate history of the assault on Makin. His efforts seemed doomed. Neither observing events for himself, nor talking to troops during the action, nor watching the marks on the situation map at headquarters gave him satisfaction. His own observations and those of others engaged in the action were too distorted. Marks on a map deceive even the most seasoned officer. What was he to do?

The solution fell into his lap quite accidently while he accompanied still another battalion in its sweep to the far tip of the island. Covering only three miles in the tortuous tropical heat during their afternoon advance, the soldiers were too tired to dig in for the night. Without realizing it, they had come to rest only a few hundred yards from the camp of the last large group of Japanese soldiers remaining on Makin. During the night, the enemy charged the perimeter eleven times. Each time they were thrown back. By morning, it was evident that the single most crucial part in the drama was played by a young machinegunner, who could only be extracted from among the attacking Japanese by the
combined efforts of two tanks and a rifle platoon.

That morning, when the sweep continued to the tip of the island, the battalion commander confided to Marshall that he did not have a clear picture of the evening's action. At noon, when they reached the end of the island, Marshall sent for the machinegunner and his platoon leader. The lieutenant said that he had ordered Schwartz, the gunner, ...

... to take over the gun; Schwartz insisted that the lieutenant was nowhere around and that he had done it on his own. Finally, to get at the truth, Marshall lined up the entire battalion and asked each man to report everything he had seen and done during the night. Not only was Schwartz's story upheld, but Marshall almost immediately realized he had stumbled onto the secret of accurate combat reporting. Every man remembered something—a piece to be fitted into the jigsaw puzzle."

Upon returning to Hawaii, Marshall conducted more mass interviews until he put together the picture of the island fight. He also wrote the first scheme for conducting group interviews. This format quickly found its way to Kemper in Washington, where it became the basis for the training of the newly-arrived members of the field historical teams, which included in its first batch, such men as Forrest Pogue, Hugh Cole, Gordon Harrison, and R.G. Ruppenthal.

His new method impressed not only the Historical
Division, but also the leaders of the units that he had interviewed. The commander of the 27th Division, Major General Ralph C. Smith, wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (under whose purview the Historical Division fell):

[Colonel Marshall] gathered what appears to me to be highly important data. His tact and keenness as an observer made him a most valuable member of the expedition.

It seems to me that the pattern he has set for collecting historical data on the spot should be of the greatest value, both to the army in its present training problems and to the future for basic historical data.

If the Historical Division can send officers on such missions who are the equivalent of Colonel Marshall in judgment and tact, I think they will always be welcomed by commanders. 14

Smith realized that the data which Marshall had collected could be put to immediate use in fighting the Japanese. For example, Marshall noticed that when a tank platoon was not subordinated to the infantry unit it was attached to, it would often leave an engagement before the enemy was defeated, leaving the infantry without heavy weapons. Investigating this seemingly cowardly action, Marshall determined that the cause was that the tank platoon leader had not conserved his unit's ammunition, so when he figured he should resupply, he pulled the entire platoon out of the
action for an extended period. After Marshall brought the matter up, tank platoons were subordinated to the infantry commander so that they would conserve ammunition and replenish by sections instead of as a whole.

So Marshall had not only found the system he was looking for, but he had proved that if the historical officer played his cards right, he could win the support of the commanders on the spot. Were all who were exposed to his method over the years equally impressed as General Smith was? Was Marshall as effective—or rigorous—in applying the technique in later years as he evidently was on Makin? What was the essence of this technique? Before evaluating the validity of the technique, we must understand the basics of the method.

First the historical officer must do some research. By checking the journals for the units involved in a given engagement, he can zero-in on a handful of company-size units whose efforts seem to have carried the action. Then he asks the division and regimental commanders for permission to interview the troops. Once told where and when to meet with them, he must determine the starting point of the action: the first incoming or outgoing fire. (This must be determined before the interview starts.)
With the unit assembled, with the company officers (along with the battalion intelligence officer, operations officer, and commander), the interviewer explains the reason for the interview and the two ground rules: (1) everyone must speak up so that the entire group can hear, and (2) all men are equal during the interview—rank means nothing. In fact, if a soldier disagrees with his superior's testimony, it is his duty to disagree.

This preamble completed, he calls his first witness, Often the company commander or one of the platoon leaders, based on his research as to when and where the first firing took place. As this witness calls the names of others, they are asked to contribute. During this early stage, the platoon leaders are asked to sketch on the blackboard, map, or sand box (reproducing the terrain and deployment are essential) the terrain and dispositions the unit had been confronted with. Others are asked for further detail or correction. By this method, the historical officer not only sets the stage, but also breaks the ice.

The historical officer, having gotten things going, can turn the process over to the company commander. By paying close attention to the unfolding narrative and by prompting
the commander in his questions, the historical officer can ensure that points of interest are not skimmed over.

The types of questions to ask are: "How did your squad go forward?" "Did it rush or did it crawl?" "What fire was delivered against you?" "What effect did these casualties have on the rest of the squad?" "When you landed on the beach, did you land wet or dry?" "Did you lose any equipment?" "Did you go to ground immediately?" "How did you feel when you were pinned down?"

The technique itself seems fairly simple, but as General Smith remarked, it took a certain degree of tact and a lot of keen judgment on the part of the interviewer.

According to Forrest Pogue, another practitioner and distinguished historian in his own right, there may have been even more qualities involved than just these two. Speaking of the historical officers in Europe, he said:

None of us had his success. He had been a young lieutenant in the first war, was called back as a lieutenant colonel, had extensive experience as a newspaperman, [and] had written a lot about the war... He could get battalion and regimental officers to bring together dozens and even hundreds of men... None of us had his rank, we lacked his skill and reputation... However, so far as we could, we tried to practice some of the lessons he had to teach.
During the course of his career, Marshall interviewed hundreds of front-line units: 505 in World War II, 13 in Korea during the winter of 1950-51, an unknown number in Korea, Lebanon, Israel, and Vietnam from 1952 to 1968. How many others have used the technique is even more obscure, for not only were the historians of the Historical Branch trying to apply it in World War II, but also during Vietnam, the Defense Department convinced Marshall to teach his method to a new crop of historians. Furthermore, elements of the technique became incorporated in "Realtrain," an improved training system for small units, designed in the early 1970's.

Not only was Marshall's expertise solicited officially, but also privately. At least twice, unit commanders wrote to Marshall personally to enlist his support in conducting their own after action interview programs while engaged in combat. In 1952, the commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment requested detailed information on the technique. Fourteen years later, the commander of the First Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, wrote Marshall about his "little SLAM Marshall Program," which he hoped would improve his unit's success in Vietnam.
Four retired general officers, who were themselves subjects of the technique as colonels during the European campaign, have written that the after action interview is perhaps the only valid means of getting at the truth of what men do in battle. Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General E. C. Meyer, considers the technique "... the only truly effective way to come close to what really took place in an action." [The underlinings are the general's.]

As difficult as the method is to apply effectively, Marshall was not the only one capable of making the system work. One of his closest subordinates, Dr. John Westover, wrote: "I watched Marshall at work and then I used it [the technique] in three wars and a variety of non-military uses. It simply cannot be beaten as a method of collecting accurate information." One of the battalion commanders that Marshall showed the system to after the Normandy invasion tried it himself after the Arnhem operation. He claimed that it worked as well for him as for Marshall.

But not everyone considered the technique a valid source of obtaining accurate information. General James M. Gavin wrote that on at least one occasion, the troops resented Marshall's prying. Furthermore, Marshall was not always accurate in his details. A former company commander,
interviewed by Marshall in Vietnam, wrote that Marshall did not conduct the interview in a group environment, but rather individually with the unit's leaders. When the book came out (Battles In the Monsoon) it was "... replete with inaccuracies—of fact, of name, of situation, of location."

In addition, he said that his battalion commander, who had been interviewed by Marshall in connection with Pork Chop Hill in the Korean War, had had a similar experience.

Why would Marshall allow inaccuracies in his interviews?

Colonel E.M. Parker, USMA class of 1931, Rhodes scholar, and Marshall's fellow analyst with the Operations Research Office in Korea, wrote that Marshall conducted his interviews to support his pre-conceived ideas. However, H.W.O. Kinnard, one of many young officers which Marshall interviewed in World War II, and later a lieutenant general, absolutely disagreed: "He would let the flow of the interview take him wherever it would lead, and not go into it with preconceived ideas."

I conducted a spot check of three of Marshall's books, based on his notes of actual interviews. I cross-checked parts of the interview notes with the published versions of The River and the Gauntlet, Night Drop, and Ambush. I found that Marshall's most glaring inaccuracies were increasing
the numbers of men or the distances involved by 20 to 50 per cent. More often, however, the story followed the notes exactly. For instance, in *The River and the Gauntlet*, page 17 ff., he wrote:

They were 129 able-bodied men when they started forward on the morning of 25 November in the great advance which was intended to reach the Yalu line and terminate the war. And though they had but recently dined on turkey and the Thanksgiving trimmings, they were in a black and resentful mood.

By their own account, it griped them all, from Capt. William C. Wallace down to the latest replacements. Their beef was that they had been getting the dirty end of the stick. . . . It had just happened that every time Baker [Company] got forward, the enemy grew nasty, and there was subsequent fire and loss, whereas the other companies had moved along relatively unscathed.

. . . Wallace deployed his Third Platoon along the base of the north slope and faced it southward. First and Second formed in an arc around the base of 219's western end and started upward, with First Squad, Second Platoon, serving as point and leading the other people by about 10 yards.

The time was 1015. They climbed for one quarter hour without trouble except their own hard breathing and sweat. By then the line was halfway up the hill, and the point, having lengthened its interval, was within 25 yards of the first knob.

As Pfc. Lawrence E. Smith, Jr., who was leading the squad, stopped for breath and a last look upward, a shower of twenty or more grenades came down on him. A few exploded as they hit among the rocks. Smith was struck in the thigh. Lieut. Robert A. Kjonaas, standing next him, was wounded in the foot. These were the first shots and the first casualties in the Battle of the Chongchon;
they started the "new war" at 1030 on 25 November.

The record of Marshall's interview of that company, found in the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, conducted at 1100 hours on December 14, 1950 (the action took place on November 25, 1950,) said (the discrepancies are noted by their being in capital letters):

(Witness: Wallace) - There were ABOUT 120 MEN in the company. . . . One of the chief morale factors in my company at this time was that for the preceding week or so we had been attached tactically to the 2nd Bn and we had been pushed very hard. The battalion was then advancing and we had made several contacts and had gotten into fire fights with groups of the enemy. . . . My company had borne the brunt of the fighting. Maybe it just happened that we were always in front at the wrong time. The men all had the feeling that they should have been given some relief, since practically no other elements were engaging during this period and my men were getting more than their share of it. (All present agreed that this factor was as Wallace had stated it). . . . Coming to the nose of the ridge I moved 2nd and 1st platoons right up the slope to a point about half way up to the first peak. To the south of us the position was virtually unflankable, because the hill fell off so sharply. But, on the north side, the slope was somewhat gentler and I moved 3rd platoon up that way with the idea of facing the platoon northward. I was with the 2nd platoon. (Pfc Lawrence E. Smith, Jr - I was leading 1st squad, 2nd platoon, and we were serving as point just a FEW yards in advance of the others. (Witness: Wallace - I'd say 2nd platoon was half way from the base of the hill to the first knoll when we came under fire. It was automatic and rifle fire and seemed to be coming from the high ground right ahead. This happened at about 1030 hrs.
(Witness: Kjonaas - I was with Smith's squad and were ABOUT 20 TO 30 YDS from the first knob. Suddenly 20 or SO grenades came down on us. . . . I got a grenade fragment in the foot and Smith was hit in the thigh. . . .

The discrepancies in these two accounts, ranging from giving a specific figure for the distance between units to substituting the word "more " for "so" in describing the number of grenades thrown, is representative of the discrepancies I found in the other two books. In Night Drop, I compared four pages to the written interview; in The River and the Gauntlet, 20 pages; and in Ambush, seven pages. In each book, Marshall made minor mistakes similar to those above, but kept the sequence of events and the majority of the facts faithful to the testimony as he recorded it. In each case, the record was written or typed and subsequent entries were made, possibly indicating that Marshall had the witnesses read the copy and make changes as they saw fit.

There are many possible reasons for the variety of reactions to the interview method, and I discuss several of them in the final chapter. But at least one unbiased observer, a psychiatrist, himself trained in oral interviews, thought Marshall's method to be unquestionably valuable. Dr. David McK. Rioch, wrote:
I was fortunately able to attend several sessions in which Brig. General S.L.A. Marshall (Reserve) debriefed small units a short time after they had engaged in action. General Marshall has developed a very superior technique of group interviewing, and it was obvious that the data obtained by his methods were considerably different from data on combat situations obtained from men after they had returned to the security of routine life in rear areas. These discrepancies can be accounted for by mechanisms which affect memory . . . . However, it seemed obvious that . . . the system of tactical debriefing (which was being established through several divisions in the Eighth Army) would provide much better information than is now available on psychological stress in combat. Such studies are important in that correct information in this area is necessary for adequate planning of pre-combat training . . . .

Regardless of the actual merits or shortcomings of the system, it was adopted for official use in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Marshall's own reply to those who thought the troops told him only what they thought he wanted to hear was that men in the presence of their comrades are less likely to overstate their own part in the battle when they know that others will call their bluff. The few times it did happen that men tried to "shoot the bull," their comrades spoke right up. In fact, while still in the Pacific, he deliberately had the division commander appear before the troops to give a mistaken picture of a given incident, just to see if they would dare to contradict the commander. They did.
Three months after the Makin operation, Marshall covered the invasion of Kwajalein Island in the Marshalls. Again he stuck close to the front. His book, Island Victory, describes both the events of that fight and the details of the process.

In April 1944, against his wishes, Marshall was transferred from the Pacific to the European theater, where the historical operation seemed to be floundering. The chief of the Historical Section of the European Theater, the aging Colonel William A. Ganoe, seemed to have lost control of his section, which was not producing the material it should. Kemper's attempt to correct the situation earlier by sending Lieutenant Colonel Taylor and Major Hugh Cole in early 1944 had failed. So it was that Colonel Kemper assigned Marshall to Europe as an historian with instructions to do what he could to straighten out the operation.

Arriving in England two weeks after the invasion of France, Marshall told Ganoe that he would go to Normandy immediately. Marshall took Taylor, who was still somewhat skeptical of the group interview technique, with him. Upon reaching Normandy and finding that the First Army's
Historical Team had not done anything to get the story of the landings on Omaha Beach, Marshall sent the team's commander to the 1st Infantry Division, while he took the job of finding out what happened during the airborne drop. This task proved to be the beginning of a long, profitable association with the 101st Airborne.

With Colonel Taylor watching, Marshall interviewed units of the 101st. Taylor, the Harvard trained historian, retracted his objections and became one of the system's most ardent supporters. Marshall returned to England with the 82nd and the 101st to continue the interviews. While there, he had three newly-arrived historical officers observe his technique. One of them, Captain John Westover, became his constant companion for the next six months. Westover, a field artillery officer with combat experience in North Africa and Italy, and an M.A. in history from the University of Missouri in 1941, acted as Marshall's ombudsman. Together, they traveled across Europe, conducting group interviews and even being among the first Americans to enter liberated Paris.

Westover knew Marshall intimately during this period, and saw both sides of the complex Marshall nature. He saw enough of his gruffness and bluster to make him mad
occasionally, but he also saw an amazing mind at work. Frequently "shooting the bull" with each other on a jeep ride or over a couple of drinks, Westover and Marshall exchanged experiences and ideas about what made men do what they did in combat. Having interviewed hundreds --thousands-- of soldiers and having been under fire themselves (Westover had been a forward observer in North Africa before being assigned to the Historical Branch), they speculated on the very matters which would later come out in Marshall's writings. Reading what Marshall was to write later, Westover recognized several subjects from their "bull sessions." Regarding Marshall's gruffness and occasional lack of tact, Westover remarked that during the period he knew him, Marshall's second wife, Ives, (Marshall had divorced Ruth about the time he went to Detroit,) was extremely ill and Marshall was often deeply depressed about it. (She had developed multiple sclerosis and was not expected to live long.) He would often retire to his work and not be seen for a week at a time.

Of Marshall's rather unscholarly method of drawing conclusions, he said:

Keep in mind, Marshall was an intuitive thinker. He did not gather evidence, weigh it ponderously, draw tentative hypotheses, then test them. If he did, it was not in an organized
manner. Usually, from "out of the blue" he stated a principle. Then he marshalled his evidence and statistics to back his concepts. Some of his statistics are subject to grave question as to source.

What is important, though, regardless of how he established a tactical principle, it was usually sound. It was often so "self-evident" that one wonders why someone didn't think of it earlier. 43

Dr. Pogue said of him:

Sam's training was that of reporter. He was splendid on small level details. He had read an inordinate amount of military history, novels, adventures, memoirs, and the like. He knew some of the historians extremely well. He did not have a historian's training and, I fear, had a certain contempt for pedants who let exact facts stand in the way of a good story. At times when he was writing an article or pushing some point of doctrine, he was capable of pulling a figure out of the air and suggesting that this was based on the solid information gathered by the 200 combat historians under his command. Some of us were in total disagreement. He was almost dogmatic about some of his opinions and got into arguments with several commanders about disputed points. He was convinced that Simpson could not have gone into Berlin in a few days as Simpson believed and they took potshots at each other. I am inclined to agree with Marshall but he did not approach it as a historian would have. He had strong prejudices about commanders and that had to be taken into consideration. . . . His book on World War I is good history. His writing was outstanding. His stories of small unit actions are superb. Night Drop, Pork Chop Hill, River and the Gauntlet are good portrayals of action and as exciting as a novel. Battle at Best is made up of the kind of stories he told over a drink.

He certainly had a feel for history, but he was not in Hugh Cole's league in matters of sketching strategy or the development of great political events. . . . I never sat in on any of his
interviews. 44

During the late summer and fall of 1944, Marshall was busy putting fire into the historical operation. Besides giving the new historical officers on the job training, as he did Westover, Marshall began getting involved in the operations of Ganoe's headquarters. He convinced his superior to move the entire operation to France. But while Marshall and Westover were investigating the events of the Utah and Omaha Beach landings, Ganoe had moved without telling Marshall where he had gone. Finally tracking him down to Paris, Marshall told him that he and Westover were on their way to cover the Market Garden operation, the allied airborne/ground assault designed to cut off all German troops in western Holland.

Ganoe forbade Marshall to go to the front any more because Kemper had decided that Marshall was too valuable. Kemper wanted to save Marshall for the China-Burma-India Theater. Marshall told Ganoe in no uncertain words that he was going to cover Market Garden, and the C-B-I would have to wait. Furthermore, Marshall told Ganoe that the chief of the First Army Historical Detachment should be replaced immediately by Dick Shappell. Ganoe finally agreed.

Upon his return from the Holland operation, Marshall
found Kemper in France ready to sack Ganoe and replace him with Marshall. Marshall protested and offered another solution. He said that Ganoe was a fine man and a friend, so he would not be party to relieving him. Instead, Kemper should leave Ganoe in as the chief, while he, Marshall, took over the operation as his deputy. When the war was over, Ganoe could retire honorably.

Kemper agreed to the arrangement for taking care of Ganoe. When the Battle of the Ardennes erupted in December 1944, Marshall was busy in Paris reorganizing the historical headquarters. He immediately realized that if the historical section could cover this operation in detail, the section would gain the respect of the high command. He demanded—and got—access to the war room. During the evening of December 18, he and Kemper made an assessment of the strategic situation and juggled the assignment of the historical division in order to cover as much of the action as possible, even sending in sixteen of those assigned to the theater historical headquarters section. This was the first and only time historical officers were shifted among commands by the Theater Historical Section.

Marshall sent his protege, John Westover, and Lieutenant Joe Weber to Bastogne, with orders to cover only the armored
and tank destroyer aspect of the operation. Marshall promised to follow as soon as he could to handle the infantry story. As it happened, he was not able to get there until after Patton's Task Force Abrams had relieved Bastogne. By that time, Westover and Weber had already done the lion's share of the work. For the next nineteen days, they labored to keep up with the fight while under fire.

When he returned to Paris, Marshall found that Ganoe had begun to act irrationally, transferring men from the historical teams of one Army to another, when he had neither reason nor authority to do so. Able to take the responsibility no more, Marshall went to Eisenhower's Services of Supply Commander, Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee, to have Ganoe relieved. Lee gave his personnel officer the dirty work of having to tell Ganoe.

But Lee did not tell his personnel officer that it was Marshall who had asked for the relief. So when Ganoe reacted to the news by asking to have Marshall come in to back him up, the G-1 knew no better. Marshall arrived and was put in the awkward position of having been the one behind the relief, and also the one in whom Ganoe placed his confidence. Marshall told the two of them that Ganoe had frequent periods of being unable to think clearly. Marshall
thought Ganoe should see a doctor about it. In addition, Ganoe had "a professional disease." In Marshall's opinion, he was unable to confront his superiors. In fact, he went out of his way to avoid them. Consequently, the historical operation had no support from the high command.

Ganoe admitted his fear of his superiors. As to seeing the doctor, he agreed to have a check up the next morning and stay away from the historical section for the rest of the war. And Marshall agreed that if Ganoe wanted to remain on the roles as the chief, he would not argue. (Ganoe's examination the next day revealed that he was suffering from an advanced case of diabetes.)

Despite the story of how Marshall handled the Ganoe problem, some people have asserted that Marshall's ego often resulted in his being unscrupulous in dealing with others. In one particular instance, a well known general officer wrote:

"Regarding S.L.A. Marshall, I take it from your comment about Marshall that you look upon him with considerable favor. Actually, in many of the combat units he was not seen that way, not in Europe anyway, and many historians look upon him as a newspaperman, which is what he was, and not a historian. The original historian in the European theater was a professor from Fordham University, Jeremiah O'Sullivan, a specialist in Medieval History. We were good friends and I saw him on many occasions. He felt that in a rather"
unscrupulous way S.L.A. Marshall pushed him out of his position. Some historians talked to me about it and thought that the Army had made a big mistake. Marshall was certainly not a Samuel Eliot Morrison. 51

Forrest Pogue remarked, while describing the heads of the teams assigned to each Army: "The 1st Army head—a professor of medieval history from Fordham—lasted until Christmas—got quite ill from pneumonia—and was superseded during the Ardennes by a newspaperman from Flint, Michigan." But the general was not making the whole thing up, for Dr. Hugh M. Cole pointed out:

W.A. Ganoe, who was Theater Historian before he was replaced by his deputy, Sam, was old and wanted no trouble. Sam, in his turn, had a gruff exterior but simply could not lower the boom on people he knew. Jerry Sullivan was not relieved by Sam. Sam and John Westover came into the area where Sullivan (a major) was supposed to be working with the Airborne and simply pushed him aside as being ineffective [presumably for Market Garden]. There was no big deal. Sullivan had ingratiated himself with Jim Gavin and others at Hqs but didn't get out much to the combat units.53

As to the contention that Marshall was not suited to the work because he was newspaperman and not an historian, Dr. Michael Howard, military historian at the University of Oxford, remarked that both Marshall and men like Sullivan were writing history, so the distinction was irrelevant. Marshall was particularly suited to asking questions of men in the front lines exactly because he was a newspaperman.
54 On the other hand, academic historians like Sullivan often had a hard time doing that because they were trained to work with documents and not in oral history. The area where such men do best is generally in writing about strategy and politics, because the sources of that history are the documents found at higher headquarters.

Quite aware that the section could not rely solely on group interviews and that he had serious shortcomings as an historian, Marshall arranged to have Major Hugh M. Cole promoted and transferred from Patton's Third Army to be Deputy Chief of the European Historical Section. (In later years, Cole wrote the Lorraine volume of the Army Historical Series.)

Marshall's next act as chief was to convince the high command that the historical operation had something practical to offer the army. Through his contacts, Marshall sent to General Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, the story of the Bastogne operation, complete with footnotes and references. Smith was impressed and offered his support to Marshall's efforts to write better history.

When the war ended in Europe, Marshall's Historical Section still had a great deal of work to do, compiling and
writing the account of the war. But rapid demobilization threatened to abort the operation by sending men home regardless of the disposition of their work. Marshall fought long and hard to keep his team of historians together, going so far as to write to congressmen to put pressure in the right places.

It worked. Secretary of War Stimson cabled to General Harold E. Bull, Eisenhower's Chief of Operations:

If we allow officers to stay on as volunteers, provided they have essential work to do, and approve the discharge of enlisted personnel having points to come home, and their retention overseas as civilian employees with civil service rating, provided they are willing, will this satisfy your mad historian? 59

So the "mad historian" was able to keep enough of his men on duty that the sources for the European section of The United States Army in World War II were finished. Such men as Forrest Pogue, at that time a sergeant, were induced to stay on as civilian experts. (Pogue's new civilian pay grade was that of a colonel. When Bedell Smith came to Marshall in November, 1945, to have someone write a short history of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), Marshall gave the job to Pogue. This eventually led to Eisenhower's personally arranging for Pogue to do the complete history of SHAEF, including giving
him access to Eisenhower's papers as well as those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and War Department.

In the meantime, Marshall fought another administrative battle. Because Eisenhower promised the building which housed the Historical Section to the Canadians as their embassy, Marshall had to find a new home. The proposed buildings on the Versailles grounds were too run down and ill-lighted. Marshall pulled some more strings and got the operation moved to the Chateau Hennemont at Saint Germain-en-Laye on the outskirts of Paris. In these idyllic surroundings, the European Historical Section carried on their work.

Perhaps the most daring of all Marshall's activities in this period was the virtual kidnapping of four senior German officers from the prisoner of war compound at Oberursel. The full account of the exploit and its sequel is told in Bringing Up the Rear. In essence, Marshall and Major Ken Hechler (who first suggested interviewing the Germans) got Generals Bayerlein, von Luttwitz, and Kokott and Colonel von Lauchert (all major actors in the Ardennes breakout) out of the camp without orders, and flew them to Paris. Working frantically with these four officers, and using his own detailed knowledge of the American side of the operation,
Marshall hoped to have the interrogation completed before anyone knew what had happened to the Germans. He wanted to use the resulting view "from the other side of the hill," as a pilot model for convincing the high command that the interrogation of the losers would benefit the winners.

After he finished the pilot work (as usual leaving all the administrative details of day-to-day operations to Cole), Marshall made his proposal to Bedell Smith at one of the bi-weekly General Staff meetings. Smith conferred with General John C.H. Lee, and decided to approve the suggestion. Rapidly, Marshall put his idea into operation. Before he was through, over 250 German senior officers were interviewed.

From this effort came valuable information concerning how the Russians had fought, what their weaknesses were, and how the Germans had developed tactics to take advantage of these weaknesses. The Applied Studies Group, a new division of the Historical Branch in Washington, wrote about 620 studies based on these interviews by December 1948.

Eventually the Army published many of the insights derived from the interviews in a vast number of monographs, (the D.A. Pamphlet 20- series), originally classified, but
now available through normal channels. (The degree to which this series affected training is difficult to determine at this late date. But it seems highly likely that since so much effort went into producing it and keeping it classified, the series was not regarded as merely of historical interest. Also, the fact that the pamphlets are still in circulation within the army suggests that they are still considered to be of value.)

While the German generals were still in residence at the Chateau Hennemont, a special committee charged with analyzing the strategy of the theater came to the chateau to review the records Marshall and his men had accumulated. The committee was impressed. So when Marshall went to its chairman, Lieutenant General Leonard Gerow, to get the archives sent back to the United States, Gerow agreed, though he claimed he didn't have the authority. By his order, 46 tons of paper, all classified, were shipped to the United States.

Before Marshall was released from active duty on May 3, 1946, the chief of staff had the first of his series of pamphlets that he had originally asked for. More important, the source materials for the European part of The United States Army in World War II series were safely in archives
in Washington and the historical teams had begun to write drafts for that monumental work.

During the war, Marshall's greatest service proved to be that of combat historian. Not a historian in the usual sense, the combat historian, as conceived by Kemper originally, was to ensure that the documents (such as unit journals and after-action reports) generated overseas would be catalogued and preserved for later use in writing the official history of the war. After his observations at Kiska, Kemper realized that merely collecting and cataloguing records would not provide enough solid information for the task. Record keeping was atrocious and too much valuable information was not included. So he decided that interviews would have to supplement documentary evidence. Enter Marshall and his journalistic training. Kemper recognized the value of putting a man like Marshall on the job—not because of his eminence as an historian (he had none at the time), but because of his writing and interviewing ability. But while Kemper undoubtedly told Marshall that he was to interview people, he did not suggest a group interview. Marshall's efforts at one-on-one interviews, particularly with staff officers and commanders in headquarters, led to too much distortion based on what is
now obvious: each individual sees only a small portion of the fight. So Marshall followed his nose and his penchant for dealing with the real actors in a situation and stumbled on the group interview technique. No one has denied that this method was Marshall's invention. Piecing together the picture of a confusing series of events by walking the participants through it step by step seems to be the only way to approach the truth. This was probably Marshall's greatest contribution in this period.

But he also did other things which laid the foundations for himself or others to build on later. Not only were his methods mimicked by the other historians and a great body of interviews amassed to support the records all of which later formed the raw materials from which the official history was drawn, but his bold action in getting the German generals to his chateau for interrogation led to a series of pamphlets which still form the basis of our understanding of how the Soviets conduct war. On a less spectacular scale, but no less important because it undoubtably saved lives in World War II, by applying the dictum of his high school professor that history should be studied to avoid repeating one's mistakes, Marshall did more than amass information, he applied some common sense to that information and presented
his conclusions to commanders in the Pacific for their use in modifying their tactics to fit the local situation. Another even less tangible but nevertheless significant practical and immediate contribution occurred through the interview process itself. Repeatedly Marshall noticed that at the beginning of an interview, soldiers often did not know whether their participation in a given action was something to be proud of or whether it even had any significance in the larger picture of the war. So not only did they benefit from hearing the tricks and methods of their comrades which came as a natural result of sharing information, but they also came to see themselves as valuable members of a team. Their morale was noticeably improved, for often in the daily grind of combat, the officers had no idea themselves whether the actions of their men had made any substantial contribution to the war effort or whether it was just another small engagement that meant nothing. Therefore, the officers could not tell the troops they had done something to be proud of. But when outsider got them to talk and told them how their fight fit into the larger battle, the troops understood their contribution for the first time. The next time they entered battle, they could fight with more confidence in themselves and their comrades. So the technique had an important contribution
beyond that of history.

Finally, through his frequent chats with soldiers, with other historians, and with commanders he bunked with in the field, Marshall began a process of analysis which, intuitive though it undoubtably was, led to some important insights about how the American soldier reacts in combat and how leaders might improve the effectiveness of their units. But the results of these ruminations would not become public for another few years.
CHAPTER TWO

SOUNDING THE TRUMPET -- 1946 to 1950

PART I: Men Against Fire

"I went where I was told to go, and I did what I was told to do, but no more. I was scared shitless just about all the time."

James Jones
WW II

The dropping of the atomic bomb heralded the birth of a new world. Speculation about the future of peace and war occupied the minds of soldier and civilian alike. The war had brought the world of gadgetry to the minds of the general populace. The "high technology" craze of today had its genesis in the aftermath of World War II. High speed communications and high speed transportation became available as never before. The popular imagination was captured by the potential of radio and television, jet engines, rockets, and electronic marvels of all types. These developments, along with the harnessing of the atom, quite understandably caused nearly everyone to doubt the
efficiency and even the effectiveness of a large standing army. It seemed that man would be largely replaced by the machine, not only in the factory, but also on the battlefield. Politicians wanted to get the biggest bang for the buck.

But there were a few voices crying in the wilderness that war will always require a well-trained ground soldier. Among these voices was Sam Marshall. Newly returned to civilian life as a military critic with the Detroit News, he found that he had something important to say. And he could not keep quiet. Indeed, he did not want to keep quiet. He knew he had had a unique experience in the service, and he intended to use it to the best advantage of all concerned. Not only did he have a body of knowledge and experience which few others had (having interviewed men in over 500 units during the war), but he had a wide circle of influential friends who would keep him informed about important matters. They respected him, recognizing his usefulness as a writer who might further serve as a publicist for the army. But he was not one to be easily controlled. He spoke his mind in ways which ran counter to the prevailing spirit of blind faith in modern technology. He was very much a spokesman for the common soldier. Just
how much so came forth within a year of his separation from the army. With the encouragement of some of his friends, his writings took on a new slant. No longer would he write about the strategies of mechanized war, but rather about the nature of man in battle.

Marshall's friendship with the editor of the *Infantry Journal*, Colonel Joseph Greene, had developed magnificently during the war years. From his first article in 1938 (which had brought him to J.F.C. Fuller's attention), to the books which the Journal had published from his wartime monographs (*Island Victory* and *Bastogne*), Marshall found that his reputation as an expert was growing. Greene encouraged Marshall to write for his magazine. So the "Slam Marshall Doctrine" became public at the same time the "George C. Marshall Doctrine" did. The first installment in this developing doctrine concerned what motivated men to act as they did in war, and what implications this had for the future.

In the May 1947, issue of the *Infantry Journal*, Marshall began a series of articles entitled "Battle Command In Future War." The articles were actually the debut of his book, *Men Against Fire*, which was to be published by the Infantry Journal Press later in the year. Neither the
articles nor the book would have been written if he hadn't been hounded by Colonel Wayne Archer, chief of the Senior Observer's Board from 1944-1945. This board's express purpose was to distill the lessons of the war so that immediate action could be taken in the development of new tactics, logistics, etc. According to the "Author's Note — 1961" in Men Against Fire, Colonel Archer and Marshall came to an informal agreement. Since the board's officers were elderly colonels who would find it difficult to get the kind of information they needed, and since the historical teams were young men who were getting that kind of information as a natural part of their duty, Marshall would turn over the reports of the Historical Section for the board to review.

Frequently Marshall and Archer talked in depth about the observations Marshall was making about our soldiers in combat. Archer told him, "Marshall, this is all new ground. We have suspected some of these things about infantry. But we have not known it for sure. You have pinned it down. Now you must write it. For if you don't, it may never be said." Marshall promised him over a cocktail in Paris that he would, hardly thinking anything of it the next morning. When he returned to the states to be released from active duty, he wanted only to get back to
work on his old newspaper. He was tired of writing about the war. But Archer sent him a telegram reminding him of his promise. *Men Against Fire* was born, first as a series of articles, then as a book.

Hailed as one of the most important books to come out of World War II, *Men Against Fire* caused great controversy. Some veterans understood Marshall to be saying that the American soldier was not a good fighter. Others saw in the book an explanation for what had happened to them during the war. But before examining this controversy, it is important to examine the themes of the book.

Marshall examined several areas in his analysis of the nature of war at the soldier's level, for like so many human activities, combat is a complex interaction of many factors. Through his interviewing technique and his experiences with soldiers in two world wars, Marshall noticed a common pattern. By analyzing and publishing his reflections, he contributed a valuable insight into the causes of effectiveness— and ineffectiveness—in tactical operations. Some of his findings merely confirmed time-honored beliefs— others resulted in drastic changes in training and leadership. To organize the observations and conclusions found in *Men Against Fire*, one can approach the
work with the following questions: What is crucial to combat effectiveness? What had been the accepted theories and methods of training prior to World War II? How does man react in combat? What are the causes of a soldier's actions? How can the military improve the performance of men in battle?

In 1947, Marshall wrote:

It has been seen that the prevailing tactical conditions increased the problem of unit coherence in combat. The only offset for this difficulty was to train for a higher degree of individual courage, comprehension of the situation, and self-starting character in the soldier. . . . Our weakness lies in -- that we have never got down to an exact definition of what we are seeking. . . . What we need in battle is more and better fire. What we need to seek in training are any and all means by which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we have to go to war. 5

His experience indicated to him that, contrary to popular belief, success often depends on an amazingly small amount of fire by just a few men, delivered at just the right time in just the right place. As examples of this, he cited the efforts of a unit on Omaha Beach and of twelve men at the Bourcy roadblock north of Bastogne. According to Marshall, it was the efforts of only 47 men that saved the day at Omaha. At Bourcy, twelve infantrymen, having fired into advanced elements of the German 2nd Panzer Division, fell
back to another position. But their fire had convinced the German regimental commander that he was being engaged by superior forces. When Corps Headquarters heard the report, it ordered the 2nd Panzer Division to swing northward and, in so doing, lost the race to Bastogne.

Besides the importance of increasing the ratio of firers to non-firers, Marshall urged that the army investigate its training in regard to information flow. "Fire and person-to-person communication are the twin essentials of successful minor tactics." By improving such communication, the army increases the likelihood that a man will stand his ground, that he will fire, that he will exercise initiative, and that a unit will respond to crises with unity of action instead of remaining inactive for considerable periods of time.

Finally, Marshall emphasized the importance of leadership in combat. He asserted that effective leadership required two things: first, "the ability to carry out an assigned task and do it completely"; second, the willingness to accept risk instead of always placing security uppermost. He later expressed this willingness to take a risk as having a gambler's attitude toward uncertainty:

True decision-making is the resolution of a
dilemma, a leap into the dark where nothing is certain, but some action is requisite. The gamble is there and unavoidable and one must go at it as a gambler. Moreover, when the worst trials come along, one may have to decide altogether in solitude. 10

By themselves, these insights do not seem extraordinary. Indeed, Marshall himself would probably would have said that they were just common sense. But the fact is that until he began to stress them, and to offer concrete proof that these principles were not being practiced, military men relied on antiquated, inappropriate methods to achieve tactical success. Marshall concluded that even the most experienced leaders in history virtually ignored the realities of human nature and, when figuring how to increase their chances of success, looked only at

... the geometry of the problem. They were optimists, these distinguished captains, and they appear to have taken it for granted that if they could devise a superior pattern and plan of maneuver, the willing response of well-trained troops would correspond very closely to the number of spear points which could get at the body of the enemy or the number of muskets which were in position to fire. 11

All too often, even in the twentieth century, service schools have taught soldiers to consider the deployment and positioning of weapons the commander's most crucial tactical consideration. That is, an officer should first examine the terrain to determine how he can best create interlocking
bands of fire. The physical characteristics of the weapons and the ground on which they were deployed constituted the crucial planning factor. But Marshall thought otherwise:

The heart of the matter is to relate man to his fellow soldier as he will find him on the field of combat, to condition him to human nature as he will learn to depend on it when the ground offers him no comfort and his weapons fail. 12

Most officers have applied the adage that discipline makes a soldier and that the road to discipline is through drill, repetition, and a balance of rewards and punishment. Marshall considered this as putting the cart before the horse. Discipline comes from morale, not the other way around. Furthermore, the cause of poor training since World War II was the application of eighteenth century principles of discipline to modern warfare. The advances in weaponry since then demanded a change in training and discipline, which (as of 1947 at least) had not been realized. Although everyone was aware that personal initiative was crucial in modern war, automatic response was the main goal of training, as it had been for centuries. Leaders faced a training challenge -- how to reconcile the need for individual initiative with the tradition of discipline to orders. Tactically, the American soldier had been encouraged "to think creatively as a person without
stimulating him to act and speak at all times as a member of a team." As far as increasing the soldier's participation in combat, it was generally believed that increasing his confidence in his weapon or increasing his enjoyment of firing it would suffice.

Finally, Marshall considered the tendency of commanders to seek a chance at blood-letting in order to "season" raw recruits to be counter-productive. The sight of a buddy's death is not strengthening but debilitating to most men.

How does a man react in combat? Let's take a look at a short battle narrative:

To return to the beginning of the Makin Island fight, which was part of the Gilbert Islands invasion in November, 1943, one battalion of the 165th Infantry Regiment was stoutly engaged all along the front of its defensive perimeter throughout the third night. The enemy, crazed with sake, began a series of Banzai charges at dusk, and the pressure thereafter was almost unremitting until dawn came. The frontal gun positions were all directly assaulted with sword and bayonet. Most of the killing took place at less than a ten-yard interval. Half of the American guns were knocked out and approximately half of the occupants of the forward foxholes were either killed or wounded. Every position was ringed with enemy dead.

When morning brought the assurance that the defensive position had weathered the storm and the enemy had been driven back by superior fire, it seemed certain to us that were close enough to it to appraise the action that all concerned must have acted with the utmost boldness. For it was
clear that the whole battalion was alive to the
danger and that despite its superior numbers, it
had succeeded by none too wide a margin. We began
the investigation to determine how many of our men
had fought with their weapons. It was an
exhaustive search, man by man and gun crew by gun
crew, each man being asked exactly what he had
done.

Yet making allowances for the dead, we could
identify only 36 men as having fired at the enemy
with all weapons. [An infantry company typically
had approximately 200 soldiers; a battalion about
four times as many.] The really active firers
were usually in small groups working together.
There were some men in positions directly under
attack who did not fire at all or attempt to use a
weapon even when the position was being overrun.
The majority of the active firers used several
weapons; if the machine gun went out, they picked
up a rifle; when they run out of rifle ammo, they
used grenades. But there were other witnesses who
testified that they had seen clear targets and
still did not fire. 19

As Marshall found out when he was transferred to Europe,
the pattern remained essentially the same. In both theaters
he used the same method of identifying the firers, and got
similar results:

In an average experienced infantry company in
an average stern day's action, the number engaging
with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per
cent of total strength. In the most aggressive
infantry companies, under the most intense local
pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 per cent
of total strength from the opening to the close of
action.

Now maybe I should clarify the matter still
further. I do not mean to say that throughout an
engagement, the average company maintained fire with an average of 15 per cent of its weapons. If that were it, there would be no problem, for such a rate of fire would necessarily mean great volume during the height of an assault.

The thing is simply this, that out of an average one hundred men, only fifteen on the average would take any part with the weapons. This was true whether the action was spread over a day, or two days, or three. The prolonging of the engagement did not add appreciably to the numbers.

Moreover, men did not have to maintain fire to be counted among the active firers. If he had so much as fired a rifle once or twice, though not aiming it at anything in particular, or lobbed a grenade in the direction of the enemy, he scored on the positive side. Usually the men with heavier weapons, such as the BAR, flamethrower or bazooka, gave a good account of themselves, which of course is just another way of saying that the majority of men who were present and armed but would not fight were riflemen.20

Now that was an eye-opener!

Was Marshall the only one to notice that a large percentage of men don't fire? No. Questionnaires administered to American soldiers in World War II indicated that what Marshall was to say later was true. In a post-war study based on these questionnaires, a social scientist wrote:

The threats of being maimed, of undergoing unbearable pain, and of being completely annihilated elicit intense fear reactions which may severely interfere with successful performances. If soldiers are given no preparation for dealing with danger situations and
if special techniques for controlling fear reactions are not utilized, many men are likely to react in a way which would be catastrophic to themselves and to their military organization. 21

The fact that fear was prevalent came out quite plainly in these questionnaires. More important,

... a sample of infantrymen were asked how far such feelings [of fear] actually impaired their ability in combat: 65 per cent of them, from a division in north-west Europe, in 1944, admitted that on at least one occasion they had been unable to perform adequately because of extreme fear, whilst 42 per cent admitted that this had happened more than once. 22

Besides noticing that only a small percentage of infantrymen actually fired, Marshall pointed out that day after day it was the same stalwart few who were active. "You could pick out your man who would probably keep going until he was dead. Or for that matter, after a few trial rounds, you could spot the man who would never get going though his chances of dying were relatively good." But was it possible to make such a determination prior to combat? No. Probably not. At least not through the time-honored methods of evaluation: performance in drill or degree of administrative discipline.

But an important note needs to be made here: he would not
classify those who stayed but did not fight as cowards or as useless baggage in combat. "It must be said in favor of some who did not use their weapons that they did not shirk the final risk of battle. They were not malingerers. They did not hold back from the danger point. They were there to be killed if the enemy fire searched and found them." In comparison to the assertions of Colonel Anthony Standish in his April, 1952, article "Crisis In Courage," Marshall's stand on this point was mild.

But why would they stay and yet not fight? Marshall observed that though a rifleman may hesitate to expose himself by firing his weapon, he is even more fearful of losing face in the eyes of his comrades. Since most often a soldier under fire crouches out of sight for protection, he is also out of sight of most of his fellows. But if he should flee, he would not only chance exposure to the enemy, but also his comrades would observe his flight and consider him a coward—a judgement which could not be escape even upon returning to a safe place.

Furthermore, "... those soldiers which advance but do not willingly employ their weapons still make a direct physical contribution to the success of offensive action. ... The moral feeling of physical support in
battle derives from the presence of another soldier rather than from the knowledge that he is taking action." Finally, the passive soldier does not detract from the effectiveness of the active firers.

Marshall observed another important reaction to combat, which had hitherto been overlooked. When directed to investigate the cause of the recurring 45 to 60 minute halt which an advancing line almost always made upon receiving fire, Marshall reported that the act of diving for cover severed all sense of unity. Since it always took time to restore low-level communications and to reintegrate the unit, the delay preceded any further movement. The men would not advance as long as they felt isolated, one from the other. Marshall suggested that to reduce the reintegration time, the commander must train the leaders that "... the first thing you do as you hit the ground is re-establish contact with your men. Determine where they are and let them know where you are."

A couple of years later, he suggested still another reason for a unit's being temporarily immobilized: "The explanation, though not sensed clearly at the time, was that the attacking companies were being drained of their muscle power by the repeated impact of sudden fear."
The next step towards increasing combat effectiveness was determining the reasons for the actions he had observed. Marshall offered several specific explanations for a man's failure in combat, such as unrealistic expectations of combat, being afraid of killing a living creature, failing to communicate, observing unexpected rearward movement, following the teachings of the culture, and operating in difficult weather.

The most serious and repeated breakdowns on the field of combat are caused by failure of the controls over human nature. In minor tactics the almost inevitable cause of local defeat is fundamentally the shrinkage of fire. In the greatest number of circumstances this shrinkage is the result of men failing to carry out tasks which are well within their power.

The harshest thing about a battlefield is not that it is dangerous but that it is empty with little or no action most of the time. Firing is only occasional. Unlike his earlier dangerous experiences, a soldier's moments of excitement are rare. A recruit, thinking about battle, expects that when danger comes, he will be comforted by the presence of other members of the team, other units, and the very power of the army. This expectation arises from all his pre-combat experiences. In training, on the parade field, and during
exercises, he saw people around him constantly. He felt he was always being watched. Furthermore, the training films, the day room pictures, and Hollywood movies always depicted the enemy as clear and visible. "They are rugged, flesh-and-blood, fully mortal, and therefore vulnerable. . . He thinks of battle as the shock impact of large and seeable men and machines extending as far as the eye can see." The problem with this image is that it is misleading. When combat comes, he will not be able to see very far and he feel more alone than ever before:

. . . he finds himself suddenly almost alone in his hour of greatest danger. And he can feel the danger, but there is nothing to contend against. It is from the mixture of mystification and fear that there comes the feeling of helplessness which in turn produces greater fear. 35

A few soldiers react to enemy fire by returning fire both blindly (for they do not see any clear targets) and timidly (for they expect someone to chide them for wasting ammunition). But most men do nothing; some because they are confused about this unexpected situation and await orders; others because they are paralyzed with fear and cannot think. Junior leaders are not immune to the apprehensions and lose self-confidence with every moment of inaction. They hesitate to give a clear order and so the problem intensifies. "Could one clear commanding voice be
raised, . . . [the men] would obey, or at least the stronger characters would do so and the weaker would begin to take heart because something is being done."

What happens when men are no longer raw recruits and have survived a few battles?

One of the principle effects of battle seasoning is apparently to make the leaders cognizant of some of the proportions of the problem so that when the company engages, a larger percentage of NCOs will use direct methods to increase the firepower of the immediate group. But the best of NCOs cannot for long move up and down the fire line booting his men until they use their weapons. Not only is that an invitation to sudden death but it diverts him from supporting and encouraging the relatively few willing spirits who are sustaining action. Also, regardless of what the book says to the contrary, that is not his real role on the battlefield. When the heat is on, he is more likely to be working hard with his own weapon. 37

So, Marshall urged, the problem of reluctance to fire should be addressed in training rather than expecting the junior leader to initiate corrective action on the battlefield. The American soldier has been taught by his family, his school, and his religion that aggression and killing are wrong. Obviously, this hinders him in combat. His reluctance is caused by an emotional, unconscious restraint, not an intellectual one. Psychiatrists investigating combat fatigue cases found that "... Fear of
killing, rather than of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure in the individual, and that fear of failure ran a strong second." So if a soldier can avoid it, he will not kill.

Marshall observed that another cause of tactical mishap was the lack of shared information. Not just leaders, but all men should be kept informed of the strength and intentions of adjacent units. Otherwise, a soldier will assume he is unsupported and will be more likely to retreat or panic if put under pressure. What holds true for an individual also holds for a squad, platoon, or company. That is, knowing that there are "friendlies" nearby boosts morale and hence discipline. But in order for the soldier to know of the strength and intentions of friendly forces, his leaders must seek out this information and disseminate it to the lowliest private. All too often, however, leaders are harassed by frequent demands from higher headquarters to provide a progress report. This pressure, added to dealing with the immediate situation and trying to anticipate future ones, results in the commander's neglecting to inform his troops of vital information. Also, frequently a company commander does not think in strategic terms. He is often unaware of the larger importance of his position and may
give it up if enemy resistance is not encountered. In other words, a leader [and this reaction is not limited to company commanders] may be spoiling for a fight so much that if he attains his objective without one, he may go off looking for one. This very event occurred on D-Day, when Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Timmes, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 507th Airborne Infantry, relinquished a key crossing of the Merderet River because it did not seem important to him when he got there.

There it lay for the taking by anyone prepared to dig in and hold till hell froze over. Nothing interrupted study of the scene by the first group of Americans to view it. There were no Germans in the vicinity. Had even one grenade been tossed at them, that might have changed everything; they would have deployed, and probably have stayed to fight it out on the right line. But it was too peaceful to be meaningful. So though they looked, they did not see. 40

Another cause of bungled operations was panicked retreats. They were not as commonplace as one might have suspected. Marshall knew of only seven during World War II, each of which he investigated. In each case the panic could have been avoided merely by informing everyone in the area of an intended rearward movement.

Nothing is more likely to collapse a line of infantry in combat than the sight of a few of its number in full and unexplained flight to the rear. . . . In every case, those who started the run, and thereby the spread of fear which started
the panic, had a legitimate or at least a reasonable excuse for the action. It was not the sudden motion which of itself did the damage but the fact that the others present were not kept informed. 41

For example, on June 12, 1944, during the fight for the Carentan Causeway, a sergeant, suddenly wounded, headed for the aid station without telling his squad where he was going. The squad and soon the whole line withdrew, thinking that orders had been given to that effect. Seeing others flee relieves the soldier of the fear that he would lose face by retreating, "for he knows that his personal failure is made inconspicuous by the general dissolution." 42

The positive side to this innate tendency for man to be constantly concerned with how others see him is that:

The thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade. . . . It is that way with any fighting man. His is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily. Having to make a choice in the face of the enemy, he would rather be unarmed and with his comrades around him than altogether alone, though possessing the most perfect of quick-firing weapons. 43

This concept of cohesion is not the sole creation of Marshall. At the same time he was coming to this awareness about the nature of man in battle, Professors Morris Janowitz and Edward A. Shils were finding the same group
dynamic operating in the Wehrmacht: their findings, based on interviews of German prisoners of war, were independent of Marshall's. Even Shils and Janowitz cannot be hailed as the originators of the idea. French Captain Andre Laffargue wrote in 1916 that cohesion (and he used that word) is required for success in assaulting the enemy. But the idea did not begin with Laffargue, either, for fifty years beforehand Ardant DuPicq expressed the same concern for increasing combat effectiveness through methods aimed at creating unit cohesion. (He, too, used that word.)

The final factor which Marshall mentioned in *Men Against Fire* as being disruptive of tactical operations (other than the efforts of the enemy) was the weather. More than just an impediment to logistical efforts, weather can affect tactics. For instance, he considered the dense fog to have been more disorganizing for Americans in the Ardennes counter-offensive than all other factors put together.

Having identified the causes of tactical disintegration, Marshall presented some possible solutions. "A system of man-to-man control on the battlefield is our great need in tactics and . . . it is fully attainable."

The differences between combat and training are obvious:
first, in training, safety is stressed to the point that movement under fire is unrealistically conducted; second, "In training the soldier does not have a man as his target. He is not shooting with the idea of killing." (Like the Marine Corps today, the army at the time trained men to fire at bulls eye targets on a "known distance" range, which was devoid of anything remotely resembling combat: firing was conducted on a range cleared of any distractions other than the sound of other men's weapons. No shrubs, no dead space, no uncertainties of any sort. The idea was that this sterile environment would enhance the soldier's learning to trust where his weapon would shoot, and this knowledge would enhance his confidence in himself and his weapon.) Third, whereas in training a soldier is closely watched and is motivated by the desire to impress his superiors, in combat he "... is of necessity pretty much on his own, and the chief pressure is to remain alive, if possible." So an army must ensure that training is as realistic as possible and prepares a soldier for what he will experience on the battlefield. Marshall quoted Clausewitz:

> It is of the first importance that the soldier, high or low, should not have to encounter in war things which seen for the first time, set him in terror or perplexity. 52

Since fear is a permanent condition of combat, and since
uncontrolled fear is the real enemy, the better the soldier understands and anticipates the dangers and distractions of the battlefield, the more likely he is to control his fear, and hence improve his chances of tactical success.

The American soldier must be trained from the very beginning that he must talk with others. In particular, the two elements of essential information must be freely passed: strength and intentions — both friendly and enemy (insofar as they can be determined). Further, he must be taught that "... his first duty is to join his force with others," and that talking is essential to that task. Only if troops and leaders are trained that combat inevitably results in disorder will they be able to establish order when confronted with an unexpected crisis.

How many times on the field of battle one sees a young commander unnecessarily dismayed and shaken because the reality is so unlike what he had envisaged! Viewing the chaos, the litter and the inaction, he thinks them tokens of defeat because his nerve has not been steeled or his eye trained to look for the signs of order and of progress amid the confusion.

Leaders must also be trained to think clearly in all situations so that they can improvise their plans to fit the situation. In short, the commander must be mentally flexible:
Sixty per cent of the art of command is the ability to anticipate. Forty per cent of the art of command is the ability to improvise, to reject the preconceived idea and to rule by action instead of acting by rules. 58

To overcome the natural fear in soldiers, leaders should be aware that many men fire only when given a specific order to do so. Therefore the leaders should take note of who is unwilling to fire and should give them special attention. When he gives an order, he must ensure that it is clear and forceful, for "... an order only half heard becomes a convenient excuse for non-compliance." The soldier must furthermore be trained to exercise "concentric initiative," not "eccentric initiative"; that is, initiative towards group -- not individual -- action. To do this, he must be trained to speak to his comrades rather than to remain silent in a crisis. In WW I, doughboys "talked it up" in combat more than they did in WW II. The introduction of the tactical radio probably resulted in less training in face-to-face communication.

Not only must lateral communications improve, but so must upward communications. Often a company commander found a novel, effective way of overcoming a problem, but he did not pass his solution on to others outside his company. The cause was not selfishness or modesty, but his training. He
was trained to think not how he can help others, but how others can help him. So the army must foster the awareness that everyone has something valuable to contribute as well as independent thought.

Far from encouraging a retreat from the basic disciplinary idea of "I command: you obey," I am suggesting that it is chiefly when command is exercised as if it were based on some military magic known only to officers that it precludes that form of obedience which is distinguished by intelligent and aggressive action.

To overcome the soldier's learned reluctance to kill, he should be trained to fire at non-personnel targets such as bushes and windows. Training should teach men to mass fire on command against targets like river embankments, the roots of trees at the edge of a forest, or hillcrests. "The proper educating of group fire requires constant insistence on the principle of spontaneous action developing out of a fresh and unexpected situation."

So by training both the leaders and the soldiers in the proper use of men on the battlefield, the army can increase its fire ratio. For those who show no initiative after the first fire fight, the leader should assign them to a gun crew.
There, the group will keep them going. Men working in groups or on teams do not have the same tendency to default of fire as do single riflemen. This is such a well-fixed principle in human nature that one rarely sees a gun go out of action simply because the opposing fire is too close. 65

An alternative solution for handling the unwilling firers is to put them on the heavier single-man weapons. Such assignments allow them the opportunity to show others that they deserve more respect than they had been getting. As for self starters, they should not be wasted on rear area duties or continuously concentrated on hazardous duties like outposts and patrols. No matter what tasks they are given, however, self-staters should be allowed as much freedom of action as possible. Over-supervision will ruin them.

Can training accomplish all this? Probably so. Under the traditional system, training merely enhanced the willing soldier's recognition of how to make the most of his own firing.

It may also stimulate and inform the man who is already fixed with a high sense of duty so that in him the initiative becomes simply a form of obedience. But more than that it is not likely to do under the present methods and until the principles by which we attempt to establish fire discipline are squared with human nature. 68

These were the major conclusions Marshall brought out in *Men Against Fire*. The response to them was immediate. On
September 17, 1947, Colonel Branner P. Purdue wrote to Marshall:

Our good friend, Colonel Joe Greene, asked me to write an article in the form of a letter to the Journal giving my views on Men Against Fire. I am enclosing a copy for two reasons: I would like for you to know who wrote it, and part of it might be editorially deleted. I am sorry to have to use a pseudonym but it is essential because of my present assignment a Chief of the Troop Training Division of G-3, Army Ground Forces. It would be very difficult to have your ideas adopted if my own strong opinions were advertised. . . .

Less than two weeks later (on October 1), he wrote Marshall again:

Upon returning from a trip to the west coast, I found your two letters awaiting me. . . .

I told Brigadier General Bruce Clarke, AGF G-3, of your coming visit, and he said that he very much wishes to have the opportunity of talking with you. . . .

I loaned General Clarke my annotated copy of Men Against Fire, together with a copy of A Soldier Who Can Write. Much to my surprise, he sent both to our chief of staff who possibly will pass them on to General Devers [the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces]. As yet, there have been no comments from the front office. . . .

But General Devers had indeed read the book, for on the same day that Colonel Purdue wrote the previous letter, Devers himself wrote:

May I take this opportunity to thank you for the autographed book, "Men Against Fire," which you gave me in Chicago.
I have read that book with a great deal of interest. It is certainly a valuable contribution to our leadership courses for it is a factual history of just what happens at the front. Only a small percentage of the thirteen million men that fought this war ever had the experience which you portray so correctly.

It is obvious that Marshall had impressed the right people. It is equally obvious that he was not one to let events run their own course. He was actively involved in trying to cultivate this new acquaintance at the Army Ground Forces training office. How excited Marshall must have been to get that flattering letter! But he had also realized that General Devers himself would be a valuable ally, for he had cornered him in Chicago evidently before Purdue's copy of *Men Against Fire* had been passed from Clarke through the chief of staff to Devers.

And Purdue was not yet through with Marshall. On January 19, 1948, he wrote:

Your *Men Against Fire* becomes more of a challenge the more we study it. It being a challenge, and a valid, legitimate challenge at that, we are trying to overcome faults of training -- and of battle actions -- which you so graphically pointed out. In my opinion, the most damaging of these faults is the unwillingness of the majority of riflemen to shoot. I have attacked this problem as described in the inclosed article, which is being sent to *The Infantry Journal* today. Furthermore, we are taking steps to change our infantry doctrine so that it will include the training advocated in the article.
One thing which bothers us is the need for small-unit and individual lateral communications and as yet there seems to be no satisfactory solution. There is no reason why the squad leader cannot be issued a portable, short-range radio, small enough not to interfere with his movements, but the problem is: How can we obtain efficient communication within the squad.

The main reason for this letter is to ask you one question. In your opinion, can you offer any suggestions other than those contained in Survival Lies Forward for better teaching men to shoot in battle?

We are sorry that you were not able to visit Fort Monroe as you had planned. Brigadier General Clarke, our G-3, is leaving for Fort Knox, where he will be the Assistant Commandant of The Armored School. I know that he would like to meet you and if you are ever in Fort Knox after the end of this month, he would deem it a privilege for you to call upon him. 72

Exactly what came of this correspondence is unknown, but the implications are clear: professional soldiers were standing up and taking notice of Marshall. Indeed, some were already considering him an expert. Almost overnight Men Against Fire elevated his reputation from that of civilian journalist turned historian to that of incisive military analyst, and perhaps teacher.

In December, 1947, only months after Men Against Fire was published, the commanding generals of the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Armies received the Revised Program of Instruction listed in the inclosures to Purdue's January
letter to Marshall. It was to go into effect on January 12, 1948. *Men Against Fire* was used as a reference for several blocks of instruction including "Introduction to Leadership" (one hour) and "Combat Leadership" (two hours). In 1949, the Command and General Staff College published a text entitled *Military Psychology* which included *Men Against Fire* in its bibliography. In January 1950, the Engineer School published the text *Military Leadership*, and sent Marshall a copy saying

> We have used some of your material in this text, particularly that contained in your fine book, "Men Against Fire." In the class discussions which are based on this text material, we are also using your book for illustrations, case histories, and practical application of the text material.

In 1950, The Army General School published *Leadership for the Company Officer*, giving as one of its ten recommended readings, *Men Against Fire*.

Marshall's reputation was not confined to members of the United States Army. His influence traveled overseas as well. In 1948, Colonel W.T. Campbell, of the British Joint Services Mission, wrote Marshall that the War Office had asked him to find out more about the behavior of the non-firer. On January 29, 1949, Major J.P. Searight, of the War Office, asked Marshall if *Men Against Fire* was going
to be published in Britain, as he wanted to review it in the British Army Journal. "It might interest you to know that I have lent my copy of it to General Sir Brian Horrocks, who is at this moment engaged in writing our new manual on training."

In addition to foreign and high level correspondence, Marshall received letters from junior officers indicating that he had explained for them incidents and reactions that they had experienced in World War II but had not understood at the time. For instance, Captain Steve W. Mulkey, Infantry, USMA class of 1944, who was General Bradley's aide de camp from 1947 to 1949, and assistant to General Eisenhower from 1949 to 1951 wrote:

I have just finished reading your "Men Against Fire" and it made such a favorable impression on me that I can not resist sending you my congratulations and thanks.

I can only regret that your book was not available to me before I had the honor of leading troops in combat in the European theater as I feel that the information that it contains is so pertinent and useful that my ability as a leader would have been vastly improved. I know that my understanding of some of the puzzling traits of individual behavior under combat conditions would have been bettered.

What strikes me about your book, however, is that the results of your studies—especially those dealing with the tendency of riflemen not to fire their weapons in combat—are validated in my mind by my personal observations but at no time in
my career have I realized what your book discloses is a universal condition with infantry troops. "Men Against Fire" has illuminated a here-to-fore dark area in my understanding of the meaning of war as we in the Infantry know it.

As a graduate of West Point and as an infantry small unit commander for more then three years, I feel that your book contains information which should be brought to the attention [of] every officer and man in the Army Field Forces. Let me assure you that the lessons contained in "Men Against Fire" will be spread by me whenever and where-ever the opportunity arises during my career as an army officer." 80

In the immediate post-war period, Marshall's star was definitely rising, and he had the satisfaction of knowing that it was due to his own effort. The letters he received from people who read his books and articles clearly indicated it was his thinking that stirred the minds of many, both high and low. In the four years following his release from active duty, he was called back to active duty forty-seven times for various lengths of time, and for various reasons. Sometimes he contributed to policy for the military on matters concerning national affairs, "... policy that led to NATO, the Berlin airlift, and Tito's problems with the Soviets." 81

In addition, he was asked to speak at service schools—a practice which he kept up throughout his remaining years. In September, 1949, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy,
Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, wrote what may have been the first of a long line of such invitations:

    In view of the wide acclaim in military circles which your "Men Against Fire" has received, it might be appropriate for you to speak on some such subject as "The Human Equation in Combat."82

In November, 1949, Marshall gave two lectures at the Ground General School at Fort Riley, Kansas.
CHAPTER TWO -- SOUNDING THE TRUMPET

Part II: The Soldier's Load

But Marshall was not easily satisfied. He still had a lot to say and a lot of energy to devote to saying it. When he finished Men Against Fire, he had some unanswered questions that had been plaguing him for several years. In Men Against Fire, he had handled the question of fear by saying: "Fear is ever present, but it is uncontrolled fear that is the enemy of successful operation, and the control of fear depends upon the extent to which all dangers and distractions may be correctly anticipated and therefore understood." Modern research confirms this point. Colonel F.R. Drews, chief of the Physical Fitness Research Institute at the Army War College, agreed, stating "Fear is normal. Overcoming fear is what training is all about."

Dr. Gregory Belenke, Chief of the Department of Behavioral Biology of the Division of Neuropsychology at The Walter Reed Institute of Research, supports what Colonel Drews said about the importance of training. According to Dr. Belenke, training is all-important, for the well-trained soldier knows what to expect and is more confident in himself, and if trained under realistic combat conditions,
will not get as high an adrenalin response to combat as a man who is not so well trained. But both these men speak with the research of more than thirty years at their fingertips. When Marshall began to formulate his theory about fear, no one had conducted any in-depth scientific research into the physiological component of fear. Although Clausewitz had asserted "Among the many factors in war that cannot be measured, physical effort is the most important. . . . Like danger, it is one of the great sources of friction in war," no one had connected the two in any precise way until Marshall postulated a connection.

According to Dr. Belenke, Marshall is the one who stirred the army to investigate the physiological component of fear.

Why did the question nag him? What did he conclude, and how did he support his conclusions? His own experiences in World War I and World War II, including the testimony of the men he interviewed, led him to think that fear and fatigue were somehow related. When on Makin he found that salt tablets and water restored his self-control, he realized that the abject cowardice he felt was caused by fatigue or dehydration or some other physiological condition. But just what it was, he could not identify. It took hearing the
testimony of the soldiers who landed at Omaha Beach to give him the corroboration he needed. Even then it was not until years later that he had enough confidence in a theory to make the connection:

In 1948 I raised the question with my personal friend, Dr. Raymond Waggoner, chief of psychiatry at the University of Michigan. He was at first skeptical about the theory and said that the physical effects of fear and fatigue might seem to be the same but he believed that the rebound from fear would be more rapid. When I stood on the documentation, he called in some of the biologists. They rallied to my side of the discussion, one of them saying: "We have been thinking along these lines for some years." After hearing them out, Dr. Waggoner warmed to the subject, gave me a private lesson in bio-chemistry and imparted to me the confidence with which to proceed.

What was the documentation he referred to? The notes of his after action interviews provided the facts he needed. One participant in the D-Day landings told Marshall:

They lay there motionless and staring into space. They were so thoroughly shocked that they had no consciousness of what went on. Many had forgotten that they had firearms to use. Others who had lost their arms didn't seem to see that there were weapons lying all around them. Some could not hold a weapon after it was forced into their hands. Others, when told to start cleaning a rifle, simply stared as if they had never heard such an order before. Their nerves were spent and nothing could be done about them. The fire continued to search for them, and if they were hit, they slumped lower into the sands and did not even call out for an aid man.
Elsewhere on Omaha, E Company, 16th Infantry lost 105 men, but only one of them died inland from the beach. The survivors agreed that most men moved at the pace of the incoming tide. They lacked the strength to move forward although they knew that to stay on the beach was certain death. Three sergeants gave a particularly enlightening insight:

..., [They] shouted to the men. But on arising, they found that they were stopped by their own physical weakness. The three sergeants said that after dragging themselves forward a few steps at a time, they had to drop because their legs wouldn't support them. They said, also, that they and the others would probably have remained inert had not the tide kept moving behind them so that they had to advance to escape being drowned.

..., Though the company lost more men to the water behind it than to the fire from in front, it required one hour to cross 250 yards of beach.

But even this did not clarify the matter. Another sergeant at another point on the same beach was more successful, but came to a profound conclusion. Company M, 116th Infantry, made it across the beach in ten minutes—crawling. They, too, were too weak to take more than a few steps at a time. It was Staff Sergeant Thomas B. Turner that provided the key:

We were all surprised to find that we had suddenly gone weak, and we were surprised how much fire men can move through without getting hit. Under fire we learned what we had never been told—that fear and fatigue are about the same in
their effect on an advance. 92

Once Dr. Waggoner told Marshall that there might be something to his ideas, Marshall began to do more research. Recalling a discussion with his friend, J.F.C. Fuller in June, 1944, Marshall dug up an obscure British Army booklet. In the 1920's, the Hygiene Advisory Committee of the British Army had studied the history of how soldiers have been loaded down through the centuries. It's report reinforced Marshall's ideas on the subject. The pamphlet showed that with few exceptions, commanders have always expected their men to carry from 55 to 80 pounds into battle. The committee reached an absolute conclusion "... that not in excess of forty to forty-five pounds was a tolerable load for an average-sized man on a road march. More specifically, it stated that on the march, for training purposes, the optimum load, including clothing and personal belongings, is one-third the body weight. Above that figure the cost of carrying the load rises disproportionately to the actual increment of weight." But the committee went no further, concluding the report with "Everyone agrees that equipment must be lightened. But when it comes to saying what equipment can be dispensed with, there is endless variety of opinion. Aye, there's the rub."
Marshall was not one to let it go at that. In the spring of 1948, he wrote to another friend, Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe, who was then on the Army General Staff, for data on the weight of U.S. Army equipment. McAuliffe gave him the information on May 13.

In the meantime, Marshall learned that over fifty years before, the German Army had conducted tests to measure the effect on soldiers carrying various loads under varying conditions of temperature. It was found that if the weather was brisk, a load of forty-eight pounds could be carried on a 15-mile march by seasoned men of military physique. But in warm weather the same load caused an impairment of physical powers and the man did not return to a normal state until sometime during the day following the march.

When the load was increased to sixty-nine pounds, even when the weather was cool, the man showed pronounced distress. Furthermore, no amount of practice marching with this load made any change in the man's reactions. He continued always to show distress in about the same amount. The conclusion was therefore drawn that it is impossible to condition the average soldier to marching with this much weight no matter how much training he is given—a finding which flatly refutes the traditional view that a weight of sixty-five pounds is a fair and proper load for a soldier.

... From the physical findings alone, the Institute concluded that forty-eight pounds per man was the absolute limit under the stress and fatigue of the combat field. [Yet this study] had the curious blind spot directing almost no attention to the fact that physical breakdown is accompanied ... by a [proportional] decline in
Marshall found support from General George S. Patton, who wrote, "No soldier should be compelled to walk until he actually enters battle. [From that point forward, he should] carry nothing but what he wears, his ammunition, his rations and his toilet articles. [When the battle is over,] he should get new uniforms, new everything." Taking it a step further, Marshall said "rations and ammunition should be specified only in the amounts which reason and experience tell us the soldier is likely to expend in one day. Beyond that, everything should be committed to first line transport." He emphasized this because in WW II, U.S. troops hit the beaches with three days' rations on their backs, weighing approximately nine pounds, even though shipments of food were coming ashore immediately behind the troops. What rations did Marshall recommend for the troops to carry ashore? "One package would always have been enough—one-third of a ration. In fact, we learned by actual survey on the battlefield that only some three percent of the men along the combat line touched any food at all in the first day's fighting. And that water consumption was only a fifth of what it became on the second day and thereafter."
As for ammunition, Marshall referred to his notes of interviews with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to conclude that the soldier does not need as much ammunition as was commonly believed.

The belief that it is good for his battle morale... is a psychological fallacy... The willing fighter will spend his last round if convinced that the tactical situation requires it. And he will then look around to see where he can get some more ammunition.

As for the contention that he might run out of ammunition at a critical time, Marshall pointed out that proving such a contention for past wars is next to impossible because the necessary statistics are not available. Furthermore, he cited three reasons why in modern combat why soldiers not likely to run out of ammunition: (1) supply vehicles were mechanized, (2) the few firers can always get ammunition from the dead and from those who will not fire, and (3) a given unit is seldom hit equally along its front, so it can conduct internal resupply. To prove his point, he wrote:

And though Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe kept banging on VIII Corps' door and repeating that his lines were in danger of being overrun because of his ammunition shortage (a condition gradually eased by the air resupply missions) there was no operation of the last war in which American troops fought with higher morale and confidence.

Although 200 rounds per man had been the standard load from
the mid-nineteenth century, in World War II, the U.S.
soldier in the Pacific carried 80 rounds and 5 to 8
grenades. Marshall's interview notes indicated that less
than 6 per cent of combat soldiers used grenades at all, and
about the same number used all 80 rounds. Since eight
grenades weighed over ten pounds, cutting back on them alone
would represent a considerable reduction.

It should be noted at this point that Marshall's
observations, as valid as they may have been, overlooked
some circumstances. There may have been other factors
besides fear which caused the soldiers on Omaha Beach to act
so sluggishly. Ernie Pyle, who accompanied the 29th
Division in the landing, said they had been issued
seasickness pills. "Well, we took the first two and they
almost killed us. The capsules had a strong sleeping powder
in them, and by noon we were in a drugged stupor. ... They constricted our throats, made our mouths bone-dry and
dilated the pupils of our eyes until we could hardly
see." In addition to the effects of seasickness pills,
troops may have been suffering from a vitamin and caloric
deficiency, particularly if they had been subsisting on "C"
or "K" rations.

With all this data, Marshall wrote another series of
articles for *The Infantry Journal* which later became the book *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation*. In the preface to the 1965 edition, he said:

The basic theme is elementary and should be beyond argument: no logistical system is sound unless its first principle is enlightened conservation of the power of the individual fighter.

The secondary theme, in 1949 a radically new idea, as yet unsupported by incontrovertible scientific proof, is that sustained fear in the male individual is as degenerative as prolonged fatigue and exhausts body energy no less. 107

According to Marshall, the earlier studies, while admirable as far as they went, failed to consider the role of the soldier as being different from that of a beast of burden:

Unlike the mule, the jeep, or any other carrier, [man's] chief function in war does not begin until the time he delivers that burden to the appointed ground.

It is this distinction which makes all the difference. For it means that the logistical limits of the human carrier should not be measured in terms of how much cargo he can haul without permanent injury to bone and muscle, but of what he can endure without critical, and not more than temporary, impairment of his mental and moral powers. ... His superiors must respect not only his intelligence but also the delicate organization of his nervous system. When they do not do so, they violate the basic principle of war, which is conservation of force. 108

While one may argue what the fundamental principle may be,
the point that a soldier's function is not as simple as a mule's cannot be denied. Equally obvious to us now is that commanders at all levels must keep the soldier's mental as well as physical limitations in mind when conducting operations.

Once stated, the proposition that fear and fatigue (or mental and physical factors) are related sounds commonsensical. It may be. But what exactly is the connection between fear and fatigue? Put simply, "Tired men fright more easily [and] frightened men swiftly tire." So they have a reciprocal relationship. Once a man is overloaded, he becomes tired. Once tired, he becomes more prone to fear. Once fearful (and it is well-known that combat causes fear or at least a heightened level of nervous tension), he loses strength.

Although he disclaimed exact knowledge of the bio-chemical processes involved, Marshall did venture to say that the adrenalin released by fear causes higher than normal amounts of glycogen to be sent to the muscles, resulting in fatigue. Similarly, when exerting themselves digging trenches or marching, soldiers experience fatigue because of the glycogen which their muscles must use for energy. Dr. Belenke and a bio-chemist at the Walter Reed
Institute of Research both corroborate his description to a point. When faced with certain situations, the adrenal medulla secretes certain hormones, known as catacolamines. Two of these, epinephrin (known in England as adrenalin) and norepinephrin, constrict arterioles, which join arteries to their capillary beds. The result is that certain areas of the body get less blood than they usually do, while other areas (the muscles which are involved in the "fight or flight" response) get more. So when the adrenal medulla orders the liver to secrete glycogen into the bloodstream, the majority of the glycogen goes to the muscles involved in fight or flight. Glycogen, a form of stored energy, is then turned into glucose, which later becomes lactic acid in the muscles. Since lactic acid buildup in the muscles causes fatigue, it is tempting to say that this is the process that explains how fear causes fatigue. But to say that the process is as straightforward as Marshall suggested is at present unprovable. There are too many complicating factors which cannot be easily tested or explained. Let it suffice to say that Dr. Belenke does not hesitate to say that fear interacts with fatigue. But just how it does so, no one can say for sure.

Colonel Drews of the Physical Fitness Research Institute
describes the process in essentially the same way as Dr. Belenke. Furthermore, they agree that the effects of stress are cumulative. It takes time to recuperate from the adrenalin response. If a person is under repeated or continuous stimulation of this sort, and not given a chance to rest, it will wear him down physically as well as mentally. Of the things which can be done to reduce the level of adrenalin response, Colonel Drews mentioned several: working in shifts to give time for recuperation; getting four hours of uninterrupted sleep per 24 hours; letting soldiers know that casualties are well taken care of, for this enhances their feelings of security, as does adequate food, clothing and shelter. Another important aspect of security is the formulation and maintenance of friendships. Above all, realistic training helps, because it can increase one's knowledge of combat, and therefore one's confidence when exposed to combat; and confidence is a major factor in reducing stress levels.

What is important about all this is that Marshall came to the same conclusions through his experiences in the two world wars and later, Korea. He incorporated the findings of the earlier German and British studies concerning using 1/3 of body weight as the maximum training load, and reducing
the combat load to 4/5 of the training load. Since 
according to official figures, the average American soldier 
weighed 153.6 pounds, the optimum training load would be 51 
pounds. According to Marshall, given the equipment weights 
McAuliffe had supplied, he determined that 51 pounds would 
not only give the soldier his combat essentials, but also 
allow him to carry two blankets and a raincoat. For combat, 
the soldier should carry no more than 40 pounds. Again, 
using his own judgement, he determined that allowing 11.03 
pounds for the uniform itself, 2 grenades, 2 belts of M-1 
ammunition, and one "K" ration, and other essentials, the 
soldier's combat load could be kept at 39.94 pounds.

So Marshall was offering a solution to the complex 
problem of the interaction between psychology, physiology, 
logistics, mobility, and willpower. A major part of the 
solution required that the leaders as well as the soldiers 
be convinced that the problem was met and overcome. The 
first step was explaining the problem simply, as he had done 
in _The Soldier's Load_: 

> Up to the zone where men come under fire, 
ninety per cent of the problem of movement can be 
solved with the horsepower of our machines. From 
that line forward, ninety per cent of success 
depends on will power. . . . Whether [a soldier] 
moves forward or hesitates in the moment when his 
life is at stake is almost wholly dependent on how 
well he has been led. 113
On the other hand, his leaders must have "... the courage to believe that the soldier with only five clips in his pocket but spring in his gait is tenfold stronger than the man who is foundered under the weight of ammunition he will never use." The army must teach the soldier to believe "that a toughened back and strong legs will give him his main chance for survival, but at the same time [the army must teach] the command and staff to treat those firm muscles as the Army's most precious combat assets."

How did senior officers react to Marshall's allegations that it had so much room to improve in understanding its troops' physical limitations and the effect of those limitations on their combat performance? In Marshall's own words:

... The paper which I did three years ago on the load of the soldier has finally scored a total success at the decisive point. The Army accepted it almost immediately in theory and a complete action program is now coming of it. The load has been re-standardized at the figures which I set. All basic equipment other than arms is now being remodelled so that it will come within the formula, new logistical safeguards are being set up and staff procedures are being refined so that the basic requirements will not be overridden in times of extraordinary pressure.

Was Marshall right? Completely. Not only did General Devers, still the Chief of Army Field Forces, ask Marshall
to send him a copy of his study of the problem in May 1949 but he also invited him to testify before the newly appointed Army Equipment Board. Marshall did so that July. It is not correct to say, however, that Marshall was the first one to notice the problem. According to general Devers, the subject was an important one at the 1946 Infantry Conference. But very little had been done since then other than talk. According to the report of the Quartermaster Climatic Research Laboratory (one of two official organizations which began research into the subject), it was Marshall's making the problem public that made the research possible. Before he came forth with *The Soldier's Load*, it remained a topic of discussion, but one which everyone had his own opinion on and which suffered from lack of hard evidence. But because he stirred the complacency of the public, the military felt sufficiently confident that dedicating resources toward studying the problem would be supported from all quarters. Out of the efforts of the Quartermaster's research and that of The Army Field forces Board Number 3, at Fort Benning, new equipment was indeed being designed and tested, some of which is still in use today. For the first time, equipment was designed to be comfortable, riding lower on the body. "Prior to that, uniforms were designed for appearance, not so much for
functional purpose." In 1956, Major General T.L. Sherburne, Director of Personnel Operations, wrote:

> I appreciated very much a copy of "The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of the Nation." I have read through it already and am particularly interested in your prescription for accouterments of the individual soldier. I am trying to get Dep Log [The deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics?] to design a water-proof, warm, light envelope that men can carry in mean weather.

Between his being separated from the service in 1946 and his being invited to analyze the performance of American forces in Korea in 1950, Marshall stirred up a great deal of controversy. He was not the only person concerned with combat effectiveness at the individual and small group levels. Indeed, he would never have been heard at all if others had not agreed with him. But he was undoubtedly the most outspoken critic involved with these matters. In a manner similar to both Fuller and Liddell Hart, he formulated theories and tried to get them across to the military and the government. He applied not only his own experiences, but also those drawn from the history of warfare to back up his arguments. He cultivated contacts within the higher reaches of the army and pushed very hard for his ideas. Like Liddell Hart, his status as a reporter, officially a civilian, made him relatively free from overt political or military pressure.
Though Marshall was not alone in his desire to analyze the experiences of World War II in order to improve the army's combat effectiveness, he was certainly one of the most outspoken and prolific analysts of that war. Using all the means at his disposal, from his newspaper column to articles for professional magazines to his books, Marshall stressed that the human element in combat must not be ignored even in the face of modern technology. Ultimately, the soldier who must face his own fear decides the battle. To increase the number of men that show the initiative necessary to contribute their efforts in the face of danger, Marshall urged that a sense of tight group cohesion be fostered, not only in training but in combat. One of the most effective ways to accomplish this goal would be to teach each man from the beginning of his military career that it was his duty to share information with others, for shared information not only would increase each man's knowledge of battlefield events as they unfolded, but also would provide him with a feeling of belonging to a group which needed his support and which supported him. Finally, Marshall made public the important connection between fatigue and fear which had been known by only a few.

So within seven years Marshall pioneered thought in two
major fields — military history and military theory. In military history he presented a new approach for obtaining the sequence of events in combat, an inherently confused situation. As a by-product of his experiences in investigating small unit actions, he developed a novel theory of human behavior under stress. But it still remained for him to reform the army along the lines of his conclusions.
CHAPTER THREE

LABORS OF SISYPHUS — 1950 to 1977

". . . [There struggled] Sisyphus, whose task was to roll a huge stone up a hill-top, but when the steep was well-nigh gained, the rock, repulsed by some sudden force, rushed again headlong down to the plain. Again he toiled at it, while sweat bathed all his weary limbs, but all to no effect."

Having committed himself to his theories in the late forties and thereby stirring up a great deal of interest and controversy, Marshall spent the rest of his life promoting those theories and defending them. Although he had impressed some very influential people, Marshall's ideas would not live a life of their own. He thought they were self-evident, but, as he was to find out, reforming a large organization with a strong sense of tradition, even with the help of its leaders, was no simple task. It would take perseverance, self-confidence, and a lot of luck. Did Marshall have these qualities? Would he ever be successful in serving his country in the way he thought so important:
the re-education of the military? Perhaps most important, did he have a viable theory, or merely a set of wild assertions that would — and should — be allowed to fade away without making any real impact?

Before he died in 1977, Marshall saw action or interviewed those who had seen action in several wars, from Korea to Israel to Vietnam. He had ample opportunity in several environments with several armies to change his theories if they did not seem appropriate. Yet he did not do so to any great extent, as can be seen in an analysis of his writings over the period. A few specifics did change, such as his observations about how many front line soldiers took active part in combat. In World War II he had found that the percentage of firers to non-firers was seldom above 15 percent of those in a given combat unit, and that even in the best units, 25 percent was uncommon. He noticed an increase in this percentage in subsequent wars, but by and large, his ideas remained remarkably constant.

To promote his ideas, Marshall used every resource at his disposal and acted in many capacities, from combat analyst to storyteller to newspaperman. He even tried a few new roles: government consultant, publicist, and "serious" historian. Because these functions often overlapped, it is
difficult to determine which role he was playing at any given time. But throughout the entire period, he devoted his energy to changing what he considered to need changing. He often exerted his considerable influence in high places to this end — a technique which sometimes gets results and often makes enemies. That he had enemies is unquestionable, for his ideas seemed to require that one either be for him or against him. While many people, particularly professional soldiers, wrote him to express their admiration and appreciation for his efforts, others were offended by his writings. Too proud to step out of the limelight when challenged, Marshall did everything he could to ensure that his impact would last. Wanting to be rewarded for his effort, Marshall eventually became frustrated to the point of bitterness which, combined with his advancing age and failing health in the 1960's, led him to change his manner. In his last years, his increasingly gruff manner added one more obstacle on the path to success. But the intervening years brimmed with vitality and hope for Marshall. In 1950, at the age of fifty, he was feeling a measure of success. How did things change over the years?

In 1950, Marshall completed yet another book, this time a leadership manual for all the services. In November, 1950,
George C. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, wrote the preface to the Department of Defense manual, *The Armed Forces Officer*, "This manual on leadership has been prepared for use by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned."

This manual eloquently restated the ideas Marshall put forth in *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load* but also included more mundane subjects of interest to the junior officer, such as the meaning of the commission, how to keep one's personal affairs in order, and the customs and courtesies of the service. Based solely on Marshall's studies, experiences, and reflections to that date, *The Armed Forces Officer* provides the historian an excellent base line from which to evaluate how subsequent experiences caused Marshall to modify his ideas. Given the opportunity to revise his manual in 1956 when the Department of the Army, revised and republished in 1960 by D.O.D., and again in 1975, Marshall could have revised his explanations of how men reacted to combat. Furthermore, in 1965, Brigadier General Joseph B. Sweet, senior editor of Stackpole Books, engaged Marshall to write *The Officer As A Leader*:

> What we want, of course, is a book which will have your best thoughts on "the philosophy,
... While based on the DOD revision -- which you wrote -- the new version should be distinctly different in appearance and in content. (We can influence the appearance and format in choice of style, layout, type face, binding, and jacket.)

But what Stackpole got was indeed a warmed-over DOD version. The changes made in 1965 were so few and so minor that it almost looks as if Marshall dared Stackpole to change it. He added a reference here and there to Korea, Lebanon or Vietnam, cut out a comment on this general or that one, and added three propositions to his list of how to lead Americans in combat. But the majority of the changes in the 1950 edition were made between the 1956 (identical to the 1950) and the 1960 editions, and even these were minor. The Officer As A Leader is so close to the 1960 version as to make one wonder whether Marshall even read Sweet's letter. The changes are mostly in appearance and format -- the very things that Sweet said would be handled by the company. The chapter headings were changed but little, and some entire chapters are verbatim from the earlier versions.

An example of the degree to which this book changed -- or rather, did not change -- in its various forms can be found
in the last chapter of each book, entitled "Americans in Combat" in all versions of *The Armed Forces Officer* and "The Leading of Americans in Combat" in *The Officer As a Leader." This short (8 page) chapter lists about thirty propositions "to which the Armed Services subscribe in saying to the officer corps what may be expected of the average man of the United States under the conditions of battle. Generally speaking, they have held true of Americans in times past from Lexington to Okinawa." What follows represents a sampling of the propositions:

**All versions -- I**

"When led with courage and intelligence, an American will fight as willingly and as efficiently as any fighter in world history."

**All versions -- V**

"He is to a certain extent machine-bound because the nature of our civilization has made him so. In an emergency, he tends to look around for a motor car, a radio or some other gadget that will facilitate his purpose, instead of thinking about using muscle power toward the given end. In combat, this is a weakness which thwarts contact and limits communications. Therefore it needs to be anticipated and guarded against."

**1950/56 -- VII**

"Except on a hollywood lot, there is no such thing as an American fighter "type." Our best men come in all colors, shapes, and sizes. They appear from every section of the Nation, including the territories."
The phrase "including the territories" does not appear.

"The normal, gregarious American is not at his best when playing a lone-handed or tactically isolated part in battle. He is not a kamikaze or a one-man torpedo. Consequently, the best tactical results obtain from those dispositions and methods which link the power of one man to that of another. Men who feel strange with their unit, having been carelessly received by it, and indifferently handled, will rarely, if ever, fight strongly and courageously. But if treated with common decency and respect, they will perform like men."

"Under the conditions of battle, any extra work, exercise, maneuver, or marching which does not serve a clear and direct operational purpose is unjustifiable. The supreme object is to keep men as physically fresh and mentally alert as possible. Tired men take fright and are half-whipped before the battle opens. Worn-out officers cannot make clear decisions. The conservation of men's powers, not the exhaustion thereof, is the way of successful operation."

"When forces are committed to combat, it is vital that not one unnecessary pound be put on any man's back. Lightness of foot is the key to speed of movement and the increase of firepower. In judging of these things, every officer's thought should be on the optimistic side. It is better to take the chance that the men will manage to get by on a little less than to overload them, through an over-cautious reckoning of every possible contingency, thereby destroying their power to do anything effectively."

"Even a thorough training and long practice in weapons handling will not always insure that a majority of men will use
their weapons freely and consistently when engaging the enemy. This is particularly true of Americans. In youth they are taught that the taking of human life is wrong. This feeling is deep-rooted in their emotions. Many of them cannot shake it off when the hour comes that their own lives are in danger. They fail to fire, though they do not know exactly why. In war, firing at an enemy target can be made a habit. Once required to make the start, because he is given personal and intelligent direction, any man will find it easier to fire the second and third time, and soon thereafter his response will become automatic in any tactical situation. When engaging the enemy, the most decisive task of all junior leaders is to make certain that all men along the line are employing their weapons, even if this means spending some time with each man and directing his fire. Reconnaissance and inspection toward this end, particularly in the early stages of initial engagement, are far more important than the employment of weapons by junior leaders themselves, since this latter tends to distract their attention from what the men are doing."

All versions -- XXII

"Unity of action develops from fullness of information. In combat, all ranks have to know what is being done, and why it is being done, if confusion is to be kept to a minimum. This holds true in all types of operation, whatever the service. . . . All plans in combat are subject to modification as circumstances dictate; this being the case, it is better not to muddle men by filling their minds with a seeming conflict in ideas [by having "Plan A," "Plan B," etc.]. . . . " 6

All versions -- XXVI

"On the field of sport Americans always "talk it up" to keep the nerves steady and to generate confidence. The need is even greater on the field of war, and the same treatment will have no less effect. When men are afraid, they go silent; silence of itself further intensifies their fear. The resumption of speech is the beginning of thoughtful, collected action, for self-evidently, two or more men cannot join strength and work intelligently until they know each other's thoughts. Consequently, all training is an exercise in getting men to open up and become articulate even as it is a process in conditioning them physically to move strongly and together." 7
[At this point, in *The Officer As a Leader*, Marshall added three propositions not included in the Department of Defense and Department of the Army editions:]

(XXVII) "Among Americans, there is no more persistent cause of patrol failure than overloading, in particular, with ammunition. . . ."

(XXVII) "The average American adult male, even following military training, will not through instinct make the proper use of ground in an approach march or in between fire interludes during battle. . . ."

(XXIX) "Enemy-vacated ground, possibly booby-trapped or mined, should be tested and neutralized by specialists. When danger is not palpable, our typical fighting man tends to disregard it wholly and rush into the scene head down. That's when the leader must push back the crowd." 8

All versions -- XXXII

"In any action in which several services are joined, any American officer may expect the same measure of respect from the ranks of any other service as from his own, provided he conducts himself with a dignity and manner becoming an American officer.

For all officers, due reflection on these points, relating to the character of our men in war, is not more important than a continuing study of how they may be applied to all aspects of training, toward the end that we may further strengthen our own system. This is the grand object in all military studies. that service is most perfect which best holds itself, at all times and at all levels, in a state of readiness to move against and destroy any declared enemy of the United States." 9

All propositions which have not been listed above were exactly the same in all versions. The intent of the preceeding comparison was to give an idea of the few slight modifications made in Marshall's thought and the closeness
of each version of the leadership manual. The conclusion is that Marshall did not find anything in the intervening years to change his mind about the observations and ideas he made in the 1940's. Reading his subsequent books substantiates this conclusion. In 1969, he wrote:

As I have written many times, most battles are more like a schoolyard in a rough neighborhood at recess than a clash between football giants in the Rose Bowl. They are messy, inorganic, and uncoordinated. It is only much later, after the clerks have tidied up their reports and the generals have published their memoirs, that the historian with his orderly mind professes to discern an understandable pattern in what was essentially catch-as-catch-can, if not chaotic, at the time.

Although the clash may be widespread and immediate, what happens in any one sector is all too often almost unrelated to the action in any other. ... Within a given company, each platoon may have its own fight virtually in isolation, and within one battalion, each company may get the feeling that it is standing at Armageddon and battling pretty much alone for the Lord.

In this respect, conventional war and irregular operations are far more alike than unlike. Nor does the resemblance end there. I am well aware that the average American who has not been to Vietnam believes that the war there has nothing in common with operations against the North Koreans and Communist Chinese, against the Japanese in World War II, or the Germans in 1918. The military analyst who has worked all these fields is far more impressed by the identicalness of features, the similarity of problems, the grinding repetition of historical incident.

So The Armed Forces Officer, which contains all of
Marshall's 1950 vintage ideas on man and combat, changes so little that the inescapable conclusion must be that he remained true to those ideas throughout his life. But is that to say that Marshall himself became static? Certainly not! The record of his activities for the last 27 years of his life indicates that he was indefatigable. He pressed on gathering information, spreading his views, and offering his services to whoever asked for them. Indeed, he was always on edge when there were wars or rumors of wars, wanting to be "in" on what was going on. "When the nation is at war and I am functioning only as a sideliner, I have nightmares." He lived for the chance to be involved in world affairs, particularly wars. He was restless, almost driven. He was certainly not static.

What may have changed, however, was his confidence that anyone was listening. Dr. Roger Spiller, formerly a research fellow at the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth and a military historian who is working on a biography of Marshall, remarked that in listening to tapes of Marshall's speeches given at Fort Leavenworth between 1952 and 1962, one can detect a change in Marshall's voice and demeanor.

I thought I saw a certain change in Marshall's syntax between the first and last lectures. There
was a stridency, and a certain cocksure attitude about the influence he obviously thought he was having in 1952 that simply was not there in 1962. The ten years had convinced him that the Army, perhaps, was just not hanging around, waiting for him to reform it. 12

So what had happened that made Marshall feel frustrated and less sure of his influence? Was his perception that the army was not listening to him accurate or was he expecting too much too soon? A description of the major events and activities in these years hints at the answers to those questions.

While *The Armed Forces Officer* was being approved and printed in the summer of 1950, the war in Korea began, catching the world by surprise. In the fall, as the Department of Defense was putting the final touches on *The Armed Forces Officer*, Marshall was approached by the Chief Historian of the Army (an old El Paso friend, Major General Orlando Ward) to handle the historical work in Korea. If because of technicalities, his appointment fell through, Marshall did not miss the action in Korea. The two year old Operations Research Office invited him to go to Korea as an operations analyst, which invitation Marshall readily agreed to do.

One of Marshall's fellow analysts, Colonel Edward M.
Parker, USMA class of 1931, Rhodes Scholar, and logistics officer of the 10th Army in World War II, wrote about the Operations Research Office:

... A million dollars was appropriated for OR [operations research] in the budget for fiscal year 1949. Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe (then Deputy Director of Logistics for Research and Development), carefully studied the institutions which might contract to form and operate an agency for the work contemplated. In April 1948 he selected Johns Hopkins University on the basis of demonstrated competence, reputation and prestige—both general and in fields related to OR. On 28 September 1948 the 'General Research Office' was activated and on 28 December 1948 the name was changed to 'Operations Research Office.'

... ORO is administered and the staff recruited and maintained by Johns Hopkins University, but supervisory responsibility for technical operation resides in the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, for Research and Development. ... Now [he wrote the article in the spring of 1951] there are about sixty professional staff members, and sixty administrative employees.

... The Army responded early to ORO's suggestion that the Korean campaign was an opportunity for evaluations based on fresh observations and records of actual combat performance. Field teams from ORO, attached to the Far East Command and subordinate echelons, are now in the theater applying through objective scientific analysis the criteria of battle to problems connected with the tactical use of atomic weapons, close air support of ground forces, the employment of U.S. armor and methods of defeating North Korean (Soviet) armor, psychological warfare against North Korean forces, infantry weapons systems and tactics, airborne operations, service (logistical) support of combat, and mobilization of South Korean manpower for separate and integrated combat and service units. 15
Marshall signed his contract on November 13. On November 28, he accompanied Ellis Johnson (ORO director), Lynn H. Rumbaugh, and Colonel Parker to Japan.

We made Tokyo on Thanksgiving morning. Major General Charles Willoughby greeted me like a long lost brother. His chief historian, Dr. Gordon Prange, also gave me three cheers. Willoughby thought I had come over to take on the Eighth Army historical task, and I learned for the first time that he had initiated the request that Ward had passed along to me as a Department of the Army idea. ... Two days later [after the Communist Chinese had broken through along the Chongchon River], I flew for Seoul. Some of our party, half military, half civilian scientist, went along. It had been understood all along that I would be working pretty much on my own.

I had barged north to contact what was left of the 2nd Infantry Division after the worst of all clobbers at Kunuri. We met north of Pyongyang. I had realized without being told that my primary mission was fundamentally changed. Instead of concentrating primarily on our tactics, that part of the search would be almost incidental to getting the measure of the Red Chinese as a fighting body so that I could report on their use of weapons, manner of deployment, rate of advance, signal system, and so forth. In the head of each U.S. rifleman who had faced them were bits and pieces of vital information which he probably thought unimportant. Once these fragments were extracted and fitted together like a mosaic we would have something.

The press reports of the performance of the army in Korea indicated that the army was smashed and broken beyond belief, that there had been mass panic, and that the soldiers had not fought well at all. Rumors were rampant
about the poor showing of the 2nd Division in particular. Marshall must have heard all this and entered into his investigations expecting to uncover the cause of the debacle.

After twelve days of interviewing troops and commanders as he had done in World War II, Marshall reported his findings to Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander. "The critique and questioning concluded, I sat all night pounding out the tactical stuff. It was rushed from my mill to a duplicator. By daylight we had it in bundles aboard trucks speeding north to our embattled forces." On December 16, he wrote "Notes on Chinese Company Tactics," ORO-S-41, [the administrative number for this report] (EUSAK) [Eighth United States Army Korea], a secret working paper describing how the Chinese worked. This paper was the first of several to break the mystique of the Chinese as being hardened, invincible killers with an almost perfect intelligence system. This paper threw light on four points previously misunderstood by American forces. First, most encounters that Marshall had investigated in the Chongchon fight (14 of 16 engagements) were meeting engagements and not carefully planned attacks by the communists. The other two were set-piece because U.S.
troops had given away their positions with their campfires. Second, the bugle calls and other noise-making devices were not designed primarily for unnerving our troops. They were attack signals similar to those used by the Japanese in World War II. Third, the shepherd's horn provided company and battalion level control, the whistle platoon and squad control, while the bugle performed both as a control measure and a fear-inducer. Fourth, some musical instruments, like rattles, congo drums, and flutes, were indeed designed to scare our soldiers. But the use of these musical instruments, as well as the chanting and chattering of the enemy troops would demoralize our men only so long as they were not accustomed to it. Once they were trained in what the signals meant, the men could actually take advantage of them.

Four days later, Marshall wrote yet another secret memorandum for the Eighth Army. In "CCF Tactics in the Envelopment of a Column," he analyzed the 2nd Infantry Division's retreat from Kunuri on November 30. On January 2, 1951, he wrote "Notes on CCF Area Targets Based on CCF Tactics," in which he surmised that the enemy's success at hiding during the day was due to their cramming men into hamlets, and moving at night. He suggested that B-29
strikes on likely enemy concentrations would turn their tactic into an advantage for the U.N. forces. Three days later he wrote the first part of "CCF in the Attack," describing the communist tactics used against the 2nd Division. The second part followed on January 27, describing the activities of the 1st Marine Division in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni action, (popularly known as the Chosin Reservoir fight), from November 20 to December 10, 1950.

These documents were not the only immediate result of Marshall's activities in Korea during the winter of 1950-51. He performed two other services while present in the field. First, he harangued the press about their bogus reporting. At the end of his initial briefing for General Walker in mid-December, Marshall declared "I can find no fault in the 2nd Division or its commander, General Keiser. The army should be proud of them." Walker immediately asked him to tell that to the press the next day. Marshall asked, "Does that include what I said about General Keiser and about how well the integrated units fought?" Walker responded, "Those things especially."

I didn't talk to the press gallery; I gave it hell. I said it had been writing irresponsible copy about a bugout army based on rumors and spook stuff from malingerers. I reminded them that the
Eighth Army was in retreat, with our national affairs in crisis, and that an American wasn't divested of all moral responsibility to his nation just because he held a news job. I said: "Now, I can account for the 2nd Division. I'll tell you what you need to know. If you want to argue, get up and do it now, but if you haven't got any argument to make, for God's sake quit writing stories aimed to doom your country and its cause.")

Setting the press straight wasn't his only additional, unofficial contribution, either. When the army replaced General Keiser with General Bob McClure as commander of the 2nd Infantry, Walker's deputy chief of staff told McClure "Colonel Marshall has the confidence of the army commander. He knows a great deal about how to reconstitute forces out of a demoralizing situation. You should trust him." Trust Marshall he did. While others dealt with the training and resupply aspects of putting the 2nd Infantry back in fighting shape, Marshall was given free rein to improve its fighting spirit. He did this by visiting every unit he could, telling them

... in detail what the unit and the division as a whole had been through.

Toward the close, I would say something like this: "That was the worst ordeal ever given an American division. It survived only because the men who came through are the most rugged fighters that have ever served in this uniform. Yes, you are getting an extraordinary number of replacements, some of whom haven't seen combat for years, and others never. From what you've heard today, you must know that you are in good hands."
And I get it from the leaders that we are filling with soldiers just as steady as the division lost. That's all it takes."

Sure, all of it sounds corny. Still, it worked. 25

After General Walker died in a jeep accident in December 1950, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, became the Eighth Army commander. Ridgway knew Marshall and his methods well. Soon after arrival, Ridgway gave Marshall a special task: improving night defensive tactics, particularly the aspect of battlefield illumination. Since the U.S. Army had had no doctrine for the subject since World War I, Marshall had to deal with it "by the seat of my pants. ... by-guess-and-by-God." Not only did he guess at the appropriate ranges for searchlight employment, he wired Liddell Hart to tap the British military for their experience on the subject of "artificial moonlight" [aiming searchlights at clouds to brighten the night sky]. Once again, Marshall's connections came through for him. He wrote back to Liddell Hart, "Bully for you and many, many thanks. Your piece came through just in the nick of time."

When he returned to the United States in April 1951, Marshall had the raw material for a lengthier report on the infantry's performance in Korea. Originally entitled
"Analysis of Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea During the Winter 1950-51, (ORO-R-5)," this report combined the observations and deductions of his earlier Eighth Army memoranda. But because he was not a scientist, the paper changed its name twice, from "Analysis," to "Notes," to "Commentary." According to Colonel Parker, "This was originally intended as a technical memorandum. It was objected that the work was not an objective analysis but rather a commentary (like Caesar's on the Gallic Wars), thus its category and title [were] changed." By August 1, 1951, Marshall had completed his draft "Analysis" and sent over 25 copies for comment to officers who had been to Korea. Among those who responded were Lieutenant Colonel Oliver G. Kinney (then on duty in the ROTC Department at the University of Dayton) and Lieutenant Colonel H.W.O. Kinnard, Marshall's 101st Airborne friend, both of whom offered strong constructive criticism. The report got an even closer review by officers of the 6th Infantry Division, as reported by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Holden:

... [Having just received a copy of the treatise on Infantry operations in Korea this week, and ordered by the commanding general to prepare a thorough response,] I formed a committee of approximately 20 officers who were Korean returnees. The group included officers from every Army division in Korea and represented all levels of command from platoon through battalion. For the past two days, we have been
going through the report sentence by sentence.

I have set a goal of finishing your analysis by the end of next week, which should put the report in your hands by the 24th or 25th [of September]. You will be interested to note that thus far our main comments have been merely to ask you to emphasize even more strongly certain points that you have made. The officers as a group were amazed at how accurately you have sensed Infantry operations during the period that you were there. Needless to say it was merely the correct and analytical study that I expected you would produce.

However, I think that we are going to produce a couple of subjects that will be of interest. I am going to include our opinions of the impact of career management on the combat readiness potential of the U.S. Army. This will be based on our evaluations of the battalion and regimental commanders that were sent to Korea in command of these Infantry units. It should be interesting and it should be of some value. 31

The Chief of Army Field Forces [AFF] issued a directive to the commandants of all army service schools, the presidents of the four AFF Boards, the G-3 [Operations] and G-4 [Logistics], concerning Technical Memorandum ORO-T-7(EUSAK) - "Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea," (one of the early versions of Marshall's work):

1. The subject memorandum contains interesting authoritative observations on our operations immediately following our withdrawal from the Yalu and North Korea, December 1950 to February 1951. . . .

2. The memorandum contains combat lessons and source material which may be directly applied to training. Selected actions illustrate the necessity for protection of lines of communication and routes off withdrawal; the advantages to be derived from close coordination of infantry-armor task force
organization; the CCF [Chinese Communist Forces] pattern of movement, use of marching fire, and emphasis on grenades; the discussion of the illuminated front is a useful adjunct to our training material; and throughout the report there is evident the lack of security measures. . . .

[To ensure the broadest possible use of the memorandum, the directive goes on to downgrade the report's security classification except for six parts that were considered highly sensitive.] 32

What significant insights did Marshall put in these reports? A review of the final version of the report, "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-51," ORO-R-13, printed by Operations Research Office on October 27, 1951, indicates that his findings fell into two categories: first, observations of the Chinese and our response; second, an affirmation of the points he had begun publicizing four years earlier with Men Against Fire and The Soldier's Load. The first category includes such points as the Chinese use of musical instruments and the inadequacy of company-size defensive perimeters in the Korean situation, as he had already indicated in his local Eighth Army papers. But what is most interesting is the degree to which his World War II observations about the behavior of men in combat were borne out by the Korean experience. For instance, "... the American soldier will never develop an adequate appreciation of what full information means to the unity of combat
forces, and what it requires of him, until more attention is paid to that subject in the course of his training." And again," In the Korean fighting, the average combat soldier, when his total load is somewhere between 38 and 45 pounds (including clothing), gets along fairly well and can march a reasonable distance, engage, and still remain relatively mobile. When the load goes above 50 pounds he becomes a drag upon the company." The only major difference he noted was that whereas the percentage of firers in World War II seldom rose above 15-25%, in Korea "when the ground and situation permit it, the measure of willing participation is more than double World War II averages. In nighttime perimeter defense, the majority of those present actually take a personal part in the return of fire. The chronic non-firer is an exception under the conditions of the Korean fighting." He attributed the increase not only to better training in the inter-war years and to the peculiar nature of the Korean terrain, but also to improved low level communications:

Perhaps an even more decisive influence in the buildup [of fire] is that in Korea the combat Army has regained its voice. Both in attack and on defense, there is incessant noise -- cheering, screaming, and the shouting of orders to individuals. Company action partakes the nature of a team game. Again, it is to be emphasized that by the testimony of all concerned this "talking-it-up" produces greater unity of action
and more general participation with weapons. This had come out of ideas which were instilled in training: but greater emphasis on the same points during training is still desirable. 35

Although the war in Korea had stabilized, the attention of the military was rivetted to the lessons of the conflict, if only to better prepare our forces for the expected Soviet assault in Europe. As part of this absorption with the war, Marshall's ORO reports were in high demand. On 16 February, 1953, Major General C.D. Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 [Operations], wrote to the Chief of Army Field Forces that the present supply of Marshall's "Commentary" had been exhausted and would not be reprinted unless the field commands indicate that a large supply were required. At that point the Fifth Army had already submitted a request for 668 more copies. At about the same time several other agencies and units expressed their need for more copies of the same document.

That this report received a great deal of attention in the service schools is evidenced by a letter from the librarian of The Infantry School Library to the Operations Research Office:

1. The Infantry School has on file one (1) copy of report ORO-R-13, dated 27 Oct 51, subject: "Commentary on Infantry Operations & Weapons Usage in Korea in Winter of 1950-51," by S.L.A. Marshall. This document was one of a number
received by the school and distributed to departments. It is understood that all copies are in constant use.

2. The one copy on hand in the Library has never been sufficient for the faculty and students who asked to borrow it, and it is almost worn to pieces with use. Demand is especially heavy from students in Infantry Officers Advanced Classes preparing their required monographs.

3. Request additional copies of this report be furnished The Infantry School Library, if at all possible. As many as four (4) additional copies could be put to use.

4. Request also that one (1) copy of the classified report on the same subject: ORO-R-5 (FEC) [Far East Command], dated 1 Aug 51, be furnished the library. This is to replace the one copy now on hand which is in very bad physical shape. 38

Marshall returned to the United States in April 1951 and resumed his role as journalist, drawing on his most recent experiences to convince the American public that the soldiers in Korea were not the cowards they had been painted as being.

In 1953, Marshall found himself back in Korea. Intending only to escape his editor (and to forget his wife's death in February 1952), Marshall did not go to Korea the second time as an analyst, but as a correspondent. However, his friends in Korea saw a need for his services again. The lines had stabilized around the 38th parallel and truce talks had been in progress since July 1951. By pure luck, he was visiting a
friend, Major General Arthur Trudeau, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, when the first Battle of Pork Chop Hill occurred. Furthermore, he was the only correspondent to witness it, because the others were at Panmunjom covering the first prisoner exchange.

While Marshall stayed with the 7th Infantry, he contributed again directly to the efficiency and effectiveness of troops in the field. As he put it:

General Trudeau had another military job for me, bucked down to him from General Taylor... Patrolling by our forces across the Eighth Army front had become totally undependable after the onset of rotation. Goofing-off was not only fairly common but probably more general than faithfulness to the mission. All higher commanders knew it, but little or nothing was being done about it. Patrol leaders had learned to lie with some proficiency, and it was increasingly difficult to hold them to account.

That was the problem put in my lap. At the same time I was given a military staff, a van, a chopper, and three sergeant assistants to birddog stories for me so that I could meet the requirements of the Detroit News...

The problem was not complex. I solved it by relieving all lower commands of their responsibility for the debriefing of patrols that had been engaged in a fight to any extent. The debriefings would all be done thereafter from division level, and I would do them personally to establish the techniques. I was not merely suspicious. I knew that at company and battalion levels there would be covering-up for patrols that had fouled out, and I was also aware that interrogation down below was weak and too easily subverted.
The work had the threefold purpose of demonstrating the weakness of the old hit-or-miss method, substituting a system that could be centrally controlled, and starting a school for the training of people who could extend the system. Had the war lasted, it might have proved more than a novel, local experiment.

I dealt with the patrols as rapidly as I could get to them. . . . We did our work in the early morning hours, meaning from around midnight until 0500 or so, before the survivors had been given rest or a chance to clean up. The average debriefing session lasted four hours, and we gathered in whatever bunker was handiest to their point of return. . . .

The men, irrespective of how grievous their losses, were eager to talk things out. Recounting their experiences and getting them on record was a kind of emotional purge for them, and they could find untroubled sleep when we finished. 41

Reaction to the results he obtained from the technique was enthusiastic. It was during this trip that the director of the Neuropsychiatry Division of the Army Medical Service Graduate School at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center was moved to write to his superiors that Marshall's method, which he, Rioch had personally observed several times, provided a useful tool not only for gathering tactical information, but also for gaining insight into the psychological processes of men under extreme stress. 42

In later years, others would become impressed with the technique. Introduced to Colonel Katriel Salmon, the
Israeli military attache to the United States in 1956, Marshall soon found himself involved in another war and another chance to prove his method -- and his theory. Immediately after the second Arab-Israeli War broke out in October 1956, Marshall and Cate moved to Washington to be close to the action. The United States government would not allow any American citizens into Israel. By a series of devious maneuvers and a lot of good luck, both of which had long since become a Marshall trademark, Marshall managed to get into Israel. The key element in his success (besides his boldness) was the intervention of Colonel Salmon and the fact that the Israelis had pirated both *The Soldier's Load* (printed in Hebrew in 1952) and *Men Against Fire* (published in Hebrew in 1956). Evidently, his ideas had so impressed them that they not only smuggled him into the country but also gave him special treatment. Marshall was one of only two correspondents allowed into the Sinai. In addition, the Zahal (Israeli Defense Force) not only allowed him to interview their troops, but urged him to teach their own men how to do it. Out of his interviews and a return trip there the next year, Marshall wrote *Sinai Victory* (published in 1958 and again in 1967), which described the war and analyzed the Israelis' application of doctrine.
Obviously impressed with the Israeli army and no doubt feeling a warm glow of satisfaction that someone had been listening to him, Marshall now had proof of the validity of his arguments.

On returning to the United States, I told the leaders of our General Staff once again that we should pay heed to the Israeli Army. It had much to teach us, more probably than we could give it. I ticked off the [techniques] and policies that we should examine -- night firing, snap shooting, the use of Class 4 and 5 material (low IQs) within the military, and the field training of field officers in combat decision-making. The suggestions fell on deaf ears. What we don't know can't be taught; since World War II, our military have fallen into the habit of so believing.

It wasn't until the 1967 war that the Pentagon became truly impressed. By 1968 Fort Benning at last got around to experimenting with new training technics in snap firing that the Israelis had been using for a decade.

Further interest in his interview technique came from the United States government during the Vietnam War. First in 1964 and again in 1966, the military asked for his assistance in clearing up the "fog of battle." On his two trips to Vietnam in 1966, Marshall trained several officers in his technique, for there was no agency that had kept alive the training program based on Marshall's method that the Historical Branch had initiated in World War II. The first trip was cancelled, possibly because Secretary McNamara found Marshall's column in the Detroit News so
critical of him that he could not abide seeing Marshall get any sort of help or encouragement from the government. The 1966-67 trips were considerably more successful. He not only managed to collect enough interview notes to enable him to write six books on Vietnam, he trained several men in his technique. Moreover, at about the same time, several articles appeared in professional military journals describing the technique and urging its adoption by the entire army.

Although the army adopted his interviewing technique only slowly and fitfully in the era of the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam Wars, it did make better use of his ideas for improving the effectiveness of its soldiers. In January 1954, the Operations Research Office published a report which Marshall did not help write, but which substantiated many of his ideas about men in battle. "Human Factors in Military Operations," ORO-T-259, contained three chapters that bore directly on subjects which Marshall had investigated: fatigue, fear and panic. The chairman of the Department of Psychology at the University of Maryland, drawing solely on scientific research, concluded that there was indeed a relationship between fatigue and fear. Examining the phenomenon of fear, Dr. Neal A. Miller
supported Marshall's assertions that of the many causes of fear, lack of knowledge of the situation, fatigue, and fear of killing another human being are among the most important. He suggested that it might be possible to determine before battle who would be an active participant, but . . .

... in the absence of conclusive proof, one way or the other, the foregoing evidence raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the selective techniques now used. Present neuropsychiatric selection techniques tend to be based on analogies to the quite different conditions of civilian life. No adequate studies have been made to validate them. Thus, it is entirely possible that they are rejecting many potentially good men. 50

Studies of this sort continued for several years. The Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO), Operations Research Office's counterpart at the George Washington University, published four studies dealing with training and leadership, drawing heavily on the Korean War. These studies validated many of Marshall's ideas. One, "Trainfire I," tested exactly the kind of marksmanship training that Marshall had recommended years before, replacing the "known-distance" range with a combat course. This system was adopted by the army in 1958.

In July 1957, HumRRO published "Trainfire II," the
platoon level sequel to its marksmanship program; and six months later, study regarding the pre-selection of suitable soldiers: "Fighter I: An Analysis of Combat Fighters and Non-Fighters." This report began with a salute to Marshall:

The problem has been dramatically spotlighted by S.L.A. Marshall during and following World War II and again in the Korean conflict. In *Men Against Fire*, he states that during World War II, only about 15 per cent of the men available in a company normally fired their weapons at the enemy during a firefight; in some exceptional companies, the number of firers was as high as 25 or 30 per cent. Marshall does not imply cowardice on the part of those who did not fire; in fact, he found that, for the most part, non-firers exposed themselves almost as much as firers did. Neither the type of action nor its duration seemed to influence the percentage of those who fired their weapons. . . . In the Korean hostilities, Marshall found that the percentage of non-firers was reduced to a point where approximately 50 per cent of the men were firing in most actions, and in some perimeter defense situations almost all men were firing. . . . Task FIGHTER, initiated by the Department of the Army during the Korean action, was designated as the first step in a long-range effort to increase the number of good performers, or "fighters," in infantry combat units. 54

The army was also interested in the problems Marshall had brought up about overloading the soldier. The Quartermaster Research and Development Command had been conducting research into this area and sent Marshall copies of their findings to date, along with the promise that they would send more as they became available. According to the
Introduction to their report, progress was made in the subject largely through Marshall's making the problem public in his "dramatic" way.

The army had also begun research into the psychological aspects of combat and considered Marshall an expert on the subject. In April 1954, he spoke before a "Graduate Symposium of the Medical Service Graduate School," at Walter Reed -- an appearance that may have been arranged by Dr. Rioch, his acquaintance from the second tour in Korea. The subject of his talk was "Combat Stress." According to the letter of invitation from the school's commandant, the notes of all speakers were to be printed to "constitute a textbook of the most recent and pertinent professional lessons in military medicine. These volumes will fulfill a definite need in the educational programs of the Armed Forces, Civilian Defense, and American medical colleges, to mention but a few."

The next year, 1955, Marshall was appointed to a panel investigating the conduct of American soldiers while interned in Communist prison camps during the Korean War. This was not the first contact Marshall had had with prisoners of war, for in World War II, before joining the Historical Branch, he had been involved in the relocation of
Japanese-Americans. And, later, while at Kwajalein, he was given the extra duty of determining how to soften Japanese resistance and get them to surrender. Although the method he proposed worked there (making 167 Japanese prisoners the largest number in the first twenty-seven months of the war), there were not enough interpreters available to apply it on a larger scale. In Korea, General Mark Clark, General Ridgway's successor as UN Commander, had sent for Marshall to help with the first exchange of prisoners with the communists. The story of his efforts in "Operation Little Switch" is told in Bringing Up the Rear and need not be recounted here. Essentially Clark wanted him to evaluate the men the communists released to determine if special rules on press censorship needed to be applied. Clark knew of Marshall's work in the area and needed his judgment to avoid arousing the animosity and indignation of the press corps. With this background, Marshall became a consultant to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development in 1955, sitting on the "Special Operations Commission." The Secretary had charged this panel with investigating psychological warfare, Special Forces operations, and escape and evasion training in the armed forces. Marshall served on the committee for escape and evasion, and so became involved in the drafting of the "Code
of Conduct." This document, which later became effective as one of President Eisenhower's executive orders, was intended to prescribe the actions expected of captured U.S. military personnel. Marshall, who was the primary author of the code, tried to keep it simple and practical. The main thrust of the code was to permit the prisoner to engage in a game of wits with the enemy and not to limit his response to his name, rank, and serial number.

Marshall's prisoner of war involvement became his introduction to Vietnam. In 1962 he appeared before the "Advisory Committee on Non-Military Instruction," chaired by the Undersecretary of the Army Karl L. Benedetson. Concerned about operations already begun in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense commissioned this investigation to see how well the military was preparing its troops to avoid a repetition of American prisoners' poor behavior in Korea. In other words, were the men sufficiently indoctrinated in the Code of Conduct to enable them to withstand torture and imprisonment? One of several witnesses, Marshall spoke about command responsibility. Benedetson and Allen Dulles were so impressed with his statement that they invited Marshall to accompany them on a whirlwind tour of the Pacific and Far East (including Vietnam) to gauge the state
of training in the theater. In a month's time, they flew from Oahu to Midway, Hong Kong, Manila, and Saigon. The report, published in July, indicated that Code of Conduct training was being sloughed off everywhere. The trip was the first of four Marshall was to make to Southeast Asia.

Besides the committees on prisoners of war and the Code of Conduct, Marshall served on many other advisory boards and commissions, ranging from investigating the possible uses of such drugs as LSD, to providing foreign aid, to reviewing the 1975 version of Field Manual 100-5, "Operations." Yet he sensed he was not having the success he had had in the immediate post-World War II period. Although government agencies called on him frequently, and for a variety of reasons, he characterized the period after his Korean adventures as "that decade when I was wallowing in the bureaucracy." It might also apply to the years 1962 to 1977.

But Marshall had not forsaken his role as master storyteller. A seasoned raconteur, he had entertained many friends over a drink or in bivouac during World War II. In 1954, with the publication of The River and the Gauntlet, he continued the sort of history that he had pioneered with Island Victory and Bastogne. His narrative histories
combined his skills as storyteller, combat historian, and operations analyst. Before he died he wrote twelve such books, each taken almost exclusively from his field notes as historian/analyst. Each of these provides a dramatic, human element to Marshall's analytical works. For instance, *Night Drop* and *Battle at Best* are drawn from his World War II field notes and complement *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load*. Likewise, *The River and the Gauntlet* comes from the notes of his 1950-51 interviews with the troops that had been hit by the Communist Chinese on the Chongchon River.

These books, written in a popular, easy to read style, attracted many readers both within the military and without. Because of this style and the dramatic sequence of events portrayed in the books, many soldiers -- and not just officers -- came to read Marshall's narrative histories. And in them, they were exposed not only to history, but also to Marshall's theory of what makes a good soldier. In other words, by couching his theory in books that appealed to a wide spectrum of readers, Marshall probably reached more people than he would have if he had been a purely "scholarly" writer, writing carefully footnoted and researched works and publishing in less quantity.
Next to his writings, one of his most influential services to the government involved giving lectures to service schools. Since the late 1940's he had been a frequent speaker at every level of military school from the National War College down to the branch schools at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, Fort Sill, and others. The subjects on which he spoke varied, but most often concerned the human element in combat and how to understand what makes a man get a difficult job done. He not only spoke at American military posts but also in foreign countries. At the British Staff College at Camberley in 1964, John Keegan, eminent military historian and senior lecturer of military history at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, saw Marshall for the first time. Keegan's impression was very revealing:

... He [Marshall] chose to wear the dress uniform of a Brigadier-General. It sat very badly on his tiny, corpulent person. It went even worse with his manner, which was aggressive, hectoring and rude. He cheerfully insulted those who asked him what he thought were stupid questions. He exuded energy and vulgarity in about equal measure. But I did infallibly detect that he was someone apart and above any military historian I had met before. I subsequently came to believe, as I still do, that he was touched by genius. 67

Keegan was not the only one to see these two sides of Marshall's character, for critics and admirers had been
commenting on his manner and his intelligence for years. Response to Marshall's ideas had always had been mixed. Even Men Against Fire had not received universal acclaim. Several soldiers misunderstood Marshall to be saying that the American soldier was a coward. In the Army Times, a senior sergeant wrote:

I first heard of S.L.A. "SLAM" Marshall . . . shortly after World War II and he has been slamming the American soldier ever since. . . .

His books would never sell if he wrote stories of the American soldier's bravery and innumerable successes in battle. Heroes are common. But they do sell when he digs up dirt about the few cowards that all armies have had through the ages; . . .

This man has done much harm and hurt the reputation of U.S. military men since he began his research. He continually tells everyone that the American soldier just won't fire his rifle.

I participated in four campaigns as a rifle squad leader across France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany and never once saw a man who failed to fire his weapon. I had never heard any of the other small unit commanders complain that any of their men refused to move out or refused to fire.

Since Mr. Marshall caused me and many thousands of American soldiers a great deal of anger and loss of honor, I had hoped to meet, or at least to see this man from a distance, that I might judge him as he had judged me and the other cowardly soldiers who in his opinion had performed so badly in battle.

The opportunity came in the summer of 1958 during the crisis in Lebanon. I was an infantry platoon sergeant with the 1st ABG [Airborne Battle Group] of the 187th [Airborne Infantry Regiment].
One day I came down to headquarters . . . to attend to some matters there. In a few minutes Colonel Sharkey, the group commander, introduced a little fat man, wearing what looked like a dirty brown coat, as S.L.A. Marshall.

He was standing with his hands in his pockets, looking at the ground, very casual and unconcerned, as he said: "Oh, yes, I just spoke with the rebel leader and he told me everything. But I won't tell you where he is or anything like that. Ha, ha!"

This is S.L.A. Marshall to me: a little civilian who has caused many a combat veteran a great deal of consternation, who has impressed the world with the fact that, at best, the American soldier is a pretty shaky fellow.

I wonder whose side he is on.

Another reader, once a platoon leader in World War II, wrote a long letter to Marshall defending the deeds of the World War II soldier, concluding with:

Generally speaking, your observations of training methods and shortcomings are indisputable. What I contest is the sweeping and all encompassing condemnation of WW 2 combat troops when I feel they should be credited for doing so well in spite of the shortcomings of their training.

Another complaint about Marshall's writings was that he got his facts wrong. Colonel G. Proctor, Jr., a student at the United States War College, wrote that West To Cambodia was inaccurate in stating that Colonel Proctor refused assistance to Colonel Parnley and refused to allow a
lieutenant to see the brigade commander.

But not only strangers found fault with his writings at times. On May 6, 1969, his close friend, Hugh M. Cole wrote to him:

... Remember, as you read what I have to say, that not only do I count myself among your close friends, but, as a professional, I rate you and Basil [Liddell Hart] at the top. ... 

Bird, taken by itself, leaves me with a very sharp and very favorable impression. The sum total of your writings on Vietnam, however, has given me quite another impression. ... I have come away from this whole series with these general impressions: that the US fighting man dies in large numbers and without purpose; that US troops seldom if ever accomplish the attainment of even the most minor tactical objective; and that, once one rises above the level of the company grade officer, the US brass are little concerned with the fate of the rifleman and are often incompetent or sluggardly. ... 

Admittedly, this is the negative side of the coin. Admittedly, what you have said in these volumes needed to be said. But now may be the time to leave this field and plow some other ground. For some time, I have been thinking of the things that I, as a faithful reader, would like to see coming from your pen. I have had two ideas— and give them without attaching any priority. I would like to see you write a book which would be semi-autobiographical in character but would encompass all the interesting and important personal associations in your professional lifetime. ... This could be a great book and, since you, yourself, are a "character," what you did have to say about said gentry would be quite different than the observations of any other writer or writers. ... 

My second suggestion would be a cap sheaf to
all of your work in Vietnam and would place your collective writings in the perspective you would like to attach to them. . . . 71

Cole was not the only one to feel that Marshall's writings about Vietnam painted a poor picture of the leaders there. Referring to a newspaper article, a captain of infantry with a degree in history wrote:

Your opinion seemed to be that the impatience and heroics of captains, lieutenants, and platoon sergeants have resulted in a large proportion of our casualties. In your book, "Ambush" you wrote that casualties have needlessly resulted because lower-grade officers and sergeants have engaged in too much hard-charging, rushing, and have disregarded security rules by not following the course laid out.

After reading your seemingly unqualified derogatory remarks about company-grade officers and sergeants, it was evident to me that you must have conducted your interviews in a manner to obtain what you wanted to hear. At this time I feel it is my duty to answer in response and ask you a few questions:

a. How many Infantry rifle companies were you actually with in Vietnam, especially when they were engaged in enemy contact?

b. What would you expect a small unit leader to do when caught in a hasty enemy ambush?

c. Do you think that American soldiers are dying because of unsound leadership?

Since I am a professional member of this group you have ridiculed in newspapers across the nation, I am wondering just how qualified you are to write about ground-fighting in Vietnam, based on a VIP trip and so-called on-the-spot interviews. Having been an Infantry rifle platoon leader and Long Range Patrol Platoon leader in
Vietnam, I think I am qualified to say that you should let the people who made the history, write it. 

Favorable responses were as strong in emotion and praise as the critical were in animosity and blame. Readers of professional journals often reacted in letters to the editor. One such letter, written by an infantry lieutenant responding an article by Colonel Anthony Standish, (an officer who agreed with Marshall), represents the strong feeling many young officers had toward Marshall's writing:

By way of introduction, I submit myself as a fighting combat infantryman who in two wars has been decorated thirteen times, four of which were this nation's third highest combat award. It's about time a junior officer spoke out about something he believes in. . . .

I have slogged through centuries of stagnated silence in the jungles of New Guinea, and with my outfit attacked and defended God's Green Hell. Invariably, at the end, I found only a few men with me. The first time it happened I thought only three of us were left—me, my corporal and my BAR [Browning Automatic Rifle] man. We did have quite a few casualties, but almost before I could do anything, the others started moving up from the rear. Reorganization was completed, the objective was ours and 90 per cent of the platoon was intact.

It was then when I started wondering why and I didn't find the answer right away. It wasn't until I read General S.L.A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire* that I was able to assemble my facts and get an answer. But I did and it paid off in Korea. There, I had 100 per cent fire power. When we hit
an objective only some of the wounded failed to make it to the top with the others. . . .

I am not a professional soldier— I am a well trained, well disciplined civilian and I've fought for what I believe in two wars. I have been wounded six times and hate living like a savage. And like all combat infantrymen, I hate war and killing. But if it's necessary, I will fight again.

I believe that we have certain basic needs. General S.L.A. Marshall and Colonel Standish have pointed them out. That's what I intend to keep on doing, too. 73

In the fall of 1963, Brigadier General W.W. O'Connor, retired, wrote to Major General G.T. Duncan, Chief of Staff at CONARC [Continental Army Command], to suggest that the army take a closer look at Marshall's writings. They exchanged letters over the next several weeks, during which General O'Connor tried to convince General Duncan that the Army was overlooking an important part of training because there was not enough emphasis on low-level communications of the sort Marshall had analyzed in Men Against Fire and had illustrated in books like Night Drop.

I have found no one who has written more articulately and effectively on the subject at the platoon, company, and battalion level than S.L.A. Marshall. In his classic of small unit leadership, "Men Against Fire", he makes unmistakeably clear in the chapters, "Multiples of Information" and "Tactical Cohesion", the vital importance of the interchange of information, particularly that related to friendly units. He cites too, convincing combat examples of the untold cost of failure of unit commanders to appreciate the
importance of passing on information that is vital and available. Again in his other documentaries on combat, as "Night Drop" and several others, he underscores the failure of officers and NCO's to recognize information as vital and to communicate it. The point is well made that information is valuable not just as information per se, but that its sharing is a powerful booster to morale and tactical cohesion.

Looking back on my own service, and all of it was with troops except the terminal two years in the C/S' [Chief of Staff's] office, I can't recall any training especially emphasizing this subject.74

After Duncan replied that there was already sufficient training in communication, missing the point of O'Connor's letter, O'Connor tried again:

... The necessary training involves inculcating an attitude of awareness to the significance of events that have been perceived in combat and then taking action in spite of battlefield inertia to communicate. Let me quote from Marshall who states the problem so well in "Men Against Fire": "We do not teach our men from the day they first put on uniform that speech in combat is as vital as fire in combat. We do not say to them that for a man to be able to think straight about his tactical situation is not enough; he must communicate his thoughts to others before they can begin to produce unity of action. Out of speech or from the written word which is its substitute comes all unification of strength on the field of battle, and from the latter comes decisive action. This applies to two men serving together on an outpost; it applies equally to the battalion or the regiment. 75

From his return from Korea in 1953 until his death in 1977, Marshall strove very hard to convince others that his
ideas were sound and that his recommendations should be adopted for reforming the army. He had contributed directly to military effectiveness in Korea through his papers written under the auspices of the Operations Research Office. In particular, "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, winter of 1950-51" was so well-received by soldiers all over the world that requests for reprinting came forth rapidly. Furthermore, his group interview technique received attention not only in Korea but also in Israel and Vietnam, and Marshall was repeatedly asked to train men in the method, for no government agency had institutionalized it. The story of his technique is only one example of the army's slowness in adopting his ideas. Notwithstanding the interest shown by various agencies in the fatigue/fear relationship, in more effective marksmanship training, and in the government's expectations of its soldiers when captured, Marshall had to fight constantly to maintain the influence he achieved immediately after World War II.

His ideas remained constant, though it should not be said he became static or complacent. He expended a great deal of energy and applied every means at his disposal to make sure his arguments were heard. Whether as a columnist,
historian, soldier, expert, lecturer, storyteller, or analyst, Marshall was determined that he reach not only the military but also the government and people at large. The reaction to him personally and to his assertions was varied. Some people saw him as a self-seeking journalist who used his connections with the military to degrade the soldier. Others considered him the champion of the common soldier. This conflict of views notwithstanding, his ideas were reinforced by his experiences in Korea, Israel, and Vietnam. But all his efforts seemed only to keep him from losing ground; he stayed in people's minds and generated a great deal of controversy, but the kind of reform he wanted was not forthcoming. All that is not to say that he had no influence on the army. He had planted a seed in the minds of a new generation of leaders -- a generation which would later be the policy-makers for the army. Unfortunately for Marshall's ego, it took several years for that seed to sprout.
EPILOGUE

"The wise man must remember that while he is a descendant of the past, he is a parent of the future; and his thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not carelessly let die."

—Herbert Spencer

From World War II until his death, Marshall tried to get people to understand his ideas as an integrated whole. Using all his talents and his positions (from writer to consultant), he dedicated his life to spreading the truth as he saw it. To what degree was he successful in influencing the military? Did his efforts have unintended consequences? What factors worked against him? Have his concepts stood the test of time? To what degree does the army still honor his ideas?

Beginning in the late 1940's, it must have seemed to Marshall that he was going to succeed in reforming the army. But certain factors worked against him. First, the army, like any large organization, was -- and is -- in a
state of flux, with people and policies changing constantly. These fluctuations occur both internally and externally, for not only must the military transfer its personnel, but also the environment in which the army operates is one of change. Second, Marshall's ideas, though surprisingly simple when taken one by one, form a web whose complexities are difficult to assimilate. Finally, Marshall's personality and that of his audience affected the way he was received. All of these factors must be examined before we can present any sort of conclusion about the degree and nature of his influence on the military.

By its very nature, the army is not an organization which is easy to reform. Not only its size but also the frequency with which leaders change positions make reform especially difficult. Even when chiefs of staff attempt to make changes, they encounter both active and passive resistance in the form of ingrained habits, misunderstandings, and personal preferences, not to mention "power politics." That any major intended changes have ever taken place, even when the resources of the organization itself are put to the task, is remarkable. When it is remembered that Marshall had no such resources, only his own talents and his personal influence, then one can better appreciate any changes he
succeeded in making.

The effects of frequent personnel transfers on small units are well known. But the effects are even more exaggerated at the level of high command. A program which receives the full backing of one commander may die of neglect when another commander with a new set of priorities and personal preferences takes over. Sometimes the old programs are left "on the books" but not given the attention they once were merely because the new commander wants to make a name for himself as an innovator in his own right. The same holds true of staff officers. All seek not only to do their best for the organization, but also to improve their careers. Out of such intentions come lost causes as well as important new ideas. What this means to men on the outside, like Marshall (and Liddell Hart and Fuller before him), is that the struggle is never-ending. Every year or two there are new people to convince and new policies to fight. A cursory review of service school curricula indicates that fundamental assumptions about the location and nature of the "next war" change periodically. With these changes often come changes in training. So it is that a particular program of instruction may reflect an emphasis on conventional war one year, and counter-insurgency the
Besides the flux caused by personnel transfers and changes in doctrine, additional resistance can be caused by the in-fighting of factions. These factions can be categorized as institutional and personal. When one branch (or, for that matter major service) vies with another for the limited resources of the defense establishment (particularly money), many ideas and policies are lost in the shuffle. That is, ideas which show great potential may be discarded as having too great a price, either financially or politically: just as compromises are made in the legislative branches of government, so too are they made in the military. Added to this are the factions built up around friendships. For example, there can be no doubt that the army has been profoundly affected by the mystique of airborne forces, and the high positions of many airborne officers did much to further its influence.

The writings of Major General Aubrey S. Newman suggest two more ways in which the army resists reform. First, it is quite possible for a professional officer to have such a series of assignments that he does not have the opportunity or the need to study the innovations presented by men like Marshall. For instance, when Marshall was writing, General
Newman served in staff positions which did not allow him
time to evaluate Marshall's ideas, though both men were
deeply concerned with the human side of warfare, and both
had been writing articles for Army and other journals for
years. But General Newman made another, more revealing
point when he stated that the typical officer is imbued with
the idea that hard work is the officer's prime means of
accomplishing a difficult mission. Relating the story of
his first staff assignment, Newman pictured himself as an
eager, though inexperienced young man who, when confronted
with a task for which he had no formal training, spent many
long hours both during and after duty reading manuals
voraciously. It was only when his "fine old chief of staff"
offered the following advice that he realized that his
efforts amy have been misplaced:

"Newman, every day when I pass this door I see
you talking on the phone, pushing a pencil as
though in a hurry, or reading with a worried
frown on your face. . . . In fact, I'm beginning
to worry about you a little—and to wonder if we
have the right man up here. . . . Now, if some of
the time when I come by here I find you smoking a
cigarette and looking out the window, then I would
be encouraged—and think maybe some general staff
work was getting done." 4

What the "fine old" chief of staff was referring to, of
course, was not that the job of a general staff officer was
a lark, but rather that "the most important duty of a
general staff officer is not just to work skillfully, even selectively, at matters brought to him for resolution or coordination, but to reflect on matters he should be working on that nobody else has thought about yet." It is far too easy for an officer to become trapped on the treadmill of routine, never looking beyond immediate crises (or perceived crises). Other officers have expressed a similar view of the army's tendency not to encourage thinkers but doers. The army stresses action—on the battlefield and behind the desk. Thinkers are sometimes so frowned upon by those who don't see the larger picture, that an incredible, yet very real bias influences young officers to approach the solution to every problem as being one of prompt action aggressively applied. Lieutenant General H.W.O. Kinnard asserted:

It is hard to say if [Marshall] had any particular influence on me. ... Things get picked up indirectly. But he did get people to think, not only in his writings but in conversations. Wherever he went, he started conversations which a lot of people took part in and in which a lot of knowledge was transmitted. This shows that a lot of people are interested in the subject of man in combat and are willing to take part in a discussion. But in my opinion, a frighteningly small percentage of our officers read and think creatively. Those who don't read history are condemned to repeat it. I don't know why it is. Maybe it's because people think soldiering is a tough business and there is no room for a dialectically inclined person. 7

National politics also worked against lasting changes.
When a new president enters office, he brings with him men who very often hold different ideas than those of their predecessors. Each president chooses his advisors based on various criteria, and each administration makes its decisions based on thought processes and assumptions which may be quite different from those of previous administrations. The confusion and flux which result are well known.

Another, perhaps more subtle external influence which made Marshall's task of reform difficult was that of the society's growing faith in technology and experts. The rise of science, technology, and "experts" began long before Marshall tried to change the army. Though the specifics of tactical doctrine changed drastically from 1946 through 1976, there was a strong thread of continuity in the faith of the nation's technical superiority to provide for the national security. The military journals of the period overflow with articles and advertisements proclaiming the latest and best new weapon on the drawing boards or in the inventory. An unfortunate but understandable result of this emphasis on weapons and gadgets was a loss of concern for the training of the individual soldier. Since Marshall was attempting to counteract this prevailing faith in
technology, he was faced with a difficult task, notwithstanding the other obstacles already mentioned.

Moreover, in the 1960's Secretary McNamara introduced to the military the systems analysis approach to problem solving. The so-called "number-crunchers" took the military by storm, introducing civilian management techniques. The controversy over the applicability of these techniques to a military organization has not yet subsided. The question, simply put, has been is the officer a manager or a leader primarily? But the point is that Marshall ran afoul of McNamara largely because of their divergent views on this issue. Marshall's emphasis on the intangibles of combat had no place in the quantification process espoused by McNamara. With the forces of the government behind him, McNamara was able to reorient an entire generation of officers toward the benefits of the management process. Marshall, who could count only on his friends and his own writing, had a hard time keeping alive the idea that security in general and mobility in particular are not primarily quantifiable results of weapons, vehicles, and other machines, but rather based on the intangibles of human nature:

Inquiry into an improved mobility should begin with a better understanding of the whole nature of the soldier. What assists him and hardens his will? What stops him and strangles his best
intentions? It is altogether conceivable that at this stage of history, we can achieve much faster movement by concentrating on these questions— and much more surely than we can do it by looking for a faster wheel or a more powerful engine.

Yet another factor inhibiting universal and speedy acceptance of Marshall's ideas was the nature of the ideas themselves. Marshall's ideas about leadership, motivation, morale, communication, fear, and fatigue were not, if taken separately, entirely unknown in military circles. What he did was to show a complex interrelationship among these intangibles which few soldiers of the time could articulate. By articulating the mutual relationship and spreading "the word," Marshall rejuvenated some old ideas while stimulating thought among professional soldiers the world over. Regardless of the truth of his ideas, or of the validity of his group interview method, he set a standard to which subsequent generations of historians and soldiers would have to refer, even if they chose to reject the standard. For example, although the 44th Military History Detachment does not use the group interview technique, its members are aware of it and have consciously chosen not to use it.

While his ideas, taken separately, were neither new nor incomprehensible, they were difficult to comprehend as an
integrated whole — because Marshall's theory dealt with many difficult-to-define factors such as fear and fatigue, group psychology, and historical accuracy. In fields so new that the vocabulary has not yet been agreed upon, it is difficult to present new ideas, much less gain widespread acceptance. While concern over historical accuracy is as old as history itself, the subject is a "slippery" one — difficult to define for philosophical reasons. Marshall's introduction of the group interview method has added another means to consider in the search for historical truth.

Regarding historical accuracy, by basing his theory on his personal observations of combat and on his interviews, Marshall left his conclusions open to criticism. His argument that the training methods of the thirties and forties did not prepare men adequately for combat sparked a controversy that polarized officers. Those who did not agree often questioned the validity of the argument by calling Marshall's credentials into question. He was a self-serving journalist, not a professional officer; a pedantic critic, not a commander; a slob, not a combat soldier. The implication is that these categories, even if accurate, are mutually exclusive. That is, that a journalist (even a self-serving one) cannot provide insight
which professional officers lack; that a critic cannot provide valuable information for commanders; that an out-of-shape, overweight observer cannot be accurate in his reporting.

These arguments against Marshall tend to cloud the issue. The accuracy of an observation or a conclusion cannot be determined merely by analyzing the background of the person making the statement. Other, more objective criteria must be applied, such as one's own observations in similar situations. That many people affirmed the validity of Marshall's observations and conclusions does not explain why others denied that validity. One possible reason for the discrepancy may be that those veterans of World War II who claimed that all their men (save a few acknowledged cowards) fought consistently not only saw what they wanted to see, but also suffered from the kind of blindness that combat causes. That is, when under fire, men—including officers—have their span of vision foreshortened, not only by intervening terrain and vegetation, but also by their concentration on staying alive and managing their assets, such as firing their own weapons or calling for supporting fires. They are quite likely to assume that the men in their immediate vicinity are representative of the men under
their command. When a general says that even during the chaotic circumstances of an airborne assault he witnessed all his men acting aggressively, he overlooks two factors. First, his very presence is likely to motivate those around him to fight aggressively and yet scarcely to affect those outside his range of vision. Second, if a man is hiding in the bushes in such a chaotic situation, refusing to take part, is it likely that he will be noticed by a general who is intent on getting on with the mission?

However, not all Marshall's critics were from the World War II era. Veterans of Korea and Vietnam have found it hard to believe that only 15 percent of the line troops ever fired their weapons in anger. They claimed that their personal observations refute any such assertion. In their experience, nearly all their troops took part in firefights. The discrepancy between their experiences and their understanding of Marshall's ideas called all of Marshall's ideas into question. Evidently these soldiers had not studied Marshall's writings over time. If they had, they would have known that Marshall observed a remarkable increase in participation from one war to the next. It seems that many soldiers have assumed that the observations in *Men Against Fire* were the only ones that Marshall made.
This misapprehension would naturally call all his ideas into question.

But anyone who denied the validity of Marshall's conclusions must have felt compelled to justify his denial on grounds other than his own personal experiences. Since Marshall based his ideas on his interview technique, some have said, quite rightly, that a person can ask questions in such a way as to get the responses he wants. Certainly this is a constant problem in all forms of questioning, from opinion polls to newspaper interviews. The implication is that Marshall carefully chose his questions to support his pre-conceived theories, and that therefore everything which was derived from his questions (as most of Marshall's books and ideas were) reflects the bias of the interrogator, and hence bears little relation to reality. This argument, so strong in an abstract sense, loses strength when certain aspects of this particular situation are considered. First, it is difficult to believe that the professional soldiers who witnessed the technique in action, beginning in 1943 in the Pacific with Major General Ralph C. Smith, would be blind to bias. Is it plausible that General Smith, who personally saw the Marshall apply the technique, would have written to Marshall's superiors that Marshall and his
technique were valuable to the army—or that he would have taken steps to readjust his tactical dispositions and training—if he any indication that Marshall was shaping questions to suit his preconceptions? Second, that others found the technique useful if applied properly also suggests that it was a valid method for penetrating the fog of battle. But because the method requires tact and understanding (both of human nature and the essentials of battle), it is not likely that everyone can apply it effectively. Several people have warned of the pitfalls involved in the technique when improperly applied, but most have concluded that when applied by a skillful interrogator, there is no better way to get to the truth of an event. Because there are few men anywhere who have had the opportunity, much less the inclination, to observe combat in as many theaters as Marshall and on as many campaigns as he, a summary discounting of his experiences would be logically dangerous. That is, perhaps unfortunately for Marshall, the fact that he interviewed over 500 units in World War II and several dozen more in subsequent campaigns all over the world puts him in a league by himself. Dr. John Westover, who used the technique in several wars and who might be considered one of its most accomplished users (having learned it literally at Marshall's elbow over an extended
period of time) considers it unbeatable as a means of collecting accurate information.

The assertion that Marshall chose his questions to support his theories overlooks, moreover, the possibility that he had no theories when he first began his observations about men in battle. There is no evidence to suggest that he had any unorthodox ideas about men in combat before World War II. When he began writing about war in earnest in the early forties as a newspaperman, he concentrated on mechanization. His *Blitzkrieg* and *Armies On Wheels* show nothing controversial about the human side of warfare. So it is far more probable that events occurred just as he described them: like all the other men in the historical department, he had no pre-conceived method of getting at the truth; that he stumbled on his group interview technique on a hunch that only the group could solve the dispute between a private and his lieutenant; that the ideas which came out in his books *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load*, were the result of many "bull sessions" between himself and those he managed to corner into a conversation; and that subsequent events did not drastically upset his notions, but rather confirmed them. If he was less rigid in his scholarship and less accurate with his facts in later years,
If so, would that necessarily mean that his earlier writings had been wrong? Would discarding those ideas be a reasonable response?

Another point about the interview technique which bears emphasis is the conditions under which the questions were asked. First, the best time to question a group—as with individuals—was as soon as possible after the action in question to avoid contamination of facts by hearsay, supposition, and collaboration. Furthermore, early interrogation lessened the chance that a rationalization process would color events. In a description of events surrounding his participation in the evacuation of Saigon in 1975, a retired professional Air Force pilot and accomplished historian wrote:

For the first and only time in my life, I kept a journal. The relevant entry is that for 29 April, the day on which Saigon fell. I flew in the evacuation, leading an element of three H-53s from the carrier Midway. . . . I found myself wondering, as the red tile rooftops of Saigon swept beneath my crew and me on our initial run in, how many of the days' observers were watching with historical detachment and perspective. It was a fleeting thought: I was -- to return to my earlier point -- extremely busy, occupied with 40,000 odd pounds of helicopter plus responsibility for two more on our wing. I had to deal with a crew of five, plus a cacophony of static, radio calls and interphone transmissions in my headset, some relevant and others not,
conveying a fast-breaking tactical situation.

I and my crew deposited our final load of evacuees on the Midway at 2100 hours (9:00 p.m.) that night, having logged six hours of flying time and three trips in and out. By 2300 hours I was seated at my Navy roommate's desk in a borrowed cabin writing. My journal entry for that day ran to nine pages of cribbed text plus two more pages of sketched naps and diagrams.

The following days and weeks were full. Although I made extended entries for the next three days containing additional details of the events of the 29th as I learned them from fellow participants, I did not have occasion to reread my original entry for some two weeks. In the meantime, I, my crew, and our wingmen, with little else to do, discussed and rediscussed the mission in detail. We had, in the process, formed a fair idea of what had transpired in our share of the day's activities. The operational situation had been confused, particularly after dark, and we had, by pooling our individual recollections, made sense of it.

When I reread my entry of the 29th, it was as if someone else had written it. The penmanship and style were unmistakably my own; the events the pencilled words described were unquestionably those in which I had participated as seen through my eyes. But they did not come in the smooth, logically flowing sequence in which I and my crew had since come to understand them; they returned as a cacophonous mishmash of disconnected impressions, raw, jagged and discordant. With visceral impact and a clarity which surprised me, I relived the day's events as I had experienced them at the time. The contrast between what I remembered and what I thought I had remembered was striking.

The lesson was self evident. We had succeeded in imposing a degree of order on the chaos about us -- and in our subsequent recollections. But the order which we had imposed was more a product
of trained reflexes than of any logical reasoning process; it was more the product of willpower and the ability to perceive and defer to he who was best in command of the situation at a given instant, more a matter of unleashing and giving full play to a carefully developed informal hierarchy of professional respect than of the functioning of any formal chain of command.

With a force approaching that of religious insight, I realized that S.L.A. Marshall was right; the longer you wait to interview the participants, the smaller your chances of approaching the truth. Given time — and very little time is needed — the dirty little inconsistencies of battle will put on their dress uniforms and arrange themselves in parade formation, all neat and orderly, in even the most honest and self-critical of minds, mocking the historian's efforts to construct an honest narrative. As a trained historian, fully aware of the problem and making every conscious effort to be objective, I had deceived myself.

Understanding this rationalization process might provide another means of comprehending why some veterans disagreed so violently while others argued equally forcibly for those ideas. If a soldier does not examine his impressions of combat soon after the event (whether because he hasn't the leisure time, the inclination, or the energy to do so), his memory of those events will change, becoming more ordered and, perhaps, more pleasant and easy to live with. In any event, images become blurred and feelings less distinct. If, on the other hand, another soldier, participating in the same combat, should reflect on his recent experience immediately thereafter and continue to do so for some time
to come, he may remember events and discover connections which the first soldier allowed to slip away. It would seem inevitable that these two men might disagree on the nature of combat and on the conclusions drawn therefrom.

The second point about the interview technique which bears noting is the way Marshall determined the number of people who took part in an engagement. To understand the situation fully, one must put himself in the position of a man who has recently been on the front line, and may yet be within sound of the guns. Imagine being called into a company formation, told that your entire platoon would fall out and report to some officer from headquarters who would ask questions about the fight the other day. When the group has settled down, probably after a few snide comments about staff officers and how a soldier never gets any free time, a short, stocky officer introduces himself and lays the ground rules for the interview. This done, he calls the platoon leader up and asks him to describe the preparation phase and deployment prior to the operation. As the lieutenant does this, other people are invited to come up and corroborate the lieutenant's story as their names are mentioned. Of course, the response is slow at first, but amazingly enough, before long everyone wants to take part and get his two
cents in. At the end of about three hours of discussion, during which the staff officer has been taking copious notes and showing a great interest in everything that is said, the question "How many of you fired your weapon at the enemy during the engagement?" comes up. Not wanting to seem like the only one who did not take part, you raise your hand. Is it likely that anyone that took part would hesitate to raise his hand? How much more likely is it that the man who fired a round or two off at no specific target would yearn to be included? Is it likely that Marshall, who often had officers from higher headquarters there to witness the interview, would deliberately miscount the hands raised, knowing that his account would become part of the official record and might be included in a report to the commanding general of the division? Since he undoubtably knew that the division commander could easily call in the company commander and platoon leader in question to ask if Marshall's report were accurate, it seems unlikely that Marshall would have intentionally falsified the record. If Marshall had contrived to deceive others, how many times in the course of his 500 interviews would he have risked his job and his reputation? Wouldn't commanders, having a war to fight, have at least withheld their support of his operations if they doubted the usefulness of his efforts?
If he had fabricated evidence for or made significant errors in studying the 1958 Arab-Israeli War, would the Israelis have allowed — much less welcomed — him back into their country?

Lack of understanding is not the only factor which may have caused people to discount Marshall's conclusions. Personalities also enter into the picture. Marshall was a very complex man whose remarkable qualities were balanced by his shortcomings. There can be no doubt that he possessed a way with words and a keen eye for the dramatic. He had a knack for coming to arresting conclusions based on an intuitive process. He had the independence of thought to speak his mind when doing so was bound to upset others. His energy and persistence enabled him to withstand the frustration caused by the resistance of the army (and the public as a whole) for over three decades. He was able to keep up a killing pace of newspaper deadlines, lectures, book contracts, consulting jobs, and social engagements that would have worn out most people fairly quickly.

All these things indicate that he had something which John Keegan saw in England. That something might be labelled genius, or it might not, depending on what criteria one uses in the determination of the quality of a genius. One of the
properties ascribed to genius is as Webster's notes:
"Extraordinary native intellectual power especially as manifested in unusual capacity for creative activity of any kind. . . or a person endowed with transcendent mental superiority, inventiveness and ability." Although this definition could be applied to Marshall, there is another aspect of genius which bears consideration. Thomas Edison once said that genius was one per cent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration. Matthew Arnold agreed "Genius is mainly an affair of energy." Implicit in both these saws is that a genius must not only be smart, but must also be uncommonly energetic. Marshall had the energy as well as the intelligence to struggle constantly against a system inherently resistant to change. He had to be able to present his ideas again and again despite the friction which sought to wear down his resolve. Furthermore, he had to discipline himself to write as prolifically and as vividly as he did. His knowledge of the military art and his writing skills came only after much labor. This self-discipline and continued influence on others required great talent and persistence.

However, genius can often develop into egotism. Indeed there is a fine line between the persistent genius and the
egotist, for to sustain himself, the genius with any self doubts must look for proof that he is right. Eventually this can turn into a tendency to elevate oneself above the mere mortals who oppose him and who are blind to his truth. What were once tentative conclusions turn into opinion and then into personal dogma. People who agree become automatic friends and those who disagree are fools. Increasingly, the genius comes to identify his very being with the ideas he supports. When they are attacked, he feels personally affronted. His energies stop being used for further creative pursuits and tend to be focused on defending his ideas. Throughout this whole process, his opponents scrutinize his every action, searching for weakness. If Marshall could be considered a genius, then it is not surprising that he might also become the rude, aggressive man that Keegan observed.

When this tendency on Marshall's part is coupled with the egotism of others, the responses of some of his detractors become a little clearer. In the competitive world of the army, there are many who vie for the attention of a few. But there is room enough for only so many experts. Experts in any field resent challenges to their claim to expertise. Jealousy clouds reason, so that even those who share many
fundamental beliefs often stress their differences in order to force an opponent off the stage. When one self-proclaimed expert perceives that another enjoys more influence in the eyes of the policy-makers, he is likely to mount an attack on the one in favor. The bitterness which results can cause policy level decisions to be made primarily on the basis of personality clashes rather than on reason alone. After-the-fact rationalizations cover up the fundamental reason for the decision.

Another personal factor, which can often be related to egotism, though is not dependent on it, is that of pride. When soldiers think an outsider has maligned them, they may feel their pride hurt to the point of writing scathing letters to the editor. Sometimes these responses are sound. Other times they are based on an incomplete understanding of the intent of the outsider. Vehement denunciations of Marshall as an enemy of the common soldier might indicate that the man who responded felt a deep hurt and did not bother to investigate the situation beyond his wounded pride.

Finally, there is the pride of the generation gap. Those officers who fought World War II as generals had been brought up in the post World War I period. In the inter-war
era, great strides were made regarding infantry tactics and mechanization. The Great War remained foremost in the minds of men like Eisenhower, Patton, and George Marshall because their training used that conflict as the most modern expression of warfare. They sought above all to find tactics that would avoid a repetition of the trench warfare of 1914-1918. Having succeeded in improving their tactics and avoiding another stalemate on the Western Front, they emerged from World War II well satisfied. When Marshall began to challenge the appropriateness of their tactics and training, they would be understandably skeptical and even somewhat sensitive to that criticism, for their efforts during World War II were personal achievements. After the war, these same commanders were constrained by funds. But the men who took over from these generals in the sixties and seventies were the junior officers (regimental level and below) of World War II and Korea — men like Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., General William C. Westmoreland, General Donn Starry, and General William E. DePuy. The following letters from two professional officers, one a recently retired chief of staff and the other a long-since retired lieutenant colonel state eloquently how Marshall influenced them as young officers in the 1950's. These two letters present a remarkable view of
the army of the period and Marshall's influence upon it.

Lieutenant Colonel J.E. Calahan, retired, wrote:

I "discovered" SLA Marshall via Men Against Fire in, as I recall, 1954 or 55 while serving as a company commander in the First Armored Division. The great majority of my contemporaries had, of course, seen action Korea and we all had our personal and until then mostly unexpressed observations about the quality of American Infantry and particularly squad level action, leadership and small arms fire. I had been a rifle platoon leader in the 2nd Infantry Division and felt Marshall was talking to me! This book as well as his articles formed the basis of many BOQ bull sessions, and many of us became enthusiastic about placing more emphasis on physical fitness, marksmanship and live fire work relating to squad application of fire.

About this time I obtained a transfer to my first love—armor—and began a long period of service as an Armored Cav unit commander. The same interest among combat experienced tankers led, I think, to greater emphasis on the same skills in the rifle and scout elements of the troops.

A lot of training techniques and training emphasis that we now take for granted in the combat arms was just coming into existence in the mid-50's. While much of this was based on the experience of slightly senior officers and NCOs who had been platoon people in WW II, I find it was primarily Marshall who, almost alone, published what many of us were thinking.

In summary, Marshall may or may not have been responsible for any specific change, but I think he was the spark plug for a generation of Army leaders. . . . 22

Subsequently Calahan elaborated on Marshall's importance to junior officers of the 1950's:
... My own feeling towards Marshall falls in the "spark plug" category. Many of us had read Rommel and all the standard service school book store biographies, but here was SLA, who was saying it like it really was and talking to us!

I may be overdramatizing, but even though the Army has always tended to more or less make progress due to the impact of various "managers" and innovators, it seems like it has made a big jump during the past few years, and this was from the impact of the classes of '49 to '53 now at a career point where they can have impact. This was the age group Marshall spoke to.

Yes, I always encouraged my people to become military history buffs (officers must do this because our profession rather lacks a valid laboratory). Motivational awards in units tended to be history books, bull sessions were often slanted toward history and I was big on terrain walks and/or "drives" laced with historical references. All my officers had a copy of the DOD Pam [Department of Defense Pamphlet] The Armed Forces Officer and I pushed River & the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire. 23

General E.C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1979-1983, shared Calahan's impression of Marshall:

I first knew of SLA Marshall as a cadet. His writings and a lecture he gave as a part of our course on military psychology were my introduction to him. I continued to read his writings and listen to his lectures as a student & instructor at the Infantry School.

In 1957 I went to Ft. Campbell, Ky. as an Airborne Company Commander. In the same battle group was a friend & classmate from west Point about whom Gen. Marshall wrote "Pork Chop Hill." On several occasions Joe Clemons, Gen. Marshall & I spent long nights together discussing Gen. M's theories. (Discussing is incorrect—listening to is probably more accurate.) Gen Marshall & I
became better acquainted in 1966 when he came to visit his dear friend Gen Harry Kinnard who commanded the 1st Cav. He sent some time with me and the 2/5th Cav which I was commanding at the time.

We met again when he lectured at NWC [National War College] in 1967 and I invited him to speak at the AWC [Army War College] in 1972-3 when I was Dpty Cmdt [Deputy Commandant].

I next had him stay with us in Heidelburg after his visit to Israel in Oct/Nov 1973 after the last Arab/Israeli War. I have visited with his widow Cate in El Paso on a few occasions since he died.

(2) I believe his theories on how to train and how to prepare for combat had both a direct & indirect effect on the officer corps. I believe young officers were far more receptive to his views than those who had grown up in the Army prior to WW II. Therefore as those younger officers progressed in rank and position they were able to influence training and tactics to take into account many of SLAM's views.

(3) I believe most of us reacted semi-critically to these writings -- but as we gained more and more troop experience (3 to 4 years as a Co Cdr was not uncommon) the hard core truths of his writings became clearer and second nature to those interested in being ready for war. Many officers weren't/aren't interested in being able to fight.

(4) Several countries were avid students of his writings. Israel is a good example.

(5) I was a lieutenant when I re-read Men Against Fire. I doubt that Generals looked at it the same way I did. As a General -- 20 years later -- I tried to apply the principles contained in Men Against Fire with certain adjustments to the challenges facing our Army in the post-Vietnam era. -- Training / Education / Tactics / Doctrine / Org & Equip.
(6)(a) Agree that fatigue makes cowards of most of us all.

(b) Relationships within squads and platoons are at the heart of how armies operate -- particularly in combat!

(c) We have a responsibility to prepare each soldier for combat as though it were going to occur tomorrow.

(d) [Low % of firers] will always be so -- Support forces permit combat forces to fight.

(e) I consider it [the group interview technique] the only truly effective way to come close to what really took place in an action.

(f) [Major elements in combat motivation:] Simple -- Love & Fear. Manly love of other soldiers in the squad. Fear of dying -- fear of letting peers down.

(g) [Tactical and organizational ideas:] Weakest part of his repertoire -- but his focus on squad and platoon building blocks was [the] strongest portion of his ideas in this area.

(7) [Opponents.] I believe the "hierarchy" in the post WW II era who remained wedded to pre WW II ideas were the prime opponents. Very few of the leaders who were promoted quickly during WW II & who spent little time with the troops in a company understood what he was writing about. Therefore in the post WW II era the "fast burners" from WW II & the older officers from pre WW II would have been the prime "opponents" of SLAM's views -- because they would be less comfortable and understanding of them. Additionally many may have been put off by his somewhat all-knowing attitude.

Gen SLA Marshall was clearly a former of the ideas of those of us who joined the Army immediately following WW II. In my own case he had a profound impact upon my views of the small unit, of cohesion, of training and of innovation. . . . 24

One of General Meyer's attempts to put some of Marshall's ideas into practice is reflected in the recent emphasis on creating cohesive units. In a 1982 article for Army
[There are many important innovations under way in the army today.] One significant example is the current effort to revamp our personnel system, from one heretofore focused (civilian-style) on the creation and maintenance of effective units. Many in the past have come to the same conclusion we have today: that the features we are designing into this system (regimental affiliation, home-basing and unit rotation) are the right way to go. But the inordinate difficulty of constructing a workable solution has, time and again, put it in the "too tough" box. At the same time, we all know that as long as turbulence [frequent personnel transfers] reigns, our best efforts to maintain ready units will evaporate. . . . In May of 1981, [we began] a three-year evaluation program termed COHORT, in which we created 20 company-sized packages with the intent of seeing them through full cycles of training, stateside assignment and overseas deployment. . . .

One of the key findings -- which should not have been a surprise -- is that the Army's current management system has buried within it all varieties of obstacles which prevent us from keeping a unit together. These obstacles are being identified, and will be rooted out because the results thus far leave little doubt that a unit-based system is the correct way to go. . . . We have considered how best to recreate an Army community -- with solid traditions, sure teamwork, close friendships and geographical orientations. As a result, we are in a period of tough decisions regarding the limits and dimensions of an American regimental system. 25

General Meyer's praise notwithstanding, Marshall thought he had made only two major contributions to military thinking: his technique for lifting the "fog of battle" and an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between fear
and fatigue. Marshall had, however, done much more. In publicizing his ideas forcefully and persistently over three decades, he focused the attention of the military on matters which deserved attention. His observations concerning the strength of cohesive units and the problems of communications on the tactical and interpersonal level have generated many studies on these subjects. Likewise, his most controversial and perhaps most misunderstood observations about active participation in combat have caused many research organizations to investigate new methods of marksmanship training. In the field of military history, his technique provided a novel, effective method of complementing documents and official records.

Notwithstanding Marshall's efforts and success, the army accepted his ideas piecemeal. It managed to incorporate some of them while discarding his model as a whole. An example of this phenomenon is the spotted "career" of the interview technique. Used by the Historical Department in World War II as the basis for operational history, it fell into disuse quickly. In Korea, Marshall had to revive it on a local scale although there were historians present in Korea early in the conflict. When the war was over, there was no attempt to keep the technique
alive in the Center of Military History. So when the army entered Vietnam, the Chief of Military History invited Marshall to go and "cover" the war, albeit for a limited period. Before the war was over, Marshall once again trained men to act as group interrogators. Although semi-private organizations like Institute for Defense Analyses and Kinton, Inc., continued to consider his method valid and useful, both for combat and training, the only military history detachment on active duty today eschews the group interview as being liable to exaggeration and reinforcement of the participants' limited perceptions.

While the whole of Marshall's innovations has not lived in the conscious "mind" of the army of the 80's, parts of it still do. The army presently trains its soldiers in a marksmanship program similar to "Trainfire." The logical derivative of this program is being used in tank gunnery training, including firing on the move at pop-up silhouettes, under simulated combat conditions in varied terrain. Moreover, the scientists at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research ascribe the current studies of fear and fatigue to Marshall's writings and frequently refer to his ideas in their discussion. Furthermore, the Command and General Staff College lists Men Against Fire as
mandatory reading. From this emphasis has come the purchase of 165 copies of *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load* by the present commander of the 4th Infantry Division, Major General T.C. Jenes, Jr.

But perhaps the most important single set of programs based on Marshall's ideas were those that General Meyer instituted during his terms as Chief of Staff of the Army: the COHORT and regimental systems, and the great emphasis he put on educating the leaders on the purposes behind these innovations.

How then did Marshall's life influence the Army? From 1900 until his becoming a combat historian in 1943, Marshall's youth and early career as a newspaperman prepared him for the jobs that lay ahead. During this period he honed his popular writing style that was to bring him a wide audience when he later began writing narrative histories—perhaps the major vehicle for supporting his theory of combat effectiveness. Also during this preparatory stage, he developed his knowledge of the military art—not only by his extensive reading, but also by his correspondence with the two most progressive military theorists/historians of the interwar era, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart.
The next stage began with his becoming a combat historian in the newly created Historical Branch. From then until he left active duty in May 1946, Marshall contributed several things to the way the United States Army approached military history. First, his group interview technique seemed to dispel the "fog of war" as researching documents alone could not do. Adopted by the entire branch, this method not only supplied important data for the seventy-two volume history of *The United States Army in World War II*, it also provided local commanders with valuable and timely information on friendly and enemy tactics. Second, as deputy and then chief of the Historical Section, European Theater of Operations, he helped get that organization producing at maximum capacity; and he managed to keep enough historians together in the face of the rapid demobilization program to prepare the records they had amassed during the war for later use, not only organizing and cataloguing them but also saving them from destruction. An outgrowth of this activity was the interviewing of senior German officers — an accomplishment that produced much information on how the Soviets had operated on the Eastern Front, and provided post-war tacticians with valuable information.

Following his return to civilian life, Marshall wrote
several articles, later to become books, drawing together his observations on the war in the Pacific and Europe and presenting explanations of why some soldiers fight better than others. This period (1946-1950) was generally one of public and governmental reliance on technology -- particularly the atomic bomb -- to maintain the peace, so Marshall's focus on the common soldier ran contrary to the prevailing thinking. In his first analytical book, *Men Against Fire*, Marshall stressed that all training should concentrate on improving the active participation of soldiers in combat. According to his observations in World War II, only a small proportion of the men on the front line actually fired at the enemy, and it seemed that it was always the same men who carried the unit forward. To increase participation, Marshall urged that the army improve unit cohesion -- the identification of the soldier with his unit. To do this, he pointed out that person-to-person communication provided the key, for without it, men confronted with danger and isolation shrank back in fear. Small unit leaders had to be attuned to ways of enhancing communication and hence cohesion. In so saying, Marshall stressed the importance of what Napoleon called the "moral" over the "physical" in very practical terms and provided concrete suggestions for improving combat effectiveness. To
counter the recruit's unrealistic expectations of combat, Marshall urged realistic training — letting the soldier know that combat consisted not of constant activity but long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of intense excitement, training him to expect the feelings of isolation and fear that modern combat causes and not to be overwhelmed by these feelings. One means of improving training was to conduct a more realistic combat marksmanship course, firing at pop-up silhouettes and non-human targets under simulated combat conditions. An important element in Marshall's theory was directed at small unit leaders. They needed to know not merely how to improve the soldier's performance, but as leaders, they needed more: training in anticipating and improvising so they could react to the vicissitudes of combat; practice in giving clear, forceful orders of the sort which motivates men in the face of danger and indecision; education in determining what information may be useful to other commanders — including solutions to local problems which might benefit other units.

Following close on the heels of *Men Against Fire* came *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation*, Marshall's second great contribution to military thought. (He considered his interview technique the first.) In this
book, Marshall drew on his wartime experiences and interviews to suggest that fear and fatigue had a relationship which few people were aware of, but which had enormous implications for the military. Simply stated, a tired soldier frightens easily and a frightened soldier tires easily. His theory led to investigations which are still being conducted but -- most important -- also to a general concern for keeping the soldier's load within limits which would not detract from his combat performance.

When taken together, these two books contained a fully developed and innovative system for understanding men in combat. From 1950 until his death in 1977, Marshall did not significantly modify these ideas and found them applicable in the Korean, Middle East, and Vietnam Wars. So this period was one not of innovation and creative thought, but of continual struggling to promote the ideas he had already stated.

Against this effort worked institutional resistance to change, zealous faith in technology and systems analysis, the nature of the theory itself, the nature of the interview technique, and certain personality factors. In his attempt to reform the army, Marshall used every means at his disposal -- from his writing to his personal contacts.
Although he enjoyed great influence in high places, in retrospect it was probably his influence on the junior officers of the post-World War II / Korean War era which bore the most fruit. Many of these men, having read not only his analytical but also his narrative books, and having heard Marshall speak at one or another of the service schools, benefitted directly in combat.

It would be foolish to suggest that Marshall was absolutely right in every aspect of his ideas, and equally foolish to suggest that he was the only source of innovation in the period. That Marshall had a direct (albeit sometimes ephemeral) impact on training through the use of his observations in training memoranda in Korea and after, cannot be denied. Whether the post-Vietnam generation of junior officers will draw heavily on Marshall's ideas as the post-World War II generation did, or whether his influence will gradually die out because Marshall is no longer available to advocate his ideas is difficult to say. However, if the innovative ideas of men like Generals Hamilton Howze, Arthur S. Collins, and Edward C. Meyer take root in the near future, then Marshall's labors, unlike those of Sisyphus will not have been in vain.

In any event, since Marshall cannot truly be called a
trainer in his own right, it would perhaps be best to describe him as a military historian, critic, and theorist. If so, Colonel Calahan's description of Marshall as a "spark plug" probably provides the most accurate expression of Marshall's influence. As Marshall himself wrote: "A military critic is not an innovator but a catalyst who brings to focus the thoughts of his associates."
ENDNOTES

PREFACE:


2. Ibid., p. 74.


CHAPTER ONE:

Part I:


4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

6. Hugh H. Cole, untitled manuscript, [possibly a draft of an article eulogizing S.L.A. Marshall], 13 Jan 1978; supplied to the author by Dr. John Westover.

7. Marshall would look back on these times with a great deal of pleasure, so much so that he retired in El Paso. He felt very close to the place, for he knew that a large part of what he had accomplished had its beginnings there.
3. Marshall's Identification cards can be found in the S.L.A. Marshall Military History Collection, part of the Special Collections section of the library of the University of Texas at El Paso. This collection will hereafter be referred to as "MC."

9 Hugh M. Cole indicated that Marshall had a driving desire to carve a niche for himself in the world and that he was quite vain. (Statement made by Hugh M. Cole, Ph. D., telephone interview, April 11, 1984.)


11. S.L.A. Marshall, "On Being Commissioned; The Commissioning Day Address at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville," June 7, 1969, p. 12; published in booklet form with two other speeches under the title, "The Last Refuge."


15. Ibid., p. 23.


18. Letter from Forrest C. Pogue, Ph. D., to the author, August 9, 1983.


22. His books and articles were not the only means Marshall had to influence the minds of others. One of Marshall's radio broadcasts, followed by a promise to make some campaign speeches, convinced two Michigan congressmen (John Dingel and John Lesinski) to vote for renewal of the draft—a bill which passed 171 to 170 in July 1941.!

23. Marshall, *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 44.
CHAPTER ONE

PART II:


3. Ibid., p. 56. The younger Marshall was entirely correct in his assessment of the coverage of that war, as is borne out in "Historical Work in the United States Army; 1862-1954," by Dr. Stetson Conn, former chief historian for the Center of Military History. In this work, tracing the Army's historical efforts for that period, Conn wrote that on the day the United States declared war on Germany, the head of the Historical Section wrote a memorandum redefining the duties of the section, specifically stating that "no historical work of any kind on World War II was contemplated..." [p. 76.] The story behind the Historical Section is rather involved, but anyone interested in seeing how S.L.A. Marshall's efforts fit into the larger picture should read this work. Marshall's description of events in his autobiography, including this interview with the chief of staff, is a dramatic portrayal of those events from his own point of view, as would be expected in an autobiography. While Marshall's depiction of the workings places him at the center of events, Conn's work provides a detailed picture from the point of view of those in Washington. Though the writing style and perspective in these two books differ greatly, there are few places that would indicate any real shortcomings in Marshall's version. That is, while Marshall implied that it was his brief interview with General Marshall that made the latter aware of the state of the historical effort in the Army at the time, Conn does not refer to any such meeting, and suggested that the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy was a prime mover in the project of getting the war covered and mentioned General Marshall very little at all. But he noted that it was a member of the chief of staff's office that suggested that McCloy be approached. So General Marshall may well have initiated the action through his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel, Otto L. Nelson, Jr. Therefore, while the two accounts do not correspond exactly, there is enough room for them both to be true. The study [Stetson Conn, "Historical

4. Conn, p. 91. S.L.A. Marshall wrote a draft on the Doolittle raid, but it was never released. Instead, the first in The American Forces in Action series [and the first publication of the Branch] was "To Bizerte with the II Corps," published in February 1944. Fourteen titles appeared before this series was discontinued to release writers for the official history of the army in the war.


6. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 57; also Conn, p. 90, in which three other men are listed as well: "Major Jesse S. Douglas, previously of the National Archives staff, Captain Roy Lamson, a teacher of English at Williams College, and Dr. George X. Auxier, previously head of the Engineers' historical office." Conn noted that though the new branch was authorized thirteen military and twenty-two civilian workers, only seven officers and sixteen civilians were on the job in March 1944.


8. By December 1943, Kemper had two teams in the Mediterranean. By June 1944, the number of teams had risen considerably and were assigned to the field armies and several manuscripts for the AFA series were being readied for the printer. Conn, pp. 93 ff.


10. Ibid., p. 68. Though Marshall seems to ascribe his recovery to the salt tablets, it may have been the water which had the greatest benefit.

11. Ibid., p. 72.

12. Bill Davidson, "Why Our Combat Soldiers Fail To Shoot," Collier's, (November 8, 1952). See also Marshall's 1958 speech to the 101st Airborne Division in the files of the University of Texas at El Paso; also Bringing Up the Rear, p. 72; also "The Fight on Saki Night" in Marshall,
Battle at Best, (New York: William Morrow, 1963), pp. 141 ff. This last chapter ("The Fight On Saki Night") tells not only how the system came about but also the events of the night.


14. Letter from General Smith to Major General George V. Strong, attached to the extract of Marshall's system, MC.

15. "Extracts from correspondence of Lieutenant Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, Field Representative, Historical Branch, G-2, relative to writing historical accounts of the Makin and Kwajalein operations," December 7, 1943, through January 10, 1944; this document indicates that Marshall saw the practical uses early on for historical work in precisely the area that all commanders want to get from their G-2s: intelligence of the enemy. But Marshall also pointed out that knowledge of one's own strengths and weaknesses could be had, thereby accomplishing Sun Tzu's dictum of knowing thyself. Furthermore, this extract points out that men who are adept at asking questions would be best suited for this sort of work, specifically naming journalists and lawyers. Another source of the type of knowledge Marshall gave to the commanders can be found in Bringing Up the Rear, p. 80, and in Battle at Best.

16. S.L.A. Marshall, Island Victory, (1945; rpt. Washington: Zenger Publishing, 1982), p. 112. The time between the engagement and the interview varied depending on how long it took to determine what units were crucial in an operation, how long it took to get an historical officer to them, and when the tactical situation allowed the interviewer to get the men together. Sometimes, as on Makin Island, Marshall was literally travelling with the troops, so he could begin some of the interviews immediately and continue them on the transport ships at sea. At other times, as after the Normandy invasion, Marshall had to wait weeks or months to interview the survivors. On his first trip to Korea, he interviewed the troops two to three weeks after the operation. On his 1953 trip, he was often able to debrief patrols immediately upon return to the front lines. In the Sinai in 1956 and again in 1967, he arrived within a few days of the end of hostilities, so the time lag was probably a few weeks. In Vietnam, the helicopter often enabled him to conduct an interview within hours after an engagement. Moreover, the intensity of the conflict had a
great deal to do with how long it took Marshall to get to the desired units. Not only did active operations on a large scale hamper his being able to get the unit aside for the day or two necessary to conduct the interview, but also a lot of activity required the interviewer to conduct a considerable amount of research, determining which units were key to the operation since it was impossible to interview every unit involved, and then to understand the flow of events so that he would know what questions to ask. On small scale operations, like the patrolling during the relatively quiet period in Korea in 1953 and some of the operations in Vietnam, he could focus on the unit very quickly and with little or no prior research because the operations were simple.

The importance of the time factor lies in the fact that the longer the period between the event and the interview, the less accurate memories are likely to be. Not only are details forgotten in the interim, but also a rationalization process takes place. This process is discussed in the epilogue.

17. Several retired generals, all of whom have experienced the technique first hand, agree that it takes great skill to conduct the interviews properly. General William R. Desobry, who was interviewed by Marshall in connection with the action of Task Force Desobry at the Battle of the Bulge, Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, Jr., who requested Marshall's help in preparing his Division for its assignment to Vietnam, and Lieutenant General H. W. O. Kinnard, G-3 of the 101st Airborne at the Bulge, all said that the technique is tricky, and takes a keen mind. (Letter from Generals Desobry (August 12, 1983) and Collins (August 9, 1983); telephone interview with General Kinnard (October 27, 1983).


19. Letter from Joseph Coates, Institute For Defense Analyses, to Marshall, December 18, 1963; extract from Ferguson, United States Army Historical Efforts In Viet Nam, CAHP 3/78, p. V - 24, [ a xerox manuscript found in the Archives of the United States Military History Insitute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., which archives will be referred to hereafter as "Archives, MHI"]; letter to Marshall from Captain Calvin P. Kennedy, 18th Military History Detachment, 25th Infantry Division, February 23, 1967, MC (box 77).


24. Letter from John Westover to the author, p. 11.


31. If Marshall allowed interviewees to come back after the interview to make corrections, he may inadvertently introduced more error into the record rather than lessened it. If the corrections were made immediately after the interview, then the changes may have improved the report. But if even a day or two elapsed, then the changes may reflect the rationalization process. (See footnote 16.)
32. David McK. Rioch, M.D., Technical Director, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, "Report on Temporary Duty in Japan and Korea (14 April to 17 July 1953)," [unpublished report], pp. 31-32, MC (box 88).

33. See memorandum dated 26 June 1944, signed by the Theater Historian for Europe; also the letter from Lt. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Commanding General Eighth Army Korea, dated 27 May 1953, and Circular No. 26, HQ Seventh Infantry Division, dated 27 May 1953; all three of these documents are in box 88, MC; Also see the letter from Captain Calvin F. Kennedy, 18th Historical detachment, 25th Infantry division, February 23, 1967, MC (box 77). It should be noted in passing, however, that the only remaining active duty Military History Detachment -- the 44th -- does not conduct group interviews any more. According to Colonel Louis D. F. Frasche and Sergeant First Class Jerry L. Wells, who were among those who interviewed the returning combatants of the recent Grenada invasion, they prefer to interview soldiers individually. [From telephone conversations with the author on February 6, 1984.]


35. For anyone who doubts the validity of the technique, I recommend reading Island Victory, both Chapter One ("How the Truth of Battle is Found") and the Appendix (Conducting the Interview After Combat.").

36. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 87; also Letter from Forrest Pogue to the author, p. 2.

37. Throughout Bringing Up the Rear, it is obvious that the friends Marshall made through his interviewing the 101st Airborne remained friends throughout his life; for example, General Matthew B. Ridgway and Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) H.W.O. Kinnard.

38. Ibid., p. 91; also Spiller, Lectures, V, December 3, 1962, p. 30.


40. The story of how Marshall, Westover, Ernest Hemingway, and six other Americans tagged along with the French 2nd Armored Division when it liberated Paris is recounted in "How Papa Liberated Paris," The American
Heritage, (April, 1962), as well as in Chapter 10 of Marshall's autobiography, Bringing Up the Rear. Westover confirmed the event in a letter to the author, August 9, 1983.

41. Letter from John Westover to the author, August 9, 1983, p. 3.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 8.

44. Letter from Forrest C. Pogue to the author, August 9, 1983, p. 4.

Hugh M. Cole, head of the Third Army historical team and later Marshall's deputy, corroborated the views given by Westover and Pogue, stressing particularly strongly that with his Marshall's training as a journalist, he would prefer being at the scene of the action or closeted in a room with his typewriter than do almost anything else (except perhaps tell stories, as Westover described.) Cole explained Marshall's weakness in the strategic and political areas was due to his preference for the history that made good stories. Because the material for those stories was to be found at the small unit level, that was where Marshall concentrated. Even when Cole urged Marshall many years later to view Vietnam from the generalship standpoint, Marshall refused, preferring to write his memoirs instead. (Hugh M. Cole, telephone interview, April 11, 1984; also, the letter from Cole to Marshall, May 6, 1969, NC.)

45. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 121.

46. Ibid., p. 122 ff.

47. Ibid., p. 125.


49. Ibid., p. 125 ff.; see also letter from John Westover to the author, p. 4-5.

50. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 130-1.

51. Since the general did not give me permission to ascribe that statement to him, he cannot be identified him in this paper.
52. Letter from Forrest Pogue to the author, August 9, 1983.


54. Michael Howard, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, telephone interview, January 31, 1984. Indeed, when the emphasis was on writing the short, narrative histories such as the Armed Forces in Action (AFA) series, the Chief Historian in Washington recommended that the job be given over entirely to journalists, for he recognized that academic historians were not suited to the task. Soon thereafter (June 1944), however, the decision was made to concentrate on "improving the historical and literary quality of its combat histories, and rewriting or discarding those that did not measure up to acceptable historical standards. The basic manuscripts of the accepted histories were fully documented, although they were printed without footnotes." The basis had been laid for the shift to the even more historically precise "Green Book" series, The United States Army in World War II. (Conn, p. 96.)

55. Michael Howard, telephone interview, January 31, 1984. This would tend to explain why Sullivan tended to remain at headquarters—not because of any personal shortcomings or cowardice, but because that was where he could find the materials he was trained to deal with. Likewise, this fact may be a large part of the reason the European historical section under Ganoe had not been producing as well as expected—not merely because of Ganoe's personality, but because the first teams sent to the theater had not had the benefit of the "Marshall method." When later teams were sent over and saw Marshall in action (as Westover did), they could use the system better. Trying to apply the system without seeing it in action by someone who had mastered it would naturally be difficult. Printed words cannot teach a man how to apply his judgment, when to let go of a subject and when to pursue it. Indeed, because many of the historians lacked military (much less combat) experience, they might not even have a good idea of what questions to ask.

56. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 133.

only fully footnoted publication. See the handwritten note on the cover of the copy in the Marshall collection's shelf of special books.


59. Ibid., p. 145.

60. Letter from Forrest Pogue to the author, p. 3.

61. The state of affairs in Germany at the time was such that anyone could walk into one of the detention camps and walk off with "a platoon of German generals." (Hugh H. Cole, telephone interview, April 11, 1984.)


64. Ibid., p. 158. By mid-summer 1946, over 500 generals had been interviewed; Conn, p. 181.

65. Conn, p. 182.

66. The current U.S. Forces Command [FORSCOM] commander, General Richard E. Cavasos, considers these pamphlets to be valuable today in understanding Soviet strategy and tactics. So important did he perceive the volume on "The Breakthrough" that General Cavasos recently issued a copies of it to all his senior commanders. (General David Doyle, telephone interview, April 27, 1984.)

67. Marshall, *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 163-4. Hugh Cole attributed the saving of these documents to Marshall's personal efforts, saying "Sam understood the importance of [the historical records as primary sources] and moved heaven and earth at ETOUSA/SHAEBF to stop the proposed shipment of those records to Liege (and a possible unknown grave)." (Letter from Hugh H. Cole to the author, 6 March 1984.)

CHAPTER TWO:


2. Exactly what effect he may have had on the the army through this board alone are beyond the scope—though not the intent—of this paper. The Military History Institute did not have a copy of their findings—at least not under the name "Senior Observers Board." The Center of Military History seemed to lack that kind of document entirely, while the National Archives researchers seemed to have next to no knowledge of Marshall or of the type of documents I needed. Marshall's crediting Colonel Archer with forcing him into writing Men Against Fire, can be found in Bringing Up the Rear, p. 150, and in pages 5-10 of the 1978 reprint of Men Against Fire.


4. Ibid., p. 164.

5. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. Ibid., p. 69.

8. Ibid., p. 135.


12. Ibid., p. 38.


15. Ibid., p. 40.

16. Ibid., p. 127.

17. Ibid., p. 76.

18. Ibid., p. 118.

19. Ibid., p. 54 ff.

20. Ibid., p. 56


22. John Ellis, The Sharp End (New York: Charsles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 102. There is no indication that Marshall had any knowledge of the questionnaires mentioned here. In all likelihood, even if he knew they were being given, he would not have had access to them as they were being administered by a the Research Branch, Information and Education Division of the War Department and had nothing to do with history, per se. And even if he had had access to them, it is doubtful that meaningful conclusions were reached while he was preparing Men Against Fire. The results were not published until 1949. The questionnaires that Ellis refers to are from Stouffer, op. cit. (See footnote 21.)

23. Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 58; this understanding led to suggesting that the squad (approximately 12 men) be divided into two teams, each formed around an automatic rifleman, for often it was the wielder of heavier weapons, such as the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) which fought consistently. In time this recommendation was adopted. (See S.L.A. Marshall, "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea; Winter of 1950-51," (n.l.: The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, Report No. ORO-R-13 (SECRET), 27 October 1951, pp. 53-54.)


25. Ibid., p. 60.

26. Ibid., p. 59; The idea of "Killers, Fillers, and Fodder" is well expressed by Colonel Thomas A. Horner in his article by that name in the September 1982 issue of
Parameters, the Journal of the U.S. Army War College, pages 27-34.

27. Standish asserted that the very fabric of American society was deteriorating, and that those who did not fire were indeed cowards and malingers. Furthermore, it was the fault of society, and parents in particular, that had brought this crisis on. Colonel Anthony Standish, "Crisis In Courage," Combat Forces Journal, (April, 1952), pp. 13 ff.


29. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

30. Ibid., p. 65.

31. Ibid., p. 129; because of Men Against Fire, army doctrine dropped the one-man foxhole in favor of a two man foxhole. (Letter from General William E. DePuy, former commander of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, to the author, February 14, 1984.)


34. Ibid., pp. 45-6.

35. Ibid., p. 44.

36. Ibid., p. 48.

37. Ibid., p.57.

38. Ibid., p. 78.

39. Ibid., p. 79.


41. Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 142.

42. Ibid., p. 150.
43. Ibid., pp. 42-43.


46. A prisoner of his time, even this far-sighted thinker attributed to close order drill and exact discipline the means of creating the unit esprit which goes hand in hand with confidence that one's comrade will not let one down. See Capt. Andre Laffargue, The Attack in Trench Warfare, trans. "An Officer of Infantry" Washington: The United States Infantry Association, 1916), pp. 31-32.

47. Ardant DuPicq, Battle Studies, trans. Colonel John N. Creely and Major Robert C. Cotton (Harrisonburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1946). There is some question whether Marshall had read DuPicq prior to 1947. In August 1964, Stephen E. Ambrose wrote to Marshall that he intended to read before the American Historical Association a paper entitled "Technology and Tactics on the Eve of World War I." Ambrose said to Marshall that one of his main points was the similarity between DuPicq and Marshall. On the copy of the paper that Marshall received from Ambrose, Marshall scrawled "What Ambrose did not know is that I never read DuPicq." If that were true, then the similarity could be explained in the same way that the Shils and Janowitz study could be considered an original insight based on independent data. However, in his 1950 book The Armed Forces Officer, Marshall referred to DuPicq on several occasions. That does not in itself make Marshall a plagiarist, though it might suggest that in 1964 he did not choose to remember his earlier references to the Frenchman. There is one further bit of evidence, however, which might indicate that Marshall's ideas as expressed in Men Against Fire were not stolen from Battle Studies: the American edition of DuPicq's work was published in 1946, after Marshall had already begun his analysis.


49. Ibid., p. 39.

50. Ibid., p. 71.
51. Ibid., p. 71.
52. Ibid., p. 49.
53. Ibid., p. 37.

54. It would be interesting to know when the current "spot report" format came into being and whether it's designer was influenced by Marshall. [A "spot report" is a quick means of passing information of enemy sightings over the radio. It usually has at least five sections (lines) which tell: what activity was observed (an indication of intention) and how many were observed (strength), the location of the enemy, the time of observation, what the observer intends to do about the sighting, and the observers identification code.]

56. Ibid., p. 117.
57. Ibid., p. 108.
58. Ibid., p. 82.
59. Ibid., p. 138.
60. Ibid., p. 136.
61. Ibid., pp. 113-114.
62. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
63. Ibid., p. 81; the findings of a Human Relations Research Organization [HumRRO] project in 1955 indicated the truth of Marshall's assertions even as low as the squad level.

The major conclusion is that a squad does not necessarily have to have a good leader to be effective; it can often perform well with a mediocre leader if this leader receives enough help from his men. This group-help system was developed and encouraged in the SQUADTRAIN final program by emphasizing, all through the training period, the mutual interdependence of men and the responsibility of all for squad performance. All were encouraged to think about the things that had to do with the success of the squad as a whole.
The men and the leader were encouraged to talk; the principle "Communicate"—pass the word—was emphasized. This point of emphasis came from S.L.A. Marshall, who says... "Along our own fronts, [in World War II] contact was frequently broken and many small actions were lost because our men had not learned that speech is as vital a part of combat as is fire." . . . This system was especially advantageous to the weaker squad leaders. When they did not know what to do, or tended to become confused, their buddies helped them out. This seems to be one of the primary reasons why no poor squads, in terms of field test scores, were turned out by the final SQUADTRAIN program of training. . . . It is recommended that the foregoing ideas be emphasized in the orientation to small-unit training and during the training. Mutual interdependence and the importance of communication should always be stressed. The leader should not be required to use such a system of built-in reminders, but he should be aware that he can use such a system. . . . It should be clearly established that the person who reminds the squad leader cannot usurp the leader's responsibility of command; the leader is in any event responsible for all of the actions of the unit.


65. Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 75.

66. Ibid., p. 79.

67. Ibid., p. 59.

68. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

69. Letter from B.F. Purdue, Colonel, Army Ground Forces Operations and Training Officer (G-3) to Marshall, September 17, 1947, NC.

70. Letter from B.F. Purdue, Colonel, Army Ground Forces
Operations and Training Officer (G-3) to Marshall, October 1, 1947, NC.

71. Ibid.

72. Letter from B.F. Purdue, Colonel, Army Ground Forces Operations and Training Officer (G-3) to Marshall, January 19, 1948, NC.

73. This publication is in the Marshall Collection.

74. Found in the Marshall Collection.

75. Letter from Colonel Henning Linden, Infantry, Chief of the Military Leadership Department, January 31, 1950.

76. Leadership for the Company Officer, Army General School Special Text Number 1, Revised, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1950, n.p.

77. Letter from W.T. Campbell, Colonel, SDW&T (Infantry/Air), British Joint Services Mission, January 19, 1948; MC (box 76).

78. Letter from Major Searight, the War Office, Whitehall, London, January 29, 1949, NC (box 76).

79. USMA Register, p. 474.

80. Letter from Captain S.W. Mulkey to Marshall, February 7, 1949. According to the USMA Register, Mulkey retired in 1964, after being a battalion commander with the 45th Division in 1953, and a member of the staff and faculty of the Infantry School in 1960. So this was no mediocre officer.

81. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 167. Also see the orders in the files of the Marshall Collection. Although they do not specify the purpose of any given assignment, they do indicate that he was called up for duty with not only service schools, but also the Historical Division and the Office of the Chief of Information. This latter office is the one he refers to on page 167 of his memoirs as being the one wherein he wrote those policy papers. He worked in this office thirteen times between March 1948 and July 1950, for a total of 148 days. In addition, he worked for them for thirty days between 1953 and 1960. It could be that part of this time was spent writing --and later rewriting-- The
Armed Forces Officer, a Department of the Defense/Army Pamphlet which I refer to later in this chapter.

82. Letter from LTG Manton S. Eddy, Commandant, Command and General Staff College [C&GSC], to Marshall, 19 September, 1949, MC. It is interesting to note that when he spoke at C&GSC on January 16, 1952, October 16, 1952, and November 18, 1953, he used the title which General Eddy had suggested: "The Human Equation in Combat." See Spiller, Lectures, p.iii.

83. Orders, Headquarters, 5th Army, ALFAG-ZO #11-249, dated 10 November 1949.

84. Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 37

85. Interview with Colonel F.R. Drews, Chief of the Physical Fitness Research Institute at the Army War College, personal interview, August 12, 1983.

86. Dr. Gregory Belenke, Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, Chief of the Department of Behavioral Biology, Division of Neuropsychology, The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, telephone interview, March 6, 1984.


88. Dr. Gregory Belenke, telephone interview, March 6, 1984.

89. Marshall, The Soldier's Load . . ., p. iv-v. This quote and the episode surrounding it can also be found -- almost verbatim-- on pages 204-208 in his autobiography, Bringing Up the Rear.


91. Ibid., p. 39-40.

92. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

93. N.V. Lothian, Major, Medical Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, The Load Carried by the Soldier, Army School of Hygiene, Army Hygiene Advisory Committee Report No. 1., (London: John Bale, 1913 [?]), MC (box 105).
95. Ibid., p. 68.
96. Letter from Major General A.C. McAuliffe to Marshall, May 13, 1948, MC.
98. Quoted by Marshall from War As I Knew It, in The Soldier's Load, p. 57.
100. Ibid., p. 10.
101. Ibid., p. 18.
102. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
103. Ibid., p. 13.
104. Quoted in John Ellis' The Sharp End, p. 60, from pages 357-58 of Pyle's Brave Men. Of course there is a chance that Pyle misread the cause of the symptoms. The physical reactions he described might be attributable to fear and not to the pills. Certainly the constriction of the throat and the dryness of the mouth have been identified with fear in other theaters, where no seasickness pills were taken. Ellis quotes several British and American soldiers with these symptoms on page 93.
105. Ellis, p. 281 ff.
106. The Soldier's Load was printed four times: in 1950 and 1952 by the Combat Forces Press—the successor to The Infantry Journal Press—and in 1965 and later 1980 by the Marine Corps Association. There are only two differences between the earlier and the later versions. The preface was changed in 1965 to explain how Marshall came to write the book; secondly, the later versions number the pages slightly differently. What was page ten in the 1950 edition is page eleven in the 1980 edition. The discrepancy between stating that the articles appeared in The Infantry Journal and the book's being printed by The Combat Forces Press is explained by the following: In August, 1950, The Infantry Journal (first published in July 1904) combined with the Field
Artillery Journal (first published in 1910) when their respective associations combined to form the Combat Forces Journal. In February, 1956, it was renamed Army magazine. What is now Infantry magazine has a different lineage, coming from the Infantry School Hailing List which was renamed the Infantry School Quarterly in 1947. It was renamed Infantry in April, 1957. This information was supplied by the Center of Military History.

108. Ibid., p. 8.
109. Ibid., p. 47.

110. Dr. Gregory Belenke, telephone interview, March 6, 1984. In a separate interview on the same day, a civilian biochemist at The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research said that tests of troops going into the field for tactical exercises show that the level of a certain hormone (cortisol) goes up when they go to the field and falls when they return. This rise indicates an increased level of stress. In addition, whereas under normal, garrison conditions there is a pattern to the secretion of the hormone, in the field the pattern deteriorates. In particular, normally the level is high during the daytime and lower at night. But once in the field, it remains high. This indicates that the men are under stress more or less continuously, probably due to their having to perform military tasks and remain alert both day and night. Remember, this is during peacetime exercises when "kills" are registered using laser devices and where everyone knows no one will die. The exercise took place recently at Camp Hunter-Liggett in California. But she, too, could not say positively that increased stress—no matter what the cause—directly affects the muscles as Marshall said.


112. Marshall, The Soldier's Load, p. 71 ff. Marshall further clarified his ideas on the load when, during the Korean War, he wrote "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea." In this report, he described how his predictions about overburdening the soldier would result in great waste; how the soldiers determined on their own what their maximum limit was—and it was close to his own estimate: 38 to 45 pounds; and how stress on all, including
staffs, was exacerbated by the leadership's not knowing the limits of its men. See "Commentary...", chapters IV and V, pp. 29 thru 50.


114. Ibid., p. 53. Interestingly enough, Marshall noticed that the army may have over-applied his admonition to keep the soldier's burden to a minimum. After visiting the 1st Airborne Battle Group in Lebanon in 1958, Marshall wrote an article for The Combat Forces Journal. In this article, "Doves and Olive Branches," he said that while the troops trained well and reacted well under very trying conditions, they had been outloaded too light. They lacked essentials. They carried only one change of socks and underwear.


117. Farrington Daniels, Jr., M.D., Physiology of Load Carrying I, Quartermaster Research Laboratory, Environmental Research Branch, Quartermaster Research and Development Command, Report No. 203, (March 1953), p. 1. Not only was The Soldier's Load listed in the 21 book bibliography, but also Major Lothian's The Load carried by the Soldier. (See footnote 93).

118. Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, personal interview, August 18, 1983. Marshall's contention that the Army took immediate action is borne out in an article in Army Times on September 3, 1949, announcing the "new project going forward at Army Field Force Headquarters." In an article in the Combat Forces Journal, a member of the Army Field Forces Board No. 3 wrote that in 1950, the board recommended what the policy ought to be concerning the maximum weights the soldier would be required to carry. They are virtually identical to what Marshall had suggested. [Major Richard T. Matthews, "The Load of the Individual Soldier," Combat Forces Journal, (October, 1952), pp. 12 ff.] The major difference is that whereas Marshall had said that the soldier's uniform should be included in the calculations, the board specifically excluded it. A comparison of the equipment described in the article with that now in service yields the conclusion that this board,
and hence Marshall's ideas, had long-lasting influence. Unfortunately, my experience indicates that the distinctions between combat load and training load have been lost over the intervening period. I am not conscious, as a serving combat arms officer, of having been instructed in the differences in these two loads or the reasons behind them. So it seems something of the policy recommended by both Marshall and the board has been lost where it is needed most: in combat arms training.

119. Letter from Major General T.L. Sherburne to Marshall, March 30, 1956, MC. Was this to become the current poncho?
CHAPTER THREE


2. Evidently, the idea for the book had been considered as early as 1943, for Training Circular Number 6, Department of the Army, 19 July 43, referred to "'The Armed Forces Officer,' a manual prepared jointly by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, will serve as the basic reference" for establishing "common basic concepts of leadership." This circular can be found in the MC.


4. "About" thirty propositions, because the 1950, 1956 and 1960 editions list twenty-nine, while the 1975 lists thirty, and The Officer As a Leader lists thirty-two. The quote is to be found in all versions, though as time went on and new wars were fought, Pork Chop Hill and Vietnam were added.

5. This sentence appears only in the 1950/56 versions.

6. There are only two modifications in this proposition over the years. First, in the 1950/56 versions, the word "service" is not capitalized. In all other editions it is. Second, the sentence beginning "All plans in combat . . ." was altered in the editions after 1956 to read "Since all plans in combat are subject to modification as circumstances dictate, it is better . . ." The portions of the paragraph not shown discuss the shortcomings of too much information, which leads to confusion. Deciding how much to tell is the constant bane of the small unit leader, who often does not have enough experience to know what is essential and what is irrelevant to the men at his level. This dictum -- and the problem-- has come down to leaders of the post-Vietnam era, and is based on von Steuben's observations of American soldiers in the American Revolution.

7. The only change here was "self-evidently" was removed after the 1956 edition.

8. It is tempting to infer that the reason these three paragraphs were never included in the official publications is that they offended the hierarchy. These paragraphs sound
a bit disparaging of the American soldier and might therefore have been deemed unfit for the government publication.

9. The only change in this proposition was that after the 1956 edition, the first paragraph regarding the expectation of respect from members of all services being mutual, was deleted -- probably because it was deemed so axiomatic as not to need stating.


11. Marshall, *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 178. His wife, Cate, confirmed this uneasiness when she told me that he always had a bag packed for immediate departure. (Interview with Mrs. Marshall, June 16, 1983.)

12. Letter from Dr. Spiller to the author, November 30, 1983.

13. The Chief of Army Field Forces recommended that enough copies be made to "provide one copy per four officers on active duty plus a few in higher headquarters for planning and orientating purposes. It is estimated that 30,000 copies will be needed to cover the Regular Army distribution." (From a letter from Office, Chief, Army Field Forces to Director of Personnel and Administration, General Staff, United States Army, February 15, 1950, MC.)


16. Travel orders found in the Marshall Collection.


18. Ibid., p. 182.

EUSAK [Eighth United States Army Korea], Combat Information Bulletin #6, dated 17 Dec 50, signed by Lieutenant General Walker, and also entitled "Notes on Chinese Company Tactics." The four sections in it were "Introduction," "Reconnaissance," "Chinese Attack Signals," and "The Attack." The similarity of these two publications and their chronological proximity lead one to believe that the one came from the other. Both can be found in the MC.


24. This account is what McClure told Marshall later. (Ibid., p. 188.)

25. Ibid., p. 188-9.

26. On at least three occasions, Ridgway sent Marshall quite complimentary notes, including one in 1964 saying: "I believe you to be freer of political bias, and more objectively fearless in analysis than any one I know. (Letter from General Ridgway to Marshall, April 23, 1964, MC.) Marshall dedicated his book on World War I to General Ridgway. Their friendship, according to Mrs. Marshall, was very close.


29. Response to my questionnaire, August 12, 1983. [See Appendix A for the questions asked.]

30. Kinnard criticized Marshall for the report's lack of unity and failure to reach a strong conclusion. Indications
are that Marshall followed Kinnard's suggestions for improvement very closely. The responses of these two officers are in the MC.

31. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Maurice C. Holden to Marshall, September 14, 1951, MC.

Marshall ensured a thorough review of the draft, for he received a reply with comments from General Mark Clark, still the Chief of Army Field Forces. Clark's staff had gone through the report with little disagreement. In addition, Clark wrote "it may be of interest to you that I have recently initiated action for the development of a new pack [ruck sack]. . . . With regard to another subject with which you are concerned, defensive fire power, I have also recommended to the Department of the Army certain increases in mortars and machine guns in the infantry regiment."

[Letter from General Clark to Marshall, October 23, 1951, MC. See also letter to Marshall from Major General John H. Church, the Commandant of the Infantry School, September 20, 1951; letter from Colonel E.B. Crabill, one of General Clark's staff, December 4, 1951.]


34. Ibid., p. 47.

35. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


37. Letter from Captain Dierhauf, Administrative Assistant of the 11th Airborne Division, to the Director of the Operations Research Office, February 10, 1953, MC; also letter from Major Frederick H. Black, Jr., of the Replacement training Center in Puerto Rico, February 27,
1953, MC. His former deputy chief of the ETO History Section, Hugh M. Cole, and in 1953 an ORO analyst with Forrest Pogue and Roland Ruppenthal, wrote him from Europe, "Your ORO study on Korea has excited very considerable interest in the command. Seventh Army came back for three hundred copies after the original issue of four or five hundred." [Letter from Hugh M. Cole, June 15, 1953, MC (box 75).]


39. Years later, during the Vietnam War, the Army asked him -- unofficially -- to perform the role of "pro-army publicist" again. Specifically, the Chief of the Center of Military History asked Marshall to write a narrative for popular consumption, showing the fine job that the troops in Vietnam were doing. (Letter from Brigadier General Hal C. Pattison, Chief of the Center of Military History, March 31, 1966, MC.) Marshall did so, though not necessarily as a direct result of the chief's request. Marshall was one of the few journalists and writers of the Vietnam era that put the military in a good light. In his six Vietnam books (Battles in the Monsoon, Bird, West to Cambodia, Ambush, The Fields of Bamboo), he praised the courage of the soldier while criticizing the leaders for being too impetuous. However, taken in sum, Marshall's writings in books, professional journals, and popular magazines (such as Saga and Collier's) functioned not only as a sounding board for his ideas and criticisms but also as a vehicle for strengthening the prestige of the military in the eyes of the public -- the role of a publicist.

40. Marshall had had a part in the initial steps of the exchange, a fact which would contribute to his service later as an expert in prisoner of war investigations. But having completed that mission, he went to visit his friend, General Trudeau, in time to witness the Battle of Pork Chop Hill.

41. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, pp. 218-19. General Trudeau corroborated this account in an interview with the author on August 18, 1983. He said that Marshall lived with him in his field headquarters, during which time they spent many hours discussing tactics, organization and equipment. Further, he said Marshall would meet the patrol when they returned -- though he gave the time as 0500. Trudeau tried to have the appropriate soldiers decorated at the very next
formation. This account is what was referred to in the first chapter regarding the short time period between an engagement and Marshall's interview of the participants.

General Trudeau also gave Marshall credit for identifying the fact that a unit replacement center was too far to the rear to render effective service. Trudeau had that changed.

42. In *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 220, Marshall remembered a conversation with Dr. Rioch:

He said: "We've seen troops open up for you in a way that they never do for us. What's the secret?"

"There isn't any. You begin at the beginning. You work through to the end. You preserve chronology. Your brain has too be able to do that and think about the missing pieces. Doing that, you can get recall.

Rioch wanted to know if I had learned anything new from the interviews in the Yokkokchon Valley. I told him I didn't know yet. Time must be allowed for reflection. It is only through the repetition of the thing not heard or understood before that the brain becomes alerted, freshened by a feeling of possible discovery and extended like a hound after a rabbit. The assimilation is done in the head as the search progresses, and the written record is simply a handy body of proof should my conclusions be challenged.

So here we have in Marshall's own words, a description of the intuitive thinking process that Dr. Westover observed in World War II.

43. The story of Marshall's getting into the country and the way the Israelis treated him is found in *Bringing Up the Rear*, pp. 235 ff. That he was urged to teach the Israelis how to conduct interviews has been verified by Colonel Shobtai Noy, Ph.D., Head of the Mental Health Research Division, Mental Health Department, of the Israeli Defense Force Medical Corps, in an interview with the author on August 15, 1983. He said that the techniques now used in the IDF are directly traceable to Marshall.

44. Marshall, *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 245. It shouldn't be surprising that the United States would be so reluctant
to learn from others. After all, we had won World War II and Korea, we had the atomic bomb, and Israel was a whippersnapper of a country that as far as anyone could tell had merely had a run of good luck. In 1967, however, we were not only impressed with the speed of the Israeli success, but also smarting from our experiences in Vietnam. A review of the professional military journals since then indicates that we have been paying very close attention to the IDF.

45. The first time the United States government showed interest (1964), the Institute For Defense Analyses, which provided advice to the Defense Department's Directorate of Research and Engineering, wrote: "We have come to understand that there is an inadequate understanding of the military problems and hence of the R & D [Research and Development] requirements in these remote areas, particularly in Vietnam. A possible means of clarifying the situation is combat interviews of the kind you successfully conducted in Korea, the Sinai campaign, and World War II." (Letter from Joseph Coates to Marshall, December 18, 1963, MC.)

46. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, pp. 269-70. Corroborating documents, including a letter of apology to Marshall can be found in the Marshall Collection.

47. Extract from Ferguson, US Army Historical Effort in Vietnam, CAMP 3/78, found in the archives of the Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, pp. v-24 ff. Included in this extract was a description of the group interview technique, as perceived by one of the participants. The technique did not vary from that described in Island Victory, and seemed to be applied within hours of the engagement. See also the letter from Captain Calvin F. Kennedy to Marshall, 23 February 1967, MC (box 77).


52. In a letter to a researcher dated September 26, 1978, John J. Slonaker, Chief of the Historical Reference Section of the Military History Institute, wrote: "Apparently, Marshall's warning did not result in any timely or effective remedy, because the Korean War produced widespread concern, plus a number of studies, on the high percentage of non-firers and poor marksmen in combat. Recognition of the problem led to research and development by the US Army Infantry Human Research Unit for a fresh approach to teaching basic rifle marksmanship. The result was the Trainfire course of instruction, implemented during fiscal year 1958."


Daniels, Jr.; MC. The Navy, in behalf of the Marines, also came to Marshall for help concerning the soldier's load. Investigating the problems of providing practical "armored garments" (such as the so-called "flak jacket"), Marshall was asked to contribute his ideas on the advantages and costs of such equipment. They had identified the problem of over-loading as one of the major costs, and hence came to Marshall -- not once but twice: in 1957 and 1967. (Letter from Commander F.J. Lewis, USN, Head, Department of Personnel Protection, U.S. Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, to Marshall, 14 February 1957, MC; letter from Captain Jesse F. Adams, USN, Commander, Naval Field Research Laboratory, to Marshall, 27 July 1967, MC.)

56. Letter from Colonel William S. Stone, Medical Corps, Commandant, Army Medical Service Graduate School, 4 January 1954, MC (box 80). This school later became The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research [WRAIR].

57. Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear, p. 53 ff.

58. Ibid., p. 74 ff.

59. Ibid., p. 215 ff.


62. His work on this field manual's early draft is shown by a letter from General W. E. DuPuy, Commanding General of the United States Training and Doctrine Command, to Marshall, 15 July 1976, in which the general thanked Marshall for his help, and enclosed a copy of the new manual. "... Your review and substantive comments on one of the early drafts were a great assist."


65. According to Robert Leckie, author of *March to Glory*, the story of the Marines' fight from encirclement at the Chosin reservoir, Marshall provided notes of his interviews with the Marines. "Much of the book's validity — especially of the Marines of the Fifth and Seventh Regiments coming down the road from the reservoir — is due to his notes." (Letter from Robert Leckie to the author, August 17, 1983.)

66. Professor Ira Gruber remarked in a conversation with the author on April 22, 1984, that it was his experience that very often as quantity of writing goes up, quality goes down; the converse also being true.


68. Master Sergeant Johann N. Deutsch, "A Slam for Marshall," *Army Times*, 29 January 1963. Marshall's story of his interviews with the rebel leaders can be found in *Marshall, Bringing Up the Rear*, pp. 250 ff. Marshall could very well have said what MSgt. Deutsch said he did. If so, he was amazingly insensitive to the feelings of the men there in Lebanon. Such a remark is bound to cause some sort of negative feeling, if only to give the impression that Marshall was bragging about what he could do that they could not. But if Marshall told the truth of the encounter, would the men have believed him? It was indeed fantastic. Better he had not made any remark at all. Instead, his physical appearance and demeanor caused the same reaction that John Keegan got at Camberley without the opportunity to show his best side. I wonder why Marshall kept this in his files. Does this indicate that he had a sincere desire to keep his perspective? As the narrator of the movie "Patton" said in the closing scene, the victor in a Roman triumph traditionally had a servant standing by him in the chariot, whispering in his ear the warning "All glory is fleeting."

69. Letter from Mr. Paul Heilman to Marshall, December
16, 1961, p. 6, MC.


As a company commander training Lieutenants at the Basic School of the Marine Corps Schools I have had occasion to re-read the Armed Forces Officer. . . . I have always enjoyed reading this book as it says to me with great clarity and force most of the things that an Officer should really know

I have long been curious as to how this book came to be written and who wrote it. It does not read like a committee project. I have heard informally that you had a hand in its writing.

Can you set me straight? I mean to use it extensively in counselling my Lieutenants.

(Letter from Major T.E. Donnelly, to Marshall, July 16, 1963, MC.) It is interesting to note that many officers had heard the rumor that Marshall wrote The Armed Forces Officer. Even as late as 1984, some were not sure of its authorship. Indeed, Brigadier General Thomas Griess, former Head of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy, wrote me "I have always felt that the Armed Forces Officer (a DOD Pamphlet) was one of SLAM's greatest accomplishments. I understand that he was the unnamed author -- but I can't document that." What is even more interesting is that it is documented, not only by the contracts and letters in the Marshall Collection, but also in all his books written after 1958. In the opening pages of these books, the publishers listed "Other Books by S.L.A. Marshall," divided into four categories: "On Tactics and Leading," On War," On Battle," and "On Operations." After, Bringing Up the Rear came out, a new category, "Memoir," was added. Furthermore, his introduction to The Officer As a
Leader describes the chain of events leading to his writing *The Armed Forces Officer*.

74. Letter from W.W. O'Connor to Major General George T. Duncan, October 14, 1963, MC.

75. Letter from W.W. O'Connor to Major General George T. Duncan, December 2, 1963; MC. O'Connor kept Marshall abreast of the correspondence, adding: "It takes considerably more words than these to not only present the problem but also to dilute long-held and presumably 'correct' opinions. However, I hope your quoted words might cause enough of a second thought for someone to say 'Well, let's see what else this guy Marshall has to say.' If so, mission accomplished..." (Letter from General O'Connor to Marshall, December 2, 1963, MC.)
EPILOGUE:

1. To answer these questions, I wrote to several general officers, some of whom I knew to have had personal contact with Marshall and some whose acquaintance with him was unknown. Also, I wrote to scholars and acquaintances of his, such as Forrest Pogue and Hugh M. Cole. I also asked for readers of Army, Infantry, and The Army Times to contribute. A copy of the questionnaire that I sent to the generals is enclosed as Appendix A. In addition, I interviewed several people in person and on the telephone. From these people, I received the ideas which made this epilogue possible.

Before going into the results of these letters, a bibliographical note is appropriate. The vast majority of the letters I received are positively disposed toward Marshall. One could propose a good many reasons for this, including the self-serving one of desiring to be seen in a positive light in relation to a man who is somewhat of a legend in military circles. I discount this reason partly because each of these men is a distinguished soldier or scholar whose reputation transcends the necessity for such action. Another possible reason for the positive replies would be that many of the people I wrote were friends of Marshall's, and not likely to say anything detrimental to him. Even this does not explain things fully, for in many cases, those who were closest to him (Drs. Cole and Westover, for instance) tended to supply extremely candid insights into Marshall's character. In addition, for the last three decades of his life, his presence as a speaker at service schools and before official boards of investigation continued undiminished. Though no statistics are available, I would venture that few other soldiers, writers, or analysts could boast such a record, particularly when it is remembered that such engagements were not a primary source of his income. Indeed, the records in the Marshall Collection indicate that very often he was not paid beyond his travel expenses. Another indication of his popularity is that his books and magazine articles were consistently in high demand. Based on the number of printings of Men Against Fire alone, Marshall might be considered an author highly acclaimed throughout the world. When his other writings are included, there can be no doubt that he had many fans beyond his acquaintances and friends.

But just as there can be no doubt that he had a
following, there can also be no doubt that there were some who could only be considered "anti-Marshall." The intensity of those who did not approve of him indicates that there may have been a personal factor involved in their response. This bears examination and will be discussed in this chapter.

2. The first of the "Leavenworth Papers," The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, describes this aspect of doctrine formulation in a clear, concise way:

   Between 1953 and 1965, the Army had suffered through a number of dramatic changes in its tactical doctrine. These abrupt shifts in the focus of its doctrine forced the Army to reconsider every aspect of its tactics, organization and equipment. Considering the sweeping nature of the changes, the ability of the Army to respond to counter-insurgency needs was remarkable.


5. Ibid.


8. It can be argued that rational thought received a tremendous boost in the "Age of Enlightenment" and that the science and technology boom of the nineteenth century were a direct result of that period. Furthermore, the "professionalization" of American culture, according to Burton J. Bledstein in The Culture of Professionalism, was brought about by the rise of a class of experts, whose
knowledge in their particular fields placed them in positions of authority and hence, of policy-making. Popular trust in these three areas (science, technology, and experts) was implicit in the period 1945-75.


10. In the course of this research, I have come to realize that many people, including general officers, often understand only portions of what Marshall was saying. For instance, when asked to comment on Marshall's contention that a low percentage of soldiers fired in combat, several respondents referred the ratio of combat to service troops, missing the point entirely. In another case, it is difficult to understand how anyone could consider Marshall to be an enemy of the common the soldier. Perhaps it is because few people have studied Marshall very thoroughly. Throughout his writings, he praised the courage and qualities of the individual soldier. His criticism was aimed not at the man in the trench, but at policy-makers who failed to consider the human element in war.

11. In an Operations Research Office report (Richard H. Williams, ed., "Human Factors in Military Operations," The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, Report No. ORO-T-259, January 1954), two experts could not agree on how to categorize fear. One called it an emotion (p. 233), while another specifically said that such a view was passe and called it a drive (p. 269). And both of these remarks were in the same document!

12. Modern psychology and psychiatry were still relatively young sciences, and social psychology — a cross between psychology and sociology — was even younger.


15. His close friend, Dr. Hugh Cole, indicated that perhaps Marshall's attitude toward his ideas and those that doubted them was influenced by advancing age. He said that perhaps only those who have grown old can truly appreciate the effect the aging process (and perhaps the realization of their own mortality) can mean in the shaping of attitudes
and behavior patterns. (Opinion expressed by Hugh M. Cole, telephone interview, April 11, 1984.)

16. There is an old saying that even if a fool should proclaim in broad daylight that the sun is shining, knowing he is a fool does not make the night fall any faster.


18. In an address to newly commissioned lieutenants at the University of Virginia in 1969, Marshall made several remarks which indicated certain aspects of his views of life and therefore provide us with a better view of the complexity of his personality.

Looking back over my pilgrim's progress along the journey of life, I see only three main lessons.

First, life is much too short. By the time one gets to the stage where it is possible to add something of value to the store of man's knowledge, time runs out.

Second, in a given field, it is necessary to acquire only about one-half percent more of knowledge than one's competitors to win an over-inflated reputation as an expert. This should be an encouraging thought. There are few geniuses on earth. The race is not always to the swift. The competition is less fearsome than you now think.

Last, you may reach the point where you are able to add something new to human wisdom. But you will not discover it; given time, it may discover you. Truth has to arise from the dust and hit one right between the eyes about three times before one is likely to see it. Being able to recognize it finally is the main thing.

... My point is that if along the route anywhere, you think you have a new idea, something that no one else has ever dreamed, don't be afraid of it. Speak up! Far better that you should look
foolish for a moment, or fall flat on your face, than that, by remaining silent, you will let your golden chance pass you by.

... What is the mainspring of man as we know him? Recall with me the line from The Cowboy and the Lady when Gary Cooper said: "Ha' am, I aim to be high-regarded." And so do we all, or so do most of us. We want to make a mark. We want to stand a little at least above the crowd, though not necessarily as leaders. Some of us prefer to do personal, creative work and make it worthwhile.

... facing life, or facing the unknown, a man must be prepared to risk. Remember that, always. You may come a cropper now and then. But if you never risk you never win.

... You must know the language. You must continue throughout your career to perfect yourself in it, meaning both the written word and the spoken word. Disraeli said: "Men govern with words." Men also command with words. Indeed, there is no other way to do it.

... What matters most is that a man be true to his own nature. There is no such thing as the one perfect stance, attitude or posture. And imitation, as I have often said, is the flattest form of sincerity.

... You can learn more from a squad of old sergeants than from a platoon of young generals. And it's out of the close and binding association which thrives on mutual interest and respect that you will find the strength to stand steadfast when the going gets tough.

("On Being Commissioned," one of three public addresses given by Marshall in the spring of 1969 and published in a pamphlet entitled The Last Refuge. He expressed his three lessons of life as early as 1954 when he spoke at the Army War College; and again in a 1958 speech to the 101st Airborne Division and in a 1962 address to the Command and General Staff College. Copies of these three speeches can be found in the Marshall Collection.


21. Each of these men have kindly responded to my inquiries, and have indicated that Marshall had an influence on them.


27. Furthermore, though not directly related to his influence on the military, his focus on the subject of combat at the soldier level affected the way subsequent authors wrote military history. According to Dr. John Westover, "Marshall had another great impact — that on military literature. His own accounts set a standard for combat stories and often provided the information itself. The interview materials developed by the combat historians were not private property but public domain. Quite a number of popular historians mined those accounts. One of the most successful was Cornelius Ryan in his The Longest Day. ... Marshall's own story of Pork Chop Hill became a successful movie. I recall asking Marshall about the movie while I was visiting him in Detroit. He said, "I'll tell you, John, I am probably the only author who thought that the movie was better than the book!" (Letter from Dr. John Westover to the author, August 9, 1983, pp.11-12.)

28. Driven as he was not only to serve his country but also to carve a niche for himself in history, Marshall relentlessly sought recognition for his efforts. It is doubtful that he was ever satisfied with the rewards that he was accorded. But he was given some rather remarkable
considerations. Considering that he never graduated from high school or college, his being promoted to brigadier general indicates that someone was very impressed with him. Promoted to brigadier general first in the Michigan State Guard in 1951 and colonel in the Army Reserves in 1952, he was promoted to brigadier general in the United States Army Reserves in 1957. ("Statement of Military Service of Samuel Lynan Atwood Marshall," signed by Kenneth C. Wickham, Major General, The Adjutant General, 26 October 1966; NC.) In August 1960, he was placed on the Army of the United States Retired List of Brigadier Generals. His retirement ceremony, given in Washington, was attended by many important people including the Secretary of Defense, Wilbur Brucker. *Newsweek* wrote of it: "A ceremony unlike that ever given any one of his rank, least of all a civilian soldier." . . . reception in the secretary's office and the pinning on of another decoration. (Marshall, *Bringing Up the Rear*, p. 265.) Marshall earned the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Combat Infantryman Badge (which he claimed to be the first to receive), as well as three campaign medals and the victory ribbons for both world wars.

29. Indeed, while *Men Against Fire* is well-known in military circles, *The Soldier's Load* is now almost unknown.

In the study *Men Against Fire* I dealt somewhat narrowly with the problem of conserving the average man's power on the battlefield. . . . But the case as presented there was too limited. It considered man only as a being who can think -- who gathers strength from his close comrades -- who needs every possible encouragement from them if he is to make clear decisions and take constructive actions in the face of enemy fire.

But something should be added. On the field of battle man is not only a thinking animal, he is a beast of burden. He is given great weights to carry. But unlike the mule, the jeep, or any other carrier, his chief function in war does not begin until the time he delivers that burden to the appointed ground.

It is this distinction which makes the difference. For it means that the logistical limits of this human carrier should not be measured in terms of how much cargo he can haul
without injury to bone and muscle but of what he can endure without critical, and not more than temporary, impairment of his mental and moral powers. If he is to achieve military success and personal survival his superiors must respect not only his intelligence but also the delicate organization of his nervous system. (Marshall, *The Soldier's Load*, p.7.)

30. In the early 70's, Kitron, Inc., was charged with helping the Army Research Institute develop an improved training system for small units. The result was a program still in use: "Realtrain." The after-action review became an integral part of the system, and Marshall collaborated on its use. (Edgar L. Shriver, et al., "Technical Report S-4; Realtrain: A New Method For Tactical Training of Small Units," Army Research Institute, December 1975, MC (box 109).]


32. Conversations with Dr. Gregory Belenke in August 1983 and on the telephone, March 6, 1984. As an example, as yet unpublished article entitled "The Combat Stress Threat," by Peyton R. Williams, Jr., WRAIR's foreign science information officer, referred to Night Drop for proof that unit cohesion enhances the individual's ability to reduce stress and that the psychological stress arising from uncertainty contributes to physical stress.

33. Telephone conversation with Major Roger Cirillo, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, who talked with General Jones during a visit.

34. General Meyer was the first Chief of Staff to use video tapes to make his presence felt by all the leaders in the army. He made several which stressed the importance of small unit leadership and how his programs were designed to enhance those principles. Every officer in the army was required to view these tapes.

APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questions were asked of over twenty general officers. Similar questions were asked of other people I thought might have some information on Marshall, such as Dr. Forrest Pogue and Dr. Hugh M. Cole.

(1) How did you come in contact with General Marshall?

(2) In your career, did you observe any changes in training which could be attributed to General Marshall's activities, either directly (as in his giving lectures) or indirectly (such as the degree to which which books were recommended and read)?

(3) If you have read any of the following, how did you react to:
   (a) Men Against Fire?
   (b) The Soldier's Load?
   (c) The Armed Forces Officer?
   (d) "Notes On Infantry Action In Korea"?

(4) How do you think other leaders reacted to them?

(5) Did you find any of his insights of a practical value to you as a junior officer, a field grade officer, or as a general officer? (I wrote this question with the understanding that one's position influences one's needs and hence Men Against Fire may say one thing to a lieutenant and quite another thing to a general.)

(6) Who else was influential in formulating training methods and policies from 1946-67?

(7) Recognizing that you may agree with some of General Marshall's ideas while disagreeing with others, would
you please comment on the following?

(a) The direct relationship of fear and fatigue.

(b) The importance of giving soldiers realistic combat training.

(c) The importance of the kind of battlefield communications General Marshall dealt with in *Men Against Fire*.

(d) The low % of men who actively took part in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

(e) The effectiveness and accuracy of the interview technique.

(f) The factors which motivate men in battle.

(g) His tactical and organizational ideas.

(8) Who might be considered General Marshall's opponents?
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