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THE IRICNIC CHARACTERIZATION
OF KLINIGER'S STORM AND STRESS
GENIUS FIGURE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The central characters of Friedrich Maximilian Klinger's early works represent the epitome of the Storm and Stress genius idealization. These characters have superhuman strengths, prophetic insights, a yearning for simplicity, or naturalness, and a spontaneity that reflects their emotional fervor. In Klinger's works these traits become so overwhelming that they engulf the genius figure himself, smothering his very existence and thus rendering the author's idealization meaningless. This lack of meaning itself then becomes the focus of the reader's attention.

It is generally thought that Klinger and the other Storm and Stress writers sincerely believed in "genius," uncritically depicted its idealization, and empathized with the genius' self-annihilating behavior. While this evaluation may hold some truth with respect to Klinger's earliest works, the ensuing developments of his genius figure belie its validity. His later works reveal an objectification of the earlier genius idealization. They are riddled with irony. In the last work discussed in this study, the genius figure is totally caricaturized. In fact, the only individuals in that
work who are not treated in this manner are the "simple" human beings. It is the purpose of this study to illustrate the undercurrent of irony throughout Klinger's genius characterizations and to discuss its implications with regard to the Storm and Stress movement as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION

The Storm and Stress genius concept reflects the ideology of that movement more than any other single notion. All of the traditional depictions of Storm and Stress literature are an outgrowth of the ideals defining the genius concept. For example, the genius was the epitome of extreme subjectivism, a trait which marked not only the content, but also the form of the artist's works. Aesthetic rules governing the structure of art works were replaced by an emphasis on the expression of feelings. This was all justified by the genius' claim to independence and by his search for the freedom enabling self-realization.

In the view of posterity the genius concept is the monumental remnant of the Storm and Stress era. The modern notion of genius is tailored to the character who was then known as the glorified misfit. Therefore, the hypothesis of an ironic undercurrent coloring the genius figures in some of the major Storm and Stress works is particularly significant in that it leads to a re-evaluation of our own twentieth century genius concept. What is genius? How can it be defined? Does the mere act of definition negate the essential concept? Do we nowadays sincerely believe in a concept which the Storm and Stress writers were themselves mocking?
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of any hypothesis concerning irony in the genius figure, it is first necessary to discuss the nature of irony and the conditions predica-
ting the realization of irony. Irony is an interplay be-
tween oppositions—one which foreshadows the destruction of ab-
solute categories and points toward a revelation of arbitrar-
iness. It involves the opposite of what one means. Irony
was an established literary technique in the eighteenth cen-
tury drama. However, it was often confused with other lit-
erary techniques such as mockery, satire, and raillery, while
discussions of its philosophical import were generally re-
erved for the intellectually elite. Most of the specific
literary tropes with which irony was confused were employed
in comedy.

In Klinger's three dramas discussed in the present study
the irony of the first one differs from that of the latter
two. Die Zwillinge involves a sort of tragic irony. It
still appears to be an attempt to glorify the Storm and Stress
genius, but closer analysis reveals that it is an attempt de-
liberately contrived to fail. In this way it prefigures
Klinger's later mockery of the genius figure. Both Sturm
und Drang and Der verbannte Götersohn are more easily seen
as forerunners of Romantic irony, especially in light of the
key element of Selbstvernichtung used in the genius charac-
terizations: in both these plays it is difficult to decide
if the genius' most outstanding traits are tragic or comic,
so complete is the ironic exchange between the "ideal" and the
"real," i.e., the confusions and failures of the idealized genius are made the vehicle of comedy, which in itself negates that ideal. This is akin to Romantic irony, in which the communication of an ideal according to finite terms, or according to what is known, essentially negates the infinite properties of that ideal.  

Finally, the primary factor predicated the recognition of irony is the existence of shared conventions between author and reader. Irony is an inversion of traditional meaning, and one must therefore be familiar with that meaning before irony can be realized. For this reason the definition of genius specific to the Storm and Stress era should be discussed before an analysis of irony in the works themselves can proceed. 

As a reaction to the philosophical dualism of a cognitive/sensual dichotomy which was prevalent during the first half of the eighteenth century, the Storm and Stress genius saw himself as the embodiment of forces which represented a unification of the earlier split. Unfortunately, because of the rebellious and abrupt emergence of the Storm and Stress writers, any realization of this unification in their works is often overlooked by critics. The Storm and Stress writers are generally appraised as being far too extreme, i.e., as demanding creative, imaginative freedom in absolutist terms. 

It may be true that in their initial eagerness to assert the imagination as an all-powerful entity within itself, the members of the "genius cult" managed to lose perspective and
distort its very properties. They began to sever the traits belonging to genius (such as creativity, sensitivity, or a primal, Rousseau-like naturalness) from the realm of human behavior. This is why, for example, some of Klinger's characters seem more like personified characteristics rather than whole individuals. However, once the initial eagerness of the movement had subsided, Klinger continued to use the same literary technique of severing and magnifying personality traits, but the incongruities arising thereby were now manipulated so as to illuminate character fragmentation. Thus Klinger demonstrated that the image of his Storm and Stress "superman" was clearly incongruent with the contours of reality.

In Klinger's works the discrepancy between Storm and Stress idealism and reality is blatantly confronted. The earlier works reveal and attempt to justify the ideals as independent variables. The later works of this period have as their main objective an attempted understanding of reality, whereby the ideals can be re-examined and re-defined. In this objectivization of his own concepts, Klinger managed to compensate for the overzealous quality which initially penetrated his involvement with the Storm and Stress movement. He then conveyed his earlier ideals with a grain of criticism, or in an ironic vein.

Because Klinger's Storm and Stress works are usually criticized according to the expectations of classical drama, many of their features which are very progressive are often interpreted as artistic flaws. For example, the juxtaposition
of overwhelming contradictions in *Sturm und Drang* is sometimes seen as an artistic flaw, but the mere existence of those contradictions is in itself a major constituent of the drama's theme, i.e., of the arbitrary quality of life in general.⁴
PART I

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
CHAPTER I

Irony: An Attempt to Establish
a Basic Understanding

Irony, by its very nature, seems to defy concise definition. It is reliant upon the interaction of oppositions for its realization, bridging the disparity between possibility and actuality. These oppositions are reconcilable only within an ideal sphere of existence, but in reality they are governed by what is known as the law of "internal fatality." Kenneth Burke describes this phenomenon in terms of a peri-patetic strategy of reversal in which "what goes forth as A returns as non-A" (p.517). For example, we could say that the creativity of Dios in Klinger's Verbannter Göttersohn is shown in the final analysis to be a self-annihilating force. Similarly, in Die Zwillinge, the death of Guelfo results from his overzealous search for self-realization. In both of these examples there are two parallel extremes whose juxtaposition outlines the contours of a missing equilibrium. Irony thus depicts the impossibility of completion, or synthesis, by demonstrating the confusion wrought by its postulation. Nothing is as it appears to be, and the only thing we can know for certain is uncertainty itself. However, even this statement is a contradiction in terms.

The evolution of irony in drama during the 1700's can be
best outlined according to the manner in which it was defined; it was often confused with certain other literary tropes.

Until the eighteenth century the word "irony" itself was generally thought of as a technical term reserved for intellectuals. At that time obscurity surrounding the word resulted in the popularization of four different definitions: 1) saying the opposite of what one means; 2) saying something other than what one means; 3) condemnation under the pretense of praise, or vice versa; 4) mockery (Knox, pp. 9-10). It would be difficult to specify points at which even the most obvious generalizations overlap, but all four have in common the fact that they refer to verbal devices of saying one thing while meaning another. However, this is also a characteristic of raillery, banter, and ridicule, terms which were often confused with "irony" (Knox, p. 16).

During the eighteenth century, some theorists gradually became aware of a type of aesthetic perception different from reality. Once the external stipulations placed on art as an "imitation" of reality were diminished, it was then possible to depict the comic and tragic aspects of a situation beyond the realm of pure pedagogical and didactic concerns. The manipulation of a certain disillusionary interplay between seeming opposites, i.e., irony, became more clearly distinguished in literature from other artistic devices with which it had previously been confused.

Nowadays probably the most well-known definition of irony is that of "infinite absolute negativity." This refers to the
dialectical process in which the definition of a universal truth is equivalent to the negation of its infinite properties. The ideal, as a pre-existing absolute, cannot be realized within a finite system. The irony would be the point at which such concrete realization of the infinite would occur, which would simultaneously eradicate its essence. Irony then becomes equated with a paradoxically dogmatic notion of instability. It involves not merely a singular negation of one item or the next, but is an operant principle of negativity.

Because irony is philosophically described only in the most esoteric terms, it has been extremely difficult for critics to specify the working mechanisms of irony as applicable to literary analysis. In the process of defining these mechanisms there is a tendency to overemphasize the specific implications of irony in individual works, rather than concentrating on the means of its artistic employment. Irony, when used as a literary device, inevitably reflects its underlying philosophical referent. Therefore, it would be better to concentrate on the mental operations performed in order to recognize irony in art, than to attempt to illustrate the nexus of philosophical and literary definitions. We then need to align our focal point in terms of creator-work-recipient relationships that render the concretization of irony possible.

The word "concretization" refers to the ongoing processes of artistic interpretation whereby the artist's intention, the work as an entity within itself and the recipient's understanding coalesce. None of these three constituents can be
Independently analyzed. Therefore, when studying something such as the communication of irony in art, it is important to be aware of the potential interrelationships between all three. The best analysis emphasizing the mechanics of irony as a literary phenomenon, rather than the definition of types, can be found in Wayne C. Booth's *A Rhetoric of Irony*. Booth devotes himself to an analysis of how we can substantiate the validity of interpretations which revolve around the concept of irony. He lists four basic steps required of a reader in order to "discover" ironic intention: 1) presumption that the surface meaning is deceptive; 2) consideration of alternatives; 3) a definite decision that the author did not intend surface meaning; 4) reconstruction of meaning in accordance with that decision (p. 12).

It is the third step which is the most crucial, for this step may take us "outside the work itself," leaving us at least partially dependent upon extrinsic knowledge about the subject and/or the author. This raises the question as to whose opinions about the author and other features of the work are "correct." In order to take this step we must make a judgement against the overt proposition, followed by a discussion as to where the author stands. Booth notes that this is a subtractive process, because the movement from one level of intellectual understanding to another requires an initial act of rejection which must be constantly kept in mind in order to achieve the full meaning of further deductions (Booth, pp. 33-37). It is as if we reject both the
initial hypothesis and final theory of an argument, so that we can work both against each other and form our own conclusions. Irony then is both the means and the end of its own objective, in that it seeks fulfillment within itself.

What is most important to note is that the initial rejection of an overt proposition depends upon an appeal to assumptions, i.e., upon knowledge, by the reader and the ironist. Irony involves an aggressive confrontation with a conventional value system. Any clues which the author may furnish as to his ironic intentions are an outgrowth of the societal norms themselves. They involve an outright rejection of surface meaning within a given context which renders that meaning insufficient. The same thing is also true of satire, although the objective is different. Satire aims at improving the situation being criticized, while irony exists for its own sake; it simply displays the incongruities of meaning without further comment. These incongruities can be simultaneously so extreme and so subtle that their irony is often missed, or dismissed.

We have thus far established that the recognition of irony is dependent upon an initial rejection of surface meaning, or in a broader sense, of conventionalized meaning. In the case of irony, the entire encounter between author and reader is predicated upon three areas of commonality: 1) common experience of the vocabulary and the grammar of the language in use; 2) common cultural experience and the evaluation of its basic implications, or familiarity with these; 3) common
experience of literary genres or channels into which reading comprehension can be directed (Booth, p. 100). Therefore, if we are to validate interpretations of irony in literature belonging to any period other than the present, we must first examine our understanding of the era from which it arises.

Because this paper is an attempt to analyze irony veiling the genius figure in key works by Klinger, the following chapter is devoted to a description of the genius concept as it was popularized during the Storm and Stress period. This will establish the foundation by which it can be seen that Klinger's genius figures are themselves a rejection of the Kraftmensch-Ideal.
CHAPTER II

The Genius Concept

The modern definition of genius, which stems from the Storm and Stress era, means approximately "exceptional intellectual and creative power," or "the possessor of this power, originality and spontaneity,"¹ This definition constitutes a relatively recent fusion of variant notions. The awareness of a specific type of perception which distinguished "aesthetic illusion" from "imitation" of reality freed the artist from stifling ethical and pedagogical concerns in the creation of his work.² This then placed emphasis on the role of imagination in artistic creativity. Furthermore, the recognition of aesthetic perception was secondary to the obliteration of dualistic philosophical systems in which anything involving arousal of the passions was subsumed by the "superiority" of cognitive operations. The postulation of a mutual complementarity between sensual and cognitive activities paved the way for the Storm and Stress emphasis on such traits as creativity and originality as a necessary factor of artistic production. An understanding of these correspondences between artistic developments and the genius concept will hopefully enhance understanding of the Storm and Stress works themselves and thereby make up for the lack of aesthetic theory written during this
period. We will then have a model of the popular Storm and Stress genius ideal by which to compare the central figures of Klinger's most important early dramas.

During the eighteenth century various means of explaining imagination without accounting for it as a function within itself were exhausted. Jean-Paul Sartre has summarized what he considers to have been the most significant approaches to the problem of distinguishing imagination from perception. In the following passage he is referring respectively to Descartes, Hume and Leibniz:

"Such were the three solutions offered by the three great currents of philosophy: a reign of thought radically different from that of images; a world of pure images; and a world of fact-images, behind which must lie thought, appearing only indirectly as the sole possible reason for the organization and tel- eology discernible in the world of images (somewhat as God can be concluded in the physicotheological argument from the order of the world.

What we have then, grossly oversimplified, is either knowledge based ultimately on reason, knowledge based on sense-impressions, or knowledge gained a posteriori through the senses, but on the premises of an "infinite reason" established a priori.

With specific regard to the genius concept, Johann Christoph Gottsched had named wit, perception, the ability to see similarities in differences, and imagination all as part of a poet's "character." However, those attributes had to be accomplished by a well-tempered education adherent to classical rules (basically as they were interpreted by
leading French critics of the time). Gottsched described the mystery of genius as follows:

"...den heimlichen Einfluss des Himmels fühlen, und durch ein Gestirn in der Geburt zu Poeten gemacht worden seyn, das heisst ausser der gebundenen Schreibart nichts anders, als ein gutes und zum Nachahmen geschicktes Naturell bekommen haben" (p. 151).

Gottsched's imitation theory tended to stifle literary creativity.

In Bodmer and Breitinger's journal, *Die Discourse der Mahlern* (1721) the creative process was described as the ability to "communicate feelings" as opposed to merely making a detailed and accurate reproduction of an object. This was an idea which Bodmer further advanced in his work *Von dem Einfluss und Gebrauche der Einbildungskraft* (1727) (Wilkinson, pp. 16-17). He emphasized that the same feelings and thoughts which occurred in the writer should be stimulated in the reader. Contrary to Gottsched's approach, Bodmer shifted the emphasis from the relationship between the work of art to its original in nature and concentrated on the relationship between the work and the reader. However, Bodmer's concern with transmitting specific feelings to the reader did not allow for the reader's own interaction with the work. To allow for this would have necessitated the acknowledgement that the art work represents an artificially created world through which the reader may be effectively guided. This idea had not yet been established. Bodmer's insights may have been an advancement beyond Gottsched's, but they did not inevitably
lend themselves to a greater amount of creative freedom for the artist. They only changed his intention, equating emotional empathy with moral awareness.

Johann Elias Schlegel attempted to illuminate the difference between the art object and the original in nature, rather than minimizing that difference. Schlegel therefore stressed that when we speak of "imitation," we are dealing with the imagination, not reality. In this manner Schlegel's insights were very progressive, moving one step closer to recognition of the imagination as the working principle in art (Wilkinson, pp. 47-64). From the 1750's onward there was a tendency for ambiguous and unharnessed traits such as intuition, spontaneity, and originality to slowly penetrate the concept of genius.

During the Storm and Stress period the emphasis on imagination reached its apex; however, there were comparatively few theoretical treatises produced at that time. Theoretical explanations, which were themselves symbolic of Enlightenment tradition, were precisely what the writers representing the genius cult wished to avoid. This relative absence of theory encourages over-simplification of the movement in general.

However, one gains insight into the Storm and Stress writer's ideas through their criticism of Enlightenment theorists such as Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn was basically a metaphysician. His abstract and generalizing definitions were criticized by the Storm and Stress generation for being
too static. This, they thought, was the very antithesis of some of the concepts Mendelssohn was seeking to establish.

Thus Goethe wrote,

"Mendessohn und andere ... haben versucht die Schönheit wie einen Schmetterling zu fangen, und mit Stecknadeln, für den neugierigen Betrachter festzustecken; es ist ihnen gelungen; doch es ist nicht anders damit, als mit dem Schmetterlingsfang; das arme Thier zittert im Netze, streifit sich die schönsten Farben ab; und wenn man es ja unversehrt erwischt, so stickt es doch endlich steif und leblos da; der Leichnam ist nicht das ganze Thier, es gehört noch etwas dazu, noch ein Hauptstück, und bei der Gelegenheit, wie bey jeder andern, ein sehr hauptsächliches Hauptstück: das Leben, der Geist der alles schön macht."

This reaction was a reflection of new trends emanating during the 1760's.

The clergymen-philosophers Johann Georg Hamann and Johann Gottfried Herder both rejected the intellectualizing theories of their predecessors and contemporaries. Hamann's works are written in a very convoluted, oracular prose style, and are therefore difficult to comprehend. Hamann tends to ber very reactionary in advocating the genius's abandonment of all rules and also in his total reliance on sensuousness. Thus, in opposition to earlier trends, Hamann uses Sokrates as a paragon of wisdom and writes, "Die Unwissenheit des Sokrates war Empfindung. Zwischen Empfindung aber und einem Lehrsatz ist ein grösserer Unterschied als zwischen einem lebenden Tier und anatomischem Gerippe desselben."^8

Hamann's very one-sided views offer posterity little in terms of progressive developments. Yet, his basic method of analyzing existential problems did lead him to some significant
insights. In his *Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), he criticizes Kant's use of such abstractions as "reason," "understanding," "sense," etc. He states that there is no such thing as "reason" per se, but only an activity which is called reasoning. In this manner Hamann foreshadows the development of a dynamic philosophical science in which energy and motion rather than mass are the basis of all phenomena. In other words, he foreshadows phenomenological arguments in which different types of conscious activities, rather than different categories of "reality" are delineated. Hamann's works as a whole, however, are mostly of minor significance and much inferior to Herder's.

Herder's views were more promising than Hamann's, but his approach was much the same. He described processes of creativity in comparison with dynamic scientific principles emphasizing the continuity of "becoming" rather than the stasis of "becoming." This approach penetrates all of Herder's concepts. It is important to note the dynamics of Herder's system, because this progressive trait implies that his ensuing aesthetic theories are, if anything, a step forwards rather than backwards.

Herder clearly rejected on all grounds the idea of a systematized split between theory and practice, or, in other words, between reason and experience. He believed that this split was the fault of an overly complicated society that could no longer produce wholeness within its individual members,
but rather produced "Halbdenker und Halbempfinder." His ideas eradicated the presumption of an active/passive, appetitive/cognitive dichotomy. Herder emphasized experience more than reason or comprehension of a systematization. He wrote, "Die vollständige Wahrheit ist immer nur That; das Erkenntnis und Empfindungsvermögen ist im Grunde der Seele und war auch bei den Urvätern unserer Bildung Eins. Alles wuchs aus Einer Wurzel zur Glückseligkeit und Wahrheit" (p. 261).

This integration of cognitive/appetitive spheres penetrated Herder's concept of the genius, or "große Seele." Herder believed that an individual's exceptional powers may be concentrated in one sphere more than in the other, but he added that the intensification of sensual capacities precludes that of perceptual ones, and vice versa. The initial source of intensification may result in different personality types characterized either by "Innigkeit" or "Ausbreitung," the first being predisposed to melancholic brooding, the second to visionary fantasy and passionate outbursts. In two of the three genius works by Klinger which will be dealt with in this study we will see the juxtaposition of characters who embody this distinction (Guelfo-Grimaldi, Blasius-La Feu). In the first work the two are tragic figures, and in the second they are caricatures. It will be noted that Klinger's exploration of the Storm and Stress genius concept in the dramas is somewhat parallel to Herder's definitions of Innig-
The manner in which Klinger used these two genius types led him from the standpoint of tragedy to tragicomedy; the latter indicating a complete authorial objectivization of the former. This development as a whole reveals Klinger's scepticism about the genius concept itself in light of the fact that his works so wholly nullify the theories from which that concept arose.

Herder's works provided a major impetus for the Storm and Stress writers. His theories embody the initial germination of those ideals which they later attempted to realize: the reconciliation between feeling and thought; the establishment of imagination and creativity in cohesion with reason, hence the culmination of originality and spontaneity; the denial that a priori systems were more reliable than intuition and emotions; the unity between theory and practice. It follows then that the Storm and Stress genius figure should ideally be individualistic, imaginative, intuitive, emotionally charged, natural (in the Rousseauean sense) and therefore strong in physical fortitude.

It has been generally acknowledged that the genius figure appears in his sharpest contours in the works of F.M. Klinger. This is because Klinger himself is regarded as the writer who most clearly embodies Storm and Stress ideology. Kurt May states, "Friedrich Maximilian Klinger wird gemeinhin als der Dramatiker seiner Generation angesehen und dargestellt, der in seinen Jugenddichtungen den Sturm-und Dranggeist am reinsten
In light of this appraisal, the hypothesis that there may be an undercurrent of irony running throughout Klinger's Storm and Stress works, particularly the later ones, necessitates a reconsideration of the genius concept itself.

Interestingly enough, with the one Storm and Stress writer to whom the device of irony has been conceded, Lenz, it is an irony reflecting social criticism (satire), rather than one directed towards the superhuman individuality of a genius figure. This may be an unconscious consequence of the fact that our present day genius concept stems from that which was born in the Storm and Stress period. Yet the members of the genius cult are most often criticized for being reactionary, naive in their rebellious impulses, and extravagantly egotistical. Until recently their aesthetic achievements were granted very little significance. While it may be true that during the emergent stages of Storm and Stress most of the works were characterized by a radical naïveté (i.e., as is evident in the simplistic attempt to equate ideals like self-liberation with the total renunciation of conventional behavior), the deliberate employment of a literary device such as irony would imply an innate awareness of the bitter chasm between illusions that lend themselves to artistic form and life in reality.

Storm and Stress enthusiasm and preoccupation with creativity, sensuality, and originality was symptomatic of the
times. The robust idealism of those representing the genius cult can be best understood as an apocalyptic agent for the overthrow of the dominance of reason, thus paving the way for the reconciliation that was to follow in Classicism. With the Storm and Stress movement the imagination had finally come to exist as a functional entity within itself. It was not a correlate of reason, nor of sensuality, but rather occupied a realm of its own. It is for this reason that we see innovative trends in many of the dramas emerging from this period.

In the following chapters we will see that Klinger's depiction of the Storm and Stress genius figure metamorphosizes from that of a tragic and disillusioned being, to a fairy-tale-like superman, and finally to a mythical, self-destructive hero. Corresponding to the first category, the dramas Otto (1774), Das leidende Weib (1774), Die Zwillinge (1775), and Die neue Arria (1775) all revolve around central characters whose emotional intensity produces disastrous effects when it is subjugated to forces beyond their control. Otto's fervent devotion to his lord, Karl, and his love for Gisella lead to his suicide. Through the deceit of their enemies Otto becomes a traitor to both of them and thereby succumbs to his guilt in death. In Das leidende Weib a young woman marries a courtier in order to honor the advice of her father, whose concern is focused only upon the social status of his daughter's husband. At the time that she marries she is already in love with another man. This love is consummated despite the marriage, and the ensuing guilt of both individuals destroys
them. In *Die Zwillinge* the main character is seen as a criminal instead of a victim as in the earlier plays, but he, too, is consumed by the insanity of his feelings. He himself is killed for having murdered his brother out of hatred and jealousy. In each of these dramas Klinger displays heroes and/or heroines whose emotional magnitude cannot withstand the confines of external reality.

*Simsone Grisaldo* (1776) marks the beginning of a new era for Klinger. He no longer depicts a genius figure whose robust personality is overcome by the limitations of reality. Instead, he places his energetic superhuman in a setting whereby their conflicts are more easily resolved. They become more assertive and self-reliant, but they also have less to contend with; they have been transplanted into fantasy-lands. It is during this second phase that the genius figures move from the sphere of tragic irony into one of a self-depreciating, objectified evaluation. Klinger adopts a more critical attitude towards the genius himself, instead of emphasizing his external obstacles. These statements will be supported by further analysis at a later point. The object here is to show the overall pattern of Klinger's gradual devaluation of his *Kraftmensch*, whose strength is now only validated by his existence in a fantasy world. The best known drama from this phase is undoubtedly *Sturm und Drang*.

Gerhard Kaiser notes that the remainder of Klinger's early dramas from *Simsone Grisaldo* onward through *Derwisch*
(1779), including Der verbannte Göttersohn and Prinz Seidenwurm (1779), are all dominated by the portrayal of a fantastic, ephemeral sphere of existence (p. 32). In the 1780's Klinger wrote his major works in novel form, but still continued the fairy-tale trend. At this point a very definite negation of the Storm and Stress genius concept had already taken place. This negation is most openly confronted in Der verbannte Göttersohn, even though it is only a fragmentary work. The main character in this work is a being who is plagued by conflicts arising from the fact that he is half human and half god. Der verbannte Göttersohn is Klinger's last exhibition of the confusion wrought by positing the existence of an extraordinary being within the confines of normality, or for want of a better word, of every-day life. His later works acquire a much more compromising tone, especially where the alienated or idealized genius figure is concerned. He seems to no longer believe in this concept. In Der Weltmann und der Dichter (1798) Klinger establishes the poet and the statesman as equals who are able to achieve a functional understanding of each other's innate differences.

In Part Two the following three dramas will be discussed, each representing one of the three phases marking the development of Klinger's genius concept: Die Zwillinge, Sturm und Drang, and Der verbannte Göttersohn. I have chosen to analyze Die Zwillinge, despite the fact that it does not envelop the same sort of irony as do the latter two, because it furnishes
a solid basis of comparison with them. It is traditionally considered the best of Klinger's early dramas, which in itself indicates a one-sidedness in the twentieth century evaluation of the Storm and Stress genius ideal. Die Zwillinge portrays the climax of Klinger's genius idealization, but also foreshadows its ensuing negation.
PART II

AN ANALYSIS OF KLINGER'S GENIUS CONCEPT
CHAPTER III

Die Zwillinge

Die Zwillinge is essentially an elaborate psychological profile of one central character, Guelfo. There is no protagonist-antagonist relationship, and there is no extended dramatic conflict in the traditional sense. Instead, we see an emphasis on contrastive moods, while our attention is never distracted from Guelfo. Of the twenty one scenes, he is present in all but seven and even in those he is the topic of conversation.

In order to focus entirely on the illumination of Guelfo's feelings, Klinger deliberately keeps the plot action to a minimum. All the crucial events, except one, occur offstage between different acts. For example, at some point between acts two and three, Guelfo has an abrasive argument with his father which seals their estrangement from one another. Then between acts three and four, Guelfo murders his brother, Ferdinando. Both of these events are revealed only in narrative. The one significant action seen on stage is the drama's finale, the death of Guelfo. Thus the basis of the drama is a microscopic view of Guelfo's personal conflicts. In this way Klinger demonstrates how Guelfo's inner and outer worlds tend to merge. There is little distance between subject and
object, but rather everything radiates from the central character's mind. Klinger leaves unanswered the primary question with which Guelfo is concerned; we are never told whether or not he is the first born son. Hence, the original source of Guelfo's inner turmoil becomes irrelevant in light of the overpowering hatred which later engulfs him. As will be seen in the following discussion, the hatred becomes personified more than Guelfo is. It manifests itself in those actions which cause him to be identified with animal terminology such as Löwe, Wild, or Raubtier throughout the drama.

The following trends can thus be cited as explicit features of Die Zwillinge: 1) the complete focus on psychological detail to explicate motivations of mood; 2) very little dramatic action; 3) lack of a protagonist-antagonist conflict; 4) the merging of object-subject distinctions; 5) the absence of definite boundaries between different worlds, such as the animal-human indeterminacy of the central character. These are all progressive traits seen more commonly in twentieth century dramas than in those of the eighteenth century. Yet despite the omnipresence of these traits, the work is often criticized according to the tenets of classical drama. This is because its external form adheres to those dramatic principles. There are five acts, and the turning point (the murder of Ferdinando) occurs almost exactly in the middle, at the end of Act III; there are limited changes of scenery and also a very moderate number of characters.
(seven); the scenes are arranged according to a taut, chronological order. Furthermore, in comparison with Klinger's earlier works, Die Zwillinge is amazingly cohesive. Neither Otto nor Das leidende Weib displays a thematic development so carefully constructed. The drama Otto is given its title after a minor character who is often submerged from the reader's view, disappearing amidst the excessive details of his chaotic environment. Das leidende Weib is a much more unified work than Otto, but it still does not achieve the artistic efficiency of Die Zwillinge.

It should be noted that the compact, conservative structure of Die Zwillinge could at least be partially due to the fact that it was written in response to a drama competition which imposed certain rules on the authors. The competition was promoted in February, 1775 by Charlotte Ackermann and her son, Friedrich Schröder, who were both directors of a traveling theater group known as the "Ackermannsche Schauspielgesellschaft."¹ They stipulated three basic regulations. In order for the dramas to be acceptable, the moral content had to be stageworthy, the characters had to be kept to a minimum, and the props and costumes necessary for stage production were not to be elaboratively expensive. These external restrictions may have influenced Klinger's adherence to classical form. In view of this possibility, there is no contradiction between the drama's progressive features and its traditional classic structure, rather, each reinforces
As regards the content per se, in the past there have been three basic trends discernible in criticism of **Die Zwillinge**. Interpretations either become panegyrics to the all-powerful genius figure, or they result in anachronistic critiques based on contemporary social attitudes, or they dwell on the fatalistic elements overpowering Guelfo. In correspondence to the first, Ferdinand Josef Schneider sees in Guelfo a Rousseauean model of total *Naturkraft*. Richard Newald analyzes Guelfo as an individual whose very being proclaims the power of elemental emotions. Neither questions that Guelfo was intended to be anything but a magnified personification of those conventions surrounding the genius concept.

An example of the second approach listed above is furnished by the Marxist critic, Olga Smoljan. According to Smoljan, Guelfo is a character whose strengths liberate him from the restrictions of an unfair social stratification. She points out that all three dramas submitted to Schröder's competition dealt with the theme of fratricide, and she therefore concludes:

Nach den Vorstellungen der Sturm-und Drang Dichter sollte die gesellschaftliche Stellung des Menschen auf dem inneren, natürlichen Recht des Menschen begründet, nicht durch hohe Geburt bedingt sein, sondern durch persönliche Begabung, durch natürliche Eigenschaften, die den Menschen vor anderen auszeichnen (p. 65).

At a later point in her article, Smoljan does point out some of the negative attributes of Guelfo's personality, i.e.,
his rampaging, destructive behavior. However, she considers the feudal society to be responsible for this, too (p. 69). In other words, Guelfo commits murder as a result of extreme provocation, undergoing a classic metamorphosis from victim to victimizer.

Finally, the third tendency is represented by Hans M. Wolff and Christoph Hering. Both claim that we can best understand Guelfo's behavior when it is seen as the vehicle of a fatalistic process. From the very beginning Guelfo identifies himself as playing the role of Shakespeare's Cassius in *Julius Caesar*. He therefore acquires the features of a marionette at the mercy of powers beyond his control. Hering notes that the emphasis on fate is consequently a denial of any superhuman strength on Guelfo's part, for he is unable to overcome the odds set against him (p. 72).

Against this background there is, to my knowledge, only one critic who expressly finds an ironic principle at work in determining Klinger's depiction of Guelfo. Karl S. Guthke believes that Klinger deliberately portrayed Guelfo in such a way as to reveal the fallacies of the genius conception. He bases his argument on statements made by Klinger in letters concurrent to *Die Zwillinge*, thus relying more on extrinsic materials than on an analysis of the drama itself. Guthke believes that Klinger sought to resolve his own confusions through the figure of Guelfo, but certainly not to idealize the character whose chaotic nature revealed exactly what he
wished to eradicate in himself. Guthke employs the following statements in support of his theory. In a letter written during February, 1775, Klinger wrote,

Mich zerreißen Leidenschaften, die dir unbekannt sind.... Jeden Andern müßte es niederschmeißen.... Ich möchte jeden Augenblick das Menschengeschlecht und Alles, was wimmelt und lebt, dem Chaos zu fressen geben, und mich nachstürzen.... Doch laß es, ich weiß dies verlöscht, und dann lach ich."⁶

This last comment in particular reveals Klinger's ability, or at least imminent desire, to objectify his situation as described by the previous remarks. Klinger clearly acknowledges the therapeutic function of his writing in a later letter of 1776; this lends credence to Guthke's argument. Klinger states, "Du thust wohl wenn du nur denkst was vor Leidenschaften auf und absteigen in diesem wilden Herzen.... Die Poesie ist warrlich eine Wohltat für mich und große Entschädigung, daß ich all das hinschmeißen kann."⁷ Because Guthke interprets these and similar remarks as evidence of Klinger's "Distanz zum eigenen Stürmen und Drängen," he sees in the figure of Guelfo a simultaneous affirmation and denial of the "Genie-Ideal." He writes,

Noch im Medium des geniezeitlichen Ausdrucks selbst wird hier die kritische Abkehr vom geniezeitlichen Verhalten präfiguriert, die deutlich sichtbar und konsequent bereits in dem Jahr einsetzt, in dem Die Zwillinge uraufgeführt werden.

It is interesting to note here that Kurt May also used Klinger's letters in a similar vein as did Guthke, but only in reference to the play Sturm und Drang (1776) ("Klinger's Sturm und Drang," p. 404). May views Die Zwillinge as the
climax of Klinger's fixation with the naive genius ideal, while its decline began with *Sturm und Drang*. Guthke goes one step further towards the realization of irony veiling the figure Guelfo, in that he recognizes Klinger's simultaneous positing and obliteration of the ideal. Further delineation of the irony surrounding Klinger's Guelfo can only be accomplished by an intrinsic analysis of the drama itself.

There are several means by which Klinger demonstrates that his central character should be evaluated with much scrutiny, rather than automatically assumed to be an uncomplicated representative of the genius cult. Guelfo's fortitude, which is the product of an obsessive hatred, manifests itself in emotional and mental aberrations. These aberrations could be considered constituents of an alienated genius personality and present nothing unusual in and of themselves. However, evidence of Klinger's "Distanz zum eigenen Stürmen und Drängen" lies in the fact that he portrays Guelfo in a manner which would seem to negate almost all potential empathy on the reader's part. Guelfo appears to us as a pathological criminal, not as a victim of misunderstanding. He has an innate tendency towards emotional extremity, and this manifests itself in violence.

In the first scene we learn that Guelfo has hated Ferdinando for as long as he can remember, because of his parents' partiality to the older twin. He believes that their favoritism was a result of their inability to harness and
direct his own personality as they did Ferdinando's. Thus he indicates that he suffered as a child, because he possessed the virtue of independence, whereas Ferdinando did not. But this is only his interpretation. What Guelfo sees as a virtue, Klinger underscores as a fanatic compulsiveness. For example, Guelfo describes how he had once begged his father for a colt, which was given instead to his brother. Ferdinando, finding that he was unable to control the animal, offered it to Guelfo. This only enhanced the latter's rage. Guelfo remembers, "Da wollt er mir's geben: aber nieder stieß ich den flüchtigen Springer in Grimm!" (I, 45). Guelfo’s anger obliterated his desire, and the colt became only a symbolic motivation of hatred.

Guelfo’s penchant for violent and impetuous behavior is emphasized throughout the entirety of the drama. The moment that Grimaldi, Guelfo’s faithful companion, mentions anything at all with an element of horror, his interest is immediately aroused. This is clearly evident in the following exchange where Grimaldi is commenting on his friend’s rash insensibility:


Guelfo: Was ist das? Eine Schreckszene? Ich hör gern so was.

Grimaldi: Als du den Della Forza durch die Lunge
schossest, um sein Marter zu verlängern. (I, 39).

In Act I, scene 5, we are again made aware of Guelfo's grotesque delight in torture. Here we learn that he has beaten his tenant-farmer to death, because the man captured the most beautiful deer in the forest (I, 53). Yet Guelfo himself often kills the animals and pacifies his raging spirit by bathing his hands in their blood (I, 63).

Not only do Guelfo's frustrations acquire the form of ebullient cruelty, but much of his behavior is a sort of haphazard and misdirected aggression. It is without cause-effect reciprocity. As he sees Ferdinando and Kamilla (the woman whom Guelfo loves) approaching the family estate, Guelfo wishes in vain for lightning to strike the brother. When nature fails to correspond with his wishes, he finds his own ineffective surrogate. He takes his pistol and shoots it aimlessly into the air, while Grimaldi mocks him in the background (I, 59).

Any suspicions that Guelfo is being presented as a raving tyrant, rather than as a glorified victim, are confirmed in two basic ways. First, Guelfo's interaction with the other characters, except Grimaldi, clearly displays his inability to escape the labyrinth of his own despair. He understands others' motivations only in terms of his own hatred and responds accordingly.

In Act II, scene 6, Guelfo frequently attempts to agitate his brother in various ways. He describes how he has
been passionately kissing Kamilla, Ferdinando's betrothed. That the brother remains calm only increases Guelfo's anger, and he orders Ferdinando to leave. The latter responds with such remarks as, "Red freundlich mit deinem Bruder! Gib meiner Liebe Raum! ... Laß mich meinen Bruder in dir wiederfinden" (I, 71). Guelfo only replies, "Mensch, geh!" (I, 71). While it is true that Ferdinando is speaking from a vantage point which Guelfo is unable to achieve, still Guelfo's obsession with hatred renders Ferdinando's desire for fraternal reconciliation futile. Guelfo claims that the two things which he absolutely must have are Ferdinando's inheritance and Kamilla. Yet this claim seems to be based more on Guelfo's thirst for revenge than anything else. When Ferdinando tells his brother that he can kiss Kamilla as much as he wishes, Guelfo becomes enraged. He refuses to kiss her at all (I, 71). Though this is probably not an absolute denial of his love for Kamilla, it is definitely a stark affirmation of his vengeance towards Ferdinando. It is like the earlier episode with the colt—a pattern of reaction that makes Guelfo appear incapable of loving anything.

Guelfo's relationship with his parents is similar to that with his brother. In Act I, scene 4, the father and mother offer a traumatic apology for having cursed their son during an argument. Guelfo responds with words of paranoid suspicion, "Ihr spielt mit mir---mißbraucht mich!" (I, 52).
This again reveals that Guelfo's deep-rooted hatred and jealousy obscure his understanding of others' objectives. Though his anger may be justified, its intensely bizarre magnitude seem to have no appropriate antecedent.

The second way in which Klinger confirms the extreme pathological state of Guelfo's mind is much easier to perceive by scrutinizing the characters' verbal exchanges. Guelfo himself acknowledges that his gross instability is a problem he is unable to conquer. Regardless of the fact that he feels persecuted, Guelfo apparently knows that there is something wrong with him. At one point he openly confronts the problem of his own communicative failures. During the above-mentioned interval with Ferdinando, Guelfo becomes perplexed and asks, "Wer ist der, welcher Guelfo lehren will, wie er sprechen soll? Guelfo hat ausgelernt." (I, 71). Notice here that Guelfo is referring to himself by name rather than using the first person pronoun. It is as if he is outside of himself, viewing his communicative deficiencies in a more objective, almost omniscient manner. Guelfo calls himself by name at other such strategic points throughout most of the drama. In the beginning he does this when he is discussing his anger, as if it is an emotion controlled by some other being. As the drama progresses, he does it whenever he tries to act out his anger and becomes confused. This habit increases until after Guelfo has released his anger—when he confronts himself in the mirror and realizes
that he is looking at a murderer. In the last scene he does not refer to himself in the third person at all. It is as if Guelfo's whole identity revolved around the realization of that anger.

In the scene with Kamilla, Guelfo explicitly refers to himself as being sick. Here he finds himself laughing wildly, because of the triumph he feels in being alone with her. When he notices that Kamilla isn't reciprocating his laughter he asks, "Sie wollen nicht mit mir lachen? Nicht ein Lächeln? Tun Sie's doch! Zwingen Sie sich ein wenig! Um eines Kranken willen!" (I, 68).

Not only does Guelfo say that he is sick, but he mentions quite frequently that there are evil spirits penetrating his being. In conversation with his mother, he asks, "Und wer erbarmt sich meiner, der ich gefoltert werde von bösen Geistern innig?" (I, 49). Also, after he has firmly decided to murder Ferdinando, Guelfo declares, "Im Sturme sausen böse Geister: Guelfo, du mußt!" (I, 73). By this means Guelfo effectively removes from himself the responsibility for his action.

Thus far we have established the following facts concerning Guelfo's behavior: 1) he is basically characterized by violence, which often takes the form of an angry impetuosity; 2) his actions revolve around his obsessive hatred for Ferdinando; this obsession governs the expression of his personal needs and desires; 3) he is presented as a pathological character who considers himself to be driven by evil
spirits, is unable to stabilize his sense of personal identity, and is unable to attain an authentic level of communication with any one, except Grimaldi; this exception is significant.

Grimaldi and Guelfo are united in their mutual hatred of Ferdinando. Grimaldi wanted to marry Juliette, the twins' sister, but Ferdinando forbade it. Instead, he advised her to marry a rich count. Juliette married death (Act V, Scene 4). Grimaldi was then left embittered and resentful towards Ferdinando.

Otto Ludwig, though he praised Klinger's drama as a whole, called the character Grimaldi "trivial" (Hering, p. 75). In more recent criticism Grimaldi is regarded as significant. Attention is most often called to an operant dualism between the melancholic Grimaldi and the fiery, impulsive Guelfo.

(In Herder's Innigkeit/Ausbreitung definition of two different types of genius, Guelfo would represent the latter, Grimaldi the former.) Smoljan notes that the basic opposition between these two characters enhances the traits of each; Grimaldi's sad brooding stimulates Guelfo's aggressive outbursts (p. 66). Mark O. Kistler refers to Grimaldi as Guelfo's "foil." Gert Mattenklott goes so far as to claim that Guelfo and Grimaldi are, in fact, the real twins of the drama. He states that Grimaldi serves a dialectical function for Guelfo. He aggravates Guelfo's anger, often reminding him that he has been treated unjustly. He makes such remarks as, "Mich ärger nichts, als daß dir mitgespielt ist" (I, 45).
Yet, Grimaldi also serves as Guelfo's conscience. He righ-

teously disapproves of the murder, offering only chastisement (I, 90–92). His dialectical function is most clearly es-

tablished at the beginning of the drama, where Guelfo says, "Mensch! Mensch! Du machst mich rasend mit deiner Zwei-

deutigkeit... Du sagst zu viel und zu wenig." (I, 42).

If the Grimaldi-Guelfo relationship is defined in terms of a polarized complementarity, then there is little sig-

nificance in the fact that Grimaldi is the one person with whom Guelfo can effectively communicate. In other words, this does not negate earlier surmisals of Guelfo's patho-

logically helpless state, but only reinforces them. It would even be feasible to interpret Grimaldi as a personi-

fied appendage of Guelfo's distorted mind. He is almost like an alter-ego who represents the dismal and brooding constituents of Guelfo's personality. The agitation he inspires only makes Guelfo more keenly aware of his un-

resolved frustrations.

It can thus be concluded that Guelfo is an ailing character, whose defects Klinger emphasizes more than his virtues. There seems to be a reciprocal relationship between Guelfo's emotional intensity and his pathological nature. Just how much of Guelfo's behavior can actually be linked to external causes is never revealed. Klinger apparently wants the reader to focus entirely upon the psychological features of his central character, rather than motivation.
In this way the frenetic nature of Guelfo's inner being is stressed above all else. The reader sees the blind passions that permeate Guelfo's life. What was potentially a lion-like regalness, Klinger transposed into a horrifying beastliness.
CHAPTER IV

Sturm und Drang

The drama Sturm und Drang marks an important point in Klinger's development. Klinger's works from Simsone Grisaldo (spring, 1776) onward through Derwisch (fall, 1779) are set in a fantastic, ephemeral sphere of existence (Kaiser, p. 32). In Sturm und Drang Klinger balances fantasy and reality so completely that interpretive problems have arisen. Many critics have taken Klinger's "happy ending" at face value and thus, because of the blatant display of seemingly irreconcilable oppositions within the drama, they have criticized Sturm und Drang for its absurd incongruities. They point out such discrepancies as the fact that the characters who have been completely controlled by a wanton thirst for revenge are united in touching reunions; misunderstandings that have existed for years are clarified and dissolved within minutes. Furthermore, these changes are brought about by chance; after many years of separation and wandering the members of two feuding families just happen to be staying in the same inn, and they are thereby reconciled. Because of contradictions such as these, the drama has often been described simply as a collection of bombastic extravagances typical of the Storm and Stress period.
It is true that the optimistic resolution of *Sturm und Drang* initially seems trite with regard to the many intricate juxtapositions of polar extremes which form the body of the drama. However, the reader's understanding can be enhanced by consideration of extrinsic factors involved, namely by a knowledge of the situation in which Klinger found himself at the exact time the drama was written (fall, 1776). In the summer of 1776 discontent had led Klinger to abandon his law studies at Giessen. He then went to Weimar seeking the company of Goethe, hoping for greater recognition as a dramatist, and also desiring to enter military office as a means of livelihood. None of these goals materialized. For reasons unclear to posterity, the friendship between Goethe and Klinger temporarily soured and wasn't resumed until many years later. Goethe tired of Klinger's company quickly and wrote in a letter to Merck, "Klinger kann nicht mit mir wandeln, er drückt mich, ich hab's ihm gesagt, darüber er außer sich war und's nicht verstünd und ich's nicht erklären konnte, noch mochte." This incident was the beginning of an extremely distressing period for Klinger. His distress was intensified when his plans for the military also failed. As a last resort Klinger joined Abel Seyler's theatrical company, which then accepted and performed *Sturm und Drang*. Prior to the drama's completion Klinger was depressed, unsettled and apprehensive about his future. He wrote of himself, "Ich treib mich in unendlichem Wirrwarr herum und flüchte da und dorthin vor
mir, dem Schrecklichsten." Interestingly enough, "Wirrwarr" was originally the title Klinger had designated for his play (he later changed it upon the suggestion of his friend, Christoph Kaufmann). Thus the correspondence between Klinger's life and the traumatic conflicts of the drama itself is evident.

Klinger's evaluation of his drama following its completion reveals his intentional use of discrepancies. He wrote, "Ich habe die tollsten Originalien zusammengetrieben. Und das tiefste tragische Gefühl wechselt immer mit Lachen und Wiehern." Klinger called this play "das liebste und wunderbarste, was aus meinem Herzen geflossen ist."

Precisely because Sturm und Drang is the epitome of a dialectical exchange between fantastic and realistic elements, it is also most subject to condemnation for being haphazardly constructed, or "ein wüstes Durcheinander von Geist und Unsinne." It is my purpose here to outline this dialectical exchange so as to illuminate Klinger's underlying artistic consistency. This entails two basic steps: 1) examination of the drama's plot and setting, which can be hypothesized to be deliberately incohesive; 2) examination of the characterizations, and of the interaction between plot and subplot which motivates some of the grotesque contrasts the characters embody. Completion of these steps will reveal that Klinger has structured scenes, acts, and even singular verbal exchanges so as to emphasize vehement contradictions teetering on a fulcrum of fairy-tale illusions. The absolute
exclusiveness of contradictions not only betrays the simplistic joy of the drama's conclusion, but also affords new insights concerning Klinger's characterizations. He explicitly demonstrates that even his most robust character, Wild, is granted credibility only by an artistically contrived alliance between fantasy and fate. Therein lies the irony of Klinger's superhuman individual; his presentation of contrasts between reality and fantasy within the drama only serves to magnify the questionability of his genius concept.

Criticism stating that Klinger's Sturm und Drang is a massive display of artistic ineptitude most often is caused by the drama's lack of plot substance. We are shown only the final stages of a feud, whose history is hidden in obscurity. For example, no reason for Berkley's belief that it was Bushy who rampaged his estate and destroyed his family is ever given. The only hint offered lies in Bushy's words issued in the last scene, "Unser Unglück war Mißverständnis, daß wir nach einem Ziel trieben, unsere Interessen sich einander stießen, meine zu hastigen Leidenschaften und deine noch feurigere" (I, 161). This remark offers no information as to the actual circumstances surrounding the two men's earlier friendship, except that its ruin was apparently caused by their material ambitions. However, even this idea is never further clarified, because the identity and motivations of that individual actually responsible for Berkley's loss are never revealed. Bushy makes an allusion
to this missing information, but again it is not clarified. He only says, "Der es tat, liegt längst im Tale des Todes verschlossen." (I, 161). Finally, no explanation is ever given as to why Berkley and Bushy are both banned from England and destined to a life in exile. Thus an understanding of that incident which gave birth to the effervescent passions forming the drama is itself unattainable to the reader.

Not only the plot outline maintains a nebulous quality, but the setting also does. The drama takes place in America during the revolution. We know that Wild ventured to the colonies only to satiate his lust for war. He blindfolded his two friends, Blasius and La Feu, and dragged them along. Furthermore, if he had found war elsewhere, he would have gone there instead. This is evident in his comment to Blasius and La Feu, "ich [führte] euch aus Rußland nach Spanien, weil ich glaubte der König fange mit dem Mogol Krieg an. Wie aber die spanische Nation träge ist, so war's auch hier. Ich packte euch also wieder auf, und nun seid ihr mitten im Krieg in Amerika" (I, 102). Thus the actual setting seems to be rather irrelevant, at least in Wild's mind. He has no overwhelming political convictions concerning the American revolution in particular. The choice of setting is obviously not dependent upon dramatizing the ideal of political freedom. Instead, emphasis is placed only upon the character's need for external chaos in order to escape inner conflicts. Wild says, "Wir sind nun mitten im Krieg
hier, die einzige Glückseligkeit, die ich kenne, im Krieg zu sein" (I, 103).

Because of the stress on turmoil itself rather than setting or plot, the relationships of place locations between acts and scenes are very unclear. The inn is the focal point of convergent activities, but somehow, somewhere, shipyards and battlefields are drawn into its proximity. While these ambiguities of setting and plot motivation are usually evaluated as an artistic flaw, I believe that they are quite the opposite. Klinger explicitly draws attention to factual omissions by offering clues and hints, but never really answering any questions. Bushy begins to explain the relationship that once existed between himself and Berkley, but doesn't finish. He vaguely refers to the person guilty of Berkley's ruin, but goes no further and will not even mention the individual's name. Likewise, Berkley describes the attack on his estate in great detail, but tells us none of the whys and wherefores (I, 109).

Klinger manipulates his plot structure in such a way as to emphasize the irrationality of emotions like those of which the drama is composed. He seems to be saying that they define the essence of their own existence—the specification of their genesis is trivial in comparison with their ensuing self-propagating development. Time has erased the historical significance of the Berkley-Bushy feud per se. All that remains are the passions whose ever-growing intensity enables
them to feed on themselves. What may have started as a very precise cause-effect relationship, has become a complex set of associative reactions. This is exactly what Berkley experiences in the second scene of Act I where he sits reminiscing about his deceased wife. His daughter begins to play a melancholy tune on the piano, and suddenly all he can think of is Bushy and his overpowering hatred for the man. He notes the effect of music upon his moods, and thereby calls attention to the correlation between emotions and music; both are comprised of a set of interacting forces in cadence with each other, a situation in which nothing can be distinctly separated for analysis. If we accept the idea that the incoherence of Klinger's plot substance and setting are deliberately contrived to complement the delineation of emotions comprising the body of the drama, then what at first appears to be a jumbled-up world acquires a very definite pattern, as do the notes of a musical composition when subject to the appropriate rhythm.

The characters of Sturm und Drang are aligned in contrasting pairs. Berkley, who rarely speaks of anything but revenge, hatred, and fighting stands parallel to Bushy, the contented individual whose kindness has extinguished his bitterness. In the last scene where Bushy's son is warning his father of Berkley's hatred, Bushy only states, "Ich will mich Berkley dargestellen, was kann ihm mein Anblick Zorn einjagen, er muß ihn versöhnen. Hab ich ihn doch gesucht, und da ich ihn finde—ich bin da, bleibe da, Carl!" (I, 158). This response
clearly illustrates the opposing personalities of Bushy and Berkley. Just as the two fathers are the embodiment of oppositions, so too are the sons. Both Wild and the captain are rambunctious and high-spirited, but whereas Wild is extremely idealistic, the captain is despairingly harsh and bitter.

Wild and his lover, Caroline, form the center of the drama. They are the Romeo and Juliette amidst the fighting and chaos. Surrounding them are the four characters who motivate a subplot. The theme of this subplot is basically the establishment of erotic liaisons. Kathrin is paired with La Feu, both of whom are lost in a haven of passionate fantasy. Louise is more compatible with Blasius, though she is not as passive as he. Both of them are sarcastic cynics, who display rather keen perception. The significance of all these traits will be further discussed later. What we want to consider first is the interplay between plot and subplot, because this will clarify Klinger's thematic intentions.

One of the key stylistic techniques of tragicomedy is the use of interlacing parallel plots. In this manner the comic and tragic elements of a drama can be made to enhance each other without distorting the main line of thematic development. This then adds a new dimension to the meaning of laughter and tears within the dramatic context. Laughter can be used to signify the most abysmal pain, one that arises when tears are no longer even appropriate. It is as Nietzsche
wrote, "The most acutely suffering animal on earth invented laughter." On the other hand, staggering sentimentality can be a means of avoiding a painful issue by concentrating on emotional expression itself, rather than on an underlying conflict. Hence, tragic and comic elements can be used simultaneously, each to illuminate the contours of the other. To say that it was Klinger's intent to write a play akin to a tragicomedy is to increase the likelihood of an ironic undercurrent, for in tragicomedy neither the serious nor the comic can be understood as an entity within itself. Each reflects upon the other in order to reveal some covert meaning. In support of this assumption about Klinger's intention we need only to recall the above remark about the exchange of Lachen und Wiehern (I, 61). Also, Klinger originally called his drama a "Comödie," but later changed this to the more ambiguous word "Schauspiel" (Kaiser, p. 30).

Wolfgang Kayser believes that Klinger has employed a fusion of comic and tragic features in order to achieve an effect of the grotesque, and that only in this light can the drama be appreciated. He writes:

Though the quality of grotesqueness must be distinguished from irony, both are largely dependent upon authorial objectivity or Distanzierung, something rarely attributed to the zealous idealism of Sturm und Drang writers. The grotesque involves total distortion of reality within the dramatic context. Klinger's dramas exhibit this. He alludes to the source of his character's conflicts and thereby outlines the resolutions of the conflicts. However, he never confronts us with the details of those conflicts, but only shows us the consequences in a topsy-turvy world of uncontrolled emotions. We see the characters' neglect of realistic features in favor of fantasy, but not a distortion of the contextual reality itself. Thus the energetic, bombastic personalities of characters like Wild, or La Feu, are immediately suspect.

Having thus established that Klinger's character alignment and his plot construction itself forewarn us of some type of critical undercurrent we are now ready for a more detailed analysis of characterization. Klinger's positioning of individuals according to contrastive personality traits betrays a significant amount of typecasting. Even the names he attaches to his players are evidence of typological categorizing. For example, La Feu continuously dreams of himself as being the very embodiment of sensuous eroticism. He wants to be a shepherd among the beautiful hills with his lovely shepherdess, Kathrin. Blasius, on the other hand, is as his name describes him, blasé. He has an apathetic at-
ttitude towards life, and had he his choice, he would be a
hermit. "Wild" is the descriptive adjective appropriately
attached to the central figure of the drama; he is an im¬
petuous youth whose entire life is directed by a dire need
to find Caroline and Bushy.

The juxtaposition of these three characters reveals an
ironic tone in the work itself, for each character is at some
point a source of mockery for the others. For example, La
Feu's romantic tirades and his illusions of himself as a
virile and passionate lover, are scoffed at by Wild and Blasius.
During the trip to the states La Feu, while he is blindfolded,
becomes engrossed in an ardent monologue about his "phantas-
tische Göttin," and about all the miraculous things he has
felt and seen. To this Wild makes the sarcastic reply,
"Besonders wenn ich dir die Augen zuband. Ha! Ha!" (I, 101).

Similarly, there are comic encounters between La Feu and
Kathrin, indicating that neither character is to be taken
seriously. After La Feu has eloquently elaborated on his
love for Kathrin (upon his first acquaintance), she replies,
"Das ist kurios! ich verstehe ihn nicht, und gefällt mir
doch." (I, 117). Immediately prior to this exchange, Louise
had been observing the pretentiousness of both individuals
and stated, "Die Leute sind nicht zum Ausstehn!" (I, 116).

Blasius, La Feu's counterpart, is also a part of this
comedy team. Instead of being consumed by fiery passions,
he is the exact opposite of La Feu, despondent and disinter-
ested in life in general. He is paired off with Louise, though both these individuals indicate more awareness of themselves and of external reality than do La Feu and Kathrin. There are several statements indicating that Blasius and Louise are capable of a more perceptive level of communication than are their two friends, especially Blasius. For example, the following exchange indicates his sensitivity towards others, despite his own sense of worthlessness and alienation:

Blasius: (zu Louise) verzeihen Sie mir, ich bin so gerührt---Sie sind schön, Miß!
Louise: Und Sie sehr unterhaltend.
Blasius: (nach langer Pause) Sie haben Langeweile. Ich bedaure, daß ich Sie nicht besser unterhalten kann... (I, 116).

Blasius is at least able to recognize the sarcastic nature of Louise, to read through the superficial content of her words, while La Feu is basically unaware of anything but his own fantasies. La Feu regards these as the vehicle of life itself, as is seen in his statement, "Ich wollt mich so selig träumen, so glücklich! träumen muß der Mensch, lieber, lieber Blasius! wenn er glücklich sein will, und nicht denken, nicht philosophieren." (I, 126).

La Feu believes himself a very competent person, because his dreams and illusions bolster his self-image. Blasius, on the other hand, thinks of himself as a burdensome, vegetative being; he apparently internalizes his disappointment with the world rather than escaping in fantasies. Nowhere is the irony of this situation more clearly depicted than in
the captain's introductory conversation with the two characters:

Kapitän: Meine Herren, ich wollte Bekanntschaft mit Ihnen machen. Sind Sie von der Armee?

Blasius: Nichts bin ich. (Schläft ein.)

Kapitän: Das ist viel. Und Sie?

La Feu: Alles, alles.

Kapitän: Das ist wenig... (I, 129-130).

I think it highly probable that both La Feu and Blasius are to be seen as extensions of Wild's alter ego. This is why he takes them with him wherever he goes, regardless of their feelings. He simply blindfolds them and they are automatically made to accompany him. They represent two divergent sides of his personality, each a distinct means of coping with reality, but unacceptable because of their extreme one-sidedness. La Feu and Blasius exhibit the traits of schizophrenic personalities, while Wild stands in the middle trying to compromise his control over both of them. Their friendship with Wild is the epitome of a love-hate relationship, indicating the frustration of dependency needs. For example, at one point in the first scene, Blasius threatens to kill Wild (I, 103). But immediately thereafter he shrugs, "Dich soll keiner totschießen, edler Wild!" (I, 104).

Also, both La Feu and Blasius thrive on persecution complexes typical of maladjusted individuals. This provides them a convenient escape from imminent problems, one which Wild doesn't share. Wild says, "Unser Unglück kommt aus
unserer eigenen Stimmung des Herzens, die Welt hat dabeige-
tan, aber weniger als wir." (I, 103). Blasius and La Feu immediately contradict this thought with the following state-
ments:

Blasius: Toller Kerl! ich bin ja ewig am Bratspieß.
La Feu: Mich haben sie lebendig geschunden und mit Pfeffer eingepökelt.—Bitte Hundel! (I, 103).

Blasius and La Feu are like right and left extensions of a being who attempts to establish equilibrium based upon a heritage of chaos. Wild has spent his life wandering the earth in search of his father and his childhood sweetheart. The fact that he has reached a point where war is the only happiness he knows may be an indication of the severity of his inner conflicts. Also, he may not be speaking only of external war, but referring to inner turmoil. Immediately following the above-quoted sequence of La Feu and Blasius Wild states, "Wir sind nun mitten im Krieg hier, die einzige Glückseligkeit, die ich kenne, im Krieg zu sein. Genießt der Szenen, tut was ihr wollt." Because La Feu and Blasius do not respond favorably to this remark, Wild begins to talk about his confusions. These can then be interpreted as the warring factors within his own personality. The passage contains a caustic plea for the accommodation of La Feu and Blasius:

La Feu: Ich bin nicht für Krieg.
Blasius: Ich bin für nichts.
Wild: Gott mach euch noch matter! Es ist mir wieder
Wild (cont.): so taub vorm Sinn. So gar dumpf. Ich will mich über eine Trommel spannen lassen, um eine neue Ausdehnung zu kriegen. Mir ist so weh wieder. O könntest du mir in dem Raum dieser Pistole existieren, bis mich eine Hand in die Luft knallte. O Unbestimmtheit! wie weit, wie schief führst du den Menschen! (I, 104).

Only when confronted with these two warring elements of his personality, does Wild completely lose his desire for self-responsibility and want to be controlled by an omniscient "Hand."

The idea that Wild, La Feu, and Blasius might all be part of the same personality could be indirectly supported by some critics. Wolfgang Kayser believes it possible that all three are to be seen as caricatures, distinguishing them from the other characters of the drama. Kayser sees Wild as a mock representative of the genius cult. He never states exactly what Blasius and La Feu are caricaturizing, but somehow fuses his indistinct categorizations with the idea that the entire drama displays an "Ineinander des Grotesken" (Kayser, p. 47). Only in this light can the characters and events be understood. The important thing is that Kayser treats La Feu, Blasius, and Wild basically as a unit outstanding from the other characters. This initial observation of these three as probable caricatures facilitates further deductions about the grotesque quality which pervades the drama.

A more profound conclusion is found in G. Kaiser's article where he writes, "Klingers Drama hat keinen wirklichen Schauplatz; es spielt nicht in Amerika, es spielt im Genie" (p. 26).
Kaiser states that the only manner in which we can understand the structure of Klinger's drama is to recognize the correlation between the inner and outer worlds of the genius figure. In other words, the external reality of the drama is a projection of his inner reality. The drama is then entirely a machination of Wild's phantasy. This opinion is not incompatible with my idea that La Feu and Blasius are manifestations of Wild's inner conflicts, though it is more inclusive. I describe these three individuals as a unit distinct from the other characters, because the interaction seen among them doesn't extend to the other characters. The remaining individuals are not so dependent upon each other in order to validate their feelings.

Thus far we have established that the nebulous quality of plot action and setting are deliberate; they emphasize Klinger's concentration on the magnification of emotions and should not be seen as an artistic flaw. The display of emotions focuses on Wild, La Feu, and Blasius. The latter two appear to be imaginary extensions of the former. They are Wild's inner conflicts personified. That they are likewise caricatures of a scepticism-fanaticism opposition indicates Klinger's movement further away from the supposed genius idealization of the Storm and Stress movement. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that the characters are depicted in paired contrasts, and thereby we see an integration of plot and subplot which reveals the tragicomic tendencies
of the play. The attempt towards reconciliation between fathers and sons, and between the lovers, Wild and Caroline, forms the authentic basis of the drama. But this does not eliminate the extremity of the contrasts defining these relationships, nor of the subplot in which the caricaturized couples (La Feu-Kathrin, Blasius-Louise) offset the relationship of Wild and Caroline.

*Sturm und Drang* incorporates all the modernistic trends listed earlier for *Die Zwillinge* and more. In the later play tragedy and comedy tend to become united, typified caricatures are easily discernible, and blatant contradictions are illuminated at the expense of dramatic action. The addition of these three features renders *Sturm und Drang* very much akin to the Expressionistic dramas of the twentieth century. Thus in order to appreciate the drama, adherence to classical standards must be abandoned in its evaluation. It seems that Klinger is trying to emphasize ambivalence, or, the lack of absolutes. This is evident even in the manner in which he concludes the drama. The last line of the finale belongs to Berkley, who until this point has utterly despised Bushy. Now he attempts to reconcile himself with his old friend and states, "Komm, Bushy, ... ich will versuchen, ob ich mich mit Dir vertragen kann. Ich kann Dir noch über keiner meiner Empfindungen Wort geben, haß Dich noch, und---es fällt mir so vieles ein---Komm nur!" (Act 5, Scene 2). Berkley's remark only serves to render Klinger's so-called "happy ending"
all the more dubious. This is consistent with the manner in which Klinger has displayed the confusing nature of human emotions throughout the entirety of the drama. Thus what has formerly been called artistic inefficiency is arbitrariness with a pattern, one which grossly distorts the profile of the genius figure.
CHAPTER V

Der verbannte Göttersohn

The increasing irony of Klinger's genius depiction is most clearly epitomized in his work, Der verbannte Göttersohn (autumn, 1777). Although the work remains a fragment, it attains much significance when viewed within the context of Klinger's overall development. This is because it marks the final transition of Klinger's genius fixation. No longer is the genius figure seen as the tragic victim of his own pathological powers, nor is he the character whose grotesque incongruities are resolved merely within the realm of a fairy-tale setting. In Der verbannte Göttersohn the genius figure is a joke. Not only do his conflicts function as entertainment for the gods, but those gods themselves are the comic constituents of a totally distorted mythological world. Therefore, the role of the genius cannot be understood unless we first analyze the framework against which his position can be defined. This involves a discussion of the work's basic form in consideration with Klinger's presentation of the two major characters, Jupiter and Dios.

It should first of all be noted that questions pertaining to the unfinished state of Der verbannte Göttersohn are essentially irrelevant. On the basis of statements made in
some of Klinger's letters, several divergent opinions have arisen as to why the work was never published in its entirety. This situation can be summarized briefly as follows. On September 5, 1777, Klinger wrote to Gotter (who was a mediator between the publisher, Ettinger, and Klinger) that his work was completed, but he first wanted to test the public's reception by printing only a fragment. In December he offered a similar explanation to J.J.W. Heinse, stating, "Den ersten Wisch vom Göttersohn habe ich drukken lassen, um zu probiren wie man's verdaut." In his critical commentary, Berendt posits that it could have been either fear of censorship which prevented further publication (considering the fact that the negative role of Jupiter is comparable to that of a despot), or simply lack of incentive, as he assumes was the case with Klinger's earlier work, Pyrrhus (III, 335). C. Hering raises doubts as to whether or not the work's remaining parts had ever been written; if so, then perhaps the author destroyed them himself before entering his Russian military career (pp. 109-110). Finally, Guthke favors the possibility that Klinger never intended to publish any more of the work and already viewed it as a completed entity (Guthke, "VG", 112). Even though assumptions concerning Klinger's intentions may be unwarranted, I am inclined to agree with Guthke's statement about the work that "in der vorliegenden Form ist es [the fragment] in seiner Sinnintentionalität durchaus und mit Sicherheit erfaßbar, da die
For this reason there is no need to refer to the work's final implications using subjunctive terminology; rather, we will concentrate on the wholeness of the fragment.

There are two parts belonging to Klinger's Verbannter Göttersohn. The first is dominated throughout by Jupiter, the second by his son, Dios. Dramatic action is almost non-existent, and the basic events are explicated only insofar as they motivate Klinger's elaborate characterizations of both Jupiter and Dios. The drama's conflict is revealed in the first part where we learn that Jupiter has ordered Dios into exile, because of the son's erotic adventures in Olympus, particularly on account of his relationship with Juno. Dios, whose mother is the mortal Inos, is the half-human, half-divine mythical embodiment of the genius concept. When thrown into exile he envisions himself as the herald of a massive rebellion against the gods. Yet, while satiating himself with illusions of his independent and creative strength, Dios becomes the object of Jupiter's mockery. His imaginary apocalypse furnishes comic amusement for the god who is otherwise bored and exasperated with the pestilent beings he has created. The most important factor coloring the relationship between these two is Klinger's caricaturistic depiction not only of Dios, but also of Jupiter.

Stripped of any subliminal qualities, Jupiter's appearance
seems to negate the essence of his divinity. As the drama begins we see him bitterly complaining about the responsibilities of his unrewarding position. He is, if anything, envious of his human subjects, who are too blind to recognize the superior quality of their inferior status. He says of them, "sie beneiden mich, wie die kriechende Sterbliche ihre Könige, und doch ist ihr Herz und Phantasie ungekränkt, und wir werden von Scepter und Herrschaft gezwickt, während sie furchtlos an dem Busen ihrer Weiber liegen.---Der Morgen kommt und schon Langeweile!" (Berendt ed., III, 125). It is thus established from the very beginning that Jupiter is sorely disgruntled with the conditions of his own deified position. While contemplating how he might best rid himself of this dissatisfaction Jupiter indirectly summarizes his interpretation of the human condition.

The very qualities which Jupiter had thought would make human beings pleasantly amusing are the ones which cause them to be such a nuisance. Jupiter asks himself, "Hab ich sie nicht aus Muthwillen und Spott, so kurzsichtig, schwach, lächerlich, dumm, verzerrt, verschoben, verzittert, halbganz und widersinnig gemacht?" (III, 126). This description, while it would seem to outline the futility of human endeavors, becomes quite humorous in light of Klinger's phraseology. Continuing in this vein of thought, Jupiter decides that he will simply have to tolerate the irritations these humans cause, for to reform them would be too much work and it would
also be too risky; they might become more "ridiculous monstrosities" than before (III, 127). Jupiter is then content to remind himself of the humiliation and confusion which Dios will suffer from his exile, because that will be entertainment for the time being.

The most important thing which can be extracted from Jupiter's reactions towards human beings is his concept of creativity. He sees nothing especially unique about his own function as a creator. It has become only a chore, another aspect of his godliness. He is too lax even to attempt altering the product which causes him such discomfort. Yet, while he regards his own creativity simply as burdensome, Jupiter usually views human creativity as a disaster. As far as he is concerned, it only adds another dimension to the human caricature of the gods:

"um die verwirrte, verzerrte Carrikatur zu vollenden, müßte Prometheus den gestohlenen Strahl der Gottheit einigen in die Seele giessen, um diese zugleich zu den seeligsten und unseeligsten Geschöpfen machen, da sie auf dem Leimenklumpen von den schwachen und schiefen Geschöpfen gekreuzigt werden, oder sich selbst in ihrem Feuer aufbrennen müssen" (III, 126-127)

Thus, if it does not first result in external destruction, human creativity is a trait motivating self-annihilation.

Together Jupiter and Mercury categorize Dios as one of these self-destructive creatures (III, 128). For this reason he will afford them much amusement, should he live up to their expectations during the course of his exile. Mercury comments to Jupiter, "Ich sage dir, sein Daseyn muß ihn peinigen, und
es muß ihm werden, wie dem Genie, das sich unter der Milion Schuster emporhebt, und sich endlich selbst aufhenken muß, oder von der Kanaille zu Wasser geritten wird" (III, 128).

We are then introduced to the excommunicated Dios, who, accordingly, is seen thriving in the furor of his idealism. Dios is a contrast to Jupiter in almost every way conceivable. In his optimistic ambitiousness, he is determined not to let his alienation extinguish his personal fortitude. His vision of rebellion is conveyed as follows:


These statements clearly explicate Dios' self-image as an inspiring leader. His creativity lies in the fact that he will awaken the human beings' awareness, and thereby establish a new kingdom. Thus Dios' initial adjustment to his earthly existence is exactly as Jupiter and Mercury had predicted it would be. Unfortunately, the fragment ends shortly thereafter with no further delineation of Dios' dreams. That they are thus far unrealized is entirely appropriate in conjunction with Jupiter's views.

Jupiter schematizes the world in terms of the human being's inadequacy, the genius' self-annihilating tendencies, and the lazy resignation of the gods. Dios, on the other hand, sees only the malicious aspect of the gods, the latent
and abused strength of the humans, and the apocalyptic powers of his own godliness. In Jupiter we see the epitome of scepticism, in Dios that of fanaticism. This opposition is typical for the dualistic characterizations of Klinger (i.e., Guelfo-Grimaldi, Blasius-La Feu). The interesting thing here is that between the two extremeties which Dios and Jupiter represent, the only balancing fulcrum is the mediocre human being. He is the object of common concern to both. And while Jupiter refers to the human as a "Carrikatur," Klinger has ironically represented Jupiter as a caricature. In fact, the only creature Klinger fails to caricaturize is the human. He stands somewhere between the realms of helpless stupidity and overpowering wisdom. In other words, his traits can only be defined according to the outline of his opposing misrepresentations. Is it any wonder then that the initial conflict between gods and humans presented in Der verbannte Göttersohn remains unresolved? Perhaps there is significance in the very fact that the work is unfinished, for we can definitely not say that this unfinished state is simply a consequence of poor artistic quality. Hering has noted that this work could have possibly become "eine der bedeutendsten Leistungen nicht nur Klingers, sondern der ganzen Genieepoche" (p. 110).

In summary, while Dios views his creative strength as the crown of his existence, Jupiter sees it as the seed of his destruction, a contrast which furnishes the latter much
amusement. However, even this discrepancy seems at first to be superfluous when placed within the universal order Klinger has constructed. The gods are, in and of themselves, a denial of deity. Furthermore, there is no fatalistic mechanism operating in Klinger's scheme, for fate appears only to be a concept invented by Jupiter. He uses it for the sake of controlling humans: "Hab ich ihnen nicht ... die fatalen Begriffe vom Schicksal und Verhängnis, die ihre Grösse und Stärke zerknicken müssen, ins Herz gelegt?" (III, 126). Thus what we have then is a cosmology void of any supreme ordering forces. Seen in this light, the genius' rebellion becomes somewhat absurd. Yet this absurdity isn't conveyed as a strictly tragic consequence of his being. The contrast between the over-zealous genius and the absolutely mundane god colors the entire fragment with an element of humor, which then transposes its tragic aspects into irony. This irony is much like that of the Romanticists. We are given the affirmation of the infinite by the mere postulation of godliness. That postulation is then obliterated in that the supreme being who represents infinitude is seen to embody the traits and emotions common to mortals. In other words, the infinite can be communicated only in terms of the finite, or, of what is known. When both are continuously reflected upon each other, then neither can be wholly substantiated.

Der verbannte Göttersohn is a continuation of the tragi-comic tendencies seen in Sturm und Drang. In the later work
they are much more pronounced, because Klinger now portrays his genius figure in a more definitive way than before. His attempts to bridge the chasm between the ideal and the real, between the superman and the human, finally culminate in the unmasking of his genius concept. In Der verbannte Götersohn the genius figure is made to parody the impotence of those ideals adherent to his existence.
CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has been an attempt to establish the fact that Klinger presents the Storm and Stress genius concept as a vehicle to empty idealism. Though in his earliest works Klinger may have tried to sincerely affirm the genius concept, his later works transform it into a ridiculous apparition of fantasy.

Die Zwillinge reveals the culmination of Klinger's attempt to validate the suffering of a being whose emotional intensity alienates him from a world of practical concerns. However, owing to the characterization of Guelfo, this drama also predicates the negation of the genius ideal. In Sturm und Drang and Der verbannte Göttersohn Klinger indicates that the glorification of genius-like intensity only invites misery. It glorifies the discrepancy between the "ideal" of one's inner world and the "real" of external circumstances, making it easier to assume that the two are irreconcilable, rather than to attempt a functional unification. Whether or not such unification would be possible is something which neither Klinger, nor anyone else, has ever answered. Klinger merely indicates that an obligation towards reconciling endeavors outweighs the glorification of the genius ideal. He accomplishes this by transforming the genius figures of his later works into a source of comedy and error. It is
in this way that Klinger has ironized the cliché-ridden
genius of the Storm and Stress movement. However, because
Klinger's characters are acknowledged to be the most robust
embodiments of Storm and Stress ideology, the recognition
of irony therein calls for re-evaluation of the genius concept
as a whole.

Criticism of Storm and Stress works which postulates a
naive, egocentric, and exceedingly rebellious nature of the
writers may prove to be grossly superficial. Perhaps these
writers were, if anything, all too aware of the impotence
produced by the grotesque discrepancies between their ideals
and the world they lived in. What would appear to be ex¬
travagant reinforcement of those ideals would then become
somewhat akin to its very opposite. Perhaps it is for these
reasons that the Storm and Stress movement emerged so force¬
fully, and endured so briefly. The idealism motivating the
movement has been clearly demonstrated to be its faltering
point. The representatives then scattered themselves in
whatever direction they saw most appropriate. Goethe moved
on to his more secure world of classicism; Wagner and Müller
became somewhat insignificant amidst the convoluted designs
of literary history; Lenz succumbed to madness; Klinger
compromised himself—he focused his energies upon his position
as a stout Russian statesman, and in his spare time wrote
mediocre novels, or better yet, whimsical fairytales—accepting
the totally (?) arbitrary designs of everything about life,
extcept life itself.
NOTES

Introduction


Chapter One


3 I note that this specific development was in the eighteenth century, because the dichotomy between irony as a specific trope and irony as a method had been delineated even as early as the writings of Cicero and Quintilian. However, use of the term "irony" was then submerged, the roots of its current usage being established during the latter eighteenth century.


Chapter Two


7 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Briefe der Jahre 1764-1786,


12 Lenz has long been recognized as a satirist; see Ottomar Rudolf, Jacob Michael Reinhold Lenz: Moralist und Aufklärer (Bad Homburg: Verlag Dr. Max Gehlen, 1970), or Max Spalter, Brecht's Tradition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 3-38.

Chapter Three


4 See Hans M. Wolff, "Fatalism in Klinger's Zwillinge," Germanic Review, 15 (1940), pp. 181-190. Wolff defines fatalism according to the ideas of the French philosopher Baron Holbach, who he believes could have had much influence on Klinger. Wolff sees in Die Zwillinge a reflection of social injustice, but one that is made obvious by the fatalistic elements of the drama itself.


6 In a letter to Schumann in Max Rieger, Klinger in der Sturm und Drang Periode, (Darmstadt, 1880), p. 373; see Guthke, pp. 706-707. This source is unavailable.

7 In a letter to Philipp Kayser in Rieger, p. 383; see Guthke, pp. 706-707.

8 Guthke, p. 712. The drama was first performed in the spring of 1776.


11 See Gert Mattenklott, Melancholie in der Dramatik des Sturm und Drang, Studien zur allgemeinen und vergleichenden
Literaturwissenschaft, 1 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), p. 64.
Chapter Four

1 It was only in the early 1900's that this trend began to change; particularly in the last two decades there has been more positive criticism of the drama. Both Hering (pp. 90-98) and Kaiser (pp. 15-35) offer thorough literary analysis that goes beyond the scope of mere value judgement. For a summary of criticism up to the early 20th century see Werner Kurz, F.M. Klingers Sturm und Drang, Bausteine zur Geschichte der neueren deutschen Literatur, 11, Diss. Halle 1913 (1913; rpt. Walluf bei Wiesbaden: M. Sändig, 1973), pp. 3-6.

2 For information regarding these historical facts, see either Hering, pp. 13-19, or Geerdt's Introduction, I, xi-xviii.

3 Goethe, pp. 340-341.

4 Rieger, p. 21; see Hering, p. 15.

5 Christoph Kaufmann was an eccentric, wandering apothecary, proclaiming mystical ideals and representing the embodiment of anti-conventional behavior. See Geerdt, I, xviii.

6 Rieger, letter 22; see Hering, p. 90.

7 Rieger, letter 29, unavailable; see Hering, p. 90.

8 Hettner, p. 201.

9 Klinger relied heavily on analogizing emotions to music. This was also done in Die Zwillinge (I, 40). For an explanation of the role of music in Sturm und Drang, see Kaiser, p. 27.


Chapter Five


3 Rieger, p. 416; see Hering, p. 109.
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