THE GARRISONS ABANDONED.
26th Nov.
—Sir E. Baring, the Government Representative
in Egypt, to Lord Granville.—“Fears are
entertained
for the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat.”
[Nothing done, as the Premier had a letter to write to the Derby
Working Men's Gladstone Presentation Committee.]
2nd Dec.
—Another massacre at Tamanieb. 1000 Egyptians killed within 20 miles of British troops and
war-vessels.
The Grand Old Mummies look on smiling and do nothing, as they are
unveiling a statue of the G. O. M. in the
City Liberal Club.]
8th Dec.
—The commander at Tokar writes:—“The
assistance that I begged for, you have not afforded me. I have
received nothing but empty compliments. We have
done our work like brave men, but THERE IS NO ONE
TO
SUPPORT US. There is no use your writing complimentary
letters to us if at the end we are to fall into the hands
of the
enemy.” [Nothing was done, as Mr G. was presenting a chestnut
tree to the Corporation of Brighton.]
5th Feb. 1884.
—Massacre near Tokar. 96 officers, 2250 men slaughtered within a day's march of British troops.
9th Feb.
—The commander at Sinkat telegraphs:—“We
are DYING OF STARVATION, and our condition is
DESPERATE.
The men are chewing the leaves of trees to allay their
cravings.” [Nothing was done, as Mr Gladstone was
presenting a bust of himself to the town of Kirkwall.]
12th Feb.
—Massacre at Sinkat. The brave
Tewfik and 1000 men, women, and
children are butchered
within 26
miles
of the British garrison.
[“We have been involved in some amount, at least, of moral
complicity with the
basest and blackest outrages upon
record.”—W.E.G.
on the Bulgarian
Horrors.]
| Granville to Baring, 22nd Feb. |
Baring to Granville, 28th Feb. |
“I have to request you to furnish
further information
as to whether the SANITARY CONDITIONS of Upper
Egypt would allow of a European force being stationed
there.” |
“We have taken the responsibility
of preserving
tranquillity in Egypt; and this task is
impossible without
exposing our troops to WHATEVER RISKS THE CLIMATIC
INFLUENCES INVOLVE.” |
MORAL—The British Army
(Under the Gladstone Government)
cannot invade an enemy's country without a
satisfactory
report upon the DRAINS. |
“What noise is this? What traitors have we here?”
I Henry VI.
THE SALVATION(?) ARMY.
29th Feb.
—Battle of El Teb. British and Arab losses, 2550. [N.B.—Mr Gladstone's Mission in the
Soudan was
entirely “PACIFIC,” so that a general
“scuttle” order was given, after this purposeless
slaughter.]
GENERAL GORDON TO THE RESCUE.
11th Jan.
—General Gordon is refused permission by the G. O. M. to
suppress the slave trade on the Congo unless
he
resigns his commission in the British Army. [N.B.—Mr Gladstone's father was a slave owner, but
did not resign
his commission (£68,454) on the
slaves.]
16th Jan.
—The Grand Old Weathercock is shamed into changing his mind
and allowing Gordon to retain his commission.
17th Jan.
—Wind again changes. The G. O. M. recalls Gordon and sends
him, against his wish, and that of the
Egyptian authorities, to Khartoum, TO SAVE THE
GLADSTONE GOVERNMENT.
22nd Jan.
—Sir Charles Dilke says at Chelsea:—“We
were informed that General Gordon, although he had no
wish to
go to Egypt, would go if he were ORDERED.” [And he was ordered.]
18th Jan.
—General Gordon leaves
Charing Cross at 8 P.M.
“Lord Wolseley carried the General's portmanteau, Lord
Granville took his ticket for him, and the Duke of Cambridge held open
the carriage door.”—
Pall Mall
Gazette, 19th Jan. [
N.B.—Mr
Chamberlain was unable to be present as he was privately engaged on
“pacific
negotiations” with Mr Larry Mack, of
Birmingham.]
THE GOVERNMENT POLICY. (?)
1st Feb.
—Gordon says:—“It is possible I may go
to the Mahdi.” 6th Feb., BARING to
GORDON:—“I hope you
will
on no account visit the Mahdi.” 6th Feb., GRANVILLE to BARING:—“Your message to Gen. Gordon is
approved.”
Commentary: 12th May
1884, the G. O. M. says: “We did not negative General
Gordon's visit to the Mahdi.”
[At the very outset,
Gen.. Gordon's “pacific mission” is obstructed by
the G. O. M. & Co. Refused permission
to try PEACE; afterwards refused permission to try
WAR.]
5th Feb.
—In reply to a question with regard to assistance to General
Gordon, the G. O. M. at once declares his
Egyptian Policy and
says:—“Her Majesty's Government do not find
themselves called upon TO ADOPT ANY
MEASURES
OF ANY KIND.” [And they didn't.]
13th Feb.
—W. E. G. says:—“It is no
exaggeration., in speaking of General Gordon, to say
that he is a HERO. It is no exaggeration
to
say that he is a CHRISTIAN.” [MORAL: It is no
exaggeration to “say that the G. O. M. is the
original of PECKSNIFF.]
8th Feb.
—General Gordon crosses the desert to Khartoum, on the
Gladstonian “pacific mission,” to convey,
without
“military operations,” 20,000 troops
and 30,000 civilians through the heart of a SAVAGE
INSURRECTION.
[“Peace, Retrenchment, and
Reform”—especially RETRENCHMENT.]
” The Oracles are dumb.”
Milton.
THE SLEEPING BEAUTIES.
18th Feb.
—Gordon asks for the assistance of Zebehr Pasha, and is
answered—
| 22nd Feb.—Granville to Baring. |
28th Feb.—Baring to
Granville. |
“The PUBLIC
OPINION of this country (i.e.,
the Brummagem
Caucus, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and the
Peace Society)
will not tolerate the
appointment.” |
“Any attempt to settle Egyptian
Questions by the
light of ENGLISH
PUBLIC OPINION is sure to be productive
of
harm, and it would be preferable to follow the advice
of responsible authorities on the spot.” |
[The Cabinet, however, referred the
appointment to a committee composed of Caucus Joe and
Larry Mack, Esq., who negatived the appointment.] |
NO HELP FOR GORDON.
27th Feb.
—[received by Granville on 11th March.]—General
Gordon tells the tribes of the Soudan by Proclamation:
“The troops of the British Government are now on their way, and, in a few days will be at
Khartoum.” [3rd
April, Lord Hartington
says:—We have no knowledge that Gordon even desires that
troops should be sent.”]
1st March.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“I feel conviction I shall be caught
in Khartoum.”
2nd March.
—Gordon to Baring—[received by
Granville on 4th March.]—“I am sure the
revolt will collapse if I
can say that I have British troops at my back.” [22nd April. The G. O.
M. says:—“As a matter of FACT,
no
request from General Gordon for the
sending of British troops to Khartoum has ever been
received.”] (“The
right hon. gentleman is
indebted to his imagination for his facts.”—SHERIDAN.)
2nd March.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“My difficulty arises from haziness
of the future (i.e., the indecision and
vacillation
of the Weathercock Government). Do not
delay.” [But the Do-Nothing Government must keep up their
reputation,
and do delay for seven
months.]
8th March.
Gordon to Baring.—“If you do
not send Zebehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away.
Zebehr is fifty times the Mahdi's
match.” [But the Gladstone Government had decided on 5th
Feb. “not to adopt
any measures of any
kind”—so the garrisons are massacred.]
PEACE and WAR.
19th March.
—Zebehr Pasha says:—“The policy of
working with an
ARMY at Suakim, while Gordon
is
DIPLOMATICALLY
acting at Khartoum, is a
MISTAKE. Gordon
is in the greatest jeopardy—yet, if you act
QUICKLY, I will be responsible
with my
own life for bringing him safely back to
Cairo.” [Zebehr was
a Conservative—and had put
the definition of the
Government want of policy “in a
nut-shell”—so nothing was done.]
21st March.
—Khartoum totally invested. 21st-24th.—The Mahdi's
forces attack Khartoum [22nd April, Granville
says: “It
is well known that the Arabs SHRINK
from any attempts at attacking a fortified
town.”]
24th March.
—Baring to Granville—“The, question now is how to get General Gordon AWAY FROM KHARTOUM.” [The
answer to this telegram was unusually prompt.
25th March
—Granville to Baring—“Her Majesty's
Government
desire to leave full discretion to General Gordon to REMAIN IN KHARTOUM.”]
|
24th March.
|
28th
March.—Granville to Baring. |
—Baring to
Granville. “I think that an effort
should be made to help Gordon
from Suakim. Gen. Stephenson and Sir
E. Wood are of opinion
that the expedition
is
possible.” |
“The military authorities here regard the expedition as
impossible.” |
[N.B. “The military
authorities here” were Joe Chamberlain, Larry
Mack, the Peace Society, and
Lord Wolseley. The
“impossible” becomes
“possible” in 1885.]
|
“They shall have wars and pay for their presumption.”
3 Henry VI.
THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.
| 25th March.—Baring
to Granville. |
8th Aug.—Lord Hartington
says:—
|
“Gordon evidently
expecting help from Suakim, and has
ordered
messengers to be sent along the road from Berber
to
ascertain whether any English force was
advancing.” |
“General Gordon, so far as the
Government know,
NEVER ADDRESSED ANY REQUEST to
them for the assistance
of a British
force.” |
26th March.
—Tamanieb burnt. English commander telegraphs, “The
campaign is at an end.” [Which end?]
27th March.
—Gordon writes:—“If Her Majesty's
Government do not act promptly, Graham's victory
[at Tamai] will
go for
naught.” [No heed was paid to this warning, and Granville
telegraphs to Gen. Graham, “The Government
have no
intention of sending British troops to Berber. Preparations should be
made for immediateGordon write embarkation of
force.” So
they scuttled from Suakim, leaving the garrisons entreating assistance.
Apparent victory for the
British—real victory for the
Mahdi.]
28th March.
—Lord Granville announces the final ABANDONMENT of Gen. Gordon, and
says:—“General Gordon's assurances
fail to
convince Her Majesty's Government.” [Not even a Birmingham
affidavit would have convinced
them of General Gordon's
danger—as at this time they were busy jerrymandering with the
Franchise Bill.]
28th March.
—Granville to
Baring.—“The condition of affairs does not
appear to call for measures attended by so much
risk, and entailing
possibly a great loss of life, and CERTAINLY
large expenditure.” [Peace,
Retrenchment, and
Reform—especially RETRENCHMENT. Gordon versus
£. S. D.]
28th March.
—Granville to
Baring.—“Her Majesty's Government have
sanctioned the despatch of TWO British
Officers
to Berber.” [At 13s. 7d. per head per diem. Lord Granville at the same time
forwards a second-hand English flag
to be waved judiciously at
intervals, and a band to play “Rule
Britannia”—when there are no Arabs in the
immediate
vicinity.]
MORE APPEALS FOR HELP.
28th March.
—Soudan Merchants to
Baring.—“On the APPEARANCE
alone of English troops depend our lives,
our
families, and our goods. May the Almighty grant that this
appearance may not be delayed. We await the
arrival of help in
agony to see the British flag covering us with its power.”
[The British flag, damaged in New
Guinea, is under repair.]
29th March.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“I dare not go out for fear of the
town. Had you sent Zebehr how different would
have been the state of
affair.” [12th May, Sir M. Hicks-Beach
says:—“The principal danger which besets
General Gordon is not famine, nor even the attacks of the insurgents
outside, but it is treachery within the
town.”]
MORAL.—23rd Feb. 1885, W. E. G.
says—“Khartoum was betrayed. What connection has
betrayal with the
question of a relief expedition?” It should have hurried it on.
1st April.
—The question is asked in the House of
Commons:—“Is it true then that General Gordon is
to be left to
share the fate of
Tewfik Bey?”
No answer was given, and nothing was done.
|
3rd April.—W. E. G.
says:—
|
3rd March.—Gordon to Baring.
|
“General Gordon is under no order
and under no constraint
to stay at
Khartoum.” [i.e., according to
the
Past-his-Prime Minister of England, a
British General who
is besieged is quite safe because
he can save his own life
by deserting his army.] |
If I was mean enough to escape, I HAVE NO POWER TO
DO so. As a
gentleman, could you advise that course?”]
(“Why, certainly, the life of the Government
before the
life of the Garrisons.”) |
4th April.
—W. E. G. says:—“General Gordon faces
the difficulties before him.” [Which is
more than can be said of
Her Majesty's Ministers.]
“Doing nothing with a deal of skill.”
Cowper.
THE EGYPTIAN “EXPEDITION”
|
7th April.—Consul Power
telegraphs:—
|
8th April.—The G. O. M.
says:—
|
“Khartoum is at present the centre
of an enormous
rebel camp. To retreat to Berber is
impossible. The
English Government have turned down
their thumbs
while General Gordon is struggling
here.” |
“It was the desire of the
Government that General
Gordon should find himself able to remain at Khartoum,
if the reasons were sufficient for it. He is under
no
inability to leave the Soudan at the present
moment.” |
| (The reasons
WERE
sufficient. He was “hemmed
in.”) |
Lord Kimberley, Sec. for India, House of
Lords
4th April 1884.
|
W. E. Gladstone, House of Commons,
21st
April 1884.
|
“Everybody must be aware that the
position of General
Gordon
must be critical at
Khartoum.” |
“The position of General Gordon is,
so far as we know,
a position of
security.” |
5th April.
—The Marquis of Hartington says:—“It
appears to the Government that General Gordon has somewhat
overrated the danger from the Mahdi.” [4th April, General
Gordon writes:—“No human power can deliver us
now. We are surrounded, and unless God causes the savage Arab tribes to
disperse, no English troops will do
so, until they have reached
Khartoum, and massacred the inhabitants. What the
people want is plunder.”]
7th April.
—Baring to Granville (received 7th
April).—“The number of rebels surrounding
Khartoum is increasing.
There is great alarm at Berber.”
[But not in Downing Street.]
8th April.
—The House rises, and the G. O. M. being “under no
constraint to remain” in London, “finds himself
able” to
go and relieve his son at Hawarden Parish
Church.
BERBER ABANDONED.
15th April.
—Inhabitants of Berber to
Baring.—“We implore that great,
chivalrous, and humane POWER to come to
our help, for it is full time. Can it raise us again after our death? We
await help from England. We implore
you then to quiet our minds by
announcing to us the immediate despatch of a force to our assistance. If not,
CERTAIN DEATH awaits us.” [And it
DID, for “that great, chivalrous,
and humane power” had abandoned itself
to
“Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform.”]
17th April.
—Baring to
Granville.—“Zebehr has received a telegram
from Gordon directing him to proceed to Berber.
He will be watched, and his departure will be
prevented.” [12th Feb., W. E. G. had
said:—“It was our duty to
beware of interfering with General Gordon's
plans.”]
23d April.
—Egerton (in place of Baring) to
Granville.—“Governor of Berber
telegraphs, We are in great danger.
If
Berber falls there will be no hope for the Soudan. Answer quickly.' “[No answer is sent because the
rescue
of Berber is not a “political
necessity,” as, according to W. E. G. (24th April).
“There would be no essential
change in the position of Khartoum in consequence of the fall of
Berber.”]
The Egyptian Government having decided upon an immediate advance on
Berber—
|
Granville to Egerton, 23rd April.
|
House of Commons, 25th April.
|
“We cannot sanction attempt to send
English force to
Berber, or to send Egyptian troops
alone. TELL GOVERNOR
OF BERBER
THAT NO ASSISTANCE CAN BE GIVEN TO HIM.”
[As the G. O. M. & Co. were a
“pacific” firm.] |
It was asked whether the Egyptian Government
had
abandoned the expedition for the relief of Berber
owing
to directions from Her Majesty's
Government. |
|
Mr Gladstone said:—“No,
sir, I have net been informed
of the fact.” |
“Beauty, Wisdom, Modesty.”
Merchant of Venice,
THE THREE GRACES.
24th April.
—W. E.G. is asked whether the garrison of Berber may meet the
fate of the garrison at Sinkat and replies,
“We have no
reason to believe there is any risk at Berber of any
such thing.” [The Ministry have no
“intelligence”—
and never had.]
RESULT:—
10th June.
—Major Kitchener to Sir Evelyn
Wood.—“Berber was surprised nine days ago,
and every one massacred.
The Governor, and all his family, and all
soldiers, and many merchants killed. The Pasha's family are killed,
and men, women, and children massacred in the streets.” 3500
lives lost.
[12th May.—The G. O. M.
said:—“We declined to send troops to Berber
and other places. There was no one to
conquer at
Berber.”—But plenty to slaughter.]
“Five millions of Bulgarians, hardly venturing to look upwards
even to their Father in Heaven, have extended
their hands to you;
they have sent yon their petition; they have prayed for your help and
protection.”—
W. E. G. on
Bulgarian Atrocities, 7th May 1877.
KHARTOUM ABANDONED.
11th April.
—Mr Power, brother of the English Consul at Khartoum, says in
The Times:—“It should
be clearly understood
by all, that those in Khartoum have been abandoned by the present Government, and further,
the Government.
in so devoting these three brave men to death, have
done so KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, and HEARTLESSLY.“
6th April.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“I SHALL LEAVE
YOU [i.e. the G. O. M. & Co.]
THE INDELIBLE DISGRACE OF ABANDONING
THE
GARRISONS, WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT YOU WILL EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO
SMASH UP THE MAHDI UNDER
GREAT DIFFICULTIES, IF YOU WOULD
RETAIN PEACE IN EGYPT.” [March 1885.—The
Gladstone Government, having
abandoned the garrisons, proceed to
smash up the Mahdi at a cost of thousands of lives and millions of
money.]
16th April.
—Baring to Granville (received by Granville
16th).—“General Gordon has told Colonel
Stewart and
Power that, as British troops are not coming to the
relief of Khartoum, they can take their choice of retreating
with
him to the Equator, or trying to retreat to
Berber. They both prefer the former course as the less
dangerous.” Consul Power having said, “I do not
see how it is possible for any but an Arab to get to Berber."
24th April.
—The G. O. M.
says:—“It is not a
fact that General Gordon has requested Her Majesty's Consular Agent
to leave Khartoum. It is not a fact that that
measure was essential to their safety, and it is not a fact that
General Gordon stated that the only means of
leaving Khartoum would be by Equatorial Africa and the Congo,
[It
is a fact that the G. O. M.'s fact's were not
facts.]
| Baring to Granville, 18th April. |
Lord Granville, 22nd April, in the House of
Lords. |
“General Gordon appears to think he
is to be abandoned,
and is very indignant.”
[9th April.—Despairing
of aid from England,
Gordon had appealed to British and
American capitalists
to advance £300,000, that he might
get
Turkish troops to help him.] |
“It is quite true that Gordon was
promised co-operation,
but we had not the
slightest hint we had not the
slightest idea-that he required
it.” Or we wouldn't have
promised
it.]
|
23rd April.
Granville to Egerton.—“Gordon should be at once
informed that we do not propose to supply him with
TURKISH OR OTHER FORCE. That if, with this
knowledge, he continues at Khartoum, he should state to us the
cause.”
[The cause had already been stated, as on 19th
April General Gordon had said—“We are hemmed
in by determined men.”]
25th April.
—Egerton to Granville.—“The last
messenger that was sent to Khartoum returned, being
unable to proceed.”
[28th April. W. E. G. says:—“We
have heard nothing to the effect that General Gordon was
insecure.”
“Such painted puppets.”
Pope.
THE MUMMY GOVERNMENT.
| 22nd April, W. E. G. says:— |
10th March, Lord Hartington
says:— |
“It may be the opinion that General
Gordon is 111
imminent danger. In our view that is an
entirely
erroneous opinion.” |
“We are anxious that General Gordon
should return from the dangerous and
critical position which, of course, we are aware he
occupies as long as he is in Khartoum.” |
| 22nd April, Lord Granville says:— |
21st April, W. E. G. says:— |
“The Government has no fear NOW of the personal
safety of
General Gordon.” |
“There are bodies of hostile troops
in the neighbourhood of Khartoum, forming
more or less of a chain around
it.” |
| 16th April, Power to Baring:— |
4th April, W. E. G. says:— |
“We are quite blocked on the north,
east, and west.”
[And they
had previously been ordered by Lord Granville
not
to go south.]
|
“General Gordon is authorised to
use his own discretion,
and to withdraw from the Soudan
if he thinks
proper.” |
7th April.
—Through Admiral Hewett, England begs assistance from the King
of Abyssinia.
22nd April.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“There are rumours of Abyssinian
advance, which I trust for the honour of England
are not true, It is like a big boy getting little boy to fight his
battle.”
| 28th April.—Hewett to King of
Abyssinia. |
The King of Abyssinia to Hewett. |
| (Translation)
“Are you very well? Are you very well? I am,
thank God, unite well.” |
“How do you
do? I and my army are, thank God, quite well. I am engaged
here in a bath. I have sent you Ras Alala to assist
you.” |
| [Aid also promised, through similar
negotiations, by Rum Ti Foo, King of the Cannibal Islands,
the Prince of Monaco, the Claimant, and Larry Mack, after
his present engagement is terminated.] |
26th April.
—Merchants of Kassala
write:—“If English troops do not come,
Gordon's mission will be much
compromised.” [No troops
sent, as Mr Gladstone was translating his Midlothian speeches into
Arabic.]
26th April.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“We are making decorations for
defence of Khartoum. You will not be asked
to pay
for them.” [Special Meeting of Cabinet summoned. Mr
Childers proposes the debased half-sovereigns
as decorations. Price
OK. 6d. each.]
3rd May.
—It is reported in Khartoum that help is coming, and that the
English army is at Berber. [3rd March 1885,
Lord Wolseley at Korti
expressed the hope that they “would all be in Khartoum by the end of 1885.”]
8th May.
—Meeting at St James's Hall to protest against the abandonment
of General Gordon. [Nothing is done,
because the G. O. M. is
getting well hissed at the Healtheries, although he tries to
“explain “the hisses away.]
THE TOO-LATE EXPEDITION.
10th May.
—The G. O. M. & Co. are hissed into ordering the
military authorities in
Cairo to prepare for the
IMMEDIATE
despatch of a relief force to Khartoum, to start in
FIVE MONTHS (i.e. October).
13th May.
—Lord R. Churchill says:—“The Prime
Minister thinks that the British people will wait till October.
Does he think that the Mahdi will wait till then?” [The Mahdi
does not wait till then.]
12th May.
—“The G. O. M. says:—“We are
determined not to place this country in conflict with a people
struggling
for their freedom.” [March 1885. The G. O. M.
instructs Lord Wolseley to “smash up” these
“people
struggling for their freedom.”]
“Jerrymandering the
despatches.”
“THE PIOUS EDITUR.”
| W. E. G., 12th Feb. 1884. |
General Gordon, 27th Feb. 1884. |
”These (i
e., the Soudanese rebels) are people
struggling
to be free,
and they are struggling rightly to be
free.” (Hansard, 288, col.
55). |
”This is the actual state of
affairs: two-thirds of the people are
terrorised over by one-third, excited by emissaries
of the Mahdi.” (Egypt, No. 12, 1884, page
150.) |
Commentary: 27th Feb. 1885. W. E.
Forster says:—“My right hon. friend
(i.e., the G.
O. M.) convinces himself,
and he convinces
others, but he does not always convince facts."; |
| W. E. G., Ist May 1884. |
W. E. Forster, 13th May 1884. |
“There is no
military danger at the present moment
besetting Khartoum.” |
“Every one but the Prime Minister
is convinced of
General Gordon's danger.” |
11th May.
—Although there is “no
military danger,” prayers are offered
up in the churches throughout England for the safety of General
Gordon.
12th May.
—Granville to Egerton.—“General Gordon
is enjoined to adopt measures FOR HIS OWN
REMOVAL.”
2th May.
—By a majority of 28 on a proposed vote of censure, the
Automaton Radical majority vote for further
abandonment, and a
continuance of the Micawber policy of waiting for something to turn
up.
19th May.
—The Grand Old Mystifier says:—“Whatever
measures the Government take will be IN THE
DIRECTION OF
MAKING EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH REGARD TO
BRINGING all the difficulties to an end.” [The
Gladstonese
equivalent for “doing nothing.”]
“Promise, pause, prepare, postpone,
And end by leaving things
alone.”
20th May.
—The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, interrogated,
“Knows nothing except that communication with
General
Gordon is cut off.” [Yet he was in no danger.] On another point the Gladstonian-trained Under-
Secretary is questioned, and replies, “I daresay I shall be
able to answer it TO-MORROW.”
[Probably!]
20th May.
—Messrs Gladstone & Co. negotiate with Messrs Cook,
the tourists' providers, for a cheap third-class return
ticket for
Lord Wolseley to Khartoum and back.—(Hansard, 288, col. 1010.)
[“Peace, Retrenchment, and
Reform”—especially Retrenchment,]
23rd May.
—The G. O. M. says:—“The intelligence
from Khartoum is re-assuring.” although, according to the
Under-
Secretary, there had been absolutely “no intelligence” since the 10th
April.—(Hansard, 288, cols.
1181–2.)
25th May.
—While maintaining that General Gordon is not in danger, the
G. O. M. & Co. offer £200 for an answer to
their telegram to the General at Khartoum. (Egypt, No. 24, p. 75.) [The
bribe didn't take, as no Arab could
be get to run the risk or trust
Her Majesty's Government to that extent.]
27th May.
—Lord Granville displays his ignorance of his own business by
declaring, “so far as I know, the Mahdi
resides somewhere in the interior of Africa.”
(Hansard, 288, col. 1454.) [Probably in the Cameroons or at
Angra
Pequena.]
GORDON FORGOTTEN.
May, June.
—Gordon forgotten—“knowingly, willingly,
and heartlessly,” because the Government is engaged
on
the Franchise Bill and in an attack upon the House of Lords.
“How scandalously unjust were the
suspicions entertained
by some that the prolonged silence of General Gordon arose from offended
pride.
It was the enforced silence of an English officer so closely
beleaguered that no messenger from without was
able to bring
tidings to the besieged. During these long summer months General Gordon
was battling for
his life against overwhelming odds, the bullets
falling incessantly into his palace from every side.”
[9th September.—General Gordon
writes:—“While you are eating,
drinking, and resting in good beds,
we soldiers and servants
are watching by night and day, endeavouring to quell the
movement of this false Mahdi.”]
“A deed without a name.”
Macbeth.
ABANDONED.
23rd June.
—A Conference on Egyptian Affairs is summoned, meets,
and—[2nd Aug.—collapses. March 1885,
England
ultimately surrenders to France.]
23rd June.
—W. E. G. says:—“We have agreed with
France that our occupation of Egypt shall terminate on 1st June
1888.” [If Lord Wolseley's picnic party has reached
Khartoum
by that date.]
24th June.
—Marquis of Hartington states:—“No decision has been come to with respect to an
expedition to Khartoum.” [No decision was come to till March
1885, when the Govt. was morally defeated in the House of Commons.]
3rd July.
—Lord Know-nothing Fitzmaurice
states:—“Nothing has been heard from General
Gordon since the 10th of
April.” [On account of the
noise caused by the Franchise Demonstrations.]
20th July.
—Message from Gordon:—“Tell the
messengers where the reinforcements are, and what is
their number.”
[ANSWER:—Number
of soldiers, 137,632. Place,
England—until something turns up.]
| 21st July.—Lord Hartington
says:— |
13th May.—Lord Hartington
says:— |
“The climate
was given as one of the principal reasons
for not sending
THE TROOPS ASKED FOR BY GENERAL
GORDON.”
[And yet the Government had persistently
denied that
Gordon had ever asked for troops.] |
“General Gordon does not appear to
have MADE ANY
REQUEST for
British troops to be sent to Khartoum.
General Gordon
never suggested the employment of
British troops for
the relief of Khartoum.” |
22nd July.
—Egerton to
Granville.—“£10,000 might be offered for bringing General Gordon out of
Khartoum.” [But
it wasn't.]
30th July.
—Gordon to Baring.—“Retreat is
impossible. I recommend, as a route for troops, Wady Halfa, but FEAR
IT Is TOO
LATE.” [And it was.]
31st July.
—Gordon to Baring.—“You ask me to state
cause and intention of staying at Khartoum. I stay at Khartoum because
Arabs have shut us up and will not let us
out.” [23rd Feb. 1885, W. E. G.
says:—“We believe that
it was in the power of
General Gordon to have REMOVED
himself.”]
31st July.
—Consul Power writes:—“For the last five
months the siege has been very close.”
[11th July, Lord Hartington
said:—“The
intelligence does not point to the fact that General Gordon has been
closely besieged. On the
contrary, it rather
points in the opposite direction.”]
30th July.
—Gordon to Baring.—“If we get out, it is
in answer to prayer.”
5th Aug.
—The Ministry begins to make up its mind (if it has any), and
asks for a Vote of Credit for “preparations.”
[The only credit they ever got.]
14th Aug.
—The G. O. M. says in the Queen's
Speech:—“I shall continue to fulfil with fidelity
the duties which grow
out of the presence of my troops in the
valley of the Nile.” [Quite so
—pure Gladstonese.]
HOW THE NILE ROUTE WAS SELECTED.
8th Aug.
—Hartington to General Stephenson at
Cairo.—“I am advised
[? by Lord
Wolseley] that the transport of a
force in
small boats, such as were employed by Lord
Wotseley (!)
in the Red River Expedition, would
not present any insuperable difficulties.”
11th Aug.
—Stephenson to Hartington.—“Small boats
proposed not suitable.”
12th Aug.
—Hartington to Stephenson.—“Experienced officers here (i.e., Lord Wolseley)
confident of practicability of boat plan.”
Not with standing the adverse opinions of Captain
Molyneux, Commander Hammill, and Admiral Sir John
Hay, who had been
deputed to examine the cataracts of the Nile, Lord Hartington adheres to
his crotchet.
because it was Lord Wolseley's, and the route
afforded the best chance of being “too late.”
“Spur to the rescue!”
1 Henry VI.
“RESCUE AND RETIRE.”
21st. Aug.
—Stephenson to
Hartington.—“Small boats impracticable. Naval opinion here, is in this sense. I am still
in favour of Suakim-Berber
route.” [In 1874 Gordon left Suakim on 23rd Feb. at 10
A.M., and readied Khartoum
on 13th
March at 6 A.M.]
22nd Aug.
—Hartington to
Stephenson.—“I am still of opinion that small
boat expedition is practicable.” [Opinion
of Canadian
boatmen on Lord Hartington's boats:—“The boats
were too frail, while the keels were obstructive to
navigation on
the shallow part of river. The men actually tore the stems out of them,
and ten of the voyageurs
were drowned.”]
MORE DELAY.
22nd Aug.
—General Wood to Egerton.—“Men who swam
out of Khartoum say that that place is in great
straits,
being long invested.” [21st April, W.
E. G. said that the enemy were near Khartoum, “forming more
or less of a
chain around it. I draw a distinction between
that and the town being surrounded.”]
[More Gladstonese.]
MORAL. —“My right hon.
friend (i.e., W. E. G.). as we all know, is the
greatest master that
ever existed of distinctions and
differences.”—W. E. FORSTER, 27th Feb. 1885.
23rd Aug.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“English troops must be sent to the Soudan. If the rebels kill the people, you
will
be responsible for their lives.” [Nothing was done,
as W. E. G. was engaged in “editing” for
publication the
Egyptian despatches, and Lord Granville was making
further concessions to Germany.]
24th Aug.
—Gordon writes:—“We
are very cross with you all. The rôle
of our country has not been very noble in
Egypt or
Soudan.” [Or in the Transvaal, New Guinea, Angra Pequena, or
elsewhere.]
31st Aug.
—Egerton to
Granville.—“Question of
line as to General Gordon's relief appears serious.” [More delay, as
the G. 0. M. was in
a fog on the top of Ben Macdhui.]
31st Aug.
—Gordon to
Baring.—“Is it right that I should have been
sent to Khartoum, and no attention paid to me
till communications
were cut?”—(Egypt, No. 35, p. 96.)
THE NILE EXPEDITION.
30th Aug.
—At last, the Wolseley picnic party
leaves England to supersede General Stephenson (who supported the
Suakim-Berber route), and is timed to reach Khartoum too late.
4th Sept.
—Gordon
writes:—“Had another fight, and again was
defeated with heavy loss. One of our steamers has
970 bullet marks on her. Another
850.” [“A position of security,”
according to W. E. G.—who was not on deck.]
9th Sept., Gordon writes:—
“How many times have we writtten asking for
re-inforcements, calling your serious
attention to the Soudan?
No answer at all has come to us as to what has been
decided in
the matter, and the hearts of men have become weary of this delay.
Of
course you take no interest for suppressing this Rebellion,
the serious consequences of
which are reverse of victorious for
you, and the neglect thereof will not do.”
“Stand not upon the order of your
going,
But go at once.”
Macbeth.
THE NILE PICNIC.
17th Sept.
—Lord Hartington, abusing Her Majesty's English,
writes:—“In arriving at this decision, Her
Majesty's
Government desire to remind you that no decision has been
arrived at.”—(Egypt, No. 35, p. 97.) [Painful
grammatical result of the Government's first arrival at a decision.]
18th Sept.
—Massacre of Colonel Stewart, Consul Power, and French Consul
Herbin near Merawi. “The bodies were
thrown into the
river.” [9th Sept., Gordon to
Baring:—“I have sent Colonel Stewart because you
have been
silent all this while, and HAVE
NEGLECTED us, and lost time WITHOUT DOING
ANY GOOD.”]
17th Sept.
—Hartington to Wolseley.—“You are fully
aware of the views of Her Majesty's Government.” (Which is
more than they are themselves).
18th Sept.
—Two telegrams from General Gordon complaining of slackness of
Relief Expedition, and saying that the number
of rebels was
increasing. [23rd Feb. 1885. W. E. G. said:—“We
had no proof that General Gordon was
IN DANGER WITHIN THE WALLS OF
KHARTOUM.”]
18th Sept.
—Gordon to Baring.—“I asked that I might
be helped with reinforcements. Hitherto they have not
come. Having
so often promised the people that assistance would come, we are now as liars in their eyes. I am
at
Khartoum as a hostage, and it may cost me my life.” [27th
Feb. 1885, W. E. Forster says:—“The
Prime
Minister evidently believes that the delay in the sending of the
expedition did not cause Gordon's death.
He almost went so far as to suppose that the delay
prolonged his life.”]
20th Sept.
—Baring to Granville.—“Gordon has given
Stewart orders to burn Berber. I have informed Stewart that
he
should not allow Berber to be burnt.”
[Since it may become useful to the Mahdi, as it did.]
4th Oct.
—Baring to Granville.—Enclosing despatch from
General Gordon, who writes:—“We must fight it out with
our own means. If blessed by God we shall
succeed. If not His will, so be it.” [1st Sept., W. E. G.
says:—
“We have not known as much as we could
have desired to know of all Egyptian affairs. The public out of
doors naturally [very!] have known still less
“—because the despatches had
been carefully “doctored” before issue.]
MORE “EXPEDITION.”
4th Oct.
—Lord Wolseley arrives at Wady Haifa—and delays for
four days waiting for a fresh supply of Gladstone jam,
marmalade,
pickles, napkin rings, toothpicks, safety matches, Gladstone bags (from
Galashiels), and angling
tackle, “to capture flounders
in the Nile, where the only fish is the crocodile.”
13th Oct.
—Announcement that the Madhi, having heard that General Gordon
was running short of provisions, was determined
to starve out the Garrison.
19th Oct.
—The Madhi advancing rapidly on Khartoum—Lord
Wolseley not advancing rapidly on Khartoum.
24th Oct.
—Wolseley to Hartington. “Buller remains at Wady
Haifa for another fortnight to push on supplies, and,
generally
speaking, to keep the ball rolling.”
[Like Sisyphus.]
5th Nov.
—Troops embark on the boats. The
“expedition” goes up the Nile—so does 2d. on the Income Tax.
13th Nov.
—Lord Wolseley marches back to Wady Haifa—to hasten
his advance on Khartoum.
“Our only general, he had ten thousand
men,
He led them up the Nile, and led them down
again.”
[13th Nov., Lord Hartington says:—“I should be very
sorry to hazard any conjecture as to when Lord Wolseley
will be
before Khartoum.”]
20th Nov.
—“The average rate of the whaleboats is scarcely five miles a
day.”—The Daily (?
Delay) News.
26th Nov.
—General Gordon writes:—“I will accept
nothing whatever from Gladstone's Government. I will not even
let
them pay my expenses. I will never put foot in England
again.”
“I cannot get him out of the House.”
Coriolanus.
“NEITHER RESCUE NOR RETIRE”
16th Dec.
—Lord Wolseley at Korti—where he stays, and offers
a prize to the first regiment that reaches Debbeh.
27th Dec.
—Arrangements for an advance very
nearly completed. The troops will shortly move forward to save
Mr
Gladstone and gain a hundred pounds.
HOW THE DESPATCHES WERE “EDITED.”
31st Dec.
—Wolseley telegraphs to Baring (received by Granville, 1st
Jan.):—“The messenger to General Gordon has
just returned here. He brings only a piece of paper the size of a
postage-stamp, on which is written:—‘Khartoum
all right. C. G. Gordon. Dec. 14, 1884.'”
[This information, evidently intended by Gordon for the
enemy in the event of the messenger's capture, was
published, but the following, intended for Wolseley
and the Public, was suppressed by
Granville:—]”
General Gordon told the messenger to give me
the-following message:—'We are besieged on three
sides. Fighting
goes on night and day. Enemy are numerous. Our
troops are suffering from lack of provisions. Food we
still have is
little. Some grain and biscuit. We want you to come
quickly. Do this without letting rumours of
your approach
spread abroad.' “
[N.B.—General Gordon's Diaries are
edited in an equally satisfactory manner by Messrs. Gladstone
& Co.]
12th Jan. 1885.
—Wolseley to
Hartington.—“I reached Korti on 16th Dec.
… A small column would probably be
able to fight its way
into Khartoum. Possibly it might fight its way out again, but it could
not bring away
General Gordon and his garrison.” [But it might have prevented treachery, and saved
General Gordon's life.]
17th Jan.
—Battle of Abu Klea. 168 British killed
and wounded, including Colonel Burnaby and Lord St Vincent.
19th Jan.
—Battle of Metammeh. 124 British killed
and wounded, including General Stewart, Mr Cameron,
and Mr
Herbert.
Letter from General Gordon, dated 14th Dec. 1884
“ALL IS UP. I EXPECT A CATASTROPHE IN TEN DAYS' TIME. IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO IF OUR PEOPLE
HAD
KEPT ME BETTER INFORMED OF THEIR INTENTIONS. MY ADIEUX TO ALL.”
C. G. GORDON.”
26th JANUARY 1885.
After a year's gallant defence, waiting for succour which
never
came, Khartoum is betrayed, and General Gordon
assassinated.
“O LOVED ONE, LYING FAR AWAY,
WHAT WORD OF LOVE CAN DEAD LIPS SEND?
O WASTED DUST AND SENSELESS CLAY,
IS THIS THE END? IS THIS THE END?”
“Here I and Sorrow sit.”
George Eliot's Letters.
“MELENCOLIA.”
TRAGEDY AND COMEDY.
“I had thought I had had men of some understanding
And wisdom, of my Council; but I find none.”
Shakespeare.
THE GLADSTONE ALMANACK, 1885.
FIFTY-FOURTH THOUSAND.
“Mr Gladstone has too much confidence in the good
sense and
fairness of the public to imagine they will be
misled by the gross
misrepresentations which the Almanack
contains, and the glaring
vulgarities which characterise
it.”—Letter from Mr Gladstone's Secretary.
“A remarkably clever political satire, and must have
taken
much labour to produce.”—Globe.
“A vulgar and scurrilous publication.”—The Spectator
(Liberal).
“A little work which is full of fact, and overflows with
fun.”—The Sheffield
Telegraph.
“We have not been able to discover any wit or humour
in the
letterpress.”—The Elgin
Courant (Liberal).
“The Gladstone Almanack is extremely
clever, and the
illustrations are admirable.”—The Whitehall Review.
“Published with the undisguised design of caricaturing
and
villifying (sic) the revered leader of the
Liberal party …
Vulgar and
exaggerated.”—The Greenock
Telegraph.” (Radical).
“'Redolent of thought and genius,”—St Stephen's
“More or less vulgar.”—Tin-Echo (Radical).
“As a work of art, deserving of high
praise.”—Cork
Constitutional,
“Stupid cartoons and turgid attempts at
fun.”—The Fife
Herald
(Radical).
“One of the most irresistibly funny contributions to
the
political controversies of the day.”—John Bull.
“A concoction of the most vulgar and virulent
misrepresentations
that party spite can produce. From so foul
a
fountain there cannot come truth or fairness.”—The
Sheffield Independent (not
“Independent” but Radical.)
“There is hardly a line in the book that would not furnish
a
text for an article. The Gladstone Almanack is
a
book to buy, to read, and to keep.”—The Yorkshire Post.
“Sixpenny worth of the class of material which seems
to make
glad the hearts of those who dislike the Premier,
and delight in seeing
him misrepresented.”—The
Dunfermline
Saturday Press (Radical).
“A clever and laughable party skit.”—The City Press.
“OBAN SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY
ASSOCIATION.—A
memorial, signed by a number of
members, was read, requesting
the removal of The
Gladstone Almanack, which
was placed on the table of the
reading-room by a member of
the Association. On the vote being taken,
the Raid
publication was ordered to be
removed.”—The Oban Times
(Radical).
“A hit—a palpable hit! Displays undoubted humour
on every page.”—Society.
