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DE RE BELIEF

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Title: DE RE BELIEF
Author: LEHMANN, JEFFREY SCOTT
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy thesis
Abstract: Chapter 1 presents two inadequate theories of belief. Chapter 2 examines three inadequate theories of de re belief. In Chapter 3, I distinguish belief from the other attitudes in terms of the functional role of belief states, and I distinguish among individual beliefs in terms of their mode of presentation and what they represent. A de re belief is defined as a belief about objects the agent has experienced and has a sufficient amount of information about. Chapter 4 defends the Quinean analysis of de re belief sentences in terms of a three-place belief predicate. Chapter 5 presents a more general statement of the logical form of de re belief sentences than either Quine's or Loar's statement, and it presents the truth-conditions for de re belief sentences.
Citation: LEHMANN, JEFFREY SCOTT. (1983) "DE RE BELIEF." Doctoral Thesis, Rice University. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/15767.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/15767
Date: 1983

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