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POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND SECULARIZATION
THEORY IN GERMANY, 1918–1939:
EMANUEL HIRSCH AS A PHENOMENON OF HIS TIME *

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According to Goethe, “writing history is a way of getting the past off your back.”¹ In the twentieth century, Protestant theology has a heavy burden on its back—the readiness of some of its most distinguished representatives to embrace totalitarian regimes, notably Adolf Hitler’s “Third Reich.” In this matter the historian’s task is not to jettison but to ensure that the burden on Protestants is not too lightly cast aside—an easy temptation if we imagine that the theologians who turned to Hitler did so with the express desire of embracing a monster. On the contrary: they did so believing their choice was ethically correct. How could this come to pass in the homeland of the Reformation?

To begin with, let me reassure you that the original core of the Nazi movement was not made up of distinguished theologians and church leaders. Professors Gerhard Kittel and Friedrich Gogarten did not run in Nazi circles until the spring of 1933. The most brilliant of the group, Emanuel Hirsch, an old friend of Tillich’s and a famous professor of church history, did not support Hitler until

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¹ “Geschichte schreiben ist eine Art, sich das Vergangene vom Halse zu schaffen.” Text according to Horst Günther, ed., *Goethe Erfahrung der Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Insel, 1982) 9 = *Maximen und Reflexionen*, no. 105, according to Ms. Christa Sammons, Curator of the Yale Beinecke Library Collection of German Literature.

April of 1932, later going on to join the party and even to enter the auxiliary of the SS as a supporting member.²

Despite this relatively late turn to Naziism, each did have long-standing ties to wider conservative circles. This point holds in detail for the Göttingen church historian Hirsch (1888–1972), whose turn to Naziism can be properly grasped only against the backdrop of contemporary currents. Thus some attention to these currents must precede a look at Hirsch himself as political theologian and diagnostician of secularizing decadence.

Although most conservative thought in Germany after 1918 was well rooted in respectable traditions far more attractive than the vulgarity of the rowdy Nazis, nevertheless conservatism took every conceivable shape. In Weimar conservatism there was something to appeal to every critic of democracy, from the most educated to the most violent. Outmoded and pseudo-scientific racism, sophisticated cultural history, occult antiquarian movements, Romantic nostalgia, prophecies of the future, Nordic neopagan rune religions, academic research on the so-called problem of “Late Judaism” in antiquity, right-wing appropriation of Marxist denunciation of “Late Capitalism,” elitist sociology and literature, and crackpot theories linking the world’s fate to Hyperborean ice ages all mingled together to nourish resentment against liberalism, democracy, capitalism, socialism, and Judaism, and to foster hopes for a rebirth of the medieval *Reich*, the old German Empire so unsatisfyingly revived by Bismarck. Conservatives yearned for authority, hierarchy, true allegiance, salvation from communism, and for a strong central state and strong traditional values in the world of urban industrialization and pluralism.³

While this chaos appeared without form, and void, a basic fundament or morphology did underlie conservative diversity. According to Kurt Sontheimer, Armin Mohler, and H. Stuart Hughes, the common element was the tendency to think in eternal cycles of historical decay and regeneration. Careful scholars readily detect a foundation for such cyclical thinking behind the vestigial

² Robert P. Erickson, *Theologians under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1985) 28–70, 124–67; Wolfgang Trillhaas, “Emanuel Hirsch in Göttingen,” in Hans Martin Müller, ed., *Christliche Wahrheit und neuzeitliches Denken: Zu Emanuel Hirschs Leben und Werk* (Theologische Beiträge und Forschungen 4; Tübingen: Katzmann, 1984) 37–59; Theodor Strohm, *Theologie im Schatten politischer Romantik* (Gesellschaft und Theologie, Systematische Beiträge 2; Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1970) 158–59. My thanks are extended to Prof. Gordon Kaufman for making available to me the MS of his review of Erickson, *Theologians*. See also Jean-Loup Seban, “The Theology of Nationalism of Emanuel Hirsch,” *Princeton Seminary Bulletin* n.s. 7 (1986) 157–76.

³ Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany* (New York: Scribner’s, 1960). For bibliography and documentation on these points see Appendix A below on Weimar conservatism. The works cited in appendices will be referred to in text footnotes in shortened form derived from first citations in the appendices.

survival of linear or arrow-like apocalyptic terminology in the cycle-fixated conservatism of the Weimar period.⁴

While such cyclical thinking goes back to Polybius and Vico, it became a Germanic obsession only with the popularization of cyclical interpretations of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence of all things. Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* from 1872 argues that the ironic distance of modern historical criticism is part of an eternal cycle known already in ancient Greece, where unhistorical, primordial myth, health, and creativity had originally unified the culture. Myth in its immediate, irrational,⁵ enthusiastic power had helped the individual to endure the horrors of life, even as it had provided a necessary religious foundation for the state. Individuals, the state, art, and all branches of culture by means of myth had put the "stamp of the eternal" on daily life and thus "desecularized" (*entweltlicht*) life by removing it from the "relativity of time."⁶

For Nietzsche the artistic power of myth convinces us that even the ugly and horrible are part of an artistic game which we sense only dimly—life becomes a "comedy of art" prepared as a "perpetual entertainment for itself" by whatever power animates the world. Only by somehow mythically sensing this do we attain to eternal dignity; in Nietzsche's famous phrase, "it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally justified."⁷

Here Nietzsche the future Antichrist chooses the inner-worldly and amoral aesthetic salvation of Dionysos conferred in recurring cycles. He thus anticipates his later explicit choice of Dionysos over the otherworldly salvation

⁴ Sontheimer, *Denken*, 43–50; Hughes, *Consciousness*, 375–76; Mohler, *Revolution*, 78–90. Mohler (*Revolution*, 85, 111) argues convincingly that, since the temporal linearity of Christianity had deeply marked language for two thousand years, Weimar conservatives at times used "linear" or "arrowlike" terms to express what at bottom were concepts of cyclical recurrence; hence the occurrence of "apocalyptic" or "eschatological" rhetoric of catastrophic decadence among conservatives need not signify anything more than linguistic inertia, without in any way denaturing their basic adherence to the premise of eternal recurrence. Cf. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (2d ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Will-Erich Peuckert, *Die Grosse Wende: Das apokalyptische Saeculum und Luther* (Hamburg: Claassen und Goverts, 1948); Knoll and Schoeps, *Zeiten*; Karl Löwith, *Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen* (Berlin: Verlag Die Runde [!], 1935).

⁵ On the dubious utility of the ambiguous concept of "irrationalism" as a key for unlocking the political and intellectual mysteries of German history, see Rücker, "Irrational," who concludes (587) that—since Karl Popper finds it in the Left and Lukács in the Right—therefore: "Fazit des neueren Begriffsgebrauchs: Irrational denken und des Im. schuldig sind—die anderen."

⁶ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, § 23 in idem, *Basic Writings* (ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann; New York: Random House, 1968) 137 = Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie: Der griechische Staat*, (ed. Alfred Baeumler; Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1930) 182. On the problematical concept of "secularization" see Herman Lübke, *Säkularisierung: Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs* (Freiburg i. B./Munich: Karl Alber, 1965) and Hermann Zabel, "Säkularisation, Säkularisierung," in Otto Brunner, et al., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984) 789–829.

⁷ Nietzsche, *Birth*, §§ 5, 24, pp. 52, 141.

offered by the Crucified. At the same time Nietzsche believes that every culture is fated to lose touch with the mythic sources of its eternal youth. Abstract criticism and historical distance must gain the upper hand. It happened to the Greeks, even as it happened to the Germans. Abstraction and historical distance gained power over "native myth," with baneful results for individuals, for education, for law, for the state, for art, for religion. So arose the necessity for dead, historicizing imitation of the styles and thoughts of departed ages.

With this "destruction of myth" came "the loss of mythical home, the mythical maternal womb."⁸ For, when a people begins to comprehend itself historically and to smash the mythical works that surround it, there is found a corresponding "degeneration and transformation" of the people's character, "which calls for serious reflection on how necessary and close are the fundamental connections between art and the people, myth and custom, tragedy and the state." Once this degeneration begins in a people, writes Nietzsche, "we generally find a decisive secularization (*Verweltlichung*), a break with the unconscious metaphysics of its previous existence, together with all its ethical consequences."⁹

Yet with the passage of time there is hope for rebirth. The cycle turns round, even as it did in the German Middle Ages, when from the "abyss" there awakened the chorale of Luther's Reformation, for Nietzsche a "first Dionysian luring call breaking forth from dense thickets at the approach of spring," an anticipation of the later beauties of the music of Wagner. Likewise, in Nietzsche's own time of decadence, there is still concealed a "glorious, intrinsically healthy, primordial power" that dreams of a "future awakening. . . . Toward this perception . . . all our hopes stretch out" with longing.¹⁰

Here are all the components in this system of cultural criticism: first, a cycle of cultural decay and rebirth, youth and age fluctuating according to closeness to the timeless eternity of irrational and ecstatically compelling myth (a view which fosters elitist hostility to rationality); second, the premise that all domains of culture—art, government, religion—are linked together and hence bound to flourish or decay according to a culture's place on the eternal roller coaster of closeness to and separation from the eternal, mythic springtime; third, ultimate significance given to aesthetic criteria at the price of moral absolutes; fourth, salvation conceived of as within the world rather than coming from outside it—Dionysos versus the Crucified. This paradigm for cultural criticism became

⁸ Ibid., § 23, pp. 135–36; cf. Mohler, *Revolution*, 78–86, 112–21, esp. 80 n. 2, citing Romano Guardini, *Der Heilbringer in Mythos, Offenbarung und Geschichte* (Zürich: Thomas, 1946).

⁹ Nietzsche, *Birth*, § 23, p. 137 = ed. Bäumler, p. 182.

¹⁰ Ibid., § 23, pp. 136–37. Let me stress that here I do not present a full interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return, but rather its possibilities for legitimating a cyclical pattern as basis for "conservative rebirth" after "liberal decay" as that pattern came to be used after Nietzsche's death.

popular, especially after the German defeat in 1918. It moved from Swiss exile to become the stock-in-trade of mainline thinkers such as Thomas Mann. Those who looked back now lived in an "Old Culture," a "Late Culture," one too weak to survive the challenge of proletarian revolution unless old Europe were somehow reborn—a theme already popular before the war. Right-wing youth movements, the cult of *Jugendstil*, the Italian Fascist liking for songs about youth (*Giovanezza*) all testify to unease about life in a *Spätkultur*. And after all, a swastika is a revival of the ancient solar sundisk, eternally revolving in a circle.¹¹

Crucial in all this is the emphasis on linkage of all branches of culture within a given epoch and on aesthetic amorality that are corollaries of the more basic tendency to think in cycles. Such tendencies, summed up in Nietzsche, actually have roots reaching back to German Idealism and Romanticism. These deep roots help explain the all-pervasiveness of Weimar fondness for sine wave cycles of rebirth, a fondness even detectable in Max Weber, despite his concentration on the unilinear rationalization or secularization of life in the Western world. In truth, Weber's doubts about the primacy of the West suggested to some that Western secularization was but one part of a worldwide pattern of sine waves.¹²

The grand statement of these themes came in Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*, a bestseller at the close of World War I. Emphasizing the biological growth and decay of cultures and the interlinking of cultural branches at each stage of the lifecycle, Spengler predicted (as Hughes citing Talcott Parsons put it) that

the era of "individualism, humanitarianism, intellectual freedom, skepticism" was nearing its end; the new era that was dawning would be characterized by "restrictions on individual freedom . . . , a revival of faith . . . and an increase in the use of force."¹³

Here was a prophecy of return to primitive and barbaric vigor once decadence had intensified into decay.

II

The relation of this paradigm of cultural criticism to Christianity was an ambiguous one, simultaneously comforting and disturbing the anxious theolo-

¹¹ For documentation on these points see Appendix B on cultural criticism in the wake of Nietzsche.

¹² Hughes, *Consciousness*, 376.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 378, citing Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (2d ed.; Glencoe, IL, 1949) 179.

gian trying to tell friend from foe in the age of Bolshevik revolution. Take, for example, the conservative perception that Weimar Germany stood for pluralism, relativism, and opposition to both religion in the schools and the church tax. Given such perceptions, theologians could easily find much to like in the conservative rhetoric of decadence inspired by Nietzsche and Spengler. Between 1928 and 1937 a variety of international and German ecumenical conferences made “secularism” or the “general secularization of life and thought” a buzzword,¹⁴ thereby canonizing perceptions given various labels by writers during the previous century—writers ranging from Auguste Comte (1798–1857) to the recently deceased Max Weber.¹⁵

Yet the ambiguity remained. What exactly had been lost in this process of cultural decay and growing secularism? Was it supernatural Christianity, which then represented the primordial wellspring of European vigor, a source of transcendent remedies to Bolshevism, atheism, barbarism, and mass society? How could this be reconciled with Nietzsche’s death of God and the runic neopaganism of the folkloristic conservatives? They looked for the source of eternal immanence and mythic rejuvenation and found it in Greek temples, Latin and Canaanite sacred groves, and Teutonic forests, even atop Babylonian ziggurats, but emphatically not atop Mount Sinai or Golgotha.¹⁶ To be sure, some followers of Nietzsche tried to make the ambiguity disappear by prescribing myth in general. This became increasingly hard as the 1930s wore on and National Socialism emerged as overtly neopagan. At length it became crucial to ask precisely what kind of a soul Jung’s modern man was in search of.

In this confusing situation, some critics of mythic neopaganism took note of the conservative fondness for cyclical thinking and thus turned to the conceptualization of time in a somewhat misdirected effort at sorting out what was Christian and what pagan in contemporary cultural criticism. From the time of Lessing and Hölderlin, the Germans had strongly identified with the ancient Greeks, an identification that reached astonishing dimensions with Leni Riefenstahl’s film of the Berlin Olympics, where Greek statues merge into a Greek torchbearer running from Greece to Germany with animated map superimposed (the

¹⁴ Lübke, *Säkularisierung*, 100; Schlunk, “Säkularismus,” *RGG* 5 (2d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck) 37–39.

¹⁵ G. Patzig, “Comte, Auguste,” *RGG* (3d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1957) 1858–59; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber* (2d ed.; Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); Julien Freund, *The Sociology of Max Weber* (trans. Mary Ilford; New York: Pantheon, 1968); Guenter Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber’s Vision of History* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979); Joachim Wach, “Max Weber als Religionssoziologe,” in *Kultur- und Universalgeschichte: Walter Goetz zu seinem 60. Geburtstage* (Berlin: Teubner, 1927) 376–94; Gottfried Küenzlen, *Die Religionssoziologie Max Webers* (Sozialwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen der Görres-Gesellschaft 6; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980).

¹⁶ For documentation on these points see Appendix C on paganism and religiosity.

future route of the *Wehrmacht* in reverse).¹⁷ German conservatives in particular had long identified with the Greeks. Moreover, Nietzsche himself had proclaimed that the life-loving, myth-intoxicated Greeks “during the period of their greatest strength kept a tenacious hold on their unhistorical sense,” rightly fearing that historical distance and criticism would destroy the mythic illusions necessary to fullness of life.¹⁸ By the turn of the century Wilhelm Windelband had taken up Nietzsche’s theme of Greek unhistoricity. In 1922 it was enshrined in an article by Ernst von Dobschütz, an opponent of the popular obsession with comparative religion approaches to New Testament study.¹⁹

From there it was but a short step to the dogma that Greeks and pagans always thought in circles or cycles, even as Hebrews and Christians always thought in unilinear arrows—a misleading over-simplification canonized in the 1940s by Oscar Cullmann and Romano Guardini, only to be branded as dubious by the work of James Barr and Arnaldo Momigliano later on.

However mistaken Cullmann and Guardini may have been, their circle-arrow time dichotomy testifies to a very accurate theological perception that something was seriously wrong with the contemporary effort in some quarters to marry Nietzsche, Spengler, and the cyclical “unhistoricity” of mythical paganism with Christianity. Those looking for points of contrast would have done better to ask whether salvation can or cannot break in from outside time and space; the latter possibility had been excluded by Nietzsche.²⁰

Equally ambiguous was the linkage of an epoch’s departments of culture, especially the link between religion and government. German thinkers in the wake of Weber and Troeltsch corrected Marx’s materialism to allow plenty of

¹⁷ The latter phrase I owe to Prof. John Murrin of Princeton. Note that Riefenstahl’s film of the Berlin Olympics seems to have been entitled “Olympia” in German and in French “Les Dieux du Stade.” See Charles Ford, *Leni Riefenstahl* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1978) 188.

¹⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the uses and disadvantages of history for life,” in idem, *Untimely Meditations* (trans. R. J. Hollingdale; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 79.

¹⁹ See Friedrich Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studien der Dogmengeschichte* (4th ed.; Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1906): “Die Geschichte hatte bei den Griechen für die Frage der Weltanschauung überhaupt keine Rolle gespielt,” citing in n. 1 Wilhelm Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (3d ed.; Tübingen, 1983) 209–10; Ernst von Dobschütz, “Zeit und Raum in Denken des Urchristentums,” *JBL* 41 (1922) 212–23; attention is directed to these writers by James Barr, *Biblical Words for Time* (Naperville, IL: Allenson, 1962) 137–38.

²⁰ In this space it is not possible to determine what is of lasting value in proponents of the circle-arrow dichotomy, nor to assess the complex role of Karl Löwith. See Romano Guardini, *Das Ende der Neuzeit* (Basel: He, 1950); Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time* (trans. Floyd V. Filson; reprinted Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964); Thorleif Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960); Barr, *Biblical Words*; idem, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Arnaldo Momigliano, “Time in Ancient Historiography,” in *History and the Concept of Time (History and Theory)* (Studies in the Philosophy of History 6; Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966) 1–23; Mohler, *Revolution*, 82; Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, *Nos extra nos* (BHT 46; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1972).

causal importance to mental and spiritual factors.²¹ Obviously, then, politics and religion affected each other in a spiral of causation. But did this mean that Christianity ought to persuade the state to help it out? When ancient Christianity had come onto the scene, it had found ready-made the term "political theology" for the god of the polis, and Augustine had not hesitated to question it.²² Yet ambiguity in the relation of theology to politics had grown up already with the Constantinian alliance of throne and altar. The results of modern thought on these matters were to be unpredictable.

Modern self-conscious reflection on the political use of sociology in the aftermath of 1848 brought with it an approving revival of the term "political theology." Its *Sitz im Leben* was the conservative French Roman Catholicism taking its cue from the Spanish diplomat Juan Donoso Cortés (1809–1853).²³ For his

²¹ Manfred Wichelhaus, *Kirchengeschichtsschreibung und Soziologie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert und bei Ernst Troeltsch* (Heidelberger Forschungen 9; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1965); Dietrich Fischer, *Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft von J. G. Droysen bis O. Hintze in ihrem Verhältnis zur Soziologie* (Phil. diss., University of Cologne, 1966).

²² Augustine *City of God* book 6; see esp. 6.12: "tres theologicas, quas Graeci dicunt mythicen physicen politicen." On the history of the concept, see (with bibliography) Francis Fiorenza, "Religion und Politik," *Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft* (Basel/Wien: Herder, 1982) 59–101; Alexander Schindler, ed., *Monotheismus als politisches Problem: Erik Peterson und die Kritik der politischen Theologie* (Studien zur evangelischen Ethik 14; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1978); Jacob Taubes, ed., *Religionstheorie und Politische Theologie*, vol. 1: *Der Fürst dieser Welt. Carl Schmitt und die Folgen* (Munich/Paderborn: Fink/Schöning, 1983) and vol. 2: *Gnosis und Politik* (1984) (my attention was called to this series by Prof. Dr. Walter Sparr of Bayreuth); Erik Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem* (Leipzig: Jakob Hegner, 1935); Hendrik Berkhof, *Kirche und Kaiser* (trans. Gottfried W. Locher; Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947); George Huntston Williams, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century," *CH* 20 (1951) 3: 3–33; 4:3–25; R. A. Markus, *Saeculum* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Heinz-Horst Schrey, "'Politische Theologie' und 'Theologie der Revolution': Die Rezeption des Neomarxismus durch die Theologie," *ThR* n.s. 36 (1971) 346–77 and n.s. 37 (1972) 43–96; Georg Picht, "Die Dialektik von Theorie und Praxis und der Glaube," *ZThK* 70 (1973) 101–20; Siegfried Wiedenhofer, *Politische Theologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1976); Volker Spülbeck, *Neomarxismus und Theologie: Gesellschaftskritik in Kritischer Theorie und Politischer Theologie* (Freiburger Theologische Studien 170; Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1977); Arnulf Seifart, *Der Gott der "politischen Theologie": Die Entwicklung der Gottesdiskussion vom kämpfenden Nationalgott bis zur christlich motivierten Strategie des Guerillakrieges* (Zürich/Einsiedeln/Köln: Benziger, 1978); Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, *Reformatorsche Vernunftkritik und neuzeitliches Denken* (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 59; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1980) 304–6.

²³ Albert Maier, ed., *Donoso Cortés: Briefe, Parlamentarische Reden und diplomatische Berichte* (Cologne: Bachem, 1950); Edmund Schramm, *Donoso Cortés: Leben und Werke eines spanischen Antiliberalen* (Ibero-amerikanische Studien 7; Hamburg, 1935); Alois Dempf, *Christliche Staatsphilosophie in Spanien* (Salzburg: Anton Pustet, 1937) 146–65; Dietmar Westemeyer, *Donoso Cortés: Staatsmann und Theologe: Eine Untersuchung seines Einsatzes der Theologie in der Politik* (Münster/Westfalen: Regensberg, 1940); Carl Schmitt, *Donoso Cortés in gesamteuropäischer*

followers, “political theology” signified a reactionary theology of history taking into account the most modern sociology—a mixture of viewpoints that eventually was to open perspectives on the possibilities of cynical self-deception as a way of synthesizing mythical antidotes to decadent unbelief.

Donoso Cortés knew the Saint-Simonians and may have been acquainted with Comte’s sociology, which paralleled intellectual with political evolution. Comte’s evolutionary scheme proceeded from theological illusion (personification) through metaphysics (legal abstraction) culminating in the descriptive positivism of modern science that renounces causes behind phenomena. The Spaniard Donoso’s political theology put such evolutionary thinking at the service of Catholic reaction, paralleling religious and political ideas. Thus “every affirmation respecting society or government . . . necessarily resolves itself” into “an affirmation” about God.²⁴

Donoso Cortés saw Europe heading for catastrophe after 1848. Deism had brought with it the weakening of monarchs into constitutional figureheads. Then the pantheist denial of a personal God in German Idealism had led to the

Interpretation (Cologne: Greven, 1950); Erich Przywara, *Humanitas* (Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz, 1952) 243–56; Waldemar Gurian, “Louis Veuillot,” *CHR* 36 (1951) 385–414; John T. Graham, *Donoso Cortés: Utopian Romanticist and Political Realist* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1974).

²⁴ Juan Donoso Cortés, *An Essay on Catholicism, Authority and Order Considered in Their Fundamental Principles* (1925; trans. Madeleine Vincent Goddard; reprinted Westport, CT: Hyperion, 1979) 4. Cf. Fiorenza, “Religion and Politik,” 77: “In ihrem Eintreten für einen Parallelismus zwischen religiösen und politischen Ideen nahm die politische Theologie der katholischen Restauration mit umgekehrten Vorzeichen die marxistische Analyse von Staat und Gesellschaft vorweg. Der Marxismus kann nämlich als eine Umkehrung der zentralen These der katholischen Restauration interpretiert werden. Diese wollte den Parallelismus zwischen politischen und religiösen Ideen hervorheben, um dann zu argumentieren, dass eine Veränderung von theologischen und religiösen Ideen zu einer Veränderung politischer und gesellschaftlicher Muster führe. Der Marxismus hingegen will mit seiner Ideologiekritik das Umgekehrte betonen, nämlich dass Veränderungen in den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Mustern die religiösen Überzeugungen beeinflussen.” It is not arguable that the “real” existence of “society” or “class” or “self” is as philosophically problematical as that of “God”? Is there then any philosophical necessity for preferring as a solid point of departure any one of these ideas over any other?

Clearly after 1750 or so there occurred some analogous shift in theology and politics, in that (among “advanced” thinkers) transcendence and divine right political hierarchy gave way to Idealistic panentheism and ideas of sovereignty immanent within the “people.” Whether these analogous shifts “prove” that ideas about “God” are “really” projections of our ideas about “society,” “self,” and “politics” is, however, not immediately evident. Instead, what we may see here could simply be the triumph of a belief in the *inevitability* of such analogous linkage accompanied by corresponding mental labors among theologians. To be sure, a vague sense that ideas about deities and ideas about earthly orders were linked was widespread and can be found in antiquity; but with Feuerbach, Durkheim, etc., claims to illuminate these matters were put into a new sharpness, so that they became a weapon against religious belief, or (otherwise viewed) a weapon against “revolution.”

claim that political power is immanent within the electorate, so that monarchy could only be abolished. Next, out of the atheistic dethroning of any God developed the anarchistic claim that there is no divine authority to be embodied in institutions. The only remedy was dictatorship based on willpower.²⁵

Donoso himself still operated within the framework of believing Tridentine Catholicism. The post-World War I revival of his thought occurred in a far less Christian context, strongly suggesting that theology was an ideological mask knowingly adopted by cynical proponents of political reaction.

The early 1920s were years of parallel crisis in Weimar theology and constitutional law. In theology the threat was summed up in Ernst Troeltsch, whose battle for the absoluteness of Christianity had ended with the total crisis of historical relativism. The rise of Marxism and the appearance of Freud gave new weight to Feuerbach's claim that God was merely a human projection.

In law and political science of the Weimar period the threat took shape in the crisis of state sovereignty within the dominant neo-Kantian school of jurisprudence. The major figures were Rudolf Stammler (1856–1938) and Hans Kelsen (b. 1881).²⁶ Stammler's relativistic skepticism attacked the concepts of state and national sovereignty by making "the idea of law logically prior to the idea of the State" (Rupert Emerson's words). Having weakened the traditional state, Stammler argued that "the self-inclusive legal system" was itself sovereign. "Law creates itself by establishing the conditions under which the will of the people, the monarch, or the State is legally valid." Stammler prohibited any

²⁵ Donoso, "Rede von 30. Januar 1850 über die soziale Frage in Spanien in ihrer Beziehung zur allgemeinen Lage Europas," in Maier, *Donoso*, 210–37 esp. 222: "Gott ist die Menschheit. Das ist das Glaubensbekenntnis des Pantheisten." Donoso in Maier, *Donoso*, 77 and 79: "Die Lehren die Spinoza und Voltaire, die Kant, Hegel und Cousin vorgetragen haben und die ausnahmslos als verderblich bezeichnet werden müssen, sind samt und sonders auf die Grundideen des Rationalismus zurückzuführen. . . . Die Gesellschaft ist dem Untergang geweiht, weil wir aus unseren Söhnen keine Christen mehr machen wollen und weil wir selbst keine wahren Christen mehr sind." According to Schmitt (*Donoso*, 56), when in Berlin Donoso said of the intellectuals there that their "Gehirne durch den Hegelianismus—*causa principalissima del giro radical*—desorganisiert und verwüstet sind." Cf. Graham, *Donoso*, 166 n. 13. Cf. Westemeyer, *Donoso*, 76–77 and 182. See also Hans Joachim Schoeps, *Vorläufer Spenglers* (2d ed.; BZRG 1; Leiden: Brill, 1955) 83–88.

²⁶ "Stammler, Rudolf," *Encyclopaedia Britannica Micropaedia* 9 (15th ed.); Max Weber, "R. Stammers Überwindung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung" in idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (ed. Johannes Winckelmann; 2d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1951) 291–359; "Kelsen, Hans," *Encyclopaedia Britannica Micropaedia* 5 (15th ed.) 753; R. A. Métall, *Hans Kelsen* (Vienna: Deuticke, 1968); Hans Kelsen, *Das Problem der Souveränität* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1920); idem, *Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1922); Carl Joachim Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective* (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 163–77; W. Friedmann, *Legal Theory* (5th ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1965) 84–85, 276–79, 576–77; Wolfram Bauer, *Wertrelativismus und Wertbestimmtheit im Kampf um die Weimarer Demokratie* (Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft 3; Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1968) 368–409.

metajuristic appeal to sources outside law—at a time of chronic governmental crisis of political legitimacy.²⁷

Neo-Kantianism was brought to its definitive legal crisis by Kelsen. He decisively contributed to the further weakening of the notions of state and sovereignty. Kelsen held that the state as an entity is merely a fiction. Although for Kelsen the state originally was an emanation of a power political act, once established it is absorbed “wholly in the formalism of law.” The state is a fiction: “The will of the state is . . . a juristically constructed attribution point. Thus the person of the state, like all other legal personality, is merely the personification of legal norms.”²⁸ For Kelsen, even as the Weimar state has no “real existence in the world of causation,” so likewise must the notion of sovereignty “be radically repressed.”²⁹

In 1922, within the context of an elaborate parallel between law and theology, Kelsen asserted that the concepts of God and the state were both fictitious personifications—a claim which he supported by invoking Feuerbach, Durkheim, Freud, and Cassirer. To Kelsen, God personified socio-political systems, and the sovereign state personified legal systems. Even as Feuerbach had rightly regarded God as superfluous wish-fulfillment, so Kelsen believed he rightly could now see the state as superfluous to a modern democratic legal order no longer requiring appeal to divine right or absolute monarchy, being instead grounded in a system of closed legal norms.³⁰

In response to Kelsen, and in general to neo-Kantian efforts to drown the state in legal norms, conservative political theology received an impulse to further development. For example, in 1922 the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) revived Donoso Cortés’s connection of political theology

²⁷ All quotations are from Rupert Emerson, *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928) 165 (cf. 254). See 166–67: Stammler contributed to the theory of sovereignty by pointing to “a means of escape from what the Neo-Kantians customarily called metajurisprudence. This side of the Kant-Stammler teachings was given special emphasis by later members of the school such as Julius Binder, Hans Kelsen, and Fritz Sander. The term metajurisprudence is used to include any theoretical procedure which finds the sources of law outside law itself. If the law is to be regarded, argue the Neo-Kantians, as a system of thought complete in itself, then it must be wrong to go beyond law in the search for its sources. . . . Not the spirit of the people, the monarch, or the State creates law, but law creates itself, establishes the means by which it is to be changed, and lays down the conditions under which the will of the people, the monarch, or the State is legally valid. Thus the self-inclusive legal system comes itself to be sovereign.”

²⁸ All quotations from Emerson, *State*, 170, 72.

²⁹ For Kelsen, see Emerson, *State*, 165; for repressing sovereignty, see Schwab, *Challenge*, 50, citing Kelsen, *Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1920) 120: “Die Souveränitätsvorstellung muss radikal verdrängt werden.” Cf. Schwab, *Challenge*, 48.

³⁰ Kelsen, “Gott und Staat,” *Logos* 11 (1922/23) 261–84; cf. Kelsen, *Staatsbegriff*.

with secularization.³¹ Schmitt's transformation from pre-World War I neo-Kantian to decisionist and defender of the Weimar state in some form during the 1920s and early 1930s to the self-appointed political theorist of the Third Reich between 1933 and 1936 has aroused great controversy.

Though it is true that Schmitt's decisionism culminated in a legitimization of the emergent right-wing tendency toward dictatorship, one must be very careful regarding Schmitt's own understanding of dictatorship; he plainly distinguished more than one type of dictatorship in his system and his own efforts before Hitler assumed power were directed toward saving the Weimar state by strengthening the powers of the president and by severely limiting the chances of a legal assumption of power by extremist parties who avowedly aimed at an irreversible subversion of the Weimar constitution.³²

Within such a context, Schmitt's revival of the term "political theology" in a celebrated book of that title in 1922 did not mean an unambiguous return to supernatural revelation.³³ Rather did Schmitt take Donoso Cortés to mean that, since belief in God as a transcendent source of state sovereignty for absolute monarchy had died out, therefore dictatorship based on mass enthusiasm was the only alternative to anarchy. Using Kelsen's own arguments, and invoking the secularization hypotheses of Comte and Schmitt's teacher Max Weber, Schmitt argued that the weakening of the legitimacy of the Weimar system on account of

³¹ Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922); in part identical is Schmitt, "Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes und politische Theologie" in *Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber* (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1923) 2, 3–36. The second edition of *Politische Theologie* appeared in 1934; the fourth appeared with Duncker & Humblot in 1985. Meanwhile Schmitt published *Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder politischen Theologie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* (trans. George Schwab; Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

³² Schmitt, *Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf* (2d ed.; Munich/Leipzig, 1928); Joseph W. Bendersky, "Carl Schmitt in the Summer of 1932: A Reexamination," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 16:44 (July 1978) 39–53; idem, "Carl Schmitt Confronts the English-Speaking World," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 2 (1978) 125–35; idem, "The Expendable Kronjurist," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979) 309–38; idem, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Schwab, *Challenge*, 30–132; cf., however, Heinrich Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik des Sommers 1932," in Theodor Schieder, ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 1; Munich: Oldenbourg, 1971) 75–147. Muth is still of the opinion that it is correct to say (138): "Im Gefolge Hugenberg's und der Deutschnationalen hat er [Schmitt] dann das Seine zur Unterminierung der Reichsverfassung nach Kräften beigetragen." See, however, Schwab, *Challenge*, 92–96. How Muth's position can be harmonized with that of Schwab is an issue that cannot be pursued in an article devoted chiefly to Emanuel Hirsch. What one makes of Schmitt's efforts before 1933 will in part depend on whether one thinks diagnosing a condition as pathological can contribute to making it worse.

³³ For documentation on these points see Appendix D on Carl Schmitt.

secularization required an appeal to metajuristic sources. In the crisis of the Weimar Republic, one must go outside the neo-Kantian system of pure law to sociopolitical sources:³⁴ at this point one must turn to the popularly elected president, the sovereign, for it was he according to Article 48 of the Weimar constitution who could decide on the exception—and according to Schmitt, “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”³⁵ In short, it was Schmitt’s own clear belief that in response to the “challenge of the exception”³⁶ what was in order was a temporary and limited type of dictatorship. This response Schmitt called “commissarial dictatorship,” distinguishing it from “sovereign dictatorship” resting upon the *pouvoir constituant* of the people. In Schmitt’s view, order had to be reestablished before constitutional revisions could be brought about;³⁷ these revisions, had they followed Schmitt’s line of thought, would have eliminated what Schmitt saw as fundamental contradictions in the constitution.³⁸

Schmitt’s work on political theology and related themes overlaps with university theology. Schmitt’s nontheological use of the Kierkegaardian theme of decision played on the current popularity of the Dane among university figures inventing existentialism.³⁹ Equally fashionable was Schmitt’s use of theories of secularization with their suggestion of cultural decline, and the vague, yet ever-lurking sense that his thought probably had some positive relation to contemporary theories of cyclical turning. Schmitt suggested that the all-caring modern democratic welfare state in its Weimar form was in danger of becoming inwardly illegitimate and weak, but that it could be transformed into a strong “total” state in which all aspects of life would be suffused with political

³⁴ See (in addition to *Politische Theologie*) Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928); idem, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (2d ed. 1926; reprinted Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969); idem, *Der Hüter der Verfassung* (Beiträge zum Öffentlichen Recht der Gegenwart I; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1931); idem, *Legalität und Legitimität* (1932; reprinted Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968); idem, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1932; reprinted Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979); Peter Schneider, *Ausnahmezustand und Norm* (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte I; Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957).

³⁵ Translation from Carl Schmitt, *Political Theory: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (trans. George Schwab; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) 5.

³⁶ This phrase comes from Prof. George Schwab.

³⁷ See Schwab, “Introduction,” in Schmitt, *Political Theory*, xxiv, a passage kindly called to my attention by Prof. Schwab.

³⁸ Schwab, *Challenge*, 32–33, 86–89; Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt in the Summer of 1932.”

³⁹ Löwith, “Dezisionismus,” 98: “Was Schmitt an Kierkegaard hervorhebt, ist ausschliesslich dessen scheinbare Apologie der Ausnahme, weil, wie der erste Satz der politischen Theologie lautet, souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.” Cf. Krockow, *Entscheidung*, 55–57.

legitimacy once the turn to some kind of stronger presidential power took place.⁴⁰

Important in interpreting Schmitt's intent was his distinction between a "quantitative total state" (one so weak that it was at the mercy of all kinds of political parties, including ideologically subversive ones that avowedly had no intention of ever relinquishing power once it was attained, and the weakness of which was manifested in the state's being forced by the parties to be active in all domains of life) and a "qualitative total state" (one in which the state possesses enough support and legitimacy to resist both demands to support special interest groups by regulating numerous aspects of life and claims to perduring power by extremist parties).⁴¹ Here we see how Schmitt's thought could readily be interpreted by popularizers as being in accord with conservative revolutionary thought about intensification of current conditions as a means of causing the cycle to revolve from decrepitude to youthful vigor.⁴²

Schmitt's indebtedness to contemporary cultural criticism emerges in his discussion of secularization and cultural linkage. His famous phrase in the memorial volume for Weber was that "all significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts."⁴³ This implied first a historical⁴⁴ development of gradual secularization as a diachronic process. Schmitt traced the crisis of sovereignty and governmental legitimacy in Weimar

⁴⁰ Schmitt, "Die Wendung zum totalen Staat (1931)," in idem, *Positionen*, 146–57; Schmitt, "Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staats in Deutschland (1933)," in idem, *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958) 359–66; Jänicke, *Herrschaft*, 36–48; Schmitt, *Hüter*, 73–91.

⁴¹ See n. 40 above; Schwab, *Challenge*, 77–79, 85–89, esp. 86, 145–49; Schmitt, *Der Hüter der Verfassung* (Beiträge zum Öffentlichen Recht der Gegenwart 1; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1931).

⁴² Cf. Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik," 145–46.

⁴³ Schmitt, *Politische Theologie* (2d ed. reprinted as 4th) 49: "Alle prägnanten Begriffe der modernen Staatslehre sind säkularisierte theologische Begriffe." The translation here departs only slightly from that of Blumenberg, *Legitimacy*, 92. For a similar version, see Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 36. Cf. Andreas Marxen, *Das Problem der Analogie zwischen den Seinsstrukturen der grossen Gemeinschaften* (Phil. diss. Bonn, 1937).

⁴⁴ Here and throughout this article the author's original text using "an" before unaccented syllables starting with h has been suppressed by the editorial staff. The author, in order to gain publication of this article, has had no alternative: he has given in here in order to get the work into print. He is neither persuaded by arguments and authorities advanced in favor of the change nor gladdened by the progress of linguistic barbarism. As Jacob Burckhardt wrote, "My mental picture of the *terribles simplificateurs* who will overrun our old Europe is not a pleasant one" (cited by James Hastings Nichols, "Jacob Burckhardt," in Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom: Reflections in History* [ed. Nichols; New York: Pantheon, 1943] 43).

Doubtless the root cause of the editorial drive to impose uniformity even in articles lies in the unending process of centralization, standardization, and *Nivellierung* that is as characteristic of the postmodern age as it was of that modern age of progress concerning which Burckhardt wrote: "One thing after another must be sacrificed, position, property, religion, distinguished manners, higher scholarship . . ." (ibid., 42).

back to a deep rooted Western crisis of governmental legitimacy. This was really a process of “neutralization,” which had begun with the removal of religion from public life after the Counter-Reformation wars of religion. Second, Schmitt’s dictum implied a structural synchronicity or systematic analogy between politics and religion, in that both derived from the metaphysics predominant in a given epoch. According to Schmitt, the move from earlier political absolutism to modern mass democracy corresponded to the shift from Orthodox and Deist theologies of transcendence to modern theologies of immanence as developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴⁵ Particularly fascinating are Schmitt’s correlation of human sovereignty with divine transcendence and his analogy of the Deist watchmaker God who allows no miraculous intervention with the enlightened monarch who eschews any intervention that would disrupt the orderly operation of a rational code of law. All these synchronous correlations Schmitt set within a diachronic yet cyclical framework of Western decline or secularization since 1648.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Schmitt, “Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen (1929),” in idem, *Positionen*, 120–32; cf. idem, “Die politische Theorie des Mythos (1923),” in *Positionen*, 9–18; idem, review of Reinhart Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise in Das Historisch-politische Buch 7* (1959) 301–2; Hanno Kesting, *Geschichtsphilosophie und Weltbürgerkrieg* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959); Ernst Forsthoff, *Der totale Staat* (2d ed.; Hamburg: Hanseatisches Verlagsanstalt, 1933); Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation,” in *Säkularisation und Utopie: Ernst Forsthoff zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 75–94; reprinted in Heinz-Horst Schrey, ed., *Säkularisierung* (Wege der Forschung 424; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981) 67–89.

⁴⁶ Schmitt, *Politische Theologie*, esp. 49–66 and idem, “Zeitalter.” Cf. idem, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus* (1926; reprinted Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969) 89 (with reference to Sorel, Mussolini, and Lenin, as well as Weimar weakened by secularization and “neutralization” or the removal of religious legitimacy): “Die Theorie vom Mythos ist der stärkste Ausdruck dafür, dass der relative Rationalismus des parlamentarischen Denkens seine Evidenz verloren hat.” For utilization of Schmitt’s “neutralization” or secularization ideas in Nazi Germany, see Christoph Steding, *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur* (ed. Walter Frank; Hamburg: Hanseatisches Verlagsinstitut, 1938); see esp. “Neutrales Mittelalter in der Schweiz” (95) (94), “Karl Barth und die dialektischen Theologie” (95), and (97, *gesperrt*): “Young- und Dawes-Plan, Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich und dialektische Theologie Karl Barths sind ein und dasselbe.” Steding, like Schmitt, represents a further development of certain conservative and plebiscitary tendencies in the complexity of Max Weber: note the use of Schmitt in Steding, *Politik und Wissenschaft bei Max Weber* (Breslau: Korn, 1932); see also Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920* (2d ed.; Tübingen, 1974) 52, 403–15, 444, 455; and Karl Loewenstein, *Max Weber’s Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time* (trans. Richard and Clara Winston; Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966); also Alois Dempf, “Religionssoziologie,” *Hochland* 18 (1921) 747, cited by Ephraim Fischhoff, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization* (New York/London: Basic Books, 1968) 70.

Schmitt's historical arguments deriving political form from theological or metaphysical substance were challenged at the time by the patristics scholar Erik Peterson. Schmitt's theological critics found unpalatable his conclusion that the erosion of divine right made inevitable a choice between anarchy and dictatorship.⁴⁷ To be sure, Schmitt during the Weimar years accepted the validity of the constitutional assembly's creation of the Weimar constitution and chose to operate within its framework. Yet, as Schmitt saw matters, by the 1920s the liberal parliamentary system had begun to lack the basis for legitimacy in the eyes of a divided and paralyzed population. Schmitt remained, however, truly conservative: during the Weimar years he offered no revolutionary alternative to the Weimar state; his efforts were rather directed at rescuing the German *state* by revising the Weimar constitution. In his view the latter urgently required revision to make it workable because it contained a contradiction. On the one hand were the principles of direct democracy in the sense of direct election of the president; on the other was a liberal democracy of arithmetical procedure according to which an ordinary and qualified majority may subvert the constitutional foundation of the existing state by technically correct parliamentary methods. Schmitt saw the danger of reliance on mere rules of the game in a situation in which several players vowed to use the rules against the game itself, and hence tried to exclude these politically extremist players from the game altogether. Once he had failed in this attempt by saving the Weimar state, he compromised himself by throwing in his lot with Hitler—but after the *Reichstag* had given Hitler an unprecedented enabling act.⁴⁸

Schmitt's first suggestions for revision during the crisis of Weimar were aimed at strengthening the executive; these Weimar moves have been read subsequently in the light of his later opportunistic embrace of the Hitler regime to the detriment of a clear understanding of Schmitt's documentable efforts to prevent ideological subversion of the entire Weimar state by radical extremists of the Left or Right. Schmitt's opportunistic decision to participate in the Nazi venture has, it would seem, also led many writers to pay insufficient attention to his experiments with the application of the theory of institutions to political theory; in this connection, Schmitt suggested supplementing the decisionistic legitimacy of a strong executive branch with a turn to greater reliance on the legitimation provided by the traditional prestige of concrete, historically rooted institutions. Their authority was, Schmitt hoped, not something upon which the sovereign could easily infringe.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Peterson, *Monotheismus*; Schindler, *Monotheismus*.

⁴⁸ Schwab, *Challenge*, 16–17, 38, 48, 69–70, 86–87, 94–95, 100–105, 114, 120, 130–32, 141; idem in Schmitt, *Political Theology*, xiv, xvii, xxiv.

⁴⁹ Here I follow on the whole the work of Prof. George Schwab, which, while once highly controversial, is now largely accepted by Schmitt specialists. Prof. Schwab has made many useful suggestions for improving the understanding of Schmitt in this study. Pointing in a direction similar to the

Though Schmitt had begun his career as an advocate of Roman Catholic supernatural revelation as the best source of governmental legitimacy, and though he was heavily influenced by Hans Vaihinger's philosophic claim that we are entitled to use deliberate fictions to get out of religious and legal dilemmas (philosophy of the *als-ob*), Schmitt did not even begin to elaborate a theory of how divine monarchy could be reinvented in modern terms to legitimate Hitler.⁵⁰ This lack may at first seem surprising, in the light of Schmitt's enduring perception of a close link between decay in general acceptance of supernatural religious revelation stemming from a divine monarch and the decay of political authority in the sovereign state. In explanation of this lack of an application of the Schmittian theory of secularization and political theology to the specific issues raised by Hitler, one may offer first Schmitt's dissatisfaction with institutional Roman Catholicism during the Weimar years and, perhaps even more important, Schmitt's professional frame of reference as a jurist and political theorist rather than as a theologian dabbling in politics. Nonetheless,

studies by Schwab is much of the work of Ellen Kennedy, which shows that the kinship between the work of Schmitt and that of other political theorists, including those in the Frankfurt School, has been obscured by writers after 1933; in the interest of covering over these similarities, the complexity of Schmitt's thought has often been ignored in order to turn him into a simple precursor of Hitler. See Ellen Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt und die 'Frankfurter Schule': Deutsche Liberalismuskritik im 20. Jahrhundert," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 12 (1986) 380–419; cf. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Joachim Perels, ed., *Recht, Demokratie und Kapitalismus: Aktualität und Probleme der Theorie Franz L. Neumanns* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984). However, there are writers aware of such recent scholarship who nonetheless see every reason to assess the Weimar Schmitt in extremely harsh terms; Muth (n. 32 above) still can speak of Schmitt's "Unterminierung der Reichsverfassung"; see also Volker Neumann, "Verfassungstheorien politischer Antipoden: Otto Kirchheimer und Carl Schmitt," *Kritische Justiz* (1981) 235–54 esp. 252, which can be taken to suggest that some of the Weimar moves made by Schmitt and those associated with him left openings utilized by the Nazis, however contrary that may have been to Schmitt's intentions ("Entworfen für autoritäre Herrschaft einer staatstragenden Elite wurde die Theorie und Praxis des starken Staates zum Einfallstor für nationalsozialistische Machtgelüste"). See also 254 n. 105: "Die antisemitischen Ausfälle [Schmitt's—J.S.] waren nicht bloss 'lip service to the terminology of National-Socialist propaganda', wie George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception*, Berlin 1970, S. 101, allzu wohlmeinend schreibt." On Schmitt's shameful and opportunistic anti-Semitism, see, e.g., the comments in Schwab, *Challenge*, 138: "His recently acquired anti-Semitism was certainly opportunistic in so far as no traces of this pernicious, parochial and provincial attitude can be detected in his writings prior to 1933." See also Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik," 138, and Günter Maschke, "Im Irrgarten Carl Schmitts," in *Intellektuelle im Bann des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1980) 204–41. Cf. also Lothar Gruchmann, *Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung: Die Konstruktion einer 'deutschen Monroe-Doktrin'* (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4; Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962) 20–27, 121–45. For background on the theory of institutions as it touches Schmitt's thought, see Maurice Hauriou, *Die Theorie der Institution* (ed. Roman Schnur; trans. Hans and Jutta Jecht; Schriften zur Rechtstheorie 5; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965).

⁵⁰ For documentation on these points see Appendix D on Carl Schmitt.

the link between politics and theology was not so much the property of Schmitt that no German ever got around to constructing a theory of divine legitimation for Naziism. On the contrary: such a theory was in effect provided by one of the very greatest Protestant theologians to remain in Hitler's Germany, Emanuel Hirsch.

III

Karl Barth described his Göttingen colleague Hirsch as "a notable phenomenon"; Barth is said to have regarded Hirsch as "an opponent who had to be taken with utmost seriousness."⁵¹ Hirsch's fame rests on his treatment of cultural linkage and secularization in his unsurpassed five-volume "history of modern Protestant theology in connection with the general movements of European thought."⁵² His brilliance is as unquestionable as his diligence. He treated an astonishing variety of topics: Luther's view of God and conscience, Fichte's philosophy, Kierkegaard's development, Schleiermacher's view of the Reformation, the New Testament's Greek text, Christianity's essence, Weimar Germany's fate, Hitler's *Reich*, juristic neo-Kantianism's political weakness, and Hirsch's own systematics.⁵³

Born in 1888, Hirsch lived until 1972 and published 515 books and articles. His father had been pastor of the Golgatha congregation in Berlin. While still young he went blind in one eye; the other was accidentally injured by a barber's razor, and Hirsch lived with the growing threat of complete retinal detachment.⁵⁴ Called to Göttingen as a church historian in 1921, he assumed the chair of systematics in 1936. He retired in 1945 to fend off denazification proceedings.

In 1934, during a bitter controversy over Naziism with Tillich, Hirsch referred to himself as a "political theologian."⁵⁵ He did not use the term loosely. In 1923 and 1924 Hirsch reviewed approvingly three separate books by Carl Schmitt.⁵⁶ Hirsch liked Schmitt's theory of dictatorship, his "Kierkegaardian" and metajuristic emphasis on personal decision of conscience in politics, and his theory of secularization. As Hirsch put it, Schmitt's work on secularization and sovereignty furnishes "a decisive point for the argument with the

⁵¹ Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth* (trans. John Bowden; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) 134; the second quotation comes from Busch himself.

⁵² Emanuel Hirsch, *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europäischen Denkens* (5 vols.; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949–54).

⁵³ See the titles in Hans-Walter Schütte, *Bibliographie Emanuel Hirsch* (Berlin/Schleswig-Holstein: Die Spur, 1972).

⁵⁴ For documentation on these points see Appendix E on Emanuel Hirsch.

⁵⁵ Hirsch, *Christliche Freiheit und politische Bindung* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt) 6.

⁵⁶ Hirsch reviews Schmitt, *Politische Theologie* in *ThLZ* 48 (1923) 524–25; reviews *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage und Römischer Katholizismus* in *ThLZ* 49 (1924) 185–87.

enlightened and Kantian doctrine of law.”⁵⁷ He endorsed Schmitt’s dictum that “all significant concepts in the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts.” However, Hirsch indicated that Schmitt had taken the wrong road in applying his principles by ignoring the notion of organic community or *Gemeinschaft* as the point of intersection between theology and constitutional history. Here, especially in the related notion of the Kingdom of God (*Reich Gottes*), was the key area.⁵⁸

In 1934 Hirsch labeled himself a political theologian. At that moment he explained what this implied for the months since Hitler’s coming to power:

I have sought to teach about the way everything connected with the *Volk* borders on the hidden [*verborgen*] divine Majesty; I have tried as a thinker and preacher to express as seriously . . . as possible the Gospel . . . on the basis of divine judgment. . . . Not once have I had . . . the feeling of being in conflict with the will of the *Führer* to build up a *Volk* united in worldview [*Weltanschauung*] and order of life [*Lebensordnung*]. On the contrary, there, in the place where it was proper for me to be, I understood myself as a helper in the work now going on among us Germans.⁵⁹

To cooperate in building a people united in worldview and order of life—these two phrases re-echo in Hirsch’s work, signifying the strictly theological and juridico-political aspects of political theology. This double task of the political theologian corresponds to the kind of challenge symbolized by Kelsen’s double fictionalism.

Hirsch’s career thus shows a step by step logical progress from Weimar conservatism to enthusiastic support of Hitler. Hirsch at all stages agreed with other conservatives that secularizing decay had been at work. Hirsch repeatedly affirmed that politics, religions, mores, and culture were intertwined, so what one did in one branch had to affect the other. And, added Hirsch, since the nineteenth-century theologians had been too weak to unite the Germans behind a healthy worldview, it was only right that Hitler should lend a political hand where the liberal theologians of cultural Protestantism had failed.⁶⁰

Hirsch’s lifework was designed to meet such a double challenge: the crisis of atheism symbolized by Feuerbach and Nietzsche, and the crisis in legitimacy of the state embodied in Weimar neo-Kantian jurisprudence. Yet Hirsch’s political theology ended by assimilating so much from Nietzsche, Spengler, and Idealism that he parted company with Christianity without realizing it.

⁵⁷ Hirsch, Review of *Politische Theologie*, 524.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Hirsch, *Christliche Freiheit*, 53.

⁶⁰ Hirsch, *Der Weg der Theologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1937) 24–25.

Hirsch had analogous aims and methods in his theology and in his metajuristic appeal to divine legitimation for the state. His theological aim was one he ascribed to “all the more serious German thinkers” from Leibniz on—“out of philosophical reflection freely to produce the essential content of Christian piety and morality.”⁶¹ Thus human and divine truth would be seen to coincide.⁶² An analogous correlation of what one could perhaps call “autonomy” and “heteronomy” was the goal of Hirsch’s treatment of the state. In his lectures on systematics between 1938 and 1940, Hirsch stated that the “true” sanction of legitimacy would emerge when one made it “clear, by what means a specified act of government by the state acquires the holiness that causes us inwardly to honor it as a divine action and work.”⁶³

In this staggering double enterprise of theology as political theology, Hirsch’s starting point came from his heritage in the so-called Luther-Renaissance of his teacher, the Berlin church historian Karl Holl (1866–1926).⁶⁴ Here was the Lutheran counterpart to the dialectical theology of Karl Barth. Holl made, however, a less definite break with cultural Protestantism than Barth. Holl unfolded everything from the doctrine of justification. God’s command, written in the heart, allows the sinner to experience divine wrath in the conscience as an immediate proof of God’s existence.⁶⁵ In contrast to Ritschl, Holl stressed this experience of wrath, but he also brought out how, in Luther’s theology, comfort came in clinging to the divine Word of promise and the accompanying forgiveness that alone could still an accusing conscience.

Holl thus took up a live issue and gave a plausible answer. In Holl’s view, God’s omnipotence was for Luther behind the entire world. What then was the nature of this world order and this God? Is the Hidden Sovereign capricious and amoral in His awesome majesty? Holl’s Luther denied this. He indeed recognized a hidden aspect of God, one mysterious and wrathful; but even with regard to such hidden divine purposes, what was called for was trusting faith.

⁶¹ Hirsch, *Die Reich-Gottes-Begriffe des neuern europäischen Denkens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927) 20.

⁶² See Böbel, *Wahrheit*; also idem, “Allgemein menschliche und christliche Gotteserkenntnis bei Emanuel Hirsch,” *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 5 (1963) 296–335; Hayo Gerdes, ed., *Wahrheit und Glaube: Festschrift für Emanuel Hirsch zu seinem 75. Geburtstag* (Itzehoe: Die Spur, 1963).

⁶³ Hirsch, *Werke*, III: *Christliche Rechenschaft* (Berlin/Schleswig-Holstein, 1978) 2. 280. Here I use “autonomy” and “heteronomy” for want of better expressions; cf. R. Pohlmann, “Autonomie,” *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1971) 701–19.

⁶⁴ For documentation see Appendix F on Karl Holl.

⁶⁵ Here and in the remainder of this paragraph I paraphrase Bornkamm, *Luther*, 114–17, and Dillenberger, *God*, 18–27. Cf. Holl, “Was verstand Luther unter Religion?” in idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, vol. 1: *Luther* (2d/3d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1923) 36–37: “Bei ihm [sc. Luther] führte Gott selbst ganz unmittelbar im Gewissen den Beweis für sein Dasein.” See also in this connection the two treatments of Holl by Rückert cited in Appendix F on Karl Holl.

For God's wrath was purposeful, necessary as a breaking up of the old and preparation for the new in God's creation. For Holl, God's wrath turns out to be "the mask under which God hides himself. It belongs to God's essence that He reveal Himself in His opposite. But He does this not because of a mood, but according to a plan."⁶⁶ So: Holl's Luther resolves the tension between *deus absconditus* and *deus revelatus*; that is to say, Luther found that trust eliminated any ethical problem in affirming God's *Alleinwirksamkeit*, or sole and complete causation of everything.⁶⁷

Given this view, Holl then had to show how the afflicted conscience is comforted by ethical action. Holl identified forgiveness with conscience. Morality emerges reborn and reactivated from forgiveness. Only by recourse to such Ritschlian claims could Holl cope with his view that in conscience we encounter the wrath of God. Holl's approach necessarily ethicizes, moralizes, and regularizes the spontaneous omnipotence of the sovereign Majesty of the Hidden God. Here is the full individual sense of interpreting Luther's as what Holl labeled a "religion of conscience."⁶⁸

For Holl this was no abstruse game. Holl had good reason to worry about the caprice and amorality of human affairs. His wartime sermons show how concerned he was to find a pattern in the meaninglessness of the German defeat. His Berlin sermons stress the necessity of faith and ethical involvement. Only thus would it become plain that a blessing for Germany was hidden in defeat. God was good, and mysteriously planned somehow to bless the nation yet—if only it kept faith. God's big wartime *Nein* of wrath concealed the promise of a *Ja* to those who trusted. Holl here begins subtly to shift from Luther's emphasis on the Hidden God's Law/Gospel pattern as something primarily concerning individuals to a post-Enlightenment stress on the Hidden God's Law/Gospel pattern as a way for individuals as a part of a national community to find purpose and meaning by identification with the nation-state.⁶⁹

Holl's sermons, later edited by his student Hirsch, join alarm at secularization with belief in the linkage of religion and politics. It was clear that only firm

⁶⁶ Holl, *Luther*, 41 cited in Dillenberger, *God*, 22; cf. Dillenberger, *God*, 19.

⁶⁷ Dillenberger, *God*, 21; Holl, *Luther*, 45; Rückert, *Vorträge*, 370–72. On the "hidden God" see, besides Dillenberger, Rudolf Köhler, "Der *Deus absconditus* in Philosophie und Theologie," *ZRGG* 7 (1955) 46–58; Julius Richter, "Luthers 'Deus absconditus'—Zuflucht oder Ausflucht?" *ZRGG* 7 (1955) 289–303; Hellmut Bandt, *Luthers Lehre vom verborgenen Gott* (Theologische Arbeiten 8; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958); Alfred Adam, "Der Begriff 'Deus absconditus' bei Luther nach Herkunft und Bedeutung," *Luther-Jahrbuch* 1963 (ed. Franz Lau; Hamburg: Wittig, 1963) 97–106; B. A. Gerrish, "'To the Unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God," *JR* 53 (1973) 263–92.

⁶⁸ Dillenberger, *God*, 10–11, 24–25; Wilhelm Pauck, "The Historiography of the German Reformation during the Past Twenty Years," *CH* 9 (1940) 311, cited in Dillenberger, *God*, 25–26.

⁶⁹ Holl, *Reden*, vii–viii, 38, 45, 51, 55–56, 82–84, 86–89, 90–91, 98–99.

religious faith could provide the moral strength for national rebirth—a faith threatened by growing estrangement from the church. Now was the hour of decision for the conscience of the German *Volk*. (Yes, Holl had pioneered in teaching Kierkegaard as early as 1908).⁷⁰

Holl applies Luther concretely by proclaiming that the dialectic of wrath concealing the promise of ultimate grace to those who trust is a dialectic for nations as well as individuals. Only in view of such trust could those in the pew see God's morality and reject the suggestion of a capricious, amoral god.⁷¹

Holl's Luther-Renaissance is, then, very ambiguous. Is it reviving Lutheran Christianity or German patriotism, or both? Holl and Hirsch after him read into Luther "the Neoprotestant [and Idealist] thought of the presence of God in human moral and religious experience" (Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen).⁷² Hence Holl's stress on conscience ironically parries Luther's original thrust against a Stoic or Neoplatonic divine spark of ethical inclination innate in the human person. Fichte had reintroduced into Protestant philosophy what Luther had thrown out, that is, the old notion that conscience is "an oracle of the eternal world." Such an ontology of conscience ultimately needs no biblical revelation.⁷³

This Idealist heritage in Holl, if not checked by a strong doctrine of revelation, lacks any principle of falsification—a recipe for disaster. That disaster occurred with Hirsch. He took from Holl God's omnipotent *Alleinwirksamkeit* as historical theodicy along with Fichte's notion of conscience innately

⁷⁰ These themes echo throughout Holl's sermons. See esp. Holl, *Reden*, 55, 57, 89. Hirsch (*Kierkegaard-Studien* [Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1933] 2. 695 n. 1) speaks of "Karl Holl's für die damalige Lage glänzende Kierkegaard-Darstellung im Kolleg 1908, die mir einen starken Stoss auf Kierkegaard hin gegeben hat"; cf. *ibid.*, 2. 958; also Eilert Herms, "Die Unformungskrise der Neuzeit in der Sicht Emanuel Hirschs," in Müller (ed.), *Wahrheit*, 95–96 n. 47, citing the second of these passages with its reference to Holl. In view of this evidence, it seems necessary to modify Schjørring, *Gewissensethik*, 145: "So wie Karl Holl Hirsch kaum auf Fichte hingewiesen haben dürfte, kann er ihn auch nicht zum Studium Kierkegaards angeregt haben." Cf. Krockow, *Entscheidung*; Harald Eklund, *Theologie der Entscheidung* (Uppsala: Universitets Arsskrift, 1937; Uppsala: Lundquist, 1937). For details on the German reception of Kierkegaard, see Wolfdietrich von Kloeden, "Einfluss und Bedeutung im deutsch-sprachigen Denken," in Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulová Thulstrup, eds., *The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard* (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana 8; Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1981) 54–107 (on Hirsch, 64–66; on Ernst Jünger, 58; Heidegger, 83–87; "Entschluss"/"Beslutning," 88; Dempf, Przywara, Balthasar, 57–60; Guardini, 59; Haecker, 95; Tillich, 76–83).

⁷¹ Holl, *Reden*, 41–48, 86–91.

⁷² Zur Mühlen, *Vernunftkritik*, 199; cf. Tilgner, *Volksnomostheologie*, 141.

⁷³ Ernst Wolf, "Gewissen," *RGK* 2 (3d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1958) 1550–57, esp. 1553–54; cf. *idem*, *Peregrinatio* (2 vols.; Munich: Kaiser, 1962, 1965) 1. 81–112; 2. 52–118. See in particular the remarks in Dillenberger, *God*, esp. 48 n. 32 (on "the lack of a decisive doctrine of revelation in [Hirsch's] interpretation of Luther" so that divine hiddenness is pertinent to theodicy but not to ethics as human responsibility); also *ibid.*, 19 (Holl on caprice in God), 25 (conscience), 42, 48–56.

grounded in God, then added the emotional volatility of Nietzsche's appeal to myth, and turned this into divine legitimation for Hitler.

IV

Hirsch starts where Holl left off. Behind the world is God's sole causation, *All- und Alleinwirksamkeit*. It is knowable in the human conscience both as condemnation and as hidden grace. From this point of departure, Hirsch "proves" what he sets out to show: that God exists and is in history despite Feuerbach and Nietzsche, and that God's shaping of history allows the conscience of the German people a metajuristic criterion for delegitimizing Weimar democracy and for legitimating Hitler's total state. How can Hirsch simultaneously reconcile "autonomy" with "heteronomy," his announced task?

Starting from the principle that Luther's God works "all things in all" according to an incomprehensible standard, Hirsch holds that thus we cannot escape God. Luther's use of the hiddenness of God means that only trusting faith can see God's unity and truthfulness of benevolent purpose in apparent evils as a continuity of purpose reaching to the core of God. God's revealed goodness and unknown purpose can only thus come into ethical unity. Hirsch is chiefly interested in continuity of purpose in God: what is hidden in God is affirmed to be ultimately good in intent for us. Hirsch has little concern with the possibility of a logical split between morality and caprice inside God, denying that Luther took over such a split from Late Scholasticism's ordained and absolute powers of God. Hirsch is interested in theodicy from the human point of view: trusting faith sees that even God's wrathful No contains a hidden Yes. The enemy is not God, but failure to trust the hidden divine purpose.⁷⁴

Hirsch treated Luther's view of God in 1918, under the immediate impact of his studies with Holl. Two years later, in the *Luther-Jahrbuch*, he published an article on "Luther und Nietzsche."⁷⁵ Here Hirsch begins a gradual incorporation of the image of Nietzsche as conservative cultural critic into Christian theology of a proto-Nazi variety. The dimensions of this theological assimilation of Nietzsche and "irrationalism" are a topic which demands further investigation.⁷⁶

Hirsch's treatment of Nietzsche and Luther in 1920 inaugurates an ill-understood theological development that culminated in two claims made or sug-

⁷⁴ Dillenberger, *God*, 48–51, esp. 49, 56, 63–64, 66, 69, 145, 168; Hirsch, *Luthers Gottesanschauung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1918) esp. 26–27.

⁷⁵ Hirsch, "Luther und Nietzsche," *Luther-Jahrbuch* 2/3 (1920/21) 61–106 (listed in the table of contents, p. 2, under "II. Aus Luthers Zeit—für unsere Zeit"); cf. Hirsch, "Luthers Rechtfertigungslehre bei Kant," *Luther-Jahrbuch* 4 (1922) 47–65.

⁷⁶ For documentation see Appendix G on "irrationalism" and *Schicksal*.

gested by some theologians supporting Hitler: (1) the various “irrational,”⁷⁷ conservative currents summed up in National Socialism really belong inside Christianity and should not separate from it; (2) the appeal of raw, ecstatic emotional power and amoral aestheticism which these groups found in Nietzsche is an appeal that can legitimately be domesticated and incorporated into a Christian worldview for Christian purposes, and (at least for Hirsch) all the more so since that appeal derives ultimately from the Hidden God of Luther.⁷⁸

In moving toward this use of the Hidden God, Hirsch’s 1920 article on Nietzsche unwittingly brought out the ambiguity of the Luther Renaissance. By 1920 Nietzsche’s cultural criticism had become a weapon for the Right to use against Weimar democracy. Holl himself had often referred to Nietzsche, arguing that Nietzsche’s great thoughts were merely de-ethicized, amoral distortions of Pauline and Lutheran themes—here he enumerated “dancing in chains,” hardness as love, “and the notion that the divine goes about in a mask.”⁷⁹ Hirsch continued by bringing to light Nietzsche’s near total dependence on misunderstood Luther. Nietzsche’s Dionysos was more than mere ecstatic divine *Rausch* or enthusiasm. He was in fact a “naturalistic duplicate of the Lutheran concept of God.”⁸⁰ Hirsch claimed that the “Dionysiac union of a *Nein* and *Ja*” was derived from Hegel’s dialectic, which itself descended directly from Luther’s *simul justus et peccator*.⁸¹ Behind all this was Luther’s God, simultaneously “judge and Father, highest wrath and highest love.”⁸² This union of *Nein* and *Ja* allowed Nietzsche to arrive at the “Dionysian theodicy of life,” according to which “a moment of joy justifies all the woe in the world.”⁸³ Hirsch then argued that Nietzsche’s problem—other than his atheism—was his failure to arrive at an absolute morality capable of

⁷⁷ For documentation on these points see Appendix G on “irrationalism” and *Schicksal*.

⁷⁸ The second of these claims in its strongest (Hidden God is behind Hitler) form is the implication of a synoptic reading of the following works by Hirsch: “Luther und Nietzsche”; “Vom verborgenen Suverän,” in Paul Althaus, Emanuel Hirsch, Walter Wilm, and Heinrich Rendtorff, eds., *Glaube und Volk* 2:1 (Küstrin: Verlag Deutscher Osten, 1933) 4–13; *Die gegenwärtige geistige Lage im Spiegel philosophischer und theologischer Besinnung: Akademische Vorlesungen zum Verständnis des deutschen Jahrs 1933* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1934); *Christliche Freiheit und politische Bindung* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935). I cannot explore here the position of theologians such as Althaus, Werner Elert, and Friedrich Gogarten with regard to Hirsch’s political use of the theme of divine hiddenness, nor can I look at such figures as Arno Deutelmoser.

⁷⁹ See esp. Holl, “Die Kulturbedeutung der Reformation,” in idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (3d ed.) I. 533.

⁸⁰ Hirsch, “Luther und Nietzsche,” 83: “Dionysos ist ein natürliches Nachbild des lutherischen Gottesbegriffes, das Dionysische ein naturalistisches Nachbild der lutherischen Frömmigkeit.”

⁸¹ Hirsch, “Luther und Nietzsche,” 83–85.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 84.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 84–88.

domesticating the amorality implicit in the Dionysiac God.⁸⁴ In other words, where Nietzsche failed, Luther, Holl, and Hirsch succeeded: only trusting faith could perceive the benevolent unity of God's plan hidden under the changes and chances of this mortal life.

With the passing of time, Hirsch more and more saw Nietzsche as a secret ally, one who had sensed the superficiality of liberal religion and by intuitive instinct had opened up a tunnel to the emotional force of the Hidden God—even though Nietzsche himself was so constrained by the narrow horizons of an age of decadence that he failed to understand what he had begun to rediscover. By 1934, in showing how Weimar decadence had undergone metamorphosis into Hitlerian rejuvenation, Hirsch explained that Nietzsche's will to power had been the suicide of all modern philosophies of progress, freedom, and autonomous reason.⁸⁵ Here in Nietzsche had occurred the paradoxical intensification (*Steigerung*) of conditions necessary to bring about the crisis from which there could be no retreat, only advance to the rejuvenation of all areas of life in a senile *Spätkultur*. For in religion, as in politics and art, crises rejuvenate ("Krisen machen jung") in that all branches of culture are forced to seek out the basis of faith, the mythic and metaphysical substrate on which culture finally rests. As Hirsch sees it, God is present in the created particularities of the existence of historical communities and in the crises of the historical process; the Logos is a fountain of youth for cultures caught up in the aging process of secularizing separation from divine life; thus it is the function of theologians to proclaim where the true source of youth is to be found, so that the *Volk* can remain *jung* and *geschichtsmächtig*, potent and youthful in its shaping of history. In this way, argues Hirsch, the Germans can avoid becoming a weak, vegetating people unfit for history (*geschichtsuntauglich*); instead, close to God's power, they can experience through rejuvenation in crisis the truth that "All that is great stands in the storm" (Heidegger's 1933 rendering of Plato *Republic* 497d, 9: τὰ . . . μεγάλα . . . ἐπισφαλῇ).⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Ibid., 85–97.

⁸⁵ Hirsch, *Lage*, 15–16; cf. 11–12, 16, 28–29, 71, 91, 97, 98, 130, 135, 136, 141; also 117.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 16, 29; for Heidegger and Hirsch's crises, see *ibid.*, 72 ("Alles Grosse steht im Sturm"), 52, 51, 101, 71, 77, 73. For the notion that peoples are "verjüngt" by "Krisen" see Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal* (n. 93 below) 35, 36 ("Krisen machen jung"). Cf. Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion [Selbstbehauptung] of the German University," 480; Hirsch, *Lage* 52 ("Geheimnis des Seins") 46 ("Entschlossenheit"). Ibid., 52, contends that, if existential philosophy does not agree with him in a Christian interpretation of 1933 as a *Gottesbegegnung* in the "boundaries" of national particularity so that one perceives "das Rauschen der verborgenen göttlichen Gnade," then instead it must identify G5d with μη ὄν, a chaos of meaninglessness: "Dann versteht sie das Geheimnis des Seins, welches in der schicksalsumringten Existenz ihr sich künden möchte, als Sorge und Selbstbehauptung." The Anglo-Saxon may perhaps be excused from exegesis or even translation of this passage, since, as a well-known philosopher has argued, philosophy is possible only in Greek and

Having turned the anti-Prussian Nietzsche into a critic of Weimar and having transformed Nietzsche the Antichrist into a prophet of the rediscovery of the lurking emotional force of Luther's Hidden God, Hirsch was now in a good position to reveal Luther's Hidden God of history as the benevolent power behind Hitler.

In that same year, 1934, Hirsch went on to argue that the divine obedience of Romans 13 had not prohibited revolt against Weimar democracy, and to draw the concrete implications of his long-standing concession to Troeltsch concerning Luther's dualistic doctrine of the Kingdom of God (what we now call Two Kingdoms, with the Troeltschian corollary that Luther had glorified sheer power)—namely, that this doctrine needed reinterpretation.⁸⁷ Hirsch conceded to Troeltsch that Luther's thoughts on the Kingdom of God and the state must not be taken to allow the autonomous operation of a secular state. Rather must the state be hallowed by a divine religious mission, in accord with the proper interpretation of Luther's doctrine of God's Kingdom in relation to state and church, Law and Gospel.⁸⁸ The importance of this ethical mission in German politics had first become clear to the Lutheran tradition in the age of Idealism, a time when intellectual and moral force had been summoned up to aid the anti-Napoleonic transition to the national state.⁸⁹ What did Hirsch's religio-ethical reinterpretation of political order and the Two Kingdoms imply, and how did it operate?

The logical starting point in Hirsch's project was in theology itself, where necessity required retrieving the doctrine of God from the difficulties into which Feuerbach had placed it.⁹⁰ Hirsch takes Luther and Schleiermacher to be in fundamental agreement. Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* is called upon along with Hirsch's distinctive theory of language to support the claim that God is "simultaneously the thought of scientific reflection that establishes the ground . . . of reflection and the ground . . . of religious experience, present to us in feeling and raised to definitive consciousness by reflection." Otherwise, without God, "all must dissolve into nothingness."⁹¹ Though we cannot have an adequate idea of

German. In any event, it cannot be said that Hirsch gained transparency by his encounter with Heidegger. "Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter" (Hölderlin, "Andenken," IV, 63, vs 59).

⁸⁷ For documentation on these points see Appendix H on the "Two Kingdoms" and Hirsch.

⁸⁸ Hirsch, *Reich-Gottes-Begriffe*, 22–23, 25–29; cf. Troeltsch's negative review, *ThLZ* 48 (1923) 23–24; Hirsch, *Werke*, III. 1. 2, 280.

⁸⁹ Hirsch, *Gottes-Reich-Begriffe*, 23.

⁹⁰ On the young Hirsch's personal encounter with Feuerbach's claim that God is mere human self-perception, see *Lage*, 82.

⁹¹ See, from the 1930s and 1940s, Hirsch, *Werke*, III. 1. 2, 198–220 on revelation, esp. 210: "Der erste, der die beiden Urbeziehungen am Gottesbewusstsein begrifflich sauber unterschieden hat, ist Schleiermacher in seiner Dialektik gewesen." Hirsch's defense of "revelation" rests on his theory of language (III. 1. 2, 196–204), a topic which needs further investigation. The quotations are from Hirsch, *Geschichte* (1949–54) 5, 283, 287; cf. 291 and Böbel, *Wahrheit*, 81–82. Hirsch,

God, God can be known in the conscience as defined by Holl/Luther/Kierkegaard/Fichte. As Hirsch will allow revelation only in psychological or historical categories, no miracles, divine preexistence, or physical resurrection can be allowed; God is simply History as general revelation—and otherwise present in conscience as an encounter with the boundary and ground of being. Kierkegaard's extreme subjectivity here merges with heavy reliance on German Idealism. A chain of individual consciences realigned according to the *Nein/Ja* dialectic extends from Jesus down to Hirsch himself, consciences encountering God in the ethical decision of history. So in brief did Hirsch refute the charge that God was merely our own wish-fulfilling construction.⁹²

V

That revelation is behind history is for Hirsch the sense of Luther's claim that the world is a mask of God. As a practicing historian Hirsch had to reject Hegel's willfulness;⁹³ yet as a theologian he fought against the amoral skepticism of Nietzsche and Spengler.⁹⁴ During the Weimar era he sought refuge in conscience: God is affirmed to be behind all of history and to meet us in its events, in that we are constantly called upon to shape events by decision.⁹⁵ Only thus can Hirsch ward off the possibility that it is all a meaningless jumble.

Despite his critique of Hegel, Hirsch as practicing historian liked the Idealism of Fichte's *Staatslehre* of 1813. He agreed with Fichte against Spengler that

Werke, III. 1. 2 is a reprint expanded with full lecture notes of his *Leitfaden zur christlichen Lehre* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1938).

⁹² See esp. Böbel, *Wahrheit*.

⁹³ Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal: Staat, Volk, und Menschheit im Licht einer ethischen Geschichtsansicht* (3d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1925) 21–23, 31; cf. 90–93, 62–63, 24–25, 60–61, 58–59, 48–53, 34–37. Other sources for Hirsch's view of history include: Hirsch, *Christentum und Geschichte in Fichtes Philosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1920); idem, "Oswald Spenglers 'Untergang des Abendlandes,'" *Geisteskampf der Gegenwart* 56 (1920) 127–33; idem, "Grundlegung einer christlichen Geschichtsphilosophie," in *Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum* (Studien des apologetischen Seminars 14; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1926) 1–35; Schweer, "Ethik," 20–26, on which I here depend; Schneider-Flume, *Theologie*, 13–115; Tilgner, *Volksnomostheologie*, 136–57; Ericksen, *Theologians*, 124–41. See also Hirsch, *Geschichte* (1949–54) 4, 401–7 on Fichte's *Staatslehre* of 1813; idem, "Das Ringen der idealistischen Denker um eine neue, die Aufklärung überwindende Gestalt der philosophischen Aussagen über Gott (1932)," in Müller (ed.), *Wahrheit*, 142–204.

⁹⁴ See Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal*; cf. the treatments by Böbel, Schweer, and Schneider-Flume; but see Tilgner, *Volksnomostheologie*, 136–45.

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal*, 49–63 ("Die Gemeinschaft der Gewissen") 68; cf. Böbel, *Wahrheit*, 43, 81–83; on decision in Hirsch, see Schneider-Flume, *Theologie*, 13–53; cf. Ericksen, *Theologians*, 127–33 on the refutation of meaninglessness and relativism and Hirsch's sympathy with the notion of "the life cycle of civilizations" (131).

Christianity must remain the “heart” of history, for Jesus meant an objective turn to human events.⁹⁶ Hirsch in his 1939 lectures on the essence of Christianity made very clear use of Fichte’s claim that the true rhythm of history lies in the destruction and rebirth of faith in forms autonomously appropriated by free human insight—a cycle of tearing down superstition and building up a free faith without end.⁹⁷ Though Hirsch could lightly criticize Spengler’s mechanical reliance on cycles, Hirsch’s periodization shows a fondness for cycles that harmonizes well with his growing certainty that the entire age from 1648 to 1933 constituted an era of increasingly individualistic decadence and separation from God. Hirsch’s radical immanentization of apocalyptic in his theology and his liking for the Fourth Gospel helped this tendency along by, as it were, “blunting” the arrow of traditional eschatology.⁹⁸

Hirsch often labeled the Weimar Republic and the late nineteenth century a Late Culture, implying its decadent separation from the rejuvenating vigor of faith in God and what the turn-of-the-century Fichte revival had come to see as the God-appointed historical mission of Germany.⁹⁹ Thus Hirsch readily saw in 1933 a great turning point, even as he labeled all pro-Hitler elements as “young” in their closeness to the divine, mythic source.¹⁰⁰ Hirsch’s diagnosis of the moribund *Spätkultur* saw the era before 1933 as ruled by self-destructive autonomous reason and freedom that dissolved into atomistic and rootless

⁹⁶ The clearest statement on this point is Hirsch, *Geschichte* (1945–54) 4, 402 (“Herz”); but see the works by Hirsch listed in n. 82 above for his use of Fichte in his period of concern with Spengler.

⁹⁷ Cf. Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal*, 32–35, 92 (cycles); n. 84 above; idem, *Christentum* (1920) 22; idem, *Geschichte* (1949–54) 4, 404–5 (on Fichte, 1813): “Also Religions- und Staatengeschichte gehören zusammen und geben erst zusammen und geben erst mit ihrem Ineinander ein verständliches Bild des Geschichtsverlaufs.” Then (404–5) follows Fichte’s historical rhythm of “Glaube” and “Verstand” and the destruction of the superstitious, “unechten Glaubensinhalt” by “Verstand.” This Fichtean scheme appears to be the plan behind Hirsch, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Weimar: Verlag Deutsche Christen, 1939).

⁹⁸ Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal*, 35–36 may imply such criticism. Here I do not claim that Hirsch shows a consistent and unthinking (“mechanical”) reliance on cyclical thought. I do claim that one ought to examine Hirsch’s works keeping in mind the currency of cyclical patterns among conservatives of his time. Like some other educated conservatives, Hirsch did not adhere rigidly to a doctrine of cycles; what seems to have appealed to him was a pattern of (“cyclical”) ebb and flow that could somehow explain how Weimar “decadence” bears an inevitable connection with subsequent national “rebirth.” The distance from God of the epoch 1648–1933 as a result of individualistic, rationalistic freedom is the central point of all sections in Hirsch, *Lage*, that deal with the years before Hitler. Immanentization: Hirsch, *Werke*, III. 1. 2, 97, 112; cf. Rudolf Bultmann, “Hirschs Auslegung des Johannes-Evangeliums,” *EvTh* 4 (1937) 115–42; Hirsch, *Studien zum vierten Evangelium* (BHT 11; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1936); idem, *Das vierte Evangelium in seiner ursprünglichen Gestalt verdeutscht und erklärt* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1936) esp. 5: “Im Anfang war das Wort, und das Wort war bei Gott, und Gott von Art (*sic*) war das Wort.”

⁹⁹ E.g., Hirsch, *Lage*, 29 (“Spätkultur”).

¹⁰⁰ E.g., *ibid.*, 71, 114.

random chaos; here the real cause was the individualistic refusal to recognize the binding force (*Bindung*) of God-given limits in religion, politics, and race.¹⁰¹

Therefore in 1934 Hirsch came to agree that true freedom must consist in bringing to consciousness the hidden harmony of human truth and human destiny with God's binding order. By psychologizing and subjectivizing revelation, Hirsch had established a theological harmony of divine revelation and critical thought. Likewise, Hirsch's political theology would make a bizarre claim to preserve an illusion of freedom even as it reasserted binding authority.¹⁰²

VI

Hirsch's specifically political theology was conceived as apologetic for the contemporary relevance of theology. As he declared in 1938, "The living location of the God-question is in the human being's relation to politico-social reality."¹⁰³ Hirsch declared that Germany would leave Christianity behind if the church failed to show awareness of God's hand in the religious revival accompanying the National Socialist revolution.¹⁰⁴

Behind such views was Hirsch's interpretation of Luther on the world as God's mask. During the 1930s Hirsch held that the conscience of the individual must try to discern God's created source of revelation in the givenness of national life: the transhistorical German *Volk* was taken as a divinely instituted order of creation. God had given the *Volk* a mission to which conscience must respond.¹⁰⁵

As Wolfgang Tilgner and John Dillenberger have noted, here the lack of a clear doctrine of biblical revelation became important.¹⁰⁶ Hirsch's stress on meeting God in the ethical demand of conscience required a source of revelation more concrete than his affirmation of the New Testament as witness to Jesus' liberation of the conscience from Jewish legalism¹⁰⁷ and separation from God. Thus Hirsch mistakenly but enthusiastically perceived a divine mission given to the *Volk* and already recognized by contemporary conservatives—as he saw it, a

¹⁰¹ E.g., *ibid.*, 7–16, 97.

¹⁰² Cf. *ibid.*, *passim*: the point is that true German freedom requires authoritative *Bindung*. On revelation see Böbel, *Wahrheit*, 85; Hirsch, *Freiheit*; and *idem*, "Suverän." See also Friedrich Gogarten, "Säkularisierte Theologie in der Staatslehre," *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* 86 (2. März 1933) 1–2 and (3. März 1933) 1–2; *idem*, *Politische Ethik* (Jena: Diederichs, 1932) 185–86.

¹⁰³ Cited as a sentence of Hirsch from 1938 by Schneider-Flume, *Theologie*, i.

¹⁰⁴ A frequent theme in much of Hirsch, *Lage*; see also *idem*, *Das kirchliche Wollen der Deutschen Christen* (Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Christen 6; Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1933); also *idem*, *Deutsches Volkstum und evangelischer Glaube* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Tilgner, *Volksnomothologie*, 144, 139, 128; Schneider-Flume, *Theologie*, 58.

¹⁰⁶ Tilgner, *Volksnomothologie*, 144–52; Dillenberger, *God*, 48.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Hirsch, *Wesen*; Moore, "Christian Writers."

mission of advancing Protestant inwardness and freedom from Catholic and Jewish “legalism.” For Hirsch in the 1930s, God spoke, not only in Jesus Christ as Savior, but as Creator in the orders, blood, and law of the various nations. According to his critics, Hirsch assigned God’s Law to the nation-state and the Gospel to the church.¹⁰⁸

This concept of revelation and divine mission of the *Volk* permitted Hirsch to reassert binding conservative state authority even in the face of mass politics capable of choosing social democracy or something worse. By reworking Luther’s doctrine of a God hidden (*verborgen*) behind the world, and combining it with Carl Schmitt’s rhetoric of sovereignty, Hirsch could rush an article into print in mid-January of 1933 (two weeks before Hitler came to power) entitled “Vom verborgenen Suverän,” “Concerning the Hidden Sovereign.”¹⁰⁹ Thus Hirsch gave metajuristic—that is, theological or divine—legitimation to conservative regimes while denying legitimacy to liberal or socialist successors of the Weimar Republic.

The earliest hint of this doctrine had come in 1921. In discussing German versus non-German ways to secularize the Kingdom of God, *Reich Gottes*, Hirsch had rejected the Troeltschian charge that what we now call Luther’s Two-Kingdoms doctrine had simply turned the state loose from divine moral authority, allowing it to go its own way. Rather, Hirsch insisted that for the German Idealist prolongation of Luther, the state had been bound to serve a higher moral goal in the service of humanity and the Kingdom of the Moral (*Reich der Sittlichen*) as known in the presence of the eternal in the conscience.¹¹⁰

In Hirsch’s 1933 article, conscience must trust that God’s historical *Nein* at Versailles implied a secret *Ja* of blessing to the divine mission of the German *Volk* in its laws and orders of life. Thus, “Das Volk . . . ist der verborgene, und damit der wahre Suverän.”¹¹¹ (The *Volk* . . . is the hidden, and thus the true Sovereign). Of course this referred only to the *Volk* whose consciences had been instructed about their divine mission, and not to just any accidental democratic “visible” majority at the polls.¹¹² With this transhistorical proviso, Hirsch was entirely prepared to recognize the binding authority of Romans 13 in government by the *Volk*, since any unpalatable government was by definition open to revolutionary overthrow in view of its disagreement with the divine mis-

¹⁰⁸ Tilgner, *Volksnomostheologie*, 151.

¹⁰⁹ Cited in n. 78 above; see Schweer, “Ethik,” 86–90; Schjørring, *Gewissensethik*, 155 n. 7 and 157 n. 11; Schneider-Flume, *Theologie*, 153–59; Ulrich Ruh, *Säkularisierung als Interpretationskategorie* (Freiburger Theologische Studien 190; Freiburg: Herder, 1980) 175–80, 279–99.

¹¹⁰ See n. 86 above.

¹¹¹ Hirsch, “Suverän,” 7; “einem heimlichen Ja,” “deutsche Sendung,” 5.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 7; cf. 5–6, 8–13.

sion of the *Volk*.¹¹³ It is noteworthy that after 1933 Hirsch claimed to have espoused such a right of revolution during the Weimar Republic.¹¹⁴

After 1933 Hirsch used his doctrine of hidden sovereignty to emphasize the benevolent continuity between God's plan and the work of Hitler. Like his doctrine of the hiddenness of God, Hirsch's doctrine of the Hidden Sovereign affirmed continuity of blessing despite occasional appearances to the contrary. Like the doctrine of divine hiddenness, hidden sovereignty could always be used to indict lack of trust.¹¹⁵

At the same time, since the state created by the action of human choice corresponded to the divine mission of the *Volk*, Hirsch could claim that the state was not its own goal but a servant of a higher purpose. Hence it deserved "to be honored inwardly as a divine action and work"; thus autonomy and heteronomy (socio-political and individual as well as divine and human demands) were reconciled in the "free" coincidence of the religious feelings and external duties.¹¹⁶

Without doubt Hirsch intended for his political theology to serve a metajuristic function in response to the crisis of neo-Kantian jurisprudence. This aspect has been ignored by most scholars, notably by Robert Ericksen in his recent study of *Theologians Under Hitler*.¹¹⁷ In 1936 Hirsch was invited to contribute to the *Festschrift* for the neo-Kantian constitutional and legal theorist Rudolf Stammler. In his article Hirsch vehemently argued that the entire neo-Kantian reliance on a closed system of law was completely outmoded in the New Germany. Its defect lay in its failure to see the need for a metajuristic appeal to the *Volk* as the source and goal of law. Having thus insulted the recipient of the honorary volume, Hirsch contended that law must work with the religious category of divine judgment ultimately known only to individual faith questing after the eternal and the hidden.¹¹⁸

Such were the results of interpreting 1933 as a God-given turning point in the cycle of European history. As Hirsch's old friend Tillich wrote to him in an open letter from Union Seminary in 1934, "You have moved the year 1933 so close to the year 33 that it has acquired salvation-historical significance for

¹¹³ Cf. Schweer, "Ethik," 86–89; as Schweer notes (86 n. 2) Hirsch does not here undertake an explicit discussion of Rom 13:1–7—though the meaning is clear enough. Schweer says (89 n. 1) that Hirsch here prepares a "knife" for use against the Weimar Republic.

¹¹⁴ Hirsch, *Lage*, 117. See also the articles by Rendtorff and Nowak cited in n. 76 above.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Hirsch, *Freiheit*, 26, 29; idem, *Werke*, III. 1. 2, 279–45.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., III. 1. 2, 280. For Hirsch's own concept of "Autonomie" see *Lage*, 41 and *Werke*, III. 1. 157. Cf. Werner Conze, et al., "Freiheit," *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 2. 425–542.

¹¹⁷ Cited in n. 2 above; cf. on Stammler, Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal*, 73.

¹¹⁸ Hirsch, "Recht und Religion," *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 29 (1935/36) 226–38 esp. 228.

you.”¹¹⁹ Another result of this approach was Hirsch’s historical-critical argument in favor of a non-Jewish ancestry for Jesus.¹²⁰ Likewise he found that God’s revelation in the *Volk* required that only those sympathetic to Hitler be fully supported as church leaders.¹²¹

God hidden in the historical mission of the *Volk*—this is the message of Hirsch’s political theology. As Tillich in effect suggested in 1934, Hirsch and the pro-Nazi Lutherans were illegitimately conferring a “priestly-sacramental consecration” on Hitler. This can be taken to imply that Hirsch was wrongly applying the anti-Nestorian and anti-Zwinglian thrust of Lutheran christology of the hypostatic union to politics: for Hirsch the visible finite is so capable of encompassing the invisible infinite that Hitler becomes the visible sign of the invisible grace of the divine mission of the transhistorical *Volk*.¹²² So is attained a theodicy of history rooted in Luther’s hidden God, conflated with Schleiermacher’s theology of consciousness, perverted by Fichte’s view of the conscience, and made explosive by resort to Nietzsche’s emphasis on the power of irrational myth. Hirsch’s indebtedness to cultural Protestantism gave him so pallid a doctrine of revelation that he could see no obstacle to casting his lot with the Nazis; that is, he mistakenly thought that his ritual incantation of words like “God,” “Gospel,” and “conscience” could ethicize and domesticate the amoral aestheticism and nihilistic politics that were in Hitler not hidden but fully revealed.

Hirsch undertook a pseudo-ethicizing of politics;¹²³ in so doing he ended by

¹¹⁹ Paul Tillich, “Die Theologie des Kairos und die gegenwärtige geistige Lage,” *Theologische Blätter* 13 (November 1934) 305–28; cf. 313: “Damit hast Du das Jahr ‘1933’ dem Jahre ‘33’ so angenähert, dass es für Dich heilsgeschichtlich Bedeutung gewonnen hat.” Cf. Erickson, *Theologians*, 179–83. (There are many English versions of Tillich’s sentence; cf. the one by Victor Nuovo and Robert P. Scharlemann in *The Thought of Paul Tillich* [ed. James Luther Adams et al.; San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985] 364.)

¹²⁰ Hirsch, *Wesen*, 158–65; Gösta Lundström, *The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus: A History of Interpretation* (trans. Joan Bulman; Richmond: John Knox, 1963) 125–26, 131 n. 7; Martin Lehmann, *Synoptische Quellenanalyse und die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus* (BZNW 38; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970). This is not the place to follow the trail of this notion backward; suffice it to say that it would lead us back to Paul Haupt and beyond.

¹²¹ “Deutsch-christliches Bekenntnis,” dated “Berlin, zur Weihnachtszeit 1933” and signed by Hirsch, Ernst Haenchen, and others, reprinted in *Junge (!) Kirche* 2 (1934) 28–30; see p. 30: “Wir können heute nur von solchen Christen rechte kirchliche Führung in der Wirklichkeit von Volk und Staat erwarten, welche in der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung eine für alle Deutschen verbindliche neue Gestalt deutschen Lebens erkennen.” Cf. Erickson, *Theologians*, 167–77.

¹²² Tillich, “Theologie,” 312; idem, *Protestantismus und politische Romantik* in *Gesammelte Werke*, 2, 212–15; cf. Werner Elert, “Über die Herkunft des Satzes Finitum infiniti non capax,” *ZStH* 16 (1939) 500–504.

¹²³ Writers on Holl and Hirsch frequently speak of their “ethicizing.” “Pseudo-ethicizing” is the better term, unless one concede that ethics is merely rationalization of inclination and self-interest. Note Holl’s review of Hirsch, *Deutschlands Schicksal* (Appendix F), with approval of Hirsch’s

ascribing sacral significance to Hitler as fulfillment of God's promise to bless. Hirsch embarked on this road in 1921 in response to Troeltsch's criticism of what we know conventionally as the amoral reliance on untamed force in Luther's Two Kingdoms Doctrine. Does this mean that there is not only a road from Luther to Hitler, but also a road from Troeltsch to Hitler, and perhaps even a road leading from Troeltsch's proto-democratic Reformation Spiritualists to Hitler?¹²⁴ Both no and yes to all questions. Far more important to us is another question: Having seen the motivation and results of Hirsch's abandonment of the separation of religion and politics, can contemporary non-Nazi political theologians avoid comparable disasters? Or will future historians be forced to conclude that any mixing of theology with politics must lead to enthusiastic fanaticism, zealotry, and the sanctification of ideological holy war?¹²⁵

unrepentant nationalism in 1920: "Man möchte wünschen, dass [dieses Buch] in vieler Hände, zumal in die Hände unserer Jugend käme. Es hat die Kraft in sich, den Geist zu erwecken, der uns jetzt vor allem not tut."

¹²⁴ Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1: *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (1922; reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1961) 848–940 ("Die Mystik und der Spiritualismus").

This sentence has aroused some comment. By way of clarification I would add that I certainly do not question Troeltsch's hearty support of the Weimar Republic. I rather mean to imply that the "ethicizing" of politics supported by appeal to Troeltsch and the "Left Wing" of the Reformation (in opposition to the Two Kingdoms position and the Enlightenment separation of religion and politics) is an extremely ambiguous matter. I see no good reason to suppose that "ethicizing" politics by injecting religion into it can guarantee protection against fanaticism, intolerance, and persecution. Even those who persist in claiming that the so-called Two Kingdoms doctrine somehow caused Hitler's rise (in the face of evidence that the "Third Reich" represents an outgrowth of a mania which is quasi-religious in essence), must admit that religion has something to do with recent events in, for example, Iran.—Yes, but that is the wrong religion and not the one I had in mind.—Precisely my point. The great achievement of the English Enlightenment lay in its (temporarily successful) effort to exclude as many religious passions as possible from politics. Alas, the Reign of Terror illustrates the difficulty of the problem.

¹²⁵ For documentation on these points see Appendix I on the world-political context of "secularization" and "political theology."

Appendix A: Weimar Conservatism: A Bibliographical Appendix

On this topic, see Louis Dupeux, “Nationalbolschewismus” in *Deutschland 1919–1933* (trans. Richard Kirchhoff; Munich: Beck, 1985); Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany* (New York: Scribner’s, 1960); George L. Mosse, *The Culture of Western Europe* (New York: Rand McNally, 1961); Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961); George Foot Moore, “Christian Writers on Judaism,” *HTR* 14 (1921) 197–254; Armin Mohler, *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932: Ein Handbuch* (2d ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972); Helmut Dolezal, “Hörbiger, Hanns,” *Neue deutsche Biographie* 9 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1971) 352–53; H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York: Knopf, 1961); Aurel Kolnai, *The War Against the West* (New York: Viking, 1938); Friedrich August von Hayek, “The Socialist Roots of Naziism,” in idem, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) 167–80; Hayek, “Was ist und was heisst ‘sozial’?” in Albert Hunold, ed., *Masse und Demokratie* (Erlenbach-Zürich, 1957) 71–85; Wolfgang Hock, *Deutscher Antikapitalismus* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Bankwirtschaft und Bankrecht an der Universität Köln, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Reihe 9; Frankfurt: Knapp, 1960); Robert Hepp, *Politik: Studien zur Säkularisierung des Protestantismus im Weltkrieg und in der Weimarer Republik* (Ph.D. diss., Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1967); Konrad H. Jarausch, *Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Bernd Faulenbach, *Ideologie des deutschen Weges* (Munich: Beck, 1980); Klaus Schwabe, *Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969); Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany’s New Conservatism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik* (2d ed.; Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1964); Helmut Plessner, *Die Verspätete Nation*, in idem, *Gesammelte Schriften* 6 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982) 7–224; Christian Graf von Krockow, *Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger* (Göttinger Abhandlungen zur Soziologie 3; Stuttgart: Enke, 1958); Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933* (trans. Eric Matthews; Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); J. H. W. Rosteußer, *Die Wiederkunft des Dionysos* (Bern: Francke, 1947); Georg Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (East Berlin: Aufbau, 1955); S. Rücker, “Irrational, das Irrationale, Irrationalismus,” in Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, eds., *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1976) 4. 583–88; Werner Elert, *Der Kampf um das Christentum* (Munich: Beck, 1921); Richard Frank Krummel, *Nietzsche und der deutsche Geist* (Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung 3 and 9; Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1974 and 1983); Hermann Lübke, *Politische Philosophie in Deutschland* (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1963); Carl Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923–1939* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940); Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft Berlin 4; Stuttgart/Düsseldorf: Ring, 1955); Manfred Schroeter, *Der Streit um Spengler* (Munich: Beck, 1922); Joachim H. Knoll and Julius H. Schoeps, eds., *Vom Kommenden Zeiten: Geschichtsprophetien im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Studien zur Geistesgeschichte 4; Stuttgart/Bonn: Burg, 1984);

Hubert Cancik, ed., *Religions- und Geistesgeschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1982); Klaus Scholder, *Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich*, vol. 1: *Vorgeschichte und Zeit der Illusionen 1918–1934* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1977); Jochen Jacke, *Kirche zwischen Monarchie und Republik* (Hamburger Beiträge zur Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte 12; Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1976); Kurt Nowak, *Evangelische Kirche und Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981); Alexander Schwan, "Zeitgenössische Philosophie und Theologie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Weimarer Republik," in *Weimar, Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie* (Düsseldorf, 1980) 259–61, cited in Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies* (trans. Ewald Osers; New York: St. Martin's, 1984) 135 n. 2.

As early as 1927 the forms "Frühkapitalismus," "Hochkapitalismus," "Altkapitalismus," and "Feudalkapitalismus" were documented. The form "Spätkapitalismus" may have appeared only somewhat later. Nonetheless, the evidence strongly suggests that many earlier writers on the Left applied a dynamic of temporalization to the concept of capitalism to imply its eventual disappearance; the analogy with the notion of "Spätjudentum" ought not to be overlooked. See Marie-Elisabeth Hilger and Lucian Hölscher, "Kapital/Kapitalist, Kapitalismus," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982) 450, citing Richard Passow, "Kapitalismus," (2d ed.; Jena, 1927) 34; Bracher, "Ende des bürgerlichen Zeitalters?" in idem, *Europa in der Krise* (Frankfurt, 1979) 112ff., cited in idem, *Age*, 39 n. 1; cf. Reinhart Koselleck, "The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts," in idem, *Futures Past* (trans. Keith Tribe; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) 159–97, and idem, "'Neuzeit,'" in *Futures*, 265: "Ideological criticism distributes the validation of political discourse among the succession of historical periods. It is precisely on the basis of the categories 'earlier than' or 'later than,' and especially on that of 'too early' or 'too late,' that attitudes can be 'ideologically' deciphered in a way distinct from that followed with other modes of examination. . . . Ideological criticism . . . argues with concepts of movement whose burden of proof can only be summoned up in the future." So arises the necessity to "make" History Itself so as to validate one's position—a necessity that can bring world-wide civil war.

Appendix B: Cultural Criticism in the Wake of Nietzsche

On cultural criticism, decadence, and the *völkisch* attitude, see Mohler, *Die Konservative Revolution*, 24, 78–129, 138–41; Mosse, *Culture of Western Europe*, 219, 279. Here I should like to acknowledge a debt to the penetrating analyses of the *völkisch* mentality in the works of Mosse and of Michael Ledeen. The notion of "old" versus "young" peoples or cultures was popularized by the original (1922) propagandist for a "Third Reich," Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, who in Stern's words (*Politics*, 191), asserted that "the peoples of the world were divided into young and old peoples—roughly, those that still had a future and those that did not." See Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, *Sturm- und Kampflieder für Front und Heimat* (Berlin: Propaganda-Verlag Paul Hochmuth, 1939) 6 ("Jugend kennt keine Gefahren. . . . Jugend! Jugend! wir sind der Zukunft Soldaten."); 16 ("Eine junges Volk steht auf, zum Sturm bereit!"); 18 ("Es zittern die morschen Knochen der Welt vor dem roten Krieg. Wir haben den Schrecken gebrochen. . . . Und mögen die Alten auch schelten . . . wir werden doch Sieger sein").

It would be morbidly fascinating to linger here, dwelling on the suicidal nihilism implicit in this paradigm of conservative revolution, with its notion that the cycle can be moved on from decay to rebirth only by an intensification of current decadence. One could look at links between the notion of decadent separation from eternal myth and the rise of that elitist anti-Semitism so despised by Nietzsche. Here we could take our cue from Harvard's George Foot Moore, who in 1921 indicted the heritage of Erlangen scholarship on Judaism for its acceptance of the absurd notion that postexilic Judaism made God totally inaccessible and hence doomed to concentrate on law at the expense of attention to the love and life that came from closeness to God (see Moore, "Christian Writers," 228–54). Or we could look at turn-of-the-century figures like Georges Sorel and the notion of rejuvenating deeds of violence in their association with elitist opposition to parliamentary democracy and modern *Spätkapitalismus*, Late Capitalism (see Hughes, *Consciousness*, 91, 162–66, 170–75; Hock, *Antikapitalismus*). For our purposes, though, the popularization of Nietzschean cultural criticism after 1918 means the emergence of three interconnected tendencies among conservatives: (1) the tendency to think in historical cycles of decay and rebirth or of ebbing and flowing; (2) the tendency to see all branches of culture as linked within a given epoch, so that the health of religion and the health of the state are somehow intertwined; (3) the tendency to favor aesthetic over morally absolute categories in evaluating historical events.

Appendix C: Paganism and Religiosity

Here I can only point to the immensity of the problem of revived paganism in post-Enlightenment Europe; its varieties (Greek, Babylonian, Celtic, Latin, Runic-Teutonic) are legion. Its appearance coincides roughly with the emergence of Protestant revivals of confessionalism and Roman Catholic revivals of medieval and antique-patristic (e.g., Odo Casel) religiosity, as well as with the emergence of a priestly Romanticism of Protestant self-hatred or doubt about the Reformation (Anglo-Catholicism, Berneuchener). For paganism in "time machine" religiosity, see, e.g., Rosteutscher, *Wiederkunft*; Klaus Vondung, *Magie und Manipulation: ideologischer Kult und politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); Edgar Salin, *Um Stefan George* (2d ed.; Munich/Düsseldorf, 1954); Friedrich Wilhelm Haack, *Wotans Wiederkunft* (Munich: Claudius, 1981); Alfred Baeumler, "Bachofen und Nietzsche," "Nietzsche und der Nationalsozialismus," "Hellas und Germanien," in idem, *Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte* (Berlin: Junker & Dünhaupt, 1937); Margaret Alice Murray, "Witchcraft," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.; London/New York, 1929) 23. 686–88, an article unreliable in numerous particulars; Hans Hauptmann, *Jesus der Arier: Ein Heldenleben* (Munich: Deutscher Volksverlag, 1930); Martin Ninck, *Wotan und germanischer Schicksalsglaube* (Jena: Diedrichs, 1935); Scholder, *Kirchen*, 572–77 (on Jakob Wilhelm Hauer); also on Hauer's Teutonic faith, see Jean-Pierre Sironneau, *Sécularisation et religions politiques* (Religion and Society 17; The Hague, 1982) 282: "Au dieu-père judéo-chrétien tend à se substituer un dieu maternal aryen: . . . Rosenberg, dans le *Mythe du XXe siècle*, développera les même thèmes"; Ernst Bergmann, *Erkenntnisgeist und Muttergeist: Eine Soziologie der Geschlechter* (2d ed.; Breslau: Hirt, 1933); Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Women-Church: What Is It? Where Is It Going?" *The World* 1 (March/April 1987) 4–7; Heinz Hoffmann, "' . . . und ist kein anderer Gott'? Bemerkungen zur Gesangbucharbeit der 'Deutschen Christen,'" in Siegfried

Herrmann and Oskar Söhngen, eds., *Theologie in Geschichte und Kunst: Walter Elliger zum 65. Geburtstag* (Witten: Luther, 1967) 83–93; Jost Hermand, “All Power to the Women: Nazi Concepts of Matriarchy,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 19 (1984) 649–67; Kurt Leese, “Die Magna Mater: zur Lebensmetaphysik Ludwig Klages,” *ZThK* 41 (1933) 25–45; Henry Hatfield, *Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Walter Rehm, *Griechentum und Goethezeit: Geschichte eines Glaubens* (Das Erbe der Alten 26; Leipzig: Dietrich, 1936); F. Kückler, “Bibel und Babel,” *RGK* 1 (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1909) 1138–44 (with bibliography on the early phase of the Friedrich Delitzsch controversy); Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele* (2 vols.; Salzburg/Leipzig: Pustet, 1937); Theophil Spoerri, *Die Götter des Abendlandes: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Heidentum in der Kultur unserer Zeit* (3d ed.; Berlin: Furche, 1932); Eric Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen* (2d ed.; Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer, 1939); Romano Guardini, *Der Heilbringer in Mythos, Offenbarung und Politik* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1945).

Appendix D: Carl Schmitt: A Bibliographical Note

See esp. Frithard Scholz, “Die Theologie Carl Schmitts,” in *Monotheismus als politisches Problem?* and Taubes, ed., *Religionstheorie*, vol. 1; Piet Tommissen, “Carl Schmitt—metajuristisch betrachtet,” *Criticón* 30 (1975) 177–84; Karl Löwith, “Der Okkasionelle Dezisionismus von C. Schmitt,” in idem, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960) 92–126; Klaus-Michael Kodalle, *Politik als Macht und Mythos: Carl Schmitts “Politische Theologie”* (Urban-Taschenbücher, Reihe 80, Band 842; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973); Hans Maier, *Kritik der politischen Theologie* (Kriterion 20; Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1970); Ulrich Ruh, *Säkularisierung als Interpretationskategorie* (Freiburger Theologische Studien 119; Freiburg: Herder, 1980) 279–99; Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (trans. Robert M. Wallace; Studies in Contemporary German Social thought; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983) 89–102.

For orientation in the vast literature by and about Schmitt, see Mohler, *Die Konservative Revolution*, 325–27; Tommissen, *Versuch einer Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie* (Düsseldorf: Academia Moralis, 1953); idem, “Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie,” in Hans Barion, Ernst Forsthoff and Werner Weber, eds., *Festschrift für Carl Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959) 273–330; idem, “Ergänzungsliste zur Carl-Schmitt-Bibliographie vom Jahre 1959,” in Hans Barion et al., eds., *Epirrhosis: Festgabe für Carl Schmitt* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968) 2. 739–78; idem, “Zweite Fortsetzungsliste der C.S.-Bibliographie vom Jahre 1959,” *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto* 16/44 (1978) 187–238; F. R. Cristi, “Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 17 (1984) 529–32; José M. Beneyto, *Politische Theologie als politische Theorie* (Schriften zur Rechtslehre 105; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1983); the last three items are cited by George Schwab in his trans. of Schmitt, *Politische Theologie* (cited below) xiv, xxvi, xv.

In general, see George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970); Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), esp. p. 35 with its detailing of how Schmitt took part in Max

Weber's Munich seminar of 1919–20; see also the discussion of Schmitt and Article 48 of the Weimar constitution; G. L. Ulmen, "The Sociology of the State: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber," *State, Culture and Society* 1 (1985) 3–49; Paul Hirst, "Socialism, Pluralism and Law," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 13 (1983) esp. 175–81. Heinrich Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik des Sommers 1932," in Theodor Schieder, ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik* (Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 1; Munich: Oldenbourg, 1971) 75–147; Hasso Hofmann, *Legitimität gegen Legalität* (Politica 19; Neuwied/Berlin: Luchterhand, 1964); Jürgen Fijalkowski, *Die Wendung zum Führerstaat* (Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft Berlin 12; Cologne/Opladen, 1958); Mathias Schmitz, *Die Freund-Feind-Theorie Carl Schmitts* (Ordo Politicus 3; Cologne/Opladen, 1965); Heinz Laufer, *Das Kriterium politischen Handelns* (Jur. diss., Universität Würzburg; Munich: Institut für Politische Wissenschaften der Universität München, 1961); Volker Neumann, *Der Staat im Bürgerkrieg* (Campus Forschung 136; Frankfurt, 1980); Martin Jänicke, *Totalitäre Herrschaft: Anatomie eines politischen Begriffes* (Soziologische Abhandlung 13; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1971); Thomas Würtenberger jun., *Die Legitimität staatlicher Herrschaft: Eine staatsrechtlich-politische Begriffsgeschichte* (Schriften zur Verfassungsgeschichte 20; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973); Klaus Schlaich, *Neutralität als verfassungsrechtliches Prinzip* (Tübinger Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen 34; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1972); Michael Schweitzer and Heinhard Steiger, "Neutralität," in Brunner, Conze, and Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 315–70; Odo Marquard, "Neutralisierungen, Zeitalter der," *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer; Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1984) 6. 781–82; "Carl Schmitt gestorben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Mittwoch, 10. April 1985) 1; Schmitt, *Political Romanticism* (trans. Guy Oakes; Cambridge; MIT Press, 1986); idem, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (trans. Ellen Kennedy; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).

For Schmitt and Vaihinger, see Schmitt, "Juristische Fiktionen," *Deutsche Juristenzeitung* 18 (1913) 804–6. Schmitt's historical critique of parliamentary democracy seems to end in the claim that, since political form is derived from a metaphysic or theology underlying the epoch, and since divine right had eroded, the choice was between anarchy and dictatorship. The issue would seem to be, then, the following: as Schmitt seemed to accept the conservative rhetoric of decadence and improvement by intensification of the decay of liberalism (thus his claim that the "total," omniscient welfare state born of weakness in surrender to all factions is precursor of a total state strong in its own right), did he then at any point see in Hitler a cyclic rebirth of some newly instituted divine right? I cannot claim to give an answer. A negative answer might be detected in Schmitt's claim that, before Hitler came to power, he worked to prevent that event. Moreover, I am hard pressed to see in Schmitt's Nazi period any clear resumption of his claims for Catholic divine right politics from the early 1920s. Key texts in this connection include: Schmitt, "Die Sichtbarkeit der Kirche," *Summa* 2. Viertel (1917) 71–80; idem, *Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form* [with imprimatur] (2d ed.; Der katholische Gedanke 13; Munich/Rome: Theatiner Verlag, 1925); idem, *Verfassungslehre* (Munich/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1928) 16; see esp. "Die zwei Prinzipien politischer Form: Identität und Repräsentation" (204–16) and 22, 282–92; Fijalkowski, *Wendung*, 174–81. See esp. Scholz, "Theologie," 164: "In dem

rechtsbegrifflich noch unbestimmten Aufsatz von 1917: Die Sichtbarkeit der Institution Kirche entspricht der Sichtbarwerdung Gottes in der Inkarnation." Ibid., 165: "Dieser ... Souveränitätsbegriff wird aber juristisch erst praktikabel, ... als Schmitt 1923 die weiterführende Figur der 'Repräsentation an der Katholischen Kirche abliest ... [als] der ... Vorgang, der eine nicht präsente Autorität durch einen Stellvertreter für einen autoritätsunterworfenen. ... Dritten verbindlich darstellt. ... In der Konstruktion des Repräsentationsbegriffes bei Schmitt liegt aber eine Dynamik beschlossen, die den Repräsentierten löst." Ibid., 166: "Schmitts Rechtstheorie ist Theologie—aber eine nachgemachte und ... kaum christlich."

Yet certain texts in Schmitt could perhaps be taken to imply a quasi-divine legitimation for Hitler, though one devoid of derivation from Schmitt's Catholic "representation." Note the use of "realer Präsenz" and "unmittelbarer Gegenwart" to signify "eine unbedingte Artgleichheit zwischen Führer und Gefolgschaft" by Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Der deutsche Staat der Gegenwart 1; Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934) 42; also note the sacral overtones in Schmitt, "Der Führer schützt das Recht (1934)," in idem, *Positionen*, 200: "Das Richtertum des Führers entspringt derselben Rechtsquelle, der alles Recht jedes Volkes entspringt. ... Alles Recht stammt aus dem Lebensrecht des Volkes." Here all depends on how "divine" Schmitt meant *Volk* and *Führer* to be. Equally ambivalent (and crucial) are Schmitt's *original* intentions in his notoriously difficult *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938); cf. Schmitt, "Die Vollendete Reformation," *Der Staat* 4 (1965) 51–69; Helmut Rumpf, *Carl Schmitt und Thomas Hobbes* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972); Martin Jänicke, "Die 'abgründige Wissenschaft': Zur Hobbes-Deutung Carl Schmitts im Dritten Reich," *Zeitschrift für Politik* n.s. 16 (1969) 401–15. At all events, I see no evidence that Schmitt provided positive arguments for a renewal of divine right in Hitler, and I read Schmitt's embrace of Hitler as an act of opportunism made easier for Schmitt by Hitler's claim to serve the rejuvenation of Germany. However this may be, Schmitt received a Catholic burial; see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Samstag, 13. April 1985) 28. On Vaihinger's relation to Schmitt, see the perceptive comments in Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der deutschen Innenpolitik," 143–44.

Appendix E: Emanuel Hirsch: A Bibliographical Note

Trillhaas, "Hirsch," 39; Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought*, vol. 1: *Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) 30–31; Ericksen, *Theologians*, 123. Ericksen's treatment of Hirsch is a pioneering effort in English, usually correct in its narrative and an excellent synthesis of a variety of materials (though stylistically flawed). Yet Ericksen as an intellectual historian does not do an altogether satisfactory job of placing Hirsch in his *Sitz im Leben*. He shows no sign of awareness of Hirsch's interest in Carl Schmitt and would have benefited by taking into account Mohler (*Revolution*, 401, 426, 138–42), who puts Hirsch during his earlier Weimar days into a Protestant subgroup of the "Jungkonservativen": not purely reactionary, not violently revolutionary, but oriented toward a further, "sober" development of the ideal of the *Reich* as political form, an ideal that was combined with a definite interest in both Christianity and juridical argumentation. For *Reich* in Hirsch, see his *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Weimar: Deutsche Christen, 1939) 83–84, 89, 140, 157. In accord with Mohler's assessment of

Hirsch is the report that the Deutsche Christen at one point accused the *Glaube und Volk* circle (Heinrich Rendtorff, Paul Althaus, and Hirsch) of having too "preussischkonservativ" a notion of the *Volk* (i.e., one insufficiently racist); see Wennemar Schweer, "Die theologische Ethik des Politischen bei Emanuel Hirsch" (Th.D. diss., Heidelberg University, 1969) 95. Schweer's dissertation is, to be sure, the best intellectual biography of Hirsch to date; however, it, like the work of Ericksen, fails adequately to make the central point that Hirsch and other pro-Nazi intellectuals cannot be adequately understood if they are treated simply as part of a Right treated in isolation from other attackers of liberal democracy and liberal economics. The great failure of most writers on these topics is a failure to see that Right and Left share an indebtedness to a common continental heritage of antipluralism and antiliberalism. While individual figures among critics of "bourgeois" democracy varied in the degree to which they approached the ideal type of a total repudiation of parliamentary democracy, free market economics, and societal pluralism, these empirical deviations from the ideal type of antiliberalism in no way justify the customary failure of scholars to register the existence of a tradition of antiliberalism shared by extremes of Left and Right. This claim is one that I hope to argue in detail by means of a comparison of Hirsch the Nazi with Tillich the Religious Socialist in a book-length manuscript now in preparation; cf. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) 142, 157; Ellen Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt und die 'Frankfurter Schule': Deutsche Liberalismuskritik im 20. Jahrhundert," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 12 (1986) 380–419; Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, *Theonomie: Fallstudien zum Integrationsanspruch neuzeitlicher Theologie* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1987); Norman Podhoretz, *The Bloody Crossroads* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) 119 n.: "In Europe opposition to the rising power of industrial capitalism came (at least until 1945) from the Right as well as the Left, taking the form of fascism and of literally reactionary political movements which advocated the restoration of monarchy or of an essentially feudal social organization." Cf. James Nuechterlein, "Neoconservatism & Irving Kristol," *Commentary* 78:2 (August 1984) 43–52. See also Müller, ed., *Christliche Wahrheit*; Friedrich Böbel, *Menschliche und christliche Wahrheit bei Emanuel Hirsch* (Th.D. diss., Erlangen-Nürnberg University, 1963); Gunda Schneider-Flume, *Die politische Theologie Emanuel Hirschs 1918–1933* (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XXIII, vol. 5; Bern/Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1971; Jens Holger Schjørring, *Theologische Gewissensethik und politische Wirklichkeit* (Arbeiten zur kirchlichen Zeitgeschichte, Reihe B, Band 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979); Wolfgang Tilgner, *Volksnomostheologie und Schöpfungsglaube* (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes 16; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966); Scholder, *Die Kirchen*, 1. 127–33, 213–15, 211–23, 402–4, 528–47; Michael Weinrich, *Der Wirklichkeit begegnen . . .* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1980) 265–331; Friedrich Miltenberger, *Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Theologie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Theologische Wissenschaft 10; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981) 26, 182, 184, 250–51. For details of Hirsch's early years (including the onset of his retinal detachment in 1917) see Hans-Walter Schütte, ed., *Emanuel Hirsch/Paul Tillich Briefwechsel 1917–1918* (Berlin/Schleswig-Holstein: Die Spur, 1973) esp. 9; Jean-Loup Seban, "The Theology of Nationalism of Emanuel Hirsch," *Princeton Seminary Bulletin* n.s. 7 (1986) 157–76.

Appendix F: Karl Holl: A Bibliographical Note

In the pursuit of Holl bibliography I have been greatly assisted by Prof. Dr. Robert Stupperich and Prof. Dr. Johannes Wallmann, to whom I extend my thanks.

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Reformation in der Sicht Ernst Troeltschs," *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie* 5 (1963) 132–72; Walter F. Bense, "Editor's Introduction," in Karl Holl, *What Did Luther Understand by Religion?* (ed. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense; trans. Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietzke; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) 1–14; Bense, "Editor's Introduction," in Karl Holl, *The Reconstruction of Morality* (ed. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense; trans. Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietzke; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1979) 9–30; Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther im Spiegel der deutschen Geistesgeschichte* (2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970) 114–17; Walther von Loewenich, *Luther und der Neoprotestantismus* (Witten/Ruhr: Luther, 1963) 279–83; Horst Stephan and Martin Schmidt, *Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Theologie seit dem deutschen Idealismus* (Sammlung Töpelmann 1. Reihe, Band 9; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1960) 295–98, 324, 332, 335–36, 345, 352–54; John Dillenberger, *God Hidden and Revealed* (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1953) 19–27, 36–41, 578; Gerhard O. Forde, *The Law-Gospel Debate* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1969) 128–31, 194–98; Bernhard Lohse, *Martin Luther: eine Einführung in sein Leben und sein Werk* (Munich: Beck, 1981) 232–35; Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, *Reformatorsche Vernunftkritik und neuzeitliches Denken* (BHT 59; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1980) 181–218, 255–56, 296–97; Klaus Schwabe, *Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969) 39, 70, 186; Bernd Faulenbach, *Ideologie des deutschen Weges* (Munich: Beck, 1980) 126; Scholder, *Kirchen*, 1. 50, 133–34, 529; Walter Bodenstein, "Karl Holl," in Martin Greschat, ed., *Theologen des Protestantismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978) 2. 256–71; cf. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., *Ruling Class, Regime and Reformation at Strasbourg 1520–1555* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 22; Leiden: Brill, 1978) 11 n. 40: the approach of the "Luther Renaissance" was "basically a special form of ideological warfare against the Weimar Republik."

Appendix G: "Irrationalism" and Schicksal

So far as I can see, scholarship has not yet adequately dealt with the reception by German Protestant (and Catholic) theology of such themes as "Irrationalism," *Schicksal*, Nietzsche, Jung, Bachofen, "Mythos," Rudolf Otto, etc.—despite numerous publications on the Deutsche Christen; cf. Scholder, *Kirchen*, 1. 93–109, 572–76. Among the sources for this complex phenomenon of positive reception and negative reaction are: Paul Tillich, "Philosophie und Schicksal (1929)," *Gesammelte Werke* (= GW; ed. Renate Albrecht; Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1975) 14. 84–131; idem, *Das Dämonische* (1926) in GW 6. 42–71; GW 4; GW 12. 286; 12. 128; 12. 184; 12. 384; see esp. Tillich on "politische Romantik" in GW 2. 209–18, 234–63; cf. Carl Schmitt, *Politische Romantik* (2d ed.; Munich/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1929); Detlef Döring, *Christentum und Faschismus: Die Faschismusdeutung der religiösen Sozialisten* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1982); C. Axelos, "Dämonisch, das Dämonische," *Historisches Wörterbuch* (ed. Ritter) 2. 4–5; Rücker, "Irrational," (n. 3 above); "Schicksal," *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe* (ed. Rudolf Eisler and Karl Roretz; 2d ed.; Berlin: Mittler, 1929) 4. 754–55; A. Bertholet and O. Piper, "Schicksal" (with bibliography), *RGG* 5 (2d ed.) 155–57; H. Ringgren, K. E. Løgstrup, and J. Konrad, "Schicksal" (with bibliography), *RGG* 5 (3d ed.) 1404–10; Hans Henning Freiherr Grote, *Das Schicksalsbuch des deutschen Volkes: Von Hermann dem Cherusker bis Adolf Hitler*

(Berlin: Schönfeld, n.d.); Rudolf Ibel, *Schicksal und Sendung* (Das Reich im Werden: Arbeitshefte im Dienste politischer Erziehung, Reihe: Deutsches Schrifttum 9; Frankfurt a. M.: Diesterweg, 1934); Uwe-Karsten Ketelsen, *Von heroischem Sein und völkischem Tod: Zur Dramatik des Drittes Reiches* (Abhandlungen zur Kunst-, Musik- und Literaturwissenschaft 96; Bonn: Bouvier, 1970) esp. "Schicksal," 230–43 (a computerized analysis of Hirsch's use of *Schicksal* and *schicksalhaft* would indicate his indebtedness to the currents traced by Ketelsen, even after 1945); on the use of "Schicksal" by critics of Hitler in Germany, see Trutz Rendtorff, "Die Religion in der Moderne—die Moderne in der Religion," *ThLZ* 110 (1985) 561–74; Stephan and Schmidt, *Geschichte* (2d ed.) 318–21; Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University (1933/34)," trans. Karsten Harries, *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1985) 467–502; idem, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*, in idem, *Gesamtausgabe, II Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923–1944* (ed. Susanne Ziegler; Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1980); Balthasar, *Apokalypse*, 3. 454 (s.v. "Heidegger"); idem, *Geschichte des eschatologischen Problems in der modernen deutschen Literatur* (Ph.D. diss., Zürich, 1930); Ferdinand Kattenbusch, *Die deutsche evangelische Theologie seit Schleiermacher*, 2. Teil: *Zeitenwende auch in der Theologie* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1934); Rudolf Otto, *Gottheit und Gottheit der Arier* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1932); Heinrich Frick, "Rudolf Otto innerhalb der theologischen Situation," *ZThK* 46 (1938) 3–15; Hans Walter Schütte, *Religion und Christentum in der Theologie Rudolf Ottos* (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 15; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1969); Heinz Erich Eisenhuth, *Der Begriff des Irrationalen als philosophisches Problem* (Studien zur systematischen Theologie 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1931); Wolf-Erich Klünker, *Psychologische Analyse und theologische Wahrheit: Die religionspsychologische Methode Georg Wobbermins* (Göttinger theologische Arbeiten 33; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985); Georg Wobbermin, *Systematische Theologie nach religionspsychologischer Methode* (3 vols.; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913, 1921, 1925); idem, *The Nature of Religion* (= vol. 2 of preceding), with an introduction by Prof. Dr. Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Yale University (trans. T. Menzel and D. S. Robinson; New York: Crowell, 1933); Heinz Hunger, Geschäftsführer des Instituts zur Erforschung und Beseitigung des jüdischen Einflusses auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben, "Wobbermins religionspsychologischer Zirkel im Zusammenhang mit der Ganzheitspsychologie betrachtet," in Friedrich Wilhelm Schmidt et al., eds., *Luther, Kant, Schleiermacher . . . Georg Wobbermin zum 70. Geburtstag* (Berlin: Collignon, 1939) 217–34; cf. the portrait of demonic and religio-psychological elements in theology (with possible direct references to Hirsch and Wobbermin) in chaps. 11–13 of Thomas Mann, *Doktor Faustus* (1947; reprinted Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1974); Emil Fuchs, "Das Unbewusste—das Überbewusste—Gottheit? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit C. G. Jungs Psychologie," *ZThK* 45 (1937) 228–45; H. Wagner, "Rasse und Religion. Darstellung und Kritik der Gedanken von Kurt Leese . . .," *ZThK* 44 (1936) 122–40; H. Knittermeyer, "Freiheit und Schicksal," *ZThK* 44 (1936) 1–30; Kurt Leese, *Philosophie und Theologie im Spätidealismus* (Berlin: Junker & Dünhaupt, 1929); idem, *Die Religion des protestantischen Menschen* (Berlin: Junker & Dünhaupt, 1938); Carl Heinz Ratschow, *Die Einheit der Person: Eine theologische Studie zur Philosophie Ludwig Klages* (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1938); Kurt Leese, "Anonyme Religion," in Hans Prinzhorn, ed., *Die Wissenschaft am Scheidewege von Leben und Geist: Festschrift Ludwig Klages . . .* (Leipzig: Barth, 1932) 129–35;

Hans Kasdorff, *Ludwig Klages im Widerstreit der Meinungen* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978) 335; Ratschow, "Friedrich Nietzsche," in Ninian Smart et al., eds., *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 3. 37–70; Karl Löwith, "Nietzsche im Lichte der Philosophie von Ludwig Klages," in Erich Rothacker, ed., *Probleme der Weltanschauungslehre* (Darmstadt: Reichl, 1927) 285–348; Erich Przywara, "Um das Erbe Friedrich Nietzsches," in idem, *Ring der Gegenwart* (Augsburg: Filser, 1929) 2. 169–79; Karl Heim, *Glaube und Leben* (3d ed.; Berlin: Furche, 1928) esp. "Die religiöse Bedeutung des Schicksalsgedankens bei Oswald Spengler," 374–405, and "Der Schicksalsgedanke als Ausdruck für das Suchen der Zeit," 406–29; Przywara, *Humanitas* (Nürnberg: Glock & Lutz, 1952); Erich Przywara 1899–1969: *Eine Festgabe* (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1966); *Der beständige Aufbruch: Festschrift für Erich Przywara*, ed. Siegfried Behn (Nürnberg: Glock & Lutz, 1962); Richard Wilhelm, "Von Erleben und Gestalten des Schicksals," *Schriften der Bremer wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, Reihe D: Abhandlungen und Vorträge* (Bremen: Schünemann, 1926) 1. 73–82; Theodor Odenwald, *Das Religionsproblem bei Friedrich Nietzsche* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1922); idem, *Friedrich Nietzsche und das heutige Christentum* (Aus der Welt der Religion, Religionsphilosophische Reihe, 1; Giessen: Töpelmann, 1926); Wolfgang Trillhaas, *Seele und Religion: Das Problem der Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches* (Furche-Studien 3; Berlin: Furche, 1931); Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche und das Christentum* (Hameln: Seifert, n.d. [written, 1938; publication postwar]). See also Carlo Ginzburg, "Mythologie germanique et nazisme. Sur un ancien livre de Georges Dumézil," *Annales ESC* 40 (1985) 695–715.

Moreover, any historian trying to take account of "ecstatic" and "irrational" currents in German theology of the period 1918–45 must come to terms with the ambiguities of the very concept of "irrationalism" itself. As Rücker has shown (see n. 3 above), both conservatives and followers of Marx charge each other with "Irrationalism." See Rücker, 587–88; cf. K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (2 vols.; 5th ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); Georg Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft: Der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler* (East Berlin: Aufbau, 1953, 1955). Likewise, Schnädelbach (*Philosophy*, 140–41) points out that today's Green Party owes much to *Lebensphilosophie* and "Irrationalism," even as Lukács himself has a debt to Simmel and *Lebensphilosophie*; moreover, it is a "tautology" to classify an age as "imperialistic" and then to argue that any philosophy in it is bad because of its "imperialistic" tendency. See Schnädelbach, *Philosophy*, 141: "Why then is 'irrationalism' a reproach? Could it not be the truth?"

Making matters more difficult is the fact that some Nazi sympathizers explicitly rejected the "irrational" along with "bourgeois capitalism"; see Theodor Odenwald, "Die heutige Krise des Christentums," in *Luther, Kant, Schleiermacher*, 361, 358. To be sure, in some sense Hirsch in his mystic individualism and obsession with *Schicksal*, intuition, Fichte, and Nietzsche is rightly labeled "irrational" by Schweer, "Ethik," 24–26 and elsewhere. After invoking Lukács, Schweer concludes that the real problem in Hirsch's view of history is his historicizing dedication to individuality and his resultant rejection of any "Rationalisierungsprozess" (leading to "irgendeinen Idealzustand") in favor of unpredictable self-unfolding (Schweer, "Ethik," 24). This analysis will not do: the monads and Meinecke differ so much from Hitler and Hirsch that nothing is gained

by lumping them together; besides, are all who doubt "progress" to be labeled "irrational" and Fascist?

The real issue here is whether "rationality" can be predicated only of central, governmental planning of the economy, or whether true "rationality" does not rather pertain to a vast process too large and complex to be supervised by any finite set of "rational" individuals. See Friedrich A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," in idem, *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) 77–91; idem, "Was ist und was heisst 'sozial'?" in *Masse und Demokratie* (Volkswirtschaftliche Studien für das Schweizerische Institut für Auslandsforschung; Erlenbach Zürich: Rentsch, 1957) 71–84. Lest anyone think that most German conservatives and the National Socialists advocated pure Adam Smith, allow me to cite Oswald Spengler, *Preussentum und Sozialismus* (Munich: Beck, 1935); Hock, *Deutscher Antikapitalismus* (Appendix A, above); Hayek, "The Socialist Roots of Naziism" (in Appendix A above). There is, however, a German tradition of anticentralism with roots in Montesquieu. See Geraint Parry, "Enlightened Government and its Critics in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The Historical Journal* 6 (1963) 178–92; John Stroup, *The Struggle for Identity in the Clerical Estate* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 33; Leiden: Brill, 1984).

We must then ask whether the concept of "Irrationalism" is useful. I cannot answer the question here; I can only suggest that, just as right-wing fondness for cycles responded to a left-wing monopoly on linear "progress," so perhaps did "irrationalism" respond to a left-wing monopoly on "Reason" in History. Cf. Trutz Rendtorff, "Christentum," *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 1. 790–814; Reinhart Koselleck, "Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement," in idem, *Futures Past*, 231–66. All this says *nothing* about what it "really" means to be "irrational." See also F. A. von Hayek, *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) esp. 66–105.

Appendix H: The "Two Kingdoms" and Hirsch

Hirsch, *Lage*, 117, 115; cf. idem, *Werke*, III.2, 280; idem, *Reich-Gottes-Begriffe*, 20–29. On the "Two Kingdoms," see Heinz-Horst Schrey, ed., *Reich Gottes und Welt* (Wege der Forschung 107; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969); Hans-Joachim Gänssler, *Evangelium und Weltliches Schwert* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung für abendländische Religionsgeschichte 109; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983); Ulrich Duchrow, *Christenheit und Welverantwortung* (Forschungen und Berichte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft 25; Stuttgart: Klett, 1970); idem and Heiner Hoffmann, eds., *Die Vorstellung von Zwei Reichen und Regimenten bis Luther* (Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte 17; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1972); C. G. Shoenberger, "Luther and the Justifiability of Resistance," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40 (1979) 3–20; F. Edward Cranz, *An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law, and Society* (HTS 19; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, *Studies in the Reformation* (ed. C. W. Dugmore; London: Athlone, 1980); Ulrich Duchrow and Wolfgang Huber, eds., *Die Ambivalenz der Zweireichelehre in lutherischen Kirchen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte 22; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1976); idem, eds., *Umdeutungen der Zweireichelehre Luthers im 19. Jahrhundert* (Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte 21; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1975); Rudolf Ohlig, *Die Zwei-Reiche-Lehre Luthers*

in der Auslegung der deutschen lutherischen Theologie der Gegenwart seit 1945 (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XXIII, Band 41; Bern/Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1974); idem, *Gottes Wirken in seiner Welt: Zur Diskussion um die Zweireichelehre* (ed. Niels Hasselmann; 2 vols.; Zur Sache 19, 20; Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1980); Carsten Nicolaisen, "'Anwendung' der Zweireichelehre im Kirchenkampf—Emanuel Hirsch und Dietrich Bonhoeffer," in *Gottes Wirken* (Zur Sache 20; Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1980) 15–26; Trutz Rendtorff, "Theologische Notizen zu einer missverständlichen Typologie," in idem, *Gottes Wirken in seiner Welt* (ed. Niels Hasselmann; Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1980) 2; Kurt Nowak, "Zweireichelehre," *ZThK* 78 (1981) 105–27, esp. 115–16 n. 34 with reference to Duchrow, *Zwei Reiche und Regimente* (SEE 13; 1977) 286 n. 24; Duchrow there notes concerning Hirsch that "es offenbar mindestens zwei Möglichkeiten gegeben hat, den Nationalsozialismus religiös zu legitimieren, nämlich, sowohl auf dem Weg einer Einreiche—als auch auf dem Weg einer Zweireichelehre"; Nowak himself says: "Hirsch kann als theologischer Dezisionist mit irrationalen ethisch-politischen Kategorien (Wagnis, Entscheidung, Kampf, Schicksal usw.) angesprochen werden; vom Denkmodell 'Zwei-Reiche-Lehre' als Vertreter einer 'Ein-Reich-Lehre'." In the text, p. 115, Nowak speaks of the damage done (in 1934) by Hirsch's "Hypostasierung von 'Logos' und 'Nomos' der 'irdisch-geschichtlichen Schicksalsgemeinschaft'" and concludes: "Es ist deutlich, dass Hirsch hier schwerlich auf der Linie eines Zweireiche-Dualismus zu interpretieren ist. Seine Zweireiche-Terminologie war der Versuch einer Umschreibung der Dimensionen des Politischen und des Religiösen, die unter der faszinierenden Allgewalt eines irrational-divinisierten Wirklichkeitsverständnisses jedoch sofort ineins gesetzt wurden."

Appendix I: The World Political Context of "Secularization" and "Political Theology"

We must consider the possibility that—as a final result of the longstanding "secularization" of public life in the Christian West—in the twentieth century we have experienced a pagan "resacralization" of "secular" politics. Corollary to this phenomenon is the "secularization" ("paganization") of "Christian" theology, which in the twentieth century has undergone an emptying of traditional, sacral content even as it has been filled with the neosacrality of ideological politics (Deutsche Christen thought, Neomaxism). Signs of this development include Nazi and Communist ideology, worldwide civil war, the breakdown of classic European limited war as a legal "duel" between legal equals, the criminalizing of initiation of hostilities, the spread of ideological "holy wars" aiming at the extinction of political and economic systems, the spread of guerrilla wars of international and ideological partisanship that do not distinguish combatants from noncombatants or peace from hostilities, the growing tendency to regard theology as an epiphenomenon of worldly politics justifiable only as a further arena of ideological conflict, and the growing tendency to use nonmilitary pressures to achieve socio-political changes at the expense of classic national sovereignty—or, the movement toward a unified world-state, a movement powered by "moral force" and accompanied by the end of both the Two Kingdoms doctrine and the separation of Christian orthodoxy from politics. It is too soon to say whether all this represents the triumph of values over tyranny, or rather simply Carl Schmitt's "tyranny of values." See Julien Freund, "Politik als Heilslehre."

in Ernst Forsthoff and Reinhard Hörstel, eds., *Standorte im Zeitstrom: Festschrift für Arnold Gehlen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum, 1974) 53–62; idem, “La confessionnalisation en politique,” *Res publica: Tijdschrift van het Belgisch Instituut voor Wetenschap der Politiek* 17 (1975) 341–56; idem, “Der unauffindbare Friede,” *Der Staat* 3 (1964) 159–82; Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften* 1.2 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1980) 431–508 (*Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*); Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Cologne: Greven, 1950); idem, “Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Weltgegensatzes von Ost und West,” in *Freundschaftliche Begegnungen: Festschrift für Ernst Jünger* (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1955) 135–67; Julien Freund, “Das Utopische in den gegenwärtigen politischen Ideologien,” in *Säkularisation und Utopie: Ernst Forsthoff zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967) 95–118; Quincy Wright, “Changes in the Conception of War,” *American Journal of International Law* 18 (1924) 755–67; Carl Schmitt, *Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff* (Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht, Gruppe Völkerrecht 5; Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1938); James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); J. T. Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); G. I. A. D. Draper, “Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality,” in Michael Howard, ed., *Restraints on War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) 135–62; Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963); Cornel West, “Introduction to the English Edition,” in Ana Maria Ezcurra, *The Neoconservative Offensive: U.S. Churches and the Ideological Struggle for Latin America* (New York: New York CIRCUS, 1983); George Schwab, “Enemy or Foe: Der Konflikt der modernen Politik,” in *Epirrhosis*, 2. 665–82; Jakob Gemmel, S.J., “Die Lehre des Kardinals Bellarmin über Kirche und Staat,” *Scholastik* 5 (1930) 357–79; Carl Schmitt, Eberhard Jüngel, and Sepp Schelz, *Die Tyranne der Werte* (ed. Sepp Schelz; Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1979); Carl Schmitt and Joachim Schickel, eds., *Guerrilleros, Partisanen: Theorie und Praxis* (Reihe Hanser 42; Munich: Carl Hanser, 1970) 9–30. At all events, I think that Carl Schmitt was correct in 1969 when he cited Jürgen Moltmann as proof that “political theology” was by no means dead, and that we are not again to see any “sublimation” of politics into the “purely theological” (*Politische Theologie II*, 117–18 n. 3). Cf. Dorothee Sölle, “Die Entpolitisierung des Evangeliums,” in idem, *Politische Theologie* (2d ed.; Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1982) 40–46; Harvey Cox, “Politische Theologie,” trans. Gerhard Borné, *EvTh* 29 (1969) 565–72 esp. 572: “Zu lange Zeit haben die Theologen die Welt nur interpretiert—die Zeit ist gekommen, sie zu verändern.” On the Soviet contention that the United States lacks any “dynamic ideology” so that, “de-ideologized,” it is open to revolutionary propaganda, see Y. A. Zamoškin in *Voprosy filosofii* 19 (1965) 4, 29ff, cited by Erwin Hölze, *Idee und Ideologie* (Bern/Munich: Francke, 1969) 126 n. 115; cf. Wilhelm Kahle, “Über den Begriff ‘Ende des konstantinischen Zeitalters,’” *ZRG* 17 (1965) 206–34; David Martin, “The Christian Ethic and the Spirit of Security and Deterrence,” in idem and Peter Mullen, eds., *Unholy Warfare* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) 85–107 esp. 92: “The liberal politics of historic dissent, especially in the period 1860–1940, have now been adopted by large sectors of various Christian establishments.” Cf. Bracher, *Age*, 97 n. 2, citing Karl Corino, ed., *Intellektuelle im Bann des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1980); also Bracher, *Age*, 141 n. 2,

on "the shipwrecked illusion of a combination of Marxism and Christianity," citing R. Banks, "The Intellectual Encounter between Christianity and Marxism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11 (1976) 309–11, 316–17, "who sees the significance of Tillich more in a future relaxation of the understanding of Marxism by emphasis on the pre-materialistically prophetic Marx"; Bracher, *Age*, 134 n. 3, citing Rudolf Vierhaus, "Die Ideologie eines deutschen Weges der politischen und sozialen Entwicklung," in Rudolf von Thadden, ed., *Die Krise des Liberalismus zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978) 96–98; cf. Bracher, *Age*, xi–xii: "Intellectuals, young people and the churches in particular are emerging as exponents of revived crisis thought, with the threat of nuclear annihilation overshadowing everything. These are ideas which carried a good deal of weight before and after the First World War, in the slogan of the 'Decline of the west'. . . . Ideological flight from reality can acquire pseudo-religious features; it can lead to the undermining of an open society and weaken its resistance to right-wing or left-wing dictatorships. . . . The new ideological movements . . . [typically employ] persuasive 'empty formulas' such as we encounter at present in the peace concept of the eponymous movements; their function is dramatization and emotional mobilization. In the role of alternative movements, of ecological, anti-nuclear and anti-American colouring, they touch upon the foundations of the western concept of democracy whenever they see themselves as a fundamental opposition . . . and whenever . . . they . . . have one foot outside parliamentary democracy. Operating as they do in the boundary zone between democracy and dictatorship they might provide a nutrient for the incubation of totalitarian ideologies." On Bracher see "The Persistence of Political Faiths," in Richard John Neuhaus, ed., *The Religion & Society Report* 3 (March 1986) 3–4. I am indebted to this article for calling my attention to Bracher, *Age*.

See also Hans Klaus Tanner, "Die fromme Verstaatlichung des Gewissens: Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Legitimität der Weimarer Reichsverfassung in Staatsrechtswissenschaft und Theologie der zwanziger Jahre" (Theol. Diss., Munich, 1987), a work invaluable for its pioneering effort to put Hirsch within the setting of other forms of theological antiliberalism and antipluralism, including those of the Left. In addition see Wolfgang Trillhaas, "Der Einbruch der Dialektischen Theologie in Göttingen und Emanuel Hirsch," in Bernd Moeller, ed., *Theologie in Göttingen: Eine Vorlesungsreihe* (Göttinger Universitätsschriften A.1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987) 362–80; Hans-Joachim Birkner, "Hirsch, Emanuel," *TRE*, 15. 390–94 (with bibliography); Wolfgang Trillhaas, "Repräsentant und Aussenseiter einer Generation: Nach dem Tode von Emanuel Hirsch," *Evangelische Kommentare* 5 (1972) 601–3; Hans-Joachim Birkner, "Der Beitrag Emanuel Hirschs zur Debatte über das kirchliche Bekenntnis," in Wolf-Dieter Hauschild et al., eds., *Die lutherischen Kirchen und die Bekenntnissynode von Barmen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984) 224–34 (kindly called to my attention by Prof. J. H. Schjørring); Robert P. Ericksen, "Die Göttinger Theologische Fakultät im Dritten Reich," in Heinrich Becker et al., eds., *Die Universität Göttingen unter dem Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Saur, 1987) 61–87 (kindly called to my attention by Mr. Ronald B. Thomas, Jr.); Ronald B. Thomas, Jr., "Philosophische Hintergründe zur Theologie Emanuel Hirschs," *Theologie im Nationalsozialismus: Fallbeispiele aus der Theologischen Fakultät Göttingen. Festschrift der Fachschaft evang. Theologie zum 250. Universitätsjubiläum* (Sonderheft, Göttinger Theologienzeitung; Göttingen, 1987) 158–61.