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Title:
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DE RE BELIEF |
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Author:
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LEHMANN, JEFFREY SCOTT |
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Degree:
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Doctor of Philosophy thesis |
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Abstract:
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Chapter 1 presents two inadequate theories of belief. Chapter 2 examines three inadequate theories of de re belief. In Chapter 3, I distinguish belief from the other attitudes in terms of the functional role of belief states, and I distinguish among individual beliefs in terms of their mode of presentation and what they represent. A de re belief is defined as a belief about objects the agent has experienced and has a sufficient amount of information about. Chapter 4 defends the Quinean analysis of de re belief sentences in terms of a three-place belief predicate. Chapter 5 presents a more general statement of the logical form of de re belief sentences than either Quine's or Loar's statement, and it presents the truth-conditions for de re belief sentences. |
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Citation:
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LEHMANN, JEFFREY SCOTT. "DE RE BELIEF." Doctoral Thesis, Rice University, ETD http://hdl.handle.net/1911/15767. |
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Citable link to this page:
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http://hdl.handle.net/1911/15767 |
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Date:
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1983 |
